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Report date: 1 August 1944-9 May 1945

Title: After Action Reports

Units: United States Army, 3rd Army

Abstract: **Item 280, v.1:** Operations illustrations, overlays and charts; **Part A:** Planning in the United Kingdom, preoperational phase on the Continent; **Part B:** August 44 operations: 1. Britanny; 2. Argentan, Falaise, Mortain; 3. Advance to the Seine; 4. Enemy evacuation of South France; 5. Round of enemy across Marne, Aisen, Meuse Rivers. Summary comparative casualty chart, towns captured and overlays; **Part C:** September 44 operations: Crossing the Moselle, summary, reinforcements received, towns captured, casualty chart, and overlays; **Part D:** October 44 operations: Preparation for new offensive. (Sivry, Fort Driant, Aville, Wormeldingen, Maizieres-les Metz, Rhine and 2 plans, summary, casualty chart, reinforcements, received, towns captured and overlays; **Part E:** November 44 operations: Capture of Metz, summary, reinforcements received, casualty chart, towns captured and overlays; **Part F:** December 44 operations: Bastogne, St. Vith, illustrations, overlays, casualty chart, reinforcements received, and towns captured; **Part G:** January 45 operations: End of the Bulge, summary, reinforcements received, casualty chart, towns captured, Army Commander's note on Bastogne operation and overlays; **Part H:** February 45 operations: Through the Siegfried Line, summary, towns captured, casualty chart, overlays, and illustrations; **Part I:** March 45 operations: Crossing the Rhine, summary, casualty chart, towns captured, illustrations, and overlays; **Part J:** April 45 operations: Heart of

Germany (Kassel, Bad Kreuz, Idar Oberstein, Elbe River near Czechoslovakia, Redoubt), summary, casualty chart, and towns captured; **Part K:** May 45 operations: End of war. Split of German army, collapse of Redoubt, illustrations, overlays, summary, casualty chart, towns captured, and reinforcements received; **Part L**: Summary: From the Channel to the Alps, summary, reinforcements received, casualty chart, overlays, 3rd Army campaigns, roster of 3rd Army HQ Officers, illustrations, and 3rd Army Corps and divisions; and **Part M:** Annexes: Directives, 12 Army Group, and 3rd Army, XIX Tactical Air Command Report, 3rd Army Outline plan to Operation "Overlord".

Number of pages: 721 p.

Notes: From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Microfilm collection. Call #: D-17, Item 280.

Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release

AFTER ACTION REPORT THIRD U.S. ARMY 1 AUGUST 1944 — 9 MAY 1945

Acknowledgment

Scholarly Resources wishes to thank the Center for Military History for its cooperation in the publication of this material.

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

Unclassified
Letter Headquarters 3d U.S. Army 14 Feb 47
25 June 1947
JSB

REPORT

AUG 1944

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

15 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

1. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 of Army Regulations 345-105, as changed to include 10 August 1944, there is submitted herewith the report of operations of the Third United States Army in the European Campaign. This report includes the planning phase as well as the operations. The operations phase covers, specifically, the period 011200 August 1944 to 090001 May 1945.

2. Inasmuch as this report on operations is reproduced by multiple copy methods, the original records called for in paragraph 11 of the Army Regulations above cited are being submitted to your office only. They have not been reproduced for the general distribution being given this report.

3. Since the contents of the report of operations would be of value to the Armed Forces of any enemy of the United States, and since hostilities with Japan have not terminated, this report is classified as SECRET. It will retain this classification until downgraded by the War Department.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

R. E. CUMMINGS,
Colonel, A. G. D.
Adjutant General

VOLUMES I & II REPRODUCED JOINTLY BY
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PHOTOS BY THIRD US ARMY SIGNAL CORPS

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 403

Regensburg, Germany
15 May, 1945

With the termination of hostilities, the Third Army and its inseparable comrade-in-arms, the XIX Tactical Air Command, completed 281 days of constant battle during which we have engaged in every type of combat except defensive. In each type of fighting successful solutions have been evolved.

This report describes in considerable detail the various situations which developed and the tactical combinations utilized for their successful solution.

It is noteworthy that while our operations in pursuit or exploitation have at times developed phenomenal speed, they have always been preceded by bitter and sometimes prolonged assaults. This is particularly true in the initial break-through at ST. LO in July, in LORRAINE from November 8 to December 19, and in LUXEMBOURG and GERMANY from December 22 to March 5.

The success of all our operations has been due to team-work and mutual cooperation, to the untiring efforts of a devoted and experienced staff, to the ability of commanders from Corps and Tactical Air Commands to platoons and individual pilots. But above all to the fighting heart of the American soldier.

G S Patton Jr.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
General.

FOREWORD

THE OFFICIAL AFTER-ACTION REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY IS PRESENTED IN TWO VOLUMES SUPPLEMENTED BY MAPS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS. VOLUME I CONTAINS THE OVER-ALL ARMY OPERATIONS REPORT. VOLUME II IS A COMPILATION OF THE OPERATIONS REPORTS OF EACH OF THE GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS.

THE PRESENTATION OF THIS REPORT BY PHASES OF OPERATIONS RATHER THAN BY CALENDAR MONTH, ALTHOUGH CONSIDERED, WAS FINALLY REJECTED IN FAVOR OF A FACTUALLY CORRECT RECORD OF EVENTS AS THEY OCCURRED. THE FIXED DATES SIMPLIFIED THE PREPARATION OF THE REPORT AND ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBMITTING AN UNINTENDED INTERPRETATIVE STUDY.

SEPARATE, IDENTICALLY NUMBERED CHAPTERS IN BOTH VOLUMES COVER OPERATIONS FOR A PERIOD OF ONE CALENDAR MONTH, WITH TWO EXCEPTIONS. CHAPTER 1 IS DEVOTED TO PLANNING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, CHAPTER 2 IS THE PRE-OPERATIONAL PERIOD ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. THEREAFTER, IN BOTH VOLUME I AND VOLUME II, CHAPTER 3 COVERS AUGUST 1944, CHAPTER 4, SEPTEMBER 1944, ETC.

THE GRID COORDINATES OF THE MAPS REFERRED TO IN THE REPORT ARE THOSE OF THE MODIFIED BRITISH GRID SYSTEM. THESE REFER TO GSGS (GEOGRAPHICAL SECTION, GENERAL STAFF) MAPS. A SET OF MAPS COVERING THIRD U.S. ARMY'S ZONE OF OPERATIONS ACCOMPANIES THE REPORT.

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES AND LOSSES OF MATERIEL, BOTH ENEMY AND THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY, ARE PRESENTED GRAPHICALLY IN THE CHARTS AT THE CLOSE OF EACH CHAPTER COMMENCING WITH CHAPTER 3, VOLUME I. LIKEWISE, MAIN ROADS AND POINTS OF SUPPLY ARE GRAPHICALLY SHOWN. THE SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS APPEARING IN VOLUME I IS FOR A 24 HOUR PERIOD COMMENCING 1200 (NOON). THE DATE SHOWN IS AS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF EACH SUCH PERIOD.

THE ANNEXES ACCOMPANYING BOTH VOLUMES ARE SUPPORTING DETAIL FOR THE REPORT. "LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS" APPEAR AS THE FINAL CHAPTER OF THIS AFTER-ACTION REPORT.

THE PREPARATION, COMPILATION AND REPRODUCTION OF THIS AFTER-ACTION REPORT CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGNS OF THIRD U.S. ARMY UTILIZING EXCLUSIVELY ARMY FACILITIES AND PERSONNEL.

Hobart R Gay

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

Chapter 1



PLANNING
UNITED

Third U.S. Army Headquarters was located in FORT SAM HOUSTON, Texas, when it was alerted on 1 January 1944 for overseas movement to the European Theater of Operations.

An advance party of thirteen officers and twenty-six enlisted men left there on 12 January, to depart ten days later from the United States through the Port of Embarkation at FORT HAMILTON, New York, aboard H.M.S. QUEEN MARY. The ship reached GLASGOW, Scotland, on 29 January, and the group was met on board by LIEUTENANT GENERAL G. S. PATTON JR., newly designated Army Commander. Immediately on disembarking, the officers and men entrained for PEOVER CAMP, about three miles from KNUTSFORD, Cheshire, England, there to begin preparations for reception of the main body.

PEOVER CAMP and TOFT CAMP, approximately two miles distant, were former British camps, and were to be used by Army Headquarters. A number of Staff Officers who had served with the Army Commander in Africa and Sicily reported for duty.

Conferences were held by the Army Commander with GENERAL EISENHOWER, Allied Supreme Commander, on 16 February, and in LONDON several days later with staffs of the First U.S. Army Group and Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Soon afterward the Army Commander's first letter on instructions for Corps, Division and Unit Commanders was published and distributed.

The main body of Headquarters cleared through CAMP SHANKS, New York, and sailed 13 March on the ILE DE FRANCE, arriving in the FIRTH OF CLYDE opposite the port of GREENOCK, Scotland, on 21 March. Troops proceeded by rail to KNUTSFORD, and on 23 March were addressed by the Army Commander who informed them, along with other officers and men of the Headquarters, of his policies, the standard of performance he expected of them, and what Third U.S. Army would be expected to accomplish in its forthcoming mission. Headquarters was then established as follows: at PEOVER CAMP, the Army Commander, the Command Group, the Forward Echelon; at TOFT CAMP, the Rear Echelon.

OPERATION OVERLORD

Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force had directed that an operation be conducted to seize and secure a Lodgement Area in Continental France from which further operations could be developed. This was "OVERLORD", the beginning of the gigantic Allied operation from the west to liberate Europe, and was to be executed in two phases:

Phase 1, the assault and capture of an initial beachead, including the development of airfield sites in the CAEN (U06) area and the capture of CHERBOURG (012) (this being known as the "NEPTUNE" phase of "OVERLORD");

Phase 2, the enlargement of the area captured in phase 1 to include the BRITTANY Peninsula, all ports south to the LOIRE river, and the area between the LOIRE and SEINE rivers.

The initial assault was to be made across selected beaches between CHERBOURG (012) and LE HAVRE (L82) by American and British forces -- First U.S. Army on the right (west) and Second British Army on the left (east), both under command of 21 Army Group British.

The Third U.S. Army was to land on the Continent during the period D + 15 to D + 60 through the COTENTIN Peninsula. Its mission was to be executed in two phases:

Phase 1, to capture the BRITTANY Peninsula and open the BRITTANY ports, unless this had already been accomplished by the First U.S. Army;

Phase 2, after clearing the BRITTANY Peninsula, to concentrate on the right of the First U.S. Army and be prepared to operate to the east, either in close conjunction with First U.S. Army or by swinging south of the LOIRE if a wider envelopment was feasible.

START OF PLANNING

The entire Headquarters launched vigorous individual and collective efforts into a period of planning which was to last until Third U.S. Army moved from England to the Continent. This planning period can be considered from four standpoints; first, the reorganization and adjustment of the Command Group and staff to comply with the Army Commander's requirements as to personnel and policies; second, the study of the proposed operation, tactically and logistically; third, the acquisition, reception, training and briefing of troops for the operation; and fourth, coordination of operational plans and supply matters with higher headquarters concerned, and adjustments between headquarters of Army level.

On 12 March, a group of staff officers, headed by the Chief of Staff, conferred on LONDON with the First U.S. Army Group G-3, to discuss participation of the Third U.S. Army in "OVERLORD", and soon afterward an intensive program of preparation was initiated throughout all Army units. (The Third U.S. Army Outline Plan to Operation "OVERLORD" is reproduced in full as Special Annex "A" to this report, and is included as part of Volume I).

The G-2 Section set up the War Room in PEOVER HALL, and the Army Commander started daily staff conferences there on 27 March in which section chiefs were briefed on security instructions, G-3 Section operational plans, G-2 Section estimates, and staff policy. Rigid security measures were adopted, including the use, around buildings of the Forward Echelon, of a high barbed wire fence and constant guard by military police. A new document classification of "Top Secret" was directed by Supreme Headquarters, which necessitated establishment of a top secret control room under the Adjutant General for handling of documents so classified.

The G-3 Section was concerned immediately with locating available and suitable training areas and accommodations for units arriving daily from the United States, and with the planning and continuation of training of the units and the preparation of future operational plans.

Third U.S. Army Divisions lined up in the United Kingdom as follows:

DIVISION	DATE ASSIGNED THIRD U.S. ARMY	FURTHER ASSIGNED TO	DATE
5th Infantry*		XV Corps	2 Jan
8th Infantry*		XV Corps	2 Jan
4th Armored	1 Feb	XV Corps	20 April
5th Armored	3 March	XX Corps	9 March
6th Armored	3 March	XX Corps	9 March
90th Infantry	5 March	(Attached to First U.S. Army, 27 March - 30 July)	
79th Infantry	4 April	VIII Corps	8 April
83d Infantry	4 April	VIII Corps	8 April
28th Infantry	14 April	XX Corps	14 April
2d French Armored	21 April (Attached)	XII Corps (Attached)	20 May
35th Infantry	26 April	XV Corps	5 May
7th Armored	26 April	XX Corps	5 May
80th Infantry	11 June	XII Corps	15 June

* Units assigned directly to Corps by European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army. Headquarters Third U.S. Army was in the United States on this date.

The G-4 Section's initial work was with requirements for new equipment, these being made known to Headquarters, European Theater of Operations on 23 March. Plans were started for organization of a Transportation Section to operate and control all motor, rail, water, pack and civilian impressed transportation of Army agencies.

The Engineer Section began a period of endeavor covering terrain analyses, bridge requirements, river crossing sites, road studies, traffic circulation plans, computation of supply requirements, and survey and mapping plans. Study was made of the region of northwest France, north of the LOIRE River and west of the SEINE, special attention being given to its suitability for tank warfare. The most suitable roadnet of the area was chosen, in accordance with policies of "OVERLORD", and bridging requirements were estimated on the assumption that all bridges would be destroyed and require replacement. All major rivers were studied to determine the most suitable crossing sites.

The task of planning a system of communications for use in the coming operation was initiated by the Signal Section. Primarily this was a matter of mapping wire circuits and radio nets, but as it developed it involved all of Third U.S. Army's communications facilities for the gathering of intelligence, the establishment of security, the procurement of Signal supplies and personnel sufficient for the operation. There was also the matter of establishing communications with subordinate Army units scattered over a large area of the English Midlands, Wales, and North Ireland.

The Quartermaster Section was reorganized on 27 March, a new division, Field Service, being created and the Transportation Section, now taken over by the G-4 Section, being dropped.

Officers of the Medical Section began a series of conferences and inspections which were to involve almost daily contact with higher headquarters and with the many Medical units of the Army. On 31 March, for example, Headquarters of Western Base Section was consulted in connection with water supply, sanitation, and venereal disease control among troops in the United Kingdom. Investigation of Medical units revealed that no major personnel shortages existed, as most units had arrived at full Table of Organization strength. However, in order to provide maximum efficiency, a number of Medical officers were shifted, resulting in better balanced professional staffs in hospital units. Medical personnel attended department schools on a quota basis and nurses were placed on temporary duty with Services of Supply hospitals for practical experience. Formal training inspections were started of all units to determine their ability to perform in the field. Conferences were held with the Office of the Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, Headquarters First U.S. Army Group, Advance Section Communications zone, and the European Theater of Operations Blood Bank, regarding availability and distribution of whole blood during the coming operation.

The Chaplain, in March, initiated plans calling for complete religious coverage of all units. Civil Affairs was established at special staff level on 31 March, conferences with First U.S. Army Group on the need for such a section having been started late in February.

The Army Commander meanwhile was making personal inspections of his troops throughout the United Kingdom, visiting all principal units and talking with officers and non-commissioned officers.

The G-1 Section reported the strength of the Army on 31 March to be 134,200.

THE LONDON OFFICE

As activities of all sections increased, it developed that a tremendous amount of coordination and adjustment with higher headquarters required almost constant presence in LONDON of key Third U.S. Army staff personnel. In view of these conditions, an office was established there early in April in Bryanston Square, adjacent to First U.S. Army Group Headquarters, with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Tactical, in charge, to maintain contact with Headquarters European Theater of Operations and Headquarters First U.S. Army Group. Officers from the G-4, Medical, Quartermaster, and Signal Sections were originally placed on duty in this office, and as contacts became more necessary and frequent, other Sections sent representatives to LONDON.

The G-2 Section gave a preliminary estimate of the enemy situation at the beginning of April, and announced completion of a terrain appreciation study of the Third U.S. Army target area. Security precautions of this Section consisted of Headquarters security, counter-subversive coverage, security training and preparation of a counter-intelligence plan. Passwords and replies were prepared for publication and dissemination. A counter-sabotage plan was drafted.

The Chemical Warfare Section, knowing if the enemy intended using

gas warfare at all that the time of initial landings would be a very favorable one, provided troops which would be involved in this phase of the operation, but which later would revert to Third U.S. Army control, with additional and appropriate equipment. Initial issues of all classes of chemical supplies for this Army's troops was necessary, and an estimate was compiled on supply requirements.

Based on experience of past operations, a decision was made by the Adjutant General to centralize all administration in administration centers of divisions for all assigned and attached troops. A circular was issued 12 April prescribing the personnel administrative plan and the organization and function of the administration centers. A casualty sub-section was added to the Adjutant General Section.

An Army Exchange Officer was appointed and an American Red Cross Field Director joined Headquarters in the first week of April. Both were to operate under the Special Services Section, which had recently issued two programs of recreation and athletics for Army troops designed for use either with or without standard equipment.

Through the G-3 Section an intensive aircraft identification program was started early in the month for all Army troops. Airplane models, charts, and booklets were utilized, and arrangements made with the Ninth U.S. Air Force to give demonstration flights of Allied and German planes so that personnel could learn to identify them through actual observation.

G-2 AND G-3 AIR SUB-SECTIONS

An Air Sub-section of the G-3 Section was activated to fill the vital and recognized need for coordinating close combat Air support for ground troops. A G-2 Air Sub-section was organized for the purpose of securing information about the enemy from Air sources. The Quartermaster Section began large scale planning to supply the forthcoming operation. During this period, the Inspector General Section made extensive alert inspections of and contact visits to many units, special attention being given to the indoctrination of troops. Schools in radio security were established by the Signal Section. To hasten communications, especially to higher headquarters, the Section set up an air courier system with officers as couriers, using planes of the Fourteenth Air Liaison Squadron which was assigned to Headquarters.

On 11 April the final draft of Joint Operations plan U.S. forces for operation "OVERLORD" was received. Also at this time a "Mounting Plan" prepared by Headquarters European Theater of Operations was received which set forth the procedure involved for staging troops to the embarkation points. In short, this plan stated the method by which each unit in the United Kingdom would be moved from its present location to the concentration areas, there to receive the last necessary items of equipment, and then to the marshalling areas, wherein they awaited movement to the various ports of embarkation. The responsibility for the administrative control to insure the movement of each Third U.S. Army unit to the Continent rested with the A.C. of S. G-3. This entailed the compilation of all necessary movement tables, and the coordination of all changes in each unit's status from the time the unit was alerted for overseas movement until that unit reached the embarkation point. The data compiled enabled Headquarters European Theater of Operations to control and exercise the movement of all units in the United Kingdom to the designated embarkation points for the cross channel voyage.

On 16 April, a training memorandum, "Use Of Tanks In Support Of Infantry", written by the Army Commander, was issued. Commanding Generals of the VIII and XV Corps were briefed on the operation "OVERLORD" on 24 April at PEOVER HALL, and those of the XII and XX Corps on 26 April.

Target Analysis No. 1, the first of a series of reports on Third U.S. Army's potential target area, was issued 23 April by the G-2 Section. It covered "Strategical Terrain Study", "Tactical Analysis of Terrain", and "Possible Airfield Sites Suitable for Landing Areas."

G-2 SECTION ESTIMATE NO.1

On the same day the Section issued "G-2 Estimate Number 1." Under enemy situation it reported that in the west (France, Belgium, and Holland) there were an estimated fifty-two German divisions, elements of German Army Group "D", commanded by GENERAL FELDMARSCHALL GERD VON RUNDSTEDT, with Headquarters at ST. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE (R84). The Army Group consisted of four Armies, the First German Army, with six divisions, occupied the area along the Bay of Biscay from NANTES (005), to the Spanish Border; the Nineteenth German Army with nine divisions along the MEDITERRANEAN from the Spanish to the Italian Border; in Northern France and Belgium, the Fifteenth German Army with eighteen divisions; and Holland occupied by four divisions of the LXXXVIII German Corps. Three other divisions with no known assignment or attachment were also estimated in France.

The estimate outlined in detail the enemy situation as it then existed in the projected Lodgement Area, that part of France west of a line from CAEN (U06) to NANTES (005). Twelve divisions, under the Seventh German Army, were located in this sector, which included BRITTANY, the COTENTIN Peninsula, and extended east to CHARTRES (R30) and ORLEANS (F62).

Under "Enemy Dispositions", the estimate examined in detail ground, naval and air defenses. The over-all European situation, including the battle-fronts of Russia, Italy, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and the Balkans, was covered. One section contained assumptions and enemy capabilities, concluding with the following statement: "Except for the estimate of enemy capabilities to bring to and commit reinforcements in the target area, it is not feasible at this time to forecast the situation likely to confront Third U.S. Army when its first elements debark on the COTENTIN Peninsula. The situation as it might effect Third U.S. Army is currently too obscure to prognosticate further at this time."

First U.S. Army Group requested an "Allocation of Tonnages" estimate, which was submitted by the A.C. of S. G-4 on 23 April in three

charts, the first a detailed tonnage phasing chart, the second a reserve buildup chart, and the third a breakdown chart. First U.S. Army Group approved the estimate soon afterward.

THE CIVIL AFFAIRS MISSION

The mission, responsibility, and object of Civil Affairs was outlined on 26 April by the Army Commander thusly: "The sole mission of Civil Affairs Administration is to further military objectives. The exercise of Civil Affairs control is a command responsibility. The object of Civil Affairs is to assist in military operations." The order also said that the Army Commander would "provide policies for the Civil Affairs Section, including composition, size, relationship with other staff Sections, scope and general directives for operations." A special order on 29 April detailed the chief Civil Affairs officer to the General Staff Corps, and next day the section was designated G-5.

A Public Relations Section was originally planned as an auxiliary agency of the G-2 Section, but in keeping with a plan being followed in higher headquarters, work was started late in April, following a conference between the Army Commander and two officers from the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Detachment of First U.S. Army Group, to set up a Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section.

Parts interchangeability charts were started during the month by the Ordnance Section, and basic ammunition load charts for all types of Army organizations concerned were prepared.

On 22 April the Army was allotted control over certain established training areas and artillery ranges. The G-3 Section placed artillery ranges under control of the Artillery Section, which coordinated and controlled their use on a monthly basis so that more than thirty Field Artillery, Tank and Tank Destroyer battalions used them during the month. AAA units were inspected to determine the status of their training and equipment, and all were sent to ranges for refresher and familiarization firing. The dual function of the Headquarters Commandant and Provost Marshal was altered late in the month and an Army Provost Marshal appointed, with a special staff section established under his command.

VIII Corps was alerted on 14 April for overseas movement, XV Corps on 22 April, and the Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters on 24 April.

On 30 April, the G-1 Section reported total strength of the Army as 219,800.

ACTIVITIES OF MAY

Early in May the G-2 Section received Engineer terrain studies from Headquarters European Theater of Operations and First U.S. Army Group, including detailed studies of beaches. The terrain model covering the southern portion of the target area was completed.

A demonstration of the use of tanks with infantry was given by the 4th Armored Division, supervised by the Army Commander. First assignments of Third U.S. Army Air Liaison officers to elements of its supporting XIX Tactical Air Command were made.

The G-5 Section during the first week in May started to recruit staff officers. The Civil Affairs Sections of First U.S. Army and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force were studied to obtain a basis for G-5 organization. The Army Commander personally instructed branch chiefs of the section in what the Army expected of Civil Affairs.

A War Department Army Historical Section was attached on 6 May to the G-3 Section for the purpose of writing the history of the Third U.S. Army and its supporting troops for the War Department Record.

The final draft of Third U.S. Army Outline Plan was sent to LONDON on 11 May for approval. On 16 May the revised First U.S. Army Group Joint Operations Plan for Operations "OVERLORD" was received.

Forms for "Report of Progress of Preparation for Continental Operations" were published for all alerted units on 12 May by the G-4 Section. The object of this report was to keep Third U.S. Army and its corps informed of the progress of the various units, which were scattered throughout the United Kingdom.

First U.S. Army Group notified Army Headquarters on 13 May that it would be possible to move all troops of the Third U.S. Army through beaches and ports of the COTENTIN Peninsula, extended to the west to include ST. MALO, (S71) assuming that supplies were to be brought through the QUIBERON BAY (M99) area to full capacity; that from an operational viewpoint it was desirable that a maximum number of Third U.S. Army troops be brought in from the north, and requested that plans be made accordingly. It was considered essential that VIII and XV Corps be brought in through the COTENTIN Peninsula and if experience proved that the entire Third U.S. Army could not be brought in by this means it was desired that alternative plans be made to bring in the XX and XII Corps through the QUIBERON BAY (M99) area as early as possible after its capture.

Target Area Analysis No. 2 was issued 14 May by the G-2 Section. Section 1, prepared by the Engineer Section, comprised a "Strategical Terrain Study". Sections 2, 3, and 4 were prepared by the G-2 Section and were entitled respectively: "Tactical Terrain Analysis","Special Beach Studies", and "Railroad Situation in France."

By the middle of May, the G-3 Section's planning on the Army's part in operation "OVERLORD" continued at an intense pace. Build-up priority lists were revised continually, accommodations were obtained for the great influx of units which included the movement of the XV Corps Headquarters and supporting troops from North Ireland. Plans which required participation by the Navy and Air Forces were discussed with the XIX Tactical Air Command and Western Naval Task Force. Many such conferences were held before plans were considered final.

On 15 May, the Headquarters Commandant began reconnaissance south of the line LONDON-BRISTOL for suitable accommodations for the Headquar-

ters, in order for it to be nearer the designated embarkation area and to the bulk of troops assigned to the Army. The area within a ten-mile radius of BREAMORE HALL, Hampshire was selected.

On the assumption that all units of this Army would land across the beaches of France, a general purpose vehicle (¼ to 2½ ton) waterproofing school was set up on 15 May to provide sufficient instructors for unit schools. XX Corps opened a waterproofing school on 22 May to augment the program.

The Quartermaster Section completed a chart on "Typical Plan for the Evacuation of Deceased in a Division", and started work on the Graves Registration Plan. To provide religious services for the large numbers of units arriving in the United Kingdom in the first half of May, especially battalions and companies whose T/O did not authorize chaplains, the nearest chaplain was told to assume responsibility for all small units in his vicinity. Vectographs were made available by the G-2 Section. Preparations were begun on what was called a "Going Map"; a map of the terrain to show its accessability to various types of military movement, to show areas subject to inundation, marshy or swampy, mountainous, forested, or other types of areas.

ARMY INFORMATION SERVICE

On 16 May the Army Commander directed the Sixth Cavalry Group to establish a channel, both physical and technical under Army control, to make and report front-line G-2 and G-3 information direct to the Army Advance Command Post, by-passing normal communications channels. Information was to be based on front-line observations in collaboration with all subordinate echelons of command. The plan, called "Army Information Service", called for the Group to monitor continuously friendly battalion, regimental, division, and reconnaissance units operating in the Third U.S. Army, and to use an officer patrol system of visits to regimental and battalion command posts and observation posts periodically, and also to contact Division A.C. of S. G-2s and A.C. of S. G-3s for exchange of information. The Army Information Service proved invaluable on the Continent, once the Army became operational, by providing the Army Commander with the latest tactical information.

A Tank Destroyer staff section was established on 18 May. Authority to issue one tankdozer blade for medium tanks M1 in each Armored division prior to leaving the United Kingdom was requested of Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations. Ammunition tonnage estimates were submitted by the Ordnance Section for Third U.S. Army units attached to First U.S. Army, based on an expenditure of 1/3 of a unit of fire per day and a seven-day operational reserve for all troops ashore from D / 29 to D / 41. The G-4 Section published revised "Basic Loads of Ammunition" during May.

Plans were made by the Medical Section with the Ninth U.S. Air Force for use of air evacuation facilities for Army personnel. Six C-47 planes furnished by the Ninth U.S. Air Force and Air Evacuation personnel aided Medical personnel to train in the methods of loading casualties into planes. Medical officers arranged for the release of supplies to build assault medical packs. Releases were obtained for the unit assemblies of all evacuation hospitals (400-bed) then in the United Kingdom. Nutrition of troops was studied by the section.

Conferences were held on 19 May for the A.C. of S. G-4s for all corps and divisions. They were oriented on procurement policies and procedures for Continental operations and given a resume of the supply picture as foreseen at that time.

By 20 May, all Medical units which had been in the United Kingdom for three weeks or longer were ninety percent equipped. The forty-five general surgeons and ninety surgical technicians requested for Landing Ship Tank duties by Headquarters European Theater of Operations, reported for briefing. A Chief Nurse was assigned.

On 22 May, the Build-Up Control Organization Section of Headquarters, known as BUCO, left for PORTSMOUTH, where it operated under BUCO West, supervising the priorities and loading of units moving to the Continent.

A conference on 22 May, at which representatives of the G-4 Section, First U.S. Army Group, Ninth U.S. Air Force, Advance Section communications Zone, and European Theater of Operations U.S. Army were present, determined "That not more than fifteen divisions could be fully supported by ST. MALO (S71) and COTENTIN Peninsula area." Entrance of further divisions would have to await capture and development of QUIBERON BAY (M99) area in order for such troops to be maintained.

The Finance Section, on 22 May, obtained 3,760,000 Francs in "Invasion Money" for the use of contracting and purchasing officers.

Loading lists for all three echelons were published on 22 and 23 May by the Headquarters Commandant to facilitate movement to the ports and loading on landing craft.

On 24 May, the XX Corps and attached units were alerted for overseas movement.

The Graves Registration plan was published by the Quartermaster on 25 May. On the same date, revised ammunition estimates for expenditure during the period D / 42 to D / 90 were submitted by Ordnance.

While the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section was being organized, a Public Relations Officer was named on 26 May to take charge of arrangements for Public Relations and a Press Camp for war correspondents who were to be assigned to the Army during combat operations. On 28 May, the Third U.S. Army was assigned supply priority to No. 5, which equalled eighty percent of all organization equipment. The A.C. of S. G-4, issued a memorandum to A.C. of S. G-4s of corps and divisions saying supply discipline is an essential part of training and a continuing function of command; that the standard of supply discipline is an indication of the general efficiency of an organisation and its commander.

PREPARATIONS BY ARTILLERY

Preparations for Artillery Operations loomed importantly through the May planning. In addition to operations memoranda, annexes were published on Serenade (to expedite the massing of all artillery fires within a corps sector in extreme emergency when lack of time precluded prearrangement of fire); special radio nets for Artillery and Tank Destroyer units; observation of artillery fire by fighter-type aircraft; anti-tank measures in offense and defense; Field Artillery Intelligence; and Field Artillery Communications and reports. Anti-Aircraft Artillery operations memoranda published included one on the use of Radar.

Strength of the Army on 31 May was 253,500, the G-1 Section reported.

On 1 June corps outline plans for operation "OVERLORD", prepared by the VIII, XII, XV, and XX Corps, were received and approved by Headquarters.

The A.C. of S. G-5 obtained Supreme Headquarters approval to attach Civil Affairs troops to Third U.S. Army with an approximate strength of 1,200 officers and enlisted men, with 390 vehicles. On 4 June the G-5 Section received copies of the Supreme Headquarters Field Handbook for Civil Affairs, France, enabling planning to take definite shape for events to come.

Military Intelligence Interpretation and Interrogation of Prisoners of War teams commenced instruction and indoctrination of neighboring units. The Office of Strategic Services Special counter-intelligence-unit and Office of Strategic Service secret intelligence detachment and the evasion and escape unit reported to the G-2 Section for duty.

The Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section became officially known as the G-6 Section on 1 June. From the publicity standpoint, an organization to service war correspondents in the field was contemplated. This included a field hotel, transportation, conducting officers, a censorship group to censor correspondents' copy at Army level, and communications facilities by which censored copy could be transmitted on relay to main communications centers in England and the United States.

The Psychological Warfare Branch of the G-6 Section was organized to monitor enemy and other radio broadcasts, to originate leaflets and other publications to persuade the enemy that his cause was lost, and to lift the morale of the French citizenship in occupied areas by such means as news broadcasts by mobile units. Radio monitored intelligence was considered of particular significance in determining the enemy situation. Personnel of this branch consisted in part of American and British civilians and British officers, in addition to U.S. Army personnel.

On 2 June the Army Commander addressed assembled corps and Army troops in the vicinity of XX Corps. Headquarters European Theater of Operations notified the Ordnance Section on the same date that Class II, Class IV, and Class V supplies on the Continent would be normal after D + 41, and that it would be their responsibility to maintain supplies without further action on the part of Third U.S. Army.

Several matters of importance were handled by various sections on 5 June, the following being examples. The A.C. of S. G-3 ordered officers from that section on duty in the War Room twenty-four hours a day, to maintain situation maps. The final draft of the operation "CHASTITY" was completed, presenting the operational manner in which BELLE ISLE (M77) and the QUIBERON BAY area would be secured. XII Corps and attached units were alerted for overseas movement. Finance obtained 352,256,000 francs for use of disbursing officers. The A.C. of S. G-4 was informed it was probable that Third U.S. Army units would be equipped with major essential T/E or T/BA items of equipment, but not far in advance of operations. VIII Corps was equipped with its essential T/E equipment and arrangements were made to carry additional ammunition for 155 howitzers and eight-inch howitzer battalions.

Target area analyses No. 4 and 5 were published by the G-2 Section. No. 4 included "A Study of Northwest France and Area South of LOIRE River As to Suitability of Terrain for Mechanized Operations", and "German Underwater Beach Obstacles." No. 5 included four sections, the first two of which were prepared by the G-2 Section. Subjects were: (1) "Additional Material to Supplement Tactical Study of the Terrain, BELLE ISLE-EN-MERE (M77);" (2) "Terrain and Defense Characteristics and Order of Battle, QUIBERON BAY (M99) Area"; (3) "Study of Feasability of Mounting a Seaborne Assault Force from Vicinity of GRANVILLE (T13)"; and (4) "Tactical Study of the Terrain, NORTHWEST BRITTANY."

The G-2 Section Estimate No. 4 was issued the same day, reporting a total of sixty and one-half enemy divisions in the west (France, Belgium and Holland). This was an increase of eight and one-half divisions since Estimate No. 1, dated 23 April. The report dealt in detail with the CHERBOURG (O12) area. The COTENTIN Peninsula was estimated to include six and a half enemy divisions. The enemy had forty-five infantry and two tank battalions on or in the immediate vicinity of the CHERBOURG Peninsula. ROMMEL, with headquarters at LA ROCHE GUION (R57), was reported to be in command of Army Group B, which included the Seventh and Fifteenth German Armies and the LXXXVIII German Corps. It was also indicated that parachute divisions were being concentrated in France.

The enemy had shown an increasing trend to thicken his coastal defenses and it appeared that he was building up double, and in some places triple, lines of defense. In the first line were limited employment type infantry divisions; in the second, field type infantry divisions; and in the third, Panzer divisions.

D-DAY, 6 JUNE

As Third U.S. Army entered the final period of its planning phase in England, news that the whole world was waiting to hear was announced on 6 June. Airborne and seaborne landings by Allied Forces, under command of 21 Army Group British, had started in NORMANDY early that day, the 82d Airborne Division landing in the vicinity of ST. MERE EGLISE (T39) ten miles southwest of VALOGNES, while the 101st Airborne Division landed in the vicinity of CARENTAN (T38) and British forces parachuted

into an area northeast of CAEN (U06). Supported by tremendous naval and air bombardment, seaborne landings were made by units of the V Corps, First U.S. Army, on the "OMAHA" (T78) beaches northwest of BAYEUX (T78), while troops of the VII Corps fought their way ashore on the "UTAH" beaches east of ST. MERE EGLISE (T39). British forces made seaborne landings north and northwest of the strategically important city of CAEN (U06). The enemy was reported to have been surprised as to the scope, nature, and area of the assault.

Preparations continued throughout Third U.S. Army for the task ahead. Authority was received from Headquarters European Theater of Operations to move Army Headquarters to the concentration area around BREAMORE. On 9 June the Army was informed that it would be responsible for receiving the Headquarters, Ninth U.S. Army, due to arrive in the United Kingdom on or about 29 June.

The Forward Echelon of the Army was phased in to be lifted to the Continent on D ∕ 29; the Rear Echelon, on about D ∕ 44. On 10 June it became apparent that there was a possibility the Forward Echelon might become operational while the Rear Echelon was still in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, on D ∕ 29 the great bulk of the troops assigned to this Army would still be stationed in the United Kingdom. Many were still to arrive from the United States. Their equipping and preparation for combat was a task of considerable magnitude. Accordingly, the following decisions were made:

1. The Commanding General, XII Corps, was designated as Deputy Army Commander, to assume command of Third U.S. Army troops in the United Kingdom upon the departure of the Army Commander for the Continent.

2. The normal Forward Echelon of Headquarters was to be provided with operational groups from the following sections normally in the Rear Echelon: G-5, Adjutant General, Chaplain, Finance, Inspector General, Judge Advocate, Medical, Ordnance and Quartermaster. This new grouping of the staff was known as Forward Echelon, Group "X".

3. The Rear Echelon of the Headquarters was to be provided with operational groups from the following sections normally in the Forward Echelon: G-1, attached G-2 teams, G-4, Artillery, and attached Engineer teams. This grouping was known as Rear Echelon, Group "Y".

4. To reinforce the staff of the XII Corps and to assist in its new Army mission, in addition to its own responsibilities, another group of personnel, designated as Group "Z", was formed, with the following sections represented: G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, Adjutant General, Artillery, Chemical Warfare Service, Engineer, Inspector General, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Signal. Group "Z" was to rejoin Army Headquarters when the XII Corps arrived on the Continent.

Medical supplies and equipment were flown from England to Northern Ireland on 10 June to complete the equipping of the 5th and 8th Infantry Divisions.

On 10 and 11 June, public relations officers of the XII, XV, and XX Corps, the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Armored Divisions, and the 5th, 8th, and 29th Infantry Divisions held a conference at Army Headquarters for briefing, planning, and discussion of public relations activities on the Continent. The Army Commander explained the public relations function at Army, Corps, and Division levels.

Waterproofing schools previously set up had trained approximately 4,880 instructors in the waterproofing of vehicles for Continental operation. Transfers of Medical personnel were completed between 10 and 20 June, balancing the staffs of Army hospital units, and it was considered that all were now qualified to perform their mission, except that field hospitals would need assistance through attachment of surgical teams.

First U.S. Army Group approval of the Third U.S. Army plan for the Operation "CHASTITY" was given on 14 June. XX Corps was directed to make detailed plans for the operation, designed to secure BELLE ISLE (M77) and the QUIBERON BAY area.

The Provost Marshal Section, recently designated a special staff section, held a planning conference with representatives from all corps, divisions, and Military Police battalions and companies of the Army present. The Army Commander discussed the importance of traffic control, the handling of prisoners of war, appearance and aggressiveness of Military Police.

ENGINEER MAP DEPOT

The Engineer Section on 15 June established for the first time an Army Map Depot, at ALTRINCHAM, England, to make distribution of operations maps to build-up troops leaving for the Continent. VIII Corps Headquarters, with certain supporting troops, was attached on this date to the First U.S. Army, and became operational on the Continent. Liaison representatives from the G-2, G-3, Provost Marshal, Quartermaster, and Signal Sections of Third U.S. Army Headquarters accompanied VIII Corps into action. Liaison officers from the G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, Engineer, Medical and Quartermaster Sections were attached to the Advance Section Communications Zone.

During the period 17 to 24 June, the A.C. of S. G-4 sent a letter to all units on "Embarkation Procedure", covering points to be stressed in loading, movement of vehicles on craft, preparatory to the embarkation of the Army for France, and on request from Headquarters European Theater of Operations, the G-4 Section obtained 10,000 bayonets and scabbards from various Third U.S. Army units for use by the First U.S. Army.

In this period, the G-2 Section issued Target Area Analysis No. 6, containing a preliminary study of crossings of the LOIRE River, ORLEANS (F62) to SAUMUR (P15) (prepared by the Engineer Section), a "Study of VANNES (H10)", and appendices entitled "Terrain Estimate" and "Strategic Points in the Road Net" (prepared by the Engineer Section).

On 24 June, Group "X" of Headquarters was directed to move by motor transport to BREAMORE.

In the last week of June, a G-2 Section memorandum outlining the function and policies of the Army Photo Center was concurred in by the

commanding officer, 10th Reconnaissance Group. The A.C. of S. G-2 (Air) and the 10th Group commanding officer agreed to a daily photographic cover of the Army front to a depth of ten miles at 1/15,000. Pinpoints of artillery locations, bridges, and known or suspected enemy locations were to be taken on a larger scale. In slow-moving or static situations, photographic reconnaissance would be employed to the utmost, while in fluid or mobile situations tactical reconnaissance would be employed. In this period the Engineer Technical Intelligence team reported for duty, its mission being to search for and examine captured enemy materiel and to send to higher echelons any new-type equipment for evaluation.



A liaison staff of four U.S. Navy officers reported to the G-5 Section for duty in the French coastal area.

The Headquarters Commandant was concerned with several important matters pertaining to efficient movement of and service in the field to Army Headquarters. The need for utility engineers, carpenters, masons, plumbers, sign painters, and electricians was met. Quartermaster truck and car companies were attached, plus an Ordnance automotive maintenance company to service the motor transportation. The 6th Cavalry Band, later redesignated the 61st Army Ground Forces Band, was attached to the Army Headquarters.

NEW HEADQUARTERS LOCATION

On 29 June Army Headquarters moved by motor from PEOVER and TOFT Camps to the area around BREAMORE, nineteen miles west of SOUTHAMPTON. On 2 July, verbal orders were received from higher headquarters to prepare for immediate movement to the Continent.

Strength of the Army was reported by the G-1 Section to be 264,843 on 30 June.

On 3 July the G-6 Section, in its staging area at BROOKHEATH MANOR, near BREAMORE HALL, was joined by its Psychological Warfare Branch personnel, the Second Service Team of the 72d Publicity Service Battalion, and forty three war correspondents who were to cover Third U.S. Army activities on the Continent for newspapers, news and photographic services, magazines, and radio stations around the world.

On 4 July, XX Corps was directed to prepare plans for the sea-borne aspect of the Operations "Hands Up", to expedite the cutting off of the BRITTANY Peninsula and the capture of QUIBERON BAY (M99) by Third U.S. Army.

MOVE TO THE CONTINENT

The United Kingdom planning phase of the Army's activities came to a close during 5 to 7 July, when the Forward Echelon, Group "X", sailed from SOUTHAMPTON for France, covering a distance of approximately 150 miles in convoy, average time for transit being fourteen hours. Liberty Ships and Landing Ships Tank were used. The transports anchored offshore, and their loads were transferred to small landing craft and amphibious trucks for unloading on "UTAH" Beach, vehicles going ashore through shallow water. LSTs were beached at high tide, left dry when the tide ebbed, and debarkation was carried out across dry land. All vehicles moved inland about eight miles to a transit area for dewaterproofing, and then proceeded in convoy a distance of twenty-eight miles to the Headquarters bivouac area near NEHOU, (T19) 7 miles southwest of VALOGNES, fifteen miles south of CHERBOURG (012) and eight miles from the front lines of VIII Corps. The Army Commander and Chief of Staff flew to France to join Headquarters, which was set up under canvas in the orchards and fields of NORMANDY, lined by the famous hedgerows.

Chapter 2

OPERATIONAL PHASE IN THE CONTINENT

Immediately upon arrival of Army Headquarters in France, emphasis was placed upon security, particular effort being made to conceal the presence of Third U.S. Army on the Continent, documents being closely safeguarded, and telephone security and physical checks of the surrounding areas being maintained. Radio silence was imposed. The only troops available at the time for defense of the Command Post were those of the various sections and the 503d Military Police Battalion, so each Section set up its own interior guard, including a perimeter defense of exposed boundaries until defense was taken over by the Sixth Cavalry Group and the 546th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, coordinated through the Provost Marshal Section.

The XIX Tactical Air Command, previously designated to provide aerial support to the Army upon entry into action, established its Headquarters adjacent to Army Headquarters and detailed plans for air-ground cooperation were started.

Representatives of all Headquarters Sections began a series of observation tours of the front and of opposite number sections of the First U.S. Army in order to profit by their lessons learned from battle experience. Sections studied the tactical situation and terrain estimates. Daily briefing of section chiefs was resumed. Liaison was established with 21 Army Group British, First U.S. Army, and Twelfth U.S. Army Group (formerly known as First U.S. Army Group). The Army Commander made personal inspections of those divisions in the V and VIII Corps which were to revert later to Third U.S. Army control, and conferred with the United States Secretary of War during the latter's tour of the battle areas.

As of D ∕ 30, the enemy was continuing to launch counter-attacks against the British sector, using infantry supported by tanks. In the American sector, enemy units were reported cleared from the western tip of the CHERBOURG Peninsula, while fighting for the port continued. Determined pressure was being maintained along the First U.S. Army front.

ENEMY CAPABILITY ESTIMATE

The G-2 Section's report on enemy capabilities listed the following significant facts:

1. There had been a continued retarded build-up in enemy infantry strength against the assault, approximately fifty percent of pre-D-Day estimates; 2. In contrast, the build-up in armor by D ∕ 25 had reached predicted possibilities in the number of Panzer divisions, but total tank strength was far below previous estimates, which had given the enemy a force of between 1,750 and 2,600 tanks. (As of 1 July, Headquarters 21 Army Group British estimated the actual enemy tank total in the battle area at 400 to 900, fifty percent of which were Mark IVs); 3. The continued disruption of enemy lines of communication by air bombing and sabotage by Resistance elements had materially hampered the movement of enemy reserves into the battle area; 4. The further stripping of the BRITTANY Peninsula by commitment in the battle area of one entire division and battle groups from three other divisions had left the 450-mile BRITTANY coastline defended by a crust of two divisions and elements of three others; 5. An apparent thinning out of the forces in the Bay of BISCAY and MEDITERRANEAN areas had started; 6. The enemy continued to maintain a margin of safety in the PAS DE CALAIS sector; 7. Practically all armor was concentrated in the VILLERS BOCAGE (T85) - CAEN (V06) sector: 8. A severe scarcity of tanks was indicated, due either to inability to transport them to the battle area or actual lack of armor; and 9. The piecemeal commitment of reserves in an effort to contain the Lodgement Area had impaired the enemy's capabilities to launch a coordinated major counter-offensive. Enemy casualty figures as of 7 July were: Prisoners of war captured by First U.S. Army 46,219, buried enemy dead, 4,739.

The general tactical scheme of 21 Army Group British was to secure the eastern flank around CAEN (U06), captured on 10 July, and around the mouth of the ORNE River, and to contain as much of the enemy strength in that sector as possible while aggressively pushing the attack in the First U.S. Army zone.

Reception of Third U.S. Army troops arriving daily on the Continent was one of the first and biggest concerns of the Headquarters. Control points were established on "UTAH" and "OMAHA" Beaches to receive all arriving troops. Military Police were utilized as escorts from points of debarkation on the beaches to the concentration areas. Plans for circulation and movement of this traffic were coordinated through Traffic Control Headquarters of the First U.S. Army and the A.C. of S. G-3, Third U.S. Army. Some 500 units of the Third U.S. Army were thus moved over the narrow, crowded roads of the Peninsula.

ADJUSTMENT OF SUPPLY PLANS

Constant readjustment of supply plans was necessary. Arrangements were made with First U.S. Army to establish Quartermaster supply points for Class I, II, III, and IV supplies for Third U.S. Army troops on the Continent, and those due to arrive. Request was made by the G-4 Section to the Communications Zone for provisions for the supply and evacuation of units when they became operational, with special provisions for keeping supplies pushed forward in anticipation of a breakthrough. Communications Zone became operational on 17 July, under First U.S. Army control, its Advance Section thereafter being the supply agency for the Third U.S. Army. The G-4 Section, among its varied activities, requested completion of arrangements to provide, by 25 September, the following winter clothing for troops: 370,000 pairs of overshoes; 100,000 overcoats; and 50,000 mackinaws. Units of the Army were placed on equal priority within the availability of equipment, divisions to have first priority, units on troop movement tables second priority, and all other units to have equal priority of 100 percent. All previous Army priority lists were rescinded. Late in the month, conferences were held between the A. C. of S. G-4 and representatives of the Navy and the Transportation Corps over possibility of using water transportation between the United Kingdom and such ports as GRANVILLE (T13), ST. MALO (S71), ST. BRIEUC (S20), MORLAIX (R41), BREST (V99), and QUIBERON BAY (M99), to supply units moving down the BRITTANY Peninsula. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was also contacted on policies and procedure regarding supply of Third U.S. Army by air.

Back in England, a small detachment from Army Headquarters, attached to XII Corps, was working with that corps equipping and moving Third U.S. Army troops for Continental operations. Units were arriving

in the United Kingdom and being marshalled so rapidly that it was found necessary to devise means of completely equipping them in less than twenty-one days. Build-up Control Organization was forced to defer shipment to the Continent of a number of units for lack of equipment.

One of the first missions carried out by the Signal Section was to make a reconnaissance of existing communications in the Third U.S. Army area on the Continent. Messenger service was established to the Air Dispatch Letter Service landing strip, and an axis of communication was constructed following VIII Corps as closely as possible in its advance down the coast toward BRITTANY. On 14 July, Third U.S. Army was given jurisdiction of all circuits to its rear boundary. Coordination with the Provost Marshal Section resulted in an agreement that any prisoner of war documents passing through the latter's hands would be inspected for information of value to Signal Section intelligence. Plans were made for lateral communications between First and Third U.S. Armies.

The Engineer Section opened its Army Map Depot for the first time on the Continent at BRICQUEBEC (010), on 19 July, for issuance of operational maps in limited quantities. Reconnaissance of roads in liberated areas was made to acquire data for comparison with the road information used during the planning period in England, and indicated that the enemy had not destroyed as many bridges as expected. No major changes were made in the Third U.S. Army estimates bridging requirements, however, which were carried to the D / 90 to D / 120 period. Engineer units concentrated on training in elimination of mines and booby traps.

Following a series of experiments, the Ordnance Section formulated plans to equip Armored divisions, tank battalions, Tank Destroyer battalions, and Cavalry reconnaissance squadrons with hedgerow cutting devices, over 1,000 of these eventually being produced. As of 26 July, certain tank recovery vehicles for divisions and tank battalions were still not available, so it was decided to issue M2 half-tracks, not as a substitute but to enable the units to carry necessary tools and equipment which might be utilized for recovery purposes.

HOSPITALS IN SERVICE

Third U.S. Army evacuation hospitals were being placed in service, through attachment to the First U.S. Army, as they arrived on the Continent. Among decisions of consequence affecting the Medical Section during the pre-operational phase were the following: the Communications Zone detachment was made responsible for bringing blood from airstrips to the Blood Bank detachment, to be delivered on a prorata basis to all units; the Surgeon's plan for the movement of collecting, ambulance, and clearing companies on orders of the Army Group Commander without previous notification of Third U.S. Army Headquarters, was approved; and immediate release on arrival for all medical supplies bearing markings for this Army was agreed upon.

Among problems solved by the Artillery Section during this period was one pertaining to the movement of liaison-type aircraft to the Continent from the United Kingdom. A marshalling airdrome and special over-water equipment were obtained, and a procedure established whereby a unit's planes were dispatched in coordination with the unit's movement by water. Preparations were made for truckloading of aircraft when cross-channel flights to the Continent were not possible.

The Finance Section placed its disbursing sub-sections according to the density of troops so that all units served were paid promptly. Sterling was converted into francs for these sub-sections as they arrived.

Because of the small number of Catholic chaplains in certain areas, the Chaplain arranged for use of French churches by Army troops of that faith, another step in assuring complete religious coverage.

Profiting by field observation, the A. C. of S. G-5 established officer liaison with each corps G-5 Section on a daily schedule. French speaking officers were used to obtain intelligence direct from civilians, and detachment officers were brought to Army Headquarters for discussions with G-5 Section staff specialists and branch chiefs. The Judge Advocate Section supervised ten general court-martial trials, in most cases the defense counsel as well as the Trial Judge Advocate being officers of the Section. The Machine Records unit of the Adjutant General's Section began operations in France on 20 July. Files of Third U.S. Army troops under control of First U.S. Army were coordinated with files of the First U.S. Army's records unit. Preparations were made for the return to Third U.S. Army of all files of battle casualty records of personnel upon their returning to this Army's jurisdiction.

G-6 SECTION ACTIVITIES

War correspondents, according to plan, were cared for by the G-6 Section, whose Press Camp began operations under canvas on 8 July. Facilities for censorship, and for wireless and radio voice transmission of their material, did not become available until the end of the month, the latter situation being due to radio silence imposed during the Army's pre-operational status. Officer couriers were used to take copy to the First U.S. Army for censorship and transmission. Though they were not permitted to mention the Third U.S. Army, the correspondents produced over 300,000 words of news copy during the pre-operational phase about individuals and units in action, particularly those in divisions which later would revert to Third U.S. Army. Many news items prepared by military reporters of corps and divisions, plus articles and photographs originated by the section itself, were forwarded to the United States. Still and motion picture correspondent photographers made scores of pictures and many thousands of feet of motion picture film during this period. Radio correspondents, through an arrangement between the Public Relations Officers of First and Third U.S. Armies, made their broadcasts to LONDON and NEW YORK via the First U.S. Army transmitter. Radio recording equipment was utilized by the Section in producing several programs about soldiers for rebroadcast in the U.S.A.

During this period the Psychological Warfare Branch of the G-6 Section through its publications section prepared strategic and tactical leaflets and published daily news bulletins in French for broadcast over public address systems to the people in liberated towns. The branch utilized its radio recording teams in gathering stories for broadcasts over facilities of the American Broadcasting Service in Europe (ABSIE) and the British Broadcasting Company. Teams from the branch's intelligence section operated in prisoner of war cages of the First U.S. Army, while others gathered French intelligence to be used in consolidation work by the branch and later by Supreme Headquarters teams.



On 22 July a directive was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group by Third U.S. Army Headquarters concerning the Army mission upon becoming operational. The Army Commander conferred with the Commanding General of the Army Group on the next day, and afterward had a Staff Section conference to discuss plans for probable employment of the Army. A plan for probable employment was submitted to Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Corps and Division Commanders were briefed.

STATUS OF ARMY'S UNITS

Status of major units during the pre-operational period was as follows:

UNIT	DATE OF ARRIVAL
VIII Corps	First U.S. Army
XII Corps	29 July
XV Corps	15 July
XX Corps	24 July
5th Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
8th Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
28th Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
35th Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
79th Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
83d Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
90th Infantry Division	First U.S. Army
4th Armored Division	16 July (employed by First U.S. Army)
5th Armored Division	29 July
6th Armored Division	25 July (employed by First U.S. Army)

The following major units arrived on dates indicated after Third U.S. Army became operational:

UNIT	DATE OF ARRIVAL
80th Infantry Division	2 August
2d French Armored Division	4 August
7th Armored Division	10 August

A special G-2 Enemy Situation Report was prepared for the staff at this time, reading, in part as follows:

"1. Fighting wholly defensively south of the AY and SEVES Rivers, the enemy has been limited to aggressive patrolling. He has maintained a counter-reconnaissance screen challenging our patrols and resisting locally penetrations of his defensive positions, taking advantage of the hedgerowed terrain and canalized approaches to his position. Small armored elements, working in conjunction with infantry, have been employed in his local counterattacks to bolster weak points. An increase in the use of mines, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, has been reported along the entire front.

"2. Enemy artillery fire has been largely sporadic shelling of our front, extending from LESSAY (T17), to CHAPELLE EN JUGER (T36), eight miles west of ST. LO, with occasional counterbattery concentration and interdiction fires on road junctions. Indications point to his continued use of single pieces in roving gun roles; however, captured overlays, showing artillery group fire plans, indicate attempts are underway to coordinate and possibly mass his artillery fire.

"3. Present enemy strength disposed along this section of the front is estimated at a maximum of 15,000 Infantry, ninety artillery pieces and forty to fifty tanks and assault guns. In immediate reserve in the vicinity of COUTANCES (T25), the enemy has an estimated 10,000 Infantry and 125 Tanks.

"4. The area most likely to furnish reserves for this front is BRITTANY. The realization by the enemy that Third U.S. Army has been committed in NORMANDY is likely to induce him to move some of his carefully hoarded infantry divisions from the PAS DE CALAIS area. However, because of the many difficulties involved in crossing the SEINE River, it is estimated that units from PAS DE CALAIS could not begin to arrive in NORMANDY prior to 3 August."

Enemy capabilities were estimated as follows:

"1. The enemy is capable of continued aggressive delaying action with the forces now disposed on our front, extending from LESSAY (T17). to CHAPELLE EN JUGER (T36), eight miles west of ST. LO, yielding ground only at the highest price obtainable by employing, (a) local counterattacks south of AY River and inundations to the east, (b) utilization to fullest extent of the extremely favorable hedgerowed terrain, and (c) reinforcing by piecemeal commitment reserves as they arrive on the battlefront. The enemy is capable of piecemeal commitment with forty-nine infantry battalions and six tank battalions by 3 August as follows: (Re-commitment of his immediate reserves and reinforcement by sideslipping):

Five Inf and 3 Tk Bns (2 SS Pz) by 27 July (now in area).
Six Inf Bns (265 Inf Div & Para Tng Regts) by 27 July (now in area).
Eight Inf Bns (2 Para) by 28 July (now in BRITTANY).
Six Inf Bns (Remainder 275 & 343 Inf Divs) by 29 July (now in area).
Six Inf & 3 Tk Bns (9 SS, 10 SS or 130 Pz Lehr) by 30 July (now on eastern sector of front).
Six Inf Bns (Ost Bns - BRITTANY) by 30 July (now coast defense in BRITTANY).
Six Inf Bns (319 Inf Div) by 1 August (now on JERSEY ISLAND).
Six Inf Bns (363 Inf Div) by 3 August (now moving west from Belgium).
Total Infantry 45,000, Total Tanks 250.

"2. He can withdraw to high ground south of COUTANCES (T25) - ST. LO (T46) road, running generally east from MONTMARTIN SUR MER (T15), five miles southwest of COUTANCES, TORIGNY (T55), five miles southwest of ST. LO, and maintain an aggressive defense while massing a reserve for the purpose of endeavoring to stalemate a further projection of the Lodgement.

"3. He may delay our advance by occupying successive defensive positions, (a) along high ground in (2) above, (b) along high ground south of GRANVILLE (T13) - VIRE (T63), and (c) along secondary ridge immediately south of LA SEE River, running generally east from AVRANCHES (T21) to MORTAIN (T51), while assembling south of the COTENTIN Peninsula a reserve to contain the Lodgement within the COTENTIN Peninsula.

"Capabilities (1) and (2) are favored in that order as they are in line with the strategy so far pursued by the enemy."

BREAK-OUT FROM THE HEDGEROWS

Having established strong bridgeheads to the east of the ORNE River around CAEN (U06), 21 Army Group British issued a general directive for an offensive to break out of the COTENTIN Peninsula, gain control of BRITTANY, and swing wide to the east. British and Canadian Armies on the left flank were to attack continually to the south and east to screen the location of the main effort, which was to be undertaken by the First U.S. Army in a pivoting move on its left flank and a swing south on its right flank which would secure the whole of the COTENTIN Peninsula. On reaching the base of the Peninsula, it was to turn VIII Corps west into BRITTANY towards RENNES (Y05) and ST. MALO (S71). Third U.S. Army was instructed to follow the advance of VIII Corps on the extreme right flank to take command of this operation when ordered.

The First U.S. Army's operation was known as "COBRA". It set forth the mission of effecting a penetration of the enemy defenses west of ST. LO (T46), by the VII Corps and exploiting this penetration with a strong armored and motorized thrust deep in the enemy's rear toward COUTANCES (T25). It was assumed that the enemy would be forced to maintain a gradual withdrawal to expected organized positions. During this withdrawal, VIII Corps, consisting of the 8th, 79th, 83d, and 90th Infantry Divisions, was to continue to exert direct pressure.

D-Day and H-Hour for this operation was set for 1300 on 24 July, with VIII Corps scheduled to jump off at 0530 on 25 July, but in each case H-Hour was postponed twenty-four hours because bad flying weather prevented the scheduled aerial bombardment. Heavy artillery barrages and an almost continuous aerial bombing preceded the attack. Substantial gains were made all along the front, and by nightfall of 27 July it was evident that the enemy's left flank was collapsing. On 28 July, on verbal orders of LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRADLEY, Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON assumed operational command of all troops then in the VIII Corps Zone, and, acting as Deputy Army Group Commander, supervised the lightning-like followup with which the enemy was hit by that Corps. The 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were quickly thrown in, followed closely by the 8th and 79th Infantry Divisions, to drive rough shod to the south over a demoralized and rapidly retreating enemy. LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATTON'S role at this time fitted generally into plans for the coming entire Third U.S. Army operation as it was initially planned that VIII and XV Corps would come under Third U.S. Army command when this Army became operational.

On 31 July the Forward Echelon of Headquarters moved to a new Command Post location generally north of MUNEVILLE LE BINGARD (T26) five miles northwest COUTANCES (T25).



SECRET

THE STAFF

COMMANDING GENERAL
Lieutenant General G. S. Patton, Jr.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Major General Hugh J. Gaffey

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Brigadier General Hobart R. Gay

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF (OPNS)
Colonel Paul D. Harkins

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
Colonel Frederick S. Matthews

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
Colonel Oscar W. Koch

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-3
Colonel Halley G. Maddox

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-4
Colonel Walter J. Muller

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-5
Colonel Nicholas W. Campanole

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-6
Colonel Charles C. Blakeney

ADJUTANT GENERAL
Colonel Robert E. Cummings

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
Colonel Frederick R. Chamberlain

ARTILLERY
Colonel Edward T. Williams

BUILD UP CONTROL ORGANIZATION
Colonel Redding F. Perry

CHAPLAIN
Colonel James H. O'Neill

CHEMICAL WARFARE
Colonel Edward C. Wallington

ENGINEER
Colonel John F. Conklin

FINANCE
Lt. Colonel Charles B. Milliken

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton

INSPECTOR GENERAL
Colonel Clarence C. Park

JUDGE ADVOCATE
Colonel Charles E. Cheever

MEDICAL
Colonel Thomas D. Hurley

ORDNANCE
Colonel Thomas H. Nixon

PROVOST MARSHAL
Colonel John C. Macdonald

QUARTERMASTER
Colonel Everett Busch

SIGNAL
Colonel Elton F. Hammond

SPECIAL SERVICE
Lt. Colonel Kenneth E. Van Buskirk

1 AUGUST

Chapter 3

AUGUST OPERATIONS

1 AUGUST (D+56)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

At 1200 hours on 1 August 1944, a warm clear day with good visibility except in the early morning hours, the Third U.S. Army under command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL G. S. PATTON JR., became operational under a veil of official secrecy, although the enemy had previously suggested the presence in France of this force. In addition to the VIII Corps, commanded by Major General TROY H. MIDDLETON, the Army took operational control of the XII Corps, commanded by Major General GILBERT R. COOK; the XV Corps, commanded by Major General WADE H. HAISLIP; and the XX Corps, commanded by Major General WALTON H. WALKER, the latter three corps being located in the rear areas. At the same time the XIX Tactical Air Command, which was to provide air support for the Army's activities, became operational under the command of Brigadier General O. P. WEYLAND, the Command's headquarters being located adjacent to the Army's headquarters. The Command had been operating for months from England as a part of the IX Fighter Command and had participated in the mounting crescendo of attack which preceded D-Day. From D-Day until 1 August the Command provided air support for the First U.S. Army. (The detailed report of operations of the Command with Third U.S. Army appears in full as Annex No. 3 to this report).

Operations during August developed along five phases which will be summarized in more detail at the end of the month. They were: 1. The conquest of BRITTANY; 2. The ARGENTAN (U21)--FALAISE (U13)--MORTAIN (T51) encirclement; 3. The advance to the SEINE, and the MANTES GASSICOURT (R66)-- ELBEUF (R19) envelopment; 4. The enemy evacuation of southwestern France and the threat to the Third U.S. Army's great exposed flank along the LOIRE River and to the vicinity of TROYES (Y27). 5. The rout of the enemy across the MARNE, the AISNE and the MEUSE Rivers.

Capabilities of the enemy as estimated at this time were divided into those of BRITTANY and those opposing the Third U.S. Army front. In BRITTANY it was estimated he could evacuate by land or delay to the west, defending the peninsula by utilizing favorable terrain for sporadic defense. He could delay in the northern portion while evacuating to the east by land in the southern portion. Or he could withdraw into and defend the heavily fortified BRITTANY ports from the landward side. On the Third U.S. Army front the enemy was considered capable of defending to the south while attempting to organize a major armored counterattack against the Army's east flank designed to drive a wedge to the sea and sever the Army's north-south supply line. He was also considered capable of executing piecemeal counterattacks against units of the Army then operating in the vicinity of RENNES (Y05) and DINAN (X79), and to the north of the SELUNE River. The situation was too fluid at the time to accurately formulate close-in enemy capabilities.

At Third U.S. Army Headquarters near MUNEVILLE LE BINGARD (T26), five miles northwest of COUTANCES (T25), a conference was held during the day by the Commanding Generals of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, the XV Corps, and the XX Corps, and the Third U.S. Army Commander, who since 28 July had been acting as Deputy Group Commander in operational command of the VIII Corps.

The Army's mission was to drive south and southwest from locations generally in the vicinity of AVRANCHES (T21) and to secure the RENNES (Y05)--FOUGERES (Y37) area, to turn west to capture the BRITTANY Peninsula and open the BRITTANY Ports, and to be prepared for further operations to the east. Two problems confronted the command. One was to hold open the corridor between the SEE and SELUNE Rivers against enemy counterattacks. The second was to exploit the breakthrough already accomplished.

The Army Commander ordered the VIII Corps (the 8th and 79th Infantry Divisions and the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions) to continue its advance westward and seize BREST (V99) and the QUIBERON Bay (M99) area. The XV Corps (the 83d and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division) was ordered to move south within its assigned zone, coordinating with the VII Corps (First U.S. Army) and the VIII Corps. The XX Corps (the 2d French Armored Division, upon arrival) was ordered to be prepared to move south on order, initially to the vicinity of FOUGERES (Y37). The XII Corps (the 80th Infantry Division, upon arrival) was to continue to stage all Third U.S. Army troops arriving on the Continent and be prepared to move south on order. The XIX Tactical Air Command was to provide air support.

Scattered French resistance forces in BRITTANY, with an approximate strength of 30,000 armed combatants, passed to the control of the Army Commander. Known officially as the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, various groups were given the immediate mission of protecting the railroad from BREST (V99) along the north coast of the peninsula, of seizing the high ground north of VANNES (H10), of providing guides for leading elements of the Third U.S. Army, and of intensifying guerrilla activity short of open warfare throughout BRITTANY.

The VIII Corps continued to exploit the breakthrough at AVRANCHES (T21), with elements of the 4th Armored Division reaching the vicinity of RENNES (Y05) and moving to the southwest. Against scattered enemy resistance, the 8th Infantry Division placed elements along the SELUNE River, while leading elements of the 6th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of DOL (S90).

Fighter-bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Command, grounded until late afternoon by bad weather over their bases, provided armored column cover and flew armed reconnaissance.

1 AUGUST

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD U.S. ARMY TROOPS AND ENEMY DIVISIONS

IN U.K.

CHANNEL ISLANDS (to Great Britain)

LANDING AT UTAH BEACH

THIRD U.S. ARMY LATER TO REDEPLOY

LEGEND

BLUE — THIRD U.S. ARMY

RED — ENEMY

24 HR. PERIOD OF OPERATIONS

BATTLE LINE

ORDER OF BATTLE

VIII CORPS

XII CORPS

XV CORPS

XX CORPS

Miles

As the result of the operations of its first operational day, the Third U.S. Army widened the bridgehead south of the SELUNE River, with armored elements followed closely by infantry fanning out to the south, southwest and west.

The Third U.S. Army reserves of Quartermaster supplies on hand at this time in the vicinity of NEHOU (T19) and at LA HAYE DU PUITS (T18) were 1,500,000 gallons of gasoline, plus diesel, oils and greases, and 1,500,000 operational rations. Classes I and III receipts for the day from the Advance Section Communications Zone were short of requirements, but the shortages were made up from reserve stocks. The "B" ration was discontinued for all troops and operational rations were substituted. Ammunition supply points operated by the VIII Corps had been increased in capacity to furnish by 1 August a reserve of approximately 6,000 tons for Third U.S. Army operations.



Armored Unit Passing Through Avranches

2 AUGUST (*D*+57)

The enemy's forces were in too fluid a condition to present an established front line. Air reconnaissance reported possible enemy reserves in fifty small ships at GANCALE (S91) and PONT DU GRIUM (S92) and 100 barges at ST SERVAN (S71). An unconfirmed civilian report indicated that enemy troops were unloading at ST. MALO (S81).

A directive from the Twelfth U.S. Army Group set forth a mission for the Third U.S. Army to secure the line ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40)-FOUGERES (Y37) - RENNES (Y05). When this line was secured, forces were to be pushed vigorously into the BRITTANY Peninsula with the objective of seizing the QUIBERON BAY (M99) area and clearing the enemy from the peninsula. The directive specified that ST MALO (S71) could be bypassed and contained if its reduction took too large a force and too much time.

The Army Commander instructed the XV Corps (the 83d and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division) to occupy and hold the general line ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40) - NAFTEL (T40) -REFFAVEILLE (T41), and to take over the security of dams across the SELUNE River then under the control of the VIII Corps. The 5th Armored Division was to move south without delay, pass through the lines of the 90th Infantry Division, and attack and secure FOUGERES (Y37) and the road net around the town. The 83d Infantry Division was to be assembled by combat teams at the earliest practicable moment in an area west of the 90th Infantry Division, at the completion of which it was to take over the position then held by the 5th Armored Division. The 5th Armored Division, after being relieved by the 83d Infantry Division, was to be assembled for further operations.

After this Order was issued by the Army Commander, the Commanding General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group arrived at the Third U.S. Army command post and directed that the 79th Infantry Division be moved on FOUGERES (Y37), with the mission of occupying the line FOUGERES (Y37) - LOUVIGNE DU DESERT (Y49).

The VIII Corps (8th and 79th Infantry Divisions and the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions) was then instructed by the Army Commander to order the 79th Infantry Division to advance and occupy FOUGERES (Y37) before dark on 2 August and to have the 90th Infantry Division extend its front to secure and occupy LOUVIGNE DU DESERT (Y49).

The XV Corps was instructed orally to assemble the 5th Armored Division in an area west of LOUVIGNE DU DESERT (Y49) and east of the ST JAMES (Y29) - FOUGERES (Y37) road. The 83d Infantry Division was to be moved motorized by combat teams with the least practicable delay via GRANVILLE (T13) on AVRANCHES (T21).

Task Force "A" (the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, the 2d and 15th Cavalry Groups, the 6th Tank Destroyer Group, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 159th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 509th Engineer Light Ponton Company) commanded by Brigadier General HERBERT L. EARNEST, was formed for the specific mission of clearing the enemy from the northern BRITTANY route to BREST (V99).

In the VIII Corps zone, leading elements of the 6th Armored Division reached QUEDILLAC (X67), three miles south of CAULNES (X67), and pushed west toward BREST (V99), meeting sporadic resistance by small entrenched groups. Fifteen enemy fighters equipped with rockets bombed and strafed trains of the 6th Armored Division. Enemy aircraft bombed the bridge at AVRANCHES (T21) and the dam at DUCEY (T30), but the bridge was quickly repaired and there was no damage to the dam. Elements of the 4th Armored Division had advanced to HERMITAGE (X18), seven miles southeast of QUINTIN (X18), and Task Force "A" was generally in the vicinity of DOL (S90). The 83d Infantry Division passed to the control of the VIII Corps.

The XV Corps troops were concentrating in the area ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40) - FOUGERES (Y37). The 79th Infantry Division passed to control of the XV Corps.

The XIX Tactical Air Command afforded armored column cover for the assaulting spearheads, performed armed reconnaissances on the front and flank, and covered bridges in the AVRANCHES (T21) corridor to prevent incursions by enemy aircraft.

As the result of operations for the day spearheads of the Third U.S. Army made considerable progress to the south, southwest and west, while the XV Corps regrouped preparatory to commitment.

The Third U.S. Army Headquarters, Forward Echelon, moved to BEAUCHAMPS (T23), eleven miles north of AVRANCHES (T21).

3 AUGUST (D+58)

The enemy was still unable to present a cohesive front line but attempted to establish a defensive line anchored on CHARBONNIERE (Y05) and extending southwest and southeast, with well dug-in 88 mm and assault guns. He continued to utilize his air force primarily as defensive cover for his ground troops. Prisoners of war stated the enemy's gasoline supply was so low that its use was being limited to heavy tanks and officers inspecting troops.

The Twelfth U.S. Army Group gave the Third U.S. Army a mission as follows: The Army was to complete the securing of the BRITTANY ports and clearing of the peninsula with a minimum of forces. Crossings of the MAYENNE River were to be secured in a zone as far south as CHATEAU GONTIER (J71), inclusive, and the Army was to be prepared for further action with strong armored forces toward the east and southeast. The area west of the MAYENNE River as far south as the LOIRE River was to be cleared. The Army's right (south) flank was to be protected with minimum forces.

In the VIII Corps zone leading elements of the 6th Armored Division advanced to LOUDEAC (X26), encountering enemy units which appeared immobile because of a gasoline shortage. Elements of the 8th Infantry Division captured RENNES (Y05) over light enemy resistance, including artillery. The XV and XX Corps continued to concentrate major elements preparatory to commitment.

Despite unfavorable weather the XIX Tactical Air Command covered advancing armored and infantry columns. A request for night fighters was referred to the Ninth U.S. Air Force.

The high ground north of VANNES (H10) was seized by approximately 6,000 of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur who also occupied an area in the vicinity of JOSSELIN (X30). Active guerrilla operations were initiated throughout the BRITTANY Peninsula.

As the result of operations for the day the Army advanced rapidly in all zones with RENNES (Y05) being captured and armored elements reaching LOUDEAC (X26).

The Headquarters Rear Echelon joined the Forward Echelon at BEAUCHAMPS (T23), eleven miles north of AVRANCHES (T21), as did the XIX Tactical Air Command Headquarters.

4 AUGUST (D+59)

Still unable to present an established front line, the enemy was limited to the use of delaying tactics by small groups employing road blocks, demolitions and mine fields. Harassing fire by snipers hindered movement of supplies by the Third U.S. Army. Enemy aircraft continued flying, attacking Army supply lines in PONTORSON (T10) and AVRANCHES (T21).

The Army Commander directed the VIII Corps (the 8th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions) to complete clearing of the BRITTANY Peninsula, to secure the ports and be prepared for further operations to the east. He gave orders to the XV Corps (the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division) to seize and hold a bridgehead east of MAYENNE (Y77) until relieved by the First U.S. Army, to seize a bridgehead at LAVAL (Y64) and secure the MAYENNE River as far south as CHATEAU GONTIER (J71), to seize LE MANS (V46) and to prepare for further offensive action to the north, east or northeast.

The XII Corps (80th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division) was ordered to concentrate in the vicinity of LA HAYE PESNEL (T22) and be prepared to move south on Army order. The XX Corps (5th and 35th Infantry Divisions and the 2d French Armored Division) was ordered to concentrate in the vicinity of VITRE (Y35), to secure crossings of the MAYENNE River from CHATEAU GONTIER (J71) as far south as the LOIRE River to advance rapidly to the east and to protect the south flank of the Army.

In the VIII Corps zone the 6th Armored Division, having by-passed ST MALO (S71) and DINAN (X79), was north of GOURIN (W50) with its leading elements. Task Force "A" (1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, 2d and 15th Cavalry Groups, 6th Tank Destroyer Group, 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 159th Engineer Combat Battalion and the 509th Engineer Light Pontoon Company), with the 330th Regimental Combat Team of the 83d Infantry Division, moved north to attack ST MALO (S71) where resistance was strong. The 4th Armored Division was moving rapidly toward VANNES (H10) through REDON (H80).

In the XV Corps zone a task force of the 90th Infantry Division captured MAYENNE (Y77) while remaining elements of the division were deployed along a north-south line in contact with the 1st Infantry Division of the First U.S. Army. The 79th Infantry Division was deployed

along a line north of FOUGERES (Y37). The 5th Armored Division was moving south to an area east of ST JAMES (Y29). The XII and XX Corps continued to concentrate major elements.

The scale of protection given by the XIX Tactical Air Command rose sharply with the support given to the ground forces near FOUGERES (Y37) and ST MALO (S71).

A company of 150 Special Airborne Services Troops from the United Kingdom was parachuted behind enemy lines to assist the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur in the protection of railroad trestles at MORLAIX (R41).

As the result of operations for the day the Army captured MAYENNE (Y77). At the same time armored spearheads raced to capture the major BRITTANY ports and to cut off the peninsula.

During the first week of August the Army solved a critical problem and bottleneck along the west coast of the COTENTIN Peninsula to AVRANCHES (T21). It was vital to maintain a supply route through the narrow strip that varied in width from ten to twenty miles and to protect this Third U.S. Army lifeline from aerial attack.

Crossing the Mayenne River

Only two principal north-south highways extended through this area, which was cut deeply on the west by three tidal estuaries, one at the mouth of the SIENNE River near COUTANCES (T25) and the others at the mouths of the SEE and SELUNE Rivers near AVRANCHES (T21). An adequate network of roads through the strip was necessary in order to supply Third U.S. Army troops which were swinging west down the BRITTANY Peninsula, pushing south to cut off the base of the peninsula, and fanning out east and southeast.

At COUTANCES (T25) where the two main highways converged it was found possible to separate the routes and eliminate the first bottleneck. But all axial highways converged at AVRANCHES (T21), where the strip narrowed to ten miles or less, then followed one principal route south for five miles to PONTAUBOULT (T31). The town of AVRANCHES (T21) had been badly damaged by both Allied and enemy bombing, but the bridge over the SEE River at the edge of town was captured intact. The bridge at PONTAUBOULT (T31) over the SELUNE River was demolished, but was repaired rapidly and later a timber trestle bridge was built to carry part of the transport load. The enemy attempted nightly to bomb these critical bridges. To meet this threat anti-aircraft defenses already established along the supply route were augmented by the siting of additional automatic weapons and 90mm gun battalions which were released from the First U.S. Army on this date. Defense of the SELUNE River line with 90mm guns was extended east from the mouth of the river to ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40). The river line was extremely important, not only because of the bridge across it but because destruction of the dam at DUCEY (T30) would have flooded the area. An inner artillery zone was established, bounded by a line 12,000 yards north and south of the river and 12,000 yards west of its mouth and east of ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40). In this zone anti-aircraft artillery was instructed to engage immediately at night any plane not identified as friendly. Of 291 enemy aircraft reported over the area during 6 and 7 August, more than ten percent were destroyed or probably destroyed by anti-aircraft artillery.

Among other developments within the Army at this time were the following: (a) The Public Relations Section placed its SCR 399 and Mackay Radio into operation at GAVRAY (T24). With the censors present, it was then possible for the first time to use all planned facilities and to flash Third U.S. Army news to the press of the world. However, security on use of the Army name and of its Commander remained in effect. (b) French authorities were rapidly restoring their authority and assuming their functions. The chief problem was control of civilian circulation. (c) At this time, 110 Third U.S. Army units were still in the United Kingdom incompletely equipped. Every effort was being made to obtain the necessary equipment.

5 AUGUST (D+60)

The relentless aggressiveness and wide-ranging sweep of Third U.S. Army's offensives by this time had resulted in a widespread disorganization of the enemy's forces. He continued unable to form a cohesive line of defense except in the ST MALO Peninsula, and offered only scattered resistance at other points. Small elements were identified but there were no indications of divisional sectors or areas. There was evidence that small groups of the enemy were attempting to escape from BRITTANY by the southern route of the peninsula.

The Army Commander directed the XV Corps to cross LA MAYENNE River at MAYENNE (Y77) and to secure a bridgehead east of MAYENNE (Y77) and hold it until relieved by VII Corps (First U.S. Army). Elements not needed to hold the bridgehead east of MAYENNE (Y77) were to be moved south of the inter-Army boundary without delay. The corps was also directed to secure crossings of the MAYENNE River to LAVAL (Y64) inclusive, and to extend this front further south if deemed necessary and advance rapidly on LE MANS (V46).

In the VIII Corps zone the 6th Armored Division continued its rapid advance toward BREST (V99) with elements reaching HULEGOAT (W49) and GOURIN (W56). The 4th Armored Division continued its progress toward VANNES (H10) and LORIENT (G72) with Combat Command "A" capturing VANNES (H10). Task Force "A" was withdrawn from the ST MALO (S71) area and proceeded along the northern BRITTANY route toward BREST (V99). The 83d Infantry Division met aggressive resistance at ST MALO (S71).

In the XV Corps zone elements of the 90th Infantry Division secured MAYENNE (Y77). The 79th Infantry Division concentrated on the west bank of the MAYENNE River in the vicinity of LAVAL (Y64) while the 5th Armored Division moved east to cross this river in the vicinity of CHATEAU GONTIER (J71). The enemy destroyed bridges across the MAYENNE River as he retreated.

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command kept the enemy away from the advancing columns while attacking motor vehicles, gun positions and an enemy headquarters. They performed fighter sweeps in the ST MALO (S71) DINAN (X79) area.

As the result of operations for the day Third U.S. Army units captured VANNES (H10) with advances continuing to the east toward LE MANS (V46), south to LAVAL (Y64), southwest toward LORIENT (G72), west toward BREST (V99), and north toward ST MALO (S71).

6 AUGUST (D+61)

Capabilities of the enemy as estimated at this time were divided into those of BRITTANY and those applying to the eastern front of the Third U.S. Army. In BRITTANY it was estimated the enemy would withdraw to fortified ports while continuing sporadic resistance in the interior of the peninsula to delay the Army's advance. On the eastern front of the Army the enemy was expected to combine a defense east of the MAYENNE River with a counterattack in the MORTAIN (T51) area with the intent of severing the Army's north and south forces and make the latter untenable logistically.

Upon securing crossings of the MAYENNE River from MAYENNE (Y77) to LAVAL (Y64), the Army was directed by Twelfth U.S. Army Group to advance from the line of the MAYENNE River to secure the crossings of the SARTHE River from ANGERS (087) to LE MANS (V46) and to be prepared to push strong armored forces in the direction of the ORLEANS (F62) - PARIS (S04) gap. NANTES (005) and ANGERS (087) were to be occupied and the south flank of the Army was to be watched for possible enemy crossings over the LOIRE River. The reduction of BRITTANY was to be continued with minimum forces.

Two additional anti-aircraft artillery brigades were ordered attached to the Army, one to be used in the defense of ST MALO (S71) and RENNES (Y05), the other in the defense of BREST (V99), immediately on the capture of these cities.

In the VIII Corps zone the 6th Armored Division continued its rapid advance through the BRITTANY Peninsula along two roads, leading elements of Combat Command "A" reaching PLONEOUR (R30) and leading elements of Combat Command "B" reaching LESNEVEN (R11). Task Force "A" moved rapidly along the northern BRITTANY route with leading elements reaching the vicinity of CHATELAUDREN (S00). The 4th Armored Division advanced toward LORIENT (G72). The 83d Infantry Division continued its attack on ST-MALO (S71) against stubborn enemy resistance consisting in part of mortar, automatic weapons, and 88mm fire. With the exception of the determined defense of ST MALO (S71) enemy activity on the BRITTANY Peninsula was confined to sniping and small sporadic delaying actions. Indications were, however, that BREST (V99) was being prepared for a determined defense.

In the XV Corps zone the advance toward LE MANS (V46) progressed rapidly with all major elements across the MAYENNE River and advancing east. In the XX Corps zone major elements were assembled west of VITRE (Y35). The XII Corps continued to concentrate its major units.

As the ground campaign entered upon a phase of encirclement planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command shifted the main weight of power to the eastern front and the LOIRE Valley. Patrols still covered the AVRANCHES (T21) corridor and fighter-bombers attacked tanks and other ground targets ahead of the armored columns.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur occupied JUGON (X58) and ST BRIEUC (S20) and were ordered to protect lines of communication.

As the result of operations for the day armored spearheads raced toward the major objectives of LE MANS (V46) to the east and BREST (V99) to the west, these two cities being 210 air miles apart.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Advance Section Communications Zone were notified that arrival of supplies by water transport in the west would relieve pressure on shipment by land transport. With supply lines lengthening rapidly, more truck companies were requested and the Ninth U.S. Air Force was asked for air evacuation facilities in the vicinity of RENNES (Y05). The Army was notified that 710 colored replacements were being flown in to be attached to truck companies as extra drivers. Approximately $1,000,000 worth of captured medical equipment was obtained from the hospital at St. Vincent's College at RENNES (Y05).

A total of 119 principal towns and a population normally numbering 3,500,000 were now included in the Army's zone of operations. The French people were reported caring for their own refugees with some Army assistance. There was a scarcity of bread, main item of French diet, although the excellent wheat harvest underway was expected to alleviate the situation.

During the night the Army Headquarters at BEAUCHAMPS (T23), eleven miles north of AVRANCHES (T21), was bombed and strafed. One stick of bombs fell into an area of Headquarters Company, but caused neither casualties nor damage. Ammunition Depot No. 1 near GRANVILLE (T13) was bombed with a loss of approximately 600 tons of ammunition.

7 AUGUST (D+62)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

The enemy situation continued fluid, his only aggressive resistance being in the ST MALO Peninsula where mines, booby traps, anti-tank obstacles, and anti-tank guns were in use. The city of ST MALO (S71) was reported to be barricaded and locks in the harbor to be mined and prepared for demolition. Indications also pointed to a determined defense of BREST (V99), where among other troops there were an estimated 10,000 German marines. The enemy was also reported to have mined all roads out of NANTES (005) and to have circled that city with mines. ANGERS (087) was reported heavily mined. Bridges across the MAYENNE River in the vicinity of LAVAL (V64) and MAYENNE (Y77) were reported blown or mined.



Smoking Out Remaining German Snipers in Laval

The Army Commander verbally ordered the XX Corps to move one regimental combat team from the 5th Infantry Division to ANGERS (087), to move one infantry battalion from the 5th Infantry Division to NANTES (005) and to move the 5th Infantry Division, less detachments, from south of VITRE (Y35) to the vicinity of SEGRE (J50). He also ordered the corps to make plans for a possible attack in the direction of ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40) - FLERS (T82) in anticipation of a strong hostile counterattack on AVRANCHES (T21). The 2d French Armored Division, the 35th Infantry Division, and the 80th Infantry Division were to be used, with the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 702d Tank Battalion attached. The 5th Infantry Division was to be attached to the XV Corps in the event the plan went into effect.

The Army Commander ordered the 2d French Armored Division held in the vicinity of ST JAMES (Y29), the 35th Infantry Division held in the vicinity of ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40), and any complete artillery battalions not already moving to the new area west of VITRE (Y35) to be held in the vicinity of ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40). He alerted one regimental combat team from the 35th Infantry Division for a possible attack toward MORTAIN (T51) - BARENTON (T60) to meet an anticipated enemy counterattack in the direction of MORTAIN (T51) - AVRANCHES (T21).

The XII Corps was verbally ordered to move the 80th Infantry Division to the vicinity east of AVRANCHES (T21) and to turn it over to the XX Corps.

In the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division continued its attack on ST MALO (S71). Leading elements of Task Force "A", enroute to BREST (V99), approached MORLAIX (R41). The 6th Armored Division advanced to the immediate vicinity of BREST (V99), meeting heavy artillery fire. The 4th Armored Division surrounded LORIENT (G72). Stubborn enemy resistance continued at ST. MALO (S71), LORIENT (G72), and BREST (V99) with supply lines in the interior of the peninsula being harassed by isolated enemy groups and snipers. Tactical air reconnaissance indicated large fires in ST. MALO (S71) and LORIENT (G72).

In the XV Corps zone major elements advanced to a point twelve miles west of LE MANS (V46), the enemy offering only delaying actions to obstruct them as he withdrew his forces east of the MAYENNE River.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division had elements generally along the line NANTES (005) - CHATEAUBRIANT (J20) - ANGERS (087) to protect the Army south flank. The 35th Infantry Division had advanced to the vicinity of BARENTON (T60).

The XII Corps continued its assigned mission of moving Third U.S. Army units from the beaches to selected assembly areas.

To meet its increased responsibilities the XIX Tactical Air Command by this time had raised its strength to nine full groups of fighter-bombers. The Luftwaffe became more aggressive and in a day of fierce combat thirty-three enemy aircraft were destroyed. Participating in tank battles XIX Tactical planes in one attack claimed destruction of twelve tanks and five staff cars. Cover was continued for all columns moving to the west, south and east. Attacks were made on enemy troops in BRITTANY.

7 AUGUST

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD U.S. ARMY TROOPS AND ENEMY DIVISIONS.

ENEMY DIVISIONS ON FIRST U.S. ARMY FRONT

ENEMY DIVISIONS ON 21 ARMY GP. FRONT

CHANNEL

ENGLAND

Cherbourg

Le Havre

Granville

Avranches

Brest

St. Brieuc

Rennes

Le Mans

Chateaubriant

Fougères

Laval

Alençon

Lisieux

Caen

Bayeux

St. Lô

Coutances

Helier

Alderney

Sark

Guernsey

Jersey

Plateau des Minquiers

Baie de St. Brieuc

Baie de Douarnenez

Audierne Bay

Foulon Bay

Quiberon Bay

Presqu'île de Quiberon

Ile de Groix

Ile de Glénan

Belle Ile

Ile Houat

Ile Hoëdic

Pte. de Penmarch

Pte. du Raz

Pte. de Talut

Pte. de Trévignon

Pte. de Bontusval

Pte. de Barfleur

Pte. de Querqueville

C. de la Hague

C. de la Chèvre

Raz Blanchard

Anse de Vauville

Rade de St. Vaast

Passage de la Déroute

Baie du Mont St. Michel

Forêt de Fougères

Forêt de Laval

Forêt de Perseigne

Forêt de Charnie

Forêt de Bercé

Forêt de Sillé

Forêt de Multonne

Forêt de Ecouves

Forêt de Gouffern

Forêt de Cerisy

Forêt de Mont Castre

Forêt de Meudon

Forêt de Montaigu

Forêt de Carnoët

Forêt de Duault

Forêt de Coat an Noz

Forêt de Coat Loudéac

Forêt de Quénécan

Forêt de Lorge

Forêt de Penthièvre

Forêt de Paimpont

Forêt de Rennes

Forêt de Haute Sève

Forêt de Pertre

Forêt de Chevré

Forêt de Vibraye

Forêt de Perseigne

Forêt de Bonnétable

Forêt de Conlie

Forêt de Sillé

Forêt de Multonne

Forêt de Ecouves

Forêt de Gouffern

Forêt de Cerisy

Forêt de Mont Castre

Forêt de Meudon

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Forêt de Rennes

Forêt de Haute Sève

Forêt de Pertre

Forêt de Chevré

Forêt de Vibraye

Forêt de Perseigne

Forêt de Bonnétable

Forêt de Conlie

Miles 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Kilometers 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 80 100

LEGEND

BLUE --- THIRD U.S. ARMY

RED ENEMY

24 HRS PERIOD OF OPERATIONS

BATTLE LINE

ORDER OF BATTLE

XV CORPS

XII CORPS

V CORPS

21 Army Gp Front

First

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur aided in BRITTANY by mopping up pockets of enemy troops that had been bypassed by the armored spearheads.

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army surrounded and cut off from the remainder of the BRITTANY Peninsula the city of BREST (V99), the second largest port in France. ST. MALO (S71) was being besieged and LORIENT (G72) was being contained while in the east armored spearheads rushed toward LE MANS (V46).

During the night of 7 August and early morning of 8 August the Prisoner of War enclosure at MARCEY (T21), three miles northwest of AVRANCHES (T21), was subjected to an enemy bombing and strafing attack. Twenty-one German prisoners were killed and sixty-two wounded. Two enlisted men of the 244th Field Artillery Battalion, operating personnel of the enclosure, were killed and several others were wounded. A perimeter guard was established as quickly as possible and to safeguard the German prisoners from attack they were permitted to leave the enclosure and seek protection in the surrounding area. This raid led to a policy of lighting prisoner of war enclosures in emergencies only.

Surveys showed that two-thirds of the population of RENNES (Y05), normally numbering 87,000, had returned to the city and that the medical facilities and personnel there were adequate to meet local needs. Ample labor was found for the harvesting in BRITTANY.

8 AUGUST (D+63)

The estimate of enemy capabilities in BRITTANY at this time still held to the view that the fortified ports of BREST (V99), LORIENT (G72) and ST. NAZAIRE (N56) would be defended. The situation at NANTES (005) remained obscure, it not being clear whether the enemy intended to use the city as an assembly point for elements of scattered and disorganized divisions in BRITTANY or whether it was being prepared for a siege. The potential threat of an enemy breakthrough in the MORTAIN (T51) area was viewed as diminishing. The least favored capability was that the enemy would defend east of a line ANGERS (087) - LE MANS (V46) - MAYENNE (Y77) while attempting to rush up reinforcements from south of the LOIRE River and possibly from the PAS DE CALAIS area to build up a force to protect his exposed and extended west flank and rear from envelopment.

In response to Twelfth U.S. Army Group instructions the Army Commander ordered an advance on the axis LE MANS (V46) - ALENCON (Z38) - SEES (Q42) to the line SEES (Q42) - CARROUGES (Z19) and preparation for further action against the enemy flank and rear. He ordered a bridgehead to be held east of the SARTHE River in the vicinity of LE MANS (V46), and NANTES (005) and ANGERS (087) be occupied and the south flank of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group be covered. Capture of the BRITTANY ports and the reduction of the peninsula were ordered continued.

The Army Commander ordered the VIII Corps (8th and 83d Infantry Divisions and 4th and 6th Armored Divisions) to continue its assignment in BRITTANY, to occupy NANTES (005), to cover the south flank to the corps boundary, and to be prepared for further operations to the east.

The XV Corps (79th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 5th Armored Division, and 2d French Armored Division) was to advance along the axis LE MANS (V46) - ALENCON (Z38) - SEES (Q42), secure the line SEES (Q42) CARROUGES (Z19), both inclusive, and be prepared for further advance.

The XX Corps (5th, 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions and 7th Armored Division) was to occupy ANGERS (087) and cover the south flank of the Army within the assigned zone, hold the bridgehead east of the SARTHE River in the vicinity of LE MANS (V46), and be prepared for further operations to the east.

The XII Corps was to continue its present mission.

In the VIII Corps zone the 6th Armored Division consolidated its position on the outskirts of BREST (V99), while Task Force "A" continued its drive toward the city along the northern route. The 83d Infantry Division continued its attack of ST. MALO (S71), reaching the outskirts of the city and engaging in bitter house-to-house fighting. The 121st Infantry Regiment, attached to the 83d Infantry Division from the 8th Infantry Division, advanced on DINARD (S71). The 4th Armored Division continued to contain LORIENT (G72).

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division captured LE MANS (V46), (followed by elements of the 90th Infantry Division.) The 5th Armored Division moved south of LE MANS (V46) and blocked communications south and southeast of the city. The 80th Infantry Division was attached and continued its movement south through LAVAL (Y64) to an area just east of that city. The 2d French Armored Division was attached and started movement to an area near BRULON (K07), southwest of LE MANS (V46).

In the XX Corps zone elements of the 5th Infantry Division reached ANGERS (087) and NANTES (005). The 35th Infantry Division continued its attack on the MORTAIN (T51) area where the enemy continually tried to break through and disrupt communications between NORMANDY and BRITTANY.

The XIX Tactical Air Command reached a new peak of activity by flying 717 sorties, bombing and strafing the enemy on all fronts. Claims included destruction of twenty-nine locomotives, 137 freight cars, 205 motor vehicles and seventeen tanks. Armed reconnaissance was flown in order to gain aerial superiority, with emphasis placed on knocking out the airdromes north and east of PARIS (S04) and on isolating the battlefield on the east as far as the Belgian border.

The Forward Echelon of Headquarters moved to a new command post at POILLEY (Y39), eight miles northwest of FOUGERES (Y37), between ST. JAMES (Y29) and FOUGERES (Y37). The Advance Echelon of XIX Tactical Air Command Headquarters was established nearby.

As the result of operations for the day the Army captured LE MANS (V46), continued the attack on ST. MALO (S71), and contained LORIENT (G72) and BREST (V99).

9 AUGUST (D+64)

Five enemy capabilities appeared possible at this time. Continued defense of the fortified ports of BREST (V99), LORIENT (G72), and ST NAZAIRE (N56) was one, it still being obscure as to what forces were holding the latter port. As a second there was the continued possibility of a counter-attack against the Army's east flank in the MORTAIN (T51) area although tactical developments were diminishing the weight of this capability. A withdrawal of enemy forces from the LE MANS (V46) - SEES (Q42) area to the north and east, reinforcing them with units from east of the SEINE River and south of the LOIRE River, appeared possible. Immediately available as reinforcements in this area were troops reported moving west and southwest from PARIS. A fourth capability was an enemy withdrawal along the entire Allied front toward the east with counterattacks on a large scale expected in conjunction with the withdrawal. There was also the possibility of the enemy moving reinforcements from the PAS DE CALAIS area and from the RHONE Valley to any portion of the Allied front in a desperate effort to strengthen his forces in present positions.

In the VIII Corps zone Task Force "A" advanced to the vicinity of BREST (V99) and made contact with the 6th Armored Division which continued to contain the big port while reorganizing for an attack against it. The 83d Infantry Division continued its attack against the ST MALO (S71) defenses with most of the resistance there reduced to a small pocket, the Citadel. The 4th Armored Division continued to contain LORIENT (G72) where enemy defense was stubborn, while other elements moved toward NANTES (O05). The 8th Infantry Division remained in the vicinity of RENNES (Y05). The VIII Corps Artillery, less attachments to the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, was committed in support of the attack on ST MALO (S71). Successful artillery missions included sinking of a ship in the harbor, a direct hit on a building suspected of being a command post, and one adjustment on an ammunition dump followed by explosions lasting for half an hour.

In the XV Corps zone the 90th Infantry Division mopped up LE MANS (V46). The 2d French Armored Division moved through LE MANS (V46), followed by the 90th Infantry Division, to a position on the west flank of the 5th Armored Division east of the SARTHE River. The 79th Infantry Division moved north, following the 5th Armored Division.

In the XX Corps zone ANGERS (O87) was cleared. The 7th Armored Division passed to control of the corps.

The XIX Tactical Air Command had its busiest day since becoming operational with Third U.S. Army, flying seventy-two missions and 780 sorties. One squadron destroyed seven of twelve ME-109s encountered. A rocket-carrying squadron was placed in operation. Missions included the provision of cover for armored columns in BRITTANY but most of the Command's power was concentrated on the eastern battle front over the spearheads of the XV and XX Corps.

As the result of operations for the day the Army continued to secure towns on its south flank, to prepare for an attack on BREST (V99), and continued the attack on ST. MALO (S71). A new attack to the north began along the LE MANS (V46) - ALENCON (Z38) - SEES (Q42) axis for the purpose of trapping enemy forces in northern France.

Advance Section Communications Zone general plans for Classes I and III supply to Third U.S. Army included the movement of supplies to the DOL (S90) area for support to the west and to the LAVAL (Y64) area for support to the east. ST. MICHEL EN GREVE (R62) five miles southwest of LANNION (R73) was selected by higher headquarters as the unloading point for supplies for the BREST (V99) campaign.



Plasma Being Administered at an Advance Aid Station

10 AUGUST (D+65)

Principal organized enemy resistance was now centered in the DINARD Peninsula across the RANCE Estuary from ST. MALO (S71). The enemy also appeared determined to defend BREST (V99) and LORIENT (G72), although there were continued reports of shipping at these ports which indicated he might be preparing an attempt to evacuate them.

In the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division, with strong artillery support, continued the attack against the one remaining stronghold at ST. MALO (S71), the Citadel. DINARD (S71) was attacked against determined enemy resistance. Task Force "A" assembled in the vicinity of MORLAIX (R41) to protect the beaches and routes to BREST (V99) while the besieged city and LORIENT (G72) and NANTES (O05) were being contained.

In the XX Corps zone ANGERS (O87) was captured without resistance. The 35th Infantry Division continued to engage the enemy in the vicinity of MORTAIN (T51) in the zone of the VII Corps (First U.S. Army). In the XV Corps zone the attack to the north continued.

Despite low-hanging clouds planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command provided strong support to the Army's operations. Armored columns in BRITTANY and major ground forces on the eastern front were covered. Sweeping railroad reconnaissance was carried out to isolate the battlefield north, east, and south of PARIS (S04). A series of attacks was begun in the semi-circle of the immediate Third U.S. Army front. Other attacks followed the LOIRE River on the Army's south flank with special attention being given to the area south of the LOIRE.

As the result of operations for the day the Army captured ANGERS (O87) and cleared the enemy from ST. MALO (S71), except the Citadel, while armored elements sped north toward ALENCON (Z38) and SEES (Q42).

Ten tons of captured enemy Medical equipment were obtained in the vicinity of ST. MALO (S71). Arrangements were made for deliveries of penicillin and plasma as well as whole blood on a weekly basis to Third U.S. Army Medical Units.

MONT ST. MICHEL (T11), an architectural relic of the Eleventh Century, was found to be intact, although the Germans had occupied parts of the cathedral for observation posts and billets.

The Army Headquarters Rear Echelon joined the Forward Echelon at POILLEY (Y39) eight miles northwest of FOUGERES (Y37).

11 AUGUST (D+66)

Reinforcement of his troops in the Third U.S. Army's northward zone of advance appeared to be the enemy's intention in moving elements of several divisions into the LE MANS (V46) - ALENCON (Z38) - SEES (Q42) area. The enemy was also reported to be evacuating a considerable number of troops from BELLE ISLE (M77) to the QUIBERON Peninsula. His defense in the VIII Corps zone was generally astride the DINARD (S71) - PLEURTUIT (S70) road. He continued unable in the XV Corps zone to establish a cohesive line.

The Army Commander ordered the XX Corps (35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) to assemble on the line MAYENNE (Y77) - LE MANS (V46), to attack promptly to the northeast to secure the line CARROUGES (Z19) - SEES (Q42) within the zone of the corps, and to be prepared for further advance. One regimental combat team (80th Infantry Division) was to remain in the vicinity of LE MANS (V46) to hold a bridgehead east of the SARTHE River. The 7th Armored Division was to be moved from the assembly area northeast of FOUGERES (Y37) to an area in the rear of the line of departure. The 35th Infantry Division was to be released by the VII Corps (First U.S. Army) at a point on the inter-Army boundary to be designated later, and was then to be moved to an area in the rear of the line of departure.

The XX Corps also was ordered to direct the 5th Infantry Division to leave one regimental combat team at ANGERS (O87), the division, less detachments, to move northeast along the LOIR River to the vicinity of CHATEAU-DU-LOIR (K50) clearing the area of enemy enroute. Upon arrival in the vicinity of CHATEAU-DU-LOIR (K50) the division was to send reconnaissance to the northeast, east, and southeast as far as TOURS (P76). A further mission was to protect the south flank of the Army.

In the VIII Corps zone mopping up the BRITTANY Peninsula continued. The attacks on the Citadel of ST. MALO (S71) and on DINARD (S71) were pressed. Task Force "A" secured ST. MICHEL-EN-GREVE (R62), five miles southwest of LANNION (R73). The 6th Armored Division at BREST (V99) repulsed an enemy counterattack on its left flank. Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division still contained LORIENT (G72). Combat Command "A" deployed north of NANTES (O05) and relieved the infantry battalion which was containing the city. The 8th Infantry Division, less detachments, remained in the vicinity of RENNES (Y05).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division after capturing ANGERS (O87) moved west of the MAINE River with the 11th Regimental Combat Team enroute to CHATEAU GONTIER (J71). The 35th Infantry Division pressed its attack to the north and northeast of MORTAIN (T51). The 7th Armored Division continued to move into its concentration area northeast of FOUGERES (Y37).

In the XV Corps zone the attack to the north by the 5th Armored and 2d French Armored Divisions, followed closely by the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions, continued with good progress. Increasingly violent enemy delaying action was encountered from infantry supported by individual tanks attempting to hold road blocks. The Army Commander ordered the XV Corps to push on in the direction of FALAISE (U13) after the capture of ARGENTAN (U21) and allow the rear elements of the corps to close. Upon reaching FALAISE (U13), it was to advance until contact was made with Allied forces pushing down from the north.

The XII Corps continued its assigned mission.

The XIX Tactical Air Command was charged with the security of the south flank of the Army below which great numbers of the enemy were reported to be concentrated. Planes of the Command flew 454 combat sorties in support of the push to encircle the MORTAIN (T51) - FALAISE (U13) - ARGENTAN (U21) area. Sweeps of railroad lines and highways continued.

As the result of operations for the day the Army secured ANGERS (087) on the south flank, while to the north armored spearheads raced toward SEES (Q42).

A new policy of delivering supplies to this Army by Advance Section Communications Zone was begun. Supplies for the forces in the west were delivered to Classes I and III supply point No. 12 in the vicinity of TRESSE DU MESNIL (X89) seven miles east of DINAN (X79); for the forces in the east to Base Depot No. 55 of Advance Section Communications Zone in the vicinity of LA RICOULIERE (Y75) seven miles northeast of LAVAL (Y64). The ration situation became critical because forward units had outrun their supply lines. Shipments from the beaches were short and heavy withdrawals had to be made from reserves.

12 AUGUST (D+67)

The estimate of enemy capabilities at this time stressed as significant the fact that since D-Day the enemy had shifted eleven divisions into the battle area from his high priority PAS DE CALAIS area. Every indication implemented the view that the Germans considered the PAS DE CALAIS area to be of the greatest tactical importance. The sector was the most heavily defended in the west and was the last to be tapped for reinforcements for the battlefront. It was significant, therefore, that the enemy was forced to withdraw eleven divisions from the PAS DE CALAIS and adjoining areas and rush from west of the SEINE River to plug up gaps in his sagging battle lines. Only nine enemy divisions then remained in France, Belgium and Holland, with five others reported moving. In view of the tactical situation it was considered unlikely that any of these divisions would be moved south of the SEINE River. It was estimated that the enemy could muster 125,000 combat effectives from the divisions then believed to be north of the SEINE. It was estimated also that the enemy could withdraw approximately 55,000 troops from BRITTANY and NORMANDY, making a total of 180,000 combat effectives from north of the SEINE. The enemy might eventually withdraw behind the SEINE, but then he was still trying to hold on to northern France.

The Army Commander ordered the VIII Corps (8th and 83d Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, and supporting troops) to continue the mission of clearing the BRITTANY Peninsula, including the relief of the 5th Infantry Division at ANGERS (087). He ordered the XII Corps (4th Armored Division, 35th Infantry Division, and supporting troops) into action for the first time. It was to concentrate southeast of LE MANS (V46), prepared to operate north, northeast or east, and to protect the south flank of the Army.

The XV Corps (2d French Armored Division, 5th Armored Division, 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and supporting troops) was to assemble in the vicinity of ARGENTAN (U21), prepared for further advance to the north, northeast or east. The XX Corps (5th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division, and its supporting troops) was to advance northeast within its assigned zone on DREUX (R33), prepared for further advance to the north, northeast or east. The 80th Infantry Division was to continue its attack until contact was made with the XV Corps on the right and elements of the First U.S. Army on the left. It was then to halt and await further orders.

In the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division continued its attack against the Citadel at ST. MALO (S71) and against DINARD (S71), where the main enemy defensive line was breached. Task Force "A" continued to protect the beaches northeast of MORLAIX (R41) and the supply route to BREST (V99).

Infantry Patrol in Action

The 6th Armored Division continued its attack on BREST (V99) while Combat Command "B" moved to LORIENT (G72) and Reserve Combat Command to VANNES (H10). Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division moved into position north of NANTES (005) and patrols entered the city. The 8th Infantry Division continued in its location in the vicinity of RENNES (Y05) while preparing to move to DINAN (X79).

In the XV Corps zone the attack continued to the north. The 2d French Armored Division captured CARROUGES (Z19) while the 5th Armored Division captured SEES (Q42) despite harassing armored and anti-tank resistance. Both divisions continued rapidly toward ARGENTAN (U21) to the north with leading elements of both divisions northeast of ARGENTAN (U21). The 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions continued to follow the two armored divisions.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division was moving toward ST CALAIS (V74). The Army Commander directed the XX Corps to await further orders upon contacting elements of the XV Corps in the vicinity of ALENCON (Z38). The 35th Infantry Division reverted to control of Third U.S. Army at ST. HILAIRE DU HARCOUET (T40) and moved to an area southeast of LE MANS (V46). The 80th Infantry Division launched an attack to the north toward ARGENTAN (U21).

The XII Corps prepared to take over protection of the Army's south flank.

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command covered the XV Corps in its drive north of ALENCON (Z38) and attempted by means of strong armed reconnaissance between LE MANS (V46) and PARIS (S04) to cut off the battlefield and clear the way to the capital. Planes patrolled the LOIRE River flank and heavily attacked the ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S71) three miles north of ST MALO (S71).

As the result of operations for the day SEES (Q42), CARROUGES (Z19), and ALENCON (Z38) were captured in the Third U.S. Army's drive to the north while armored elements pushed rapidly toward ARGENTAN (U21).

Civil affairs detachments in BRITTANY were supervising the civil administration of an area approximately 11,000 square miles with an average population per detachment of 160,000. The important telephone center of RENNES (Y05), restored under Army supervision, was put into military use.

Operations in the field by this date had proved that the functions of publicity and psychological warfare had so little in common that they could best operate separately. The G-6 Section therefore was dissolved as such, a Public Relations Section being formed, and Psychological Warfare becoming one of the Auxiliary Agencies of the G-2 Section.

The Army Headquarters Forward Echelon moved to ST OUEN DES TOITS (Y55) seven miles northwest of LAVAL (Y64).

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13 AUGUST (*D*+68)

All indications pointed to an enemy withdrawal through the FALAISE (U13) - ARGENTAN (U21) gap as being well under way. Aggressive delaying action with local counterattacks, especially armored, was expected toward the east and southeast, particularly against the western shoulder of the Third U.S. Army's advance to delay the closing of the escape corridor. A considerable movement of Tiger and Panther tanks and troop carriers from CORDEY (U13), four miles southwest of FALAISE (U13), and FLERS (T82) toward ARGENTAN (U21) was reported.

The Army Commander ordered the VIII Corps (8th and 83d Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and 319th Infantry of 80th Infantry Division) to continue the mission of reducing the BRITTANY Peninsula and to protect the south flank of the Army within the corps zone. It was to release the 6th Armored Division as soon as it was relieved by other elements of the VIII Corps.

The XII Corps (4th Armored Division and 35th Infantry Division) was ordered to advance east on ORLEANS (F62) and protect the south flank of the Army within the corps zone. This was the XII Corps' first operational mission.

The XV Corps (79th and 90th Infantry Division, 2d French Armored Division, and 5th Armored Division) was ordered to advance east within its zone on DREUX (R33). The 90th Infantry Division was to relieve the 5th Armored Division in the vicinity of ARGENTAN (U21) and the 2d French Armored Division was to remain in position in the vicinity of ARGENTAN (U21).

The XX Corps (5th Infantry Division, 80th Infantry Division, and 7th Armored Division) was to advance on CHARTRES (R30). The 80th Infantry Division, less detachments, was to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of EVRON (Y96) - MONTSURS (Y89) and await orders.

In the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division continued its attack on the Citadel in ST. MALO (S71). The advance on DINARD (S71) progressed to within two miles of the city. Task Force "A" continued to protect the beaches northeast of MORLAIX (R41) and lines of communication in BRITTANY. Elements of the 6th Armored Division continued to contain BREST (V99) while other elements relieved the remainder of the 4th Armored Division at LORIENT (G72). The Reserve Combat Command of the division continued its move to VANNES (H10). The 4th Armored Division reported NANTES (005) cleared of the enemy and began to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of ST CALAIS (V74) where it would revert to the XII Corps. The 8th Infantry Division, less detachments, moved from RENNES (Y05) to DINAN (X79).

In the XV Corps zone the 2d French and 5th Armored Divisions reached ARGENTAN (U21). The 90th Infantry Division mopped up ALENCON (Z38) and pushed elements on to the north approximately halfway between ALENCON (Z38) and ARGENTAN (U21), overcoming stiff enemy opposition. The 79th Infantry Division occupied LE MELE-SUR-SARTHE (Q51), nine miles west of MONTAGNE (Q61).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division, less the 2d Regimental Combat Team, moved to an assembly area in the vicinity NOGENT LE ROTROU (V89). The 7th Armored Division moved to the vicinity of LA FERTE BERNARD (V77) to prepare for an attack to the northeast. Elements of the 80th Infantry Division, now in the Army reserve, were pinched out west of ALENCON (Z38).

The XII Corps assembled its major elements southeast of LE MANS (V46).

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command gave heavy support over the FALAISE (U13)--ARGENTAN (U21) gap, destroying 710 enemy motor transport. Thirty-seven P-47 pilots made the biggest killing of the month when they attacked a concentration of 800 to 1,000 vehicles. They claimed 400 to 500 enemy transport destroyed.

The VIII Corps employed heavy artillery extensively against the concrete fortifications of the Citadel at ST. MALO (S71). In one attack 185 rounds from 8-inch guns blew a 10 by 20-foot hole in a turret built of 26-inch concrete backed with steel sheeting, blew a 20-foot hole in a concrete tower, and destroyed two 88mm guns in concrete turrets. Ammunition expenditures continued light in all corps except the VIII, which was using approximately one-third of a unit of fire daily. Air observation planes were used extensively, the hazardous nature of such operations resulting in relatively high losses of both pilots and aircraft.

As the result of operations for the day the Army occupied LE MELE-SUR-SARTHE (Q51) nine miles west of MONTAGNE (Q61) while armored elements spearheading to the north and northeast reached ARGENTAN (U21) and NOGENT LE ROTROU (V89).



Armor and Infantry Nearing Dreux

14 AUGUST (D+69)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

On the DINARD Peninsula the enemy was now dropping back toward DINARD (S71) offering only delaying actions. But to the east he continued his desperate fight to withdraw through the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U13) gap despite almost constant hammering by air and ground forces. A Twelfth U.S. Army Group order to the Third U.S. Army stated, in fact, that it was believed many of the German divisions originally in the trap had escaped.

To hold and destroy the remaining enemy in the ARGENTAN-(U21)-FALAISE (U13) pocket, Twelfth U.S. Army Group issued a directive that the Third U.S. Army hold the southern jaw of the trap with part of the XV Corps and the 80th Infantry Division, together with the VII Corps (First U.S. Army). At the same time, in order to take advantage of the enemy's confusion, Third U.S. Army was ordered to initiate a movement to the east. An armored division and an infantry division of the XV Corps were ordered to start the movement at once, with DREUX (R33) as the first objective. The XX Corps (7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions), currently advancing toward DREUX (R33), was ordered to change its objective to CHARTRES (R30). The XII Corps (4th Armored and 35th Infantry Divisions) was ordered to advance as soon as ready with ORLEANS (P62) as its initial objective. The 80th Infantry Division was to remain in Third U.S. Army reserve pending the outcome of the fight in the FALAISE (U13)-ARGENTAN (U21) pocket and was to be used toward the east when the pocket was cleared. As soon as the pocket was cleared the First U.S. Army, following behind XV Corps, was to take over that part of the front in its zone as designated by previous instructions of Twelfth U.S. Army Group. XV Corps, less certain divisions to be designated later, was then to be attached to First U.S. Army.

In order to speed the capture of the BRITTANY Peninsula a corps of three infantry divisions of the First U.S. Army was to be attached to the Third U.S. Army as soon as pinched out of the current operation. Composition of the corps to be designated later.

The Army Commander ordered the XII Corps to advance to CHATEAUDUN (W26), with its reconnaissance as far as ORLEANS (S62). He ordered the XV Corps to seize and hold a bridgehead at DREUX (R33). The XX Corps was ordered to seize and hold a bridgehead at CHARTRES (R30).

In the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division continued its at-



Military and Civilian Traffic in Brittany

tack on the Citadel in ST. MALO (S71). Elements of this division and elements of the 8th Infantry Division reached the outskirts of DINARD (S71). The 6th Armored Division, less Combat Command "A", completed relief of the 4th Armored Division in the vicinity of VANNES (H10) and LORIENT (G72). During a temporary truce in hostilities 20,000 civilians were marched out of the besieged city of BREST (V99) by the Germans. They were turned over to French civil authorities. A Third U.S. Army relief team set up a refugee camp at PLABANNEC (091) and relief supplies were brought from RENNES (Y05) in captured German trucks.

In the XV Corps zone major elements were in the area ALENCON (Z38)-SEES (Q42)-ARGENTAN (U21). The 79th Infantry Division and the 5th Armored Division prepared to move east on DREUX (R33). The 90th Infantry Division held the line ARGENTAN (U21)-GACE (Q54) within its zone while other elements of the division continued to mop up in vicinity of ALENCON (Z38). The 2d French Armored Division remained in the vicinity of ARGENTAN (U21). The enemy continued to withdraw his forces from the MORTAIN (T51) pocket through the ARGENTAN (U21) gap.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division continued its move from BRITTANY toward ORLEANS (F62). Elements of the 35th Infantry Division remained in its concentration area southeast of LE MANS (V46).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division, less detachments, advanced toward CHARTRES (R30). The 7th Armored Division attacked to the northeast, making good progress toward CHARTRES (R30).

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command provided close support for the ground troops in all zones. Three hundred to 400 enemy soldiers near ARGENTAN (U21) surrendered to pilots of the Command by waving white flags. Fighter Control was given the location so the nearest ground troops could pick up the prisoners.

As the result of operations for the day armored elements of the Army swept to the northeast toward CHARTRES (R30) and DREUX (R33).

Unloading of Landing Ships Tank at ST. MICHEL EN GREVE (R62), five miles southwest of LANNION (R73), was being accomplished at the rate of fifty tons per hour for Class III supplies and thirty-two tons per hour for rations and ammunition. Working time was limited to eleven to twelve hours daily because of the tides.

On this date there were sixty-one Third U.S. Army units in the UNITED KINGDOM which were not completely equipped.

The Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to an area at LA BAZOGE (Z34) ten miles north and northeast of LE MANS (V46).

14 AUGUST

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD U.S. ARMY TROOPS AND ENEMY DIVISIONS.

ENEMY DIVISIONS ON :

FIRST U.S. ARMY FRONT		21 ARMY GP. FRONT	
84	155	711	9
331	17	346	271
2	10	272	276
		85	277
		89	326
		12	3
		363	21

CHANNEL

ENGLISH

PASSAGE DE LA PEROUTE

(Great Britain)

JERSEY

LEGEND

BLUE --- THIRD U.S. ARMY

RED --- ENEMY

① --- 24 HR. PERIOD OF OPERATIONS

BATTLE LINE

ORDER OF BATTLE

VIII CORPS

XII CORPS

XV CORPS

XX CORPS

Miles 10 5 0 10 65 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Kilometers 20 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

15 AUGUST (D+70)

The enemy appeared to be making his last stand in the DINARD Peninsula (S71) and the ST MALO Citadel (S81) in the VIII Corps zone. He managed to form a front line generally from ECOUCHE (U11) - ARGENTAN (U21) - GACE (Q54) in the XV Corps zone and was employing small groups of infantry supporting tanks and occasional anti-tank guns elsewhere in that zone. No cohesive enemy front line existed in the XX Corps zone although occasional road blocks defended by tanks, anti-tank guns, and small groups of infantry were reported. In two weeks of action against Third U.S. Army the enemy was now losing approximately ten men killed, wounded, and captured as against one killed, wounded, or missing in the Third U.S. Army.

Orders by the Army Commander directed the Commanding General of the 80th Infantry Division to reconnoiter the most direct and expeditious routes for possible movement of his command to a point on the axis LE MANS (V46) - ALENCON (Z38) - ARGENTAN (U21), from which it could be quickly disposed to assist in defending an area occupied by the 2d French Armored Division and 90th Infantry Division, currently threatened with enemy attack. These orders also directed the Commanding General of the 80th Infantry Division that should his command be moved into this area he would, as Senior Division Commander, assume charge and coordinate efforts of the 2d French Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division, under the Commanding General of the XV Corps.

A Provisional Corps, composed of the 2d French Armored Division and the 90th and 80th Infantry Divisions (less the 319th Infantry) was formed by order of the Army Commander with Major General HUGH J. GAFFEY, Chief of Staff of Third U.S. Army, in command. Its purpose was the temporary coordination of these divisions which were operating in the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U13) area while the remainder of the XV Corps proceeded eastward toward the SEINE River.

In the VIII Corps zone the clearing of BRITTANY continued. The 83d Infantry Division occupied DINARD (S71). The Citadel at ST. MALO (S71) held out against heavy aerial bombardment and attack by ground troops. The 8th Infantry Division captured CAP FREHAL (S52) and continued to mop up in the DINARD (S71) area with elements of the 83d Infantry Division. Elements of the 6th Armored Division continued containing BREST (V99) while other elements of the Division contained LORIENT (G72) and VANNES (H10). Improvement was noted in enemy defensive positions at LORIENT (G72). Task Force "A" continued to protect lines of communication near MORLAIX (R41) and cleared pockets of resistance in that vicinity.

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division and the 5th Armored Division continued their advance toward DREUX (R33). The 90th Infantry Division continued to hold a line west of ALENCON (Z38) and east of ARGENTAN (U21) as the 2d French Armored Division operated in the area south of ARGENTAN (U21) in the vicinity of CARROUGES (Z19). The enemy exerted considerable pressure against both these divisions in an effort to keep the corridor open and to withdraw the bulk of his forces from the pocket. Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command dropped surrender leaflet bombs in this enemy sector.

In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division, followed by elements of the 5th Infantry Division, entered CHARTRES (R30) while the remainder of the 5th Infantry Division moved into ST. CALAIS (V74).

In the XII Corps zone major elements advanced on the Army south flank towards CHATEAUDUN (W26). The 80th Infantry Division (less the 319th Infantry) concentrated southeast of MAYENNE (Y77).

The XIX Tactical Air Command afforded assault aerial cover west and south of PARIS (S04), furnishing close support to armored columns driving to the east, and conducted armed reconnaissance north of the LOIRE River to the line ETAMPES (W89) - ORLEANS (F62). Enemy fighter plane activity rose sharply, showing that many German air units had completed their moves to new bases. On this date Headquarters of the Command moved to the vicinity of Third U.S. Army Headquarters, seven miles northwest of LAVAL (Y64), where it remained until 30 August.

Infantry Mops Up in Dinard

As a result of operations for the day, with the objectives of CHATEAUDUN (W26), ORLEANS (F62), DREUX (R33), and CHARTRES (R30) in view, the Army continued its advance rapidly in their direction. Due to the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army elements the execution of the operation "TRANSFIGURE", a plan to use airborne troops to prevent the enemy south of the SEINE River from escaping through the PARIS (S04) - ORLEANS (F62) gap, was not necessary.

On this date Supreme Headquarters officially announced for worldwide dissemination the fact that the Third U.S. Army was operational on the Continent, under command of LIEUTENANT GENERAL G.S. PATTON JR.

16 AUGUST (*D+71*)

On the basis of enemy casualty computations and from prisoner of war statements it was estimated that the total enemy force in the Third U.S. Army battle area was approximately 125,000 combat effectives and 300 tanks, exclusive of BRITTANY and including troops only in the area bounded roughly by the line of contact of the XII, XX, XV Corps of the Third U.S. Army, the First U.S. Army, the British and Canadian areas, and the SEINE River. Enemy forces in the BRITTANY Peninsula were estimated to total 38,300, dispersed as follows: ST. MALO (S71) Citadel, 8,000; PAIMPOL (S03), 2,000 (500 Army and 1500 Navy and miscellaneous); BREST (V99), 16,500 (8,500 Army, 8,000 Navy and Marines); LORIENT (G72), 9,500 (1,500 Army, 8,000 Navy, Marines and miscellaneous); ST NAZAIRE (N56), 9,500 (1,500 Army, 8,000 Navy, Marines and miscellaneous). In the VIII Corps zone on the DINARD Peninsula only small strongpoints continued to hold out. The enemy at LORIENT (G72) was reported to have two defensive lines, with anti-tank ditches, minefields, blockhouses, obstacles and bunkers. At PAIMPOL (S03) his defensive organization was reported to include anti-tank guns and pillboxes. In the XII Corps zone no established enemy line was reported. In the XV Corps zone the enemy held generally the same line as the previous day and was reported to be massing armor and infantry in considerable strength in the FORET DE MOULINS (Q63) -COURTOMER (Q53) - FORET DU PERCHE (Q72) area. In the XX Corps zone no organized enemy line was established but he was reported to be defending the highway west of CHARTRES (R30) with small arms and mortars.

Due to orders contained in a directive from Twelfth U.S. Army group the Provisional Corps was dissolved and, based on the directive, the next mission of the Third U.S. Army was announced as follows: To secure a position in the vicinity of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) from which to prevent enemy movement on the roads in that vicinity east of the SEINE River and by barges on that river. In accomplishing this mission XV Corps (79th Infantry Division and 2d French Armored Division with corps troops) was directed to move out at the earliest possible moment on 18 August to secure a position in the vicinity of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) from which it could interdict the SEINE River and the road east of that river. In addition XV Corps was made responsible for the maintenance of reconnaissance north of the road SEES (Q42) - MANTES GASSICOURT (R66).

XX Corps (5th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division and corps troops) was ordered to take over occupation and defense of the bridgehead at DREUX (R33) in addition to its current mission of occupying and defending the bridgehead at CHARTRES (R30). Mutual arrangements were to be made by XX Corps with XV Corps so that DREUX would be occupied by elements of the XX Corps prior to evacuation of that city by the last elements of XV Corps.

XII Corps (4th Armored Division, the 35th Infantry Division, and corps troops) was directed to hold ORLEANS (F62) with a minimum force, maintaining the bulk of the command in the vicinity of CHATEAUDUN (W26) and placing an armored Combat Command in the vicinity of LA LOUPE (R00). This command was to be engaged only by authority from the Army.

In the same order the VIII Corps (8th Infantry Division, the 83d Infantry Division, the 6th Armored Division, and the 319th Infantry from the 80th Infantry Division) was directed to continue its mission of reducing the BRITTANY Peninsula. The 2d Infantry Division, another infantry division and two ranger battalions, all from the First U.S. Army, were to pass temporarily to control of the VIII Corps for the accomplishment of this mission. When the two infantry divisions and the ranger battalions passed to VIII Corps control, the 2d Cavalry Group was to be relieved from VIII Corps and revert to Army control.

In actions of the day in the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division continued its attack against the Citadel at ST MALO (S71) and its mopping up activities in the ST. MALO (S71) - DINARD (S71) area. The 121st Infantry reverted to control of the 8th Infantry Division while the 28th Infantry of that division reached the vicinity of BREST (V99). The 8th Infantry Division, less the 28th Infantry, prepared to move to the vicinity of PAIMPOL (S03). Task Force "A" continued its mission of protecting the beaches northeast of MORLAIX (R41) and the north supply route to BREST (V99). Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division continued to contain BREST (V99), and Combat Command "B" continued at VANNES (H10), while the Reserve Combat Command contained LORIENT (G72).

In the XV Corps zone the 5th Armored Division captured DREUX (R33). The 79th Infantry Division closed into a concentration area in the vicinity of DREUX (R33) and established a bridgehead across the AUNAY River.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division assembled in an area southwest of CHARTRES (R30) and the 7th Armored Division assembled in the area northeast of CHARTRES (R30) while Combat Command "A" and the Reserve Combat Command established a bridgehead on the east side of the AUNAY River. Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command provided air cover for the 7th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division and in addition attacked airfields in the PARIS (S04) area and strafed enemy barges on the SEINE River.

ORLEANS (F62) was captured in the XII Corps zone by Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division and the 137th Regimental Combat Team of the 35th Infantry Division. The 320th Infantry of the 35th Infantry Division captured CHATEAUDUN (W26) while the remainder of the division closed into an assembly area south of CHATEAUDUN (W26). The balance of the 4th Armored Division closed into an assembly area west of ST. CALAIS (V74) while moving to an assembly area at VENDOME (F01).

In the Provisional Corps zone the 90th Infantry Division and the 2d French Armored Division continued to hold a line in the vicinity of ARGENTAN (U21) and the 80th Infantry Division moved to an area northwest of ALENCON (Z38). Indications were that the enemy was massing his armor in the ARGENTAN (U21) - ECOUCHE (U11) area.

XIX Tactical Air Command conducted armed reconnaissance south of the LOIRE River and in the PARIS (S04) - ORLEANS (F62) area.

Results of operations for the day were highly satisfactory, the major objectives of CHATEAUDUN, (W26), DREUX (R33), CHARTRES (R30), and ORLEANS (F62) being attained despite use by the enemy of strong delaying forces.

17 AUGUST (*D+72*)

The Army Commander directed XII Corps (4th Armored Division, the 35th Infantry Division, and corps troops) to hold ORLEANS (F62) with a minimum force, to maintain an armored combat command in the vicinity of LA LOUPE (R00), to move the bulk of the corps to an area south of JANVILLE (W67), and to push reconnaissance to the east.

In the VIII Corps zone the 83d Infantry Division captured the Citadel at ST. MALO (S71), where the enemy commander and his staff officers were almost unanimous in stating that it was artillery fire gradually reducing their guns to uselessness which brought surrender. Reconnaissance elements of Task Force "A" moved toward PAIMPOL (S03), isolated small groups of the enemy being reported as resisting in that sector. Other elements of Task Force "A" continued to protect lines of communication from the beaches northeast of MORLAIX (R41) to BREST (V99). The 2d Infantry Division moved from the First U.S. Army area to join VIII Corps in the vicinity of BREST (V99).

In the XV Corps zone the 5th Armored Division and 79th Infantry Division continued to hold their bridgeheads across the AUNAY River while elements of each began movement to MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and initiated reconnaissance north of the road SEES (Q42) - MANTES GASSICOURT (R66). Air cover for these movements was provided by the XIX Tactical Air Command, which reported also that friendly aircraft were so numerous over the FALAISE (U13) - ARGENTAN (U21) pocket that they had to wait their turn to attack enemy tanks and motor transport therein. Considerable enemy movement northeast out of the MORTAIN (T51) pocket was observed.

The 5th Infantry Division closed into an area southwest of CHARTRES (R30) in the XX Corps zone while the 7th Armored Division maintained its positions in the bridgehead it had established across the river northeast of CHARTRES (R30), preparing meanwhile to take over defense of the bridgehead at DREUX (R33). Indications pointed to the possibility of the enemy taking up a defensive position west of PARIS (S04) along a line ETAMPES (W89) - DOURDAN (R70) - RAMBOUILLET (R62) - HOUDAN (R53). Numerous enemy patrols were encountered in this vicinity during the day and several tanks were reported defending vital road junctions, supported by infantry and anti-tank guns.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division with the 137th Infantry Regiment of the 35th Infantry Division continued to mop up in the vicinity of ORLEANS (F62). Remaining elements of the 4th Armored Division moved into a concentration area at AMBLOY (K90), seven miles southwest of VENDOME (F01), with Combat Command "B" preparing to move to the vicinity of LA LOUPE (R00). The 35th Infantry Division's 320th Infantry Regiment mopped up CHATEAUDUN (W26). In the southern sector of the XII Corps zone, enemy forces withdrew across the LOIRE River, destroying bridges as they retreated.

The 2d French Armored Division, the 80th Infantry Division (less the 319th Infantry) and 90th Infantry Division, together with attached XV Corps artillery were detached from Third U.S. Army and attached to First U.S. Army to aid in the closing of the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U13) gap, against which the enemy continued to exert pressure.

Capitulation of the Citadel at ST. MALO (S71) was the principal operational result of the day, while CHATEAUDUN (W26), DREUX (R33) CHARTRES (R30), ORLEANS (F62) and numerous small towns and villages were being mopped up.

Responsibility for the anti-aircraft defense of ALENCON (Z38) was assumed by the Army from XV Corps in addition to four airstrips scheduled to become operational, bridges, depots, and supply points in the vicinity of LAVAL (Y64), ALENCON (Z38), and LE MANS (V46).

The Headquarters Rear Echelon joined the Forward Echelon at LA BAZOGE (Z34) ten miles north of LE MANS (V46).

Tank Destroyer Opens Up In Orleans

18 AUGUST (*D+73*)

With Third U.S. Army forces operating over such a wide expanse of territory the enemy was considered capable of five moves. He could continue a determined defense of the major BRITTANY ports of BREST (V99), LORIENT (G72), and ST. NAZAIRE (N56) and by this defense and extensive demolitions deny the use of these ports for a considerable period. He could continue aggressive delaying action to cover withdrawals across the SEINE River, north and east of the line ARGENTAN (U21) - DREUX (R33) - CHARTRES (R30) - ORLEANS (F62). He could mount small counterattacks from the northwest and northeast in the ARGENTAN (U21) - LAIGLE (Q74) area and the DREUX (R33) - CHARTRES (R30) - MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) - area. He was considered capable of establishing hasty defensive positions in the northeast sector of the pocket between the LA TONQUES and RISLE Rivers from LAIGLE (Q74) to the channel and in the southeastern sector of the pocket from EVREUX (R16) - HOUDAN (R43) - RAMBOUILLET (R62) - ETAMPES (W89). Lastly, he could establish a defensive or reorganization position east of the SEINE River, anchored on the SEINE and ARNE Rivers, and manned by 250,000 infantry from the battle area, PAS DE CALAIS, LOWLANDS, DENMARK, and NORWAY. None of these capabilities was favored over any of the others.

The Army Commander directed VIII Corps to release the 319th Infantry Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division as soon as it could be relieved by elements of the 83d Infantry Division, the 319th to move to the vicinity of ST. CALAIS (V74). The 2d Cavalry Group was to be detached from VIII Corps and move to join the XII Corps.

XII Corps was directed to move Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division from LA LOUPE (R00) to rejoin the division and the 3rd Cavalry Squadron was to revert to XX Corps as soon as the 2d Cavalry Group arrived with the Corps.

XV Corps was directed to continue its advance on LOUVIERS (R28) and ELBEUF (R19) and to withdraw reconnaissance from SEES (Q42) to DREUX (R33) when relieved by XIX Corps of the First U.S. Army, which was now on the XV Corps' left along a new temporary inter-Army boundary.

In actions for the day in the VIII Corps zone the 8th Infantry Division completed its movements into a concentration area at PLABENNEC (Q91) north of BREST (V99), the 2d Infantry Division continued its movements to an area in the vicinity of BREST (V99), and Task Force "A" concluded its operations in the vicinity of PAIMPOL (S03) and moved to the vicinity of MORLAIX (R41).

In the XV Corps zone the 5th Armored Division and the 79th Infantry Division advanced toward their objectives on the SEINE River northwest of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66). Corps artillery sank four enemy barges on the SEINE River and started fires on others. The enemy continued frantic efforts to withdraw his remaining elements from the MORTAIN (T51) trap.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division moved into the vicinity of CHARTRES (R30), while the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments formed a line HOUX (R41) - VOISE RIVER-AUNEAU (R60) - VOVES (W48), maintaining contact with XII Corps on the south and the 7th Armored Division on the north. The 7th Armored Division occupied the bridgehead at DREUX (R33) while the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron patrolled aggressively as far east as the SEINE River. The enemy continued his delaying action in the area east of DREUX (R33) - CHARTRES (R30) - ORLEANS (F62) and there was evidence, in addition to that gathered the previous day, that he intended to make a stand along the PITHIVIERS (W96) - ETAMPES (W89) - DOURDAN (R70) - RAMBOUILLET (R62) - HOUDAN (R43) line to keep open his escape routes across the SEINE in the vicinity of PARIS (S04) and to prevent an encircling movement across the SEINE south of PARIS (S04).

In the XII Corps zone, Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division closed in the vicinity of LA LOUPE (R00). Combat Command "A" continued operations in the vicinity of ORLEANS (F62). The 137th Infantry of the 35th Infantry Division completed mopping up ORLEANS, while the bulk of the corps started movements to the vicinity south of JANVILLE (W67).

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew assault cover in the MELUN (S20) CHARTRES (R30) - DREUX (R33) - ORLEANS (F62) area and conducted armed reconnaissance in the ORLEANS (F62) area. Destruction of enemy materiel included seventeen tanks, 205 motor vehicles, seven locomotives, and 218 railway cars.

Major operational achievements of the day were the securing of the bridgeheads at DREUX (R33) and CHARTRES (R30) and the reaching of the SEINE River by various elements.

Expenditure of communications wire by the rapidly advancing forces of the Army was so great that a used wire recovery program was put into effect, utilizing certain artillery battalions to gather it.

19 AUGUST (*D+74*)

There was little change in the BRITTANY Peninsula situation, from the enemy standpoint. In the XII Corps zone patrols reported that the enemy was assembling at PITHIVIERS (W96) from ORLEANS (F62) and that SAUMUR (P15) and TOURS (P76) were held by small enemy forces. In the XV Corps zone the enemy was in a fluid state, only isolated small units being reported between DREUX (R33) and MANTES GASSICOURT (R66). In the XX Corps zone ETAMPES (W89) and DOURDAN (R70) were reported heavily defended.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group issued a new directive for action by Third U.S. Army: to attack early on 21 August to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the YONNE River at SENS (X66) and east of the SEINE River at MONTEREAU (G11) and MELUN (S20); to hold the bridgehead east of the SEINE River at MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and deny use of crossing sites to the enemy as far north as LOUVIERS (R28) until relieved by elements of the First U.S. Army; and to complete the reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula.

VIII Corps (2d, 8th, 29th and 83d Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division, and supporting troops) was to continue the reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula and to protect the south flank of the Army within its zone.

The XV Corps (79th Infantry Division, the 5th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to hold the bridgehead east of the SEINE River at MANTES-GASSICOURT (R66) and deny use of crossing sites to the enemy as far north as LOUVIERS (R28) until relieved by elements of the First U.S. Army, and also to be prepared to advance east from MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) or advance southeast west of the SEINE River.

XII Corps (35th Infantry Division, the 4th Armored Division, and supporting troops) was directed to attack east within the zone, to seize and hold a bridgehead east of the YONNE River at SENS (X66), to protect the south flank of the Army, and to be prepared to advance further to the east, northeast, or north. Major General MANTON S. EDDY became the Commanding General of the corps succeeding Major General GILBERT R. COOK, relieved at his own request for reasons of ill health.

XX Corps (5th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division, and supporting troops) was directed to attack east in its zone, to seize and hold bridgeheads east of the SEINE River at MONTEREAU (G11) and MELUN (S20), and to be prepared to advance further to the east, northeast, or north.

During the day's operations in the VIII Corps zone elements of the 83d Infantry Division were enroute to ANGERS (087) and NANTES (005). The 2d Infantry Division continued to move to a concentration area in the vicinity of BREST (V99). Task Force "A" moved into the area LANDERNEAU (R10) - LANDIVISIAU (R21) in the vicinity of BREST (V99). The 34th Field Artillery Brigade was attached to VIII Corps to support the attack on BREST (V99).

In the XV Corps zone one battalion of the 313th Infantry of the 79th Infantry Division forced a crossing of the SEINE River northwest of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and established a bridgehead. The 5th Armored Division started a movement to the north along the west side of the river to block enemy crossings of the SEINE as far north as LOUVIERS (R28).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division completed mopping up in the vicinity of CHARTRES (R30) and organized a bridgehead over the EURE River in that area. The 7th Armored Division completed its movement to organize a bridgehead in the vicinity of DREUX (R33). The enemy was reported to be establishing defensive positions in the DREUX (R33) - LAIGLE (Q74) area.

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division closed into a concentration area south of JANVILLE (W67). Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division moved to an area in the vicinity of AUTAINVILLE (W24). Two field artillery groups and four battalions were attached to the corps.

The XIX Tactical Air Command afforded air support in corps zones and despite curtailment of operations because of bad weather succeeded in destroying twenty barges and damaging ninety-one others on the SEINE River.

An enemy force estimated at two battalions counterattacked a bridgehead held by French resistance forces at (F6319), southwest of ORLEANS (F62) and seized a bridge at that point. Orders were given resistance forces in the LE MANS (V46) - ALENCON (Z38) - DREUX (R33) - ORLEANS (F62) area to perform mopping up missions in that area.

Operational results for the day were highlighted by the securing of the bridgehead across the SEINE River at MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and the drive north toward LOUVIERS (R28) by armored elements, cutting off possible enemy escape exits across the SEINE.

This was a significant day in the history of Third U.S. Army supply for the first shipment of supplies by air was received at the BEILLE (V66) airstrip three miles south of TUFFE (V67) near LE MANS (V46). Twenty-one C47 transports landed, their cargoes including forty-seven tons of Class I supplies. Air evacuation of wounded was started the same day, fifty patients being flown out.

A policy of benefit to infantry divisions was initiated to provide that medium maintenance companies, attached to divisions of either the First or the Third U.S. Army, would continue to accompany and serve the division despite its being shifted to control of either Army. This policy was extended to armored divisions as well, to each of which was attached a heavy maintenance company.

20 AUGUST (D+75)

Closing of the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U13) gap on the previous day in the First U.S. Army zone cost the enemy an estimated 10,000 men trapped therein. In the eastern portion of the Third U.S. Army zone the enemy was continuing his escape efforts, meantime employing delaying actions while strengthening and extending defensive positions, particularly along a line RAMBOUILLET (R66) - DOURDAN (R70) - ETAMPES (W89) - PITHIVIERS (W96).

An attack was launched to the east in the XII Corps zone with the 4th Armored Division leading along the route VENDOME (F01) - ORLEANS (F62) - FERRIERES (X35) - JOUY (X46) - MONTARGIS (X24) - VILLEROY (X66) - SENS (X66). The 35th Infantry Division captured PITHIVIERS (W96).

In the XV Corps zone the bulk of the 79th Infantry Division crossed the SEINE River northwest of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) to establish a bridgehead, encountering small arms fire from the enemy forces, one unit of which was a battalion recently rushed from the PAS DE CALAIS area. The 5th Armored Division reached the vicinity of VERNON (R47) pushing north toward LOUVIERS (R28). The enemy was reported to be using boats to cross the SEINE north of VERNON (R47) and was fighting stubbornly to keep open his escape route.

The XX Corps launched an attack to the east to secure crossings and establish bridgeheads east of the SEINE at MELUN (S20) and MONTEREAU (G11). Anti-aircraft inner artillery zones were established at MELUN (S20), MONTEREAU (G11), and SENS (X66) to protect anticipated crossings of the SEINE River. Elements of the 5th Infantry Division reached the vicinity of ETAMPES (W89).

In the VIII Corps zone preparations were still in process for an attack on BREST (V99). The 2d Infantry Division closed into an area northeast of that city. Elements of the 83d Infantry Division relieved elements of the 80th Infantry Division at ANGERS (O87).

Besides affording armored column cover in the advance to the east and normal support in other zones, planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command dropped delayed-fuze bombs at ferry slips along the SEINE River from which the enemy was trying to cross. Air reconnaissance reported that the enemy was moving out of PARIS (S04).

With PITHIVIERS (W96) captured and the SEINE River crossed, the Third U.S. Army continued its vicious attack on all fronts as armored spearheads raced to the north and east.

Quartermaster supplies for Third U.S. Army began arriving in Landing Ships Tank at ST. MICHEL EN GREVE (R62) thirteen miles northeast of MORLAIX (R41) but since they could not provide full requirements shipments by truck and rail were continued. Two refrigerator trucks from the blood bank were dispatched to the VIII Corps. Four hundred and ninety-six patients were evacuated by air from the BEILLE (V66) airstrip three miles south of TUFFE (V67).

Seventeen artillery liaison aircraft arrived from the United Kingdom, the first such replacements to be received.

Increasing strength and better organization of civilian government was found as the Third U.S. Army moved forward. ORLEANS (F62) and the surrounding area were reported to be ably administered. The Army Commander issued a letter to all troops emphasizing the extreme punishment which had been and would be imposed upon those committing crimes of violence against civilians.

The Headquarters Forward Echelon moved to BROU (W17) twenty-two miles southwest of CHARTRES (R30).

21 AUGUST (D+76)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

An estimate of enemy strength was issued on this date, giving the following calculations: In the area bounded on the north by a line DREUX (R33) - RAMBOUILLET (R62) east to the SEINE River, on south by the LOIRE River, and on west by a line DREUX (R33) - CHARTRES (R30) - ORLEANS (F62), there were five divisions with combat strength of 35,000 men and seventy-five to 100 tanks. North of the DREUX (R33) - RAMBOUILLET (R62) - SEINE River line were four divisions with approximately 39,000 combat strength. South of the LOIRE River were an estimated three divisions with 22,000 combat troops. In northern France east of the SEINE River and north of the MARNE River were an estimated eight divisions with 75,000 men. Estimated to be in BELGIUM and available for employment east of the SEINE River in three or four days were two divisions with combat strength of 19,000 troops. In Holland and available for employment east of the SEINE River in five to six days were three divisions of 23,000 combat strength. In Denmark and available for employment east of the SEINE River in ten days were three divisions with 35,000 combat strength, one of these divisions having an estimated 150 tanks. From Norway the enemy was considered able to bring within fourteen days, nine divisions with 75,000 men for employment east of the SEINE River. And in Germany available for employment east of the SEINE River in fourteen days were estimated to be thirty-three divisions, with combat strength of 307,000 troops.

Capture of SENS (X66) was accomplished by the 4th Armored Division in the XII Corps zone while the 35th Infantry Division after having captured PITHIVIERS (W96) continued eastward, elements of the division reaching the vicinity of BOYNES (X06), six miles southeast of PITHIVIERS (W96). Only sporadic resistance was encountered.

In the XV Corps zone the 5th Armored Division continued its advance northwest toward LOUVIERS (R28), meeting strong enemy infantry and tank opposition but reaching the vicinity of CHAMPENARD (R37) eight miles northeast of EVEREAUX (R16). The 79th Infantry Division continued to hold its bridgehead across the SEINE River northwest of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66). The enemy at this point changed his air activity from an almost exclusive night operation to daylight as well, repeatedly attacking in the vicinity of the SEINE crossing, bombing, strafing, and firing rockets. Anti-aircraft artillery beat off the attacks and there was no damage to the bridge. Sixty enemy planes were claimed as shot down.

In the XX Corps zone against strong enemy opposition ETAMPES (W89) was captured and held against a local counterattack. The 7th Armored Division moved into ARPAJON (R91) northeast of ETAMPES (W89) despite enemy resistance and elements reached the vicinity of RAMBOUILLET (R62).

In the VIII Corps zone final preparations were made for the attack on BREST (V99). The 29th Infantry Division passed to Corps control from First U.S. Army and began moving toward BREST (V99).

French resistance forces were directed to protect the bridges at MELUN (S20) and MONTEREAU (G11). Enemy artillery intermittently shelled ORLEANS (F62) during the day, from positions south of the LOIRE River.

Principal results of the day's operations were the capture of the important cities of SENS (X66) and ETAMPES (W89) while armored spearheads continued penetration to the north and east.

A supply plan for future operations was prepared, stating in seven points the following recommendations: that Third U.S. Army be relieved of the responsibility of supply and evacuation of the VIII Corps and its attached units in BRITTANY; that in the event VII Corps (First U.S. Army) was substituted for XV Corps, all Third U.S. Army supporting troops with XV Corps revert to this Army for support of VII Corps; that aviation groups be attached to this Army for construction of airstrips for evacuation and supply; that necessary railway operating and construction battalions follow closely behind the Army to provide speedy rail transportation; that minimum daily tonnages for supply and maintenance, less any buildup for reserves, be estimated at 5,000 long tons per day; that additional truck companies be attached to the Army; and that the operation could be supported provided the main effort for supply and evacuation by Communications Zone and its Advance Section including movement of supplies by motor, rail, and air, be directed toward the Third U.S. Army's advance route. Class II supplies were badly need-

ENGLISH CHANNEL
CHANNEL ISLANDS (to Great Britain)
GUERNSEY
Herm
St. Peter Port
Sark
JERSEY
Roches Douvres
Barnouic
Plateau des M
Aldernay
The Casquets
les Sept Iles
Sillon de Talbert
I. Bréhat
Paimpol
pte. Minard
Plouezec
Pontrieux
Ploubazlanec
Perros Guirec
Trégastel
Lannion
Roscoff
St. Pol de Léon
I. de Batz
pte de Bontusval
I. Vierge
Plouguerneau
Lanmeur
Plougasnou
Morlaix
Primel
Carantec
Locquirec
Plouezoc'h
Plouegat
Plouenez Lochrist
Lanvollon
Plouha
Bégard
Guingamp
Belle Isle en Terre
Plougonver
Plouaret
Louargat
Etables
Pordic
Erquy
Baie de St. Brieuc
St. Brieuc
Pléneuf
Matignon
St. Cast
St. Malo
Dinard
St. Enogat
Lancôt
Lamballe
Binic
Plérin
Ploufragan
Bourbriac
Callac
Carhaix
Maël Carhaix
Rostrenen
Mt. Noir
Roc Toulaeron
Gourin
Montagnes Noires
Carnoët
Quintin
Uzel
Loudéac
Mur
Pleslin
Mouconseil
Plessala
Pleguenast
Caulnes
Merdrignac
Pleven
Ploërmel
Cléguérec
Pontivy
Guémené
Le Faouet
Scaër
Quimperlé
Roscanvel
Bannalec
Melrand
Meslan
Nostang
Naizin
Josselin
Rohan
Mauron
Ménéac
la Trinité Porhoët
Malestroit
Ploërmel
Elven
Locminé
Baud
Pont Scorff
Hennebont
Plouay
Arzano
Quimperlé
Concarneau
Pont Aven
Fouesnant
Pte. de Trévignon
Pte. de Penmarch
St. Guénolé
Audierne
Pont-l'Abbé
Douarnenez
Tréboul
Pont Croix
Crozon
Morgat
Camaret sur Mer
Pte. de Pen-hir
Pte. St. Mathieu
le Conquet
Pte. de Corsen
Pte. de Béniguet
St. Renan
Lambezellec
St. Pierre Quilbignon
Landerneau
Guipavas
Daoulas
Le Faou
Pont de Buis
Châteaulin
Pleyben
Port Launay
Landévennec
Crozon
Morgat
Chaussée de Sein
I. de Sein
I. d'Ouessant
Lampaul
Base de Douarnenez
C. de la Chèvre
Rade de Brest
Goulet de Brest
Presqu'île de Quiberon
Quiberon
Pte. de Conguel
Quiberon Bay
Pte. des Poulains
Belle Ile
le Palais
Pte. de Kerdonis
Pte. de Taillefer
Ile de Groix
Port Tudy
Lorient
Pouldu Bay
Hennebont
Plouay
Pont Scorff
Arzano

21 AUGUST

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD ARMY TROOPS AND ENEMY DIVISIONS.

ENEMY DIVISIONS ON :
FIRST U.S. ARMY FRONT — 21 ARMY GP. FRONT

Citadel captured-17 Aug

THIRD (Essay) (KLUG)

THIRD (7-8)

THIRD (James) (8-12)

THIRD (12-14)

THIRD (Ballon) (4-20)

THIRD (20-25)

Temporary Inter-Army Boundary

THROWBACK TO BREST

LEGEND

BLUE --- THIRD U.S. ARMY
RED --- ENEMY
(1) --- 24 HR. PERIOD OF OPERATIONS
BATTLE LINE

ORDERS OF BATTLE

VIII CORPS
XII CORPS
XV CORPS
XX CORPS
ARMY CONTROL

Miles
Kilometers

ed by this date. Large quantities of clothing, individual equipment, water cans, cleaning and preserving materials, and tentage were requested shipped by rail and air. Acute shortage of operating parts for medium and heavy caliber weapons was reported in all corps.

A survey showed that 185,835 refugees were in the Army's zone of operations but were being taken care of chiefly by the French under civil affairs supervision. Arrangements were made to furnish diesel oil for tractors harvesting crops in BRITTANY.

During the day the Honorable ROBERT P. PATTERSON, Under-Secretary of War, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL BREHON B. SOMERVELL, Commanding General of the Services of Supply, visited Army Headquarters.

22 AUGUST (*D+77*)

There were some indications that the enemy might be planning a stand in the vicinity of FONTAINEBLEAU (X29) where considerable troop concentration was noted and roads west of that city being reported mined and covered by anti-tank guns. Bridges north of VERSAILLES (R83) were reported blown. In the vicinity south of ORLEANS (F62) there were reports of considerable troop, rail, and motor traffic, indicating a possible plan for a counterattack against the Army's flank at that point.

Heavy fighting took place in the XII Corps zone between the 35th Infantry Division and the enemy in the vicinity of MONTARGIS (X24). Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division encircled this area preparing to attack the town from the rear to clear out enemy concentrations in that vicinity.

In the XV Corps zone the 5th Armored division advanced to the northwest despite frequent and heavy attacks from enemy armor and artillery fire from across the SEINE River. It was estimated that sixty tanks and elements of three Panzer divisions were thrown against the division at this point. The 79th Infantry Division held its bridgehead at MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) against an enemy counterattack.

FONTAINEBLEAU (X29) was reached by the 5th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone as the division drove toward MONTEREAU (G11). The 7th Armored Division entered MELUN (S20). The enemy fought rear guard actions while continuing to withdraw his forces east of the SEINE and YONNE Rivers.

Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division, VIII Corps, assembled in the vicinity of LANDERNEAU (R10) while preparing to move to LORIENT (G72). Task Force "B" was formed for the purpose of clearing the DAOULAS Peninsula (W19) and attacking the CROZON Peninsula (V98). The force was composed of Task Force "A", the 38th Regimental Combat Team, the 50th Armored Infantry Battalion, Battery A of the 777th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, Company A of the 68th Tank Battalion, and the 174th Field Artillery Group. The ST. MALO (S71) - DINARD (S71) area was being secured. The 29th Infantry Division from First U.S. Army continued moving toward BREST (V99).

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command in addition to providing support for columns of the 5th and 7th Armored Divisions bagged twenty enemy aircraft.

Results of operations for the day showed rapid advances being made toward the major objectives of MELUN (S20), LOUVIERS (R28) and TROYES (Y27), while reinforcing of the BREST (V99) area continued.

Communications zone was notified that tonnage scheduled for this Army had not been delivered and was requested to extend the air lift allotment for ten days after 25 August to meet a critical supply situation. Signal supplies were supplemented at this time by the receipt of equipment from the United Kingdom with four truck companies, plus discovery of 300 miles of German wire in a cave near CHARTRES (R30). Two instances of sabotage on signal lines in the vicinity of VOVES (W48) were discovered. Ten tons of German medical equipment were captured at ORLEANS (F62), fifteen tons at DREUX (R33) and twenty tons at FONTAINEBLEAU (X29).

23 AUGUST (*D+78*)

The Army Commander issued a new directive for future operations.

VIII Corps (2d, 8th, 29th, and 83d Infantry Divisions, and the 6th Armored Division, and supporting troops) was directed to complete reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula and to protect the south flank along the LOIRE River as far east as ORLEANS (F62), exclusive.

Plans "A" and "B" affecting future operations of XII Corps and XX Corps were issued by the Army Commander. Plan "A", to be executed on Army order only after 1000 hours 24 August, directed XII Corps (35th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, and supporting troops) to advance north and seize the ST. JUST (N11) - BEAUVAIS (M90) - GISORS (R69) road within its zone, to protect the right (south and east) flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) inclusive to the east, and to be prepared for further advance. XX Corps was directed under Plan "A" to use its 5th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division, and supporting troops to complete the securing of crossings at MELUN (S20) and MONTEREAU (G11), to advance north and seize the ST. JUST (N11) - BEAUVAIS (M90) - GISORS (R69) road within its zone, PARIS (S04) exclusive, to contact elements of the XV Corps holding the bridgehead at MANTES GASSICOURT (R66), and be prepared for further advance.

Plan "B", to be executed on Army order only after 1000 hours 24 August, directed XII Corps to advance east within its zone, to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the SEINE River at TROYES (Y27), to protect the south flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) inclusive to the east, holding its 319th Infantry (Motorized) in an area northeast of ORLEANS (F62) for this purpose, and to be prepared to advance to the east. XX Corps was directed to advance east within its zone to seize and secure NOGENT SUR SEINE (X89) and to be prepared for further advance to the east.

The 80th Infantry Division (less the 319th Infantry) and the 90th Infantry Division were to be assigned to corps on Army order as soon as they could be moved from present locations.

XII Corps was directed to withdraw its reconnaissance elements along the LOIRE River west of ORLEANS (F62) when relieved by VIII Corps.

ed by this date. Large quantities of clothing, individual equipment, water cans, cleaning and preserving materials, and tentage were requested shipped by rail and air. Acute shortage of operating parts for medium and heavy caliber weapons was reported in all corps.

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Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command in addition to providing support for columns of the 5th and 7th Armored Divisions bagged twenty enemy aircraft.

Results of operations for the day showed rapid advances being made toward the major objectives of MELUN (S20), LOUVIERS (R28) and TROYES (Y27), while reinforcing of the BREST (V99) area continued.

Communications zone was notified that tonnage scheduled for this Army had not been delivered and was requested to extend the air lift allotment for ten days after 25 August to meet a critical supply situation. Signal supplies were supplemented at this time by the receipt of equipment from the United Kingdom with four truck companies, plus discovery of 300 miles of German wire in a cave near CHARTRES (R30). Two instances of sabotage on signal lines in the vicinity of VOVES (W48) were discovered. Ten tons of German medical equipment were captured at ORLEANS (F62), fifteen tons at DREUX (R33) and twenty tons at FONTAINEBLEAU (X29).

23 AUGUST (*D+78*)

The Army Commander issued a new directive for future operations.

VIII Corps (2d, 8th, 29th, and 83d Infantry Divisions, and the 6th Armored Division, and supporting troops) was directed to complete reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula and to protect the south flank along the LOIRE River as far east as ORLEANS (F62), exclusive.

Plans "A" and "B" affecting future operations of XII Corps and XX Corps were issued by the Army Commander. Plan "A", to be executed on Army order only after 1000 hours 24 August, directed XII Corps (35th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, and supporting troops) to advance north and seize the ST. JUST (N11) - BEAUVAIS (M90) - GISORS (R69) road within its zone, to protect the right (south and east) flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) inclusive to the east, and to be prepared for further advance. XX Corps was directed under Plan "A" to use its 5th Infantry Division, 7th Armored Division, and supporting troops to complete the securing of crossings at MELUN (S20) and MONTEREAU (G11), to advance north and seize the ST. JUST (N11) - BEAUVAIS (M90) - GISORS (R69) road within its zone, PARIS (S04) exclusive, to contact elements of the XV Corps holding the bridgehead at MANTES GASSICOURT (R66), and be prepared for further advance.

Plan "B", to be executed on Army order only after 1000 hours 24 August, directed XII Corps to advance east within its zone, to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the SEINE River at TROYES (Y27), to protect the south flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) inclusive to the east, holding its 319th Infantry (Motorized) in an area northeast of ORLEANS (F62) for this purpose, and to be prepared to advance to the east. XX Corps was directed to advance east within its zone to seize and secure NOGENT SUR SEINE (X89) and to be prepared for further advance to the east.

The 80th Infantry Division (less the 319th Infantry) and the 90th Infantry Division were to be assigned to corps on Army order as soon as they could be moved from present locations.

XII Corps was directed to withdraw its reconnaissance elements along the LOIRE River west of ORLEANS (F62) when relieved by VIII Corps.

By order of the Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, Headquarters of the XV Corps with supporting troops, including the 5th Armored Division now north of PARIS (S04) in the vicinity of LOUVIERS (R28), and the 79th Infantry Division, now having established a bridgehead across the SEINE River at MANTES GASSICOURT (R66), were released to First U.S. Army effective at 0600 on 24 August.

A G-2 estimate of how favored enemy capabilities would effect Plans "A" and "B" of Third U.S. Army was issued. Initially against Plan "A" the enemy was considered capable of delaying and defending to the north, of counterattacking the Army's west flank, particularly north of PARIS (S04), and of delaying and defending to the north and of counterattacking the Army west flank. Ultimately the enemy was considered capable of defending across the Army zone of advance by piecemeal commitment of four of his six PAS DE CALAIS divisions plus the equivalent of two divisions and two Panzer elements extricated from the pocket west of the SEINE River, of attacking the Army east flank with the equivalent of two divisions from Belgium and Holland and with the equivalent of one division from south and east of the LOIRE River. Against Plan "B" initially, he was considered capable of delaying and defending in the Army's zone of advance with the equivalent of one division southeast of PARIS (S04) and of attempting to drive a wedge into our lines on the south flank to disrupt communications. Ultimately against Plan "B" he was considered capable of delaying and defending in the Army's zone of advance and attacking from the north with one plus division from units in the low countries.

Driving East Through Fontainebleau

In the VIII Corps zone the 29th Infantry Division closed in the vicinity of PLOUDALMEZEAU (Q81) northwest of BREST (V99). Grouping for the attack on BREST (V99) continued. Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division closed in the vicinity of LORIENT (G72).

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division captured MONTARGIS (X24) against stubborn enemy infantry and continued its advance to the east. The 4th Armored Division advanced toward TROYES (Y27).

The 5th Infantry Division captured FONTAINEBLEAU (X29) in the XX Corps zone and continued its advance, elements reaching the vicinity of MONTEREAU (G11). The 7th Armored Division continued attacking MELUN (S20) against small arms and mortar fire. Corps Artillery fired 1,000 rounds in support of this division silencing four naval guns.

French resistance groups continued to clean out enemy pockets and to protect important installations throughout the Army area.

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command provided continued close column cover in the various corps zones.

With only three corps, one of which was fully occupied in the BRITTANY Peninsula, Third U.S. Army during the day captured FONTAINEBLEAU (X29) and MONTARGIS (X24) and its armored spearheads continued to drive east toward Germany.

The XV Corps was released to First U.S. Army.

Gasoline shipments were short of daily requirements and a critical situation began to develop. No appreciable reserves of rations had been accumulated. Communications Zone established special trucking services from the beaches to the Army to expedite forwarding of supplies.

Among official visitors at Army Headquarters during the day were the Swedish counsel with a party enroute to attempt to arrange for the surrender of PARIS (S04). Ten representatives of American labor organizations visited Headquarters also.

24 AUGUST (D +79)

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division continued its advance to the east. The 35th Infantry Division reached the vicinity of COURTENAY (X54) southwest of SENS (X66). Elsewhere in the zone scattered skirmishes took place. The enemy continued his general withdrawal to the northeast, east, and southeast. Reports from south of the LOIRE River indicated that enemy forces in that sector were drifting east in an effort to join the First German Army.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division continued to advance, crossing the SEINE River and occupying MONTEREAU (G11). The 7th Armored Division crossed the SEINE and captured MELUN (S20). Enemy artillery shelled the bridge under construction at FONTAINEBLEAU (X29).

In the VIII Corps zone plans were prepared to attack BREST (V99) the next day.

Although bad weather restricted the XIX Tactical Air Command in its activities during the day missions were flown over targets along the LOIRE River between ORLEANS (F62) and TOURS (P76) and air cover was afforded the 7th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division.

The Army Commander directed the XX and XII Corps to execute Plan "B" of the directive issued 23 August but to be prepared to execute Plan "A" on Army order.

Results of operations showed that the rapid advance was continuing on the Army's front with the major objective of MELUN (S20) captured and the SEINE River being bridged in several places.

The newly designated French Commander of the PARIS (S04) area, General JOSEPH R. KOENIG, visited Army Headquarters while enroute to take his post.

On request of Twelfth U.S. Army Group a small group of officers and enlisted men from the Public Relations Section were ordered to PARIS (S04) to assist Third U.S. Army war correspondents there in the handling of their news articles and photographs upon the fall of the city, expected shortly.

25 AUGUST (D +80)

Orders for further action by the XII and XX Corps were issued by the Army Commander to carry out the Army mission of seizing and securing a bridgehead along the line REIMS (T37) - CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) - VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61). XII Corps (4th Armored Division, the 35th Infantry Division, the 80th Infantry Division, and supporting troops) upon securing a bridgehead at TROYES (Y27) was directed to move on Army order within its zone to seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) and to protect the Army south flank, using adequate force to hold the line ORLEANS (F62) - MONTARGIS (X24) - SENS (X66) - TROYES (Y27) inclusive. XX Corps (7th Armored Division, the 5th Infantry Division, the 90th Infantry Division attached, and supporting troops) was directed, upon securing a bridgehead at NOGENT SUR SEINE (X89), to move on Army order within its zone to seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

In the Army Commander's order it was also stated that prior to reaching the line REIMS (T37) - CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) - VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61) the XV Corps would probably enter the Third U.S. Army zone to operate on the north. Anticipating this, the Army Commander directed that XV Corps when so committed seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of REIMS (T37). XX Corps was directed in this event to seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) and XII Corps was directed to seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61). A change in direction to the east would be necessary and new boundaries would be prescribed.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division captured TROYES (Y27) after strong fighting in the streets. Combat Command "B" reached the vicinity of AUXON (Y15) after capturing ST. FLORENTIN (Y04). Reserve Combat Command reached VILLIENEUVE L'ARCHEVEQUE (X86) following on a road between Combat Commands "A" and "B". The 35th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east with elements reaching the vicinity of JOIGNY (X74), while remaining elements followed after mopping up scattered enemy in the MONTARGIS (X24) area. The enemy continued withdrawal to the northeast, east, and southeast and considerable north-south traffic was observed between TROYES (Y27) and BAR SUR SEINE (Y55).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division established and secured two bridgeheads across the SEINE, one in the vicinity of MONTEREAU (G11) and the other at MISY SUR YONNE (X58) seven miles southeast of MONTEREAU (G11). The enemy resisted stubbornly around the northern entrance of MELUN (S20) and the eastern out-skirts of the city where extensive minefields covered by automatic weapons, mortars, and anti-tank guns were encountered.

In the VIII Corps zone an attack was launched against BREST (V99) at 1300 hours with the 2d, 8th, and 29th Infantry Divisions and Task Force "B" engaged. This attack, preceded by an hour's artillery preparation, progressed slowly against well fortified positions. The build-up of the attack had the 8th Infantry Division attacking from the north, the 29th Infantry Division attacking from the west, the 2d Infantry Division attacking on the left flank of the 8th Infantry Division from the northeast, and Task Force "B" attacking from the east in the Peninsula southeast of BREST (V99).

The XIX Tactical Air Command coordinated air support with the VIII Corps attack on BREST (V99) and in engagements throughout the Third U.S. Army zone destroyed 127 enemy aircraft, claimed eleven probables, and damaged thirty-three others, the most successful day's kill since becoming operational.

In operations for the day the Army captured the major objective of TROYES (Y27), while approximately 300 miles to the west at the other end of the Army's zone the attack on BREST (V99) was launched. Bridgeheads across the SEINE were consolidated while armored spearheads continued to push to the east.

Gasoline shipments were short, the daily telegram requesting 250,000 gallons of which 197,450 gallons were received. Frozen stores previously trucked from CHERBOURG (O12) became available to the Army at LE MANS (V46). Supply of the Army by air continued, 207 transports landing at BRICY airstrip (W55) nine miles northwest of ORLEANS (F62) with 507 tons of Class I, II, IV, and V supplies.

In the First U.S. Army zone the 2d French Armored Division fought its way into PARIS (S04) and by the middle of the afternoon obtained the surrender of the city from the enemy garrison commander. Refugees from PARIS (S04) in the Third U.S. Army's zone of operations were estimated to total 100,000. Civil affairs detachments were instructed to have local authorities exert special effort to prevent their return to PARIS (S04) until the food situation there improved.

The Headquarters Forward Echelon moved to COURCY AUX LOGES (W85) eight miles south of PITHIVIERS (W96).

26 AUGUST (*D+81*)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

A Twelfth U. S. Army Group order directed Third U. S. Army to cross the line of the SEINE and YONNE Rivers in zone, to advance to the line TROYES (Y27) - CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) - REIMS (T37), to protect the right flank eastward from ORLEANS (F62) inclusive with at least one division, to be prepared to continue the advance rapidly on order to seize crossings in Germany of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ, to protect the south flank along the LOIRE River, and, employing VIII Corps, to complete reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula.

The Army Commander ordered the XX Corps to advance on 27 August between the hours of 1200 and 1800 to seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of REIMS (T37) and ordered the XII Corps to advance on 28 August at 0600 hours to seize and secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54).



Armor Regroups to Renew Attack

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division advanced northeast with elements east of TROYES (Y27) in the vicinity of CRENEY (J13) six miles south of CHAUMONT (Z05).

In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division advanced to the east, capturing the historically prominent town of CHATEAU-THIERRY (S86) while other elements reached VILLIERS (S81) north of PROVINS (S70). The 5th Infantry Division, after crossing the SEINE River, advanced along the north bank of the river and the captured NOGENT SUR SEINE (X89) with leading elements reaching the vicinity of ROMILLY (Y09) east of NOGENT SUR SEINE (X89).

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) progressed slowly against concrete fortifications and road blocks.

XIX Tactical Air Command planes encountered few enemy aircraft while providing protective cover for Army columns; however, many ground targets were attacked.

Gasoline supplies continued to fall short, the daily telegram calling for 450,000 gallons of which only 315,000 gallons were received. Eighty tons of critical medical supplies were received by air at the BRICY (W55) airstrip, nine miles northwest of ORLEANS (F62).

Ordnance heavy maintenance tank companies were moved from support of armored divisions and placed at collecting points in support of separate armored units other than divisions. The rapid advance of armored divisions made necessary increased maintenance for tank and tank destroyer battalions.

ENEMY DIVISIONS ON

FIRST U.S. ARMY FRONT — 21 ARMY GP FRONT

48 · 49 · 191 GAF · 17 GAF · 711 · 708 · 346 · 116 · 272 · 21 · 716 · 105 · 9ss · 6 · 2ss · 2ss · 85 · 344 · 331 · 12ss

CHANNEL ISLANDS (to Great Britain)

St. Herm · St. Peter Port · 110 Sark · 319 · 138 · St. Helier

ENGLISH CHANNEL

PASSAGE DE LA DERROUTE

C. de la Hague · Raz Blanchard · Alderney · The Casquets · Anse de Vauville · Cherbourg · Rade de St. Vaast · le Havre · Fecamp · Lisieux · Caen · Bayeux · Granville · Plateau des Minquiers · Le Chausey

THIRD (1 AUG) · THIRD (2 AUG) · THIRD (8 AUG) · THIRD (12-24 AUG) · THIRD (14-20 AUG)

Brest · Quimper · Douarnenez · Morlaix · St. Pol de Léon · St. Brieuc · Lannion · Guingamp · Paimpol · St. Malo · Dinan · Dinard · Cancale · Fougères · Vitré · Laval · Mayenne · Alençon · Mortain · Avranches · Coutances · St. Lô · Torigny sur Vire · Villedieu · Tessy sur Vire · Rennes · Redon · Châteaubriant · Ancenis · Angers · Saumur · La Flèche · Le Mans · Sablé · Segré · Craon · Château Gontier · Meslay · Evron · Mayenne · Loire · Baie de St. Brieuc · Baie du Mont St. Michel · Audierne Bay · Benodet Bay · Pouldu Bay · Quiberon Bay · Presqu'île de Quiberon · Belle Ile · Ile de Groix · Iles de Glénan · Ile Houat · Ile Hoëdic · Ile d'Ouessant · IROISE · C. de la Chèvre · Pte. du Raz · Pte. de Penmarch · Pte. de Trévignon · Pte. de Talut · Pte. de Conguel · Pte. des Poulains · Pte. de Castelli · Pte. du Croisic · Pte. de Beniguet · Pte. St. Mathieu · Pte. du Château · Pte. du Groin · Pte. de Barfleur · Pte. de Carteret · Pte. de Roscoff · Pte. de Bertheaume · Pte. de Querqueville · Pte. de Grouin · Pte. de Primel · Pte. de Pen-Hir · Pte. de Kermorvan · Pte. de Corsen · Pte. de Minard · Pte. de Pern · Pte. de Kerdonis · Pte. de Kerpenhir · Pte. de Kerdruc · Pte. de Kerlouan · Pte. de Kerlouan · Pte. de Kerlouan

26 AUGUST

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD U.S. ARMY TROOPS AND ENEMY DIVISIONS

LEGEND

BLUE --- THIRD U.S. ARMY

RED ENEMY

--- 24 HR. PERIOD OF OPERATIONS

BATTLE LINE

ORDER OF BATTLE

XII CORPS

XX CORPS

XV CORPS

Paris

Versailles

Orléans

Troyes

Chalons Marne

Reims

Soissons

Laon

Quentin

Amiens

Rouen

Evreux

Dijon

Nancy

Verdun

Metz

Charleville

Sedan

Chaumont

Dieppe

Fontainebleau

Compiègne

Montargis

Pithiviers

Chartres

Dreux

Mantes-Gassicourt

Meaux

Provins

Sezanne

Epernay

Vitry-le-François

Bar-le-Duc

Commercy

Toul

Epinal

Luxembourg

27 AUGUST (D+82)

Indications pointed to a marked decline in the battle-worthiness of enemy personnel and it was evident that the enemy was facing a serious manpower problem, this being partially borne out by the increasing employment of low grade units in front-line fighting. Higher headquarters estimated that enemy strength north of a line GACE (Q54) - VERNEUIL (R03) - LOUVIERS (R28) was approximately 80,000, including elements of nine panzer divisions and four infantry divisions which escaped the FALAISE (U13) - MORTAIN - (T51) trap, and seven infantry divisions which either were not caught in the pocket or had arrived recently. The estimate also included 15,000 headquarters and other miscellaneous troops. The enemy generally was withdrawing before the Army's advance and was reported to have blown all bridges in TROYES (Y27) and to have established a defensive position at CHATILLON LA BORDE (S30) including bunkers, anti-tank guns, machine guns, and bazookas.

A directive was issued to XV Corps that upon release by First U.S. Army it would be prepared to move the corps, less the 79th Infantry Division and 5th Armored Division, via RAMBOUILLET (R62) - ETAMPES (W89) FONTAINEBLEAU (X29) to an assembly area in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40) MAISON-ROUGE (S60) - ST. HILLIERS (S71) - BETON-BAZOCHES (S62) - ROZOY-EN-BRIE (S42). Details of movement were to be effected later through liaison.

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division advanced toward CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) with Combat Command "A" reaching the vicinity of MESNIL (Y39) fifteen miles northeast of TROYES (Y27). The 35th Infantry Division moved to positions to protect the south flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) to TROYES (Y27). The 80th Infantry Division moved northeast from its concentration area west of SENS (X66) and crossed the SEINE River in the vicinity of ARCIS SUR AUBE (Y39) northeast of TROYES (Y27). The enemy resisted strongly in the TROYES (Y27) vicinity, but eventually was reported withdrawing eastward.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the northeast toward REIMS (T37) along the NOGENT SUR SEINE (X89) - EPERNAY (T25) road, leading elements reaching the vicinity of BARBONNE (T01) five miles south of SEZANNE (T02). The 7th Armored Division advanced to the northeast toward REIMS (T37) with two columns of Combat Command "A" in the vicinity of MONTMIRAIL (S93) and two columns of Combat Command "B" east of the city. The enemy withdrew in disorganized fashion from this zone, east of PROVINS (S70) and NANGIS (S40) after heavy strafing attacks by planes.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) continued against stubborn resistance. The 2d, 8th, and 29th Infantry Divisions had surrounded the city on three sides while Task Force "B" attacked the DAOULAS Peninsula (W19) and CROZON Peninsula (V98) south of the city. The 83d Infantry Division moved to positions to protect the south flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) exclusive west along the LOIRE River.

The Army Commander directed the 6th Armored Division to move Combat Command "B" along the north bank of the LOIRE to ORLEANS (F62), clearing the enemy along the route.

The XIX Tactical Air Command conducted air support in all Army zones including BREST (V99) and started a rail-cutting project to cut off the main enemy escape route of Germans trapped south of the LOIRE River.

The Army continued its swift advance during the day toward the major objectives of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54), REIMS (T37), and VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61) with armored columns leading the way.

Gasoline shipments received totalled 375,000 gallons which augmented by air lift, brought deliveries for the day to 402,635 gallons. This was not sufficient, however, to make up for past deficiencies.

The Headquarters Rear Echelon joined the Forward Echelon at COURCY AUX LOGES (W85) eight miles south of PITHIVIERS (W96).

28 AUGUST (D+83)

An estimate of enemy capabilities was issued covering the area south of the LOIRE River from ANGERS (087) - TOURS (P76) - ORLEANS (F62), the Army zone of advance, and the BRITTANY Peninsula. It was considered possible for the enemy to attempt a northward thrust from south of the LOIRE River to disrupt the Army's lines of communications and force employment of troops that might otherwise be used to exert pressure against him in the Army zone of advance. It was considered possible that the enemy, in the Army's zone of advance, could delay and defend to the east and counterattack from the south, could withdraw troops from the south to the northeast and use them as reinforcements or replacements across the Army's line of advance, and could mount small scale local counterattacks spearheaded by tanks, in the REIMS (T37) - CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) - TROYES (Y27) area to cover his withdrawal behind the AISNE and MEUSE Rivers. In BRITTANY the enemy was considered capable of continuing the defense of the major ports of BREST (V99), LORIENT (G72), and ST. NAZAIRE (N56) in order to deny them as long as possible for tactical and logistical reasons.

Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division advanced to the northeast in the XII Corps zone, crossing the MARNE River at MAIRY SUR MARNE (T53) six miles south of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) and at DROUILLY (T62) four and one half miles northwest of VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61), and capturing VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61). Combat Command "B" reached PINEY (Y47) northeast of TROYES (Y27). Reserve Combat Command reached a point about half way between TROYES (Y27) and PINEY (Y47). The 80th Infantry Division advanced to the northeast and captured CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54). The 35th Infantry Division protected the Army south flank. Indications were that the enemy was withdrawing beyond the AISNE and MEUSE Rivers in the direction of VERDUN (U26).

In the XX Corps zone elements of the 7th Armored Division advanced ten miles northwest of REIMS (T37) while other elements reached the vicinity of EPERNAY (T25) and MONTMIRAIL (S93). The 90th Infantry Division advanced to the northeast in the wake of the 7th Armored Division, and reached the vicinity south of CHATEAU-THIERRY (S86). The 5th Infantry Division pushed northward to capture EPERNAY (T25).

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) continued with slow progress against strong enemy resistance from concrete pillboxes and similar fortifications. The 83d Infantry Division continued protecting the south flank of the Army along the north bank of the LOIRE from NANTES (O05) to ORLEANS (F62) exclusive.

Low clouds restricted operations of the XIX Tactical Air Command during the day, but planes gave direct support to forces attacking BREST (V99) and to those advancing in the MARNE River area.

Results of operations for the day found the push to the east progressing rapidly and the cities of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54), MONTMIRAIL (S93), and EPERNAY (T25) being liberated.

The supply situation for gasoline as well as certain other Army requirements was by this time alarming. All gasoline supply points reported no gasoline received during the afternoon. Delivery of Class III supplies was 100,000 gallons short of requirements. The Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group while in Army Headquarters during the day advised that emphasis on supply would go to the First U.S. Army. In answer to an Army Group request, daily maintenance estimates for Third U.S. Army were figured to be 6,416 long tons. A recommendation for airlift priority was submitted as follows: first, clothing and individual equipment; second, gasoline; third, rations. A conference was held with the Troop Carrier Command on plans for continued air supply of critically needed items, it being stressed that Third U.S. Army desired the following: a field close behind the Army front for evacuation of wounded; delivery of critically needed supplies of special types, such as signal equipment, small arms, special ammunition, medical supplies, and spare parts not readily available on the Continent; the balance of the lift to be used for gasoline, rations, and ammunition, and a rapid method of placing requisitions for these items.

Operation of the BRICY airstrip (W55) nine miles northwest of ORLEANS (F62) was taken over by the Advance Section Communications Zone.

29 AUGUST (*D*+84)

The Army Commander announced the next Army mission: to advance to the east to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the MEUSE River from VERDUN (U26) to COMMERCY (U42) inclusive, to be prepared for further advance to seize crossings of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ, to complete reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula, and to protect the south flank along the LOIRE River as far east as NEUFCHATEAU (Z57).

He ordered VIII Corps (2d, 8th, 29th, and 83d Infantry Divisions, the 6th Armored Division, and supporting troops) to continue completion of the reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula and to protect the south flank of the Army along the LOIRE River as far east as ORLEANS (F62) exclusive. He ordered the XII Corps (35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, the 4th Armored Division, and supporting troops) to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the MEUSE River from ST. MIHIEL (U43) to COMMERCY (U42) both inclusive, to be prepared for further advance to the east, and to protect the south flank of the Army from ORLEANS (F62) inclusive to NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). XV Corps was ordered to concentrate its headquarters and corps troops in the NANGIS (S40) - PROVINS (S70) - COULOMMIERS (S53) area, to be prepared to assume command of the 2d French Armored Division upon its arrival in the Army area, and to operate within the Army area on order.

XX Corps (5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the MEUSE River from ST. MIHIEL (U43) exclusive to VERDUN (U26) inclusive and be prepared for further advance to the east.

XV Corps Headquarters reverted to Third U.S. Army control and was enroute to an area in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40).

In the XII Corps zone a task force from the 35th Infantry Division and elements of the 4th Armored Division attacked to the southeast to clear the enemy southeast of the line BAR-SUR-AUBE (Y76) - VENDUVRE SUR BARSE (Y56) - BRIENNE LE CHATEAU (Y68). The 80th Infantry Division advanced across the MARNE River and concentrated north of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) in the vicinity of LES GRANDES LOGES (T45).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the north and occupied REIMS (T37). The 90th Infantry Division crossed the MARNE River against only scattered resistance and maintained a bridgehead as far north as FISMES (T08). The 7th Armored Division moved to an assembly area northeast of REIMS (T37) meeting strong resistance including tanks and anti-tank guns at crossroads along the main EPERNAY (T25) - REIMS (T37) highway.

Slight progress was made in the VIII Corps zone in the attack against BREST (V99) against determined enemy resistance.

With REIMS (T37) CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54) and VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS (T61) now secure, the Army made plans for an immediate effort to seize the major objectives of VERDUN (U26), COMMERCY (U42), and ST. MIHIEL (U43).

Over 406,000 refugees were estimated to be in the Army's zone of operations.

30 AUGUST (*D*+85)

As the enemy withdrew closer to his own border reports indicated that he would make a determined stand once prepared fortifications were reached. The following forts in the MAGINOT LINE--METZ (U85) vicinity were reported reequipped by the Germans and prepared for attacks from the west: FORT DE MOUSSON at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U75); ST BLAIS (between CORNY (U74) and JOUY AUX ARCHES (U75); FORT DE FOIRE in the vicinity of NANCY (U81); PLAPPEVILLE, two kilometers from METZ (U85); FORT JEANNE D'ARC on an elevation just beyond BAN ST MARTIN (U86); ANCY SUR MOSELLE, in the face of the fort at ST BLAIS (U75); FORT DE ST JULIEN LES METZ (U85); on the elevation at SAULNY, between METZ (U85) and BRIEY (U84); and at QUEULEU, suburb of METZ (U85). The enemy was also reported to be moving troops of all types from the west and south toward the east with screening forces along the LOIRE River in the ANGERS (O87) - ORLEANS (F62) area. POITIERS (U47) and TOURS (P76) were reported to be focal points of enemy movements from south and west toward the east.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division reached the vicinity east of ST. DIZIER (T90) while Combat Command "B" reached PERTHES LES BRIENNE (Y68) four miles north of BRIENNE LE CHATEAU (Y68) east of TROYES (Y27). The 35th Infantry Division attacked to the southeast, elements reaching a point approximately seventeen miles north of CHATILLON SUR SEINE (H62).

Headquarters of the XV Corps and corps troops closed into assembly area in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40).

In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division launched an attack toward VERDUN (U26) with elements driving to an area about fifteen miles southwest of that historic fortified city, meeting scattered resistance. The 90th Infantry Division continued to secure the bridgehead north of the MARNE River in the vicinity of REIMS (T37). The 5th Infantry Division concentrated its elements just east of REIMS (T37) preparatory to continuing its drive to the east.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) continued. Task Force "B" completed the clearing of the DAOULAS Peninsula south of the city, while other elements of the Force advanced to a point approximately ten miles from CROZON (V98) in clearing the CROZON Peninsula. Elements of the 83d Infantry Division made preparations for assaulting ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S71), three miles north of ST. MALO (S71), a small island off the coast still held by the enemy.

The third day of poor flying weather kept all XIX Tactical Air Command planes on the ground, with the exception of two weather reconnaissances.

Results of the day's operations showed the capture of the DAOULAS Peninsula south of BREST (V99) in the west, while in the east two corps abreast continued to drive relentlessly toward the German border.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group notified Third U.S. Army that there would be no gasoline available for it in appreciable amounts until 3 September. The shortage of gasoline was desperate, 400,000 gallons being requested for the day's delivery and only 31,975 gallons being received. All supply points were dry and unit loads were fast disappearing. The shortage made necessary the establishment of priorities for movement of medical units. Among actions taken to alleviate the gasoline shortage was an increased tonnage by Red Ball truck transport at the expense of a like tonnage of Class I supplies. It was planned to use bombers in place of transport planes to haul supplies, the latter having been called off the supply lift for tactical operations.

The Headquarters Forward Echelon moved to LA CHAUME (H82) thirteen miles northeast of SENS (X66).

31 AUGUST (D+86)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division continued its rapid attack to the east, Combat Command "A" reaching and occupying the high ground east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity of ST. MIHIEL (U43) and COMMERCY (U42). Combat Command "B" reached the vicinity of JOINVILLE-EN-VALLAGE (Z08). The 80th Infantry Division advanced to the east reaching the vicinity of BAR-LE-DUC (U12).

XV Corps continued concentrating in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40).

VERDUN (U26) fell to Combat Command "A" of the 7th Armored Division in the XX Corps zone and the division established a bridgehead while Combat Command "B" moved to EIX (U36), four and a half miles east of VERDUN (U26), and Reserve Combat Command reached the vicinity of CHEPPY (U07), one mile east of VARENNES (U07) approximately twelve miles northwest of VERDUN (U26). The 5th Infantry Division also reached the vicinity of VERDUN (U26). The 90th Infantry Division remained in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) and the CROZON Peninsula (V98) continued while elements of the 83d Infantry Division and corps troops prepared to assault the ILE DE CEZEMBRE (S71) three miles north of ST. MALO (S71).

Despite poor flying weather the XIX Tactical Air Command flew armed reconnaissance in the METZ (U85) area and attacked ground targets including motor vehicles, tanks, and gun positions in various corps zones.

With VERDUN (U26) captured Third U.S. Army now occupied the line VERDUN (U26) - COMMERCY (U42) - ST. MIHIEL (U43) and awaited orders for further advance.

Supply problems continued to be severe as the month closed. The Army had no Class III reserve supplies since adequate operational requirements had not been received in recent days. No gasoline shipments were received during the day. The Army was notified that, less VIII Corps, its allocation of supplies of all classes would be 2,000 long tons, as against a recommended 7,916 long tons.

Strength of the Army was reported by the G-1 Section to be 346,208.

A recapitulation of operations for the month, as viewed from the five phase standpoint, showed the following facts:

In BRITTANY the Army's sweep through the peninsula caught the enemy completely by surprise and with forces inadequate to cope with the tactical situation. He was compelled to withdraw into the fortified ports of ST. MALO (S71), BREST (V99), LORIENT (G72) and ST. NAZAIRE (N56), and by the end of the month ST. MALO (S71) had been captured and the other three ports were being contained. The daring strategy employed in overrunning BRITTANY blocked the enemy from moving his reserves from south of the LOIRE River in time to be committed in BRITTANY.

The second phase was the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U13) - MORTAIN (T51) encirclement. The enemy made his first attempt at a counterattack in force against the Army in the MORTAIN (T51) area, committing a force of armor, infantry, and artillery supported from the air in strength in a violent, determined drive toward the channel coast at AVRANCHES (T21). After three days' effort he withdrew when threatened with complete encirclement and made a mass withdrawal to the east, counterattacking locally the shoulders of the Army's encircling column in a desperate attempt to keep open a corridor of escape. He sustained tremendous losses in personnel and equipment while extricating a considerable portion of his forces from the ARGENTAN (U21) pocket.

THE FIVE PHASES OF AUGUST OPERATIONS, THIRD U.S. ARMY



The third phase was the Army's advance to the SEINE River and the MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) - ELBEUF (R19) envelopment, simultaneously with the ARGENTAN (U21) encirclement. The Army continued to advance east, swinging northwest of PARIS (S04) to seize a bridgehead across the SEINE River in the vicinity of MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and to drive toward ELBEUF (R19) and ROUEN (N21), along the west bank of the SEINE River. Faced with the threat of a second encirclement west of the SEINE River, following immediately on the ARGENTAN (U21) debacle, the enemy fought desperately to prevent the severing of escape routes across the SEINE River between MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and LE HAVRE (L42) and began the withdrawal of his forces east of the SEINE River. To the south, Third U.S. Army armored columns drove toward PARIS (S04) and the SEINE, no defense the enemy devised being able to stop them, although he threw in units of every description and from all available sources. Captured enemy documents revealed that the enemy's planned strongpoints were overrun before they could be occupied.

The fourth phase was the enemy evacuation of southwest France, or the threat to the Third U.S. Army's great exposed flank. Remnants of enemy divisions from NORMANDY, BRITTANY and the Franco-Spanish border area, plus upgraded headquarters troops and elements of replacements overrun in the RENNES (Y05) - ST. MALO (S71) area, were collected in the

ENEMY DIVISIONS ON :

FIRST U.S. ARMY FRONT

18 GAF
9
48
116

21 ARMY GP. FRONT

711
271
396
21
272
85
331
344
49
17 GAF

S L A S H E S (to Great Britain)

THIRD (1 AUG)
THIRD
THIRD
THIRD (12-14)
THIRD (14-20)
FB
V
XXX
XXXX

C H A N N E L

E N G L I S H

I R O I S E

P A S S A G E D E L A D E R O U T E

C O T E N T I N

M O N T A G N E S N O I R E S

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Kilometers 20 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

31 AUGUST

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF FIRST U.S. ARMY TROOPS AND ENEMY DIVISIONS

LEGEND

BLUE --- FIRST U.S. ARMY

RED --- ENEMY

(1) --- 24 HR. PERIOD OF OPERATIONS

BATTLE LINE

ORDER OF BATTLE

VIII CORPS

XII CORPS

XV CORPS REVERTED TO THIRD ARMY 30 AUG

XX CORPS

THIRD (30-4 SEPT)

THIRD (20-25)

THIRD (25-30)

Dieppe
Amiens
Quentin
Charleville
Mezieres
LUXEMBOURG
Rouen
Quevilly
Elbeuf
Louviers
Evreux
Pont-Audemer
Beaumont-le-Roger
Laigle
Dreux
Chartres
Versailles
PARIS
Meaux
Chateau Thierry
Epernay
Soissons
Compiegne
Clermont
Laon
Chauny
St. Quentin
Rheims
Verdun
Sedan
Metz
Nancy
Bar-le-Duc
Commercy
Toul
Epinal
Chaumont
Langres
Dijon
Auxerre
Sens
Montargis
Fontainebleau
Orleans
Tours
Blois
Vierzon
Bourges
Chateauroux
Romorantin
Nevers
Joigny
Troyes
Provins
Coulommiers
Melun
Corbeil
Etampes
Dourdan
Rambouillet
Mantes
Vernon
Gisors
Forges-les-Eaux
Neufchatel
Abbeville
St. Valery-en-Caux
Montdidier
Roye
Peronne
Bapaume
Arras
Albert
Doullens
Hesdin
Montreuil
Boulogne
Calais
St. Omer
Aire
Lillers
Bethune
Lens
Douai
Valenciennes
Cambrai
Le Cateau
Hirson
Rethel
Vouziers
Grandpre
Stenay
Montmedy
Longwy
Thionville
Metz
Pont-a-Mousson
Toul
Neufchateau
Bruyeres
Epinal
Remiremont
Luxeuil
Vesoul
Gray
Dole
Besancon
Pontarlier
Montbeliard
Belfort
Mulhouse
Colmar
Strasbourg
Saverne
Sarrebourg
Phalsbourg
Luneville
Baccarat
St. Die
Gerardmer
Munster
Ribeauville
Selestat
Haguenau
Wissembourg
Bitche
Sarreguemines
Forbach
Saarbrucken
Thionville
Briey
Longuyon
Montmedy
Sedan
Mezieres
Rethel
Laon
Soissons
Chateau Thierry
Meaux
Coulommiers
Provins
Nogent-sur-Seine
Troyes
Bar-sur-Aube
Chaumont
Langres
Is-sur-Tille
Dijon
Beaune
Chalon-sur-Saone
Autun
Le Creusot
Montceau-les-Mines
Chagny
Nuits
Auxerre
Avallon
Vezelay
Clamecy
Cosne
Pouilly
Sancerre
Gien
Briare
Montargis
Fontainebleau
Melun
Corbeil
Etampes
Dourdan
Rambouillet
Chartres
Dreux
Evreux
Pont-Audemer
Honfleur
Le Havre
Fecamp
Yvetot
Dieppe

LOIRE River cities of NANTES (005) - ANGERS (087) - SAUMUR (P15) - TOURS (P76) - BLOIS (L28) and ORLEANS (F62). Together with the regular garrisons they attempted unsuccessfully to defend these cities. Occupying the south bank of the LOIRE River, these troops constituted a continual threat to the Army's right flank. Remaining at first in a wholly defensive attitude, the enemy's primary concern later in the month was to flee to Germany before his escape routes were cut. Toward the end of the month the exodus became a race against time, with the escape channel between the Third U.S. Army and the Seventh U.S. Army closing rapidly.

Rout of the enemy across three rivers, the MARNE, the AISNE, and the MEUSE was accomplished in the fifth phase. Continuous hammering by the XIX Tactical Air Command, coupled with thrusts by Third U.S. Army's armor and infantry destroyed all enemy hopes of restoring the line of the SEINE River. The line of the SOMME-MARNE Rivers was turned before it could be occupied and in the resulting confusion the enemy withdrew hastily toward Germany, not only on the Third U.S. Army front but also in the zones of First U.S. Army and 21 Army Group British. The speed of the Third U.S. Army's advance forced the enemy into headlong retreat across the MARNE, AISNE and MEUSE Rivers without an opportunity to occupy their natural defenses. But despite shattered communications, disorganization and tremendous losses, the enemy was able to maintain an overall control of his tactical situation. His withdrawal, though tempestuous, was not a mass collapse.

As the month closed there was an indication that the Army's advance would necessarily have to slow its pace in order to permit supply echelons to make readjustments that would enable them to keep up. There was one more river before the SIEGFRIED Line and Germany proper, the MOSELLE, and it was believed that a delay in the advance at this time would result in a buildup in the path of Third U.S. Army. At this time this Army was responsible for operations on eastern and western fronts which were 600 miles apart, and responsible for a flank of over 1,000 miles which it covered with less than two divisions. The XIX Tactical Air Command was always considered a potential threat to any concerted enemy effort that could develop and if such a condition arose plans were always envisioned that the fighter bombers could break it up, delay or destroy it, while ground forces were being directed to points of contact. That no such threat ever developed was probably the result of the constant pounding from the air on enemy concentrations each time they were discovered.

A very close relationship existed between the infantry-tank and air-ground combinations. Although the advance of the ground troops constantly left the air forces operating from bases far to the rear, the support throughout the whole campaign was magnificent. When tank and tank destroyer columns moved they often carried infantry on their backs. When they hit obstacles, the infantry would dismount and in many places assist in clearing the way and move on again. The air would talk to the leading tank columns telling what was in front and in many cases answering questions about the enemy on their flanks.

On the whole, Third U.S. Army, during the latter phase of this action, had advanced through the very heart of France with uncovered flanks, but the risks calculated and accepted by the Army Commander in such an advance proved well taken.

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD US ARMY



COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART
THIRD U.S. ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD U.S. ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH — DAILY ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH — THIRD U.S. ARMY CASUALTIES



* Includes 6677 PW's evacuated through medical channels for month.

AUGUST

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Daily Dead (est.)	No daily breakdown this period. Cumulative total on 8th.							3707	543	800	750	100	3400	50	966	384	100	150	50	25	5	1970	820	680	1100	400	200	600	1200	300	200
Daily Wounded (est.)								9304	4196	6400	5100		13400	5600	2000	1500	500	750	100	50	25	2075	1760	1240	1250	250	250	1250	1500	1200	200
Daily Captured	4181	1672	499	1685	769	1354	1319	1345	3816	4992	2423	2256	2224	3425	3022	4162	1499	2567	1575	820	1683	762	960	1110	1766	2087	1934	1930	2741	1798	7640*
Total	4181	1672	499	1685	769	1354	1319	14356	8555	12192	8273	2356	19024	9075	5988	6046	2099	3467	1725	895	1713	4807	3540	3030	4116	2737	2384	3780	5441	3898	8040

	U																														
Daily Dead	21	38	35	35	33	58	92	61	89	181	219	228	158	88	42	102	54	63	42	27	24	45	41	33	53	21	35	148	146	144	89
Daily Wounded	93	163	150	153	133	219	470	249	406	831	958	865	665	994	344	690	198	229	160	140	175	190	193	164	238	153	181	686	668	476	699
Daily Missing	89	50	45	48	54	69	73	76	125	257	288	59	45	21	15	53	116	77	73	74	19	38	29	27	27	12	18	103	83	31	82
Total	143	251	230	236	220	346	635	386	620	1269	1465	1152	868	703	401	845	368	369	275	241	218	273	263	224	318	186	234	937	891	651	770

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









TERRITORY LIBERATED BY ALLIED FORCES IN NORTHERN FRANCE THROUGH 31 AUGUST

LEGEND:

- FIRST US ARMY 6 JUNE - 1 AUGUST
- 21 ARMY GROUP BR 6 JUNE - 1 AUGUST
- 21 ARMY GROUP BR 1 - 31 AUGUST
- FIRST US ARMY 1 - 31 AUGUST
- THIRD US ARMY 1-31 AUGUST

DATA ON TERRITORY LIBERATED BY THIRD US ARMY

71 Important cities captured	406,000 refugees cared for	6,163,000 population liberated
35,000 square miles of territory	500 air miles distance E-W	1,000 mile south flank

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Kilometers 20 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

THIRD ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS

1-31 AUGUST



NOTE:

* RELEASED TO CONTROL OF BRITTANY BASE SECTION AND XIII CORPS AFTER AUG 21

O-OPENED

C-CLOSED

TOWNS CAPTURED BY THIRD U S ARMY
AUGUST

TOWN	CORPS	DATE
Angers	XX	10 August
Alencon	XV	12 "
Argentan	XV	13 "
Bar-Le-Duc	XII	31 "
Chateaubriant	VIII	3 "
Cap Frehal	VIII	15 "
Chartres	XX	16 "
Chateaudun	XII	17 "
Chateaulin	VIII	17 "
Chateau Thierry	XX	26 "
Chalons-Sur-Marne	XII	28 "
Commercy	XII	31 "
Ducy	VIII	1 "
Dol	VIII	3 "
Dinan	VIII	5 "
Dinard	VIII	13 "
Dreux	XV	15 "
Daoulas Peninsula	VIII	30 "
Evran	VIII	2 "
Etampes	XX	21 "
Epernay	XX	28 "
Fougeres	VIII	3 "
Gourin	VIII	5 "
Guincamp	VIII	7 "
Houdan	XV	17 "
Joigny	XII	25 "
Loudeac	VIII	3 "
Landivisiau	VIII	6 "
Lesneven	VIII	6 "
Laval	XV	7 "
Le Mans	XV	8 "
Le-Mele-Sur-Sarthe	XV	13 "
Mayenne	XV	5 "

TOWN	CORPS	DATE
Morlaix	VIII	8 August
Mantes-Gassicourt	XV	18 "
Montargis	XII	23 "
Montereau	XX	23 "
Melun	XX	25 "
Montmiral	XX	27 "
Nantes	VIII	13 "
Nogent-Sur-Seine	XX	26 "
Pontorson	VIII	1 "
Pontivy	VIII	4 "
Plouneor	VIII	6 "
Plouvien	VIII	7 "
Paimpol	VIII	17 "
Pithiviers	XII	21 "
Provins	XX	28 "
Plougastel	VIII	28 "
Quedillac	VIII	2 "
Rennes	VIII	4 "
Redon	VIII	4 "
Reims	XX	29 "
St Brieuc	VIII	6 "
St Renan	VIII	7 "
St Michel-En-Greve	VIII	11 "
Sees	XV	12 "
St Malo	VIII	17 "
Sens	XII	21 "
St Florentin	XII	25 "
Sezanne	XX	28 "
St Dizier	XII	31 "
Troyes	XII	25 "
Vannes	VIII	5 "
Vitry-Le-Francois	XII	28 "
Verdun	XX	30 "

Chapter 4

SEPTEMBER

CROSSING THE MOSELLE



SEPTEMBER OPERATIONS

Operations of Third U. S. Army as they developed during September underwent an abrupt change as the history-making pace of the Army's August advance was slowed, making necessary a type of warfare considerably different from that employed during the first thirty-one days of Continental action. At the beginning of the month it was apparent that, whatever the cause, an acute shortage of gasoline was seriously impairing the Army's mobility. Subsequently came other supply shortages, plus an enemy build-up and steadily worsening weather conditions. By the end of September Third U. S. Army had gone from an offensive to a defensive status, as will be shown in detail.

The campaign during the month can be considered from four phases: first, the slowing of the Army's offensive, whereupon a fleeing and badly beaten enemy turned around at the German border and occupied the MOSELLE River line; second, the battle in which the enemy fought desperately to prevent crossings of the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers, and launched counterattacks against the north and south flanks of Third U.S. Army; third, developments along the flanks; and fourth, termination of the Army's activities in the BRITTANY Peninsula. Each of these phases is summarized in greater detail at the close of the chapter.

To illustrate pertinent facts about the September campaign, maps are presented herein, dated 15, 25, and 30 September. Charts and graphs at the end of the chapter give figures on losses of personnel and materiel by both Third U. S. Army and the enemy. A map showing main supply routes and supply points is included. Annexes include: No. 1, Twelfth U. S. Army Group operational directives; No. 2, Third U.S. Army operational directives; and No. 3, the operational report of the XIX Tactical Air Command.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

1 SEPTEMBER *(D+87)*

The enemy was unable to organize an established line against the XII Corps and offered only scattered and sporadic resistance against the XX Corps. Feverish construction activity was reported in the Westwall sector between METZ (U85) and SAARBRUCKEN (Q47).

Twelfth U. S. Army Group directed the Third U.S. Army to cross the line of the SEINE and YONNE Rivers in the Army zone and to advance and seize the line VITRY LE FRANCOIS (T61) - CHALONS-SUR-MARNE (T54) - REIMS (T37). The Army was to be prepared to continue the advance on Twelfth U. S. Army Group order to seize the crossings of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM (R59) to KOBLENZ (L99), both inclusive.

Employing the VIII Corps (the 2d, 8th, 29th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 6th Armored Division), the Third U.S. Army was to complete reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula. The Army was to protect the south flank along the LOIRE River to ORLEANS (F62) and thence to the east, for this purpose at least one division was to be employed in the area ORLEANS (F62) - MONTARGIS (X24) - SENS (X66) - TROYES (Y27).

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) and the CROZON Peninsula continued. The attack of the 2d Infantry Division on the port was supported by a forty-five minute artillery preparation, fired by the division artillery and three field artillery groups having a total of nine battalions. Artillery with the VIII Corps fired 570 missions, including 136 counterbattery missions, in the twenty-four hour period ending at 0600. The VIII Corps artillery utilized a so-called "flash bang" counterbattery procedure that proved very effective in silencing enemy guns emplaced in strongly fortified positions. Single pieces, batteries, and occasionally, even battalions, when not actively engaged in other missions, were kept laid on known enemy guns. All observation facilities, including ground, air, sound and flash, were coordinated on enemy gun positions. Whenever an enemy gun opened fire it was detected immediately and prompt counterbattery fire either destroyed the enemy or silenced it by driving its personnel to cover.

Elements of the 83d Infantry Division launched an attack against the ILE DE CEZEMBRE off ST MALO (S71). Other elements of the 83d Infantry Division continued to protect the south flank of the Army as far south as ORLEANS (F62), while Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division continued moving along the north bank of the LOIRE River to the east, clearing pockets of enemy resistance enroute. Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division contained LORIENT (G72).

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division held the high ground east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U43) - COMMERCY (U42), while Combat Command "B" crossed the river in the vicinity of CHALAINES (U50) ten miles southwest of TOUL (U61) and occupied the high ground in that area. The 80th Infantry Division crossed the MEUSE River in the vicinity of COMMERCY (U42) and reached the high ground east of ST MIHIEL (U43) - COMMERCY (U42). The 2d Cavalry Group pushed reconnaissance elements to the general line MIRECOURT (Z86) - NANCY (U81) - PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73).

XV Corps concentrated in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40). In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division secured a bridgehead over the MEUSE River at VERDUN (U26), while the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the vicinity of CHEPPY (U07) twelve miles west of VERDUN (U26).

XIX Tactical Air Command provided close support to elements of the VIII Corps attacking BREST (V99), to Task Force "B" attacking in the QUIMPER (W15) and CROZON (V98) Peninsulas, and to elements of the XII and XX Corps, while conducting fighter sweeps and armed reconnaissance in the area REIMS (T37) - VERDUN (U26) - CHAUMONT (Z05). Aircraft flew 492 sorties during the day, which was featured by the destruction of eleven enemy planes confirmed, six probables and twelve damaged. Thirty three locomotives, 130 tanks and armored vehicles and 817 motor transports were damaged or destroyed in the day's activities.

Elements of the Third U.S. Army secured bridgeheads at ST MIHIEL (U43) - COMMERCY (U42) and VERDUN (U26) in operations during the first day of the month.

The supply situation was critical, especially as to Class III supplies, since transportation facilities had not kept pace with the rapidly lengthening supply line. This caused a strict rationing policy to be placed in effect. Class I supplies on hand were adequate for maintenance plus a small reserve. Twelfth U.S. Army Group allocated 2,000 tons of supplies daily to the Third U.S. Army (tonnage for the VIII Corps was not included in this total), 5,000 tons daily to the First U.S. Army, and the remainder available for transport equally to Third and First U.S. Armies. Daily requirements of the Third U.S. Army were estimated to be approximately 5,500 tons, including 450,000 gallons of gasoline and 10,000 gallons of diesel, plus balanced quantities of oils and greases. The requirements became greater as divisions were added. The daily request was for 1,050,000 gallons of gasoline, but receipts amounted to only 110,600 gallons. Rations on hand totaled 592,562, all of the operational type, and unit reserves were intact. Thus it was decided to reduce ration shipments to 500 tons daily for 2, 3, and 4 September and increase daily gasoline requisitions to 1,500 tons, less diesel, for Class III supplies.

On this date the Twelfth U.S. Army Group officially was designated the Central Group of Armies.

A medical gas treatment battalion arrived fully-equipped in the Third U.S. Army assembly area, making a total of three such battalions available to the Army.

Engineers continued a study of crossings of the RHINE River and stream crossings between the SEINE and RHINE Rivers. Reproduction of topographic maps covering the SIEGFRIED Line in front of the Third U.S. Army was begun.

2 SEPTEMBER *(D+88)*

The enemy was reported cleared from north of the LOIRE River between SAUMUR (P15) and TOURS (P76) and from ANGERS (O87) to ORLEANS (F62), and made scattered contact along the XII Corps front.

VIII Corps (the 2d, 8th, 29th, and 83d Infantry Divisions, the 6th Armored Division and supporting troops) was directed by the Army Commander to extend the area of its responsibility to include MONTARGIS (X24), utilizing Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division. Combat Command "B" was to keep contact with the 83d Infantry Division on the west and the 35th Infantry Division on the east.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) continued against strong enemy resistance.

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division continued to hold the high ground east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity of ST MIHIEL (U43) - COMMERCY (U42). The 35th Infantry Division remained in positions protecting the Army south flank, while the 80th Infantry Division maintained its hold on the high ground east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity north of COMMERCY (U42). The 2d Cavalry Group continued patrolling along the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of NANCY (U81).

XV Corps continued its concentration in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40).

In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division secured its bridgehead east of the MEUSE River with elements at ETAIN (U47) - AMBLY (U34) and VERDUN (U26). The 5th Infantry Division outposted VERDUN (U26) with elements northeast and southeast of the town. The 3d Cavalry Group patrolled along the MOSELLE River near METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division remained in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur continued to attack and harass the enemy in the HAUTE MARNE and LOIRE ET CHER areas.

XIX Tactical Air Command gave support to units of the VIII Corps attacking BREST (V99), to Task Force "B" attacking in the CROZON Peninsula (V98) and to major elements of the XII, XV, and XX Corps, while conducting armed reconnaissance to the German frontier. In 164 sorties the Command claimed forty-seven railroad cars, 106 motor transports, seven locomotives and seven tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or damaged.

As the result of fighting during the period, the 7th Armored Division secured its bridgehead on the MEUSE River and extended reconnaissance to the east.

Classes II and IV supplies, especially woolen clothing and blankets, became so critical that they were given priority for the first time. The daily telegram requested 750,000 gallons of gasoline, of which 25,390 were received.

Civil affairs detachments were spread throughout Third U.S. Army's zone of operations covering two-thirds of France. French civil administration was reported to be in excellent condition, capable officials appointed by the provisional government cooperating efficiently in carrying out the wishes of the Army Commander. The order of the Supreme Commander that "Civil Administration in all areas will be normally controlled by the French themselves" was followed, civil affairs detachments being assigned to towns and cities only when investigation indicated a need for them. Through civil affairs the Army helped in the feeding and care of the civilian population by taking charge of captured foodstuffs and gasoline released for civilian use. Many tons of German food, including grain, flour, sugar and rice, and hundreds of carloads of coal were distributed. Early in September, through naval liaison officers, resumption of fishing along the north coast of BRITTANY was allowed.

An air evacuation holding unit of the Advance Section Communications Zone was declared available for evacuation of Third U.S. Army patients. The Engineers started projecting the proposed Army main supply routes from the MARNE to the MOSELLE Rivers.

3 SEPTEMBER *(D + 89)*

Enemy capabilities as estimated at this time leaned to the conclusion that the overall enemy attitude would remain defensive. The most favored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay in the Army's zone of advance, supported by local counterattacks, to screen the withdrawal of his forces behind the SIEGFRIED Line. The next most favored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay in the Army's zone of advance while establishing blocking lines south of the Army's south flank to screen the withdrawal of his escaping forces south of the LOIRE River and from the upper RHONE Valley to the northeast. The third most favored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay east of the MOSELLE River, while massing reserves from the PAS DE CALAIS, southern France, Germany and more distant fronts for a large-scale counterattack.

In an estimate of enemy strength two divisions from the Italian front were identified and a third division tentatively identified. Actually, with the final tabulation of enemy losses in the pocket west of the SEINE River, the overall total of enemy combat troops on the front had diminished during the past week. It was estimated that the enemy had lost 264,300 infantry and 120,000 Panzer troops. His estimated effective strength was 106,700 infantry and 78,000 Panzer troops and his estimated combat strength when committed was 371,000 infantry and 198,000 Panzer troops.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) and in the CROZON Peninsula (V98) continued. ILE-DE-CEZEMBRE off ST MALO (S71) surrendered at 0930 to the unrelenting attack of elements of the VIII Corps, supported by artillery and bombardment by planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command which used the island as a last resort target and dumping ground for unused bombs.

In the XII Corps zone the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions continued to consolidate their positions east of the MEUSE River while pushing patrols to the east.

The XV Corps concentrated in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40). The XX Corps secured the VERDUN (U26) bridgehead while pushing patrols to the east.

Forward Machine Gun Outpost East of Verdun



Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command provided close support to units of the VIII Corps attacking BREST (V99) and to Task Force "B" attacking in the CROZON peninsula. Close support was given to the XII and XX Corps and armed reconnaissance was conducted up to the German border. Fighter bombers flew thirty-eight missions with 510 sorties but found few targets. Fourteen railroad cars and forty-five military installations were damaged or destroyed.

Elements of the Third U.S. Army continued to secure and enlarge its bridgeheads, with active reconnaissance to the east during the period.

The Central Group of Armies officially became Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

The Army was seriously hampered by the shortage of gasoline. Many supporting units including all field artillery, were immobilized. In the XII Corps zone movement was restricted and in the XV Corps zone activity was limited to small patrols. As the airfield at REIMS (T37) was operational for the receipt of supplies, a request was made that gasoline be shipped there, since tonnage allocations of the Army were not arriving by other means of transportation. The daily request was for 590,000 gallons of gasoline, of which 49,930 gallons were received.

Engineers in the meantime began a terrain study of western Germany to determine its suitability for mechanized operations.

4 SEPTEMBER (D + 90)

The enemy built up a defensive position along the line PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73)- TOUL (U61) and south along the MOSELLE River, and resisted strongly at NANCY (U81) and in the FORET DE HAYE (U70), three miles west of NANCY (U81). Forward elements of the VIII Corps were in contact at several points with the enemy at BREST (V99).

Twelfth U.S. Army Group directed that the Ninth U.S. Army assume command of the VIII Corps (2d, 8th, 29th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 6th Armored Division) although the 83d Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division were to be released to the XV Corps of the Third U.S. Army upon transfer of the VIII Corps effective at 1200 hours, 5 September, and gave the corps the mission of reducing the BRITTANY Peninsula and protecting the south flank of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS (F62), exclusive. The Ninth U.S. Army was to prepare for further action to the east on the right (south) flank of the Third U.S. Army.

The Army Commander directed an advance to the east with two corps abreast, one corps initially covering the right flank and later advancing to the east. A bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River was to be established, the advance was to continue and a bridgehead east of the RHINE River from KOBLENZ (L99) exclusive to KARLSRUHE (R44) inclusive was to be seized.

XX Corps (the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to seize METZ (U85) without delay, advance east of the MOSELLE River within its zone, to seize MAINZ (M35), and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone. The Corps was to be prepared to continue the advance to seize FRANKFURT (M66) on Army order and was to maintain contact with the First U.S. Army on the left (north).

XII Corps (the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, the 4th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to seize NANCY (U81) and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River within its zone. It was to protect the south flank of the Army until relieved by elements of the XV Corps, to be prepared to continue the advance rapidly to the northeast, on Army order, to seize MANNHEIM (R59) and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone.

Artillery Cleans Mud From Shells in Moselle Sector

XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 2d French Armored Division) was ordered to move to an area southeast of TROYES (Y27) and to protect the south flank of the Army from MONTARGIS (X24) to the east, relieving elements of the XII Corps. The corps was to move the 79th Infantry Division, upon release by the First U.S. Army, to a concentration area southeast of TROYES (Y27) and was to direct the 83d Infantry Division, upon release by the VIII Corps, to move to an area selected by the XV Corps. It was to seize the line of the MOSELLE River within its zone and be prepared to continue the advance to the northeast to seize KARLSRUHE (R44) and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone, or to move through bridgeheads secured by the XII or XX Corps. The 6th Armored Division, upon being released by the VIII Corps, was to be moved to an area east of TROYES (Y27) as Army reserve.

In the VIII Corps zone the attack on BREST (V99) and the CROZON Peninsula (V98) was continued, with slow progress being made against a determined enemy entrenched in solid forts and blockhouses. Artillery with VIII Corps fired 607 missions in the twenty-four hour period ending at 0600 4 September, including 105 counterbattery missions and 265 harassing missions. Many duds were noted in the enemy artillery.

In the XII Corps zone the 80th Infantry Division occupied a line running north of TOUL (U61), with the 317th Infantry concentrated in the vicinity of BERNECOURT (U62) the 318th Infantry, less one battalion at COMMERCY (U42), in the vicinity of FRANCHEVILLE (U61) and the 319th Infantry concentrated in areas northwest and southwest of TOUL (U61). The 4th Armored Division remained in its position east of the MEUSE River while the 35th Infantry Division continued its mission of protecting the south flank of the Army.

XV Corps concentrated in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40). XX Corps continued to secure a bridgehead in the vicinity of VERDUN (U26) while pushing patrols aggressively to the east.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur captured a bridge across the MOSELLE River, destroyed an enemy gasoline dump of 200,000 gallons, and generally continued to harass the enemy. The Army Commander instructed Forces Francaises de l'Interieur to assist in establishing traffic control in key cities on main supply routes to assist in the movement of Army supplies.

Planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command flew close support for the 2d, 8th, and 29th Infantry Divisions attacking BREST (V99), and Task Force "B" attacking in the CROZON Peninsula (V98). Limited in its operations due to adverse weather the Command flew 159 sorties in nine missions, destroying seventy-seven railroad cars and nineteen motor transports, while continuing to disrupt the enemy's rail transportation.

Third U.S. Army continued to secure bridgeheads, with active reconnaissance to the east, while every effort was made to bring up sufficient gasoline and other supplies to continue the attack toward the German frontier.

The daily tonnage of supplies allocated to the Third U.S. Army was increased to 3,500 tons. Gasoline receipts began to increase, 240,265 gallons being received of 640,000 gallons requested. The Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to a bivouac area north of MARSON (T63), eight miles east of CHALONS SUR MARNE (T54).

5 SEPTEMBER (D+91)

On the XII Corps front the 2d Cavalry Group contacted the enemy along a line PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) - TOUL (U61) - ST VINCENT (U80) - BAYON (Z98) and efforts to penetrate this line met with machine gun and artillery fire. On the XX Corps front the 3d Cavalry Group found the area NILVANGE (U78) - HAVANGE (U78) - TERVILLE (U88) - UCKANGE (U88) strongly held with tanks, anti-tank weapons, and infantry.

Mortar Crew Shells German Strongpoint

In the XII Corps zone the 80th Infantry Division attacked to the east and reached the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) with the 317th Infantry in the vicinity of BLENOD (U73), one mile south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the 318th Infantry in the vicinity of MARBACHE (U72) twelve miles northeast of TOUL (U61) and the 319th Infantry in the vicinity of TOUL (U61). Against stiff enemy resistance the division was able to force a part of one battalion across the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The 4th Armored Division remained in position east of the MEUSE River while the 35th Infantry Division continued to protect the south flank of the Army.

The XV Corps continued concentrating in the vicinity of NANGIS (S40), with the 79th Infantry Division enroute to an intermediate assembly area in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

XX Corps launched an attack to the east against stiff enemy resistance to force crossings over the MOSELLE River north and south of METZ (U85). Elements of the 90th Infantry Division advanced from REIMS (T37) to an area northeast of VERDUN (U26). The 5th Infantry Division attacked to the east, with the 2d Infantry reaching the vicinity of BUZY (U56), twelve miles east of VERDUN (U26) the 10th Infantry in the vicinity of FRESNES (H20), seven miles south of TONNERRE (H21) and the 11th Infantry in the vicinity of DONCOURT (U66) two miles southeast of CONFLANS (U66).

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur cleared out the northern part of the YONNE department and continued to disrupt the withdrawal activities of the enemy.

Flying 389 sorties in thirty-one missions, the XIX Tactical Air Command dropped 108 napalm tanks on enemy installations and troops, the heaviest concentration of these tanks since the Command became operational. Among other claims during the day were nineteen railroad lines cut, thirty-one gun installations and forty-six military installations damaged or destroyed.

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army resumed its advance to the east toward the heavily fortified cities of METZ (U85) and NANCY (U81) in ALSACE-LORRAINE with the enemy offering strong resistance.

The gasoline situation continued to improve as the air lift began at the REIMS (T37) airstrip, where 70,250 gallons of gasoline were received. Of 560,000 gallons of gasoline requested on this date, 275,720 gallons were received.

6 SEPTEMBER (D + 92)

In the XII Corps zone the enemy held a line along the MOSELLE River and resisted at CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z47) and in the vicinity of NANCY (U81) - PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The enemy was entrenching in considerable strength at GRAVELOTTE (U75) in the XX Corps zone, but French civilians reported little troop activity along the SIEGFRIED Line.

XII Corps continued its attack to gain a bridgehead over the MOSELLE River. Against strong enemy resistance and continuous counterattacks the elements of the 80th Infantry Division which were across the MOSELLE River were withdrawn. The 317th Infantry remained in the vicinity of BLENOD (U73), one mile south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), while the 318th Infantry reached the vicinity of BELLEVILLE (U72) and the 319th Infantry occupied a line from the vicinity of GONDREVILLE-SUR-MOSELLE (U71) four miles northeast of TOUL (U61) to VILLEY-LE-SEC (U70), three miles east of TOUL (U61). The 35th Infantry Division continued to protect the south flank of the Army while the 4th Armored Division remained in positions east of the MEUSE River.

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division continued to move to an assembly area in the vicinity of REIMS (T37).

In the XX Corps zone the 7th Armored Division crossed the MEUSE River and advanced toward the MOSELLE River. Combat Command "A" of the 7th Armored Division moved in two columns to the vicinity of ROMBAS (U87), ten miles east of CONFLANS (U66), on the north, and ST PRIVAT-LA-MONTAGNE (U76), eight miles northwest of METZ (U85), on the south. Combat Command "B" also moved in two columns and reached the river in the vicinity of DORNOT (U75), five miles southwest of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division closed in an area near FOAMEIX (U47), two miles northwest of ETAIN (U47), while the 5th Infantry Division continued to force crossings of the MOSELLE River against very stiff enemy resistance.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur continued guerilla actions against strong enemy resistance in the vicinities of HAUTE-MARNE, MEURTHE ET MOSELLE, NIEVRE, and VOSGES, where 200 Maquis were killed in action. The enemy was cleared from the department of AUBE with several thousand prisoners taken, including two generals.

The XIX Tactical Air Command continued its heavy pressure on the enemy with 416 sorties in thirty-seven missions. Claims for the day included seventy-five motor transports, thirty-two gun installations, and twenty-seven military installations damaged or destroyed.

Artillery ammunition shortages became increasingly critical. The XX Corps had a fair supply but the XII Corps was very short of all types of artillery ammunition and fuzes.

The gasoline shortage was alleviated by air and rail shipments of 358,840 gallons, of which 58,605 gallons were received in the first air shipment to RENNEVILLE (Q42).

7 SEPTEMBER (D + 93)

In the XII Corps zone the enemy continued to hold a general line CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z47) - MIRECOURT (Z86) and north along the MOSELLE River. In the XX Corps zone the enemy defended the east bank of the MOSELLE River.

In the XII Corps zone the 80th Infantry Division continued attacking against fierce resistance to drive bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River. The 319th Infantry secured a bridgehead across the river in the vicinity of GONDREVILLE-SUR-MOSELLE (U71) four miles northeast of TOUL (U61) - VILLEY-LE-SEC (U70), three miles east of TOUL (U61). The 35th Infantry Division prepared to move east toward NANCY (U81) and its 134th Infantry moved to an area northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). The 4th Armored Division remained in position east of the MEUSE River.

Because of the wide corps frontage, the XII Corps established two corps artillery fire direction centers, one operating in rear of the north elements of the corps and the other in rear of the south elements.

The XII Corps attached one 105 howitzer battalion to the 2d Cavalry Group operating in advance of the corps with a mission to push on to LUNEVILLE (V09). In one instance this force encountered and attacked an enemy column, the cavalry attacking the front of the column and the artillery firing upon its rear. This combination destroyed thirty-six enemy vehicles and inflicted heavy casualties.

The XV Corps prepared to move to a concentration area south and east of TROYES (Y27). The 2d French Armored Division started its movement from PARIS (S04) to an area in the vicinity of BAR-SUR-AURE (Y76). The 79th Infantry Division, less one combat team, moved into an area south of REIMS (T37) and continued movement south to the vicinity of JOINVILLE-EN-VALLAGE (Z08) and TROYES (Y27), preparing to relieve elements of the 35th Infantry Division which were protecting the south flank of the Army. The other combat team of the 79th Infantry Division was enroute from the First U.S. Army to vicinity of JOINVILLE-EN-VALLAGE (Z08).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division, fighting against increasing enemy resistance, advanced toward the MOSELLE River with the 2d Infantry in the vicinity of VERNEVILLE (U76), ten miles northwest of METZ (U85), and the 11th Infantry in the vicinity of CORNY (U74), seven miles southwest of METZ (U85). Elements of the division forced a crossing of the river in the vicinity of CORNY (U74) and were followed over by elements of the 7th Armored Division. The 90th Infantry Division repulsed strong enemy counterattacks from the north and continued its advance to the MOSELLE River, reaching a line from AUDUN (U68) to BRIEY (U77), with the 359th Infantry in the vicinity of FOAMEIX (U47), two miles northwest of ETAIN (U47), cleaning up pockets of enemy resistance.

Hundreds of Germans were killed and over 1,000 prisoners taken in the ARDENNES (O80) sector by the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, while 1,500 resistance troops and AMERICAN elements who had been ordered to occupy CHATILLON (O80), nine miles northwest of BUZANCY (T99), took 200 prisoners and killed 100 Germans.

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 238 sorties in sixteen missions in the day's operations with 132 motor transports destroyed and 310 horse-drawn vehicles, eleven gun installations and eleven military installations damaged or destroyed during the day.

Elements of the Third U.S. Army forced crossings over the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of CORNY (U74), seven miles southwest of METZ (U85), and continued the attack toward the German border during the period.

For the first time in September receipts of Class III supplies exceeded the requests as the first rail shipment of gasoline arrived at SOMMESOUS (T42). Delivery of approximately 200,000 gallons of gasoline helped to build up the unit reserves but still left receipts for the month 2,856,000 gallons short of requests.

8 SEPTEMBER *(D+94)*

On the XII Corps front a captured enemy overlay showed a defensive line with strong points at EPINAL (V05) - NANCY (U81) - METZ (U85) - THIONVILLE (U88) and a secondary line at SAARGEMUND (Q55) - BITSCH (Q75) WORTH (R03) - STRASBOURG (W09) - COLMAR (V70). In the XX Corps zone the enemy held the east bank of the MOSELLE River and a bridgehead running from METZ (U85) to AMANVILLERS (U76) - VERNVILLE (U76), one mile east of GRAVELOTTE (U75) and southeast to the MOSELLE.

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division, having been relieved by elements of the 79th Infantry Division (XV Corps), started moving east with the 134th Infantry closing in the vicinity northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). The 80th Infantry Division continued its drive against stiff enemy resistance to cross the MOSELLE River while the 4th Armored Division remained in position east of the MEUSE River.

The XV Corps continued to move to its concentration area south and east of TROYES (Y27). The 315th Infantry (79th Infantry Division) closed in its area east of JOINVILLE (Z08) while the other two regiments were en route to their new locations. Two Combat Commands of the 2d French Armored Division closed into a concentration area in the vicinity of BAR-SUR-AURE (Y76) with the balance of the division en route.

In the XX Corps zone fierce fighting continued on both sides of the MOSELLE River, the enemy launching four counterattacks. Elements of the 7th Armored Division and 5th Infantry Division continued to cross the river in the vicinity of CORNY (U74), seven miles southwest of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued to attack against very determined enemy resistance to secure crossings in its zone, while patrols of the division established contact with elements of the V Corps, First U.S. Army, on the north.

Continuing its close support of Third U. S. Army, the XIX Tactical Air Command flew 470 sorties in thirty-nine missions. Planes concentrated heavily on the enemy's military installations with the following claims: twenty-eight gun installations and 136 military installations were destroyed or damaged during the day's operation.

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army increased its bridgeheads over the MOSELLE and continued to move east.

A beginning was made toward a policy of moving Third U.S. Army hospitals into buildings, all hospitals previously having been under canvas in the field.

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9 SEPTEMBER *(D+95)*

An estimate of enemy capabilities at this time still attributed to him only a defensive attitude. The most favored capability was that the enemy could defend and delay east of the MOSELLE River, counterattacking with armor-spearheaded assaults against the Army's bridgeheads to contain them and impede eastward advance. The other capabilities in order of preference were:1. that the enemy could oppose the Army's eastward advance with local armor-spearheaded assaults against the shoulders of the advance from the northeast in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U78) and from the southeast in the vicinity of NANCY (U81), 2. that he could continue to establish blocking lines south of the south flank in the LANGRES (J22) - CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) area to screen the withdrawal to the northeast of his forces withdrawing before the Seventh U.S. Army, 3. that he could defend and delay in the zone of Third U.S. Army's advance, supported by counterattacks against bridgeheads over the MOSELLE River and the shoulders of the advance to gain time to bring up reserves from distant areas and to organize and man the SIEGFRIED line, and 4. that he could defend and delay in Third U.S. Army's zone of advance, while launching counterattacks against the south flank from the CHAUMONT (Z04) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) area.

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of COLOMBEY-LES-BELLES (Z69). The 80th Infantry Division continued its drive to cross the MOSELLE River in the face of ever-stiffening enemy resistance, with the 319th Infantry holding the northern half of LIVERDUN (U71) six miles northwest of NANCY (U81). The 4th Armored Division remained in position east of the MEUSE River in the vicinity of COMMERCY (U42).

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division closed into its assembly area in the vicinity of JOINVILLE-EN-VALLAGE (Z08), while the 2d French Armored Division closed in its assembly area southeast of BAR-SURE-AURE (Y76) and made contact with Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division to the west.

Medics Attend Wounded As Infantry Moves Forward Across Moselle

Upon request of the XV Corps, Forces Francaises de l'Interieur troops protected the bridges and contained enemy pockets in the CHAUMONT (Z05) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) area. The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur reported that the departments of YONNE and AUBE were free of the enemy, enemy casualties amounting to 2,000 killed and 5,000 prisoners. This cleared a large area in the rear of the XV Corps.

XX Corps continued fighting fiercely to exploit crossings of the MOSELLE River. The 5th Infantry Division furthered its crossings over that river, while elements of the 10th Infantry crossed at NOVEANT (U74). The 90th Infantry Division pushed forward, with the 357th Infantry reaching the vicinity of AVRIL (U77), four miles north of BRIEY (U77), the 358th Infantry reaching the vicinity of FONTOY (U78), eight miles west of THIONVILLE (U88), and with the 359th Infantry fighting in the vicinity of AUDUN-LE-ROMAN (U68). Elements of Combat Command "A" (7th Armored Division, with the 2d Infantry of the 5th Infantry Division attached) reached a line in the vicinity southeast of AMANVILLERS (U76), seven miles northwest of METZ (U85). Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division was attached to the 5th Infantry Division.

The artillery ammunition supply situation improved on all calibers with the notable exception of 105 howitzer ammunition, which was critically short. Air shipment was requested in the priority 105 howitzer, 155 howitzer, and 155 gun. XX Corps artillery did perhaps its most active firing to date, over 20,000 rounds being expended in two days. In one instance one 240 howitzer battalion obtained six direct hits out of ten rounds fired at a fort in the METZ (U85) area and succeeded in starting fires. The enemy was making extensive use of the old forts around METZ (U85) and all lighter calibered weapons had proved ineffective against these defenses.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 308 sorties in twenty-five missions during the day, with excellent claims being made on enemy rail installations, eighty-eight motor transports, 200 locomotives, twenty-seven gun installations and thirty-two military installations were damaged or destroyed while thirteen tanks and armored vehicles were knocked out during the day. Five enemy airdromes were attacked.

During the period elements of the Third U.S. Army continued to exploit the crossing of the MOSELLE River, while additional forces concentrated to the south preparatory to being committed.

The Third U.S. Army asked to be relieved of the responsibility for accepting the surrender of a German general and 18,000 troops in the province of LOIRE. It was recommended that the Ninth U.S. Army perform this mission.

The Army captured 2,600,000 pounds of frozen beef and 500,000 pounds of canned beef, property of the German Army, and issue to front line troops was started at once. Four medical ambulance companies and one field hospital were transferred from Third U.S. Army to the First U.S. Army.

10 SEPTEMBER (*D+96*)

On the XII Corps front the enemy still held the MOSELLE River line. There was no change in the METZ (U85) area on the XX Corps front and the enemy continued a determined resistance to expansion of the Third U.S. Army bridgehead east of the MOSELLE.

The XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions, and the 2d French Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to move without delay to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River within its zone and to leave behind only minimum forces necessary to cover the south flank from MONTARGIS (X24) to CHAUMONT (Z05), inclusive.

The enemy continued his stubborn resistance of the MOSELLE River line along the entire Third U.S. Army zone and improved his defensive positions in the FORET DE HAYE (U70) area, three miles west of NANCY (U81).

XII Corps launched an attack to secure bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River. The 35th Infantry Division succeeded in forcing two battalions of the 134th Infantry across the river in the vicinity of FLAVIGNY (Z89), eight miles south of NANCY (U81), against heavy enemy resistance, while the 137th Infantry advanced to the MOSELLE River. The 80th Infantry Division continued to push forward against increasing enemy resistance. Reserve Combat Command of the 4th Armored Division moved to the vicinity of RUPPES (Z58), nine miles northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57), and Combat Command "B" moved to the vicinity of HAROUE (Z88), fifteen miles south of NANCY (U81).

The XV Corps launched an attack to secure the west bank of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of CHARMES (Z97) and EPINAL (V05). The 79th Infantry Division advanced with the 313th Infantry in the vicinity of GONDRECOURT (Z39), the 314th Infantry in the vicinity of BETTONCOURT (Z89), four miles north of MIRECOURT (Z86), and the 315th Infantry in the vicinity of GERMAY (Z28) fifteen miles northwest of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). The 2d French Armored Division established contact with elements of the First French Infantry Division, Seventh U.S. Army, in the vicinity of SOMBERNON (N75). This development, the culmination of the Seventh U.S. Army's landing on the Mediterranean coast of France, placed a barrier of friendly troops between the Third U.S. Army's right (south) flank and the enemy, assured the Supreme Command a continuous battleline facing the German frontier, and trapped thousands of enemy troops behind the Allied lines in southwestern France.

In the XX Corps zone heavy fighting continued. The 90th Infantry Division moved forward to the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88) with elements of the division northwest and southwest of the city. Following a strong enemy counterattack, the 5th Infantry Division withdrew some of the elements of the 11th Infantry from the east bank of the MOSELLE River while the 10th Infantry, less one reinforced company, fought its way across the river in the vicinity of ARNAVILLE (U74), nine miles southwest of METZ (U85). Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of VAUX (U75), four miles west of METZ (U85).

Concentrating on enemy troops and military installations, the XIX Tactical Air Command flew 377 sorties during the day. Thirty-two enemy tanks, thirty-three gun installations and thirty-two military installations were damaged or destroyed during the period.

In operations for the day Third U.S. Army continued the attack to secure bridgeheads east of the MOSELLE River while patrols established contact with Seventh U.S. Army in the vicinity of SOMBERNON (N75).

Two tank destroyer battalions arrived on the Continent thereby completing the lift of all field artillery and tank destroyer units then assigned to the Third U.S. Army.

Ammunition supply continued to be critically short especially in the XII Corps. The weekly ammunition ration received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group allocated to Third U.S. Army approximately one-third of a unit of fire per day in all calibers of artillery weapons. All artillery stressed observed fires and held unobserved fires to a minimum in order to conserve ammunition. Air observation post patrols proved effective in minimizing enemy artillery fire, it being found that enemy artillery, to avoid disclosing their positions, would not fire so long as spotter planes were in the air.

11 SEPTEMBER *(D+97)*

In the XII Corps zone the enemy held the east bank of the MOSELLE River from PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) to GRIPPORT (Z98), except in the TOUL (U86) area. In the XV Corps zone the enemy continued to hold a blocking line CHATEAU VILLAIN (Y90) - CHAUMONT (Z04) - ANDELOT (Z16) - RIMANCOURT (Z26) - ST BLIN (Z26) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z47) - MIRECOURT (Z86) - CHARMES (Z97). On the XX Corps front he held the east bank of the MOSELLE River except for the bridgehead CORNY (U75) - NOVEANT (U74).

Infantry Advances in Bayon Zone.

The XII Corps continued its attack to secure bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River. In the zone of the 35th Infantry Division, the 320th Infantry less one battalion attached to Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division. assembled in the vicinity of VEZELISE (Z78), the 134th Infantry was in the vicinity of FROLOIS (Z89), nine miles southwest of NANCY (U81), while the 137th Infantry, having pushed seven companies across the river on a line north of BAYON (Z98), made contact one mile north of BAYON (Z98) with Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division. The 80th Infantry Division continued its advance with the 317th Infantry moving to a crossing site in the vicinity of DIEULOUARD (U72). The 318th Infantry, in preparing to follow Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division, assembled in the vicinity of ST JULIEN-LES-CORZE (U64), thirteen miles southwest of METZ (U85). Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division battled its way across the river in the vicinity of BAYON (Z98), with three infantry companies and two tank companies crossing at this point and two companies of armored infantry crossing in the vicinity of BAINVILLE (Z98), three miles south of BAYON (Z98).

XV Corps continued its advance with the 79th Infantry Division fighting its way toward the MOSELLE River. The 313th Infantry reached an area northeast of CHARMES (Z97), the 314th Infantry pushed southeast of CHARMES (Z97) and the 315th Infantry reached the vicinity southwest of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57), clearing the enemy from that area. The 2d French Armored Division advanced rapidly, encountering slight enemy resistance, with Combat Command "L" reaching the vicinity of CONTREXEVILLE (Z65), east of BULGNEVILLE (Z55), and Combat Command "V" reaching the vicinity of ST BLIN (Z26). Elements of the 106th Cavalry Group reached CHARMES (Z97).

The XX Corps continued to cross the MOSELLE River and established bridgeheads. In the zone of the 5th Infantry Division the 10th Infantry, plus two tank companies and one tank destroyer platoon, crossed the river in the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), while the 90th Infantry Division continued its attack in the north sector of the XX Corps zone. The 357th Infantry and the 358th Infantry reached the vicinity south of THIONVILLE (U88), while the 359th Infantry assembled in an area north west of THIONVILLE (U88). The 7th Armored Division with an attached infantry regiment of the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the vicinity south of AMANVILLERS (U76), seven miles northwest of METZ (U85).

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 411 sorties in forty-five missions during the day's operations, with heavy claims on enemy rail transportation, ninety-two railroad cars, forty-six motor transports, forty-four gun installations, thirty-five horse-drawn vehicles, and thirty-two military installations were damaged or destroyed.

In activities for the period the Third U.S. Army continued to secure bridgeheads established across the MOSELLE River, while major Army elements west of the river pushed forward preparatory to making additional crossings.

Of 300,000 rations requested, 65,348 were delivered. Reserves were used to make up the shortage. A total of 247,340 gallons of gasoline were received by air shipment to RENNEVILLE (Q42) and ETAIN (U47).

12 SEPTEMBER (D + 98)

In the XII Corps zone the enemy still held a position on the east bank of the MOSELLE River and strongly opposed expansion of the Third U. S. Army bridgehead, while the same situation was evident on the XX Corps front. There was no cohesive front line opposing the XV Corps.

Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division, by order of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, was released to the Third U.S. Army. The Combat Command was ordered to move to a designated assembly area east of TROYES (Y27) and the Commanding General was notified that the remainder of the division would be released soon for movement to the same assembly area.

The XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions and the 2d French Armored Division) was ordered to establish contact without delay with the Seventh U.S. Army in the vicinity of BAIGNEUX (097) and to maintain continuous contact thereafter. The corps was also ordered to capture NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) and to continue on its assigned mission. Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division was to take over protection of the south flank as far east as TROYES (Y27), inclusive, with the XV Corps responsible from TROYES (Y27), exclusive, to the east.

XII Corps continued to enlarge its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River north and south of NANCY (U81) at DIEULOUARD (U72) and NEUVILLER (Z98) two miles northwest of BAYON (Z98). In the 35th Infantry Division zone the 137th Infantry completed crossing the MOSELLE River north of BAYON (Z98) and the 320th Infantry crossed the river in the vicinity of ST MARD (Z99), three miles north of BAYON (Z98). The 80th Infantry Division continued its advance as the 317th Infantry and the 318th Infantry crossed the river in the vicinity of DIEULOUARD (U72), south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). After fighting its way across the river, the 317th Infantry gained control of the high ground south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The 4th Armored Division completed moving Combat Command "B" across the river in the vicinity of BAYON (Z98) while Combat Command "A" crossed the river in the vicinity of DIEULOUARD (U72). Reserve Combat Command prepared to cross the river in the vicinity of BAYON (Z98). In the XII Corps sector a 30-minute artillery preparation was fired by 80th Division Artillery and the reinforcing 404th Field Artillery Group for a crossing of the MOSELLE south of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the artillery preparation being fired in barrage fashion against the east bank of the river. Considerable enemy artillery fire was directed at the Army's forward elements and the bridgehead.

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division fought its way forward, with the 313th Infantry reaching the vicinity of MIRECOURT (Z86). The 314th Infantry occupied the city of CHARMES (Z97) and from there advanced one battalion across the MOSELLE River. The 315th Infantry captured the city of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). The 2d French Armored Division continued its advance. Combat Command "L" cleared the enemy from VITTEL (Z65), three miles northeast of CONTREXEVILLE (Z65), and continued to advance east to DOMPAIRE (Z85). Combat Command "V" advanced to the vicinity of VITTEL (Z65) three miles northeast of CONTREXEVILLE (Z65).

Liberated Russian Nationals in Third U.S. Army Area

XX Corps continued against determined resistance to strengthen its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River, with the 5th Infantry Division fighting to hold its crossings on the river. The 90th Infantry Division pushed forward with the 357th Infantry in the vicinity east of BRIEY (U77), the 358th Infantry in the outskirts of THIONVILLE (U88) and the 359th Infantry in the vicinity north of THIONVILLE (U88). UCKANGE (U87), four miles south of THIONVILLE (U88), was occupied by elements of the 90th Infantry Division. The 7th Armored Division continued to move forward toward the river in the vicinity of AMANVILLERS (U76), seven miles northwest of METZ (U85).

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 388 sorties in operations, which were featured by the destruction of thirty-five enemy planes confirmed and seven damaged on the ground while the Command lost eight planes. Other claims during the day's operation were sixty-eight railroad cars, 129 motor transports, thirteen locomotives and twenty-six gun installations damaged or destroyed. Two enemy airdromes were attacked during the period.

NEUFCHATEAU (Z57), VITTEL (Z65), and UCKANGE (Z87) fell to the Third U.S. Army advance, while other elements continued to secure and enlarge the MOSELLE River bridgeheads.

The Army photo center opened in the vicinity of ST DIZIER (T90), this being the first time that it was located within range of the SCR 193 radio. One artillery radio set was thereupon established at the officer's radio network operated for the first time as contemplated; that is, with one set each at the Army Command Post, the photo center and each corps artillery command post. A Third U.S. Army air evacuation holding unit was opened at ETAIN (U47). This was in accordance with existing policy that the Army set up these units as far forward and as soon as air strips became available. A request was made that the entire air lift available to this Army be used to supply ammunition on which a priority had been placed.

13 SEPTEMBER *(D + 99)*

In an estimate of enemy strength in the Third U.S. Army zone at this time, the equivalent of eight divisions, consisting of 67,500 troops and ninety tanks and assault guns, were identified in contact. Available as immediate reserves were the equivalent of six divisions, consisting of 53,500 troops and eighty tanks. In an estimate of the enemy's strategic reserves, it was considered that six divisions reported unlocated for several weeks were capable of being employed on the Army's front. There were indications that enemy reinforcements were en route from other fronts. It was estimated that by 1 October the enemy could bring the equivalent of three divisions with fifty tanks from Italy and four divisions from Denmark and Norway. Four other divisions were reported moving at various times from the two Scandinavian countries. There were no known reinforcements for the west coming from the Russian front, but the enemy had the capability of withdrawing an estimated three divisions and 150 tanks from the east by 1 October. Higher headquarters estimated that from within Germany fourteen divisions, all of low quality, and 200 tanks could be produced by 1 October. Not all of these divisions, of 8,000 men each, necessarily would be committed against the Third U.S. Army but they definitely constituted the enemy's strategic reserves for such employment.

In the zone of the XII Corps the 35th Infantry Division continued its advance with the 137th and the 320th Infantry Regiments moving on NANCY (U81) from the south. The 80th Infantry Division continued to exploit its crossings of the MOSELLE River. Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division reached the vicinity of ARRACOURT (Q11), northeast of NANCY (U81), some of its elements crossing the MEURTHE River in the vicinity of DAMELEVIERES (V09), eleven miles southeast of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "B" advanced to the vicinity of the FORET DE VITRIMONT (Q00), two miles west of LUNEVILLE (V09), meeting heavy resistance.

The XV Corps continued its advance to the east. The 79th Infantry Division advanced, capturing BETTONCOURT (Z87), four miles north of MIRECOURT (Z86), CHARMES (Z97), POUSSAY (Z77) and AMBRICOURT (H02) one mile north of MIRECOURT (Z86). Combat Command "L" of the 2d French Armored Division captured DOMPAIRE (Z65) and DAMAS (Z85), nine miles west of EPINAL (V05), and reached the vicinity of EPINAL (V05), while combat Command "V" advanced to the vicinity of MIRECOURT (Z86).

In the zone of the XX Corps the 5th Infantry Division, with Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division, attacked to expand their bridgehead to the south. They continued to hold the bridgehead and one battalion of the 11th Infantry crossed the MOSELLE River. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division moved to relieve elements of the 5th Infantry Division, while the 357th Infantry advanced to the river in the vicinity of RICHEMONT (U87), eleven miles north of METZ (U85). Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division completed crossing the MOSELLE River in the zone of the 5th Infantry Division.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew eighty-two sorties in nine missions with few claims for the day. Five gun installations were destroyed or damaged and three troop concentrations were attacked.

BETTONCOURT (Z87), CHARMES (Z97), POUSSAY (Z77), AMBRICOURT (H02), DAMAS (Z85), and DOMPAIRE (Z65) fell to the relentless pressure of the Third U.S. Army, while bridgeheads over the MOSELLE River were enlarged and elements of the Army crossed the MEURTHE River at DAMELEVIERES (U09), eleven miles southeast of NANCY (U81).

The Class I supply situation was critical. To make up the shortage in shipments of "B" and operational rations from Advance Section Communications Zone, 140,000 German rations were issued, numerous captured storehouses were emptied, and field bakeries began to use German flour. The pipeline to CHARTRES (R30) started operations with an expected gallonage of 100,000 daily. The air lift, which had been discontinued, was not to be resumed until further notice, Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised.

The Military Vicar, ARCHBISHOP SPELLMAN, of NEW YORK, arrived at Third U.S. Army area and offered mass for the personnel of Headquarters and adjoining units. He made a tour of front line units.

14 SEPTEMBER *(D + 100)*

In the XII Corps zone the enemy held the east bank of the MOSELLE River except for three Third U.S. Army bridgeheads. In the XV Corps zone the enemy in force held the canal from the MARNI River to the SAONE River, south of LANGRES (J22). There was no change on the XX Corps front where the enemy held the line THIONVILLE (U88) - METZ (U85) - PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73).

The XII Corps launched an attack to capture NANCY (U81) and FORET-DE-HAYE (U70), three miles west of NANCY (U81). The 35th Infantry Division continued its advance with the 134th Infantry less two battalions, gaining control of the high ground on the west bank of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of PONT-ST-VINCENT (U70). The 137th Infantry held a line from ST NICOLAS-DU-PORT (U90) to FLAVIGNY (Z89), eight miles south of NANCY (U81), and the 320th Infantry held the high ground in the vicinity of DOMBASLE (U90). This gave the 35th Infantry Division a line running southeast, south and southwest of NANCY (U81). The 80th Infantry Division held a line roughly northwest, north, and northeast of NANCY (U81), with the 318th Infantry holding the high ground one mile east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the 317th Infantry holding the high ground in the vicinity of BELLEAU (U82) - SIVRY (U82) - MILLERY (U82), eight miles north of NANCY (U81), and the 319th Infantry holding the high ground on the west bank of the MOSELLE River from BELLEVILLE (U72) to VILLEY-LE-SEC (U70), three miles east of TOUL (U61). The 4th Armored Division moved into position with Combat Command "A" assembled in the vicinity of LUNEVILLE (V09), where contact was established between the two combat commands, both located south of NANCY (U81).

XV Corps continued to move to the east. The 79th Infantry Division pushed forward with the 315th Infantry capturing the city of CHATENOIS (Z56) and advancing to NEUEVILLE - SOUS - CHATENOIS (Z56). The 313th Infantry captured MIRECOURT (Z86) and REMECOURT (U76), two miles west of MIRECOURT (Z86). The 2d French Armored Division repulsed strong enemy counterattacks and drove on, capturing MATTAINCOURT (Z86), two miles south of MIRECOURT (Z86), DARNEY (Z52), two miles south of CHATENOIS (Z56) and HOUECOURT (Z66), three miles east of CHATENOIS (Z56), and made contact with elements of the Seventh U.S. Army at CHAUMONT (Z05). Combat Command "L" assembled in the vicinity of DOMPAIRE (Z85), while elements entered EPINAL (V05). Combat Command "V" pushed forward and entered MATTAINCOURT (Z86), two miles south of MIRECOURT (Z86), while Combat Command "D" moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of ANDELOT (Z16).

In the XX Corps zone the 90th Infantry Division had the 358th Infantry west of THIONVILLE (U88), the 357th Infantry in the vicinity northwest of METZ (U85), and the 359th Infantry in the vicinity of AMANVILLERS (U76). The 5th Infantry Division attacked to expand its bridgehead across the river while the 2d Infantry moved to a concentration area in the vicinity of REMBERCOURT (U64), fifteen miles southwest of METZ (U85). The 7th Armored Division moved to a concentration area northwest of CHAMBLEY (U65) preparing to attack through the bridgehead.

The XIX Tactical Air Command was limited in its day's operation due to adverse weather condition. One hundred and eight sorties were flown in six missions with claims of twenty-eight motor transports, six locomotives, and seven tanks and armored vehicles damaged or destroyed.

CHATENOIS (Z56), MIRECOURT (Z86), RAMECOURT (Z76), MATTAINCOURT (Z86), DARNEY (Z52), and HOUECOURT (Z66) were captured as the Third U.S. Army continued its advance to the east.

The first rail shipments of gasoline arrived at LEROUVILLE (U32), five miles northwest of COMMERCY (U42), and at VERDUN (U26). This was a great help since truck haul distances were tremendously reduced.

15 SEPTEMBER *(D+102)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

There was no change in the enemy lines opposing the XII, XX, and XV Corps.

The Army Commander ordered Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division to extend the area of its responsibility as far east as the MARNE River at CHAUMONT (Z05), relieving elements of the XV Corps. The Combat Command was to remain under the command of the Third U.S. Army.

The XII Corps fought its way forward to the MOSELLE River. A special task force composed of elements of the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) and elements of the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) advanced through thick mine fields and road blocks and cleared the FORET-DE-HAYE (U70), three miles west of NANCY (U81). The large French border city of NANCY (U81) was occupied by the 134th Infantry. The 35th Infantry Division continued to enlarge its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River with the 137th Infantry crossing the river in the vicinity of ST NICOLAS-DU-PORT (U90). The 320th Infantry succeeded in getting across the CANAL-LA-MARNE-AU-RHIN in the vicinity of DOMBASLE (U90), and gained control of the high ground to the north. The 80th Infantry Division continued to enlarge its bridgehead across the MOSELLE River against a determined enemy that fought for every inch of ground. The 4th Armored Division, now completely across the MOSELLE River, cut off all enemy troops in the vicinity of NANCY (U81) and closed in from the east. Combat Command "A" assembled in the vicinity of RECHICOURT-LA PETITE (U58) with Combat Command "B" in the vicinity of ANTHELUPT (Q00), southeast of NANCY (U81). Severe counterattacks launched against the 80th Infantry Division's bridgehead across the MOSELLE were broken up and repelled. Fourteen enemy tanks were destroyed or disabled by the division's artillery fire. A sound and flash detachment of the 14th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was overrun and fought as infantry for six hours before being relieved.

In the XV Corps zone the 313th and 315th Infantry Regiments (79th Infantry Division) cleared out pockets of resistance in their zone and closed into an area west of CHARMES (Z97). The 2d French Armored Division continued to clean up pockets of enemy resistance with Combat Command "B" and Combat Command "L" in the vicinity of HYMONT (Z86), two miles south of MIRECOURT (Z86), and DOMPAIRE (Z85) while Combat Command "D" reaching the vicinity of BOURMONT (Z45).

XX Corps continued its attack to secure bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River toward the city of METZ (U85). The 5th Infantry Division attacked across the river south and southwest of METZ (U85) and captured MARIEULLES (U84), eight miles southwest of METZ (U85), in addition to the high ground in the vicinity of ARRY (U74), nine miles southwest of METZ (U85). Elements of the 2d Infantry relieved elements of Combat

15 SEPTEMBER

DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD US ARMY AND THE ENEMY SITUATION

Miles 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Miles

Kilometres 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Kilometres

CHALONS-NANCY

25 Km. OVERLAP ON SHEET 6. NAMUR-LUXEMBOURG

SECOND EDITION

ARMY/AIR

SHEET Nº 9




FIRST ARMY
SECOND ARMY
THIRD ARMY
FOURTH ARMY
FIFTH ARMY
RESERVE
SOUTH FLANK
FROM PROTECTION OF ARMY
FROM BAR SUR AUBE
FROM JOINVILLE
FROM BAR SUR AUBE
BOUNDARY
INTERIOR
317TH INF
313TH INF
314TH INF
315TH INF
316TH INF
CCL 2FR
CCD 2FR
CCR 2FR
CCB 4A
CCB 5A
CCB 6A
CCB 7A
CCB 8A
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Command "B" at VITTONVILLE (U74), ten miles southwest of METZ (U85), while the remainder of the regiment advanced to the vicinity of REMBERCOURT (U64), fifteen miles southwest of METZ (U85). The 11th Infantry Regiment advanced to the vicinity of AUGNY (U85), three miles southwest of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued to advance with the forward elements of the 357th Infantry reaching AMANVILLERS (U76), seven miles northwest of METZ (U85), and the 359th Infantry attaining positions in the vicinity of ROZERIEULLES (U75), three miles west of METZ (U85). Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division crossed the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of ARNAVILLE (U74), nine miles southwest of METZ (U85), and closed in an area in the vicinity of POMMERIEUX (U84), seven miles south of METZ (U85). Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division advanced south to the vicinity of VITTONVILLE (U74), ten miles southwest of METZ (U85). Combat Command "A" crossed the river in the zone of Reserve Combat Command and advanced to the vicinity of COIN SUR SEILLE (U84), six miles south of METZ (U85). This completed the movement of the 7th Armored Division across the MOSELLE River.

In coordinated action with XII Corps, 200 troops of the Forces Francaises de l'Interieur assisted materially in the capture of NANCY (U81) in the face of considerable enemy sniping activity.

Concentrating on enemy rail transportation, the XIX Tactical Air Command flew 294 sorties in twenty-three missions during the day's operations. Claims for the day were twenty-two railroad lines cut, sixty-two railroad cars, sixteen gun installations and eighteen military installations damaged or destroyed.

The important border city of NANCY (U81) was captured by the Third U.S. Army while the advance to the east continued.

The Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to a bivouac area near BRAQUIS (U46), eleven miles east of VERDUN (U26).

At VITTEL (Z65) were found 2,087 Allied nationals who had been interned for four years in hotels surrounded by wire barricades. Of these, 361 were U.S. citizens, 1,160 British and the remainder were of twenty-nine other nationalities. Food from captured German stocks was sent to them.

16 SEPTEMBER (D+103)

One of the significant enemy order of battle facts at this time was the identification in contact of four previously-reported administrative divisions, one of which was committed in the Third U.S. Army zone. This development indicated the extremes to which the enemy was going in seeking manpower. Prisoner of war statements indicated that these divisions, of strength estimated at not more than 6,000 men each, were composed of cooks, bakers, clerks and other normally non-combatant elements. Several new sub-standard Panzer and infantry divisions also were identified. The disclosure at this time of VON RUNDSTEDT'S restoration as Supreme Commander of the enemy forces in the west was considered a very important development. His reappointment only eight weeks after his ouster was regarded as an indication that HITLER had been forced to come to some terms with the German General Staff. An estimate of enemy strength showed that fifty-four infantry divisions, with a combat strength of 565,000 when committed and an effective strength of 165,200, had been identified on the Allied front. Sixteen Panzer divisions, with a combat strength of 199,500 when committed and an effective strength of 58,500 men and 335 tanks, were identified. To these could be added ninety tanks and assault guns of headquarters brigades. Enemy losses were estimated as 399,800 infantry and 141,000 Panzer troops.

The 6th Armored Division was ordered to move without delay upon release from the Ninth U.S. Army to an area east of TROYES (Y27). Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division was ordered to move without delay to the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57) and to continue patrols to the south.

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division continued to clean up pockets of enemy resistance, the 137th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of DOMBASLE (U90). All elements of the 80th Infantry Division with the exception of two battalions of the 319th Infantry were across the MOSELLE River despite enemy counterattacks. The 4th Armored Division continued to move forward. Elements of Combat Command "A" advanced to the vicinity of MARSAL (Q12), twenty miles northeast of NANCY (U81), Combat Command "B" to the vicinity of COURBESSEAUX (Q01), ten miles east of NANCY (U81), and Reserve Combat Command to the vicinity of LUNEVILLE (V09), which the enemy shelled. The 3d Battalion, of the 318th Infantry, to which 20,000 rounds of small arms ammunition had been dropped by liaison pilots of the 80th Division artillery, was relieved after having been isolated for several days beyond ST GENEVIEVE (U83), fifteen miles south of METZ (U85). Five artillery battalions fired four concentrations upon enemy assembly points at the request of the 80th Infantry Division commander. A strong enemy counterattack against the division was broken up by the massed fires of the division artillery coordinated with air support.

XV Corps concentrated in an area on the west bank of the MOSELLE River. The 79th Infantry Division concentrated in the vicinity of CHARMES (Z97) while elements of the 2d French Armored Division reached the west bank of the river in the vicinity of CHATEL-SUR-MOSELLE (V06), twelve miles east of MIRECOURT (Z86). The corps employed one heavy antiaircraft artillery battalion in a field artillery role. Two counter-attacks by infantry and tanks against the 2d French Armored Division at CHATEL-SUR-MOSELLE (V06), twelve miles east of MIRECOURT (Z86), were supported by enemy artillery fire. Both counterattacks were repelled, one being broken up by the artillery fire of the 2d French Armored Division artillery. The 79th Infantry Division encountered little or no enemy artillery opposition.

The XX Corps continued its advance toward METZ (U85) against stubborn enemy resistance. The 90th Infantry Division advanced with the 357th Infantry closing in the vicinity of AMANVILLERS (U76), seven miles northwest of METZ (U85) and the 359th Infantry closing in the vicinity of REZONVILLE (U75), eight miles west of METZ (U85). Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division advanced southeast of METZ (U85).

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 286 sorties in twenty-one missions during the day's operation with few claims being made. Fourteen

gun installations, seven military installations and eight small naval vessels were damaged or destroyed during the day.

As the result of operations for the day the Third U.S. Army continued to push forward toward the east against determined enemy resistance.

A critical shortage of clothing and individual equipment developed, the quantities required for current issues totaling 258,000 items.

17 SEPTEMBER *(D + 103)*

The 6th Armored Division was directed to move to the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU (Z57). The XX Corps (the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to continue the advance and seize FRANKFURT (M66) and to maintain contact with the First U.S. Army on the left (north). The XII Corps (the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, the 4th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to advance rapidly to the northeast, to seize DARMSTADT (M64) and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone. The XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions, the 2d French Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to advance to the northeast on Army order, echeloned to the right rear of the XII Corps. It was to protect the right (south) flank of the Army, maintain contact with the Seventh U.S. Army, and be prepared to seize MANNHEIM (R59) and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE within its zone, or to move through bridgeheads secured by the XII or the XX Corps. Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division was ordered to report to the Commanding General of the XII Corps and was alerted for movement to the vicinity of TOUL (U61), to be attached to the XII Corps.

In the XII Corps zone Task Force "SEBREE", consisting of Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division (which was attached to XII Corps), the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) and one company of the 737th Tank Battalion (4th Armored Division), was organized to clean out the woods northeast of NANCY (U81) in conjunction with the 80th Infantry Division. In the zone of the 35th Infantry Division the 137th Infantry advanced to the vicinity of CERCUEIL (U91), five miles east of NANCY (U81), and the 320th Infantry closed in the vicinity of MAZERULLES (Q01), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81). The last elements of the 80th Infantry Division crossed the MOSELLE River against heavy enemy resistance, placing the entire division east of the river. Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of MAZERULLES (Q01), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

In the XV Corps zone the 79th Infantry Division continued to concentrate on the west bank of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of CHARMES (Z97), while the 2d French Armored Division reduced pockets of resistance along the southern flank of the Army.

XX Corps launched a coordinated attack against stubborn resistance to capture METZ (U85), the 90th Infantry Division attacking from the west and the 5th Infantry Division from the south. The 7th Armored Division had as its objective the seizing of the high ground northeast of METZ (U85) in conjunction with the attack. Enemy artillery in the sector remained silent for long periods at a time but the forts around METZ (U85) had proven virtually impregnable to artillery fires and were still capable of heavy and effective fire. Much of the enemy artillery was emplaced so that a direct hit upon a relatively small opening was necessary for effective neutralization. In an effort to neutralize the VERDUN Group of Forts, the corps allotted a 155mm gun battalion the sole mission of maintaining continued fire upon this group. In addition, one 155mm gun was moved into position for direct fire upon the forts.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur reported the HAUTE MARNE area cleared of the enemy.

The XIX Tactical Air Command flew 133 sorties in seventeen missions with the following claims being made: two railroad lines cut, twenty-three railroad cars, fifteen motor transports and twenty-three military installations damaged or destroyed during the day.

The Army continued to drive eastward against increasing resistance in its day's operations.

Because of the scarcity of transport planes, a policy on evacuation of wounded was followed whereby five Third U.S. Army Evacuation hospitals were to send their patients to the Army evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U61). Five other evacuation hospitals were to evacuate to the one Army 750-bed evacuation hospital, which would be evacuated by Advance Section Communications Zone.

By this time civilian refugees constituted a growing problem in the Army zone. Of thirty different nationalities, chiefly Ukrainian Russians, they began to filter back through the front lines. Civil affairs detachments, augmented by Red Cross workers and uniformed volunteers of the Secours National, were called forward to take charge of the refugees. The VERDUN (U26) center housed 2,200 on this date and hundreds more were moving along the roads.

35th Division Infantrymen Move Up, Northeast of Nancy

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18 SEPTEMBER *(D+104)*

In the XII Corps and XX Corps zones there was no change in the enemy situation. The XV Corps however encountered strong resistance along a line MORIVILLE (V07) - ROMONT (V17) - ROXVILLE-AUX-CHENES (V17).

XV Corps (the 79th and 83d Infantry Divisions, the 2d French Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to cross the MOSELLE River and move northeast to secure the line LUNEVILLE (V09) - BADEN-VILLER (V38) between the corps left (north) boundary and a line BACCARAT (V28) - BLAMONT (V39). The corps was to reconnoiter to the northeast within its zone and be prepared for further advance, to protect the right (south) flank of the Army and maintain contact with the Seventh U.S. Army.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division arrived in NANCY (U81) and assembled in the vicinity of SAULXURES-LES-NANCY (U91), two miles east of NANCY (U81). Task Force "SEBREE" continued to clean up pockets of enemy resistance northeast of NANCY (U81). Elements of the 35th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division launched an attack to the east. Elements of the 134th Infantry, 35th Infantry Division, reached the vicinity of SEICHAMPS (U91), four miles east of NANCY (U81).

XV Corps launched an attack to the northeast and the 79th Infantry Division succeeded in driving completely across the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of BAYON (Z98), with the 313th Infantry, 314th Infantry and the 315th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of GERBEVILLER (V08). Combat Command "V" of the 2d French Armored Division fought its way across the MOSELLE River followed by Combat Command "D", and advanced to the vicinity of HADIGNY (V07), ten miles southeast of CHARMES (Z97).

The XX Corps continued its advance on METZ (U85) with the 5th Infantry Division gaining its objectives in the vicinity of MARIEULLES (U84), eight miles southwest of METZ (U85). Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued the attack, with the 357th and 359th Infantry Regiments northwest of METZ (U85), and the 358th Infantry continuing to contain THIONVILLE (U88) while protecting the northern flank along the river line. Reserve Combat Command of the 7th Armored Division continued its advance and mopped up SILLEGNY (U84), seven miles south of METZ (U85). Enemy artillery activity at METZ (U85), especially from FORT JEANNE D'ARC, increased. It was found that even 240 howitzers could do no more than temporarily neutralize the forts. Eight-inch howitzers fired on and destroyed two enemy railroad trains near METZ (U85).

The 6th Armored Division (less Combat Command "B") moved to NEUF-CHATEAU (Z57) to relieve elements of the 2d French Armored Division protecting the Army south flank.

The Forces Francaises de l'Interieur continued flank guard action in the XV Corps zone, inflicting numerous enemy casualties.

The XIX Tactical Air Command was limited in its day's operation due to weather condition and had light claims. In thirty-two sorties seven gun installations and three military installations were attacked.

Advance to the east continued in all zones of the Army during the period.

The Rear Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to a bivouac area near ROUVRES (T86), four miles northeast of the Forward Echelon and fourteen miles east of VERDUN (U26).

19 SEPTEMBER *(D+105)*

In his efforts to delay the Army's advance, the enemy blew bridges in the zone of the Third U.S. Army's advance, constructed road blocks of mines and felled trees, and built trenches, bunkers and anti-tank positions.

XX Corps (the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) was informed that a continued threat existed on the north flank in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88), which might result in an attempt by the enemy to cross the MOSELLE River at that point. The Corps was ordered to strengthen the Regimental Combat Team from the 90th Infantry Division, and the cavalry then covering the flank, with some tank and tank destroyer elements. The 90th Infantry Division, less detachments, was to contain METZ (U85), while the 5th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division proceeded on assigned missions.

In the XII Corps Task Force "SEBREE" was dissolved. The attack to the east continued, while the 35th Infantry Division continued to clean up the woods north of NANCY (U81). The 80th Infantry Division enlarged its bridgehead to the south, and advanced to the vicinity of MALLELOY (U82), six miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of CHATEAU-SALINS (Q12) and Reserve Combat Command advanced to the vicinity of LUNEVILLE (V09).

XV Corps continued to advance to the east. The 79th Infantry Division advanced northeast of GERBEVILLER (V08), elements of the division crossing the MARTAGNE River. The 2d French Armored Division advanced with elements of Combat Command "D" in the vicinity of MOYEN (V18), three miles east of GERBEVILLER (V08), and some elements across the MARTAGNE River. Combat Command "V" advanced to the vicinity of HALLAINVILLE (V09), ten miles east of CHARMES (Z97).

XX Corps continued its attack toward METZ (U85) with the 5th Infantry Division driving to the north against determined enemy resistance. The 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) advanced to the vicinity of ROZERIEULLES (U75), three miles west of METZ (U85), while the remainder of the division continued to contain THIONVILLE (U88) and protect the northern flank of the Army. Elements of Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division reached the vicinity of LOUVIGNY (U84), nine miles

south of METZ (U85). The enemy continued to use numerous road blocks and demolitions covered by mortar and artillery fire to delay the advance.

Five hundred Forces Francaises de l'Interieur reported to the THIONVILLE (U88) - HAYENGE (U78) - MAYEUVRE (U77) area at the request of the counter-intelligence corps, to assist in controlling the local population who were largely pro-German.

Two hundred and sixty-two sorties in twenty-two missions were carried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command with light claims being made. Four railroad lines were cut, five railroad cars destroyed and ten motor transports were damaged or destroyed during the day.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack on all fronts.

Graves registration supplies were in a critical state, with 2,000 mattress covers and 3,000 personal effects bags needed. It was necessary to send trucks 300 miles to the beach to obtain these and other items. The gasoline situation again became uncertain, for receipts had been short since 17 September. One hundred thousand pounds of green coffee were received at LEROUVILLE (U32), seven miles south of ST MIHIEL (U43), and bakeries started to roast it at once.

20 SEPTEMBER (D + 106)

The enemy continued to construct defensive works in Army's zone of advance, pressed small counterattacks and pushed patrols across the MOSELLE River. In an estimate of enemy strength in the Third U.S. Army zone at this time the enemy's total effective combat strength was set down as the equivalent of eight divisions, consisting of 63,750 troops and 175 tanks or assault guns. It was estimated that the enemy had the equivalent of five divisions, consisting of 42,000 troops and 150 tanks, as immediate reserves. Against the XX Corps it was estimated the enemy had an effective combat strength of 27,750 troops, with thirty-five tanks or assault guns, and 17,000 troops and fifty tanks available as immediate reserves. Opposing the XII Corps it was estimated the enemy had 19,500 troops, with seventy tanks or assault guns, and 10,000 troops and fifty tanks available as immediate reserves. Against the XV Corps it was estimated the enemy had 63,750 troops, with 175 tanks or assault guns, and 42,000 troops and 150 tanks available as immediate reserves.

Third U.S. Army was ordered by Twelfth U.S. Army Group to continue the advance to the east within its zone and secure crossings of the RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM (R59) and MAINZ (M35). If sufficient forces of Twelfth U.S. Army Group were available, a bridgehead in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE (R44) also was to be seized. The Army also was to protect the south flank east of ORLEANS (W60) inclusive.

Shelltorn Dombasle Entered By Patrols

The XII Corps continued its attack to the east. In the zone of the 35th Infantry Division, the 134th and 137th Infantry Regiments advanced to the vicinity of CHAMPENOUX (U91), five miles east of NANCY (U81). In the 80th Infantry Division zone, the 317th Infantry and the 318th Infantry moved to an area southeast of NANCY (U81), while the 319th Infantry moved in division reserve in the vicinity of VILLE-AN-VAL (U82), ten miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of RECHICOURT-LA-PETITE (U58), twenty miles west of THIONVILLE (U88). Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division assembled in the vicinity of FLAINVAL (Q00), four miles northwest of LUNEVILLE (V09), to support Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division.

XV Corps continued its advance to the east. The 79th Infantry Division pushed forward, with the 313th Infantry advancing to the east of LUNEVILLE (V09), the 314th Infantry advancing to the MEURTHE River, with elements of the regiment crossing the river and advancing to the east. Combat Command "D" of the 2d French Armored Division actively patrolled the vicinity up to the MEURTHE River.

Against formidable enemy resistance the XX Corps continued its attack on METZ (U85). In the 5th Infantry Division zone the 10th Infantry occupied POURNOY LA CHETIVE (U84), five miles south of METZ (U85), and drove forward while the 2d Infantry cleared and occupied COIN-SUR-SEILLE (U84), six miles south of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued to hold the west bank of the MOSELLE River in its zone. The 7th Armored Division in trying to cross the SEILLE River encountered considerable enemy resistance. Combat Command "A" reached the vicinity of SILLEGNY (U84), seven miles south of METZ (U85), and Combat Command "B" fought in the vicinity of LOUVIGNY (U84), nine miles south of METZ (U85). Enemy artillery became active again, some concentrations numbering as many as sixty rounds. Very little of the fire came from the forts, however, and the 155 gun emplaced for direct fire upon the forts achieved good neutralization results.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 165 sorties in twelve missions during the day's operation with the following claims: thirteen railroad lines cut, thirty railroad cars, twelve motor transports, and eleven locomotives damaged or destroyed, while five marshalling yards were attacked with good results reported.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack on all fronts.

21 SEPTEMBER (D+107)

Numerous defended road blocks, obstacles, and demolitions were placed by the enemy in the path of the Third U.S. Army advance. New concrete trenches were encountered.

In the XII Corps the attack continued with the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions cleaning up pockets of enemy resistance and pushing north and east of NANCY (U81). The 6th Armored Division and Combat Command "B" of that division moved to an area in the vicinity of JALLAUCOURT (Q02), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Reserve Combat Command of the 4th Armored Division moved to the vicinity of BURES (Q11), eight miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09).

XV Corps continued to advance to the northeast, with elements of the 79th Infantry Division strengthening the MEURTHE River bridgehead and elements of the 313th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of MONCEL (V19), three miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09). The 314th Infantry crossed the MEURTHE River with three companies in the vicinity of LORONXE (V19), six miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09) and elements of the 315th Infantry advanced to LUNEVILLE (V09), relieving elements of the 313th Infantry which were holding the town. The 2d French Armored Division began to close in on the east bank of the MOSELLE River.

Heavy fighting continued in the zone of the XX Corps, the 5th and the 90th Infantry Divisions continuing to fight violently with an enemy determined to hold its positions at all cost. Due to strong enemy counterattacks, the 7th Armored Division was delayed in crossing the SEILLE River south of METZ (U85). The enemy used dug-in tanks and heavy artillery, and made counterattacks all along the line.

An enemy counterattack against the 5th Infantry Division was preceded by an artillery preparation of over 300 rounds. The XX Corps was conserving all ammunition possible in the 90th Infantry Division in order to balance the heavy demands by artillery firing in support of 5th Infantry and 7th Armored Divisions. A sound and flash base was installed east of the MOSELLE River in an effort to locate better the artillery firing upon these two divisions.

During this period the XIX Tactical Air Command flew 245 sorties in nineteen missions with heavy claims being made on rail transportation. Fifteen railroad lines were cut and 256 railroad cars, fourteen locomotives, forty-seven motor transports, and twenty enemy tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed during the day's operation.

Small gains in the face of stiffening enemy resistance were accomplished in the day's fighting.

The first bulk gasoline to arrive by air, a shipment of 12,000 gallons, was brought to ST DIZIER (T90) by bombers.

22 SEPTEMBER *(D+108)*

The enemy continued to construct additions to the SIEGFRIED Line fortifications. Numerous dug-in tanks were encountered along all routes of advance. The favored enemy capability at this time was that he could pivot on METZ (U85) to establish a general defensive line paralleling the SIEGFRIED Line, while gaining time to prepare the defense of the SIEGFRIED Line proper. To execute this capability, it was considered likely that the enemy would make a fortress stand at METZ (U85) to impede the Third U.S. Army's eastward advance by the diversion of troops, artillery, munitions, and aviation, while throwing armor-spearheaded attacks against the shoulders of the advance from the general THIONVILLE (U88) area in the north, the GERBEVILLER (W08) - LUNEVILLE (W09) - FORET DE PARROY (Q10) area to the south. While nowhere was he able to concentrate reserves sufficient to propel a major concerted offensive, he was still capable of massing desperate resistance. As had been the case in the COTENTIN Peninsula, a temporary front existed, and once more the enemy was expending his mobile reserves in piecemeal local counterattacks of a purely defensive nature. Although temporarily succeeding in organizing a front line, it was obvious that the enemy could never recoup the estimated 900,000 losses inflicted in the west since D-Day. Reinforcements were arriving on the battlefront, but they were arriving late. Originally, the Third U.S. Army's eastward thrust was the most menacing Allied drive, yet the Third U.S. Army reached the MOSELLE River before any major enemy reinforcements appeared. Similarly, when the First U.S. Army breached the SIEGFRIED Line in the AACHEN (K84) area, more than a week elapsed before the enemy was able to mass forces to meet the threat. The enemy's combat strength when committed was estimated at this time as 607,000 infantry and 191,000 Panzer troops and his effective strength was estimated at 176,950 infantry and 46,000 Panzer troops with 530 tanks. Against the Third U.S. Army front, the enemy had an estimated equivalent of four and one-half infantry divisions, two Panzer divisions, and two Panzer Grenadier divisions, with 250 effective tanks.

The 6th Armored Division, which had been ordered to move to the vicinity of JALLAUCOURT (Q02), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81), was directed to discontinue its movement in anticipation of a different mission. The Third U.S. Army was ordered by the Twelfth U.S. Army Group to release the 7th Armored Division to the First U.S. Army, to move on the morning of 27 September. A combat command from the 6th Armored Division was ordered to move at once to take over the 7th Armored Division's area.

The Army Commander ordered the XX Corps (the 5th, 83d and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 7th Armored Division and supporting troops) to continue its present mission, to give particular attention to the protection of the city of LUXEMBOURG (P81) to protect the left (north) flank of the Army, and to maintain contact with the First U.S. Army.

Infantryman Harasses Germans

In the XII Corps the attack continued with the 35th Infantry Division attacking to the north of NANCY (U81). The 80th Infantry Division north of NANCY (U81) attacked to the south to clear out large pockets of enemy resistance, with the 317th Infantry in the vicinity of MALLELOY (U82), six miles north of NANCY (U81). The 318th Infantry

occupied MOREY (U82), seven miles north of NANCY (U81), and the 319th Infantry was in the vicinity of SIVRY (U82), eight miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division attacked to the southwest and reached the vicinity of BIONCOURT (U92), nine miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

In the XV Corps the advance to the northeast continued. The 79th Infantry Division strengthened its bridgehead east of the MEURTHE River. More elements of the 313th Infantry reached the vicinity of MONCEL (V19), three miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), while elements of the 314th Infantry advanced to the edge of the FORET DE MONDON (V19), five miles east of LUNEVILLE (V09), and continued to strengthen the bridgehead. The 2d French Armored Division pushed forward with Combat Command "V" advancing to the MEURTHE River and establishing two bridgeheads across the river, one at FLIN (V28), ten miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), the other at CHENEVIERES (V09), nine miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09). Combat Command "D" crossed the river in the vicinity of VATHAMENIL (V19), nine miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), and advanced to BENAMENILE (V39), nine miles east of LUNEVILLE (V09), while Combat Command "L" advanced to the vicinity of VENNEZEY (V08), ten miles south of LUNEVILLE (V09).

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division sent aggressive patrols to the north against the forts of METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued to advance slowly in the face of strong enemy resistance while the 7th Armored Division continued forcing a crossing of the SEILLE River against heavy resistance.

Heavy artillery fired repeatedly in close support of the 7th Armored Division, the effect of these weapons being well suited for driving the enemy out of positions in buildings. Accuracy of the 8-inch howitzer made this weapon especially suitable for firing in close support of the leading elements.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 273 sorties in twenty-three missions during this period with many claims being made against enemy transportation and military installations. Twenty-one railroad lines were cut, while 135 railroad cars, 120 motor transports, thirteen locomotives, four supply dumps, six gun installations and twenty-two tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to covered billets in ETAIN (U47), ten miles east of VERDUN (U26), the first time since arriving on the Continent to be indoors.

Air evacuation removed 600 patients to the United Kingdom during the period.

Refugees of thirty nationalities were under civil affairs care and control as follows: 2,200 at VERDUN (U26), 1,800 at HAYANGE (U78), 400 at ETAIN (U47), and 500 at BRIEY (U77). Other centers were opened at LANDRES-PIENNE (U68), ten miles northwest of BRIEY (U77), and PAGNY-SUR-MOSELLE (U74). Eventually full responsibility for the camps was given to French authorities.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that effective 25 September the minimum tonnage allocation to Third U.S. Army would be 3,500 tons.

23 SEPTEMBER (*D+109*)

Construction of entrenchments was being rushed by the enemy to meet the Army's advance.

The XII Corps continued its attack, with the 35th Infantry Division reaching the high ground ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81) and being engaged in cleaning up the BOIS DE FAULX (U82), FORET DE ST JEAN FONTAINE (N39), and the FORET DE CHAMPENOUX (U91). The 80th Infantry Division straightened its lines and held the high ground between MONTENOY (U92), five miles north of NANCY (U81), and JEANDELAINCOURT (U92), nine miles north of NANCY (U81), while the 4th Armored Division repulsed a strong armored attack in its zone. Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division cleared the enemy from LEYR (U92), six miles north of NANCY (U81), while the enemy attempted to withdraw from the pocket northeast of NANCY (U81).

XV Corps continued to advance to the northeast. The 79th Infantry Division and 2d French Armored Division strengthened lateral contact, cleared the FORET DE MONDON (V19), five miles east of LUNEVILLE (V09), and advanced along a general line running from LUNEVILLE (V09) to BADENVILLER (V38).

Attacks in the zone of the XX Corps continued with slight progress being made. The 331st Infantry (83d Infantry Division) closed into an area in the vicinity of ESCH (P70), while the 90th Infantry Division continued to patrol aggressively and to make further advance against the forts surrounding METZ (U85).

During this period the XIX Tactical Air Command had limited air activity due to adverse weather conditions. In ninety-six sorties, eighteen railroad lines were cut, while twenty railroad cars, twenty-seven motor transports, eleven locomotives, fourteen gun installations and five enemy tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

As the result of the day's operations the Third U.S. Army continued to attack to the east, while straightening its lines.

A combination of air evacuation and use of a hospital train resulted in the evacuation of more than 1,400 patients from the Third U.S. Army zone. The evacuation of 374 patients from the holding unit at TOUL (U61) enabled that unit to reopen.

24 SEPTEMBER (D+110)

Patrols probing the outlying defenses of the SIEGFRIED Line met strong enemy resistance from pillboxes and other strongpoints.

XII Corps continued to consolidate its bridgehead and made preparations to improve its positions. In the zone of the 35th Infantry Division, the 134th Infantry advanced to the vicinity of ARMANCOURT (U92), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81), and made contact with the 80th Infantry Division on the left and the 6th Armored Division on the right. The 137th Infantry in the vicinity of MAZERULLES (Q01), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81), prepared to relieve the 6th Armored Division and Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division on the north edge of the FORET-DE-GREMECEY (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81). A field artillery observation battalion's flash base in the XII Corps sector located an enemy infantry and artillery assemblage. Two artillery battalions were adjusted and fired two volleys. Three times the enemy reassembled and three times he was dispersed by two volleys from the two battalions. Widespread destruction was the result, with many enemy dead and wounded.

XV Corps continued aggressive patrolling beyond LUNEVILLE (V09) and BADONVILLER (V38). Forward elements of Combat Command "D" of the 2d French Armored Division reached the vicinity of OGEVILLER (V29), six miles southwest of BLAMONT (V39), while elements of Combat Command "L" held a bridgehead at FLIN (V28), ten miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09). Forward elements of the 314th Infantry (79th Infantry Division) reached the vicinity of LARONXE (V19), six miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (V09).

In the XX Corps zone the remainder of the 83d Infantry Division closed in an area in the vicinity of ESCH (P70). Elements of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) occupied SILVANGE (U87), ten miles south of THIONVILLE (U88). The 7th Armored Division began concentrating west of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of SPONVILLE (U65), fifteen miles west of METZ (U85), after being relieved in the bridgehead by the 5th Infantry Division. Reserve Combat Command of the 6th Armored Division was en route to the vicinity of BRIEY (U77).

Two fighter groups of the XIX Tactical Air Command, on short notice and in almost impossible weather, flew close support of the 4th Armored Division which was being counterattacked in force by strong enemy armored elements and infantry. After destroying three enemy tanks the air support bombed and strafed a woods and flushed a large number of enemy tanks which were knocked out either by the air or by Third U.S. Army armor. The weather was so bad the fighters were unable to return to their field near ST DIZIER (T90) and finally landed at ETAIN (U47), where the Army Commander personally thanked them. One hundred and six sorties in nine missions were reported by the Command. Claims for the day included sixteen railroad cars, eight motor transports and four tanks and armored cars damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued to patrol aggressively to the east, while consolidating its positions during the period.



Engineers Bridging The Moselle

The first rail shipment of bulk gasoline arrived at TOUL (U61). The operation of the ST GERMAINE (R84) - CHALONS (T54) - VERDUN (U26) rail link to supplement and relieve truck transportation showed shipment of approximately 14,500 tons, with a saving of approximately 693,000 truck miles and 139,000 gallons of gasoline. Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that effective on 27 September the minimum tonnage allocation to the Third U.S. Army would be 3,100 tons daily.

Twenty-eight civil affairs detachments with a total strength of 133 officers, seven warrant officers and 235 enlisted men were attached to the Third U.S. Army for deployment in German towns in the SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) region. They were stationed in the town of ETON (U57), fourteen miles northeast of VERDUN (U26).

25 SEPTEMBER *(D+111)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

Forced civilian labor was being used by the enemy to construct fortifications and strong points.

Letter of Instruction No 4 was issued on this date by the Army Commander. The order stated in part:

"1. The acute supply situation confronting us has caused the Supreme Commander to direct that until further orders, the Third Army, with its supporting troops, and those elements of the Ninth Army placed in the line, will assume the defensive.

"2. It is evident that the successful accomplishment of this mission will require particular concentration upon two points:

a. First, this change in attitude on our part must be completely concealed from the enemy, who, should he learn of it, would certainly move troops from our front to oppose other Allied armies.

b. Second, we must be in possession of a suitable line of departure so that we can move rapidly when the Supreme Commander directs us to resume the offensive.

"3. In order to carry out the requirements of Paragraph 2a, above, we will not dig in, wire, or mine, but will utilize a thin outpost zone backed at suitable places by powerful mobile reserves. We will further insure that all possible avenues of tank attack are registered in by all batteries - Division, Corps, and Army - whose guns can bear. Under the supervision of the Army Artillery Officer these zones of concentration will be numbered from north to south and recorded on a uniform map to be distributed to the units concerned, so that fire may instantly be opened in any zone. Further, a copy of this map will be placed in the possession of the Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command so that he may coordinate the concentration of planes upon any critical area in the most expeditious manner. Counterattacks by our mobile reserves should be planned and executed to secure a double envelopment of the hostile effort with the purpose of not only defeating it but destroying it.

"4. To provide the necessary means for such limited operations, the utmost parsimony will be used in the expenditure of gasoline and ammunition consistent with the economy of the lives of our troops.

"5. Wherever circumstances admit, troops not in the immediate presence of the enemy will be billeted. As soon as the troops so billeted have rested and been equipped they will be given constant practice in offensive tactics."

In the zone of the XII Corps the 35th Infantry Division advanced with the 134th Infantry in the vicinity of MALAUCOURT (U92), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81), and the 137th Infantry in the vicinity of COUTURES (U98). The 80th Infantry Division advanced with the 319th Infantry between LESMENILS (U83), two miles northeast of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), and LANDREMONT (U82), five miles southeast of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), the 317th Infantry in the vicinity of VILLERS (U92), eight miles north of NANCY (U81) and the 318th Infantry in the vicinity of MOIVRONS (U82), nine miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "A" of the 6th



Engineer Radio Communications Across Moselle

Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of JALLAUCOURT (Q02), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Strong enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of MARSAL (Q12), twenty miles northeast of NANCY (U81), were repulsed by the 4th Armored Division with Combat Command "A" advancing to the vicinity of XANREY (Q11), ten miles north of LUNEVILLE (W09), and Reserve Combat Command advancing to the vicinity of MONCOURT (Q11), ten miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (W09).

XV Corps continued aggressive patrolling, particular emphasis placed on the roads to the south of the FORET-DE-PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (W09), and along the LA VEZOUSE River; and, despite enemy resistance, reconnoitered the FORET-DE-PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (W09), in preparation for an attack. A considerable increase was noted in the amount of enemy artillery opposing the XV Corps. Heavy fires were received, so much on the bridge at FLIN (W28), ten miles southeast of LUNEVILLE (W09), that engineers were forced to withdraw their equipment. Corps artillery fired twenty-three counterbattery missions and a considerable reduction in the enemy's artillery activity was noted.

In the XX Corps zone the 329th Infantry (83d Infantry Division) relieved the 5th Armored Division in its zone. While the 330th Infantry completed relieving the 7th Armored Division in the bridgehead south of METZ (U85), and continued to improve its positions in the MOSELLE bridgehead, the 90th Infantry Division continued to push forward slowly over bitterly contested ground. Reserve Combat Command of the 6th Armored Division was still en route to its new assembly area in the vicinity of PAGNY-SUR-MOSELLE (U74) and Reserve Combat Command and Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division were en route to LONGUYON (U49). Army artillery maintained neutralizing fires on FORTS DRIANT and JEANNE D'ARC at METZ (U85) on a 24-hour basis. One hundred fifty-five rounds of 155 gun, 100 rounds of 8-inch howitzer and twenty-five rounds of 240 howitzer ammunition were fired upon FORT JEANNE D'ARC. A number of direct hits were obtained on the casements, two being destroyed, and an ammunition dump was exploded. A total of 107 rounds of 155 howitzer was fired upon the concrete shelters and casements of FORT KELLERMAN, but chipped concrete was the sole result.

Because of adverse weather conditions no flying was possible by the XIX Tactical Air Command.

In the day's action, the Third U.S. Army continued to consolidate and improve its positions, while maintaining aggressive patrols.

Four of a fleet of cargo planes carrying 20,000 blankets, 10,000 litters and 375 oxygen cylinders unfortunately overshot the airstrip at ETAIN (U47). One of the planes was shot down by the enemy and the other three were lost. As a result, Third U.S. Army hospitals received only 2,500 blankets, 1,000 litters and 100 oxygen cylinders.

A terrain study of central Germany was distributed to Third U.S. Army engineers. Studies of the MAGINOT Line were obtained from the French Army.



26 SEPTEMBER (D+112)

In a Twelfth U.S. Army Group report on enemy supply and equipment, additional evidence was cited of the frequent inability of the enemy's supply organization to properly execute its function. Up to 16 September, the Third U.S. Army had captured and put to use 306,000 gallons of enemy gasoline. These were recorded totals only, the amount of unreported stocks overrun and put to use by front line units probably raising these figures considerably. Rapid advances of the Third U.S. Army so disrupted the enemy's supply system that, far from being able to rescue his sorely-needed stocks of gasoline, oils, and greases, he was unable even to destroy them.

Enemy effective combat strength in the Third U.S. Army zone was estimated at this time as the equivalent of nine divisions, consisting of 76,500 troops and 310 tanks or assault guns, identified in contact, and the equivalent of six divisions, consisting of 49,700 troops and 195 tanks, available as immediate reserves. Facing the XX Corps, it was estimated, were 24,000 troops and twenty-five tanks or assault guns, with 21,200 troops and seventy-five tanks in immediate reserve. Opposing the XII Corps were 35,000 troops and 190 tanks or assault guns, with 10,000 troops and fifty tanks in reserve. Facing the XV Corps were 17,500 troops and ninety-five tanks, with 18,500 troops and seventy tanks in reserve.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group in a letter of instruction on this date stated that the strong defensive positions held by the enemy along the SIEGFRIED Line in the north facing the First U.S. Army and along the MOSELLE River in the south facing the Third U.S. Army had given him an opportunity to regroup and strengthen his forces defending the approaches to Germany. New divisions had been arriving from training areas in Germany and Denmark and from the Russian front.

Since the support of the attack of 21 Army Group British was the primary consideration at that time, the Twelfth U.S. Army Group set itself the mission of clearing the area between its left (north) boundary and the MEUSE River and of protecting the right flank of 21 Army Group British.

After this mission was assured and when sufficient forces were available, the attack on KOLN (F45) was to be pushed. Third U.S. Army was given the mission of holding its present positions until the supply situation permitted a resumption of the offensive. The 83d Infantry Division, reinforced, was assigned to the Third U.S. Army at once. The 7th Armored Division was transferred to the First U.S. Army and moved to LONGUYON (U49).

XII Corps continued to consolidate and improve its position, while repulsing severe enemy counterattacks. The 4th Armored Division moved forward preparing to assist in heading off enemy troops in the north which were trying to escape from the FORET DE PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09). Combat Command "B" was enroute to the vicinity of BURES (Q11), eight miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), while Reserve Combat Command was moving toward SERRES (P91). Combat Command "B" of the 6th Armored Division reached the vicinity of ARMANCOURT (U92) ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81), on its way to MOIVRONS (U82).

XV Corps continued to patrol its zone aggressively and to protect the south flank of the Third U.S. Army. Preparations were started to launch a coordinated attack with air to clear the FORET DE PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), where patrols were still meeting strong resistance.

XX Corps prepared to launch an attack on FORT DRIANT (U75). The 5th Infantry Division continued to improve its bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River, while elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied GREIVELDANGE (P91). Elements of the 359th Infantry, 90th Infantry Division, advanced to the vicinity of ROZERIEULLES (U75), three miles west of METZ (U85). The 358th Infantry, 90th Infantry Division, relieved by "Task Force POLK" (3d Cavalry Group, the 135th Engineer Combat Battalion, and a French Infantry unit, the 1st Battalion, Regiment of Paris) moved to its new assembly area in the vicinity of VIONVILLE (U65), eight miles west of METZ (U85). The 7th Armored Division passed to the control of the First U.S.Army.

Due to weather conditions the XIX Tactical Air Command had limited air activity. In thirty-five sorties, claims included four motor transports damaged or destroyed and three military installations attacked.

A shipment of 221 long tons of Classes II and IV supplies, including 86,780 blankets, was received. All divisions were issued enough blankets to bring the total to three for each man and plans were made to complete the issues to corps and Army troops. A survey of fortifications of the MAGINOT Line was started by the engineers from information obtained from the French Army.

27 SEPTEMBER (D+113)

By order of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group the XV Corps (the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 2d French Armored Division and supporting troops) was assigned to the Sixth U.S. Army Group.

XII Corps was successful in driving back strong enemy counterattacks. The 137th and the 320th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of PETTONCOURT (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Elements of the 80th Infantry Division repulsed the enemy in the vicinity of SERRIERES (U82), nine miles north of NANCY (U81). Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division was en route to the vicinity of SAULXURES (U91). The 4th Armored Division repulsed several strong counterattacks in the vicinity of MOYENVIC (Q11), HEZANGE LA PETITE (Q01), and COINCOURT (Q11). Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division closed in an area in the vicinity of BURES (Q11), eight miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09).

XV Corps continued aggressive patrolling in the vicinity of FORET-DE PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), prepared to launch an attack to clear the forest after air bombardment. The 79th Infantry Division moved the bulk of its forces to positions on the south bank of the VENZOUSE River, while the 2d French Armored Division continued to protect the south flank of the Army.

In the XX Corps elements of the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) launched a probing attack on FORT DRIANT (U75) and in the face of fanatical enemy resistance advanced to the moat surrounding the fort before withdrawing. The 83d Infantry Division pushed forward with the 329th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of GREVENMACHER (L02). The 331st Infantry advanced to the vicinity of REMICH (L00) with patrols to the MOSELLE River. The corps experienced an increase in enemy artillery fire at METZ (U85), especially from positions within the forts. GRAVELOTTE (U75) continued to receive much of the enemy's attention, over 300 rounds having fallen on the town within a three-day period. Corps artillery continued its neutralization fires against FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) with good effect. Over 100 rounds of 90mm antiaircraft artillery time fire were directed against infantry entrenched in the environs of this fort. One battalion of the 5th Infantry Division launched an attack against FORT DRIANT (U75) that was preceded by an artillery preparation fired by 5th Infantry Division Artillery and the supporting corps artillery. The attack reached the moat surrounding the fort before being compelled to withdraw.

During this period the XIX Tactical Air Command took advantage of excellent weather conditions, flying 517 sorties in thirty-nine missions with very good results. Among claims for the day were twenty-six railroad lines cut and 180 railroad cars, forty-five motor transports, thirty-eight locomotives, five supply dumps, twenty-two gun installations, twelve military installations, nineteen tanks and armored vehicles damaged or destroyed, while troop concentrations and marshalling yards were attacked with good results reported.



Artilleryman Rests During Lull in Action

28 SEPTEMBER *(D + 114)*

In an operational directive on this date to the XII and XX Corps, the Army Commander informed the corps that the Sixth U.S. Army Group had continued its attack to seize the RHINE River crossings south of SPEYER (R58) inclusive.

First U. S. Army was to clear the area between its left (north) boundary and the MEUSE River and protect the right flank of 21 Army Group British. It was to be prepared to resume its advance to the RHINE River in the vicinity of KOLN (F45) and BONN (F53). It was to move the V Corps to the north when relieved by elements of the Ninth U. S. Army. The Ninth U. S. Army was to take over the present front of the V Corps and upon its arrival in the line was to contain the enemy on its front. As additional units became available it was to extend its front south to include METZ (U85), relieving the Third U.S. Army elements in this area.

Third U. S. Army was ordered by the Army Commander to improve its positions by local counterattacks to seize and secure the line of departure delineated in the Letter of Instruction No 4 of 25 September. The Army was to continue aggressive reconnaissance and was to be prepared to resume the advance to the northeast to secure crossings of the RHINE River and seize the FRANKFURT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area.

XII Corps repulsed numerous enemy counterattacks, maintained aggressive patrols and continued consolidating and improving positions. The 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) captured PORT SUR SEILLE (U83), eight miles east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The 4th Armored Division cleared in an area in the vicinity of ARRANCOURT (Q11) - COINCOURT (Q11) and the 35th Infantry Division concentrated in the vicinity of ARMANCOURT (U92) - MANHOUE (U89) - PETTONCOURT (Q02). The 6th

Armored Division moved to the vicinity of LEYR (U92), six miles north of NANCY (U81), while the 80th Infantry Division concentrated in the vicinity of LEYR (U92) - LESMENILS (U83).

XV Corps launched its attack against the FORET DE PARROY (Q10), four miles northeast of LUNEVILLE (V09), with elements of the 79th Infantry Division advancing three miles. XV Corps passed to control of the Seventh U.S. Army.

XX Corps continued its attack on one of the METZ (U85) forts against strong enemy counterattacks. Elements of the 5th Infantry Division occupied the high ground in the vicinity of LESMENILS (U83), two miles northeast of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73). The 358th Infantry of the 90th Infantry Division closed in an area in the vicinity of VIONVILLE (U65), eight miles west of METZ (U85). The 331st Infantry captured REMICH (L00), while the 329th Infantry occupied the high ground in the vicinity of MOMPACH (L02).

Five hundred and seventy-three sorties in thirty-nine missions were carried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command with the following claims being made: seventy-two railroad lines cut, 371 railroad cars, forty-nine motor transports, sixty-seven locomotives, eighteen gun installations and seventeen military installations damaged or destroyed with eight marshalling yards and five airdromes being attacked.

The town of REMICH (L00) was captured by the Army, which continued to improve its positions with aggressive patrols to the east in the period.

Permission from higher headquarters was requested to reorganize six towed tank destroyer battalions into self-propelled M36 battalions as and when the necessary equipment became available.

Armor Moves Through Luneville

29 SEPTEMBER (D+115)

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division repulsed numerous enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of JALLAUCOURT (Q02), thirteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Reserve Combat Command which was en route to rejoin the 6th Armored Division closed in the vicinity of SAULXURES (U91), two miles east of NANCY (U81).

An interesting employment of its air observation posts was reported by the 4th Armored Division, in which the advance of each combat command was habitually preceded by an air observation post whose radio had been set upon the command channel of the combat command. In this way the commander of each combat command at all times had accurate and prompt information of the situation in front of his advance. He very often had the air observation plane land and take him aloft for a rapid aerial reconnaissance prior to employing his command.

XX Corps continued aggressive patrolling of the forts in the METZ (U85) area. Elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied OSWEILLER (L03) - MOMPACH (L02) and WASSERBILLING (L12).

The XIX Tactical Air Command had another good day, flying 576 sorties in forty-six missions. Attacks continued on enemy rail and motor transportation. Forty-five railroad lines were cut while 226 railroad cars, sixty-six motor transports, forty-three locomotives, twenty-two gun installations, fifty horse-drawn vehicles, twenty-three military installations, seventy-seven miscellaneous naval vessels, three highway bridges and three tanks and armored vehicles were damaged or destroyed. Continued attacks on troop concentrations and marshalling yards were carried out with good results being reported.

Improvement of positions by the Third U.S. Army continued in the face of heavy enemy resistance.

30 SEPTEMBER (D+116)

(Map for this date accompanies text)

In the XII Corps zone the 35th Infantry Division launched an attack to clear the enemy from the FORET DE GREMECY (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81). The 80th Infantry Division maintained aggressive patrols in its zone. The 6th Armored Division attacked and gained the high ground FRESNES (H20) - LEMONCOURT (Q03) and the town of CHAMBERY (Y76) with the high ground to the north thereof.

XX Corps continued to aggressively patrol the area in the vicinity of METZ (U85), but made little progress against an enemy that was determined to hold its ground at all costs.

All air activity for the day was grounded due to weather conditions.

30 SEPTEMBER
DISPOSITION AND MOVEMENT OF THIRD U.S. ARMY AND THE ENEMY SITUATION

OPERATIONAL MAP SHOWING BATTLE LINE 30 SEPT

RELD FROM NINTH U.S. ARMY ASGD TO THIRD U.S. ARMY (21 SEPT)

TEMPORARY BOUNDARY

FIRST XXX THIRD

TO FIRST U.S. ARMY (26 SEPT)

RELD FROM FIRST U.S. ARMY ASGD TO THIRD U.S. ARMY (6 SEPT)

ATCHD TO THIRD U.S. ARMY (12 SEPT)

RELD FROM U.S. ARMY ASGD TO THIRD U.S. ARMY 16 SEPT

FROM VIC OF JOIGNY

ATCHD TO XV CORP FROM FIRST U.S. ARMY (5 SEPT)

THIRD XXXX SEVENTH

INITIAL BOUNDARY SEPT

NOTE:
ON 5 SEPT VIII CORPS (2nd, 8th 29th 83rd INF DIVS AND 6th ARMD DIV) WAS RELD FROM ASCHT TO THIRD U.S. ARMY AND ASGD TO NINTH U.S. ARMY. 6th ARMD DIV AND 83rd INF DIV REVERTED TO THIRD U.S. ARMY LATER IN MONTH.

AT 290001 SEPT XX CORPS (7TH INF DIV, 2nd FR. ARMD DIV) RELD FROM THIRD U.S. ARMY AND ASGD TO SEVENTH U.S. ARMY FOLLOWING ADJUSTMENT OF INTER-ARMY BOUNDARY.

A summary of operations for the month, as viewed from the four-phase standpoint, showed the following facts:

In the first phase, Third U. S. Army's swift advances and the enemy's headlong retreat were slowed down and finally brought to a halt early in September because of a shortage of gasoline. By 3 September, the enemy had turned his fleeing troops around at the German border and had occupied the MOSELLE River line. Hastily-formed units, including students from the officers' candidate school at METZ (U85), were thrown into the line in a desperate effort to stabilize the front. Units committed included the fruits of the enemy's total mobilization program, the scrapings from the bottom of the manpower barrel. All along the front the enemy rushed the preparation of hasty field fortifications, especially along the east bank of the MOSELLE. In addition, forced civilian labor, Todt workers, Hitler Youth organizations and newly-formed Army units frantically repaired and strengthened the defensive works of the SIEGFRIED Line and constructed successive lines of defense between the MOSELLE and the Westwall.

By the end of September the Third U. S. Army's tank-infantry-aircraft assaults, aided by the most intensive use of artillery thus far in the campaign, had pushed the enemy successively across the MOSELLE, MEURTHE and VEZOUSE Rivers in the southern portion of the Army's zone and to the FORET DE PARROY (V19), where the enemy was resisting stubbornly. In the XII Corps zone at the end of the month, the enemy was attempting to prevent the expansion of the bridgehead over the SEILLE River in the FORET DE GREMECEY (Q02) area and in the north he was holding the east bank of the MOSELLE and a small bridgehead west of the river around METZ (U85).

Nearly 30,000 prisoners were captured during September, with an estimated 607 enemy tanks, 663 artillery pieces and 1,735 vehicles reported captured or destroyed. The enemy's heavy losses in personnel and equipment was attributed to 1. The aggressiveness of the enemy's defense resulting in almost continuous local counterattacks, seldom of more than battalion strength, and 2. The enemy's low quality of personnel and the unsatisfactory state of training. The bulk of the enemy's armored and infantry divisions committed in September were hastily organized, and included stragglers and some convalescents. Equipment for these units, especially for the Panzer brigades, was new, but the personnel was committed after only two or three weeks of training. By the end of the month practically all of the new units had suffered severe losses. The new Panzer brigades had proved ineffective and unable to sustain heavy losses, with the result that all had been incorporated into veteran Panzer divisions. The punishing blows to the enemy, however, were inflicted at comparatively heavy losses in casualties to the Army.

In the second phase, the battle of MOSELLE between 7 and 15 September, the enemy fought desperately to prevent crossing of the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers between METZ (U85) and LUNEVILLE (V09), launching many local counterattacks with infantry and tanks against Third U. S. Army's five bridgeheads in an effort to prevent their consolidation. At the same time the enemy launched strong counterattacks against this Army's north and south flanks, but they were repulsed with heavy losses to him. Sensing the threat of an armored breakthrough from the penetration east of NANCY (U81) and LUNEVILLE (V09), the enemy launched desperate counterattacks against the salient. Terrific tank battles raged all along the bridgehead during the last half of the month, with the enemy attacking principally along the shoulders of the salient in an attempt to force a withdrawal. These attacks met with little success, but the enemy succeeded in stabilizing his front and gained time for the formation of new units and reorganization of his depleted divisions.

The Third U.S. Army's artillery came into its own in the attacks on the METZ (U85) defenses. The enemy's use of the many forts, both old and modernized, presented a most difficult artillery problem. Even the heaviest artillery proved incapable of destroying these fortifications, but excellent neutralizing effect was achieved. The fullest exploitation of artillery was prevented by the prolonged scarcity of ammunition. The enemy's artillery was capably employed, but a high proportion of duds was noted in his fire.

The third phase, the developments along the Flanks, resulted from the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army across the MEUSE River and on to the MOSELLE, a drive which exposed the Army's northern flank. Since the southern flank was already exposed the Army held a vulnerable position, which the Army Commander risked because of his belief that the enemy was incapable of attacking the flanks in strength. The enemy's counterattacks, made by fresh products of Hitler's total mobilization, were repulsed with heavy losses. Other units launching counterattacks were overrun by Third U.S. Army advances, forced by artillery fire to retreat, or badly mauled and the survivors captured. By 18 September, the enemy had been forced east of the MEURTHE River and bitterly resisted the Army's crossings. He launched strong counterattacks on 22 September to capture LUNEVILLE (V09) and MONCEL (V19). Failing in this final attack on the south flank, the enemy retired to the east bank of the VEZOUSE River on 25 September, protected by strong rearguard actions.

In the fourth phase, the continuing Battle of BRITTANY, the enemy lost two of the ports into which he had withdrawn, and was being contained in two others. Resistance at ST MALO (S71) terminated on 3 September with the surrender of the garrison on ILE DE CEZEMBRE after intense artillery and aerial bombardment. At BREST (V99), the enemy continued his determined resistance to the bitter end, his fanatical troops refusing to surrender until routed from their fortifications and underground tunnels. Final surrender of the garrison came on 20 September when the VIII Corps was under the control of the Ninth U. S. Army. At the end of the month, LORIENT (G72) and ST NAZAIRE (N56) were being contained.

Enemy air activity was curtailed sharply in the Third U. S. Army zone during September. Only 128 raids by 287 aircraft were made during the month, as compared to August's totals of 1,117 raids by 3,213 aircraft, an average of nine planes per day as against 103 planes per day. Anti-aircraft artillery claimed twenty-eight planes destroyed and fif-

teen probably destroyed during September. Losses sustained by the German air force and a desire to husband their strength, plus bad flying weather much of the time, was responsible for the decrease in enemy air activity.

Terrain over which the Army's elements passed during September was dissected by major rivers and numerous smaller streams and canals. The enemy improved and increased his bridge demolitions as the Third U. S. Army's advance slowed down, and mined roads heavily in the vicinity of the MOSELLE River. Road surfaces were not materially damaged except for a few road craters and minefields. Problems presented to the Army's engineers were thus both varied and numerous. Bridging of the MOSELLE under intense enemy fire including heavy artillery, cost the engineers many casualties. Many thousands of maps were produced during the month, first priority being given to a series covering the SIEGFRIED Line in front of Third U. S. Army, the project consisting of 254 quadrangles of 12,000 copies each. In general, quantities of engineer supplies received from Communications Zone were adequate, and special means were taken to utilize considerable quantities of captured engineer materials.

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD US ARMY



*TOTAL IS CUMULATIVE FROM D+56

Special emphasis was given to soldier voting during the month. In all, 136 Third U. S. Army units were contacted and checked on soldier voting.

Transportation cleared 9,879 vehicles hauling 189,750 tons of supplies and 165,940 troops during September.

The campaign during September placed a considerable burden upon signal facilities. Because of the necessity for rapid displacement of Command posts, trained personnel became dispersed and difficulties were encountered because of the lack of personnel. The Army axis of communication followed that of the XX Corps during the campaign. To increase the speed of building forward and to lighten the load placed on all signal construction teams, the XX Corps was directed to build or rehabilitate four circuits, two of which were used later as the Army axis.

During the month the number of finance disbursing sections was reduced to two for Third U. S. Army troops and two for each corps. Allied military marks for use in GERMANY were distributed to finance officers and Belgian francs were distributed to finance officers paying Third U.S. Army troops in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG.

The strength of the Third U. S. Army at the end of September was 224,785, as against a strength of 346,208 at the end of August. This reduction was the result of transfers of the VIII Corps to the Ninth U.S. Army and the XV Corps to the Seventh U.S. Army. Losses to the Army during the month were 2,130 killed, 12,307 wounded, and 4,100 reported missing. Replacements received numbered 25,209. Cumulative losses since the campaign started were 4,575 killed, 23,794 wounded, and 6,156 reported missing. Cumulative replacements totaled 46,640. Evaders and escapers totaled 390 for the month.

Enemy losses for the month were 28,845 prisoners of war processed in Army cages, which combined with the total for August made a cumulative total of 88,940 prisoners since the campaign started. Not included in this total for the month were 1,611 prisoners of war evacuated through medical channels. The estimated cumulative enemy dead in the two months was 32,000 and the wounded 96,500.

TOWNS CAPTURED BY THIRD U S ARMY

SEPTEMBER

TOWN	CORPS	DATE
Avril	XX	9 September
Arnaville	XX	10 "
Andelot	XV	13 "
Ambrecourt	XV	13 "
Buzy	XX	5 "
Bettoncourt	XV	13 "
Corny	XX	7 "
Charmes	XV	12 "
Chatenois	XV	14 "
Doncourt	XX	5 "
Dornot	XX	6 "
Dompaire	XV	13 "
Damas	XV	13 "
Darney	XV	14 "
Etain	XX	3 "
Fresnes	XX	5 "
Hayenge	XX	10 "
Houecourt	XV	14 "
Ile-De-Cezembre	VIII	2 "
Joinville	XII	2 "
Littol Le Petite	XV	14 "

TOWN	CORPS	DATE
Littol Le Grande	XV	14 September
Mirecourt	XV	14 "
Mattaincourt	XV	14 "
Mirieulles	XX	17 "
Mompach	XX	28 "
Noveant	XX	7 "
Neufchateau	XV	12 "
Nancy	XII	15 "
Pont-A-Mousson	XII	6 "
Poussay	XV	13 "
Rambervillers	XV	30 "
Remich	XX	28 "
Ramecourt	XV	15 "
Rouvres	XV	15 "
St Mihiel	XII	2 "
Silvange	XX	24 "
Toul	XII	5 "
Vittel	XV	12 "
Velotte	XV	14 "
Wasserbillig	XX	29 "

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









SEPTEMBER	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
DAILY DEAD (EST)	200	200	200	200	175	225	300	50	2950	250	300	500	25	925	800	400	500	200	400	400	400	700	1100	450	250	300	400	400	300	200
DAILY WOUNDED (EST)	1350	1100	1000	1050		1700	900	250	750	500	600	1000	1000	900	1000	300	1100	400	500	500	1600	2800	5500	1200	1200	1500	1600	2800	1500	1000
DAILY CAPTURED	1819	1255	1502	862	679	837	985	214	492	994	963	235	752	640	2443	1197	1631	1977	972	324	889	813	982	696	334	231	235	197	134	2788*
TOTAL	3369	2555	2702	2112	854	2762	2185	514	4192	1744	1863	1735	1777	2465	4243	1897	3231	2577	1872	1224	2889	4313	7582	2346	1784	2031	2235	3397	1934	3988

*INCLUDES 2501 PW'S EVACUATED THROUGH MEDICAL CHANNELS FOR MONTH



THIRD ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-30 SEPTEMBER



Chapter 5

OCTOBER OPERATIONS

The Third U.S. Army's major activities during October, while the general static tactical situation of September continued, were concentrated on the building up of supplies, the assembly and regrouping of troops, and the laying of plans (including carrying on of limited objective operations) all in preparation for a new major offensive designed to drive the enemy back behind the RHINE River.

Re-examination of the entire supply system was made to conserve weapons and ammunition, to obtain all possible benefits from materiel on hand, and to accumulate required surpluses. Also accomplished was the equipping of troops with adequate wet and cold weather clothing, and the bringing of armored and other vehicles to top condition.

Assembly and regrouping of troops was both difficult and involved, due to the distance from the Army zone of several organizations recently arrived on the Continent, plus a shortage of transportation. By the end of the month, however, they were up to T/O and T/E strength and in position.

Planning activities for the new offensive included the execution of certain limited objective operations to secure a favorable line of departure, to keep the enemy from becoming too aggressive, and to give specialized combat experience to various units. XII Corps carried on such offensives successfully during the month. XX Corps operations against various forts protecting METZ (U85) provided a basis for training of troops in assaults on fixed fortifications and served to determine the tactical plan for future operations against the fortress city of METZ (U85) itself.

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1 OCTOBER *(D + 117)*

Following the heavy attack made by the 6th Armored Division on the preceding day, the enemy made local withdrawals in the XII Corps zone, falling back to the north of LEMONCOURT (Q03), fifteen miles northeast of NANCY (U81). Advances in the FORET-DE-GREMECEY (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81) were made in the face of enemy small arms and mortar fire. The enemy continued to patrol and improve his defensive positions in the XX Corps zone and harassed Army troops with artillery and mortar fire.

The 35th Infantry Division pushed forward to the eastern edge of the FORET-DE-GREMECEY (Q02) and the town of CHAMBREY (Q02) in the XII Corps zone. Control of the SEILLE River in the vicinity of PORT-SUR-SEILLE (U83), eight miles east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), was gained by the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division). Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division closed into an assembly area east of NANCY (U81), while its Reserve Combat Command closed into an area northwest of PETTONCOURT (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81).

Aggressive patrols were pushed in and around the vicinity of METZ (U85) by the XX Corps, while elements of the 329th Infantry (83d Infantry Division) reached the outskirts of GREVENMACHER (L02), northeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81). Elements of the 83d Infantry Division made contact with the VIII Corps (Ninth U.S. Army) on the north flank.

A number of missions were planned by the XIX Tactical Air Command, but because of adverse weather no operations were carried out.

Occupation of the FORET-DE-GREMECEY (Q02), ten miles northeast of NANCY (U81), and aggressive patrolling of enemy positions were the chief operational results of the day.

An improvement in Classes I, II, and IV supplies was noted, but receipts of Class III supplies were below requests. A strict program of gasoline rationing was planned and supply company commanders were briefed on the plan. The daily telegram requested 219,392 gallons of gasoline, of which 95,840 gallons were received. Winter clothing and equipment arrived in greater quantities.

To assure that front line troops would not be deprived of tobacco, steps were taken to speed up the delivery of a ten-day requirement of tobacco components on the basis of a troop strength of 300,000. Emphasizing the importance of tobacco for morale reasons, Army supply officers requested and received assurance of action without delay from Advance Section Communications Zone. During the previous month, the Third U.S. Army had received limited supplies of tobacco because only 4,559,200 ration accessory convenience kits of tobacco and other items were delivered of 8,030,000 kits requested. Forty-four tons of medical supplies were received from the Communications Zone on this date.

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2 OCTOBER *(D + 118)*

SIVRY (U82) and BURES (Q11) were evacuated by the enemy in the XII Corps zone. A notable increase in enemy vehicular and troop movements was observed south from SECOURT (U93) in the XX Corps zone.

XII Corps consolidated its positions and aggressively patrolled to the east.

An attack on FORT DRIANT, southwest of METZ (U85), was launched by the XX Corps' 5th Infantry Division, a heavy aerial bombardment preceding it. Farther north elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied the high ground overlooking ECHTERNACH (L03), GREVENMACHER (L02), and WINTRANGE (P90), while the 90th Infantry Division occupied the high ground west of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

XIX Tactical Air Command had a busy day, flying 426 sorties in thirty-three missions with excellent results. Claims included twenty-nine railroad lines cut, 243 railroad cars, fifty-eight motor transports, thirty-two locomotives, forty-two gun installations and thirteen miscellaneous naval vessels destroyed or damaged. Eight marshalling yards were attacked.

Commanding ground west of the MOSELLE River and north of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) continued to be occupied by units of the Third U.S. Army while aggressive patrols probed the enemy lines.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised the Army that effective 4 October the basis of tonnage allocation for this Army would be 450 tons daily per division in the Army area, and that because of the movement of the 26th Infantry Division into the area the requisitions effective on 5 October would be based on eight divisions. At this time, all divisions and eighty percent of the smaller units had three blankets and one overcoat per man, while sufficient blankets and overcoats were on hand to equip the remainder of the Army.

Psychological warfare leaflets addressed to specific German divisions were dropped by planes. A vital link in the Third U.S. Army communications system, known as "West Wirehead", began operations at LAXOU, a suburb of NANCY (U81). Built of reinforced concrete and partly underground, the building had suffered little damage from German attempts to destroy it when the enemy evacuated the city. Hours of civilian circulation in all towns in the Army zone were fixed by the Army Commander at from 0600 to 2000 hours.

3 OCTOBER *(D + 119)*

Except for scattered artillery fire the enemy was quiet in the XII Corps zone. He was reported digging in on the high ground along the line north of CHATEAU SALINS (Q12) - MORVILLE (Q12). Two small counterattacks were launched against XX Corps positions, but both were repulsed. The 5th Infantry Division's attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85) was met by heavy enemy fire.

Aggressive patrols continued to push to the east and probe enemy positions opposite the XII Corps. Elements of the 80th and 35th Infantry Divisions repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of SIVRY (U82), eight miles north of NANCY (U81).

Elements of the 5th Infantry Division (XX Corps) entered FORT DRIANT, on the west bank of the MOSELLE River southwest of METZ (U85), and met strong enemy opposition within the fort. The 83d Infantry Division continued to occupy the high ground west of ECHTERNACH (L03) and GREVENMACHER (L02), while the 90th Infantry Division continued to patrol its front aggressively and repulsed several small enemy counterattacks.

Twenty-three field artillery battalions supported the attack on FORT DRIANT, firing a thirty-minute preparation followed by supporting fires, directed against neighboring fortresses as well as FORT DRIANT. Enemy artillery opposition to the attack was continuously heavy. Guns of the neighboring forts of JEANNE D'ARC, the VERDUN GROUPE, BATTERIE MOSELLE and MARIVAL as well as those of the objective itself were all active. Third U.S. Army artillery achieved only limited results against the heavily-fortified defenses. Temporary neutralization was achieved but even the heaviest caliber weapons proved incapable of effective destruction. Substantial damage was inflicted upon six of FORT DRIANT's casemated guns but all were repaired and resumed firing later in the day.

Flying 302 sorties in twenty-two missions, XIX Tactical Air Command continued its attacks on enemy railroad lines and military installations. Among claims for the day were thirty-nine railroad lines cut, seventy-eight railroad cars, thirty-five locomotives, fifteen military installations and four small naval vessels destroyed or damaged. Eight marshalling yards were attacked during the period.

The attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85) continued, while on the remainder of the Army front action was limited to aggressive patrolling.

A gasoline rationing board, consisting of one officer and three enlisted men, began operations with the Class III supply section. Gasoline was allotted in general as follows: infantry divisions, 5,000 gallons; armored divisions, 25,000 gallons; corps troops, 10,000 gallons, and Army troops, 84,000 gallons. Reserve stocks of gasoline at this time totalled 300,000 gallons. The 7th Convalescent Hospital, which had been operating under the supervision of the Advance Section Communications Zone since the Army became operational, was relieved from assignment to the Third U.S. Army.

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4 OCTOBER *(D + 120)*

Favored enemy capabilities as estimated at this time were that he could combine delaying actions in the Army's zone of advance with a fortress stand at METZ (U85), counterattacking locally with armored spearheads and impeding the Army's advance by the diversion of troops, artillery, munitions and aviation. Utilizing the ring of forts around METZ (U85) to the fullest, the enemy's objective, it was estimated, would be to hold the city at all costs in order to use it as a pivot to establish a general defensive line paralleling the SIEGFRIED Line. Establishment of such a line would give the enemy time to organize the SIEGFRIED Line and defenses of the RHINE River Line and secure the powerful tactical advantage of the crippling wet and cold fall and winter weather. At the same time, the enemy was expected to take advantage of the favorable terrain in the Army's zone of advance to construct one or more organized defensive positions for employment in conjunction with the inclement weather to defend and delay against the Army's eastward advance.

While repulsing enemy counterattacks on SIVRY (U82), eight miles north of NANCY (U81), XII Corps continued to push aggressive patrols to the east.

Elements of the 5th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone continued to fight their way forward within FORT DRIANT (U75), while elements of the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) and the 90th Infantry Division moved into positions to reinforce the attack. Heavy mortar, artillery and bazooka fire was employed by the enemy against pillboxes of FORT DRIANT which had been captured and occupied by the Army's troops.

Concentrating heavily on enemy rail transportation, XIX Tactical Air Command claimed twenty-two railroad lines cut, 248 railroad cars, twenty-five locomotives, twenty-one gun installations, two railroad bridges destroyed or damaged, while attacks continued against marshalling yards and troop concentrations.

Aggressive patrolling continued along the entire Third U.S. Army front, while the attack against FORT DRIANT progressed slowly against stiff opposition.

The Commanding General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group verbally informed the Third U.S. Army Commander that the 10th Armored Division would be assigned in the near future to the Third U.S. Army, and the remainder of the 26th Infantry Division (101st Infantry) would be released to the Third U.S. Army without delay.

Arrangements were made for the Advance Section Communications Zone to bring perishable Class I supplies, meat and butter, to SOMMESOUS (T42) daily, from where the Army would distribute the items to supply points. Formerly the Army had trucked these supplies from PARIS (S04). Three hundred thousand operational rations were to be set aside at Army Reserve Point No 1. A record for evacuating patients on planes was established at the air evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U61), operated by the Third U.S. Army. Nineteen aircraft, carrying 494 patients, were loaded and ready to take off one hour and eighteen minutes after receipt of the alert. Fifty trucks were sent by civil affairs to move 300 tons of flour from VERDUN (U26) to NANCY (U81) to relieve a serious bread shortage there.

5 OCTOBER *(D + 121)*

Tactical reconnaissance photographs of German positions revealed that the enemy was building new defensive installations in the Third U.S. Army's zone of advance. The enemy shelled NANCY (U81) with 280mm artillery, but no damage of a military nature resulted.

Elements of the 26th Infantry Division closed in an area in the vicinity of ATHIENVILLE (Q01) in the XII Corps zone. The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) began to relieve elements of the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division).

Task Force DRIANT was organized to continue the attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85), it consisted of a regiment of infantry, a company of engineers and a company of tanks. Meanwhile, Task Force POIK (3d Cavalry Group, less the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron; 135th Engineer Combat Battalion, 1st Regiment de Paris, 1st Battalion of the 330th Infantry, and the 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion, less Company A) relieved elements of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) in its zone.

Seven missions totaling 110 sorties were carried out by XIX Tactical Air Command, with light claims reported including four railroad lines cut, fifteen motor transports, fifty-four military installations, one highway bridge and twenty-eight small naval vessels destroyed or damaged, and six marshalling yards attacked. The railroad cutting program carried out by the Air Command was for the purpose of isolating the enemy from his supply and communications in the rear and to prevent an enemy defensive buildup.

Aggressive patrolling continued while additional elements of the Third U.S. Army closed in an assembly area preparatory to commitment.

The Rear Echelon of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, moved to NANCY (U81), the Forward Echelon remaining temporarily at ETAIN (U47).

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6 OCTOBER *(D + 122)*

Heavy enemy artillery fire fell in CHAMBREY (Q02) and PETTONCOURT (Q02) in the XII Corps zone. An enemy counterattack in the FORT DRIANT area near METZ (U85) by a company of officer candidates was repulsed by XX Corps troops. These troops, stationed at the officer candidate school at METZ (U85), were picked non-commissioned officers and fanatical Nazis, most of whom had battle experience on the Russian front. A considerable increase in enemy artillery fire was noted in the vicinity of MARIEULLES (U84) - VEZON (U74).

The 104th and 101st Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of ATHIENVILLE (Q01) and elements of those regiments relieved elements of the 4th Armored Division in the XII Corps zone. Remaining elements of the corps continued to consolidate positions and patrolled to the east.

Task Force DRIANT gained control of the northwest and southwest corners of FORT DRIANT near METZ (U85). Elements of the 83d Infantry Division occupied WORMELDINGEN (L01), while elements of the 90th Infantry Division entered MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) in the face of strong enemy opposition.

Fighter bombers of the XIX Tactical Air Command flew close support for the Third U.S. Army and claimed excellent results. Among claims were twenty-one railroad lines cut, 117 railroad cars, six motor transports, nine locomotives, twenty-four gun installations, three highway bridges, one ammunition dump and twenty tanks and armored cars destroyed or damaged.

WORMELDINGEN (L01) was occupied while the attacks on FORT DRIANT and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) continued. On the remainder of the front action was confined to patrolling.



Infantryman Finds Cover In Maizieres-Les-Metz

7 OCTOBER *(D + 123)*

Heavy artillery was used by the enemy to harass Army positions at LEYR (U92) and GREMECEY (Q02) in the XII Corps zone, while in the XX Corps zone an enemy counterattack west of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was repulsed. The enemy held the south portion of the town in heavy fighting.

To enlarge its bridgehead the XII Corps launched an attack to the northeast. The 35th Infantry Division attacked in the direction of FOSSIEUX (U92) and occupied that town and the high ground in the vicinity of MALAUCOURT (U92). The 6th Armored Division advanced in the direction of LETRICOURT (U93) and occupied MOIVRONS (U92), while the 80th Infantry Division attacked in the direction of LIXIERES (U82).

A XII Corps attack to clear the northern half of the corps sector up to the SEILLE River was supported by twenty-three field artillery battalions. There was a forty-five minute artillery preparation. Thereafter the artillery rendered continual close support, its fires consisting both of observed missions against targets of opportunity and prearranged missions fired on call. Extensive use was made of time-on-target missions, including two eleven-battalion and one ten-battalion concentration all upon the town of JEANDELAINCOURT (U92) nine miles north of NANCY (U81). Effectiveness of artillery support, and especially the counterbattery program, was amply evidenced by the fact that enemy artillery reaction to the attack was very light. Anti-aircraft artillery supporting the 80th Infantry Division artillery silenced a battery of enemy 88mm guns with two direct hits at a range of 12,950 yards.

In the XX Corps zone the 331st Infantry (83d Infantry Division) completed clearing the enemy from WORMELDINGEN (L01) while elements of the 329th Infantry cleared the enemy from ECHTERNACH (L03) and GREVENMACHER (L02). The 5th Infantry Division continued to attack FORT DRIANT (U75) while the 90th Infantry Division continued to fight its way into MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86). Strong small arms, anti-tank, and artillery fire was encountered.

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its heavy attacks on enemy rail transportation, flying 402 sorties during the period. Claims for the day included thirty railroad lines cut, 187 railroad cars, nineteen gun installations, thirty-three military installations and eighty-three miscellaneous naval vessels destroyed or damaged. Three enemy troops concentrations were attacked with good results reported.

MOIVRONS (U92), FOSSIEUX (U92) and the high ground in the vicinity of FOSSIEUX (U92) and MALAUCOURT (U92) were now occupied by the Army and the enemy was cleared from ECHTERNACH (L03) and GREVENMACHER (L02), while other elements continued the attacks on FORT DRIANT and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) during the period.

GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, Chief of Staff of the United States Army; LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS T. HANDY, Deputy Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, and were briefed on operations.

Psychological warfare units broadcast surrender messages across the MOSELLE River to the enemy in THIONVILLE (U86), while the enemy ceased firing during the broadcast.

8 OCTOBER *(D + 124)*

While in the XII Corps zone the enemy maintained his defensive attitude, in the XX Corps zone observers reported the movement toward the south of a large number of enemy vehicles, including some tanks. The enemy used explosives against XX Corps troops assaulting the underground entrance to one of the FORT DRIANT tunnels at METZ (U85).

Against scattered resistance the XII Corps continued its attack to the northeast and advanced two to three miles along a twenty-mile zone. Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division advanced to LETRICOURT (U93), while Combat Command "B" captured AJONCOURT (U92), CHENICOURT (U92) and JEANDELAINCOURT (U92). Quadruple mount 50. caliber machine guns were employed to clean out pockets of resistance. Elements of the 80th Infantry Division cleared the BOIS-DE-LA-FOURASSE (U93) area and occupied JEANDELAINCOURT (U92), while the 35th Infantry Division advanced in the vicinity of FOSSIEUX (U92).

Only limited progress was made by the 5th Infantry Division as it continued its attack on FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85) in the XX Corps zone. Heavy resistance was met in the vicinity of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) by the 90th Infantry Division which pushed aggressive patrols to the vicinity of METZ (U85).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 311 sorties during the day, which was featured by attacks on enemy airdromes and military installations. Forty-five enemy planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground and among other claims were forty gun installations, thirty-nine military installations and one ammunition dump destroyed or damaged.

AJONCOURT (U92), CHENICOURT (U92), JEANDELAINCOURT (U92) and the wooded area southwest of LETRICOURT (U93) were captured and occupied by the Third U.S. Army during the period, while attacks were continued on FORT DRIANT and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Divisions of the Army were notified that stocks were available for them to build their unit reserves of Classes II and IV supplies.

9 OCTOBER *(D + 125)*

Intensification of patrol activity was noted on the part of the enemy, who continued to offer scattered resistance in the XII Corps zone. A large number of enemy dead observed in the BOIS DE LA FOURASSE (U93) was believed to be the result of aerial fragmentation bombs. The enemy continued his heavy artillery fire in the FORT DRIANT area of the XX Corps zone, while mines and snipers harassed the Army's advance at MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

XII Corps continued to advance toward the SEILLE River, while the 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions consolidated their gains. Combat Command "A" of the 6th Armored Division cleared CHENICOURT (U92) and reached the vicinity of AULNOIS (U93), where it was relieved by the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division). Combat Command "A" moved in mobile reserve in the vicinity of LEYR (U91), six miles north of NANCY (U81), while the remainder of the division moved into corps reserve in the vicinity of SAULXURES-LES-NANCY (U91), two miles east of NANCY (U81). Preparations to attack in the direction of PARROY (Q11) were started by the 4th Armored Division.

Task Force WARNOCK (2d Infantry), commanded by Brigadier General ALVA C. WARNOCK, replaced Task Force DRIANT (10th Infantry) and assembled equipment prior to continuing operations in the tunnels of FORT DRIANT at METZ (U85) in the XX Corps zone, where resistance continued to be heavy. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued to clear the enemy out of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), where house-to-house fighting continued.

Because of adverse weather no operations were carried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command.

The day's operations resulted in elements of the Third U.S. Army advancing to the SEILLE River and continuing to clear MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) and FORT DRIANT.

Beginning on this date and for seven days thereafter an additional supply tonnage of 250 tons daily was requested to prepare for the arrival of an armored division. The reserve stock of gasoline totaled 600,000 gallons.

10 OCTOBER *(D + 126)*

Heavy enemy harassing artillery fire fell throughout the XII Corps zone. Bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) and the enemy made extensive use of basements of houses and employed bazookas against buildings occupied by troops of the XX Corps.

Headquarters of III Corps, commanded by Major General JOHN MILLIKIN, and the 95th Infantry Division were relieved from assignment to the Ninth U.S. Army and assigned to the Third U.S. Army. Upon arrival on the Continent the III Corps Headquarters was established at CARTERET (P09), moving to ETAIN (U47) on 1 November. The 83d Infantry Division was transferred from the Third U.S. Army to the Ninth U.S. Army.

XII Corps continued to consolidate its gains. A strong enemy counterattack in the vicinity of LETRICOURT (U93) was repulsed by the 80th Infantry Division. XX Corps continued to fight fiercely for FORT DRIANT near METZ (U85) and for MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), but made only limited progress. Advance elements of the 95th Infantry Division arrived in the corps area in the vicinity of NORROY-LE-SEC (U67).

No missions were carried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command on this date because of poor weather conditions.

While consolidating gains in XII Corps zone, Third U.S. Army continued to attack at MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

The Army Commander escorted GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL and LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS T. HANDY to the forward command posts of the divisions in XII and XX Corps.

11 OCTOBER *(D + 127)*

Tactical reconnaissance observed enemy entrenching and construction activity along the high ground east of the SEILLE River in the vicinity of CLEMERY (U83) and in the FORET DE CHATEAU SALINS (Q13) in the XII Corps zone. Enemy artillery fire fell throughout the corps zone. Tactical reconnaissance also observed considerable movement in the rear of the enemy lines in the XX Corps zone. A troop train entered METZ (U85) and another moved south from KNOZ KARTHAUS (L12).

The 2d Cavalry Squadron (XII Corps) relieved the 42d Cavalry Squadron in the vicinity of PARROY (Q11) - COINCOURT (Q11). Elements of the 80th Infantry Division repulsed strong enemy counterattacks in the vicinity of LETRICOURT (U93) and cleared the vicinity of FOSSIEUX (U92) of the enemy. The 26th Infantry Division continued to relieve the 4th Armored Division, the Commanding General of the 26th Infantry Division assuming command of the 4th Armored Division zone.

XX Corps began regrouping of forces, rotating units at the same time. Advance elements of the 95th Infantry Division closed in an area in the vicinity of NORROY-LE-SEC (U67). Elements of the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) began moving to MALANCOURT (U77) to assist the 357th Infantry at MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), where bitter fighting continued. Task Force POLK was attached to the 90th Infantry Division. At FORT DRIANT near METZ (U85) the enemy employed disabled tanks as outposts and placed harassing fire from self-propelled guns on Third U.S. Army troops.

Flying 124 sorties in ten missions, XIX Tactical Air Command found few targets during this period. Three railroad lines were cut, while thirty-three gun installations, six military installations and six small naval vessels were damaged or destroyed.

Regrouping of forces to conform to the new north boundary was begun, while FOSSIEUX (U92) was cleared by Third U.S. Army.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, made his second visit of the month to Army Headquarters on this date.

12 OCTOBER *(D + 128)*

Enemy capabilities as estimated at this time were little changed from those estimated for 4 October. The enemy was expected to defend and delay in the Army's zone of advance and make a fortress stand at METZ (U85). The capability of an enemy limited-objective offensive north of METZ (U85) also was given consideration.

Tactical reconnaissance and other reports indicated the organization of defensive positions in the area LIOCOURT (U93) - CHATEAU SALINS (Q12) - HERNY (Q04) - CONTRIL (Q23) and from DIEUZE (Q22) to MOUSSEY (Q30) - FORBACH (Q36) SAARGUEMINES (Q55) - BITCHE (Q75). Although counterattacks by the enemy against the salient east of NANCY (U81) had decreased in intensity, entrenching activity to the immediate front and aggressive patrolling clearly indicated a determination to contain Third U.S. Army forces. Flooding of areas in the zone of advance further indicated a continued overall defensive attitude on the part of the enemy. Numerous troop movements, both road and rail, plus the identification of elements of a new infantry division in the THIONVILLE (U88) sector indicated a possible enemy thrust. Prisoners of war reported the discussion by their officers of enemy plans to attack.

XX Corps was ordered to withdraw its forces from FORT DRIANT and to contain enemy defenses in the METZ (U85) area with newly-assigned divisions. Divisions which had been continuously engaged were to be rested, refitted and prepared for further offensive action, while training of the newly-assigned divisions was to be continued. The corps was ordered to maintain aggressive reconnaissance and to continue coverage of all possible avenues of tank approach. It was to be prepared to advance on Army order to secure crossings of the RHINE River and to seize WIESBADEN (M36) and FRANKFURT (002).



Mixed Anti-Aircraft Gun Crew on the Alert

XII Corps continued to regroup its forces despite considerable harassing artillery fire. The 26th Infantry Division took over the zone of the 4th Armored Division, which reverted to corps reserve.

Task Force WARNOCK withdrew from FORT DRIANT under the cover of darkness in the XX Corps zone. The 95th Infantry Division continued to close into its assembly area preparatory to relieving the 5th Infantry Division. Clearance of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was continued by the 90th Infantry Division, while Task Force POLK took over the protection of the north flank of the corps.

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its support of the Third U.S. Army, flying 207 sorties in eighteen missions. Fourteen railroad lines were cut, while thirty-six railroad cars, twenty-three locomotives, thirty-eight gun installations and thirteen military installations were destroyed or damaged.

Regrouping of forces continued during the period, with the 95th Infantry Division closing in its assembly area.

Orders were received from the Twelfth U.S. Army Group drastically reducing the field ammunition allowance until 7 November, so that possibility of any offensive was precluded. Immediate and strenuous efforts were made to restrict the firing of field artillery ammunition, a ninety-five percent reduction being obtained. No ration was imposed upon tank, tank destroyer and antiaircraft artillery ammunition and these weapons were effectively employed in their secondary role as artillery. Extensive use of captured materiel and ammunition, including Russian 76.2mm guns, German 88mm, 105mm howitzers, 150mm guns and Schneider 155mm howitzers, was made by XX Corps and to a lesser extent by XII Corps. Ammunition for the Schneider howitzer was employed successfully in the 155mm howitzer M-1.

The Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters and the Forward Echelon of XIX Tactical Air Command moved to NANCY (U81), setting up in large military casernes there near the already established Rear Echelon. This was the first time on the Continent for the three headquarters to be located adjacent to one another in buildings in the same city. Many problems not previously encountered as to housing, messing, and transportation of personnel were solved.

13 OCTOBER *(D + 129)*

Considerable enemy troop movement was noted in the XII Corps zone and tactical reconnaissance observed large enemy troop concentrations at MOUSSEY (Q20) and HEMING (Q41). Heavy enemy railroad and highway movements were observed in the XX Corps zone, with all types of vehicles moving to and from METZ (U85).

XII Corps continued to consolidate its positions, the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) continuing to relieve the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division).

Gun Crew Observes Effect of Fire on German Strongpoint

XX Corps continued to regroup its units. Elements of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) relieved other units of the regiment at MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), where the attack continued. The 95th Infantry Division continued to assemble in the corps zone with elements of the 378th Infantry, 379th Infantry and 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion arriving at DOMMARY (U57) by rail, and motor elements of the 378th Infantry moving into an assembly area in the vicinity of NORROY-LE-SEC (U67).

Concentrating on enemy rail and military installations, XIX Tactical Air Command flew 252 sorties in twenty-two missions. Twenty-two railroad lines were cut, while 226 railroad cars, fifty motor transports, thirty-two locomotives, thirty-four military installations and five highway bridges were damaged or destroyed. Ten marshalling yards were attacked during the day.

New defensive traces of the SIEGFRIED Line were supplied by The Army Photo Center.

Requirements of the Army for winter clothing and equipment were being met in most cases. Ground sheets and sleeping bags began to arrive, but raincoats, mess gear and one and two-burner stoves remained in short supply. The reserve stock of gasoline totaled 800,000 gallons. Coal, lubricants and oil were urgently needed for the mines and steel plants of the industrial valley running from BRIEY (U77) to THIONVILLE (U88). As reserves were expended, the situation became more acute daily, threatening the employment of a majority of the civilian workers in the area.

14 OCTOBER *(D + 130)*

The enemy continued to shift troops in both forward and rear areas of the XX Corps zone. Hostile patrols became bolder, displaying marked interest in artillery locations, and penetrated as far as REZONVILLE (U75) and ST MARCEL (U75). An enemy armored reconnaissance in force in the vicinity of BEZANGE LA PETITE (Q11) was repulsed in the XII Corps zone, and a minor infantry attack in the vicinity of BEZANGE (Q11) also was beaten back. Patrolling and probing of enemy positions continued.

The 90th Infantry Division continued to fight its way forward into MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) in the XX Corps zone. With the exception of some attached units, the 95th Infantry Division closed into its assembly area in the vicinity of NORROY-LE-SEC (U67).

Nineteen missions totaling 230 sorties were carried out by XIX Tactical Air Command with good results being reported against enemy rail transportation. Among the claims for the day were twenty-five railroad lines cut, 207 railroad cars, forty-one motor transports, twenty-four locomotives, sixteen military installations, one fuel dump and nine tanks and armored cars destroyed or damaged. Eleven marshalling yards were attacked.

Consolidation of positions was continued during the period by the Army, while concentrating the 95th Infantry Division in an assembly area in the vicinity of NORROY-LE-SEC (U67). Fierce fighting continued in the town of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

The quartermaster tonnage allocation was increased from 2,100 to 2,325 long tons.

15 OCTOBER *(D + 131)*

Patrols observed heavy enemy vehicular traffic in MALAUCOURT (U92) and JALLAUCOURT (Q02) in the XII Corps zone, while in the XX Corps zone the enemy maintained a purely defensive attitude. Enemy artillery activity showed a decrease.

Regrouping was continued by the 80th Infantry Division in the XII Corps zone, while the 328th Infantry (reinforced) of the 26th Infantry Division closed in an area in the vicinity of BEZANGE-LA-GRANDE (Q01), east of NANCY (U81), then moved to relieve the 166th Engineer Combat Battalion (reinforced). The 137th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) relieved the 134th Infantry on the left of the division zone, and the 134th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of BRIN-SUR-SEILLE (U92), northeast of NANCY (U81).

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued fighting in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) in the XX Corps zone, with the 3d Battalion of the 357th Infantry making slight gains within the city. Relief of the battalion was completed by the 2d Battalion of the same regiment.

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its pressure on the enemy's rail transportation, flying 107 sorties during the day's operations. Claims included 143 railroad cars, twenty-eight locomotives and five military installations destroyed or damaged, while four marshalling yards were attacked with good results reported.

Strengthening and consolidating of its positions was continued by the Army during the period, while fighting progressed in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Daily tonnage estimates for the period 29 October to 13 November were submitted to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, which was to make tonnage allocations based on bids forwarded by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Estimates were as follows: For Class I, 1,000 tons for maintenance, 214 tons for reserve, a total of 1,214 tons. For Classes II and IV, 225 tons for maintenance, forty-seven tons for reserve, a total of 272 tons. For Class III gasoline, oils and greases, 1,900 tons for maintenance, 401 tons for reserve, a total of 2,301 tons. For civil affairs, twenty tons for maintenance, five tons for reserve, a total of twenty-five tons. The grand total was 3,345 tons for maintenance, 714 tons for reserve, a total of 4,059 tons. No gasoline was received on this date, nor was there a forecast of any shipments. Fifty-eight and one-half tons of medical supplies were received from the Communications Zone.

The ordnance supply situation was serious enough to warrant local purchases. Arrangements were made to let contracts for a number of critical items of simple construction and therefore easy to manufacture. If these were successfully produced it was planned to contract for items more difficult to manufacture.

16 OCTOBER *(D + 132)*

Enemy patrols were active and sporadic artillery fire fell throughout the XII Corps zone. Tactical reconnaissance observed enemy troops moving between the north and south forts of the VERDUN group at METZ (U85) in the XX Corps zone.

The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) completed relief of the 166th Engineer Combat Battalion (reinforced) in the left (north) division zone. Other elements of XII Corps continued to consolidate their positions.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued the attack in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), where house-to-house fighting continued. Elsewhere in the XX Corps zone the 378th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) moved from its assembly area at NORROY-LE-SEC (U67) to the zone of the 5th Infantry Division southwest of METZ (U85).

XIX Tactical Air Command was grounded throughout the day because of adverse weather.

Inquiries were made to the Communications Zone and the Advance Section Communications Zone in regard to the non-receipt of gasoline of 15

October and the lack of a forecast of any having been shipped. The daily telegram on this date requested 334,740 gallons of gasoline, but none was received in the Army area and reserves were used to supplement previous receipts of 56,000 gallons for the day's commitments.

17 OCTOBER *(D + 133)*

Troops of XII Corps continued active patrolling.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division XX Corps zone continued fighting in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) against stubborn resistance. The 378th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) closed in an area southwest of PRENY (U74), southwest of METZ (U85). The 377th and 379th Infantry Regiments (95th Infantry Division) moved to the same general area in the zone of the 5th Infantry Division.

Bad flying weather again hindered XIX Tactical Air Command during the period, but forty sorties were flown with light claims being made. Railways and other transportation facilities behind the enemy lines continued to be the focal points of attack.

Fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), while units in contact with the enemy were relieved and supplanted by fresh troops and active patrolling continued all along the Third U.S. Army front in the day's operations.

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL JACOB L. DEVERS, Commanding General, Sixth U.S. Army Group, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, to review the plan for resumption of the offensive.

Corps and divisions were notified that, beginning on 18 October, issues of gasoline would be reduced twenty-five percent until further notice. The daily telegram requested 363,624 gallons of gasoline, but only 13,375 gallons were received.

18 OCTOBER *(D + 134)*

Tactical reconnaissance and other reports indicated the organization of enemy defensive positions in the area LIOCOURT (U93) - CHATEAU SALINS (Q12) - HERNY (Q04) - CONTRIL (Q23) and from DIEUZE (Q22) to MOUSSEY (Q30) - FORBACH (Q36) - SAARGUEMINES (Q55) - BITCHE (Q75), making clear that the enemy was determined to contain the Army's forces.

Plans for resumption of the offensive by Third U.S. Army were issued on this date. Two alternate plans were described, "A" and "B". They stated in part:

PLAN "A"

"a. General Plan:

Third U.S. Army will:

(1) Envelop METZ (U85) defensive works from north and south.

(2) Advance northeast within zone to seize the MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area.

(3) Be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast.

"b. Scheme of Maneuver:

(1) Phase One:

(a) Contain METZ (U85) on the west.

(b) Cross MOSELLE River north of METZ (U85) and seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of BOULAY (Q16).

(c) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FALQUEMONT) (Q15).

(d) Destroy enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ (U85) area and isolate METZ (U85) defensive works.

(2) Phase Two:

(a) Advance northeast with two corps abreast. One corps will remain initially in the area northeast of BRIEY (U67), advancing on Army order echeloned to the left rear.

(b) Continue rapidly to -

1. Establish a bridgehead east of the RHINE River between MAINZ (M35) (inclusive) and MANNHEIM (R59) (exclusive).

2. Seize the MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area.

(c) Be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast.

"4. CORPS MISSIONS:

a. XX Corps (5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Division, 10th Armored Division and supporting troops) will -

(1) Contain METZ (U85) defensive works west of the MOSELLE River.

(2) Cross the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (Q16).

(3) In conjunction with XII Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area and be prepared for further advance to northeast.

(4) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:

(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE River between MAINZ (M35) and OPPENHEIM (M43) (both inclusive).

(b) Seize MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) area.

(5) Be prepared for further advance to the northeast.

b. XII Corps (26th, 35th and 80th Infantry Division, 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) will -

(1) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FALQUEMONT) (Q15).

(2) In conjunction with XX Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area and be prepared for further advance to northeast.

(3) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:

(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE River between OPPENHEIM (M43) and MANNHEIM (R59) (both exclusive).

(b) Seize DARMSTADT (M64) area.

c. III Corps (and supporting troops) to -

(1) Assemble in an area northwest of ERIEY (U67).

(2) Assume command of troops as may be assigned by Army order.

(3) Advance northeast on Army order, echeloned to left rear.

(1) In the advance Corps will be disposed in depth with armor in lead; armor to be reinforced by motorized infantry. These leading elements will pass around obstacles and points of resistance wherever possible in order to continue the advance to the RHINE River. Infantry forces following will advance rapidly, clear enemy resistance and consolidate gains.

(2) Reconnaissance will be pushed to maximum in order to seize intact all possible crossings of major river obstacles (e. g., the SAAR and RHINE Rivers)."

PLAN "B"

"1. SCHEME OF MANEUVER

a. Phase One -

(1) Contain METZ (U85) on the west.

(2) Seize and secure all possible crossings of the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88), and advance on BOULAY (Q16).

(3) Attack northeast, with two corps abreast, from the PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) - NANCY (U81) area to seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of FALKENBERG (Q15) - BOULAY (Q16).

(4) Destroy enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ (U85) area and isolate METZ (U85) defensive works.

b. Phase Two - (After METZ (U85) has been neutralized).

(1) Advance northeast with two corps abreast, one corps advancing on Army order, initially echeloned to the left rear.

(2) Continuation of the advance to be same as Plan "A".

"2. CORPS MISSIONS:

a. XX Corps (one armored division, two infantry divisions and supporting troops) will -

(1) Attack northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) with one armored and two infantry divisions and -

(a) Seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FALQUEMONT) (Q15).

(b) Seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (Q16).

(2) In conjunction with III Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area and be prepared for further advance to northeast.

(3) Continuation of the advance to be the same as Plan "A".

b. XII Corps (two infantry divisions, two armored divisions and supporting troops) will -

(1) Attack northeast from the NANCY (U81) area destroying the enemy in its front and protecting the south flank of Third U.S. Army.

(2) Assist XX Corps in seizing rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FALQUEMONT) (Q15).

(3) Continuation of the advance to be same as Plan "A".

c. III Corps (two infantry divisions, one tank group - to be made up of tank battalions detached from infantry divisions - and one tank destroyer group) will -

(1) Contain METZ (U85) defense works west of the MOSELLE River.

(2) With a minimum of one infantry division, one tank group and one tank destroyer group, seize and secure all possible crossings in the THIONVILLE (U88) area.

(3) Attack southeast and assist XX Corps in seizing rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (Q16).

(4) Assist XX Corps in destroying any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ (U85) area.

(5) Be prepared to advance to the northeast in XX Corps zone echeloned to left rear.

(6) Protect left (north) flank of Third U.S. Army."

Estimates at this time credited the enemy with the capability of making a determined defensive stand, aided by favorable terrain in the Army's zone of advance which the enemy had fortified with extensive entrenchments and flooding of low areas. It was considered likely that the enemy would attempt to contain the Army's salient by defending and delaying tactics, counterattacking locally with infantry and armor. In conjunction with his entrenching, it was believed the enemy would use METZ (U85) and its protective ring of forts as a pivot for his defensive line, attempting to hold back Third U.S. Army until he could bring in reserves to organize and man the SIEGFRIED Line and gain time to take advantage of the inclement weather of fall and winter. The capability of a limited objective enemy offensive north of METZ (U85) also was given consideration.

Aggressive patrolling and rotation of elements in contact with the enemy continued in the XII Corps zone. Front lines remained generally unchanged. Two batteries of 90mm antiaircraft artillery knocked out the locomotive of an enemy supply train operating behind METZ (U85).

Elements of the 95th Infantry Division began relieving units of the 5th Infantry Division to the west and southwest of METZ (U85) in the XX Corps zone. Two battalions of the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) in the bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River were relieved by the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division). Elements of the 90th Infantry Division continued fighting in and around MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Thirty-four sorties were carried out by XIX Tactical Air Command, but because of adverse weather conditions no targets were found.

19 OCTOBER *(D + 135)*

The enemy continued to improve his positions by digging, mine-laying and construction of fortifications in the XII Corps zone. Enemy activity in the XX Corps zone consisted primarily of active patrolling and moderate artillery shelling. Front lines remained unchanged.

Units on front line duty in XII Corps zone were relieved by units in reserve, while front lines remained unchanged.

The 95th Infantry Division, XX Corps, continued to relieve the 5th Infantry Division in the vicinity of METZ (U85), while elements of the latter division closed into an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68). The 3d Battalion, 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) continued bitter fighting in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Adverse weather conditions again confronted XIX Tactical Air Command, nevertheless sixty-eight sorties in five missions were carried out. Claims included ten railroad cars, five locomotives, twenty-six military installations and three small naval vessels destroyed or damaged.

Fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) during the period, with the front lines remaining unchanged.

Twenty rounds from an enemy 280mm railway gun fell in the vicinity of the XX Corps command post at JARNY (U66). This gun, or guns, appeared at intervals along the entire Army front during the month but did little damage. Favored targets in addition to JARNY (U66) were NANCY (U81) and PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), each of which was shelled two or three times. Effect of the fire was entirely harassing, only minor damage being inflicted. Eighty-nine German planes, the largest concentration of enemy aircraft to appear in the Army area for some time, flew over NANCY (U81) during the night, but no bombs were dropped.

20 OCTOBER *(D + 136)*

Enemy mines and booby traps were encountered by XII Corps patrols. Tactical reconnaissance reported large tank and troop concentrations south of DIEUZE (U22). Enemy activity in the XX Corps zone consisted chiefly of entrenching and increased artillery and mortar fire.

Some reliefs by minor Third U.S. Army elements in the line took place in the XII Corps zone, but there was no change in the front lines.

The 95th Infantry Division continued to relieve the 5th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone. Elements of the division thus relieved moved to an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68). Command of the bridgehead area near METZ (U85) was assumed by the Commanding General of the 95th Infantry Division. House-to-house fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), with the 3d Battalion of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) battling the enemy in the city.



Battling Mud and Flood Conditions Along Swollen Moselle River

Fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command were out in force during this period, carrying out twenty missions totaling 245 sorties. Claims included twenty-four railroad lines cut, fifty-seven railroad cars, seventy motor transports, twelve locomotives and five military installations destroyed or damaged. A dam on the SEILLE River was attacked and destroyed.

Defensive positions were maintained and aggressive patrols probed enemy positions all along the Third U.S. Army front in the day's operations.

21 OCTOBER *(D + 137)*

Defensive patrolling, sporadic artillery shelling and increasing vehicular movement toward the north characterized enemy activity in the XII Corps zone. A defensive attitude, with the enemy covering his front with aggressive patrols and artillery and mortar fire, was maintained in the XX Corps zone.

After the 26th Infantry Division closed into the XII Corps front line it launched an attack, elements of the division advancing 2,000 yards to the east in the BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (Q11) area toward MONCOURT (Q11).

Relief of the 5th Infantry Division by the 95th Infantry Division was completed in the XX Corps zone. The remainder of the 5th Infantry Division moved to an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68). Fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) by the 3d Battalion of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division).

Flying 174 sorties in fifteen missions, XIX Tactical Air Command continued its attacks on the enemy. Twenty-six railroad lines were cut, eighty-seven railroad cars, eighteen motor transports, ten locomotives, ten gun installations and two highway bridges were destroyed or damaged. One troop concentration and four marshalling yards were attacked during the period.

Fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) during the period, with Third U.S. Army elements advancing to the outskirts of MONCOURT (Q11) and BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (Q11).

Intelligence reported that a large railway gun, believed to be the 280mm weapon which had been shelling NANCY (U81), was in the railroad shops at METZ (U85) for repairs. A pilot from the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group adjusted a 155mm gun battalion upon the shops, following which 140 rounds were fired for effect, sixty of these under air surveillance. The firing was concluded with six rounds of white phosphorous shell which caused large fires. An intelligence agent dispatched to ascertain the results of the firing reported demolition of the gun, twenty-two cannoneer casualties and complete wreckage of the area.

A political survey showed the region of NANCY (U81) to be strongly conservative and anti-German. Local administration, headed by two distinguished educators, co-operated fully with the Third U.S. Army.

The credit system of ammunition supply, under which allocations were made to the Armies on the basis of overall availability and missions assigned, was put into effect by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Only ammunition on hand in depots of the Advance Section Communications Zone was available to the Armies on credits established by Communications Zone. During the time these depots were being stocked, shipments to Third U.S. Army were curtailed.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARL A. SPAATZ, Commanding General United States Strategic Tactical Air Forces, visited Headquarters of Third U.S. Army during the day.

22 OCTOBER *(D + 138)*

Except for moderate resistance with small arms, emplaced infantry weapons and mines at MONCOURT (Q11) and BOIS DE FRONTIERS (Q11), the enemy was relatively inactive in the XII Corps zone. A slackening in artillery fire and patrol activity was noted in the XX Corps zone.

Letter of Instruction Number 10, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, was received. It stated in part:

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

"2. a. Twelfth Army Group will regroup and prepare for an advance by all three armies to the RHINE River. Target date, First and Ninth Armies, 5 November. However, attack will not be made more than two days prior to attack of Second British Army. Target date, Third Army, 10 November."

"3. c. Third Army.

(1) Advance in zone to the RHINE in the MAINZ (M35) - WORMS (L50) area and seize a bridgehead immediately if the situation permits. If it is impracticable to seize a bridgehead, Third Army will attack to the north and clear the area to the MOSELLE."

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The 26th Infantry Division consolidated its positions on the high ground west of BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (Q11) and MONCOURT (Q11), east of NANCY (U81), and prepared to resume the attack to clear both towns. Elsewhere in the XII Corps zone units in front line duty were rotated and active patrolling continued. Except for sporadic artillery fire the enemy was relatively inactive.

Active patrolling was continued in the XX Corps zone. The 5th Infantry Division continued to move to an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68). Minor fighting continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

XIX Tactical Air Command continued to hit the enemy rail and military installations, flying 152 sorties during the day. Sixteen railroad lines were cut, eighty-nine railroad cars, fifty-three motor transports, eighteen locomotives and five gun installations were destroyed or damaged.

The day's operations resulted in positions being consolidated west of BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (Q11) and MONCOURT (Q11), while active patrolling was continued and fighting progressed in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group, conferred with the Army Commander on the proposed offensive, the date of the attack, fixed by weather conditions rather than by the calendar, being after 5 November.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that tonnage allocations, effective with requisitions forwarded on 24 October, would be increased to 5,300 tons daily. Third U.S. Army was informed that there would be no further air evacuation of patients either at TOUL (U61), operated by the Army, or at ETAIN (U47), operated by the Advance Section Communications Zone. It was decided that holding units would continue to operate these fields and evacuate patients by rail.

Supplies Move to the Front In One of Many Vast Convoys

23 OCTOBER *(D + 139)*

Prior to resumption of the offensive, the 26th Infantry Division consolidated its gains in the XII Corps zone, while the remainder of the corps continued to maintain positions and conduct extensive patrolling.

In the XX Corps zone, movement into an assembly area west of AUDUN (U68) was completed by the 5th Infantry Division. Fighting on a small scale continued in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

Because of unfavorable weather conditions no operations were carried out by the XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army elements continued to fight in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) during the day.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group in a letter stressed the necessity for strict supply discipline to conserve items in limited supply or items which, through indifference to supply discipline, might quickly reach a critical status. It was desired that reserves be built up only within prescribed levels.

Operational necessity dictated the immediate procurement of extended end connectors, also locally called "duck feet", for medium tank tracks. These connectors were attached to the ends of the tank track end connectors, enabling the tank to secure more flotation and insure better progress in the mud. Approximately 25,000 connectors were received from Communications Zone on operational priority and installed on tanks of XII Corps units. Contracts were placed with NANCY (U81) area manufacturers for 200,000 connectors.

24 OCTOBER *(D + 140)*

The 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) relieved the 320th Infantry of that division. Elsewhere in the XII Corps zone there were no changes in the front lines, and active patrolling was continued. NANCY (U81) and ST MAX (U81) again were shelled with sixteen rounds of German 280mm artillery, three shells narrowly missing the Army Commander's quarters. A dud shell landed between the two wings of the 12th Evacuation Hospital in NANCY (U81), cutting a thirty-six foot course into the ground and coming to rest at a point twenty feet deep.

Small-scale fighting continued at MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), which the enemy shelled heavily. Front line units in the XX Corps zone were rotated and patrolling was continued aggressively. An advance party of the 10th Armored Division arrived in the corps zone.

Adverse weather conditions again prevented XIX Tactical Air Command from carrying out missions.

Third U.S. Army forces maintained their positions and patrolled aggressively during the period.

Third U.S. Army notified Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force that since 1 October the Army had received 2,100,000 gallons of gasoline less than requested in daily telegrams based on tonnage allocations. This deficiency steadily reduced Army reserves, although all units were strictly rationed, until gasoline for less than two operational days remained on hand and basic loads were impaired. A new daily allocation of gasoline to units was approved by the chief of staff. Armored units were allotted 12,500 gallons instead of 25,000, infantry divisions were allotted 6,500 gallons instead of 5,000, and there was an increase in the allocation to corps for corps troops. The supply of B rations became critical.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

25 OCTOBER *(D + 141)*

Capability of the enemy to launch a limited objective offensive north of METZ (U85) was no longer given consideration in view of developments. Small advances were made in the XII Corps zone by the 26th Infantry Division, which occupied MONCOURT WOODS (Q11) and some high ground to the east of NANCY (U81) against spotty resistance by the enemy. The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) relieved the 104th Infantry of the same division and assumed command of the newly-won area. Elsewhere positions were maintained and strengthened.

Intensive training of troops by the 5th Infantry Division was started in the XX Corps zone, while the 90th Infantry Division completed its regrouping. Active patrolling continued along the entire corps front.

XIX Tactical Air Command was limited in its day's operations because of poor flying weather, but in forty-four sorties nine railroad lines were cut and twenty-eight railroad cars and twelve gun installations were destroyed or damaged.

Many items of captured enemy ordnance were modified for Third U.S. Army use during this critical supply period. Approximately 14,000 German spark plugs were renovated for use in M-4 tank engines and many German motorcycles were rebuilt with captured spare parts and issued to Army troops.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN C. H. LEE, Commanding General of Communications Zone, European Theatre of Operations, visited Third U.S. Army Headquarters during the day.

26 OCTOBER *(D + 142)*

Active patrolling and rotation of front line troops continued in the XII Corps zone. Forward elements were harassed by intermittent small arms, machine gun, mortar and artillery fire.

The 10th Armored Division began a move to the XX Corps assembly area, while elements of the corps continued to patrol and maintain their positions.

Nine missions totalling 226 sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command, with twenty-seven railroad lines cut and fifteen locomotives, nine military installations, three highway bridges and two miscellaneous naval vessels were damaged or destroyed.

While additional major units continued to move into Third U.S. Army's area during the day, positions were maintained.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group advised that, effective with requisitions forwarded on this date, the tonnage allocations for Third U. S. Army would be 3,500 tons, exclusive of ordnance Class V supplies which would not be charged against the allocation. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was informed that even with rigid rationing of gasoline, unit reserves were being lowered. Shortages of tires, tubes and patches had now reached the danger stage.

27 OCTOBER *(D + 143)*

Enemy activity on the XII Corps front consisted of patrolling, heavy mortar fire and light artillery fire. Active patrolling and light artillery fire characterized enemy activity in the XX Corps zone.

Front line positions remained unchanged in the XII Corps zone, with aggressive patrolling being carried out. The 10th Armored Division continued to move toward the XX Corps assembly area.

Planes of XIX Tactical Air Command were grounded during the period because of unfavorable weather conditions.

The Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group gave verbal authority for the Army to proceed with the reorganization of tank destroyer battalions (self-propelled). Arrival of special trains considerably increased the stocks of B rations.

28 OCTOBER *(D + 144)*

Positions were maintained and units in contact with the enemy continued to be rotated in the XII Corps zone. An increase in the enemy's flare activity was noted.

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division resumed the attack on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) in the XX Corps zone, with satisfactory progress being made. On the remainder of the corps front there was no change. An antiaircraft gun battalion, firing in support of XX Corps Artillery, shelled an enemy troop concentration near the VERDUN forts at METZ (U85), causing heavy losses to the enemy.

Concentrating on enemy rail and military installations, XIX Tactical Air Command flew 241 sorties in eleven missions. Among claims for the day were twenty-five railroad lines cut, 219 railroad cars, sixty-five motor transports, thirty-three locomotives, thirty-one military installations and five highway bridges damaged or destroyed.

Patrol activities continued along the front during the period, while positions were maintained and the attack on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was resumed.



Signal Corps Lineman Repairs Wire

29 OCTOBER *(D + 145)*

Elements of the 90th Infantry Division seized all of the town of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) except for the town hall where the enemy resisted stiffly. This final attack on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was preceded by a thirty-minute preparation by XX Corps artillery, emphasis being placed on counterbattery fires. Initially the enemy's artillery reaction was strong and included fire from positions which previously had remained silent. These positions were promptly attacked with counterbattery fire so that early ascendancy was achieved over enemy artil-

lery and maintained throughout the attack. Elements of the 10th Armored Division arrived in the corps area in the vicinity of MARS-LA-TOUR (U65), west of METZ (U85). Elsewhere in the corps zone there was no change, METZ (U85) had been completely cleared and Forts DRIANT, JEANNE D'ARC, PLAPPEVILLE and ST QUENTIN were being contained by the 5th Infantry Division.

Elements of Headquarters, III Corps, closed in VANDELAINVILLE (U74), southwest of METZ (U85), while the main force remained in CARTERET (T09).

Combat planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command had one of their best days of operation. Flying seventeen missions with 419 sorties various targets were attacked including enemy aircraft, marshalling yards, railroads and gun positions. Four hundred and seven tons of bombs were dropped and 100 enemy fighters were engaged in the air. Twenty-four enemy aircraft were claimed shot down while the XIX Tactical Air Command lost six fighters. In addition, five bridges, fifty-nine locomotives, 156 railroad cars and thirteen motor cars were claimed destroyed as well as nine marshalling yards and twenty-two military buildings hit. The XIX Tactical Air Command lost a fighter group, which was ordered to be attached to the First U.S. Army.

Principal operational achievement of the day was the clearing of MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) except for the town hall.

Supplies Travel By Rail Across Bridge Built By Army Engineers

30 OCTOBER *(D + 146)*

Positions were maintained in the XII Corps zone while front lines were unchanged. The enemy employed harassing mortar and artillery fire along the corps front.

All organized resistance in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) ended at 1400 in the XX Corps zone. The 10th Armored Division closed in its assembly area near MARS-LA-TOUR (U65), west of METZ (U85). The 2d Infantry and elements of the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) were en route to the zone of the 95th Infantry Division near METZ (U85).

Two missions of fifty-three sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command during the period, but no claims were reported.

The supply situation was still incapable of sustaining an offensive if launched immediately. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was asked to grant authority to the Advance Section Communications Zone to ship available gasoline over and above the requirements of other Armies to the Third U.S. Army in order to build up reserves.

31 OCTOBER *(D + 147)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

Patrolling was active in the XII Corps zone, but there was no change in the front lines.

In the XX Corps zone the 2d Infantry and elements of the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) relieved elements of the 95th Infantry Division in the MOSELLE River bridgehead. Elements of the 10th Armored Division relieved the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division), which moved to an area west of AUDUN (U68), northwest of METZ (U85). There was no change in the front lines.

XIX Tactical Air Command again was limited in its operations because of adverse weather conditions, but flew eighty sorties with claims of one railroad line cut and seventeen military installations destroyed or damaged.

As the result of operations for the day, Third U.S. Army continued to rotate and regroup its units in contact with the enemy in order to give the maximum rest to troops who had been in combat for a considerable time.

Advance Section Communications Zone was asked for an emergency shipment of 30,000 gallons of diesel fuel and was informed that the Third U.S. Army daily telegram requests were not being met. No diesel was on hand and arrangements were made with the Seventh U.S. Army to exchange 10,000 gallons of No. 10 motor oil for 10,000 gallons of diesel, the exchange to be made on 1 November.

* * * * *

TACTICAL SITUATION
31 OCTOBER

LUXEMBOURG
METZ
Thionville
Esch-sur-Alzette
Bettembourg
Differdange
Longwy
Longuyon
Conflans
Toul
Pont-à-Mousson
Saarburg
Merzig
Wasserbillig
Falkenberg
Remich
Grevenmacher
Sierck les Bains
Rustroff
Boulay
Faulquemont
Morhange
Dieuze
Marsal
Château-Salins
Delme
Vic-sur-Seille
Morville-les-Vic
Salonnes
Chambrey
Arracourt
Juvrecourt
Xanrey
Gerbécourt
Lubécourt
Amelécourt
Puttigny
Foulcrey
Vannecourt
Langatte
Langenberg
Hargarten
Falck
Tétercheu
Bettange
Valmunster
Gomelange
Anzeling
Piblange
Hestroff
Holling
Brettnach
Remelfang
Diesen
Berweiler
Reimerskirchen
Reimeringen
Thorn
Dalheim
Wellenstein
Wormeldingen
Niederleuken
Oberleuken
Trassen
Castel
Mettlach
Orscholz
Tettingen
Sinz
Kanfen
Weiten
Freudenburg
Kreuzweiler
Sudingen
Beuren
Mürlich
Kirf
Saarhölzbach
Britten
Hausbach
Nohn
Ob Tunsdorf
Wehingen
Merschweiler
Manderen
Ritzing
Launstroff
Rémeling
Evendorf
Montenach
Wald Wisse
Kirschnaumen
Grindorf
Rehlingen
Ittersdorf
Bisten
Merchingen
Hartelange
Bilsdorf
Bilsdorfer Berg
Wellingen
Fillingen
Bilringen
Ralling
Ralling Wald
Ralling Berg
Ralling Hof
Ralling Mühle
Ralling Kapelle
Ralling Kirche
Ralling Schule
Ralling Friedhof
Ralling Brücke
Ralling Bahnhof
Ralling Post
Ralling Rathaus
Ralling Markt
Ralling Platz
Ralling Straße
Ralling Gasse
Ralling Weg
Ralling Allee
Ralling Park
Ralling Garten
Ralling Wiese
Ralling Feld
Ralling Berg
Ralling Tal
Ralling Fluß
Ralling Bach
Ralling Quelle
Ralling Mühle
Ralling Kapelle
Ralling Kirche
Ralling Schule
Ralling Friedhof
Ralling Brücke
Ralling Bahnhof
Ralling Post
Ralling Rathaus
Ralling Markt
Ralling Platz
Ralling Straße
Ralling Gasse
Ralling Weg
Ralling Allee
Ralling Park
Ralling Garten
Ralling Wiese
Ralling Feld
Ralling Berg
Ralling Tal
Ralling Fluß
Ralling Bach
Ralling Quelle

FIRST XX ARD
5TH INF DIV
35TH INF DIV
80TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV
THIRD
FORTRESS
ELM
POLK
IN RESERVE

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









OCTOBER	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DAILY DEAD (EST)	700	100	200	1900	100	100	1200	300	1200	1000	100	200	100	600	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	200	100	100	100				800	100	50
DAILY WOUNDED (EST)	2800	500	800	400	400	300	800	500	2000	2000	300	500	400	1800	500	300	400	300	400	300	400	500	400	300	400				1300	100	200
DAILY CAPTURED	102	225	106	48	70	23	51	63	2033	361	74	182	59	31	60	31	10	9	42	7	4	92	23	57	5	29	11	2	18		*394
TOTAL	3602	825	1106	2348	570	423	2051	863	5233	3361	474	882	559	2431	660	431	510	409	542	407	504	792	523	457	505	29	11	2	2118	200	644

COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD US ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD US ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH— DAILY ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH— THIRD US ARMY CASUALTIES

*INCLUDES 307 PW'S EVACUATED THROUGH MEDICAL CHANNELS FOR MONTH

40,000
39,000
38,000
37,000
36,000
35,000
34,000
33,000
32,000
31,000
30,000
29,000
28,000
27,000
26,000
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10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0

33,472

5,989

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DAILY DEAD	52	64	33	32	31	25	17	80	64	56	41	41	22	15	6	11	6	6	7	5	12	26	35	19	23	14	19	18	7	7	1
DAILY WOUNDED	366	227	174	130	171	118	93	479	334	170	171	167	166	75	51	46	34	19	37	46	49	63	244	43	24	57	54	31	46	46	27
DAILY MISSING	230	137	77	61	51	55	12	35	136	97	57	125	50	59	32	22	7	1	13	6		39	79	18	4	14	4	6	1	7	1
TOTAL	648	428	284	223	253	198	122	594	534	323	269	333	238	149	89	79	47	26	57	57	61	128	358	80	51	85	77	55	54	60	29

THIRD ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-31 OCTOBER 1944



LEGEND

O – OPENED
C – CLOSED

W Kelly

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD US ARMY



*CUMULATIVE FROM 1 AUGUST

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

Following is a brief summary of operations for October:

Major contact with the enemy resulted from the XII Corps drive to enlarge and improve its bridgehead east of the MOSELLE and MEURTHE Rivers and the Third U.S. Army's effort to wipe out the enemy's bridgehead west of METZ (U85). Aggressive and determined enemy opposition met both of these offensives. The enemy's resistance in the first days of the month carried the impetus developed in the last days of September. His build-up reached the equivalent of seven divisions along the Army front by 1 October.

III Corps remained in CARTERET (T09) on the COTENTIN Peninsula throughout the month with the exception of advance elements of corps Headquarters which closed at VANDELAINVILLE (U74), south of METZ (U85), on 29 October.

Enemy resistance to the XII Corps expansion of the bridgehead east of NANCY (U81) continued strong throughout the first part of the month.

However, numerous unsuccessful counterattacks sapped the enemy's strength without preventing further development of the bridgehead to include the high ground along and east of the SEILLE River which the Army desired.

In the XX Corps zone the line from the northern boundary south to HAUCONCOURT (U87) remained stable with the enemy disposed thinly along the east bank of the MOSELLE River. Enemy patrols crossed to the west of the river and harassing and interdicting artillery fire persisted throughout the period in this area. In the METZ (U85) bridgehead the defending forces, stiffened by a battalion of officer candidates from the school at METZ (U85), staved off the capture of FORT DRIANT. Slightly to the north in the same bridgehead, the enemy tenaciously defended through the month the Army's assault on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86), from which he was finally cleared on 30 October.

In the Army bridgehead east of NANCY (U81), the enemy was cleared to the general line SIVRY (U82)--FRESNES (Q02)--CHAMBREY (Q02) in the first four days of the month, with bitter fighting developing at SIVRY (U82). For the remainder of the month the enemy was able to mount only small, local counterattacks, none of which did more than delay temporarily the taking of the limited objectives designed to strengthen the Army's bridgehead.

Early in the month the enemy realized that the current major threat to the stability of his front did not exist in the Third U.S. Army zone. The counterattacks against the XII Corps diminished rapidly as the enemy reshuffled his forces and disposed his better-trained and more mobile elements to meet the growing major threats in Holland, at AACHEN (K84) and in the Seventh U.S. Army zone. At end of the month the enemy strength opposing the Army was estimated at five divisions.

Enemy air activity was on a limited scale during the month as compared to August and September. Only when a serious threat to vital areas developed was any large scale effort made by the Luftwaffe. Anti-aircraft claims for the month were twenty-seven planes destroyed or probably destroyed, bringing the total since beginning of operations to 464.

During October, the 7,346,755 gallons of gasoline received amounted to 67 percent of requests. As the result of rationing, average daily issues of gasoline were approximately 216,000 gallons, in contrast to the average issue of 313,000 gallons during September. The Army reserve stock of gasoline at the end of the month totaled 638,235 gallons.

At the end of October the ammunition supply was still tight and units in contact voluntarily instituted a system of self-rationing when the seriousness of the situation became known to them. Ordnance Class II and Class IV supplies were in an improved condition at the end of the month, although fire control equipment was still critical. The shortage of small arms was greatly alleviated because of the battlefield recovery drive instituted earlier in the month. During October Third U.S. Army ammunition personnel handled 124,361 tons of ammunition and attached Quartermaster truck companies traveled 450,000 miles to haul supplies.

During the month, 5,070 vehicles in forty-two convoys were cleared for Third U.S. Army units carrying 194,655 tons of supplies and 119,530 troops.

Battle casualties and changes in casualty status reports pertaining to 17,412 casualties were processed, an average of 561 per day.

During October there were 629 normal promotions, 234 battlefield promotions and seventy-four battlefield appointments processed. A total of 2,541 awards were made to Army personnel.

Towns captured by the Third U.S. Army during October were GREVENMACHER (L02), WORMELDINGEN (L01), ECHTERNACH (L03), MOIVRONS (U92), FOSSIEUX (U92), AJONCOURT (U92), CHENICOURT (U92), JEANDELAINCOURT (U92), and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

As the month ended, D-Day for resumption of the offensive against the enemy was announced as between 5 and 8 November, depending on the weather, but in any case not later than 8 November.

Strength of the Army at the end of the month was 252,000, as against 224,785 at the end of September.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Chapter 6

NOVEMBER

THE CAPTURE OF METZ



NOVEMBER OPERATIONS

DEVELOPMENTS during November saw Third U.S. Army go back on the offensive after having been, because of an acute supply situation, on an aggressive defense characterized by active patrols and improvement of positions, since 25 September. Launching of the offensive came on 8 November, the second anniversary of the landing of American troops in North Africa. Outstanding among November's achievements was the capture by assault for the first time since 451 A.D. of the fortress city of METZ (U85) and the reduction of most of the forts around METZ. Despite the most extreme weather conditions, which flooded the streams, made the terrain difficult upon which to maneuver, and brought about many cases of trenchfoot among the troops, Third U.S. Army drove the German Army back into its SIEGFRIED Line defenses and served notice that the Wehrmacht was to be granted no winter breathing spell. The phase of operations which started on 8 November carried over into the middle of December, as will be shown in the chapter for the following month.

1 NOVEMBER *(D + 148)*

Favored enemy capabilities indicated that he could defend and delay in the Army's zone of advance, counterattacking locally with infantry and armor in an attempt to block and contain the Army's eastward thrusts, and that he could make a fortress stand at METZ (U85) to impede the Army's eastward advance by the diversion of troops, artillery and aviation. In combination with the favored capabilities, it was considered that the enemy could pivot on METZ (U85) to establish a general defensive line paralleling the SIEGFRIED Line and could take advantage of favorable terrain in the Army's zone of advance to construct new organized defensive positions.

Offering moderate resistance at ABAUCOURT (U93) and LETRICOURT (U93), the enemy engaged in patrolling and sporadic artillery fire in XII Corps zone. His activity was limited to patrolling, light harassing artillery fire, and routine troop movements in XX Corps zone.

A Letter Directive for Current Operations signed by the Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, was received which stated generally that the 83d Infantry Division would be at the disposal of the Third U.S. Army Commander in forthcoming operations with certain restrictions as to its use imposed by the Army Group Commander. These restrictions were that the division, was not to be used for an assault crossing of the MOSELLE River but was to be moved over bridgeheads already established, and was not to be used beyond the SAAR River.

There was no change in the status of III Corps, which established

Elements of the 80th Infantry Division in an area east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) attacked to improve their positions and occupied ABAUCOURT (U93) and LETRICOURT (U93). Both of these towns and the ground to the immediate east were cleared of the enemy. Elsewhere in the corps zone activity was limited to aggressive patrolling.

XX Corps continued regrouping and rotation of its front line units. Elements of the 5th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 95th Infantry Division, which in turn relieved elements of the 90th Infantry Division. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division closed in a concentration area near AUDUN (U68), while the 10th Armored Division remained in the MARS-LA-TOUR (U65) area west of METZ (U85).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew twelve missions of 247 sorties and dropped 125 tons of bombs, destroying three enemy planes on the ground and losing two of their own planes.

Third U.S. Army during the period cleared the enemy from the area west of the SEILLE River in the zone of the 80th Infantry Division. Relief of the 95th Infantry Division was completed, while relief of the 90th Infantry Division continued.

The supply situation in general was fairly satisfactory although certain critical shortages persisted. Class I supplies arrived in adequate quantities, but Classes II and IV receipts were inadequate on many winter items such as blankets, sweaters, field jackets, raincoats, overcoats, one and two-burner stoves and tentage. Gasoline receipts improved rapidly, but there was a shortage of diesel fuel. There were 1,174,215 gallons of 72-80 gasoline, an 80 octane fuel standard for all

2 NOVEMBER *(D + 149)*

Forward elements of XII Corps were harassed by enemy artillery fire, while enemy activity in XX Corps zone consisted of light artillery and mortar fire combined with patrolling.

Relief of the 90th Infantry Division by the 95th Infantry Division was completed, the former closing in a concentration area near AUDUN (U68), west of METZ (U85). XX Corps, in order to minimize the effect of stringent ammunition restrictions, employed thirty-nine captured artillery pieces, including some the Germans had taken from the French and Russians. To date the corps had fired 30,920 rounds of captured ammunition valued at $702,391.

No air missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command because of adverse weather conditions.

Third U.S. Army continued active patrolling during the period, while relief of the 90th Infantry Division was completed.

Tank cars with bulk gasoline arrived for the first time at DOMGERMAIN (U50), four miles southwest of TOUL (U61), the principal decanting point within the Army area at this time. An engineer combat unit was instructed to find means of erecting one-inch steel anchor cables across an 800-foot, swift-flowing stream. Four hospital trains were made available to the Army for the evacuation of wounded, two to leave from TOUL (U61) and two from ETAIN (U47).

Bulk Gasoline Arrives at Decanting Point

3 NOVEMBER *(D + 150)*

An operational directive was issued by Twelfth U.S. Army Group on this date giving instructions to Third U.S. Army for the resumption of the offensive.

Third U.S. Army was ordered to envelop the METZ (U85) defensive works from the north and south and to destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ (U85) area; to advance northeast within the Army zone to seize the MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area, and to be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast. The time of the attack was to be announced later. XIX Tactical Air Command was to provide air support based on target priorities submitted by the XII and XX Corps.

The Army Commander issued the following plans for XII and XX Corps:

XII Corps (the 26th, 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to advance northeast from the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize the rail and road facilities in the vicinity of FALKENBERG (FALQUEMONT)(Q15). In conjunction with XX Corps, it was to destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ (U85) area and to pass control of the 80th Infantry Division to XX Corps on Army order. The corps was to advance rapidly to the northeast to establish a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone, to seize the DARMSTADT (M64) area and to be prepared for further advance to the northeast.

XX Corps (the 5th, 83d, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, the 10th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to contain the METZ (U85) defensive works west of the MOSELLE River. It was to cross the MOSELLE River in the vicinity of KOENIGSMACKER (U99) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of BOULAY (Q16). XX Corps was to be granted access to the area south of the line BETTEMBURG (P80) - REMICH (L00), both inclusive. In conjunction with XII Corps, it was to destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ (U85) area. The corps was to exercise operational control over the 83d Infantry Division, which was to move across the MOSELLE River through an established bridgehead, clear the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers and seize crossings of the SAAR River in the vicinity of SAARBURG (L11). One regimental combat team was to remain west of the MOSELLE River and the corps was to assume command of the 80th Infantry Division on Army order. The corps was to advance rapidly to the northeast to establish a bridgehead east of the RHINE River within its zone, seize the MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) area and be prepared for further advance to the northeast.

The Army Commander directed the Commanding General, XX Corps, to send a strong armored reconnaissance force to the SAAR River to locate crossings in addition to the main crossing in vicinity of SAARBURG (L11). The force was to consist of approximately a battalion of tanks, a battalion of motorized infantry and an armored reconnaissance detachment. Its mission was to cross the MOSELLE River as soon as crossings were available in XX Corps bridgeheads, push rapidly east to the SAAR River and secure any bridges which were intact.

Patrolling continued in XII Corps, with no change in front lines, the enemy being inactive except for sporadic artillery fire. XX Corps continued rotating its front line units and maintaining aggressive patrols, while front lines remained unchanged. An enemy counterattack by an estimated reinforced platoon on MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86) was repulsed.

Poor weather conditions limited operations of XIX Tactical Air Command, four missions of fifty-one sorties being flown in escorting medium bombers which bombed through clouds with unobserved results. In addition, six tactical reconnaissance and four photo missions were flown.

Advance Section Communications Zone was given a memorandum on the supply situation which stressed the critical need for tires, tire patches and anti-freeze mixture. Diesel fuel was in critical short supply. Because daily shipments of from 10,000 to 20,000 gallons had not been delivered, it was necessary to request immediate shipment of 100,000 gallons to replenish Third U.S. Army units and supply points. Verbal authorization was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group to defer placing of ten truck companies on 48-hour notice to the Group. A supply of 10,000 pairs of shoes, 10,000 sets of underwear and 500 pounds of soap was procured for displaced persons and refugees in the METZ (U85) area.

The Right Reverend HENRY W. HOBSON, representing the General Commission on Army and Navy Chaplains and Major General WILLIAM R. ARNOLD, the Chief of Chaplains, called on the Army Commander and conferred with the Army Chaplain.

4 NOVEMBER *(D + 151)*

Enemy patrols and artillery were active in III Corps zone, while a violent enemy counterattack north of BERG (U99) regained high ground which XX Corps had captured. Considerable artillery fire from FORT DRIANT (U75) and FORT VERDUN (U75) fell on NOVEANT (U74) and GORSE (U75).

Units were rotated periodically in XII Corps positions, while front lines remained unchanged. Elements of Task Force POLK, consisting of a cavalry group with two reconnaissance squadrons augmented by a tank destroyer battalion, an engineer combat battalion and a 105mm field artillery battalion, attacked and recaptured BERG (U99), northeast of THIONVILLE (U88), and occupied the town. Elsewhere in XX Corps zone there were no changes.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew eighty sorties in four missions as escort for heavy bombers. One plane was lost.

Operations for the day in Third U.S. Army's zone resulted in the capture of BERG (U99), as shown above.

New railheads were established at NANCY (U81), CHAMBLEY (U65), BELLEVILLE (U72), DIEULOUARD (U72), BARONCOURT (U57), TRIEUX (U68) and AUDUN-LE-ROMAN (U68) for the supply of Third U.S. Army. An engineer combat group designed splash shields to prevent water from splashing over the bows of storm and assault boats.

A request was approved for five L-1 litter planes, reconnaissance aircraft which would carry one litter patient, for use by the Army for emergency air evacuation of wounded. Pilots and crew chiefs also were requested.

5 NOVEMBER *(D + 152)*

Continuing his defensive attitude, the enemy dropped light artillery fire along the entire XII Corps front, while increasing his artillery fire in XX Corps zone.

A top secret letter, "Target Data", covering air support and target data for the attack, was issued to corps commanders on this date. Front lines of XII and XX Corps remained unchanged.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew fifteen missions of 252 sorties and dropped eighty-three tons of bombs. In addition, pilots destroyed twenty-eight enemy planes of the jet-propelled type on the ground. Twenty-four tactical reconnaissance and twelve photo missions were flown.

In preparation for renewal of the offensive, supplies of gasoline and rations were in a sound condition. Sites were selected for reserves of rations and gasoline in strategic locations east of the MOSELLE River, but stocking of the supply points was delayed until the last moment for reasons of security. Communications Zone advised that for the 10-day period beginning on this date Third U.S. Army would receive a daily maximum amount of 1,000 tons, approximately 320,000 gallons of gasoline in bulk to supplement shipments in cans. Communications Zone had been instructed to bring all U.S. Armies up to a five-day supply, which that headquarters figured on a basis of 15.47 pounds of gasoline, lubricants and grease per man per day. Third U.S. Army's strength for ration purposes was more than 320,000.



L-1 Litter Plane

6 NOVEMBER *(D + 153)*

Increasing his artillery fire, the enemy placed heavy concentrations in GREMECEY (Q02) and BIONCOURT (U92) in XII Corps zone, and sent out night patrols to capture prisoners. Heavy artillery concentrations also fell in the vicinity of ARNAVILLE (U74) and elsewhere in the XX Corps bridgehead across the MOSELLE River.

Amendment No. 3 to the Twelfth U.S. Army Group's Letter of Instructions No. 10, issued on this date, revised target dates for all three armies of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, and announced changes in missions of 21 Army Group (British) and Sixth U.S. Army Group, also setting forth a new mission for Ninth U.S. Army. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to regroup and prepare for an advance by its three armies to the RHINE River. Target date for the Third U.S. Army was 5 November and for the First and Ninth U.S. Armies 10 November. After the attack of the First U.S. Army reached the RHINE River, the Ninth U.S. Army was to attack northward between the RHINE and the MEUSE Rivers in conjunction with the Second British Army. Ninth U.S. Army was then to take over the area west of the RHINE River to REES (A05) inclusive. A new inter-group boundary was to be announced later.

Artillery ammunition again became available for expenditure in substantial quantities. Since late October all artillery with the Third U.S. Army had planned for participation in the coordinated attack along the entire Army front and new positions were prepared and occupied. Extensive relocation of artillery was carried out in XX Corps area, the mass of batteries being transferred to the extreme north flank in the vicinity of BOIS D'OTTANGE (U79) to support the 90th Infantry Division's bridgehead operations at KOENIGSMACKER (U98). Virtually all Army artillery and tank destroyer units displaced to new positions, all moves being made under cover of darkness. A policy of silence was imposed in the new positions, firing being restricted to registration by a single gun in each battalion. Every effort was made to simulate normal activity in the old positions, two guns per battalion being left behind to continue firing. These weapons rejoined their battalions on the night preceding the attack.

Due to bad weather no missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command.

The day's activities were again confined to active patrolling and rotation of front line units.

Diesel fuel arrived in sufficient quantities to remove it from the critical list. Engineers completed the design of the proposed bridge to be used to cross the RHINE River. All hospitals in NANCY (U81) were directed to clear as many transportable patients as possible to the air/rail holding unit at TOUL (U60) and to establish the following numbers of vacant beds by 8 November: 12th Evacuation Hospital, 450 beds; 101st Evacuation Hospital, 250 beds, and 104th Evacuation Hospital, 300 beds. There was a total of 1,628 patients remaining in all Army evacuation hospitals and 2,447 empty beds. An additional 3,010 patient capacity was available in the air/rail evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U60) and in the 6th Convalescent Hospital.

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THIRD U.S. ARMY RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE

071200-081200 NOVEMBER *(D + 154)*

Third U.S. Army at 0600 on 8 November opened the Battle of Germany which dashed the enemy's hopes for a winter breathing spell during which he could rest, refit and reorganize his battered divisions. Without benefit of preliminary aerial bombardment, in rain and with unprecedented flood conditions prevailing, the attack, as German prisoners later stated, achieved tactical surprise, for the enemy considered it impossible for Third U.S. Army to launch an offensive under such unfavorable weather and terrain conditions. Since 25 September the Army had been limited to local actions while awaiting the buildup of supplies with which to resume the offensive. In the Army's zone of advance were coal mines along the SAAR River which were vital to the enemy's war industries, and beyond the SAAR and the protecting double SIEGFRIED Line lay some of the industries themselves. Opposing Third U.S. Army were an estimated 42,500 enemy troops, the equivalent of five divisions. These included major elements of six infantry divisions, one Panzer grenadier division, and five fortress infantry and machine gun battalions.

Launched by XII Corps with the 26th, 35th and 80th Infantry Divisions, the attack progressed well during the period. The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) drove from a vicinity west of MONCOURT (Q11) through MONCOURT (Q11) and BEZANGE LA PETITE (Q11). The 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) crossed the canal northeast of MOYENVIC (Q12), while elements of the 104th Infantry drove into VIC-SUR-SEILLE (Q12). In the 35th Infantry Division zone, the 320th Infantry passed through FRESNES-EN-SAULNOIS (Q02) while elements of the 137th Infantry occupied MALAUCOURT-SUR-SEILLE (U92) and JALLAUCOURT (Q02). At the same time the 80th Infantry Division was advancing with the 319th Infantry passing through AULNOIS-SUR-SEILLE (U93), the 318th Infantry in MAILLY-SUR-SEILLE (U93), and the 317th Infantry east of CLEMERY (U83). The corps had the 26th Infantry Division in the south, the 35th Infantry Division in the center and the 80th Infantry Division on the north.

Supporting the XII Corps attack, corps artillery and tank destroyer units fired from H-60 to H + 147. After the first half-hour divisional artillery was released for "on call" missions and targets of opportunity in close support of the divisions. Ninety concentrations were fired on towns, thirteen on defiles, 190 on enemy artillery locations, forty on enemy command posts, thirty-one on enemy anti-aircraft artillery locations, fourteen on assembly areas, one on a strongpoint and one on a farm building. The heaviest was a six-battalion, two-volley concentration on the town of ORIOCOURT (Q03). Upon completion of the prearranged program, corps artillery continued to maintain intense neutralization fires until 1200 hours, after which heavy fires were delivered on call. This heavy artillery support prevented any aggressive enemy artillery reaction to the attack, only fifteen reports of enemy shelling being received over the entire corps front and all of these small concentrations of less than twenty rounds each. Serious disruption of the enemy's communications was achieved.

Because of adverse weather conditions, XIX Tactical Air Command was unable to provide support for the resumption of the offensive, only night photography missions being flown.

There was no activity in XX Corps zone other than continued relief of the 10th Armored Division by the 95th Infantry Division.

Third U.S. Army resumed the offensive during the period with its XII Corps in an attack designed to seize the MAINZ (M35) -- FRANKFURT (M66) -- DARMSTADT (M64) area. During the day JALLAUCOURT (Q02), MALAUCOURT (U92) and ROUVES (U83) were captured.

Gasoline on hand in the Army area at this time totaled 2,415,578 gallons, exclusive of gasoline in the hands of troops. Rations on hand numbered 2,246,851. A fire at the gasoline decanting point at DOMGERMAIN (U50), started by hot coals from a switch engine, destroyed 6,000 gallons of gasoline and 9,178 cans. Shipments of tire patching material were reported on the way to the Army, while anti-freeze mixture was being flown from the United Kingdom and full requirements were expected within three weeks. Seven tons of potatoes from German planted fields at ETAIN (U47) were turned over to the mayor to relieve the town's shortage of food.

Experiments were made with a new anti-concussion device for artillerymen. Made of acrylic, a plastic, and molded to fit the individual ear, the device afforded considerable relief from concussion, according to tests made under fire.

ATTACK ON METZ BEGINS

081200-091200 NOVEMBER *(D + 155)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

Launching a drive against the strong-fortified city of METZ (U85), XX Corps advanced in the face of determined enemy opposition and the handicap of flood conditions along the MOSELLE River. The 5th Infantry Division jumped off first with a strong attack, followed shortly by coordinated drives of the other divisions of the corps. XII Corps continued its attack, employing the 26th Infantry Division east of NANCY (U81), with the 104th Infantry advancing to the vicinity of CHATEAU-SALINS (Q12) and the 328th Infantry moving south of HOEVILLE (Q01). Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division, operating northeast of NANCY (U81) had the 320th Infantry moving east on the south of FORET DE GREMECEY (Q02), reaching MORVILLE (Q12), and the 137th Infantry, flanking the FORET DE GREMECEY (Q02) on the north, while fighting abreast of Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division), which by that time had reached MALAUCOURT (U92) and JALLAUCOURT (Q02). The 6th Armored Division crossed the SEILLE River in the northern part of the Corps zone at PORT-SUR-SEILLE (Q12) and prepared for further advance. A smoking operation which denied observation to the enemy protected troops making the crossing. Flooded streams continued to hamper operations.



The 5th Infantry Division advanced through CHEMINOT (U84), south of METZ (U85), while the 90th Infantry Division established bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River near THIONVILLE (U88). DUKWs, standard two and one-half ton amphibious vehicles, were used by the 90th Infantry Division in its crossing of the MOSELLE, this experimental mission being entirely successful. Artillery in support of the 90th Infantry Division opened fire at H-hour, surprise being considered essential to the night attack. Counterbattery and prearranged fires continued until H / 120. Enemy artillery opposition to the attack was extremely light, only the fortress guns at METZ (U85) firing heavily. Initial crossings were made in storm boats at CATTENOM (U99) and MALLING (U99). At the former place an attempt was made to put in an infantry support bridge, but the current was so swift that the bridge was swept away and shortly afterward the water rose to such a height that approaches to the bridge were submerged three feet. Meanwhile engineer troops began construction of a treadway bridge at MALLING (U99). The bridge was damaged by enemy artillery fire and a treadway ferry, put into operation as an alternative, was hit and sunk by enemy shells. As the flood waters began to recede, the bridge at CATTENOM (U99) was rushed to completion and later the bridge at MALLING (U99) was finished. The 10th Armored Division assembled preparing to use the established bridgeheads. Other bridgeheads in the vicinity of UCKANGE (U88) were captured by the 95th Infantry Division. On the extreme north flank of the corps zone, operational control of the 83d Infantry Division reverted to XX Corps from First U.S. Army.

With weather permitting, XIX Tactical Air Command flew 471 sorties in twenty-nine fighter-bomber missions and dropped 134 tons of bombs including tanks of Napalm. Two enemy planes were destroyed on the ground and six in the air. Napalm bombs dropped on foxholes and trenches achieved good results.

Opening XX Corps' drive against METZ (U85), Third U.S. Army's attack continued during the day, with considerable territory being overrun and several towns being captured.

When XII and XX Corps launched their attacks tactical bridging requirements were taxed heavily because of flood conditions. In the XII Corps zone bridging was laid not only for crossings of the SAAR and SEILLE Rivers but also for gaps left by craters and the demolition of culverts. The enemy, taking advantage of the unusual precipitation, blew craters and destroyed culverts at such low spots that bridging was necessary to span these gaps. This resulted in an unusual expenditure of Bailey bridges and at one time 3,500 feet of crossings of this type were in place in XII Corps area alone. In the 5th Infantry Division's crossings of the SEILLE and MOSELLE Rivers in XX Corps zone it was considered at the beginning of operations that existing bridges over the MOSELLE at ARNAVILLE (U74), PAGNY (U74), VANDIERES (U74) and PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) were adequate. Continued rains, however, caused other rivers in the area to rise to flood heights, inundating the entire plain across the MOSELLE Valley and washing out all bridges except the one at PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), a high-level structure.

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9 NOVEMBER *(D + 156)*

With entire companies surrendering in a few instances, the enemy continued to present sporadic and loosely-organized resistance in XII Corps zone. Thick mine fields and flood conditions delayed XX Corps' advance.

Good progress was made all along the XII Corps front. The 26th Infantry Division advanced to the vicinity of HAMPONT (Q12). The 35th Infantry Division continued to advance, with the 134th Infantry occupying COUTURES (Q02), while the 137th Infantry seized high ground east of LANEUEVILLE-EN-SAULNOIS (Q03) and captured DELME (Q03). To the north the 80th Infantry Division, followed by a task force of the 6th Armored Division, advanced to an area eight miles northeast of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73).

In the northern sector of XX Corps zone, Task Force POLK (3d Cavalry Group, 689th and 241st Field Artillery Battalions, 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 135th Engineer Combat Battalion) was attached to the 83d Infantry Division then preparing to attack in coordination with the other divisions of the corps. Southwest of the 83d Infantry Division zone the 10th Armored Division attacked to the east, capturing RUMELANGE (U79). The 90th Infantry Division continued reinforcing its bridgeheads, aided by smoking operations, over the MOSELLE River and practically the entire division was across by the end of the period. The 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) entered KOENIGSMACKER (U99), while the 359th Infantry reached a point due east of that town. South of the 90th Infantry Division zone and due north of METZ (U85) the 95th Infantry Division had elements driving to within six miles of METZ (U85). On the south of the corps zone the 5th Infantry Division, located northwest of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), captured LOUVIGNY (U84), while the 10th Infantry took an objective northeast of that city. Other elements of the 5th Infantry Division swept on and took VIGNY (U94).

Heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force, 1,476 in number, delivered a saturation attack on all fortified towns east of the bridgehead area in support of XX Corps' attack to capture METZ (U85). Enemy communications were cut and enemy units were left, temporarily at least, as separate fighting forces. Principal targets of the heavy bombers were the towns of METZ (U85), VERNY (U84), ORNY (U94), POMMERIEUX (U84) and SAARBRUCKEN (Q43). The bombers dropped 2,305 tons of bombs on METZ (U85) alone. XIX Tactical Air Command supported the attack of the heavy bombers. In addition, the Air Command flew 312 sorties in twenty-one missions and dropped sixty-one tons of high explosives and forty-one Napalm tanks, losing four planes.

In co-ordination with the air support given to the attack, Army antiaircraft units provided two "flak lines" to guide friendly bombers and to prevent release of bomb loads on friendly troops. The "flak lines", each two miles long and consisting of bursts from eight guns sited 500 yards apart, were fired to appear at an altitude of 17,000 feet, 3,000 feet below the attack flight.

Third U.S. Army elements pushed north, south, and east during the day and continued their concerted drive to cut off the enemy forces in the well-fortified city of METZ (U85), while in the southern zone the attack continued to the northeast.

TACTICAL SITUATION
8 NOVEMBER 1944
(RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE)

FIRST
XXXX
THIRD
SEVENTH
95TH INF DIV
5TH INF DIV
80TH INF DIV
35TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV
TF POLK
FORTRESS
METZ
Thionville
Pont-a-Mousson
Conflans
Toul
Briey
Longwy
Esch
Remich
Merzig
Falkenberg
St Avold
Dieuze
Marsal

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARL A. SPAATZ, Commanding General of the U.S. Strategic Tactical Air Forces, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. DOOLITTLE Commanding General Eighth Air Force, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

A new evacuation policy was established whereby all lightly wounded casualties were sent direct from the ambulance regulating post at NANCY (U81) to the 28th Field Hospital at TOUL (U60). From this point this type of casualty was disposed of through the air/rail evacuation holding unit at TOUL (U60) to the 6th Convalescent Hospital or to the 58th or 90th General Hospitals at COMMERCY (U42) and BAR-LE-DUC (U12) respectively. With the surgical load in the Army's evacuation hospitals there was a shortage of surgical teams which Advance Section Communications Zone helped to relieve by dispatching four surgical and eight shock teams for temporary duty with Army hospitals.

10 NOVEMBER *(D + 157)*

After disorganized resistance initially following Third U.S. Army's offensive, the enemy stiffened his opposition along the entire XII Corps front, delaying the advance by means of defended minefields, roadblocks, obstacles and demolitions. Fighting tenaciously in XX Corps zone, the enemy sought to prevent expansion of the corps bridgehead east of the MOSELLE River. In the southern portion of the corps zone the enemy continued his disorderly withdrawal but maintained a stiff defense in the vicinity of UCKANGE (U87) and MAIZIERES-LES-METZ (U86).

In XII Corps zone the attack continued with the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) capturing CHATEAU-SALINS (Q12) and HAMPONT (Q12), while the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) cleaned up SALONNES (Q02). Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division was attacking in a zone just north of the 26th Infantry Division where its 137th Infantry cleared out VIVIERS (Q03) and ORIOCOURT (Q03), and the 134th Infantry took GERBECOURT (Q12) while the 320th Infantry attacked in the Foret de CHATEAU-SALINS (Q12). The 80th Infantry Division was operating east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) in close conjunction with the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions. The 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) took TINCRY (Q03), the 318th Infantry was fighting heavily in the JUVILLE (U93) - ACHATEL (U93) - VULMONT (U93) area, and the 317th Infantry had elements in the vicinity of BACOURT (Q03) and LUPPY (U94). Fighting alongside the 80th Infantry Division, the 6th Armored Division made good progress with Combat Command "B" taking BUCHY (U94) and Combat Command "A" capturing LUPPY (U94), BECHY (Q04) and TRAGNY (Q04). Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division captured FONTENY (Q03), HANNOCOURT (Q03) and FREMERY (Q03) and drove to the vicinity of LUCY (Q03). Due east of Combat Command "B", Combat Command "A" seized HABOUDANGE (Q13). Flood conditions continued to hamper operations. At the end of the period XII Corps had captured since the start of its drive on 8 November the following towns: NOMENY (U83), ROUVES (U83), EPLY (U83), RAUCOURT (U83), ST JURE (U83), VIGNY (U94), BUCHY (U94), BEUX (U94), SECOURT (U94), ACHATEL (U93), SAILLY (U93), MONCHEUX (U93), JUVILLE (U93), FOVILLE (U93), THEZEY-ST-MARTIN (U93), LEMONCOURT (Q03), ORIOCOURT (Q02), DELME (Q03), VIVIERS (Q03), FRESNESEN-SAULNOIS (Q02), AMELECOURT (Q02), FONTENY (Q03), CHATEAU-SALINS (Q12), SALONNES (Q02), VIC-SUR-SEILLE (Q12), MORVILLE (Q12), HAMPONT (Q12), OBRECK (Q12), MOYENVIC (Q12), and BEZANGE-LA-PETITE (Q11).

XX Corps continued to attack aggressively with the 5th, 90th, and 95th Infantry Divisions, while the 10th Armored Division moved up to join the main action. In the zone of the 83d Infantry Division there was no particular activity other than patrolling. South of METZ (U85) the 5th Infantry Division was operating on the north of the 6th Armored Division (XII Corps). The 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) was advancing rapidly to the east, south of METZ (U85). To the north of METZ (U85) the 95th Infantry Division strengthened its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River and elements of the 379th Infantry crossed near THIONVILLE (U88). Farther north the 90th Infantry Division continued driving forward.

Poor weather conditions for flying prevailed, but XIX Tactical Air Command flew ninety-one sorties in five missions. In addition, they flew two tactical reconnaissance missions and one photo reconnaissance mission.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance to the east, liberating many small towns.

The Army had 2,558,000 gallons of gasoline. Five additional surgical teams and thirty-four nurses were obtained on temporary duty from Communications Zone.

At THIONVILLE (U88), engineers started construction on a 200-foot Bailey bridge, the longest so far in the campaign, to span a gap on a destroyed highway bridge. The bridgehead here was held chiefly by engineer troops, but with their organic weapons they could not drive back enemy mortars, machine guns and artillery which kept up a harassing fire for thirty-six hours despite a good smoke screen. This bridge was completed before two bridges were built at MALLING (U99) and was used to cross part of the 10th Armored Division.

200-Foot Double Triple Bailey Bridge Under Construction

11 NOVEMBER *(D + 158)*

All along the Army's front the enemy withdrew, fighting strong delaying actions in some places such as forested areas and towns which were favorable for defense. He opposed with determination the XII Corps advance in the FORET de CHATEAU SALINS (Q12) and pounded XX Corps positions with heavy artillery fire.

Relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army, the 83d Infantry Division reverted to control of the First U.S. Army, on verbal orders of the Commanding General, Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

The 26th Infantry Division drove northeast in the XII Corps zone and made substantial gains. Operating to the north of 26th Infantry Division, the 35th Infantry Division, took VAXY (Q12) on a similar drive to the northeast. The 80th Infantry Division drove due north and liberated an area including the towns of BACOURT (Q03) and PREVOCOURT (Q03). With elements on the flanks of the 80th Infantry Division the 4th Armored Division also pushed north with its Combat Command "A" capturing CONTHIL (Q23) and Combat Command "B" capturing BAUDRECOURT (Q04). These drives were well north and east of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) and began to menace the enemy forces at METZ (U85) from the rear. Concurrently the 6th Armored Division drove northward in a zone west of the 4th Armored Division's zone. Combat Command "A" captured HAN-SUR-NIED (Q04) and SANRY-SUR-NIED (U95) and under enemy artillery fire pushed bridges across the NIED ERSE River at both places. Construction of bridges was rushed under protection of smoke screens. Leading elements of Combat Command "A" were then six miles southeast of METZ (U85). Combat Command "B" captured LEMUD (U95) and REMILLY (Q04) while driving north.

In the XX Corps zone the attack was continued by the 5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, with the 10th Armored Division moving up to assume major action. On the north of the corps zone the 90th Infantry Division enlarged its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River and captured FORT KOENIGSMACKER (U98), one of the important forts in the outer ring of forts in the METZ (U85) area. The 95th Infantry Division continued its crossings of the river in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (U88) and UCKANGE (U88). South of METZ (U85) the 5th Infantry Division made moderate advances to the east. The 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division), from positions one mile west, advanced to the vicinity of LEMUD (U94) where solid contact was made with the 6th Armored Division (XII Corps), which had advanced two miles north. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced to the vicinity of SILLY (U95).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew ten missions and 162 sorties, and dropped thirty-one tons of bombs and thirty-two Napalm tanks, as well as firing eighteen rockets.

Third U.S. Army's drive continued during the period, with FORT KOENIGSMACKER (U98) being captured. Towns liberated were GERBECOURT (Q12), TINCRY (Q03), PREVOCOURT (Q03), BACOURT (Q03), MORVILLE-SUR-NIED (Q04), TRAGNY (Q04), THIMONVILLE (Q04), BUCHY (U94), NOCOURT (Q03), SOLONNES (Q02) and FONTENY (Q03).

New railheads for the Army were established at CHAMBREY (Q02), MONCEL (Q01), BRIN (U92), BETTEMBOURG (P80) and DUDELANGE (U89). A need for labor troops to replace prisoners of war in hospital units became apparent, the use of prisoners being curtailed because as the Army approached the borders of Germany, the danger of prisoners escaping increased. Trenchfoot cases began to appear among Third U.S. Army casualties.



Medical Officer Examines Trenchfoot Case

12 NOVEMBER *(D + 159)*

XII Corps' advance to the east continued against stubborn resistance in BAZONCOURT (Q05) and along the road from HAN-SUR-NIED (Q04) to HERNY (Q04). In the 26th Infantry Division on the south of the corps zone, the 104th Infantry captured CHATEAU-VOUE (Q12) and WUISSE (Q22), while the 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments fought through the woods north of DIEUZE (Q22), consolidating their positions. In the 35th Infantry Division, which was then fighting just north of the 26th Infantry Division, the 134th Infantry occupied DALHAIN (Q13) and BELLANGE (U78), while the 137th Infantry and 320th Infantry captured CHATEAU BREHAIN (Q13). The 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) advanced northeast and captured HERNY (Q04). Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) captured ORON (Q03) and VILLER-SUR-NIED (Q13) while Combat Command "A" drove generally northeast. Meanwhile the 6th Armored Division continued to advance northward. Combat Command "A" (6th Armored Division) captured VATIMONT (Q04) and supported the 80th Infantry Division in the vicinity of HERNY (Q04) - HAN-SUR-NIED (Q04).

The 90th Infantry Division (XX Corps) enlarged its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River, pushing across armored and tank destroyer units. In the 95th Infantry Division zone the 378th Infantry continued to cross the river. South of METZ (U85), the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the north and cleared CORNY (U74), POMMERIEUX (U84), LIEHON (U94), SANRY-SUR-NIED (U95) and ANCERVILLE (Q04). Heavy resistance was offered by the enemy in the corps zone, a determined counterattack being launched in the vicinity of KERLING (U98) and crossings in the bridgehead area at UCKANGE (U87) being heavily shelled by artillery.

No air operations were possible except some sorties by night fighters of XIX Tactical Air Command. These night fighters attacked two trains and strafed a convoy moving on the road.

Third U.S. Army's drive to encircle METZ (U85) continued to the north and east during the period, while to the northeast armored elements drove toward the German frontier. During the day CHATEAU-VOUE (Q12), WUISSE (Q22), VANNECOURT (Q13), DALHAIN (Q13), BELLANGE (Q78), CHATEAU-BREHAIN (Q13), BREHAIN (Q13), CHICOURT (Q03), ORON (Q03), FREMERY (Q03), LUCY (Q03), VATIMONT (Q04), HERNY (Q04), BAZONCOURT (Q05), LIEHON (U94), VALMESTROFF (U98), ELZANGE (U98), BREISTROFF-LA-PETITE (U98) were captured by elements of Third U.S. Army.

By this date reinforcements were coming to Third U.S. Army at a rate averaging 1800 a day and continued at that rate for more than a week. Every effort was made to focus the attention of all commanders and troops on the necessity for preventive measures against trenchfoot, which was responsible for an increasing number of casualties. Troops were instructed to massage their feet and keep them dry by changing to clean socks which were issued daily with rations.

13 NOVEMBER *(D + 160)*

Continuing his delaying actions in XII Corps zone, the enemy employed counterattacks, extensive minefields, roadblocks and obstacles and increased his artillery fire. Minefields and artillery fire proved formidable barriers to XX Corps' advance.

Verbal orders of the Commanding General, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, in regard to the transfer of the 83d Infantry Division to the First U.S. Army were confirmed in written orders on this date.

Repulsing several German counterattacks, XII Corps continued to advance to the east. The 101st Infantry and the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) had elements in the FORET DE BRIDE (Q22), north of DIEUZE (Q22), while the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) assembled in the vicinity of LIDREZING (Q23). The 35th Infantry Division continued driving in the zone north of the 26th Infantry Division, with the 134th Infantry occupying PEVANGE (Q13) and ACHAIN (Q13) and the 137th Infantry capturing MARTHILLE (Q13). Meanwhile, the 80th Infantry Division continued northeast and captured MANY (Q14) and ARRIANCE (Q04). Elements of Combat Command "A" 6th Armored Division captured THICOURT (Q14), ARRAINCOURT (U92) and VATIMONT (Q04), while Combat Command "B" reached ANCERVILLE (Q04).

XX Corps troops continued to attack to the north and south of METZ (U85), with the 95th Infantry Division taking MASSE YUTZ (U88) and IMMELDANGE (U87). Armored vehicles were ferried across the MOSELLE River while armored reconnaissance elements joined the bridgehead forces of the 95th Infantry Division. FRECHING (Q09) was entered by elements of the 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division). Just north of the 95th Infantry Division, the 90th Infantry Division enlarged its bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River and captured KERLING (U99), KUNTZIG (U98) and INGLANGE (U98). In the zone south of METZ (U85) the 5th Infantry Division continued to attack north with advance elements closing to within five miles of the city. ORNY (U94), COIN-LES-CUVRY (U85), CUVRY (U85), PONTOY (U94) and POUILLY (U85) were liberated and L'AISNE (U85) and L'YSER (U85) in the VERDUN group of forts capitulated.

There was no air activity because of inclement weather.

Continuing to advance to the east and northeast during the day, Third U.S. Army captured L'AISNE (U85) and L'YSER (U85) in the VERDUN group of forts, together with the towns of ORNY (U94), COIN-LES-CUVRY (U85), CUVRY (U84), POUILLY (U85), KERLING (U99), FRECHING (Q09), KUNTZIG (U98), INGLANGE (U98), MASSE YUTZ (U88), PONTOY (U94) and IMMELDANGE (U87).

Engineers Remove Roadblock Caused by Blasted Bridge

PERIODIC PROGRESS CHART

THIRD U S ARMY

011200 NOV TO 011200 DEC 1944

AND

DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS

ON 011200 DEC 1944

NOTE: ON 8 NOV THE 83RD INF DIV WAS ATTACHED TO THIRD U S ARMY FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL WITH CERTAIN RESTRICTIONS ON ITS EMPLOYMENT. ON 11 NOV THE DIV REVERTED TO FIRST U S ARMY.

THE 99TH INF DIV WAS ASSIGNED TO III CORPS AND THIRD U S ARMY ON 25 NOV, BUT DID NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL DURING THE MONTH.

14 NOVEMBER *(D + 161)*

XII Corps troops met determined enemy delaying actions, consisting of anti-tank fire, mines, roadblocks and blown bridges. Heavy resistance in the northern bridgehead and strong delaying actions elsewhere were encountered by XX Corps troops.

Continuing XII Corps' attack to the east, elements of the 26th Infantry Division occupied HARRACOURT (Q12) and MARSAL (Q12) and elements of the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) drove south toward DIEUZE (Q22), while other elements of the division approached that city from the west. Working in close conjunction with the 4th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division captured DESTRICH (Q13) and BARONVILLE (Q13), while the 4th Armored Division cleared GUIBLING (Q22) and ZARBELING (Q23) and fought in the DESTRICH - BARONVILLE area. Slightly north, the 6th Armored Division seized LANDORF (Q14). Elements of the 80th Infantry Division struck to the northeast.

On the north of XX Corps' advance, the 95th Infantry Division captured OUVR-ST-HUBERT (U97), FEVES (U86), and FT D'ILLANGE (U88). The 10th Armored Division began crossing the MOSELLE River near THIONVILLE (U88) and MALLING (U99), aided by smoking operations. Farther south the 90th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east and on the south of corps zone the 5th Infantry Division took MECLEUVES (U95) in its flanking drive on METZ (U85).

No operations were conducted by XIX Tactical Air Command due to bad weather.

Advance of the Army to the east continued during the day, with HARRACOURT (Q13), GUEBLING (U22), BOUSSE (U87), LANDROFF (Q14), MECLEUVES (U95), OUVR-ST-HUBERT (U97), FEVES (U86) and FT D'ILLANGE (U88) being captured, while the 10th Armored Division began crossing the MOSELLE River at THIONVILLE (U88) and MALLING (U99).

Rail evacuation of patients reached a new high as the weather prevented evacuation by air, four trains at TOUL (U60) evacuating 1,119 patients. In addition, 346 patients were evacuated from TOUL (U60) by ambulances.

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15 NOVEMBER *(D + 162)*

A study of enemy capabilities at this time showed that he could make a fortress stand at METZ (U85) to impede the Army's eastward drive by the diversion of troops, artillery and aviation, and could withdraw to the MAGINOT Line and supplementary defensive positions while bringing up reinforcements from other sectors and manning the fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line. These objectives could be implemented, it was estimated, by defending and delaying in successive prepared positions, counterattacking locally with infantry and armor to block and contain the Army's eastward thrusts.

Enemy delaying action strengthened perceptibly in the XII Corps. Strong counterattacks were launched and artillery fire on the Army's front elements was extremely heavy. Effective slowing of the attack was achieved by the enemy's system of road blocks, minefields and obstacles, covered by small arms and anti-tank fire. However, XII Corps troops advanced to the east, with the 26th Infantry Division driving from the north and west, fighting toward DIEUZE (Q22). Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division was fighting directly north of the 26th Infantry Division, with the 134th Infantry clearing MORHANGE (Q23) and RACRANGE (Q23). The 80th Infantry Division, flanked by the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, continued movement to the northeast. Some elements of the 4th Armored Division were supporting the 35th Infantry Division around MORHANGE (Q23).

XX Corps continued its attacks with good progress being made, despite resistance, including many local counterattacks. South of METZ (U85) the 5th Infantry Division was moving up for an attack on the city. The 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) took AUGNY (U85) while the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) took MARLY (U85) and CHESNY (U95). Farther north the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions had shifted their positions so that the 90th Infantry Division held the corps north boundary. The 95th Infantry Division captured FEVES (U86), ILLANGE (U78), and ST REMY (U86). Task Force BACON, composed of elements of the 378th and 379th Infantries (95th Infantry Division) with attached engineers, tank destroyer and reconnaissance elements, was formed for the purpose of attacking down the east bank of the MOSELLE River from THIONVILLE (U88) to aid in the capture of METZ (U85). After completing its crossings of the MOSELLE River the 10th Armored Division struck rapidly to the east and its Combat Command "A" secured LEMESTROFF (U98). On the corps north boundary the 90th Infantry Division's 358th Infantry took STUCKANGE (U98), while other elements of the division captured DISTROFF (U98).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew two missions of thirty sorties and dropped thirty-five tons of bombs. Planes strafed an enemy convoy and attacked marshalling yards near METZ (U85).

During the day, Third U.S. Army's drive continued against strong resistance, with MORHANGE (Q23), RACRANGE (Q23), AUGNY (U85), MARLY (U85), CHESNEY (U95), DISTROFF (U98), ST REMY (U86), SEMECOURT (U86), BOUSSE (U87) and LEMESTROFF (U98) being captured.

Third U.S. Army was informed by Twelfth U.S. Army Group that for the period 19 November to 2 December the daily allocation of tonnage would be 2,800 tons. This figure covered all classes except Class I Quartermaster and Class V Ordnance. Army Group requested a daily report on the numbers of trench-foot cases admitted to Army medical installations. A new peak of evacuation of wounded was reached, with 1,481 evacuated by road and 303 by rail from TOUL (U60). The necessity for an air lift to evacuate patients became critical.

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

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16 NOVEMBER *(D + 163)*

XII Corps regrouped for further attacks to the east. There were only minor advances along the corps front. The 137th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) reached the vicinity of HARPRICH (Q24), while Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) reached the vicinity of GERBECOURT (Q12).

Continuing XX Corps' advance, the 5th Infantry Division capturing the towns of PELTRE (U85), SORBEY (U95), and a fort at CHESNEY (U95) which had held out after the fall of the town on the previous day. North of METZ (U85) elements of the 95th Infantry Division captured VIGNEULLES (U86), SAULNY (U96), LORRY-LES-METZ (U86), PLESNOIS (U86), and NORROY-LE-VENOUR (U86). In addition, several of the strong forts which protected METZ (U85) from the north and northwest were under heavy siege, with two being completely surrounded. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division on the corps north boundary took METZERVISSE (U98), due east of THIONVILLE (U88), and other elements of the division captured BUDING (U98) and REINANGE (U97). The 10th Armored Division, striking due east from positions of the 90th Infantry Division, cleared NONNEREN (U08), ST MARGUERITE (U88) and ST FRANCOIS-LACROIX (Q08).

In conduct of armed reconnaissance and in attacks on enemy command posts in conjunction with support of both corps, XIX Tactical Air Command flew six missions of 112 sorties, and dropped thirty-two and a half tons of bombs in addition to Napalm, fragmentation bombs and rockets.

During the day, there was a continued advance in the northern zone of Third U.S. Army, while regroupment of forces continued all along the Army front in preparation for further advances to the east.

A gasoline fire at a supply point at NANCY (U81) resulted from the backfire of a 30-gallon dispenser. Approximately 35,000 gallons of gasoline were lost before the fire could be extinguished.

17 NOVEMBER *(D + 164)*

The enemy maintained a purely defensive attitude in the XII Corps zone, while in XX Corps zone his delaying actions were disorganized and a large number of prisoners were taken. In the METZ (U85) area enemy resistance was sporadic, with the strongest opposition being offered along the FORT DRIANT (U75) - FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) line of forts.

XX Corps continued to advance. South of METZ (U85) the 5th Infantry Division was making good progress, with JURY (U95), MAGNY (U85) and GRIGY (U85) being captured. North of METZ (U85) the 95th Infantry Division captured FORT LORRAINE (U76) and made local advances. The 10th Armored Division took HALSTROFF (Q08), the 90th Infantry Division captured ABONCOURT (U97) and LUTTANGE (U97) and patrols of the 10th Armored Division crossed the German border. As the horseshoe drew tighter around METZ (U85) and the enemy accelerated his withdrawal, heavy harassing and interdiction artillery fires were placed on all his escape routes from the city.

A break in the weather afforded an excellent day of air operations. With missions of corps support, armed reconnaissance and attacks on enemy airdromes, twenty missions of 317 sorties were flown. Fragmentation bombs, Napalm and leaflet bombs were dropped and rockets were fired, over seventy-eight tons of high explosive bombs being expended.

As the result of operations for the day, elements of Third U.S. Army captured eight towns in the advance to the east, while the forces encircling METZ (U85) were approximately four miles apart.

With eight supply points having 1,629,405 gallons of V-80 gasoline on hand the gasoline situation was sound. The Army had 1,884,544 rations, a substantial five-day supply. Communications Zone and Advance Section Communications Zone were presented with a Third U.S. Army supply summary which stressed as critical the shortages of coal, wire W-130, mess kits, canteen cups, knives, forks and spoons, tires, tire patches, tubes and anti-freeze. At this time the number of troops drawing from Third U.S. Army supply points totaled 311,963, including Third U.S. Army, 256,356; Advance Section Communications Zone, 29,583; Ninth U.S. Air Force 22,113; French troops, 1,342, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 2,569. In a three-week period the Army authorized subsistence trains which carried to NANCY (U81) 340 tons of potatoes, 580 tons of flour and thirty-two head of cattle for the use of civilians.

Enroute to the Prisoner of War Enclosure

18 NOVEMBER *(D + 165)*

Breaching of the approach defenses to METZ (U85) eliminated the capability of the enemy to wage a fortress stand in the city for the purpose of compelling the Army to divert troops, artillery, aviation and munitions to contain the bastion. This development not only released important Third U.S. Army combat strength for offensive employment but deprived the enemy of the key defensive position in the Army's zone of advance west of the SIEGFRIED Line. It smashed the controlling pivot of the enemy's defenses and dispositions in the Army's zone of advance west of the SIEGFRIED Line, and left him with only one alternative with the forces he had in contact: to defend and delay as long as possible in order, on one hand, to effect a maximum withdrawal behind the SIEGFRIED Line, and, on the other hand, to reinforce the SIEGFRIED Line with new units. The weight of indications predicted the above strategy as the one being pursued by the enemy. Presenting a sporadic resistance to the Army's advance in the XII Corps zone, the enemy threw out screening forces which gave ground upon contact. Tactical reconnaissance reported numerous enemy columns moving east and northeast along the corps front. Enemy resistance weakened perceptibly in XX Corps zone and a general withdrawal along the entire corps front was indicated. Resistance continued in the forts at METZ (U85), of which eight major ones remained to be taken.

Making local advances, the 26th Infantry Division made limited progress on the south flank of XII Corps, while the 35th Infantry Division captured BERTRINGEN (Q24), BERMERINGEN (Q23) and VALLERANGE (Q23). There was little activity in the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions' zones.

Encirclement of METZ (U85) was completed by XX Corps troops. The 5th Infantry Division on the south flank and Task Force BACON (1st Battalion of the 377th Infantry, 2d Battalion of the 378th Infantry, 95th Reconnaissance Troop, a platoon of Engineers, and two companies of tank destroyers with two self-propelled guns) made contact due east of the city. Firing into METZ (U85), a chemical mortar unit with the 5th Infantry Division hit an ammunition dump, the resulting explosion knocking out several pieces of enemy heavy artillery. The 5th Infantry Division captured BORNY (U85) while Task Force BACON took ST JULIEN-LES-METZ (U87). Two more of the METZ forts fell to elements of the 95th Infantry Division. On the north boundary the 10th Armored Division continued to precede the 90th Infantry Division, capturing BOUZONVILLE (Q17), WALDWEISTROFF (Q18), FLASTROFF (Q18), SCHWERDORF (Q18), and FILSTROFF (Q18). The 90th Infantry Division meanwhile was mopping up in the rear of the 10th Armored Division advance.

Enemy air activity flared up when nineteen raids by thirty-one enemy aircraft attacked targets in the Army area. Anti-aircraft units shot down seven planes and claimed eight as probably destroyed. With good weather continuing, XIX Tactical Air Command flew twenty-five missions of 347 sorties.

Third U.S. Army captured BORNY (U85), ST JULIEN-LES-METZ (U87), WALDWEISTROFF (Q18) and other small localities during the day, while the 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions closed the pincers which cut the last escape route of the German forces in the city of METZ (U85).

Arrangements were made to bring into the Army area a group of former civilian managers and operators of coal mines. They were to go into the mines captured from the enemy as soon as they were taken, in order to begin operations before the mines flooded from seepage.

19 NOVEMBER *(D + 166)*

All enemy divisions resisting the Third U.S. Army's offensive suffered heavy losses in the week previous, some to such an extent that they became mere remnants. Despite reinforcements, it was estimated that at this time the enemy had the equivalent of seven divisions opposing the Third U.S. Army, one less than during the previous week. It was evident that the enemy viewed the situation in the west as approaching a critical stage.

Fighting a strong defensive battle from behind well-prepared positions in XII Corps' zone of advance, the enemy employed numerous tanks, some dug-in, to support strongpoints and roadblocks. Continuing his withdrawal in XX Corps' zone, the enemy became disorganized, with no tactical control being exercised above company level. In the METZ (U85) area street fighting was in progress, while the major forts dominating the city's defenses remained in enemy hands although surrounded by the Army's forces.

The 26th Infantry Division supported by elements of the 4th Armored Division was on XII Corps south flank. Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) captured VIRMING (Q24) and the two divisions commenced the attack on the important town of DIEUZE (Q22). The 35th Infantry Division with elements of the 6th Armored Division attacked eastward in a zone immediately north of the 26th Infantry Division. There was little activity in the 80th Infantry Division on the corps north flank.

Elements of the 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions entered METZ (U85), the 5th Infantry Division took VAUDREVILLE (U95) and LAULAILLIERS (U96), while the 95th Infantry Division seized SANRY-LES-VIGY (U96). At MAGNY (U85) a smoke mission was fired to deny observation to the enemy at FORT QUEULEU (U85) while XX Corps troops advanced. NENNIG (Q00), TETTINGEN (Q19), WALDWISSE (Q19) and WEIHINGEN (Q19) were taken by the 10th Armored Division while the 90th Infantry Division, following the 10th Armored Division, cleared HINCKANGE (Q06), BRECKLANGE (Q06) and VOLMERANGE (Q06).

Another great day of air support was recorded by XIX Tactical Air Command, with 403 sorties being flown on armed reconnaissance, corps support, and IX Bomber Command escort. Thirteen aircraft and eight pilots were lost, but destruction and damage to the enemy included 387 motor transports, eighteen tanks and armored vehicles, fifty-seven locomotives, 429 railroad cars, forty-eight gun positions, thirty-seven factories and buildings, ten railroad cuts and twelve attacks each on marshalling yards and towns.

Third U.S. Army's advance to the east continued during the period, with major elements entering METZ (U85) and a number of smaller towns being captured.

A daily tonnage bid was submitted to Twelfth U.S. Army Group for the period 3 to 17 December calling for 7,633 tons for maintenance and 399 tons for reserve, a total of 8,032 tons.

20 NOVEMBER *(D + 167)*

Withdrawing the bulk of his forces in the XII Corps zone, the enemy left only a skeleton force along the corps front. His covering force gave ground rapidly, but numerous road blocks, blown bridges, minefields and sporadic artillery fire impeded XII Corps' advance. XX Corps advance on MERZIG (Q29) was held up by road blocks covered by anti-tank fire, while at METZ (U85), disorganized resistance continued with the enemy surrendering in large numbers. Enemy forces of undetermined strength continued to hold FORTS DRIANT (U75), ST QUENTIN (U85), ST PRIVAT (U85), JEANNE D'ARC (U75), PLAPPEVILLE (U86), and VERDUN (Q85).

Continuing the attack to the east in XII Corps zone, the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) and elements of the 4th Armored Division captured DIEUZE (Q22). Other elements of the 328th Infantry captured LUSTROFF (Q32), while elements of the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) captured INSWEILER (Q33). The 4th Armored Division operating in the same zone took FRANCALTROFF (Q34). To the north the 35th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division made small advances to the east, while the 80th Infantry Division operating on the corps north boundary made good advances and captured PONTPIERRE (Q25), LELLINGEN (Q24) and FAULQUEMONT (Q15).

METZ (U85) was reported cleared by elements of the 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions, except for ILE-DU-SAULCY (U85) and ILE-CHAMBIERE (U85). While the 95th Infantry Division was reducing the forts on the north of the city, elements of the 5th Infantry Division surrounded the forts on the south and east of METZ (U85) and took FORT QUEULEU (U85).

A chemical company provided a smoke screen for the 5th Infantry Division's crossing of the SEILLE River in the attack on FORT QUEULEU (U85) denying observation to the enemy troops within the fort.

The 90th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division continued to operate jointly on the XX Corps' north flank, with only local gains to the east and northeast being made.

In support of Third U.S. Army, XIX Tactical Air Command flew sixty fighter-bomber sorties.

Third U.S. Army during the day advanced from two to five miles to the east and northeast, and FORT QUEULEU (U85) was captured.

21 NOVEMBER *(D + 168)*

In the XII Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division captured ALBESDORF (Q33), TORCHEVILLE (Q33), INSWEILER (Q33). Meanwhile the 4th Armored Division captured LOUDREFING (Q32), RENING (Q34), RODALBE (Q23), and CUTTING (Q32) and advanced to the west bank of the RHIN-MARNE canal at MITTERSHEIM (Q42). North of these two divisions the 35th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division continued their coordinated attacks to the east. Elements of the 35th Infantry Division took HELLIMER (Q34) while the 6th Armored Division captured FREMESDORF (Q34) and FLETRANGE (Q15). The 80th Infantry Division continued advancing slowly on XII Corps north flank.

XX Corps continued its attack, with the 5th and 95th Infantry Divisions mopping up METZ (U85). The 95th Infantry Division took ILE CHAMBIERE (U85) and began mopping up ILE-DU-SAULCY (U85). Forces entering METZ (U85) and actually sharing in its reduction were the 10th and 11th Infantries (5th Infantry Division), the 377th (-) and 378th (-) Infantry (95th Infantry Division) and Task Force BACON. During this phase the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) was due east of METZ (U85) preventing enemy forces from withdrawing, while the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) was west of METZ (U85) exerting containing pressure on the forts in that vicinity. Attacks to the east and north were continued by the 10th Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division. Major elements of both divisions crossed the German border near the LUXEMBOURG frontier. BOUZONVILLE (Q17) was taken by the 10th Armored Division.

Planes of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 114 sorties but almost entirely as escort to the IX Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force.

ALBESDORF (Q33) was cleared during the day, while the advance to the east continued. Mopping up operations in the METZ (U85) area continued with ILE CHAMBIERE (U85) being cleared.

Third U.S. Army estimated its ammunition requirements over a six months' period on a rounds per gun per day basis as fifty for 105mm howitzers, high explosive only; thirty-five for 155mm howitzers, twenty-five for 155mm guns and twenty-five for 8" howitzers.

Infantry Advances Toward Metz

22 NOVEMBER *(D + 169)*

All resistance at METZ (U85) ceased at 1435 hours on this date, marking the first time in modern history that "The Bastion of the East" was captured by assault. In 451 the city was stormed and devastated by the Huns, who occupied it for sixty years. A French garrison surrendered the city in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian war after running out of food, the city remaining in German hands until the end of the first World War. Then the city was held by the French until occupation of the country by the Germans following France's surrender in 1940. With the fall of METZ (U85) to XX Corps troops after a two months' siege, handicapped by the worst floods in twenty years and by weather which prevented maximum air support, a new route to the east was opened and the last important obstacle in front of the SIEGFRIED Line was removed.

Third U.S. Army on this date received Amendment No 5 to letter of Instruction No 10, Headquarters Twelfth U.S. Army Group, dated 21 November, which adjusted the boundary between First and Third U.S. Armies.

In the southern part of XII Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division captured MUNSTER (Q33), while Combat Command "B" of the 4th Armored Division cleared MITTERSHEIM (Q42) and took FENETRANGE (Q42). The 35th Infantry Division advanced rapidly to the north of the 26th Infantry Division zone and captured ST JEAN-ROHRBACH (Q34), GRENINGEN (Q34), LEYWEILER (Q34), DIEFENBACH (Q34), PETITE-TENQUIN (Q34). The 6th Armored Division, operating in conjunction with the 35th Infantry Division and the 80th Infantry Division on the north corps flank, made good gains.

Relief of the 95th Infantry Division in the METZ (U85) area was started by the 5th Infantry Division, the former division moving to a concentration area in the vicinity of COLLIGNY (U95), east of METZ (U85). To the north the 90th Infantry Division began relieving Combat Command "B" of the 10th Armored Division, while the remainder of the 10th Armored Division attacked to the northeast and captured WALDWISSE (Q18) and HALSTROFF (Q08).

XIX Tactical Air Command cancelled all missions because of continued bad weather.

Third U.S. Army's advance to the east and northeast continued during the day. ST JEAN-ROHRBACH (Q34), DIEFENBACH (Q34), PETITE-TENQUIN (Q34), GRENINGEN (Q34), MUNSTER (Q33), INSWEILER (Q33) and MITTERSHEIM (Q42) were captured and resistance in the city of METZ (U85) ended.

The PARIS (S04) to NANCY (U81) civilian food train was changed from a twice-weekly to a daily except on Sunday.



Stars and Stripes is Raised on Captured Metz Fort

23 NOVEMBER *(D + 170)*

Continuing his vigorous delaying tactics in XII Corps zone, the enemy defended towns and strongpoints with infantry and tanks. Third U.S. Army's 26th Infantry Division met heavy resistance in clearing the FORET DOM D'ALBESDORF (Q33), north of MUNSTER (Q33). In the same general zone the 4th Armored Division pushed elements across the SAAR River at ROMMELFINGEN (Q42) and GOSSELMINGEN (Q42). Leading elements reached POSTDORF (Q52) and KIRBERG (Q52). During the period the 35th Infantry Division continued its drive in the zone of the 4th Armored Division, and attacked and reached RENING (Q34) and INSMING (Q34). Meanwhile the 6th Armored Division regrouped its forces preparatory to continuing the attack. On the XII corps north flank the 80th Infantry Division organized for an attack to the east.

The 5th Infantry Division completed relief of the 95th Infantry Division with elements of the latter division moving to an assembly area in the vicinity of COLLIGNY (U95), east of METZ (U85), from which point it relieved elements of the 90th Infantry Division in the NIED River vicinity. Meanwhile the 5th Infantry Division continued to exert pressure on a stubbornly resisting enemy in the remaining METZ (U85) forts, using smoke to screen passage of troops across the MOSELLE River. In the northern part of XX Corps zone the 90th Infantry Division continued to relieve the 10th Armored Division in the task of mopping up in rear areas, freeing the latter division for front line combat.

XIX Tactical Air Command again was unable to schedule any operations because of continued adverse weather conditions.

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24 NOVEMBER *(D + 171)*

Numerous enemy obstacles combined with rain and mud slowed the Army's progress.

In the southern part of XII Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division cleared the BOIS-DE VIBERS-VILLER (Q43), BOIS DE HAMMESSIEL (Q43), FORET D'ALBESDORF (Q33) and BOIS DE GEVRICOURT (Q43), and took VIBERSVILLER (Q43). The 4th Armored Division in the same general zone employed Combat Command "B" to take POSTDORF (Q52) and BARENDORF (Q52). Combat Command "A" completed the crossing of the SAAR River at GOSSELMINGEN (Q42) and ROMMELFINGEN (Q42). After capturing UBERKINGER (Q34), KAPPELKINGER (Q34) and RENING (Q34) the 35th Infantry Division spent the remainder of the period regrouping its forces to continue the attack. The 6th Armored Division pushed forward, taking VALATTE (Q35) in its drive toward PUTTELANGE (Q45). To the north the 80th Infantry Division launched a new attack to the east, took FAULQUEMONT (Q14), MAINVILLERS (Q14) and reached an area northeast of LAUDREFANG (Q25) in a drive on ST AVOLD (Q25).

The 5th Infantry Division continued to contain the remaining forts of METZ (U85). Realignment of various divisions of XX Corps being completed, the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions both launched heavy attacks early in the morning. Excellent progress was made by the 95th Infantry Division in a zone along the NIED River northeast of METZ (U85), capturing BRECKLANGE (Q06), BOULAY MOSELLE (Q06), HALLING (Q16) and NARBEFONTAINE (Q16). Fighting along the German border near the Luxembourg frontier, the 90th Infantry Division captured BIRINGEN (Q19), NEUNKIRCHEN LES BOUZONVILLE (Q18) and REMELDORFF (Q18). Meeting heavy resistance inside Germany, the 10th Armored Division continued its attack and captured TETTINGEN (L00), BUTZDORF (L00) and OBERLEUKEN (L00).

XIX Tactical Air Force again had no operations during the period because of unfavorable weather.

GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

Seven Army supply points had 1,749,975 gallons of gasoline, and reserve points held an additional 3,024,264 gallons. Information was given Twelfth U.S. Army Group that the following winter clothes and equipment were needed to complete the initial issue to Third U.S. Army troops: 30,000 overshoes, 97,000 ground sheets, 225,921 mufflers, 260,000 trousers, 260,000 jackets, 182,789 sleeping bags, 226,000 sweaters and 175,358 combat boots. A mobile water purification unit was sent to METZ (U85) to alleviate the problem of water supply. Because of the danger of prisoners escaping over the nearby German borders, a directive was issued to all medical units to turn back to Advance Section Communications Zone all prisoners of war employed in hospitals.

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25 NOVEMBER *(D + 172)*

Offering stiff resistance from the MAGINOT forts in the vicinity of LONGEVILLE (Q25) in the northern portion of XII Corps zone, the enemy impeded the Army's advance in the central portion with obstacles and in the southern portion resisted aggressively with Panzer units. He continued his dogged defense in XX Corps zone fortifications in the northern portion, while in the central and southern portions resistance was scattered.

XII Corps continued its attack, with the 26th Infantry Division on the south flank capturing WITTERSBURG (Q43), clearing the BOIS DE BONNEFONTAINE and fighting in HUNKIRICH (Q43) at the end of the period. The 4th Armored Division, also on the south flank, reached KIRBERG (Q52) after crossing the SAAR River. Farther north elements of the 35th Infantry Division captured HILSPRICH (Q44), MORSEBROWN (Q44) and strategic high ground known as HILL 241 (Q44). The 6th Armored Division, working in the same general zone as the 35th Infantry Division, occupied REMERINGEN (Q44) and entered HIRBACH (Q44). Attacking strongly on the corps north flank, the 80th Infantry Division elements made substantial gains through the MAGINOT Line and established contact with the 95th Infantry Division (XX Corps) at ZIMMINGEN (Q15).

Continued pressure on the remaining METZ (U85) forts was made by the 5th Infantry Division. The heavily defended FORT VERDUN, as well as ST BLAISE, MARIVAL and ST SOMMY, surrendered. On the XX Corps south flank, the 95th Infantry Division attacked and occupied BOULAY (Q06), MOMERSTROFF (Q16), NARBEFONTAINE (Q16) and RICRANGE (Q16), making solid contact with the 80th Infantry Division (XII Corps). To the north the 90th Infantry Division continued driving to the east, capturing OBERESCH (Q18) and SCHWERDORFF (Q18), while the 10th Armored Division, fighting across the German border, captured BETHINGEN (Q19).

Two hundred twenty fighter-bomber sorties of XIX TAC got off on corps support missions and armed reconnaissance, and accounted for 183 railroad cars, sixty-seven motor transports, eighteen locomotives, four-gun positions and various miscellaneous targets.

Reinforcements for Third U.S. Army continued to arrive at a rate of 500 to 600 a day. New railheads were cleared to Army services at FLORANGE (U88), HAMPONT-HUDIGEN (Q12), HABUNDANGE (Q13) and CONTHIL (Q23).

26 NOVEMBER *(D + 173)*

Tactical reconnaissance reported heavy rail movements, of a size indicating several divisions, into Third U.S. Army zone of advance. Considering losses previously sustained by the enemy, it was believed likely that he was reinforcing his front opposing the Army. Enemy capabilities as estimated at this time were unchanged, however, from those of 23 November.

XII Corps continued to attack all along its front. On the corps south flank the 26th Infantry Division and elements of the 4th Armored Division were heavily engaged in the vicinity of HUNKIRICH (Q43). Other elements of the 4th Armored Division were in the vicinity of WOLFSKIRCHEN (Q53) while GUNGWEILER (Q58), LOHR (Q62), SCHALBACH (Q52) and FOLSCHWEILER (Q25) were captured. Slight progress was made by the 35th Infantry Division, which then stopped to regroup its forces, while the 6th Armored Division continued the attack in the zone of the 35th Infantry Division, and took HOLVING (Q44). On the north, the 80th Infantry Division cleared VALMONT (Q25), FOLSCHWEILER (Q25), while some elements of the division entered the important city of ST AVOLD (Q25). A tank destroyer battalion neutralized thirteen pillboxes with direct fire in supporting the attack.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division continued to contain the forts around METZ (U85). Pushing forward, the 95th Infantry Division attacked and cleared ROUPELDANGE (Q06), NEIDERVISSE (Q16), OTTONVILLE-ET-RECRONGE (Q16), COUME (Q16), DENTING (Q16), TETERCHEN (Q17), VELVING (Q17), RICRANGE (Q16) and ALMUNSTER (Q17). The 90th Infantry Division moved eastward and took OTZWILLER (Q18), just across the border in Germany. Elements of the 10th Armored Division cleared part of the woods FORET DE SAARBURG (L10) while BETHINGEN (Q19) was captured by Combat Command "B".

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 217 sorties in corps support and escort missions, with a loss of two planes. Claims were made against ninety-nine railroad cars, twenty-seven locomotives and many other targets. Fourteen towns were attacked.

For the relief of civilians in METZ (U85), twenty-two tons of emergency supplies were sent to the city. A 30-day supply of flour was moved from ETAIN (U47) to BOULIGNY (U57) to relieve civilian shortages there.

27 NOVEMBER *(D + 174)*

Withdrawing toward the SIEGFRIED Line before the attacks of XII and XX Corps, the enemy offered resistance varying from strong to scattered.

Coordinating its drive on the south flank with that of the 4th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division captured ALTWEILER (Q43), HUNKIRICH (Q43), KAPPELKINGER (Q34), and NEUWEYERSHOT (Q43) in the XII Corps zone. Meanwhile the 4th Armored Division attacked with Combat Command "A" taking DURSTEL (Q63), GUNGWEILER (Q53), ASSWEILER (Q61), and Combat Command "B" capturing WOLFSKIRCHEN (Q53). Farther north the 35th Infantry Division completed its regrouping and prepared for an attack. The 6th Armored Division, in the central part of XII Corps zone, captured LIXINGEN-LES-ST AVOLD (Q24), LANNINGEN (Q34), VAHL EBERSING (Q25), MAISTADT (Q35), CAPPEL (Q35) and BARST MARIENTHAL (Q35), and coordinated with the 80th Infantry Division in the capture of ST AVOLD (Q25). The 80th Infantry Division operated on the corps north flank, aided in the capture of ST AVOLD (Q25), and took MACHEREN (Q25), HOMBOURG-HAUT (Q35), SENGBUSCH (Q35), FAREBERSVILLER (Q35) and LACHAMBRE (Q25).

Continuing reduction of the remaining forts at METZ (U85), the 5th Infantry Division also took over part of XX Corps south flank where it relieved elements of the 80th Infantry Division (XX Corps) which were then functioning north of the inter-corps boundary. Advancing rapidly, the 95th Infantry Division occupied more than twenty-five small towns, and reached positions on the German border. Also reaching the German frontier the 90th Infantry Division captured NIEDALTORF (Q18). The 10th Armored Division, regrouping its forces, was prepared to be relieved in its zone by the 3d Cavalry Group.

Due to bad weather conditions no missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Steady progress was continued all along the Third U.S. Army front during the day with ST AVOLD (Q25) and numerous other towns being captured.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

28 NOVEMBER *(D + 175)*

XII Corps attack to the east continued. The 26th Infantry Division made an advance to HINZINGEN (Q43). In the same general zone the 4th Armored Division made a northward advance, captured DURSTEL (Q63), BERG (Q53), BURBACH (Q53), HARSKIRCHEN (Q43), ZOLLINGEN (Q53) and PISDORF (Q53). The 6th Armored Division advanced and took DIEFENBACH (Q35), CAPPEL (Q35), BARST (Q35), BIDING (Q35) and MARIENTHAL (Q35). The 35th Infantry Division was assembling in corps reserve. On the north flank the 80th Infantry Division was regrouping its forces and preparing for further attacks to the east.

The 5th Infantry Division continued to harass the enemy-held forts in the METZ (U85) area. A powerful attack to the east was made by the 95th Infantry Division, which captured RAMMELFANGEN (Q18), and DUREN (Q27). Meanwhile the 90th Infantry Division along with the 10th Armored Division continued clearing the enemy west of the SAAR River. Relief of the 10th Armored Division units was completed by the 3d Cavalry Group.

Bad weather conditions continued and no missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Captured German foodstuffs released to the civilian population of METZ (U85) included 150 tons of frozen beef, twenty tons of frozen pork, fifty carloads of flour and 150 tons of flour in storage, and a quantity of canned goods. Coal from captured mines was available for issue to all troops at the rate of two pounds per man per day.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, and LIEUTENANT GENERAL LUCIEN K. TRUSCOTT, Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

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29 NOVEMBER *(D + 176)*

An estimate of enemy strength in the Third U.S. Army zone of advance showed that the equivalent of five divisions, consisting of 39,000 troops and 140 tanks or assault guns, were in contact. Available as immediate reserve were an estimated 36,000 infantry troops and 15,100 panzer troops with 195 tanks or assault guns. There was no change in the estimated enemy capabilities at this time, the most favored one being that he could defend and delay in successive prepared positions in an effort to block Third U.S. Army's advances toward the SIEGFRIED Line.

Preparing to continue its attack to the east, XII Corps commenced regrouping the majority of its forces. In an advance to the northeast the 4th Armored Division attacked and captured THAL (Q53).

FORT ST PRIVAT, another of the strongpoints in the vicinity of METZ (U85), was captured by the 5th Infantry Division. Part of the division not needed at METZ (U85) was attached to the 95th Infantry Division, which made excellent gains, after repulsing a strong counterattack near FELSBERG (Q27), and captured KERPRICH-HEMMERSDORF (Q18) and OLSINGEN (Q28). During the period the 90th Infantry Division consolidated its gains and patrolled to the SAAR River while the 10th Armored Division pushed its attack to the east on XX Corps north flank inside Germany. Combat Command "B" (10th Armored Division) was in the vicinity of SILWINGEN (Q19) at the end of the period.

XIX Tactical Air Command again had no air activity due to bad weather conditions.

Receipt of Classes II and IV supplies had fallen off, practically no signal supplies had been received in the preceding ten days, engineer supplies were backlogged at the NORMANDY Base Section, and there was a critical shortage of field jackets. During the period 25 to 29 November, sixty-seven tons of foodstuffs were transported to NANCY (U81) by civilian subsistence trains.

30 NOVEMBER *(D + 177)*

Enemy activity in the XII Corps zone was limited to harassing artillery and mortar fire and active patrolling in the northern and southern portions. The enemy opposing XX Corps troops continued his obstinate defense behind fortifications and laid down heavy artillery fire.

On orders of the Army Commander, the 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced) (Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th Ranger Battalion, Company "C" of the 602d Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company "B" of the 293d Engineer Combat Battalion, and Troop "E" of the 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) was formed and attached temporarily to the XX Corps. The 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop "E") was to remain on duty as the Army Information Service for Army Headquarters. XX Corps was to utilize the 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced) to extend and cover its right (south) flank. XII Corps was to continue to maintain contact with XX Corps on its left (south) flank.

Amendment No 6, dated 29 November to Letter of Instructions No 10, Twelfth U.S. Army Group which was received on this date, announced a change in the mission of Sixth U.S. Army Group, and changes in the Sixth - Twelfth U.S. Army Group boundary.

Third U.S. Army on this date issued Amendment No 4, dated 1 December, to Operational Directive, dated 3 November, which set forth changes in the mission of Seventh U.S. Army, and in the Sixth - Twelfth U.S. Army Group boundary.

XII Corps continued regrouping the majority of its major elements. Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Division occupied the high ground northeast of THAL (Q53) and Combat Command "B" moved to the high ground southwest of MACKWEILER (Q53). The 6th Armored Division maintained patrols and north flank contact with XX Corps.

In the XX Corps zone the 5th Infantry Division continued to exert pressure on the forts in the METZ (U85) area. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) was attached to the 95th Infantry Division and advanced to the vicinity of NIEDERVISSE (Q16). TETERCHEN (Q17), OBERLINBERG (Q28), ITZBACH (Q28), and FELSBERG (Q28) were occupied by the 95th Infantry Division. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division were fighting in BUREN (Q28) well inside Germany, northeast of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), and took FREMERSDORF (Q29). North of the 90th Infantry Division, and also inside Germany, the 10th Armored Division captured FITTEN (Q19) and BALLERN (Q19). A tank destroyer platoon on reconnaissance destroyed a twenty-man enemy patrol.

There was no air activity by the XIX Tactical Air Command due to bad weather.

Third U.S. Army improved its positions in preparation for a further advance to the east, with OBERLINBERG (Q28), FITTEN (Q19), BALLERN (Q19) and BUREN (Q28) being captured during the period.

HERBERT H. LEHMAN, Director of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

Prisoners Lined Up In Metz

Nazi Flag Is Removed from Former German Headquarters

TACTICAL SITUATION

30 NOVEMBER 1944

LUXEMBOURG
Saarburg
Remich
Dalheim
Wormeldingen
Grevenmacher
Wasserbillig
Trintange
Waldbredimus
Bous
Stadtbredimus
Sûdlingen
Beurig
Saarlouis
Wadrill
Schwarzenbach
Nohfelden
Limbacher
Wolfersweiler
Hahnweiler
Frauenberg
Reichenbach
Merzig
Wellingen
Filsdorf
Ellange
Mondorf
Schwebsingen
Elvange
Wellenstein
Kesslingen
Oberleuken
Drochholz
Nohn
Burmerange
Rentgen
Rodemack
Contz
Apach
Merschweiler
Manderen
Kirsch-les Sierck
Sierck les Bains
Rustroff
Montenach
Evendorff
Remerding
Kirschnaumen
Grindorff
Haistroff
Koenigsmacker
Kerling-les-Sierck
Ham
Oudrenue
Elange
Valmestroff
Inglange
Budling
Buding
Distroff
Kuntzig
Volstroff
Metzervisse
Bertrange
Metzeresche
Hombourg-Budange
Guenange
Kedange
Dalstein
Klang
Kemplich
Filstroff
Veckring
Bibiche
Neudorf
Laumesfeld
Monneren
St. Francois-Longchamps
Colmen
Hettange-Grande
Garche
Thionville
Kuntzig
Buding
Distroff
Illange
Stuckange
Yutz
Inglange
Boust
Mailing
Sentzich
Hunting
Metrich
Frecheng
Kalliwiller
Obernaumen
Remeling
Ellingen
Bibiche
Filstroff
Colmen
Hettange
Garche
Thionville
Kuntzig
Buding
Distroff
Illange
Stuckange
Yutz
Inglange
Boust
Mailing
Sentzich
Hunting
Metrich
Frecheng
Kalliwiller
Obernaumen
Remeling
Ellingen
Bibiche
Filstroff
Colmen
Hettange-Grande

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

November opened with the enemy continuing his defensive tactics and hoping that a winter stalemate had been achieved in which he could rest, refit, and reorganize his battered divisions. He concentrated upon defensive reorganization of the terrain between the line of contact and the SIEGFRIED Line, constructing anti-tank ditches, communications and fire trenches, pillboxes and minefields. Barbed wire was used extensively and prisoners of war frequently mentioned that dugouts and foxholes were being winter-proofed.

On 8 November the Third U.S. Army opened the Battle of Germany which upset the enemy's hopes for a winter breathing spell. XII Corps delivered the first of a two-blow attack, preceded by a devastating artillery preparation which disrupted enemy communications and curtailed the employment of his artillery. The SEILLE and MOSELLE Rivers, at flood stage as the result of the unusually heavy autumn rains, imposed an unforeseen obstacle to Third U.S. Army troops. On November 9, when the XX Corps delivered the second punch, the rivers were at record high levels. Bridgeheads which had been won by the 5th, 80th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions were maintained only by the utmost effort.

At the beginning of the month the enemy had committed on the Third U.S. Army front an estimated 42,500 troops, the equivalent of five divisions. These included major elements of six infantry divisions, one panzer grenadier division and five fortress infantry and machine gun battalions. The 11 Panzer Division, while out of contact, was believed to be in immediate reserve on the Army front. The attack on 8 November provoked an immediate reaction. Drawing upon tactical reserves and shifting elements of divisions on adjacent fronts, the enemy increased his total commitments to an estimated eight divisions consisting of 63,500 troops and 285 tanks by the end of the first week of the offensive. In addition to these reinforcements he bolstered his battered forces by the hasty commitment of seven fortress-type battalions from defensive positions in the SIEGFRIED Line.

Bad weather throughout the entire month greatly hampered Third U.S. Army's operations, limiting the use of air support and confining armor and tank destroyers largely to roads, and the enemy took every advantage of the defensive opportunities afforded by the weather. His troops were moved and reinforcements committed with comparative immunity from air attack. Demolitions and mines were freely employed with frequent road blocks and blown bridges covered by anti-tank fire to harass the Army's armored spearheads. Numerous enemy counterattacks, principally of company strength supported by a few tanks, were launched at critical points of our advance in an effort to contain our eastward thrusts. The enemy fought his delaying action from one critical terrain feature to the next. Practically every village was turned into a defensive strongpoint and maximum use was made of the limited amount of artillery available to him.

Despite reinforcements committed by the enemy, his estimated total strength opposing the Third U.S. Army by the end of the second week of the offensive dropped to the equivalent of seven divisions, 56,000 troops and 165 tanks, as the result of heavy losses sustained in counter-attacks. During the last week of the month the enemy's strength further decreased to the equivalent of five divisions, 39,000 troops and 140 tanks, again due to the heavy losses, among them 25,592 prisoners of war.

In the METZ (U85) area the enemy's attempt to make a fortress stand, hinged upon the elaborate system of forts, was shattered between 15 and 20 November. Pincers formed by the 5th Infantry Division from the south and the 95th Infantry Division from the north snapped shut east of the city, trapping an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 troops. On 18 November, major elements of the Army entered METZ (U85), but an estimated 2,800 enemy troops continued to hold out in the outer ring of forts. By the end of the month resistance ended in all except FORT DRIANT (U75), FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75), FORT PLAPPEVILLE (U86) and FORT ST QUENTIN (U85). As the month closed the enemy was forced into SIEGFRIED Line positions from NENNIG (L00) to SAARLAUTERN (Q28), where he massed the greatest concentration of artillery yet to confront the Third U.S. Army. The SAAR River was reached in the vicinity of HILBRINGEN (Q19). In the twenty-three days since the opening shot was fired in the Battle of Germany, 25,592 prisoners of war were processed.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 226 missions and 3,238 sorties during November, dropping 716 tons of bombs. Pilots of the Air Command destroyed sixteen enemy aircraft in the air and twenty-three on the ground, with five enemy aircraft claimed as probably destroyed and nine as damaged. Losses to the Air Command were fifty-nine aircraft. The Air Command flew eighteen tactical reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance missions. The wide variety of claims made included ninety-nine railroad lines cut, 815 railroad cars and 267 locomotives, 810 motor vehicles 107 gun installations, 180 factories and buildings, sixty-nine tanks and armored cars destroyed, and fourteen troop concentrations attacked.

November saw a further decrease in hostile air activity over the Third U.S. Army zone, with seventy-eight raids by 136 aircraft of which sixteen attacked ground targets. Of these, anti-aircraft units claimed sixteen destroyed and eleven probably destroyed.

Bridging activities during November exceeded those of any other month, unusually heavy rainfall twice flooding the MOSELLE Valley, washing out some bridges and inundating the approaches. This required the construction of 120 Bailey Bridges, 111 treadway bridges, sixty-four timber spans and two heavy ponton bridges. Army units also built thirty-four culverts, light rafts and ferries, four infantry support rafts and three foot bridges, a total of four and one-half miles of bridging.

From 8 November until the end of the month trench foot constituted a serious problem for the Army. Due to the necessity for constant exposure of the men's feet to water and cold a sharp increase in this type of casualty resulted. During this period 4,587 cases of trench foot were admitted to division clearing stations and it was estimated that ninety-five percent of the patients would be of no further value for combat duty during the winter months. All possible efforts were made toward prevention of trench foot and the falling rate was evidence of success. From five peak days, 12 to 16 November inclusive, when the rate averaged 444 cases a day, incidence dropped to 124 cases a day.

During November the 12,137,026 gallons of gasoline received were ten percent over requests. Signal troops laid 142 miles of field wire and 226 miles of spiral-four cable during the month, while 966 miles of open wire were placed over forty-five miles of pole line. During the month 123 convoys were cleared totaling 6,208 vehicles, which carried 35,600 troops and 179,030 tons of supplies.

Since the Third U.S. Army became operational its chaplains had suffered thirty-two casualties; three killed and one missing in action; three captured, of whom two were later released, and twenty-five wounded.

During November 447 normal promotions, 102 battlefield promotions and 84 battlefield appointments were processed. A total of 7,116 awards were made. Battle casualties and changes in casualty status reports pertaining to 21,059 casualties were processed, an average of 701.9 per day. During the month the Army received 26,981 reinforcements, an average of 900 a day. Strength of the Army at the end of the month was 245,013.

REPLACEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD US ARMY



NOVEMBER-		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
DAILY	DEAD	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	1000	500	400	500	1100	500	500	1000	500	1500	1300	1000	500	300	200	200	300	200	200	300	200	300	200
	WOUNDED	200	200	200	200	200	100	100	2500	1500	900	1100	3000	1500	1500	2000	2000	3000	4000	3000	1500	500	600	600	700	800	600	900	600	900	600
	CAPTURED	41	69	63	10	13	81	63	739	776	925	1185	1211	770	931	609	1248	1084	1826	1314	2619	2994	1622	556	442	566	708	852	622	324	1649
	TOTAL	291	319	313	260	263	231	213	4239	2776	2225	2785	5311	2770	2931	3609	3748	5584	7126	5314	4619	3794	2422	1356	1442	1566	1508	2052	1422	1524	2449

78,000
76,500
75,000
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6,000
4,500
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1,500
0

COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART
THIRD U S ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY (EST)

THIRD U S ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH— ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH— THIRD U S ARMY CASUALTIES

74,462

22,773

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
DAILY	DEAD	14	8	7	13	16	12	10	52	151	96	164	106	163	119	193	113	87	150	95	69	52	57	35	47	60	99	90	42	55	39
	WOUNDED	42	32	35	40	67	42	38	766	1086	824	707	676	876	677	1411	944	608	794	650	416	534	520	323	295	544	819	543	289	383	254
	MISSING	6	20	11	1	7	2	20	64	345	305	416	150	507	313	470	145	116	185	668	35	55	143	45	81	60	130	117	278	390	239
	TOTAL	62	60	53	54	90	56	68	882	1582	1225	1287	932	1546	1109	2074	1202	811	1129	1413	520	641	720	403	423	664	1048	750	609	828	532

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-30 NOVEMBER 1944



TOWNS CAPTURED NOVEMBER

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED		
ABAUCOURT	XII	1	November	
AULNOIS-SUR-SEILLE	XII	7	"	
ACHATEL	XII	10	"	
AMELECOURT	XII	10	"	
ANCERVILLE	XX	12	"	
ARRIANCE	XII	13	"	
ARRANCOURT	XII	13	"	
AUGNY	XX	15	"	
ALBESDORF	XII	21	"	
ALMUNSTER	XX	26	"	
ALTWEILER	XII	27	"	
ASSWEILER	XII	27	"	
BERG	XX	4	"	
BUCHY	XII	10	"	
BEUX	XII	10	"	
BECHY	XII	10	"	
BACOURT	XII	11	"	
BAUDRECOURT	XII	11	"	
BELLANGE	XII	12	"	
BARONVILLE	XII	14	"	
BERTRINGEN	XII	19	"	
BRECKLANGE	XX	24	"	
BOULAY-MOSELLE	XX	24	"	
BIRINGEN	XX	24	"	
BOULAY	XX	25	"	
BETHINGEN	XX	25	"	
BARST MARIENTHAL	XII	27	"	
BERG	XII	28	"	
BURBACH	XII	28	"	
BUDINGEN	XII	28	"	
BALLERN	XX	30	"	
BUREN	XX	30	"	
COUTURES	XII	9	"	
CHATEAU-SALINS	XII	10	"	
CONTHIL	XII	11	"	
CHATEAU BREHAIN	XII	12	"	
CUVRY	XX	13	"	
CHESNY	XX	15	"	
CAPPEL	XII	27	"	
DELME	XII	9	"	
DALHAIN	XII	12	"	
DESTRICH	XII	14	"	
DIEUZE	XII	20	"	
*DIEFENBACH	XII	22	"	(28 Nov)
DENTING	XX	26	"	
DURSTEL	XII	27	"	
DUEREN	XX	28	"	
FRESNES-EN-SAULNOIS	XII	7	"	
FONTENY	XII	10	"	
FREMERY	XII	10	"	

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED	
FOVILLE	XII	10	November
FEVES	XX	14	"
FT D'ILLANGE	XX	14	"
FT QUEULEU	XX	17	"
FRONTIGNY	XX	17	"
FT LORRAINE	XX	17	"
FROSCHWEILER	XII	26	"
FELSBERG	XX	30	"
FREMERSDORF	XX	30	"
FITTEN	XX	30	"
GERBECOURT	XII	10	"
GRENINGEN	XII	21	"
GIVRYCOURT	XII	25	"
GUNGWEILER	XII	27	"
HAMPONT	XII	10	"
HANNOCOURT	XII	10	"
HABOUDANGE	XII	10	"
HANS-SUR-NIED	XII	11	"
HERNY	XII	12	"
HARRAUCOURT	XII	14	"
HACHENBURG	XX	17	"
HALSTROFF	XX	17	"
HALLING	XX	24	"
HUNKIRCH	XII	25	"
HILSPRICH	XII	25	"
HIRBACH	XII	25	"
HOLVINGEN	XII	26	"
HOMBOURG-HAUT	XII	27	"
HARSKIRCHEN	XII	28	"
INGLANGE	XX	13	"
ILLANGE	XX	15	"
ILE CHAMBIERE	XX	21	"
ILE DE SAULCY	XX	21	"
INSWEILER	XII	22	"
JALLAUCOURT	XII	7	"
JUVILLE	XII	10	"
KOENIGSMACKER	XX	9	"
KERLING	XX	13	"
KUNTZIG	XX	13	"
KASERNE BARRACK	XX	21	"
KERPRICH-HEMMERSDORF	XX	29	"
LETRICOURT	XII	1	"
LOUVIGNY	XX	9	"
LEMONCOURT	XII	10	"
LEMUD	XII	11	"
LIEHON	XX	12	"
L'AISNE	XX	13	"
L'YSER	XX	13	"
LANDORF	XII	14	"
LEMESTROFF	XX	15	"

*Originally captured 22 Nov., recaptured 28 Nov.

TOWNS CAPTURED NOVEMBER (CONT'D)

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
LORRY	XX	16 November
LUTTANGE	XX	17 "
LANNINGEN	XII	27 "
LIXINGEN-ST-AVOLD	XII	27 "
LACHAMBRE	XII	27 "
MOUNCOURT	XII	7 "
MELAUCOURT-SUR-SEILLE	XII	7 "
MORVILLE	XII	8 "
MONCHEUX	XII	10 "
MOYENVIC	XII	10 "
MASSE YUTZ	XX	13 "
MARTHILLE	XII	13 "
MANY	XII	13 "
MARSAL	XII	14 "
MORHANGE	XII	14 "
MARLY	XX	15 "
METZERVISSE	XX	16 "
MAGNY	XX	17 "
METZERESCHE	XX	17 "
MERCY-LES-METZ	XX	18 "
MARSILLY	XX	18 "
MARIMONT	XII	19 "
MUNSTER	XII	22 "
MITTERSHEIM	XII	22 "
MAXSTADT	XII	27 "
MOMERSTROFF	XX	25 "
MACHEREN	XII	27 "
NOMENY	XII	10 "
NORRY-LE-VEMOUR	XX	16 "
NARBEFONTAINE	XX	24 "
NEUNKIRCHEN-LES-BOUZONVILLE	XX	24 "
NEIDERVISSE	XX	26 "
NEUWEYERSHOT	XII	27 "
NIEDALTDORF	XX	27 "
ORIOCOURT	XII	10 "
OBRECK	XII	10 "
ORON	XII	12 "
ORNY	XX	13 "
OUVR-DE-JUSSY	XX	14 "
OUVR-ST-HUBERT	XX	14 "
OBERLEUKEN	XX	24 "
OBERESCH	XX	25 "
OTTONVILLE-ET-RECRONGE	XX	26 "
OTZWILLER	XX	26 "
OLSINGEN	XX	29 "
OBERLINBERG	XX	30 "
PREVOCOURT	XII	11 "
POMMERIEUX	XX	12 "
PONTOY	XX	13 "
POUILLY	XX	13 "
PREVANGE	XII	13 November
PELTRE	XX	16 "
PLESNOIS	XX	16 "
PUCHE	XX	18 "
PISDORF	XII	28 "
RUMELANGE	XX	9 "
ROUVES	XII	10 "
RAUCOURT	XII	10 "
REMILLY	XII	11 "
RACRANGE	XII	15 "
REINANGE	XX	16 "
RICRANGE	XX	25 "
REMERINGEN	XII	25 "
ROUPELDANGE	XX	26 "
RAMMELFANGEN	XX	28 "
SALONNES	XII	10 "
ST JURE	XII	10 "
SECOURT	XII	10 "
SANRY-SUR-NIED	XII	11 "
ST REMY	XX	15 "
STUCKANGE	XX	15 "
SORBEY	XX	16 "
SAULNY	XX	16 "
ST MARGUERITE	XX	16 "
ST JEAN ROHRBACH	XII	22 "
SCHWERDORF	XX	25 "
ST AVOLD	XII	27 "
SENGBUSCH	XII	27 "
TRAGNY	XII	10 "
THEZEY-ST-MARTIN	XII	10 "
TINCRY	XII	10 "
THICOURT	XII	13 "
TETTINGEN	XX	24 "
THAL	XII	29 "
TETERCHEN	XX	26 "
VIC-SUR-SEILLE	XII	7 "
VIGNY	XX	9 "
VIVIERS	XII	10 "
VILLER-SUR-NIED	XII	12 "
VATIMONT	XII	13 "
VIGNEULLES	XX	16 "
VALMONT	XII	26 "
VELVING	XX	26 "
VAHL EBERSING	XII	27 "
WUISSE	XII	12 "
WOIPPY	XX	16 "
WITTERSBURG	XII	25 "
WOLFSKIRCHEN	XII	27 "
ZARBELING	XII	14 "
ZOLLINGEN	XII	28 "

Chapter 7

DECEMBER

MPAIGN

DECEMBER operations of Third U.S. Army divided themselves into two phases. As the month began, the Army was advancing toward the SIEGFRIED Line in continuation of the operation which had opened on 8 November, succeeding during the early part of the month in completing capture by assault of remaining forts at METZ (U85), a feat unprecedented in modern history. Later in the month, just previous to the date set for a new operation designed to crash through the SIEGFRIED Line and drive to the RHINE River, Third U.S. Army was called upon to swing northward and smash into the south (left) flank of the enemy's ARDENNES salient. This was accomplished with such success that by the close of the month the enemy was being forced to shuttle divisions from the point of his attack and from his north flank to combat the growing menace of Third U.S. Army on the south.

DECEMBER OPERATIONS

1 DECEMBER *(D + 178)*

The favored enemy capability at this time was that he would defend and delay in successive prepared positions in an effort to block the Army's advances toward and attacks on the SIEGFRIED Line. Less favored was the capability that the enemy would implement his defend and delay tactics by counterattacking locally with infantry and armor in an effort to contain the Army's advances and delay the assault on the SIEGFRIED Line. There were no indications at this time that the enemy was planning to launch limited-objective offensives, his overall attitude continuing to be defensive. However, it was considered that the enemy was capable of reinforcing against any section of the Army's zone within twenty-four hours, in the event of which the capability of a limited-objective offensive would be appreciably enhanced.

Continuing his defensive attitude in the XII Corps zone, the enemy offered stubborn resistance to the 26th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions. The enemy bitterly contested XX Corps' advance toward the SAAR River and continued to hold stubbornly to his salient southwest of VOLKLINGEN (Q37).

III Corps remained non-operational at ETAIN (U47).

Operating jointly on XII Corps' south flank were the 26th Infantry Division and the 4th Armored Division. Elements of Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) advanced one mile north, reaching a point two miles east of SARRE-UNION (Q53) and occupied the woods northeast of RIMSDORF (Q53), while Combat Command "A" also advanced north and was three miles due east of SARRE-UNION (Q53) where it occupied important high ground known as HILL 318 (Q5837). In the 26th Infantry Division the 101st Infantry moved north four miles from the vicinity of WOLFSKIRCHEN (Q53) and leading elements entered the southern part of SARRE-UNION (Q53). The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) remained in its position at HARSKIRCHEN (Q43), two miles west of SARRE-UNION (Q53), and at EHNSINGEN (Q43), three miles to the northwest. Eight miles to the northwest of SARRE-UNION (Q53) the 3d Battalion, 320th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) reached KAPPELKINGER (Q44). Solid contact was maintained by the 35th Infantry Division with the 6th Armored Division on its north and the 26th Infantry Division on its south. Continued patrols were maintained by the 6th Armored Division, while in the northern part of the corps zone the 80th Infantry Division maintained its positions, repulsing light counterattacks.

XX Corps was disposed with the 5th Infantry Division on the south flank, in contact with the 80th Infantry Division (XII Corps), the 95th Infantry Division, and the 90th Infantry Division disposed along the corps front and the 10th Armored Division on the corps north flank. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division), which was attached to the 95th Infantry Division, reverted to the 5th Infantry Division. Task Force FICKETT (6th Cavalry Group reinforced) was attached to 5th Infantry Division and began assembly in the vicinity of CARLING (Q26), on right flank of the 95th Infantry Division. Gains of about one mile were made by 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) in the vicinity of CARLING (Q26), four miles north of ST AVOLD (Q25). The remainder of the division continued to exert maximum pressure on the METZ (U85) forts. Just to the north, the 95th Infantry Division launched an attack supported by tank destroyers, with elements capturing BERUS (Q27), three and one-half miles southwest of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), while others were two miles due west of that city. Straightening its front lines with minor gains to the north, the 90th Infantry Division cleared MONDORF (Q19), two miles

southwest of MERZIG (Q29). The 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) cleared SIERSDORF (Q28), four and one-half miles northwest of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), and pushed patrols to REHLINGEN (Q28) on the SAAR River four miles north of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). On the north corps boundary, Combat Command "B" (10th Armored Division) took HILBRINGEN (Q19), just west of MERZIG (Q29), and continued to straighten its lines. Combat Command "A" relieved Combat Command "B" at the end of the period, with Combat Command "B" moving to a concentration area north of REMELING (Q09). Task Force POLK continued active patrolling on the corps north flank.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 126 sorties in corps support and on escort missions, making its best claims on motor vehicles, of which forty-one were destroyed; on railroad cars, destroying and damaging thirty-two, and on horse-drawn vehicles, destroying twenty-seven.

The supply situation was sound, all classes of supplies arriving in satisfactory quantities with the exception of certain Class II and Class IV items still on the critical list. On hand in the Army area were 3,558,056 gallons of gasoline plus balanced quantities of greases and oils, enough for nearly ten days' operations in the case of V-80 gasoline and enough for twenty-five days' operation in the case of engine oil. Also on hand were 1,263,671 rations, plus 660,000 operational-type rations on reserve for Third U.S. Army in an Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26). Rations on hand were sufficient for 5,825 days. A total of 2,669 long tons of Classes II and IV supplies was on hand in the depot at TOUL (U61) but tires, tubes, tire patches and certain items of winter clothing and individual equipment remained in critical short supply. Supply figures were based on a Third U.S. Army strength on this date of 249,889. In addition, the Army supplied 26,995 Advance Section Communications Zone, 29,364 Ninth U.S. Air Force, 2,108 French and 2,950 miscellaneous troops in or near the Army area.

Photographic coverage of the routes of approach to the SIEGFRIED Line in the SAARBURG (Q51) area was completed.

★ ★ ★

2 DECEMBER (D + 179)

An analysis of enemy railroad movement at this time indicated that the major portion of rail traffic during the period 17 November to 2 December was definitely toward the SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) and EIFEL (L37) areas. On 17 November a total of 300 trains was observed by tactical reconnaissance and marshalling yards were particularly active. On 18 and 19 November reports indicated a total of eighty-four trains was moving into the same area, with a large number of trains stationary in marshalling yards on routes leading into the northern zone of the Third U.S. Army's advance and the southern zone of the First U.S. Army's advance. On 26 November forty-six trains were observed, thirty-three of which moved west or southwest. Finally on 2 December the rail movement analysis indicated a definite buildup of enemy troops and supplies directly opposite the north flank of Third U.S. Army and the southern flank of First U.S. Army.

Several enemy counterattacks were broken up one mile south of MACKWILLER (Q53) in XII Corps zone. The enemy's organized resistance in SARRE-UNION (Q53) was broken, tanks being used mostly in defensive support of infantry strongpoints. Heavy enemy resistance consisting of small arms, mortar and artillery fire as well as mines was encountered in SAARLAUTERN (Q28), where street fighting was reported. Strong resistance also was met in the VOLKLINGEN (Q37) salient and determined enemy opposition was encountered in other parts of XX Corps zone.

On the south flank of XII Corps, Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) was fighting in the vicinity of DIEMERINGEN (Q63), four miles east of SARRE-UNION (Q53), and one mile south of MACKWILLER (Q53). Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) advanced north and was generally along the SARRE-UNION - DOMFESSEL Road and the high ground at (Q5539). Meanwhile, organized resistance was broken in SARRE-UNION (Q53) by the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division). Mopping up of SARRE-UNION (Q53) was progressing satisfactorily by the end of this period. The 35th Infantry Division started relief of the 6th Armored Division, with the 134th Infantry taking over positions west of PUTTELANGE (Q45) and the 320th Infantry moving into positions near REMERING (Q44). Continuing aggressive patrolling, the 80th Infantry Division began regrouping, with the 318th Infantry being relieved by elements of the 6th Armored Division.

Task Force FICKETT (6th Cavalry Group, reinforced) occupied positions along the XX Corps south flank after relieving elements of the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) near CARLING (Q26), four miles north of ST AVOLD (Q25). Some elements of the 5th Infantry Division gained over a mile in the vicinity of WILHELMSBROWN (Q26), seven miles north of ST AVOLD (Q25) while the remainder of the division contained those forts holding out west of METZ (U85). Preceded by aerial bombardment and artillery preparation, the 95th Infantry Division advanced in its zone from one to two miles, capturing NIEDERLIMBERG (Q28), one and one-half miles northwest of SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and ITZBACH (Q28), four miles northwest of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). The 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) attacked SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and pushed into the western part of the town, making minor gains in house-to-house fighting. Corps heavy artillery fired in support of troops engaged in the street fighting. When one side of a street was cleared, 8-inch howitzers and 240mm howitzers were adjusted by forward observers upon the buildings on the opposite side of the street until a breach was effected. Infantry then dashed into the breached building and cleared the street house by house. Enemy pillboxes and fortified houses were destroyed by 155mm guns. NEUFORWEILER (Q27) and BISTEN (Q27), south of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), were cleared by the 378th Infantry (95th Infantry Division), while other elements of the division captured a bridge intact across the SAAR River. PIKARD (Q27) and BEAUMARIS (Q27) were captured during this drive. Elements of the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) advanced one mile and occupied REHLINGEN (Q28), on the west bank of the SAAR River, four miles north of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). The 359th Infantry began relieving elements of the 357th Infantry. Combat Command "A" (10th Armored Division) cleared DREISBACH (Q19), four miles northwest of MERZIG (Q29), while Combat Command "B" closed into an assembly area in the vicinity of MONTENACH (Q09), ten miles northeast of THIONVILLE (U88).

XIX Tactical Air Command suffered heavy losses, losing nine planes and pilots, but gave a good account of itself in support of the Army,

destroying and damaging 329 railroad cars, forty-six motor vehicles, thirty-five locomotives, cutting railroad lines in thirty-five places and damaging many other military targets. Claims against enemy aircraft were seven confirmed destroyed and two damaged.

Crossing the SAAR River in the advance to the northeast, Third U.S. Army captured BISTEN (Q27), NEUFORWEILER (Q27), PIKARD (Q27), ITZBACH (Q28), NIEDERLIMBERG (Q28) and BEAUMARIS (Q27), while mopping-up began in SARRE-UNION (Q53) and SAARLAUTERN (Q28).

A tonnage bid for the period 17 December to 31 December of 5,165 tons for daily maintenance and 116 tons for daily reserve, a total of 5,281 tons, was submitted to the Twelfth U.S. Army Group by Third U.S. Army.

3 DECEMBER *(D + 180)*

Continued study of enemy capabilities at this time indicated an overall defensive attitude in the Third U.S. Army zone, although his capability to launch a counteroffensive in the center and southern sections of the Army zone in an effort to halt the Army's offensive and bog it down for the winter still prevailed. In a determined effort to regain all of SARRE-UNION (Q53) the enemy used tanks and infantry in bitter house-to-house fighting. The enemy also launched an aggressive counterattack to recapture LAUTERBACH (Q26).

Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) made advances of one-half mile northeast and due east of SARRE-UNION (Q53), there being no change in the disposition of Combat Command "A". The 26th Infantry Division attacked to clear SARRE-UNION (Q53). Some enemy counterattacks were repulsed, but the enemy continued to hold the northeast part of the town at the end of the period. Other elements of the 26th Infantry Division cleared the woods two miles southwest of SARRALBE (Q27) BETTRING (Q44), HOLVING (Q45) and PUTTELANGE (Q45) were cleared by the 35th Infantry Division. There was no change in the situation of the 6th Armored and the 80th Infantry Divisions in the XII Corps zone.

Task Force FICKETT established contact with the 80th Infantry Division (XII Corps) and cleared LAUTERBACH (Q26), six miles northeast of ST AVOLD (Q25). Elsewhere in the XX Corps zone, the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) straightened its front, capturing CREUTZWALD (Q26), and crossing the German border, while other elements of the 5th Infantry Division occupied WILHELMSBROWN (Q26). A good part of SAARLAUTERN (Q28) was held by the 95th Infantry Division which had elements clearing WALLERFANGEN (Q28), northeast of the city, SAARLOUIS (Q27) and LISDORF (Q27). The 90th Infantry Division continued to clear the west bank of the SAAR River in its zone. There was no change in the disposition of the 10th Armored Division.

Only eight sorties were flown by the XIX Tactical Air Command due to unfavorable weather. One town was attacked with unobserved results.

The Third U.S. Army attack continued to the northeast, while BETTRING (Q44), HOLVING (Q44), CREUTZWALD (Q26), SAARLOUIS (Q27), WILHELMSBROWN (Q26), LISDORF (Q27) and WALLERFANGEN (Q28) were captured.

MAJOR GENERAL HUGH J. GAFFEY, Chief of Staff, Third U.S. Army, departed the Headquarters to assume command of the 4th Armored Division. BRIGADIER GENERAL HOBART R. GAY was appointed Chief of Staff on GENERAL GAFFEY's departure. Former GOVERNOR HERBERT H. LEHMAN, international director of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, inspected forward areas of the Third U.S. Army zone in a study of refugees, displaced persons and relief problems.

Third U.S. Army submitted to the Twelfth U.S. Army Group estimated requirements of 2,250 parka-type overcoats, on the basis of thirty per battalion. Immediate steps were taken to comply with a request for prompt unloading and returning of railroad cars in order to relieve a shortage of cars in the Communications Zone.

Signalmen String Communication Lines

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS

1–19 DECEMBER 1944

AND DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS

NOTES:

THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION CONTAINED METZ FORTS WITH ONE INFANTRY REGIMENT UNTIL 8 DECEMBER AT WHICH TIME IT WAS RELIEVED OF THIS MISSION BY THE 87TH INFANTRY DIVISION, WHICH CONTAINED FORT JEANNE D'ARC UNTIL 13 DECEMBER, BEING RELIEVED IN TURN BY THE 26TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

BECAUSE OF THE DRIVING COUNTERATTACK IN FIRST U S ARMY'S ZONE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO MOVE THIRD U S ARMY DIVISONS TO THE NORTH. THE 5TH, 26TH, 35TH AND 80TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS, AND 4TH ARMORED DIVISION MOVED DURING THE PERIOD 18-22 DECEMBER, WHILE THE 10TH ARMORED DIVISION MOVED EARLIER ON 16 DECEMBER.

ON 18 DECEMBER THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION RELIEVED THE 95TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE SAARLAUTERN BRIDGEHEAD BUT PASSED CONTROL OF THIS AREA BACK TO THE 95TH INFANTRY DIVISION ON 20 DECEMBER AT WHICH TIME THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION MOVED TO THE LUXEMBOURG AREA, UTILIZING THE 90TH AND 95TH INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 6TH ARMORED DIVISION. XX CORPS HELD THE FRONT FROM FORBACH NORTH TO THE MOSELLE RIVER WITHOUT CHANGE DURING REMAINDER OF THE MONTH.

LUXEMBOURG

MOVED TO VIC OF LUXEMBOURG

16 DECEMBER

FIRST XXXX THIRD

FROM CHANNEL BASE SECTION

XXXX THIRD

47 MANCY

BATTLE LINE 19 DECEMBER

BATTLE LINE 1 DECEMBER

Statute Miles

0 5 10

4 DECEMBER (D + 181)

Mopping-up continued in SARRE-UNION (Q53) until 1730A when the town was cleared. Only scattered resistance was met in the north portion of the XII Corps zone until EBERING (Q45) was reached, while in the southern portion the enemy resisted stubbornly. A small counterattack southwest of SAARLOUIS RODEN (Q28) was the only aggressive enemy action in the XX Corps zone. Stiff opposition was met in the FORET DER KARLSBRUNN (Q26).

An Operational Directive instructed III Corps (87th Infantry Division) to relieve the 5th Infantry Division of XX Corps in the METZ (U85) area. Mutual arrangement between III and XX Corps was to determine the time of relief. III Corps was directed to contain the forts still resisting by exerting maximum pressure without assaulting directly any major fortifications, to assume command of additional troops to be assigned, and to advance on Army order. XX Corps was to withdraw elements of the 5th Infantry Division successively from the METZ (U85) area upon relief by elements of the 87th Infantry Division and continue the offensive as instructed in the Operational Directive of 3 November, as amended.

Elements of Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) continued their advance to the north in XII Corps zone and gained one mile to VOLLERDINGEN (Q54), two and one-half miles northeast of SARRE-UNION (Q53), seized a bridge intact across the EICHEL River at VOLLERDINGEN (Q54) and set up a small bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 26th Infantry Division completed its task of clearing SARRE-UNION (Q53) and its 101st Infantry advanced one and one-half miles north of the city. To the north, in the 35th Infantry Division zone, the 320th Infantry captured RICHELING (Q28), northeast of SARRALBE (Q2977), while the 137th Infantry advanced two and one-half miles through PUTTELANGE (Q45) and cleared GUEBENHOUSE (Q45) and ERNESTVILLE (Q45). The 6th Armored Division reopened its attack with some elements advancing five miles to capture CADENBROWN (Q45), four and one-half miles northwest of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while other elements captured METZINGEN (Q45), TENTELING (Q45), DIEBLING (Q44) and EBERING (Q45). On the corps north flank the 80th Infantry Division, attacking strongly, gained up to three miles along its front, while maintaining contact with Task Force FICKETT (XX Corps).

Advances of two to four miles were made by the 5th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone, and elements drove into the vicinity of DIFFERTEN (Q37) at the northern tip of the FORET DER KARLSBRUNN (Q26). Street fighting in SAARLAUTERN (Q28) was continued by the 95th Infantry Division, while elements of the division secured a bridgehead at LISDORF (Q28) and enlarged the bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN (Q28) across the SAAR River. A chemical smoke operation aided the crossing. To the north the 90th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division continued regroupment and preparation for renewal of their attack.

Though only five missions totaling fifty-seven sorties were flown, forty-nine railroad cars and twenty-two motor vehicles were destroyed or damaged by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army continued the attack, enlarged the bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and established a new bridgehead at LISDORF (Q28) by assault crossings.

5 DECEMBER (D + 182)

In an estimate of enemy capabilities at this time it was considered that a general enemy withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED Line was in progress, although where the SIEGFRIED Line had not been reached by Army troops it was believed the withdrawal would be accompanied by defend and delay tactics, implemented by small local counterattacks. In its northern zone Third U.S. Army was directly against the SIEGFRIED Line positions and only a short distance remained before the remainder of the Army front could hold similar positions. Enemy covering forces withdrew rapidly before XII Corps' advance, in which numerous road blocks, blown bridges and minefields were encountered. The 95th Infantry Division's bridgehead across the SAAR River in XX Corps zone received heavy artillery fire. Enemy resistance in the FORET DER KARLSBRUNN (Q26) slackened.

Elements of the 87th Infantry Division closed in the vicinity of METZ (U85). This division was the only major tactical unit then under III Corps control.

Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) crossed the EICHEL River at VOLLERDINGEN (Q54), while Combat Command "A" crossed one mile to the south at DOMFESSEL (Q53), and then made a rapid seven-mile advance to the northeast with leading elements at BINING (Q64), SCHMITTVILLE (Q54) and KULHAUSEN (Q54). The enemy offered armored resistance in force against this advance in XII Corps zone. In a three-mile advance the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) captured OERMINGEN (Q54), four miles north of SARRE-UNION (Q53), while the 328th Infantry advanced in the vicinity of SARRALBE (Q27). Meanwhile in the 35th Infantry Division the 320th Infantry captured WILLERWALD (Q44), five and one-half miles southwest of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), and the 134th Infantry captured HAMBACH (Q45), three miles southwest of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). The 6th Armored Division captured ROUHLING (Q46) and IPPLING (Q45), west of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while the 80th Infantry Division on the north took some high ground and improved its positions.

The 5th Infantry Division made advances of from two to five miles in XX Corps zone, captured KARLSBRUNN (Q36) and MERLEBACH (Q36), southwest of SAARBRUCKEN (Q57), while a few elements of the division continued to contain the forts still holding out in the METZ (U85) area. Fighting in the eastern part of SAARLAUTERN (Q28) was continued by elements of the 95th Infantry Division, while other elements enlarged the bridgehead at LISDORF (Q26). Assault crossings of the SAAR River were made in four places by the 90th Infantry Division between two and five miles north of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), while PACHTEN (Q28) was captured. To preserve surprise no artillery preparation was fired, but an intensive schedule of counterbattery fire was launched from H-Hour to H + 45 consisting of approximately 8,000 rounds on thirty-nine enemy artillery locations. The 10th Armored Division continued aggressive patrolling on the corps north flank, but its front lines were unchanged.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 168 day and seven night sorties and dropped forty-six tons of bombs. A total of thirty locomotives were knocked out and 108 railroad cars were damaged. One plane was lost.

Bridgeheads at SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and LISDORF (Q26) were enlarged, and another bridgehead at PACHTEN (Q28) was established as the Third U.S. Army continued advancing to the northeast.

Infantrymen Advance Through Saarlautern

6 DECEMBER *(D + 183)*

At this time it was considered that defense of the RUHR still dominated the enemy's strategy, but Third U.S. Army's threatened breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line might force a shift of view, with more of the WESTPHALIA Panzer reserve being shuttled south. Enemy reinforcements against Third U.S. Army were considered urgent and certain to appear. Enemy losses were so high that his estimated strength on the Army's front had decreased to an equivalent of four and one-half divisions, consisting of 35,000 combat effectives and 135 tanks or assault guns. The 80th Infantry Division encountered stiffening resistance at FORBACH (Q36) and the 35th Infantry Division engaged in heavy fighting in the outskirts of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). The 4th Armored Division was engaged heavily at SINGLING (Q64) and BINING (Q64), where numerous tanks, pillboxes, antitank mines and artillery were encountered. The bridgehead in the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN (Q28) continued to receive heavy enemy fire. There was bitter fighting in the towns cleared by the 5th Infantry Division in its advance to WEHRDEN (Q37).

III Corps moved from its concentration area at ETAIN (U47) to METZ (U85) and opened its new Command Post.

The 4th Armored Division (XII Corps) consolidated its gains and Combat Command "B" advanced two miles to occupy SINGLING (Q65), eight miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55) while Combat Command "A" made small advances in the vicinity of BINING (Q64). Meanwhile, in an advance to the northeast the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) reached the outskirts of ETTING (Q64), seven miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while the 328th Infantry cleared SARRALBE (Q27) and the 101st Infantry reached KULHAUSEN (Q54). Advancing two miles, the 6th Armored Division took WELFERDING (Q55), while other elements were in the vicinity of LIXING (Q46). The 80th Infantry Division maintained its front lines and sent out aggressive patrols, while the 2d Cavalry Group assumed the north flank protection and pushed patrols to FORBACH (Q36), GETING (Q46) and EMMERSWEILER (Q36).

Task Force FICKETT and elements of the 5th Infantry Division made small advances on XX Corps south flank. Farther north the ROSELLE River was crossed by elements of the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) in the vicinity of PETITE-ROSELLE (Q36), while the 10th Infantry reached WEHRDEN (Q37) on the SAAR River. Far to the rear at METZ (U85), FORT ST QUENTIN surrendered early in the period to elements of the 5th Infantry Division. House-to-house fighting raged in the northern section of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), with the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) still continuing to clean up the town, and one mile to the south at ENSDORF (Q37) the 378th Infantry fought against heavy enemy resistance. After crossing the SAAR River, elements of the 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) occupied the western half of DILLINGEN (Q28), one and one-half miles northwest of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). Units were rotated in the 10th Armored Division and preparation continued for the renewal of its attack.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew twenty-nine sorties in nine missions, dropped 535 tons of bombs, while concentrating on railroad facilities. Ten locomotives and 126 railroad cars were damaged or destroyed, and twenty-six railroad lines were cut in the day's operations.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance to the east, with bridgeheads across the SAAR River being enlarged, while to the rear FORT ST QUENTIN, near METZ (U85), was captured.

A shortage of certain items of clothing and individual equipment continued. Most urgently needed were overshoes, blankets, field jackets, raincoats, sleeping bags, shelter halves, mufflers, meat cans and canteen cups.

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7 DECEMBER *(D + 184)*

Maintaining active patrolling against the 6th Armored Division, the enemy placed heavy fire from all types of weapons against the 26th Infantry Division, and aggressively defended the MAGINOT Line in the vicinity of SINGLING (Q64). From pillboxes and prepared positions, the enemy resisted the advance of the 90th Infantry Division, while on XX Corps right flank delaying forces strongly opposed the 5th Infantry Division. Annotated photographs showing defenses of the SIEGFRIED Line in the ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q77) area were distributed.

There was no change in the situation of III Corps, for the 87th Infantry Division was not yet committed in its mission of containing the remaining forts at METZ (U85).

Fighting in BINING (Q64) was continued by Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division), that being the only activity in the division zone. Elements of the 4th Armored Division were being relieved in its zone by the 12th Armored Division (XV Corps, Seventh U.S. Army). ETTING (Q54), seven miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), was captured by elements of the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) while the 101st Infantry moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of OERMINGEN (Q54), northeast of SARRE-UNION (Q53), and the 328th Infantry assembled in the vicinity of SCHMITTVILLE (Q54), six miles northeast of SARRE-UNION (Q53). Just before the period closed, the 26th Infantry Division launched a new attack in strength; supported by tank destroyers which reduced ten enemy pillboxes. In the 35th Infantry Division zone, the 320th Infantry advanced two miles to the SAAR River in the vicinity of WITTRING (Q55) and captured DIEDING (Q55), while the 134th Infantry attacked in the outskirts of SARREGUEMINES (Q55) meeting heavy artillery and mortar fire. An attack coordinated with that of the 26th Infantry Division was launched by the 35th Infantry Division just before the close of the period. Combat Command "A" (6th Armored Division) completed relief of the 80th Infantry Division and continued its patrolling activities. On the XII Corps north flank patrols of the 2d Cavalry Group entered FORBACH (Q46), four miles southeast of SAARBRUCKEN (Q57).

Fort PLAPPEVILLE (U86), west of METZ (U85), surrendered to the 5th Infantry Division (XX Corps) while other elements of the 5th Infantry Division made advances of one to two miles to the SAAR River, clearing the four small towns, WADGASSEN (Q37), HOSTENBACH (Q37), WEHRDEN (Q37) and FURSTENHAUSEN (Q37), north and south of WOLFLINGEN (Q37), and drove to a point four and one-half miles west of SAARBRUCKEN (Q57). Small advances were made by the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division), while other elements of the division met heavy resistance in limited attacks within SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and the 378th Infantry continued the attack at ENSDORF (Q37), one mile to the south. In the 90th Infantry Division zone the 357th Infantry continued its attack to the northeast in the forest one and one-half miles north of DILLINGEN (Q28), while the 358th Infantry repulsed a heavy counterattack on its bridgehead at PACHTEN (Q28). Holding its zone west of the river, the 359th Infantry enlarged its bridgehead. There was no change in the 10th Armored Division or in Task Force POLK, which maintained patrols on the north flank.

Bad weather conditions grounded all planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command.

Continuing the advance to the east, Third U.S. Army captured WADGASSEN (Q37), FURSTENHAUSEN (Q37), HOSTENBACH (Q37), WEHRDEN (Q37), DIEDING (Q55), ETTING (Q54) and FORT PLAPPEVILLE (U86).

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

American Soldier with Captured German Schmeisser Machine Pistol 43

8 DECEMBER *(D + 185)*

A confirmed report was received that the enemy was using definite routes for infiltrating and returning agents through Third U.S. Army lines. Points involved were ST MARIE AUX CHENES (U76), SAARLAUTERN (Q72), THIONVILLE (U88), ST AVOLD (Q25), NANCY (U81), BITCHE (Q75) and HAGENAU (R02). Arrangements were made to establish road blocks along the route.

Improving his defensive positions in areas not under attack by XII Corps, the enemy offered stubborn resistance to the 35th Infantry Division on the east bank of the SAAR River, while farther south he bitterly opposed the advance of the 26th Infantry Division to ACHEN (Q54). He launched a strong counterattack on DILLINGEN (Q28) but withdrew after street fighting with the 90th Infantry Division. SAARLOUIS RODEN (Q28) also was defended strongly.

The 87th Infantry Division of III Corps completely relieved the remaining elements of the 5th Infantry Division following the surrender of FORT DRIANT (U75) to the 5th Infantry Division.

On the south flank of XII Corps, elements of the 4th Armored Division continued to be relieved by the 12th Armored Division (XV Corps, Seventh U.S. Army) following a readjustment in the inter-Army Group boundary. The 26th Infantry Division attacked to the northeast after a heavy air bombardment had helped to soften enemy resistance on its front, captured ACHEN (Q54), six and one-half miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), and entered WIESVILLER (Q55). Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division resumed its attack aided by tank destroyers and made four crossings of the SAAR River, one at SARREGUEMINES (Q55) and three to the southeast at REMELFING (Q55), ZETTING (Q55) and DIEDING (Q55). Advances in the DIEDING (Q55) bridgehead were temporarily held up to allow supporting elements to cross the river. SARREINSMING (Q55) was cleared while patrols entered NEUNKIRCH (Q55). On the corps north flank the 6th Armored Division continued its patrols, with no changes on the front lines.

Elements of the 5th Infantry Division on the front line were being relieved by elements of Task Force FICKETT, while to the rear, FORT DRIANT (U75), west of METZ (U85), surrendered to other elements of the 5th Infantry Division early in the period. At this time only one METZ fort, FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75), still resisted. Fighting inside SAARLAUTERN (Q28) was continued by the 95th Infantry Division, with progress being reported by all infantry elements of the division which had completed crossings of the SAAR River. Elements of the 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) started crossing the SAAR River at DILLINGEN (Q28) following repulse of a counterattack.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 271 sorties and dropped seventy-three tons of bombs and 134 tanks of Napalm on various military targets. Two enemy planes were destroyed and one damaged while the XIX Tactical Air Command lost two planes.

FORT DRIANT (U75), one of the last remaining METZ (U85) forts, fell to the Third U.S. Army, while other elements continued to enlarge and strengthen the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and PACHTEN (Q28) bridgeheads. Elements continued to cross over the SAAR River south of SAAREGUEMINES (Q55) while the advance to the northeast continued.

9 DECEMBER *(D + 186)*

An additional survey of rail movements for the period 3 to 9 December resulted in estimate of an enemy buildup of six and one-half divisions in the EIFEL (L37) area. Inclement weather greatly hampered detailed air reconnaissance, but in spite of this handicap it appeared that the number of enemy train sections in marshalling yards varied, indicating much railroad activity.

Street fighting continued in SARREGUEMINES (Q55) in the XII Corps zone. Enemy troops in fortified houses and pillboxes contested the advance of the 95th Infantry Division in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, while farther north in the XX Corps zone the 90th Infantry Division met stiff resistance.

The 87th Infantry Division (III Corps) contained FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75), the last resisting METZ (U85) fort.

Captured German Film Shows German Soldiers Stripping Shoes from Dead Americans

In a two-mile advance to the east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), WOELFLING (Q55) and WIESVILLER (Q55) fell to the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) in the XII Corps zone. Heavy fighting continued in GROS REDERCHING (Q65) following a drive of the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) into that town. The 6th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division continued regrouping while the 4th Armored Division commenced refitting. Foot elements of the 134th and 320th Infantry Regiments (35th Infantry Division) finished crossing the SAAR River and while two bridges were completed at SAAREINSMING (Q55) and WITTRING (Q55), heavy fighting continued in the vicinity of SARREGUEMINES (Q55).

The 6th Cavalry Group (XX Corps) maintained positions on the south flank following its relief of the 5th Infantry Division which had retired to an assembly area north of ST AVOLD (Q25). In the 95th Infantry Division bridgehead around SAARLAUTERN (Q28), the advance continued, while farther north the 90th Infantry Division advanced against heavily fortified positions, with the 359th Infantry crossing the SAAR River. There was no change in disposition of 10th Armored Division on the corps north flank.

Bad weather hampered air operations but fifty-six tactical sorties were flown as well as five reconnaissance sorties. Limited bombing and strafing of gun positions and a marshalling yard were carried out.

Third U.S. Army advance to the northeast continued, with positions in the bridgehead areas on the east bank of the SAAR River being improved.

A demonstration was conducted to acquaint the XII Corps artillery with the use and characteristics of the new POZIT fuze, with extraordinary results being obtained. A similar demonstration was conducted for XX Corps artillery the following day. The fuze, which exploded automatically by magnetic attraction approximately thirty feet from the ground or from metal objects, was employed by antiaircraft artillery as well as by field artillery.

New railheads surveyed and cleared to Third U. S. Army services were at LENING (Q33), SARRALBE (Q44), MARS-LA-TOURS (U65), UCKANGE (U87), AUDUN LE TICHE (U79), CHAMBREY (Q02), MORHANGE (Q13) and ESCH (P70). Clearance was given for re-establishment of the Advance Section Communications Zone Class 1 sub-depot at TOUL (U61).

Two groups of Allied military personnel were discovered in German prisoner of war camps. At DENTING (Q16) were found 1,138 Russian prisoners, 300 of whom were suffering from tuberculosis and 219 of whom needed medical and surgical care. At CREUTZWALD (Q26) were 798 Allied military personnel, 110 of whom were bedridden. Eighty-five percent of the patients had nutritional deficiencies.

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10 DECEMBER *(D + 187)*

Significant order of battle facts at this time indicated that although the Allied offensive was destroying weekly a number of German divisions, nevertheless the enemy was able to maintain a cohesive front without drawing on the bulk of his infantry and armor reserves. As of this date the enemy had a strong reserve of eight Panzer divisions out of the line, with the strong possibility that a ninth might have come to the West from the interior. Of these divisions, five were in the north, available for speedy employment against the First and Ninth U.S. Armies, and at least two were disposed farther south close to the boundary of the First and Third U.S. Armies. Overall, the initiative still rested with the Allies, but the massive armored force the enemy had built up in reserve gave him the definite capability of launching a spoiling offensive which might tend to disrupt Third U.S. Army's planned offensive. It appeared also that the enemy's concern was growing over the mounting threat to the SAAR and that he might be forced to bolster this sector with elements of his infantry and Panzer reserves in order to block a breakthrough.

Continuing his strong delaying actions in the XII Corps zone, the enemy launched numerous small counterattacks. Heavy artillery fire was used against the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead in XX Corps zone. There was an increase in enemy activity in III Corps zone as considerable mortar fire was laid down from FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) at METZ (U85).

III Corps remained at METZ (U85), with the 345th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) continuing to contain FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75). The 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) closed in the METZ (U85) area.

GROS REDERCHING (Q65), seven miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55) in the XII Corps zone, was captured by the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) while the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) made a one-mile advance to the north and took the high ground northeast of WOELFLING (Q55), four and one-half miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). The 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) was attached to the 26th Infantry Division and it moved to positions on the front while the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) retired to METZ (U85) to conduct an infantry replacement training program. The 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) made a two-mile advance to the vicinity of FOLPERSVILLER (Q55), while the 137th Infantry crossed the SAAR River to enter SARREGUEMINES (Q55) from the south with elements of the 320th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) making a one-mile advance and entering BOIS DE BLEIS BRUCKEN, four miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). There was no change in disposition of the 4th Armored Division or the 80th Infantry Division. The 6th Armored Division on the corps north flank maintained its patrolling activities.

Fighting continued in SAARLAUTERN (Q28) to enlarge the bridgehead of the 95th Infantry Division, with small advances made against pillboxes and fortified houses. The 90th Infantry Division continued to attack to the northeast in the XX Corps zone and small advances were made north of DILLINGEN (Q28). Several enemy counterattacks were repulsed with no ground lost. Task Force POLK on the corps north flank maintained its front line patrols with no change, while 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced) continued active patrolling in its zone. The 5th Infantry

Division and the 10th Armored Division remained in their respective areas.

Thirty-two sorties were flown by the XIX Tactical Air Command. In dog-fights, there were five confirmed, one probable and four damaged enemy planes for no losses. In addition, four marshalling yards were attacked and twenty locomotives destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance to the northeast and to improve the bridgehead areas on the east bank of the SAAR River.

By this date the production of extended end connectors ("duck feet") for tanks had reached a peak of approximately 3,500 daily and many additional tanks appeared on the line thus equipped. Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, advised that high-explosive bombs camouflaged as coal were found in possession of apprehended German saboteurs and Class III solid fuel supply points were directed to take necessary precautions. The number of fresh meat meals for troops was increased from seven to ten per week, on orders of the Office of Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations.

A flag-raising ceremony, the first held in Germany by personnel of the Third U.S. Army, was held at EFT-HELLENDORF (Q09). Townspeople assembled outside of the military government office for the reading of proclamations and raising of the flag of the United States.



"Duck Feet"

11 DECEMBER *(D + 188)*

The enemy continued to hold out at FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) near METZ (U85) in III Corps zone. Little enemy activity was evident in the XII Corps zone except harassing artillery fire, but he placed heavy small arms and artillery fire on the 35th Infantry Division along the BLIES River and resisted stubbornly in the SAAR River bridgehead of the XX Corps zone.

An operational directive sent to the Commanding Generals of the III, XII and XX Corps stated that Third U.S. Army would continue its present mission of advancing northeast within its zone to seize the MAINZ (M35) - FRANKFURT (M66) - DARMSTADT (M64) area and be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast. III Corps (the 26th Infantry Division and supporting troops) was directed to assume command of the 6th Armored Division, temporary control of the 6th Cavalry Group (mechanized and reinforced) and to assume command of the 42d Infantry Division upon arrival. The Corps was to continue its current mission set forth in the operational directive of 4 December, was to maintain contact with XII Corps on the south and XX Corps on the north, and to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy in its zone. Upon completion of the refitting of the 26th Infantry Division, the corps on Army order was to drive the enemy east of the SAAR River within the corps zone and seize and secure a bridgehead across the SAAR River.

XII Corps (the 35th, 80th and 87th Infantry Divisions, the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was directed to pass control of the 6th Armored Division to the III Corps at once and to continue its current mission. XX Corps (the 5th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, the 10th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to pass control of the 6th Cavalry Group to the III Corps at once and to continue its current mission.

FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) was being contained in III Corps zone. Effective this date the 6th Armored Division was assigned to III Corps and Task Force FICKETT (6th Cavalry Group, reinforced) was attached for operational control only, although neither unit was immediately committed to action by III Corps.

In the 26th Infantry Division (XII Corps), the 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) which was temporarily attached to the 26th Infantry Division for operational control, made a one-mile advance to the northeast to an area seven miles southeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) made gains of one mile in the BOIS DE BLIES BRUCKEN (Q55). To the rear, the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) closed at METZ (U85). The 87th Infantry Division, with only its 347th Infantry, moved up to assume positions on the front between the 26th and the 35th Infantry Divisions, while its 345th Infantry remained in the vicinity of METZ (U85). Advances of one to two miles were made by various elements of the 35th Infantry Division north and east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while fighting in the city continued. Elements of the 35th Infantry Division reached the border at BLIES-EBERSING (Q55), with FOLPERSVILLER (Q55) being captured. The 6th Armored Division pushed patrols to the north one mile south of FORBACH (Q46), while the 4th Armored and the 80th Infantry Divisions continued regrouping. Effective this date the 87th Infantry Division was assigned to XII Corps.

The 95th Infantry Division continued house-to-house fighting in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, in the XX Corps zone, with about one-third of the suburb FRAULAUTERN (Q38) being cleared. Heavy fighting also continued at ENSDORF (Q37). Efforts to enlarge the 90th Infantry Division bridgehead continued with slight advances being made against harassing enemy artillery fire. There was no change in the 10th Armored Division, Task Force POLK, or the 5th Infantry Division.

Bad weather prohibited flying.

Continuing the advance to the northeast Third U.S. Army improved its SAAR River bridgehead positions, while to the west other Army elements contained FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75).

Advance Section Communications Zone at VERDUN (U26) became the base for Class III supplies for Third U.S. Army. Previously the Army had submitted the daily telegram through the 24th Regulating Station to the Advance Section Communications Zone for full requirements, including bulk. Under the new arrangements, bulk shipments of 1,000 tons were placed on an automatic basis and shipped to the Army direct from the Communications Zone, with no telegram or other request required. Requests for gasoline and allied products required in addition to the automatic bulk shipments were placed on a daily telegram basis and submitted direct to the VERDUN (U26) depot. Additional gasoline was received in packaged form.

Machinegunner Overlooks Target Area

12 DECEMBER *(D + 189)*

With the surrender at 131115 of FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75), the last remaining strongpoint of the hitherto impregnable METZ (U85) forts fell to Third U.S. Army. The garrison surrendered to the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division), following its relief of the 345th Infantry (87th Infantry Division). Effective on this date, the 26th Infantry Division was assigned to III Corps.

The 26th Infantry Division, reinforced largely with troops from Third U.S. Army Headquarters and corps and division headquarters who had been given a refresher course in infantry training, had two regiments, the 101st and the 104th Infantry, in the vicinity of METZ (U85), while the 328th Infantry made advances of one mile and captured the high ground southeast of OBERGAILBACH (Q65). Attached to the 26th Infantry Division, the 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) made advances of one and one-half miles to the northeast to RIMLING (Q65) against light resistance. The 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) closed into an assembly area near KULHAUSEN (Q54), south of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while the 345th Infantry began moving from METZ (U85) to rejoin the remainder of the division. Elsewhere in XII Corps Zone, heavy concentrations of artillery and small arms fire were directed at 35th Infantry Division zone but the division advanced slowly, the 134th Infantry taking HABKIRCHEN (Q56) and crossing the BLIES River in assault boats while the 137th Infantry continued to mop up in SARREGUEMINES (Q55). There was no change in the zones of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and the 80th Infantry Division.

House-to-house fighting in SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28) and FRAULAUTERN (Q38) was continued by the 95th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone, while its 378th Infantry continued to enlarge the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead south of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). Farther north, the 90th Infantry Division fought hard to enlarge its bridgehead, brought supplies and supporting weapons across the SAAR River under cover of smoke, and beat off savage counterattacks. Front lines of the 90th Infantry Division were unchanged at the end of the period. There was no change in the disposition of the 5th Infantry Division, the 10th Armored Division or Task Force POLK, the latter being on the north flank performing patrol duties.

XIX Tactical Air Command had a big day, flying 256 sorties while dropping eighty-eight and one-half tons of bombs. Fifteen enemy planes were shot down, two probably destroyed and five damaged, while eight planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command were shot down. Some of the claims for the day included seven oil storage tanks destroyed, one ammunition dump attacked, eleven locomotives and 278 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army continued advancing to the northeast. The bridgeheads over the SAAR River in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and ENSDORF (Q37) areas were expanded, and crossings were made over the BLIES River in the SARREGUEMINES (Q55) area. The last of the remaining METZ (U85) forts, FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) capitulated, completing the historical siege of the city.

13 DECEMBER *(D + 190)*

German reserves of armor and infantry in the northern sectors of the Western Front continued to be the biggest question mark in enemy dispositions. There were out of contact eight Panzer, three paratroop and three infantry divisions. Indications continued that the enemy planned an operation that would employ the four divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army to spearhead a counter-offensive, apparently in the AACHEN (K84) - DUREN (F14) area. The four reconstructed divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army remained west of the RHINE River in the vicinity of COLOGNE (F45) despite the growing Third U.S. Army threat of a SIEGFRIED Line breakthrough. A fifth SS Panzer division also was reported out of contact and it was possible it might be with the other enemy armor in the vicinity of COLOGNE (F45). Another German reserve of two Panzer divisions appeared to be concentrated north of the MOSELLE River, close to the boundary of the Third and First U.S. Armies and in a strategic position to be committed rapidly against either Army. It was concluded that from the determined hoarding of Sixth SS Panzer Army units the enemy was making every effort to employ this armor in a coordinated effort, bending over backward to avoid piecemeal commitment. It appeared, therefore, that if the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies continued to exert their breakthrough threats several Panzer divisions might have to be committed against them and if a rapid breakthrough of the SIEGFRIED Line was achieved the enemy might have to forego offensive plans elsewhere and commit the Sixth SS Panzer Army in an effort to avert another AVRANCHES (T21) catastrophe.

III Corps took 514 prisoners of war from FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75), last of the METZ (U85) forts. A determined enemy defense slowed down the advance in the XII Corps zone, while the enemy continued his strong defense in the SAAR River bridgeheads in the XX Corps zone.

More elements of the 26th Infantry Division closed at METZ (U85) in the III Corps zone.

Advances in zone on the south flank of XII Corps, to the vicinity of OBERGAILBACH (Q65) were made by the 346th and 347th Infantry Regiments (87th Infantry Division). The 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) assembled in an area near ACHEN (Q54) preparatory to rejoining the rest of the division at METZ (U85). Farther north, advances to the north of NEUNKIRCH (Q55) and FRAUENBERG (Q55), three miles northeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), were made by the 137th Infantry (35th Infantry Division). On the north of the 35th Infantry Division zone the 320th Infantry made another crossing of the BLIES River near BLIESBRUCK (Q55), four miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), the crossing being made under heavy artillery fire, while supporting weapons were ferried across the river in the rear of the advancing troops. During the period the 4th and 6th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division remained unchanged.

The 95th Infantry Division made small gains to the north and east with its 377th and 379th Infantry Regiments. House-to-house fighting continued in SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28) and ENSDORF (Q37). Meanwhile, elements of the 90th Infantry Division, advancing against stiff resistance, and clearing numerous pillboxes, reinforced their XX Corps bridgehead areas. Tank destroyers were carried across the river on ponton ferries under fire, believed to be the first time that this feat had been accomplished. The 5th Infantry Division, 10th Armored Division, and Task Force POLK on the Army north flank were unchanged during the period.

Only three air missions were flown, two of which were in escorting planes of IX Bomber Command. In the third mission a train was attacked, the locomotive damaged and twenty boxcars damaged while the rails were cut.

Continuing to advance, Third U.S. Army improved its bridgeheads across the SAAR River in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) area and over the BLIES River in the SARREGUEMINES (Q55) area.

Commanding Generals of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, the XIX and XII Tactical Air Commands conferred with the Army Commander and representatives of the Seventh U.S. Army to coordinate the proposed aerial bombardment of the SIEGFRIED Line in connection with the attack set tentatively for 19 December. The air attack was to include 500 to 600 medium bombers, 1,200 to 1,500 heavy bombers supported by fighter bombers, and 600 to 1,000 Royal Air Force bombers, and was to be repeated for three or four days.

Surveys by military government personnel working in front line German villages showed that it was the enemy's policy to evacuate all civilians who could be induced to leave their homes. Health of German civilians was found to be generally satisfactory despite a scarcity of medical supplies and the small number of physicians.

German Road Block on way to Bastogne

14 DECEMBER *(D + 191)*

An analysis of enemy rail movements for 10 to 14 December, based primarily on tactical reconnaissance, logistically indicated a potential increase in the number of enemy divisions in the EIFEL (L37) area to an estimated nine and one-half.

Resistance varying from strong to sporadic was encountered in the III Corps zone. Opposition to the attack on DILLINGEN (Q28) in the XX Corps zone was sporadic, while the enemy continued to offer strong resistance to the expansion of the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead.

III Corps took over control of part of the Army zone between XII and XX Corps, and assumed control of the 26th Infantry Division, 6th Armored Division, Task Force FICKETT, and the 42d Infantry Division (upon arrival) which division was completely unloaded at MARSEILLES (T41). Front lines were unchanged during the period, however, aggressive patrols were continued by the 6th Armored Division and Task Force FICKETT.

Readjustment between corps left the XII Corps with the 35th, 80th and 87th Infantry Divisions, and the 4th Armored Division. The 4th Armored Division continued its training and rehabilitation program. To the north, the 87th Infantry Division made a one mile advance with the 346th and 347th Infantry Regiments. The 346th Infantry reached the German border eight and one-half miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55) and took RIMLING (Q65), while the 347th Infantry cleared OBERGAILBACH (Q65), six miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). The 35th Infantry Division continued its attack to the north. Its 137th Infantry beat off two counterattacks and advanced one-half mile into the woods north of HABKIRCHEN (Q55), while the 134th Infantry gained one mile in the vicinity of RELCHEIM (Q56). On the right flank NIEDER-GAILBACH (Q65) was cleared by the 320th Infantry after a one-mile advance. There was no change in the 80th Infantry Division. A broadcast made to German units in BLIESBRUCKEN (Q55) by the Psychological Warfare unit attached to Headquarters, XII Corps, was credited with bringing twenty-eight prisoners of war into the Army lines.

XX Corps had the 5th, 90th, 95th Infantry Divisions, the 10th Armored Division and Task Force POLK after the corps realignment. On the south of corps zone the 5th Infantry Division was unchanged. The attack inside SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28) continued by the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) with numerous fortified houses being reduced. A ferry across the SAAR River moved up equipment to the 378th Infantry in the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead. Various elements of the 90th Infantry Division made local gains, with the 358th Infantry fighting in DILLINGEN (Q28) and the 359th Infantry making small gains north of the city, while ferrying of supplies and equipment across the SAAR River continued. There was no change in the 10th Armored Division or in Task Force POLK on the Army north flank.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 131 sorties and dropped thirty-five tons of bombs. Twenty-eight motor vehicles, six locomotives and fifty-five railroad cars were damaged or destroyed, while no enemy planes were encountered.

The advance to the northeast continued, with bridgehead positions being improved and RIMLING (Q65) being captured.

An emergency arose in the supply of 6,000 troops being trained as riflemen in the 48th Replacement Depot at METZ (U85). These troops were given priority over all others and all items in critical supply needed for them were frozen in the Army's Classes II and IV depots. Work was begun to clear FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75) at METZ (U85) of mines, booby traps and delayed action charges so that a communications system could be installed. Clearance was obtained to release the new POZIT fuze in the inner antiaircraft artillery zone at SAARLAUTERN (Q28).

15 DECEMBER *(D + 192)*

Resisting stubbornly in the XII Corps zone, the enemy launched three local counterattacks. There was a slight reduction of resistance in the 90th Infantry Division bridgehead in the XX Corps zone, while expansion of the 95th Infantry Division's bridgehead at FRAULAUTERN (Q23) was resisted fiercely by the enemy with intense artillery fire.

Active patrolling continued in the III Corps zone, while front line positions were maintained.

XII Corps continued to advance slowly against heavy resistance. Its 4th Armored Division continued screening the corps south flank while the 87th Infantry Division attacked north with the 345th Infantry approaching ERCHING (Q65), eight miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q66) after advances of one and one-half miles. The 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) assembled in the vicinity of RIMLING (Q65), while the 347th Infantry attacked to the north near MEDELSHEIM (Q66). The 35th Infantry Division continued clearing NIEDER-GAILBACH (Q65) and also attacked to the north, but made only local gains around HABKIRCHEN (Q55) and RELCHEIM (Q56). Tank destroyers supporting the attacks reduced five strongpoints. Elsewhere in the corps there was no change.

Local advances by the 95th Infantry Division in SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28) were made against heavy resistance, while the enemy continued his heavy artillery fire against the 90th and 95th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 144 sorties in mushy weather, with an ammunition dump and two supply dumps being attacked. Large explosions were observed, but due to poor visibility the extent of damage was not determined. In addition, seven locomotives and fifty-two railroad cars were damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance slowly, with positions in the bridgeheads around SAARLAUTERN (Q28) being improved.

The Army Commander directed that an additional five percent of all Army and corps troops, other than medical and colored personnel, be transferred to the III Corps Training Center to provide riflemen reinforcements for infantry divisions. Five percent previously taken in a like manner were to report to the 48th Replacement Battalion (III Corps) the final group to arrive by 16 December. In a German prisoner of war camp at SARREGUEMINES (Q55) were found 981 Allied prisoners of war.

Overshoes remained in critical short supply, a total of 82,500 pairs in sizes ten and above being needed for initial issue. A telegram was sent to the Commanding General, Communications Zone, inviting attention to the priority for the issue of overshoes to reinforcement personnel. Escape hatches for medium tanks became critical at this time and contracts for their manufacture were placed with French firms.

German Prisoners

16 DECEMBER *(D + 193)*

Spearheaded by elements of the hoarded Sixth SS Panzer Army, the enemy opened a counteroffensive in the VIII and VII Corps zones of the First U.S. Army. On the Third U.S. Army front, the enemy remained wholly defensive in the III Corps zone and fought strong delaying actions from dominating ground, wooded areas and towns in the XII Corps zone. He slackened resistance in the DILLINGEN (Q28) bridgehead in the XX Corps zone and continued his stiff opposition in the FRAULAUTERN (Q28) - ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead areas.

Maintaining their positions, the 6th Armored Division and Task Force FICKETT continued active patrolling in the III Corps zone. An attack late in the period was launched by the 6th Armored Division to exert pressure on the enemy in its zone. The 26th Infantry Division remained at METZ (U85), while the 42d Infantry Division was expected to start its movement to the METZ (U85) area on 18 December.

In the XII Corps zone the 87th Infantry Division continued to attack north with the 345th Infantry, which relieved the 346th Infantry, and cleared ERCHING (Q65), eight miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). The 347th Infantry made a one and one-half mile advance to the vicinity of WALSHEIM (Q66). Meanwhile, the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) gained three-quarters of a mile in the woods five miles northeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while the 320th Infantry cleared GERSHEIM (Q66) on the SARREGUEMINES-HOMBOURG railroad. For the first time in the Third U.S. Army campaign tank destroyers knocked out three locomotives. The 4th Armored Division continued its south flank patrols while the 80th Infantry Division moved into an assembly area.

XX Corps attacked and made minor gains to the northeast against strong enemy resistance. On the south flank the 5th Infantry Division continued active patrolling. The 11th Infantry relieved the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead area. Prior to its relief, the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division), fighting for every house, advanced 100 yards inside SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28). Tank destroyers accounted for eleven pillboxes in the bridgehead. A psychological warfare team attached to XX Corps addressed German troops in pillboxes in the SAARLAUTERN (Q27) area, with the result that six enemy in one pillbox surrendered. Meanwhile, the 377th Infantry gained 300 yards inside FRAULAUTERN (Q38) in door-to-door-fighting, and the 378th Infantry broke through the main part of ENSDORF (Q37) in a 400-yard advance. Supporting equipment continued to be ferried across the SAAR River. The southern part of DILLINGEN (Q28) in the zone of the 90th Infantry Division was cleared by the 358th Infantry, while the 357th and 359th Infantry Regiments cleaned out additional strong points and mopped up enemy positions. In the DILLINGEN (Q28) area tank destroyers worked in teams with infantry and engineers in an assault of field fortifications resisting the 90th Infantry Division's attack. The 10th Armored Division, attached to VIII Corps (First U.S. Army) for operational control only, initiated movement to the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (Q81). Task Force POLK continued north flank patrolling.

A total of 237 sorties were flown in twenty-one missions by XIX Tactical Air Command. Air claims for the day were 143 motor vehicles forty locomotives and 608 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued to improve its SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and ENSDORF (Q37) bridgeheads while advancing slowly to the northeast.

17 DECEMBER *(D + 194)*

An analysis prepared for the period 15 to 17 December showed that the scale of enemy rail movements remained on the same level of high activity as those covered in previous reports. On 17 December tactical reconnaissance disclosed that a total of forty-nine trains moved south and west from marshalling yards located in the paths of the First and Third U.S. Armies, obviously reinforcements for the enemy thrust in the ARDENNES-(080) EIFEL (L37) area.

Disruption of the Allied winter drive appeared to be the design of the German counteroffensive launched against the First U.S. Army. The enemy apparently committed the bulk of his Panzer and infantry reserves in the West, but still had available a group of divisions to exploit gains made in the EIFEL (L37) front. Threat to the SIEGFRIED Line of the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies continued an undiminished danger to the enemy and it was anticipated that he might attempt to dissipate it by making a thrust in the north sector of the XX Corps zone. Apparent concentration of the bulk of the enemy's reserves in the offensive meant taking a long chance in the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies' areas, but it was a gamble the enemy evidently was willing to take.

Maintaining a purely defensive attitude in the III Corps zone, the enemy continued to fight strong delaying actions in the XII Corps zone and in the XX Corps bridgeheads. Sixteen raids by a total of seventeen enemy planes were made in the Army area, with antiaircraft units claiming five planes destroyed and four probably destroyed.

Attacking to the northwest, the 6th Armored Division in the III Corps zone reached an area just south of LIXING (Q46), four miles northwest of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while Task Force FICKETT exercised vigorous patrolling. The 26th Infantry Division continued regrouping and training in the METZ (U85) area.

On the southeast of XII Corps zone, the 4th Armored Division made local advances near EPPING-URBACH (Q65), eleven miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), while immediately to the north in the 87th Infantry Division zone the 345th Infantry made a one mile advance to the outskirts of SEYWEILER (Q66), seven miles southwest of ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q77), and the 347th Infantry advanced one mile and cleared the woods north of WALSHEIM (Q66), which is one and one-half miles west of SEYWEILER (Q66). The 80th Infantry Division continued its movement to an assembly area in vicinity of BINING (Q64).

On the south flank of XX Corps, the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) moved to ALTFORWEILER (Q27), three miles southwest of SAARLAUTERN (Q28), and relieved the 377th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) in its bridgehead zone. Local gains were made in FRAULAUTERN (Q38) by the 377th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) prior to its relief, while the 378th Infantry fought savagely, making limited gains in the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead south of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). With the exception of the factory district, DILLINGEN (Q28) was cleared by the 90th Infantry Division in its bridgehead area. Task Force POLK continued to patrol actively on the north flank, while the 10th Armored Division closed in the LUXEMBOURG (P81) area following its attachment to VIII Corps (First U.S. Army).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 356 sorties in twenty-nine missions, with more than ninety-three tons of high explosive bombs being dropped. There were numerous dog-fights, with the fighter-bombers claiming seventeen confirmed, three probables and one damaged enemy plane as compared to their loss of nine planes. Among the claims for the day were 207 railroad cars, twelve locomotives, fifty-one motor vehicles and fifty-two gun installations destroyed or damaged, nine marshalling yards and eleven towns attacked. A large part of the day's activities was in the southern part of Ninth U.S. Army zone east of MALMEDY (K80), where the enemy was beginning to concentrate troops for a heavy counterattack. The day was featured by the bombing of an ammunition dump at (L9797), northeast of KOBLENZ (L89), destruction of a steel railroad bridge and an adjoining tunnel near USCH (L16).

Third U.S. Army's advance to the northeast continued to gain ground slowly, with a gradual improvement shown in the bridgehead areas.

Experiments were started to use a truck-mounted magnet to sweep highways for shrapnel. Approximately 125 pounds of shrapnel were removed from a five-mile stretch of highway.

Camouflaged Observers Position

18 DECEMBER *(D + 195)*

Along the VIII Corps front and on the majority of the V Corps front in the First U.S. Army zone, the heavy enemy counterattack which had been developing for several days reached an acute stage. The attack made by a strong force of enemy units, initially consisting of approximately fifteen divisions, in addition to those previously identified in the sector, was generated by the Sixth SS Panzer Army, under the guidance of General VON RUNDSTEDT, commander of all enemy forces on the Western Front. Penetrations by this time had been made into zone of VIII Corps (which then consisted of the 106th, 28th, 4th Infantry Divisions and the 9th Armored Division) and into the 99th Infantry Division zone of V Corps. This penetration of approximately forty miles in depth and thirty miles in width was made along the ST VITH (P88) - ST HUBERT (P36) axis, with the flanks anchored in the south on ECHTERNACH (L03), DIEKIRCH (P84) and ETTELBRUCK (P84) and in the north on MONSCHAU (K91), MALMEDY (K70), STAVELOT (K70) and MARCHE (P29). Information at this time from the VIII Corps was scant as to the tactical situation, but the conclusion was reached, however, that the situation was very fluid and that the combat efficiency of VIII Corps, consisting mainly of the divisions mentioned above, was unknown. This created a tactical situation that was extremely critical for the Allied forces along the Western Front.

To combat this penetration and disrupting counter-offensive in the First U.S. Army zone, the Supreme Commander issued orders through the Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group that the Commanding General of Third U.S. Army assume command of VIII Corps troops south of the enemy break-through, which could be regrouped and committed, and to attack north to drive, cut off and destroy the enemy which had penetrated the First U.S. Army zone.

White Outer Garments Worn to Camouflage Rifleman

The Army Commander, in order to place the Third U.S. Army into high gear against the enemy penetration and to swing its main effort from the east to the north, issued the following orders to the corps under his command:

XII Corps was ordered to relinquish operational control of its assigned zone to the Seventh U.S. Army, pass control of the 80th Infantry Division and attached troops and of the 4th Armored Division and attached troops to the III Corps, and relinquish control of the 87th Infantry Division and attached troops to the Seventh U.S. Army. After being relieved by Seventh U.S. Army units, the corps was to withdraw the 35th Infantry Division and attached troops and XII Corps troops from their zone to the vicinity of METZ (U85). On completion of these reliefs and transfers the corps was to move the remainder of the corps, less attachments to the Seventh U.S. Army, to the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P81) and assume control of the 5th Infantry Division and attached troops.

III Corps was ordered to relinquish responsibility of the corps zone to the XX Corps. It was to pass control of the 6th Armored Division and the 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced) to XX Corps, move the 26th Infantry Division and attached troops to the ARLON (P62) area, move to the vicinity of ARLON (P62) and assume control of the 4th Armored Division and attached troops and of the 80th Infantry Division and attached troops upon their arrival.

XX Corps was ordered to assume responsibility of III Corps zone, assume control of the 6th Armored Division and attached troops and the 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced), relieve the 5th Infantry Division in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead and move the 5th Infantry Division and attached troops to the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P81).

Reacting sharply to patrol activity, the enemy continued to maintain a defensive attitude in III Corps zone. He continued to fight strong delaying actions in the XII Corps zone, but decreased his resistance in the bridgehead areas of XX Corps zone.

The 6th Armored Division continued to be heavily engaged with the enemy with no particular change in the situation in the III Corps zone. Task Force FICKETT continued to patrol aggressively in the vicinity of KARLSBRUNN (Q36), eight miles southwest of SAARBRUCKEN (Q47). III Corps assumed command of the 4th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division, which started immediate movement to the vicinity of LONGWY (P00).

Elements of the 345th Infantry (87th Infantry Division), operating on the XII Corps south boundary, cleared MEDELSHEIM (Q66), eight miles southeast of ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q77). This town had previously been by-passed, resulting in other elements of the division being in SEYWEILER (Q66) one mile to the north. Leading elements of the 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) continued fighting on the high ground one-half mile south of BLIESDALHEIM (Q66), seven miles southwest of ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q77). Meanwhile, in a zone just to the west, the 35th Infantry Division continued pushing ahead against stiffening enemy resistance, with the 320th

Infantry gaining one-half mile south of BEBELSHEIM (Q56) and the 137th Infantry clearing the woods southeast of BEBELSHEIM (Q56) and attacking BLIESMENGEN (Q56), three miles northeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). The 80th Infantry Division closed in the south part of the corps zone in the rear and prepared to move out under III Corps, while the 4th Armored Division was being relieved of its responsibilities on its front. The zone vacated by III Corps was assumed by XII Corps which gained temporary control of the 6th Armored Division and Task Force FICKETT until 20 December at which time XX Corps took over operational control.

The 378th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) continued fighting in the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead with no advances reported, while the 377th Infantry closed in the vicinity of HARGARTEN (Q17), six miles northeast of BOULAY-MOSELLE (Q06). Meanwhile the 5th Infantry Division was fighting heavily in the bridgehead areas of FRAULAUTERN (Q38) and SAARLAUTERN RODEN (Q38), with local advances made in both towns. The Commanding General of the 5th Infantry Division took over command of the XX Corps bridgehead area on 18 December, completely relieving the 95th Infantry Division. DILLINGEN (Q28) was being mopped up by the 90th Infantry Division, with ferrying operations continuing to bring supplies and materiel across the SAAR River. Task Force POLK continued its patrolling on the corps north flank.

Planes of XIX Tactical Air Command were vectored to a marshalling yard in the First U.S. Army area where five trains with 200-300 cars were observed, steam up, headed west. Fifteen vehicles with U.S. markings also were seen. Only sixty-six sorties were flown during the day. There were several dog-fights and four enemy planes were shot down with three planes of XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed. Huge air battles preceded the enemy penetration in the First U.S. Army area, with IX Tactical Air Command shooting down thirty-four enemy planes and XXIX Tactical Air Command destroying eight.

During the period III Corps was relieved of its SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) area, XII Corps made minor gains, while XX Corps enlarged its bridgeheads.

Because of the changed tactical situation in the First U.S. Army area, the planned assault against the SIEGFRIED Line set for 19 December, later postponed to 22 December, in the vicinity of ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q77) was suspended.

Military police and all sections concerned with transportation were confronted with the most complex troop movement problem of the campaign when the Third U.S. Army was given its mission of attacking the south flank of the enemy's ARDENNES salient. Special officer couriers were dispatched to each military police battalion with four troop movement routes. All possible personnel was concentrated on traffic duty. III Corps moved at once from METZ (U85) to LONGWY (P50), a truck company moved at 180100 from PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73) to PUTTELANGE (U99) to assist in moving the 80th Infantry Division, two truck companies moved at 172300 from TOUL (U60) to PUTTELANGE (U99) to assist in moving the 80th Infantry Division, and Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) moved at 180200 from near FENETRANGE (Q42) to LONGWY (P50). These four moves crossed at BARONVILLE (Q13) at 180330, with Combat Command "B" having priority. There was a constant flow of traffic during the period of movement, more than 11,800 vehicles passing over the four routes. A landslide, a weakened bridge, enemy bombing and strafing, and several wrecks caused detours to be designated, but the troops got through and enabled the Army to make its attack on schedule.

In support of the attack, Army engineers were confronted with an emergency map printing problem. Work was begun on supplying maps to three corps and thirteen divisions for an area previously north of the Army boundary. Units thus supplied were III, VIII and XII Corps; 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 35th, 80th and 87th Infantry Divisions; 4th, 6th, 10th and 11th Armored Divisions, and the 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions. Approximately fifty-seven tons of maps were issued to Army and corps units during the month.

Supply plans were revised to support the new tactical operation, under which supply of VIII Corps became a Third U.S. Army responsibility. Plans were made to supply the 4th Armored and the 80th Infantry Divisions of III Corps at LONGWY (P50). Arrangements were made to establish Classes I and III railhead and supply points at LONGWY (P50) for units of III and VIII Corps, the supply point to open not later than 1500 19 December. Steps were taken to change all supply points to the new front except those in support of XX Corps. A complete revamping of ammunition shipments was required, due in part to the responsibility for supply of the VIII Corps. All possible shipments were diverted to the north flank of the Army and every conceivable means of transportation was used to rebuild stocks in the depot nearest the northern front.

A radical revision was necessary in the Army's communication system, involving removal of a complete network and command post system installed at ST AVOLD (Q25) and installation of circuits to accompany the move of the Army Headquarters to LUXEMBOURG (P81). Circuits to the new Command Post were furnished quickly initially by the use of existing facilities of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group and of the Postes Telephones Telegraphes system and the wire communication network was expanded quickly to meet the increased requirements.

Supply Route is Guarded

TACTICAL SITUATION
19 DECEMBER 1944

FIRST XXXX THIRD

XXX XX

TF POLK

90TH INF DIV — III 357, III 359, III 358

5TH INF DIV — III 11, III 2

95TH INF DIV — III 378, III 379, III 377, III 10

TF 6

35TH INF DIV — XX 6, III 320, III 347, III 345, III 137, TF 2, XXX XII, III 134, ELM 4, ELM 319

87TH INF DIV — III 346, III 318, III 80(-), III 317

80TH INF DIV

26TH INF DIV — III 328, III 101, III 104

XXX III

XX 21 ELM

XX REM 19

XX REM 559

XX REM 25

XX 36

XX REM 17

XX 16

XX 15

XX 9

XX 408

XX 416

BATTLE LINE 16 DECEMBER

LUXEMBOURG

Saarburg

Merzig

Wadern

Weiskirchen

St Wendel

Ottweiler

NEUNKIRCHEN

St Ingbert

SAARBRÜCKEN

Bliesköstel

Zweibrücken

Baumholder

Forbach

Falkenberg

Sarralbe

Metz

Mouson

19 DECEMBER *(D + 196)*

Continuing his counter-offensive on the First U.S. Army front, the enemy made further penetrations. WILTZ (P75) was encircled in VIII Corps zone, but ST VITH (P88) still held out against strong enemy attacks from the east. In the south the enemy threatened the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03). Heavy fighting was in progress in the V Corps zone with enemy armored units in the vicinity of STAVELOT (K70). The enemy continued his defensive attitude in the VII Corps zone and gave ground under First U.S. Army's attack in this area. On the Third U.S. Army front, the enemy continued his resistance in the southern portion of XII Corps zone and increased his entrenching activity in the northern portion. Considerable enemy activity was evident in the rear areas and along the SAAR River in the XX Corps zone. In the bridgehead areas enemy resistance stiffened, a small counterattack being launched in the southern bridgehead.

III Corps started moving the 26th Infantry Division from METZ (U85) to an area northeast of ARLON (P62) while the 4th Armored Division and the 80th Infantry Division continued movement to the vicinities of ARLON (P62) and LUXEMBOURG (P81), respectively.

XII Corps, still utilizing the 6th Armored Division and Task Force FICKETT, took over temporary control of III Corps zone in addition to its own. The 87th Infantry Division, on the south flank maintained and consolidated its front lines. Heavy artillery fire was directed at the 347th Infantry on the high ground one-half mile south of BLIESDALHEIM (Q66), seven miles southeast of ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q77). The 35th Infantry Division also maintained and consolidated its positions, with the 134th Infantry two miles northwest of GERSHEIM (Q66), the 137th Infantry in the vicinity of BLIESMENGEN (Q56), three miles northeast of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), and the 320th Infantry astride the HOMBOURG-SARREGUEMINES (Q55) railroad, one-half mile north of GERSHEIM (Q66).

Fighting in the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead was continued by the 378th Infantry (95th Infantry Division) while the 377th Infantry moved into corps reserve. An attack was launched by the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) inside SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28) which gained several city blocks, while the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) made local gains in FRAULAUTERN (Q38). Enemy artillery fire continued to be very heavy in XX Corps zone. The 90th Infantry Division continued patrolling around DILLINGEN'S (Q28) factory area which was the only part of the city still in enemy hands. Ferrying of supplies continued across the SAAR River in that vicinity. Task Force POLK continued its north flank patrolling duties.

Artillery with the Army was extensively regrouped to support offensive operations on the northern front. Attached to III Corps were one field artillery group, two light, three medium and one heavy battalions detached from XII Corps and two field artillery groups, one light and one medium battalion detached from XX Corps. In addition, one field artillery observation battalion newly arrived on the Continent and assigned to Third U.S. Army was attached to III Corps. All commenced to move immediately and closed in the vicinity of the III Corps artillery assembly area at VILLERS (U69) during the night of 19-20 December. III Corps artillery which passed intact to the control of XII Corps included, in addition to the 6th Armored Division's organic artillery, one field artillery group, one field artillery observation battalion, one light, one medium and one heavy battalion.

Bad weather grounded all planes until 1400. After that, however, XIX Tactical Air Command flew 102 sorties, shot down ten planes confirmed and one probable while losing three planes, and escorted Lancaster bombers over First U.S. Army area. Some planes were vectored to the First U.S. Army break-through area.

Third U.S. Army regrouped its forces in preparation to change its axis of advance from northeast to north.

20 DECEMBER *(D + 197)*

Launching two counterattacks against the 35th Infantry Division in XII Corps zone, the enemy increased patrol activity and reacted sharply to Army patrolling. Tactical reconnaissance observed heavy vehicular traffic on the XX Corps' north flank. The enemy resisted in the bridgehead areas with small arms, machine gun and artillery fire, an average of 600 rounds an hour falling in the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead.

Observer Views Enemy Positions from a Balcony

The Army Commander gave the various Corps Commanders the new mission of Third U.S. Army. This directive stated in part:

"1. a. Enemy armored columns penetrated the First U.S. Army front in the MALMEDY (K70) and BASTOGNE (P55) areas and threaten the vital NAMUR (J91) - LIEGE (K42) communications centers.

b. First U.S. Army will attack south and restore the front in the MALMEDY (K70) area and destroy the enemy in zone.

"2. Third U.S. Army will change direction and will attack to the north from the area LUXEMBOURG (P81) - ARLON (P62) to destroy the enemy on its front and be prepared to change direction to the northeast and seize crossings of the RHINE River.

"3. III Corps (26th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division and attached troops) will:

a. Attack north in zone on Army order in the direction ST VITH (P88) and destroy the enemy on its front.
b. Maintain contact with XII Corps on east and with VIII Corps on west.

" 4. XII Corps (4th and 5th Infantry Divisions, 10th Armored Division, less Combat Command "B", plus Combat Command "A" 9th Armored Division, 2d Cavalry Group and attached troops) will:

a. Hold west bank of MOSELLE River in zone.
b. On Army order, attack initially north on the right of III Corps and destroy enemy in zone.
c. Push aggressive patrols to east and northeast to determine location of crossings of SAUER River and OUR River and strength of enemy in ECHTERNACH (L03) area. Be prepared on Army order to change direction of attack to the northeast to force crossings and penetrate SIEGFRIED Line in zone and advance in direction of BITBURG (L15).
d. Maintain contact with XX Corps on south and III Corps on west.
e. Protect right (east) flank of Third U.S. Army.

"5. VIII Corps (101st Airborne Division, 28th Infantry Division, 9th Armored Division, less Combat Command "A", plus Combat Command "B" 10th Armored Division and attached troops) will:

a. Continue defense of zone.
b. Regroup forces in zone prepared to attack north on Army order to destroy enemy in zone.
c. Maintain contact with III Corps on east.

"6. XX Corps (95th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division, 3d Cavalry Group, 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced) and attached troops will:

a. Defend SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead.
b. Hold and defend present front lines.
c. Pass to Seventh U.S. Army control of zones now held by 6th Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced).
d. On relief of 6th Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced), assemble 6th Armored Division in area from which it will be prepared to counterattack in any direction in Third or Seventh U.S. Army zones.
e. Be prepared to pass control of 6th Cavalry Group (reinforced) to III Corps.
f. Maintain contact with XII Corps and Seventh U.S. Army.
g. Protect southeast flank Third U.S. Army.

"7. In the attack, all corps will advance in multiple columns, all columns to be composed of tanks and infantry.

"8. III Corps will attack 21 December (attack actually began on 22 December), XII Corps and VIII Corps will attack on Army order.

"9. a. The following air support will be provided for this operation:

(1) Heavy bombers by Eighth U.S. Air Force.

(2) Medium bombers by Ninth U.S. Bomber Division.

(3) Seven fighter-bomber groups, one tactical reconnaissance group and one night fighter squadron by XIX Tactical Air Command.

b. Air support missions will be requested through Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command."

As seen by the above operational directive, VIII Corps in its new mission was to consist of the 101st Airborne Division, then in the isolated BASTOGNE (P55) area, which had attached Reserve Combat Command of the 9th Armored Division and Combat Command "B" of the 10th Armored Division; Combat Command "B" of the 9th Armored Division which was located in the zone of the First U.S. Army and the 28th Infantry Division. The remainder of the units previously under VIII Corps, First U.S. Army, were committed, as quickly as they could be regrouped, to other corps of the Third U.S. Army.

Tactical Echelon of Third U.S. Army Headquarters moved to LUXEMBOURG (P81) to direct the action in the enemy break-through area.

III Corps set up its Command Post in the vicinity of ARLON (P62) at 1200 20 December and continued assembling its major elements preparing to advance to the north. The 26th Infantry Division was established at EISCHEN (P62), the 80th Infantry Division at DOMMELDANGE (P81) while the 4th Armored Division closed in an assembly area west of ARLON (P62).

The 6th Armored Division patrolled aggressively along the front from SARREGUEMINES (Q55) to FORBACH (Q46) in the XII Corps zone, while the 35th Infantry Division established strong defensive positions immediately east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55). Control over that zone passed at 202400 to XV Corps at which time the Command Echelon of XII Corps started movement to LUXEMBOURG (P81). The 87th Infantry Division started relief of the 35th Infantry Division in zone.

In conformance with verbal orders given by the Army Commander to XX Corps Commander, DILLINGEN (Q28) in XX Corps zone was completely cleared by the 90th Infantry Division, and the heavy support weapons which were used in the reduction of that city were ferried back across the SAAR River to be used in the northern zone in LUXEMBOURG (P81). Numerous demolitions in the ENSDORF (Q37) area south of SAARLAUTERN (Q28) were set off by the 95th Infantry Division, which completed ferrying of its personnel from the ENSDORF (Q37) bridgehead, and established defensive positions on the west bank of the SAAR River. Meanwhile, the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) closed in an area northeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81), while the 2d Infantry continued to hold its positions awaiting relief.

Operational control of VIII Corps passed to Third U.S. Army at 201330, with corps headquarters remaining at NEUFCHATEAU (P34). At the time the corps reverted to Third U.S. Army it consisted of the 4th, 28th, 106th Infantry Divisions, the 7th, 9th and 10th Armored Divisions and the 101st Airborne Division. VIII Corps front was, however, still very fluid and its combat efficiency at this time was still considered as being unknown. Actually the 106th Infantry Division and 7th Armored Division, plus part of the 9th Armored Division, were pushed to the north of the enemy salient, being later committed by First U.S. Army.

Weather prohibited all aerial activity.

Third U.S. Army prepared to throw in a strong counter-offensive against the enemy in the breakthrough area. The zone of XII Corps passed to XV Corps, Seventh U.S. Army, while VIII Corps reverted to Third U.S. Army.

A new tactical reconnaissance plan, to become effective on 21 December, was adopted. Ten reconnaissance areas were established encompassing generally ST HUBERT (P36), COLOGNE (P46), MAINZ (M35) and ST AVOLD (Q25), each area being approximately twenty miles square.

By this date six new supply points in support of the Army's northern front had been set up in the vicinity of LONGWY (P50), with 235,000 operational-type rations and 300,000 gallons of gasoline on hand. Because of the changed tactical situation, the daily receipt and decanting of 1,000 tons of bulk gasoline became too great a responsibility for the Army and bulk gasoline shipped to the Army was reduced to 500 tons daily.

In the reorganization to support the Third U.S. Army's new northern front the Army received one medical group, three medical collecting companies, two motor ambulance companies, two evacuation hospitals, one clearing company and one field hospital. A Third U.S. Army public health squad carried food and medical supplies through enemy fire to relieve 3,200 French refugees trapped in a quarry north of WELFERDING (Q45) for more than three weeks.

A conference was held with Royal Air Force officers on improvement of communications in order that Army anti-aircraft units might receive sufficient warning of the approach of heavy bomber formations, which a number of times had flown into Army inner artillery zones without giving warning. Engineers began a study of major roads and bridges in Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany.

21 DECEMBER *(D + 198)*

Enemy advances continued in VIII Corps zone, with penetrations being made as far west as ST HUBERT (P36) and MOIRCY (P35) after the enemy had bypassed BASTOGNE (P55). Enemy elements were reported in the south edge of BASTOGNE (P55), with the remainder of the city virtually cut off. The entire XX Corps front was quiet. Enemy air activity took a sudden rise when thirty-nine aircraft attacked Army installations in a series of raids. Antiaircraft units claimed eight planes destroyed and three probably destroyed.

III Corps, established in the vicinity of ARLON (P62), was prepared to attack on the south flank of the enemy salient. Late in the period an attack was launched, with the 26th Infantry Division gaining from three to four miles while the 80th Infantry Division captured MERZIG (P73), and enveloped ETTELBRUCK (P84). Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) to the right rear of Combat Command "B", gained three miles after being halted by a blown bridge, while Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) advanced five miles.

VIII Corps' tactical situation was still very fluid, with enemy penetrations being made throughout the entire zone. Elements of the 28th Infantry Division, however, continued to hold defensive positions in SIBRET (P35), five miles southwest of BASTOGNE (P55), while the 101st Airborne Division with attached armored and tank destroyer elements continued to defend the communications center of BASTOGNE (P55), which had been enveloped by the enemy.

XII Corps moved its headquarters to LUXEMBOURG (P81) and prepared to attack to the north toward the salient. It assumed operational control of the 4th, 5th, and 35th Infantry Divisions, the 10th Armored Division (less Combat Command "B" plus Combat Command "A", 9th Armored Division) and the 2d Cavalry Group. However, the 35th Infantry Division was directed to go to METZ (U85) for refitting before moving to the LUXEMBOURG (P81) area.

Elements of the 95th Infantry Division relieved the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) in XX Corps' SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 90th Infantry Division completed withdrawal from the DILLINGEN (Q28) bridgehead. The 6th Armored Division and Task Force FICKETT (6th Cavalry Group reinforced) continued their active patrolling, both units preparing to be relieved by elements of Seventh U.S. Army. The 6th Armored Division was to go into reserve for use of either Third or Seventh U.S. Army, wherever the need was greater.

Weather again limited flying, but XIX Tactical Air Command flew 112 fighter-bomber sorties and dropped seventeen and one-half tons of bombs. Results of bombing were not observed for the most part. During the night sixty-five enemy aircraft were over Third U.S. Army area.

Major elements of Third U.S. Army launched an attack to the north at 220600 which advanced five miles, capturing MERZIG (P73). Other Army elements continued to concentrate in the LUXEMBOURG (P81) - ARLON (P62) area while maintaining defensive positions along the Third U.S. Army front.

Relocation of anti-aircraft units to oppose the German offensive resulted in three major changes of assignment. Army units assumed defense of the City of LUXEMBOURG (P81), the steel mill at DIFFERDANGE (P60) and Radio Station Luxembourg at JUNGLINSTER (P92).

All commanders were ordered to take immediate and vigorous action to enforce rigid compliance with tire maintenance standards in order to relieve the critical tire shortage. VIII Corps requested supply by air-dropping for the 101st Airborne Division at BASTOGNE (P55).

22 DECEMBER *(D + 199)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

The favored enemy capability at this time was that he could continue his advance to the west, implementing this drive by attacking to the north and south to expand the shoulders of the BASTOGNE (P55) salient. Other capabilities considered were that the enemy could commit his remaining armored reserves, attempt to extend his penetration in depth, while bypassing BASTOGNE (P55), and launch an attack in the ECHTERNACH (L03) area in an attempt to endanger the east flank of the Army's counter drive.

Enemy opposition stiffened in the III Corps zone and several local counterattacks were launched. The enemy continued his efforts to capture BASTOGNE (P55) and was reported regrouping his forces for a fresh assault. Elsewhere in VIII Corps zone there was little activity, indicating the impetus of the enemy's thrust was somewhat expended. Pressure was continued by the enemy against the shoulder of the southern salient in the XII Corps zone, numerous small attacks being launched in the ECHTERNACH (L03) area in an attempt to enlarge his bridgehead south of the SAUER River. The enemy maintained his defensive attitude in the XX Corps area, using some artillery fire. Enemy air activity continued on an increasing scale, eighty-nine planes making seventy-eight raids on this date. An attack on a supply point at MANCIEULLES (U67) destroyed 100,000 gallons of gasoline. Antiaircraft units claimed eight planes destroyed and one probably destroyed. Dissemination to all corps and divisions of detailed information concerning Germans operating in American uniforms and equipment was completed. Unnecessary civilian traffic was cleared from roads. The Provost Marshal was directed to clear at his discretion any main supply route except for the most essential civilian traffic.

A TWX was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group which confirmed verbal orders previously issued, set up new boundaries between Twelfth U.S. Army Group and 21 Army Group British, and between Sixth and Twelfth U.S. Army Groups. The TWX stated in part:

"1. Portion of Letter of Instructions in conflict herewith are cancelled. Pending publication of a new directive, the following instructions are issued for your information and guidance.

TACTICAL SITUATION

22 DECEMBER 1944

(DATE OF INITIAL ATTACK BEGINNING BASTOGNE – ST. VITH CAMPAIGN)



"2. Boundaries: A. Between Twenty One and Twelfth Army Groups: GIVET - PRUM - KOLN (All inclusive to Twenty One Army Group) Subject modification between Army Commanders concerned.

B. Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: As at present to NEUFCHATEAU (inclusive to Sixth Army Group) - then to DOMBASLE - CHATEAU SALINS - BARONVILLE - FAULQUEMONT (FALKENBERG) - ST AVOLD - CARLING (KARLINGEN) - BOUSSE (BUSS) - (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group, with running rights to Sixth Army Group on the road west of this boundary (NEUNKIRCHEN - LANDSTUHL - KAISERSLAUTERN) all inclusive to Sixth Army Group). Third Army retains running rights in that area east of above and west of former boundary which lies behind front line.

"3. A. First and Ninth Armies pass to operational control of Commander in Chief, Twenty One Army Group at once. Twelfth Army Group retains responsibility for their supply and administration.

B. Hold along present front line between SAARLAUTERN and vicinity of ECHTERNACH; contain the enemy's advance east of the MEUSE; launch without delay a counter-offensive against the southern flank of the enemy salient from general area LUXEMBOURG - ARLON in direction of ST VITH.

"4. Troops: Third Army will be as now constituted less 87th Infantry Division (to Sixth Army Group) plus Headquarters VIII Corps, 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions, 9th Armored Division, 101st Airborne Division, and First Army and Corps troops now south of Army Group boundary (details later).

"5. Coincident with 3A above, operational control of Ninth and Two Ninth TAC will pass from Ninth Air Force to Second TAF."

Substantial progress was made in the attack launched at 220600 by III Corps, with elements of Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) reaching BURDON (P54), ten miles southwest of BASTOGNE (P55), and CHAUMONT (P54), while Combat Command "A" advanced to MARTELANGE (P53), thirteen miles south of BASTOGNE (P55), where it was halted until a bridge was constructed. The 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) made good advances in a zone just east of the 4th Armored Division, the 328th Infantry reaching ESCHETTE (P63), sixteen miles southeast of BASTOGNE (P55), and the 104th Infantry reaching a vicinity five miles west of ESCHETTE (P63). The 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) remained in reserve east of ARLON (P62). Advancing due north from LUXEMBOURG (P81) and ESCH (P70), the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) occupied ETTELBRUCK (P84) while the 319th Infantry reached and cleared HEIDERSCHEID (P74), northwest of ETTELBRUCK (P84). In the vicinity of WALKERDANGE (P81) the 317th Infantry remained in reserve.

Although completely surrounded by the enemy, the 101st Airborne Division with attachments continued to hold out in BASTOGNE (P55). An enemy attack on the city from the west and northwest was developing during the period, enemy artillery fire being extremely heavy. The 28th Infantry Division (-) moved to NEUFCHATEAU (P34) and prepared to defend that city after retiring from VAUX-LES-ROZIERES (P44). The 9th Armored Division at this time was assigned to VIII Corps; however, Combat Command "A" was attached to the 10th Armored Division of XII Corps, Combat Command "B" was attached to the 7th Armored Division in the XVIII Airborne Corps (First U.S. Army) and Reserve Combat Command was attached to the 101st Airborne Division in BASTOGNE (P55).

XII Corps, composed at this time of the 4th, 5th and 35th Infantry Divisions and the 10th Armored Division, was prepared to attack heavily in a zone running roughly from ETTELBRUCK (P84) due north of LUXEMBOURG (P81) to ECHTERNACH (L03) and thence south to WORMELDANGE (L01), east of LUXEMBOURG (P81). The 10th Infantry of the 5th Infantry Division was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and moved north through elements of the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments (4th Infantry Division), advancing 1,000 yards against heavy resistance. A line running roughly from a point four miles southwest of ECHTERNACH (L03) to WORMELDANGE (L01) was held by the 4th Infantry Division, which made only local gains along this front. Meanwhile, the 10th Armored Division had Combat Command "A" at IMBRINGEN (P82), five miles northeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81), with the Reserve Combat Command enroute to NOMMERN (P83), twelve miles north of LUXEMBOURG (P81). Combat Command "A" of the 9th Armored Division (attached to 10th Armored Division) was holding a line beginning two miles south of ETTELBRUCK (P84), sixteen miles north of LUXEMBOURG (P81), and stretching eight miles to the east to WALDBILLING (P93), three miles west of ECHTERNACH (L03). Assembly in the corps zone was completed by the 5th Infantry Division, less the 10th Infantry Regiment.

The 90th Infantry Division completed its withdrawal to the west bank of the SAAR River in XX Corps zone, while in the 95th Infantry Division the 377th and 379th Infantry Regiments continued to maintain their bridgehead areas across the SAAR River at SAARLAUTERN (Q28) with other elements holding positions along the west bank of the river. A strong counterattack in the vicinity of BOUS (Q27) was repulsed by the 95th Infantry Division. The 6th Armored Division maintained its positions.

A total of 558 sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command and 157 tons of high explosive bombs plus large quantities of Napalm were dropped. Twenty-two confirmed and one probable enemy planes were destroyed. A majority of the flights were made in the First U.S. Army breakthrough area, and over TRIER (L22), a city which the Germans were using as a jumping-off place in their attack. Four hundred and twelve motor vehicles, thirty-four tanks and armored vehicles, twenty-six gun installations and fifty-six railroad cars were destroyed among other claims. XIX Tactical Air Command strength was increased on 22 December from four to nine fighter bomber groups in view of the increased need for fighter bombers in the enemy breakthrough area through Luxembourg to Belgium. This augmentation made XIX Tactical Air Command as strong as it had been during the record days of August.

Third U.S. Army continued its attack north with III and XII Corps toward BASTOGNE (P55) and ST VITH (P88), and northeast in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03) while VIII Corps defended the NEUFCHATEAU (P34), RECOGNE (P24) and BASTOGNE (P55) areas. To the southeast XX Corps maintained its positions.

The 65th Medical Group, which had moved its headquarters to ESCH (P70), assumed evacuation responsibility for III Corps in its attack to the north, as well as for XII Corps.

★ ★ ★ ★

23 DECEMBER *(D + 200)*

The Army Commander's prayer for fair weather was followed in a few days by a break in the lowering skies which had prevented full air support by XIX Tactical Air Command. Clear weather aided tremendously in halting the enemy's ARDENNES penetration and in driving him back into the SIEGFRIED Line. The Army Commander's prayer was: "Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously harken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory, and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen."

The Commanding General's operational directive sent to corps commanders on this date stated in part:

"1. Mission:

a. The mission of VIII Corps as delineated in Operational Directive, this headquarters, dated 21 December 1944, remains unchanged.

b. In addition to the above mission, VIII Corps will immediately assume operational responsibility for the defense of the MEUSE River line south from GIVET (09375) (Excl) to VERDUN (U2865) (Incl).

"2. Troops:

a. VIII Corps will immediately assume operational control of the following listed Com Z units with attachments:

(1) 342 Engr GS Regt with 6 Howitzers of 115th FA Bn, attached.
(2) 392d Engr GS Regt with 115th FA Bn (less 6 howitzers) attached.
(3) 366th Engr GS Regt with 6 Guns of AT Co, 118th Inf attached.
(4) 1308th Engr GS Regt with AT Co, 118th Inf (less 6 Guns) attached.
(5) Three Bns French Infantry, available for defense of sector GIVET - MOUZON (P0715) both inclusive.
Three additional Bns French Infantry, available for defense of sector MOUZON - VERDUN.

b. Authority is granted for direct communication with Headquarters OISE Section Com Z to facilitate assumption of control of these units.

c. On arrival in REIMS area, the 11th Armd Div is attached to VIII Corps for defense along the MEUSE River south of GIVET (Excl).

d. On arrival in REIMS area, the 17th Airborne Division is attached to VIII Corps for defense along the MEUSE River line.

"3. Employment:

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"4. Special Instructions:

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No change in the favored enemy capability was made at this time. It was believed the enemy would attempt to continue his advance to the west, implementing his drive by attacking to the north and south to expand the shoulders of the BASTOGNE (P55) salient and broaden its base.

The enemy continued to exert heavy pressure on BASTOGNE (P55), while bypassing the town and sending armor-spearheaded columns to the west and northwest to the vicinity of ST HUBERT (P36), ROCHEFORT (P27) and HOTTON (P38). At the same time, the enemy showed concern over the pressure exerted from the south by III Corps, committing a division in the 80th Infantry Division zone where his flank appeared weakest. In the TRIER (L22) - MERZIG (Q29) area enemy activity increased, with heavy night attacks being launched. Scattered enemy paratroop landings were made in the area between LUXEMBOURG (P81) and the SAAR and MOSELLE Rivers and there was a sudden increase in air activity over the TRIER (L22) - MERZIG (Q29) area. The 4th Armored Division encountered major resistance in the vicinity of CHAUMONT (P54) and the 26th Infantry Division met stubborn opposition in III Corps zone. The enemy withdrew to reform after determined assaults to capture BASTOGNE (P55) in VIII Corps zone were repulsed, defended stubbornly the ECHTERNACH (L03) bridgehead in XII Corps area and patrolled actively in XX Corps zone. More than 100 enemy planes strafed and bombed installations in Third U.S. Army area, antiaircraft shooting down sixteen planes and claiming six more as probables.

Refilling an M-2 Smoke Generator



Nurse Adjusts Lights for Surgery in Field Hospital

The 80th Infantry Division drove to the north on III corp's east flank, with the 319th Infantry capturing TADLER (P74), twelve miles southeast of BASTOGNE (P55), while its 317th Infantry passed through the 318th Infantry and assumed positions to the right rear of the 319th Infantry. To the west, the 26th Infantry Division advanced approximately four miles north against stiff resistance, and kept its 328th and 104th Infantry Regiments abreast during the drive, while its 101st Infantry remained in reserve. Meanwhile, on the corps west flank the 4th Armored Division attacked directly north toward BASTOGNE (P55), with Combat Command "B" in the vicinity of CHAUMONT (P54), five miles south of BASTOGNE (P55), while Combat Command "A" captured HANVILLE (P54) and WARNACH (P54) and Reserve Combat Command took BIGONVILLE (P64).

VIII Corps continued to defend the NEUFCHATEAU (P34) - RECOGNES (P24) - BASTOGNE (P55) area. Still completely surrounded, the 101st Airborne Division with its attachments continued patrolling actively and beat off all attacks of the enemy which was attempting to take the besieged city of BASTOGNE (P55). To the southeast, the 28th Infantry Division was fighting in the vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU (P34).

The 4th Infantry Division made slight gains against determined enemy resistance and heavy artillery fire in XII Corps zone. The 10th Infantry (attached to the 4th Infantry Division) reverted to the 5th Infantry Division. Reconnaissance elements of the 10th Armored Division advanced to approximately one mile south of DIEKIRCH (P84), while the balance of the division together with the attached Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) maintained their positions and prepared to attack in force. Late in the period the 5th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division opened new attacks, with a forty-five minute artillery preparation, which were proceeding well at the end of the period. To the rear at METZ (U85) the 35th Infantry Division was in an assembly area refitting.

Positions in XX Corps zone were maintained on the west bank of the SAAR River and in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead by the 95th Infantry Division. Elements of the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) were relieved in zone by the 3d Cavalry Group. Movement to METZ (U85) for refitting was started by the 6th Armored Division, while elements of the 103d Infantry Division (XV Corps, Seventh U.S. Army) started relieving the division in its zone.

XIX Tactical Air Command had another big day, flying 493 sorties and losing eleven planes, while twenty-three confirmed and four probable enemy aircraft were destroyed. The Air Command dropped fifty-four and one-half tons of high explosive bombs and expended the largest amount of fragmentary bombs and napalm of any day of the month. Among other claims, twenty-six tanks and armored vehicles, 250 motor vehicles and thirty-six gun positions were damaged or destroyed. Most aerial activity occurred in Third U.S. Army's new northern zone.

Third U.S. Army's advance to the north continued, resulting in the capture of BIGONVILLE (P64), TADLER (P74) and WARNACH (P54), while positions in the southeastern part of the Army zone were maintained.

Thirty-two tactical reconnaissance missions were scheduled to give constant cover of the battle area. Front line photographic cover from ST HUBERT (T39) to SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) was also scheduled. Photo cover was supplied to the 101st Airborne Division at BASTOGNE (P55) by means of plane drop. One hundred and sixty-one plane loads of supplies were dropped to troops surrounded in BASTOGNE (P55) and two hundred and fifty planes awaited good weather in order to leave England on this same mission.

Because of the threat to the Army's rear areas in consequence of the fluid tactical situation the military police became a primary force

in the maintenance of security and the apprehension of suspected spies and saboteurs. To meet this need an emergency issue of 1,200 fragmentation hand grenades was made to military police.

It was learned that some 700 to 1,300 patients would need surgical care when the breakthrough to BASTOGNE (P55) was accomplished. Only medical detachment service was available at this time to the 101st Airborne Division, inasmuch as the medical company apparently had been captured. Medical supplies dropped by plane to the troops isolated in BASTOGNE (P55) included plasma, dressings and morphine.

A submarine bolt driving gun, for use in sealing the doors of pillboxes, was procured from the British Royal Navy. Tests showed highly satisfactory results and twenty were procured for the Army's use.

24 DECEMBER *(D + 201)*

Order of Battle facts at this time showed that while the enemy so far had committed nine Panzer and fourteen infantry divisions in his offensive, he still possessed strong reserves and means to transport them. It was considered that the enemy was capable of redisposing his forces and reinforcing them in an effort to regain lost momentum or in order to launch another powerful attack in the ECHTERNACH (L03) or TRIER (I22) - MERZIG (Q29) areas. Opposing Third U.S. Army north of the MOSELLE River, it was estimated the enemy had eleven divisions of an effective combat strength totaling 88,500 troops. Against First U.S. Army it was estimated he had eight divisions of an effective combat strength totaling 63,000 troops.

Launching two strong counterattacks at HEIDERSCHEID (P74) and KEHMEN (P74), the enemy resisted stubbornly in III Corps zone, he made another strong effort against BASTOGNE (P55), attacking the southeast perimeter at MARVIE (P55). Buildup of enemy infantry and armor continued in the ST HUBERT (P36) area of VIII Corps zone and strong pressure was exerted westward from that point. The enemy withdrew to the north bank of the SAUER River and offered spotty resistance in XII Corps zone. Little enemy action was reported in XX Corps zone. Strafing and bombing by the enemy continued to increase in the Army area. Of 143 enemy planes making ninety-four raids on this date, antiaircraft fire shot down seventeen and claimed six as probably destroyed.

The 328th and 104th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) made northward advances of four miles and two miles respectively in III Corps zone, the 328th Infantry advancing to ESCHDORF (P74) and ARSDORF (P64). Leading elements of the 317th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) advanced to a point eight miles northwest of DIEKIRCH (P84), while the 318th Infantry was in the vicinity of TINTANGE (P54). Meanwhile, on the corps west flank the three combat commands of the 4th Armored Division continued their northward push toward BASTOGNE (P55) and at the end of the period Combat Command "A" was north of WARNACH (P54), Combat Command "B" was in vicinity of HOLLANGE (P54) and Reserve Combat Command one mile south of HOLLANGE (P54), approximately four miles south of BASTOGNE (P55). Following its relief in XX Corps zone the 6th Cavalry Group closed completely into an area northwest of ARLON (P62).

Communication Outpost

In VIII Corps zone the situation remained unchanged, with the 101st Airborne Division and its attachments including Reserve Combat Command (9th Armored Division) and Combat Command "B" (10th Armored Division) defending BASTOGNE (P55), the vital communications center in the breakthrough area. Heavy fighting northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (P34) was continued by the 28th Infantry Division.

In XII Corps zone the advance continued. The 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced to HALLER (P93), six miles west of ECHTERNACH (L03), the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments also making substantial gains in zone. The 4th Infantry Division maintained its positions while assembling and regrouping its forces. With Combat Command "A" capturing MOSTROFF (P94), the 10th Armored Division continued its advance to the north. At this time the 35th Infantry Division, which had completed refitting at METZ (U85), was preparing to move north and assume a position on the front.

Defensive positions on the west bank of the SAAR River and in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead in XX Corps zone were maintained by the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions. The 6th Armored Division closed at METZ (U85) for refitting. Responsibility for the vacated zone of the 6th Armored Division was assumed by the 103d Infantry Division, (Seventh U.S. Army).

Fighter-bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 652 sorties and bagged nineteen enemy planes confirmed and two probably destroyed. In addition, 588 motor vehicles, 117 tanks and armored vehicles and 115 railroad cars were damaged or destroyed, while fifteen railroad lines were cut and twelve troop concentrations were attacked. In the day's operation XIX Tactical Air Command lost thirteen planes and eleven pilots, with practically all aerial activity in the Luxembourg - Belgium zone.

Third U.S. Army continued the attack to the north, capturing MOSTROFF (P94) and ARSDORF (P64). Forces were regrouped to reinforce the attack to the north, while positions in the southeast part of zone were maintained.

Artillery ammunition supply became increasingly critical in consequence of the movement of the great bulk of Third U.S. Army to the north. Supply units followed with maximum speed but delay in their opening in the northern area was inescapable in view of the great distances and great amount of supplies involved. For several days only one ammunition supply point was available to III, VIII and XII Corps so that stocks became extremely low. The nearest Communications Zone depot available involved approximately a forty-hour round trip for the ammunition trains and was occasionally utilized in emergencies. An ammunition dump containing 8,400 tons, which was in the Seventh U.S. Army's zone as the result of the revision of boundaries, was turned over to that Army. By agreement, critical items were removed for the use of Third U.S. Army forces until 27 December.

A request for 1,200 gallons of white paint and an equal amount of paint thinner for use in painting helmets, raincoats and leggins for snow camouflage purposes was sent to Communications Zone. To meet the urgent need for snow tunics, 2,185 yards of white cloth were requisitioned from local French civilian sources and delivered to a salvage repair company which in one day completed 700 tunics.

Snow camouflage of vehicles and tentage was a responsibility of the engineers. Pattern painting of vehicles was accomplished by the use of the residue from the generation of acetylene gas, a lime-like substance found in dump piles in a dry state which, when mixed with water and applied with brushes, provided a white coat which was not injurious to metal or canvas.

25 DECEMBER *(D + 202)*

The Army Commander's Christmas greeting to his officers and enlisted men was issued on this date, as follows: "To each officer and soldier in the Third United States Army, I wish a Merry Christmas. I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty, and skill in battle. We march in our might to complete victory. May God's blessing rest upon each of you on this Christmas Day."

Christmas Dinner 1944

No change in enemy capabilities was considered likely at this time. Bitter fighting spread through III Corps zone as the enemy strove desperately to prevent further encroachment on the south flank of his penetration and it was believed the enemy planned to make a major stand along the SURE River. Launching two heavy attacks in VIII Corps zone, the enemy increased his efforts to capture BASTOGNE (P55). At the same time enemy armored spearheads continued to fan out to the west and northwest. The enemy maintained an aggressive defense and improved his defensive positions north of the SAUER River in the XII Corps zone, while his ground forces remained on the defensive in the XX Corps zone. Violence of enemy air activity on the northern front decreased, but fifty raids were made by 103 planes, of which eleven were destroyed and eleven more probably destroyed by antiaircraft fire.

The 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) continued to drive north abreast in III Corps zone with the 328th Infantry taking ESCHDORF (P74) before being relieved by the 101st Infantry. Meanwhile, the 317th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) made limited progress in capturing RINGEL (P74). The 4th Armored Division continued to drive slowly against stubborn resistance on the corps west flank. Combat Command "A" reached a point seven miles south of BASTOGNE (P55) and captured TINTANGE (P54), while Combat Command "B", receiving direct support from the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division), advanced to a point five miles south of that city. Reserve Combat Command captured REMICHAMPAGNE (P55), CHAUMONT (P54) and HOLLANGE (P54).

Around the besieged city of BASTOGNE (P55), in the VIII Corps zone, 101st Airborne Division (reinforced) repulsed heavy armored and infantry attacks from the west and northwest, ten tanks and some infantry which broke into the city were destroyed. At the same time the command consolidated its positions and prepared to fight off another heavy attack building up south of BASTOGNE (P55). Defense of NEUFCHATEAU (P34) was continued by 28th Infantry Division, which during the period effected liaison with the Reserve Combat Command of the 4th Armored Division (III Corps). Enroute to positions to reinforce the southwest part of the corps area along the MEUSE River, was the 17th Airborne Division.

Supported by elements of the 10th Armored Division, XII Corp's attack to the north was continued by the 5th Infantry Division, with good progress being made. In a zone west of ECHTERNACH (L03), HALLER (P93) and WALDBILLIG (P93) were cleared, while BEFORT (P93) was encircled. The 4th Infantry Division prepared to readjust its defensive positions, continuing to assemble and reorganize its troops. Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division moved from METZ (U85) to take positions on the line.

In the XX Corps zone the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions maintained their positions while patrolling aggressively. At METZ (U85) the 6th Armored Division prepared to move up to XII Corps zone to relieve the 10th Armored Division.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 599 sorties in another day of heavy activity over the enemy breakthrough area. Among other claims for the day were 756 motor vehicles and seventy-four armored vehicles and tanks damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army's attack continued, capturing RINGEL (P74), ESCHDORF (P74), REMICHAMPAGNE (P55), CHAUMONT (P54), HOLLANGE (P54) and TINTANGE (P54). Positions in the southeastern part of the Army zone remained stabilized.

A surgeon who volunteered for the mission was flown into BASTOGNE (P55) in an L-5 plane, taking with him a basic surgical instrument set and medical supplies, including, whole blood, penicillin, plasma, morphine and dressings.

Every means was used by the enemy to disrupt supply and communications in the rear areas of the Army. A delay in the delivery of Classes I and III supplies to the III Corps was caused by sabotage, the rail line between LONGWY (P50) and ARLON (P62) having been cut in five places.

26 DECEMBER *(D + 203)*

Driving northward to relieve BASTOGNE (P55), fighting off desperate enemy attempts to seal off its corridor by attacks on both flanks and hampered by snow, ice and bitter cold, the 4th Armored Division made contact with the garrison on this date. The enemy failed to prevent the arrival of reinforcements as he had failed to reduce the gallant defenders of the town. Contact was made at ASSENOIS (P55), two miles south of BASTOGNE (P55), by elements of the division's Combat Command "B" and elements of the 101st Airborne Division. An artillery concentration on the enemy at ASSENOIS (P55) paved the way for the juncture. Although the enemy continued to batter at BASTOGNE (P55), the 4th Armored Division's thrust to establish a supply line assured that the town was no longer an isolated outpost but the tip of a dagger pointed at the enemy's tactical security.

With the exception of one condition, the estimate of enemy capabilities remained the same, it being considered that the enemy was capable of attempting a strong limited-objective attack in the general area of SAARLAUTERN (Q28).

In the western portion of the enemy salient Panzer-spearheaded columns swung northwest, with a very large enemy build-up apparent in the general area of ROCHEFORT (P27) - MARCHE (P28) - HOTTON (P38). It was believed the enemy intended to hold and defend the southern flank of his salient from hasty entrenchments generally along the high ground on the north side of the SAUER and SURE Rivers to (P54), thence northeast to ST HUBERT (P36), employing mines, road blocks and blown bridges with tanks in mobile reserve to support these defenses. Tactical reconnaissance showed a considerable decrease in enemy vehicular traffic during daylight hours in the BASTOGNE (P55) area, indicating the high vehicular and supply losses inflicted by XIX Tactical Air Command planes had driven the enemy to cover.

Pockets of enemy resistance stubbornly defended by small arms and anti-tank fire indicated a possible screen of ST HUBERT (P36) in III Corps zone. Only scattered resistance was offered by the enemy to the 26th Infantry Division until the high ground north of the SURE River was reached. Desperate enemy attempts to again close the corridor to BASTOGNE (P55) failed. Enemy armored columns attacked from the vicinity of

SIBRET (P45) and MORHET (P45) in an unsuccessful attempt to cut the BASTOGNE (P55) corridor in VIII Corps zone. The enemy offered spotty resistance to the 5th Infantry Division in XII Corps zone, while only the enemy air resisted actively over XX Corps area. The German Air Force struck on the northern front with a violence not experienced since the attacks on the AVRANCHES (T21) corridor and the MANTES GASSICOURT (R65) crossing of the SEINE River. In 145 raids made by 234 planes, the enemy attacked communications, supply routes and installations, and highway traffic. Anti-aircraft units shot down twenty-six of the raiders and claimed twenty-one as probably destroyed.

The Army Commander sent Amendment No 1 to the Operational Directive dated 21 December to the Commanding Generals of III, XII and XX Corps. The amendment provided that III Corps pass control of the 80th Infantry Division and attached troops to XII Corps effective 2000 26 December. The corps was to assume temporary control of Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) effective immediately, retain temporary control of the 318th Infantry until completion of its mission, and assume control of the 35th Infantry Division and attached troops.

XII Corps was to assume control of the 80th Infantry Division and attached troops effective at 2000 26 December. It was to move Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) to III Corps area immediately, pass control of the 35th Infantry Division and attached troops to III Corps, pass control of the 10th Armored Division and attached troops to XX Corps, and assume control of the 6th Armored Division and attached troops.

XX Corps was to pass control of the 6th Armored Division and attached troops to XII Corps, assume control of the 10th Armored Division and attached troops, and move the 35th Infantry Division and attached troops to III Corps area.

While elements of Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) made contact with the defenders of BASTOGNE (P55), Combat Command "A" also advanced and captured SAINLEZ (P54) and LIVARCHAMPS (P54). A bridgehead across the SURE River was established by the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) and LIEFRANGE (P64) was taken. Two miles to the east, the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) advanced to the vicinity of HEIDERSCHEID (P74). Control over the 80th Infantry Division was passed to XII Corps, while III Corps assumed control of the 35th Infantry Division and Combat Command "A", 9th Armored Division. Both units opened attacks in III Corps zone before the close of the period.

After contact was made near BASTOGNE (P55) between the 4th Armored Division (XII Corps) and the besieged 101st Airborne Division (with attachments), defensive positions were maintained and improved. To the southwest, the 28th Infantry Division continued to protect NEUFCHATEAU (P34) from the northeast, making slight local advances. The 17th Airborne Division continued to move up to assume positions in VIII Corps zone, while the 11th Armored Division, which had been prepared to assume an active role in VIII Corps zone, was placed in Inter-Army reserve.

Positions directly in the rear of the 80th Infantry Division were assumed by the 35th Infantry Division, which prepared to pass through elements of the 80th Infantry Division, at which time the 80th Infantry Division would swing slightly to the east in XII Corps zone and leave the 35th Infantry Division under control of III Corps. The 4th Infantry Division continued to assemble and prepare for renewal of its attack. Continuing to attack, the 5th Infantry Division's 2d Infantry reached BERDORF (L03), two miles west of ECHTERNACH (L03), and the 10th Infantry reaching the outskirts of ECHTERNACH (L03). BEFORT (P93), six miles to the northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03), was captured by the 11th Infantry.

On the west bank of the SAAR River and in the SAARLAUTERN (Q23) bridgehead, the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions maintained their positions. The 10th Armored Division was enroute to XX Corps zone, its elements moving from the XII Corps zone as soon as relieved by elements of the 6th Armored Division.

XIX Tactical Air Command had another heavy day with 558 sorties in fifty-nine missions and dropped 157 tons of bombs and escorted medium and heavy bombers. Four hundred and twelve motor vehicles, thirty-four armored vehicles, twenty-six gun positions, sixty-one buildings, two bridges, two supply dumps, and eighty-three stacks of ammunition were destroyed, with three marshalling yards hit and fourteen rail lines cut. Claims for the day were twenty-two enemy planes destroyed, one probable and eleven damaged. XIX Tactical Air Command's losses for the day were fifteen planes.

Ammunition shipments continued to be diverted from the original southern flank to the original northern flank of the Army, with a steady buildup of tonnage being made in depots supporting the northern salient. Two surgical teams with three days of medical supplies were flown into BASTOGNE (P55) by glider.

27 DECEMBER *(D + 204)*

While continuing his stubborn resistance to pressure against the shoulders and southern flank of his salient, the enemy shifted armor into the northwest portion of the salient. Lengthening of the enemy's supply lines, continually under attack by the Army's air support, appeared to be seriously affecting his operations. Many enemy vehicles with little or no gasoline were captured in CELLES (P08). Continued reports of an enemy tank concentration in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) - HOMBURG (Q78) area activated the capability of a possible diversionary, limited-objective attack in an effort to relieve pressure on the enemy's main drive.

Continuing his stiff resistance in III Corps zone the enemy at the same time improved his defensive positions along the general line ST HUBERT (P36) - TELLIN (P16) in the VIII Corps zone. An enemy attempt to recapture the high ground north of RINGEL (P74) was repulsed and EPPELDORF (P93) and ECHTERNACH (L03) were cleared of the enemy in XII Corps zone. Enemy air activity dropped sharply on the northern front, seventy-four planes making thirty-five raids in the Third U.S. Army area. Antiaircraft claimed three destroyed and eight probably destroyed.

The 26th Infantry Division continued its advance to the north in III Corps zone and after crossing the SURE River the 101st Infantry captured KAUNDORF (P64), MECHER-DUNKRODT (P64) and BAVIGNE (P64). Ad-

vance of the 35th Infantry Division proceeded during the period with SURRE (P54), BOULAIDE (P64) and BASCHLEIDEN (P64) being taken. Mopping up operations south and southwest of BASTOGNE (P55) were conducted by the 4th Armored Division. Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) captured SIBRET (P45), while Reserve Combat Command (4th Armored Division) entered BASTOGNE (P55) and Combat Command "B" captured HOMPRE (P55) and SALVACOURT (P55).

VIII Corps continued to maintain its defensive positions northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (P34), making local gains against heavy resistance and repulsing counterattacks.

Patrols were pushed to the MOSELLE River southeast of ECHTERNACH (L03) in XII Corps zone by the 4th Infantry Division, while the 5th Infantry Division stopped its drive to the north temporarily along the SAUER River. Drives of the 80th Infantry Division continued slowly against stubborn resistance, with ETTELBRUCK (P84) being occupied. The 6th Armored Division completed movement into corps assembly area.

Positions were improved by both the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, with the 10th Armored Division continuing to assume positions along the XX Corps front.



Whitewash Used to Camouflage Tank

Five hundred and forty-four sorties were flown in fifty-seven missions by XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers. Claims for the day were impressive, with 434 motor vehicles, ninety-seven tanks and armored vehicles, 336 railroad cars, fifteen locomotives, three bridges, forty-two gun installations and eleven supply dumps destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army continued its advance to the north during the day, while the corridor to BASTOGNE (P55) was strengthened and widened. BOULAIDE (P64), BASCHLEIDEN (P64), SURRE (P54), BAVIGNE (P64), MECHERDUNKRODT (P64) and KAUNDORF (P64) were captured by major elements of Third U.S. Army.

Additional snow camouflage in the combat area became an urgent operational necessity. Communications Zone was requested to supply 1,200 gallons of white paint and an equal amount of thinner for spraying clothes and equipment. A second request was sent for 50,000 yards of white muslin and 50,000 snow suits. Communications Zone reported that no white cloth was available, but suggested that 5,000 mattress covers from which 10,000 suits could be made were available at REIMS (T37) in the Advance Section Communications Zone depot. Arrangements were made to deliver the mattress covers to an Army depot at METZ (U85).

Six hundred fifty-two patients were evacuated from BASTOGNE (P55). Of those remaining, 340 were ambulatory and forty-five were litter patients. Military government personnel to the south evacuated more than 3,000 German civilians from SAARLAUTERN (Q28) and WALLERFANGEN (Q28) and approximately 2,500 scattered villagers of the SAAR River area. They were moved to concentration areas to the rear of regimental lines both for military security reasons and to simplify control problems.

28 DECEMBER *(D + 205)*

It was clear that the enemy viewed the rupture to his offensive around BASTOGNE (P55) as a menace to his gamble. The favored enemy capability was that he could reinforce against the Army's BASTOGNE (P55) salient with the equivalent of two Panzer and one infantry divisions in an effort to reduce this vital point. Next favored capability was that the enemy could attack the shoulders or corridor of the Army's BASTOGNE (P55) salient with one Panzer and one infantry division from the southeast or northeast and the equivalent of one Panzer division from the west or northwest, either in a coordinated assault or in a series of assaults at successive intervals. A third capability was that the enemy could launch concentrated attacks to the north and south to expand his salient. Discovery of mine field near ST HUBERT (P36), however, made it clear that in this sector the enemy had gone on the defensive.

Fighting desperately to prevent further widening of the corridor into BASTOGNE (P55) in III Corps zone, the enemy made two more attacks against the city. Army patrols found no organized enemy defense line, in VIII Corps zone, but tactical reconnaissance observed considerable enemy movement headed east toward the BASTOGNE (P55) corridor. The enemy attempted unsuccessfully to recapture RINGEL (P74) in the XII Corps

zone, while there was an increase in enemy patrolling and artillery fire in XX Corps zone. For the first time since 15 December, enemy air activity came to a virtual standstill. After suffering heavy losses for a week, the enemy sent over only eight sorties.

The Army Commander issued the following orders to the Corps Commanders: They stated in part:

"1. a. First U.S. Army on the north is containing the enemy on its front.

b. Seventh U.S. Army on the south will continue to defend present sector.

"2. Third U.S. Army will:

a. Seize HOUFFALIZE (P67) and continue the attack northeast in the direction of ST VITH (P88).

b. Cross the SAUER River in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03) and drive up the PRUM Valley in the direction of BONN (F53).

"3. III Corps (26th and 35th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and attached troops) will:

a. Assume command of 6th Armored Division and attached troops.

b. Pass 4th Armored Division and attached troops to XII Corps.

c. Pass 318th Infantry (-) and attached troops to XII Corps.

d. Pass Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) to VIII Corps.

e. Attack northeast on Army order in the direction of ST VITH (P88) and, in conjunction with XII Corps, seize crossings of the RHINE River in the vicinity of BONN (F53).

"4. VIII Corps (28th and 87th Infantry Divisions, 101st Airborne Division, 9th and 11th Armored Divisions and attached troops) will:

a. Continue present mission. (Responsibility for MEUSE River Defense Sector).

b. Seize the high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (P67) in order to control the HOUFFALIZE road net.

c. Protect left (northwest) flank of Third U.S. Army and attack northeast on Army order echeloned to left rear of III Corps.

"5. XII Corps (4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division and attached troops) will:

a. Maintain contact with III Corps on left (west), continue to exert pressure along present front of 80th Infantry Division and on Army order cross SAUER River in vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03).

b. On Army order drive up the PRUM Valley in the direction of BONN (F53).

"6. XX Corps (90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, 10th Armored Division and attached troops) will:

a. With minimum force continue to hold present sector including SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead.

b. On Army order advance north and clear enemy from the area between MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers.

c. Be prepared to follow XII Corps to the northeast.

"7. Timing.

a. VIII Corps will seize high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (Q67) early 30 December; prepared to continue attack northeast echeloned to the left rear of III Corps.

b. III Corps will attack on Army order in the direction of ST VITH (P88).

c. XII Corps will cross SAUER River in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03) and on Army order attack north in the PRUM Valley to seize crossings of the RHINE River in the vicinity of BONN (F53).

d. XX Corps will clear area between MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers south of TRIER on Army order.

"8. a. The following air support will be provided for this operation:

(1) Heavy bombers by Eighth U.S. Air Force.
(2) Medium bombers by Ninth U.S. Bomber Division.
(3) Seven fighter-bomber groups one tactical reconnaissance group and one night fighter squadron by XIX Tactical Air Command.

b. Air support missions will be requested through Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command."

The 26th Infantry Division advanced from one to two miles all along its front in III Corps zone, capturing NOTHUM (P65) and approaching the WILTZ River. In the 35th Infantry Division the 320th Infantry advanced one and one-half miles, while the 137th Infantry made limited gains. Mopping-up south of BASTOGNE (P55) was continued by the 4th Armored Division and Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division), along with widening the corridor leading to BASTOGNE (P55) and opening the highway from BASTOGNE (P55) to NEUFCHATEAU (P34) for two-way traffic. Advances of two miles along the ARLON (P62) - BASTOGNE (P55) road and to the left of the road were made by Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" 4th Armored Division. Meanwhile, in BASTOGNE (P55) the 101st Airborne Division with the attached Combat Command "B" (10th Armored Division) and Reserve Combat Command (9th Armored Division) continued the defense of the city.

Defense of the MEUSE River zone was assumed by the 17th Airborne Division, while the 28th Infantry Division began regrouping in VIII Corps zone.

While the 4th Infantry Division continued to maintain its positions along the MOSELLE River in XII Corps zone, the 22d Infantry extended its zone and relieved the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division), and the 12th Infantry relieved the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03). Prior to relief of the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments, the 5th Infantry Division advanced to the SAUER River. Limited advances to the SURE and SAUER Rivers were made by the 80th Infantry

Division. Meanwhile, the 6th Armored Division began to move its units from corps assembly area to the front lines.

Continued organization and improvement of defensive positions was conducted in XX Corps by the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions and by the 10th Armored Division.

Weather conditions were less favorable than at any time during the preceding eight days. Nevertheless, 196 sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command, with sixty-two tons of bombs being dropped. Special attention was given to rolling stock, with fifty-six locomotives and 325 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Rails were cut in three places and two large oil tanks were destroyed. There was no enemy air activity in the Third U.S. Army's zone.



Artillery Observer

Third U.S. Army during the day continued to advance and widen the corridor to BASTOGNE (P55). NOTHUM (P65) was captured, while in the southeastern portion of the Army zone positions were maintained.

Emphasizing security, a check was made of the Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters and of all supply points. Additional counter-intelligence corps personnel was requested for III Corps. An investigation was made of the possibility of enemy agents using pigeons as a return means of communication.

29 DECEMBER *(D + 206)*

Determined enemy resistance continued in III Corps zone, with an increase in artillery shelling noted. Enemy tank and troop concentrations observed by tactical reconnaissance in the HOUFFALIZE (P67)--NOVILLE (P56) area indicated the presence of an unidentified Panzer-type division reinforcing the BASTOGNE (P55) area. In VIII Corps zone there was no aggressive enemy action, while in XII Corps area the enemy engaged in patrolling and laid harassing artillery and mortar fire. The enemy attitude remained defensive in the XX Corps zone.

Eighty-eight enemy planes made sixty-one raids over Third U.S. Army area. Antiaircraft shot down ten planes and claimed seven as probables.

In the III Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division advanced approximately one mile all along its front, nearing the WILTZ River. Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division advanced about two miles, with the 134th Infantry moving on the right of the 4th Armored Division and taking LUTREBOIS (P55), while making contact with the 101st Airborne Division. HARLANGE (P64) was closed in on from the south and east by the 320th Infantry. Widening of the corridor to BASTOGNE and clearing of the BASTOGNE (P55) - ARLON (P62) highway for two-way traffic was continued by the 4th Armored Division. MARVIE (P55) was captured by the 101st

Long Toms

Airborne Division, which reverted from control of III Corps to control of VIII Corps. Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) reverted to control of the 9th Armored Division(VIII Corps).

The 87th Infantry Division closed in VIII Corps area, while 11th Armored Division assumed positions on the front northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (P34). These two divisions opened a coordinated attack during the morning of 29 December.

There was little activity in XII Corps, the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintaining their positions along the SAUER and SURE Rivers, while the 5th Infantry Division prepared to attack to the northeast and relieved the 6th Armored Division which had closed into an area between NEUFCHATEAU (P34) and ARLON (P62).

XX Corps continued to maintain its patrols and hold its positions along the SAAR River with the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions and the 10th Armored Division.

XIX Tactical Air Command found fewer targets than at anytime since the enemy breakthrough began, but armored vehicles and tank claims were kept at a high level with seventy-two damaged or destroyed. Corps support featured the destruction of an enemy Command Post north of TRIER at (L24). In addition, a V-1 launching site was hit at DIERFELD (L36). Six planes and five pilots were lost during the day.

Third U.S. Army's advance continued, with LUTREBOIS (P55) taken and the ARLON (P62) - BASTOGNE (P55) highway cleared.

Arrangements were made with Twelfth U.S. Army Group for basic cover photography in the area north of MOSELLE River and west of the RHINE River as far north as COLOGNE (P45).

Riflemen Take Cover in Underbrush

In support of the attack on the northern front, two special trains of operational rations, totaling 260,000, and one train of V-80 gasoline, totaling 206,000 gallons, were dispatched from the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26) to arrive at LONGWY (P50) early on 30 December. In addition, 194,000 gallons of gasoline were transferred from the Army's mobile reserve at VALLEROY (U66) to LONGWY (P50).

Handling of American dead at the cemeteries was hindered by the receipt of German bodies clothed in American uniforms and wearing American identification tags. In cases where identity could not be established by normal methods photographs were taken as an additional aid to identification. A salvage repair company began the manufacture of snow camouflage suits from 5,000 mattress covers delivered on this date.

30 DECEMBER *(D + 207)*

While continuing to build up his forces on the east flank of the BASTOGNE (P55) salient in III Corps area, the enemy launched a counterattack by an estimated two battalions of infantry and forty tanks and succeeded in recapturing LUTREBOIS (P54). Other attacks against the base of the Army's wedge were unsuccessful, but the enemy continued to resist strongly on both flanks of the wedge. An attempt to take the high ground in the vicinity of RINGEL (P74) was unsuccessful and elsewhere in XII Corps zone the enemy remained on the defensive. Reacting sharply to XX Corps patrol activity, the enemy continued a defensive attitude in that zone. Moderate enemy air activity, mostly reconnaissance, gave the Army's antiaircraft few targets, but two planes were shot down and 3 were claimed as probably destroyed.

Advance of the 26th Infantry Division in III Corps zone continued, and elements were within one-half mile of the WILTZ River. Meanwhile, the 35th Infantry Division, helped by the 4th Armored Division, opposed a heavy counter-attack between MARVIE (P55) - VILLERS (P55) and LUTREBOIS (P54) in which the enemy took the latter town. The 6th Armored Division moved into forward positions and prepared to launch an attack as the period closed.

VIII Corps' attack launched by the 11th Armored Division and the 87th Infantry Division proceeded well during the period. An advance of five miles to REMAGNE (P35) was made by the 11th Armored Division with Combat Command "A" encountering heavy artillery fire around REMAGNE (P35) and NIMBERMONT (P45). In the 87th Infantry Division the 345th and 346th Infantry Regiments each advanced about seven miles to the line MOIRCY (P35) - VESQUEVILLE (P35). Near MOIRCY (P35) the 345th Infantry repulsed a strong counterattack after which they cleared the town. The 101st Airborne Division continued to hold its positions around BASTOGNE (P55). Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) was heavily counterattacked near SIBRET (P45) by infantry and armor and was forced to give up a little ground.

The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced slowly and captured RIESDORF (P94), seven miles northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03), in XII Corps zone.

The 90th Infantry Division continued aggressive patrolling in the XX Corps zone. In the 95th Infantry Division, the 377th and 378th Infantry Regiments were regrouping and maintaining their positions, while the 379th Infantry launched a limited objective attack in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead and seized about two city blocks. Regrouping and training was continued by the 10th Armored Division.

Four hundred ninety-two sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command. Among numerous other claims 165 motor vehicles, sixty-two tanks and armored vehicles, twenty-two locomotives, and 468 railroad cars were damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army's advance continued during the period. Several heavy enemy counterattacks were repulsed and MOIRCY (P35) was captured, while a limited advance was made in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead.

A new system for handling AWOLS through military police channels was placed into effect. Under the new system each military police battalion maintained a collecting center through which AWOLS were returned under guard to corps units. AWOLs from Army troops were held for unit guards, while AWOLs from other Armies, Air Force and Communications Zone units were cleared through the Army AWOL collecting center, near the Army Headquarters Rear Echelon, to the Communications Zone AWOL center. This system was expected to be more efficient than the former method of handling AWOLs through replacement channels, which frequently permitted the offender to renew his absence without leave before he could be returned to his unit for disciplinary action.

31 DECEMBER *(D + 208)*

By this date, the enemy was considered capable of attacking the shoulders and/or the base of the BASTOGNE (P55) wedge in an effort to destroy this increasingly dangerous threat to his lines of communication in his salient. This capability was strongly implemented by the lack of pressure against the enemy on the northern line of contact of his salient, permitting him to withdraw armor from these sectors and employ them in concerted attacks to relieve the pressure against his supply lines and dispositions in the Third U.S. Army zone. A second favored capability was that the enemy could concentrate the equivalent of two Panzer and one infantry divisions in the ROCHEFORT (P27)--LA ROCHE (P47)--ST HUBERT (P36) area, launch an attack south and east to attempt to envelope the Army's western flank and relieve the pressure against him in the BASTOGNE (P55) wedge. A final capability was that the enemy could attempt a strong limited-objective attack in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) area.

In a week during which the enemy plan of attack appeared to undergo radical revision because of Third U.S. Army's smashing counteroffensive, the following significant Order of Battle facts stood out: 1. The enemy had all of his armor in action, all of his original Panzer reserve in the west being either committed or disposed close to the battle area. To meet Army pressure the enemy resorted to his well-known "shuttle system", moving Panzers from inactive areas to the fiercely-contested BASTOGNE (P55) area. 2. The enemy's infantry reinforcements were far below his estimated capability of six to eight divisions a week. 3. Several new Volksgrenadier divisions committed proved to be third-rate quality troops. These facts indicated that the enemy faced the alternative of breaking out of his salient to relieve the pressure on his flank or retiring behind the SIEGFRIED Line.



A Roadside "Dugout"

Continuing his stiff resistance in the III Corps zone, the enemy launched two counterattacks against the 26th Infantry Division which were repulsed. There was an indication that he was attempting to rein-

force LUTREBOIS (P55). In the VIII Corps zone the enemy failed in two counterattacks on the north portion of the BASTOGNE (P55) salient. The enemy continued a defensive attitude in the XII Corps zone except for a small-scale attack south of MACHTUM (L01) which was broken up. Enemy air activity inoreased sharply, with eighty-nine planes in sixty-four raids striking at Army installations. Three of the raiding planes were destroyed and four probably destroyed.

Appreciable gains in III Corps were made by the 6th Armored Division which hit on the eastern perimeter of the corridor leading to BASTOGNE (P55). Advances of two miles were made, WARDIN (P65) and NEFFE (P55) being captured. The 26th Infantry Division was engaged in heavy fighting all during the period, although there was little change in its front lines. A heavy counterattack launched against the 35th Infantry Division was beaten back and the 35th Infantry Division resumed its attack. The 134th Infantry recaptured LUTREBOIS (P55) while the 137th Infantry was fighting one-mile northeast of HARLANGE (P64). Support of the 35th Infantry Division was continued by the 4th Armored Division. In and around BASTOGNE (P55) fighting was continued by the 101st Airborne Division.

Advances of two miles were made by the 11th Armored Division in VIII Corps zone which drew up to a line running directly west from BASTOGNE (P55), and captured HOUMONT (P45) and CHENOGNE (P45). The 87th Infantry Division fought against extremely heavy resistance around MOIRCY (P35), the 345th Infantry advancing to JENNEVILLE (P35) while the 346th Infantry contained the enemy southeast of ST HUBERT (P36).

The 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintained their positions. Activities in the XII Corps area were limited to patrolling along the MOSELLE, SURE and SAUER Rivers.

To the south, the 95th Infantry Division (XX Corps) took two more city blocks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead area. Rehabilitation and training were continued by the 90th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division. One motorized battalion was sent to assist the 106th Cavalry Group (XV Corps).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 296 sorties and dropped 128 tons of high explosive bombs. The enemy was apparently very cautious about putting targets in the open after the heavy losses he had sustained in the preceding days. The fighter-bombers listed among other claims for the day: 125 motor vehicles, sixty-eight railroad cars, four bridges and seventeen buildings damaged or destroyed while nine marshalling yards were attacked and rails were cut in seventeen places. No losses were sustained.

Third U.S. Army fought heavily and advanced in some zones during the day, with CHENOGNE (P45), WARDIN (P65) and NEFFE (P55) being captured.

Approximately thirty-five battalions of field artillery participated in the operation to relieve and establish a solid contact with the BASTOGNE (P55) forces. Beginning with 22 December, these battalions expended 94,230 rounds of ammunition.



The Team

THIRD U S ARMY
SWITCH OF MAJOR ELEMENTS
19–31 DECEMBER 1944
BASTOGNE–ST. VITH CAMPAIGN

BATTLE LINE 19 DECEMBER

BATTLE LINE 22 DECEMBER

BATTLE LINE 31 DECEMBER

ORDER OF BATTLE

19 DECEMBER 1944

III CORPS	XII CORPS	XX CORPS
4TH ARMD DIV	35TH INF DIV	5TH INF DIV
6TH ARMD DIV	87TH INF DIV	90TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV		95TH INF DIV
80TH INF DIV		

ARMY
42ND INF DIV

22 DECEMBER 1944
(DATE OF INITIAL ATTACK)

III CORPS	VIII CORPS	XII CORPS
4TH ARMD DIV	9TH ARMD DIV	4TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV	(LESS CCB)	5TH INF DIV
80TH INF DIV	28TH INF DIV	35TH INF DIV
	(LESS 112 DIV)	10TH ARMD DIV
	101ST ABN DIV	

XX CORPS	ARMY
6TH ARMD DIV	42ND INF DIV
90TH INF DIV	87TH INF DIV
95TH INF DIV	

31 DECEMBER 1944

III CORPS	VIII CORPS	XII CORPS
4TH ARMD DIV	9TH ARMD DIV	4TH INF DIV
6TH ARMD DIV	(LESS CCB)	5TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV	11TH ARMD DIV	80TH INF DIV
35TH INF DIV	28TH INF DIV	
	(LESS 112TH INF)	
	87TH INF DIV	
	101ST ABN DIV	

XX CORPS
10TH ARMD DIV
90TH INF DIV
95TH INF DIV

NOTE: ON 19 DECEMBER HEADQUARTERS THIRD U S ARMY WAS LOCATED AT NANCY, FRANCE. ON 20 DECEMBER A TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS WAS OPENED IN THE CITY OF LUXEMBOURG WITH THE MAIN HEADQUARTERS AT NANCY. ON 28 DECEMBER THE REMAINDER OF THE FORWARD ECHELON, HEADQUARTERS THIRD U S ARMY MOVED TO THE CITY OF LUXEMBOURG.

FLORENVILLE
ARLON
LUXEMBOURG
THIONVILLE
METZ
MOSELLE R.
NEUFCHATEAU
FIRST
XXXX
THIRD

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



*CUMULATIVE FROM 1 AUGUST

DECEMBER–	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DAILY DEAD (EST)	300	300	300	500	500	400	100	300	200	500	200	1200	300	200	200	500	1800	200	100	400	100	3000	1500	1300	2400	1000	700	500	300	500	800
WOUNDED (EST)	1200	1000	1200	2000	2000	1200	400	1200	800	2000	1000	3600	1200	400	800	1500	4200	1600	800	400	400	6000	4000	5200	4600	3000	2100	1500	800	1500	2400
CAPTURED	595	323	298	366	1098	625	1259	639	1150	764	441	631	398	713	407	622	535	53	253	150	207	165	171	136	1220	1287	1283	1089	709	469	364
TOTAL	2095	1623	1798	2866	3598	2225	1759	2139	2150	3264	1641	5431	1898	1313	1407	2622	6535	1853	1153	950	707	9165	5671	6636	8220	5287	4083	3089	1809	2469	3564

104,000
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0

COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD US ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD US ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH — ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH — THIRD U S ARMY CASUALTIES

99,020

20,634

DAILY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DEAD	42	20	75	54	72	85	43	32	33	34	36	28	34	44	103	57	66	40	38	123	92	168	89	75	85	124	82	44	79	50	85
WOUNDED	329	237	386	462	440	312	287	293	256	321	299	340	241	291	275	292	359	179	189	551	296	1121	613	661	524	662	500	385	420	509	758
MISSING	17	54	53	89	90	128	74	70	72	68	59	24	46	16	98	151	137	118	53	122	319	1677	295	328	181	312	311	218	179	102	353
TOTAL	388	311	514	605	602	525	404	395	361	423	394	392	321	351	476	500	562	337	280	796	707	2966	997	1064	790	1098	893	647	678	661	1196

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL



THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-17 DECEMBER 1944



LEGEND

O- OPENED
C - CLOSED

SECRET

19 December



24 December



21 December



25 December





THE MONTH IN REVIEW

Following is a brief summary of operations for December:

Operations of the Third U.S. Army and the enemy during December fell into two phases: The pursuit of the enemy in his continued retreat into Germany, and the enemy's APDENNES offensive which by the end of the month Third U.S. Army's slashing flank attack had virtually brought to a halt.

During the first fifteen days of December the enemy continued to fight a delaying action all along the Army's front extending from the MOSELLE River near TETTINGEN (L00) on the north to SARRE UNION (Q53) on the south. XII and XX Corps were continuing their assault of the German West Wall which had started on 8 November. Advances by all units into SIEGFRIED positions continued, with the towns of SAAR UNION (Q53) and SARREGUEMINES (Q55) being taken. Aided by inclement weather, which restricted movement to roads and prevented effective air action, the enemy succeeded in preventing a major breakthrough. However, under continuous pressure from the Army's forces, he slowly withdrew into the massive SIEGFRIED Line defenses behind the SAAR River. Despite his stubborn resistance and continuous counterattacks, the enemy was unable to prevent the establishment of three Army bridgeheads across the SAAR, in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) - DILLINGEN (Q28) area, between 3 and 6 December. Bitter fighting continued in the bridgehead areas until the relaxation of the Army's attacks in order to deal with the enemy's ARDENNES offensive. During his withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED Line the enemy sustained heavy losses as a result of which his strength on the Third U.S. Army front was reduced from the equivalent of five divisions of combat effectives on 1 December to the equivalent of four divisions by 15 December. Enemy resistance in the forts at METZ (U85) ended on 131111 December with the surrender of the last stronghold, FORT JEANNE D'ARC (U75). FORT ST QUENTIN (U85), FORT PLAPPEVILLE (U86) and FORT DRIANT (U75) capitulated on 6, 7 and 8 December, respectively. An all-out attack was planned for 19 December at which time XII and XX Corps, plus III Corps which had become operational and which held positions in the central part of Army zone, were to speed up their attack with the mission of smashing through the remaining SIEGFRIED Line fortifications and driving for the RHINE River. It was necessary, however, to call off this attack because of the heavy drive of the enemy into the ARDENNES.

The enemy launched his offensive on the front of VIII Corps (First U.S. Army) and the southern portion of V Corps (First U.S. Army) on 16 December. To support the assault, the German Air Force came out in force in both day and night operations and several hundred paratroops were dropped in rear areas to disrupt American communications and destroy supply installations. From captured documents and prisoner of war statements, higher headquarters concluded that the objective of the penetration was the capture of LIEGE (K42) and ANTWERP (J79) and the splitting of the main American and British forces. The German attack consisted of two prongs: One, in the north through MALMEDY (K70) toward LIEGE (K42) was made by the Sixth SS Panzer Army. The second to the south was made by the Fifth Panzer Army and was aimed at BASTOGNE (P55) and bridgeheads across the MEUSE River with a thrust to seize the City of LUXEMBOURG (P81). To higher headquarters it appeared that the north-

ern attack, involving initially two Panzer, one paratroop and five infantry divisions, was intended as the major effort. Both drives initially met with success, the northern spearhead driving ahead despite heavy losses at STAVELOT (K70), ST VITH (P88) and MALMEDY (K70) and the southern spearhead by-passing BASTOGNE (P55) and penetrating into the ST HUBERT (P36) - SMUID (P26) - TELLIN (P16) - ROCHEFORD (P27) area.

On 18 December Third U.S. Army was directed by higher headquarters to take over all forces south of the enemy salient, consisting of elements of VIII Corps, and to drive north into the south flank of that salient. After turning over a portion of its zone to Seventh U.S. Army, Third U.S. Army transferred most of its units north. Almost overnight the situation changed from a three-corps battleline running from north to south to a four-corps battleline running from east to west in the northern VIII and III Corps zones, and from north to south in the XII and XX Corps zones.

The offensive movement necessary to throw Third U.S. Army's striking power to the north was a gigantic and complicated operation involving a switch of the majority of Third U.S. Army's divisions and their supporting troops. Some of the most rapid troop movements in the history of warfare were required, but they had to be combined with a high degree of precise timing and coordination. Not only did the tactical units have to be faced at right angles to the Western Front but the entire supply organization had to follow in support. By 17 December the 10th Armored Division was in LUXEMBOURG (P81), having been directed to leave XX Corps for VIII Corps (First U.S. Army). In the early morning hours of 19 December the 4th Armored Division, located at EPPING-URBACH (Q65), eleven miles east of SARREGUEMINES (Q55), moved northward with a task force in the lead. It was followed closely by the 80th Infantry Division, located at BINING (Q64), and the 26th Infantry Division, then in training at METZ (U85). On 20 December the 5th Infantry Division, located in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, joined the procession. On 21 December sixteen field artillery and six antiaircraft battalions began the move. On 22 December the 35th Infantry Division, located at BEBELSHEIM (Q56), started for METZ (U85) for refitting before being committed. On 23 December a provisional task force of the 6th Armored Division, then located at LIXING (Q46), started for the northern front. Spaced between these major tactical units on the road network were various regimental combat teams infiltrating toward the front, artillery, tank destroyer and engineer units, followed by the supply and service troops. Movements of varying lengths, some to positions on the north-south front of XII and XX Corps, were made by six infantry and three armored divisions, twenty-six battalions of field artillery and various combat teams. From 17 to 23 December 133,178 motor vehicles passed the seven traffic control points. Trucks traveled 1,254,042 miles from 18 December until the end of the month. Thirty-seven truck companies operated on virtually a full-time basis, carrying 41,935 tons of supplies of which 16,910 tons were ammunition. The equivalent of a division a day for thirty days moved during the month.

On the morning of 22 December, after days of continual rain, III Corps attacked north toward BASTOGNE (P55). On the following day, with the weather changing to clear and cold with flurries of snow, XII Corps joined in the attack. This abrupt change in the weather was favorable to the air-tank combination. The first attack was to relieve the besieged forces which were surrounded in BASTOGNE (P55), and by 26 December contact was regained with these units after an historic drive by the 4th Armored Division. The garrison of the important communications center of BASTOGNE (P55), consisting of the 101st Airborne Division reinforced by Combat Command "B" of the 10th Armored Division and Combat Command "R" of the 9th Armored Division, repulsed repeated attempts by the enemy to reduce it. The enemy's siege of BASTOGNE (P55), during which he committed eight divisions, cost him dearly in paratroop and infantry personnel and tanks, approximately ninety of the latter being destroyed between 20 and 26 December. The enemy committed fifteen divisions in his ARDENNES venture, which with the six divisions already on the line made a total of twenty-one enemy divisions involved.

During the remainder of the month the corridor to BASTOGNE (P55) was widened despite desperate enemy resistance and heavy attacks were launched into the southern part of the enemy salient. Having committed all of his available reserves, the enemy could resist Third U.S. Army's advances only by withdrawing and relaxing pressure elsewhere in the salient. By the end of the month the enemy's attack had been blunted and he was slowly being forced back from his most advanced positions.

* * * * * * *

At the end of the month the Army had 1,544,466 rations and an additional 660,000 rations were held in reserve for the Army at VERDUN (U26). The Army had 2,789,993 gallons of V-80 gasoline, receipts during the month amounting to 10,577,491 gallons or fifty-five percent more than the amounts requested. In Classes II and IV depots were 2,800 long tons of clothing and equipment, 5,033.3 tons having been received during the month.

Strength of Third U.S. Army on 31 December was 344,935. Total battle casualties for the month were 20,634, including 2,032 killed, 12,788 wounded and 5,814 reported missing. Non-battle casualties numbered 13,778, making total casualties 34,412. Replacements received totaled 30,088. Prisoners of war received through Third U.S. Army enclosures totaled 17,078, with 1,341 additional prisoners admitted at hospitals and medical units. Burials conducted by Third U.S. Army were; United States casualties 3,203, Allied two, and enemy 1,772. During the month eighteen reclassification cases, 486 normal promotions, 211 battlefield promotions and sixty-nine battlefield appointments were processed. Awards presented to Third U.S. Army troops during December included 260 approved or awarded by higher headquarters and the Army Commander and 5,013 awarded by units of the Army. Included in those to be honored was the surgeon who was flown to the BASTOGNE (P55) garrison on 25 December.

The enemy's losses in material during December exclusive of XIX Tactical Air Command's claims, were sixty-seven Mark III and Mark IV tanks, twenty-four Mark VI tanks, 119 pieces of artillery of 75mm or over, and 178 vehicles of all types. Third U.S. Army losses were seventeen light tanks, eighty-nine medium tanks, eighteen pieces of artillery of 75mm or over, and 332 vehicles of all types.

Chemical companies were active in the bridgehead operations along the SAAR River, firing white phosphorous and smoke shells in support of the infantry. One company in a week's time broke all previous firing records by expending more than 14,000 rounds of white phosphorous and chemical mortar ammunition. Toward the end of the month chemical troops

covered the withdrawal of troops across the SAAR.

To relieve serious shortages of certain critical items of signal supply, government contracts were awarded to local French industries. A signal repair company manufactured during the month more than 13,500 items, including radio tune base modifications and adapters, batteries for rocket launchers and flame throwers, mast sections, and radar slip ring brushes. During the month 274 miles of field wire and 636 miles of spiral-four cable were laid by Third U.S. Army troops, who also placed 306 miles of open wire over fifteen miles of pole line. The Army message center handled 12,696 messages by electrical means and messages in code required the use of 674,045 code groups. Thirty-four radio relay circuits were established during the month, covering a total distance of 1,045 miles.

The overrunning of many units by the German offensive and the great number of casualties, including a disproportionately large number of missing in action, placed a heavy burden on the record maintenance facilities of Headquarters. Heavy casualties among personnel officers, personnel sergeants major and clerks resulted in delays in submission of battle casualty reports from combat units. During the month battle casualties and changes in casualty status reports pertaining to 20,070 individuals were processed, an average of 669 per day.

During the month the engineers constructed 20,000 feet of bridges, most of which were built over the major water obstacles met during the first fifteen days of December, the SAAR, NIED and BLIES Rivers. When the changed tactical situation required mass troop movements to the north, bridges previously constructed were available. When XII Corps troops encountered streams raised to flood stages by incessant rains and aggravated by small lakes formed by MAGINOT Line dams, engineers destroyed the dams as they were captured in order to alleviate flood conditions.

War correspondents and soldier writers in the field with combat units submitted 3,801 stories totaling 700,652 words to censorship at Army level. Over the Mackay Radio flashed 343,443 words describing the Army's operations, while voice broadcast was maintained with the British Broadcasting Company in LONDON for the use of radio correspondents.

New Type Medical Personnel Identification Vest

TOWNS CAPTURED DECEMBER

PLACE	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
AACHEN	XII	8 December
BISTEN	XX	2 "
BETTRING	XII	3 "
BOIS DE BLEIS BRUCKEN	XII	10 "
BIGONVILLE	III	23 "
BEFORT	XII	26 "
BAVIGNE	III	27 "
BOULAIDE	III	27 "
CHAUMONT	III	25 "
CHENOGNE	VIII	31 "
DREISBACH	XX	2 "
*DIEBLING	XII	4 " (7 Dec.)
DILLINGEN	XX	20 "
ERNSTWEILER	XII	4 "
EBRINGEN	XII	4 "
ETTINGEN	XII	7 "
EIDER-GAILBACH	XII	15 "
ERCHINGEN	XII	16 "
ESCHDORF	III	25 "
FT. ST. QUENTIN	XX	6 "
FORBACH	XII	7 "
FT. PLAPPENVILLE	XX	7 "
FUERSTENHAUSEN	XX	7 "
FT. DRIANT	XX	8 "
FOLPERSWEILER	XII	11 "
FT. JEAN D'ARC	III	12 "
GERSHEIM	XII	16 "
HILBRINGEN	XX	1 "
HAMBACH	XII	5 "
HOSTENBACH	XX	7 "
HABKIRCHEN	XII	12 "
HANVILLE	III	23 "
HOLLANGE	III	25 December
HALLER	XII	25 "
HOMPRE	III	27 "
HOUMONT	VIII	31 "
ITZBACH	XX	2 "
IPLINGEN	XII	5 "
KAPPELKINGER	XII	1 "
KREUTZWALD	XX	3 "
KULAHUSEN	XII	6 "
KAUNDORF	III	27 "
LAUTERBACH	XX	3 "
LISDORF	XX	3 "
LIVARCHAMPS	III	26 "
LIEFRANGE	III	26 "
LUTREBOIS	III	29 "
MEDELSHEIM	XII	18 "
MERZIG	III	21 "
MECHER-DUNKRODT	III	27 "
MARVIE	III	29 "
MOIRCY	VIII	30 "
NIEDERLIMBERG	XX	2 "
NEUFORWEILER	XX	2 "
NOTHUM	III	28 "
NEFFE	III	31 "
OERMINGEN	XII	5 "
OBERGAILBACH	XII	14 "
PIKARD	XX	2 "
PUTTELANGE	XII	3 "
PACHTEN	XX	6 "
REHLINGEN	XX	2 "
RICHELING	XII	4 December
ROUHLING	XII	5 "
REDERCHINGEN, GROSS-	XII	10 "
RIMLINGEN	XII	14 "
RINGLE	III	25 "
RIESDORF	XII	30 "
REMICHAMPAGNE	III	25 "
SIERSDORF	XX	1 "
SARRE-UNION	XII	3 "
SAARLOUIS	XX	3 "
SINGLINGEN	XII	6 "
SARRALBE	XII	6 "
SAAREINSMINGEN	XII	8 "
SAAREGUEMINES	XII	9 "
SAARLAUTERN-RODEN	XX	16 "
SAINLEZ	III	26 "
SURRE	III	27 "
SIBRET	III	27 "
SALVACOURT	III	27 "
TENTELINGEN	XII	4 "
TADLER	III	23 "
WILHELMSBROWN	XX	3 "
WALLERFANGEN	XX	3 "
WILLERWALD	XII	5 "
WOLFERDINGEN	XII	6 "
WADGASSEN	XX	7 "
WEHRDEN	XX	7 "
WIESWEILER	XII	8 "
WOLFLINGEN	XII	9 "
WARNACH	III	23 "
WALDBILLIG	XII	25 "
WARDIN	III	31 "

*Originally captured 4 Dec., recaptured 7 Dec.

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

THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS, AIRFIELDS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
18-31 DECEMBER 1944

JANUARY

END OF THE BULGE

Robert Chadclock

JANUARY OPERATIONS

THE month of January saw the enemy attempt desperately to stem Third U.S. Army's northward advance from the BASTOGNE (P55) wedge and, having failed in this attempt, undertake a costly withdrawal into the SIEGFRIED Line. Striving to hold back the Army's advance, the enemy sought at whatever price to disengage his armored divisions, particularly those of the Sixth SS Panzer Army. By the end of the month the enemy's ARDENNES "gamble" offensive had been written off completely. He had been driven back east of his original starting point and had taken refuge in the SIEGFRIED Line defenses.

1 JANUARY *(D + 209)*

As the month opened there was further confirmatory evidence of the enemy's determination to wipe out the BASTOGNE (P55) wedge, which remained a menace to the tactical security of his salient. Continuing to reinforce his forces around the BASTOGNE (P55) perimeter, the enemy apparently appreciated that unless he could destroy the wedge he was faced with the alternative of attempting a break-through in another direction or withdrawing from the salient completely. These conclusions gave active currency to the following enemy capabilities: That he could attack the shoulders and/or the base of the BASTOGNE (P55) wedge, that he could attack in force along the entire perimeter of the wedge, or that implementing the first two capabilities he could attack to the south at the west elbow of Third U.S. Army's wedge. Directly related to these capabilities was the possibility that the enemy could launch a strong limited-objective attack in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) area in order to relieve pressure against his northern penetration, forcing a withdrawal of the wedge that was threatening his lines of communication.

An Operational Directive was sent to the Commanding General, XX Corps, which stated:

"1. To protect its west flank against the eventuality of an enemy attack forcing withdrawal from the present line, Seventh U.S. Army is reconnoitering and organizing a reserve battle position along the high ground on the general line: INGWEILER (wQ8130) - SAAR-UNION (wQ5338) - BENSDORF (wQ2735) to hill east of LANDORF (wQ1841).

"2. XX Corps will:

a. Reconnoiter and select at once an extension of Seventh U.S. Army's reserve battle position coordinating directly with XV Corps (Seventh U.S. Army).

b. Submit plans for organization of position to this headquarters.

c. When approved by this headquarters, organize position, utilizing troops presently assigned.

d. Continue to hold present line, including SAARLAUTERN bridgehead, withdrawing only on Army order."

On this date the enemy continued to resist stubbornly all along the northern front, launched several counterattacks and increased his artillery fire. The Luftwaffe's attempt to slow down Third U.S. Army's drive reached its peak on this date, when 308 hostile aircraft were over the Army's area during the twenty-four hour period. In the largest single attack of the day, twenty-five planes swooped in on an airfield near METZ (U85), strafing the parked P-47s at low level and from all directions, destroying twenty and damaging seventeen. Sixteen of the ene-

my aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft artillery. Supply installations, traffic and field artillery positions also were attacked, but the enemy paid heavily, losing sixty-three planes destroyed during the day.

Fighting off enemy counterattacks, the 26th Infantry Division made slight gains in the vicinity of BERLE (P65). The 6th Armored Division continued to attack from positions won the day previously, but heavy resistance permitted little gain. OUBOURCY (P66) and MAGERET (P65), east of BASTOGNE (P55), were taken, and in that vicinity III Corps troops repulsed heavy and repeated counterattacks.

While there was no change in XII Corps throughout the period, aggressive patrols were maintained.

A two mile advance was made by the 11th Armored Division, with advance elements reaching the MARCHE (P28) - BASTOGNE (P55) highway. The 4th Armored Division was temporarily attached to VIII Corps for operational control. SENONCHAMPS (P55) was taken by Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division), which assumed positions south of the town to facilitate artillery support following its capture. Continuing to defend the BASTOGNE (P55) area, the 101st Airborne Division enlarged its salient by small thrusts which gained a little ground north of the city. In the 87th Infantry Division the 347th Infantry attacked through the 345th Infantry and gained from one to two miles assuming positions astride the OURTHE River northeast of MOIRCY (P35). The enemy in ST HUBERT (P34) was contained by the 346th Infantry. The 17th Airborne Division passed to control of Third U.S. Army and was attached to VIII Corps.



Outpost Guard With Bazooka

Sixty-nine divisional and corps artillery battalions, later increased to seventy-seven, were committed in support of Third U.S. Army's offensive in the ARDENNES, beginning a week in which 401,393 rounds of artillery were expended, the highest volume in the operational history of the Army. The rough character of the ARDENNES terrain necessarily canalized enemy movement to a few primary highways replete with defiles, bridges and similar bottlenecks. An intensive program of long-range harassing and interdiction fires was instituted therefore upon all roads and highways in the enemy's area, particular emphasis being paid to the HOUFFALIZE (P67) - BASTOGNE (P55) road from NOVILLE (P56) to the road junction at (P618710). One 155mm gun battalion was attached to the 101st Airborne Division and emplaced far forward in the BASTOGNE (P55) salient to interdict this stretch of highway.

Despite shortages of overshoes, mess gear and shelter halves, the supply situation was satisfactory, with rations, excepting "K" rations, and gasoline arriving in substantial quantities. Eight rail tankers containing gasoline and one rail car containing oil were destroyed in a fire resulting from a train wreck near the Class III supply depot at MARS LA TOUR (U65). On this date 1,134,964 rations and 3,247,876 gallons of V-80 gasoline were on hand in Third U.S. Army area and 2,800 long tons of clothing and equipment were in the Army's Class II and Class IV depots at TOUL (U61), METZ (U85) and LONGWY (P50). An additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26). Divisions under Third U.S. Army had an average of three and two-tenths days' supply of Class I and four and eight-tenths days' supply of Class III supplies. Strength of the Army on this date was 353,655, and in addition the Army supplied 25,336 troops of Advance Section Communications Zone, 37,033 of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, 2,271 French and 2,344 miscellaneous troops in or near the Army area, a total of 420,639 troops. Although the practice of serving units direct from railheads had been abolished with the opening of new ammunition supply points, the volume of issues became so great at Point Number 38 at MAMER (P71) that III Corps units, whose mission called for huge expenditures of ammunition, were served from the railhead at ATHUS (P60).

Training, improvement of defenses and patrolling were continued by XX Corps troops. One reinforced battalion of the 95th Infantry Division assisted the 106th Cavalry Squadron in repelling small enemy counterattacks.

Large scale operations of XIX Tactical Air Command were carried over into the new year with 469 sorties flown on another perfect flying day. One hundred ninety-five motor vehicles, 274 railroad cars, and forty-two armored vehicles and tanks were destroyed or damaged. Photographs indicating routes available to the enemy for withdrawal from the BASTOGNE (P55) salient were forwarded to XIX Tactical Air Command by Photo Reconnaissance.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance slowly during the period, capturing MAGERET (P65).

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS 1-31 JANUARY 1945 AND THE ENEMY SITUATION 31 JANUARY 1945

FIRST XXXX THIRD

ASSUMED COMMAND OF MEUSE RIVER ZONE 3 JANUARY

FIFTEENTH U.S. ARMY 8 JANUARY

9TH ARMD DIV TO FIFTEENTH U.S. ARMY 8 JANUARY

10 CORPS 24 JANUARY

101ST ABN DIV TO SEVENTH U.S. ARMY 20 JANUARY

FROM REIMS 6 JANUARY

TO VIII CORPS 30 JANUARY

TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP 22 JANUARY

TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP 17 JANUARY

BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 2400 JANUARY

NOTE: 134TH RCT (35 INF DIV) ATCHD 6TH ARMD DIV

BATTLE LINE 31 JANUARY

BATTLE LINE 1 JANUARY

Part Of Radar Equipment

2 JANUARY *(D + 210)*

Identification of new enemy divisions around BASTOGNE (P55) indicated that the enemy was continuing to build up his forces. Heavy movement southwest from HOUFFALIZE (P67) suggested further reinforcement for the west flank of the enemy's salient. Enemy air activity continued to be heavy, but did not equal the violence of the previous day's attacks. Fifty-five raids were made by eighty-six planes, with traffic and field artillery positions the principal targets. Antiaircraft artillery claimed seven enemy planes destroyed and an equal number of probables. Enemy air action caused an explosion which killed ten men and destroyed four vehicles at ammunition supply depot Number 31 near RICHARDMENIL (U80).

The attack of the 26th and 35th Infantry Divisions (III Corps) continued, but gains were again limited. In extremely heavy fighting, the 26th Infantry Division gained from 500 to 800 yards along its front, while the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) mopped up in the vicinity of LUTREBOIS (P55). A one mile advance was made by Combat Command "A" (6th Armored Division) and despite several enemy counterattacks elements encircled WARDIN (P65), four and one-half miles from BASTOGNE (P55). Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) advanced one and one-half miles to the northeast, entered MICHAMPS (P66), four and one-half miles northeast of BASTOGNE (P55), attacked ARLONCOURT (P66), while other elements were one mile west of LONGVILLY (P66).

SENONCHAMPS (P55) and the high ground north of the town were taken by Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) along with elements of the 101st Airborne Division. The remainder of the 101st Airborne Division continued to assist the 11th Armored Division in its advance and to reinforce VIII Corps positions around BASTOGNE (P55). Consolidating gains of the previous day the 11th Armored Division continued its attack to the north. The BASTOGNE (P55) - MARCHE (P28) highway was crossed in a one-half mile advance about five miles northwest of BASTOGNE (P55), while Combat Command "B" captured MANDE ST ETIENNE (P55). The 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) gained one mile on the divisional right flank and captured GERIMONT (P25), three miles northeast of REMANGE (P35).

Situation in the XII Corps remained unchanged, with the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintaining their positions.

In the XX Corps the enemy was cleared from the area west of the junction of the ROSELLE and SAAR Rivers in the vicinity of VOLKLINGEN (Q37) and WERBELN (Q37). XX Corps units were rotated and positions were maintained in the SAARLAUTERN (Q23) bridgehead.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 407 sorties in forty two missions, the majority over the breakthrough area. Among claims for the day were fifty-five armored vehicles and tanks, 180 motor vehicles, 323 railroad cars and twelve locomotives damaged or destroyed. The Air Command shot down five enemy planes and lost seven planes, the majority to flak.

MANDE ST ETIENNE (P55) was captured in the continued advance of Third U.S. Army during the day, with pressure maintained against the flanks of the breakthrough area.

The shortage of "K" rations was alleviated by the receipt of 439,200 rations at the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26) and emergency shipments were sent to Army supply points. Fresh meat and butter were in short supply. A number of VIII Corps artillery battalions being seriously short of medical equipment as the result of losses sustained in the ARDENNES breakthrough, arrangements were made for immediate shipment from Communications Zone depots of items not available in Third U.S. Army depots.

Twenty-seven improved mechanized flame-throwers designed for mounting in medium tanks were to be made available to Third U.S. Army within two weeks, the Army was advised by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. The procedure adopted by Third U.S. Army of producing medical patient control cards through machine records units was applied throughout the Theater following a conference in Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, attended by the Army Adjutant General.

3 JANUARY *(D + 211)*

Enemy strength on Third U.S. Army's front was estimated at this time at 93,000 combat effectives in contact, the equivalent of twelve divisions, and 290 tanks or assault guns. Of this total, 34,500 combat effectives and ninety-five tanks or assault guns opposed III Corps, 16,500 troops and ten tanks or assault guns were lined against XII Corps, 27,000 troops and 170 tanks or assault guns faced VIII Corps, and 15,000 troops and fifteen tanks or assault guns opposed XX Corps. Identification of three more Panzer divisions on the Western Front left three known armored divisions still unlocated, these being considered as the enemy's armored reserve in the west. On the basis of prisoner of war statements that reserve armored divisions had been brought up to full strength, it was considered that the enemy still had a powerful striking force capable of employment against Third U.S. Army. That the enemy was having difficulty in producing infantry to replace his heavy losses in Third U.S. Army's salient was indicated by the shuttle of a Volksgrenadier division from the Seventh U.S. Army front, the fourth reinforcement to that area since Third U.S. Army began its counteroffensive. Four original enemy divisions holding the southern flank of his salient suffered heavy losses, making reinforcement necessary in order to keep the flank from collapsing.

Following the arrival of two Panzer divisions from the Sixth Panzer Army, the enemy launched an all-out assault against the northern perimeter of the BASTOGNE (P55) salient, while continuing to reinforce his offensive. The German Air Force avoided combat on this date, only one hostile plane appearing in the Army's area.

Making limited advances against heavy resistance in III Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division's 328th Infantry gained positions to attack BERLE (P65). Other elements of the division attacked to within 500 yards of the WILTZ River. The 35th Infantry Division continued to attack against heavy resistance, with no appreciable gains. Slow progress against bitter fighting was made by the 6th Armored Division. Elements of its Combat Command "A" continued fighting around WARDIN (P65), while Combat Command "B" was fighting heavily at MICHAMPS (P66) and ARLONCOURT (P66). Eight platoons of tank destroyers helped the division to repel three counterattacks during the day. One very strong counterattack in the 35th Infantry Division zone was repulsed.

The 101st Airborne Infantry Division repulsed a heavy enemy counterattack by tanks and infantry at LONGCHAMPS (P56), three and one-half miles north of BASTOGNE (P55), all available VIII and III Corps artillery firing in support of the defense. There was reshuffling of divisions in preparation for the continuance of VIII Corps' push to the north, the 17th Airborne Division relieving the 11th Armored Division, the 11th Armored Division assembling northeast of NEUFCHATEAU (P34), and the 28th Infantry Division (less 112th Infantry with First U.S. Army) assuming command of the MEUSE River sector. On the western part of corps zone the 87th Infantry Division pushed its attack on the western extremity of the enemy bulge. Its 346th Infantry gained from two to three miles to positions in the forest just east of ST HUBERT (P34) while the 347th Infantry consolidated its positions. Heavy enemy counterattacks were repulsed with the aid of artillery fires. An attack of the 17th Airborne Division was launched late in the period to the north, five miles northwest of BASTOGNE (P55).

The 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions of XII Corps continued active patrolling, along the corps front with no appreciable change in the front line.

Local gains were made by the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions (XX Corps) while the 10th Armored Division continued its rehabilitation and training.

Poor flying weather prohibited all air activity.

Third U.S. Army during the period made slight advances in its attack against the enemy bulge against a determined enemy while improving its positions in the southeastern portion of Army zone.

The coal supply situation became critical because of increased consumption during the cold weather. Advance Section Communications Zone was informed that the Army needed 15,000 tons of coal during January and that the 2,500 tons scheduled for delivery 7 to 14 January should be increased to 4,000 tons.

Antiaircraft Gun Crew Prepare To Fire

4 JANUARY (D + 212)

Failure of the enemy to build up offensive power in his salient with the reinforcements believed available to him strongly indicated the assumption of an overall defensive attitude in the penetration. Whether due to logistical deficiencies or insufficient room to maneuver, the enemy's lack of buildup in the salient was one of the most significant facts of his offensive at this time. It was known that he had available buildup forces but it was apparent that either supply shortage, lack of maneuvering room, or both, had prevented reinforcement of his striking power within the salient. Furious fighting continued in the BASTOGNE (P55) area as the enemy concentrated his efforts to reduce Third U.S. Army's pressure. Numerous heavy enemy counterattacks with armor and infantry were launched all along the perimeter of the bulge.

In conformity with Letter of Instruction Number Twelve from Twelfth U. S. Army Group, an operational directive was sent to the Commanding Generals of III, VIII, XII and XX Corps. It provided that the Seventh U. S. Army on the south continue to defend its present sector. First U. S. Army was to continue the attack to the southeast to seize HOUFFALIZE (P67) and effect a junction with Third U.S. Army in the HOUFFALIZE (P67) area, was to destroy the enemy trapped in its zone and continue the attack toward ST VITH (P88). Third U.S. Army was to continue the attack to the northeast to seize HOUFFALIZE (P67) and effect a junction with First U.S. Army in the HOUFFALIZE (P67) area, was to destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, continue the attack toward ST VITH (P88), protect the right flank of First U.S. Army, and continue to defend the line of the SAAR, MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers.

III Corps was ordered to continue the attack in the direction of ST VITH (P88) and maintain contact with First U.S. Army on the north. VIII Corps was ordered to continue its mission of responsibility for defense of the MEUSE River sector, employing troops under operational control of VIII Corps; to continue the attack to seize the high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (P67), attack northwest on Army order and destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, protect the left (west) flank of Third U.S. Army, and be prepared to attack to the northeast in the direction of ST VITH (P88). XII Corps was ordered to clear the enemy west of the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers and defend the MOSELLE - SAUER River lines in zone, attack north on Army order on the axis DIEKIRCH (P84) - ST VITH (P88) and destroy the enemy on its front, and protect the right (east) flank of Third U.S. Army. XX Corps was ordered to continue its mission of expanding the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. When a junction was effected with elements of First and Third U.S. Armies in the HOUFFALIZE (P67) area, the First U.S. Army was to come under the command of Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

Camouflaged Halftrack

In the eastern part of III Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division continued its attack against bitter resistance, making no gain. Its 328th Infantry relieved the 101st Infantry which went into divisional reserve. Advancing in the center of the corps zone, the three regiments of the 35th Infantry Division made an average gain of 500 yards. The 320th Infantry neared HARLANGE (P64), while the 137th Infantry was two miles west of HARLANGE (P55) and the 134th Infantry cleared the northeast portion of LUTREBOIS (P55). The 6th Armored Division consolidated its positions on the corps west flank and prepared to continue the attack. Its Combat Command "B", in the vicinity of MICHAMPS (P66), pulled back abreast of the 101st Airborne Division (VIII Corps) to gain infantry support.

Continuing to defend the BASTOGNE (P55) area, the 101st Airborne Division destroyed thirty-four enemy tanks in repulsing a heavy enemy counterattack. The 17th Airborne Division gained one mile against moderate resistance which increased considerably toward the end of the period. On its right flank it was in contact with the 101st Airborne Division. On the VIII Corps' west flank the 87th Infantry Division continued to exert pressure against the western end of the enemy bulge, but resistance stiffened so much that there was no gain. The 11th Armored Division closed into an assembly area between NEUFCHATEAU (P34) and BASTOGNE (P55) with Combat Command "A" moving to the vicinity of SEDAN (092).

It was requested by the enemy to have VIII Corps Artillery cease firing on an important crossroad near where was located an enemy hospital. After a thorough investigation, the Army Commander decided to hold fire, although officers were sent through the enemy lines to ascertain that these roads were used exclusively for hospital traffic.

XII Corps situation remained unchanged during the period. The 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions continued to patrol vigorously, with no change in the front line.

Only change in XX Corps was in limited objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead by the 1st Battalion of the 378th Infantry and 1st Battalion of the 379th Infantry (95th Infantry Division). The 10th Armored Division continued regrouping and training.

XIX Tactical Air Command planes were again held on the ground by poor flying weather.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack to the northeast.

Materials were released for primary repairs to the Sixteenth Century walls of the University of PONT-A-MOUSSON (U73), which the French reported had been wantonly fired by the Germans during the fighting in September.

5 JANUARY *(D + 213)*

Continuing his pressure, the enemy threw more counterattacks against VIII Corps front, while hammering at III Corps line with intense artillery fire. Enemy patrols attempted infiltration tactics.

Annex No 1 to the Operational Directive of 4 January was sent to the various corps commanders on this date. It provided that XII Corps artillery support the attack of III Corps by fire from positions within its zone, that VIII Corps artillery assist the attack of III Corps by counter-battery fire on known hostile artillery positions, and that coordination of the artillery fires be made directly by Corps Artillery Commanders concerned.

The 26th Infantry Division in III Corps continued to reorganize and strengthen its positions preparing to continue its advance. The 35th Infantry Division continued fighting against strong enemy pressure with only minor changes in the front lines being effected while clearing LUTREBOIS (P55). The 6th Armored Division on the corps west flank consolidated its front after joining flanks with the 101st Airborne Division and the 35th Infantry Division.

In the VIII Corps, the 101st Airborne Division continued defending BASTOGNE (P55), while the 17th Airborne Division was heavily counterattacked. The 513th Parachute Regiment (17th Airborne Division) fought heavily but did not gain, while the 194th Glider Infantry was forced by heavy pressure to withdraw to prepared defensive positions around HOUMONT (P45), six miles west of BASTOGNE (P55). Advancing one mile on the corps west flank, the 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) straightened its lines.

The 5th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 80th Infantry Division east of the ALZETTE River, while the 80th Infantry Division launched an attack to the north toward the end of the period and secured a bridgehead across the SURE River. Otherwise the situation remained unchanged in XII Corps zone.

There was little change in XX Corps, the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions maintaining their positions while patrolling vigorously. One limited objective attack in the 95th Infantry Division was satisfactorily accomplished.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 191 sorties, directed principally at marshalling yards and enemy airfields, with a total of 127 railroad cars damaged or destroyed in the operation.

Third U.S. Army's attack to the northeast continued during the period, while to the southeast positions were maintained.

A directive to hospital units instructed that evacuation and/or transfer of patients must be coordinated to insure proper meals. Provided their condition warranted, incoming patients were to be given a hot meal no matter at what hour they were received. This also applied to the feeding of ambulance drivers.

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6 JANUARY *(D + 214)*

Although it was considered at this time that a withdrawal of the enemy's major units from his salient had not taken place, the favored capability was that he would pull out of the western portion of the salient to a defensive position on the favorable ground extending northeast from HOUFFALIZE (P67) to ST VITH (P88) and from this position oppose the advance of Third U.S. Army to the northeast and/or east. Reports of lack of resistance to pressure on the north of the enemy salient, deep patrol penetration to the northwest of the BASTOGNE (P55) wedge, and a marked diminution of artillery fire in that area indicated either that a reshuffling of enemy units was underway or that the enemy had withdrawn some of his forces from the FAYS (P56) area. Pressure against the enemy's north flank and bombing of the vital HOUFFALIZE (P67) roadnet made his supply problem west of the HOUFFALIZE (P67) - BASTOGNE (P55) line extremely critical. Enemy air activity continued light, with only four planes reported over the Army area.

Activity on III Corps front died down somewhat, several small counterattacks being repulsed with the help of supporting artillery while the 26th Infantry Division consolidated its positions. The 35th Infantry Division pushed the attack in the northwest part of its zone. There was no change in the position of the 6th Armored Division.



Arranging Camouflage Net Over Truck



Nazi Panzer Grenadier

In the VIII Corps the BASTOGNE (P55) area continued to be defended by the 101st Airborne Division. To the west, keeping contact with the 101st Airborne Division, the 17th Airborne Division strengthened its positions while making local advances against heavy resistance. Advance elements reached the outskirts of FLAMIERGE (P46). There was no change in the 11th Armored Division which patrolled actively. The 87th Infantry Division made small advances on the west of the enemy bulge. Its 346th Infantry cleared TILLET (P45), eight miles west of BASTOGNE (P55) after a heavy artillery barrage, while the 347th Infantry made advances in the woods six miles west of ST HUBERT (P34). The 28th Infantry Division continued to patrol along its MEUSE River sector. The 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) was assigned to VIII Corps.

Moderate resistance was met as the continued attack of the 80th Infantry Division in XII Corps zone progressed, GOESDORF (P74) and DAHL (P75) were captured and leading elements of the division neared NOCHER (P75), the objective of the attack. A tank destroyer battalion knocked out two enemy tanks in a night attack by first illuminating the tanks with 60mm mortar flares, then opening fire.

The 90th Infantry Division was relieved of assignment to XX Corps on 6 January and commenced movement to III Corps zone, while the 94th Infantry Division which was assigned to Third U.S. Army on this date began movement to relieve the 90th Infantry Division in zone.

XIX Tactical Air Command was not able to take to the air because of poor flying weather.

GOESDORF (P74) and DAHL (P75) were cleared in the northward advance of Third U.S. Army during the period, while positions in the southeastern portion of Army zone were improved.

MR. PAUL V. McNUTT, chairman of the War Manpower Commission, and MR. MAURY MAVERICK, vice chairman for labor production, visited the Third U.S. Army Headquarters, Rear-Echelon, and were conducted on a tour of Army supply installations in the vicinity of NANCY (U81). Twelfth U.S. Army Group informed Third U.S. Army that it was to receive approximately thirty-five percent of cold weather clothing available in the Theater and that delivery could be expected about 15 January. These items included shoe pacs, socks, ponchos, mittens and mufflers. The total tonnage unloaded by Third U.S. Army during the week 31 December--6 January was 31,071 tons, with 4,749 tons of supplies moved by rail as intra-Army movements.

7 JANUARY *(D + 215)*

Significant order of battle facts indicated at this time that the enemy had abandoned further offensive operations in his salient and was screening withdrawal of his armor by local diversionary attacks. Failure to reinforce his offensive and to resort to the familiar shuttle of armored divisions from one sector to another indicated that the enemy lacked ready effective reserves or did not possess the equipment and supplies to maintain them, and that he considered that his offensive had achieved its objective of unhinging the Allied winter offensive. The enemy's reluctance to commit two armored divisions known to be held in reserve increased the possibility of a power drive in another sector, possibly the MOSELLE-SAAR triangle.

Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen, Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, was received. It stated:

"1. Under the provisions of SHAEF directive, Headquarters Fifteenth Army is assigned to Twelfth Army Group.

"2. For the present, Fifteenth Army is charged with the following missions:

a. Command of United States Units in SHAEF reserve.

b. Supervision of the staging, equipping and training of new units assigned to Twelfth Army Group with the object of preparing them for active operations at the earliest practicable date.

c. Supervision of the re-organization, re-equipping and training of Twelfth Army Group units returned from the combat zone and assigned or attached to the Fifteenth Army.

d. Preparation of plans for:

(1) Following the advance of Twelfth Army Group into GERMANY, occupying rear areas and protecting lines of communication.

(2) Occupying the RHINELAND within Twelfth Army Group zone, and protecting the lines of communication therein.

(3) Assuming an operational role in the advance if need therefor should arise. Further instructions will be issued at a later date.

e. Assumption of command, on orders of this headquarters, of the units engaged in containing the enemy garrisons in the BRITTANY-LOIRE region and the units employed in defense of the MEUSE River south of GIVET, exclusive. Fifteenth Army will report to this headquarters when it is fully prepared to assume this mission, at which time further detailed instructions will be issued.

"3. Headquarters Fifteenth Army, will be located initially in the vicinity of SUIPPES (T-6764).

"4. The strictest security will be maintained with regard to the location and activities of Fifteenth Army."

On the east flank of III Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division improved its positions and patrolled to the WILTZ River with no change in its front. The 35th Infantry Division fought heavily throughout the period without advance, but held its front and relieved some of its elements. Operating on the corps west flank, the 6th Armored Division improved its positions and held off numerous small counterattacks. One strong counterattack forced Combat Command "A" back 1,000 yards, but it attacked later and regained its original positions. The 90th Infantry Division closed in III Corps zone in vicinity of ESCHDORF (P74).

Heavy fighting continued north and west of BASTOGNE (P55) in VIII Corps zone. There was no change in disposition of the 101st Airborne Division, but the 17th Airborne Division, operating to the west of and maintaining contact with the 101st Airborne Division, advanced up to two miles along its front. The organic artillery of the 6th Armored Division and four attached III Corps artillery battalions fired in support of the 17th Airborne Division, whose 513th Parachute Infantry captured FLAMIERGE (P46), six miles northwest of BASTOGNE (P55), while the 194th Glider Infantry advanced slightly and was then forced to withdraw to its original positions under heavy enemy pressure. On the west of the enemy bulge the 87th Infantry Division advanced slowly and continued to attack TILLET (P45). Its 345th Infantry relieved the 347th Infantry in zone. The 28th Infantry Division continued its defense of the MEUSE River sectqr.

Gaining limited objectives east of GOESDORF (P74), the 80th Infantry Division consolidated its positions in the vicinity of DAHL (P75) and repulsed an enemy counterattack near the town, aided by a tank destroyer battalion which knocked out seven enemy tanks. Artillery of the 26th Infantry Division (III Corps) fired in support of the 80th Infantry Division. Elsewhere in XII Corps zone, the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions held their positions and patrolled vigorously.

Completing relief of the 90th Infantry Division at the end of the period, the 94th Infantry Division (-302d Infantry) took over command of XX Corps zone in the morning. Patrolling continued in the 95th Infantry Division zone.

Weather again precluded all flights of XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers.

Heavy fighting continued on the BASTOGNE (P55) area, while FLAMIERGE (P46) was taken.

In view of the tactical situation, it was decided to reduce supplies in the heavily-stocked Class II and Class IV depot at METZ (U85). Shipments to this point were reduced, supplies moved to other points and issues of American Red Cross and Post Exchange items were speeded. Because of the cold weather, V-80 gasoline, which had been used throughout the campaign instead of 73-octane aircraft fuel, became unsatisfactory for use in artillery liaison aircraft.

A definite policy was established by Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, on the handling of Allied nationals who had collaborated or served with the enemy. When captured, these persons were to be handled and processed as prisoners of war, disposition of exceptional cases to be made by the Army Provost Marshal in accordance with instructions received from higher headquarters. Combat commanders were not authorized to accept the parole of French, Belgian, Netherlands or Luxembourg nationals who had served with the German forces.

The Rear Echelon of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, began movement to ESCH (P70). Civil affairs intelligence reports cited many cases of the looting of food, horses, cattle, blankets, clothing and other property by enemy troops participating in the ARDENNES offensive.

Machine Gunner On The Alert

8 JANUARY *(D + 216)*

An operational directive in confirmation of verbal orders was issued by the Army Commander on this date. It assigned the 94th Infantry Division to XX Corps and attached temporarily the 302d Infantry to the 28th Infantry Division of VIII Corps. III Corps was ordered to assume command of the 90th Infantry Division from XX Corps, to pass control of the 4th Armored Division to VIII Corps at once, to attack aggressively on 9 January to cut the enemy salient southeast of BASTOGNE (P55) and destroy the encircled enemy. The corps was to be prepared to assist VIII Corps in seizing NOVILLE (P56) and HOUFFALIZE (P67) or to continue the attack northeast in the direction of ST VITH (P88), to maintain contact with VIII Corps until contact was gained with First U.S. Army on the north, then to maintain contact with First U.S. Army. VIII Corps was ordered to continue defense of the MEUSE River line in its zone, to assume control of the 4th Armored Division, to attack aggressively on 9 January to capture NOVILLE (P56) and seize high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE (P67), to attack northeast on Army order and destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, to protect the left (west) flank of Third U.S. Army, and to be prepared to attack northeast in the direction of ST VITH (P88). XII Corps was ordered to continue its mission of clearing the enemy west of the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers and defense of the MOSELLE - SAUER River line in its zone, to attack north on Army order on the axis DIEKIRCH (P84) - ST VITH (P88) and destroy the enemy on its front, and to protect the right (east) flank of Third U.S. Army. XX Corps was ordered to continue its present mission. There was no change in corps boundaries.

Attacks were launched on schedule at 1000 on 9 January by III and VIII Corps and were proceeding slowly at the end of the period.

The 90th Infantry Division participated with the other divisions of III Corps in the general attack, with some progress being made.

In accordance with orders from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, the 9th Armored and the 28th Infantry Divisions were assigned to XV Army and placed in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve.

The 101st Airborne Division held the VIII Corps' east flank in its continued defense of BASTOGNE (P55), patrolling vigorously and beating off some small counterattacks. Contact with the 101st Airborne Division was maintained by the 17th Airborne Division while fighting heavily around FLAMIERGE (P46). In the 87th Infantry Division the 346th Infantry continued fighting in TILLET (P45) and held positions northeast of the town, while the 345th Infantry was forced to withdraw slightly in a zone east of ST HUBERT (P34) because of heavy enemy pressure. The 28th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army and VIII Corps. A coordinated attack was launched at 091000 by the 101st Airborne Division, the 17th Airborne Division and the 87th Infantry Division. All were gaining slowly at the close of the period. The 4th and 11th Armored Divisions remained in position ready to assist in the attack if necessary. The 80th Infantry Division (XII Corps) repulsed a German counterattack and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, knocking out nineteen tanks.

Battle Worn Infantryman

In the XX Corps zone the 94th Infantry Division closed at 081900 and assumed responsibility for the 90th Infantry Division zone. The 3d Cavalry Group, which had relieved the 90th Infantry Division, gave up this zone to the 94th Infantry Division and assumed north flank patrolling. The 95th Infantry Division continued to maintain its positions in the SAARLAUTERN (Q23) bridgehead area while the 10th Armored Division continued its rehabilitation and training in the METZ (U85) area.

Another day of low overcast prohibited air activity.

Third U.S. Army launched a coordinated attack to the northeast during the period. The 9th Armored Division and the 28th Infantry Division were relieved from assignment to Third U.S. Army.

The railhead at AUDUN-LE-ROMAN (U69) continued to be the principal ammunition supply source for Third U.S. Army. Point Number 38 at MAMER (P71) continued to serve both III and XII Corps, while Point Number 39 at MELLIER (P43) served VIII Corps. Reconnaissance was made, stockage planned and ammunition diverted by rail to the vicinity of BASTOGNE (P55) to establish a new point for the support of VIII Corps.

9 JANUARY *(D + 217)*

While the enemy's overall defensive attitude increased and indications of a retrograde movement continued in the western projection of his salient, there still was no conclusive evidence of a general enemy withdrawal. It was indicated that the enemy was pursuing his familiar policy of selling space for time at as high a cost as possible. The possibility of an enemy thrust toward LUXEMBOURG (P81) and METZ (U85) was given serious consideration.

III Corps' advance which began at 091000 progressed well during the period, supported by all corps artillery. The 26th Infantry Division gained one mile along its front and secured the high ground overlooking the WILTZ River, its most advanced units being one mile from the town of WILTZ (P75). Advancing one and one-half miles, the 90th Infantry Division took positions along the WILTZ River in zone and, with tank destroyers knocking out six enemy tanks, captured BERLE (P65) and TRENTELHOF (P65), while the 6th Cavalry Group made a 300-yard advance west of the 90th Infantry Division. Six battalions of XII Corps artillery fired in support of the III Corps attack. The 35th Infantry Division made small advances in its divisional left and maintained contact with the 6th Armored Division which meanwhile made a 1500-yard advance between MARVIE (P57) and LUTREBOIS (P55).

An advance of nearly two miles in VIII Corps zone was made by the 101st Airborne Division to an area northwest of NOVILLE (P56) taking RECOGNE (P56). While making minor advances, the 17th Airborne Division maintained contact with the 101st Airborne Division. The 87th Infantry Division attacked around TILLET (P45) and nearly encircled the town until a heavy counterattack forced slight withdrawals. The 4th Armored Division attacked and made slight gains in zone just west of the 17th Airborne Division's zone. Protection of its MEUSE River sector was continued by the 28th Infantry Division, while the 11th Armored Division prepared to attack in any direction wherever it was most needed.

There was no change in the XII Corps, units patrolled continuously rotating their front line troops while maintaining positions.

The 94th Infantry Division relieved the 3d Cavalry Squadron in the XX Corps zone and aggressive patrols were maintained.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group informed the Third U.S. Army that a directive from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force indicated Third U.S. Army might have to hold its attack on the BASTOGNE (P55) area and divert divisions to the MOSELLE area, southeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81) to meet a possible attack by the Germans there. Higher headquarters directed the withdrawal of the 4th Armored Division from the BASTOGNE (P55) area to be moved southeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81), prepared to meet this threat. Plans were also made for the use of antiaircraft artillery units in an anti-tank or in a field artillery role to meet the threat. The 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, which controlled the defenses of LUXEMBOURG (P81), coordinated its anti-tank and field artillery plan with XII Corps. In METZ (U85), the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade planned the use of antiaircraft artillery for similar missions coordinating with XX Corps.

Bad flying conditions prevailed, but twenty-four sorties were flown in a bomber escort mission.

Third U.S. Army continued its attack to the north during the period and captured RECOGNE (P56), BERLE (P65) and TRENTELHOF (P65) while maintaining its positions in the southeastern portion of zone.

Seven hundred tons of special winter clothing awaited shipment to the Army at LE HAVRE (L42). Communications Zone requested that the Army dispatch vehicles to bring forward the clothing, but the tactical situation precluded the use of Army trucks for this purpose.

Observing Enemy Positions

Moving Up To The Front

10 JANUARY *(D + 218)*

Enemy combat effective strength in contact on Third U.S. Army's front at this time was estimated at 74,000 troops, the equivalent of nine and one-half divisions, and 220 tanks or assault guns, representing a decrease of 19,000 troops and twenty tanks or assault guns in one week's time. While the enemy succeeded in maintaining a flow of infantry replacements, it was indicated that these covered only partially the heavy losses he sustained in the hard fighting within his salient.

Small advances were made by nearly all major units of III Corps against heavy enemy artillery reaction. In the 26th Infantry Division zone on the east flank, the 104th Infantry advanced 500 yards to a vicinity just south of WINSELER (P65), while the 101st Infantry advanced 1000 yards along the high ground east of HARLANGE (P64). Meanwhile, the 90th Infantry Division advanced one mile to the immediate vicinity of DONCOLS (P65). The 6th Cavalry Group, flanked by the 90th and 35th Infantry Divisions, attacked on a small front, making gains up to one mile, captured BETLANGE (P54), WATRANGE (P65) and HARLANGE (P64), then advanced to TARCHAMPS (P65). The 35th Infantry Division fought ahead against stiff resistance to make minor gains and capture VILLERS-LE-BONNE-EAU (P55) while other elements entered LUTREMANGE (P55). No advance was made by the 6th Armored Division which furnished fire support for the 35th Infantry Division's attack.

Attacking northeast in VIII Corps zone from the BASTOGNE (P55) area, the 4th Armored Division advanced 1,000 yards. The 101st Airborne Division meanwhile made a 1,000-yard advance just west of the 4th Armored Division, while the 17th Airborne Division maintained its front and patrolled aggressively. On the corps west flank the 87th Infantry Division cleared TILLET (P45) and BONNERUE (P35), the former under cover of a heavy smoke screen laid by supporting artillery, while some elements made a one mile advance to the vicinity of AMBERLOUP (P46). ST HUBERT (P34) was contained by other elements of the 87th Infantry Division. There was no change in the disposition of the 28th Infantry Division in the MEUSE River zone. The 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) was released from VIII Corps and assigned to XX Corps.

Maintaining their positions in the XII Corps zone, the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions patrolled vigorously. A limited objective attack was launched by the 2d Cavalry Group which captured MACHTUM (L01).

In the XX Corps zone the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) closed in the division area at 101730 while the remainder of the division improved its positions. The 95th Infantry Division patrolled vigorously, while its 377th Infantry relieved the 379th Infantry. In the METZ (U85) area, the 10th Armored Division continued training and rehabilitation.

Good weather permitted XIX Tactical Air Command to fly 325 sorties in which 182 tons of general purpose bombs were dropped. Two hundred forty-six motor vehicles, fourteen tanks and armored vehicles, 145 railroad cars and four bridges were destroyed in the day's operations.

Capturing BETLANGE (P54), HARLANGE (P65), WATRANGE (P65), TILLET (P45) and BONNERUE (P35), the Third U.S. Army advance continued during the day, while positions in the southeastern portion of zone were maintained.

All but thirteen of forty-four rail cars loaded with ammunition for Supply Point Number 39 at MELLIER (P43) were destroyed in a train wreck at MESSANCY (P61), most of the ammunition either exploding or burning. A provisional collecting squad, an ammunition company and a platoon of a truck company worked for forty-eight hours to salvage the maximum amount of ammunition.

Because of a critical shortage of blankets and litters for medical use, conservatory measures were undertaken and supply discipline was emphasized. An increase to four blankets per ambulatory patient on hospital trains was authorized. Plans for increased production and supply of camouflage snow suits were completed. Manufacturing facilities had been located with an estimated capacity of 10,000 suits per week and complete suits for use of Third U.S. Army units were expected from the Communications Zone.

A total of 1,806 displaced persons were in camps in Third U.S. Army's zone of operations.

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11 JANUARY *(D + 219)*

With the enemy on Third U.S. Army's front definitely on the defensive, it was considered likely that he had written off his ARDENNES offensive and was defending and delaying while preparing to regain the initiative by an assault in another sector. Reports persisted that the enemy was preparing for an offensive in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) -- SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) sector.

Patrols were pushed by the 26th Infantry Division to the WILTZ River, but there was no change in its front lines. In a zone to the west of the 26th Infantry Division, the 90th Infantry Division advanced one mile, capturing DONCOLS (P65) and SONLEZ (P65) against increasingly heavy artillery opposition. Meanwhile, Task Force FICKETT (6th Cavalry Group reinforced) made contact with the 26th Infantry Division at SONLEZ (P65) after advancing one mile and taking TARCHAMPS (P65). The 35th Infantry Division in conjunction with Task Force FICKETT, captured LUTREMANGE (P55) and advanced over one mile against decreasing resistance. The 773d Tank Destroyer Battalion captured sixty prisoners. The 320th Infantry, which had been attached to the 6th Armored Division, returned to divisional control. On III Corps' west flank the 6th Armored Division maintained positions and continued patrolling.

Preparing to attack, the 101st and 17th Airborne Divisions maintained and consolidated their positions in the VIII Corps zone. The 4th Armored Division moved to an assembly area southeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81) in XII Corps reserve. The 87th Infantry Division continued its attack on the western end of the ARDENNES bulge, and captured VESQUEVILLE (P35) and ST HUBERT (P36).

Advances were made in XII Corps zone by the 2d Cavalry Group which mopped up in the vicinity of MACHTUM (L01) east of GREVENMACHER (L02), and by the 80th Infantry Division whose 318th Infantry occupied the high ground between the WARK and SAUER Rivers in the vicinity of BURDEN (P84) while the 319th Infantry took positions on the north bank of the SURE River. The 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions continued to maintain their positions and patrol vigorously.

Patrolling continued aggressively and front line units were rotated in XX Corps zone.

There was no air activity by XIX Tactical Air Command due to poor flying weather.

Advance of Third U.S. Army continued during the day, with LUTREMANGE (P55), DONCOLS (P65), TARCHAMPS (P65), VESQUEVILLE (P35) and ST HUBERT (P36) being captured. The 8th and 9th Armored Divisions were attached to Third U.S. Army for administration and supply only.

Approximately 500,000 troops were being supplied with rations by the Army, including 367,770 Third U.S. Army troops, 31,562 troops of Advance Section Communications Zone, 42,198 troops of the Ninth U.S. Air Force, 3,066 French troops, 3,233 miscellaneous troops and an estimated 52,171 prisoners of war, civilian laborers, casuals and attachments. Commanding Generals of corps and divisions were informed that the supply of "K" rations on the Continent was critical and that this type of ration should be supplied only to combat troops. Civil affairs arranged an emergency shipment of 800 tons of coal for ARLON (P62) and moved 500 pounds of yeast from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81) to MERSCH (P82) for the making of bread.

German Prisoners Are Searched At Prisoner Of War Enclosure

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12 JANUARY *(D + 220)*

Capability of an enemy attack on the shoulders and/or the base of Third U.S. Army's BASTOGNE (P55) wedge was considered materially reduced at this time because of indicated enemy withdrawals, as evidenced by his failure to counterattack and the capture of large numbers of prisoners. Elsewhere in the salient the enemy was still considered only capable of continuing on the defensive.

The 26th Infantry Division patrolled to the WILTZ River. After being pinched out by movement of the 6th Cavalry Group, Task Force SCOTT (101st Infantry reinforced) assembled southeast of ESCHDORF (P76). The 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) attacked northwest through positions of the 357th Infantry and advanced to capture BRAS (P65), then continued its attack to the north. A pocket of the enemy south of SONLEZ (P65) was cleared by Task Force FICKETT (6th Cavalry Group reinforced). Meanwhile, a two mile advance was made by 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) to make contact with the 90th Infantry Division in the vicinity of BRAS (P65). On III Corps west flank an attack to the southeast was made by the 6th Armored Division which captured WARDIN (P63) and made contact with the 35th and 90th Infantry Divisions at BRAS (P65). This successful attack created a pocket of enemy troops which was mopped up by the 26th Infantry Division and Task Force FICKETT.

In a zone north of BASTOGNE (P55) the 101st Airborne Division patrolled aggressively but did not make any advance. To the west an advance of one and one-half miles was made by the 17th Airborne Division against lightly held positions. The 11th Armored Division relieved elements of the 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions in place and launched an attack just before the end of the period. The 28th Infantry Division continued to maintain defensive positions on the MEUSE River, while on VIII Corps' west flank the 87th Infantry Division continued to reduce the western end of the enemy bulge, advancing two miles in a zone south of the OURTHE River.

There was no change in XII Corps, with the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintaining their positions. The 4th Armored Division remained in its assembly area southeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81).

XX Corps situation also was unchanged. 94th and 95th Infantry Divisions maintained their positions and patrolled aggressively while the 10th Armored Division continued training and rehabilitation in the vicinity of METZ (U85).

Bad weather limited operations of XIX Tactical Air Command to six sorties in three tactical reconnaissance missions.

Third U.S. Army continued its attack during the period, capturing BRAS (P65) and WARDIN (P65).

An enemy rocket projectile of an unidentified type landed in the area of the semi-mobile laundry located with the 104th Evacuation Hospital in the City of LUXEMBOURG (P81), injuring seven men, three of them seriously, and causing damage to two vans and one tractor. Although several projectiles struck in the city, only one landed in the hospital area.

Fifty truckloads of clothing from Advance Section Communications Zone were unloaded at the Army depot at LONGWY (P50). The shipment included 51,666 field and combat jackets of various types, which alleviated a shortage that had existed for several months. Prospects were that the Army would have from 5,000 to 6,000 camouflage snow suits per division within three weeks. Seven C-47 planes were allocated the medical service of the entire Theater for supply and evacuation, but since this number would not materially affect evacuation it was expected they would be of most value for transport of medical supplies. Responsibility of equipping the 9th Armored Division was delegated to Third U.S. Army.

Surgery In The Field

13 JANUARY *(D + 221)*

On the eastern flank of III Corps the 26th Infantry Division continued its aggressive patrols and mopped up the enemy in zone south of the WILTZ River. Immediately to the west the advance of the 90th Infantry Division continued after a heavy counterattack was repulsed, advance elements of the division reaching the WILTZ River. Task Force FICKETT, pinched out south of BRAS (P65), moved to an assembly area north of ARLON (P62). In the pocket southeast of BASTOGNE (P55), which had been closed on 12 January by a junction of the 6th Armored Division and the 90th Infantry Division, the 35th Infantry Division mopped up the remaining enemy. On the corps west flank, Combat Command "A" (6th Armored Division) continued fighting in the vicinity of WARDIN (P65) while Combat Command "B" attacked to the north, making slight gains against very heavy opposition.

Infantryman Rests At A Crossroad

The 101st Airborne Division (VIII Corps) attacked to the northeast, its 502d Parachute Infantry clearing a forest three miles northeast of BASTOGNE (P55), while leading elements reached a point just south of NOVILLE (P56). Simultaneously, the 11th Armored Division attacked north toward BERTOGNE (P56). Its Combat Command "A" advanced two miles and reached the outskirts of the town while Combat Command "B" advanced to a point one mile southwest of BERTOGNE (P56). The ST HUBERT (P34) - HOUFFALIZE (P67) highway was cut by the 17th Airborne Division, and RUETTE (P56) and GIVRY (P59) were captured following a two mile advance. The 517th Parachute Infantry (17th Airborne Division) passed through the 11th Armored Division and captured GIVROULLE (P46) and BERTOGNE (P56). On the west of the enemy bulge the 87th Infantry Division continued to drive east, advancing three miles and clearing most of the area south of the OURTHE River. LAVACHERIE (P46), SPRIMONT (P46), HERBAIMONT (P46). MACAVIVIER (P46) and TRONLE (P46) were taken in the advance. The MEUSE River zone continued to be patrolled and protected by the 28th Infantry Division.

A noteworthy example of effective air-ground coordination occurred in connection with an VIII Corps Artillery reconnaissance mission. Upon completion of the mission the pilot was asked to verify a report of enemy armor moving south into HOUFFALIZE (P67). The pilot located a mixed column of sixty vehicles, both armored and general purpose, moving into the town and adjusted an VIII Corps artillery battalion thereon. Adjustment was followed by a three battalion time-on-target concentration upon the town. The pilot also vectored in a squadron of fighter bombers to bomb and strafe the enemy column. In the meantime he circled the area, locating two enemy antiaircraft batteries on which he adjusted two 155mm gun battalions. Destruction of the enemy column was virtually complete.

There was no change in XII Corps, the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions continuing to maintain their fronts and patrol aggressively and the 4th Armored Division remaining southeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81) in assembly area.

Limited objective attacks in XX Corps zone were launched by the 94th and 95th Infantry Divisions. The 94th Infantry Division occupied TETTINGEN (L00) and BUTZDORF (L00) while the 95th Infantry Division attacked with no gain reported at the end of the period.

Five hundred fifty-one sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command and twenty-five railroad lines were cut while 137 motor vehicles, 168 railroad cars and forty factories were destroyed or damaged in the day's raids.

Third U.S. Army's advance to the northeast continued, during the period, capturing BERTOGNE (P56) while limited objective attacks were launched in the southeastern portion of Army zone, with TETTINGEN (L00) and BUTZDORF (L00) being captured.

Total tonnage unloaded by Third U.S. Army during the week 7--13 January was 56,730 tons, with 4,677 tons of supplies moved by rail as intra-Army movements. Army personnel helped in the repair of electric power lines throughout the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG. By this date power had been restored to nine of the thirteen communes of REDANGE Canton and work was progressing in other areas.

14 JANUARY (D + 222)

Order of battle facts indicated that the enemy would continue to withdraw from the ARDENNES salient under pressure and that he would continue to withdraw and hoard his mobile armored reserve for employment against a possible Allied offensive or to spearhead an offensive of his own design to retain the initiative. In this connection, the SAARLAUTERN (Q28)--SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) area was closely watched. Enemy air activity increased on this date, when six raids were made by eleven planes, one of which was destroyed and two more claimed as probably destroyed by antiaircraft artillery.

In the eastern zone of III Corps the 26th Infantry Division occupied the high ground along the south bank of the WILTZ River. Just to the west the 90th Infantry Division continued its attack and made gains of one-half mile against strong resistance. Task Force FICKETT was in corps reserve while the 35th Infantry Division pulled out and proceeded to an assembly area. On the Corps west flank the 6th Armored Division continued to advance, clearing SENONCHAMPS (P65) after a one mile advance.

In the VIII Corps zone the 101st Airborne Division consolidated its positions and prepared to continue its advance. An attack was launched by all the Combat Commands of the 11th Armored Division. Combat Command "A" advanced two miles east of COMPOGNE (P56), four miles southwest of HOUFFALIZE (P67), while Combat Command "B" attacked through positions of the 101st Airborne Division, captured COBRU (P56) and advanced to the southern outskirts of NOVILLE (P56), and Reserve Combat Command continued fighting in the forest southwest of BERTOGNE (P56). Meanwhile, the 17th Airborne Division, operating in the same zone as the 11th Armored Division, advanced north with its 507th Parachute Infantry securing all ground south of the OURTHE River in zone. Contact was made with the British 51st Infantry Division pushing from the north. The 87th Infantry Division was pinched out following the junction of the 17th Airborne Division and the British, and its 346th Infantry moved to the XII Corps zone while other elements of the division prepared to move following assignment of the division to XII Corps.

Infantryman Crouches In Trench

Front line units in XII Corps were rotated while patrolling continued. The 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) closed in an area southeast of LUXEMBOURG (P81) and began preparing to assume a position on the front, while the 4th Armored Division remained in an assembly area in corps zone.

The 94th Infantry Division (XX Corps) repulsed a heavy counterattack in the vicinity of TETTINGEN (L00) and then continued its attack, capturing BORG (L00). Meanwhile, the 95th Infantry Division consolidated positions after making minor advances in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead.

Flying 633 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command shot down seven enemy planes, destroyed or damaged 410 motor vehicles, fifty-two armored vehicles and tanks, 174 railroad cars and ten locomotives in another big day.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack against the enemy bulge in BELGIUM during the period. SENONCHAMPS (P55) was taken, while in the southeastern portion of Army zone BORG (L00) was captured. Contact with the British XXX Corps was established during the day on the western end of the enemy salient.

The Army Commander attended a conference on supply requirements at Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Army Group with LIEUTENANT GENERAL BREHON B. SOMERVELL, Commanding General of the Army Service Forces; LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN C. H. LEE, Commanding General of Communications Zone; LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, and Major General LEVEN H. CAMPBELL, Chief of Ordnance.

Third U.S. Army on this date reached a peak strength of 370,456, the highest since operations on the Continent were begun. The attachment of new divisions and units, although many of them were temporarily below strength, accounted for the increase. While the Command was at a peak strength, actually Table of Organization requirements were not met at this time despite a steady flow of reinforcements.

As the critical shortage of coal persisted, supply points were notified to cut the coal ration from four to two pounds per man per day. Army and corps headquarters were requested to reduce coal consumption by fifty percent, although the supply for hospitals remained unchanged. A total of 104½ tons of medical supplies arrived by train from Communications Zone, including many items that had been in critical short supply.

15 JANUARY *(D + 223)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

South of the WILTZ River, the 26th Infantry Division continued mopping up the enemy, while the 35th Infantry Division (-) was in III Corps reserve. The 320th Infantry and 1st Battalion 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) were attached to the 6th Armored Division. Advancing one mile, the 90th Infantry Division beat off several counterattacks, with its 358th Infantry capturing NIEDER WAMPACH (P65). After division artillery massed its fires on NIEDER WAMPACH (P65) in time-on-target concentrations, the infantry captured the town at a cost of only two casualties as against 300 prisoners taken. On III Corps west flank the 6th Armored Division advanced one and one-half miles against strong resistance. Its Combat Command "A" took high ground near LONGVILLY (P66) while Combat Command "B" captured ARLONCOURT (P66) and the 320th Infantry (attached) took OUBOURCY (P66) and MICHAMPS (P66). The attack followed a strong artillery preparation upon enemy strongpoints and assembly areas.

NOVILLE (P56) and VAUX (P56) were captured by the 506th Parachute Infantry (101st Airborne Division), while the 327th Glider Infantry advanced in a coordinated drive with Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) to clear most of the wooded area east of NOVILLE (P56). The 502d Parachute Infantry (101st Airborne Division) meanwhile protected the right flank of advancing units and kept VIII Corps in contact with 6th Armored Division (III Corps). Combat Command "A" and Reserve Combat Command (4th Armored Division) made a two mile advance along the ST HUBERT (P34)--HOUFFALIZE (P67) road, capturing COMPOGNE (P56), RASTADT (P56) and VELLEREUX (P56) and reaching a point three and one-half miles southwest of HOUFFALIZE (P67). Contact was established outside HOUFFALIZE (P67) between the 41st Cavalry Squadron (11th Armored Division) and the 2d Armored Division (First U.S. Army). Contact was maintained between 17th Airborne Division and British elements while positions along the OURTHE River were consolidated.

Front line positions of the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions remained unchanged. The 4th Armored Division was relieved from Army control and was assigned to XII Corps. Elements of the 87th Infantry Division remained in assembly areas in corps zone.

Another limited objective attack in XX Corps zone was conducted by the 94th Infantry Division, and WIES (L00) and NENNING (L00) were captured, while HUTZDORF (L00) and TETTINGEN (L00) were held against heavy pressure. The 95th Infantry Division continued to patrol aggressively while the 10th Armored Division continued rehabilitation and training.

XIX Tactical Air Command had a big day, flying 472 sorties. The day's activities were featured by attacks on rails, with forty-one railcuts made and seven railroad tunnels blocked, one just as a train entered the tunnel from the other end.

NIEDER WAMPACH (P65), ARLONCOURT (P66), OUBOURCY (P66), MICHAMPS (P66), NOVILLE (P56), VAUX (P56), COMPOGNE (P56) and RASTADT (P56) were captured in the continued advance of Third U.S. Army during the period, while contact with First U.S. Army units was established near HOUFFALIZE (P67).



A German trigger adapter which fitted into the trigger housing of rifles, machine guns and other small arms, making it possible to operate the trigger without removing gloves or mittens, was captured. The idea was adopted by the ordnance maintenance section, a similar device was designed and local contracts were placed for the manufacture of 90,000 pieces. Delivery at the rate of 5,000 per day was promised. When one-inch steel cable, used on tank recovery vehicles, became impossible to obtain through Army supply channels contracts were let with steel mills in the vicinity of ESCH (P70) and LUXEMBOURG (P71) for enough cable to satisfy the Army's needs.

16 JANUARY *(D + 224)*

Tactical reconnaissance and other reports of heavy artillery concentrations on the ridge lines northeast and south of HOUFFALIZE (P67) indicated the enemy's determination to continue to defend and delay as determinedly as possible in what remained of his penetration area. Mounting Russian pressure on the eastern front made large-scale commitment of new forces in the west highly improbable.

Information was received from Headquarters Twelfth U.S. Army Group on this date that First U.S. Army would revert to command of Twelfth U.S. Army Group at 172400, and that Letter of Instructions No. 12 (received 4 January) would become effective.

On the east flank of III Corps the 26th Infantry Division maintained its positions and patrolled aggressively, the 35th Infantry Division being in corps reserve throughout the period. At this time the 90th Infantry Division, while continuing its attacks, met decreasing resistance on its left (west) flank. Its 358th Infantry advanced one and one-half miles from NIEDER WAMPACH (P65) and captured OBER WAMPACH (P65) and SCHIMPACH (P65), while the 359th Infantry advanced on the division left flank and assisted the 6th Armored Division in clearing LONGVILLY (P66) and in securing the high ground one mile to the northeast. Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) remained in assembly area.

Gains of approximately two miles were made by the 101st Airborne Division on the east flank of VIII Corps, with the 502d Parachute Infantry taking BOURCY (P66) and the 327th Glider Infantry clearing woods between NOVILLE (P56) and BOURCY (P66), while the 506th Parachute Infantry advanced along the BASTOGNE (P55) - HOUFFALIZE (P67) road, taking RACHAMPS (P66) and HARDIGNY (P66). The 11th Armored Division maintained contact with the 2d Armored Division (First U.S. Army) which had been established the day before, and its Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" secured positions east of the BASTOGNE (P55) - HOUFFALIZE (P67) road, after clearing MABOMPRE (P56) and WICOURT (P56). All available artillery placed heavy harassing and interdiction fires on the few escape routes still available to the enemy leading east from HOUFFALIZE (P67). Position of the 17th Airborne Division was generally unchanged during the period, although aggressive patrolling continued.

The situation on XII Corps front remained stable, the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions patrolling steadily and reinforcing their positions.

In the XX Corps the 95th Infantry Division maintained its positions. In the 94th Infantry Division two elements of the 376th Infantry in the vicinity of TETTINGEN (L00) and BUTZDORF (L00) joined forces, isolated a small pocket of the enemy and mopped it up. On being relieved from XX Corps, the 10th Armored Division was attached to Sixth U.S. Army Group, and began movement from the METZ (U85) area.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 504 sorties in a successful day's operations directed largely against enemy vehicles. Enemy planes rose to meet the fighter bombers, fourteen being shot down while XIX TAC lost five. Claims included 435 motor vehicles, sixteen locomotives and 675 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.

Advance of Third U.S. Army continued during the day, with OBER WAMPACH (P65), SCHIMPACH (P65), LONGVILLY (P66), MABOMPRE (P56), WICOURT (P56), RACHAMPS (P66), HARDIGNY (P66) and BOURCY (P66) being captured.

When all track-like vehicles were virtually immobilized because of ice and snow, the problem of obtaining traction on slippery terrain was solved by welding manganese steel lugs on every fifth block of steel-type track and by replacing every fifth block of rubber-type track with a steel block equipped with a lug. This increased the effectiveness of the Army's armor. A chemical maintenance company worked on adapting the white phosphorous hand grenade for use as a rifle grenade, the modification to consist of attaching an adapter on the bottom of the grenade body.

Civil affairs estimated that 62,805 refugees were in the Army's zone of operations, an increase of 10,300 in one week. This total included 8,453 in Germany, 6,503 in Belgium, and 17,126 in Luxembourg.

Halftrack on Patrol

Enemy Headquarters Building Demolished

17 JANUARY (*D* + 225)

By this date the BASTOGNE (P55) campaign was closed, for the enemy's ARDENNES penetration was no longer a salient but a defensive bulge. A new campaign was begun in which the enemy continued to retire under pressure but was still considered capable of attacking at any point in the bulge in an effort to contain Allied pressure designed to drive him back into Germany. Reports of armor-spearheaded attacks in the TETTINGEN (L00) - BUTZDORF (L00) area gave increased importance to the enemy capability of limited offensive operations to the south or southwest of the MOSELLE River. While it was believed likely that the enemy had reinforced the SAAR-MOSELLE Rivers triangle with a Panzer division, the possibility of an offensive thrust was discounted because of difficulties of terrain. Enemy strength on the Third U.S. Army front at this time was estimated at 54,500 combat effectives in contact, the equivalent of six and one-half divisions, and 170 tanks or assault guns, a decrease of 20,000 troops and 150 tanks or assault guns since 10 January. The unwillingness or inability of the enemy to reinforce his infantry divisions in the ARDENNES Bulge was one of the outstanding order of battle facts at this time.

On instructions of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Third U.S. Army was relieved by Twelfth U.S. Army Group of operational responsibility for defense of the MEUSE River line south of GIVET (097) and of operational control over any troops turned over to them for this mission. Third U.S. Army was made responsible for removing all road blocks, mines and demolition charges placed in defense of the MEUSE River line. Instructions contained in a TWX dated 29 December which prescribed an operational rear boundary for Twelfth U.S. Army Group were rescinded. Fifteenth U.S. Army was to survey the line of the MEUSE River southward from LIEGE (K42) inclusive with a view to assuming responsibility for the defense of this line in the event of an enemy breakthrough.

The 10th Armored Division passed from control of XX Corps to Sixth U.S. Army Group, and began movement from its assembly area at METZ (U85).

Amendment No 2 to Operational Directive of 23 December was sent on this date to the Commanding General, VIII Corps, relieving VIII Corps of operational responsibility for the defense of the MEUSE River line south of GIVET (097) and of operational control over any troops turned over to the corps for this mission. It further gave the Engineer, Third U.S. Army, the responsibility of removing without delay all road blocks, mines and demolitions place in defense of the MEUSE River.

While patrolling in force along the WILTZ River, the 26th Infantry Division organized and improved its positions. The 35th Infantry Division remained in III Corps reserve. Advancing slowly against strong resistance, the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) attacked north of SCHIMPACH (P65) in an area southwest of OBER WAMPACH (P65) with little change in its front. On the corps west flank the 6th Armored Division made advances up to 1,200 yards to positions east of the BOURCY (P66) - LONGVILLY (P66) road. The 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) relieved the 320th Infantry (attached to 6th Armored Division) and Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division). Then both units moved following their relief to assembly areas in corps reserve.

Slight advances in the BOURCY (P66) - HARDIGNY (P66) area were made by the 101st Airborne Division of VIII Corps. The 17th Airborne Division started relief of the 11th Armored Division in position, and the 11th Armored Division in turn relieved the 101st Airborne Division which started movement to corps reserve.

A heavy harassing and interdiction artillery program was conducted on this date and subsequently upon all escape routes available to the enemy from the ARDENNES area. This program was fired by all available artillery of III, VIII and XII Corps and in addition the artillery of First U.S. Army participated heavily within its zone. First U.S. Army was requested to place maximum harassing and interdiction fires within the Third U.S. Army area east of the 75-grid line and north of the 70 grid line, this area being beyond the maximum range of any weapons with Third U.S. Army. The lateral limit of this area was subsequently moved east as advancing troops accelerated the enemy withdrawal and enabled Third U.S. Army artillery to displace forward.

The 87th Infantry Division took up frontal positions in XII Corps zone. Major elements of the corps at this time were the 4th, 5th, 80th, 87th Infantry Divisions and 2d Cavalry Group. During the first half of the period the 87th Infantry Division sent out strong patrols to BORN (L12), ROSPORT (L13), STEINHELF (L03) and WASSERBILLIG (L12). At 180300 the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions jumped off on a coordinated attack across the SURE River and made good progress against moderate resistance, with the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) clearing ERPELDANGE (P84). The 80th Infantry Division joined in the attack at 180700 and captured NOCHER (P75), while other elements of the division secured high ground in the vicinity of MASSELER (P74). To preserve the surprise element of the attack, no artillery preparation was fired. However all artillery with the corps participated in an intensive four-hour schedule of prearranged fires commencing promptly at H-hour. In addition to all enemy artillery locations the schedule embraced fourteen enemy com-

mand posts, two observation posts, six supply dumps, twenty-four defiles, twenty-one towns and nine heavy weapons locations. Artillery supporting 87th Infantry Division on the east flank of XII Corps participated heavily throughout the full schedule of prearranged fires so as to screen the direction of the main effort of the corps attack. Initial enemy artillery reaction to the attack was light but intensified on the succeeding day, particularly against the bridgeheads of the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions across the SAUER River.

Improving its positions, the 95th Infantry Division patrolled vigorously while the 94th Infantry Division continued clearing out the enemy pocket between TETTINGEN (L00) and NENNIG (L00). XX Corps was given the right by Third U.S. Army to use elements of the 8th Armored Division with certain restrictions.

XIX Tactical Air Command registered limited claims because of poor visibility.

Third U.S. Army's attack to the northeast continued during the day.

Operations began at the coal mines at ST AVOLD (Q25) to produce coal for the Army. Production was estimated at fifty tons per day, with an additional fifty to seventy-five tons daily within two weeks.

Locating Enemy Mines

18 JANUARY *(D + 226)*

A TWX was sent by Twelfth U.S. Army Group setting up a new Twelfth-Sixth U.S. Army Group boundary. It stated:

"By authority contained in SHAEF cable S-75440 Jan 17, the following boundary will take effect between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups as of 2400 Jan 20, provided Sixth Army Group has no objection to this timing. BUSS-COURCELLES SUR NIED-ARNAVILLE-RAMBUCOURT - to junction Twelfth Army Group rear boundary, all inclusive Twelfth Army Group. Above is provision regarding Third Army installations S of the boundary (given in our QX-30928 Jan 10, not to all), as agreed by Sixth Army Group. Request Acknowledgement."

Maintaining its positions on the right (east) flank of III Corps, the 26th Infantry Division patrolled aggressively. The 35th Infantry Division departed from the corps area and was en route to METZ (U85). The 90th Infantry Division continued patrolling, while on the corps west flank the 6th Armored Division consolidated its positions and patrolled east of the BOURCY (P66) - LONGVILLY (P66) road.

Preparations were made for renewal of the attack by the 17th Airborne Division and the 11th Armored Division. The 101st Airborne Division closed in VIII Corps reserve at ISLE-LE-PRY (P55), while the 76th Infantry Division was assigned to VIII Corps.

Continuing to fight at BETTENDORF (P94), the 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) cleared the town. The 87th Infantry Division attacked WASSERBILLIG (L12) at the juncture of the SAUER and MOSELLE Rivers, while the 2d Cavalry Group maintained its positions. Advancing two and one half miles north of the SAUER River, the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) captured DIEKIRCH (P84) and cleared ERPELDANGE (P84), while the 10th Infantry made a one and one half mile advance north of the SAUER River in an area north and east of DIEKIRCH (P84). Other elements of the 10th Infantry attacked and captured BETTENDORF (P94) from the west. A slight advance north of NOCHER (P75) was made by the 80th Infantry Division.

Heavily engaged in the vicinity of BUTZDORF (L00), the 94th Infantry Division beat off several enemy counterattacks and made contact with a small element of the division which had been isolated early in the fighting. Strong artillery fires supported the 94th Infantry Division, battalions with XX Corps firing 12,476 rounds on this date. Following heavy fighting, the division withdrew elements which had penetrated into BUTZDORF (L00). The 95th Infantry Division improved its positions.

Poor flying weather grounded all planes of the XIX Tactical Air Command.

The attack to enlarge the bridgeheads across the SAUER River continued during the period, with ERPELDANGE (P84), DIEKIRCH (P84) and BETTENDORF (P94) being captured. Strong pressure was maintained throughout the rest of Third U.S. Army's zone by aggressive patrols.

MR. LEON HENDERSON, the PRESIDENT'S advisor on foreign economics, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army.

Seven hundred tons of special winter clothing for Third U.S. Army had been delivered by Communications Zone trucks and train to the Army depot at LONGWY (P50) by this date. The shipments included shoe pacs, socks, ponchos, mittens and mufflers. Arrangements were made with Communications Zone for the direct exchange of artillery recoil mechanisms, tubes, equilibrators, traversing mechanisms and other major artillery parts of which the Army was critically short. This procedure did much to alleviate the shortage.

19 JANUARY *(D + 227)*

An operational directive sent to the Commanding Generals of the Third U.S. Army Corp Commanders on this date gave the following information: First U.S. Army on the north will continue to attack toward ST VITH (P88), while seventh U.S. Army will continue to defend in its sector. Third U.S. Army will continue to attack in the direction of ST VITH (P88) and clear the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers southwest of KONZ-KARTHAUS (L12). The directive ordered III Corps to resume the attack early on 21 January, seize the high ground southeast of ST VITH (P88) and be prepared to continue the attack to the northeast. VIII Corps was ordered to assume command of the 76th Infantry Division, resume the attack early on 21 January within its zone and assist III Corps, and maintain contact with First U.S. Army on the left (north). XII Corps was ordered to continue its mission of attacking to the north on the axis DIEKIRCH (P84) - ST VITH (P88), destroying the enemy on its front, clearing the enemy west of the MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers, defending the MOSELLE - SAUER River line, and protecting the right (east) flank of Third U.S. Army. XX Corps was ordered to attack aggressively and clear the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers north of the present line of contact, continuing to hold the balance of the sector, including the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, with minimum forces.

Amendment No 2 to Letter of Instruction No 13 was issued by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. It stated:

"In compliance with the provisions of SHAEF cablegram S-75442, dated 17 January, paragraph 2b of Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen is amended to read as follows:

"2. * * * *

b. Supervision of the staging, equipping and training of all United States ground force units assigned, or intended for assignment, to Army Groups, which enter the Continent from northern ports."

On the east flank of III Corps in the 26th Infantry Division zone the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments were relieved by the 28th Cavalry Squadron (6th Cavalry Group), and the division began regrouping. Remaining units of the 6th Cavalry Group went into corps reserve. Patrols of the 90th Infantry Division pushed out 1,500 yards with no enemy contact. The 6th Armored Division maintained its positions on the corps west flank, while the 35th Infantry Division remained in corps reserve.

Units of VIII Corps completed their regrouping and were prepared for renewal of the attack. The 17th Airborne Division and the 11th Armored Division held their forward positions while the 101st Airborne Division began moving from Army zone to that of Seventh U.S. Army following change of assignment.

Maintaining positions, the 87th Infantry Division and the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively. Repulsing a strong counterattack at BASTENDORF (P84), the 5th Infantry Division then captured the town.

After fighting heavily in DIEKIRCH (P84) and BETTENDORF (P94) the 4th Infantry Division began to extend its zone to take over part of the zone of the 5th Infantry Division. Meanwhile positions of the 80th Infantry Division were held and strengthened. LONGSDORF (P94) was taken by the 12th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) while the 8th Infantry cleared out pockets of resistance in the rear of advancing elements.

Holding the ground recently gained in the TETTINGEN (L00) - NENNIG (L00) area, the 94th Infantry Division (XX Corps) made a limited objective attack to take ORSCHOLZ (L10). The 95th Infantry Division patrolled and strengthened its positions. Relieved from Assignment to III Corps, the 35th Infantry Division (-134th Infantry) was assigned to XX Corps. It closed at METZ (U85) at 192300 where it instituted a rehabilitation and training program.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 149 sorties, but poor visibility caused light claims for the day.

Units of Third U.S. Army during the period patrolled aggressively and continued the attack to the east, capturing LONGSDORF (P94) and BASTENDORF (P84).

Third U.S. Army with a strength of 350,296 at this time was 34,000 men under strength, most of the shortage being in infantry divisions, particularly rifle companies.



Bringing In German Prisoners

An estimate of 14,000,000 rations for the period 1 to 28 February on the basis of an Army strength of 500,000 was submitted to Advance Section Communications Zone. Requirements were estimated at 9,800,000 "A" rations, 1,050,000 "C" rations, 1,050,000 "K" rations, and 2,100,000 "10-in-1" rations. In an effort to expedite shipment of medical supplies, a new system was devised to transport them from Communications Zone depots to Third U.S. Army depots. Under the plan, not more than two freight cars of medical supplies would be attached to any one hospital train destined for the general area in which a particular Army medical depot was located. Less than carload shipments would be placed in hospital train litter cars destined for the same areas.

On The Way To Ardennes

Removing Casualties From A Shelled Town

20 JANUARY (D + 228)

In what remained of the ARDENNES Bulge, the enemy withdrew generally as Third U.S. Army advanced, but retained the capability of defending and delaying in favorable terrain, particularly the high ground west of the OUR River. Intensification of the inclement weather then prevailing was expected to aid the enemy's delaying tactics, while he withdrew the bulk of his forces behind the SIEGFRIED Line.

After a full month of relative quiescence, enemy artillery in XX Corps area erupted with a violent schedule of early morning artillery fires into the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. These fires were in the nature of an artillery preparation and were accompanied by long-range heavy caliber fires in rear areas, notably at BOUZONVILLE (Q17) and RICRANGE (Q16). XX Corps artillery responded with an intensive schedule of twenty-three counterbattery missions, largely observed, following which the enemy artillery relapsed into its accustomed quiescence. No enemy ground attack developed. Long range, medium caliber enemy projectiles of a new type fell in and around the City of LUXEMBOURG (P81). This was the eighth time since 31 December that this area had been attacked with the harassing fires of this weapon, approximately 150 rounds being expended in all with relatively small material and personnel damage. The weapon was characterized by an exceptionally quick fuze action, a high order of fragmentation and by six fins at its rear and paralleling its length, apparently indicative of a non-rotating flight.

Ordnance technical intelligence personnel worked extensively and closely with artillery personnel in an effort to establish the identity of the weapon but no conclusive opinion could be reached. XII Corps artillery instituted a retaliatory program against the city of TRIER (L22). A platoon of 155mm guns fired eight rounds into TRIER (L22) for every round falling into LUXEMBOURG (P81).

On III Corps east flank the 26th Infantry Division attacked with its 328th Infantry and later with its 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments. Following a readjustment of units the high ground north of the WILTZ River was taken by all three regiments and GRUMELSCHEID (P65) was cleared. The 90th Infantry Division occupied positions on the high ground east of OBERWAMPACH (P65), then pulled back to its original positions. Late in the period the division attacked, capturing ALLERBRONN (P66), CHIFONTAINE (P66) and HAMIVILLE (P66). On the left (west) flank

the 6th Armored Division advanced alongside the 90th Infantry Division and occupied the high ground north of ALLERBRONN (P66), while clearing TROINE (P66). The 35th Infantry Division moved to the METZ (U85) area for training.

Advancing one half mile in VIII Corps zone, the 11th Armored and the 17th Airborne Divisions occupied a line of outposts from which they launched an attack just before the end of the period. Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) had reached BURET (P66) by the end of the period.

The 87th Infantry Division and the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively and maintained their positions in XII Corps zone. The 2d Cavalry Group assisted the 94th Infantry Division (XX Corps), with which it maintained contact. Positions north and east of BETTENDORF (P94) were improved by the 4th Infantry Division, with its 12th Infantry advancing north one mile and capturing LONGSDORF (P94), while other elements reached the outskirts of FOUHREN (P84). Elements of the 5th Infantry Division were relieved in zone by the 12th Infantry (4th Infantry Division). A two mile advance to LANDSCHEID (P84) was made by the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division), while the 2d Infantry advanced in a zone to the northwest, both regiments reaching points roughly three miles north of the SAUER River. In the 80th Infantry Division the 318th Infantry advanced through BURDEN (P84) to BOURCHEID (P84) and WELSCHEID (P84), clearing all three towns, while the 317th Infantry advanced through the woods north of KEHMAN (P74).

Troops Move Up To Bastogne Area

Several small counterattacks were repulsed by the 94th Infantry Division (XX Corps). Its 301st Infantry advanced 1,500 yards to the outskirts of ORSCHOLZ (L10) while its 302d Infantry cleared out the final remnants in the pocket between NENNIG (L00) and TETTINGEN (L00). The 95th Infantry Division maintained its positions and repulsed one small counterattack in its bridgehead area. Rehabilitation and training were continued by the 35th Infantry Division (-134th Infantry).

Only ten sorties were flown for reconnaissance on another day of limited operations by fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command.

Troops Move Through Captured Town

Third U.S. Army continued to advance to the northeast against decreasing resistance during the day, capturing GRUMELSCHEID (P65), ALLERBRONN (P66), CHIFONTAINE (P66), HAMIVILLE (P66), TROINE (P66) and BURDEN (P84), while the 101st Airborne Division was released from assignment to Third U.S. Army and was assigned to Sixth U.S. Army Group.

Signal construction troops completed the open wire lead from LUXEMBOURG (P81) to ETTELBRUCK (P84) and plans were made to extend the lead through CLERVAUX (P76) to ST VITH (P88). Two spiral-four cables were laid from LUXEMBOURG (P81) to ETTELBRUCK (P84) to parallel the open wire lead. Constructed at a time when there was heavy fighting in the ARDENNES bulge, the cable was damaged frequently by artillery fire. Because shell fragments penetrated the rubber but could not be seen, trouble occurred spasmodically on these lines.

A request was made for 200,000 colored eyeshields to be issued to troops to prevent snow blindness. A survey was started to insure maximum use of civilian personnel in Third U.S. Army medical installations, thus releasing military personnel for purely military duties. A supply of 5,000,000 units of insulin was obtained for use in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and arrangements were completed for obtaining foot-and-mouth disease serum from Switzerland.

21 JANUARY *(D + 229)*

Significant order of battle facts at this time were the commitment by the enemy of his last two divisions of armored reserves (one division in Third U.S. Army's zone), withdrawal from the ARDENNES bulge of more of his battered Panzers, failure for the second consecutive week to commit any new infantry in the west, and continued indications that the enemy sought to retain the initiative by offensive efforts south of the MOSELLE River. On the basis of these facts it was concluded that the enemy had no effective Panzer reserves in the west, that he had no infantry reserves he could spare for use in the west, that he might be attempting to build up an armored reserve with divisions drawn from the ARDENNES bulge, and that the offensive thrust south of the MOSELLE River was for the purpose of containing the Western Front while he attempted to stave off destruction in the east.

Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive of 19 January was sent on this date to the various corps commanders, changing the First - Third U.S. Army boundary, and providing that the new Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary be effective at 222400 January.

WILTZ (P75) and NOERTRANGE (P65) in the III Corps zone were taken by the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division), while the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) took NIEDERWITZ (P75), BRUHL (P65) and BRACH-

TENBACH (P65) after a three and one half mile advance. Advancing three miles, the 90th Infantry Division reached a point four miles west of the CLERF River and captured four small towns. On the corps west flank the 6th Armored Division made a five mile advance against decreasing resistance, approaching the CLERF River along a general line LULLANGE (P76) - HACHIVILLE (P76). LULLANGE (P76), HOFFELT (P76) and STOCKEM (P76) were captured.

The general attack of the 17th Airborne Division and 11th Armored Division in VIII Corps zone continued, while the 101st Airborne Division cleared the corps area enroute to XV Corps area (Seventh U.S. Army). After a three mile advance, the 11th Armored Division reached the LUXEMBOURG border two miles west of HACHIVILLE (P76). Four miles were gained by the 17th Airborne Division with elements of the 501st Parachute Infantry reaching a line LIMERLE (P77) - OURTHE (P77) - WATTERMAL (P77), while elements of the 194th Glider Infantry reached positions southwest of LIMERLE (P77).

Maintaining their positions, the 87th Infantry Division and the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled along the south flank of XII Corps. The 4th Infantry Division continued to clear the enemy in its zone, capturing FOUHREN (P84), three miles north of BETTENDORF (P94). Meanwhile, the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) each advanced two miles to points five and one half miles northwest of DIEKIRCH (P84), with LIPPERSCHEID (P84) being captured. Attacking along the SAUER River from BURDEN (P84), the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) made a three mile advance, capturing BOURSCHEID (P84) while the 317th Infantry reached the SURE River north of BOURSCHEID (P84).

Fighting heavily in the NENNIG (L00) - TETTINGEN (L00) - ORSCHOLTZ (L10) area against several counterattacks, the 94th Infantry Division made slight withdrawals in some areas of XX Corps zone. The 95th Infantry Division maintained its positions, while its 379th Infantry relieved the 377th Infantry in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead area. The 35th Infantry Division (-134th Infantry) continued its training and rehabilitation program.

Poor weather prohibited all flying by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Continuing its advance against scattered and light resistance, Third U.S. Army captured nineteen small towns during the period.

22 JANUARY *(D + 230)*

Pace of the enemy's withdrawal from the ARDENNES bulge was intensified. Rapid pursuit by III and VIII Corps forces and the relentless pressure of XII Corps' attack, combined with the effect of the all-out Russian drive on the Eastern Front which in eight days had carried to within 150 miles of BERLIN (Z75), served to bring this about. He raced to cross the OUR River, with the result that hundreds of his vehicles concentrated in the vicinity of the few available crossings, notably at EISENBACH (P85) and GEMUND (P85), were persistently attacked throughout the day by all available aircraft of XIX Tactical Air Command as well as all available artillery of Third U.S. Army. The enemy suffered a severe blow, losing an estimated 1,800 vehicles destroyed or damaged and untold numbers of personnel.

A TWX was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group which stated:

"Move the 35 Div less RCT now engaged with attached TD and AW Bns less the units with the one RCT without delay to SAVERNE (Q7115). Advance party to report Headquarters Seventh U.S. Army at LUNEVILLE (Q0801). Complete secrecy to include maintenance of radio silence until committed removal of vehicle markings and shoulder patches no use of unit identification on road signs and no use of code names in telephonic conversation will be observed."

After clearing WILTZ (P75), the 6th Cavalry Group and the 26th Infantry Division on the III Corps east flank advanced northeast and captured KNAPHOSCHEID (P75) while some elements continued on up the CLERF River for five miles. The 6th Cavalry Group captured WEISCHERDANGE (P76) in this drive. A five mile advance was made by the 357th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) along the right of the BASTOGNE (P55) - ST VITH (P88) road, capturing DONNANGE (P76), STOCKEM (P76), ROMLANGE (P76), BOXHORN (P76) and ASSELBORN (P76). On the corps west flank the 6th Armored Division made gains of up to five miles along the left of the same BASTOGNE (P55) - ST VITH (P88) road and captured ESSELBORN (P76), WEICHERDANGE (P76) and ESCHWEILER (P75).

The 11th Armored Division completed clearing its area in VIII Corps zone of the enemy, while the 513th Parachute Infantry and the 193d Glider Infantry advanced two and one half miles to areas east and southeast of LIMERLE (P77), leading elements reaching a point nine miles southwest of ST VITH (P88).

Medical Team Moves Up To The Front

Patrolling aggressively, the 2d Cavalry Group and the 87th Infantry Division protected the right (south) flank of XII Corps, while the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions attacked to the north and east. The 12th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) pushed past FUHREN (P84) to an area west of VIANDEN (P97). In the 5th Infantry Division the 10th Infantry advanced to an area northwest of VIANDEN (P97), while the 11th Infantry, after attacking through positions of the 2d Infantry, reached an area five miles west of VIANDEN (P97). The 80th Infantry Division attacked and occupied MASSELER (P74) at the junction of the WILTZ and SURE Rivers.

Heavy fighting continued in the vicinity of NENNIG (L00), where the 94th Infantry Division was forced to give some ground under strong and repeated counterattacks. There was no change in the situation of the 95th Infantry Division, other than relief of the 377th Infantry by the 379th Infantry in XX Corps SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead.

In a day of tremendous air activity, XIX Tactical Air Command, along with other tactical air commands put as many planes in the air as possible. XIX Tactical Air Command flew 627 sorties and destroyed 1,177 motor vehicles, damaging 536 more.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance in its west and center zones during the day, while maintaining aggressive patrols in the eastern zone.

First U. S. Army's Ammunition supply point Number 128 at BRAS (P65), which had been captured by the Germans, was recaptured by Third U.S. Army forces. The Germans had prepared the stacks of ammunition for demolition but only a small amount of materiel had been destroyed. The area was believed to be booby-trapped and mined, so one ammunition clearing company and three bomb disposal squads were assigned to inventory the stock and clear the area before it was reopened for use.

Camouflaged Machine Gunner Takes Aim



Prisoners Held Under Guard

23 JANUARY *(D + 231)*

In accordance with Amendment Number 2 to Operational Directive of 19 January, sent on this date to the various corps commanders, revisions of boundaries between III and VIII Corps and between III and XII Corps were begun as well as readjustment of divisions. The 87th and 4th Infantry Divisions were relieved from assignment to XII Corps and assigned to VIII Corps, 76th Infantry Division relieved from assignment to VIII Corps assigned to XII Corps, 95th Infantry Division relieved from assignment to XX Corps and assigned to VIII Corps, 17th Airborne Division relieved from assignment to VIII Corps and assigned to III Corps, 26th Infantry Division relieved from assignment to III Corps and assigned to XX Corps and 90th Infantry Division relieved from assignment to III Corps and assigned to VIII Corps. The net result of these changes was to strengthen VIII Corps on the left flank of the Army with five divisions, leaving XII Corps on the right flank with four divisions and III and XX Corps with two divisions each.

Following their advances of the previous day, the 26th Infantry Division and the 6th Cavalry Group mopped up in their zones on the right (east) flank of III Corps, with the 6th Cavalry Group making a small advance to clear MECHER (P76). Continuing its advance, the 90th Infantry Division gained from one to three miles in its zone and captured BINSFELD (P77). On the west flank of the corps the 6th Armored Division was delayed in its advance by marshy ground, but continued the advance for a mile gain and cleared TROIS VIERGES (P77), BIWISCH (P77) and MASSEN (P77).



Stringing Communication Lines

Following its mopping-up in zone, the 11th Armored Division (VIII Corps) moved its elements to assembly areas. The 17th Airborne Division continued its advance, captured WATTERMAL (P77) and gained one and one half miles to a line nine miles southwest of ST VITH (P88). The 76th Infantry Division closed in VIII Corps assembly area.

The right (south) flank of XII Corps was protected by the 87th Infantry Division and 2d Cavalry Group, while the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions continued their attack. A small advance was made by the 4th Infantry Division after a counterattack on FUHREN (P94) had been repelled. Against strong resistance, the 5th Infantry Division made gains of up to one mile, with leading elements on a line generally six miles north of DIEKIRCH (P84). Advancing further along the CLERF River, the 80th Infantry Division took WILWERWITZ (P75) and MERKOLS (P75).

NENNIG (L00) in XX Corps zone was cleared again of the enemy by the 94th Infantry Division after a counterattack of the previous day had forced a temporary abandonment of the town. There was no change in the 95th Infantry Division, while the 35th Infantry Division (less the 134th Infantry), which had been training in the vicinity of METZ (U85), passed to the control of Sixth U.S. Army Group.

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its attacks against German transports withdrawing from the ARDENNES pocket. Three hundred and eighteen motor vehicles were destroyed and 164 damaged, while twenty-nine gun positions were damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army's advance to the east continued during the period, with TROIS VIERGES (P77), BINSFELD (P77), MERKOLS (P75), BIWISCH (P77) and MASSEN (P77) captured while positions in the southeastern portion of zone were maintained. The 35th Infantry Division moved from METZ (U85), to control of Seventh U.S. Army, while the 101st Airborne Division closed in Seventh U.S. Army area.

Artillery with the Army was reorganized in accordance with the operational directive of 19 January. One medium and one heavy artillery battalion were detached from III Corps and two medium and one heavy artillery battalions were detached from XII Corps, all being attached to VIII Corps.

Stocks of SAE #10 engine oil were critically low, Third U.S. Army was informed by Advance Section Communications Zone, with a notice that total requirements for the balance probably would have to be met from existing stocks. The Chief Quartermaster, European Theater of Operations, instructed that SAE #30 oil would be used for civil affairs consumption and would be used in all U.S. Army vehicles to the fullest extent possible. Attempts were made to obtain four-ton trucks for snowplows from Communications Zone and from Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Blades were made available by Advance Section Communications Zone for attachment to two and one-half ton trucks.

Ski Patrol

24 JANUARY *(D + 232)*

An estimate of enemy strength on Third U.S. Army front showed 40,500 troops, the equivalent of five divisions, and 130 tanks or assault guns, a decrease of 14,500 troops and forty tanks or assault guns since 17 January. It was significant that all enemy divisions in the bulge continued to be identified in contact, although greatly depleted, indicating that he had no infantry reinforcements at hand. The major obstacle blocking Third U.S. Army's advance at this time was not the enemy's combat forces but the extremely rigorous terrain combined with the severe winter weather. Favored enemy capability was that he would withdraw into fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line.

Letter of Instructions No 14 was issued by Twelfth U.S. Army Group. It stated in part:

"1. a. The enemy is withdrawing from the ARDENNES salient and his retreating columns have already suffered heavy casualties from our air forces.

b. 21 Army Group with Ninth U.S. Army under operational control continues its advance to the ROER River between LINNICH and ROERMOND, remaining on the defensive for the present, elsewhere.

Infantrymen Dig In As Patrol Advances Through Woods

c. Sixth Army Group continues its attack to reduce the COLMAR pocket while defending the rest of its zone.

d. Air Forces continue their present attack to paralyze enemy communications west of the RHINE and isolate the battlefield. Ninth Air Force supports Twelfth Army Group.

"2. a. Twelfth Army Group defending aggressively in zone south of the MOSELLE River, will continue its attack to the east with the main effort along the axis ST VITH - BONN with the objective of penetrating the SIEGFRIED LINE and closing to the RHINE River in zone north of the MOSELLE. First objective: The high ground in the BLANKENHEIM area.

* * * * *

"3. b. Third Army attack without delay with the main effort on the left (north) flank in conjunction with First Army, penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE and protect the right flank of the attack along the line PRUM - HILLESHEIM. Assume the aggressive defense in zone south of DASBURG with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops. Be prepared to continue the attack to the RHINE or by flanking the SIEGFRIED LINE from the north, to advance to the line of the KYLL River.

Amendment No 3 to Operational Directive of 19 January was sent on this date to the various corps commanders, amending the First - Third U.S. Army boundary.

Advancing for several miles, the 26th Infantry Division seized positions along the CLERF River, while elements of the 101st Infantry crossed the river and secured high ground on the east bank. Advancing one and one-half miles, the 90th Infantry Division captured HUPPERDANGE (P76), with some elements reaching the CLERF River northwest of the 26th Infantry Division. On the corps west flank the 6th Armored Division gained over one mile, captured HOLLER (P77) and BREIDFELD (P87), DRINKLANGE (P77) and WILWERDANGE (P77).

The 17th Airborne Division continued its advance in the VIII Corps zone, gaining positions one mile east of BASBELLAIN (P77). Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command (11th Armored Division) continued to move to an assembly area in the rear, while Combat Command "A" remained on the front to protect the advance of the 17th Airborne Division. Orders were issued to the 76th Infantry Division to move to XII Corps area to relieve the 87th Infantry Division.

The 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions continued their advance, while the 87th Infantry Division and the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled and protected the right (south) flank of XII Corps zone. Making slight gains, the 4th Infantry Division consolidated its positions west of the SAUER River. Advancing against strong resistance the 5th Infantry Division gained 1,000 yards to a line six and one-half miles north of DIEKIRCH (P84) and took PUTSCHEID (P85). Supporting the attack, tank destroyers accounted for four enemy tanks. Meanwhile the 80th Infantry Division cleared the zone between the WILTZ and CLERF Rivers, capturing ALSCHEID (P75) and pulled up to the CLERF River at WILWERWITZ (P75).

BERG (L00) was entered by the 94th Infantry Division in the XX Corps zone, with stiff fighting continuing in that vicinity. Dragon's

teeth and minefields in front of the SIEGFRIED Line were cleared by the advance elements of the division. With no change in its front, the 95th Infantry Division continued patrolling aggressively.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 213 sorties in an effort to further reduce the enemy motor vehicles which had been so heavily attacked on the previous two days. As a result, 137 motor vehicles were destroyed and forty damaged, while twenty-nine guns were destroyed and eight damaged. In three days' operations XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed a total of 1,632 motor vehicles and damaged 740 more.

Third U.S. Army's advance to the east and northeast continued during the period, with the CLERF River being crossed in several places.

The Army Commander attended a conference in the office of LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, with LIEUTENANT GENERAL COURTNEY H. HODGES, Commanding General, First U.S. Army, and certain members of their respective staffs. The purpose was to cooruinate the attacks of the First and Third U.S. Armies against the SIEGFRIED Line.

25 JANUARY (D + 233)

After crossing the CLERF River, the 26th Infantry Division continued to advance, its 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments moving up one mile on the east bank. FISCHBACH (P86), CLERVAUX (P76), KOCHERY (P86) and REULER (P76) were taken in this advance by the 328th Infantry. Meanwhile the 90th Infantry Division attacked with its 387th Infantry, gaining two and one-half miles and clearing HEINERSCHEID (P86) and GRINDHAUSEN (P86) between the CLERF and OUR Rivers. On III Corps left (west) flank the 6th Armored Division captured WEISWAMPACH (P87), then consolidated its gains and prepared to renew the attack.

Advancing east and northeast with gains of up to two miles, the 17th Airborne Division in VIII Corps zone reached the vicinity of ESPELER (P87), six miles southwest of ST VITH (P88).

Patrolling the south flank of XII Corps was the 2d Cavalry Group, with the 76th Infantry Division holding a quiet part of the front due west of TRIER (L22). In line were the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions, all of which advanced slowly against stubborn resistance. The 76th Infantry Division completed relief of the 87th Infantry Division, which began movement to VIII Corps. Slight gains were made by the 4th Infantry Division in the period. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advancing one mile along the eastern portion of the ridge between the OUR and CLERF Rivers, reached PUTSCHEID (P85), three and one-half miles northwest of VIANDEN (P85), while the 11th Infantry advanced one and one-half miles to HOSCHEIDERICKT (P85) and cleared HOSCHEID (P85) and MERSCHEID (P85). On the corps left (north) flank, the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) crossed the CLERF River, clearing LELLINGEN (P75) and PINTSCH (P75).

The 94th Infantry Division continued its attack, and its 302d Infantry recaptured BERG (L00). The 95th Infantry Division meanwhile patrolled its positions in XX Corps zone.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 198 sorties, shot down two enemy planes without loss, and destroyed or damaged 240 motor vehicles.

Third U.S. Army maintained its positions in the southeast portion of zone during the day while continuing its advance in the north part of the zone. LELLINGEN (P75), PINTSCH (P75), CLERVAUX (P76), FISCHBACH (P86), KOCHERY (P86), REULER (P76), GRINDHAUSEN (P86), HEINERSCHEID (P86), WIESWAMPACH (P87) and BERG (L00) were captured.

An Operational Directive was sent to the various corps commanders which stated:

"1. a. The enemy is withdrawing from the ARDENNES salient. See current G-2 Periodic Report.

b. Seventh U.S. Army will continue present mission of assisting in reduction of the COLMAR pocket while defending in the remainder of its zone.

c. First U.S. Army will attack without delay on the axis ST VITH (vP8588) - BONN (wF5336) with its main effort on the right (south) flank; breach the SIEGFRIED LINE and seize the high ground in the vicinity BLANKENHEIM (wF2305) - MARMAGEN (wF1809) prepared to continue the advance in zone on EUSKIRCHEN (wF3329) and BONN (wF5336).



M-8 Armored Car Passes Booby Trapped Enemy Vehicle

"2. Third U.S. Army will attack without delay with its main effort on the left (north) flank in conjunction with First U.S. Army, penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE and protect the right flank of the attack along the line PRUM (wL0679) - HILLESHEIM (wL2488). It will assume an aggressive defense in zone south of DASBURG (vP8562); be prepared to continue the attack to the RHINE RIVER or, by flanking the SIEGFRIED LINE from the north, to advance to the KYLL RIVER.

"3. a. III Corps (17th Abn Div, 6th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of the 17th Abn Div and attached troops.

(2) Continue present mission of clearing enemy to the OUR RIVER in zone.

(3) On completion of (2) above, maintain aggressive defense in zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.

(4) Be prepared to attack northeast or east to advance to the KYLL RIVER.

(5) Maintain contact with VIII Corps on the left (north).

b. VIII Corps (4th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div and 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of the 4th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and 95th Inf Div and attached troops.

(2) Attack northeast without delay with main effort on the left (north).

(3) Penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE in zone and continue attack northeast.

(4) Secure the line PRUM (wL0679) - HILLESHEIM (wL2488).

(5) Be prepared to continue the attack northeast, east or southeast.

(6) Maintain contact with First U.S. Army on the left (north).

c. XII Corps (5th Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of 76th Inf Div and attached troops.

(2) Continue present mission of clearing enemy to the OUR RIVER in zone.

(3) On completion of (2) above, assume aggressive defense in zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.

(4) Be prepared to attack northeast or east to advance to KYLL RIVER.

(5) Maintain contact with III Corps on the left (north) and XX Corps on the right (south).

d. XX Corps (26th Inf Div and 94th Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of 26th Inf Div and attached troops.

(2) Maintain aggressive defense in zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.

* * * * *

Antiaircraft Crew Watch For Enemy Planes

26 JANUARY *(D + 234)*

Continuing its advance along the ridge between the CLERF and OUR Rivers known as SKYLINE DRIVE, the 26th Infantry Division captured MARNACH (P86) and MUNSHAUSEN (P76). The 90th Infantry Division's 357th Infantry advanced three miles northeast from HUPPERDANGE (P86) and captured LIELER (P87), one mile west of the OUR River, while the 358th Infantry relieved elements of the 6th Armored Division. Elements of the 6th Armored Division, after capturing WEISWAMPACH (P87) continued to the northeast for limited gains.

Following adjustment of the III - VIII Corps boundary, the 90th Infantry Division was passed to control of VIII Corps during the period. The 194th Glider Infantry (17th Airborne Division) advanced one mile, while the 507th Parachute Infantry captured ESPELER (P87) with its advance elements five and one-half miles southwest of ST VITH (P88). The 11th Armored Division remained in reserve, while elements of the 87th Infantry Division began relief of the 17th Airborne Division.

Patrol duties in the XII Corps zone were performed by the 2d Cavalry Group along the south flank and by the 76th Infantry Division in the zone formerly occupied by the 87th Infantry Division. The 4th Infantry Division patrolled aggressively while its 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments were replaced in zone by elements of the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions. Following relief these two regiments went to VIII Corps zone. An attack of the 5th Infantry Division progressed one and one-half miles to the vicinity of HOSINGEN (P85). On the corps north flank the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) gained two and one-half miles to the vicinity of HOSINGEN (P85) and captured DORSCHEID (P86), and NIEDHAUSEN (P86).

Following a 1,500 yard advance, the 94th Infantry Division reoccupied BUTZDORF (L00) in XX Corps zone, while some elements of the division continued to attack toward SINZ (L00). The 95th Infantry Division continued aggressive patrolling.

Flying 189 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 219 motor vehicles, 145 railroad cars and thirteen armored vehicles and tanks.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance to the east during the period, capturing MARNACH (P86), MUNSHAUSEN (P76), DORSCHEID (P86), NIEDHAUSEN (P86) and LIELER (P87), while maintaining its positions in the southeastern portion of zone.



27 JANUARY *(D + 235)*

All indications at this time were that the enemy was attempting to contain the Western Front with the SIEGFRIED Line and a minimum of forces while attempting to stabilize his Eastern Front. Reports indicated that at least one of the two Panzer armies in the west was being shifted to the east.

A TWX was sent by Twelfth U.S. Army Group which stated: "Confirming telephone conversation WHALEN-WRIGHT and LEONARD-WRIGHT. Authorization to employ elements of Eighth Armored Division for combat training by Third Army in support of operations of 94th Infantry Division is revoked effective 26 Jan four five".

Advancing along the SKYLINE DRIVE, the 26th Infantry Division captured HOSINGEN (P85), consolidating positions preparatory to relief. The 6th Armored Division captured some high ground east of the OUR River. The 17th Airborne Division moved into III Corps zone following its relief by the 87th Infantry Division, and made an attack late in the period, capturing HOSINGEN (P85) and DORSCHEID (P86).

After a coordinated advance with the 358th Infantry which gained two and one-half miles, the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) captured LIELER (P87) in the III Corps zone. Elements of both regiments were now on a line one-half to one mile west of the OUR River. The 87th Infantry Division completed relief of the 17th Airborne Division, following which its 346th and 347th Infantries advanced two and one-half miles east and northeast from the vicinity of ESPELER (P87), capturing DURIER (P87), GRUFLANGE (P88), MASPELT (P88) and BRACHT (P88). Some elements of the 346th Infantry moved to ST VITH (P88) and started relief of the 7th Armored Division (First U.S. Army), which had captured that city on 23 January. Other elements of the 87th Infantry Division were en route to ST VITH (P88). The 11th Armored Division remained in assembly area.

Maintaining their positions, the 2d Cavalry Group and the 76th Infantry Division patrolled along the southern part of XII Corps front. Farther north the 4th Infantry Division was relieved as the 80th and 5th Infantry Divisions extended their fronts to take over its zone. Mopping up in zone, the 5th Infantry Division turned the direction of its attack to the east, with elements of the division taking WAHLHAUSEN (P85), one mile west of the OUR River, and other elements capturing CONSTHUM (P75) and HOLZTHUM (P85). The 80th Infantry Division extended its zone and patrolled aggressively, then advanced late in the period and captured BOCKHOLZ (P75) while establishing contact with the 5th Infantry Division.

Fighting flared up anew in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead of XX Corps, when the 95th Infantry Division made a limited objective attack and occupied a fortified German position. Continuing its attack on SINZ (L00) with a 1,200 yard advance, the 94th Infantry Division entered the town.

Bad weather conditions prohibited all flying for XIX Tactical Air Command.

In its drive to the east the Third U.S. Army captured HOSINGEN (P85), DORSCHEID (P86), MASPELT (P88), BRACHT (P88), CONSTHUM (P75), HOLZTHUM (P85), WAHLHAUSEN (P85) and BOCKHOLZ (P75).

Divisions initially assigned to VIII Corps for the attack were at full strength, reinforcements since 14 January having arrived at a greatly increased rate. In the two weeks' period Third U.S. Army received 27,772 new troops.

Arrangements were made to ship special rations, as they became available, to all supply points to be issued to hospitals for patients, these items to include turkey, fresh eggs and oranges.

28 JANUARY *(D + 236)*

The "Battle of the Bulge" ended officially on this date, all ground lost by the enemy's breakthrough having been regained. Some Third U.S. Army units were already fighting in the SIEGFRIED Line. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, both in personnel and materiel, with more than 22,000 prisoners of war captured.

Relieving the 26th Infantry Division and elements of the 80th Infantry Division, the 17th Airborne Division launched an attack with its 193d Glider Infantry and 507th Parachute Infantry which cleared RODER (P86) and MARBOURG (P86). Commanding terrain west of the OUR River was seized and patrols were sent along the river. Elsewhere in III zone, Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) and the 134th Infantry (attached to 6th Armored Division) occupied positions along the SKYLINE DRIVE and captured KALBORN (P86).

Clearing a zone to the OUR River, the 90th Infantry Division (VIII Corps) reconnoitered for positions preparatory to making a crossing of the river. The 8th and 12th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) patrolled to the OUR River following relief of the 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) in zone. The 345th and 346th Infantry Regiments (87th Infantry Division) moved to ST VITH (P88) and completed relief of the 7th Armored Division (First U.S. Army), the 347th Infantry following to the new zone after its relief by the 4th Infantry Division. The 90th Infantry Division continued its attack, with elements of the 357th Infantry crossing the OUR River in zone.

Positions in the southern part of XII Corps zone were maintained and consolidated by the 76th Infantry Division and the 2d Cavalry Group. The 80th Infantry Division held a line along the west bank of the OUR River in zone. Attacking to the east, the 5th Infantry Division cleared PUTSCHEID (P85), and FENNBERG (P85) and secured a line one mile west of the OUR River, while relief of 80th Infantry Division elements in the northern part of zone was completed.

Elements of the 26th Infantry Division began relief of the 95th Infantry Division in the XX Corps SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, the relieved elements moving to the north. The 95th Infantry Division meanwhile conducted rotation of units while consolidating its positions. Elements of the 301st Infantry (94th Infantry Division) captured BUBINGEN (L00), near the MOSELLE River. Positions were consolidated with two enemy counterattacks beaten off.

Seventy sorties in five missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command as escort for IX Bomber Command. No armed reconnaissance missions were flown.

Capturing RODER (P86), MARBOURG (P86), KALBORN (P86) and PUTSCHEID (P85), Third U.S. Army continued its advance to the east during the day. In the southeast portion of zone, BUBINGEN (L00) was taken.

29 JANUARY *(D + 237)*

(Map for this date accompanies text)

Beginning a new phase of operations, Third U.S. Army's VIII Corps jumped off to cross the OUR River, the 87th Infantry Division on the left, two regiments of the 4th Infantry Division in the center, and the 90th Infantry Division on the right. The latter division advanced up to one mile to the east of the river, while the 4th Infantry Division captured HEMMERES (P88), ELCHERATH (P88) and LOMMERSWEILER (P88) after advances of up to one mile. SETZ (P98) on the OUR River was taken by the 345th Infantry (87th Infantry Division), which prepared to cross the river in zone. Elements of the 95th Infantry Division entered VIII Corps zone, while the 11th Armored Division remained in an assembly area.

RODER (P86) was cleared by the 17th Airborne Division in the III Corps zone, while patrols of the division reached the OUR River. The 6th Armored Division extended its patrols up and down the OUR River.

There was little change in XII Corps zone. The 4th Armored Division began relief of the 80th Infantry Division. Task Force "OBOE" (composed of the armored infantry elements of the 4th Armored Division) was created, relieving the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division).

Relief of the 95th Infantry Division in XX Corps was completed by the 26th Infantry Division and the 95th Infantry Division cleared the zone on its way to VIII Corps. The 94th Infantry Division consolidated its positions following advances of the previous days.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 512 sorties aimed largely at transportation, with 745 motor vehicles and 268 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued its advance, during the period, capturing HEMMERES (P88) and SETZ (P98), while maintaining positions in the southeastern portion of zone.

In accordance with instructions from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, arrangements were made to establish a new boundary in the Army area which was to be known as the Army Group Rear Air Boundary. Antiaircraft defense of installations forward of this line was to be the responsibility of the Army, antiaircraft defense of installations to the rear were to be the responsibility of IX Air Defense Com-

TACTICAL SITUATION AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE BASTOGNE-ST VITH CAMPAIGN

29 JANUARY 1945

NOTE:
134TH RCT (35TH INF DIV) ATCHD TO 6TH ARMD DIV

mand. Location of this boundary was to be determined by mutual agreement between the Army Group Commander and the Air Force Commander. The initial boundary agreed upon excluded from the area of Army responsibility the Ordnance installation and the airfield at ETAIN (U47), as well as the airfield east of CONFLANS (U66) and airfield Y-34 southwest of METZ (U85). Antiaircraft units of IX Air Defense Command, which had been defending these fields and had been attached to Third U.S. Army for operational command, were relieved when IX Air Defense Command took over responsibility for defense of the airfields. Third U.S. Army was to continue to exercise operational control over all antiaircraft units inside the Army area.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group was requested to obtain dog teams to assist in evacuation of patients through deep snow being encountered at this time by Third U.S. Army divisions. As the result of experiments made in XII Corps, plans were made to provide litters with snow runners.

30 JANUARY *(D + 238)*

Occupying a narrow zone on the south flank of III Corps zone, the 6th Cavalry Group established an outpost line on the high ground east of HOSINGEN (P85). Patrolling in strength along the OUR River, the 17th Airborne Division and the 6th Armored Division continued to clear the enemy west of the river.

Against increasing resistance in VIII Corps zone, the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) secured a solid line running one and one-half miles east of the OUR River and captured AUEL (P87). Against strong resistance, the 4th Infantry Division made small advances east of HEMMERES (P88), while the 87th Infantry Division continued its attacks to the east. Its 345th Infantry crossed the OUR River in two places after small advances and captured SCHLIERBACH (P98) and RODGEN (P98), three and one-half miles southeast of ST VITH (P88), while its 346th Infantry moved through the XVIII Airborne Corps (First U.S. Army) and cleared ANDLER (P99), SCHONBERG (P98) and ATZERATH (P98).

There was no heavy fighting in XII Corps zone, the 5th, 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintaining their positions and patrolling aggressively.

The 26th Infantry Division consolidated its positions in the new XX Corps zone, while the 94th Infantry Division maintained its positions and redisposed its troops in zone preparatory to continuing its attack.

Bad weather conditions prevented operations of XIX Tactical Air Command. Two flights were sent up, but were recalled before their mission was accomplished.

Third U.S. Army captured RODGEN (P96), SCHLIERBACH (P98), ATZERATH (P98) ANDLER (P99), SCHONBERG (P98) and AUEL (P87) in its continued advance to the east during the period.

31 JANUARY *(D + 239)*

At the end of the month enemy strength opposing Third U.S. Army was estimated at 42,000 combat effectives in contact, the equivalent of five and one-half divisions, and ninety-five tanks or assault guns. This represented an increase of 1,500 troops but a decrease of thirty-five tanks or assault guns since 24 January. While some reinforcements reached the enemy no new divisions were identified. There was every indication that the enemy was fully occupied on the Eastern Front and he was letting the west fend for itself, gambling on containing the Allies with a minimum of troops and the SIEGFRIED Line defenses, aided by favorable terrain and severe winter weather.

Defensive positions were maintained in III Corps zone. The 17th Airborne Division patrolled aggressively to and across the OUR River, while the 6th Armored Division rotated units and patrolled aggressively.

Advances of one mile were made by the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) in VIII Corps zone to a line four miles east of the OUR River, with advance elements capturing HECKHALENFELD (P97), WINTERSPELT (P98) and EIGELSCHEID (P98). In the 4th Infantry Division the 12th Infantry advancing three and one-half miles to high ground overlooking BLEIALF (P98), captured ELCHERATH (P88), IHREN (P98) and WEPPELER (P98), while the 8th Infantry crossed the OUR River, advanced three and one-half miles, and crossed the main road going north from BLEIALF (P98). Advance elements reached a vicinity eight miles southeast of ST VITH (P88). On the corps north flank, the 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) advanced two and one-half miles northeast to a vicinity ten miles east of ST VITH (P88) and captured LAUDESFELD (P98), while the 345th Infantry captured HEUM (P98) and the 346th Infantry made small gains. The 11th Armored Division remained in assembly area.

Defensive positions were maintained in XII Corps zone. The 5th, 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions with the attached Task Force "OBOE" (4th Armored Division), and the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively in zone, while preparing for advance.

A limited objective attack was made by the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division). Elsewhere in XX Corps zone, the 26th and 94th Infantry Divisions maintained positions and patrolled aggressively.

Bad weather prohibited all flights of XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers.

Third U.S. Army's attack east of the OUR River in the northern part of Army zone continued, with IHREN (P98), WEPPELER (P98), LAUDESFELD (P98), WINTERSPELT (P98), EIGELSCHEID (P98) and HECKHALENFELD (P97) being captured.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

Following is a brief summary of operations for January.

The month was characterized by extremely heavy warfare in bitterly cold weather in Third U.S. Army's III and VIII Corps zones, by patrolling in the early part of the month and attacks against heavy resistance late in the month in XII Corps zone, and by the maintaining of positions, limited objective attacks and patrolling in XX Corps zone. The ARDENNES Campaign which started on 18 December carried through until 28 January at which time all ground seized by the enemy in his breakthrough had been regained. On 29 January the campaign west of the RHINE River and north of the MOSELLE River began.

Third U.S. Army, powerful with four corps and sixteen divisions, smashed against the southern flank of the enemy salient during the early part of the month, and in the meantime continued to reinforce those units in the BASTOGNE (P55) area. The major activity was in III and VIII Corps zones while XII Corps patrolled along the SAUER, SURE and MOSELLE Rivers.

By 9 January the force applied by III and VIII Corps on the enemy began to tell, limited withdrawals of the enemy becoming increasingly frequent. III Corps had advanced north to the WILTZ River by 11 Januare. Then, on 14 January, elements of VIII Corps made contact on the western tip of the salient with the British who were driving down from the north. The following day other VIII Corps units linked up with First U.S. Army at HOUFFALIZE (P67). From then on, the First and Third U.S. Armies were able to march abreast to the east. While enemy resistance continued heavy, all indications pointed to his continued withdrawal in the face of superior forces. Daily advances increased, with gains of one and two miles being reported daily where formerly they had been reported in yards. The Russian drive toward BERLIN (Z75) was a serious threat that hastened the pace of the enemy withdrawal, the Panzers being pulled out rapidly. ST VITH (P88) was taken by First U.S. Army on 23 January, and on 27 January Third U.S. Army forces moved north to that vicinity after a change in the inter-army boundary increased the length of the Army front. By 29 January all ground seized by the enemy in his big push of December had been retaken, and the ARDENNES Campaign came to a successful close. The "Battle of the Bulge" was won and the new attack on the SIEGFRIED Line was begun.

III and VIII Corps continued aggressively to push the enemy back, and were battling in SIEGFRIED Line emplacements at the end of the month. While the heaviest fighting was to the north, XII Corps made advances in the latter part of January. On 18 January the SURE River was crossed by the 4th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions, while the 87th Infantry Division attacked WASSERBILLIG (L12). All advanced during the next few days, but advances were limited by heavy resistance and bad terrain. By the end of January forces were generally along the MOSELLE, OUR and CLERF Rivers.

No concerted action developed in XX Corps during the month, although there were stiffly fought limited objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, and around TETTINGEN (L00) and BUTZDORF (L00).

During the month engineer troops constructed a total of 157 bridges of various kinds totaling 9,303 feet in length. The bulk of tactical bridging of larger sizes was accomplished by XII Corps units in their sector of the ARDENNES salient, being constructed principally over the SAUER and SURE Rivers and their tributaries in the vicinities of DIEKIRCH (P84) and ETTELBRUCK (P84) to support the assault crossings of these rivers. Every bridge in ETTELBRUCK (P84) was destroyed by the retreating enemy, necessitating the construction of four Bailey bridges.

The principal streams encountered by III and VIII Corps in their drive to close the ARDENNES salient were the SEMOIS and OURTHE Rivers and their tributaries. Two of the largest tactical bridges built in this sector were the 100-foot Bailey bridge over the SEMOIS in the vicinity of FLORENVILLE (P22) and the 110-foot Bailey bridge over the OURTHE near OURTHEVILLE (P46). Because of the static condition of XX Corps' front, a smaller amount of tactical bridges was placed by engineer troops than in previous months, the only span of any appreciable size being the floating Bailey bridge over the MOSELLE River at UCKANGE (U87). Maintenance required to keep roads in the Army's area open was one of the biggest jobs during the month. Numerous though light falls of snow kept the 1,100 mile road network covered for the entire month, but prompt and efficient snow removal by engineer units using plows, drags and borrowed civilian rotary plows kept the main supply routes clear. This was of vital importance, since during January there was a large amount of tactical regrouping. Because of sub-freezing temperatures it was necessary to keep many stretches of highway sanded.

In spite of intensification of the wire recovery program this work was handicapped by heavy snowfall and drifts, central portions of long spans being weighted to the ground and buried under ice and snow. The additional weight of snow and ice and swaying of the wires caused large numbers of shorts where the insulation had broken down. Signal troops recovered approximately 5,100 miles of field wire, of which 3,000 miles were reclaimed for use. Field wire consumption for January amounted to 16,928 miles. Heavy demands were made on signal supplies because of losses sustained in the enemy's counter-offensive, units operating in the invaded area calling for salvage, repair or replacement of as much as ninety percent of their equipment. All battle losses of equipment sustained by elements of First U.S. Army and VIII Corps, including three divisions, fifteen artillery battalions, seven engineer battalions and miscellaneous units, were replaced at approximately eighty-five percent of total requirements before 15 January.

During January ammunition shipments received from Advance Section Communications Zone amounted to 57,217 long tons, with 188,227 long tons being handled by Third U.S. Army installations.

Patients evacuated by Third U.S. Army medical units throughout the month totaled 28,853, including 2,650 by air, 7,330 by road and 18,873 by rail. Total direct admissions to clearing stations and hospitals during the month was 49,115.

During January 296 convoys and fifty-six truck companies, totalling more than 20,000 vehicles, traveled 2,417,576 miles hauling 251,355 tons of supplies and 167,810 troops. Most of these operations were in support of the ARDENNES campaign, 18 December to 28 January, during which 448 convoys traveled a total of 3,671,618 miles.

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



JANUARY–	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DEAD (EST)	500	700	600	2000	500	300	500	500	700	600	800	500	600	1500	1000	500	400	400	300	300	400	3000	800	500	500	600	600	200	900	300	200
WOUNDED (EST)	1500	1800	1800	5000	1500	900	1500	900	2100	1500	2200	1500	1500	3000	2500	1500	1500	1200	1000	1000	1200	10,000	2000	1500	1500	1800	1800	700	1800	800	700
CAPTURED	414	518	659	234	305	286	254	116	227	254	556	2377	446	489	469	772	828	925	444	558	515	480	803	409	621	591	664	501	361	266	283
TOTAL	2414	3018	3059	7234	2305	1486	2254	1516	3027	2354	3556	4377	2546	4989	3969	2772	2728	2525	1744	1858	2115	13480	3603	2409	2621	2991	3064	1401	3061	1366	1183

104,000
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COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD US ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD U.S.ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH— ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH— THIRD U S ARMY CASUALTIES

97,025

21,441

DAILY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DEAD	103	102	89	190	136	66	234	92	100	103	45	70	72	116	98	55	49	81	61	64	61	74	60	96	47	33	52	30	71	44	32
WOUNDED	582	531	482	1081	649	365	922	544	658	662	625	393	425	504	618	460	438	510	465	358	440	350	313	494	375	373	479	293	297	272	192
MISSING	122	103	140	458	258	57	340	653	127	172	127	107	66	111	50	66	43	122	74	47	76	39	50	50	121	18	46	27	67	8	20
TOTAL	807	736	711	1729	1043	488	1496	1289	885	937	797	570	563	731	766	581	530	713	600	469	577	463	423	640	543	424	577	350	435	324	244

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COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-31 JANUARY 1945



LEGEND:

O- OPENED
C- CLOSED
#- OPERATION ASSUMED BY SEVENTH ARMY

TOWNS CAPTURED JANUARY

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
ARLONCOURT	III	15 January
ALLERBRONN	III	20 "
ASSELBORN	III	22 "
ALSCHEID	XII	24 "
AUEL	VIII	30 "
ANDLER	VIII	30 "
ATZERATH	VIII	30 "
BERLE	III	9 "
BETLANGE	III	10 "
BONNERUE	VIII	10 "
BRAS	III	12 "
BERTOGNE	VIII	13 "
BUTZDORF	XV	13 "
BORG	XX	14 "
BOURCY	VIII	16 "
BETTENDORF	XII	18 "
BURDEN	XII	20 "
BRUHL	III	21 "
BOURCHEID	XII	21 "
BRACHTENBACH	III	21 "
BOXHORN	III	22 "
BINSFELD	III	23 "
BIWISCH	III	23 "
BREIDFELD	III	24 "
BASBELIAN	VIII	24 "
BRACHT	VIII	27 "
BOCKHOLZ	XII	27 "
BUBINGEN	XX	28 "
COMPOGNE	VIII	15 "
CHIFONTAINE	III	20 "
CLERVAUX	III	25 "
CONSTHUM	XII	27 "
DAHL	XII	6 "
DONCOLS	III	11 "
DIEKIRCH	XII	18 "
DONNANGE	III	22 "
DRINKLANGE	III	24 "
DORSCHEID	XII	26 "
DURLER	VIII	27 "
EPPELDANGE	XII	17 "
ESELBORN	III	22 "
ESCHWEILER	III	22 "
ESPELER	VIII	26 "
ELSHERATH	VIII	29 "
EIGELSCHEID	VIII	31 "
FLAMIERGE	VIII	7 "
FOUHREN	XII	21 "
FISCHBACH	III	25 "
FENNBERG	XII	28 "
GERIMONT	VIII	2 "
GOESDORF	XII	6 January
GIVRY	VIII	13 "
GIVROULLE	VIII	13 "
GRUMELSCHEID	III	20 "
GRINDHAUSEN	III	25 "
GRUFLANGE	VIII	27 "
HARLANGE	III	10 "
HERBAIMONT	VIII	13 "
HARDIGNY	VIII	16 "
HAMAVILLE	III	20 "
HOFFELT	III	21 "
HUPPERDANGE	III	24 "
HOLLER	III	24 "
HEINERSCHEID	III	25 "
HOSCHEID	XII	25 "
HOSINGEN	III	27 "
HOLZTHUM	XII	27 "
HEMMERES	VIII	29 "
HECKHALENFELD	VIII	31 "
HEUM	VIII	31 "
IHREN	VIII	31 "
KNAPHOSCHEID	III	22 "
KOCHERY	III	25 "
KALBORN	III	28 "
LUTREMANGE	III	11 "
LAVACHERIE	VIII	13 "
LONGVILLY	III	16 "
LONGSDORF	XII	19 "
LULLANGE	III	21 "
LIPPERSCHEID	XII	21 "
LELLINGEN	XII	25 "
LIELER	III	26 "
LOMMERSWEILER	VIII	29 "
LAUDESFELD	VIII	31 "
MARGERET	III	1 "
MANDE ST. ETIENNE	VIII	2 "
MACAVIVIER	VIII	13 "
MABOMPRE	VIII	16 "
MACHTUM	XII	10 "
MICHAMPS	III	15 "
MASSEN	III	23 "
MERKOLS	XII	23 "
MERSCHEID	XII	25 "
MARNACH	III	26 "
MUNSHAUSEN	III	26 "
MASPELT	VIII	27 "
MARBOURG	III	28 "
NIEDERWAMPACH	III	15 "
NOVILLE	VIII	15 "
NENNIG	XX	15 "
NOCHER	XII	17 January
NOERTRANGE	III	21 "
NIEDERWITZ	III	21 "
NIEDHAUSEN	XII	26 "
OBERWAMPACH	III	16 "
OUBOURCY*	III	1 " (15 Jan.)
PINTSCH	XII	25 "
PUTSCHEID	XII	28 "
RECOGNE	VIII	9 "
RUETTE	VIII	13 "
RASTADT	VIII	15 "
RACHAMPS	VIII	16 "
REULER	III	25 "
RODER	III	28 "
RODGEN	VIII	30 "
SENONCHAMPS	VIII	2 "
SONLEZ	III	11 "
ST. HUBERT	VIII	11 "
SPRIMONT	VIII	13 "
SENONCHAMPS	III	14 "
SCHIMPACH	III	16 "
STOCKEM	III	22 "
SETZ	VIII	29 "
SCHLIERBACH	VIII	30 "
SCHONBERG	VIII	30 "
TRENTELHOF	III	9 "
TILLET	VIII	10 "
TARCHAMPS	III	11 "
TRONIE	VIII	13 "
TETTINGEN	XX	13 "
TROINE	III	20 "
TROIS VIERGES	III	23 "
VILLERS-LE-BONNE-EAU	III	10 "
VESQUEVILLE	VIII	11 "
VAUX	VIII	15 "
VELLEREUX	VIII	15 "
WATRANGE	III	10 "
WARDIN	III	12 "
WIES	XV	15 "
WICOURT	VIII	16 "
WEISCHEID	XII	20 "
WILTZ	III	21 "
WEISCHERDANGE	III	22 "
WEICHDANGE	III	22 "
WATTERMAL	VIII	23 "
WILWERDANGE	III	24 "
WEISWAMPACH	III	25 "
WAHLHAUSEN	XII	27 "
WINTERSPELT	VIII	31 "

*Originally captured 1 Jan., recaptured 15 Jan.

BASTOGNE

THE ARMY COMMANDER'S NOTES ON THE BASTOGNE OPERATION

By December 10, 1944, the Saar Offensive of the 3rd Army, begun on November 8, had progressed to the point where the XX Corps had forced a crossing of the Saar at SAARLAUTERN, using the 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, and had the 5th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions prepared to exploit the impending break-through of the Siegfried Line in that town. The left of the Corps from REMICH to MERZIG was covered by a Task Force consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Group Reinforced, Colonel Polk commanding. In the XII Corps zone the crossings over the Saar had been forced and the Corps was attacking in a northeasterly direction parallel to the BLIES River.



December 12, 1944

As a result of the meeting with General Spaatz, General Doolittle, General Vandenberg, General Weyland and myself, a definite scheme for the rupture of the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of ZWEIBRUCKEN-KAISERLAUTERN by a three day air blitz, followed immediately by a ground assault had been arranged, with target date the 19th of December.

In XII Corps, the 87th Division had relieved 26th Division east of SAAREGUEMINES, and the latter had assembled at METZ and taken over the training of 4,000 replacements secured through a 5% cut in the overhead of all Corps and Army troops in the 3rd Army.

The 5th and 80th Divisions were up to strength but the Army as a whole was 12,000 short. All divisions were ordered to cannibalize headquarters and anti-tank gun sections to provide infantry riflemen.

December 16, 1944

In the XX Corps, the 5th Infantry Division began to relieve the 95th Division in SAARLAUTERN, preparatory to the final assault for a break of the Siegfried Line. It was then to attack NE in the Corps zone supported by the 10th Armored Division.

Due to heavy enemy resistance, the date of the air blitz at ZWEIBRUCKEN was moved to December 21 to assure the arrival of ground troops within assaulting distance of the Siegfried Line in time for this date. The XII Corps started to place the 80th Infantry and 4th Armored in line abreast of the 87th Infantry Division.

The III Corps, consisting of the 26th and 6th Armored Divisions which had become operational December 15, initiated a reconnaissance with a view to passing through the 35th Infantry Division, XII Corps, immediately subsequent to the blitz.

Orders were issued for movement of Headquarters 3rd Army to ST. AVOLD on December 19.

Orders were received from Twelfth Army Group directing the 10th Armored Division be temporarily attached to VIII Corps, First Army, to counter a serious attempt at a break-through on the part of the enemy, this movement to be initiated December 17.

December 18, 1944

At the direction of the Army Group Commander I reported to his Headquarters in Luxembourg, accompanied by G-2, G-3, and G-4 of the 3rd Army. The situation of the enemy break-through, as then known, was explained.

General Bradley asked when I could intervene. I stated I could do so with three divisions very shortly. I then telephoned the Chief of Staff 3rd Army and directed that the attack of the 4th Armored and 80th Infantry Divisions be halted and sufficient transportation to move the 80th Division anytime after dawn of the 19th be collected. That the 4th Armored Division be prepared to move the night 18-19 December. Also to notify the XIX Tactical Air Command that the blitz was off for the present.

General Bradley called at 2200 hours and stated that the situation was worse than it had been at noon and directed that the troops as per previous paragraph be moved as rapidly as possible. Also that General Milliken move forward echelon of his headquarters to the front. I suggested ARLON. This was approved. General Bradley further ordered that General Milliken report in person to the Chief of Staff Twelfth Army Group on the morning of the 19th; and that I, accompanied by one staff officer, meet General Bradley for a conference with General Eisenhower at VERDUN at 1100 the same date.

One Combat Command of the 4th Armored moved at midnight on LONGWY, followed by remainder of division at dawn. The 80th Infantry started to move on LUXEMBOURG at dawn December 19. The G-4 of the Twelfth Army Group facilitated these operations by a rapid collection of truck companies from Com. Z.

December 19, 1944

Meeting of all Corps Commanders and the Commanding General of the XIX Tactical Air Command and the General Staff of the 3rd Army was called at 0800. The new situation was explained. I stated that the reputation of the 3rd Army and XIX Tactical Air Command for speed and effectiveness resulted from the efficiency of the officers present, and that I counted upon them for even greater successes.

On the assumption that the VIII Corps would be assigned to 3rd Army, a plan for the employment of III and VIII Corps was drawn up. Three possible lines of attack were envisaged: NEUFCHATEAU-ST. HUBERT; ARLON-BASTOGNE; LUXEMBOURG-DIEKIRCH-ST. VITH.

A brief telephone code between myself and the Chief of Staff 3rd Army was drawn up.

Left for VERDUN at 0930, arriving at 1045.

As a result of the conference, the Supreme Commander directed that the Sixth Army Group take over the southern front as far north as the southern boundary of the XX Corps, 3rd Army; the 6th Armored Division to stay in the SAARBRUCKEN area until relieved by elements of the 7th Army. The 87th and 42nd Infantry Divisions of the 3rd Army to pass to the 7th Army.

At this moment, it seemed to me probable that the 3rd Army in its new role would be constituted as follows:

VIII Corps (Gen. Middleton) in vicinity of NEUFCHATEAU--101st Airborne Division, and elements of 28th Infantry, 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, and 106th Infantry Division, plus Corps troops. III Corps (Gen. Milliken) in vicinity of ARLON--26th Infantry, 80th Infantry, and 4th Armored Divisions. The XII Corps (Gen. Eddy) to be assembled in vicinity of LUXEMBOURG--consisting of 35th, 4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions, and elements of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. The XX Corps (Gen. Walker) in vicinity of THIONVILLE--90th and 95th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division when relieved by 7th Army, and Task Force Polk.

In reply to a question from General Eisenhower as to when the 3rd Army could attack to the north, I stated it could attack with III Corps on the 23rd of December.

After meeting at VERDUN, I called Chief of Staff 3rd Army on phone and gave following instructions: 26th Infantry Division to be moved December 20 to vicinity of ARLON, advanced detachments to move at once. The XII Corps to disengage, and Corps Headquarters and artillery to move to vicinity of LUXEMBOURG 21st of December, leaving a working headquarters at old location until such time as it could be relieved by XV Corps, 7th Army. 35th Infantry Division to be withdrawn from line and assembled at METZ. Tactical Echelon 3rd Army Headquarters to move on LUXEMBOURG 20th of December. Forward Echelon III Corps to move in vicinity of ARLON at once.

December 20, 1944

I visited Twelfth Army Group at LUXEMBOURG, then the Commanding Generals of the III and VIII Corps and 4th Armored Division at ARLON, later visited Headquarters 4th and 26th Infantry Divisions, 9th and 10th Armored Divisions, and the advanced echelon 80th Division which had just reached LUXEMBOURG.

As it was apparent that for the present the VIII Corps had no offensive power, it was directed to hold BASTOGNE with the 101st Airborne Division and following attachments: one CC of the 9th Armored and one CC of the 10th Armored Divisions; the 705th TD Bn., less one company; and some Corps Artillery. Remainder of the Corps to fall back, using delaying action and demolitions.

The III Corps is to attack with the purpose of relieving BASTOGNE on 22nd of December at 0600. The Commanding General 10th Armored Division was directed to take temporary command of XII Corps pending arrival of that Headquarters. Also to incorporate in his unit one CC of the 9th Armored Division in the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG. The Commanding General of the 9th Armored Division with his Headquarters was sent to VIII Corps to take over command of two combat commands of the 9th Armored and one combat command of the 10th Armored Division.

Through the Chief of Staff 3rd Army arranged for immediate movement to new theater of combat of all self-propelled tank destroyer battalions and separate tank battalions, necessary ammunition, engineers, and hospitals.

Also, that the 5th Division be disengaged at SAARLAUTERN and be moved on LUXEMBOURG at once. NOTE: The 10th Infantry of the 5th Division actually reached LUXEMBOURG at midnight this date, and one company ot tank destroyers of the 818th TD Bn, which had been in combat east of the SAAR River in the morning, opened fire on the enemy north of the SAUER River that night, having marched in the meantime 69 miles.

It is noteworthy that all the operations, including plans for attack executed on the 22nd of December, were done by personal conference or by telephone, and that the highly complicated road and supply movements were only made possible by the old and very experienced General Staff of the 3rd Army and the high discipline and devotion to duty of all the units involved.

December 21, 1944

U. S. losses during Saar Operation from November 8th to midnight December 21st amounted to 29,688 killed, wounded, and missing. During the same period, enemy opposed to the 3rd Army lost 40,265 prisoners of war or buried by our Graves Registration.

December 22, 1944

The III Corps (4th Armored, 26th, and 80th Infantry Divisions) attacked at 0600. BASTOGNE was still holding out. The 10th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division, XII Corps, attacked NE on ECHTERNACH, driving the enemy towards the river.

December 23, 1944

The weather fine. Seven fighter-bomber groups, eleven medium-bomber groups, and one division of the 8th Air Force and elements of the RAF were up in support of the 3rd Army.

The III Corps continued its attack. The XII Corps continued its limited attack. The XX Corps launched an attack in the direction of SAARBOURG as a diversion.

The 35th Infantry Division closed in METZ at 2400 hours.

December 24, 1944

The 6th Cavalry Group, reinforced with one company of engineers and one company of tank destroyers, moved, this date, to join the III Corps.

The III Corps continues attack. The XII Corps cleared Sauer River from DIEKIRCH inclusive to ECHTERNACH exclusive.

December 25, 1944

Clear and cold. All the air up. Visited all front line divisions. Where men were in contact and could not get hot Xmas dinner, they were served chicken sandwiches.

Exchanged the 6th Armored Division (XX Corps) with 10th Armored Division (XII Corps) effective tonight.

The 35th Infantry Division which closed at METZ on midnight the 23rd of December, absorbed 2000 replacements from the second 5% cut in Corps and Army troops of 3rd Army, all with less than a week's training. They will close north of ARLON at 1400 tomorrow, prepared to attack between the 26th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions the morning of the 27th. The 80th Infantry Division passes to XII Corps at 1800, the 26th.

December 26, 1944

Combat Command "A", 9th Armored Division, serving with 10th Armored Division in XII Corps joined to 4th Armored Division this morning and attacks west of CC "R" (Col. Blanchard) 4th Armored Division.

Colonel Blanchard's CC "R" by a very daring attack entered BASTOGNE

1645 with one battalion of armored infantry and one battalion of tanks. We took in 40 truckloads of supplies that night, thus re-opening the supply route. Also, 22 ambulances with a total of 652 wounded were evacuated; the first night 224 went out and the remaining were evacuated the next morning.

The total time from the moment when the 4th Armored Division left the SAARBRUCKEN sector to the taking of BASTOGNE was seven days; the distance covered was 120 miles; the distances gained by combat during four days was 16 miles. In addition to the 4th Armored Division, the 318th Infantry (less 3rd battalion) of the 80th Division and Combat Command "A" of the 9th Armored Division should be given special credit for the penetration into BASTOGNE.

The 6th Armored Division closed on LUXEMBOURG. The 87th Infantry and 17th Airborne and 11th Armored Divisions are near REIMS in SHAEF reserve. The 3rd Army requested their assignment.

December 28, 1944

General Bradley explained further operations for a future continuation of the Army Group offensive action.

The 11th Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions released to 3rd Army and assigned to the VIII Corps.

December 29, 1944

Started 11th Armored and 87th Infantry Divisions on NEUFCHATEAU. They should close by 2400 and will attack west of BASTOGNE on HOUFFALIZE at 0800 December 30th.

6th Armored Division closed north of ARLON, preparatory to attacking on the axis BASTOGNE-ST. VITH on the 31st.

December 30, 1944

The 11th Armored Division on the right and the 87th Infantry Division on the left jumped off at 0800 and ran into the flank of a German counterattack headed SE to cut off BASTOGNE. The German attack consisted of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division. Our attack stopped them and turned them back. At the same time on the other flank of the BASTOGNE bulge, the 35th and 26th Infantry Divisions were attacked by the 1st SS Panzer Division and the 167th Volksgrenadier Division. The artillery of the 4th Armored Division came to the help of the 35th Infantry Division, and the enemy was repulsed with the loss of 55 tanks. This repulse was largely aided by the action of the XIX Tactical Air Command which was able to fly most of the day despite very bad weather. The 101st Airborne Division also repulsed a counterattack from the NW.

Unquestionably, this was the critical day of the operation, as there was a concerted effort on the part of the Germans, using at least five divisions, to again isolate BASTOGNE.

Twenty-one Germans, wearing U. S. uniforms, were killed in battle. Army Commander entered BASTOGNE and decorated Brigadier General McAuliffe.

December 31, 1944

Very bad weather with snow and sleet. Tractors could not be used to pull guns. Necessary to use the diamond-six trucks.

Germans continued to counterattack strongly, but the 6th Armored Division attacked as planned and made 4 kilometers on its axis. The enemy counterattacked 17 times today--all repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. We also sustained casualties, particularly in the case of the 11th Armored Division which is very green.

The 17th Airborne Division was released to the 3rd Army and is being replaced at REIMS by the 28th Infantry Division less one regiment still with the First Army.

January 1, 1945

At 0001 all guns of 3rd Army fired a New Year's greeting on the enemy for twenty minutes--heavy casualties inflicted.

Germans have formed a definite pocket in woods SE of BASTOGNE from which they seriously threaten our line of supply and bring the principal road under machine gun and mortar fire. It will be necessary to evict them.

The 6th Armored Division continued to advance. All other units made little to no progress.

The VII Corps, First Army, will initiate an attack on HOUFFALIZE from the north in the morning. This should take some pressure from the 3rd Army.

17th Airborne Division ordered to attack through 11th Armored Division at 1200, January 3.

January 3, 1945

87th Infantry Division gained on the left. The 11th Armored repulsed a strong counterattack in the center but is badly disorganized and needs a few days out of the line. Due to slippery conditions of the roads, the 17th Airborne Division was unable to attack through the 11th Armored Division as planned.

January 4, 1945

The 17th Airborne Division attacked through 11th Armored Division and ran into violent resistance, suffering heavy losses due to inexperience. The individual fighting of the men was excellent.

If the 94th Infantry Division is released to the 3rd Army, it will replace the 90th Infantry Division in the XX Corps, and the 90th Division will be sent to the III Corps for the purpose of cleaning pocket SE of BASTOGNE.

SECRET

5°20′

7°10′

50°10′

48°40′

ST. VITH

HOUFFALIZE

ST. HUBERT

BASTOGNE

OUR R.

PRUM R.

MOSELLE R.

SURE

FRONT LINE 22 DEC 1944

DIEKIRCH

NEUFCHATEAU

ECHTERNACH

TRIER

ARLON

LUXEMBOURG

FRONT LINE

SAAR R.

LONGWY

ESCH

MERZIG

LONGUYON

THIONVILLE

SAARLAUTERN

SAARBRUCKEN

22 DEC 1944

METZ

SARRGUEMINES

PONT-A-MOUSSON

MOSELLE R.

SARREBOURG

NANCY

N

44 35 26 80 64 5 4Δ 6Δ

MOVEMENTS THIRD ARMY UNITS TO BASTOGNE OPERATION

SCALE — 1:500,000

0 5 10 20 MI

SECRET

January 5, 1945

The 94th Infantry Division, less one Combat Team, was cleared to the 3rd Army at 1730. Moves to THIONVILLE at once.

January 6, 1945

Final details for employment of 90th Infantry Division settled. It will attack on January 9th through 26th Infantry Division in a northwesterly direction along ridge road, cutting base of salient. The 26th Infantry Division, 6th Cavalry Group Task Force, the 35th Infantry Division and 6th Armored Division are attacking concentrically along the perimeter of the pocket. One thousand guns are supporting the attack, some firing in prolongation and others at right angles to the main effort to insure dispersion both ways.

A deception detachment was left in XX Corps to keep up 90th Infantry Division radio net.

Enemy attacked three times today without success and in little force. I fear he is withdrawing. No flying due to bad weather.

January 7, 1945

The 319th Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division in a night attack secured the town of DAHL with surprisingly small casualties. This attack not only keeps the enemy off balance but also protects right flank of the 26th Infantry Division.

Some rumors of an attack against the northern front of the XII Corps in direction of DIEKIRCH. Measures taken to establish road blocks and minefields.

January 8, 1945

I determined to renew attack on HOUFFALIZE on 9th by adding to the present stalled attack of the 87th Infantry and 17th Airborne Divisions, a new attack by the 101st Airborne and the 4th Armored Divisions.

The attack in the morning will comprise eight divisions. The VIII Corps from left to right--87th Infantry, 17th and 101st Airborne Divisions, and 4th Armored Division. The III Corps--6th Armored, 35th Infantry, 90th Infantry, and 26th Infantry Divisions.

The 319th Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division repulsed a heavy counterattack of three battalions of Germans supported by tanks. We lost 9 men killed and 50 wounded. More than 300 German dead counted on the snow.

Due to severe fighting heretofore sustained, the attack of the 87th Infantry Division and the 17th Airborne Division will be of limited intensity but will retain the initiative.

Continued rumors of a German counter-offensive in the vicinity of SAARBRUCKEN.

January 9, 1945

Limited flying weather. The attack of the VIII and III Corps jumped off as planned. The 90th Infantry Division, making the main effort, received heavy casualties from artillery and rocket fire just after the jumpoff, but advanced 2½ kilometers. The 101st Airborne and 4th Armored Divisions moved forward, the former securing the woods west of NOVILLE. The remaining units in the two corps made very limited progress.

The rumors about the German counter-offensive from the vicinity of SAARBRUCKEN continue.

January 10, 1945

Higher authority decided that an armored division should be withdrawn from the line as a precautionary measure against the possible German attack from SAARBRUCKEN.

The attack of the 101st Airborne and 4th Armored Divisions was therefore called off at noon, and the 4th Armored will withdraw during darkness. At the same time the 101st Airborne Division and the 6th Armored Division will link up. The entire VIII Corps will limit offensive operations to vigorous patrolling. III Corps continues attack. All the arrangements for this change were made by personal contact between the Army Commander and Corps and Divisions involved.

All elements of the III Corps, particularly the 90th Infantry Division, made fair progress. A column of German guns and armor, attempting to withdraw in front of the 90th Infantry Division, was brought under artillery fire and also attacked by fighter-bombers from the XIX Tactical Air Command with good results.

General Bradley secured authority to advance the 9th Armored and 8th Armored Divisions, now on the Meuse, to the Moselle between PONT A MOUSSON and THIONVILLE. This, with the presence of the 4th Armored Division south of LUXEMBOURG, makes the situation, so far as a German attack from SAARBRUCKEN is concerned, very satisfactory.

January 11, 1945

III Corps making fair progress and securing a large number of prisoners.

Visited XX Corps to arrange plans for attacking Germans should they initiate offensive near SAARBRUCKEN. The key to this situation is ST. AVOLD. As long as we hold there and attack from there, the Germans cannot move effectively in any direction.

January 12, 1945

The VIII Corps resumes attack on HOUFFALIZE as follows from west to east: 87th Infantry, 17th Airborne, 11th Armored, and 101st Airborne Divisions.

The III Corps continues attack for the final mopping up of the salient, SE of BASTOGNE.

January 13, 1945

Attitude of troops completely changed. They now have full confidence that they are pursuing a defeated enemy. This in spite of the fact that the Germans north and northeast of BASTOGNE are resisting viciously in order to preserve their escape routes.

Plan to withdraw one RCT of the 87th Infantry Division from VIII Corps and assign it to XII Corps preparatory to attacking with XII Corps north from DIEKIRCH.

January 14, 1945

The VIII Corps attacked with great effectiveness and is very close to contact with First Army in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE.

January 15, 1945

Moving remainder of the 87th Infantry Division and assigning both 87th Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions to XII Corps. This Corps will attack north from DIEKIRCH on ST. VITH on the 18th.

January 16, 1945

At 0905, 41st Cavalry of the 11th Armored Division made contact with 41st Infantry of the 2nd Armored Division in HOUFFALIZE, thus terminating the BASTOGNE operation so far as the 3rd Army is concerned.

During the period of this operation, the 3rd Army utilized a total of 17 divisions and lost in killed, wounded, and missing, 24,598 men. In the same period the Germans utilized 20 divisions and lost a total of 18,051 in prisoners of war and enemy buried by us. Their estimated casualties, excluding non-battle, for this period amount to 103,900 as follows: 16,400 prisoners of war; 24,200 killed; 63,200 wounded. We believe that these figures are low.

On 18 December 1944 Army Engineer troops and supplies were massed behind the XII Corps prepared to support the main effort of the Third Army to breach the Siegfried Line in the SARREGUEMINES area. By 22 December 1944 these same Engineer troops were redisposed in an area extending from LUXEMBOURG on the east to VIRTON on the west, operating in close support of two Corps on offensive assignments and one Corps on defensive assignments, and thousands of tons of bridging and demolitions were moving north and west to new supply dumps in the ESCH - ARLON area. From 22 December 1944 to 16 January 1945 more than 2800 miles of roads were reconnoitered and maintained. Continuous dense traffic, combined with drifting snows, made this task a gigantic one. During this same period, the installation and dismantling of road blocks and tactical demolitions expended over 100,000 A.T. mines and 200,000 lbs of TNT. Bridging presented no problems in the initial phase of action, but toward the middle of January had again become a major function.

As of the 18th of December 1944, the major preponderance of 3rd Army ordnance troops, ammunition, and supplies, were concentrated on the TOUL-NANCY-SARREGUEMINES axis to support the projected attack of the XII Corps.

With the change of direction of the attack to the north, all incoming ammunition was diverted to existing ASP's in the LONGWY - ESCH area and new ASP's established. By rail and truck companies an average of 4,500 tons of ammunition was moved per day, truck companies traveling in one week 462,000 miles in the hauling of ammunition alone. During this period - December 22nd to January 16th - the average consumption of ammunition per day in the Army area averaged 3,500 tons.

Maintenance requirements were met by moving ordnance units in coordination with the movement of combat units they had previously serviced. Replacement, new issue, and other ordnance supply issues were handled generally in the same manner as the ammunition supply, necessitating the movement of 45,000 tons of replacement equipment and spare parts, with the issue to troops during this period of 1,940 general purpose vehicles, 814 combat vehicles and 152 artillery weapons as replacements.

The fighting quality of American troops never reached a higher level than in this operation. Neither intolerable weather or the best troops in the possession of the Germans were able to stop them or prevent their supply.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

CHIEFS OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS

(31 JANUARY 1945)

COMMANDING GENERAL
Lieutenant General G. S. Patton, Jr.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Brigadier General Hobart R. Gay

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Colonel Paul D. Harkins

SECRETARY TO GENERAL STAFF
Lt Colonel George R. Pfann

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
Colonel Frederick S. Matthews

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
Colonel Oscar W. Koch

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-3
Brigadier General Halley G. Maddox

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-4
Brigadier General Walter J. Muller

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-5
Colonel Nicholas W. Campanole

ADJUTANT GENERAL
Colonel Robert E. Cummings

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
Colonel Frederick R. Chamberlain, Jr.

ARTILLERY
Colonel Edward T. Williams

CHAPLAIN
Colonel James H. O'Neill

CHEMICAL WARFARE
Colonel Edward C. Wallington

ENGINEER
Colonel John F. Conklin

FINANCE
Lt Colonel Charles B. Milliken

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton

INSPECTOR GENERAL
Colonel Clarence C. Park

JUDGE ADVOCATE
Colonel Charles E. Cheever

MEDICAL
Colonel Thomas D. Hurley

ORDNANCE
Colonel Thomas H. Nixon

PROVOST MARSHAL
Colonel Philip C. Clayton

PUBLIC RELATIONS
Major James T. Quirk

QUARTERMASTER
Colonel Everett Busch

SIGNAL
Colonel Elton F. Hammond

SPECIAL SERVICE
Lt Colonel Kenneth E. Van Buskirk

TANK DESTROYER
Brigadier General Herbert L. Earnest

Chapter 9

FEBRUARY

THROUGH THE SIEGFRIED LINE

FEBRUARY OPERATIONS

February was a month in which terrain and weather proved to be at least as formidable hindrances to Third U.S. Army's progress as was the enemy. But in the end they both were conquered, for the spirit of the Army's service and supply troops was as indomitable as that of its infantry, tank crews and artillerymen. Although the advance was over rugged terrain incised by many flood-swollen, swiftly-flowing rivers, the bridges were built and the infantry went forward. Despite frost-damaged roads that prohibited heavy motor traffic and virtually isolated forward units, the troops were supplied in some instances by air drop, and again the infantry and tanks were enabled to continue the advance. More bridging was erected than in any other month of Third U. S. Army's operations, while for the first time railroad and air transportation became major means of supply delivery to divisions and corps.

1 FEBRUARY *(D + 240)*.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group directed that the 8th Armored Division be relieved from assignment to Fifteenth U.S. Army, from attachment to Third U.S. Army for supply and administration and assigned to Ninth U.S. Army effective 1 February. Twelfth U.S. Army Group also directed that Third U.S. Army move the 95th Infantry Division to Ninth U.S. Army. The division was to move with complete secrecy and was to reach an area designated by Ninth U.S. Army not later than 2400 on 6 February.

A plan for an attack against the SIEGFRIED Line in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03), using troops assigned to XII Corps, was approved by the Army Commander and a date of 5 February set, but the proposed attack was suspended for the time being by the Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group pending decision as to the area in which the main effort would be made.

Maintaining defensive positions, the 17th Airborne and 6th Armored Divisions and 6th Cavalry Group of III Corps patrolled to the OUR River with no change in front lines.

Advancing one mile to a line four miles east of the OUR River, the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) in VIII Corps zone captured GRUBLANGENFELD (P98) and HECKHUSCHEID (P97). The 4th Infantry Division's 12th Infantry advanced three and one half miles east to high ground overlooking BLEIALF (P98) and captured WINTERSCHEID (P98). Strong enemy resistance, including coordinated small arms, mortar and artillery fires, was encountered by 4th Infantry Division on the high ground south of RADSCHEID (P98) and west of BLEIALF (P98). Following a sharp fire fight, the enemy was driven back into BLEIALF (P98) and was repeatedly attacked with massed time-on-target artillery concentrations. Advancing three miles after crossing the OUR River, advance elements of the 8th Infantry reached points eight miles southeast of ST VITH (P88) and captured MUTZENICH (P98). A two and one-half mile advance to the northeast was made by the 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) and elements captured AUW (L09) and MANDERFELD (L09). The 11th Armored Division remained in an assembly area, while the 95th Infantry Division, assigned to VIII Corps on 29 January, remained in resarve. VIII Corps artillery made extensive use of 155mm guns and 240mm howitzers for long-range harassing fire upon traffic bottle necks and enemy troop and supply installations in the vicinity of PRUM (L07).

Front lines were maintained in XII Corps zone. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) relieved the 11th Infantry, which assembled in division rear area. The 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintained their positions and patrolled aggressively.

There was no change in XX Corps, with the 26th and 94th Infantry Divisions patrolling aggressively and maintaining positions.

Only thirty-two sorties in two missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command, all being as escort for medium bombers.

There was no advance in Third U.S. Army's III, XII or XX Corps during the dsy. VIII Corps advanced two miles along its front, capturing MUTZENICH (P98), AUW (L09), MANDERFELD (L09), GRUBLANGENFELD (P98), WINTERSCHEID (P98) and HECKHUSCHEID (P97). The 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) cleared Army area for Ninth U.S. Army, the remainder of the division having departed previously for Seventh U.S. Army.

A program for placing two and one-half inches of extra armor plate on the forward hull of M4A3 medium tanks was begun. This additional armor plate, obtained from wrecked and salvaged tanks at collection points, greatly decreased the vulnerability of the vehicles. Welding of the plate onto the tanks was performed under local contract in civilian factories.

The supply situation was generally favorable, although coal was still seriously in short supply, there was a shortage of 73-octane gasoline for use in artillery liaison planes, while cleaning and preserving materials and one-burner stoves remained on the critical list. Approximately sixty-five tons of coal daily were allocated to the Army from mines at CREUTZWALD (Q26) and CARLING (Q26) in the Seventh U.S. Army area. In regard to rations and V-80 gasoline the situation was favorable, 1,355,235 rations and 2,666,393 gallons of gasoline being on hand in the Army area. An additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26). In the Army's Classes II and IV depots were 4,707.5 long tons of clothing and equipment. The first train with supplies for the Classes II and IV depot at METZ (U85) arrived on this date. Previously, supplies for this depot were transported entirely by truck from a railhead at HAGONDANGE (U87), west of the MOSELLE River. Strength of the Army on this date was 353,635. In addition, the Army supplied 25,864 Advance Section Communications Zone, 27,290 Ninth U.S. Air Force, 1,794 French and 2,871 miscellaneous troops in or near the Army area.

Captured German Weapon Used Against Enemy

2 FEBRUARY *(D + 241)*

Not only was the enemy now on the defensive throughout the Western Front, but he had no apparent striking power. His most favored capability was that he would withdraw under pressure to and defend in the fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line, but he also was considered capable of continuing to oppose Third U.S. Army advances south of the MOSELLE River with local, armor-spearheaded attacks. On the basis of available information, it was indicated that the enemy had six Panzer-type divisions remaining in the west, north of the MOSELLE, all of them except for elements of one division being unlocated and out of contact. Although the enemy had no striking power, he could use these unlocated armored divisions in a defensive role against penetrations of his positions. There was no indication that the enemy would withdraw east of the RHINE River, for there was every tactical reason why he should continue to oppose the Allied advance in order to protect his SAAR and RUHR war industries. However, the possibility existed that, logistically, his positions west of the RHINE might become untenable. The limited roadnet west of the river, severely restricted by Allied air interdiction and winter weather conditions, might make it impossible for the enemy to maintain the bulk of the armor he had west of the river. Reports indicated that he was having considerable supply difficulties.

In III Corps the 17th Airborne Division, 6th Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Group patrolled and maintained their front.

Consolidating its positions, the 90th Infantry Division in VIII Corps zone conducted strong patrols, supported by tank destroyer units. In the 4th Infantry Division, the 12th Infantry advanced and captured BLEIALF (P98), while the 8th Infantry advanced one mile, capturing RADSCHEID (P98), one and one-half miles northeast of BLEIALF (P98). Continuing its attack, the 347th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) captured KREWINKEL (L09), BERTHERATH (L09), WECKERATH (L09) and LOSHEIM (L09), one and one-half miles east of MANDERFELD (L09). The 95th Infantry Division remained in corps reserve, as did the 11th Armored Division.

Patrolling was carried out by the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions in XII Corps zone, while Task Force OBOE (4th Armored Division armored infantry elements), operating in the 80th Infantry Division zone, cleared HOSDORF (P94). There was no change in the remainder of the corps.

In XX Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Group maintained positions and patrolled. Tank destroyers with 3d Cavalry Group fired harassing and interdiction missions into SIEGFRIED Line defenses. The 94th Infantry Division made a limited objective attack, with the 302d Infantry Regiment clearing the CAMPHOLTZ woods one mile southeast of TETTINGEN (L00), aided by tank destroyers which neutralized a number of pillboxes. Artillery with XX Corps attacked a concentration of twelve enemy tanks east of KREUZWEILER (L00) with a seven-battalion time-on-target concentration, destroying three and dispersing the remainder. The 8" howitzers were employed extensively for the attack of pillboxes by both VIII and XX Corps, with effective penetrations being obtained.

Fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 414 sorties, aimed primarily at enemy rail facilities. Five hundred and eighty-five railroad cars and thirty-two locomotives were destroyed or damaged while twenty-nine rail cuts were made.

VIII Corps continued its advance with its 4th, 87th and 90th Infantry Divisions moving forward another two miles inside Germany into strong SIEGFRIED Line fortifications, while in the remainder of Army zone there was no change during the period.

Mechanical flame throwers were issued the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, the weapons to be mounted in medium tanks. Equipped with two twenty-five gallon tanks the flame throwers were to be carried in the tanks in addition to machine guns. The two weapons were fired through a common aperture, with interchange to the firing position possible in thirty seconds. Total firing time of the flame thrower was approximately fifty seconds and firing a distance from fifty to seventy yards. Because of the sudden thaw and the subsequent toppling of ammunition stacks, it was necessary to restack fifty percent of all the ammunition that had been stacked on frozen ground and snow in Third U.S. Army dumps.

Notification was received by the Army that it would receive a number of dog teams of the air rescue service which were being flown from Labrador, for evacuation of patients from the areas of deep snow in the division areas on the northern flank of the Army. A list of medical supplies for an emergency air drop to take care of 15,000 men for one day was prepared and submitted to Twelfth U.S. Army Group, the list consisting of fourteen medical items, with a total weight of 18,377 pounds occupying a space of 10,798 cubic feet.

A War Department circular prohibited the issue of "D"-type rations as a supplement. This type of ration, if ordered on the daily telegram, was to be considered as a full ration and was to be shipped in lieu of either "A" or operational-type rations.



Infantry Advance Under Hazardous Winter Conditions

3 FEBRUARY *(D + 242)*

An Operational Directive of this date conveyed to the corps commanders the following information and orders:

The enemy was continuing to defend and delay with a minimum of troops, making maximum use of favorable terrain, fortifications of the SIEGFRIED Line and the effects of severe winter weather. First U.S. Army was continuing on its current mission, shifting the weight of its efforts to the left (north) flank. Seventh U.S. Army was continuing to defend in its sector.

Third U.S. Army was directed to continue the attack on its left and seize PRUM (LO7), to attack northeast from the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (LO3) and seize BITBURG (L15), and be prepared to continue the attack to the RHINE River.

III Corps (17th Airborne Division, 6th Armored Division and attached troops) was ordered to extend its zone of responsibility as directed, was to continue an aggressive defense in its new zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops, was to be prepared to attack northeast or east to advance to the KYLL River, and was to maintain contact with VIII Corps on the left (north) and with XII Corps on the right (south).

VIII Corps (4th, 87th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and attached troops) was ordered to continue the attack on the left (north) to maintain contact with First U.S. Army, was to attack east and southeast and seize PRUM (LO7), and was to be prepared to continue the attack northeast, east or southeast.

XII Corps (5th, 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division and attached troops) was ordered to seize and secure a bridgehead over the SAUER River, attack and seize BITBURG (L15), and be prepared to continue the attack east or northeast.

XX Corps (26th and 94th Infantry Divisions and attached troops) was ordered to continue an aggressive defense in its zone with the objective of containing the maximum number of enemy troops and to maintain contact with XII Corps on the left (north).

At a conference of the Army Commander with four Third U.S. Army corps commanding generals it was decided that XII Corps would attack the night of 6-7 February, the objective being BITBURG (L15), and that VIII Corps would continue to drive toward PRUM (LO7) with the troops assigned to it.

The 6th Armored Division, 17th Airborne Division and 6th Cavalry Group patrolled and maintained their positions in III Corps zone. Elements of the 6th Cavalry Group, relieved by elements of 17th Airborne Division, in turn relieved elements of the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division of XII Corps) in accordance with change in boundary adjustment.

Attacking in VIII Corps zone, the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) occupied BERG (P97), the remainder of the division maintaining present positions. The 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) advanced

one mile east and captured BUCHET (P98). The 87th Infantry Division continued its attack, with its 346th Infantry advancing one-half mile and capturing KREWINKEL (L09), one and one-half miles south of LOSHEIM (L09), while ROTH (L09), three miles south of LOSHEIM (L09), was taken by reconnaissance elements. Remaining in the corps assembly area were the 11th Armored Division and the 95th Infantry Division.

XII Corps' only attack was conducted by Task Force OBOE, (Armored infantry elements of the 4th Armored Division), attached to the 80th Infantry Division, which cleared HOESDORF (P94). Elsewhere the 5th, 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions maintained positions and patrolled. XII Corps artillery continued its program of strong harassing and interdiction fires placed upon all enemy-held towns and buildings within range of the artillery with the corps.

Preparing for limited objective attacks in XX Corps zone, the 94th Infantry Division patrolled aggressively and consolidated positions, while the 3d Cavalry Group and the 26th Infantry Division also patrolled. Tank destroyer units neutralized pillboxes in the 94th Infantry Division area. XX Corps artillery continued to utilize 155mm howitzers as roving guns firing from positions far forward in order to harass and interdict the enemy's extreme rear areas.

Air operations were limited by weather to three uneventful escort missions, totalling thirty-five sorties for medium bombers.

BUCHET (P98), and ROTH (L09) were taken during the day by VIII Corps in its continued advance on the Army north flank, in coordination with the drive of the First U.S. Army into the SIEGFRIED Line. The 8th Armored Division, which had been in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve, cleared the Army area for Ninth U.S. Army.

Captured enemy stores in SAARLAUTERN (Q72) provided the Army with many items of supplies which were in critical short supply. Issues from this source included 1,200 plumbing fixtures, paint and putty, 225 truckloads of packing materials, seventeen ten-ton loads of lumber dunnage and a ten-ton load of rubber gaskets for water and gasoline cans.

Inspecting Captured Enemy Artillery

4 FEBRUARY *(D + 243)*

Significant order of battle facts at this time showed a reshuffling of enemy Panzer divisions remaining in the west, with a strong trend of movement to the northern sectors of the front and non-appearance in contact in Third U.S. Army's zone of any makeshift miscellaneous units which the enemy usually employed to hold organized positions while on the defensive. From these facts, it was indicated that the enemy, while he had no offensive power in the west, was disposing his armor to give the maximum local counterattacking strength, and that he was reshuffling his infantry divisions to meet the urgent need for such troops in threatened sectors.

VIII Corps was directed to continue the attack with the explicit objective of seizing and holding the general line NEUENDORF (L08) - PRUM (L07) - PRONSFELD (L07) and the high ground generally north and east of GROSSKAMPENBERG (P97). This, in effect, changed the direction of VIII Corps' main effort from the northeast to the southeast against PRUM (L07).

III Corps units regrouped in accordance with a change in III - XII Corps boundary. Elements of the 6th Cavalry Group relieved the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) of XII Corps and 6th Armored Division relieved elements of the 90th Infantry Division of VIII Corps. Elements of the 76th Infantry Division were relieved by the 2d Cavalry Group. The 17th Airborne Division maintained its positions and patrolled to the OUR River.

In VIII Corps, the 87th and 90th Infantry Divisions zone consolidated positions and regrouped, while other elements of the 87th Infantry Division cleared KOBSCHEID (L08) after a limited objective attack. Advancing one and one-half miles in zone, the 4th Infantry Division's 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments had leading elements three and one-half miles northwest of PRUM (L07). Elements of the 11th Armored Division began relieving elements of the 90th Infantry Division in the southern zone, while other elements of the 90th Infantry Division consolidated their positions and patrolled aggressively. The 95th Infantry Division remained in corps reserve.

XII Corps units regrouped following the change in inter-corps boundaries, and patrolled aggressively. Searchlights were first used in a ground role in Third U.S. Army area on the night of 4 February in a familiarization mission in this corps. Since the ground troops were not accustomed to night combat under artificial moonlight, a sector was chosen in which no major operation was underway. A position overlooking the enemy lines along the MOSELLE River was chosen for first employment of searchlights for battlefield illumination. Two lights were emplaced in defiladed sites near CANACH (P91) to throw a beam over the MOSELLE River in the direction of the German lines. At that time, outposts were established in the town of EHNEN (L01). The hostile shores were illuminated sufficiently to discern objects on the far shore. No artillery fire was drawn during the three-day period these lights were in operation.

In XX Corps there was no change, with units patrolling aggressively and maintaining positions. Tank destroyer units attached to 3d Cavalry Group fired harassing missions into MERCHINGEN (Q29), BROTDORF (Q29) and METLACH (L10).

Bad weather grounded all planes other than two fighter bombers which performed weather reconnaissances.

Third U.S. Army units regrouped after a change in the inter-corps boundaries, while elements of VIII Corps captured the town of KOBSCHEID (L08).

5 FEBRUARY *(D + 244)*

III Corps completed its regrouping while the 17th Airborne Division continued patrolling to the OUR River.

In VIII Corps zone, the 11th Armored Division completed relief of the 90th Infantry Division, which then occupied positions in a new zone with its 359th Infantry clearing HABSCHEID (P97). The 4th Infantry Division's 22d Infantry captured BRANDSCHEID (P98) and SCHLAUSENBACH (L08), while the 87th Infantry Division consolidated its positions. Launching an attack into the SIEGFRIED Line at 0400, the 11th Armored Division and 90th Infantry Division gained two miles by the end of the period. Both LUTZKAMPEN (P87) and GROSSKAMPENBERG (P97) were captured during this advance.

XII Corps units continued patrolling to the OUR River.

A small counterattack was easily repulsed by the 94th Infantry Division while elsewhere in XX Corps zone there was no major activity.

XIX Tactical Air Command had no aerial activity because of bad weather conditions.

During the period Third U.S. Army's VIII Corps continued its attack into the SIEGFRIED Line and gained two miles while taking LUTZKAMPEN (P87), GROSSKAMPENBERG (P97), SCHLAUSENBACH (L08), BRANDESCHEID (P98) and HABSCHEID (P97). Elsewhere in Army zone active patrolling continued.

Conversion of tanks used by cavalry reconnaissance squadrons from M59 to M24 light tanks continued. This provided a faster, more maneuverable tank mounting a 75mm gun instead of the 37mm gun mounted by the former vehicle.

Authorization was granted to reestablish local mail and telephone services in LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81), ESCH (P70) and other urban centers of southern Luxembourg.

6 FEBRUARY *(D + 245)*

Unchanged at this time was the favored enemy capability, with the added factor, however, that he could defend and delay in successive positions on favorable terrain east of the SIEGFRIED Line as well as in the fortifications themselves. The enemy was still given the capability of opposing the Army's thrusts with local, armor-spearheaded counterattacks.

A limited attack in III Corps zone was launched by elements of the 507th Parachute Infantry (17th Airborne Division) and the Reserve Combat Command of the 6th Armored Division, the OUR River being crossed in zone. The 6th Cavalry Group maintained positions and patrolled to the OUR River.

Advancing two miles through SIEGFRIED fortifications, the 11th Armored Division, (VIII Corps), reached a vicinity eight miles southwest of PRUM (L07), one of Third U.S. Army's immediate objectives. After clearing HABSCHEID (P97) the previous day, the 90th Infantry Division regrouped and consolidated its positions and relieved elements of the 4th Infantry Division in zone. After moving its zone of action slightly to the north, the 4th Infantry Division attacked and captured SELLERICH (L08), HERSCHEID (L08), HONTHEIM (L08) and WASCHEID (L08). Its leading elements were, at the end of the period, three miles northwest of PRUM (L07). On the corps north flank, the 87th Infantry Division advanced one mile in zone, maintaining contact with First U.S. Army. The 4th Armored Division attacked and captured BETTEL (P94).

Attacking at 0100 in XII Corps zone, the 5th Infantry Division advanced with its 11th Infantry and the attached 417th Infantry (76th Infantry Division), crossing the SAUER River and gaining 1,000 yards. The 80th Infantry Division attacked at 0300 and elements of its 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments also crossed the SAUER River. A heavy artillery preparation, involving an expenditure of approximately 29,000 rounds of ammunition, was fired from 0130 to 0600 by all corps and division artillery battalions. Three battalions of III Corps artillery also fired in support of the attack. The preparation embraced 280 missions on enemy artillery locations, 137 on enemy command posts and 102 on enemy occupied towns. Upon conclusion of the preparation fires, divisional artillery reverted to close support of the respective divisions and the corps artillery fired a program of heavy harassing and interdiction fires on towns and enemy command posts until 1200 hours. Enemy artillery activity increased considerably in reaction to the attack with emphasis upon harassing and interdiction fires in the bridgehead areas,

Antiaircraft on the Alert

particularly against the 80th Infantry Division. XII Corps artillery fired a heavy program of counterbattery fires including a total of forty-eight "Serenade" missions throughout the period. The 5th Infantry Division requested antiaircraft artillery searchlights for battlefield illumination, two lights being sited in the 11th Infantry zone for this purpose. Lights were used only ten minutes as on this occasion they revealed infantry assault boats making the crossing.

In XX Corps zone units patrolled aggressively. In the 26th Infantry Division the 101st Infantry relieved the 328th Infantry which became division reserve. The 301st Infantry (94th Infantry Division) opened a limited objective attack just before the end of the period, entering the town of SINZ (L00).

Two hundred and fourteen sorties in seventeen missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command, with 272 motor vehicles, thirteen armored vehicles and tanks, 245 railroad cars and thirty buildings being destroyed or damaged.

All four corps were active during the period, with minor gains reported in each corps, the major effort continuing on the Army north flank by the VIII Corps. The towns of BETTEL (P94), WASCHEID (L08), HONTHEIM (L08), SELLERICH (L08) and HERSCHEID (L08) were taken as major elements of Third U.S. Army continued their penetration of the SIEGFRIED Line in the drive to capture PRUM (L07). The 95th Infantry Division left the Army zone enroute to Ninth U.S. Army.

Bib-type Red Cross aprons were produced by civilian labor under direction of military government personnel for stretcher bearers of several divisions. The easily distinguished crosses proved of value against sniper fire. Army Headquarters' Rear Echelon moved from ESCH sur ALZETTE (P70) to LUXEMBOURG (P81), and located a short distance from the Forward Echelon.

Tank Destroyer Crossing the Sauer River

7 FEBRUARY *(D + 246)*

Headquarters, Twelfth U.S. Army Group, issued Letter of Instructions Number fifteen to First, Third and Fifteenth U.S. Armies. It contained information and orders as follows: Withdrawal by the enemy from the ARDENNES salient was almost completed and there were indications that his commitments on the Western Front were being appreciably reduced to meet the threat offered by the Russian offensive. 21 Army Group British, with Ninth U.S. Army under operational control, was to carry out missions, the target dates for which had been announced separately. Sixth U.S. Army Group was continuing its attack to reduce the COLMAR (V74) pocket, while defending in the rest of its zone. Air Forces were continuing their current attack to paralyze enemy communications which affected the immediate battle area, with the Ninth U.S. Air Force cooperating with Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Ninth U.S. Army.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to secure the ROER River dams, clear the enemy from the area west of the approximate line: ROER River--GEMUND (F11) - SCHLEIDEN (F11) - FRAUENKRON (F11), was to attack on its left to support the operation of 21 Army Group British, whose right (south) flank it was to protect. Throughout the remainder of its zone Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to assume an aggressive defense generally along the existing front line.

Until receipt of contrary orders, Third U.S. Army was to continue the probing attacks in progress, maintaining the defense elsewhere on its front. Purpose of the probing attacks was to prevent movement of enemy forces to the front of 21 Army Group British and to take advantage of any weakening of the enemy to improve the position of Third U.S. Army. Cessation of the offensive along the Third U.S. Army front and part of First U.S. Army front was specifically intended to permit withdrawal of the maximum possible units to Army rear areas for rest and refitting.

An estimate of enemy strength in Third U.S. Army zone at this time showed 27,000 combat effectives (the equivalent of three and one-half divisions) and sixty tanks or assault guns, opposing III, VIII and XII Corps, while 18,000 troops (the equivalent of two divisions) and forty tanks or assault guns, were opposing XX Corps. To this total of 45,000 troops (the equivalent of five and one-half divisions) and 100 tanks or assault guns, could be added the estimated tactical reserve held by the enemy in the Army's zone of advance, consisting of 6,500 Panzer troops, fifty tanks and 5,000 infantry, the equivalent of one and one-half divisions.

Elements of the 17th Airborne Division and 6th Armored Division (III Corps) enlarged the bridgehead across the OUR River, with elements fighting in the vicinity of DASBURG (P86) at the end of the period. Other elements of the 6th Armored Division crossed and made another bridgehead one-half mile deep a little north of the first bridgehead. Patrolling on the west bank of the OUR River was continued by the 6th Cavalry Group.

The 11th Armored Division consolidated its gains in the southern part of VIII Corps zone and reoccupied LUTZKAMPEN (P87). Driving eastward one mile, leading elements of the 90th Infantry Division reached a

vicinity three miles west of PRUM (L07). Farther north, the 4th Infantry Division also advanced one mile, capturing OBERMERLEN (L08) with leading elements two miles from the west bank of the PRUM River. On the corps north flank, the 87th Infantry Division, continued to coordinate its attack with that of First U.S. Army. Its 345th Infantry gained three-quarters of a mile and approached the PRUM River north of PRUM (L07).

In the XII Corps, the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions continued their assault operations to enlarge bridgeheads across the OUR and SAUER Rivers, and reduced pillboxes on the east side of both rivers. The 5th Infantry Division, with elements of the 10th, 11th and 417th (76th Infantry Division) Infantry Regiments, repulsed several counterattacks on the eastern side of the SAUER River with the assistance of massed artillery fires. Necessary adjustments were made in siting the antiaircraft searchlights used in supporting the crossings of the 5th Infantry Division, the lights being used for eight hours. First reports stated the infantry did not like the illumination. However, after becoming accustomed to the effect of the lights, they requested additional lights. Elements of the 80th Infantry Division captured WALLENDORF (P94). The 4th Armored Division consolidated its gains of the previous day while the 76th Infantry Division (-) moved into assembly areas.

Continuing to fight in and around SINZ (L00), the 94th Infantry Division cleared the town by the end of the period. The 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) launched a limited objective attack in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Elsewhere in XX Corps zone, patrolling continued.

No fighter bomber sorties were initiated by XIX Tactical Air Command because of adverse weather.

Capturing OBERMEHLEN (L08) and SINZ (L00) and reoccupying LUTZKAMPEN (P87), Third U.S. Army continued its drive into SIEGFRIED Line positions during the period. Upon receipt of orders from higher headquarters, Third U.S. Army assumed a policy of aggressively defending its zone while continuing probing attacks into enemy positions toward certain key objectives. Main effort of the Allied Armies was being made in the northern area occupied by the British and Ninth U.S. Armies. Twelfth U.S. Army Group, by assuming the role of aggressive defense was to prevent the enemy from shifting his forces to the north.

The Army was informed by Twelfth U.S. Army Group that the serious rail car shortage had become more critical because of additional requirements to move food and coal for minimum civilian needs and coal for military use. Asked to take vigorous action, the Army increased its efforts to unload rail cars more rapidly at all supply points.

8 FEBRUARY *(D + 247)*

Advancing astride the MOSELLE River, Third U.S. Army encountered a succession of rain-swollen, heavily-defended streams that challenged its assault crossing techniques. Normally mild 100 to 200-foot streams were converted by heavy rains and melting snows into raging torrents of up to sixteen feet per second velocity. On the far shores, the enemy was strongly emplaced in pillboxes and natural rock formations. Assault troops making the initial crossings were often tossed into the water as their floats and boats overturned, while bridge construction troops worked under the double handicap of the swift-flowing streams and enemy artillery fire. A dozen bridges were lost, but despite these handicaps the troops got across and the advance continued.

Attacks across the OUR River were continued by the 17th Airborne Division and the 6th Armored Division, with the 507th and 513th Parachute Infantry Regiments (17th Airborne Division) making little progress against heavy resistance. A small bridgehead over the river was obtained by the 6th Armored Division which forced two battalions of armored infantry across. The 6th Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively along the corps south flank.

Third U.S. Army's main effort continued to be in VIII Corps zone, where the attack toward PRUM (L07) was coordinated with the effort of First U.S. Army on the north. In the south part of corps zone the 11th Armored Division patrolled in zone. Just to the north, the 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) advanced one mile and cleared 153 enemy pillboxes in a flanking drive on PRUM (L07), while the 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments made slight gains against heavy resistance. Advancing one mile to a point a little more than one mile west of PRUM (L07), the 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments (4th Infantry Division) captured CONDRENBRETT (L08) and HERMESPAND (L08). In the north of the corps zone

Launching an Assault Boat

the 87th Infantry Division maintained contact with First U.S. Army, attacking in a zone north of PRUM (L07) with its 345th Infantry advancing two miles and taking OLZHEIM (L08). Tank destroyers knocked out four pillboxes and five machine gun nests with direct fire.

In XII Corps the 4th Armored Division (-) remained in division reserve. The 76th Infantry Division (-) patrolled in conjunction with the 2d and 42d Cavalry Squadrons along the southern part of corps zone. The 5th Infantry Division with the 417th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) attached reinforced its bridgeheads across the SAUER River, while farther north the 80th Infantry Division also enlarged its bridgeheads of the SAUER River.

In XX Corps the 94th Infantry Division cleared pillboxes from the area between the CAMPHOLZ woods (L00) and BUTZDORF (L00). The 26th Infantry Division continued limited objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, capturing some fortified houses in FRAULAUTERN (Q28) and SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28).

Of 314 sorties flown, XIX Tactical Air Command lost three planes while destroying or damaging thirty locomotives, 452 railroad cars, forty-two tanks and armored vehicles, 173 motor vehicles and 153 buildings.

Bridgeheads over the SAUER and OUR Rivers were enlarged as the attack toward PRUM (L07) continued into the SIEGFRIED Line during the day. Limited objective attacks were conducted successfully in the southern portion of Third U.S. Army's zone.

Experience of some divisions indicated that, in wet weather, overshoes were superior to shoe pacs. It was found that the shoe pacs were not water-tight around the seams and that overshoes and shoes in combination provided more flexible footgear equipment. The first of the dog teams which were to be used to evacuate patients in areas of deep snow arrived in the Army area. None of the teams was ever used, as the snow had melted by the time of their arrival.

Patrolling Newly Captured Town

9 FEBRUARY *(D + 248)*

Only one change in enemy capabilities was evident at this time, that the enemy might use armored divisions currently out of contact to counterattack in threatened portions of the front. Two enemy order of battle developments bore significantly on his capabilities against the Army. One was the identification of new Volksgrenadier units on the front, indicating that the enemy could still produce replacements for his battered divisions. The second was a fifteen to twenty train rail movement observed by tactical reconnaissance in the TRIER (L22) area, which, linked with the continued absence on the line of known enemy armored units, made it imperative that every effort be made to establish the whereabouts and strength of the missing Panzers.

The 6th Cavalry Group continued patrolling aggressively along the south flank of III Corps, while the 17th Airborne Division patrolled aggressively in the bridgehead across the OUR River. The 6th Armored Division gained one mile, joining the two bridgeheads across the OUR River held by the division and consolidating them into one which was three-quarters of a mile deep and three and one-half miles wide. One Bailey bridge was completed, tanks and tank destroyers using it constantly.

In the VIII Corps the 11th Armored Division patrolled aggressively along the southern part of corps zone. The 357th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) consolidated their gains of the previous day, while the 358th Infantry attacked, advancing one and one-half miles and seizing high ground overlooking the ALF River. Ten pillboxes and three machine gun positions were knocked out by tank destroyers. Farther north, the 4th Infantry Division continued to drive east on PRUM (L07), with its 12th Infantry advancing one mile to a vicinity one-half mile from PRUM (L07), the 8th Infantry advancing two miles north of PRUM (L07) and the 22d Infantry capturing NEIDERMEHLEN (L08) and STEINMEHLEN (L07), northwest of PRUM (L07). Artillery with VIII Corps fired strongly in close support to assist in repelling repeated enemy counterattacks, particularly in the vicinity of NIEDERMEHLEN (L08). Enemy artillery fires were generally light but the counterattacks were strongly supported by heavy mortars. The 345th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) advanced one and one-half miles and captured NEUNDORF (L08).

The 5th Infantry Division (XII Corps), with attached 417th Infantry (76th Infantry Division), enlarged its bridgehead across the SAUER River inland to a depth of 800 yards and a width of two miles. The 80th Infantry Division also increased its bridgehead to one mile in depth and one-half mile in width, all of the 318th Infantry and two-thirds of the 319th Infantry being across the river. Under control of the division artillery commander, tank destroyers attacked enemy pillboxes and assisted in the capture of several hundred prisoners. Artillery with XII Corps continued to fire heavily in support of the corps attack and repeatedly fired brief but intensive preparations in support of division attacks. Enemy artillery reaction to the attack continued to increase and included considerable heavy mortar and nebelwerfer fires, notably against the bridge sites of the 80th Infantry Division in the vicinity of HOESDORF (P94) and WALLENDORF (P94). Artillery continued its program of extensive harassing and interdiction fires upon all enemy held towns and buildings up to the extreme range of the artillery with the corps.

Limited objective attacks continued in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead in XX Corps zone. The 94th Infantry Division, after clearing the BANHOLZ woods just south of SINZ (L00), was heavily counterattacked and at the end of the period heavy fighting was in progress on the edge of the woods. A tank destroyer battalion in support knocked out two enemy tanks.

Flying 192 sorties in eighteen missions, XIX Tactical Air Command dropped ninety-one tons of bombs and attacked fifteen military installations and eight marshalling yards, while making fourteen rail cuts and destroying or damaging 161 railroad cars.

Third U.S. Army continued to enlarge its bridgeheads across the OUR and SAUER Rivers during the day. NIEDERMEHLEN (L08), STEINMEHLEN (L07) and NEUNDORF (L08) were taken by VIII Corps units in the attack on PRUM (L07).

Eight hundred "K" rations and 800 "D" rations were dropped by P47s to advanced elements of the 80th Infantry Division, which had established a bridgehead across the OUR River. Upon request of XII Corps, the rations were delivered to the air field at ETAIN (U47) for packing in belly tanks. Plans were made for another air drop of rations, ammunition and medical supplies, but the division indicated that air resupply was unnecessary.

Hasty German Roadblock

10 FEBRUARY *(D + 249)*

Amendment Number One to the Operational Directive dated 3 February was sent to the corps commanders. The directive relieved Headquarters, III Corps, with certain attached troops from assignment to Third U.S. Army effective 11 February on orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group dated 10 February. So much of the Operational Directive dated 3 February as pertained to III Corps was rescinded. In addition to the missions delineated in the Operational Directive dated 3 February, VIII Corps was ordered to extend the zone of its responsibility to include the former III Corps area and was to assume control of all troops therein. VIII Corps was to complete the relief and release of the 17th Airborne Division and move it to a designated assembly area. It was to maintain contact with XII Corps on the right (south). The boundary between III and VIII Corps was rescinded. The boundary between VIII and XII Corps was designated as the former boundary between III and XII Corps without change, as follows: ARLON (P52) (to VIII Corps)--BISSEN (P73)--ETTELBRUCK (P83) DIEKIRCH (P84) (all to XII Corps) --VIANDEN (P85) (to VIII Corps) --OUTSCHEID (L05) (to XII Corps).

Movement of supplies and equipment to front line troops was greatly handicapped at this time by the poor condition of roads resulting from the thaws. Many roads were closed and others were virtually impassable after being chopped up by heavy traffic. Vehicular circulation in corps and division zones constituted a major supply problem which led to the maximum use of existing railroad lines, especially those of narrow gauge, which were rehabilitated and used to great advantage. Troops isolated from supply by trucks were supplied by air drop and consideration was given to the use of pack troops in VIII Corps zone. Poor road conditions necessitated orders by the Commanding General prohibiting movement of tank retrievers over the Army's road net, thereby preventing delivery of heavy equipment except on special occasions as required by the tactical situation. Frost-damaged roads placed a heavy burden on engineer maintenance troops, work required to keep open the Army's supply routes being greater than in any previous month. Three thousand civilian laborers and 550 prisoners of war were used to maintain and reconstruct roads.

Information was received from Seventh U.S. Army that the 10th Armored Division would be released to Third U.S. Army.

In the III Corps zone, the 6th Armored Division began relieving the 17th Airborne Division and also enlarging its bridgehead across the OUR River. III Corps passed to control of First U.S. Army, with its zone of action being taken over by VIII Corps. The 6th Armored Division and the 6th Cavalry Group were affected only by their transfer to VIII Corps, continuing in the same zones of action. The 17th Airborne Division passed from Third U.S. Army control.

Advancing in the southern part of VIII Corps zone, the 11th Armored Division cleared a number of pillboxes. The 90th Infantry Division also moved forward in the face of numerous pillboxes, with its 358th Infantry capturing WEINSFELD (L07), three miles southwest of PRUM (L07). Tank destroyers delivered direct fire on thirty-seven pillboxes and twenty-two machine gun positions. In a zone west of PRUM (L07), the 4th Infantry Division continued its attack on PRUM (L07), with the 8th Infantry attacking from the north, the 12th Infantry attacking from the south,

and the 22d Infantry making the main effort from the west. Leading elements of all three regiments were within one and one-half miles of PRUM (LO7). Tank destroyers knocked out eight enemy tanks, helping to repulse a strong enemy counterattack. Two companies of enemy infantry, supported by an estimated fifteen tanks, were observed assembling west of PRUM (LO7) preparatory to a counterattack against the 4th Infantry Division. The concentration was attacked by a five-battalion time-on-target concentration following which fire was adjusted by observed methods and the area repeatedly swept with bracket fire methods. An estimated fifty per cent casualties were inflicted upon the enemy and eight tanks were destroyed. The 87th Infantry Division consolidated its gains on the corps north flank. Control was assumed of the zone previously held by III Corps.

Artillery Flashes as a Dawn Attack Begins

In the XII Corps, the bridgehead of the 5th Infantry Division was enlarged to a depth of one mile and a width of three miles. Farther north, the 80th Infantry Division continued fighting to enlarge its bridgehead, which was now four miles wide and two miles deep. The 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) cleared BIESDORF (P94) and made contact with the 319th Infantry Regiment as the attack continued.

Heavy fighting continued in the BANHOLZ woods, south of SINZ (LOO), in XX Corps, with the 94th Infantry Division repulsing several enemy counterattacks and forcing the enemy to withdraw to prepared defensive positions. Tank destroyers knocked out four enemy tanks. The 26th Infantry Division continued its limited objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Troops of the 26th Infantry Division had their first experience working with searchlights under battle conditions. The division occupied several blocks of buildings in SAARLAUTERN (Q28), RODEN (Q28) and FRAULAUTERN (Q38). Enemy troops occupied buildings directly across the street and any movements during the hours of darkness drew small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. Searchlights assisted patrols in occupying the outer fringe of enemy-held houses which the enemy habitually vacated at night and reoccupied the following morning.

Self-propelled 155mm guns were used extensively in close support of the infantry to reduce and destroy enemy pillboxes. In VIII Corps, one battery each of these guns had been attached for some time to the 4th and 90th Infantry Divisions. XII Corps had attached one battery to the 80th Infantry Division and one platoon each to the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions. The weapon proved eminently satisfactory for the purpose and one XII Corps battery destroyed nine pillboxes on this date alone.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 136 sorties despite adverse weather, fighter-bombers destroying or damaging thirty-seven motor vehicles, 131 railroad cars, four bridges and seventeen buildings and attacking thirteen towns.

Third U.S. Army's advance continued in the northern zone where WEINSFELD (LO7) was captured during the period. Bridgeheads were enlarged in the central zone, while limited objective attacks were carried out in the southern zone.

For the care of casualties suffering from upper respiratory infections, a provisional hospital was approved, to be composed of one medical battalion to which would be attached one company of a gas treatment battalion, one clearing company and one platoon of a field hospital. Medical, as distinct from surgical, cases approximated sixty percent of all admissions to Third U.S. Army hospitals at this time. Most of these cases were upper respiratory infections which could be returned to duty within one week after admission. The setting up of a provisional hospital made it possible to hold these cases within the Army area until they could return to duty.

Through operations of Civil Affairs, bus service was reestablished between BETTBORN (P73) and LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81). Electrical power was restored to BOUZONVILLE (Q17), VECKRING (Q08), KEDANGE (U97) and eleven other communes of the area.

11 FEBRUARY *(D + 250)*

Two significant facts continued to stand out in the enemy order of battle, these being the enemy's ability to produce replacements for battle-worn divisions, and the absence from the battle line of the bulk of the ten Panzer divisions estimated as being in the west. While the quality, training and equipment of the replacements did not compare with those previously committed, they could still man automatic weapons in bunkers and pillboxes. Only five of the ten Panzer divisions in the west were in contact at this time. On the basis of these facts, it was indicated that the enemy could still defend and delay, selling space for time, and could still mount small-scale attacks with the armored and infantry divisions out of contact.

Headquarters III Corps, which passed on the previous day to control of First U.S. Army, completed movement from Third U.S. Army zone.

In VIII Corps zone the 6th Armored Division patrolled in the area formerly occupied by the 17th Airborne Division, and the 6th Cavalry Group also patrolled actively in its zone of action. The 11th Armored Division continued to attack, capturing HARSPELT (P87) and SEVENIG (P87). The 90th Infantry Division, continuing its attack, advanced one mile and captured WATZERATH (L07), two and one-half miles southwest of PRUM (L07). Tank destroyers knocked out two "Tiger Royal" tanks. WEINSFELD (L07) and WATZERATH (L07) were heavily attacked with the massed fires of artillery supporting the 90th Infantry Division. Enemy activity in the towns ceased in consequence thereof and both were taken against demoralized opposition. Farther north, the 4th Infantry Division continued its drive on PRUM (L07), with the 22d Infantry entering the western section of the town while other units completed encircling it. The 87th Infantry Division consolidated positions in preparation for renewal of attack. An attack which carried to the outskirts of VIANDEN (P85) was launched toward the end of the period by the 6th Cavalry Group.

The 417th Infantry (attached to 5th Infantry Division) returned to the control of the 76th Infantry Division in XII Corps zone, which was then enlarging its bridgehead across the SAUER River, due east of ECHTERNACH (L03). Meanwhile, the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) enlarged their bridgehead, bringing heavy weapons across the assault bridge which had been erected the previous day. BOLLENDORF (L08) was cleared by the 10th Infantry. In the 80th Infantry Division zone, its bridgehead was enlarged, while two bridges were constructed in order to bring across necessary heavy equipment.

In XX Corps, activity was limited to patrolling in the 94th Infantry Division zone, while in the 26th Infantry Division zone small scale attacks continued in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. The 10th Armored Division closed near METZ (U85).

XIX Tactical Air Command fighter bombers in 171 sorties destroyed or damaged 210 railroad cars, twenty-one buildings and eleven locomotives.

Third U.S. Army consolidated its positions in the northern zone and continued to enlarge the XII Corps bridgehead, with BOLLENDORF (L04) and WATZERATH (L07), being captured during the period.

Heavy shipments of bulk gasoline from Communications Zone had increased the quantity of fuel on hand in the Army area to 4,500,000 gallons. It was decided to set the current level in the Army at approximately 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 gallons and to make no requests for gasoline by daily telegram until the level had been reduced to this figure. Approximately three days' supply of coal and coke were on hand in the Army area, the situation having eased because of warmer weather.



A Brief Respite for Frontline Mess

Infantry Moving to the Front

12 FEBRUARY *(D + 251)*

In the VIII Corps zone the 6th Cavalry Group continued fighting in and around VIANDEN (P85) on the west side of the OUR River, while to the north Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) relieved elements of the 6th Armored Division. The 6th Armored, 11th Armored, and 90th Infantry Divisions patrolled aggressively. PRUM (L07) was cleared by the 22d Infantry (4th Infantry Division), while the 8th and 12th Infantry Regiments were north and south of the city, respectively. On the north of VIII Corps zone the 87th Infantry Division maintained its positions.

In XII Corps zone the 417th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) enlarged its bridgehead across the SAUER River and elements of the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) followed over into the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) enlarged their bridgehead to two miles in depth, capturing FERSCHWEILER (L04) and AMMELDINGEN (P94). In the northern part of the zone the 80th Infantry Division also enlarged its bridgehead.

There was no change in XX Corps. The 10th Armored Division closed in the METZ (U85) area following its move from Seventh U.S. Army.

No missions were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command because of bad flying weather.

Third U.S. Army during the day continued its attack to enlarge its bridgeheads in the central part of zone, while organizing positions in the northern and southern parts of Army zone. Headquarters of the III Corps and of the 17th Airborne Division cleared Third U.S. Army area enroute to First U.S. Army.

An inspection tour of CLERVAUX (P76) was made by PRINCE FELIX of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, who expressed deep satisfaction and appreciation for the assistance given by Army detachments at work in the Duchy assisting civilians.

13 FEBRUARY *(D + 252)*

Additional tactical and armored reconnaissance reports on the concentrations of trains in the TRIER (L22) area indicated that it was likely they were being used for movement of out-of-contact Panzer divisions or that they were being shuttled to entraining points closer to the front.

In the southern and central parts of VIII Corps zone, the 6th Cavalry Group, 6th and 11th Armored Divisions maintained their positions and patrolled. The 90th Infantry Division regrouped its forces with its 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments on the line, while the 359th Infantry went into division reserve. Positions along the high ground west of PRUM (L07) were organized by the 4th Infantry Division, which prepared to continue its attack. On the north of corps zone the 87th Infantry Division organized its positions and its 346th Infantry Regiment advanced one-half mile in zone.

XII Corps continued enlarging its several bridgeheads. Its 4th Armored Division (-) remained in corps reserve, while the 2d and 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons patrolled in the southern part of the zone. The 76th Infantry Division reduced pillboxes in zone and made minor advances. Gaining one mile in the bridgehead, the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) occupied FERSCHWEILER (L04), while the 11th Infantry gained nearly one mile, clearing high ground on the north bank of the SAUER River and taking ERNZEN (L03). Advancing one-half mile, the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) kept contact with the 5th Infantry Division on its right, while the 319th Infantry made gains of one-half mile and occupied AMMELDINGEN (P94). A strong counterattack against 80th Infantry Division was repelled by the defensive fires of artillery supporting the division assisted by the heavy fire of four VIII Corps artillery battalions upon the towns of KORPERICH (P94) and OBERSGEGEN (P94). Tanks and tank destroyers continued to be brought across into the bridgeheads of the 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions.

Patrolling was continued by the 94th Infantry Division in XX Corps zone, while the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) relieved the 104th Infantry in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead area.

Again bad weather precluded all flying by XIX Tactical Air Command fighter bombers.

Third U.S. Army's XII Corps cleared ERNZEN (L03) and FERSCHWEILER (L04) during the period, while elsewhere in Army zone positions were maintained.

In plans for reconstruction of railroads to supply the Army, first priority was given to completion of the line from GOUVY (P77) to CROMBACH (P88), bypassing ST VITH (P88) via the southern cutoff from STEINBACH (P67) to BLEIALF (P98), and to development of unloading facilities in the STEINBACH (P67) - BLEIALF (P98) area. Second priority went to the continuation of the ETTELBRUCK (P83) - GOUVY (P77) line. The recommendation for first priority was considered an emergency measure in order to relieve traffic on the road net in the vicinity of ST VITH (P88), which was in poor condition because of the rains. Approximately thirty tons of ammunition were dropped by parachute in the vicinity of BLEIALF (P98) as an experiment, the purpose of which was to determine the possibilities of supporting VIII Corps by air drop if all rear supply routes became entirely impassable. The experiment was successful and resulted in the conclusion that this method of ammunition supply could be resorted to if necessary.

Reports indicated that throughout Third U.S. Army, including the Duchy of Luxembourg and portions of France, Belgium and Germany, full cooperation was extended to military authorities by the local civil governments.

14 FEBRUARY *(D + 253)*

There was no change in the VIII Corps situation, the 6th and 11th Armored Divisions, 90th, 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions being deployed along the front in the order named from south to north.

In the southern part of XII Corps zone the 4th Armored Division (-) remained in reserve, while the 2d and 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons patrolled. The 417th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) expanded its bridgehead and reduced pillboxes in zone, while the remainder of the division patrolled aggressively. The 5th Infantry Division continued its attack with its 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments advancing one-half mile along the entire front, while the 80th Infantry Division continued to reduce pillboxes in its bridgehead area with elements of its 317th Infantry keeping contact with the 5th Infantry Division.

Positions in XX Corps zone were maintained by the 26th Infantry Division. Just before the end of the period the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) launched a limited objective attack, clearing pillboxes in the vicinity of SINZ (L00).



Rifleman Clears Buildings of Snipers

For the third straight day XIX Tactical Air Command was unable to put its planes in the air because of adverse weather.

Summarizing the day's operations, in Third U.S. Army's XII Corps zone, bridgeheads over the OUR and SAUER River were enlarged while positions were maintained elsewhere in Army zone.

Supplies for VIII Corps were dropped by parachute because the bad condition of the roads caused by unfavorable weather prevented trucks from reaching the corps area. Supplies delivered by this means included 60,000 "K" rations, 15,000 gallons of gasoline, 1,500 gallons of diesel fuel, 1,000 rifle grenades, 1,000 trip flares, and 4,500 rounds of high explosive 80mm mortar ammunition.

Major General PAUL R. HAWLEY, Chief Surgeon, European Theater of Operations, visited Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, to confer with the Army Surgeon and to visit Army Hospitals.

15 FEBRUARY *(D + 254)*

VIII Corps continued its patrolling, with no change in positions.

In the southern part of XII Corps zone there was no change, with the 4th Armored Division (-) in reserve, the 2d and 42d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons patrolling aggressively, and the 76th Infantry Division continuing to clear pillboxes in its bridgehead area. Tank destroyers in support neutralized seven pillboxes. In the 5th Infantry Division zone the 10th Infantry advanced one-half mile, reaching the outskirts of SCHANKWEILER (L04), six miles northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03), and taking high ground overlooking the ENZ and PRUM Rivers. The 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) advanced one-half mile to the northern edge of woods northeast of BIESDORF (P94) while elements of the 317th Infantry moved into the bridgehead between the 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments.

In the XX Corps, the 26th Infantry Division continued patrolling, while to the north the 94th Infantry Division continued limited objective attacks, clearing pillboxes and shelters east of the CAMPHOLZ woods and repulsing one counterattack. To the rear at METZ (U85) the 10th Armored Division conducted rehabilitation and training.

Flying 190 sorties and dropping 108 tons of bombs, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter bombers destroyed or damaged sixty-two buildings while attacking twenty-one towns and nine marshalling yards.

Third U.S. Army continued to expand and strengthen its bridgeheads over the OUR and SAUER Rivers in the central part of zone during the day, while maintaining positions elsewhere.

The narrow gauge railroad from LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81) to the east was placed in operation, hauling Classes I, III and V supplies for the 5th Infantry Division. Loading was from Army supply points at DOMMELDANGE (P81), with unloading points at JUNGLISTER (P92) and CONSDORF

Wounded Evacuated Over Difficult Terrain

(LO3), with division engineers planning to extend the line to ECHTERNACH (LO3). A shipment of 25,850 gallons of 73-octane gasoline, for use in artillery liaison planes, arrived at BETTEMBOURG (P80).

16 FEBRUARY *(D + 255)*

Continuing to advance in VIII Corps zone, the 11th Armored Division destroyed three pillboxes and a road block, while the 4th Infantry Division repulsed a counterattack in the vicinity of HEMESPAND (LO8), two and one-half miles northeast of PRUM (LO7). Interrogation of a prisoner of war elicited advance information of a strong enemy counterattack to be directed at PRUM (LO7), to be preceded by a coordinated preparation of small arms, mortar and artillery fire commencing at 1000 on 17 February. Artillery with VIII Corps fired a heavy harassing program upon all known enemy artillery locations commencing at 0955 and continuing to 1015. Heavy enemy small arms and mortar fires began promptly at 1000 hours, but no enemy artillery fire was received and no enemy counterattack developed. The 87th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 6th Armored Division and the 6th Cavalry Group maintained positions and patrolled aggressively.

In the southern part of XII Corps zone, the 76th Infantry Division continued to reduce pillboxes in its bridgehead. Making a one-half mile advance, elements of the division captured the high ground overlooking the PRUM River. Meanwhile, the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) continued its attack to the north, entering SHANKWEILER (LO4), six miles northwest of ECHTERNACH (L30) while the remainder of the division consolidated positions. Farther north, elements of the 80th Infantry Division mopped up resistance in isolated pillboxes and improved positions while the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) entered ROHRBACH (LO4). The 4th Armored Division (-) remained in assembly.

Limited objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead area of XX Corps zone were continued by the 26th Infantry Division. The 94th Infantry Division consolidated positions, beating off several enemy counterattacks. Meanwhile, the 10th Armored Division continued training in vicinity of METZ (U85).

Only thirty-four sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command because of poor weather conditions. Over 150 enemy troops were killed when a bridge was bombed.

Third U.S. Army forces continued to reduce many SIEGFRIED Line pillboxes during the period, while grouping forces and preparing for a general offensive in all three corps zones.

★ ★ ★ ★

17 FEBRUARY *(D + 256)*

Attacks were renewed in the VIII Corps zone by the 11th Armored Division, 90th Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Group. The 11th Armored Division advanced two miles, entering LEIDENBORN (P97), nine miles southwest of PRUM (LO7), and clearing GROSSKAMPENBERG (P97). Attacking to the east with elements of its 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments, the 90th Infantry Division advanced one mile, capturing KESFELD (P97) and the woods southeast of KESFELD (P97). Tank destroyers neutralized two pillboxes and captured thirty prisoners. At KEPPESHAUSEN (P85), the 6th Cavalry Group established a bridgehead over the OUR River. VIII Corps' attack caught one enemy infantry division in the process of relieving another with the result that quick initial progress was made and the capture of GROSSKAMPENBERG (P97) and KESFELD (P97) was accomplished against confused resistance. Enemy defense stiffened thereafter and the attack encountered moderate artillery opposition. Positions of the 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Armored Division were unchanged throughout the period.

River Crossing in Rubber Assault Boat

Reducing pillboxes along the way, the 385th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) advanced one-half mile toward the junction of the SAUER and PRUM Rivers in XII Corps zone. The 2d and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) launched attacks which were proceeding well at the end of the period, with the former regiment clearing SHANKWEILER (L04), six miles northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03), after advancing one-half mile and taking the high ground overlooking the PRUM River. Farther north, the 80th Infantry Division made limited gains against heavy resistance, with its 318th Infantry taking CRUCHTEN (P94), eight miles northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03), and the 317th Infantry Regiment clearing woods near NUSBAUM (L04), while capturing ROHRBACH (L04). Enemy artillery activity in the corps area increased somewhat in reaction to the attacks of 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions and included strong interdiction fires on the main road leading into ECHTERNACH (L03). The 80th Infantry Division's attack was preceded by a 45-minute artillery preparation upon enemy artillery and troop installations fired by the organic division artillery and four battalions of XII Corps artillery. Attacks of both divisions were strongly supported by close "on call" artillery fires. The 2d Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively, while the 4th Armored Division (-) remained in corps assembly area.

Limited objective attacks continued in XX Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division capturing six additional fortified houses in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. An enemy counterattack was launched during the night against one of the battalions of the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division). Searchlights were used and sufficiently penetrated the heavy mist to contribute to the halting of the counter-attack. It was observed that finer adjustment of mortar fire was possible under illumination. The 94th Infantry Division advanced 500 yards through pillboxes in the vicinity of SINZ (L00), while the 10th Armored Division remained in assembly area near METZ (U85).

Bad weather prohibited all air activity by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army resumed its attack in its northern and central zones during the day, capturing GROSSKAMPENBERG (P97), KESFELD (P97), SCHANKWEILER (L04) and ROHRBACH (L04).

Supply of VIII Corps continued to be a difficult problem because of bad roads due to thawing weather, condition of the roads being particularly poor in the vicinity of GOUVY (P77), where both a Class III supply point and a rail-off-loading point were located. A whole day was required for Army trucks to make the trip from GOUVY (P77) to the forward truckheads. Approximately 60,000 "K" rations were dropped by parachute to a Class I supply point at BLEIALF (P98) and more than thirty-one tons of packaged gasoline were delivered by similar means to a class III supply point at WINTERSCHEID (P98). Arrangements were made to contract for 5,000 tons of crushed rock for road-building in XX Corps area.

Throughout the Army zone of operations, civil affairs and military government personnel were active in supplying fodder to areas of shortage. During a four-week period, more than a million pounds of fodder were transported to JUNGLINSTER (P92) to fill requirements of cattle in that area.

Litter Bearers Rescue Wounded Soldier

18 FEBRUARY *(D + 257)*

The favored enemy capability at this time was that he would continue to defend and delay in the fortified positions and on the favorable ground in Third U.S. Army's zone of advance. Less favored capabilities were that the enemy could oppose the Army's advances south of the MOSELLE River with local armor-spearheaded counterattacks and that he could reinforce against the Army with one of several out-of-contact divisions. While there were occasional instances of group surrenders and desertions, there was no indication at this time of the enemy giving up ground voluntarily. Three significant enemy order of battle facts were evident: The number of Panzer divisions in the west was further reduced from nine to eight, the enemy increased his use of miscellaneous makeshift units to pad out his battle line, and the enemy's effective combat strength was estimated at the equivalent of sixteen divisions, the lowest figure since the first phase of the invasion and a drop of two divisions in a week's time. Evidence appeared conclusive that the enemy was attempting to contain the Western Front by taking advantage of terrain, swollen streams and the weather, and using just enough troops to provide fire cover for these obstacles.

Advancing two miles against sporadic resistance in VIII Corps zone, the 11th Armored Division cleared LEIDENBORN (P97), nine miles southwest of PRUM (L07). Just to the north, the 90th Infantry Division continued its attack to the southeast, with its 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments each advancing one mile. An enemy regimental command post was overrun southeast of KESFELD (P97), while MASTHORN (P97), OBER UTTFIELD (P97) and NIEDER UTTFIELD (P97) were taken. Elements of the 12th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) began relief of 90th Infantry Division elements. The 6th Cavalry Group captured WALDHOF-FALKENSTEIN (P85) while enlarging its bridgehead.

The 2d Cavalry Group crossed the MOSELLE River in zone on the south flank of XII Corps, taking WINCHERINGEN (L01). Although the 76th Infantry Division was relieving elements of the 5th Infantry Division, other elements of the division advanced toward the junction of the SAUER and PRUM Rivers. Advancing one-half mile, the 5th Infantry Division's 11th Infantry cleared the west bank of the PRUM River in zone. Farther north, the 80th Infantry Division captured HOMMERDINGEN (P94) after a one mile advance.

The 26th Infantry Division in XX Corps zone continued its limited objective attacks in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, tank destroyers knocking out a tower across the SAAR River used by the enemy as an observation post and machine gun nest. To the north, the 94th Infantry Division gained one mile east of SINZ (L00). Preparing to attack, the 10th Armored Division moved nearer the front to an assembly area near BORG (L00).

Only fourteen sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command on a day of poor flying weather, with negligible results.

Third U.S. Army attack gained ground in all three corps during the period. Many SIEGFRIED Line fortifications were breached, while MASTHORN (P97), OBER UTTFIELD (P97), NIEDER UTTFIELD (P97), LEIDENBORN (P97), WAIDHOF-FALKENSTEIN (P85) and HOMMERDINGEN (P94) were taken.

The 6th Armored Division reported that an M4A4 tank which had been modified with additional armor on the forward hull had received a direct hit by a German 75mm shell which penetrated only the additional armor, actually separating the middle section of plate from the forward hull of the tank. Continuing to give combat, the tank succeeded in knocking out the enemy tank which it had encountered. Crew members, whose lives had been saved by the additional plate, praised the modification highly.

19 FEBRUARY *(D + 258)*

VIII Corps was deployed with the 6th Cavalry Group on the south flank, and the 6th and 11th Armored Divisions, 90th, 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions on the line from south to north in the order named. During the period the 6th Cavalry Group seized high ground three-quarters mile north of VIANDEN (P85). Advancing one-half mile, the 11th Armored Division captured SENSERICH (P97) and HERZFELD (P97), ten miles southwest of PRUM (L07), and completed a treadway bridge across the PRUMER River just south of LEIDENBORN (P97). In the 90th Infantry Division, the 359th Infantry advanced one and one-half miles while the 357th Infantry advanced one-half mile and cleared LASTHORN (L06), six miles southwest of PRUM (L07). Other divisions of the corps patrolled aggressively.

XII Corps operated with the 4th Armored Division (-) on its south flank, then the 2d Cavalry Group, the 76th, 5th and 80th Infantry Divisions in order reading from south to north. The 2d Cavalry Group, after crossing the MOSELLE River, secured positions east of WINCHERINGEN (L01). Completing relief of elements of the 5th Infantry Division in the 76th Infantry Division zone, the 76th Infantry Division and the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced one mile against heavy resistance, occupying HALSDORF (L04) and STOCKEN (L04), eight miles northwest of ECHTERNACH (L03). Farther north, the 80th Infantry Division advanced one and one-half miles, capturing NEIDERSGEGEN (P94), FREILINGEN (P94)

Field Fortifications of the Siegfried Line

and NUSBAUM (L04), with one crossing of the ENZ River being made at ENZEN (L04) by the 317th Infantry.

In XX Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division continued limited objective attacks on a small scale in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. The 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division launched a coordinated attack late in the period from the vicinity of SINZ (L00). The attack followed a strong artillery preparation fired by the division artillery and five XX Corps artillery battalions plus tank destroyer units. The first fifteen minutes of the artillery preparation was directed exclusively upon enemy command post and communications installations. Subsequent prisoner of war interrogation brought out the fact that this fire disrupted the enemy's wire communications network and contributed materially to the rapidity of the advance. Two-mile gains were reported by elements of the 10th Armored Division which captured KIRF (L00) and PALZEM (L00), while equally good gains were made through SIEGFRIED Line emplacements by the 94th Infantry Division, FAHA (L00), MUNZINGEN (L00) and OBERLEUKEN (L00) being taken. The two divisions had the joint mission of clearing the triangle of land formed by the junction of the SAAR and MOSELLE Rivers. The 376th Infantry (94th Infantry Division) was attached to the 10th Armored Division for this mission.

Bad weather kept fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command on the ground during part of the period but 279 sorties were flown nevertheless. Poor visibility obscured some of the results, but six enemy planes were destroyed and ten damaged in the air, while 185 railroad cars and ninety-five vehicles were damaged or destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued its three corps attack during the day, with HERZFELD (P97), SENGERICH (P97), STOCKEN (L04), HALSDORF (L04), ENZEN (L04), NUSBAUM (L04), FREILINGEN (P97), NEIDERSGEGEN (P94), MUNZINGEN (L00), FAHA (L00), OBERLEUKEN (L00), PALZEM (L00) and KIRF (L00) being taken.

Smoke Screen Covering River Crossing

Intelligence reports indicated that the residents of the occupied German towns of GISINGEN (Q28) and NIEDALTDORF (Q18) were interested chiefly in a quick end to the war and a return to normal life. Opportunism, evidenced by apparent willingness to cooperate with those forces likely to provide means of a better livelihood, rather than nationalistic tendencies seemed most pronounced in these villages.

20 FEBRUARY *(D + 259)*

Favored enemy capabilities were unchanged at this time, with the minor exception that the enemy was considered capable, in the SAAR - MOSELLE River triangle, of withdrawing his forces into the SIEGFRIED Line fortifications.

On the south flank of VIII Corps the 6th Cavalry Group continued to improve its positions across the OUR River, with some elements clearing VIANDEN (P85), while other elements were advancing northeast one mile and securing high ground north of WALDHOF-FALKENSTEIN (P85). Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) captured LANGFUHR (P86) and improved its bridgehead over the OUR River by advancing one-half mile on a two mile front. Meanwhile, the 11th Armored Division gained one mile, capturing ROSCHEID (P87) and clearing fifty-three pillboxes. In the 90th Infantry Division, the 357th Infantry gained one and one-half miles to the vicinity of BINSCHEID (P96), nine miles southwest of PRUM (L07), while the 359th Infantry gained one-half mile in an attack to the south. Leading elements of the 359th Infantry reached a vicinity three miles from the PRUM River. Tank destroyers in support knocked out two enemy antiaircraft guns. VIII Corps' attacks followed an intensive counter-battery program upon twenty-five hostile artillery locations. Artillery with the corps also fired a heavy harassing program upon the bridges over the PRUM River and the road net leading thereto. The 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions consolidated their positions, remaining inactive during the period. Attacks around PRUM (L07) and ECHTERNACH (L03) during the previous four days had forced the enemy to give ground in those two localities, thereby creating an enemy bulge between these cities where the enemy was not forced back. This "Bulge" between PRUM (L07) and ECHTERNACH (L03) was referred to as "The VIANDEN (P85) Bulge". Both VIII Corps and XII Corps devoted a substantial part of their efforts toward its reduction so that the fronts of the two corps could be straightened.

Constructing two footbridges across the MOSELLE River in XII Corps zone, the 2d Cavalry Group improved its positions by limited objective attacks around WINDHERINGEN (L01). The 76th Infantry Division consolidated its positions on the high ground west of the PRUM River, continuing to reduce pillboxes in zone. Farther north, the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced one-half mile, cleared HALSDORF (L04) and established a line on the PRUM River overlooking WETTLINGEN (L04), seven miles south of BITBURG (L15) which was the primary objective of the corps. The 80th Infantry Division continued its attack, with its 317th Infantry advancing two miles across the ENZ River while the 319th Infantry entered ROTH (P94) and captured OBERSGEGEN (P94), KORPERICH (P94) and SEIMERICH (P94). The 4th Armored Division (-) remained in corps assembly area.

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS AND DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS 1-28 FEBRUARY 1945

TO FIRST U S ARMY 11 FEBRUARY

TO NINTH U S ARMY 5 FEBRUARY

NOTE: 134TH RCT (35TH INF DIVY TO NINTH U S ARMY 1 FEBRUARY

BATTLE LINE 1 FEBUARY

BATTLE LINE 28 FEBUARY

FROM SEVENTH U S ARMY 11 FEBRUARY

THIRD

SEVENTH

1-28

Statute Miles 10

An enemy counterattack was repulsed in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead by the 26th Infantry Division (XX Corps). Farther north, the 94th Infantry Division (-) and the 10th Armored Division (/) continued their joint attack into the MOSELLE - ROER River triangle. The 94th Infantry Division (-) gained three miles, capturing KOLLESLEUCKEN (L10), ORSCHOLZ (L10), WEITEN (L10) and FREUDENBURG (L10), with leading elements three miles from the SAAR River. An eight and one-half mile advance was made by the 10th Armored Division (/) whose leading elements reached a point less than four miles from the junction of the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers while resistance to the rear was being mopped up by the attached 376th Infantry (94th Infantry Division). MEURICH (L10), KORRIG (L11), WEHR (L01), HELFANT (L01), DILMAR (L00), REHLINGEN (L01), SUDLINGEN (L00), ROMMELFANGEN (L01), DITTLINGEN (L00) and FISCH (L01) were taken in this advance.

Despite none too favorable weather, 174 sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command. No planes were lost while two enemy command posts were successfully attacked and 257 vehicles were destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army progressed well during the period with substantial advances made by the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division in XX Corps zone. Small advances into the SIEGFRIED Line were made by VIII and XII Corps.

In order to keep traffic on muddy roads to a minimum and to lessen the usage of vehicles, a new system of ammunition supply was started in XX Corps. All ammunition trucks were stopped at KUNTZIG (U88) and only those which were to be unloaded at the ammunition supply point at DALSTEIN (Q07) were routed there. Others were sent to forward railheads operated by divisions, there to be routed to divisional dumps.

Infantry Advance Toward Cover of Smoke Screen

21 FEBRUARY *(D + 260)*

The Army Commander verbally instructed XX Corps to attack and seize TRIER (L22), key enemy communications center.

The 6th Cavalry Group consolidated its positions east of VIANDEN (P85) in the southern part of VIII Corps zone. To the north, Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) attacked southeast into the bulge between PRUM (L07) and ECHTERNACH (L03), gaining two miles and capturing REIPELDINGEN (P86), DASBURG (L86) and DALEIDEN (P86). The 11th Armored Division consolidated its positions, its Reserve Combat Command advancing one mile late in the period, taking REIFF (P96) and ESCHFIELD (P96). Advances all along its front were made by the 90th Infantry Division, its 357th Infantry clearing BINSCHEID (P96), HICKESHAUSEN (P96) and HALENBACH (P96), all about ten miles southwest of PRUM (L07), while the 359th Infantry Regiment cleared EUSCHEID (P97) and STRICKSCHEID (P97). Task Force SPIESS (Headquarters, 773d Tank Destroyer Battalion, four tank destroyer gun platoons, one tank destroyer reconnaissance company, 90th Infantry Division reconnaissance troop, one light tank company, one infantry rifle company, one infantry anti-tank company and one engineer platoon) covered the 90th Infantry Division's right flank and mopped up. The corps reported a total of 936 pillboxes destroyed during the period 29 January - 21 February. Of these, the 6th Armored Division reduced 72, the 11th Armored Division, 171; the 90th Infantry Division, 391; the 4th Infantry Division, 223, and the 87th Infantry Division, 79.

Moving from its assembly area in the southern part of XII Corps zone to positions behind the front, the 4th Armored Division (-) aided the attack of other major elements by furnishing fire power. The 2d Cavalry Group and 76th Infantry Division maintained their positions and patrolled, while farther north the 5th Infantry Division cleared ground up to the PRUM River. Gaining two miles, the 80th Infantry Division advanced northward into the "VIANDEN (P85) Bulge", with its 318th Infantry taking HUTTINGEN (P94) and its 319th Infantry capturing LAHR (P95) and GEICHLINGEN (P95), three miles northeast of VIANDEN (P85). Bridgeheads of the 80th Infantry Division and the 6th Cavalry Group (VIII Corps) across the OUR River were joined at ROTH (P94).

In XX Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division held its positions in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead area, while farther north the 94th Infantry and 10th Armored Divisions, continued their joint attack into the SIEGFRIED Line. A four mile advance to the SAAR River was made by the 94th Infantry Division (-), giving XX Corps control of the west bank of the SAAR River from SAARLAUTERN (Q28) to SAARBURG (L11) and clearing TAHEN-RODT (L10), HAMM (L10), KASTELTAADT (L10), TRASSEM (L10) and KRUTWEILER (L11). Meanwhile, the 10th Armored Division with the attached 376th Infantry (94th Infantry Division), continued its attack, its Combat Command "B" advancing six miles and capturing all of SAARBURG (L11) except for a castle, while Combat Command "A" advanced four miles up the MOSELLE - SAAR River triangle, reaching a point two miles from the junction of the two rivers and within six miles of TRIER (L22). Tank destroyers knocked out five enemy pillboxes. Reserve Combat Command (10th Armored Division) advanced five miles on the division west flank, clearing TEMMELS (L02) and FELLERICH (L12).

In successful corps support missions, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter bombers flew 504 sorties in which 318 vehicles, twenty-eight

armored vehicles and tanks, 575 railroad cars and fourteen gun positions were destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army had a very successful day, its XX Corps attacking strongly and clearing most of the triangle formed by the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers, while elements of VIII and XII Corps struck from the north and south respectively, reducing a good part of the "VIANDEN (P85) Bulge". All of SAARBURG (L11) except for one lone castle was cleared, while twenty-three other towns were captured.

Handicapped in the evacuation of wounded because of the poor condition of roads, XX Corps innovated a plan to use railroad cars for the evacuation of casualties from SIERCK-LES-BAINS (Q09) to THIONVILLE (U88). The rail trip lasted about one hour and fifteen minutes, which was about one-half the time consumed by ambulances in making the same trip. This means of evacuation was utilized from 21 to 23 February, a total of 182 casualties, 104 ambulatory patients and seventy-eight litter cases being evacuated.

22 FEBRUARY *(D + 261)*

To the most favored enemy capability, that he could continue to defend and delay in fortified positions and on favorable ground in Third U.S. Army's zone of advance, were added two other capabilities at this time, namely that the enemy could withdraw his forces in the PRUM (L07)-BITBURG (L15) area to the east in an effort to avoid their envelopment and destruction, and that in the KONZ-KARTHAUS (L12) -- METTLACH (L10) sector he could defend and delay in the SIEGFRIED Line fortifications while organizing and manning another defensive line on favorable ground in the TRIER (L22) area. In exercising the capability of a defensive line east of PRUM (L07) -- BITBURG (L15), the enemy had the advantage of highly favorable terrain, hilly and extensively wooded, with only a few main highways, and bisected by a series of compartments created by the deeply incised beds of the PRUM, NIMS and KYLL Rivers. There was no indication at this time that the enemy was reinforcing against Third U.S. Army.

Advancing one and one-half miles to the northeast in the southern part of VIII Corps zone the 6th Cavalry Group reached a vicinity three miles northeast of VIANDEN (P85). Combat Command "A" (6th Armored Division) crossed the OUR River and captured AFFLER (P85), one-half mile east of the river, while Combat Command "B" advanced two miles, capturing OLMSCHEID (P96) and IRRHAUSEN (P96) and seizing high ground overlooking the ENZ River. Repulsing strong counterattacks in its zone, Reserve Combat Command (11th Armored Division) advanced two miles and reached the MANNER River. The 90th Infantry Division continued its attack with its 358th Infantry advancing three miles and capturing ARZFELD (P96) and HOLZCHEN (P96), while its 357th Infantry cleared LICHTENBORN (P96), HEILBACH (P96) and KOPSCHEID (P96). The 359th Infantry Regiment maintained positions, while farther north the 4th Infantry Division patrolled in zone, prepared for attack. VIII Corps artillery continued to fire strongly in support of the advances, utilizing observed fire methods to attack enemy armor, strongpoints and infantry and also firing defensively against small and medium scale counterattacks. Forty-seven targets of opportunity were attacked in support of 90th Infantry Division alone, with seven enemy tanks destroyed, four tanks damaged and fifteen vehicles destroyed in addition to severe personnel casualties.

Relieving the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division), the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled along the southern part of XII Corps zone. Preparing to join in the attack, the 76th Infantry Division maintained positions and patrolled, while the 5th Infantry Division likewise patrolled in zone. Attacking into "The VIANDEN Bulge" from the south, the 80th Infantry Division with Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) captured OBERGECKLER (P95), gaining two miles along its front. The 4th Armored Division (less Combat Command "B") moved to a jump-off point, prepared to attack in conjunction with the 80th Infantry Division.

In XX Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division continued to hold its bridgehead positions, while to the north the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division continued reducing the MOSELLE - SAAR River triangle. Crossings of the SAAR River were made by the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) at TABEN (L10) and by the 301st Infantry at SERRIG (L10). A counterattack at SERRIG (L10) was repulsed with heavy losses inflicted on the enemy. The 10th Armored Division, meanwhile, completed clearing the MOSELLE-SAAR triangle and enlarged its SAAR River bridgehead. An examination of enemy artillery positions in the triangle area disclosed that nineteen enemy artillery pieces had been destroyed or irreparably damaged by counterbattery fires, with an additional sixteen overrun by the rapidity of XX Corps' advances.

Typical Scene in Handling of Prisoners



Adjusting Rocket Launchers Mounted on Tank Turret

XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed three enemy planes and lost two while flying 358 sorties in which seventy-eight railroad cuts were made and eighteen marshalling yards were attacked. Escort was furnished for twenty-five formations of medium bombers which made a widespread attack on enemy rail facilities.

Third U.S. Army attacks continued during the period in all three corps zones, featured by the clearing of the MOSELLE - SAAR River triangle, the further reduction of "The VIANDEN (P85) Bulge" and the capture of ARZFELD (P96), HOLZCHEN (P96), KOPSCHEID (P96), HEILBACH (P96), IRRHAUSEN (P96), AFFLER (P85), OLMSCHEID (P96), JUCKEN (P96), OBERGECKLER (P95), TABEN (L10) and SERRIG (L10).

23 FEBRUARY *(D + 262)*

Gaining two miles in the southern part of VIII Corps, the 6th Cavalry Group continued its advance, clearing BERSCHEID (P95), KARLSHAUSEN (P95), SCHEITENKORB (P95), BAULER (P95), HERBSTMUHLE (P95(, RODERSHAUSEN (P85) and KOXHAUSEN (P95). Advancing two miles in a southeasterly direction into "The VIANDEN Bulge", Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) captured LEIMBACH (P95) and MUKERAT (P95) and secured high ground overlooking NEUERBURG (P95) at the junction of the ENZ and WAHL Rivers. The other combat commands of 6th Armored Division consolidated their gains, while the 11th Armored Division maintained positions and patrolled in zone. Continuing its attack, the 90th Infantry Division advanced three miles with its 358th Infantry capturing UPPERSHAUSEN (P96), PLASCHEID (P96), EMMELBAUM (P96), NIEDERPIERSCHEID (L06), BERKOTH (L06), KRAUTSCHEID (P96), RINGHUSCHEID (L06) and LAUPERATH (L06), while its 357th Infantry cleared MANDERSCHEID (L06), that part of WAXWEILER (L06) south of the PRUM River and KINZENBURG (L07) on the PRUM River. Task Force SPIESS captured four enemy self-propelled guns. The 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions continued patrolling.

The 2d Cavalry Group, 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions maintained their positions in the southern part of XII Corps zone. To the north, the 80th Infantry Division (with attached Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division) received fire support from the 4th Armored Division (-). Slight gains were made by its 319th Infantry while the attached Combat Command "B", (4th Armored Division) cleared SINSPELT (P95) and NIEDERGECKLER (P95), capturing a bridge over the ENZ River before it could be destroyed by the enemy.

SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead positions in XX Corps zone were defended and maintained by the 26th Infantry Division. The 94th Infantry Division (less 376th Infantry) crossed six battalions over the SAAR River at SERRIG (L10) and expanded its bridgehead. Capturing OCKFEN (L11), the 10th Armored Division enlarged its SAAR River bridgehead to a depth of one mile and a width of two miles. A bridge for heavy equipment was erected near OCKFEN (L11) and the attached 376th Infantry (94th Infantry Division) crossed into the bridgehead.

XIX Tactical Air Command lost six planes in 572 sorties on a day of good weather and plentiful targets. This was one of the greatest days in the history of the Air Command, with 724 vehicles, 269 armored vehicles and tanks, 1,308 railroad cars, nineteen gun positions, 135 buildings and thirty-six locomotives being destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army continued to advance during the day, with good gains being made through the SIEGFRIED Line in VIII Corps zone. Bridgeheads across the SAAR River were enlarged in XX Corps zone, while XII Corps prepared for a major thrust toward BITBURG (L15) and the RHINE River.

Communications Zone was informed of the critical condition of hot patches for tires in Army units and that this shortage greatly aggravated the critical shortage of tires and tubes. Twenty thousand patches were requested at once and 5,000 additional each week.

Plans were formulated by civil affairs and military government personnel and local civilian authorities of agricultural areas throughout

the Army zone of operations to coordinate spring farming activities with military restrictions. Systems employing special registration and identity cards were established and passes were issued when advisable for those whose work required greater circulation than was ordinarily permitted.

24 FEBRUARY *(D + 263)*

Swinging north, the 6th Cavalry Group continued its advance in the southern part of VIII Corps zone, with leading elements capturing SCHEURN (P95), ALTSCHEUERN (P96), BERRADEN (P95) and FISCHBACH (L05). Attached tank destroyers knocked out sixteen pillboxes in two days. Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) moved south, exchanging positions with the 6th Cavalry Group and clearing NEUERBURG (P95) on the ENZ River. Tank destroyers knocked out seven pillboxes. The 11th Armored Division continued patrolling with no attacks made during the period. To the north, the 90th Infantry Division continued its attack for a gain of two miles, with its 358th Infantry capturing OBERPIERSCHEID (L06). The 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions remained inactive, maintaining positions in the northern part of corps zone.

Patrol Preparing to Cross Prum River

Attacking across the PRUM River in XII Corps zone, the 5th Infantry Division secured two small bridgeheads into which half of the fighting strength of the division quickly entered. This advance carried one and one-half miles with ETTLINGEN (L04) and PEFFINGEN (L04) being cleared. The 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) attacked through the 5th Infantry Division and captured HOLSTRUM (L04). OUTSCHEID (L05), BRIMINGEN (L05) and NIEDERRADEN (P95) were taken in a two mile advance of the 80th Infantry Division (plus Combat Command "B", 4th Armored Division). No artillery preparation was fired but time-on-target concentrations were placed in turn upon all towns and strongpoints immediately prior to the assaults. Twenty such concentrations were fired during the period, with the divisional artillery and four supporting corps battalions joining in.

The 26th Infantry Division continued limited objective attacks in the southern part of XX Corps zone. Elements of the 94th Infantry Division (-) advanced two miles east of the SAAR River, while a number of tanks and tank destroyers were brought across into the bridgehead. The 10th Armored Division (with 376th Infantry Regiment attached) increased the size of its bridgehead during the period. Small counterattacks were repulsed by both the 10th Armored Division and the 94th Infantry Division, while engineers worked feverishly constructing bridges to bring across the main supporting weapons.

Fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 327 sorties in forty-seven missions without loss. Among the claims for the day, were 253 vehicles, forty-seven armored vehicles and tanks and 597 railway cars destroyed or damaged, while two supply dumps and eight marshalling yards were attacked.

Third U.S. Army pushed forces up to the PRUM River during the period, while enlarging its SAAR River bridgeheads in the northern part of XX Corps zone and capturing twelve small towns.

Artillery liaison-type aircraft proved essential in supplying the isolated 5th Ranger Battalion, attached to 94th Infantry Division. Fifty-six sorties were flown in the face of heavy enemy machine gun fire to drop ammunition, rations, medical supplies and blankets to the troops in advanced positions at SERRIG (L10). VIII Corps reported that ninety-five percent of all supplies dropped by parachute to the Rangers were retrieved and found to be in good condition, the five percent lost consisting largely of gasoline, containers of which burst upon impact.

In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg evacuees were being returned gradually to their homes. During 17 to 24 February, approximately 600 of 3,750 refugees in ESCH (P70) had been allowed to re-enter their homes in northern cantons. Many of these were laborers whose return was requested by the Luxembourg government for rehabilitation work in the vicinity of ETTELBRUCK (P84). The number of people in DIEKIRCH (P84) had reached 1,200 and other groups of evacuees were allowed to return as accommodations were prepared.

25 FEBRUARY *(D + 264)*

Although there were no indications of mass collapse or surrender at this time, a noticeable loss of control and disintegration of morale was evident among enemy forces on Third U.S. Army's front. In a week's time the prisoner of war bag averaged more than 1,000 daily, while regimental and battalion command posts were overrun repeatedly and officer prisoners admitted the loss of control. Other significant order of battle facts were that six of the eight remaining Panzer divisions in the west were either committed or in tactical reserve in the northern sectors of the Western Front and that the enemy lacked replacements for the heavy losses he was sustaining. It was concluded that the enemy was still endeavoring to sell space for time with a minimum of forces, that this policy had begun to affect the control and morale of enemy troops, and that the enemy had no tactical reserves of any size on Third U.S. Army's front.

An Operational Directive was issued to the Commanding Generals of VIII, XII and XX Corps which stated "Effective 252400A February 1945 boundary between XII and XX Corps is changed as follows: MOSELLE River from NEUMAGEN (L33) to STADTBREDIMUS (L00) thence along road to BOUS (P90) (all to XX Corps)."

Amendment No 3 to Operational Directive dated 3 February was sent to the various corps commanders changing the VIII, XII Corps boundary.

In preparation for further movement to the east, VIII Corps units engaged in patrolling. While the 6th Cavalry Group relieved elements of the 6th Armored Division and the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division), the 6th Armored Division in turn relieved the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division). The 90th Infantry Division which had been attacking steadily for several days moved to assembly areas in the vicinity of WINTERSPELT (P98).

Attacking across the PRUM River in XII Corps zone, the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division), advanced one and one-half miles, with forward elements seizing high ground overlooking the NIMS River.

A 76th Infantry Division air observation post located a large troop concentration and adjusted the fires of an organic artillery battalion. Adjusted coordinates of the target were transmitted to XII Corps artillery fire direction center which called for a "Serenade" mission fired by all available corps and divisional artillery. Thirty enemy vehicles were destroyed and in excess of 100 casualties were inflicted. Farther north, the 5th Infantry Division continued its attack, with its 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments advancing up to two miles and seizing high ground overlooking the NIMS River. The 10th Infantry took DOCKENDORF (L04), MESSERICH (L15), BETTINGEN (L05) and INGENDORF (L04). A hard-driving attack of the 4th Armored Division during the period gained seven miles and seized bridges intact over both the PRUM and NIMS Rivers. This attack erased "The VIANDEN (P85) BULGE" and drove to a vicinity two miles north of BITBURG (L15), one of the primary objectives of Third U.S. Army's attack. Mopping up by-passed enemy elements, the 80th Infantry Division followed the 4th Armored Division, with elements capturing ECHTERSHAUSEN (L05), METTENDORF (P95), HAMM (L05) and entering MAUEL (L06).

Defense of its SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead in XX Corps zone was maintained by the 26th Infantry Division. The 10th Armored Division (with attached 376th Infantry) advanced north on the east side of the SAAR River, increasing the depth of its SAAR River bridgehead to over three miles. Meanwhile, the 94th Infantry Division (-) enlarged its bridgehead, maintaining contact with the 10th Armored Division.

Tank destroyers' 90mm guns and 105mm howitzers were frequently employed in coordination to attack and reduce pillboxes. The artillery was first adjusted upon the pillbox, following which the tank destroyer attacked the pillbox with direct fire methods to effect penetrations and force the personnel into the open, whereupon the artillery immediately fired for effect against personnel.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 434 sorties, fighter-bombers destroying or damaging 250 vehicles, ninety-seven tanks and armored cars, twenty-one locomotives, 692 railroad cars and sixty-seven buildings, thirty-three rail cuts were made and twenty-six marshalling yards were attacked. One plane failed to return.

XII Corps opened its attack on a large scale from its PRUM River bridgeheads, gaining up to seven miles during the day, while XX Corps enlarged its SAAR River bridgeheads and VIII Corps regrouped for attack.

26 FEBRUARY *(D + 265)*

Twelfth U.S. Army Group instructed Third U.S. Army that the 90th Infantry Division was to be held available in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Reserve and was not to be committed without the authority of that Headquarters.

VIII Corps continued its refitting and preparation for continuance of the attack. On the corps south flank was the 6th Cavalry Group, and other units on the front, reading from south to north in order, were the 6th Armored Division (-) 4th Infantry Division, and 87th Infantry Division (plus Combat Command "A", 11th Armored Division). The 11th Armored Division (-) was in corps assembly area. Small advances were made by both the 6th Armored Division (-) and the 87th Infantry Division to bring their forces up to the PRUM River. The 90th Infantry Division remained in assembly in vicinity of WINTERSPELT (P9180), and passed to control of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces to remain temporarily in reserve.

In XII Corps, 2d Cavalry Group elements were fighting in WASSERBILLIG (L12), while in the line were the 76th and 5th Infantry Divisions and 4th Armored Division, with the 80th Infantry Division on the north flank. The 304th and 385th Infantry Regiments (76th Infantry Division) continued clearing high ground overlooking the NIMS River, advancing to the outskirts of WOLSFELD (L04) and KASCHENBACH (L14). The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced four miles through NIEDERSTEDEM (L14) and OBERSTEDEM (L14) to a point two and one-half miles south of BITBURG (L15), late in the period swinging north to enter the outskirts of BITBURG (L15). The 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) advanced two miles, capturing a bridge intact at BIRTLINGEN (L15) and clearing STAHL (L15). Advancing five miles, the 4th Armored Division captured MATZEN

(L15) and MATTENHEIM (L15) in an area four miles northeast of BITBURG (L15). Towns were attacked with massed time-on-target fires of six battalions of artillery immediately prior to the armor's assault. In the northern part of corps zone, the 80th Infantry Division advanced up to six miles, relieving elements of the 4th Armored Division along the PRUM River and clearing MAUEL (L06).

The 26th Infantry Division rotated units, maintaining its positions in the southern part of XX Corps zone. Farther north, the 94th Infantry Division continued to enlarge its SAAR River bridgehead, clearing a forest southeast of the town and mopping up an enemy pocket at BEURIG (L11). Extremely heavy counterattacks were launched against the 5th Ranger Battalion, attached to the 94th Infantry Division. Defensive artillery fires were powerful, a single XX Corps artillery battalion firing twenty-six missions in support of the 5th Ranger Battalion's successful defense. Three additional XX Corps battalions and the organic artillery of the 94th Infantry Division also participated heavily in these defensive fires. Advancing five miles, Combat Command "B" (10th Armored Division) captured ZERF (L21), while Combat Command "A" crossed the SAAR River at SERRIG (L10) and Reserve Combat Command followed the 94th Infantry Division across at SAARBURG (L11).

Poor weather limited XIX Tactical Air Command to five missions of which two were weather reconnaissance missions and three were armed reconnaissance missions east of the RHINE River. Two locomotives were destroyed and six damaged, while forty railway cars were hit.

Third U.S. Army attacks progressed well in both the XII and XX Corps during the period, the enemy being so disorganized that several small pockets were trapped and reduced and two bridges were captured intact. Gains of up to six miles were made, ten towns were captured and the primary objective of BITBURG (L15) was entered.

27 FEBRUARY *(D + 266)*

Advancing one mile in the southern part of VIII Corps zone, the 6th Cavalry Group captured WAXWEILER (L06). Combat Command "A" (6th Armored Division) advanced one and one-half miles, crossing the PRUM River, clearing PINTESFELD (L06) and reaching a vicinity two miles north of WAXWEILER (L06). The 4th Infantry Division patrolled aggressively but made no attack during the period. On the corps north flank, the 345th and 346th Infantry Regiments (87th Infantry Division) advanced 1,000 yards to high ground southeast of ORMONT (L09). The 11th Armored Division (-) remained in corps assembly area.

The 2d Cavalry Group patrolled in the southern part of XII Corps zone. Just to the north, the three regiments of the 76th Infantry Division were driving southeastwards towards TRIER (L22) with the 385th Infantry crossing the NIMS River and clearing IRREL (L03) and NIEDERWEISS (L04), the 304th Infantry advancing three and one-half miles and capturing GILZEM (L14) and MECKEL (L14), and the 417th Infantry advancing four and one-half miles through BADENHORN (L14) and HELENBERG (L14) to positions eight miles northwest of TRIER (L22). In the 5th Infantry Division zone, the 10th Infantry advanced two and one-half miles, capturing SCHARFBILLIG (L14), RHOL (L14) and ESSLINGEN (L14), while the 11th Infantry advanced three miles east and northeast, capturing MOTSCH (L15) and MASHOLDER (L15), while continuing to fight inside BITBURG (L15), which was cleared just before the end of the period. The 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) made a slight advance and captured SULM (L14). Farther north, the 4th Armored Division mopped up in zone after its rapid advance of the previous days while its Combat Command "B" continued the advance for one and one-half miles, capturing FLIESSEM (L15), and its 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron captured NIEDERWEILER (L05) and BICKENDORF (L16). The 76th Infantry Division was used to aid XX Corps in its mission of capturing TRIER (L22). The 80th Infantry Division consolidated gains, cleared five towns, and patrolled aggressively in zone.

Repairing Rail Lines to Improve Communications

In XX Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division widened its zone to take over positions of the 3d Cavalry Group, while that unit moved north to be attached to the 94th Infantry Division. A one mile advance was made by the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) to the northeast through a forest due east of SAARBURG (L11), while the 301st Infantry relieved Combat Command "B" (10th Armored Division) on a blocking mission east of ZERF (L21). In the 10th Armored Division, Combat Command "A" advanced four miles, reaching an area six miles south of TRIER (L22), while Combat Command "B" captured BALDRINGEN (L21) and PASCHEL (L21), and the attached 376th Infantry (94th Infantry Division) maintained its position.

Artillery of VIII and XII Corps combined to conduct a coordinated anti-flak program of continued neutralizing fires upon four heavy anti-aircraft batteries on the route of approach of 1,200 heavy bombers of the Eighth U.S. Air Force. Fires were conducted for approximately ninety minutes as the bombers flew into Germany and were repeated on the return flight.

Poor flying conditions prevailed, but 112 sorties were flown by XIX Tactical Air Command. Low overcast precluded strafing for the most part however. Thirty-six bomb tons were dropped with only partially observed results. Four marshalling yards were attacked and six locomotives were destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued its major attack through the SIEGFRIED Line during the period, captured BITBURG (L15) and nineteen small towns, and began to close in on TRIER (L22), one of the oldest cities in WESTern Europe.

A general lack of civilian medical personnel and facilities in occupied sections of Germany threatened to place an excessive burden on military medical units. To eliminate this possibility, military government public health officers reestablished and improvised hospitals, relocated civilian doctors and salvaged medical supplies.

28 FEBRUARY *(D + 267)*

In addition to the most favored enemy capability (that he could continue to defend and delay from organized positions and on favorable ground in Third U.S. Army's zone of advance) it was estimated that the enemy was capable of attempting a fortress stand at TRIER (L22) in an effort to maintain an anchor between his defensive forces north and south of the MOSELLE River and to obstruct the Army's advance to the RHINE River. Retention of TRIER (L22) was of vital importance to the enemy in order to prevent the unhinging of the northern and southern forces of his line of defense, for with the city in Third U.S. Army's possession the way was opened to continue the attack astride the MOSELLE River which would split the enemy's forces and threaten his rear. It was believed possible at this time, in view of numerous indications of spreading defeatism, that the enemy might reinforce against the Army with the equivalent of one infantry and/or one Panzer-type division or task force. On the Army's front the enemy was estimated to have a total of 18,250 troops, equivalent to two and one-half divisions, and thirty tanks. Of these, it was estimated that 10,750 troops and twenty-five tanks were north of the MOSELLE River and 7,500 troops and five tanks were south of the river.

Increasing its bridgehead to a depth of 500 yards, the 6th Cavalry Group completed crossing the PRUM River. The 6th Armored Division, meanwhile, advanced one and one-half miles in zone, clearing MERLSCHEID (L07), LUNEBACH (L07), PRONSFELD (L07), DACKSCHEID (L06) and EILSCHEID (L07), with its leading elements two miles east of the PRUM River. Renewing its attack, the 4th Infantry Division crossed the PRUM River, captured KLEINLANGENFELD (L18) and drove one mile east of the river. In the northern part of zone, the 87th Infantry Division (plus Combat Command "A" of the 11th Armored Division) encountered heavy resistance, but made gains up to 500 yards while reducing pillboxes in zone. The 11th Armored Division (-) remained in assembly area.

Patrolling was continued in the southern part of XII Corps zone by the 2d Cavalry Group. The 76th Infantry Division continued its drive to the south toward TRIER (L22), advancing one and one-half to two miles along its front. Its 417th Infantry cleared MOHN (L13), BUTZWEILER (L13), WELSCHBILLIG (L14), DESHEIM (L14) and ITTEL-KYLL (L14), while the 358th Infantry captured EISENACH (L13). Two miles were gained by the 5th Infantry Division to high ground overlooking the KYLL River, the 2d Infantry taking IDENHEIM (L14), TRIMPORT (L14), SULM (L14) and DAHLEM (L14). Pushing one mile to the east between the NIMS and KYLL Rivers, the 4th Armored Division captured IRSCH (L15). On the Corps north flank, the 80th Infantry Division gained two miles between the PRUM and EHLENZ Rivers, capturing EHLENZ (L06), SCHLEID (L16) and OBERSWEILER (L06).

There was no change in the 26th Infantry Division situation in the southern part of XX Corps, patrolling being continued on the division's extended front. The 301st and 302d Infantry Regiments (94th Infantry Division) each gained one mile, further enlarging their SAAR River bridgehead to a depth of approximately five miles. In the 10th Armored Division zone, Combat Command "A" advanced one and one-half miles through three heavily-mined areas, capturing LAMPADEN (L21) and PELLINGEN (L22), with a small task force by-passing the mined area and advancing four miles to an area three miles southeast of TRIER (L22). Combat Command "B" attacked north from ZERF (L21) to positions one mile west of the leading elements of Combat Command "A" and reached a position only two and one-half miles from TRIER (L22), while the attached 376th Infantry captured WILTINGEN (L11).

Another day of overcast hampered operations, but 239 sorties were flown largely as escort for medium bombers. Several enemy planes were encountered in the air with losses of four confirmed, two probably destroyed and three damaged inflicted on the enemy, for no loss of XIX Tactical Air Command. Claims for the day were small because overcast limited visibility.

Third U.S. Army continued its attack into the SIEGFRIED Line during the day, reaching the KYLL River in its central (XII Corps) zone, while XX Corps attacked north to within two and one-half miles of the major target of TRIER (L22).

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

Following the failure of his ARDENNES offensive, the enemy resorted again to his policy of defending and delaying, selling space for time by shuttling troops from one threatened sector of the front to the other and reinforcing with a miscellany of units when he was able. None of these desperate moves was able to stall for long the advance of Third U.S. Army.

Early in the month the enemy moved the Sixth SS Panzer Army, which had spearheaded the ARDENNES offensive, to the Eastern Front to meet the critical Russian threat, the last of the Army leaving the West by 8 February. Other armored and Panzer-type divisions also were withdrawn for use in the East, so that by the end of the month only one badly-battered Panzer division was committed on the entire Western Front.

Meanwhile, also as the result of the Russian drive, a marked decrease in replacements and reinforcements was noted in the enemy's order of battle during the first half of the month. The enemy's initial solution for the problem of maintaining his defense in the face of heavy losses and withdrawals was to revert to the shuttle system. This makeshift, however, soon proved inadequate and by mid-February the enemy's second improvisation was put into effect. He committed numerous varieties of miscellaneous units, including home guard, fortress troops and headquarters battalions, all static and wholly defensive units. For a time these units were under the operational control of their parent divisions, but later, because of the great need for infantry replacements, they were absorbed by the decimated Volksgrenadier divisions. Thousands of these low combat-value troops surrendered or deserted.

During the entire month Third U.S. Army participated in "The Campaign West of the RHINE River and north of the MOSELLE River". Twelfth U.S. Army Group assumed an attitude of aggressive defense on 7 February, maintaining this type of warfare throughout the month. Third U.S. Army, however, was directed to make probing attacks throughout the month toward certain key objectives in addition to aggressive defense. During most of the month only one of the three corps was used offensively, the other two corps assuming an aggressive defense.

Main effort of the early part of the month was made by VIII Corps through SIEGFRIED fortifications in a drive toward PRUM (L07). Capture of that city on 12 February opened an advantageous path of advance up the PRUM Valley toward the RHINE River. On 10 February, III Corps passed to control of First U.S. Army, and Third U.S. Army operated throughout the remainder of the month with VIII, XII and XX Corps.

XII Corps attacked across the SAUER and PRUM Rivers in the early part of the month in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH (L03). These attacks forced the enemy to give ground, and inasmuch as he had also been forced back around PRUM (L07), a bulge resulted between these two points where the heaviest pressure had been directed against the enemy. VIII and XII Corps directed a good deal of their efforts between 12 and 25 February toward attacking the flanks of this salient which was called the "VIANDEN Bulge". This area was finally cleared on 25 February, at which time XII Corps opened a major attack to the east toward BITBURG (L15) which was cleared on 27 February. Through the remainder of the month XII Corps made rapid gains to the east.

After taking PRUM (L07), VIII Corps consolidated its positions and made only minor gains to the east, although it participated in the reduction of the "VIANDEN Bulge" by lateral attacks to the south.

XX Corps units patrolled aggressively while maintaining positions and making limited objective attacks in the first half of the month. After thorough reconnaissance and preparation, the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division launched an attack on 19 February to clear land up to the SAAR River, and the triangle of land between the SAAR and MOSELLE Rivers. By 22 February the 94th Infantry Division had two small bridgeheads over the SAAR River at TABEN (L10) and SERRIG (L10), while the SAAR - MOSELLE triangle was cleared the following day. Then both divisions enlarged these bridgeheads over the SAAR River consolidating them into one larger bridgehead which was five miles deep at the end of the month. During the last three days of the month the 10th Armored Division struck north, and was within three miles of the important communications center of TRIER (L22) at the end of the month.

Enemy resistance was stubborn throughout February, but nowhere was it strong enough to stop the driving power of Third U.S. Army. By the end of the month the SIEGFRIED Line had been completely passed through in most parts of Army zone. There was nothing between Army units and the RHINE River at the end of February except some rough terrain and a badly mauled, retreating enemy force.

VIII Corps took 264 square miles of territory in February, while XII and XX Corps overran 240 and 141 square miles, respectively. III Corps, before its transfer to First U.S. Army, took twelve square miles. Third U.S. Army gained a total of 657 square miles of territory during the month.

The German Air Force flew very few sorties in Third U.S. Army area during February, only thirty-two aircraft being seen in twenty-three raids. Of these, only two enemy aircraft made attacks, both strafing attempts with no known damage. Antiaircraft artillery units claimed three enemy planes destroyed and six probably destroyed.

By order of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, the Army directed division commanders to fully acquaint subordinate infantry and armored units, down to and including battalions, with the procedure for requesting supply by air. Designated airfields were to be stocked with prescribed air resupply loads for prompt loading aboard aircraft. Because of the impaired road net in corps and division areas, special emphasis was to be placed on moving a maximum amount of supplies to forward dumps by rail. At the end of February, Army supply and reserve points held 1,199,995 rations and 2,412,975 gallons of V-80 gasoline, while in Class II and IV depots were 7,963 long tons of clothing and equipment. An additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26). During the month, 5,989.9 long tons of Classes II and IV supplies were received by the Army. Rail tonnage of supplies unloaded in the Army area during the month totaled 190,363. During the month, 206 convoys numbering 21,946 two and one-half ton trucks carried 169,544 tons of supplies and 81,019 troops.

An experiment of using antiaircraft searchlights to create artificial moonlight by shining the lights at a forty-five degree angle

against low clouds was generally considered a success, although combat commanders observed certain limitations. The most serious objection offered was that the enemy, when located in buildings or trenches, could observe the movement of Third U.S. Army troops. Prisoners of war, interrogated regarding the effect of searchlights, stated the enemy enjoyed a number of the advantages from the lights that Third U.S. Army troops received, but it was noticed that enemy patrolling was greatly reduced. Used in the river crossings in XII and XX Corps zones, the searchlights in the words of one commander "lifted the doughboy from a blind, groping ineffective to an efficient, confident and aggressive soldier."

Tactical river crossings during February exceeded in number those of any previous month in the Army's operations, the MOSELLE River valley and adjacent areas being dissected by numerous streams which had to be crossed as the Army advanced astride the MOSELLE. In addition, several bridges had to be built across the MOSELLE to afford lateral communication. To support these operations, 225 bridges totalling 23,022 feet in length were constructed. The most extensive bridging was necessary in XII Corps zone to support crossings of the SAUER River by the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions and the crossing of the OUR River by the 80th Infantry Division. Engineers sometimes built bridges at night under artificial moonlight created by antiaircraft searchlights shining against low-hanging clouds and reflecting down.

During the month the Army's ordnance service negotiated contracts for more than 300 items, ranging from automobiles to small arms, artillery, combat vehicles and fire control apparatus. This extensive program was necessary in order to fill requirements for material in critical supply. Ammunition received from Advance Section Communications Zone during February totaled 39,767 long tons, with 137,179 long tons being handled by Third U.S. Army installations. Supply of 4.2-inch chemical mortar ammunition remained critical during the entire month, the depots never being stocked with more than one week's supply. Impounded high explosive 4.2-inch shells were issued for firing by lanyard, while the non-defective rounds were used only in missions demanding rapid fire.

Throughout the month, civil affairs and military government detachments secured many civilian laborers for units of the Army. More than 225 German nationals from NIEDALTDORF (Q18) and GROSS HEMMERSDORF (Q18) volunteered for work. Ninety men from French towns near SIERCK (Q09) were employed to unload ammunition, and groups ranging up to several hundred laborers were employed for road repair and maintenance.

Strength of the Army as of 28 February was 304,542. Casualties suffered by Third U.S. Army during the month included 1,494 killed, 10,563 wounded, 1,627 missing and 14,071 non-battle casualties, for a total of 27,755. Reinforcements received during February totalled 29,683. Prisoners of war received in enclosures numbered 23,106 and those admitted at hospitals and medical units totalled 1,055, for a total of 24,161.



C-47's Drop Supplies to 4th Infantry Division

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



*CUMULATIVE FROM 1 AUGUST

FEBRUARY–	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
DEAD (EST)	200	200	200	200	300	300	700	300	300	600	400	300	300	700	200	300	100	300	600	700	400	200	500	400	400	800	500	1000
WOUNDED (EST)	600	600	600	600	900	900	2100	900	900	1800	1200	900	900	2100	600	900	400	900	2200	2800	1600	800	1600	900	1600	2000	1500	2000
DAILY CAPTURED	262	342	297	223	420	265	254	1021	495	1118	1228	782	461	726	267	376	173	208	547	1521	1925	1922	1359	1229	1128	2070	1645	1897
TOTAL	1062	1142	1097	1023	1620	1465	3054	2221	1695	3518	2828	1982	1661	3526	1067	1576	673	1408	3347	5021	3925	2922	3459	2529	3128	4870	3645	4897

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COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD U S ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD U S ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH – ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH–THIRD US ARMY CASUALTIES

70,361

13,684

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
DAILY	DEAD	22	26	33	16	24	35	79	61	80	71	34	58	55	65	31	52	55	41	89	77	69	70	56	50	44	42	55	104
	WOUNDED	239	216	217	111	106	357	712	637	622	596	553	353	279	255	201	237	180	327	696	479	387	291	235	395	299	316	666	601
	MISSING	24	30	23	19	25	10	179	68	55	67	75	75	119	107	131	68	28	29	98	53	59	65	38	61	13	28	20	60
	TOTAL	285	272	273	146	155	402	970	766	757	734	662	486	453	427	363	357	263	397	883	609	515	426	329	506	356	386	741	765

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-28 FEBRUARY 1945



LEGEND:
O - OPENED
C - CLOSED

TOWNS CAPTURED FEBRUARY

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED	
AUW	VIII	1 February	
AMMELDINGEN	XII	13 "	
AFFLER	VIII	22 "	
ARZFELD	VIII	22 "	
ALTSCHEUERN	VIII	24 "	
BLEIALF	VIII	2 "	
BERTERATH	VIII	2 "	
BERG	VIII	3 "	
BUCHET	VIII	3 "	
BRANDSCHEID	VIII	5 "	
BETTEL	VIII	6 "	
BIESDORF	XII	10 "	
BOLLENDORF	XII	12 "	
BINSCHEID	VIII	21 "	
BERSCHEID	VIII	23 "	
BAULER	VIII	23 "	
BERKOTH	VIII	23 "	
BERRADEN	VIII	23 "	
BRIMINGEN	XII	24 "	
BETTINGEN	XII	25 "	
BIRTLINGEN	XII	26 "	
BEURIG	XX	26 "	
BADENBORN	XII	27 "	
BITBURG	XII	27 "	
BICKENDORF	XII	27 "	
CONDRENBRETT	VIII	8 "	
CRUCHTEN	VIII	17 "	
DILMAR	XX	20 "	
DITTLINGEN	XX	20 "	
DASBURG	VIII	21 "	
DALEIDEN	VIII	21 "	
DOCKENDORF	XII	25 "	
ERNZEN	XII	13 "	
ESCHFIELD	VIII	21 "	
EUSCHEID	VIII	21 "	
EMMELBAUM	VIII	23 "	
ETTLINGEN	XII	24 "	
ECHTERSHAUSEN	XII	26 "	
ESSLINGEN	XII	27 "	
FISCHBACH	VIII	24 "	
FERSEHWEILER	XII	13 "	
FREILINGEN	XII	19 "	
FAHA	XX	19 "	
FREUDENBURG	XX	20 "	
FISCH	XX	20 "	
FLIESSEM	XII	27 "	
FEILERICH	XX	21 "	
GROSSKAMPENBERG	VIII	5 "	(17 Feb.)
GEICHLINGEN	XII	21 "	
GILZEM	XII	27 "	
HECKHUSCHEID	VIII	1 "	
HOESDORF	XII	3 "	
HABSCHEID	VIII	5 "	
HERSCHEID	VIII	6 "	
HONTHEIM	VIII	6 "	
HERMESPAND	VIII	8 "	
HARSPELT	VIII	11 "	
HERZFELD	VIII	19 "	
HALSDORF	XII	20 "	
HELFANT	XX	20 "	
HICKESHAUSEN	VIII	21 February	
HALENBACH	VIII	21 "	
HUTTINGEN	XII	21 "	
HAMM	XX	21 "	
HOLZCHEN	VIII	22 "	
HEILBACH	VIII	22 "	
HERBSTMUEHLE	VIII	23 "	
HOLSTRUM	XII	24 "	
HELENBERG	XII	27 "	
IRRHAUSEN	VIII	22 "	
INGENDORF	XII	25 "	
IRREL	VIII	27 "	
KREWINKEL	VIII	2 "	
KOBSCHEID	VIII	4 "	
KESFELD	VIII	17 "	
KEPPESHAUSEN	VIII	17 "	
KIAF	XX	19 "	
KORPERICH	XII	20 "	
KOLLESLEUCKEN	XX	20 "	
KORRIG	XX	20 "	
KASTELTAADT	XX	21 "	
KRUTWEILER	XX	21 "	
KOPSCHEID	VIII	22 "	
KARLSHAUSEN	VIII	23 "	
KOXHAUSEN	VIII	23 "	
KRAUTSCHEID	VIII	23 "	
KINZENBURG	VIII	23 "	
LOSHEIM	VIII	2 "	
LUTZKAMPEN	VIII	5 "	(7 Feb.)
LEIDENBORN	VIII	18 "	
LASTHORN	VIII	19 "	
LAHR	XII	21 "	
LICHTENBORN	VIII	22 "	
LEIMBACH	VIII	23 "	
LAUPERATH	VIII	23 "	
LIESSEM	XII	26 "	
MUTZENICH	VIII	1 "	
MANDERFELD	VIII	1 "	
MASTHORN	VIII	18 "	
MUNZINGEN	XX	19 "	
MEURICH	XX	20 "	
MUXERAT	VIII	23 "	
MANDERSCHEID	VIII	23 "	
MESSERICH	XII	25 "	
METTENDORF	XII	25 "	
MATZEN	XII	26 "	
MECKEL	XII	27 "	
MOTSCH	XII	27 "	
MASHOLDER	XII	27 "	
NIEDERGECKLER	XII	23 "	
NEUERBURG	VIII	24 "	
NIEDERRADEN	XII	24 "	
NIEDERSTEDEM	XII	26 "	
NATTENHEIM	XII	26 "	
NIEDERWEISS	XII	27 "	
OBERMERLEN	VIII	7 "	
OLZHEIM	XII	8 "	
OBERLEUKEN	XX	19 "	
OBERSGEGEN	XII	20 "	
ORSCHOLZ	XX	20 "	
OLMSCHEID	VIII	22 February	
OBERGECKLER	XII	22 "	
OCKFEN	XX	23 "	
OBERPIERSCHEID	VIII	24 "	
OUTSCHEID	XII	24 "	
OBERSTEDEM	XII	26 "	
PALZEM	XX	19 "	
PLASCHEID	VIII	23 "	
PEFFINGEN	XII	24 "	
PINTESFELD	VIII	27 "	
RADSCHEID	VIII	2 "	
ROTH	VIII	3 "	
ROHRBACH	XII	17 "	
ROSCHEID	VIII	20 "	
REHLINGEN	XX	20 "	
ROMMELFANGEN	XX	20 "	
REIPELDINGEN	VIII	21 "	
REIFF	VIII	21 "	
RODERSHAUSEN	VIII	23 "	
RINGHUSCHEID	VIII	23 "	
RITTERSDORF	XII	26 "	
RHOL	XII	27 "	
SCHLAUSENBACH	VIII	5 "	
SELLERICH	VIII	6 "	
SINZ	XII	6 "	
STEINMEHLEN	VIII	9 "	
SEVENIG	VIII	11 "	
SCHANKWEILER	XII	17 "	
SENGERICH	VIII	19 "	
STOCKEM	XII	19 "	
SEIMERICH	XII	20 "	
SUDLINGEN	XX	20 "	
STRICKSCHEID	VIII	21 "	
SAARBURG	XX	21 "	
SERRIG	XX	22 "	
SCHEITENKORB	VIII	23 "	
SINSFELT	XII	23 "	
SCHARFBILLIG	XII	27 "	
SULM	XII	27 "	
TABEN-RODT	XX	21 "	
TRASSEM	XX	21 "	
TEMMELS	XX	21 "	
UTTFIELD	VIII	18 "	
UPPERSHAUSEN	VIII	23 "	
VIANDEN	VIII	20 "	
VOLXHEIM	XII	19 "	
WINTERSCHEID	VIII	1 "	
WECKERATH	VIII	2 "	
WASCHEID	VIII	6 "	
WALLENDORF	XII	7 "	
WEINSFELD	VIII	10 "	
WALTZERATH	VIII	11 "	
WALDHOF-FALKENSTEIN	VIII	18 "	
WINCHERINGEN	XII	18 "	
WEITEN	XX	20 "	
WEHR	XX	20 "	
WAXWEILER	VIII	23 "	
ZERF	XX	26 "	

Chapter 10

MARCH OPERATIONS

In March Third U.S. Army challenged the enemy on his home ground and inflicted a series of such disastrous defeats that he never recovered. The breath-taking sweep of the March operations compared with those of August 1944, when the Army's drive across France held the eyes of the world. The smashing of the SIEGFRIED Line and the advance to the RHINE RIVER, the charge across the enemy's rear which took Third U.S. Army's spearheads far into Seventh U.S. Army's zone and led to the trapping of thousands of enemy troops in the PALATINATE, the assault crossings of the RHINE for the first time in modern history, the penetration into Central Germany--all these were highlights of the March operations. As February ended, all of the Army's tactical operations were inside of Germany.

1 MARCH *(D + 268)*

The 6th Cavalry Group, 6th Armored Division, 4th Infantry Division and 87th Infantry Division (plus Combat Command "A", 11th Armored Division), were on the line reading from south to north in VIII Corps zone, with the 11th Armored Division (-) in corps reserve and the 90th Infantry Division in the rear of corps zone in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve. In the southern part of zone, the 6th Cavalry Group advanced one and one-half miles to the east, reaching a vicinity two miles east of the PRUM River and clearing GREIMELSCHEID (L06), LAMBERTSBERG (L06), HARGARTEN (L06) and PLUTSCHEID (L06) against moderate resistance. Strengthening its bridgehead, the 6th Armored Division advanced one and one-half miles east of the PRUM River. On the corps north flank, the 87th Infantry Division (plus Combat Command "A", 11th Armored Division), advanced one and one-half miles, capturing ORMONT (L09).

XII Corps, consisting of the 2d Cavalry Group, 76th Infantry Division (with attached 318th Infantry of the 80th Infantry Division), 5th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division (-), held the line, in that order, reading from south to north. In the southern part of corps zone, the 76th Infantry Division (with 318th Infantry and 2d Cavalry Group attached) advanced toward TRIER (L22) with its 385th Infantry clearing the pocket in the SAUER River bend east of ECHTERNACH (L03), capturing EDINGEN (L13) and advancing two miles, while the 417th Infantry advanced two miles south through BUTZWEILER (L13) to a vicinity three and one-half miles north of TRIER (L22). While the 304th Infantry was pinched out by converging elements of the 385th and 417th Infantry Regiments, the attached 2d Cavalry Group cleared ROSPORT (L13) and STEINHEIM (L03). The attached 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) cleared NEWEL (L13) and advanced to high ground northeast of AACH (L13). Farther north, the 5th Infantry Division maintained positions along the west bank of the KYLL River, mopping up west of the river. Advancing north about one mile between the NIMS and KYLL Rivers, the 4th Armored Division cleared MALBERGWEICH (L16) and SEFFERWEICH (L16) in an area five miles north of BITBURG (L15) and secured high ground near SEFFERN (L16). Ten battalions of artillery fired a ten-minute preparation for the attack on SEFFERWEICH (L16). On the corps north flank, the 317th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) advanced north one and one-half miles between the NIMS and PRUM Rivers, clearing SCHLIED (L16), HEILENBACH (L06) and OBERWEILER (L16).

In XX Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division continued to maintain its positions in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Farther north, the 94th Infantry Division (less 376th Infantry) continued to expand its bridgehead with the 302d Infantry clearing PASCHEL (L21), SCHOMERICH (L21), HENTERN (L21), LAMPADEN (L21) and OBERSEHR (L21). Leading elements of the 10th Armored Division (plus 376th Infantry) entered TRIER (L22) from the south after a two mile advance, cutting the road leading from the city to the northeast, and capturing a bridge intact. Intense

enemy small arms and mortar fire were encountered. The 609th Tank Destroyer Battalion captured 474 prisoners during the attack on TRIER (L22). OBEREMMEL (L21), KOMMLINGEN (L12), KRETTNACH-OBERMENNIG (L22) and WILTINGEN (L11) were cleared by the 376th Infantry (94th Infantry Division) during this advance.

Despite poor flying weather 485 sorties were flown and 188 tons of bombs were dropped by XIX Tactical Air Command. Seven enemy planes were shot down while three fighter bombers were lost. Although low clouds and poor visibility hindered observation, thereby limiting claims, 111 motor vehicles, twenty-nine tanks and armored cars, twelve locomotives, forty railroad cars and sixty-three factory buildings were damaged or destroyed during the period.

March operations thus began with Third U.S. Army entering TRIER (L22), clearing twenty-nine other towns and gaining forty-seven and one-half square miles during the period.

In general, the supply situation was sound, with all classes of supplies arriving in satisfactory quantities. On this date 1,090,054 rations and 2,223,100 gallons of V-80 gasoline were on hand in the Army area and 7,963 long tons of clothing and equipment were in the Army's Classes II and IV depots. An additional 660,000 operational-type rations were held in reserve for the Army at the Advance Section Communications Zone depot at VERDUN (U26). Strength of the Army at this time was 304,690. In addition, the Army supplied 26,680 Advance Section Communications Zone, 29,625 Ninth U.S. Air Force, 1,920 French and 3,216 miscellaneous troops who were in or near the Army area, making a total of 366,131 troops supplied.

A determined effort was made to reduce the number of ammunition supply installations, previous experience having indicated that the flow of supply, particularly that of critical items, could be more closely controlled with a minimum of installations. This practice was followed especially in the VIII Corps zone where many small ammunition points had been installed in order to reduce traffic on the main supply routes.

Third Army Uses Hitler s Autobahn

2 MARCH (D + 269)

Elevation in the German Army of GENERAL MODEL, an ardent Nazi and Army Group Commander, to Commander-in-Chief West replacing GENERAL VON RUNDSTEDT indicated that the Nazis were insistent upon an uncompromising high command on the Western Front and, to that end, were Nazifying the high command as they had done on the Eastern Front. At this time the enemy still gave no indication that he was abandoning his defend and delay tactics and withdrawing to the RHINE River, despite the fact that he was steadily losing ground and thousands of troops as prisoners. Most favored enemy capability was that he would continue to defend and delay from organized positions in Third U.S. Army's zone of advance. It was also considered that the enemy could reinforce against this Army with the equivalent of one infantry and/or one panzer-type division or combat command. There were indications that some replacements were reaching the enemy's front line units, but at a rate low in comparison with his losses.

Advancing two miles to the east in VIII Corps zone, the 6th Cavalry Group reached the high ground overlooking the NIMS River. Just to the north, the 6th Armored Division gained three miles, its leading elements reaching the NIMS River. Combat Command "A" captured HEISDORF (L07), forded the NIMS River, captured WETTELDORF (L07) and SCHONECKEN (L07), then seized a bridge intact at SCHONECKEN (L07). Meanwhile, Combat Command "B" captured NIEDERLAUCH (L07), OBERLAUCH (L07), DINGDORF (L07), HEISDORF (L07) and WINRINGEN (L07), with elements fighting in GEISDORF (L07). Making small advances in a zone one and one-half miles east of the PRUM River, the 4th Infantry Division cleared WEINSHEIM (L18) and NIEDERPRUM (L07). In the northern part of zone the 87th Infantry Division advanced one mile to the northeast.

In the southern part of XII Corps zone the 2d Cavalry Group (attached to the 76th Infantry Division) crossed the SAUER River, gaining four miles in a zone north of the MOSELLE River and capturing GREWENICH (L12) and HERRESTHALERHOF (L12). In the 76th Infantry Division the 385th Infantry advanced south four miles to an area one mile north of the MOSELLE River, clearing TRIERWEILER (L12), SIRZENICH (L13), NEUHAS (L13), NIEDERWEILER (L12) and FUSENICH (L12). The attached 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) and the 417th Infantry each advanced one and one-half miles to a line two miles north of TRIER (L22) making contact with the 10th Armored Division (XX Corps), while BESSLICH (L13) was cleared by the 318th Infantry. Attacking under cover of darkness against scattered small arms and mortar fire, the 5th Infantry Division crossed the KYLL River with two companies of its 11th Infantry and one battalion of the 10th Infantry. HUTTINGEN (L15) was taken by the 10th Infantry while the 11th Infantry cleared METTERICH (L15). Farther north, the 4th Armored Division captured SEFFERN (L16) in a one and one-half mile advance to the north. Making local advances, the 80th Infantry Division captured HEILENBACH (L06) and made contact with the 6th Cavalry Group (VIII Corps).

In XX Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division maintained its SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Clearing pillboxes in zone, the 94th Infantry Division (less 376th Infantry) made gains of one-half mile to more favorable positions. A strong enemy counterattack in the vicinity of HAMM (L10), four miles south of SAARBURG (L11), was repulsed after a

slight penetration. The 10th Armored Division (plus 376th Infantry) cleared TRIER (L22), as well as the area between SAARBURG (L11) and TRIER (L22) where two small pockets of the enemy remained. Elements of the division advanced to the KYLL River, three and one-half miles northeast of TRIER (L22), while other elements made contact with the 76th Infantry Division north of the city. KONZ-KARTHUS (L12) was captured by Combat Command "A", 10th Armored Division.

Flying 577 sorties through murky weather, XIX Tactical Air Command had good results against enemy targets of all types, with 204 motor vehicles, twenty-nine locomotives, eight barges, 115 factory buildings, nine fuel tanks and one supply depot being destroyed or damaged, while twenty-nine rail cuts and four highway cuts were made. Five enemy planes were shot down while XIX Tactical Air Command lost three.

Third U.S. Army's advance during the period continued with XX Corps making substantial gains and clearing TRIER (L22). Eighteen other towns and thirty-four square miles of territory were taken during the day, some forces penetrating the rearmost SIEGFRIED Line positions.

3 MARCH *(D + 270)*

The processing of 6,589 prisoners of war in Third U.S. Army cages, plus 303 admitted to Army hospitals, since 28 February offered increasing evidence of the enemy's loss of morale.

A Twelfth U.S. Army Group directive to Third U.S. Army ordered the 90th Infantry Division released from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve to Third U.S. Army and the 6th Armored Division to be placed in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve. An operational directive was sent to corps commanders concerned changing boundaries between VIII and XII Corps and between XII and XX Corps.

Advancing one and one-half miles on the south flank of VIII Corps, the 6th Cavalry Group captured REULAND (L07) and HUSCHEID (L16), one mile east of the NIMS River. GIESDORF (L07) was captured by the 6th Armored Division after a two and one-half mile gain, the division then being relieved by the 90th Infantry Division. Following its relief the 6th Armored Division went to an assembly area as Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve. The 90th Infantry Division was relieved from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve to replace the 6th Armored Division. Following completion of the relief, it then attacked sharply, clearing NIEDEHERSDORF (L17) and SEIWERATH (L17). Farther north the 11th Armored Division (less Combat Command "A") passed through the 4th Infantry Division, then attacked and captured FLERINGEN (L17). Before the 11th Armored Division's attack, the 4th Infantry Division, against heavy enemy resistance, gained one mile, took ROMMERSHEIM (L07), WEINSHEIM (L08) and GONDELSHEIM (L18), then consolidated its positions. The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion knocked out two Mark V tanks. On the north flank of corps zone, the 87th Infantry (with attached Combat Command "A", 11th Armored Division) gained one and one-half miles to the northeast, capturing REUTH (L18) and KERSCHENBACH (L19).

In XII Corps zone the 2d Cavalry Group captured MESENICH (L12), LANGSUR (L12), LIERSBERG (L12), IGEL (L12) and ZEWEN-OBERKIRCH (L12). It was released from operational control of the 76th Infantry Division by the end of the period. Crossing the KYLL River, the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) secured a bridgehead ten miles north of TRIER (L22), clearing HOSTEN (L14) and ORENHOFFEN (L24). EUREN (L12) was captured by the 385th Infantry, which cleared the remainder of zone to the MOSELLE River while the 417th Infantry closed up to the KYLL and MOSELLE Rivers in zone. Farther north, the 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) cleared GONDORF (L15) and repulsed an enemy counterattack in its bridgehead, while the 11th Infantry cleared METTERICH (L15) and the woods northeast of the town. The joint bridgehead of these two regiments was expanded during the period to a depth of two miles and a width of three miles. The 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) maintained its positions on the west bank of the KYLL River. Preparing to attack, the 4th Armored Division assembled in the vicinity of BITBURG (L15). In the northern part of zone the 80th Infantry Division expanded its front by taking over the zone held by the 4th Armored Division, and making a one-half mile advance east of SEFFERN (L16).

In XX Corps zone the 26th Infantry Division patrolled actively in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, while to the north the 376th Infantry, attached to the 10th Armored Division, reverted to the 94th Infantry Division. Both the 94th Infantry Division and the 10th Armored Division consolidated their gains of the preceding days, mopping up in zone to the west bank of the REWER River.

Seeking The Enemy In Deep Forests

A total of 540 sorties was flown by XIX Tactical Air Command but overcast prevented some of these from being successful. The majority of sorties flown were in corps support. Claims of the day included 224 motor vehicles, thirty eight tanks and armored vehicles, 245 railroad cars, two bridges, sixteen gun positions and ninety-five factory buildings damaged or destroyed, while twenty two towns, eleven marshalling yards and one troop concentration were attacked.

Third U.S. Army's advance continued in all three corps during the period, with twenty three towns being taken and forty square miles of territory captured.

Plans were being laid for the supply of a twenty division attack to the RHINE River.

German Youth Points Out Sniper To American Rifleman

4 MARCH *(D + 271)*

Advancing four miles on the south flank of VIII Corps, the 6th Cavalry Group captured NEUSTRASSBURG (L16), BALESFELD (L16), NEUHEILENBACH (L16), WAWERN (L16) and BURBACH (L16), reaching a line one mile west of the KYLL River. Resistance was strong initially, but slackened toward the end of the period. The 6th Armored Division remained in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve. Maintaining contact with the 6th Cavalry Group on its south, the 90th Infantry Division advanced to the west bank of the KYLL River, and captured OBERHERSDORF (L17), EIGELBACH (L17) and KOPP (L17). BUDESHEIM (L18) and WALLERSHEIM (L17) were captured by the 11th Armored Division, which advanced four miles to a vicinity one and one-half miles west of the junction of the KYLL and OOS Rivers. Farther north, the 4th Infantry Division continued its attack, gaining two miles and capturing SCHWIRZHEIM (L18), OOS (L18) and DUPPACH (L18). On the corps north flank, the 87th Infantry Division with the 346th and 347th Infantry Regiments advanced from two to three miles north to the KYLL River, while the 345th Infantry advanced two miles to the east. The division captured SCHEID (L09), HALLSCHLAG (L09) and SCHONFELD (L19) during the day's advance.

In XII Corps the 2d Cavalry Group assembled in reserve in the south of the corps zone. Gaining three miles from its KYLL River bridgehead, the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) captured SPEICHER (L24), PREIST (L24) and ORENHOFFEN (L24), while the 395th Infantry patrolled aggressively. Just to the north, the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) expanded their KYLL River bridgehead, capturing PHILIPPSHEIM (L25), BADEN (L15), ERDORF (L15), DUDELDORF (L25), ORDORF (L25) and PICKLIESSEM (L25), while the 2d Infantry patrolled west of the KYLL River. Under cover of darkness, the 4th Armored Division attacked through the bridgehead positions of the 5th Infantry Division, rapidly passed through GINDORF (L25) and STEINBORN (L26), and continued to the northeast in a drive that was destined to carry to the banks of the RHINE River within three days. After a one and one-half mile advance to the north, the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) made contact with the 6th Cavalry Group (VIII Corps) near BALESFELD (L16) and assumed positions on the high ground west of the KYLL River. The 317th Infantry patrolled in zone, the 319th Infantry being in reserve.

The 26th Infantry Division patrolled along the southern part of XX Corps zone. In the rear of the 26th Infantry Division, the 65th Infantry Division closed in assembly area. Farther north, the 94th Infantry Division (with 3d Cavalry Group attached) maintained positions. The 417th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) was attached to the 10th Armored Division. Late in the period the 10th Armored Division attacked with Combat Command "B" clearing PFAIZEL (L23), gaining two and one-half miles in a zone northeast of TRIER (L22) while Combat Command "A" and Reserve Combat Command crossed the REWER River in two places and drove bridgeheads one-half mile deep.

Poor weather limited XIX Tactical Air Command operations to six sorties of which two were flown for weather reconnaissance and four in cooperation with XX Corps. The only claims of the day were one locomotive and one factory destroyed, five railroad cars damaged and one rail cut made.

Third U.S. Army continued its three corps attack, featured by the bridging of the REWER River in XX Corps zone and the attack of 4th Armored Division through the 5th Infantry Division's KYLL River bridgehead in XII Corps zone. Twenty-eight small towns were cleared and forty-two square miles of territory were captured.

Authority was received from Communications Zone for Army ordnance to execute locally, in emergency situations, "produced to order" procurements of estimated cost up to $2,000 without clearance and of more than $2,000, when necessary, with the express approval of the Office of Chief of Ordnance prior to the execution of contracts. Under arrangements agreed to by the Theater Ordnance Officer, this clearance was to constitute the "special circumstances" needed to justify the execution, at Army level, of headquarters procurements. Similar arrangements were set up with the Army engineer for emergency procurements within Headquarters procurement category. In this instance a blanket waiver on the $1,000 monetary limitation was obtained from the Office of Chief Engineer for emergency "produced to order" requirements.

In order to relieve tactical units of the task of maintaining large numbers of security guards, local police units were organized by military government throughout the Army zone.

Third Army Forward - Refugees To The Rear

5 MARCH (D + 272)

While the most favored enemy capability was still that he would delay and defend on favorable ground in Third U.S. Army's zone of advance, the capability that he would withdraw to the RHINE River took on increased importance at this time. Prisoners of war stated that makeshift combat commands, composed of stragglers, supply troops and convalescents, were being employed to screen the withdrawal of divisional units. The enemy faced a tactical situation that normally would indicate a withdrawal, although it was known that HITLER never voluntarily relinquished territory and the enemy repeatedly suffered serious defeats because of his stubborn refusal to yield untenable positions. Enemy forces opposing Third U.S. Army at this time were estimated at 45,000 combat effectives and fifty tanks, the equivalent of five and one-half divisions and one-third of the enemy's strength on the Western Front.

Letter of Instructions Number Sixteen was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group confirming oral instructions issued previously and in the Outline Operations Plan dated 23 February 1945. 21 Army Group British, with Ninth U.S. Army under operational command, was engaged in operations which had the objective of closing to the RHINE River in zone and of seizing a bridgehead over the RHINE north of the RUHR. Sixth U.S. Army Group was to remain on the defensive. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to clear the enemy from the area west of the RHINE and north of the MOSELLE River in zone to insure the security of the main lines of communication in the north. The front south of the MOSELLE River was to remain on the defensive.

Third U.S. Army's mission under the Letter of Instructions, was divided into three stages: (1) to secure the necessary bridgeheads over the KYLL River and concentrate forces in preparation for further advance to the east; (2) to be prepared on orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group to launch a strong attack on a narrow front from the KYLL River to seize the MAYEN (L69)--KOBLENZ (L89) area and, if enemy defenses were weak, to secure a bridgehead across the MOSELLE River to the southeast; (3) to complete clearing of the enemy from the area between the MOSELLE and the AHR Rivers and to maintain the defensive south of the MOSELLE in zone.

Upon completing its mission in the southern part of VIII Corps zone the 6th Cavalry Group (less 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron) moved to assembly in the northern part of zone. The 90th Infantry Division closed up completely to the KYLL River in zone, capturing LISSINGEN (L28), without opposition, BIRRESBORN (L27) and MORLENBACH (L17), with the 357th Infantry crossing the KYLL River on a two and one-half mile front. Continuing its attack, the 11th Armored Division captured SCHEUERN (L18), KALENBORN (L18), ROTH (L28) and NIEDER BETTINGEN (L28). On the north, the 4th Infantry Division continued to attack, clearing DUPPACH (L18), making gains of up to two miles and mopping up in the southern part of its zone behind elements of the 11th Armored Division. The 87th Infantry Division continued its attack through the period, with the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron being attached to the division. The 345th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) crossed the KYLL River in zone, capturing LISSENDORF (L19) and GONNERSDORF (L19), while the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron relieved the 347th Infantry and the 346th Infantry captured STADTKYLL (L19). The 6th Armored Division remained in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve.

15 Year Old Woman Member Of Wehrmacht

Attacking to enlarge its KYLL River bridgehead, the 76th Infantry Division (with 2d Cavalry Group attached) gained one-half mile both to the west and north. Motorized to follow the 4th Armored Division through the KYLL River bridgehead previously secured by the 10th and 11th Infantry regiments (5th Infantry Division), the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division) gained two miles before the end of the period. The 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments protected the bridgehead on the north and south, with ORSEFELD (L25) being captured. The attack of the 4th Armored Division continued toward the RHINE River, with Combat Command "B" disrupting the enemy before it and gaining 15 miles. Combat Command "A" started on another route to the south, but bad roads and demolished bridges forced it to move north to follow Combat Command "B". No organized enemy resistance was met by the 4th Armored Division after the breakthrough. During this rapid advance, Combat Command "B" captured SEINSFELD (L26), STEINBORN (L26), MEISBURG (L26), KYLLBURGWEILER (L26), OBERSTADTFELD (L37), SALM (L27) and WALLENBORN (L27).

Relief and regrouping of units marked XX Corps activities. The 65th Infantry Division began relief of the 26th Infantry Division in the southern part of zone, including the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Elements of the 26th Infantry Division moved north upon relief and started relieving elements of the 94th Infantry Division east of SAARBURG (L11). Minor gains were made by the 10th Armored Division (with attached 417th Infantry, 76th Infantry Division) both north and south of the MOSELLE River in a zone northeast of TRIER (L22), with Combat Command "A" clearing KENN (L23) and ETTELSBACH (L23).

No flights of XIX Tactical Air Command were possible because of bad flying weather.

Third U.S. Army advanced in all three corps, capturing twenty-two towns during the period. The 4th Armored Division (XII Corps) continued its drive to the RHINE River, while VIII Corps continued to gain along its entire front.

The 200,000th prisoner of war captured by Third U.S. Army since 1 August was received at the Army enclosure at ARLON (P62).

6 MARCH (D + 273)

An order was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group putting into effect that portion of Letter of Instructions Number Sixteen giving Third U.S. Army the mission of advancing to the east and southeast to secure the KOBLENZ (L89) area.

On the south flank of VIII Corps the 90th Infantry Division advanced three miles east from its KYLL River bridgehead, enlarging the bridgehead both north and south, and capturing DENSBORN (L17), GEROLSTEIN (L28), BUSCHEICH (L27), PEIM (L28) and GEES (L28). Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) crossed the KYLL River, gaining three and one-half miles, while Combat Command "B" attacked in zone north of the 4th Infantry Division. Between these combat commands the 4th Infantry Division advanced three and one-half miles, closing up to the KYLL River, and the 22d Infantry crossing that river. On the north flank, the 87th Infantry Division captured FEUSDORF (L29), JUNKERATH (L19) and BIRGEL (L29), while the attached 6th Cavalry Group maintained contact with First U.S. Army elements.

In the XII Corps zone the 76th Infantry Division, with the 2d Cavalry Group attached, pushed three miles east from its KYLL River bridgehead, while the 385th Infantry (reinforced) passed through the 304th Infantry, clearing HERFORST (L25) and BINSFELD (L25). To the north the 2d Infantry (5th Infantry Division), which had been motorized the preceding day, gained seven miles in the wake of the 4th Armored Division. OBERKAIL (L26) was cleared by the 2d Infantry and SPANGDAHLEM (L25), SPANG (L25) and DAHLEM (L25) were taken by the 10th Infantry in an attack to the northeast. Gaining seventeen miles, Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) neared MAYEN (L69) in its push to the RHINE River, while Combat Command "A", seventeen miles to the rear of Combat Command "B", began pushing forward rapidly. The 80th Infantry Division maintained its positions on the corps north flank with no change in positions.

In the XX Corps zone the 65th Infantry Division continued its relief of the 26th Infantry Division, while the latter division moved up alongside the 94th Infantry Division in a zone southeast of SAARBURG (L11). Repulsing enemy counterattacks, the 94th Infantry Division maintained its positions. Clearing MERTESDORF (L23) and EHRANG (L23), the 10th Armored Division (with attached 417th Infantry, 76th Infantry Division) gained one and one-half miles.

Bad flying weather precluded all flights of XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army's attack during the period continued to be featured by the drive of the 4th Armored Division to the RHINE River. Other elements of the XII Corps followed the advance, while VIII Corps units generally moved forward in a coordinated drive, with numerous towns and villages being taken.

Food stocks throughout occupied sections of Germany were found in general to be adequate for the civilian population. When shortages were encountered, redistribution of surplus stocks from other localities sufficed for the minimum needs of the people.

7 MARCH *(D + 274)*

An estimated 25,000 enemy combat effectives were pocketed north of the MOSELLE River. The favored enemy capability was that he would defend and delay in an effort to cover the withdrawal of the bulk of his troops over the RHINE River. The enemy was considered to be capable of local offensive action within the pocket in an effort to effect the relief of the trapped forces and to cut the communications of the Allied encircling columns. There was no sound evidence as yet that the German High Command had yielded in its determination to continue to resist as long as it could exercise control. Locally, however, tactical situations multiplied rapidly to a point where the High Command's control had either vanished or was impotent and the will and capability of the combat troops to continue fighting was disintegrating. Logistically, the enemy's position in the pocket was untenable and his collapse was well under way as regards large-scale, coordinated military operations.

Employing all three regiments, the 90th Infantry Division enlarged its KYLL River bridgehead and captured ROCKESKYLL (L28), ESSINGEN (L28), NEROTH (L27), BETTELDORF (L38) and BERLINGEN (L28). To the north, the 11th Armored Division continued its attack, with Combat Command "A" advancing rapidly nine miles and capturing KIRCHWEILER (L28), DOCKWEILER (L38), DREIS (L38) and KELBERG (L48). Supporting the advance of the 11th Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Division advanced in zone, capturing HILLESHEIM (L28), BOLSDORF (L29) and LAMMERSDORF (L28). The 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division), having been motorized, advanced five miles to the east late in the period. In the northern part of zone, the 87th Infantry Division continued to attack, gaining up to five miles and capturing ALENDORF (L29), MIRBACH (L29), RIPSDORF (L29), DOLLENDORF (L29), HUNGERSDORF (L20), BIRGEL (L29), WIESBAUM (L29) and ESCH (L29). Patrolling aggressively on the north flank, the 6th Cavalry Group kept contact with First U.S. Army elements on its north. To the rear, the 6th Armored Division remained in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve.

The 76th Infantry Division (less 417th Infantry, plus 2d Cavalry Group) continued to advance. While advancing three miles, the 2d Cavalry Group screened the XII Corps south flank and cleared RODT (L24), SCHLEIDWEILER (L24) and ZEMMER (L24). Meanwhile, the 304th and 395th Infantry Regiments (76th Infantry Division) made a joint advance of five miles, capturing ARRENRATH (L25), EISENSHMITT (L26) and BEILINGEN (L25). Securing positions northwest of KOBLENZ (L79), the 4th Armored Division continued to advance unchecked as Combat Command "B" by-passed MAYEN (L69) while Combat Command "A" closed the gap separating the two combat commands. In the 5th Infantry Division, the 11th Infantry gained several miles late in the period, following the advance of the 4th Armored Division, while the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments each gained one mile with the 2d Infantry capturing GRANSDORF (L25) and SCHWARZENBORN (L26). On the corps north flank, the 80th Infantry Division made gains of one mile.

Completing relief of the 26th Infantry Division, the 65th Infantry Division assumed control of the southern part of XX Corps zone, including the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Southeast of SAARBURG (L11), the 26th Infantry Division maintained its positions. Meanwhile, the 94th Infantry Division (with 3d Cavalry Group attached) repulsed counterattacks in zone. Northeast of TRIER (L22) the 10th Armored Division (with 417th Infantry attached) gained six miles after crossing the KYLL River. Combat Command "A" passed through the 76th Infantry Division while Combat Command "B" captured QUINT (L23) and EHRANG (L23), and Reserve Combat Command crossed the KYLL River, making a short advance to the northeast.

Fighter bombers were grounded for the third straight day by bad weather.

Third U.S. Army's three-corps attack continued during the period with the 4th Armored Division nearing the RHINE River, while VIII Corps made good advances throughout zone. Seventy-six square miles of territory were cleared while twenty-nine towns were taken.

A total of 73,405 refugees and 3,442 displaced persons were estimated to be overrun in Third U.S. Army's zone of operations.

German Prisoners Ferried Across The Rhine River

8 MARCH *(D + 275)*

Mine fields and road blocks, many of the latter weakly defended, were the enemy's chief defensive measures at this time. Counterattacks and other aggressive means of resistance were abandoned for methods permitting more hasty withdrawal.

Operating far in advance of other VIII Corps units, the 11th Armored Division advanced twenty-two miles toward the RHINE River. Combat Command "B" made contact with the 4th Armored Division east of MAYEN (L69) and captured BROHL (F71), while Combat Command "A" advanced and captured MAYEN (L69) which had been previously by-passed by the 4th Armored Division. Combat Command "A" reached the vicinity of ANDERNACH (F80) before the end of the period. The 90th Infantry Division continued following the 11th Armored Division, with the 357th Infantry spearheading through KELBERG (L48), while the 358th Infantry mopped up in zone. A fifteen mile gain was made by the 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division). This regiment, motorized for the drive, was far in advance of the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments which were pushing forward on foot. The 22d Infantry captured KERFEN (L29), LEUDERSDORF (L29), UXHEIM (L39), HOFFELD (L39). While maintaining contact with V Corps (First U.S. Army) on the north, the 87th Infantry Division gained thirteen miles in the northern part of the corps zone, clearing the enemy along the way. The 6th Cavalry Group began passing through the 4th Infantry Division, while to the rear the 6th Armored Division remained in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces reserve.

The 2d Cavalry Group (attached to the 76th Infantry Division) continued to screen the south flank of XII Corps. After clearing GLADBACH (L34), LANDSCHEID (L35), BURG (L35) and HEEG GUT (L35), the 385th Infantry (76th Infantry Division), crossed the SALM River in a drive toward GROSSLITGEN (L35). Meanwhile, the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) drove three miles to the SALM River, taking GREVERATH (L24) and prepared to cross the river. Well east of other infantry units, the 5th Infantry Division had both the 2d and 11th Infantry Regiments across the SALM River. Far to the east, Combat Command "A" and "B" (4th Armored Division) took more ground north and west of KOBLENZ (L99), capturing BASSENHEIM (L89), WOLKEN (L89), KOBERN (L89), RUBENACH (L89), MULHEIM (L89), KARLICH (L89), DRUFT (L79), PLAIDT (L79), MIESENHEIM (F70), SAFFIG (L79), and KETTIG (L89). Advancing late in the period, the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division), attached to 4th Armored Division, brought its elements near elements of the 4th Armored Division. There was no change in the 80th Infantry Division, which had been pinched out by the northerly attack of the 5th Infantry Division.

The 65th Infantry Division patrolled in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead and throughout the southern part of XX Corps zone. The 26th Infantry Division, assuming the lower part of the 94th Infantry Division zone, relieved the 328th Infantry (94th Infantry Division) allowing the 94th Infantry Division to begin regrouping its forces. Against defended roadblocks, Combat Command "A" (10th Armored Division) advanced and captured ERLENBACH (L34), while Reserve Combat Command captured RIEVENICH (L34) and Combat Command "B" gained two miles to the northwest.

Only three uneventful weather sorties were flown in weather which made it impossible for XIX Tactical Air Command to fly regular attack missions.

Third U.S. Army's attack continued to drive toward the RHINE during the period, with additional units closing up to the river. Twenty-four towns were cleared.

Advance Section Communications Zone began operating railheads at ETTELBRUCK (P83) and DIEKIRCH (P84), in the Third U.S. Army area, and dispatching trucks of rations and of packaged and bulk gasoline to certain forward Army supply points not on operating railway lines. With the development of the advance and consequent extension of supply lines beyond operating railroads, however, the problem of gasoline supply became increasingly difficult. Rail lines, on which the Army depended so heavily to move supplies forward, could not be rehabilitated fast enough in the zone of action to be of material assistance. In order to utilize fully truck transportation in the Army for use forward of the railheads, bulk shipments were requested, the decanting to be done by Advance Section Communications Zone. Bulk deliveries by tank trucks under Army control were also to be initiated, the decanting to be done by Army personnel. Efforts were made to obtain additional truck transportation from Advance Section Communications Zone to support the advance of the Army. In view of the fluid tactical situation developing north of the MOSELLE River, 28,000 gallons of bulk V-80 gasoline in tank trucks were enroute to ETTELBRUCK (P83) to be held there in reserve for an emergency supply, if necessary, for forward combat elements. Approximately 200,000 operational-type rations were stored at TRIER (L22) as Army reserve. Arrangements were made with XIX Tactical Air Command and Twelfth U.S. Army Group for the use of the airfield at TRIER (L22) for supply and evacuation beginning on 11 March. Authority for use of this field for not more than fifteen planes at one time was given for a period of three weeks, with probable extension for another three weeks. Request was made to Advance Section Communications Zone for assistance in hauling Classes I and III supplies direct from Advance Section depots to the vicinity of PRUM (L07), BITBURG (L15) and TRIER (L22).

Machine Gun Crew Protects Street

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS 1-13 MARCH 1945 AND DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS 13 MARCH 1945

CONCLUDING CAMPAIGN THE EIFEL TO THE RHINE AND THE CAPTURE OF TRIER

THIRD U S ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE

1 MARCH 1945	13 MARCH 1945
VIII CORPS	VIII CORPS
6TH ARMD DIV	11TH ARMD DIV
11TH ARMD DIV	87TH INF DIV
4TH INF DIV	XII CORPS
87TH INF DIV	4TH ARMD DIV
90TH INF DIV	5TH INF DIV
XII CORPS	76TH INF DIV
4TH ARMD DIV	89TH INF DIV
5TH INF DIV	90TH INF DIV
76TH INF DIV	XX CORPS
80TH INF DIV	10TH ARMD DIV
XX CORPS	26TH INF DIV
10TH ARMD DIV	65TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV	80TH INF DIV
65TH INF DIV	94TH INF DIV
94TH INF DIV	

BATTLE LINE 1 MARCH

BATTLE LINE 13 MARCH

9 MARCH (D + 276)

Appearance of a Volksgrenadier division in the COCHEM (L57) area, last reported in contact in the COLMAR (V74) sector three weeks previous to this date, gave further evidence of the enemy's great concern over his exposed positions south of the MOSELLE River. With the EIFEL region and the RHINE Plain being mopped up, the area south of the MOSELLE was of crucial importance to the enemy. Here he was required to sell as dearly as possible his only remaining space west of the RHINE River in order to gain time to prepare an effective defense east of the RHINE. North of the MOSELLE his capability was to defend and delay in order to cover the escape of the remainder of his enveloped forces. South of the MOSELLE he could launch local offensive actions in order to relieve pressure against him in other more seriously threatened sectors. Infantry following the armor of VIII and XX Corps gained 266 square miles of territory during the period, the largest gains of any day since Third U.S. Army's lightning advances of August and early September.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group issued orders transferring the 87th Infantry Division to Seventh U.S. Army. Later these orders were revoked and the 4th Infantry Division was instead transferred to Seventh U.S. Army.

Rapid advances were made by all units of VIII Corps during this period, with the result that the VIII Corps front was considerably more advanced to the east than the fronts of all XII Corps units, with the exception of 4th Armored Division. Between VIII Corps and First U.S. Army a large number of the enemy were trapped in an area which came to be known as the "The EIFEL (L37) Pocket". On this, and succeeding days, a good part of the corps effort was directed toward containing and reducing this area. From it, Third U.S. Army took a large number of prisoners.

Tank Is Ferried Across The Rhine River

Advancing rapidly in the rear of the 11th Armored Division, the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) neared MAYEN (L69), while the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments mopped up farther to the rear. Reaching the RHINE River, the 11th Armored Division culminated its drive to the northeast, Combat Command "B" capturing BROHL (F70) and making contact with the 2d Infantry Division (First U.S. Army), while Combat Command "A" captured ANDERNACH (F70) and Reserve Combat Command preceded the 90th Infantry Division. Farther north, the 6th Cavalry Group made rapid gains through the 4th Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry (4th Infantry Division) reached ADENAU (L49) while the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments began to assemble. Minor gains on the corps north flank were made by the 87th Infantry Division. During this period of rapid drives the 11th Armored Division gained twenty-five miles, the 90th Infantry Division twenty-five miles, and the 4th Infantry Division four miles. The 6th Armored Division began movement to DIEUZE (Q22) to join Seventh U.S. Army.

On the south flank of XII Corps, the 76th Infantry Division (with attached 2d Cavalry Group) gained three miles in zone to a line about one mile east of the SALM River. While the attached 2d Cavalry Group screened the corps south flank, BRUCH (L35), BERGWEILER (L35), MUSWEILER (L35), HUPPERATH (L35), SCHLADT (L35) and MINDERLITTGEN (L35) were taken by the 76th Infantry Division's 304th and 385th Infantry Regiments. Far to the east, gains of up to four miles were made by Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division), which captured HAMBUCH (L68), DUNFUS (L68), ROES (L68) and MONTENICH (L68), while Combat Command "A" maintained positions. South of MAYEN (L69), Reserve Combat Command, (4th Armored division) preceded the attached 11th Infantry, then about ten miles from the RHINE River. The 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) each gained nine miles, mopping up and taking BETTENFELD (L36) and MANDERSCHEID (L36). Far to the west, the 80th Infantry Division maintained positions while preparing to attack to the east.

In XX Corps zone the 65th, 26th and 94th Infantry Divisions continued organization of their zones while maintaining positions. Continuing its attack, Combat Command "A" (10th Armored Division) captured WITTLICH (L35) while Combat Command "B" advanced two miles in zone. The 3d Cavalry Group was relieved from attachment to 94th Infantry Division. In the rear part of the corps zone, the 16th Cavalry Group closed in assembly in the vicinity of VECKRING (Q08).

Operating in adverse weather, XIX Tactical Air Command cooperated with advancing ground units, attacked special military targets where visibility permitted, and flew a total of 309 sorties. Destroyed or damaged without loss to the Command were 104 railroad cars, thirty-seven factory buildings, four oil storage tanks, forty-two motor vehicles and eleven locomotives.

Following the armored elements which had penetrated to the RHINE River, infantry of the VIII and XX Corps made excellent gains during the period.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

10 MARCH *(D + 277)*

As Third U.S. Army forces increased the pace of their advance, the tremendous bags of prisoners by all three corps created a serious transportation problem. During the period 3 to 10 March, 11,608 prisoners of war were received at Army enclosures and 446 were admitted to Army hospitals.

An Operational Directive, in confirmation of fragmentary orders, was sent to the Commanding Generals of VIII, XII and XX Corps. It gave the following information and orders, in part:

First U.S. Army was continuing its current offensive with the mission of clearing the enemy in zone and securing crossings of the RHINE River. Seventh U.S. Army was continuing to defend its sector, improving its positions by local attacks in preparation for an early resumption of the offensive. Third U.S. Army was to continue its current mission to destroy the enemy in zone north of the MOSELLE River. This Army was to attack southeast from the KOBLENZ (L89) plain, cross the MOSELLE River and be prepared to continue the attack southeast in the direction of BAD KREUZNACH (M03). It was to attack southeast from the TRIER (L22)--SAARBURG (L11) bridgehead in the direction of ST WENDEL (Q59), destroy the enemy in zone and make contact with Seventh U.S. Army in the vicinity of ST WENDEL (Q59), and be prepared to advance to the northeast.

VIII Corps (87th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to continue its current mission of clearing the enemy in zone to the RHINE River and defend the line of the RHINE, maintain contact with First U.S. Army on the left (north) and XII Corps on the right (south). XII Corps (5th, 76th and 89th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to continue its current mission of clearing the enemy in zone, was to seize and secure crossings over the MOSELLE River southeast of MAYEN (L69) and southwest of KOBLENZ (L89), and be prepared to attack southeast in direction of BAD KREUZNACH (M03) and maintain contact with XX Corps on the right (south). XX Corps (26th, 65th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions, 10th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to maintain and improve its bridgehead in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) area and be prepared to launch an attack northeast from the bridgehead. It was to attack on Army order from the TRIER (L22)--SAARBURG (L11) bridgehead on the axis TRIER (L22)--ST WENDEL (Q59), destroy the enemy in zone and make contact with elements of Seventh U.S. Army in the vicinity of ST WENDEL (Q59). It was to be prepared to continue the attack to the northeast and to maintain contact with Seventh U.S. Army on the right (south).

The 11th Armored Division continued to clear enemy in zone to the west bank of the RHINE River. Continuing to maintain contact on its north with First U.S. Army, the 6th Cavalry Group advanced in the rear of the 11th Armored Division. Completing mopping up in zone, the 90th Infantry Division went into assembly five miles northwest of MAYEN (L69). To the rear, the 4th and 87th Infantry Divisions were in assembly areas. At this time VIII Corps zone was practically cleared of all enemy to the RHINE River with the exception of the city of KOBLENZ (L79). Attention was directed to prevent enemy elements from shifting southward into Corps zone from the EIFEL pocket which was located in the southern part of First U.S. Army zone. The 6th Armored Division cleared the Army area enroute to Seventh U.S. Army and the 4th Infantry Division was relieved of attachment to Third U.S. Army and was attached to Sixth U.S. Army Group.

In the XII Corps zone Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) cleared ground along the west bank of the RHINE River, and along the north bank of the MOSELLE River, capturing GONDORF (L78), WIRFUS (L67), GULS (L89), WINNINGEN (L89) and KOBERN (L89) while Combat Command "B" took ILLERICH (L67), GREIMERSBURG (L57), CARDEN (L67), LANDKERN (L57) and BROHL (L68). The 5th Infantry Division (less 11th Infantry) gained three miles with its 2d Infantry clearing the area west of the LIESER River. Then the 10th Infantry relieved the 2d Infantry and captured COCHEM (L57). After being relieved, the 2d Infantry moved eastward to join the 4th Armored Division. To the rear, the 89th Infantry Division began relieving elements of the 5th and 76th Infantry Divisions. The 90th Infantry Division completed mopping up in zone and proceeded to an assembly area. Farther north, the 76th Infantry Division (with 2d Cavalry Group attached) continued to clear enemy in zone, capturing GIPPERATH (L36), PLEIN (L35), LUXEM (L45), and KARL (L06). The 80th Infantry Division was pulled back to the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG (P81) enroute to XX Corps after being relieved from XII Corps.

Patrol Advances Through The Rubble

Maintaining positions, the 65th, 26th and 94th Infantry Divisions patrolled in zone, awaiting orders to attack. The 10th Armored Division (417th Infantry, 76th Infantry Division attached) gained five miles in zone and captured BOMBOGEN (L45), CLUSSERATH (L33), SCHLEICH (L33), POLICH (L33), KRAMES (L34), CLAUSEN (L34), POHLBACH (L34), KIRSCH (L33), LONGUICH (L33), RIOL (L33) and CASEL (L22). The 16th Cavalry Group moved forward and began relieving the 3d Cavalry Group.

While flying 337 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command dropped sixty tons of bombs. Column cover was provided for the 4th Armored Division in its rapid advance, special targets were attacked, and a large number of psychological warfare leaflets was dropped. One hundred and twenty-nine motor vehicles, eight locomotives and twenty-three gun installations were destroyed or damaged during the period.

While capturing forty-four square miles of territory and clearing twenty nine towns, Third U.S. Army continued its push to the RHINE River during the period. XII Corps moved vigorously to bring its front up to that of VIII Corps, while XX Corps was being reinforced for an impending large-scale attack.

Rail lines in the Army were rehabilitated by this date to include the following points: BASTOGNE (P55)--GOUVY (P77) eastward to BLEIALF (P98); ETTELBRUCK (P83)--KAUTENBACH (P85) north through TROIS VIERGES (P77) to GOUVY (P77); LUXEMBOURG (P81) east to WECKER (L02); THIONVILLE (U88) northeast to WINCHERINGEN (L01); THIONVILLE (U88) southeast to BOUZONVILLE (Q17), the limit of Third U.S. Army's area; HOMBERG-BUDANGE (U97) north to WALDWISSE (Q19).



Work Begins On Reconstruction Of Blasted Bridge

11 MARCH (*D + 278*)

By this date the Allies controlled the west bank of the RHINE River from EMMERICH (E96) to KOBLENZ (L89) and had a substantial bridgehead on the east bank in the REMAGEN (F62)--LINZ (F61) area. Four German armies, the First Paratroop, Fifth Panzer, Fifteenth and Seventh, had been decisively defeated, with the most crushing blows being administered in the EIFEL where Third U.S. Army destroyed at least half of the combat strength of the Seventh German Army. Significant Order of Battle facts indicated that the enemy's failure to withdraw from untenable positions west of the RHINE had resulted in huge prisoner of war losses and the near destruction of four German armies, and that the enemy lacked substantial reserves to man a RHINE-HUNSRUCK-MOSELLE defense line. It was evident that the enemy's decision to defend and delay west of the RHINE had seriously crippled his reserve strength in the west. It was estimated that the fighting strength of the seven nominal divisions withdrawn across the MOSELLE totaled not more than 5,000 effectives, the equivalent of one-half division. These troops added to the units previously identified brought the enemy's known combat strength in the MOSELLE-HUNSRUCK sector to an estimated 12,000, the equivalent of one and one-half divisions. If the enemy could gain sufficient time to organize a defensive position, the rugged HUNSRUCK, south of and paralleling the MOSELLE River, offered favorable terrain.

In VIII Corps zone the 11th Armored Division cleared all enemy in its zone, while the 6th Cavalry Group assumed patrolling positions along the RHINE River. To the rear, the 4th Infantry Division began movement from VIII Corps zone to the Seventh U.S. Army. The 90th Infantry Division remained in assembly positions. Only one small pocket of the enemy in the woods northeast of MAYEN (L69) remained in the entire VIII Corps zone, the rest being cleared.

Along the RHINE River, in the eastern part of XII Corps zone, Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) was relieved by the 11th Infantry after clearing its zone of the enemy, while Combat Command "A" and Reserve Combat Command maintained their positions and patrolled. Making good gains in an area southwest of MAYEN (L69), the 5th Infantry Division (less 11th Infantry) cleared UDLER (L37), OBERWINKEL (L47), NIEDERWINKEL (L47), IMMERATH (L47), STROTZBUSCH (L46), STROHN (L46), FAID (L57) and GEVENICH (L57). The 76th Infantry Division (with attached 2d Cavalry Group) was relieved by the 89th Infantry Division in zone, and then proceeded to a new zone farther south. Meanwhile, the 89th Infantry Division continued the attack to the northeast in the former zone of the 76th Infantry Division.

In XX Corps zone, the 65th, 26th and 94th Infantry Divisions patrolled and maintained positions during the first part of the period, while the 80th Infantry Division closed in corps zone between the 26th and 94th Infantry Divisions. In the northern part of its zone, Combat Command "A" (10th Armored Division) gained five miles to the northeast while Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command were assembling in the TRIER (L22) area. During the day Combat Command "A" cleared MEHRING (L33), POLAN (L33), LOGEN (L33), LORCH (L33), SCHLEIT (L33), HISSERATH (L33), ALTRICH (L45), PLATTEN (L45), WALHOLZ (L45), WENGEROHR (L45), BELINGER (L45) and BERLINER (L45), while the 3d Cavalry Group attacked beyond RIOL (L33).

A low ceiling precluded most air attacks on enemy ground installations, but 205 sorties were flown as escort for medium bombers, and ten communications centers were attacked by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army continued to reduce enemy pockets while clearing ground to the RHINE River. During the period seventy-six square miles of territory were taken and several small towns were cleared. VIII Corps zone was by this time cleared except for one small pocket of the enemy.

An enemy shell, estimated to be 280mm, struck and exploded within ten yards of the building housing the Forward Echelon in the city of Luxembourg, killing two enlisted men and causing considerable damage to the building.

Supply of combat vehicles, particularly light and medium tanks, was good, the status of medium tanks permitting prompt replacement of battle losses and an opportunity to build up an excellent reserve for future operations. Plans were made to replace tanks which needed complete overhauling.

To meet the rising need for medical facilities in occupied areas of Germany, improvised hospitals for sick and wounded civilians were established in WAXWEILLER (L06), SCHONECKEN (L07), WEIDINGEN (L05), NEUERBURG (P95), SAARBURG (L11) and BITBURG (L15).

12 MARCH (D + 279)

Amendment Number One to Operational Directive of 10 March 1945 was sent to corps commanders. It provided: The boundary between VIII and XII Corps to be changed as follows: current boundary to OCHTENDUNG (L79) (to VIII Corps) - WALDOFERHOF (L79) - LONNIG (L79) - DRECKENACH (L78) - OBERFELL (L78) - BOPPARD (L88) (all to XII Corps). Both corps were to notify Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, when proper relief of troops in area effected by this change had been completed. The boundary between Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Sixth U.S. Army Group was confirmed as: CONFLANS (U66) - BUSS (Q37) - LEBACH (Q49) THOLEY (Q49) - NOHFELDEN (L51), thence along railroad along the NAHE River to BINGEN (M15) (all to Twelfth U.S. Army Group). Third U. S. Army was to retain possession and use of its existing installations south of new boundary.

In VIII Corps zone, the 87th Infantry Division began movement to the eastern portion of zone while the 6th Cavalry Group relieved elements of the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions, and patrolled along the RHINE River. The 11th Armored Division moved to an assembly area. In the rear, the 4th Infantry Division cleared VIII Corps zone in its move to Seventh U.S. Army.

In the eastern part of XII Corps zone, Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) patrolled along the west bank of the RHINE River and north bank of the MOSELLE River, while Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command went into assembly areas. Elements of the 90th Infantry Division relieved 4th Armored Division elements and patrolled along the north bank of the MOSELLE River in zone. The 11th Infantry reverted from 4th Armored Division to 5th Infantry Division control, and all three regiments of the division patrolled in zone on the north bank of the MOSELLE River, west of the 90th Infantry Division. Attacking to the east the 353d and 355th Infantry Regiments (89th Infantry Division) gained seven miles, clearing NIEDERSCHEIDWEILER (L46), DIEFENBACH (L45), DRIESCH (L47) and LUTZERATH (L47). The 76th Infantry Division passed control of the 417th Infantry to the 10th Armored Division, while advancing east and taking KINDERBEUERN (L45), URZIG (L45), OSANN (L44), KESTEN (L44), PEISPORT (L44) and MARING (L44).

In XX Corps zone, the 65th, 26th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions maintained positions during the first part of the period. Late in the period, the 26th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions launched a coordinated attack, with all gaining from two to four miles before the end of the period. A two-hour artillery preparation preceded the attack. The 10th Armored Division continued its attack to the northeast in the first part of the period, then being relieved by the 76th Infantry Division (XII Corps). At the end of the period the 10th Armored Division was moving to an assembly area near TRIER (L22) prepared to share in the attack with the three infantry divisions. The 3d Cavalry Group patrolled in the northern part of XX Corps zone.

Through continued unfavorable weather, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers flew a total of 142 sorties, the majority being as escort for Ninth Bomber Command.

Third U.S. Army continued to mop up isolated pockets of resistance north of the MOSELLE River during the period, while in XX Corps zone a coordinated attack was launched by three infantry divisions in accordance with a large scale plan to effect contact with Seventh U.S. Army and trap the enemy troops in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) - SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) area. This date saw the conclusion of the Third U.S. Army Campaign "The EIFEL to the RHINE and the capture of TRIER" and the beginning of "The capture of KOBLENZ and the Palatinate Campaign".

Six-By-Sixes Over The Rhine

13 MARCH *(D + 280)*

Elements of XII Corps crossed the MOSELLE River during the period, joining in the coordinated attack to effect contact with Seventh U.S. Army and envelop enemy forces in the SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE area.

Letter of Instructions Number Seventeen was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, conveying the information that 21 Army Group British, with Ninth U.S. Army under operational command, was continuing operations to secure crossings over the RHINE River north of the RUHR. Sixth U.S. Army Group was ordered to initiate an operation to close to the RHINE in zone and establish bridgeheads over the RHINE in the MAINZ (M35)--MANNHEIM (M50) sector. The mission of Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to secure the REMAGEN (F62) bridgehead over the RHINE, complete clearance of the enemy from the zone west of the RHINE and assist the attack of Sixth U.S. Army Group. Third U.S. Army's mission was to defend the line of the RHINE River in zone. It was to attack in conjunction with Seventh U.S. Army (Sixth U.S. Army Group) from the TRIER (L22) bridgehead and southeast across the MOSELLE River to strike the enemy in the flank and rear and to protect the left flank of Seventh U.S. Army. Third U.S. Army was authorized to deal directly with Seventh U.S. Army regarding the form method, location and timing of this attack. To conclude the mission, Third U.S. Army was ordered to complete the clearance of the enemy from its zone west of the RHINE River.

In VIII Corps, the 6th Cavalry Group patrolled on the west bank of the RHINE River and the 4th Armored Division (XII Corps) also operated along the RHINE River in VIII Corps zone. Just to the west, the 11th Armored Division was in reserve. The 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division) was relieving the 4th Armored Division units north of the VIII - XII Corps boundary, while the remainder of the 87th Infantry Division was moving up to join other corps units near the RHINE River.

XII Corps front at this time ran roughly from southwest to northeast. At the extreme northeastern part of the zone, the 4th Armored Division was patrolling. Just to the south the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions were deployed along the north bank of the MOSELLE River. During the night both divisions jumped off following an artillery preparation of two hours, seizing bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River which they enlarged to approximately one mile in depth, and which were consolidated by the end of the period. Two regiments of each division had crossed before the period closed. Farther west the 89th and 76th Infantry Divisions were also along the north bank of the MOSELLE River, and were clearing out enemy pockets. Artillery harassed the enemy's escape routes. At the extreme southwest of Corps zone the 2d Cavalry Group was relieved from attachment to the 76th Infantry Division, and began movement to join the 90th Infantry Division.

Along the southern part of XX Corps zone the 65th Infantry Division patrolled aggressively. Farther north the 26th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions attacked through the rough HUNSBRUCK terrain, gaining two miles, three miles and one and one-half miles respectively. GREIMERATH (L20) was cleared by the 80th Infantry Division, while BONERATH (L22), HOLZERATH (L22) and SCHONDORF (L22) were captured by the 94th Infantry Division. The 94th Infantry Division was generally one and one-half miles east of the REWER River at the close of the period. In the northern part of zone, the 10th Armored Division remained in assembly near TRIER (L22), while the 3d Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively.

While flying 432 sorties in which eighty-eight tons of bombs were dropped, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 140 motor vehicles, twenty-one armored cars and tanks, 380 railroad cars, ninety-two factory buildings and nine locomotives. Eight enemy planes were shot down while XIX Tactical Air Command suffered no losses.

Third U.S. Army elements in the XII Corps crossed the MOSELLE River during the period in preparation for a push to the south which was planned to trap a large number of enemy forces in the SAAR - MOSELLE - RHINE River area, and to ultimately link up with the Seventh U.S. Army. Armored units were in assembly areas, preparing to renew their attacks.

Smoke Screen Being Laid On The Rhine River

14 MARCH *(D + 281)*

Effective enemy combat strength opposing Third U.S. Army was estimated at this time as being 20,500 troops plus forty tanks or assault guns, the equivalent of two and one-half divisions. Against VIII Corps the enemy had an estimated 4,500 combat effectives, against XII Corps, 8,500 effectives and twenty tanks or assault guns, and against XX Corps 7,500 effectives and twenty tanks or assault guns.

Patrolling duties along the RHINE River in VIII Corps zone were taken over by the 87th Infantry Division after relieving the remaining units of 4th Armored Division which after relief proceeded to XII Corps zone. 6th Cavalry Group also patrolled along the VIII Corps front, north and south of ANDERNACH (F70). The 11th Armored Division remained in its assembly area throughout the period.

After crossing the MOSELLE River the previous day, the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions continued to attack to the south in XII Corps zone, with the 5th Infantry Division clearing LUTZ (L77) and TREIS (L67), and the 90th Infantry Division taking HERSCHWIESEN (L87), OPPENHAUSEN (L87), UDUNHAUSEN (L88), MORSHAUSEN (L77), BEULICH (L77) and MACKEN (L77). The 5th Infantry Division held a bridgehead two and one-half miles deep and three miles wide at the end of the period while the 90th Infantry Division secured a bridgehead two and one-half miles deep and about two miles wide. Preparing to attack to the south, the 4th Armored Division moved into assembly area. To the west the 76th and 89th Infantry Divisions continued mopping up the enemy north of the MOSELLE River.

In the southern part of XX Corps zone, the 65th Infantry Division patrolled while maintaining its positions. A one-mile gain through difficult terrain was made by the 26th Infantry Division as it continued its attack to the southeast. The 80th Infantry Division advanced up to three miles, clearing BERGEN (L20), reaching WEISKIRCHEN (L30) and the edge of WALDERN Forest. To the north, the 94th Infantry Division gained two miles, clearing SCHILLINGEN (L31) and HEDDERT (L31). In the northern part of the corps zone the 10th Armored Division remained in assembly, while the 3d Cavalry Group patrolled.

In 482 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command dropped eighty tons of bombs and destroyed 244 motor vehicles, nineteen tanks and armored cars, 315 railroad cars, three supply dumps, seventeen locomotives and 135 factory buildings. Ten enemy planes were shot down while one fighter bomber was lost.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack in the central and southern parts of zone during the period, with substantial gains being made by the 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions (XX Corps), while the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions (XII Corps) enlarged their bridgeheads south of the MOSELLE River.

Results of treating cold injury cases in the provisional hospital established for that purpose showed that 1,197 cases were treated, of which 817 were diagnosed as trench foot and the remainder as frostbite. Of the trench foot cases, seven and one-half percent were returned to duty, sixty-three percent were transferred to a convalescent hospital and twenty-nine and one-half percent were evacuated to Communications Zone. Of the frostbite cases, eight percent were returned to duty, fifty-one percent were transferred to a convalescent hospital and forty-one percent were evacuated to Communications Zone.



Army Engineers Build A Ponton Bridge Over The Moselle River



Machine Gunners In An Observation Position

15 MARCH *(D + 282)*

Now the enemy faced a tactical situation similar to that of the historic FALAISE (U13) pocket, the 4th Armored Division having swept across his rear in the Palatinate triangle, bounded by the RHINE, MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers. Third U.S. Army was threatening the envelopment of all the enemy's forces and defensive positions in the triangle. With the situation very fluid, the enemy still retained the capability, however, of reinforcing within the triangle for local counterattacks in an effort to salvage some of his trapped units. This capability prevailed only to the extent that the enemy was aware of what was transpiring, for his communications and tactical control were being severely tested. It was considered highly probable that he did not possess a completely clear picture of his imperiled position and that control would be lacking for the high coordination which his desperate situation demanded. The favored enemy capability was that he would retire to a hastily organized defensive position on the NAHE River, anchored on BINGEN (M15) on the north, BAD KREUZNACH (M03), KIRN (L83) and the SIEGFRIED Line positions on the south. It was also considered possible that the enemy might surrender in groups and units within the triangle. It was estimated that he had a total of 36,000 combat effectives, the equivalent of five divisions, and seventy-five tanks or assault guns in the Palatinate, or approximately forty percent of his fighting forces in the west.

Attacking southeast from positions due west of KOBLENZ (L79), the 87th Infantry Division crossed the MOSELLE River in the eastern part of VIII Corps zone, capturing DIEBLICH (L89), DIEBLICHERBERG (L89), NIEDERFELL (L88) and WALDESCH (L88). Good progress was made with a bridgehead three miles in depth being secured. The 11th Armored Division remained in assembly while the 6th Cavalry Group patrolled in the northeastern part of zone.

The combined attack of 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions continued south of the MOSELLE River in the extreme eastern end of XII Corps zone. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) was attached to the 4th Armored Division while the 2d and 11th Infantry Regiments each gained three miles, clearing DOMMERSHAUSEN (L77), DORWEILER (L77), KASTELLAUN (L76), ZILHAUSEN (L76), KORWEILER (L76), MORSDORF (L76), LAHR (L76) and BUCH (L76). Meanwhile, the 90th Infantry Division gained four miles to the southeast, capturing OPPENHAUSEN (L87), HERSCHWIESEN (L87), BUCHHOIZ (L87), DIELER (L87), NEY (L87), KRATZENBURG (L87), HALSENBACH (L78), EHR (L87), GONDERSHAUSEN (L87), MERINUTH (L87) and BEULICH (L77). Striking rapidly south from its assembly area, the 4th Armored Division pushed through the 90th Infantry Division and gained over fifteen miles. The 10th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) and 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) were attached, and prepared to follow the rapidly advancing armored elements. While Combat Command "A" took BEULICH (L77), LIESENFELD (L87) and ELLERN (L95), Combat Command "B" cleared DOMMERSHAUSEN (L77), LAUBACH (L86) and SIMMERN (L85). To the west, the 89th Infantry Division attacked south across the MOSELLE River, gaining two miles and clearing BULLARY (L56), NEEF (L56), NEHAAN (L66), SENHALS (L66), ELLENZ (L66) and POLTERSDORF (L66). Artillery barrages lasting nearly an hour preceded the attack. The 76th Infantry Division relieved the 2d Cavalry Group in zone and continued patrolling along the northern bank of the MOSELLE River. Upon relief, the 2d Cavalry Group instituted movement to the eastern part of corps zone.

Maintaining its positions in the southern part of XX Corps zone, the 65th Infantry Division carried out patrols. Advancing to the south toward MERZIG (Q29), the 26th Infantry Division gained two miles through rugged terrain. Farther north, the 80th Infantry Division continued southeast for about two miles, clearing WALDHOLZBACH (L20), SCHEIDEN (L20), WEISKIRCHEN (L30) and HAUSBACH (L20). The 10th Armored Division came out of assembly area near TRIER (L22), with Combat Command "A" passing through the 80th Infantry Division and gaining four miles and Combat Command "B" supporting the 94th Infantry Division. Gaining six miles, all regiments of the 94th Infantry Division attacked to the southeast toward ST WENDEL (Q59), with GUSENBURG (L31), REINSFELD (L32), MANDERN (L31), KELL (L31) and GRIMBURG (L31) being captured. In a limited objective attack, the 3d Cavalry Group captured WALDRACH (L22) in the extreme northern part of zone.

Fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 643 sorties, dropping 133 tons of bombs in another day of large-scale activities. Sixteen towns and seven marshalling yards were attacked, while 393 railroad cars, 219 motor vehicles, thirty-eight tanks and armored cars and fifteen locomotives were destroyed or damaged, and more than 100 enemy

troops were killed. Five enemy planes in the air and three on the ground were destroyed, while XIX Tactical Air Command lost one plane.

The Third U.S. Army attack again broke into a fluid state during the period as the 4th Armored Division struck through the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions and advanced to the south more than fifteen miles.

In XX Corps three infantry divisions and one armored division were driving southeast. To the south, Seventh U.S. Army was striking into the SIEGFRIED Line in a link-up drive to meet the rampaging Third U.S. Army units and to share in the liquidation of an estimated 80,000 enemy troops in the RHINE - SAAR area. Numerous towns were taken during the day while 47.5 square miles of territory were cleared by Third U.S. Army.

16 MARCH *(D + 283)*

On the basis of prisoner of war statements, it was believed that the identification in the BAD KREUZNACH (M03)--RHEINBOLLEN (L95) area of two divisions from the COLMAR (V74) area signified the enemy was making an attempt to prevent Third U.S. Army from extending its control of the west bank of the RHINE River to MAINZ (M35) and WORMS (M41). The enemy obviously feared the envelopment and destruction or capture of his forces in the Palatinate and domination by Third U.S. Army of four key Communications centers on the RHINE River--KOBLENZ (L89), BINGEN (M15), MAINZ (M35) and WORMS (M41), with consequent ready entry into the RHINE corridor leading into central Germany. It was indicated that the enemy was confronted with two critical problems, first, to contain Third U.S. Army's threats to his positions in the triangle, and second, to extricate the bulk of his endangered forces in order to continue the struggle east of the RHINE. It was indicated that he would have to meet these threats with the forces he had on hand.

Verbal orders were issued, giving the 4th Armored Division the mission of attacking toward MAINZ (M35), while the 11th Armored Division was ordered to attack toward WORMS (M41) and the 10th Armored Division toward KAISERSLAUTERN (R09).

A TWX was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group which stated that First U.S. Army would assign the 28th Infantry Division immediately to Third U.S. Army.

In the eastern section of VIII Corps zone, the 87th Infantry Division advanced on KOBLENZ (L89) from positions west, northwest and southwest of the city, with artillery providing close-in support. The 6th Cavalry Group continued patrolling along the RHINE River in the northeastern section of zone. Elements of the 28th Infantry Division began assembling near OBERMENDIG (L69) following assignment of the division to VIII Corps from First U.S. Army. The 11th Armored Division was passed to XII Corps control beginning movement to its new zone late in the period.

Continuing its whirlwind drive to the south, the 4th Armored Division (XII Corps) gained up to eighteen miles, with Combat Command "A" closing to the NAHE River in the vicinity of BRETZENHEIM (M14) while Combat Command "B" crossed the NAHE River near BAD MUNSTER (M03), then continued south through HALLGARTEN (M02). The attached 10th and 359th Infantry Regiments were well in advance of other infantry units, with the 359th Infantry in SIMMERN (L85) at the close of the period, while the 10th Infantry captured BLANKENRATH (L66) and PANZWEILER (L65). The 90th Infantry Division (less the 359th Infantry) reduced the enemy in the far eastern section of the corps zone, clearing BAD SALZIG (L97) and BOPPARD (L98). To the west, the 5th Infantry Division (less 10th Infantry) gained seven miles, taking BUCH (L76), KASTELLAUN (L76) and HUNDHEIM (L75) in its mopping up drive to the rear of the 4th Armored Division. By this time the 4th Armored Division was cutting up enemy units on a large scale, while the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions were mopping up and taking large numbers of prisoners. The 89th Infantry Division enlarged its bridgehead over the MOSELLE River, gaining four and one-half miles and taking BURG (L55), BRIEDEL (L55) and ELLENZ (L66), while the 76th Infantry Division maintained its positions on the north bank of the MOSELLE River in the western section of XII Corps zone. The 2d Cavalry Group screened the corps north flank, while maintaining contact with VIII Corps.

Continuing its patrolling, the 65th Infantry Division maintained its positions in the southern part of XX Corps zone. Farther north, the 26th Infantry Division gained two and one-half miles in a southerly advance toward MERZIG (Q29), capturing SAARHOLZBACH (L10) and METTLACH

German Prisoners Are Removed To The West Bank Of The Rhine

(L10). Gains of three miles were made by the 80th Infantry Division which captured several small towns. Advancing five miles to the southeast, the 94th Infantry Division was outflanking the important city of SAARLAUTERN (Q28) at the end of the period. After passing through the 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions on the previous day, the 10th Armored Division gained four miles to the south, capturing NIEDER-LOSHEIM (L30), THAILEN (L30) and CONFELD (L30). The 301st Infantry (94th Infantry Division) was attached to the 10th Armored Division. In the rear, the 12th Armored Division began assembly following its attachment to corps.

XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed twenty enemy planes in the air and twenty on the ground, while losing five. In 625 sorties, 136 tons of bombs were dropped, and 550 motor vehicles, eighty-one tanks and armored cars, 398 railroad cars and thirty-five locomotives were destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army's drive during the period rapidly threatened the enemy in the SAAR - RHINE area with encirclement by two pincers movements, the outer jaw being 4th Armored Division spearheads of XII Corps and the inner jaw being 10th Armored Division elements of XX Corps. Rapid advances cut up enemy forces, creating small pockets of resistance which could easily be mopped up, and forcing the enemy to withdraw from his prepared locations in a race to the remaining RHINE River crossings. As the enemy withdrew, a merciless pounding was continued by the tactical air commands of Third and Seventh U.S. Armies.

At a staff conference called by the Army Commander, and which was also attended by GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, the supply situation for current and future operations of Third U.S. Army was presented. Five days' supply of rations and gasoline, approximately ten days' supply of allied products, and ten to thirty days' supply of Classes II and IV supplies were stored in the Army area.

Blasted German Pillbox

17 MARCH *(D + 284)*

Observation by tactical reconnaissance of enemy Panzer movements from the REMAGEN (F62) bridgehead sector south to the zone of Third U.S. Army's advance indicated that the enemy could at this time reinforce against this Army with the equivalent of one armored division. The reinforcement, believed to be a small task force of approximately 1,000 troops and twenty-five tanks, was headed for the BINGEN (M15)--BAD KREUZNACH (M03) area with the apparent mission of attempting to contain the Army's enveloping threat in the Palatinate triangle and to keep open a corridor of escape for troops facing entrapment. As Third U.S. Army's armored columns pursued the retreating enemy seeking to escape from the triangle, the prisoner of war bags became increasingly larger. During the period 11 to 17 March, 22,220 prisoners were received at Army cages and 1,144 were admitted to Army hospitals, a total of 23,364.

Only major activity in VIII Corps was by the 87th Infantry Division which was fighting inside KOBLENZ (L89) with three-fourths of the city cleared. Other elements of the division cleared RHENS (L98). Patrols along the RHINE River were conducted by the 6th Cavalry Group, while to the rear the 28th Infantry Division completed movement into an assembly area north of MAYEN (L69).

XII Corps' spearhead continued to be its 4th Armored Division, followed up by the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions. Gains of six miles were made by 4th Armored Division after it passed through BAD KREUZNACH (M03). Three minor counterattacks were easily repulsed by the division. The 5th Infantry Division gained five miles with the 2d and 11th Infantry Regiments while the 10th Infantry was relieved from 4th Armored Division and reverted to 5th Infantry Division. The 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) continued to support the 4th Armored Division, while the remainder of the 90th Infantry Division gained two miles, mopping up and clearing the enemy to the RHINE River. After closing in corps zone, the 11th Armored Division passed through the 89th Infantry Division, gaining more than fifteen miles. At the end of the period, forward elements of the 11th Armored Division were about ten miles northwest of the 4th Armored Division. After being motorized, the 355th Infantry (89th Infantry Division) followed closely behind the 11th Armored Division, while the remainder of the 89th Infantry Division pushed forward three miles. To the west, the 76th Infantry Division maintained its positions north of the MOSELLE River, while in the eastern extremity of the corps zone the 2d Cavalry Group continued to screen the flank along the RHINE River.

Crossing the SAAR River just south of MERZIG (Q29), the 261st Infantry (65th Infantry Division) gained one mile, while the 260th Infantry gained a mile in the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead. Eight miles were gained by the 26th Infantry Division, which pushed through a disorganized enemy took MERZIG (Q29) and captured a bridge over the PRIMS River intact. Antiaircraft artillery employed in a ground role supported the attack. The 80th Infantry Division continued its advances, crossing the PRIMS River and gaining three miles. BIRKENFELD (L51) was cleared by the 94th Infantry Division after a three mile advance. The 301st Infantry was relieved from attachment to the 10th Armored Division. In a link-up drive with Seventh U.S. Army elements, the 10th Armored Division gained more than ten miles, while the 12th

Armored Division moved south from its assembly area to share in the attack. In the northern part of the zone, the 16th Cavalry Group advanced and cleared PROSTERATH (L42).

One hundred ninety sorties were flown by fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command. Two enemy planes were destroyed and two damaged, while one XIX TAC plane was lost. Enemy transportation suffered heavily, 640 motor vehicles, thirty armored vehicles and tanks and 153 horsedrawn vehicles being destroyed or damaged.

While capturing MERZIG (Q29) and clearing three-fourths of KOBLENZ (L89), Third U.S. Army continued to advance steadily in XII and XX Corps zones during this period. Roads in the SAAR - RHINE area were badly choked with retreating enemy which took heavy punishment from the air. Meanwhile, Seventh U.S. Army from the south was breaking through SIEGFRIED fortifications, further compressing the enemy held in this area west of the RHINE.

By this date extension of rail lines had reached the following points: ST VITH (P88) east to PRONSFELD (L07); LUXEMBOURG (P81) east to WEST TRIER (L22) and EHRANG (L23), and HOMBERG-BUDANGE (U97) north to MONDORF (Q19).

18 MARCH (D + 285)

Third U.S. Army by this date had secured control of KOBLENZ (L89), had smashed its way south through BAD KREUZNACH (M03) and across the NAHE River, and was threatening the FRANKFURT (M67) corridor between MAINZ (M35) and WORMS (M41). Thus, in addition to the threat to the RUHR from the REMAGEN (F62) bridgehead, the enemy had also to fear Third U.S. Army's threat to the corridor leading into Central Germany. As evidence of the enemy's shrinking manpower, his Panzer divisions had been slashed to little more than battalion task force size, while in a week's time no new division-size enemy units had been identified in the west.

Along the RHINE River in the northeastern part of VIII Corps zone, the 6th Cavalry Group was relieved by the newly assigned 28th Infantry Division, which took up patrolling while the 6th Cavalry Group went into an assembly area. KOBLENZ (L89), a large and important German city on the west bank of the RHINE River, was cleared by the 87th Infantry Division, which also captured NIEDERSPAY (L98) and OBERSPAY (L98). VIII Corps was alerted by Third U.S. Army to take over protection of the west bank of the RHINE River as far south as BINGEN (M15), in order to relieve XII Corps for action farther south.

Along the RHINE River in the northern part of XII Corps zone, the 2d Cavalry Group patrolled aggressively while the 90th Infantry Division cleared ground south along the river beyond BINGEN (M15), which was under attack by the end of the period. The 4th Armored Division made gains south of the NAHE River while fanning out to the east and west in order to reduce by-passed concentrations of the enemy. SOBERNHEIM (L93) and RECKERHAUSEN (L76) were captured while the important town of BAD KREUZNACH (M03) was cleared. Gaining eight miles, the 11th Armored Division continued to advance rapidly. Combat Command "A" forded the NAHE River, capturing MEDDERSHEIM (L93), while Combat Command "B" crossed the same river five miles to the west and captured BECHERBACH (L82). The 355th Infantry (89th Infantry Division) was attached to 11th Armored Division and followed it closely, while the remainder of the 89th Infantry Division reduced enemy troops by-passed by the armored columns. Crossing the MOSELLE River, the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) gained one mile while the remainder of the division patrolled north of the River.

At this stage of operations, the strength of XX Corps was perhaps the greatest of any corps in the history of Third U.S. Army. It consisted of four infantry and two armored divisions, plus two cavalry groups. All except the 3d Cavalry Group, then in reserve, participated in the attack, during which some of the longest gains of the entire operation were made. Clearing DILLINGEN (Q28) and enlarging its SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, the 65th Infantry Division gained two miles in the southern part of corps zone. Enemy units facing the 65th Infantry Division were threatened by encirclement as the 26th Infantry Division cut south six miles due east of SAARLAUTERN (Q28). Gaining ten miles, Combat Commands "A" and "B" (10th Armored Division) captured ST WENDEL (Q59), seizing a bridge intact on the outskirts of the town. Just eight days previously, the town of ST WENDEL (Q59) had been assigned as the initial objective of the corps and designated as a link-up point with Seventh U.S. Army. In support of the 10th Armored Division, the 80th Infantry Division gained up to sixteen miles in mopping up operations, while some elements penetrated ST WENDEL (Q59) by the end of the period.

Troops Take A "Break" During Their Advance

Attacking east in front of the 94th Infantry Division, the 12th Armored Division gained ten miles in the direction of KAISERSLAUTERN (R09). The 94th Infantry Division cleared numerous small towns, including BAUMHOLDER (L71), and took a large number of prisoners while following the 12th Armored Division. In the northeastern part of zone, the 16th Cavalry Group advanced to the northeast toward positions of the 76th Infantry Division (XII Corps) and cleared HEIDENBURG (L43), while the 3d Cavalry Group remained in reserve. More than fifty small towns were taken during the day by XX Corps units, including ST WENDEL (Q59).

In 714 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command had one of its biggest days, destroying or damaging 1,033 motor vehicles, 106 armored vehicles and tanks, forty-nine locomotives, 488 railroad cars and 416 horse-drawn vehicles. Close support was given to attacking armored divisions and retreating enemy convoys were pounded.

Enemy resistance slackened in both XII and XX Corps zones and an enormous number of prisoners was captured during the period while the important cities of KOBLENZ (L89), BAD KREUZNACH (M03), BINGEN (M15), ST WENDEL (Q59) and DILLINGEN (Q28) were cleared.

In order to facilitate support of the fast-moving tactical situation, tire repair teams were organized to patrol all main and auxiliary supply routes. The teams were equipped with hot patches, tubes, tires and air compressors. To the extent that wheels were available, tires and tubes were mounted on wheels for direct exchange.

19 MARCH *(D + 286)*

As Third U.S. Army's forces overran more than 950 square miles of territory in the biggest day of the operation, the enemy's position in the sections of the Palatinate triangle not yet occupied became completely untenable. Organized, large-scale resistance no longer existed. The only course left open to the enemy was to extricate as many troops as possible from the triangle, while the only enemy capability of consequence to Third U.S. Army was the possible success with which he could organize and reinforce defensive positions east of the RHINE River. It was considered that the enemy could organize hasty field defenses east of the RHINE, but with the Russian threat to BERLIN (Z75) as menacing as ever the only reinforcements the enemy could throw against Third U.S. Army would have to come from Central Germany, Italy or Scandinavia.

Positions along the RHINE River were maintained by the 28th Infantry Division in the northeastern part of VIII Corps zone. To the south, the 87th Infantry Division cleared the remainder of the enemy along the RHINE River and prepared to move farther south. The 385th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) was attached to VIII Corps, taking over part of the zone formerly occupied by the 2d Cavalry Group south of the VIII - XII Corps boundary. 6th Cavalry Group remained in corps reserve.

Direction of the attack of the 4th Armored Division and 90th Infantry Division was changed to the southeast to bring their forces to the banks of the RHINE River in the area MAINZ (M35) - WORMS (M41). The 2d Cavalry Group was attached to the 90th Infantry Division, extending its patrols south along the RHINE River as far as BINGEN (M15). The 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) was relieved from attachment to the 4th Armored Division, and it, along with the rest of the 90th Infantry Division, gained six miles across the NAHE River toward MAINZ (M35). During the period, HORRWEILER (M14), ASPISHEIM (M14), DROMERSHEIM (M14) and SPONSHEIM (M14) were taken by the 90th Infantry Division. Meanwhile, the 4th Armored Division (with 10th Infantry attached) cleared sixteen German towns, Combat Command "A" preceding Combat Command "B". The 5th Infantry Division (less 10th Infantry) completed clearing its path of advance to the NAHE River, capturing NUSSBAUM (L93), SOBERNHEIM (L93), WALDBOCHEIHEIM (L93) and VOLXHEIM (M13), and was prepared to cross the river at the close of the period. To the west, the 89th Infantry Division (less 355th Infantry) continued to mop up pockets of resistance by-passed by the 11th Armored Division, while that armored division plus the 355th Infantry gained eight miles and captured eleven towns. At the end of the period the 11th Armored Division was ten miles north of KAISERSLAUTERN (R09). The 76th Infantry Division (less 385th Infantry) maintained its positions both north and south of the MOSELLE River.

Loading Assault Boats To Cross The Rhine River

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS 13–22 MARCH 1945

AND ENEMY SITUATION 22 MARCH 1945

THE CAPTURE OF KOBLENZ AND THE PALATINATE CAMPAIGN

ORDER OF BATTLE

13 MARCH 1945	22 MARCH 1945
VIII CORPS	VIII CORPS
11TH ARMD DIV	76TH INF DIV
87TH INF DIV	87TH INF DIV
XII CORPS	XII CORPS
4TH ARMD DIV	4TH ARMD DIV
5TH INF DIV	11TH ARMD DIV
76TH INF DIV	5TH INF DIV
89TH INF DIV	26TH INF DIV
90TH INF DIV	89TH INF DIV
	90TH INF DIV
XX CORPS	XX CORPS
10TH ARMD DIV	10TH ARMD DIV
26TH INF DIV	12TH ARMD DIV
65TH INF DIV	65TH INF DIV
80TH INF DIV	80TH INF DIV
94TH INF DIV	94TH INF DIV

FIRST XXXX THIRD BOUNDARY 22 MARCH

FROM FIRST U S ARMY 16 MARCH

FIRST XXXX THIRD BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 22 MARCH

TEMPORARY BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 22 MARCH

12 XXXXX 6 BOUNDARY 1-22 MARCH

12 XXXXX 6

FROM SIXTH U S ARMY GROUP 17 MARCH

NOTE:
WITH FIRST-THIRD ARMY BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 22 MARCH 26TH INF DIV REVERTED TO CONTROL OF FIRST US ARMY 22 MARCH

BATTLE LINE 13 MARCH

BATTLE LINE 22 MARCH



Ponton Bridge Across The Rhine River

In the southern part of XX Corps zone the 65th Infantry Division (with 3d Cavalry Group attached) continued its attack from the SAARLAUTERN (Q28) bridgehead, clearing FRAULAUTERN (Q28), SAARLAUTERN-RODEN (Q28), NALBACH (Q38), ENSDORF (Q37) and SAARWELLINGEN (Q38) in a small area where heavy fighting had been proceeding intermittently for a period of four months. The 26th Infantry Division gained eight miles, mopping up resistance in OTTWEILER (Q58). Continuing its advance to the southeast, the 80th Infantry Division (less 318th Infantry) gained two miles while following the advance of the 10th Armored Division, which rapidly advanced twenty miles during the period to the outskirts of KAISERSLAUTERN (R09), at which time the important city of SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) was practically cut off. As a result of this and other Third U.S. Army advances, enemy forces in SAARBRUCKEN (Q47) were withdrawn, offering little or no resistance to Seventh U.S. Army units. The 12th Armored Division also advanced rapidly to the east and was five miles due north of KAISERSLAUTERN (R09) at the end of the period. Mopping up in the path of 12th Armored Division, the 94th Infantry Division gained fifteen miles. In the northern part of the zone, the 16th Cavalry Group advanced four miles, clearing MORSCHEID (L53), while the 3d Cavalry Group remained in reserve.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 605 sorties in a highly successful day without loss, destroying or damaging 816 motor vehicles, forty-six locomotives, forty-six tanks and armored vehicles and 367 railroad cars. Six enemy planes were destroyed on the ground.

Enemy resistance crumbled all along the Third U.S. Army front during the period. Heavy losses in personnel and equipment were inflicted on the enemy whose disorganized forces, unable to get back to the RHINE River, were cut up by air attacks and armored spearheads, and then systematically mopped up by infantry units.

The fluid tactical situation presented the Army with ordnance problems similar to those encountered in the August campaigning, a 200-mile round trip being necessary to link the most advanced railheads at TRIER (L22) and APACH (Q09) with forward ammunition supply points. In addition to obtaining more trucking companies, ordnance hauled Class V supplies on tank transporters and trailers, and created two provisional truck companies.

20 MARCH *(D + 287)*

With contact being made with the Seventh U.S. Army, and WORMS (M41) and KAISERSLAUTERN (R09) captured, the campaign in the Palatinate triangle neared its closing phase. Enemy resistance was scattered and disorganized and the Army's infantry and armor advanced almost unchecked.

The 28th and 87th Infantry Divisions patrolled along the RHINE River in the VIII Corps zone. To the rear, the 6th Cavalry Group remained in assembly area.

Major action of XII Corps at this time was along the RHINE River all the way south to LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50). In the northern part of its zone, control over the 76th Infantry Division was passed to VIII Corps, at which time the division was patrolling along the RHINE River with the 304th Infantry mopping up south of the MOSELLE River. The 2d Cavalry Group patrolled along the RHINE River south of the 76th Infantry Division. Encountering strong resistance around NIEDEROLM (M34) and BRETZHENHEIM (M35), the 90th Infantry Division continued its drive on MAINZ (M35), gaining five miles and clearing GONSHENHEIM (M35), MARIENBORN (M35) and HECHTSHEIM (M35). The 4th Armored Division gained thirteen miles, clearing FLONHEIM (M23), BORNHEIM (M23), ALBIG (M23) and ALZEY (M22) in its attack upon WORMS (M41), with that ancient city being cleared at the end of the period.

The heaviest air attacks experienced by Third U.S. Army troops during the entire campaign were made by the enemy on this date. Attacks were made against the bridge in the vicinity of BRETZENHEIM (M14) - BAD MUNSTER (M03) and against elements of the 4th Armored and 90th Infantry Divisions. Many types of enemy aircraft, including jet propelled Me 262's, participated in bombing and strafing attacks. A total of 314 aircraft made sixty-one raids in XII Corps zone. Antiaircraft gunners, successfully defending troops and installation, shot down twenty-five attacking planes and claimed eleven more as probables.

The 5th Infantry Division (-) mopped up while following 4th Armored Division toward WORMS (M41). Changing the direction of its attack to the east, the 11th Armored Division (with attached 355th Infantry) gained eight miles, with Combat Command "A" clearing MARIENTHAL (M11), DANNENFELS (M11), ALBISHEIM (M21), HARXHEIM (M21) and MONSHEIM (M31) while Combat Command "B" cleared GOLLHEIM (M21), OFFSTEIN (M31) and NIEDESHEIM (M41). Both combat commands were near the RHINE River between WORMS (M41) and LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50). The 89th Infantry Division continued mopping up in the rear of the 11th Armored Division.

After gaining three miles in the southern part of XX Corps zone and clearing HOLZ (Q48), WIESBACH (Q48) and MERCHWEILER (Q58), the 65th Infantry Division was pinched out, following a juncture of the 26th Infantry Division and the 6th Armored Division (Seventh U.S. Army) eight miles west of KAISERSLAUTERN (R09). From its positions near ST WENDEL (Q59), the 26th Infantry Division drove swiftly fifteen miles to the southeast, making contact with the 6th Armored Division at WIESELSKIRCHEN (Q68). It followed the 10th Armored Division, which by-passed KAISERSLAUTERN (R09) in a twenty mile advance. NEUSTADT (R28) was cleared by Combat Command "A" (10th Armored Division), while Reserve Combat Command captured HOCHSPEYER (R19). The 12th Armored Division reached the RHINE River at LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50), while the 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions both made substantial gains of up to ten miles while following and mopping up in the rear of that armored division. KAISERSLAUTERN (R09) and ENKENBACH (R19) were cleared by the 80th Infantry Division, while the 302d Infantry (94th Infantry Division) reached a point less than five miles from LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50). To the rear, the 16th Cavalry Group was mopping up while the 3d Cavalry Group remained in reserve.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 655 sorties and dropped 145 tons of bombs in another day of close support for advancing armored units. Retreating enemy convoys were hit, 859 motor vehicles and 283 horse-drawn vehicles being damaged or destroyed. Seventeen enemy planes were damaged on the ground.

Advance of Third U.S. Army in the SAAR and RHINE Palatinates was now nearing its closing phase. Contact was made with elements of Seventh U.S. Army, while the important cities of WORMS (M41) and KAISERSLAUTERN (R09) were taken during the period.

The large movement of displaced persons from Germany presented the problem of possible spread of typhus fever to the people of France. Military Government officers met this threat by dusting with DDT powder thousands of persons before evacuation to France.

21 MARCH (D + 288)

The SAAR-Palatinate triangle operation was completed except for mopping up what remained of the enemy forces, all three corps of Third U.S. Army having reached the RHINE River by this date. How many combat effectives the enemy was able to salvage from the debacle was conjectural, but it was estimated that he had lost not less than seventy-five percent of his forces and had lost just as heavily in arms and supplies, particularly heavy guns. The big question was what the enemy could produce to oppose an advance east of the RHINE. On the assumption that Third U.S. Army's threat was as urgent as that of the Russians on the Eastern Front, it was indicated that the enemy would rush reinforcements from Central Germany, although these would have to be dispersed over a large sector. Enemy strength opposing Third U.S. Army at this time was estimated at 18,500 combat effectives and fifteen tanks or assault guns, the equivalent of two and one-half divisions.

Positions in VIII Corps were maintained by the 28th and 87th Infantry Divisions with no change. Following the change in the VIII - XII Corps boundary, the 76th Infantry Division was assigned to VIII Corps. It continued its patrols along the west bank of the RHINE River as far as BINGEN (M15). The 6th Cavalry Group remained in assembly area.

Following change in VIII - XII Corps and XII - XX Corps boundaries, units of XII Corps cleared the zone from BINGEN (M15) on the north to WORMS (M41) on the south. North flank patrols were maintained by the 2d Cavalry Group which captured FREIWEINHEIM (M25) and GAULSHEIM (M15), while the 90th Infantry Division made a direct attack on MAINZ (M35), clearing half of the city against decreasing resistance. Elements of

Crossing The Moselle River

the division also cleared DEXHEIM (M43), SCHORNSHEIM (M33), UDENHEIM (M34), HAHNHEIM (M34), SELZEN (M34), MOMMENHEIM (M34) and MARIENBORN (M35). To the south, the 5th Infantry Division was mopping up the last of the enemy remaining in its zone, and the 11th Infantry was freed from this duty to move up to and patrol along the RHINE River. Capturing EICH (M42) and continuing to clear its area to the RHINE River, the 4th Armored Division (with attached 10th Infantry) gained up to fifteen miles while clearing GIMBSHEIM (M43), BERMERSHEIM (M32), WEINHEIM (M22), DALHEIM (M43), RHEIN-DURKHEIM (M42), IBERSHEIM (M42), OSTHOFEN (M43), BECHTHEIM (M42), METTENHEIM (M42), FRETTENHEIM (M32), DORNDURKHEIM (M33), WINTERSHEIM (M33), DOLGESHEIM (M33) and ELMSHEIM (M43). The 11th Armored Division gained ten miles to the RHINE River in the extreme southern part of Corps zone, relieving elements of the 4th Armored Division in and about WORMS (M41). Following the 11th Armored Division, the 89th Infantry Division mopped up resistance.

Forces of XX Corps continued their rapid advances toward the RHINE River. Reaching the river between WORMS (M41) and LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50), the 94th Infantry Division had some elements penetrating into LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50). The 80th Infantry Division continued east ten miles past the captured city of KAISERSLAUTERN (R09). In the southern part of the zone the 26th Infantry Division moved east, capturing KINDSBACH (Q99) and mopping up enemy enroute. The 10th and 12th Armored Divisions, both of which had reached the RHINE River, turned their attention to the southwest to attack toward LANDAU (R26) and SPEYER (R58), the last escape gap open to the enemy. Both divisions were operating south of the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary at the close of the period.

Wounded German Prisoners Are Ferried To West Bank Of Rhine

In another day of attack against retreating German rail and road columns, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 287 motor vehicles, forty-five armored vehicles and tanks, forty-nine locomotives and 232 railroad cars. Eight enemy planes were destroyed in the air and two on the ground, while three planes of the Air Command failed to return.

Third U.S. Army units reached the RHINE River in all three corps zones during the period and units entered the important cities of MAINZ (M35) and LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50), thus concluding "The Capture of Koblenz and the Palatinate Campaign". The 10th and 12th Armored Divisions swung south into Seventh U.S. Army area to seal off the last escape corridor available to the enemy west of the RHINE River.

Because of the large number of prisoners of war in corps cages, it was directed that trucks returning to the vicinity of TRIER (L22) from supply points at HOLZBACH (L92) and SOTERN (L50) collect prisoners from the XII Corps cage at MEISENHEIM (L92) and the XX Corps cage at BALTERSWEILER (Q89) and transport them to the Army prisoner of war enclosure near TRIER (L22).

22 MARCH *(D + 289)*

Elements of Third U.S. Army began the first of a series of four assault crossings of the RHINE River, mightiest in Europe, for the first time in modern history. Giving the enemy as little time as possible to organize defensive positions east of the RHINE, the Army plunged onward into Central Germany, beginning Third U.S. Army's campaign "Forcing the RHINE - FRANKFURT-on-MAIN and across the MULDA."

Directions were received through Twelfth U.S. Army Group from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces which stated that the 12th Armored Division would be released to Seventh U.S. Army by Third U.S. Army when contact was made between the two Armies and as soon as the tactical situation would permit. A directive was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group which changed the First--Third U.S. Army boundary. Third U.S. Army Headquarters sent an operational directive to the Commanding Generals, VIII, XII and XX Corps, which in part gave the following information and orders:

First U.S. Army was attacking east from its bridgehead to seize the general line SIEGEN (G25)--GIESSEN (G62) and was prepared to continue the advance northeast toward KASSEL (C20). Seventh U.S. Army was to continue operations to reach the RHINE River and force crossings in its zone. Third U.S. Army was to seize and secure crossings over the RHINE River between KOBLENZ (L89) and GIMBSHEIM (M43) and to continue the attack to the northeast.

VIII Corps (76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and attached troops) was ordered to assume responsibility for the RHINE River line in zone to the mouth of the NAHE River (M1152), to arrange directly with the Commanding General, V Corps (First U.S. Army), for transfer of the 28th Infantry Division to V Corps in the area in which the division was then located, at which time the new First--Third U.S. Army boundary would become effective. VIII Corps was to cross the RHINE River south of the LAHN River in zone and advance generally east. It was to assume command of the 89th Infantry Division from XII Corps.

XII Corps (the 5th, 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions, the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions and attached troops) was to assume command of the 26th Infantry Division from XX Corps, was to pass control of the 89th Infantry Division to VIII Corps, was to cross the RHINE River in zone, advance rapidly northeast, cross the MAIN River and continue the advance northeast.

XX Corps (65th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and attached troops) was to pass control of the 10th and 12th Armored Divisions to Seventh U.S. Army and assume control of the 6th Armored Division from Seventh U.S. Army in place as of 231800A, and was to pass control of the 26th Infantry Division to XII Corps. XX Corps was to move troops as soon as possible north of the Third--Seventh U.S. Army temporary boundary with one infantry and one armored division to the eastern part of XII Corps zone and two infantry divisions to the western part of XX Corps zone, then be prepared to follow either VIII or XII Corps through secured bridgeheads.

At the beginning of the period, the 28th Infantry Division reverted from control of VIII Corps to V Corps (First U.S. Army), at which time The First - Third U.S. Army boundary was changed. While the 76th Infantry Division maintained its positions along the RHINE River in the southern part of the zone, the 6th Cavalry Group relieved the 87th Infantry Division in the northern part of the zone, and the 87th Infantry Division moved to an assembly area.

Forces of the XII Corps were occupied in clearing up all enemy west of the RHINE River, and were generally along the river. The 2d Cavalry Group patrolled along the river from BINGEN (M15) to MAINZ (M35). Clearing MAINZ (M35), the 90th Infantry Division extended its front to the river line. Farther south, Combat Command "A" and Reserve Combat Command (4th Armored Division) were in assembly areas, while Combat Command "B" held positions along the west bank of the RHINE River both north and south of the XII - XX Corps boundary. The 5th Infantry Division completed mopping up in the rear of the 4th Armored Division, then moved forward and made an assault crossing of the RHINE River with out artillery or air bombardment preparation. The 89th Infantry Division assembled at SOBERNHEIM (L93), fifteen miles southwest of BAD KREUZNACH (M03), and the 26th Infantry Division passed to corps control during the period.

A change in the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary left all XX Corps units except the 26th Infantry Division in the Seventh U.S. Army zone. At the north, the 26th Infantry Division moved into an assembly area and passed to control of XII Corps. Just to the south, the 11th Armored Division patrolled north and south of the captured city of WORMS (M41). The 80th Infantry Division moved into assembly area. The clearing by the 94th Infantry Division of LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50) continued, while the 12th Armored Division continued to attack to the southeast, clearing BOHL (R48). LANDAU (R26) was cleared by the 10th Armored Division, which continued to drive to the south. The 3d Cavalry Group was in reserve during the period, while to the rear the 65th Infantry Division assembled in the vicinity of NEUNKIRCHEN (Q58).

Besides flying corps support and reconnaissance missions, XIX Tactical Air Command flew sorties against enemy railroads. Fifty-five rail cuts were made and 876 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged. Other claims included 210 motor vehicles, sixty-eight locomotives and eighteen gun installations destroyed or damaged.

LANDAU (R26) and MAINZ (M35) were cleared by Third U.S. Army, which held the RHINE River line throughout its zone at the end of the period. An adjustment in the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary left XX Corps units temporarily in Seventh U.S. Army zone. Late in the period the first assault crossing of the RHINE River by an Allied Army was made by the 5th Infantry Division of Third U.S. Army.

Deeper penetrations into Germany, particularly those made so rapidly just west and east of the RHINE River, brought an enormous increase in the amount of supplies and equipment captured from the enemy. Problems involved in disposing of this equipment had reached such proportions by this date that special procedure for its handling were established in the supply sections.

23 MARCH *(D + 290)*

In a special order to officers and men of Third U.S. Army and XIX Tactical Air Command, the Army Commander announced the first Third U.S. Army bridgehead of the RHINE. The order stated:

"In the period from January 29 to March 22, 1945, you have wrested 6,484 square miles of territory from the enemy. You have taken 3,072 cities, towns, and villages, including among the former: TRIER, KOBLENZ, BINGEN, WORMS, MAINZ, KAISERSLAUTERN and LUDWIGSHAFEN

"You have captured 140,112 enemy soldiers, and have killed or wounded an additional 99,000, thereby eliminating practically all of the German 7th and 1st Armies. History records no greater achievement in so limited time.

"This great campaign was only made possible by your disciplined valor, unswerving devotion to duty, coupled with the unparalleled audacity and speed of your advance on the ground; while from the air, the peerless fighter-bombers kept up a relentless round-the-clock attack upon the disorganized enemy.

"The world rings with your praises; better still, General Montgomery, General Eisenhower, and General Bradley have all personally commended you. The highest honor I have ever attained is that of having my name coupled with yours in these great events.

"Please accept my heartfelt admiration and thanks for what you have done, and remember that your assault crossing over the RHINE at 2200 hours last night assures you of even greater glory to come."

Identification in Third U.S. Army's bridgehead east of the RHINE River of hastily assembled enemy combat commands and miscellaneous units was a significant indication of the enemy's desperate straits to produce reserves to oppose the Army's advances. Tactical reconnaissance reports indicated that the enemy apparently was trying to interpose more substantial forces against the Third U.S. Army, a quantity of rail rolling stock carrying motor vehicles having been observed in the FULDA (H31) area. That the enemy would make desperate efforts to reinforce against the RHINE bridgehead was anticipated, but it was considered possible that developments elsewhere along the Western Front could reduce what he might assemble against Third U.S. Army to a wholly inadequate force.

In VIII Corps the 6th Cavalry Group assumed control of the land along the RHINE River which the 87th Infantry Division had been patrolling, thereby freeing the 87th Infantry Division which moved to an assembly area. The lower part of the zone was patrolled by the 76th Infantry Division. The 89th Infantry Division passed to control of VIII Corps and began movement to its new area.

Utilizing assault rafts, and attacking across the RHINE River without benefit of aerial bombardment or artillery preparation, the 5th Infantry Division quickly exploited its bridgehead. The crossing, made during the night 22 - 23 March was pushed to a depth of six miles and a width of seven miles by the end of the period with the help of artillery fires on targets of opportunity. Some amphibious tanks of the 748th Tank Battalion went across with the first wave of infantry. Twenty-four hours after the 5th Infantry Division's assault crossing of the RHINE, the Luftwaffe struck furiously in an attempt to wipe out the bridgehead. Both heavy and light antiaircraft which had been set up quickly on the bridgehead were ready for the attack. Of 154 raiding aircraft, eighteen were shot down and fifteen more were probably destroyed. Two additional planes were shot down by XX Corps antiaircraft gunners when attacks were made against the 12th Armored Division and field artillery battalions.

Riflemen Crouch For Protection Crossing The Rhine In An Amphibious "Dukw"

Attacking from OPPENHEIM (M45), the infantrymen encountered little resistance, and had cleared TREBUR (M44), WALLERSTEIN (M54), LEEHEIM (M54), ERFELDEN (M53), DORNHEIM (M54) and ASTEHEIM (M44) within twenty-four hours. A heavy ponton bridge and a treadway bridge were completed within thirty-six hours of the initial crossing. Driving into the bridgehead, the 357th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) assumed control of the southern half of the bridgehead, while the 358th Infantry assembled preparatory to crossing, after having completely cleared MAINZ (M35). Combat Command "A" (4th Armored Division) crossed into the bridgehead and attacked through the infantry at the close of the period, while Combat Command "B" assembled preparatory to crossing. Relieving elements of the 4th Armored Division along the RHINE River north of WORMS (M41), the 11th Armored Division patrolled aggressively. The 26th Infantry Division and 6th Armored Division passed to corps control during the period. Moving north, the 6th Armored Division went into an assembly area, while the 26th Infantry Division utilized the 328th Infantry in patrolling around MAINZ (M35).

Most XX Corps units continued to operate south of the new Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary. In the extreme western part of zone the 65th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Group assembled near NEUNKIRCHEN (Q58) while the 80th Infantry Division was in assembly area near BAD KREUZNACH (M03). Continuing its attack to the southeast, the 10th Armored Division made contact with the 14th Armored Division and 36th Infantry Division, both of Seventh U.S. Army. Through mutual agreement of the Commanding Generals, Third and Seventh U.S. Armies, the 10th and 6th Armored Divisions were exchanged, 6th Armored Division passing to XX Corps control Third U.S. Army. Capturing HAFSLOCH (R38) and WEINGARTEN (R47), the 12th Armored Division cleared SPEYER (R58), the last escape route of the enemy across the RHINE River, and at the same time passed to control of the Seventh U.S. Army. LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50) was completely cleared by the 94th Infantry Division which patrolled north and south of the city.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 775 sorties, but was unable to find as much highway transportation as on previous days. Six of the fighter-bombers were lost, but the enemy suffered the loss of thirty planes destroyed and eleven damaged. An even 1100 railroad cars, plus seventy locomotives, 162 motor vehicles and twenty-one tanks and armored cars were destroyed or damaged, while military installations of all types were heavily attacked.

The important towns of LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50) and SPEYER (R58) were cleared during the period, and all ground up to the RHINE River was held securely. The bridgehead over the RHINE River was being rapidly expanded, by major elements of Third U.S. Army.

Because of the heavy demand by combat troops for "K"-type rations, these units were issued 100 percent operational-type rations, while non-combat units were limited to 25 percent and hospitals to 50 percent.

★ ★ ★ ★

24 MARCH *(D + 291)*

Fighting east of the RHINE River entered the fluid stage as it had west of the RHINE. The prisoner of war bag for the fourth week of March was an indication of the low fighting quality and state of morale of the enemy's replacements. During the period 18 to 24 March 66,274 prisoners were received at Third U.S. Army cages and 1,918 were admitted to Army hospitals, a total of 68,192. The enemy air force continued to concentrate against the RHINE River crossing in XII Corps zone. Antiaircraft artillery shot down twenty-six planes and claimed six more as probably destroyed of 138 enemy aircraft which attacked bridges, installations and troop concentrations.

Crossing the RHINE River about five miles south of KOBLENZ (L89) in the VIII Corps zone, the 87th Infantry Division secured a bridgehead one mile in depth. Fighting against moderately heavy resistance, the 345th and 347th Infantry Regiments captured BRAUBACH (L98), FILSEN (L88) and CAMP (L98), while the 346th Infantry remained in reserve. Farther south, the 76th Infantry Division patrolled along the west bank of the RHINE River while furnishing fire support to the 87th Infantry Division. The 89th Infantry Division closed into an assembly area at LINGERHAHN (L86), while the 6th Cavalry Group maintained positions along the RHINE River in the northern part of the zone.

Breaking out of XII Corps bridgehead, Combat Commands "A" and "B" (4th Armored Division) passed through the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions and gained up to twenty miles. Combat Command "A" passed through numerous towns, reaching GRAF ZIMMERN (M74) while Combat Command "B" drove to KIESSTADT (M84). Meanwhile, the 5th Infantry Division continued its attack to enlarge the bridgehead in the north and east against limited resistance, clearing BAUSCHEIM (M45), RUSSELSHEIM (M45), KONIGSTADEN (M55) and GROSS-GERAU (M54). Just to the south, the 90th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east, gaining more than five miles and taking BUTTELBORN (M54), WORFELDEN (M54), GODDELAU (M53), SCHNEPPENHAUSEN (M64), GRAFENHAUSEN (M64) and GRIESHEIM (M54), while some elements were attacking the large industrial city of DARMSTADT (M64) at the end of the period. The combined 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions bridgehead was enlarged to a depth of nine miles and a width of ten miles. The 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division), attached to the 4th Armored Division, crossed into the bridgehead and prepared to pass through the 90th Infantry Division in mopping up operations behind the armor. Other elements of the 26th Infantry Division pulled up to the RHINE River, with the 101st Infantry crossing into the bridgehead late in the period. After coming from Seventh U.S. Army to XX Corps, 6th Armored Division passed to control of XII Corps. Crossing into the bridgehead area, Combat Command "B" (6th Armored Division) advanced through infantry elements at the end of the period. A floating treadway bridge across the RHINE River was completed in the lower part of the Corps zone. The northern part of the zone was being patrolled throughout the period by the 2d Cavalry Group and the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division).

Forces of XX Corps continued to operate well inside Seventh U.S. Army zone, following the change in the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary. The 65th and 80th Infantry Divisions and 3d Cavalry Group were in assembly areas throughout the period. The 11th Armored Division also proceeded into assembly area following change in assignment from XII to XX Corps. Patrols along the RHINE River were conducted throughout the period by the 16th Cavalry Group. As elements of the 94th Infantry Division were relieved around LUDWIGSHAFEN (M50) by Seventh U.S. Army elements, they initiated movement to the north.

Dropping sixty-two tons of bombs in 627 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command closely supported the three corps attack. During the period 374 motor vehicles, twenty-seven tanks and armored cars, 329 railroad cars and thirty-two locomotives were destroyed or damaged.

Fighting east of the RHINE River in both VIII and XII Corps zones, Third U.S. Army elements broke out into a fluid type warfare during the period.



Rhine River Bridge Blasted By Retreating Germans

25 MARCH (D + 292)

As Third U.S. Army's penetration into Germany extended deeper it appeared that the enemy was attempting to contain and delay with such makeshift elements as he could scrape together. While the enemy was given the capability of reinforcing against the Army with a divisional sized unit from his estimated reserve of nine divisions in Central Germany, it was considered that he might delay commitment pending clarification of the tactical situation on the entire Western Front. The enemy faced the necessity of producing reserves to replace troops destroyed by Third and Seventh U.S. Armies in the Palatinate. To the critical problem of replacements was added an intensified supply and transportation problem. In the heaviest attack yet made against XII Corps RHINE bridgehead, 230 enemy aircraft struck at bridges, installations and troop concentrations. Antiaircraft artillery destroyed twenty-nine enemy planes and claimed twenty-three probables.

Amendment No 1 to the Operational Directive of 22 March was issued to the Commanding Generals, VIII, XII and XX Corps, which changed the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary.

The VIII Corps bridgehead established the previous day by the 87th Infantry Division was enlarged to a depth of three miles and a width of eight miles, while OSTERSPAI (L98), BRAUBACH (L98) and LYKERSHAUSEN (L97) were captured. Attacking across the RHINE River, the 353d and 354th Infantry Regiments (89th Infantry Division) captured DORSCHEID (M06). Both divisions were aided by the 76th Infantry Division, which maintained its positions on the west bank of the RHINE River and furnished fire support to attacking elements. Northern positions were maintained by the 6th Cavalry Group. A treadway bridge was completed at BOPPARD (L98). Generally, stiffer resistance was encountered in the VIII Corps bridgehead than had been met in the bridgehead of XII Corps.

The rapid advance of the 4th Armored Division in the XII Corps zone continued for thirty-five miles. Both Combat Commands "A" and "B" bypassed DARMSTADT (M64) and Combat Command "A" captured a bridge intact over the MAIN River near GROSSAUHEIM (M86), repulsing several small enemy air attacks aimed at the bridgehead. Combat Command "B" captured a railroad bridge intact over the same river at ASCHAFFENBURG (N05). Enemy aircraft were very active over both these bridgeheads. The 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) was released from and the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) was attached to the 4th Armored Division. Upon relief, the 104th Infantry assumed blocking positions to the south along a general line STOCKSTADT (M54) - EBERSTADT (M63). Meanwhile, the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) crossed into the bridgehead near DARMSTADT (M64). Capturing GUSTAVSBURG (M45) and BISCHOFSHEIM (M45), the 5th Infantry Division continued its attack to the north, while clearing territory up to the MAIN River. In a zone to the west, the 90th Infantry Division drove northeast six miles with the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments, clearing the important city of DARMSTADT (M64), capturing GRIESHEIM (M54), GRAFENHAUSEN (M64), WORFELDEN (M54) and LANGEN (M65). Continuing its advance to the northeast, the 6th Armored Division captured RAUNHEIM (M55) and KELSTERBACH (M64). The 16th Cavalry Group (XX Corps) relieved the 2d Cavalry Group in its positions along the west bank of the RHINE River. By the end of the period the 2d Cavalry Group had also been relieved of attachment to the 26th Infantry Division, and was crossing into the bridgehead area.

Units of XX Corps were pulled north from Seventh U.S. Army area and by the end of the period the 65th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions, the 11th Armored Division and the 3d Cavalry Group were in assembly areas in the rear of XII Corps units.

In reconnaissance and corps support missions, XIX Tactical Air Command had a big day. Flying 700 sorties, the fighter bombers destroyed or damaged 527 motor vehicles, thirty-six armored vehicles and tanks, sixty-one locomotives, twenty-seven gun positions, and 1067 railroad cars, while two bridges were damaged and it was estimated that more than 150 enemy troops were killed. Two planes failed to return.

The important communications center of DARMSTADT (M64) was cleared while rapid advances by major elements of XII Corps forced the battle into a fluid condition. Bridgeheads in VIII Corps were consolidated with armored units preparing to drive through the advancing infantry.

The 300,000th prisoner of war captured by Third U.S. Army was received at the Army enclosure at TRIER (L22).

All appointments to civil posts were being made by military government on a temporary basis only, and in numerous localities officials first chosen were removed when investigation revealed connections with the Nazi Party or when performance in office was found to be inefficient. In many villages and small towns it was found that non-Nazi officials had been permitted to retain office after 1933 because of their importance to the local governments and the high regard in which they were held in their communities.



Convoy Rolls Across The Rhine River

26 MARCH (D + 293)

Capturing intact the FRANKFURT (M67) railroad bridge over the MAIN River, troops of Third U.S. Army entered that important manufacturing city. Only three enemy aircraft appeared over XII Corps zone, one of which was destroyed and one probably destroyed. German Luftwaffe plane losses, combined with the overrunning of many enemy fighter fields by the Army's advance had reduced the air threat to the bridgehead, which at this time was securely held.

Letter of Instructions Number Eighteen, dated 25 March 1945, was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group. It gave in part the following information and orders:

21 Army Group British, with Ninth U.S. Army under operational control, was continuing operations to secure a bridgehead over the RHINE River north of the RUHR. Sixth U.S. Army Group was to occupy its zone west of the RHINE River and establish a bridgehead over the RHINE and south of the MAIN River on the right of Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to establish a bridgehead across the RHINE River north of the MAIN River from which an advance in strength could be made in the direction of KASSEL (G20), the bridgehead line to be HANAU (M87) - GIESSEN (G62) - SIEGEN (G25) - SIEG River to its junction with the RHINE River.

Third U.S. Army was directed to exploit crossings over the RHINE River and attack vigorously to seize the line HANAU (M87) - GIESSEN (G62) and clear the enemy from zone, to vacate Sixth U.S. Army Group zone as soon as the situation permitted unless the boundary was changed, and to be prepared to continue the advance on the KASSEL (G20) area.

A Third U.S. Army operational directive confirming verbal orders was sent to the various Corps commanders. It stated in part:

VIII Corps (76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and attached troops) was to continue the current mission of advancing aggressively east of zone, and without delay was to gain and maintain contact with the bridgehead to be established by XX Corps in the MAINZ (M35) area.

XII Corps (5th, 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and attached troops) was to continue its current mission of clearing to the RHINE River in zone and was to cross the MAIN River and continue the advance to the northeast. XII Corps was to pass one regimental combat team from XX Corps through the zone and assist this combat team in an assault crossing of the MAIN River east of MAINZ (M35), supporting the crossing of the combat team by fire on call from XX Corps and protect the right flank of XX Corps in the seizure of the bridgehead.

XX Corps (65th, 80th and 94th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and attached troops) was to seize and secure a bridgehead across the RHINE River in the vicinity of MAINZ (M35). By coordination with XII Corps, one regimental combat team was to be passed through XII Corps zone and cross the MAIN River east of MAINZ (M35). XX Corps was to be prepared to advance east or northeast. The time of the attack was to be during the hours of darkness on 27--28 March. The 65th and 94th Infantry Divisions were to be committed only on Army order.

Bridgeheads of the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions in VIII Corps were consolidated, and DACHSENHAUSEN (L98), OBERLAHNSTEIN (L98), DESSIGHOFEN (M08), GEMMERICH (M08), RUPPERTSHOFEN (M07), HIMMIGHOFEN (M07), WINTERWERB (M08), KASDORF (M07), KEHLBACH (M08) and DAHLHEIM (L97) were captured by the 87th Infantry Division, while the 89th Infantry Division cleared KAUB (L06), ST GOARSHAUSEN (L97), LIERSCHEID (M07), STRUTH (M17), BORNICH (M06), KESTERT (L97), WEYER (L97), NOCHERN (L97) and WEISEL (M06). Leading elements of both divisions were about ten miles east of the RHINE River at the close of the period. Positions of the 76th Infantry Division on the west bank of the RHINE River were maintained, and the 304th Infantry relieved the 6th Cavalry Group in the northern part of zone. Upon relief, the 6th Cavalry Group assembled in preparation to crossing into the bridgehead.

All major units of XII Corps were well beyond the RHINE River during the period. The leading spearheads continued to be furnished by

Prisoners Awaiting Evacuation

Combat Commands "A" and "B" (4th Armored Division). Combat Command "B" bypassed ASCHAFFENBURG (N05) and enlarged its bridgehead over the MAIN River at that point to a depth of six miles, while Combat Command "A" (supported by the attached 328th Infantry) enlarged its bridgehead over the MAIN River near GROSSAUHEIM (M86) to a depth of four miles. Following closely behind the 4th Armored Division was the 26th Infantry Division (less 328th Infantry). Elements of the 101st Infantry moved into the GROSSAUHEIM (M86) bridgehead, after clearing OFFENTHAL (M75), URBERATH (M75), OBERRODEN (M75), while elements of the 104th Infantry relieved Combat Command "B" at ASCHAFFENBURG (N05). Continuing to attack to the northeast, the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) captured HEUSENSTAMM (M76), LANEGN (M65) and BIEBER (M76) and reached the MAIN River east of FRANKFURT (M67). To the west, the 6th Armored Division captured a damaged railroad bridge on the MAIN River and pushed foot elements across the river into the once great industrial city of FRANKFURT (M67). Other elements of the 6th Armored Division captured SCHWANHEIM (M66), KELSTERBACH (M56), RAUNHEIM (M55), SACHSENHAUSEN (M66), OFFENBACH (M76) and NIEDERRAD (M66). Early crossing operations were hampered by heavy enemy artillery fire, which soon abated. Then the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) pushed north, crossed the MAIN River and entered FRANKFURT (M67). Enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire was heavy but enemy troops were almost entirely without artillery support. Artillery with XII Corps fired extensively in support of the action and fired upon the telephone exchange and the main power plant at the request of the 6th Armored Division. The 2d Infantry assembled at the crossing site south of the city, after being relieved by the 2d Cavalry Group of the zone along the MAIN River just east of the RHINE River.

XX Corps units moved up nearer the RHINE River, preparatory to crossing, but all remained in assembly except the 16th Cavalry Group which patrolled over an extended stretch of the west bank of the RHINE.

In a day unmarred by loss, XIX Tactical Air Command attacked targets attempting to outrun armored spearheads. Pilots destroyed or damaged 361 motor vehicles, thirteen locomotives, and 119 railroad cars.

Steady advances were recorded by elements of VIII and XII Corps, and the important city of FRANKFURT (M67) was entered, while XX Corps units were assembling in preparation for crossing the RHINE during the day.

The distance between rail off-loading points and Army supply areas had become so great because of the Army's rapid advances that difficulty was experienced in moving the increased requirements of Class III supplies forward with the available truck transportation. A request was made for air delivery of 200,000 gallons of gasoline a day for three days to airfields at DARMSTADT (M64) and BUTTELBORN (M54). Information was received that these airfields would be available to receive air supply on 27 March, when deliveries were to begin with 200 planes.

27 MARCH *(D + 294)*

Six days after the initial assault crossing of the RHINE River, the enemy had produced no divisional sized units to oppose the steady advances of Third U.S. Army. The reported shift of a Panzer division from the REMAGEN (F62) bridgehead area to Third U.S. Army zone was partly substantiated by the considerable motor vehicle movement observed by tactical reconnaissance in the vicinity of WETZLAR (G52), but the division was estimated to have an effective combat strength of only 1,500 troops and fifteen tanks. An enemy armor buildup between GIESSEN (G62) and HANAU (M87) was indicated by the enemy's critical tactical situation in that area. He was still reinforcing in the Army's zone of advance with makeshift and miscellaneous forces.

Orders were received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group providing that Third U.S. Army would have operational control of the 70th and 71st Infantry Divisions and the 13th Armored Division, but would not employ either the 70th Infantry Division or the 13th Armored Division east of the RHINE River.

Steady progress was made by both the VIII Corps' 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions from their RHINE River bridgeheads. Resistance which had been rather strong, began to weaken, and both divisions were able to gain from five to eight miles. While the 87th Infantry Division captured FRUCHT (L99), HINTERWALD (L98), SCHWEIGHAUSEN (M08), SULZBACH (M08), DIENTHAL (M08), BERGNASSAU-SCHEUERN (M08), KEHLBACH (M08), NIEDER BACHHEIM (M08), SINGHOFEN (M08), LOLLSCHEID (M08), POHL (M08) and HOLZHAUSEN (M18), the 89th Infantry Division cleared REICHENBERG (M07), ZORN (M17), LIPPORN (M07), WELTEROD (M17), MUNCHENROTH (M17) and ESPENSCHEID (M16). The 6th Cavalry Group entered the bridgehead area, launching an attack to the east after passing through the 87th Infantry Division. The 9th Armored Division (First U.S. Army) had launched an attack south toward WIESBADEN (M36) in a zone ten miles east of forward infantry elements, creating a large pocket of bypassed enemy troops. It was toward this armored force that the 6th Cavalry Group attacked during the period. On the west bank of the RHINE River, the 76th Infantry Division maintained its positions until late in the period when the 385th and 417th Infantry Regiments crossed and opened attacks in a zone between the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions. Attacks had progressed well by the end of the period.

German Prisoners Ready For Prisoner Of War Enclosure

Kaiser Wilhelm I
Statue Wrecked
In Coblenz Battle



Third Army Artillery Hammers the City of Leutesdorf



Antiaircraft Gun In Front of Frankfurt Opera House

FIRST
XXXX
THIRD
From Assembly
From SEVENTH U.S ARMY
28 March 1945
From SEVENTH U.S ARMY
23 March 1945
To Assembly 25-28 March 1945
TO SEVENTH U.S. ARMY
29 March 1945
To SEVENTH US
ARMY 23 March 1945
To SEVENTH U.S. ARMY
Boundary Effective
22-28 March 1945
MANNHEIM
DARMSTADT
WIESBADEN
87
176
23-27
89
16
165
171
19
26
6
60
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10
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30
29
31
17



MOVEMENT OF THIRD US ARMY DIVISIONS

23–31 MARCH 1945

AND ENEMY SITUATION 31 MARCH 1945

BEGINNING CAMPAIGN
FORCING THE RHINE
FRANKFURT ON MAIN
AND
ACROSS THE MULDE

Battle Line 22 March 1945

Battle Line 31 March 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE

23 March 1945

VIII CORPS	XII CORPS	XX CORPS
76TH INF DIV	4TH ARMD DIV	6TH ARMD DIV
87TH INF DIV	11TH ARMD DIV	12TH ARMD DIV
89TH INF DIV	5TH INF DIV	65TH INF DIV
	26TH INF DIV	80TH INF DIV
	90TH INF DIV	94TH INF DIV

31 March 1945

VIII CORPS	XII CORPS	XX CORPS
76TH INF DIV	4TH ARMD DIV	6TH ARMD DIV
87TH INF DIV	11TH ARMD DIV	5TH INF DIV
89TH INF DIV	26TH INF DIV	65TH INF DIV
	71ST INF DIV	80TH INF DIV
	90TH INF DIV	

Statute Miles 10 5 0 10

Rapid gains were made in XII Corps zone by Combat Commands "A" and "B" (4th Armored Division) which jointly attacked to the northeast, gaining positions at OSTHEIM (M88) and WECKESHEIM (M79), approximately twenty miles northeast of FRANKFURT (M67). Supporting this advance, the 90th Infantry Division crossed the MAIN River and captured BISCHOFSHEIM (M77), BRUCHKOBEL (M87), NIEDERDORFELDEN (M77), WACHENBUCHEN (M87) and MITTELBUCHEN (M87) in gains of up to ten miles. The 26th Infantry Division regained control of the 328th Infantry which had been attached to 4th Armored Division. HANAU (M87) was cleared by the 328th Infantry, which then moved east and joined other elements of the division north of ASCHAFFENBURG (N05). The 104th Infantry was relieved by elements of the 45th Infantry Division (Seventh U.S. Army) at ASCHAFFENBURG (N05), and at the close of the period the entire 26th Infantry Division was preparing to attack to the northeast. Fighting inside FRANKFURT (M67), the 5th Infantry Division met moderate resistance, but cleared half of the city while three bridges across the MAIN River near FRANKFURT (M67) were completed. Preparing to renew the attack, the 6th Armored Division assembled south of the MAIN River. Along the south bank of the MAIN River west of FRANKFURT (M67), the 2d Cavalry Group was patrolling.

Attacking across the RHINE and MAIN Rivers just south of MAINZ (M35), the 80th Infantry Division cleared KASTEL (M35) and HOCHHEIM (M45), patrols reaching WIESBADEN (M36). A change in the inter-corps boundaries gave XX Corps a central zone between VIII Corps on the north and XII Corps on the south. The 261st Infantry (65th Infantry Division) was attached to the 11th Armored Division which moved north from its assembly area and prepared to cross in the rear of the 80th Infantry Division. All other XX Corps units remained unchanged throughout the period.

A total of 1,027 motor vehicles was destroyed or damaged by fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command, which flew 408 sorties in support of advancing ground troops. Other claims included twenty-five armored vehicles and tanks, 290 railroad cars and nineteen locomotives destroyed or damaged, while five enemy planes were destroyed.

Third U.S. Army continued its rapid advances east of the RHINE in the XII Corps zone, with HANAU (M87) being cleared. Moderate gains were made in the VIII Corps bridgehead and at the same time XX Corps opened its attack across the RHINE and MAIN Rivers in the central part of Army zone.

Headquarters, Third U.S. Army (Forward Echelon) moved from LUXEMBOURG (P81) to IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L92), locating for the first time on German soil.

28 MARCH *(D + 295)*

Third U.S. Army's steady advances, paced by the 4th Armored Division's thirty-mile gain, resulted in a bag of 22,000 prisoners of war, the largest for any one day in the Army's history.

Advancing rapidly to the east in VIII Corps zone, the 6th Cavalry Group made contact with the 9th Armored Division (First U.S. Army) and assumed positions previously secured by that division, which then withdrew to the north to the First U.S. Army zone. The 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions advanced rapidly up to fifteen miles, clearing numerous small towns in the rear of the 6th Cavalry Group.

Spearheading the advance of XII Corps to the northeast, Combat Commands "A" and "B" (4th Armored Division) gained up to thirty miles, with Combat Command "A" reaching ENGELROD (H12) and Combat Command "B" reaching LAUTERBACH (H12). Meanwhile, the 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) after being motorized, began movement to the northeast to mop up behind the 4th Armored Division. The 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) maintained positions along the line BISCHOFSHEIM (M77) - MITTELBUCHEN (M87), while completing a heavy ponton bridge across the MAIN River near DORNIGHEIM (M77). Blocking positions on the Army south flank were maintained by the 26th Infantry Division. The 2d Cavalry Group assembled in the vicinity of BABENHAUSEN (M85).

There was a general reshuffling of major units following the assumption by XX Corps of the central part of the Army zone. The 5th Infantry and 6th Armored Divisions were passed to XX Corps, while the 11th Armored Division passed from control of XX Corps to XII Corps and the 71st Infantry Division came to XX Corps control from Seventh U.S. Army.

In advance of other XX Corps units, the 6th Armored Division gained twenty miles after crossing the MAIN River. At FRANKFURT (M67) moderate resistance by German air-raid wardens, firemen and police and a few troops met the 5th Infantry Division which controlled more than half of the city at the close of the period. The 11th Armored Division passed from XX Corps control to XII Corps, after having made a rapid advance through positions of the 80th Infantry Division to a vicinity east of HANAU (M87). Contact was made near WIESBADEN (M46) with the 9th Armored Division (First U.S. Army) by the 80th Infantry Division before the 9th Armored Division was withdrawn to the north. Bridgeheads across the MAIN and RHINE Rivers of the 80th Infantry Division were expanded to a depth of ten miles, with ERBENHEIM (M46), BIERSTADT (M36), DELKENHEIM (M46), FLORSHEIM (M55), IGSTADT (M46), AURINGEN (M46) and WIESBADEN (M36) being cleared. In the reshuffling of units the 94th Infantry Division was passed to Seventh U.S. Army and the 6th Armored Division came under corps control from XII Corps. Striking rapidly across the MAIN River in a zone east of FRANKFURT (M67), the 6th Armored Division gained fifteen miles and cleared ENKHEIM (M77) and BERGEN (M77). The 3d Cavalry Group went into assembly, while the 16th Cavalry Group maintained its positions west of WIESBADEN (M36).

Flying 307 sorties, fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command furnished column cover for attacking ground units while destroying or damaging 649 motor vehicles, twenty-one tanks and armored vehicles, sixteen locomotives and fifty-three horse drawn vehicles.

Advances continued unchecked in all three corps zones. XII Corps units reached points little more than 200 miles from BERLIN (Z75) while the important city of WIESBADEN (M46) was cleared by 80th Infantry Division (XX Corps).

★ ★ ★ ★

29 MARCH *(D + 296)*

As enemy resistance became more scattered and disorganized in front of all three corps, the city of FRANKFURT (M67) was cleared by Third U.S. Army troops.

Medic Rescues Wounded Man During The Heat Of Battle

Letter of Instructions Number Nineteen, dated 28 March 1945, was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group. It conveyed in part the following information and orders:

21 Army Group British, with Ninth U.S. Army under operational control, was to expand its bridgehead north of the RUHR with the objective of gaining contact with Twelfth U.S. Army Group in the KASSEL (C20) -- PADERBORN (B74) area. Sixth U.S. Army Group, advancing from its bridgehead over the RHINE, was to protect the right flank of Twelfth U.S. Army Group as far north as the HOHE RHON Mountains (N59). First Allied Airborne Army was to be prepared to assist the advance of Twelfth U.S. Army Group with a division airborne drop in the KASSEL (C20) vicinity to seize airfields and the EDER River dam. Twelfth U.S. Army Group, upon completion of mopping up the RHINE bridgehead, would advance northeast to make junction with 21 Army Group British in the KASSEL (C20)--PADERBORN (B74) area. In conjunction with 21 Army Group British, Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to clear the enemy from the pocket formed by the juncture of their forces and be prepared for further advance into Germany.

Third U.S. Army was ordered to complete clearing of the enemy from its zone in the RHINE bridgehead area and to vacate Seventh U.S. Army (Sixth U.S. Army Group) zone as soon as practicable. The Army was to advance on the HERSFELD (H35)--KASSEL (C20) area and drive the enemy east of the line HOHE RHON Mountains (N59)--WERRA River--WESER River. Also it was to be prepared to leave one uncommitted infantry division in the area south of GIESSEN (G62) to be committed only on orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group and one Cavalry Group (currently in Twelfth U.S. Army Group reserve) was to be moved to this area at such time as would not interfere with the movement of either troops or supplies. Finally, the Army was to be prepared for further advance into Germany toward the east or southeast.

First U.S. Army was ordered to complete clearing the enemy from its zone in the RHINE bridgehead area, was to advance on the WARBURG (B92)--PADERBORN (B74) area and protect the left (north) flank of Twelfth U.S. Army Group east of the RHINE. It was to be prepared to leave one uncommitted infantry division in the area north of LIMBERG (M29) to be committed only on orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group. Also it was to make junction with 21 Army Group British and in cooperation with that Army Group was to clear the enemy from the pocket between the two forces and be prepared for further advance into Germany toward the east.

An Operational Directive was sent by Third U.S. Army to the VIII, XII and XX Corps, changing the corps boundaries and giving instructions for the advance. It stated in part:

VIII Corps (76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and supporting troops) was to continue its aggressive advance in zone, was to maintain contact with First U.S. Army on the left (north) and XX Corps on the right (south), and when the enemy had been cleared to the line WEHRHEIM (M59)--KLEINLINDEN (G61) was to be prepared to advance east or northeast on Army order. XII Corps (26th, 71st and 90th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 11th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to continue its aggressive advance in zone and maintain contact with Seventh U.S. Army on the right (south). XX Corps (5th, 65th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to continue its aggressive advance in zone.

The 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions of VIII Corps continued their advance to the east, the 87th Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Group reaching the eastern limit of their zone after twenty mile advances.

In the XII Corps zone limited gains were made by the 4th Armored Division which was restricted by Army order from making further advances until infantry units could push nearer the armor in mop-up operations. From positions north of HANAU (M87), the 90th Infantry Division gained up to ten miles to the northeast. The 359th Infantry (motorized) mopped up in the rear of the 4th Armored Division with GROSSKARBEN (M78), KILIANSTADEN (M87) and HEIDENBERGEN (M88) being cleared. East of HANAU (M87), the 11th Armored Division continued its advance with Combat Command "A" clearing ROTHENBERGEN (M97) while Combat Command "B" passed through RUCKINGEN (M87) and advanced eight miles to the north. Operating largely in Seventh U.S. Army zone, the 26th Infantry Division made good gains to the south and east. Toward the end of the period the 2d Cavalry Group relieved the southern most units of the 26th Infantry Division which began movement to the northeast. The 71st Infantry Division continued its movement from Seventh U.S. Army to XII Corps zone.

In XX Corps zone, FRANKFURT (M67), important communications center and manufacturing city, was cleared by the 5th Infantry Division which continued policing the city. To the northeast, the 6th Armored Division gained twenty miles in an area east of GIESSEN (G62), protecting the corps right flank. The 261st Infantry (65th Infantry Division) and 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) were attached to the 6th Armored Division during the period. Other elements of the 80th Infantry Division captured BAD NAUHEIM (M79) and DELKENHEIM (M46), making good gains in an area east of WIESBADEN (M36). The 65th Infantry Division (-) was in assembly area west of FRANKFURT (M67). The corps right flank was protected by the 3d Cavalry Group, while to the rear the 16th Cavalry Group crossed the RHINE River and assumed screening positions on the corps left flank.

Bad flying weather precluded all operations of XIX Tactical Air Command.

FRANKFURT (M67) was cleared in Third U.S. Army's advance, while good advances were made in all three corps. Nowhere was there sufficient enemy resistance to slow the attack.

Plans for supply of the Army east of the RHINE River were rushed, with air deliveries of gasoline being given the most importance. Allocation of railheads in the MAINZ (M35) area was completed on this date, service to begin on 3 April when the railroad was to become operational. Separate off-loading points for each class of supply were to include HEIDESHEIM (M25) for Class I, WELGESHEIM (M14) for Classes II and IV, and NIEDER INGLEHEIM (M25) for Class III. All available two and one-half ton trucks in all quartermaster units were to haul gasoline from points west of the RHINE River to the Class III supply point which was to open 31 March at HANAU (M87).

Active measures were taken by military government against civilian looting. In KOBLENZ (L89) alone, thirteen persons were arrested and held for trial by military government courts.

30 MARCH *(D + 297)*

On the basis of tactical reconnaissance and prisoner of war interrogation, it was learned that the enemy was moving reinforcements into the KASSEL (G20)--EISENACH (H86) sector for an apparent attempt to contain Third U.S. Army's advances in a zone leading into the heart of Germany. Terrain, rugged and extensively wooded and bounded by the FULDA and WERRA Rivers, favored the defender. The sector constituted a natural bottleneck into the flat ELBE River basin. Higher headquarters reported the movement of the equivalent of eight enemy divisions from Scandinavia, Italy and interior Germany to the Western Front during a three-week period.

Hitler's Youths

VIII Corps units pushed up to the eastern limits of their zone where they were pinched out from further advance. They mopped up enemy pockets in zone, taking 3,400 prisoners during the period.

XII Corps' attack continued throughout the period, with elements considerably farther east than any other units of Third U.S. Army or of other armies on the Western front. Spearheads of the 4th Armored Division resumed their attack, gaining twenty miles to the northeast. Combat Command "B" and the attached 359th Infantry fought against stubborn resistance inside HERSFELD (H35), while Combat Command "A" reached points ten miles east of the town. Gains of twenty miles were made by the 90th Infantry Division (less 359th Infantry), as it followed the 4th Armored Division. Capturing GELENHAUSEN (N07), the 11th Armored Division made ten miles in its continued advance to the northeast. Right flank protection was continued by the 2d Cavalry Group, while to the rear the 71st Infantry Division closed in an area southeast of FRANKFURT (M67), preparing to take an active role in the corps attack. The 26th Infantry Division gained ten miles in advances behind the 11th Armored Division, with LIESENWALD (H09) and BUDINGEN (M98) being taken.

FRANKFURT (M67) continued to be occupied and policed by the 5th Infantry Division. A rapid advance to the north of more than thirty miles was made by the 6th Armored Division (with attached 26lst and 318th Infantry Regiments) to an area about six miles south of KASSEL (C20). The 3d Cavalry Group continued to follow the 6th Armored Division, while farther to the rear the 65th Infantry Division (less 26lst Infantry) and the 80th Infantry Division (less 318th Infantry) made gains of ten to fifteen miles while mopping up in the rear. A forest twenty miles northwest of FRANKFURT (M67) was being cleared by the 16th Cavalry Group by the end of the period.

Poor flying weather limited operations of XIX Tactical Air Command during most of the period, 167 sorties being flown.

Third U.S. Army continued its smashing attack into Germany in all three corps zones. Gains of up to thirty miles were made, with approximately 10,000 prisoners taken.

Air deliveries of gasoline to support the Army east of the RHINE River began on this date, 216,000 gallons arriving at four airfields. At OBER OLM (M34) 162,500 gallons were delivered, at BUTTELBORN (M54), 5,500 gallons; at AILERTCHEN (G12), 3,000 gallons, and at LIMBERG (M29), 45,000 gallons.

31 MARCH (D + 298)

Prisoners of war brought to Third U.S. Army cages during the period 25 to 31 March numbered 30,325, again reflecting the rapid advances made by the Army. Prisoners received at Army hospitals during the period numbered 1,480, making a total of 31,715 for the week.

An operational directive was sent to the Commanding Generals, 70th Infantry and 13th Armored Divisions which provided in part:

The 70th Infantry Division was to be responsible for the Army area RHINE River--BOPPARD (L88) --BRAUNSHORN (L86) --STROMBERG (M04) --BAD KREUZNACH (M03)--OBERNDORF (M02)--OPPENHEIM (M44), all inclusive. After effecting necessary coordination therein with the Army Provost Marshal and Army G-5, the division was to guard all bridges, maintain law and order, both civil and military, regulate and control traffic on main supply routes, guard all public utility and military government installations, protect Army supply points and installations and be prepared to assemble for movement outside of the Army area on twenty-four hours' notice.

The 13th Armored Division was to be responsible for the Army area TRIER (L22)--WITTLICH (L35), both inclusive--BOPPARD (L88)--BRAUNSHORN (L86)--STROMBERG (M04)-- BAD KREUZNACH (M03)-- OBERNDORF (M02), all inclusive, SAARLAUTERN (Q28), inclusive, to the 1939 German border. After effecting the necessary coordination therein with the Army Provost Marshal and Army G-5, the division was to begin a mission the same as that of the 70th Infantry Division, with the added provision that it was to provide one battalion or the equivalent, to garrison the city of KOBLENZ (L89).

In VIII Corps the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Cavalry Group continued to mop up in zone. Units had reached the eastern limits of zone and were pinched out by converging boundaries of XX Corps on the south and First U.S. Army on the north.

In the XII Corps advance, HERSFELD (H35) was cleared by elements of Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division). The major part of Combat Command "B" attacked on the east abreast of Combat Command "A". By the end of the period they had converged and were fighting in HORSCHEL (H77). Following the advance of the 4th Armored Division, the 90th Infantry Division (less 359th Infantry) gained twenty miles and captured STARKLOS (H34) while mopping up isolated groups of enemy. To the south, the 11th Armored Division struck to the east, gaining up to thirty miles in a zone north and east of FULDA (H31). It was followed by the 26th Infantry Division which was engaged in mopping-up activities. To the rear, 2d Cavalry Group was functioning south of the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary, screening the right flank. Southeast of FRANKFURT (M67), the 71st Infantry Division remained in assembly at HAUSENSTAMM (M76).

Direction of the XX Corps attack was to the north and northeast. Some elements of the 6th Armored Division were within three miles of KASSEL (C20), while others seized a bridgehead over the FULDA River near MELSUNGEN (H28). The 26lst Infantry (65th Infantry Division) and 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) remained attached to 6th Armored Division, while other elements of both infantry divisions mopped up to the rear. Directly north of HERSFELD (H35), the 3d Cavalry Group, advancing thirty miles, reached and patrolled along the west bank of the FULDA River. The 5th Infantry Division continued the policing of FRANKFURT (M67) while the 16th Cavalry Group continued to mop up a forest twenty miles northwest of FRANKFURT (M67).

After the bad flying weather of the previous days, XIX Tactical Air Command finished the month with another big day in which 580 sorties were flown. Pilots destroyed or damaged 685 motor vehicles, forty seven tanks and armored cars, 722 railroad cars and ninety-four locomotives.

Third U.S. Army continued its rapid advance east of the RHINE River during the period, with its XII and XX Corps making rapid gains, and clearing the town of HERSFELD (H35). Gains up to thirty miles were made by various units in both corps. VIII Corps, pinched out by converging boundaries, was mopping up in the rear.

Air deliveries of gasoline to support operations east of the RHINE River were stepped up on this date, a total of 435,000 gallons being received at four airfields. At OBER OLM (M34), 50,000 gallons were delivered, at BUTTELBORN (M54), 54,000 gallons; at FRANKFURT-ESCHBORN (M57), 96,000 gallons, and at LIMBERG (M29), 235,000 gallons.

Advance Section Communications Zone was advised that Third U.S. Army planned to retain all captured medical supplies in the Army area, using them in captured German hospitals, displaced persons camps and prisoner of war camps, all in the Army area.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

During March, when Third U.S. Army captured more territory than in any month since August, operations fell into four phases: the battle of the EIFEL, the clearing of the PALATINATE, the crossing of the RHINE River, and the crossing of the MAIN River and the advance to KASSEL (C20). A total of 10,600 square miles of territory, practically all of it inside Germany, was captured. The SIEGFRIED Line, pierced in some places during the previous month, crumpled like paper.

As the month opened the enemy had fallen back on the KYLL River in XII Corps zone and was fighting a strong delaying action to the river in VIII Corps zone. Facing Third U.S. Army were the survivors of the costly ARDENNES debacle, augmented by what few makeshift units the enemy could use as reinforcements. These forces were totally incapable of halting the Army's sweep across the EIFEL and to the RHINE River north of KOBLENZ (L89). Elements of eleven German divisions were caught in the pincers between Third and First U.S. Armies and thoroughly mauled, only a small fraction of their strength managing to escape across the RHINE and these without their equipment. By 9 March the EIFEL had been cleared except for a small area around KOBLENZ (L89) and in the WITTLICH (L35) depression west of COCHEM (L57), where remnants of nine divisions were pocketed. These divisions fought a delaying action while attempting to withdraw south of the MOSELLE River and by 12 March had succeeded in withdrawing across the MOSELLE to set up a hastily-formed defense line in the HUNSRUCK Mountains to protect the north flank of German Army Group "G". Thus the campaign "The EIFEL to the RHINE and the capture of TRIER" ended with all territory up to the RHINE and north of the MOSELLE occupied.

The campaign "The capture of KOBLENZ and the PALATINATE" was a whirlwind operation in which Third and Seventh U.S. Armies teamed to wreck German Army Group "G" and to clear the PALATINATE. XII Corps struck south across the MOSELLE River west of KOBLENZ (L89), XX Corps swept east through the ST WENDEL (Q59) gap, and Seventh U.S. Army attacked north through the SIEGFRIED Line. XII Corps' drive across the enemy's rear, spearheaded by the 4th Armored Division, threw the enemy into a panic, but despite hurried reinforcements he was unable to halt the penetration. By 16 March, XII Corps had seized the key cities of KIRN (L83), BAD KREUZNACH (M03) and BINGEN (M15) and had linked up with XX Corps, thus pocketing the remnants of ten enemy divisions in the central HUNSRUCK Mountains. Although the enemy attempted to throw up a line of defense west of MAINZ (M35) and MANNHEIM (R59) to form a bridgehead for the withdrawal of his troops across the RHINE he never succeeded. What was intended to be an organized withdrawal quickly became a route, the enemy's fleeing columns being attacked constantly from the air and cut to ribbons by the Third U.S. Army's armor, Infantry mopping-up teams followed closely behind the tanks, taking thousands of prisoners in the wake of the charging armor. The German First and Seventh Armies were decimated, with the loss of 81,692 prisoners of war, and all territory to the RHINE River as far south as SPEYER (R58) was cleared.

Third U.S. Army's swift advance to the RHINE River and the enemy's terrific losses west of the river, coupled with his concern over the First U.S. Army bridgehead at REMAGEN (F62), left the enemy without adequate strength to man the RHINE River line and with insufficient time to move reserves into the threatened area and prepare defenses. This marked the close of "The capture of KOBLENZ and the PALATINATE campaign" and the beginning of the campaign "Forcing the RHINE - FRANKFURT-ON-MAIN and across the MULDA." The enemy was unable to offer more than scattered and ineffectual resistance to the crossing of the 5th Infantry Division early in the morning of 23 March. Other XII Corps units speedily followed into the bridgehead, expanding it so rapidly that the enemy had little chance to recover from the initial shock. The makeshift reserves the enemy did commit were unable to hold the MAINZ (M35)--FRANKFURT (M66)--DARMSTADT (M64) triangle. Little resistance was offered to XII Corps as it pressed forward to the MAIN River and on 25 March seized bridgeheads in the vicinity of HANAU (M87) and ASCHAFFENBURG (N05). Meanwhile, to the north VIII Corps advanced to the RHINE, made an assault crossing over the formidable RHINE gorge south of KOBLENZ (L89) on 25 March and by the following day had expanded the bridgehead to a depth of three miles.

Attempting to hold the line of the MAIN River, the enemy again produced too little too late and he was unable to prevent another breakthrough by Third U.S. Army. By 28 March, 4th Armored Division spearheads had driven thirty miles northward to join forces with the 9th Armored Division (First U.S. Army) in the vicinity of GIESSEN (G62) and pocket thousands of enemy troops in the WIESBADEN (M36) -- BINGEN (M15) area. Thoroughly disorganized, the enemy had little success in trying to halt Third U.S. Army's advance toward KASSEL (C20). As the month ended, Third U.S. Army's armored columns were threatening KASSEL (C20) and major elements of the Army were approximately 100 miles east of the RHINE River crossing sites. Enemy resistance was stiffening and indications pointed to the establishment of a new defense line southeast of KASSEL (C20) between the FULDA and the WERRA-WESER River lines on favorable terrain.

In the great chunks of territory which Third U.S. Army had wrested from the enemy during the month were eleven cities of more than 25,000 prewar population. They were FRANKFURT (M67), KOBLENZ (L89), WIESBADEN (M36), MAINZ (M35), LUDWIGSHAFEN (R59), DARMSTADT (M64), OFFENBACH (M76), KAISERSLAUTERN (R09), WORMS (M41), BAD KREUZNACH (M03) and IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L72).

Highlighted by four assault crossings of the RHINE River, crossing and bridging operations of Third U.S. Army during March were more extensive than those of any other month in the Army's history and probably equalled or exceeded those of any Army in the history of warfare. Had it not been overshadowed by the RHINE crossings, the bridging of the MAIN River would have been considered a major operation. Earlier in the month crossings were made of the PRUM, KYLL and SAAR Rivers. Assault crossings of the RHINE River were made at OPPENHEIM (M44), MAINZ (M35), BINGEN (M15) and BOPPARD (L88). During the month 341 bridges, were constructed with a total footage of 44,073. Rafts, naval craft and amphibious tanks were used on an unprecedented scale for river crossings.

An estimated 850 enemy aircraft made 300 raids on Third U.S. Army troops and installations during March. Of these, antiaircraft artillery claimed a total of 207 destroyed and 121 probably destroyed. Crossings of the RHINE River were marked by the first appearance of enemy jet-propelled aircraft over Third U.S. Army's zone in any great numbers.



American Flag Is Raised On The East Bank Of The Rhine River

At the end of March there were 1,995,360 rations and 2,894,041 gallons of V-80 gasoline at supply points and reserve points, including reserves held for the Army by Advance Section Communications Zone. Tonnage unloaded from rail cars for the Army during the month totalled 162,372 tons. Ammunition received by Third U.S. Army from Advance Section Communications Zone during March totalled 36,513 long tons, with 143,702 long tons being handled during the month by all installations. Long movements of personnel and of huge quantities of equipment across the RHINE River highlighted operations of the supply sections during the month, trucking operations being similar to those of the August 1944 campaigning. Fifteen extra truck companies supplemented those of Third U.S. Army, one of which was an amphibian truck company. The latter company, operating with the 89th and 90th Infantry Divisions, made 454 round trips over and across the RHINE River, transporting a total of 1,365 tons of supplies, with no appreciable losses. During the month 23,487 trucks traveled a total of 3,632,472 miles to haul supplies.

Third U.S. Army captured 136,926 prisoners of war during March, with an additional 5,291 prisoners being admitted to hospitals and medical units and not passing through Army cages. The Army's total battle casualties were 13,573, including 1,855 killed, 9,915 wounded and 1,803 missing. Non-battle casulaties totalled 11,380. Reinforcements received during the month totalled 31,650. The strength of the Command at the end of the month was 312,205.



Armor To The Front, Prisoners To The Rear

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



*CUMULATIVE FROM 1 AUGUST

MARCH –	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DAILY DEAD (EST)	900	600	500	400	500	800	700	1000	700	500	400	600	700	800	800	700	500	800	700	1600	1200	600	500	400	400	400	500	500	800	500	600
DAILY WOUNDED (EST)	1500	1600	1600	1200	1000	1000	2100	1500	1500	1500	800	1200	2100	1800	2000	1500	1000	1500	1600	2000	2000	1200	1000	1000	900	1000	1000	1200	1600	1200	1300
DAILY CAPTURED	1855	3256	1781	2148	1002	1586	1614	1855	1827	2022	2156	4508	6619	3795	2106	1330	2850	3301	8355	4699	11300	10020	11699	18818	5214	4138	4312	5510	2778	2967	6796
TOTAL	4255	5456	3881	3748	2502	3386	4414	4355	4027	4022	3356	6308	9419	6395	4906	3530	4350	5601	10655	8299	14500	11820	13199	20218	6514	5538	5812	7210	5178	4667	8696

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4,000
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206,217

13,573

COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD U S ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD U S ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH – ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH – THIRD US ARMY CASUALTIES

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
DAILY	DEAD	110	131	74	81	61	55	59	89	59	41	26	27	50	52	78	66	58	77	88	52	59	32	22	47	62	73	67	39	28	51	41
	WOUNDED	682	587	584	405	262	453	309	352	322	154	193	118	352	551	591	328	325	317	420	219	287	178	258	218	231	269	226	277	128	195	124
	MISSING	49	70	64	56	106	51	152	79	24	41	5	165	39	38	28	54	112	39	36	8	26	33	36	46	20	158	78	21	45	55	69
	TOTAL	841	788	722	542	429	559	520	520	405	236	224	310	441	641	697	448	495	433	544	279	372	243	316	311	313	500	371	337	201	301	234

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL











THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS, AIRFIELDS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-31 MARCH 1945

LEGEND

O - OPENED
C - CLOSED
* - OPERATION ASSUMED BY ADVANCE SECTION COMMUNICATION ZONE

TOWNS CAPTURED MARCH

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
ALENDORF	VIII	7 March
ARRENRATH	XII	7 "
ANDERNACH	VIII	9 "
ALTRICH	XX	11 "
ASPISHEIM	XII	19 "
ALBIG	XII	20 "
ALZEY	XII	20 "
ABBISHEIM	XII	20 "
ASTHEHEIM	XII	23 "
AURINGEN	XX	28 "
BUTZWEILER	XII	1 "
BESSLICH	XII	2 "
BALESFELD	VIII	4 "
BURBACH	VIII	4 "
BUDESHEIM	VIII	4 "
BADEN	XII	4 "
BIRRESBORN	VIII	5 "
BUSCHEICH	VIII	6 "
BIRGEL	VIII	6 "
BINSFELD	XII	6 "
BETTLEDORF	VIII	7 "
BOLSDORF	VIII	7 "
BEILINGEN	XII	7 "
BERLINGEN	VIII	7 "
BIRGEL	VIII	7 "
BROHL	VIII	8 "
BURG	XII	8 "
BASSENHEIM	XII	8 "
BRUCH	XII	9 "
BERGWEILER	XII	9 "
BETTENFELD	XII	9 "
BONERATH	XX	13 "
BERGEN	XX	14 "
BEULICH	XII	15 "
BUCH	XII	15 "
BUCHHOLZ	XII	15 "
BULLAY	XII	15 "
BLANKENRATH	XII	16 "
BAD SALZIG	XII	16 "
BOPPARD	XII	16 "
BURG	XII	16 "
BRIEDEL	XII	16 "
BIRKENFELD	XX	17 "
BAD KREUZNACH	XII	18 "
BECHERBACH	XII	18 "
BAUMHOLDER	XX	18 "
BINGEN	XII	18 "
BORNHEIM	XII	20 "
BERMERSHEIM	XII	21 "
BECHTHEIM	XII	21 "
BOHL	XX	22 "
BRAUBACH	VIII	24 "
BAUSCHEIM	XII	24 "
BUTTELBORN	XII	24 "
BISCHOFSHEIM	XII	25 "
BORNICH	VIII	26 "
BIEBER	XII	26 "
BERGNASSAU-SCHEUERN	VIII	27 "
BRUCHKOBEL	XII	27 "

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
BIERSTADT	XX	28 March
BERGEN	XX	28 "
BAD NAUHEIM	XX	29 "
BUDINGEN	XII	30 "
CARDEN	XII	10 "
CLAUSEN	XX	10 "
CASEL	XX	10 "
CONFELD	XX	16 "
CAMP	VIII	24 "
DINGDORF	VIII	2 "
DUPPACH	VIII	4 "
DUDELDORF	XII	4 "
DENSBORN	VIII	6 "
DOHN	VIII	6 "
DAHLEM	XII	6 "
DOCKWEILER	VIII	7 "
DRIES	VIII	7 "
DOLLENDORF	VIII	7 "
DUNFUS	XII	9 "
DIEFENBACH	XII	12 "
DRIESCH	XII	12 "
DIEBLICH	VIII	15 "
DIEBLICHERBERG	VIII	15 "
DOMMERSHAUSEN	XII	15 "
DORWEILER	XII	15 "
DIELER	XII	15 "
DILLINGEN	XX	18 "
DROMERSHEIM	XII	19 "
DANNENFELS	XII	20 "
DEXHEIM	XII	21 "
DALHEIM	XII	21 "
DORNDUERKHEIM	XII	21 "
DOLGESHEIM	XII	21 "
DARMSTADT	XII	25 "
DACHSENHAUSEN	VIII	26 "
DESSIGHOFEN	VIII	26 "
DAHLHEIM	VIII	26 "
DIENTHAL	VIII	27 "
DELKENHEIM	XX	29 "
EDINGEN	XII	1 "
EUREN	XII	3 "
EIGELBACH	VIII	4 "
ERDORF	XII	4 "
ETTELSBACH	XX	5 "
EHRANG	XX	7 "
ESSINGEN	VIII	7 "
EISENSCHMITT	XII	7 "
ESCH	VIII	7 "
ERLENBACH	XX	8 "
EHR	XII	15 "
ELLERN	XII	15 "
ELLENZ	XII	15 "
ENSDORF	XX	19 "
ENKENBACH	XX	20 "
ELMSHEIM	XII	21 "
ERFELDEN	XII	22 "
ESPENSCHEID	VIII	27 "
ERBENHEIM	XX	28 "
ENKHEIM	XX	28 "

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
FUSENICH	XII	2 March
FLERINGEN	VIII	3 "
FEUSDORF	VIII	6 "
FAID	XII	11 "
FRAULAUTERN	XX	19 "
FLONHEIM	XII	20 "
FREIWEINHEIM	XII	21 "
FRETTENHEIM	XII	21 "
FILSEN	VIII	24 "
FRUCHT	VIII	27 "
FLOERSHEIM	XX	28 "
FRANKFURT	XX	29 "
GREIMELSCHEID	VIII	1 "
GODENDORF	XII	1 "
GREVENICH	XII	2 "
GIESDORF	VIII	3 "
GINDORF	XII	4 "
GONNERSDORF	VIII	5 "
GEROLSTEIN	VIII	6 "
GEES	VIII	6 "
GLADBACH	VIII	8 "
GONDORF	XII	10 "
GULS	XII	10 "
GREIMERSBURG	XII	10 "
GIPPERATH	XII	10 "
GEVENICH	XII	11 "
GRANSDORF	XII	7 "
GROSSLITTGEN	XII	8 "
GREVERATH	XII	8 "
GREIMERATH	XX	13 "
GONDERSHAUSEN	XII	15 "
GERSENBURG	XX	15 "
GRIMBURG	XX	15 "
GONSENHEIM	XII	20 "
GOLLHEIM	XII	20 "
GAULSHEIM	XII	21 "
GIMBSHEIM	XII	21 "
GROSS-GERAU	XII	24 "
GODDELAU	XII	24 "
GRAFENHAUSEN	XII	24 "
GRIESHEIM	XII	24 "
GUSTAVSBURG	XII	25 "
GRIESHEIM	XII	25 "
GRAFENHAUSEN	XII	25 "
GEMMERICH	VIII	26 "
GROSSKARBEN	XII	29 "
GELENHAUSEN	XII	30 "
HUPPERATH	XII	9 "
HARGARTEN	VIII	1 "
HEILENBACH	XII	1 "
HENTERN	XX	1 "
HEISDORF	VIII	3 "
HERRESTHALERHOF	XII	2 "
HEILENBACH	XII	2 "
HUTTINGEN	XII	2 "
HUSCHEID	VIII	3 "
HOSTEN	XII	3 "
HALLSCHLAG	VIII	4 "
HERFORST	XII	6 "

TOWNS CAPTURED MARCH (CONT'D)

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
HILLESHEIM	VIII	7 March
HUNGERSDORF	VIII	7 "
HOFFELD	VIII	8 "
HEGG-GUT	XII	8 "
HAMBUCH	XII	9 "
HISSERATH	XX	11 "
HALZERATH	XX	13 "
HERSCHWIESEN	XII	15 "
HEDDERT	XX	14 "
HAUSBACH	XX	15 "
HOLSENBACH	XII	15 "
HUNDHEIM	XII	16 "
HEIDENBURG	XX	18 "
HARWEILER	XII	19 "
HECHTSHEIM	XII	20 "
HARXHEIM	XII	20 "
HOLZ	XX	20 "
HOCHSPEYER	XX	20 "
HAHNHEIM	XII	21 "
HAFSLOCH	XX	23 "
HIMMIGHOFEN	VIII	26 "
HEUSENTHAMM	XII	26 "
HINTERWALD	VIII	27 "
HOLZHAUSEN	VIII	27 "
HANAU	XII	27 "
HOCHHEIM	XX	27 "
HEIDENBERGEN	XII	29 "
HERSFELD	XII	31 "
IGEL	XII	3 "
ILLERICH	XII	10 "
IMMERATH	XII	11 "
IBERSHEIM	XII	21 "
IGSTADT	XX	28 "
JUNKERATH	VIII	6 "
KOMMLINGEN	XX	1 "
KRETTNACH-OBERMENNIG	XX	1 "
KERSCH	XII	1 "
KONZ-KARTHAUS	XX	2 "
KERSCHENBACH	VIII	3 "
KALENBORN	VIII	5 "
KENN	XX	6 "
KYLLBORGWEILER	XII	5 "
KIRCHWEILER	VIII	7 "
KELBERG	VIII	7 "
KERPEN	VIII	8 "
KOBERN	XII	8 "
KARLICH	XII	8 "
KRUFT	XII	8 "
KARL	XII	10 "
KRAMES	XX	10 "
KIRSCH	XX	10 "
KINDERBEUERN	XII	12 "
KESTEN	XII	12 "
KETTIG	XII	8 "
KASTELLAUN	XII	15 "
KORWEILER	XII	15 "
KRATZENBURG	XII	15 "
KELL	XX	15 "
KOBLENZ	VIII	18 "
KAISERSLAUTERN	XX	20 March
KINDSBACH	XX	21 "
KOMGSTADEN	XII	24 "
KELSTERBACH	XII	25 "
KASDON	VIII	26 "
KEHLBACH	VIII	26 "
KAUB	VIII	26 "
KESTERT	VIII	26 "
KELSTERBACH	XII	26 "
KASTEL	XX	27 "
KILIANSTADEN	XII	27 "
LAMBERTSBERG	VIII	1 "
LAMPADEN	XX	1 "
LANGSUR	XII	3 "
LIERSBERG	XII	3 "
LISSINGEN	VIII	5 "
LISSENDORF	VIII	5 "
LAMMERSDORF	VIII	7 "
LEUDERSDORF	VIII	8 "
LANDSCHEID	XII	8 "
LANDHERN	XII	10 "
LUXEM	XII	10 "
LONGUICH	XX	10 "
LOGEN	XX	11 "
LORCH	XX	11 "
LUTZERATH	XII	12 "
LUTZ	XII	14 "
LAHR	XII	15 "
LIESENFELD	XII	15 "
LANBACH	XII	15 "
LANDAU	XX	22 "
LEEHEIM	XII	23 "
LUDWIGSHAFEN	XX	23 "
LYKERSHAUSEN	VIII	25 "
LANGEN	XII	25 "
LIERSCHEID	VIII	26 "
LOLLSCHEID	VIII	27 "
LIPPORN	VIII	27 "
LIESENWALD	XII	30 "
MALBERGWEICH	XII	1 "
MAHLENDORF	XII	1 "
METTERICH	XII	2 "
MESSENICH	XII	3 "
MORLENBACH	VIII	5 "
MALBERG	XII	5 "
MEISBURG	XII	5 "
MERTESDORF	XX	6 "
MIRBACH	VIII	7 "
MAYEN	VIII	8 "
MUELHEIM	XII	8 "
MEISENHEIM	XII	8 "
MUSWEILER	XII	9 "
MINDERLITTGEN	XII	9 "
MONTENICH	XII	9 "
MANDERSCHEID	XII	9 "
MEHRING	XX	10 "
MARING	XII	12 "
MORSHAUSEN	XII	14 "
MACKEN	XII	14 "
MORSDORF	XII	15 March
MERIMUTH	XII	15 "
MANDERN	XX	15 "
METTLACH	XX	16 "
MERZIG	XX	17 "
MEDDERSHEIM	XII	18 "
MORSCHEID	XX	19 "
MARIENBORN	XII	20 "
MARIENTHAL	XII	20 "
MONSHEIM	XII	20 "
MERCHWEILER	XX	20 "
MOMMERNHEIM	XII	21 "
METTENHEIM	XII	21 "
MAINZ	XII	22 "
MUENCHENROTH	VIII	27 "
MITTELBUCHEN	XII	27 "
NEIDERWEILER	XII	2 "
NEIDERLAUCH	VIII	3 "
NIEDERPRUEM	VIII	2 "
NIEDERHERSDORF	VIII	3 "
NEUSTRASSBURG	VIII	4 "
NEUHEILENBACH	VIII	4 "
NIEDERBETTINGEN	VIII	5 "
NIEDERWINKEL	XII	11 "
NIEDERSCHEIDWEILER	XX	12 "
NEROTH	VIII	7 "
NIEDERFELL	VIII	15 "
NEY	XII	15 "
NEEF	XII	15 "
NEHREN	XII	15 "
NIEDERLOSHEIM	XX	16 "
NIEDERSPAY	VIII	18 "
NUSSHAUM	XII	19 "
NALBACH	XX	19 "
NIEDESHEIM	XII	20 "
NEUSTADT	XX	20 "
NOCHERN	VIII	26 "
NIEDERRAD	XII	26 "
NIEDERBACHHEIM	VIII	27 "
NIEDERDORFELDEN	XII	27 "
ORMONT	VIII	1 "
OBERWEILER	XII	1 "
OBERSEHR	XX	1 "
OBEREMMEL	XX	1 "
OBERLAUCH	VIII	2 "
OBERHERSDORF	VIII	4 "
OOS	VIII	4 "
ORENHOFEN	XII	4 "
ORDORF	XII	4 "
ORSFELD	XII	5 "
OBERSTADTFELD	XII	5 "
OBERWINKEL	XII	11 "
OSANN	XII	12 "
OBERKALL	XII	6 "
OPPENHAUSEN	XII	15 "
OBERSPAY	VIII	18 "
OTTWEILER	XX	19 "
OFFSTEIN	XII	20 "
OSTHOFEN	XII	21 "

TOWNS CAPTURED MARCH (CONT'D)

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
OSTERSPAI	VIII	25 March
OBERLAHNSTEIN	VIII	26 "
OFFENTHAL	XII	26 "
OBERRODEN	XII	26 "
OFFENBACH	XII	26 "
PLUTSCHEID	VIII	1 "
PACHEL	XX	1 "
PREIST	XII	4 "
PHILIPPSHEIM	XII	4 "
PFAIZELL	XX	4 "
PICKLIESSEM	XII	4 "
PELM	VIII	6 "
PLAIDT	XII	8 "
PLEIN	XII	10 "
POLICH	XX	10 "
POLAN	XX	11 "
POHLBACH	XX	11 "
PLATTEN	XX	11 "
PIESPORT	XII	12 "
POLTERSDORF	XII	15 "
PANZWEILER	XII	16 "
PROSTERATH	XX	17 "
POHL	VIII	27 "
QUINT	XX	7 "
RALINGEN	XII	1 "
ROSPORT	XII	1 "
REULAND	VIII	3 "
ROMMERSHEIM	VIII	3 "
REUTH	VIII	3 "
ROTH	VIII	5 "
ROCKESKYLL	VIII	6 "
RIPSDORF	VIII	7 "
RODT	XII	7 "
RUBENACH	XII	8 "
ROES	XII	9 "
RIOL	XX	10 "
REINSFELD	XX	15 "
RICKERHAUSEN	XII	18 "
RHEIN-DURKHEIM	XII	21 "
RUSSELSHEIM	XII	24 "
RAUNHEIM	XII	25 "
RUPPERTSHOFEN	VIII	26 "
REICHENBERG	VIII	27 "
ROTHENBERGEN	XII	29 "
RUCKINGEN	XII	29 "
SEFFERWEICH	XII	1 "
SEFFERN	XII	2 "
SCHLIED	XII	1 "
SCHUMERICH	XX	1 "
STEINHEIM	XII	1 "
SCHONECKEN	VIII	3 "
SIRZENICH	XII	2 "
SEIWERATH	VIII	3 "
SCHWIRZHEIM	VIII	4 "
SCHEID	VIII	4 "
SCHONFELD	VIII	4 "
SPEICHER	XII	4 "
STEINBORN	XII	4 "
SCHEUERN	VIII	5 "
STADTKYLL	VIII	5 March
SEINSFELD	XII	5 "
STEINBORN	XII	5 "
SALM	XII	5 "
SPANG	XII	6 "
SPANGDAHLEM	XII	6 "
SCHLEIDWEILER	XII	7 "
SCHWARZENBORN	XII	7 "
SAFFIG	XII	8 "
SCHLEICH	XX	10 "
STROTZBUSCH	XII	11 "
STROHN	XII	11 "
SCHLEIT	XX	11 "
SCHONDORF	XX	13 "
SCHILLINGEN	XX	14 "
SIMMERN	XII	15 "
SENHALS	XII	15 "
SCHEIDEN	XX	15 "
SAARHOLZBACH	XX	16 "
SOBERNHEIM	XII	18 "
ST. WENDEL	XX	18 "
SPONSHEIM	XII	19 "
SAARLAUTERN-RODEN	XX	19 "
SAARWELLINGEN	XX	19 "
SCHORNSHEIM	XII	21 "
SELZEN	XII	21 "
SPEYER	XX	23 "
SCHNEPPENHAUSEN	XII	24 "
ST. GOARSHAUSEN	VIII	26 "
STRUTH	VIII	26 "
SCHWANHEIM	XII	26 "
SACHSENHAUSEN	XII	26 "
SCHWEIGHAUSEN	VIII	27 "
SULZBACH	VIII	27 "
SINGHOFEN	VIII	27 "
STARKLOS	XII	31 "
TRIER	XX	2 "
TRIERWEILER	XII	2 "
TREIS	XII	13 "
THAILEN	XX	16 "
TRELUR	XII	23 "
UDELFANGEN	XII	1 "
USCH	XII	5 "
UXHEIM	VIII	8 "
UDLER	XII	11 "
UERZIG	XII	12 "
UDENHAUSEN	XII	14 "
UDENHEIM	XII	21 "
URBERATH	XII	26 "
WILTINGEN	XX	1 "
WETTELDORF	VIII	3 "
WEINSHEIM	VIII	2 "
WINRINGEN	VIII	2 "
WEINSHEIM	VIII	3 "
WAWERN	VIII	4 "
WALLERSHEIM	VIII	4 "
WALLENBORN	XII	5 "
WIESBAUM	VIII	7 "
WOLKEN	XII	8 "
WITTLICH	XX	10 March
WIRFUS	XII	10 "
WALHOLZ	XX	11 "
WENGEROHR	XX	11 "
WALDESCH	VIII	15 "
WALDHOLZBACH	XX	15 "
WEISKIRCHEN	XX	15 "
WALDRACH	XX	15 "
WALDBOCHELHEIM	XII	19 "
WORMS	XII	20 "
WIESBACH	XX	20 "
WEINHEIM	XII	21 "
WINTERSHEIM	XII	21 "
WALLERSTEIN	XII	23 "
WEINGARTEN	XX	23 "
WORFELDEN	XII	24 "
WINTERWERB	VIII	26 "
WEYER	VIII	26 "
WEISEL	VIII	26 "
WELTEROD	VIII	27 "
WACHENBUCHEN	XII	27 "
WIESBADEN	XX	28 "
ZEWEN-OBERKIRCH	XII	3 "
ZEMMER	XII	7 "
ZILSHAUSEN	XII	15 "
ZORN	VIII	27 "

Chapter 11

APRIL

NEARING THE FINISH

APRIL OPERATIONS

When April began Third U.S. Army's armored spearheads were smashing out from positions sixty miles east of the RHINE River. When the month ended the enemy was on his last legs, unable to offer any resistance worthy of the name. His Panzers were almost all destroyed or captured, his replacement system broken down, his communications shattered. Complete collapse was impending. The story of the April operations was one of never-ceasing pressure by Third U.S. Army, pressure that the enemy was unable to take. It was also the story of another shift in direction of attack comparable to the ninety-degree turn the Army executed in December to wheel its striking power against the German penetration in the ARDENNES. Restrained from following up its drive to the MULDE River toward CHEMNITZ (K66), the Army was given a new mission on 17 April to strike toward AUSTRIA and the National Redoubt, which it did with great success, driving the demoralized enemy across the ALTMUHL, DANUBE and ISAR Rivers by the end of the month and setting him up for the final kill.

1 APRIL (D + 299)

Enemy resistance stiffened considerably when Third U.S. Army spearheads reached the EDER and FULDA Rivers south of KASSEL (C20), fifty to fifty-five enemy tanks or assault guns being in active opposition. Scattered to moderate opposition was reported in the remainder of Third U.S. Army's zone as mopping up of isolated or by-passed enemy groups continued.

Late in March the 70th Infantry Division and 13th Armored Division had been passed to Third U.S. Army control for the policing and occupation of territory inside Germany west of the RHINE River. On 1 April the 70th Infantry Division closed in the vicinity of BAD KREUZNACH (M03), while the 13th Armored Division was enroute to IDAR - OBERSTEIN (L72).

Mopping up was continued in VIII Corps zone by the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Cavalry Group. Previously they had reached the eastern limits of the zone, but had by-passed several pockets of enemy resistance which they were systematically clearing out at the beginning of April.

Rapid advances of the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions of XII Corps had been the outstanding characteristics of March operations. As April began both of these divisions continued their attacks against disorganized resistance. The 4th Armored Division was twenty miles northeast of HERSFELD (H35) at the beginning of the period, and Combat Command "A" and "B" advanced from that vicinity to HORSCHEL (H77) and SPIGHRA (H77), while Reserve Combat Command and the attached 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) remained near HERSFELD (H35). Northeast of FULDA (H31) all three combat commands of the 11th Armored Division gained up to twenty-five miles, with forward elements reaching the WERRA River at (H8725). Meanwhile, the 90th Infantry Division (-) and the 26th Infantry Division were mopping up behind the 4th and 11th Armored Division spearheads, respectively. The south flank was screened by the 2d Cavalry Group which actually was operating south of the Third- Seventh U.S. Army boundary. Far to the rear, the 71st Infantry Division mopped up small enemy straggler groups in the area BUDINGEN (M98) - WINDECKEN (M88) - STADEN (M89).

The attack of XX Corps had been spearheaded during the latter part of March by the 6th Armored Division. As April began, the 65th and 80th Infantry Divisions closed up behind the armor, and the 318th Infantry

(80th Infantry Division) passed through the 6th Armored Division to the outskirts of KASSEL (C20), while the 319th Infantry crossed the FULDA River near GUXHAGEN (H29), advancing north. Crossing the FULDA River, Combat Commands "A" and "B" (6th Armored Division) attacked east, while the attached 26lst Infantry followed closely behind the armor. A treadway bridge and a railway bridge over the FULDA River were put into operation during the period. Some elements reached and crossed the ESSE River fifteen miles southeast of KASSEL (C20). North of HERSFELD (H35), the 65th Infantry Division (less 26lst Infantry) attacked north through the 3d Cavalry Group, gaining up to eight miles. Positions along the west bank of the FULDA River were maintained by the 3d Cavalry Group. Far to the rear, the major part of the 5th Infantry Division remained around FRANKFURT (M67), while the 10th Infantry moved northeast to the area BAD NAUHEIM (M69) - BAD HOMBURG (M68) to mop up enemy stragglers.

In 388 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command dropped sixty-eight tons of bombs and damaged or destroyed 398 motor vehicles, 109 armored vehicles and tanks, thirty-two locomotives and 236 railroad cars. Enemy airfields were attacked, with thirty-nine planes being destroyed and thirty-eight damaged on the ground.

Third U.S. Army continued its attack deep in Germany as April began. XX Corps units reached the outskirts of KASSEL (C20) while XII Corps units reached the WERRA River.

The supply situation in general was satisfactory, all classes of supplies being received in adequate quantities. On this date 2,108,499 rations and 2,667,004 gallons of V-80 gasoline were on hand at supply and reserve points and 4,874 long tons of clothing and equipment were in the Army Classes II and IV depots. These figures included reserves held by Advance Section Communications Zone, operational-type rations at the VERDUN (U26) depot and gasoline in the Army area. The strength of the Command on this date was 315,336, and in addition the Army supplied 18,719 Advance Section Communications Zone, 7,793 Ninth Air Force, and 431 miscellaneous troops who were in or near the Army area, making a total of 342,279 troops supplied. Two new Army railheads, at HEIDESHEIM (M25) for Class I and at NIEDER INGELHEIM (M25) for Class III supplies, opened.

As the tactical troops continued their rapid advances, the policy of establishing small ammunition supply points and leapfrogging these installations remained in force. The lack of adequate rail facilities was an important factor in dictating the current system of ammunition supply.

A captured German toxic gas dump at HUNDSTADT (M59) was found to contain approximately 55,000 shells, of which an estimated 45,000 were filled with a chemical warfare gas believed to be either adamsite or diphenylchlorarsine.

As the month opened, 46,614 displaced persons were being accommodated in camps operated by military government in the Army zone.

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2 APRIL *(D + 300)*

With the Russians driving the enemy before them from the east and the Allies doing the same from the west, the enemy was steadily being compressed in upon himself. While he was being more and more encompassed, it was expected that the enemy would derive certain defensive advantages from the situation. On the basis of currently available information, the enemy did not possess the capability for large-scale offensive effort in the west, but it was expected that his immediate control might improve and his capability to organize defensive positions might increase. An increase in organized defensive positions and grim resistance of the last-ditch type were expected. With the distance between the eastern and western fronts less than 250 miles, time and space definitely favored the enemy in resorting to his long-practiced system of shuttling Panzers from one threatened sector to another. The enemy had an estimated strength of 16,000 combat effectives, the equivalent of two divisions, and sixty tanks or assault guns opposing Third U.S. Army. He possessed favorable terrain southeast of KASSEL (C20), between the FULDA and WERRA Rivers and east of the WERRA River from MUNDEN (G78) to EISENACH (H86), on which to organize defensive positions. He possessed the capability of reinforcing these positions with the equivalent of one Panzer and one infantry division from other sectors. There appeared to be no sign of a weakening determination on the part of the German High Command to fight to the borders of the National Redoubt, despite the enemy's heavy casualties and the chaos and disorganization in the battle areas. The enemy was still hoping for a stalemate.

An operational directive issued to the Commanding Generals, VIII, XII and XX Corps stated in part:

VIII Corps (76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division and attached troops) was to assume command of the 4th Armored Division in place on Army order, was to coordinate with XX Corps on the move through its zone to the new VIII Corps zone, and was to advance east in the direction SONTRA (H57)--LANGENSALZA (J08).

XII Corps (26th, 71st and 90th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and attached troops) was to pass control of the 4th Armored Division to VIII Corps on Army order, was to continue to advance east in its zone, and was to protect the right (south) flank of Third U.S. Army.

XX Corps (65th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and attached troops) was to continue to advance east in its zone and was to protect the left (north) flank of Third U.S. Army. The 5th Infantry Division was to continue its mission in the FRANKFURT (M67) area and the woods northeast of the city, after which it was to revert to Army control for movement to the vicinity of GIESSEN (G62).

The 13th Armored Division closed in the vicinity of OBERSTEIN (L72), while the 70th Infantry Division remained in the vicinity of BAD KREUZNACH (M03). Both divisions assumed policing duties.

All organized resistance in VIII Corps zone was destroyed by the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Cavalry Group. The 76th and 89th Infantry Divisions moved to areas south of HOMBERG (H17), while the 6th Cavalry Group moved near MUHLBACH (H26), passing to temporary operational control of XX Corps.

A bridgehead across the WERRA River near CREUZBURG (H77) in XII Corps zone was established by the 4th Armored Division, after which Combat Command "A" advanced east to STREGDA (H87) while Combat Command "B" reached GOLDBACH (J07). Another bridgehead was established farther south when Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) captured a bridge intact near RITSCHENHAUSEN (H91) from which point it advanced fifteen miles to the east. Meanwhile, Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) closed to the west bank of the WERRA River. Continuing its advance to the northeast, the 90th Infantry Division (less 359th Infantry) gained ten miles, while mopping up in the rear of 4th Armored Division. FULDA (H31) was cleared by the 26th Infantry Division, which continued to follow the 11th Armored Division. To the rear, the 71st Infantry Division continued its mopping up operations, while the 2d Cavalry Group, still south of the Third - Seventh U.S. Army boundary, continued to screen the corps south flank. The 16th Cavalry Group, in assembly, prepared to move to Fifteenth U.S. Army zone west of the RHINE River.

In XX Corps zone, the 80th Infantry Division had elements fighting inside the important city of KASSEL (C20). Stubborn resistance from dug-in infantry and tanks was encountered, while road blocks and blown bridges impeded the progress of tanks in the KASSEL (C20) area. The fighting in and about the city was the heaviest encountered since the fighting in the streets of FRANKFURT (M67). To the southeast, the 6th Armored Division (with attached 261st Infantry) continued its attack, crossing the WEHRE River and gaining twenty miles to the east. It was followed closely by the 65th Infantry Division (less 261st Infantry). The 3d Cavalry Group began movement to the corps left flank west of KASSEL (C20), while the 16th Cavalry Group passed from the command of Third U.S. Army. Policing of FRANKFURT (M67) was conducted throughout the period by elements of the 5th Infantry Division, while other elements assisted in mopping up scattered enemy in the rear of XII Corps zone.

Poor weather limited operations of XIX Tactical Air Command to seventy-three sorties, but excellent results were obtained for so few flights. Fighter-bombers destroyed or damaged 102 motor vehicles, fifty-five railway cars and nine buildings were destroyed or damaged, while seventeen enemy planes were shot down and five damaged in the air, three destroyed and one damaged on the ground.

Rapid advance of Third U.S. Army to the east continued during the period. There was street fighting in KASSEL (C20), while in XII Corps zone the WERRA River was crossed in several places.

3 APRIL *(D + 301)*

Enemy infantry supported by tanks and assault guns strongly opposed the advances of Third U.S. Army north of the EDER and east of the FULDA Rivers, three infantry-tank counterattacks being repulsed in the vicinity of KASSEL (C20). Farther south and east, the 4th Armored Division encountered stubborn resistance along the WERRA River, where the enemy frantically threw in infantry, tanks and aircraft in an effort to stop the advance before it reached the open plains east of the river.

The 13th Armored Division and the 70th Infantry Division continued to police assigned areas west of the RHINE River.

An adjustment of the inter-corps boundaries gave VIII Corps the central part of Army zone, with XX Corps on the north and XII Corps on the south. The 87th Infantry Division moved northeast, going into an assembly area near FRIEDEWALD (H45). Passing to VIII Corps control were the 4th Armored Division, 65th Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Group. The 4th Armored Division continued to advance eastward, with Combat Command "B" fighting in GOTHA (J06) and Combat Command "A" reaching the vicinity of OHRDRUF (J15). Attached to the 4th Armored Division, the 355th Infantry (89th Infantry Division) moved to the vicinity of GOTHA (J06) to join the division. EISENACH (H76) was being attacked through the period by the 353d Infantry (89th Infantry Division), while the 354th Infantry moved to its new zone. The northern flank was protected



Assault over the Schleuse River

by the 65th Infantry Division which attacked to the east, while in the rear the 6th Cavalry Group continued to clear the area west of the FULDA River.

Spearheading the advance of XII Corps, the 11th Armored Division continued its rapid advance to the east. SUHL (J02) was captured by Combat Command "A", while Combat Command "B" reached OBERHOF (J13). While following the 11th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division gained fifteen miles, mopping up enemy pockets and clearing SETZELBACH (H53). When the new inter-corps boundaries went into effect, the 90th Infantry Division was inside VIII Corps zone in the rear of the 4th Armored Division. It attacked southeast to move back into XII Corps zone, gaining fifteen miles and taking SCHENKFELD (H44), VACHA (H65) and BERKA (H66). The 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) reverted to divisional control from attachment to the 4th Armored Division. The 71st Infantry Division mopped up woods twenty miles south of LAUTERBACH (H12), beginning movement late in the period to assume positions on the corps right (south) flank between SCHLUCTERN (N29) and FULDA (H31). The 2d Cavalry Group continued to screen the corps south flank, while the 16th Cavalry Group cleared Army zone enroute to Fifteenth U.S. Army.

XX Corps had the responsibility for the northern part of Army zone. 5th Infantry Division, however, continued policing in and around FRANKFURT (M67), with the 2d Infantry clearing woods in the rear of XII Corps zone. Continuing its rapid advance, the 6th Armored Division neared the important city of MUHLHAUSEN (H99), with Combat Command "B" less than three miles from the town at the end of the period. Continuing its assault on KASSEL (C20), the 80th Infantry Division cleared most of the city. The 76th Infantry Division passed to corps control, beginning movement across the FULDA River into corps zone during the latter part of the period. Left (north) flank protection was afforded by the 3d Cavalry Group, which was in contact with the 69th Infantry Division (First U.S. Army).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 219 sorties, destroying or damaging 185 motor vehicles, thirty-two locomotives and 104 railway cars. The score against enemy planes was six confirmed, three probably destroyed and fourteen damaged.

Third U.S. Army's mighty three corps attack continued to the east during the period, with heavy fighting in KASSEL (C20) and GOTHA (J06), while XX Corps attacked to within three miles of MUHLHAUSEN (H99).

Plans were made for the trans-shipment of supplies, particularly packaged Class III, from rail at BINGEN (M15) by truck across the RHINE River, using a floating Bailey bridge near RUDESHEIM (M15) and movement forward by rail to Army railheads in the HERSFELD (H35)--KASSEL (C20) area. However, this method of transportation was not put into effect because of the early completion of the gasoline pipeline across the RHINE River and continued receipt of Class III Supplies by air lift. On this date 106,808 gallons of gasoline were received at airfields at GELNHAUSEN (N07), LICH (G71) and NIDDA (G90), as well as 263,445 operational-type rations.

Forward Echelon, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, moved to FRANKFURT ON MAIN (M67), a distance of eighty-five miles from IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L72).

4 APRIL *(D + 302)*

The enemy offered strong resistance to Third U.S. Army in the vicinity of the key towns of KASSEL (C20), EISENACH (H76) and SUHL (J02), but else-where only sporadic resistance opposed the advances to the east.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group set the new First - Third U.S. Army boundary from KASSEL (C20) to SOMMERDA (J39).

The 5th Infantry Division was relieved from assignment to XX Corps, then began movement from FRANKFURT (M67) to the vicinity of LICH (G71). While the 70th Infantry Division continued policing its assigned area west of the RHINE River, the 13th Armored Division began movement from IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L72) to an area in the vicinity of ALSFELD (H04).

Communion on a Hill in Germany

In advance of other VIII Corps units, the 4th Armored Division (with 355th Infantry attached) captured GOTHA (J06) and OHRDRUF (J15) and continued driving to the east. Following this advance, the 89th Infantry Division (less 355th Infantry) continued mopping up. Gains of up to twenty miles were made by the 65th Infantry Division, which cleared ESCHWEGE (H68) and TREFFURT (H78). To the rear, the 87th Infantry Division moved into assembly area near FRIEDEWALD (H45). While continuing its patrolling, the 6th Cavalry Group mopped up along the FULDA River.

Gains of ten miles were made by all three combat commands of the 11th Armored Division, which were spearheading the XII Corps attack. OBERHOF (J13) and ZELLA MEHLIS (J03) were taken, while Reserve Combat Command drove close to MEININGEN (H82). The 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) followed the armor closely in a twenty mile advance, mopping up by-passed troops. The 90th Infantry Division continued to advance south and southeast out of VIII Corps zone, clearing ECKARTSHAUSEN (H76), MOHRA (H75), ALLENDORF (H74) and BARCHFELD (H84). South flank patrolling was continued throughout the period by the 2d Cavalry Group, which relieved the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division). Upon being relieved, the 104th Infantry moved to the northeast. The 71st Infantry Division completed mopping up enemy in its zone, then moved north to assume positions along the line SCHLUCTERN (N29) - FULDA (H31).

An adjustment in the First - Third U.S. Army boundary left most XX Corps units north of the boundary in First U.S. Army's zone. KASSEL (C20), important communications center, was captured by the 80th Infantry Division, which resumed its advance to the east after destroying the enemy inside the city. To the south, the 304th and 385th Infantry Regiments (76th Infantry Division) continued their eastward advance while the 417th Infantry closed in the division zone. MUHLHAUSEN (H99) was cleared by the 6th Armored Division, which then sent reconnaissance elements north and east of the city. North flank patrolling was conducted by 3d Cavalry Group which maintained contact with First U.S. Army.

Flying 455 sorties, fighter-bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 215 motor vehicles, fifty-three locomotives, 162 railroad cars, seven gun positions and nine buildings. While losing five planes, the Air Command destroyed twenty-nine enemy planes, probably destroyed three more and damaged sixteen.

The important cities of KASSEL (C20), MUHLHAUSEN (H99) and GOTHA (J06) were cleared as Third U.S. Army continued its driving attack to the east during the period.

The first trains with rations arrived at the new Army railheads at NIEDER INGELHEIM (M25) and HEIDESHEIM (M25) on this date. Gasoline received at airfields east of the RHINE River totalled 517,205 gallons and operational-type rations totalled 117,348, both record receipts for one day. A refrigeration plant in operating condition with a cold storage capacity of 2,000 tons was taken over by the Army at FRANKFURT (M67).

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5 APRIL *(D + 303)*

Enemy resistance continued to be scattered to moderate in Third U.S. Army's zone, two enemy counterattacks north of KASSEL (C20) being repulsed. The estimated enemy strength in the Army's zone was 17,200 combat effectives, the equivalent of two divisions, and seventy tanks or assault guns.

An operational directive sent to the various corps commanders and to the Commanding Generals of the 5th and 70th Infantry Divisions contained the following information and orders:

His major forces in the west destroyed, the enemy was attempting to defend and delay in the Allied zone of advance with miscellaneous and hastily improvised units in an apparent effort to continue organized resistance. The First U.S. Army was clearing the RUHR in its zone and was advancing east on the left (north). The Seventh U.S. Army was advancing southeast on the right (south). XIX Tactical Air Command was continuing close cooperation with Third U.S. Army.

Having seized the general line MEININGEN (H82)--GOTHA (J06)--LANGENSALZA (J08), Third U.S. Army was to advance east and southeast in its zone on orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group and was to maintain contact with Seventh U.S. Army on the right (south).

VIII Corps (65th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to consolidate along the general line GOTHA (J06)--OBERHOF (J13), pushing aggressive reconnaissance to the east of the line, on Army order was to advance east and southeast in its zone. On being relieved by infantry, the 4th Armored Division was to remain in an assembly area in the vicinity of OHRDRUF (J15) to be committed on Army order only.

XII Corps (26th, 71st and 90th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to consolidate along the general line OBERHOF (J13)--MEININGEN (H82), pushing aggressive reconnaissance east and southeast of the line, on Army order was to advance southeast in its zone, and was to maintain contact with Seventh U.S. Army on the right (south).

XX Corps (76th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 6th and 13th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to consolidate along the general line GOTHA (J06)--LANGENSALZA (J08), pushing aggressive reconnaissance east of the line, was to advance east in its zone on Army order and was to maintain contact with First U.S. Army on the left (north). The 5th Infantry Division was to remain temporarily in an assembly area southeast of GIESSEN (G62). The 70th Infantry Division was to continue its current mission of guarding installations and lines of communication and maintaining law and order in its assigned area.

The 70th Infantry Division continued policing its assigned area west of the RHINE River while the 13th Armored Division continued movement to an area near HOMBERG (H17). The 5th Infantry Division's 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments closed in vicinity of LICH (G71) while the 11th Infantry remained at FRANKFURT (M67).

Advancing southeast from GOTHA (J06), the 4th Armored Division made slight advances, then organized its positions to allow the supporting infantry to mop up and approach closer to the armor before resuming the attack. The 90th Infantry Division (XII Corps) continued following the 4th Armored Division, but was being relieved in place throughout the period by the 87th Infantry Division so that the 90th Infantry Division could move south into XII Corps zone. EISENACH (H86) was captured by the 89th Infantry Division, which continued on to the southeast, gaining seventeen miles and clearing WESTHAUSEN (J07), WIEGLEBEN (J07), HOTZELSRODA (H87) and NEUKIRCHEN (H87). After clearing out all enemy remaining along the FULDA River, the 6th Cavalry Group went into assembly area near BERNEBERG (H57).

XII Corps' attack to the east continued. Only small advances were made by the 11th Armored Division which at this time was restrained from further advance by order. This enabled the supporting infantry to close the gap between the infantry and the armor. MEININGEN (M92) was cleared by the 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) which gained up to fifteen miles. Among the towns taken by the 90th Infantry Division were BONNDORF (H83), METZELS (H93), SCHWARZA (H92), EBERTSHAUSEN (J02), MOCKERS (H83), BREITENBACH (H93) and INEIERNAU (H93). Meanwhile, the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) screened the corps right (south) flank. Positions along the EISENACH (H86) - MEININGEN (H92) road were gained by the 90th Infantry Division after an advance of ten miles. The 87th Infantry Division relieved the 90th Infantry Division, which began movement south to its proper zone. The south flank was screened by the 2d Cavalry Group, while the 5th and 14th Infantry Regiments (71st Infantry Division) moved north in search for bypassed enemy stragglers.

A reconnaissance screen was maintained by the 6th Armored Division east and north of MUHLHAUSEN (H99) in the most advanced positions of XX Corps zone. Like the 4th and 11th Armored Divisions, the 6th Armored Division was restrained from attacking eastward. Just to the west, the 65th Infantry Division made gains of up to twenty miles, mopping up the enemy enroute and reaching positions held by the 6th Armored Division. Upon relief by the 69th Infantry Division (First U.S. Army), the 80th Infantry Division which had been operating north of the First - Third U.S. Army boundary for three days, moved southeast from KASSEL (C20), going into an assembly area in the western part of XX Corps zone. While clearing out enemy to the WERRA River, the 76th Infantry Division guarded the Army north flank. The 3d Cavalry Group, which had also shared in the fighting around KASSEL (C20), moved southeast enroute to an assembly area.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 369 sorties in which 371 motor vehicles, twenty-five tanks and armored cars, eighty-five locomotives, 536 railroad cars and twelve gun positions were destroyed or damaged. Against the loss of four planes, the fighter-bombers destroyed eight enemy planes and damaged eight in the air, destroyed sixty and damaged fifty-six on the ground.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack during the period. Armored spearheads were restrained to allow following infantry to mop up. The key cities of EISENACH (H86) and MEININGEN (M92) were cleared and a large number of enemy prisoners was taken.

Three hundred fifty tons of captured medical supplies were uncovered at LAUTERBACH (H12) and a medical depot with 700 tons of supplies was found at KASSEL (C20). Because of a change in boundary, the supplies were turned over to First U.S. Army.

6 APRIL *(D + 304)*

Three counterattacks were repulsed on the north flank of Third U.S. Army's zone as enemy resistance stiffened. In XX Corps zone the enemy stubbornly defended a main line of resistance running generally along the line HELSA (H39)--GROSSALMERODE (H49)--BAD SOODEN (H59).

Letter of Instructions Number Twenty, dated 4 April, was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, stating the missions of Twelfth U.S. Army Group and Third U.S. Army.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group, in Phase One, was to mop up the RUHR pocket, seize the line MEININGEN (H82)--GOTHA (J06)--SCHLOTHEIM (J09)--DUDERSTADT (C72)--NORTHEIM (C54)--EINBECK (C46)-- ALFELD (C47) --DIESTER GEBIRGE Hills and protect the right (south) flank of 21 Army Group British so as to insure its rapid advance to the LEINE River, then regroup for strong offensive action to the east. In Phase Two, Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to attack on order along the axis KASSEL (C20)--LEIPZIG (E21) to gain contact with the Soviet forces. It was to exploit any opportunity for seizing a bridgehead over the ELBE River and be prepared to continue the advance to the east of the river.

Third U.S. Army, in Phase One, was to complete the capture of KASSEL (C20) before turning it over to First U.S. Army, then was to seize the line MEININGEN (H82)--GOTHA (J06)--LANGENSALZA (J08) and regroup for strong offensive action to the east. In Phase Two, Third U.S.Army was to advance on order to the east in its zone, maintain contact with Sixth U.S. Army Group troops on the right (south) as far as BAYREUTH (O75), and be prepared to continue the advance to the east or southeast.

The 5th Infantry Division remained in the vicinities of LICH (G71) and FRANKFURT (M67), while Combat Commands "A" and "B" (13th Armored Division) closed in assembly area near HOMBERG (H17) and Reserve Combat Command continued movement to that vicinity. West of the RHINE River, the 70th Infantry Division continued its policing.

In the eastern part of VIII Corps zone, the 4th Armored Division was constrained by Army order against further advance, and it spent the period consolidating its positions. Moving up rapidly, the 355th Infantry (89th Infantry Division) joined the 4th Armored Division elements while the remainder of the 89th Infantry Division consolidated its positions and prepared for further movement to the east. After completing its relief of the 90th Infantry Division, the 87th Infantry Division continued to push eastward, capturing ASBACH (H94). The 6th Cavalry Group remained in assembly near BERNEBURG (H47). ALTENGOTTERN (H98) was captured by the 65th Infantry Division which made gains of five miles, and prepared to move south into VIII Corps zone.

In XII Corps zone, the 90th Infantry Division completed its move south and then attacked swiftly to the east with the 359th Infantry, which relieved elements of the 11th Armored Division in the OBERHOF (J13) - ZELLA MEHLIS (J03) area. The 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments, meanwhile, assembled in the rear. Advances of up to ten miles were made by all Combat Commands of 11th Armored Division. While Combat Commands "A" and "B" advanced south to vicinity of THEMAR (J01), Reserve Combat Command attacked southeast to VACHDORF (H91) and reconnaissance elements entered SCHLEUSINGEN (J11). Mopping up behind 11th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division's 101st Infantry was in the SUHL (J02) - MEININGEN (H92) area, while the 328th Infantry occupied SCHMALKALDEN (H94) and blocking positions on the Army south flank were assumed by the 104th Infantry (26th Infantry Division). The 2d Cavalry Group was attached to the 71st Infantry Division, at which time it went into assembly at HOF BIEBER (H42). In the 71st Infantry Division, the 5th and 66th Infantry Regiments assembled, while the 14th Infantry moved east to UNTERWEID (H62), assuming Army south flank protection in that vicinity.

All XX Corps units were south of the First-Third U.S. Army boundary with the exception of 6th Armored Division which maintained a north flank screen north and east of MUHLHAUSEN (H99). Its Combat Command "A" moved south into assembly area, and late in the period Reserve Combat Command attacked northwest to assist the 76th Infantry Division in clearing the north flank. The 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) moved to vicinity of LANGENSALZA (J08), while the 385th Infantry attacked northeast, clearing enemy in zone. All elements of the 80th Infantry Division closed in assembly area of XX Corps zone, prepared to resume the attack while farther to the rear the 3d Cavalry Group closed in assembly area.

Poor flying weather limited XIX Tactical Air Command to 172 sorties. Few claims were made because of poor visibility.

The three corps attack of Third U.S. Army continued during the period. Armor was largely restrained from further advances until supporting infantry could complete mopping up in rear areas.

Rear Echelon, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, moved to FRANKFURT ON MAIN (M67), a distance of 135 miles from TRIER (L22).

7 APRIL *(D + 305)*

Continued identification of miscellaneous enemy battle groups and replacement battalions along Third U.S. Army's northern flank gave increased importance to the capability that the enemy could attempt local offensive action in this sector in an effort to drive a wedge along the east bank of the WERRA River to EISENACH (H86) and thereby reestablish his WERRA River line. Strength and coordination of enemy counterattacks along the Army's northern flank strongly indicated the presence of a higher controlling headquarters with an offensive mission. His position in the THURINGIAN Gap seemed to be untenable unless he could reestablish his defensive positions along the WERRA River.

The 5th Infantry Division (less 11th Infantry) passed from control of Third U.S. Army to III Corps (First U.S. Army) and began movement to its new zone. Meanwhile, the 11th Infantry remained in the vicinity of FRANKFURT (M67). Passing to control of XVIII Airborne Corps (First U.S. Army), the 13th Armored Division instituted movement to its new zone. Policing west of the RHINE River was continued by the 70th Infantry Division.

VIII Corps, operating in the central part of Army zone, continued its attack throughout the period. Elements of the 80th Infantry Division (XX Corps) relieved elements of the 4th Armored Division which were north of the VIII - XX Corps boundary. Continuing its advance, the 89th Infantry Division captured a number of important towns including RODICHEN (J05), WALTERSHAUSEN (H95), RUHLA (H85), NUTHA (H86) and FRIEDRICHRODA (H95), gaining twenty miles during the period. Part of the 90th Infantry Division which was north of the XII - VIII Corps boundary was relieved by the 87th Infantry Division. Then the 87th Infantry Division continued its attack to the east, gaining ten miles and capturing TAMBACH (J04). Still well north of the VIII - XX Corps boundary, the 65th Infantry Division prepared to move south to its proper zone. A counterattack in vicinity of STRUTH (H79) was repulsed by the division aided by two battalions of artillery. The 6th Cavalry Group remained in assembly area throughout the period.

Captured Enemy Officers Watch Third Army Advance

XII Corps was deployed on the front with its 90th Infantry Division on the north, 26th Infantry Division in the center and 11th Armored Division in the south, while to the rear the 71st Infantry Division and 2d Cavalry Group were mopping up and protecting the Army south flank. After being relieved north of the XII - VIII Corps boundary, the 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) went into assembly area near ZELLA MEHLIS (J03) while the 359th Infantry gained six miles in an attack to the east. The NAHE River was reached by the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division), while the 328th Infantry reached SCHMIEDEFELD (J12) and VESSER (J12) and the 104th Infantry assembled near KALTENSUNDHEIM (H72). Farther south, Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) cleared HILDBURGHAUSEN (J10), SCHLEUSINGEN (J11) and THEMAR (J01) in an eight mile advance. Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command assembled throughout the period. To the rear, the 14th and 66th Infantry (71st Infantry Division) were in assembly, while the 104th Infantry and the attached 2d Cavalry Group screened the Army south flank and ferreted out by-passed enemy.

In XX Corps zone, the 6th Armored Division maintained a reconnaissance north and east of captured MUHLHAUSEN (H99) with Combat Commands "A" and "B", while Reserve Combat Command continued to aid the 76th Infantry Division which was protecting the north flank along the WERRA River. The 385th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) attacked north, reaching ALLENDORF (H59), while the 304th Infantry advanced to DINGLESTADT (C70). Advancing in the southern part of Corps zone, the 80th Infantry Division relieved elements of 4th Armored Division and 89th Infantry Division (VIII Corps).

While flying 395 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command had a big day, destroying or damaging 247 motor vehicles, sixty-nine armored vehicles and tanks, thirty-nine locomotives and 340 railroad cars. Twelve enemy planes were destroyed and one damaged in the air; thirty-one destroyed and fifty-one damaged on the ground.

Third U.S. Army units regrouped during the period following changes in corps boundaries which necessitated the movement of units back to their proper corps zones. The general advance to the east continued throughout the period.

Easter services in Third U.S. Army's zone of operations were conducted by chaplains in forests, fields, houses, barns, orchards and churches.

Military government personnel attached to the 80th Infantry Division found that the general feeling among civilians in its area was one of stunned despondency over their misfortunes. The majority blamed the Nazi Party for the continuance of the war and only a small minority were found who admitted membership in the Nazi Party.

★ ★ ★ ★

8 APRIL *(D + 306)*

Moderate to stiff enemy opposition to Third U.S. Army's advances continued in the area southeast of EISENACH (H86), but slackened considerably on the north flank in XX Corps zone. On the basis of currently available information, it was indicated that the enemy would continue to reinforce against the Western Front with a miscellany of low-grade units and hastily-conscripted replacements for existing units and would continue to commit all available types of Panzer units in a stop-gap and local counterattack role. The estimated enemy strength facing Third U.S. Army at this time was 21,200 combat effectives, the equivalent of two and one-half divisions, and 110 tanks or assault guns.



Results of Allied Air Pounding

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS
1-11 APRIL 1945

AND ENEMY SITUATION
11 APRIL 1945

BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 4 APRIL 1945

FIRST XXXX THIRD

FIRST XXXX THIRD EFFECTIVE 1 APRIL 1945

TO FIRST U.S. ARMY 7 APRIL 1945

Fr. Oberstein TO THIRD U.S. ARMY 2 APRIL 1945

From Vicinity of GIESSEN

From Vicinity of OFFENBACH

5th Inf Div in Frankfurt 1-3 Lich 5-7 Atchd to FIRST U.S. ARMY 7 APRIL 1945

70th INF DIV Fr FIFTEENTH U.S. ARMY 1 April 45 Policed West of Rhine 1-11 April

EISENACH

FULDA

THIRD XXXX SEVENTH

CONTINUING CAMPAIGN
FORCING THE RHINE
FRANKFURT ON MAIN
AND
ACROSS THE MULDE

See Notes Page 365

Miles 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 10

BATTLE LINE - 1 APRIL 1945

BATTLE LINE - 11 APRIL 1945

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 APRIL 1945	11 APRIL 1945
VIII CORPS	VIII CORPS
76TH INF DIV	65TH INF DIV
87TH INF DIV	87TH INF DIV
89TH INF DIV	89TH INF DIV
XII CORPS	XII CORPS
4TH ARMD DIV	11TH ARMD DIV
11TH ARMD DIV	26TH INF DIV
26TH INF DIV	71TH INF DIV
71TH INF DIV	90TH INF DIV
90TH INF DIV	
XX CORPS	XX CORPS
6TH ARMD DIV	4TH ARMD DIV
5TH INF DIV	6TH ARMD DIV
65TH INF DIV	76TH INF DIV
80TH INF DIV	80TH INF DIV
ARMY	ARMY
70TH INF DIV	70TH INF DIV

After the remainder of the division had passed to control of First U.S. Army during the previous period, the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) continued policing in the FRANKFURT (M67) area. Both the 13th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division (-) cleared Army zone on route to First U.S. Army. West of the RHINE River the 70th Infantry Division continued policing.

In VIII Corps zone, control of the 4th Armored Division was passed to XX Corps. Continuing its advance to the east, the 89th Infantry Division captured FINSTERBERGEN (J05), CATTERFELD (J05), CABARZ (H95), TABARZ (H95) and WOLFIS (J15) while gaining five miles. Advances of six miles were made by the 87th Infantry Division in the southern part of zone and DIETHARZ (J04) was captured. Both the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions were mopping up and bringing their fronts up even with that of 4th Armored Division. After several days of operations in XX Corps zone, the 65th Infantry Division was relieved by the 76th Infantry Division (XX Corps) and it moved south into assembly area near BERKA (H66) in the rear of VIII Corps zone. The 6th Cavalry Group began movement forward to an area near THAL (H86).

Positions along the front of XII Corps were maintained by the 90th Infantry Division on the north, 26th Infantry Division in the center and 11th Armored Division on the south. The 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) continued their eastern advance, occupying STUTZERBACH (J23) and GEHLBERG (J13), while the 357th Infantry remained in reserve. To the south, positions of the 26th Infantry Division were consolidated along the NAHE River, and still farther south the 11th Armored Division consolidated positions, with elements of Combat Command "B" outposting ROTH (J00) and BEDHEIM (J00). The 71st Infantry Division's 5th Infantry mopped up behind the 11th Armored Division, while the 66th Infantry maintained its position. The 2d Cavalry Group, continuing to screen the Army's south flank, was relieved from attachment to the 71st Infantry Division.

XX Corps units were deployed with the 6th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division on the front, the 76th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Group mopping up in the rear. Both the 6th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division maintained their positions, prepared to resume the advance. To the rear, elements of the 76th Infantry Division completed relief of the 65th Infantry Division in zone and continued mopping up. The 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division) attacked north clearing VOLKERODE (H69) and ALLENDORF (H69) and securing positions north and east of LANGENSALZA (J08).

Improved weather conditions enabled air observation posts to considerably increase their activity, thus enabling the artillery to take under fire observed targets consisting mainly of enemy troop concentrations and vehicular movements.

In another big day, XIX Tactical Air Command dropped seventy-nine tons of bombs, destroyed or damaged 432 motor vehicles, forty-one tanks and armored cars, forty-nine locomotives, and 359 railroad cars. Against the loss of one plane, the fighter-bombers destroyed twenty-six enemy planes and damaged twenty-seven.

Third U.S. Army units continued clearing the enemy in rear areas while making preparations for future operations. No important tactical advances were made during the period.

Advance Section Communications Zone took over Third U.S. Army railheads at HEIDESHEIM (M25) and NIEDER INGELHEIM (M25), west of the RHINE River, and the Army established a forward Class I and Class III transfer point at ALSFELD (H04). The Army had a total of 1,344,670 gallons of V-80 gasoline in supply points east of the RHINE River. Ninety heavy tanks, the new T26E3 (the "Pershing") were released to Third U.S. Army. Forty of the tanks were released to the 11th Armored Division and the remainder held in the Army combat vehicle pool.

9 APRIL *(D + 307)*

There was no substantial improvement in the enemy's position in Third U.S. Army zone and in the adjacent areas to either flank. Except for the heavily-wooded THURINGIAN Forest, terrain in the Army's zone of advance was unfavorable for defense. There was no indication of an enemy build-up capable of local counterattacks in the plains leading to JENA (J76) and the enemy's transportation difficulties and lack of central reserves argued against such a build-up. The favored enemy capabilities were that he could launch local counterattacks with infantry and armor in an effort to deny Third U.S. Army critical terrain features and communication centers, while reinforcing against the Army with hastily improvised battle groups. Stiff enemy resistance continued in VIII Corps zone, with scattered opposition elsewhere.

Control of the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) passed to First U.S. Army, the regiment remaining in the FRANKFURT (M67) area throughout the period. Previously, all other elements of the 5th Infantry Division had passed to control of First U.S. Army. Policing of territory west of the RHINE River was continued by the 70th Infantry Division.

VIII Corps units were deployed with the 89th and 87th Infantry Divisions north and south, respectively, covering the front and the 65th Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Group in the rear. MUHLBERG (J15), HOLZHAUSEN (J25), RUDISLEBEN (J25), BITTSTADT (J25) and GEORGENTHAL (J05) were taken by the 89th Infantry Division in a six mile advance to the east. Mopping up of straggling enemy occupied the 87th Infantry Division during the period. Both the 65th Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Group were in assembly areas in rear of zone throughout the period.

Resuming its advance to the east in the northern part of XII Corps zone, the 90th Infantry Division captured GEHLBERG (J13) and gained five miles. UNTERNEUBRUNN (J21) was cleared by the 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) which advanced two miles to the east while the 104th Infantry remained in reserve. On the south, the 11th Armored Division resumed its attack with its Combat Command "A" advancing to OBERLAUTER (039) while Combat Command "B" entered RODACH (019). During the course of a ten mile advance, VEILSDORF (J10), GRATTSTADT (J20), OTTONWIND (J20) and DROSSENHAUSEN (029) were taken by the armored elements. While the 14th Infantry (71st Infantry Division) assembled in vicinity of DREISSIGACKER (H82) the 5th and 66th Infantry Regiments moved forward six miles and cleared by-passed enemy in the rear of 11th Armored Division. The right flank was screened and contact with Seventh U.S. Army was maintained by the 2d Cavalry Group.

In XX Corps the 76th Infantry Division was on the north and the 80th Infantry Division on the south, with the 6th Armored Division protecting the Army north flank and 3d Cavalry Group in assembly area. The newly assigned 4th Armored Division remained in assembly area. Positions along the front were maintained by the 76th Infantry Division, while gains of up to three miles were made by the 80th Infantry Division. GRAFFENTONNA (J08) was taken in one local advance of the 76th Infantry Division. An area north of ALLENDORF (H59) was cleared by reserve Combat Command (6th Armored Division) and solid contact was made with 69th Infantry Division (First U.S. Army), while the area east of the WERRA River was also cleared.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 549 sorties, and claims including 280 motor vehicles, thirty-four armored vehicles and tanks, sixty-three locomotives and 300 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Nineteen enemy planes were destroyed and 12 damaged on the ground against no losses of the Air Command.

Front line positions were maintained in VIII and XX Corps zone. Rapid advances to the east were resumed in XII Corps zone when the 11th Armored Division jumped off in an attack toward the Czechoslovakian border approximately fifty miles to the southeast.

A gasoline pipeline, a Communications Zone project, was completed across the RHINE River at MAINZ (M35) and necessary tanks and pumps installed, with the objective being to reduce truck traffic across the bridge. Bulk gasoline was transported by railway tank car from the end of the pipeline at THIONVILLE (U88) to MAINZ (M35), where it was pumped across the river and discharged in tank trucks on the east bank.

A German food warehouse captured at FRIEDBERG (M79) was released to the G-5 for Military Government. Until the transportation situation improved, all forward supply points were to continue to issue only operational-type rations.

10 APRIL *(D + 308)*

Third U.S. Army encountered generally stiff to moderate enemy opposition as the advance was resumed in force. There was no change in the estimate of enemy capabilities.

An operational directive issued to the VIII, XII and XX Corps and the 70th Infantry Division conveyed the following information and orders:

The enemy was continuing his efforts to defend and delay, utilizing hastily-formed miscellaneous units. First U.S. Army was continuing to advance east on the left (north), while Seventh U.S. Army was continuing to advance southeast on the right (south). Third U.S. Army on 11 April was to resume the advance with the main effort on the left (north), was to seize a bridgehead across the ELBE River in its zone, and was to be prepared to continue the advance east or southeast on orders of Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

VIII Corps (65th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and supporting troops) was ordered to attack east and southeast in its zone and to maintain contact with and assist the advance of XX Corps on the left (north).

XII Corps (26th, 71st and 90th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and supporting troops) was ordered to attack southeast in its zone, to maintain contact with VIII Corps on the left (north) and Seventh U.S. Army on the right (south), and to protect the right (south) flank of Third U.S. Army.

XX Corps (76th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to attack east in its zone, secure a bridgehead across the ELBE River, be prepared to continue the advance east or southeast on Army order, and protect the left (north) flank of



One German Down, and Infantry Seeks More

Third U.S. Army. The 70th Infantry Division was ordered to continue its current mission of guarding installations and lines of communication and maintaining law and order in its assigned area.

The 70th Infantry Division continued policing the area west of the RHINE River, dispatching the 275th Infantry to the FRANKFURT (M67) area for policing duties.

The 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions attacked to the east in VIII Corps zone, and advanced three and five miles respectively with ARMSTADT (J25) and RUDISLEBEN (J25) being cleared by the 355th Infantry (89th Infantry Division). To the rear the 259th and 261st Infantry Regiments (65th Infantry Division) remained in assembly area while the 260th Infantry patrolled and mopped up scattered resistance. Stragglers in rear areas were routed out by 6th Cavalry Group.

In the northern part of XII Corps zone, the 90th Infantry Division resumed its attack to the east with its 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments abreast. ILMENAU (J23) was cleared in a joint four mile advance of the two regiments. The SCHWARZA River was reached by the 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) while WIEDERSBACH (J11) and GIESSUBEL (J22) were taken. The important town of COBURG (028) was cleared by 11th Armored Division which advanced sixteen miles in the southern part of its zone. Following the 11th Armored Division, the 71st Infantry Division continued mopping up. To the rear, the Army south flank was screened by the 2d Cavalry Group.

During the period XX Corps units were deployed with the 6th Armored Division and 76th Infantry Division in on the north; the 4th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division in the south and 3d Cavalry Group screening the north flank. The 76th Infantry Division advanced five miles, capturing GEBESEE (J28) and BALLHAUSEN (J28). Passing through the 76th Infantry Division, the 6th Armored Division jumped off with its Combat Command "B" on the north and Combat Command "A" on the south, gaining twenty miles before the end of the period. The 76th Infantry Division gained ten miles, mopping up on the way. Farther south, the 4th Armored Division passed through the 80th Infantry Division and swept both north and south of the important town of ERFURT (J37). After capturing THOREY (J25), DIETENDORF (J26), FRIENSTEDT (J26), and BINDERSLEBEN (J26), the 80th Infantry Division continued to advance, gaining ten miles and attacking directly toward ERFURT (J37) at the end of the period.

Flying 535 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command dropped ninety-five tons of bombs in a day of large scale operations. Claims included 455 motor vehicles, fifty-nine locomotives, 105 railroad cars and 114 buildings damaged or destroyed. While losing one plane, the Air Command destroyed forty-two and damaged forty-two enemy planes.

The Third U.S. Army attack was resumed in force, as armored elements again passed through the infantry, forming spearheads which raced through Central Germany toward the Czechoslovakian Border. Numerous towns were taken during the period.

Experimenting in forwarding gasoline, an officer stationed at an Advance Section Communications Zone decanting point at BAD NAUHEIM (M69) stopped all empty trucks on the road traveling toward the front and required them to take gasoline to the Army transfer point at ALSFELD (H04). Deliveries at the transfer point totalled 25,000 gallons.



Blasted City of Frankfurt

11 APRIL (D + 309)

The sweep of Third U.S. Army's armored advances continued without meeting a semblance of organized enemy opposition although the enemy still indicated his determination to continue to hold local strongpoints centering on communication centers and to sacrifice the defending forces in the successive fall of these positions. Indications were that the enemy's position west of the ELBE River and north of the ERZ GEBIRGE Hills was untenable. Some movement of enemy reinforcements into JENA (J76) was reported, but in no greater strength than to indicate that the city would be held as a strongpoint in the same manner as GOTHA (J06), ERFURT (J37) and WEIMAR (J57). The favored enemy capabilities were that he would defend and delay along critical terrain features and in communication centers, counterattacking locally with infantry and armor and reinforcing with low-grade replacements and hastily-organized units.

A letter of instructions was issued to 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) to move without delay to the vicinity of HERSFELD (H35), to clear all enemy military personnel from the area as directed, and to secure the area against enemy raids and infiltration.

Relieving the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) around FRANKFURT (M67), the 275th Infantry (70th Infantry Division) assumed policing duties in that area. The 11th Infantry moved upon relief to First U.S. Army zone. Other elements of 70th Infantry Division continued policing west of the RHINE River. Two battalions of the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) closed in the HERSFELD (H35) area, while the 3d Battalion was enroute to that vicinity.

VIII Corps' attack progressed well during the period. However, without an armored division to spearhead the attack it was unable to advance as swiftly as the XX and XII Corps which flanked it on the north and south. BAD BERKA (J46) was captured by the 89th Infantry Division, and a bridge across the ILM River was taken intact in that vicinity. The attack of 87th Infantry Division continued to the east. Moving forward from its assembly area, the 65th Infantry Division prepared to share in the corps attack. The majority of 6th Cavalry Group remained in assembly, while the 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron maintained north flank contact with XX Corps.

XII Corps was lined up with the 90th Infantry Division on the north, 26th Infantry Division in the center and 11th Armored Division on the south, followed closely by the 71st Infantry Division. Attacking to the east abreast, the 358th and 359th Infantry Regiments (90th Infantry Division) cleared LANGWIESEN (J23), BREITENBACH (J32) and GEHREN (J33). In the central part of the corps front, the 101st and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) advanced abreast, clearing EISFELD (J20). To the south, NEUSTADT (049) was cleared by the 11th Armored Division which continued to advance to the southwest. Mopping up in the rear of the 11th Armored Division, the 71st Infantry Division gained ten miles, with the 5th Infantry occupying COBURG (028). The 2d Cavalry Group continued screening the Army south flank.

The 4th and 6th Armored Divisions (XX Corps) unleashed their speedy attack to the east, each gaining up to forty miles during the period. Bridges across the SAALE River were captured intact by the 6th Armored Division in the northern part of zone, and both Combat Command "A" and "B" crossed before the end of the period. The advance of the 4th Armored Division was halted at the SAALE River by blown bridges. Combat Command "B" was north of JENA (J76) and Combat Command "A" south of that important town at the end of the period. The 76th Infantry Division moved forward rapidly, but was unable to keep up with the 6th Armored Division which it followed. Many prisoners which had been hopelessly cut off by the speeding armored forces of 6th Armored Division were taken by the 76th Infantry Division in mopping up operations. At ERFURT (J37), the 80th Infantry Division encountered determined resistance. The 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) captured the large town of WEIMAR (J57), fifteen miles farther east.

In 550 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 539 motor vehicles, 599 railroad cars, eighty-three locomotives and fifty-three buildings. In the air, fighter bombers destroyed twenty-two planes and damaged seven, destroying twenty-one and damaging six on the ground.

Renewing its armored attack, Third U.S. Army swept closer to the Czechoslovakian border during the period, with enemy resistance generally disorganized. The important town of WEIMAR (J57) was taken.

In order to speed deliveries of rations and gasoline, all shipments of Class II and IV supplies from Communications Zone were suspended and the transportation allotted for Quartermaster supplies was devoted entirely to Classes I and III supplies. All available organic two and one-half ton trucks in all quartermaster units other than truck companies were released from their current duties to haul gasoline for two days. Forty-six trucks were furnished. Gasoline and lubricants were given top priority in the movement of supplies by rail on the THIONVILLE (U88)--MAINZ (M87) line.

For the first time, liberated French prisoners of war were flown from the Army zone to PARIS (S04). In the first such movement arranged by military government, 625 were repatriated. A total of 12,049 western Europeans were repatriated from the Army zone during 10-11 April, inclusive.

Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to HERSFELD (H35), a distance of eighty-five miles from FRANKFURT ON MAIN (M67).

12 APRIL (D + 310)

The enemy offered stubborn resistance to the clearing of ERFURT (J37), but elsewhere only scattered to moderate opposition was encountered. House-to-house fighting was necessary to drive the enemy from ERFURT (J37).

A letter of current operations received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, dated 11 April, explained the purposes of the current operations. The first purpose was to reduce the RUHR pocket, the second was to advance to the general line WITTENBERGE (Y69) --MAGDEBURG (D69) --DESSAU (E17)--LEIPZIG (E21)--ALTERSBURG (U61)--PLAUEN (K10)--BAYREUTH (075) and to seize bridgeheads across the ELBE River from MAGDEBURG (D69) to DESSAU (E17), both inclusive. This position would permit the Allies to operate either toward BERLIN (Z75), directly to the east, if such a move was necessary to gain contact with the Russians, or to launch an attack

to the southeast. If the advance to this general line was made rapidly, the limit of the supply lines would be about reached until such time as the railroads could be brought into operation. Any advance in force beyond this general line was to be limited to those necessary to take advantage of obstacles such as the MULDE River.

A visit was made by GENERAL of the ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER and LIEUTENANT GENERAL OMAR N. BRADLEY, Commanding General of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, to Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, at which time the line MULDE River - ZWICH MULDE River - PLAUEN (K10), HOF (099) and BAYREUTH (075) was ordered verbally as the restraining line for Third U.S. Army.

Movement to the vicinity of HERSFELD (H35) was continued by the 474th Infantry (Separate). To the rear, the 70th Infantry Division continued policing its assigned areas west of the RHINE River and also around FRANKFURT (M67).

The 89th Infantry Division continued attacking eastward in the northern part of VIII Corps zone, while to the south the 87th Infantry Division made a parallel attack. The 65th Infantry Division and 6th Cavalry Group were in reserve. Passing through the 354th Infantry, the 353d Infantry (89th Infantry Division) reached the SAALE River where it was held up by blown bridges. The 353d Infantry (89th Infantry Division) gained eight miles in an attack to the southeast after clearing GOSSELBORN (J34), STADTIL (J34) and DOLLSTEDT (J34), RITTERSDORF (J45), KRANICHFELD (J45), TANNRODA (J45) and BAD BERKA (J46) were cleared during the day by other elements of the 89th Infantry Division. The 87th Infantry Division reached the SAALE River in the southern part of zone, and made preparations for crossing. Contact was maintained between VIII and XX Corps by elements of the 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (6th Cavalry Group), while the remainder of the group was in assembly.

In order from north to south, the 90th Infantry Division, 26th Infantry Division and 11th Armored Division were on the line in XII Corps zone, with the 71st Infantry Division and 2d Cavalry Group following the 11th Armored Division in the southern part of zone. All divisions progressed well during the period, with the 90th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Division and 2d Cavalry Group all crossing the HARLACH River and the 26th Infantry Division clearing SONNEBURG (J40), LAUSCHA (J41) and ERNSTTHAL (J41). The farthest penetrations were made by armored spearheads of the 11th Armored Division which reached the vicinity of KULMBACH (067). The Army south flank was screened by the 2d Cavalry Group. Large numbers of prisoners were taken by the 71st Infantry Division in mop up activities.

The attack of XX Corps continued to be spearheaded by the 6th Armored Division on the north and the 4th Armored Division on the south, followed respectively by the 76th and 80th Infantry Divisions, while the 3d Cavalry Group screened both flanks.

Rapid advance of the 6th Armored Division continued as a bridge over the WEISSE ELSTER River was captured intact by Combat Command "B", and positions southwest of ZEITZ (K08) were secured by Combat Command "A" and Reserve Combat Command. Close infantry support was provided by the 76th Infantry Division which mopped up in the rear, its 304th Infantry passed through the 417th Infantry, reaching the WEISSE ELSTER River just west of ZEITZ (K08), with all three regiments east of the SAALE River at the end of the period. All three combat commands of the 4th Armored Division gained up to twenty miles, by-passing JENA (J76). Bridges across the SAALE River were completed at MAUA (J75) and KUNITZ (J76) by Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B", respectively. ERFURT (J37) was cleared by the 317th and 318th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) after had it had offered stubborn resistance although completely cut off. All artillery supporting the division fired nearly 1,000 rounds into the city. Meanwhile, the 319th Infantry moved east to JENA (J76), and were fighting in the city at the end of the period.

Continuing its large scale attacks, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 588 motor vehicles, 428 railroad cars, twenty-three locomotives and sixteen armored vehicles and tanks. One plane was lost, while twenty-four enemy planes were destroyed and thirty-two damaged on the ground.

Third U.S. Army units advanced well in all three corps during the period, ERFURT (J37) along with many smaller towns was cleared, while JENA (J76) was entered.

Advance Section Communications Zone notified Third U.S. Army that starting 13 April a target of 3,000 tons of Class III and Class I supplies was set for movement into the EISENACH (H76) area daily. As the Army advanced eastward, additional airfields were opened at WENIGEN LUPNITZ (H86), LANGENSALZA (J08), ROHRENSEE (J15) and GOTHA (J06) for the delivery of rations and gasoline.

Arrangements were made on 12 April whereby the Surgeon, Advance Section Communications Zone, agreed to assume responsibility for captured German hospitals west of the general line GIESSEN (G62)--GELNHAUSEN (N07), within Third U.S. Army's zone. Transfer of responsibility involved approximately 11,786 patients in twenty-three captured German hospitals or groups of hospitals.

13 APRIL *(D + 311)*

The fast-moving situation on the Western Front was drawing the Eastern and Western Fronts closer together, with the possibility that the same enemy units might be forced to engage the Allies simultaneously on both fronts. Considerable artillery and anti-tank weapons fire was received in the vicinity of ZEITZ (K08) in XX Corps zone, but elsewhere in Third U.S. Army's zone the enemy offered scattered and ineffective resistance.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group notified Third U.S. Army of a change in the Sixth - Twelfth U.S. Army Group boundary. An operational directive sent to the VIII, XII and XX Corps, the 70th Infantry Division and the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) conveyed the following information and orders:

Miscellaneous and hastily-formed enemy units were continuing their efforts to defend and delay in the Twelfth U.S. Army Group's zone of advance, particularly at cities, communication centers and critical terrain features. First U.S. Army on the left (north) was continuing to advance east to the line of the MULDE River, Seventh U.S. Army on the

right (south) was continuing to advance southeast, while XIX Tactical Air Command was continuing to cooperate closely with Third U.S. Army.

Third U.S. Army was ordered to continue its advance east to the line ZWICKAUER - MULDE River from the point on the inter-Army boundary in the vicinity of ROCKLITZ (K58) to WILKAU (K34)--PLAUEN (K10)--HOF (099)--BAYREUTH (075), and be prepared to resume the advance east, southeast or south on order of Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

VIII Corps (65th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and supporting troops) was to continue to advance east to the line ZWICKAUER - MULDE River from the inter-Corps boundary at (K3654) to WILKAU (K34), thence on the Reichsautobahn to the inter-Corps boundary at (K0913). VIII Corps was to secure a bridgehead across the ZWICKAUER - MULDE River, pushing light reconnaissance forward of this line only to secure essential terrain features. It was to continue to advance east, southeast or south on Army order.

Allied Prisoners of War Liberated By Third Army

XII Corps (26th, 71st and 90th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to continue to advance southeast to the line at the inter-corps boundary at (K0913), thence to the road through BLOSENBURG (K00)--HOF (099)--MUNCHBERG (088)--BERNECK (086) to the inter-Army Group boundary at (07853), pushing light reconnaissance forward on this line only to secure essential terrain features. XII Corps was to continue to advance southeast or south on Army order.

XX Corps (76th and 80th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to continue to advance east and secure a bridgehead across the ZWICKAUER - MULDE River from the inter-Army boundary at (K5486) to the inter-corps boundary at (K3654), pushing light reconnaissance forward of this bridgehead only to secure essential terrain features. XX Corps was to continue to advance east, southeast or south on Army order.

The 70th Infantry Division was to continue its current mission of guarding installations and lines of communication and maintaining law and order in its assigned area. The 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) was to continue its current mission of clearing its assigned area and securing it against enemy raids and infiltrations.

The change in the VIII-XII Corps boundary was confirmed as follows: There was no change to (J5733), thence along the SAALE River to (J8323), thence northeast to a point on the current boundary at (J9026), thence along the current boundary to ADORF (K20). The limiting points were: VIII Corps, (K3654) and (K0913), XII Corps, (K0913) and (07853), and XX Corps, (K5486) and (K3654).

While the 70th Infantry Division continued to police its assigned areas west of the RHINE River and around FRANKFURT (M67), the 474th Infantry (Separate) continued movement to the vicinity of HERSFELD (H35). Both the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions crossed the SAALE River in VIII Corps zone. In the northern part of zone, the 353d and 355th Infantry Regiments crossed the SAALE River, continuing to advance east. REINSTADT (J65) and KESSLAR (J55) were taken by the 355th Infantry. The 346th and 347th Infantry Regiments (87th Infantry Division) made crossings of the SAALE River and captured RUDOLSTADT (J54), BAD BLANKENBURG (J43) and SAALFELD (J53). Mopping up in rear areas was continued by elements of the 65th Infantry Division, while the remainder of the division remained in assembly. The corps north flank was screened by elements of the 6th Cavalry Group while other elements moved to a forward assembly area.

Advancing to the east in the northern part of XII Corps zone, the 90th Infantry Division captured ROTTERSDORF (J61), HEBERNDORF (J61), RUPPERSDORF (J71) and LOTHRA (J72) and captured two bridges intact across the SAALE River. Gains of up to ten miles were made by the 26th Infantry Division which cleared GOLSBERG (059) and BUCHBACH (J50) and on the south flank KULMBACH (067) and STADT STEINACH (068). Numerous small towns were taken by 11th Armored Division as it continued to advance to the southeast. The 2d Cavalry Group moved through the 11th Armored Di-

vision with the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron advancing more than thirty miles to the outskirts of BAYREUTH (075), thirty miles from the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border. Close support was furnished 11th Armored Division by the 71st Infantry Division, which screened the south flank and continued mopping up by-passed enemy.

A sudden drive of more than thirty-five miles was made by the 4th Armored Division in the southern part of XX Corps zone, which by-passed GERA (K06) and then drove to the ZWICKAUER-MULDE River, seizing three bridges intact across that river. Farther north, a parallel drive of the 6th Armored Division gained twenty miles, with Combat Command "A" reaching LINDENBERG (K17) after crossing the WEISSE ELSTER River and Combat Command "B" advancing southeast to LEHMA (K28). ZEITZ (K08) was cleared by Reserve Combat Command in conjunction with the 304th Infantry (76th Infantry Division). Other elements of the 76th Infantry Division continued mopping up in zone. The 80th Infantry Division continued to advance east. JENA (J76) was cleared by the 317th Infantry, while the 318th Infantry cleared EISENBERG (J97) and the 319th Infantry was fighting inside GERA (K06) at the end of the period. Both the north and south flanks were screened by the 3d Cavalry Group.

XIX Tactical Air Command lost three planes from 242 sorties, but destroyed thirteen enemy planes and damaged eleven more. In addition, 140 motor vehicles, seven armored vehicles, 240 railroad cars and sixteen locomotives were damaged or destroyed.

In a day of substantial advances, Third U.S. Army troops captured JENA (J76), ZEITZ (K08), EISENBERG (J97) and numerous smaller towns. The ZWICKAUER-MULDE River was crossed, while elements reached the outskirts of BAYREUTH (075) in the southern part of the Army zone.

14 APRIL *(D + 312)*

Enemy resistance against Third U.S. Army's advances continued to be disorganized and ineffective, with the same types of miscellaneous units being sacrificed daily. There was no change in the estimate of enemy capabilities.

Movement of the 474th Infantry (Separate) to the vicinity of HERSFELD (H35) was continued throughout the period, while the 70th Infantry Division continued policing its assigned areas.

Continuing their joint advance to the east, the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions gained up to ten miles during the period. Rapid advances of armored columns in both XX and XII Corps zones left the VIII Corps front considerably less advanced than those on the north and south. The 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (6th Cavalry Group) passed through the 89th Infantry Division, captured a bridge intact across the WEISSE ELSTER River, and screened the corps north flank while other elements of the 6th Cavalry Group patrolled in the corps rear area. Completing its patrolling and mopping up in rear areas, the 65th Infantry Division moved to a forward assembly area.

In the northern part of XII Corps front, the 90th Infantry Division advanced twelve miles east of the SAALE River. SCHELGEL (J80), BRUCK (J80) and GORITZ (J81) were cleared in this advance, with the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) driving to within three miles of HOF (099). To the south, all three regiments of the 26th Infantry Division advanced abreast, gaining up to fifteen miles. On the south flank, BAYREUTH (075) was captured by the 11th Armored Division which then pulled back to an assembly area. The 2d Cavalry Group assumed positions southeast of BAYREUTH (075) and the 71st Infantry Division relieved the 11th Armored Division in the city and to the northwest.

The ZWICKAUER-MULDE River was reached in the northern part of XX Corps zone by the 6th Armored Division which prepared to cross the river fifteen miles south of LEIPZIG (E21). The bridgehead of the 4th Armored Division was consolidated, after which Combat Commands "A" and "B" drove to points less than fifteen miles west of CHEMNITZ (K66). Behind the advance of the 4th Armored Division, the 80th Infantry Division mopped up, clearing enemy west of the ZWICKAUER-MULDE River. GERA (K06) was

Nazi Gasoline Trailer Is Blown Up By German Snipers

taken by the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) during the course of the advance. Farther north, the 76th Infantry Division cleared zone behind 6th Armored Division. The corps south flank was screened by the 3d Cavalry Group.

While flying 279 sorties, fighter-bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command dropped twenty tons of bombs and destroyed or damaged eighteen enemy planes, 190 motor vehicles, twenty locomotives and seventy-five railroad cars.

Third U.S. Army continued its sweeping advances to within ten miles of the Czechoslovakian border, fifteen miles from LEIPZIG (E21) and five miles from CHEMNITZ (K66). BAYREUTH (075) and GERA (K06) were taken during the period.

The Army Commander attended the ceremony marking the opening of the Roosevelt Memorial Railroad Bridge across the RHINE River in the vicinity of MAINZ (M35).

Plans were developed to advance the Army transfer point from EISENACH (H76) to ERFURT (J36) or WEIMAR (J57), a forward displacement of approximately fifty miles to the latter point. EISENACH (H76) was 145 miles from the Army railheads in the MAINZ (M35) area and forward Army supply points were forty miles farther to the east. The front line already was 100 miles beyond EISENACH (H76) and the establishment of a new transfer point was urgent. The speed of the advance was reflected in heavy issues of gasoline. In the period 8 to 14 April, inclusive, 4,331,087 gallons of V-80 gasoline were issued, an average of 618,727 gallons per day.

15 APRIL *(D + 313)*

Advances of Third U.S. Army, as well as of all Allied forces on the Western Front, continued to be opposed by every type of hastily conceived and created unit and service, training or specialized troops which could be thrown into the Army's path. Other significant order of battle facts were the failure of the enemy to shift units to the Western Front from other fronts, especially the Eastern Front, and commitment of the first unit organized in the National Redoubt region. The enemy's effective combat strength opposing Third U.S. Army was estimated at 15,500 troops, the equivalent of two divisions, and sixty-five tanks or assault guns.

A letter of instructions sent to the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) ordered it to move on Army order to the vicinity of WEIMAR (J57). The regiment was to clear all enemy personnel from the area as directed and secure the area against enemy raids and infiltrations.

Movement of the 474th Infantry (Separate) was completed as that unit closed in vicinity of HERSFELD (H35). Policing west of the RHINE River and around FRANKFURT (M67) was continued by the 70th Infantry Division.

Advancing abreast in VIII Corps zone, the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions each gained another ten miles. SCHLEIZ (J82) was captured by the 87th Infantry Division, while the 89th Infantry Division took PIESIGITZ (J94) and WEIDA (K05). Advancing ahead of the 89th Infantry Division, the 6th Cavalry Group crossed the WEISSE ELSTER River and patrolled to the south. The 65th Infantry Division remained in corps reserve.

HOF (099) and FROSSEN (J81) were captured by the 90th Infantry Division in the northern part of XII Corps zone, bringing its forces up to a line running north from the city. The SAALE River was crossed at several points north of HOF (099) by the 90th Infantry Division, and south of that city by the 26th Infantry Division which captured MUNCHBERG (088) and consolidated positions between HOF (099) and GEFREES (087). Positions between GEFREES (087) and BAYREUTH (075) were consolidated by the 71st Infantry Division as the advance of XII Corps was materially slowed down to allow reorganization for the continuance of the attack. The 2d Cavalry Group initially occupied positions southeast of BAYREUTH (075), but was relieved during the period by the 71st Infantry Division, then pulling back to an assembly area. Throughout the period, the 11th Armored Division was in assembly.

Continuing its rapid push to the east, the 6th Armored Division (XX Corps) drove to points directly north of CHEMNITZ (K66), then stopped to organize its positions. The 4th Armored Division maintained its positions west and northwest of CHEMNITZ (K66). Following the advance of the 6th Armored Division, the 76th Infantry Division drove up to the ZWICKAUER-MULDE River, capturing KAYNA (K17), while clearing enemy enroute. Mopping up behind the 4th Armored Division, the 80th Infantry Division cleared GLAUCHAU (K35) and CRIMMITSCHAU (K25) and began relief of elements of the 4th Armored Division. The 3d Cavalry Group continued screening the corps south flank.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 364 sorties, registering claims of 562 motor vehicles, 101 locomotives and 432 railroad cars. Three planes were lost by the Air Command, which destroyed five planes in the air and fifty on the ground, damaged one plane in the air and thirty-nine on the ground. During the period 1-15 April, the fighter-bombers were able to fly in force each day. As the ground troops advanced toward a meeting with the Russian forces, the Luftwaffe was forced to abandon many of its fields, and planes on the remaining fields made excellent targets. XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed a record number of planes during the period, claiming 111 destroyed, six probably destroyed and forty-nine damaged in the air, 321 destroyed, five probably destroyed and 306 damaged on the ground. Losses of the Air Command were twenty-three planes.

Third U.S. Army straightened its front and consolidated its positions during the period. HOF (099), GLAUCHAU (K35) and numerous smaller towns were taken, while in the northern part of the zone the bridgehead over the ZWICKAUER-MULDE River was consolidated.

Having reached the line MULDE River - ZWICKAUER-MULDE River, PLAUEN (K10), HOF (099), BAYREUTH (075), Third U.S. Army halted its advance in conformance with verbal orders of the Supreme Commander, given on 12 April 1945.

The 120th Evacuation Hospital moved to ETTERSBURG (J47) to provide medical service for inmates of the large concentration camp there known as BUCHENWALD. Of 21,000 persons in the camp, approximately 5,000 needed immediate medical care.

16 APRIL *(D + 314)*

No serious opposition developed throughout Third U.S. Army's zone but resistance stiffened at scattered points in VIII and XX Corps zones.

While the 70th Infantry Division continued policing its assigned areas west of the RHINE River and around FRANKFURT (M67), the 474th Infantry (Separate) continued patrolling in the HERSFELD (H35) area.

Joint advances of the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions on the VIII Corps front continued throughout the period, with the 87th Infantry Division advancing nineteen miles and taking OELSNITZ (K11), ELSTERBERG (K13) and ZEULENRODA (K03) and the 89th Infantry Division gaining nine miles and capturing GREIZ (K13) and WALDDORF (K14). The 6th Cavalry Group preceded the 89th Infantry Division, some elements entering the important city of ZWICKAU (K34). Neither infantry division attempted large gains, but patrolled, improved positions and mopped up in rear areas.

Troops of XII Corps were disposed with the 90th Infantry Division on the north, then the 26th Infantry Division, and the 71st Infantry Division on the south. The 11th Armored Division was in reserve and the 2d Cavalry Group was on the south flank patrolling. There was no advance during the period although aggressive patrols were maintained. The 2d Cavalry Group went into assembly during the period, being relieved by elements of the 71st Infantry Division.

Positions of XX Corps were maintained throughout the period. Elements of the 6th Armored Division were relieved by 76th Infantry Division in place, while to the rear the 65th Infantry Division was assigned to the Corps. Other corps units (80th Infantry Division, 4th Armored Division, 3d Cavalry Group) were unchanged.

In 482 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed twenty-three enemy planes in the air and eighty-four on the ground, while damaging seventy five. Good results against ground targets were obtained with 347 motor vehicles, 319 railroad cars and 111 locomotives being damaged or destroyed.

Advance of Third U.S. Army carried forward in VIII Corps area while elsewhere Army units maintained positions preparing to renew their attack to the south. The Army bagged 32,269 prisoners of war, its biggest catch for a single day.

A minimum of ten percent of the persons in forward areas of XII Corps zone were found by military government officers to be displaced persons. In factory areas this figure was much higher. A total of 112,000 displaced persons were in camps throughout the Army zone.

17 APRIL *(D + 315)*

Enemy resistance on Third U.S. Army's front continued to center on key towns and terrain features, with substantially uncoordinated forces making local stands of varying effectiveness. The most stubborn opposition in the Army's path existed in the CHEMNITZ (K65) area. The estimate of enemy capabilities remained unchanged. Negligible enemy opposition was met by elements of the 90th Infantry Division upon entering Czechoslovakia.

Letter of Instructions Number Twenty-One, received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, detailed orders for Twelfth U.S. Army Group to launch a powerful attack to gain contact with the Soviet forces in the DANUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG (Z92). Twelfth U.S. Army Group was to defend the general line ERZ GEBIRGE Hills--MULDE River--ELBE River in its zone and hold the existing bridgehead as a threat to BERLIN (Z75) unless driven back by superior enemy forces.

Four corps, the III, XII, XVIII Airborne and XX, were to be placed under Third U.S. Army control for the operation. They were composed of the 5th, 8th, 26th, 65th, 70th, 71st, 80th, 86th, 90th, 97th and 99th Infantry Divisions, and the 4th, 11th, 13th, 16th and 20th Armored Divisions. At this time the 70th Infantry Division was in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve and the XVIII Airborne Corps, 5th and 8th Infantry, and 4th Armored Divisions were in Twelfth U.S. Army Group reserve. Corps troops of the III, VIII and XX Corps were to remain with their corps, subject to such adjustments as were necessary to maintain the balance of supporting troops in the armies to which they were assigned.

Third U.S. Army was to complete closure to the general line ERZ GEBIRGE Hills and MULDE River on the front BAYREUTH (075)--ROCHLITZ (K58) and regroup for an advance to the southeast. Relief of the elements of Seventh U.S. Army in Third U.S. Army zone was to be accomplished progressively as agreed between the Army Commanders. Third U.S. Army was to attack in zone to gain contact with the Soviet forces in the DANUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG (Z92). It was to protect the left flank of the advance south of the juncture with First U.S. Army. It was to hold one corps (XVIII Airborne Corps with two infantry and one armored divisions) initially in Twelfth U.S. Army Group in the area southeast of FULDA (H31).

An operational directive was sent to the various corps conveying the following information and orders:

Enemy resistance in Third U.S. Army zone was scattered. Penetration of his defenses east of NURNBERG (040) and the Allied advance west of STUTTGART (S02) threatened the entire enemy defense line in that area. Enemy movements south and southeast from the NURNBERG (040) area were reported, but there were no other indications of a general withdrawal south.

First U.S. Army was to defend the line of the MULDE River and extend responsibility south to the new inter-Army boundary. Seventh U.S. Army was to continue the offensive southeast in zone, in conjunction with Third U.S. Army, to reduce the Redoubt area and seal the Swiss--German border. XIX Tactical Air Command was to continue its close cooperation with Third U.S. Army.

Third U.S. Army was to complete closure to the line ZWICKAUER--MULDE River from ROCHLITZ (K58) to WILKAU (K34) on the front line PLAUEN (K10)--HOF (099)--BAYREUTH (075) and regroup for an advance southeast. On order of Twelfth U.S. Army Group, Third U.S. Army was to attack along the axis REGENSBURG (U15)--LINZ (V88). It was to hold XVIII Airborne Corps, one armored and two infantry divisions in the area southeast of FULDA (H31), initially in Twelfth U.S. Army Group reserve.

III Corps (86th and 99th Infantry Divisions, 20th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to pass control of the 5th Infantry Division to XVIII Airborne Corps and the 7th Armored Division to First U.S. Army, then move to its new zone without delay. It was to assume command of the 86th Infantry Division and the 20th Armored Division upon arrival in the new zone and relieve elements of Seventh U.S. Army. On Army order it was to attack southeast in its zone and maintain contact with XX Corps on the left and Seventh U.S. Army on the right.

VIII Corps (76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and supporting troops)was to assume command of the 76th Infantry Division, the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, was to extend its responsibility to include the current XX Corps zone and that portion of XII Corps zone north of the new inter-Army boundary. It was to relieve those elements of the 90th Infantry Division north of the new inter-Army boundary without delay, assemble the 4th Armored Division in preparation to move to an area southeast of FULDA (H31) on Army order and be prepared to pass to the control of First U.S. Army on Third U.S. Army order.

XII Corps (26th, 90th and 97th Infantry Divisions, 11th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to move the 71st Infantry Division to relieve elements of XV Corps in the left of its zone, then pass control to XX Corps. It was to relinquish control of that portion of the 90th Infantry Division zone north of the new-inter-Army boundary upon relief by VIII Corps. It was to continue to attack southeast in zone, assume command of the 97th Infantry Division upon its arrival in the corps zone and protect the left flank of Third U.S. Army.

XVIII Airborne Corps (5th and 8th Infantry Divisions, 4th Armored Division (upon release by VIII Corps) and supporting troops) was to assist in the movement of III Corps to Third U.S. Army zone. It was to assume command of the 5th Infantry Division and move that division, the 8th Infantry Division and Corps troops to the new zone on Third U.S. Army order. It was to be prepared to move any or all of its assigned divisions from FULDA (H31) on twenty-four hours' notice.

XX Corps (65th, 71st and 80th Infantry Divisions, 13th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to relinquish control of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and the 76th Infantry Division. It was to relieve the 80th Infantry Division, assume command of the 65th Infantry Division and move to the new zone without delay, and assume command of the 71st Infantry Division in the new zone. It was to move corps troops to the new zone, relieve elements of Seventh U.S. Army and assume command of the 13th Armored Division upon arrival. It was to attack southeast in its zone on Army order and maintain contact with XII Corps on the left.

The 70th Infantry Division and attached troops were to continue to secure the RHINE River installations and, upon relief by Fifteenth U.S. Army, were to move by successive elements into its new area east of the RHINE River. The 16th Armored Division was to assemble in an area southwest of MAINZ (M35) and be prepared to move on Army order. The 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) was to continue its current mission of securing the HERSFELD (H35) area.

Additional elements of the 70th Infantry Division moved eastward across the RHINE River to police. The HERSFELD (H35) area was patrolled and policed by the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate). The 16th Arm-

Captured Hitler Youths

ored Division was assigned to Third U.S. Army, beginning movement to Army zone.

Gains of the 6th Cavalry Group, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions in VIII Corps zone continued as ZWICKAU (K34) was taken by the 89th Infantry Division in an eleven mile advance. Gaining five miles, the 87th Infantry Division captured LENGENFELD (K22) and PLAUEN (K10). Late in the period the 6th Cavalry Group moved to the corps south flank preparing to attack to the southeast.

Patrols of the 90th Infantry Division (XII Corps) covered the Czechoslovakian border northeast of HOF (099), while the 26th Infantry Division gained along its front, occupying positions previously covered by patrols. In a zone north of BAYREUTH (075), Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command (11th Armored Division) relieved elements of the 71st Infantry Division in place and prepared to attack to the southeast. Upon being relieved, the 71st Infantry Division moved back to assembly area. The south flank was patrolled by the 2d Cavalry Group.

In XX Corps zone, the 4th Armored Division moved from its assembly area, relieving the 80th Infantry Division in place. The 80th Infantry Division moved back into an assembly area, prepared to follow the 4th Armored Division when it renewed its attack. Positions in the northern part of the front were maintained by 6th Armored Division and 76th Infantry Division. To the rear, the 65th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Group, both in reserve, were unchanged throughout the period. The 71st Infantry Division was passed from Army control to XX Corps.

Fighter-bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 500 sorties, destroyed fifty-one enemy planes and damaged fifty-eight. Among other claims, the Air Command destroyed or damaged 544 motor vehicles, 176 locomotives and 186 railroad cars.

Third U.S. Army prepared for its coming operation of attacking south into the so-called German Redoubt area. Armored divisions were moved forward from assembly areas to frontal positions, prepared to jump off. Meanwhile, mopping up in rear areas continued. The Czechoslovakian border was crossed by patrols of the 90th Infantry Division.

The 69th Medical Group assumed responsibility for captured German military hospitals in an intermediate area in Third U.S. Army zone in which twenty-six hospitals were located. The 66th Medical Group continued to be responsible for forward German hospitals and Advance Section Communications Zone for rearmost hospitals.

18 APRIL *(D + 316)*

The enemy offered only scattered opposition to the advance in the southern portion of Third U.S. Army's zone, making half-hearted attempts to defend road blocks, villages and key terrain features.

Assigned the previous day, the 16th Armored Division was enroute to Third U.S. Army zone. Patrolling west of the RHINE River and in the vicinity of FRANKFURT (H67) was continued by the 70th Infantry Division, while the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) patrolled and policed in the vicinity of HERSFELD (H35).

III Corps passed from control of First U.S. Army to Third U.S. Army. It had been engaged during the preceding days in helping to reduce the RUHR pocket, from which it took a record toll of prisoners. Also passing to Army control to be used by III Corps was the 99th Infantry Division, which closed at TRABELSDORF (014).

Control of the northern XX Corps zone was passed to VIII Corps, which assumed command of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and the 76th Infantry Division. The 4th Armored Division, relieved on the line by the 76th Infantry Division, proceeded to an assembly area. Thus, the corps line-up on the front from north to south was: 6th Armored Division, 76th Infantry Division, 89th Infantry Division, 87th Infantry Division, with the 4th Armored Division and the 6th Cavalry Group in assembly. Front line positions were aggressively patrolled throughout the period. Local gains were maintained throughout the zone, and south flank patrolling was handled by 28th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (6th Cavalry Group).

In the grand-scale regrouping of Third U.S. Army units the make-up of XII Corps was effected by the passing of 71st Infantry Division to XX Corps. The 90th Infantry Division resumed its advance in the northern part of zone with its 357th and 358th Infantry Regiments while the 359th Infantry went into assembly. Gains of up to eight miles were made by elements of the division during the period. In the central part of the front the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) resumed their attack, gaining nine miles and taking KIRCHENLAMITZ (P08), while on the south the attack of the 11th Armored Division made good progress as Combat Command "B" advanced eleven miles to TREMMERSDORF (093) and Combat Command "A" cleared woods northeast of KIRCHENLAIBACH (084). Slowly advancing along the north flank, the 2d Cavalry Group screened along the Czechoslovakian border.

A general movement south was instituted by XX Corps and its attached units. Its 65th Infantry Division moved to an assembly area near BAMBERG (024) which had been taken previously by Seventh U.S. Army. Advancing on the new corps north flank, the 71st Infantry Division gained two miles. Meanwhile, the 80th Infantry Division moved west and south from its old zone. Elements of the 3d Cavalry Group closed in zone near LICHTENFELS (037).

In 393 sorties, fighter bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 333 motor vehicles, sixty-seven locomotives, 383 railroad cars and fourteen enemy planes.

Further preparations during the period were made for Third U.S. Army's attack to the southeast. III Corps came under Army control while XX Corps turned over its zone plus most of its attached units to VIII Corps and moved south to occupy a new zone of operations.

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MOVEMENT OF DIVISIONS THIRD U S ARMY 11–21 APRIL 1945 AND ENEMY SITUATION 21 APRIL 1945

CONCLUSION CAMPAIGN
FORCING THE RHINE
FRANKFURT ON MAIN
AND
ACROSS THE MULDE

See Notes Page 365

FIRST
XXXX
THIRD

From Assembly

From FIRST US ARMY
17 April 1945

Policed Frankfurt
11–21 April 1945

XXXXX
6

Effective 11 April 1945

Battle Line 11 April 1945

Battle Line 21 April 1945

UNLOCATED

KOSSUTH

19 APRIL *(D + 317)*

Indications of a greater degree of organization of the enemy's defensive forces on Third U.S. Army's front were evident at this time. That this organization amounted to no more than a crust was indicated by the successful penetration to the GRAFENWOHR (P03) area on this date. The same lack of defense in depth was evident elsewhere on the Western front. There was no change in the estimated capabilities of the enemy.

The 70th Infantry Division continued its policing, with more of its elements moving east of the RHINE River. The 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) continued its patrolling of the HERSFELD (H35) area, while 16th Armored Division was enroute to Army zone throughout the period.

III Corps prepared to occupy an area on the Army south flank. The 86th Infantry Division closed into the new area while the 99th Infantry Division was in assembly near SCHWABACH (T38). Preparations continued for resumption of the corps attack in the new zone.

VIII Corps units remained in positions along their restraining line PLAUEN (K12) - ZWICKAU (K34) - ZWICKAUER-MULDE River, patrolling continuously. The 4th Armored Division continued to assemble north of ZWICKAU (K34) while divisions on the line in order from north to south were the 4th Armored Division, 76th, 89th and 87th Infantry Divisions.

XII Corps advanced southeast, the 90th Infantry Division (north), 26th Infantry Division (center), and 11th Armored Division (south) gaining eleven miles, twelve miles and fifteen miles respectively. REHAU (P09) was cleared by the 90th Infantry Division, while GRAFENWOHR (P03) was taken by 11th Armored Division. On the north flank the 2d Cavalry Group kept contact with VIII Corps.

XX Corps units in their new zone occupied ground taken previously by Seventh U.S. Army. The 71st Infantry Division continued to attack southeast from positions ten miles due south of BAYREUTH (075) gaining eight miles and taking PEGNITZ (073). Meanwhile, the 65th Infantry Division started passing through XV Corps units (Seventh U.S. Army), relieving them in zone. The 80th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Group continued movement south to their new zone.

XIX Tactical Air Command continued its flights against the Luftwaffe. On the ground forty-five enemy planes were destroyed and ten damaged while an additional seven were shot down in combat. The Command lost one plane. Good results against ground targets were obtained as 353 motor vehicles, thirty-nine locomotives and 125 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged.

While XII Corps units attacked to the southeast, other Third U.S. Army elements regrouped and prepared during the period for the coming operation of striking into the German Redoubt area.

By this date the Army had attained its goal of moving at least 1,000,000 rations and 1,000,000 gallons of gasoline to base points at WURZBURG (N53) and BAMBERG (Q24) before the roads became congested with troop movements for the new mission to the southeast. Advance Section Communications Zone planned to establish at once a transfer point at KAHL (M96) for packaged and bulk gasoline and a decanting point at the airfield east of WURZBURG (N53). Rations were to be continued to be unloaded at HEIDESHEIM (M25) until a railhead could be opened at ASCHAFFENBURG (N05) in two or three days.

In the area of the 6th Armored Division the general reaction among the people was found to be semi-relief that the war apparently was drawing to a close. The average citizen claimed to be ignorant of the atrocities in Nazi concentration camps and laid responsibility for the war and defeat upon the Nazi leadership.

20 APRIL *(D + 318)*

Third U.S. Army forces made substantial gains in the central and southern portions of its zone against negligible opposition. Numerous road craters, blown bridges and road blocks were encountered, but the majority were undefended.



Slave Workers Liberated by Third Army

A letter of instructions sent to the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) rescinded the order contained in the Letter of Instructions dated 15 April for the regiment to move to the vicinity of WEIMAR (J57). The regiment was instructed to move on Army order to the vicinity of ERLANGEN (031), to clear all enemy military personnel from the area as directed and to secure the area against enemy raids and infiltrations.

Amendment Number One to the operational directive dated 17 April was issued, providing that XVIII Airborne Corps would not come under Army control. The 5th Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division were directed to move to an area southeast of FULDA (H31) when released by First U.S. Army and be prepared to move from the FULDA (H31) area on twenty-four hours' notice.

The 70th Infantry Division completed its movement to the vicinity of FRANKFURT (M67) while the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) continued policing around HERSFELD (H35) and the 16th Armored Division continued movement to Army zone.

The 86th and 99th Infantry Divisions remained in their respective assembly areas in the new III Corps zone. Passing to corps control, the 20th Armored Division assembled in vicinity of MAINBERNHEIM (N72) while the 14th Cavalry Group was also assigned to the corps, closing in vicinity of IPHOFEN (N82).

Divisions on the line in the VIII Corps zone patrolled aggressively, maintaining positions. The 4th Armored Division remained in assembly near CRIMMITSCHAU (K25) while the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions and 6th Armored Division were on the line. The corps south flank was screened by 6th Cavalry Group.

Advances to the southeast of the 90th and 26th Infantry Divisions (XII Corps) continued through the period as the 26th Infantry Division gained eleven miles, clearing METZENHOF (083), KEMNATH (094), PRESSATH (P03) and ERHENDORF (P04) while the 90th Infantry Division gained twelve miles and cleared BRAND (P16) and SEUSSEN (P16). In the southern part of zone Combat Commands "A" and "B" (11th Armored Division) maintained their positions near GRAFENWOHR (P03) while Reserve Combat Command assembled in vicinity of ESCHENBACH (093). The 2d Cavalry Group cleared AS (P18) in its continued advance while it screened the north flank and maintained contact with 6th Cavalry Group (VIII Corps). The 97th Infantry Division was assigned to the corps and was enroute to corps zone.

Attacking through elements of the 14th Armored Division (Seventh U.S. Army), the 65th Infantry Division (XX Corps) captured TRAUTMANNSHOFEN (T79) and LAUTERHOFEN (T89) in a six mile advance. Continuing its attack to the southeast, the 71st Infantry Division gained eight miles and captured VELDEN (071) and AUERBACH (082). To the rear, the 80th Infantry Division closed near SCHESSLITZ (035), then initiated movement to NURNBERG (040) at the end of the period. Also closing in corps zone, the 3d Cavalry Group prepared to patrol.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 575 sorties, destroying forty-two enemy planes and damaging twenty-two. Among other claims were 294 motor vehicles, fifty-eight locomotives and 617 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

With the assignment of 20th Armored Division to III Corps and 97th Infantry Division to XII Corps, the Third U.S. Army possessed four corps and seventeen divisions, making it temporarily stronger than at any time in its operational history. Its front, measuring over 200 miles, was the longest held at any time in its entire history of operations. Preparation continued in the northern zone for the push south along the Czechoslovakian border, while to the south XX Corps commenced its attack into the German Redoubt area.

Sudden changes in the tactical plan made necessary the swift relocation of many heavy ordnance installations, including the main supply depots and the Army vehicle pool. The 26th Ordnance Battalion, operating the main supply depots, was moved a distance of approximately 165 miles to FURTH (T30), while the vehicle pool was moved to NURNBERG (T39), a distance of approximately 150 miles. Many trains of full-track vehicles consigned to the vehicle pool at HANAU (M87) were rerouted to the new location. Sufficient vehicles to replace current losses were shipped direct to forward depots from HANAU (M87).

21 APRIL *(D + 319)*

As Third U.S. Army ended its campaign in Central Germany and began moving south toward the Redoubt Area, the enemy offered meager opposition to the advances in the central and southern portions of its zone. Only at NEUNMARKT (T78), where 300 to 400 enemy troops supported by self-propelled guns and artillery defended the town stubbornly, did serious resistance develop.

Corps Commanders were provided with recognition data for use when contact with Russian forces was made.

Policing of rear areas near FRANKFURT (M67) was continued by the 70th Infantry Division, which was released from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve. This division had been continuously in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve but had been attached to Third U.S. Army for policing duties only. Moving to ERLANGEN (031), the 474th Infantry (Separate) continued policing and protection of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army. Movement to Army zone was continued by 16th Armored Division through the period.

In the southern III Corps zone the 86th Infantry Division moved to a forward assembly area in vicinity of ANSBACH (T08), while the 394th Infantry (99th Infantry Division) relieved elements of the 42d Infantry Division (Seventh U.S. Army) in FURTH (030). Other elements of the 99th Infantry Division were moving to SCHWABACH (T38). Elements of the 14th Cavalry Group reconnoitered to the line LINDELBURG (T58) - OBERHEMBACH (T58) and the 20th Armored Division remained assembled. III Corps preparations for attack were practically completed at the end of the period.

Units under control of VIII Corps patrolled unchanged throughout the period. The corps, with the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Group, passed to control of First U.S. Army at 221200. The 4th Armored Division remained in assembly area in Twelfth U.S. Army Group reserve.

XII Corps was lined up with 2d Cavalry Group on the north, then the 90th and 26th Infantry Divisions, and 11th Armored Division on the south. All attacked to the southeast, the 26th Infantry Division gaining eight miles and taking SCHWARZENBACH (P03) and PARKSTEIN (P13). Advancing twelve miles, the 90th Infantry Division cleared FALKENBERG (P24) and entered ARZBERG (P17). Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) cleared WEIDEN (P12) while Reserve Combat Command entered HIRSCHAU (P01). Continuous north flank contact with VIII Corps was furnished by the 2d Cavalry Group, which advanced four miles and captured HASLOV (P28).

Attacking southeast, the 65th Infantry Division (XX Corps) cleared NEUMARKT (T78). On the corps north flank, the 71st Infantry Division continued its attack, gaining another seven miles. Elements of the 80th Infantry Division relieved elements of the 3d Infantry Division (Seventh U.S. Army) in NURNBERG (040) while other elements assembled near SCHESSLITZ (035). The entire division passed to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force reserve during the period. Attacking through positions of the 65th and 71st Infantry Division, the 2d Cavalry Group made good gains. The 13th Armored Division was assigned to XX Corps and was enroute to the corps zone.

Continuous good weather enabled XIX Tactical Air Command to fly 346 sorties. Enemy airfields were hit, with forty-six planes destroyed and nineteen damaged on the ground, 274 motor vehicles and 182 railroad cars damaged or destroyed. Targets became increasingly difficult to find.

Third U.S. Army passed control of the VIII Corps, with the 76th, 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions, 6th Armored Division and 6th Cavalry Group, to First U.S. Army, and passed the 4th Armored Division and 80th Infantry Division to Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve, respectively. Good gains were made by XII Corps units.

The campaign which had started on March 23 ended as Third U.S. Army opened its drive toward the Redoubt area during the period. Losses had been astoundingly small, while increasingly big groups of prisoners were taken. From 1 through 21 April, 240,661 prisoners were taken.

22 APRIL *(D + 320)*

As Third U.S. Army's drive to the southeast gained momentum, current Allied and Russian advances clearly indicated an early transformation of the Eastern and Western Fronts into a northern and a southern pocket, followed by the formation of one or more pockets within the original pockets. There was little change in the estimate of enemy capabilities. It was considered that the enemy was capable of defending and delaying on critical terrain features and in communication centers, of launching small-scale counterattacks, of reinforcing against Third U.S. Army with miscellaneous units or with the equivalent of one infantry or Panzer division. He was also considered capable of organizing hasty defensive positions along the DANUBE River, or of attempting small-scale airborne operations to drop assassins, agents or saboteurs behind the Army's lines.

The 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) took up protection of the new Forward Echelon Headquarters at ERLANGEN (031). The 70th Infantry Division policed its assigned areas east of the RHINE River, while the 4th Armored Division remained in VIII Corps area (First U.S. Army) in Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve. Farther to the rear, movement of 16th Armored Division to Army zone continued throughout the period.

III Corps took over control of zone from XV Corps (Seventh U.S. Army), passing control of 20th Armored Division to XV Corps and assuming control of the 14th Armored Division which was in advance of other units in the northern part of zone. Farther south, the 341st Infantry (86th Infantry Division) passed through the 42d Infantry Division while the 342d and 343d Infantry Regiments remained in assembly areas. The 99th Infantry Division remained in assembly near SCHWABACH (T58), sending out reconnaissance elements to the southeast. Movement was initiated by the 14th Cavalry Group to relieve elements of the 65th Infantry Division along the III - XX Corps boundary, and to protect the corps north flank.

In the northern part of XII Corps zone, the 97th Infantry Division closed with the 303d, 386th and 387th Infantry Regiments going into assembly areas near HOF (099), prepared to protect along the Czechoslovakian border. To the south, the 90th Infantry Division was advancing to the south along the Czechoslovakian border. Still farther south, the 11th Armored Division continued gaining ground to the southeast. Combat Command "A" advanced to HAAG (P40), while Reserve Combat Command cleared HIRSCHAU (P01) and SCHNAITTENBACH (P01) and Combat Command "B" reached UNTTRAUBENBACH (U57). Following the 11th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division mopped up enemy, gaining fifteen miles. A reconnaissance screen along the Czechoslovakian border was maintained by 2d Cavalry Group.

In the northern part of XX Corps zone, the 71st Infantry Division continued its advance southeast, capturing AMBERG (090), ILLSCHWANG (080) and ROSENBERG (090) in an eleven mile advance. A parallel advance was made by the 65th Infantry Division which gained eight miles and cleared NEUMARKT (T78) and KASTL (T89). The 80th Infantry Division remained in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve in the rear part of the corps zone. The 13th Armored Division, assigned the previous day, closed in the vicinity of ESCHENAU (051). A bridge over the NAAB River near BURGIENGENFELD (U17) was captured intact by the 3d Cavalry Group, which was advancing in front of the 65th Infantry Division. Some elements of the Cavalry Group gained up to twenty-four miles as HORMANNSDORF (T97), HOHENFELS (T97) and HOHENBURG (T98) were captured.

Poor flying conditions limited operations of XIX Tactical Air Command to seventy-nine sorties. Nevertheless, 113 motor vehicles, forty locomotives and ninety-one railroad cars were destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army's attack into the Redoubt area speeded up during the period as elements headed for the DANUBE (DONAU) River and the Austrian border. Deployed with the XII Corps on the north, XX Corps in the center and III Corps on the south, the Army was pivoting to attack due south with XII Corps screening the Czechoslovakian border as it moved south.

Because of the long supply lines and congested rail traffic, the problem of distributing balanced "A"-type rations to the troops was very difficult, particularly in the matter of selecting a suitable depot for stores and balancing the rations from which direct shipments could be made to forward Army supply points. Adequate quantities of operational-type rations were being received and the Army reserve had been increased.

Forward Echelon of Army Headquarters moved to ERLANGEN (035), a distance of one hundred and fifty miles from HERSFELD (H35).

A total of 134,000 displaced persons were housed in military government camps throughout the Army zone of operations.



Third U.S. Army Troops Cross Czechoslovakian Border

23 APRIL *(D + 321)*

In the war of pockets into which the enemy fell, compressed from both the east and west, he found increasingly limited opportunity to employ the hastily-formed miscellaneous units which constituted the only replacements he was able to commit. Forced contact with enemy units driven before the Russian advance was expected by Third U.S. Army. The National Redoubt still loomed as the most favorable last-stand site available to the enemy and he was expected to reinforce against the southern Western Front with forces from other fronts, especially the Russian, or from the Redoubt itself, in an attempt to hold open an escape corridor into the Redoubt. There was no overall improvement in the enemy's defensive efforts. Significant order of battle facts included failure of the enemy to create an effective control of his forces despite the commitment of ten nominal divisions in a week's time, the continued lack of reinforcements to the West from other fronts, and the continued pocketing of large enemy forces. Enemy opposition to Third U.S. Army's advance was negligible until forward elements approached REGENSBURG (U15), when resistance stiffened and numerous defended road blocks and mine fields were encountered.

Among units assigned directly to Army, the 70th Infantry Division policed in the general vicinity of FRANKFURT (M67), while patrolling around ERLANGEN (031) was continued by the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate). Movement of the 16th Armored Division to Army zone proceeded throughout the period. The 4th Armored Division (Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve) was enroute to Army zone.

III Corps, after assuming control of zone from XV Corps (Seventh U.S. Army), was disposed with the 86th and 99th Infantry Divisions abreast, preceded by the 14th Armored Division, and with the 14th Cavalry Group screening the left (east) flank. Forward of other units, the 14th Armored Division advanced against slight resistance, gaining fifteen miles to the southeast. A seven mile advance was made by the 99th Infantry Division, which mopped up in rear of the armor. On the right (west) flank, the 86th Infantry Division advanced five miles to HAGSBRONN (T36). Six miles were gained by the 14th Cavalry Group, which screened the left flank.

Disposition of XII Corps units was different from that of any corps at any time in Third U.S. Army's operations. The 11th Armored Division preceded the 26th Infantry Division, 90th Infantry Division, 2d Cavalry Group and 97th Infantry Division in the order named. All units in the rear of the armor were moving south while screening along the Czechoslovakian border. Thus, there was a continuous following column of three infantry divisions and one cavalry group. Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) reached a point four miles from REGEN (U95), capturing bridges over the REGEN River at CHAM (U58) and MILTACH (U67). Combat Command "A" followed closely behind Combat Command "B" as both combat commands gained more than twenty miles. Mopping up behind the armor, the 26th Infantry Division reached the line STEINBERG (U28) - DAUTERSDORF (U49). Other units advanced south as they were relieved in zone from the north.

XX Corps, in a central zone between the III Corps on the west and XII Corps on the east, was deployed with the 65th and 71st Infantry

Divisions preceded by 3d Cavalry Group on the front while the 80th Infantry Division (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve) and 13th Armored Division were in rear areas. Spearheading the advance, the 3d Cavalry Group swept twenty-five miles to within five miles of REGENSBURG (U15). Directly to the rear, the 71st Infantry Division cleared SCHWANDORF (U19) in a seventeen mile advance. Also advancing to the southeast fifteen miles, the 65th Infantry Division captured many small towns against negligible resistance. All XV Corps units in NURNBERG (040) were relieved as the 80th Infantry Division closed in the city. Remaining in its assembly area near EXCHENAU (051) was the 13th Armored Division.

While flying 158 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged twenty-six enemy planes, 247 motor vehicles, thirty-six locomotives and seven armored vehicles.

Third U.S. Army's attack into the German "Redoubt" area assumed its full speed and power as units crossed the REGEN River and smashed through disorganized resistance to within forty miles of the Austrian border. Advances of from fifteen and twenty miles were common in all three corps zones. Third U.S. Army had the smallest losses of any day in its history of operations. Three men were killed, thirty-seven wounded and five missing. In contrast, 8,878 prisoners were taken.

A large enemy ammunition dump containing an estimated 3,000,000 chemical warfare shells was uncovered in the vicinity of GRAFENWOHR (P03).

24 APRIL (D + 322)

Only scattered enemy opposition was encountered by the 11th Armored Division column racing east along the REGEN River to join forces with the Russians. Resistance elsewhere in Third U.S. Army's zone was negligible.

Passing from control of First U.S. Army, the 5th Infantry Division was assigned to Third U.S. Army, but was in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve. It was enroute to Army zone during the period. Closing in vicinity of BAYREUTH (075), the 4th Armored Division (Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve) went into assembly area. Policing around FRANKFURT (M67) was continued by the 70th Infantry Division, while patrolling around ERLANGEN (031) was carried on by the 474th Infantry Regiment.

Crossing the ALTMUHL River at three points in the western part of III Corps zone, the 86th Infantry Division advanced twenty-four miles and cleared numerous small towns. The ALTMUHL River was also crossed by the 99th Infantry Division in a seventeen mile advance. Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command (14th Armored Division) advanced parallel to the two infantry divisions, setting up bridgeheads over the river. In the extreme eastern part of zone, the 14th Cavalry Group screened the left flank while clearing WALDDORF (U04) and KELHEIM (U04), and reached the DANUBE (DONAU) River.

The 11th Armored Division continued to lead the attack of XII Corps. Its Combat Command "B" advanced twenty-eight miles, cleared REGEN (U95) and reached SCHONBERG (Q14) while Combat Command "A" reached the vicinity of ZWIESSEL (Q06). Crossing the REGEN River, the 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) gained fifteen miles while mopping up behind the 11th Armored Division. Upon relief by the 2d Cavalry Group from the north, the 90th Infantry Division moved farther south. A continuous screen along the Czechoslovakian border was furnished by the 90th Infantry Division, 2d Cavalry Group and 97th Infantry Division.

Passing through the 3d Cavalry Group in XX Corps zone, the 260th and 261st Infantry Regiments (65th Infantry Division) advanced twelve miles through KOLLERSRIED (T96) and RECHBERG (U06) and reached the DANUBE (DONAU) River west and southwest of REGENSBURG (U15). A screen along the northern bank of the DANUBE (DONAU) River in zone was furnish-

The Enemy had Women in Uniform

ed by 3d Cavalry Group. The REGEN River was crossed near REGENSTAUF (U26) by the 5th and 14th Infantry Regiments (71st Infantry Division) which continued their aattack to the southeast twelve miles toward the DANUBE (DONAU) River. Remaining in the vicinity of NURNBERG (040), the 80th Infantry Division was released from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve to full operational control under Third U.S. Army. Elements of Combat Command "A" (13th Armored Division) plus the 93d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (13th Armored Division) moved south from the assembly area at ESCHENAU (051) and screened the corps right (west) flank while other elements of the division remained in assembly.

Fighter-bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command flew 306 sorties. Good results were obtained against enemy transportation with 373 motor vehicles, thirty-one locomotives and 510 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army continued its three corps attack toward the Austrian border during the period, reaching the DANUBE (DONAU) River at several points. Good gains were made throughout Army zone.

Large quantities of foodstuffs, both military and civilian, were being captured. Higher Headquarters directed that German food supplies be used for Allied displaced persons, German civilians, and Allied prisoners of war except United States and British, and that the Army conserve United States ration stocks, restricting the issue of such rations to Allied forces, United States and British prisoners of war and United States and British civilian internees. In view of a shortage of "C" and "K"-type rations in Communications Zone, higher headquarters requested that the Army make every effort to utilize "A" or "10-in-1"-type rations to the maximum extent.

Rear Echelon of Headquarters moved to ERLANGEN (035) from FRANKFURT ON MAIN (M67), a distance of one hundred forty miles.

25 APRIL (D + 323)

Tactical reconnaissance and ground reports indicated a possible shift of two Panzer divisions from the CHEMNITZ (K66)--TACHAU (P54) area to Third U.S. Army zone. If employed against the Army's advances, these Panzers, locally, possessed small-scale offensive capabilities for defensive purposes. Neither was considered to be an offensive threat of any significance. Enemy opposition in the Army's zone continued to be scattered.

Verbal orders were issued to the 16th Armored Division to relieve the 80th Infantry Division in NURNBERG (040).

Among Army troops the 70th Infantry Division continued policing the area around FRANKFURT (M67) while the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) policed around ERLANGEN (031). Movement to Army area was continued by the 16th Armored Division. The 5th Infantry Division (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve) continued movement to vicinity of BAMBERG (024) while the 4th Armored Division (Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve) remained in assembly area at BAYREUTH (075).

Advancing twelve miles along the west flank of III Corps, the 86th Infantry Division cleared EICHSTADT (T53) and WETISTETTEN (T73) and entered INGOLSTADT (T72). Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command (14th Armored Division) expanded their bridgeheads over the ALTMUHL River to a depth of five miles, while Combat Command "A" mopped up north of the river. The 394th Infantry Regiment (99th Infantry Division) cleared DIETFURT (T85) and advanced up to ten miles along the west bank of the LUDWIGS Canal while other elements gained five miles south of the ALTMUHL River. Mopping up of the zone north of the juncture of the LUDWIGS Canal and the DANUBE (DONAU) River, along the corps east flank was continued by the 14th Cavalry Group.

Rapid advance of 11th Armored Division in XII Corps zone was continued seventeen miles as Combat Command "A" cleared GRAFENAU (Q14), and FREYUNG (Q23), and Combat Command "B" reached a vicinity five miles southeast of FREYUNG (Q23) only ten miles from the Austrian border. To the rear, the 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) advanced twenty-one miles, clearing ZEITLDORN (U45), STEINACH (U55) and FALKENSTEIN (U46) while following the armor and mopping up in zone. Still farther to the rear, the 90th Infantry Division, 2d Cavalry Group and 97th Infantry Division in the order named, moved south along the Czechoslovakian border as relief could be furnished from the north.

Bridgeheads over the DANUBE (DONAU) River were set up in XX Corps zone by the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions, which both made good progress against sporadic enemy resistance. The 3d Cavalry Group was relieved on the line by the two divisions, and it moved east to assume positions on the corps left (east) flank. To the rear, the 13th Armored Division started forward movement to an assembly area in vicinity of VELBURG (T87) while the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued to screen the right (west) corps flank. The 80th Infantry Division at NURNBERG (040) was relieved from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve.

In 389 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed fifty-six enemy planes and damaged sixty-six on the ground. In addition, 516 motor vehicles, eighty-three locomotives and 281 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged.

As the large-scale attack of Third U.S. Army into the Redoubt area entered its fourth day, elements of XII Corps reached points only ten miles from the Austrian border. The DANUBE (DONAU) River was crossed both east and west of REGENSBURG (U15). On this important day the long awaited link-up between American and Russian troops occurred in First U.S. Army's zone.

A rail regulating point began operations in the WURZBURG (N53) area to receive Third U.S. Army supplies shipping to that point.

★ ★ ★ ★

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U S ARMY DIVISIONS 21-30 APRIL 1945 AND ENEMY SITUATION 30 APRIL 1945

BEGINNING CAMPAIGN
CROSSING THE DANUBE
AND ENTERING
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA

See Notes Page 365

BATTLE LINE 21 APRIL

BATTLE LINE 30 APRIL

BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 30 APRIL

FIRST U.S. ARMY
XXX
THIRD

FROM FIFTEENTH U.S. ARMY 22 APRIL

FROM FIRST U.S. ARMY 25 APRIL

FROM ASSEMBLY

12 A.G. RESERVE 28 - 30 APRIL

FROM FIRST U.S. ARMY 25 APRIL
SHAEF RESERVE 25-27 APRIL 1945
TO THIRD U.S. ARMY 27 APRIL 1945

FROM FIRST U.S. ARMY 22 APRIL

FROM SEVENTH U.S. ARMY 22 APRIL

FROM THIRD U.S. ARMY 25 APRIL

FROM SEVENTH U.S. ARMY 22 APRIL

FROM ASSEMBLY AREA DARMSTADT

5 ARMORED DIVISION
76 INFANTRY DIVISION
65 INFANTRY DIVISION
80 INFANTRY DIVISION
TO FIRST U.S. ARMY
22 APRIL 1945

FROM FIRST U.S. ARMY 28 APRIL

FROM ASSEMBLY

SHAEF RESERVE 25-28 APRIL

FROM ASSEMBLY AREA DARMSTADT

FROM SEVENTH U.S. ARMY 22 APRIL

FROM ASSEMBLY

FROM ASSEMBLY

FROM ASSEMBLY

NOTES FOR APRIL MAPS

Because of the large-scale regroupment of Third US Army, which occurred during the month of April 1945, the following notes have been added to augment the information shown on the various maps:

The following major units were assigned or relieved from assignment to Third US Army:

UNIT	DATE OF ASSIGNMENT	DATE RELIEVED FROM ASSIGNMENT
Hq & Hq Co, III Corps	18 Apr 45	
Hq & Hq Co, VIII Corps		22 Apr 45
4th Inf Div		8 Apr 45
6th Armd Div		22 Apr 45
10th Armd Div		8 Apr 45
13th Armd Div	2 Apr 45	
14th Armd Div	23 Apr 45	
16th Armd Div	17 Apr 45	
20th Armd Div	19 Apr 45	23 Apr 45
70th Inf Div	1 Apr 45	
76th Inf Div		22 Apr 45
86th Inf Div	18 Apr 45	
87th Inf Div		22 Apr 45
89th Inf Div		22 Apr 45
97th Inf Div	20 Apr 45	28 Apr 45
99th Inf Div	17 Apr 45	

The following assigned Third US Army divisions were attached to, or relieved from attachment to First US Army:

UNIT	DATE OF ATTACHMENT	DATE RELIEVED FROM ATTACHMENT
4th Armd Div	22 Apr 45	23 Apr 45
5th Inf Div (- 11th Inf Regt)	7 Apr 45	25 Apr 45
13th Armd Div	7 Apr 45	21 Apr 45

Within Third US Army, the following divisions were assigned (or attached or relieved from assignment (or attachment) to Corps:

UNIT	RELIEVED FROM ASSIGNMENT TO	ASSIGNED TO	EFFECTIVE DATE
4th Armd Div	XII Corps	VIII Corps	4 Apr 45
	VIII Corps	XX Corps	9 Apr 45
	XX Corps	VIII Corps (atchd)	17 Apr 45
	VIII Corps (atchmt)		22 Apr 45
		XII Corps	30 Apr 45
5th Inf Div	XX Corps		4 Apr 45
		XII Corps	28 Apr 45
6th Armd Div	XX Corps	VIII Corps	17 Apr 45
13th Armd Div		XX Corps	21 Apr 45
14th Armd Div		III Corps	23 Apr 45
20th Armd Div		III Corps	19 Apr 45
	III Corps		23 Apr 45
65th Inf Div	XX Corps	VIII Corps	4 Apr 45
	VIII Corps	XX Corps	17 Apr 45
71st Inf Div	XII Corps	XX Corps	17 Apr 45
76th Inf Div	VIII Corps	XX Corps	4 Apr 45
	XX Corps	VIII Corps	17 Apr 45
86th Inf Div		III Corps	18 Apr 45
97th Inf Div		XII Corps	20 Apr 45
	XII Corps		28 Apr 45
99th Inf Div		III Corps	17 Apr 45

The following summary sets forth the divisional moves during the period 1 April 1945 to 1 May 1945:

UNIT	DATE OF MOVEMENT	FROM	TO
13th Armd Div	1-2 Apr 45	ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q7372)	IDAR OBERSTEIN (L7025)

CCB, 13th Armd Div	5 Apr 45	vic IDAR OBERSTEIN (L7025)	vic HOMBURG (H1772)
RCT 2, 5th Inf Div	4 Apr 45	vic FRANKFURT (M6770)	vic LICH (G7614)
RCT 10, 5th Inf Div	5 Apr 45	vic FRANKFURT (M6770)	vic LICH (G7614)
CCA, 13th Armd Div	6 Apr 45	vic KIRN (L8032)	vic HOMBURG (H1772)
CCR, 13th Armd Div	7 Apr 45	vic KIRN (L8032)	vic HOMBURG (H1772)
13th Armd Div	8-9 Apr 45	HOMBURG (H1772)	ALTENKIRCHEN (F9333)
5th Inf Div (-RCT 11)	8-9 Apr 45	LICH (G7614)	MEDEBACH (G6889)
RCT 11, 5th Inf Div	12-13-14 Apr 45	FRANKFURT (M6770)	MEDEBACH (G6889)
474th Inf Regt (Separate)	11-13 Apr 45	AACHEN (K8343)	HERSFELD (H3954)
16th Armd Div	16-27 Apr 45	vic ROUEN (FRANCE) from 15th Army	vic MAINZ (M3856)
65th Inf Div	17-18 Apr 45	vic ARNSTADT (J2554)	vic BAMBERG (02649)
99th Inf Div	17-18 Apr 45	vic ALTENA (A9600)	SCHWEINFURT (N7864)
Hq & Hq Co, III Corps & Corps Troops	18-19-20 Apr 45	FREDEBURG (G4088)	vic NEUSTADT (00713)
Hq & Hq Co, XX Corps & Corps Troops	17-18-19-20 Apr 45	WEIMAR (J5272)	vic BAMBERG (02649)
86th Inf Div	19-20 Apr 45	HOHENLIMBURG (A8807)	vic NEUSTADT (00713)
70th Inf Div	17-21 Apr 45	BAD KREUZNACH (M0938)	FRANKFURT (M6770)
20th Armd Div	20-21 Apr 45	WALDMUHLEN (G2321)	KITZINGEN (N7528)
97th Inf Div	21-23 Apr 45	vic BERG-GLADBACH (F5865)	HOF (09799)
80th Inf Div	19-20 Apr 45	GERA (K0563)	BAMBERG (02649)
13th Armd Div	20-22 Apr 45	vic COLOGNE (F4559)	vic NURNBERG (04300)
474th Inf Regt (Separate)	22 Apr 45	HERSFELD (H3954)	ERLANGEN (03617)
4th Armd Div	24-25 Apr 45	W of CHEMNITZ (K6560)	BAYREUTH (07555)
16th Armd Div	26-30 Apr 45	MAINZ (M3856)	NURNBERG (04300)
5th Inf Div	25-27 Apr 45	vic MENDEN (B0317)	BAMBERG (02649)
5th Inf Div	29-30 Apr 45	BAMBERG (02649)	vic REGEN (U9455)

Regroupment:

Third US Army's easterly advance during the first two weeks of April established its forward elements along a general north-south line LEIPZIG - CHEMNITZ - western tip of CZECHOSLOVAKIA - BAYREUTH. On 17 April the disposition of major units was as follows (schematic):

			(NORTH)
	XX CORPS		(6th Armd Div (80th Inf Div (4th Armd Div (76th Inf Div
70th Inf Div (SHAEF RESERVE)	VIII CORPS	(65th Inf Div ((Res)	87th Inf Div 89th Inf Div
	XII CORPS		(90th Inf Div (26th Inf Div (11th Armd Div (71st Inf Div
			(SOUTH)

Twelfth US Army Group directed Third US Army to relinquish its northern area to First US Army, to assume control of an area to the south then in Seventh US Army zone, and to advance to the southeast along the western boundary of Czechoslovakia toward Austria. Involved in this operation were the release in place of the VIII Corps and 5 divisions to First US Army, the acquisition of the III Corps and 6 divisions to be moved in from First US Army, the movement of supporting Army troops to the new zone, and the resumption of the offensive. The new Army order of battle from northeast to southwest was to be; XII Corps, XX Corps and III Corps. This operation was accomplished by the following steps:

17 April 45

1. VIII Corps, in place, retained the 87th and 89th Infantry Divisions, and assumed control from XX Corps of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions and 76th Infantry Division.

2. XII Corps remained in place with the 11th Armored Division, 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions. The 71st Infantry Division sideslipped to the southwest to become the left flank unit in the new XX Corps zone.

3. The 65th Infantry Division, in VIII Corps reserve, commenced to move south into the new XX Corps zone, coming into line on the right of the 71st Infantry Division.

4. XX Corps troops began to move from the Army north flank, across the rear of VIII Corps and XII Corps, and into position on the right of XII Corps.

5. The 99th Infantry Division commenced to move from First US Army to vicinity of SCHWEINFURT (N7864) as left flank of the III Corps new zone and to the right of the new XX Corps zone.

18 April 45 6. III Corps troops began to move from First US Army into new zone on Third US Army's right flank.

19 April 45 7. The 80th Infantry Division commenced its move as part of the XX Corps, crossing both the VIII and XII Corps, and going into line on the right of the 65th Infantry Division.

8. The 86th Infantry Division moved from First US Army into the III Corps zone on the right of the 99th Infantry Division.

20 April 45 9. The 20th Armored Division moved from First US Army into the III Corps zone in rear of the 86th Infantry Division.

10. The 13th Armored Division moved from First US Army into the XX Corps zone along its right flank.

21 April 45 11. The 97th Infantry Division moved from First US Army into the XII Corps zone taking up the extreme left flank position.

This regroupment was largely completed late on 22 April. The VIII Corps passed to control of First US Army on that date, and Third US Army assumed the offensive in its new zone on 23 April. At this time the schematic disposition of units was as shown:



As a final corollary to the regroupment, the 20th Armored Division moved to the southwest out of the III Corps zone on 23 April, passing to control of the Seventh US Army. In exchange from Seventh US Army, the III Corps assumed control of the 14th Armored Division in place. The 4th Armored Division moved on 24 April from First US Army, assembling in the vicinity of BAYREUTH (07555) in Twelfth US Army Group reserve. On 25 April, the 5th Infantry Division moved from First US Army to the vicinity of BAMBERG (02649) in SHAEF reserve. This restriction was raised on 28 April, and on 29 April the Division moved into the XII Corps zone. Also on 28 April, the 97th Infantry Division, in XII Corps, was released in place to control of First US Army.

The statistics of April's troop movements can only be surmised. There were 26 separate movements involving divisional units and corps troops. Some of the troops coming from First US Army made administrative moves of close to 300 miles. Third US Army Headquarters itself accomplished a lateral move of 150 miles on 23 April in order to follow the line of communication in its new zone. It can be estimated that 350,000 - 400,000 troops were involved in Third US Army's regroupment, change of area, and resumed offensive in the new direction.

RESERVE UNITS

At the start of the month, the 13th Armored Division and 70th Infantry Division were earmarked as SHAEF reserves, subject to movement from the Third US Army area on 24 hours notice. The 13th Armored Division was released from this restriction on 5 April, and moved east of the RHINE into the XX Corps rear area, and then back into First US Army southeast of COLOGNE (F4559). The 70th Infantry Division remained in status until 20 April, being then released in exchange for the 80th Infantry Division located at NURNBERG (04300). The 80th Infantry Division was released on 24 April, and the 5th Infantry Division became SHAEF reserve effective upon arrival at BAMBERG (02649), remaining in that status until 28 April. The 4th Armored Division was designated as Twelfth US Army Group reserve at BAYREUTH (07555) from 22 to 30 April, being released on the latter date in exchange for the 16th Armored Division then closing into NURNBERG (04300).

Line of Communications

Prior to Third US Army's advance into Germany, line of communications responsibilities had extended from Corps rear boundaries to the forward boundary of Advance Section, Communications Zone, an area which fell within liberated territory. With the advance to the east, however, the Army rear boundary did not move beyond the political boundary between GERMANY, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG and FRANCE, and the line of communications area not only became extended but fell entirely within enemy territory. Line of communications and rear area security were responsibilities assigned to the Army Provost Marshal.

On 1 April the 70th Infantry Division was assigned to Third US Army and placed in SHAEF reserve, with the restriction that it could not be employed east of the RHINE RIVER and was subject to movement from the Army area on 24 hours notice. On 2 April, the 13th Armored Division was assigned to Third US Army in similar status and with the same restrictions. Both divisions were immediately given line of communication and security missions: the 70th Infantry Division in the area west of the

RHINE, including BAD KREUZNACH (M0938), OPPENHEIM (M4239), MAINZ (M3856) and BINGEN (M1253); the 13th Armored Division, in an area extending west from the 70th Infantry Division to the GERMANY-LUXEMBOURG-FRANCE boundary, including SAARBURG (L1413), IDAR OBERSTEIN (L7025), SIMMERN (L8558), WITTLICH (L3954), TRIER (L2124). A detachment also occupied KOBLENZ (L8995). (See Operational Directive dated 31 March 1945 - Annex 2 - Volume I).

On 4 April one battalion of the 70th Infantry Division moved across the RHINE to garrison and secure the city of WIESBADEN (M3564), the new headquarters of Twelfth US Army Group. (See Letter of Instructions dated 4 April 1945 - Annex 2 - Volume I).

On the same date a meeting was held at FRANKFURT (M6770) with Fifteenth US Army representatives to arrange for the relief of Third US Army units on line of communications missions west of the RHINE, the relief to be accomplished successively as troops became available to Fifteenth US Army. The screening and patrolling of both banks of the RHINE, the maintance and protection of bridges over the river, including antiaircraft protection, were to remain the responsibility of Third US Army indefinitely. As a part of this arrangement Third US Army agreed to leave the following units west of the RHINE until relief could be effected by Fifteenth US Army:

70th Infantry Division
243d FA Battalion
267th FA Battalion
558th FA Battalion
10th Belgian Fusilier Battalion

The agreement further arranged for the ultimate release of the 10th and 11th Belgian Fusilier Battalions to Fifteenth US Army, as well as 4 French infantry battalions, 3 French Class "B" battalions and 1 French truck company. These units were all released during April.

The 13th Armored Division was released from SHAEF reserve on 5 April, and commenced movement east of the RHINE. Its line of communications responsibilities and area were turned back to the Provost Marshal.

On 14 April the 70th Infantry Division was ordered to garrison the city of FRANKFURT (M6770) with not more than 1 infantry regiment. The 70th Infantry Division was completely relieved west of the RHINE by Fifteenth US Army troops by 20 April, and was released from SHAEF reserve on that date. The division's troops closed in the DARMSTADT (M6642) - ASCHAFFENBURG (N0154) - HANAU (M8471) - FRANKFURT (M6770) - LIMBURG (M2499) area on 21 April. On 29 April the division was assigned line of communication responsibilities in an additional area including WURZBURG (N5935), KITZINGEN (N7529) and SCHWEINFURT (N7864). (Letter of Instructions dated 26 April 1945 - Annex 2 - Volume I).



Antiaircraft Weapon Protects Danube Crossing near Viehhausen, Germany

26 APRIL *(D + 324)*

Enemy resistance continued to be scattered and disorganized throughout Third U.S. Army's zone. Two bridgeheads across the DANUBE River east and west of REGENSBURG (U15) received no serious enemy opposition, while the 11th Armored Division's spearheads continued their rapid advance toward the Austrian border against meager enemy resistance.

A letter of instruction was sent to the 70th Infantry Division increasing the zone of policing for the division, effective 29 April 1945.

Closing in vicinity of MAINZ (M35), the 16th Armored Division continued its movement to NURNBERG (040). Still in Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve, the 4th Armored Division remained at BAYREUTH (075) while the 5th Infantry Division (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve) continued movement to BAMBERG (024). Meanwhile, patrolling and policing in the vicinities of FRANKFURT (M67) and ERLANGEN (031) was conducted by the 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) respectively.

A bridgehead over the DANUBE (DONAU) River in the western part of III Corps zone was assumed by the 86th Infantry Division which captured INGOLSTADT (T72) during the course of a four mile advance. A treadway bridge near INGOLSTADT (T72) was completed and the 343d Infantry (86th Infantry Division) drove six miles south of the DANUBE (DONAU) River. To the east the 394th and 395th Infantry Regiments (99th Infantry Division) drove south to the DANUBE (DONAU) River at the end of the period.

On the corps east (left) flank, the 14th Cavalry Group cleared the zone north of the DANUBE (DONAU) River while maintaining contact with XX Corps elements.

XII Corps units continued to be spearheaded by the 11th Armored Division, with the 26th Infantry Division following closely and mopping up behind the armored elements. Other units (90th Infantry Division, 2d Cavalry Group and 97th Infantry Division) continued to screen the Czechoslovakian border, side-stepping to the south as they did so. While the corps had a comparatively narrow front of fifty miles, it had an extended flank of more than 150 miles along the Czechoslovakian border. Patrol elements of the 11th Armored Division crossed the Austrian border, and then came back to assembly areas approximately six miles north of the border. Both Combat Commands "A" and "B" were prepared to strike across the border in strength at the end of the period, with Combat Command "A" assembled in the vicinity FURHOLZ (Q33) and Combat Command "B" in the vicinity WALDKIRCHEN (Q33) - WOLLABERG (Q33). Mopping up was continued by the 26th Infantry Division which gained eighteen miles and captured BOGEN (U64) and METTEN (U84). As other units to the north expanded their zone of flank protection, the 90th Infantry Division moved south twelve miles.

In XX Corps zone the 65th Infantry Division reinforced and expanded its bridgehead over the DANUBE (DONAU) River, completing a treadway bridge in the vicinity of LOHSTADT (U14). Another treadway bridge was completed farther east near SULZBACH (U25) by the 71st Infantry Division. Both divisions held their bridgeheads securely to a depth of five miles at the end of the period. The 80th Infantry Division remained at NURNBERG (040), while the 13th Armored Division moved to a forward assembly area at VELBURG (T87). Late in the period it advanced farther south to institute crossing of the DANUBE (DONAU) River. Patrolling activities on the east (left) flank were continued by the 3d Cavalry Group, which maintained contact with XII Corps.

Although weather conditions were not the best, XIX Tactical Air Command flew 465 sorties and destroyed or damaged 444 motor vehicles, seventy locomotives and 425 railroad cars.

Third U.S. Army's advance continued unabated as the first patrols crossed the Austrian border during the period. INGOLSTADT (T72) was captured and firm bridgeheads over the DANUBE (DONAU) River in XX Corps zone were secured.

On this date 1,129,675 gallons of V-80 gasoline were issued, up to this time the largest day's issue of the campaign.

To date no cars of Classes II and IV supplies had been brought across the RHINE River. Because rail priority had been given to Classes I and III supplies, cars of Classes II and IV supplies had been placed in storage yards west of the RHINE River. On this date the Army requested that thirty-five cars of Classes II and IV supplies be delivered each day to an unloading point at WURZBURG (N53), where rail facilities had opened, with priority given to cars containing clothing.

27 APRIL *(D + 325)*

Moderate to scattered enemy resistance was encountered while expanding the bridgeheads across the DANUBE River in the central portion of Third U.S. Army's zone, but additional crossings of the DANUBE in III Corps zone received heavy enemy opposition throughout the period.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group directed that First U.S. Army would take over the protection of the left flank of Third U.S. Army along the Czechoslovakian border as troops became available. It further changed the First - Third U.S. Army boundary.

Among Army Troops, the 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) policed their respective assigned areas. The 16th Armored Division continued its movement to NURNBERG (040). Closing in assembly area at BAMBERG (024), the 5th Infantry Division was released from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Reserve. The 4th Armored Division remained unchanged in assembly at BAYREUTH (075) in Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve.

Advances of up to fifteen miles south of the DANUBE (DONAU) River were made by the 86th Infantry Division on the west flank of XII Corps zone. The 393d Infantry (99th Infantry Division) crossed the DANUBE (DONAU) River, followed closely by the 395th Infantry. NEUSTADT (T93), EINING (T93) and SITTLING (T93) were taken by these two regiments, while the 394th Infantry (99th Infantry Division) held position along the north bank of the river. Reserve Combat Command (14th Armored Division) relieved elements of the 86th Infantry Division at INGOLSTADT (T72) while Combat Commands "A" and "B" maintained positions north of the DAN-

UBE (DONAU) River. Completing its mopping up on the corps east (left) flank, the 14th Cavalry Group assembled in vicinity of BUCH (T94).

Relief in the northern part of XII Corps' extended zone was started by the 1st Infantry Division (First U.S. Army) so that corps units could continue their side-stepping to the south along the Czechoslovakian border. The 90th Infantry Division, 2d Cavalry Group and 97th Infantry Division continued their southern movement, with some elements of each across the border to a depth of two to five miles. The 11th Armored Division remained in assembly just north of the Austrian border, while the 26th Infantry Division closed up behind the armor in a twelve mile advance and captured ST HERMAN (U94) and DEGGENDORF (U89).

Crossing the DANUBE (DONAU) River both east and west of REGENSBURG (U15) in XX Corps zone, the 13th Armored Division passed all three of its Combat Commands through the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions. Good progress was made as Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" each gained nine miles. The 260th Infantry (65th Infantry Division) captured REGENSBURG (U15) on the south bank of the DANUBE (DONAU) River, a city that has been called "The outer bastion of the Redoubt area". Other elements of the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions increased their bridgeheads to a depth of ten miles, with the 71st Infantry Division capturing PFATTER (U35). To the rear, the 80th Infantry Division moved from NURNBERG (040) south, prepared to cross the DANUBE (DONAU) River. Patrolling on the east (left) flank was continued by the 3d Cavalry Group.

In 103 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed eleven enemy planes and damaged twelve. Low claims against ground targets resulted from poor visibility and lack of targets.

More bridgeheads over the DANUBE (DONAU) River were secured and strengthened as Third U.S. Army's attack into the German Redoubt area continued during the period. Enemy troops were surrendering wholesale all along the front and resistance was sporadic.

A committee was formed by military government in FRANKFURT (M67) to alleviate suffering caused by the Nazi discriminatory laws against Jews. New and complete ration cards were issued, provision was made for the homeless, repairs to damaged homes begun, grants made to the needy, impartiality in hiring policies pledged by the Chamber of Commerce, and two Jews were appointed to the local Labor Board.

28 APRIL (D + 326)

Indications pointed to an apparent planned and organized attempt by the enemy to keep open a corridor into the BAVARIAN ALPS in the PASSAU (Q21)--LINZ (V88) area, while endeavoring to gain time in the western portion of Third U.S. Army's zone to organize hasty defensive positions along the ISAR and INN Rivers in order to slow down the Army's advance. There was little change in the enemy's estimated capabilities. It was considered possible that he could defend and delay, launch small-scale local counterattacks and reinforce against Third U.S. Army. He could attempt to organize hasty defensive positions on the ISAR, INN and DANUBE Rivers in an effort to delay the Army's advance into the National Redoubt, or he could attempt small-scale airborne operations for attacks against Command Posts or to drop assassins or saboteurs behind the Army's lines. There was evidence not only of a definite buildup in the Army's zone of advance and on its eastern flank, but indications of greater control and organizational cohesion among enemy units opposing Third U.S. Army.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group directed that Third U.S. Army continue its drive to effect junction with the Russians in the DANUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG (Z92). It also provided for a change in the Sixth - Twelfth U.S. Army Group boundary.

A letter, subject "Temporary Operational Boundary Between First and Third U.S. Armies" was issued to the various corps commanders. It stated in part that the protection of the left flank of Third U.S. Army along the Czechoslovakian border was to be taken over by First U.S. Army as rapidly as troops become available and as agreed between the Commanding Generals, First and Third U.S. Armies. As the situation developed, First U.S. Army was to make preparations to extend its sector of responsibility to the southeast.

The 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) continued to police their assigned areas. Movement to NURNBERG (040) was continued by the 16th Armored Division. The 23d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (16th Armored Division) was attached to the 86th Infantry Division and moved to vicinity of INGOLSTADT (T72). At BAYREUTH (075), the 4th Armored Division remained in Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve, while the 5th Infantry Division began movement to XII Corps zone following assignment to that corps.

The 86th Infantry Division (with attached 23d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron of the 16th Armored Division) continued its advance to the south along the west flank of III Corps zone, gaining eleven miles and clearing WOLNZACH (T80). The 99th Infantry Division continued its advance to the east with the 393d and 395th Infantry Regiments abreast, clearing NEUSTADT (T93), ABENSBERG (U03) and MUHLHAUSEN (T92). Combat Command "A" (14th Armored Division) advanced between the 86th and 99th Infantry Divisions, gaining eighteen miles, Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command (14th Armored Division) followed Combat Command "A". The 14th Cavalry Group remained in assembly in vicinity of BUCH (T74).

The majority of the 11th Armored Division remained in assembly in the southern part of XII Corps zone, while Combat Command "B" started clearing ground between the Austrian border and the PASSAU (Q21) - ROHRNBACH (Q23) road. Clearing its zone, the 26th Infantry Division, prepared to strike across the Austrian border, advanced seven miles and captured ZENTING (Q03) to close up with the forward armor. Other corps units continued their side-stepping to the south along the Czechoslovakian border. The 97th Infantry Division passed to First U.S. Army control.

Ahead of other XX Corps units, the 13th Armored Division drove south to the ISAR River. Gains of up to twenty miles were made, with GREIBING (U43) and BUCHHAUSEN (U23) being taken. Directly in the rear of the armor, the 71st Infantry Division cleared STRAUBING (U54) and TAIMERING (U34) in a ten mile advance. On the right flank of the 71st Infantry Division, the 3d Cavalry Group also advanced south while po-

licing its zone. The 65th Infantry Division maintained its position, and policed south of REGENSBURG (U15). Policing south of the DANUBE (DONAU) River in the western part of corps zone was conducted by the 80th Infantry Division.

Unfavorable weather prevented all operations of XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army continued its rapid gains in III and XX Corps, while consolidating its forces in XII Corps zone for a smash across the Austrian border. The ISAR River was reached in XX Corps zone and many towns were taken during the period.

Supply of gasoline, all types of rations and rail cars was critical. Corps and divisions under control of Third U.S. Army were urged to economize in the operation of motor vehicles in order to avert strict rationing of gasoline. The average daily issue of gasoline during the period 22 to 28 April, inclusive, was 870,094 gallons, an increase of 214,474 gallons daily over the preceding seven-day period. Commanders of all echelons were requested to take measures to inventory, assemble and guard captured enemy food stocks. Necessity for the rapid unloading of railway supply cars was emphasized. The problem of collecting and storing captured food supplies became of paramount importance in view of the expected liberation of approximately 300,000 Allied prisoners of war and displaced persons in the Army's zone of operations. In order to exploit fully the captured enemy food stores, the quartermaster field service division was allotted an additional service company and a battalion headquarters.

Roundup of German Prisoners

Five barges loaded with approximately 2,500 gas-filled bombs were found on the DANUBE (DONAU) River near DEGGENDORF (U83). The enemy had left an officer at the site to insure that neither side detonated the bombs and created an unintentional gas attack. A neutral zone was established around the area of the DANUBE where the barges were located.

29 APRIL *(D + 327)*

The enemy offered only scattered and ineffectual opposition as Third U.S. Army made advances of up to twenty-five miles and established two bridgeheads across the ISAR River. Estimated strength of enemy forces opposing Third U.S. Army was 20,500 combat effectives, the equivalent of two and one-half divisions, and 100 tanks or assault guns.

A letter of instructions sent to the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) ordered the regiment to clear all enemy military personnel from an area south of NURNBERG (Q40) as directed, and cooperate with the Army Provost Marshal. The regiment was instructed to move one battalion into the rear of XX Corps and one to the rear of III Corps, progressively comb the areas to the DANUBE River and coordinate with the Commanding Generals of XX and III Corps.

Among troops under Army control, the 70th Infantry Division continued to police a large area east of the RHINE River, while the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) policed and patrolled around ERLANGEN (031). Closing in NURNBERG (Q40), the 16th Armored Division (-) was placed in Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve. Simultaneously, the 4th Armored Division at BAYREUTH (075) was released from Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve to control of Third U.S. Army.

The ISAR River was reached after a thirteen mile advance by the 86th Infantry Division (plus attached 23d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron), with the 343d Infantry forcing a crossing. The 341st Infantry followed closely, passing through the 342d Infantry to cross the river. Just to the east, the 99th Infantry Division's 393d and 395th Infantry Regiments advanced eighteen miles and reached the ISAR River. SIEGENBURG (U02) and PFEFFENHAUSEN (U11) were cleared, while MOOSBURG (Z19) was captured by elements of the 395th Infantry and elements of the 14th Armored Division. LANDSHUT (U20) was cleared by Reserve Combat Command (14th Armored Division). On the corps east flank, the 14th Cavalry Group crossed the DANUBE (DONAU) River, with elements reaching the ISAR River after a rapid advance. By the end of the period, a good part of the 86th Infantry Division was across the ISAR River, while the north bank of the river was screened practically all the way through corps zone.

The 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) closed in an assembly area near GRAFENAU (Q14) in XII Corps zone, directly north of positions of the 26th Infantry Division. Late in the period the 11th Infantry attacked to the south. Meanwhile, the 2d Infantry was enroute to assembly area in the corps zone. In front of

other units, Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) cleared up to the Austrian border, taking ULRICHSTRENT (Q23) and WILHEILMSTREUT (Q23). Late in the period both Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" launched an attack which was proceeding across the border as the period closed. The zone to the north of 11th Armored Division was cleared by the 26th Infantry Division in mop-up operations which gained eleven miles, with OTTERSKIRCHEN (Q01) being taken. In the northern part of zone, the 2d Cavalry Group and 90th Infantry Division patrolled along the Czechoslovakian border.

Attacking swiftly south along the western flank of XX Corps, the 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) drove toward the ISAR River, with elements of the 319th Infantry reaching the river in a twenty-six mile advance which captured many towns. The 317th Infantry followed behind the other two regiments mopping up enroute. Following an artillery preparation in which one battalion fired 1,882 rounds, both Combat Command "B" and reserve Combat Command (13th Armored Division) made assault crossings of the ISAR River at MAMMING (U51) and PLATTING (U73) respectively, and construction of bridges at both crossing sites was begun. Elements of the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) began movement into the bridgehead of Reserve Combat Command at the end of the period. The 71st Infantry Division continued its advance to the south, gaining up to fifteen miles, and clearing LEIBLFING (U53), while the 3d Cavalry Group went into assembly area. Postions in the rear were policed by the 65th Infantry Division.

While flying 233 sorties, XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed or damaged 452 motor vehicles, 277 railroad cars, twenty-eight armored vehicles and tanks, sixty locomotives and nine enemy planes on the ground.

Rapid advances were made in III and XX Corps zones as Third U.S. Army units crossed the ISAR River and cleared LANDSHUT (U20) and MOOSBURG (Z19).

An enemy chemical depot at NIEDER LEIERNDORF (U23), stocked with approximately 60,000 gas-filled aerial bombs, was captured.

30 APRIL (D + 328)

Of the 183,331 prisoners of war taken by Third U.S. Army in the period 26 March to 26 April, not including those admitted to Army hospitals, 173,796 prisoners were from miscellaneous units as compared with 1,832 from Panzer-type divisions and 9,703 from infantry divisions. The relatively few prisoners of war processed from Panzer-type divisions was expected, for the enemy lost most of his Panzers in the RUHR pocket. Decline of the enemy's infantry divisions was caused chiefly by the crushing of his organized strength so completely that his replacement system broke down almost entirely. The enemy committed numerous makeshift units composed of "ersatz" soldiers, including cripples of every description, mental cases, young boys and some 500 women.

An operational directive sent to the various corps commanders and to Third U.S. Army troops conveyed the following information and orders:

The enemy was continuing to withdraw, attempting to employ favorable terrain features to strengthen his delay-and-defend tactics, while endeavoring to build up his forces in Third U.S. Army zone of advance by moving troops from Czechoslovakia and other sectors.

First U.S. Army on the left (north) was extending its zone south, taking over part of Third U.S. Army zone and was maintaining its positions on the remainder of its front. Seventh U.S. Army on the right (west) was continuing to advance into Austria, had captured INNSBRUCK (D75), was blocking the BRENNER Pass (W12) and was pushing strong reconnaissance to LANDECK (V34) and WARTH (C85) to assist First French Army in blocking the RESIA Pass (V31). XIX Tactical Air Command was continuing its close cooperation with Third U.S. Army.

Third U.S. Army was instructed to continue its current drive southeast, to seize and secure LINZ (V88) and effect a juncture with the Soviet forces in the DANUBE Valley. It was to seize SALZBURG (Z92), advance rapidly and seize the BRUCK (E86)--RADSTADT (A38) area, and occupy that part of Austria in its zone.

III Corps (86th and 99th Infantry Divisions, 14th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to assist XX Corps in seizing SALZBURG (Z92) and BERCHTESGADEN (Z90), advance rapidly in its zone and seize BRUCK (E86), LEND (A06), ST JOHANN (E59) and KITZBUHEL (E58), and maintain contact with Seventh U.S. Army on the right (west).

XII Corps (5th, 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 11th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to continue to advance southeast in the DANUBE Valley to seize and secure LINZ (V88). It was to be prepared on Army order to push reconnaissance east from LINZ (V88) to make contact with the Soviet forces and push a force rapidly southwest from the vicinity of LINZ (V88) toward SALZBURG (Z92). It was to protect the left (northeast) flank of Third U.S. Army.

XX Corps (65th, 71st and 80th Infantry Divisions, 13th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to advance rapidly in its zone and seize SALZBURG (Z92) and BERCHTESGADEN (Z90), continue its advance and seize KREUZBURG (A18) and RADSTADT (A38).

The 16th Armored Division reverted to Twelfth U.S. Army Group reserve in NURNBERG (040) at 301200 April. Current missions were to be continued by the 70th Infantry Division and the 474th Infantry Regiment.

Policing of their areas was continued by the 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate). In Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve, the 16th Armored Division (-) remained in NURNBERG (040). The 4th Armored Division was assigned to XII Corps, immediately starting movement from BAYREUTH (075) to XII Corps zone.

On the west flank of III Corps, gains of up to seven miles were made by the 342d and 343d Infantry Regiments (86th Infantry Division) south of the ISAR River. The north bank of the ISAR River was patrolled by the 341st Infantry which prepared to cross. Farther east, the 99th Infantry Division closed up to the ISAR River with the 395th Infantry establishing a bridgehead at MOOSBURG (Z19) in conjunction with elements of Combat Command "B" (14th Armored Division). Another bridge-

head was set up at LANDSHUT (U20) by the 393d Infantry Regiment which captured ACHDORF (U20) south of the ISAR River, while the 394th Infantry patrolled on the north flank of the river. Advances of from six to eight miles south of the ISAR River were made by Combat Commands "A" and "B" (14th Armored Division) in a zone between the two infantry divisions. The 14th Cavalry Group completed its patrolling north of the ISAR River and was prepared to cross at the end of the period.

In advance of other XII Corps units, Combat Commands "A" and "B", (11th Armored Division) drove several miles inside Austria, with Combat Command "B" capturing a bridge intact at KAPPEL (Q41) and reaching LEMBACH (Q50), while Combat Command "A" captured WEGSCHEID (Q41), important border town. Reserve Combat Command moved forward to the Austrian border. Elements of the 26th Infantry Division were close to the Austrian border at the end of the period as the 328th Infantry drove ten miles to within two miles of PASSAU (Q20) on the border. Assuming positions along the Czechoslovakian border, the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) gained fourteen miles and prepared to follow the 11th Armored Division south into Austria. Other elements of the 5th Infantry Division patrolled and followed the 11th Infantry Regiment. The 2d Cavalry Group and the 90th Infantry Division patrolled and policed along the Czechoslovakian border in the northern part of zone. Relief on the northernmost part of zone was given the 90th Infantry Division by elements of the 97th Infantry Division (First U.S. Army) so that the 90th Infantry Division might again side-step to the south.

In order from west to east on the front of XX Corps were the 80th and 71st Infantry Divisions and 13th Armored Division, while to the north were the 65th Infantry Division and 3d Cavalry Group. Crossings of the ISAR River were made by the 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) while the 317th Infantry was held in assembly. The bridgehead of the 318th Infantry at MAMMING (U51) had been secured earlier by Reserve Combat Command (13th Armored Division). Just to the east, good progress was made as the 14th and 66th Infantry Regiments (71st Infantry Division) drove south capturing PILSTING (U62) and WALLERSDORF (U62), crossed the ISAR River and gained two to three miles south of the river. At the close of the period, the 5th Infantry (71st Infantry Division) began crossing into previously secured positions of the 14th Infantry Regiment. On the corps right flank, Combat Commands "A" and "B" (13th Armored Division) made rapid gains from their PLATTING (U73) bridgehead, fanning out in a twenty to twenty-five mile advance. A bridge for heavy equipment was completed early in the period. The 3d Cavalry Group remained in assembly with the 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron protecting the corps right flank. Occupation and policing of REGENSBURG (U15) and the vicinity was continued by the 65th Infantry Division, far in the rear of other XX Corp units.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 175 sorties to round out a big month of operations. One hundred seven motor vehicles, sixty-seven locomotives and 588 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged, and four planes were destroyed on the ground.

As April ended, Third U.S. Army's XII Corps began driving into Austria while advances to the south were continued in III and XX Corps zones.

The 130th Evacuation Hospital moved to the vicinity of MOOSBURG (Z09) to provide care for patients in the Allied prisoner of war camp uncovered there.

Pursuant to orders of GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER on 23 April that immediate steps be taken to cause decent and reverent burials of all persons of all nationalities who had been victims of atrocities committed by the enemy, chaplains of Third U.S. Army officiated at hundreds of ceremonies during the last week of April. In some towns military government officers ordered civilians to make coffins, dig up bodies from pits and rebury them decently in separate cemeteries. At SCHWARZENFELD (U91), services were conducted over the graves of 200 Jews who had been murdered by SS troops.

The Month In Review

Striking deep into the heart of Germany, Third U.S. Army during April rode roughshod over the enemy's frantic, disorganized and ineffectual delaying actions, compressing him against his Eastern Front defenses, then swiftly shifted the axis of attack to the southeast against the National Redoubt. Operations during the month fell into three phases: the conquest of KASSEL (C20) and of the FULDA and WERRA River lines followed by the reduction of MUHLHAUSEN (H99), GOTHA (J06) and SUHL (J02); the pursuit of the retreating enemy across the MULDE River; and the campaign crossing the DANUBE and entering Czechoslovakia and Austria. April combined with March made up a record period of advance in which Third U.S. Army smashed from the Franco-German border to the junction of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany, a distance of 360 air miles. The Army's path of advance, however, was far from straight, its forces actually advancing more than 500 miles during the two months. During April the Army conquered more than 16,200 square miles of territory and inflicted such losses upon the enemy that by the end of the month he was hopelessly defeated.

Following close on the destruction of German Army Group "G" in the PALATINATE, the enemy's disorganization after the retreat north of the MAIN River and the accompanying breakdown of his entire replacement system, the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army to the northeast toward KASSEL (C20) and FULDA (H31) found the enemy ill-prepared to man his proposed defenses along the EDER, FULDA and WERRA Rivers. Any possibility of a strong defense was nullified by the swift drive of the Army's armored columns down both sides of the WERRA River to EISENACH (H86) and another drive across the FULDA River to twenty miles beyond FULDA (H31). Only to the north in the vicinity of KASSEL (C20) did the enemy make a determined stand, holding out in the city until 4 April and continuing to offer stubborn resistance east of the city for several days. By 4 April the advancing armor had seized MUHLHAUSEN (H99), GOTHA (J06) and SUHL (J02), then waited in this general area until the infantry had mopped up in the rear and until the Army's flanks were protected by the advances of First and Seventh U.S. Armies.

On 10 April Third U.S. Army was again on the move, pushing the enemy toward the MULDE River. After reaching COBURG (O28) the first day, the armor broke loose on 11 April, by-passed ERFURT (J37), WEIMAR (J57), JENA (J76) and GERA (K06), crossed the MULDE River and halted on the outskirts of CHEMNITZ (K66), a five-day drive which covered approximately eighty miles. WEIMAR (J57) was captured 11 April, while ERFURT (J37) and JENA (J76) were cleared on 12 and 13 April, respectively. On 12

April the Army Commander was informed verbally by the Supreme Commander to halt the Army's advance at the line: MULDE River--ZWICH--MULDE River--PLAUEN (K10)--HOF (099)--BAYREUTH (075). This line was held by 15 April, when the advance to the east was halted.

Orders were received on 17 April to shift the Army's path of advance to the southeast into BAVARIA to attack the German-Austrian Redoubt area while maintaining patrols along the Czechoslovakian border. The northern part of Army zone with VIII Corps and its assigned units reverted to First U.S. Army, while III Corps came to Third U.S. Army. Certain areas which had been previously secured by Seventh U.S. Army were taken over by Third U.S. Army. From 17 to 22 April the Army shifted its units in preparation to launch its attack into the Redoubt. On 21 April the campaign forcing the RHINE - FRANKFURT ON MAIN - and across the MULDE was officially finished and the campaign crossing the DANUBE and entering Czechoslovakia and Austria began with Third U.S. Army attacking to the southeast. Determined and organized enemy resistance was encountered at five main points, NEUMARKT (T78), REGENSBURG (U15), the ALTMUHL, DANUBE and ISAR Rivers. On 26 April, a captured field order of the German First Army, dated 23 April, disclosed the enemy's intention of attacking Third U.S. Army's exposed left flank with the 11 Panzer Division. The attack did not materialize, the Panzer Division later surrendering in a body. The REGEN River was crossed on 23 April and the DANUBE was reached the following day. Advancing from bridgeheads across the DANUBE River, III and XX Corps swept south to the ISAR River, which was reached on 29 April. Concurrently, advance armor elements of XII Corps struck across the Austrian border and were fifteen miles inside of Austria by the end of the month, when enemy resistance appeared to be collapsing.

XIX Tactical Air Command contributed to the continued victories by smashing ground installations and battering the remnants of the erstwhile great Luftwaffe. In April the Air Command destroyed 174 and damaged sixty-three planes in the air, destroyed 745 and damaged 631 planes on the ground, while losing forty-six of its own planes. The Air Command's claims for the month included as damaged or destroyed: 9,165 motor vehicles, 545 armored vehicles and tanks, 1,505 locomotives, 9,238 railroad cars and 1,369 factory buildings.

The paralysis of the enemy's replacement system was strikingly illustrated by an analysis of the 226,309 prisoners of war captured by Third U. S. Army during the period 26 March to 30 April. Of these prisoners, 1,911 were from Panzer-type divisions, 10,121 from infantry divisions and 214,277 from miscellaneous units. The enemy was forced to use low grade troops or none at all to replace his losses. In a quality analysis of prisoners of war, 18,148 or 8.1 percent were found to be in Class I, consisting of combat personnel of divisions, all personnel of General Headquarters, Army Group, anti-tank, infantry and Panzer units; 79,111 or 34.9 percent were in Class II, consisting of all personnel of fortress and replacement units, home guard, Volkssturm, police and foreigners; 129,050 or 57 percent were in Class III, consisting of service and supply troops of divisions, personnel of General Headquarters artillery, engineer and antiaircraft units, personnel from higher headquarters, General Headquarters service and supply units. Of the 226,309 prisoners of war, 1,911 or 0.9 percent were from Panzer-type divisions, 10,121 or 4.5 percent were from infantry-type divisions, and 214,277 or 94.6 percent were from miscellaneous units.

During April the bridging constructed by Third U.S. Army averaged nearly 1,500 feet per day. A total of 394 bridges with a total length of 44,670 feet were constructed. Initially, the greater part of the bridging consisted of providing passages over or around the numerous damaged overpasses and underpasses on the FRANKFURT (M67)--DRESDEN (F29) Autobahn, since for the first half of the month the autobahn was the backbone of the Army's roadnet. Most of the obstructions individually were inconsequential, for they were either by-passed or spanned quickly with a Bailey bridge. A few small floating bridges were required on the FULDA, WERRA, SAAL and ELSTER Rivers. Except for a costly fire fight on the WERRA River, the crossings were accomplished easily. In mid-April, when the Army's axis of advance was shifted to the southeast into a region of larger rivers, major stream crossings were encountered again. The first of the larger rivers, the DANUBE, was successfully assaulted by both III and XX Corps in well-executed operations. So swiftly were the crossings exploited that the next major river in the Army's path, the ISAR, thirty miles to the south, was reached and crossed before the Germans could bring any effective resistance to bear in its defense. Crossings of the NAAB and REGEN Rivers also were major operations. The Army's change of direction, the large requirements of equipment for crossing the DANUBE, and the long distances between the main supply depots and forward dumps made supply of engineering equipment and materiel a difficult problem.

Classes I and III supplies transported into the Army area during the month by air lift included 1,576,732 operational rations and 4,650,935 gallons of V-80 gasoline. At the end of the month there were 2,381,110 rations and 544,770 gallons of V-80 gasoline in Army supply points and reserve points, including reserves held for the Army by Advance Section Communications Zone. In the Classes II and IV depots were 800 long tons of clothing and equipment and an additional 4,110 tons enroute to the depots. Eighteen Quartermaster Truck Companies and one Ordnance Provisional Truck Company hauled Class V supplies a distance of 722,547 miles during April. Ammunition handled by all Third U.S. Army installations totalled 32,949 long tons for the month. Ammunition received from Advance Section Communications Zone totalled 3,753 long tons. At the end of the month Third U.S. Army ordnance personnel were operating more ammunition installations than at any time since the Army became operational, a total of ten ammunition supply points having been opened and operated during the month. The situation was caused by the fast advances of the combat troops, the constantly shifting Army boundaries, limited rail facilities and the fact that Advance Section Communications Zone was not operating ammunition installations in Germany. Critical shortages of trucks, V-8 tank engines, tank tracks and bogie wheels continued to exist at the end of April. As the volume of supplies received by air increased, a program by which returning planes would evacuate Allied prisoners of war was instituted. By the end of the month a total of 18,540 Allied prisoners were moved out of the Army area by air alone, and thousands of others were evacuated by road and rail. Tens of thousands of German prisoners of war and displaced persons were hauled by motor transportation.

Two outstanding developments occurred with respect to the Army Medical Service: First was the undertaking by the Army Surgeon of direct responsibility for public health throughout the Army area. In addition to the transfer physically, to the Medical Section, of all medical personnel assigned to the G-5 Section, there were eight U.S. Army Medi-

cal Department officers, fourteen French medical officers, and four United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration nurses placed at the disposal of the Army Surgeon during the month of April for public health work. This personnel was to be on call by the Army, regardless of the changing Army boundaries. Second, with the rapid advance of Third U.S. Army, numerous captured enemy hospitals were uncovered. It was soon apparent that this was becoming a major medical problem. To cope with the situation, the 66th Medical Group was selected to take over these hospitals, determine their needs with respect to food, clothing and medical supplies, and submit rosters of protected enemy hospitals personnel, as well as information regarding patient status, to the Medical Section, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army. One field hospital and two evacuation hospitals were ultimately given the assignment of assisting the group in carrying out this program.

During April 236,724 prisoners of war were processed through Third U.S. Army cages and an additional 96,180 prisoners were admitted to hospitals and medical units. Third U.S. Army's casulaties were 1,016 killed, 4,487 wounded and 783 missing, for total battle casualties of 6,266. Non-battle casualties totalled 8,966, making total casualties 15,232. Reinforcements received by the Army totalled 25,520. The strength of the Army at the end of the month was 346,839.

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



APRIL—	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
DAILY DEAD (EST)	700	600	500	500	300	400	1100	400	300	600	500	600	200	500	900	300	200	300	400	200	200	300	200	200	300	400	700	400	1000	500
WOUNDED (EST)	1500	1800	1000	1000	900	800	1500	800	700	1200	1000	1200	500	1000	1800	600	400	900	1200	600	600	700	600	600	900	1200	1900	1200	2800	1500
CAPTURED	11307	2044	6796	16454	8254	14343	18751	10887	5029	7364	3633	3476	1588	7467	5869	32269	6842	8716	27756	7785	7216	1616	8878	18564	7745	10575	28434	17743	18987	6516
TOTAL	13507	4444	8296	7954	9454	15543	21351	12087	6029	9164	5133	5276	2288	8967	8569	33169	7442	9916	29356	8585	8016	2616	9678	19364	8945	12175	31034	19343	22787	8516



		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
DAILY	DEAD	23	64	79	39	61	33	61	53	45	24	46	55	28	24	31	29	30	22	18	25	29	11	3	11	25	61	21	12	23	30
	WOUNDED	139	251	295	142	149	135	147	221	148	205	244	235	95	121	136	129	69	100	74	85	115	73	37	101	162	272	170	142	75	200
	MISSING	28	37	13	18	33	28	73	13	27	39	59	41	33	15	11	11	8	57	19	7	17	5	5	6	57	61	16	20	6	20
	TOTAL	190	352	387	199	243	196	281	287	220	268	349	331	156	160	178	169	107	179	111	117	161	89	45	118	244	394	207	174	104	250

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL











THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS, AIRFIELDS
OPERATING RAILROADS
and
SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-30 APRIL 1945

LEGEND

O - OPENED
C - CLOSED
⅄ - OPERATION ASSUMED BY 1ST ARMY
ⅅ - OPERATION ASSUMED BY 9TH ARMY
⊹ - OPERATION ASSUMED BY ADVANCE SECTION COMMUNICATION ZONE

TOWNS CAPTURED APRIL

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
ALLENDORF	XII	4 April
ASBACH	VIII	6 "
ALTENGOTTERN	VIII	6 "
ALLENDORF	XX	8 "
AS	XII	20 "
AMERBACH	XX	20 "
AMBERG	XX	22 "
ABENSBERG	III	28 "
ACHDORF	III	30 "
BERKA	XII	3 "
BARCHFELD	XII	4 "
BONNDORF	XII	5 "
BREITENBUCH	XII	5 "
BITTSTADT	VIII	9 "
BALLHAUSEN	XX	10 "
BINDERSLEHEN	XX	10 "
BAD BERKA	VIII	11 "
BREITENBACH	XII	11 "
BAD BLANKENBURG	VIII	13 "
BUCHBACH	XII	13 "
BRUCK	XII	14 "
BAYREUTH	XII	14 "
BRAND	XII	20 "
BOGEN	XII	26 "
BUCHHAUSEN	XII	28 "
CATTERFELD	VIII	8 "
CABARZ	VIII	8 "
CRIMMITSCHAU	XX	15 "
DROSSENHAUSEN	XII	9 "
DIETENDORF	XX	10 "
DOLLSTADT	VIII	12 "
DIETFURT	III	25 "
ESCHWEGE	VIII	4 "
ECKARTSHAUSEN	XII	4 "
EISENACH	VIII	5 "
EBERTSHAUSEN	XII	12 "
ERNSTTHAL	XII	12 "
ERFURT	XX	12 "
EISENBERG	XX	13 "
ELSTERBERG	VIII	16 "
ERBENDORF	XII	20 "
EICHSTADT	III	25 "
EINING	III	27 "
FRIEDRICHRODA	VIII	7 "
FINSTERBERGEN	VIII	8 "
FRIENSTEDT	XX	10 "
FROSSEN	XII	15 "
FALKENBERG	XII	21 "
FREYUNG	XII	25 "
FALKENSTEIN	XII	25 "
GOTHA	VIII	4 "
GEORGENTHAL	VIII	9 "
GEHLBERG	XII	9 "
GRATTSTADT	XII	9 "
GRAFFENTONNA	XX	9 "
GIESSUEBEL	XII	10 "
GEBESEE	XX	10 "
GEHREN	XII	11 "
GOSSELBORN	VIII	12 "
GOLSBERG	XII	13 "
GORLITZ	XII	14 "
GLACHAU	XX	15 "
GREIZ	VIII	16 "

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
GRAFENWOHR	XII	19 April
GRAFENAU	XII	25 "
GREIBING	XII	28 "
HOTZELSRODA	VIII	5 "
HILDBURGHAUSEN	XX	7 "
HOLZHAUSEN	VIII	9 "
HEBERNDORF	XII	13 "
HOF	XII	15 "
HIRSCHAU	XII	22 "
HORMANNSDORF	XX	22 "
HOHENFELS	XX	22 "
HOHENBURG	XX	22 "
INEIERAU	XII	5 "
ILMENAU	XII	10 "
ILLSCHWANG	XX	22 "
INGOLSTADT	III	26 "
JENA	XX	13 "
KASSEL	XV	4 "
KRANICHFELD	VIII	12 "
KESSLAR	VIII	13 "
KULMBACH	XII	13 "
KIRCHENLAMITZ	XII	18 "
KEMNATH	XII	20 "
KASTL	XX	22 "
KELHEIM	III	24 "
LANGWIESEN	XII	11 "
LAUSCHA	XII	12 "
LOTHRA	XII	13 "
LENGENFELD	VIII	17 "
LAUTERHOFEN	XX	20 "
LANDSHUT	III	29 "
LEIBLFING	XX	29 "
MOHRA	XII	4 "
MEININGEN	XII	5 "
METZELS	XII	5 "
MOCHERS	XII	5 "
MUEHLHAUSEN	XX	7 "
MUEHLBERG	VIII	9 "
MUENCHBERG	XII	15 "
METZENHOF	XII	20 "
METTEN	XII	26 "
MUEHLHAUSEN	III	28 "
MOOSBURG	III	29 "
NEUKIRCHEN	VIII	5 "
NUTHA	VIII	7 "
NEUSTADT	XII	11 "
NEUMARKT	XX	22 "
NEUSTADT	III	27 "
OHRDRUF	VIII	4 "
OBERHOF	XII	4 "
OTTOWIND	XII	9 "
OELSNITZ	VIII	16 "
OTTERSKIRCHEN	XII	29 "
PLAUEN	VIII	17 "
PEGNITZ	XX	19 "
PRESSATH	XII	20 "
PARKSTEIN	XII	21 "
PFATTER	XX	27 "
PLEFFENHAUSEN	III	29 "
PILSTING	XX	30 "
RODICHEN	VIII	7 "
RUHLA	VIII	7 "
RUDISLEBEN	VIII	9 "

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
RITTERSDORF	VIII	12 April
REINSTADT	VIII	13 "
RUDOLSTADT	VIII	13 "
ROTTERSDORF	XII	13 "
RUPPERSDORF	XII	13 "
REHAU	XII	19 "
ROSENBERG	XX	22 "
REGEN	XII	24 "
REGENSBURG	XX	27 "
SUHL	XII	3 "
SETZELBACH	XII	3 "
SCHENKFELD	XII	3 "
SCHWARZA	XII	5 "
STRUTH	VIII	7 "
SCHIENSINGEN	XX	7 "
STADTILM	VIII	12 "
SONNEBERG	XII	12 "
SAALFELD	VIII	13 "
STADTSTEINACH	XII	13 "
SCHELGEL	XII	14 "
SEUSSEN	XII	20 "
SCHWARZENBACH	XII	21 "
SCHNAITTENBACH	XII	22 "
SCHWANDORF	XX	22 "
SCHONBERG	XII	24 "
STEINACH	XII	25 "
SITTLING	III	27 "
STRAUBING	XII	28 "
SIEGENBURG	III	29 "
TREFFURT	VIII	4 "
TAMBACH	VIII	7 "
THEMAR	XX	7 "
TABARZ	VIII	8 "
THOREY	XX	10 "
TANNRODA	VIII	12 "
TRAUTMANNSHOFEN	XX	20 "
TAIMERING	XII	28 "
UNTERNEUBRUNN	XII	9 "
ULRICHSREUT	XII	29 "
VOCHA	XII	3 "
VOLKERODE	XX	8 "
VEILSDORF	XII	9 "
VELDEN	XX	20 "
WESTHAUSEN	VIII	5 "
WIEGLEBEN	VIII	5 "
WALTERSHAUSEN	VIII	7 "
WOLFIS	VIII	8 "
WIEDERSBACH	XII	10 "
WEIMAR	XX	11 "
WALDDORF	VIII	16 "
WEIDEN	XII	21 "
WALDDORF	III	24 "
WETTSTETTEN	III	25 "
WOLNZACH	III	28 "
WILHELMSREUT	XII	29 "
WEGSCHEID	XII	30 "
WALLERSDORF	XX	30 "
ZELLA-MEHLIS	XII	4 "
ZEITZ	XX	13 "
ZEULENRODA	VIII	16 "
ZWICKAU	VIII	17 "
ZENTING	XII	28 "

Chapter 12

MAY

WAR'S END

MAY OPERATIONS

In the first eight days of May was written the end of the German war machine by Allied power. Third U.S. Army split the Reich in half with an armor-spearheaded drive to the Czechoslovakian border, wheeled southeast to push the faltering enemy across the DANUBE, ISAR and INN Rivers and into Austria, and, with restraining lines lifted by higher headquarters, plunged into Czechoslovakia to capture PILSEN (LO4). The eight days in May also brought collapse of the National Redoubt myth. Even if the enemy had planned to make a last stand in the mountains of Bavaria and Austria, Third U. S. Army's swift drive into the area blasted his scheme before it could be put into effect. In this chapter of the Third U.S. Army's after-action report of operations on the continent is told briefly the story of its final successful campaigning against the enemy forces.

1 MAY (D + 329)

Road blocks, poor roads and rough terrain offered the chief obstacles to the advance of Third U.S. Army. Armored spearheads which raced to the INN River in the vicinity of BRAUNAU (Z97) met negligible enemy resistance, while opposition to the bridgeheads across the ISAR River remained scattered.

As May began the 70th Infantry Division continued to police its assigned areas, while elements of the 474th Infantry (Separate) began movement to the REGENSBURG (U15) area. In Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve, the 16th Armored Division remained in NURNBERG (O40).

Continued gains to the southeast in III Corps zone were made by the 342d and 343d Infantry Regiments (86th Infantry Division), while a task force composed of elements of the 341st Infantry and 23d Cavalry Squadron (16th Armored Division) advanced rapidly southeast to the vicinity of WASSERBURG (Z35). While a task force composed of the 393d Infantry (99th Infantry Division) supplemented by tanks and tank destroyers advanced rapidly southeast on the division left flank, the 394th Infantry passed through the 395th Infantry (99th Infantry Division) in its advance to the south. The 395th Infantry (99th Infantry Division) began assembling in vicinity ALTFRAUNHOFEN (Z29). Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" (14th Armored Division) advanced 20 miles south to the INN River, seizing a bridge and dam intact near JETTENBACH (Z46), while elements of the 14th Cavalry Group crossed the ISAR River and continued to advance southeast on the corps left flank.

Mopping up behind the 11th Armored Division in XII Corps zone, the 26th Infantry Division continued its advance north of the DANUBE (DONAU) River. While advancing over poor roads, Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) reached NEUFELDEN (Q60) and pushed foot elements across the MUHL River. In its advance to the east, the 5th Infantry Division captured bridges across the MUHL River in vicinity of SCHIAGEL (Q52). While elements of the 387th Infantry (97th Infantry Division) relieved elements of the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) on the corps north flank, the 358th Infantry advanced east, clearing a wooded area in its zone just across the Czechoslovakian border. The remainder of the division consolidated its positions. Continuing to advance, the 2d Cavalry Group maintained contact with the 5th Infantry Division, while the 4th Armored Division continued movement to corps zone.

Motorized, the 261st Infantry (65th Infantry Division) crossed the ISAR River at PLATTING (U73) and advanced rapidly to the southeast in XX Corps zone, capturing SULZBACH (Q10). It was followed by the 259th and 260th Infantry Regiments (65th Infantry Division). With elements in the vicinity of ANZENKIRCHEN (Z99), the 71st Infantry Division continued its rapid advance to the south. The advance southeast was continued by the 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division), while Combat Command "A" (13th Armored Division) drove rapidly south to the INN River in the vicinity of MARKTL (Z77) and BRAUNAU (Z97). Combat Command "B" (13th Armored Division) reached the INN River in the vicinity of NEU-OTTING (Z67) in an advance to the south. Along the corps right flank, the 43d Cavalry Squadron (3d Cavalry Group) moved south to cross the ISAR River at DINGOLFING (U51).

Unfavorable weather conditions restricted XIX Tactical Air Command's operations. A total of 113 successful sorties were flown in which thirteen motor vehicles, ten locomotives, ninety-three railroad cars and fourteen horse-drawn vehicles were damaged or destroyed on the Army front.

The powerful three corps attack of Third U.S. Army was continued into May as the INN River was reached in III Corps zone and numerous towns were captured.

The supply situation, because of heavy demands, long supply lines and consequent inadequate transportation facilities, was generally critical. On this date 1,842,959 rations and 821,910 gallons of V-80 gasoline were on hand in Third U.S. Army supply and reserve points, and 800 long tons of clothing and equipment were in the Army Classes II and IV depots. An additional 4,110 long tons of Classes II and IV supplies were enroute to the depots.



Riflemen Pin Down the Enemy

2 MAY (D+330)

Enemy opposition to Third U.S. Army's advance was generally scattered and ineffectual as bad roads, craters, road blocks and blown bridges continued to constitute the chief obstacles to forward progress. It was considered that the enemy was capable of defending and delaying at critical terrain features and communication centers, that he could attempt small counterattacks, particularly against the Army's exposed flanks, that he could organize sabotage activities in overrun areas, and that he could continue to surrender in groups and units or surrender en-masse. It was estimated that the Czechoslovakian pocket, part of which was in the Army's zone, contained 141,250 enemy combat effectives and 325 tanks and/or assault guns. The surrender of all enemy forces in Italy was announced.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group amended boundaries between Sixth and Twelfth U.S. Army Groups and First and Third U.S. Armies. Policing of assigned areas was continued by the 70th Infantry Division. Elements of the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) moved to REGENSBURG (U15) to act as security forces for Headquarters, Third U.S. Army while the remainder of the regiment patrolled and policed its assigned areas. Coming from Seventh U.S. Army, the 4th Infantry Division was assigned to Third U.S. Army. Remaining in Twelfth U.S. Army Group reserve, the 16th Armored Division was in NURNBERG (Q40).

Continuing to advance south in III Corps zone, the 342d and 343d Infantry Regiments (86th Infantry Division) passed in place to control of Seventh U.S. Army. After mopping up in its zone, the 99th Infantry Division began assembling by the end of the period, while the 23d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron reverted to control of the 16th Armored Division. Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" (14th Armored Division) mopped up remaining resistance in the corps zone and captured a bridge over the INN River in the vicinity FRAHAN (Z46), while Reserve Combat Command moved to an assembly area. The 32d Cavalry Squadron (14th Cavalry Group) moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of LANDSHUT (U20), with the remainder of the 14th Cavalry Group mopping up in corps zone to the INN River line.

Clearing the wooded area along the Czechoslovakian border, the 10th and 11th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) continued their advance in XII Corps zone. While the 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) continued to advance east behind the 11th Armored Division, the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division) protected the corps right flank and cleared its zone to the DANUBE (DONAU) River. Relief of the 358th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) was instituted by elements of the 2d Infantry Division (V Corps). The 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) continued to clear wooded areas across the Czechoslovakian border, while the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) maintained positions and patrolled to the east. Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) crossed the MUHL River at a ford in the vicinity of NEUFELDEN (Q60) and continued to advance southeast over poor roads, while Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) constructed a treadway bridge over the MUHL River at STARZ (Q50) and crossed by the end of the period. The 2d Cavalry Group patrolled and maintained contact with the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions, while the 4th Armored Division moved into assembly in the DEGGENDORF (U83) - REGEN (U95) area.

Reaching the INN River, the 65th Infantry Division continued its advance southeast in XX Corps zone. After capturing PASSAU (Q21), the 261st Infantry (65th Infantry Division) crossed the INN River at SCHARDING (Q20), while the 259th Infantry (65th Infantry Division) assembled. In swift advances, the 5th and 66th Infantry Regiments (71st Infantry Division) seized dams intact across the INN River in the vicinity of ERING (V08) and OBERNBERG (V18), respectively. Continuing their advances, the 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) reached the INN River, while the 317th Infantry initiated movement to forward positions on the river by the end of the period. Combat Command "A" (13th Armored Division) pushed infantry elements across the INN River at BRAUNAU (Z97), capturing the town, while Combat Command "B" (13th Armored Division) established a bridgehead across the river and captured NEU-OTTING (Z67). The 43d Cavalry Squadron (3d Cavalry Group) moved south and protected the corps right flank, while the 3d Cavalry Squadron (3d Cavalry Group) remained in assembly area.

The weather hampered XIX Tactical Air Command's operations. Only sixteen sorties were flown, with no claims made for the day.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack south and southeast in zone during the period. Bridgeheads over the INN River were established, and PASSAU (Q21), BRAUNAU (Z97), NEU-OTTING (Z67) and ALT-OTTING (Z67) were captured.

Forward Echelon, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, moved to REGENSBURG (U15).

Various measures to assure maximum spring planting in the area surrounding FRANKFURT (M67) were taken by Military Government. Two hundred nineteen tons of seeds were hauled to the city from surplus stocks at ERFURT (J37), 385 tons of seeds discovered in railway cars in FRANKFURT (M67) were distributed through normal civilian channels, and 1,500 tons of nitrogenous fertilizer which had been stored in the FRANKFURT I. G. Farben plant were released for distribution to civilians.

3 MAY *(D+331)*

No serious resistance was offered by the enemy at any point of Third U.S. Army advance. It was considered possible that the enemy's surrender in Italy and Northern Germany might presage a pattern for enemy collapse in the Army's zone. Details of a desperate, last chance enemy plot to use amateur airborne saboteurs to blast installations in friendly rear areas were uncovered. Captured enemy pilots revealed they were given the mission of destroying bridges and cutting railroad lines and were told to proceed to their homes when their missions were accomplished. The enemy forces in Northwest Germany, Holland and Denmark surrendered.

While the 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) continued to police assigned areas, the 16th Armored Division remained in NURNBERG (O40) in Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve and the 4th Infantry Division began movement to an area near NURNBERG (O40).

In III Corps zone the 99th Infantry Division moved to an assembly area. Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" (14th Armored Division) held positions along the INN River and secured a bridge in the vicinity of FRAHAN (Z46), while Reserve Combat Command (14th Armored Division) remained assembled in BERGKIRCHEN (Z47).

V Corps (1st, 2d and 97th Infantry Divisions and 9th Armored Division) was assigned in place from First U.S. Army.

Positions of the 5th Infantry Division were consolidated and patrolled in XII Corps zone. Following the 11th Armored Division, the 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) continued to advance southeast. While a screen along the north bank of the DANUBE (DONAU) River was being maintained by the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division), the 38th Infantry (2d Infantry Division) relieved the 359th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) in place and the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) was relieved in place by the 9th Infantry (2d Infantry Division). The 90th Infantry Division began to reassemble. Combat Command "B" (11th Armored Division) moved east, reaching WILLERSDORF (V89), while Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) continued its advance to the southeast. East of DEGGENDORF (U83) the 4th Armored Division closed in an assembly area, while the 2d Cavalry Group maintained positions and patrolled in zone.

Completing a bridge across the INN River at SCHARDING (Q20), the 65th Infantry Division continued its rapid advance east. After crossing the INN River, the 71st Infantry Division continued to advance east. A bridge was completed over the INN River at BRAUNAU (Z97) by the 317th



Third Army Vehicles Cross Water Barriers

and 318th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division), while the 319th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) began movement across the INN River. Combat Command "B" and Reserve Combat Command (13th Armored Division) continued moving into a new zone while maintaining their bridgeheads, and Combat Command "A" patrolled aggressively. Elements of the 3d Cavalry Group moved southeast and crossed the INN River at BRAUNAU (Z97).

Another day of unfavorable weather limited the number of sorties flown by XIX Tactical Air Command to 149. Claims included fifty-six motor vehicles, four locomotives, forty-seven railroad cars, one bridge and eight buildings damaged or destroyed.

During this period Third U.S. Army continued to attack southeast in zone, clearing numerous towns.

A test train carrying supplies reached NURNBERG (O40), but operation of the line WURZBURG (N53)--BAMBERG (O24)--NURNBERG (O40) permitted only limited tonnage until double track and communications could be completed. Work progressed on the line NURNBERG (O40) south to MUNICH (Y85), and reconnaissance was made east of NURNBERG (O40) toward PILSEN (L04).

Czechs Thank Third U.S. Army Liberators

4 MAY (D+332)

Surrender of the 11th Panzer Division to the 90th Infantry Division was the first divisional unit capitulation on Third U.S. Army front. With the enemy's tactical and logistical situation in the Czechoslovakian pocket becoming more untenable daily, it was considered possible that other enemy divisions might follow the example. Other enemy capabilities remained unchanged. Enemy resistance continued to be negligible throughout Third U.S. Army's zone.

Policing of assigned areas was continued by the 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate). From Twelfth U.S. Army Group Reserve, the 16th Armored Division was released to V Corps control. The 4th Infantry Division continued movement to the vicinity of NURNBERG (O40).

The 99th Infantry Division and 14th Cavalry Group remained assembled in III Corps area. Combat Commands "A" and "B" (14th Armored Division) remained assembled, being relieved from guarding installations in its zone by the 86th Infantry Division (XV Corps).

Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) was attached to the 1st Infantry Division in V Corps zone, assembling in the vicinity of MARKTREDWITZ (P16). Maintaining its positions, the 1st Infantry Division engaged in patrolling. Attacking east, the 23d and 38th Infantry Regiments (2d Infantry Division) made advances up to four miles. North of the 2d Infantry Division, the 303d and 386th Infantry Regiments (97th Infantry Division) attacked east and advanced five miles. While Reserve Combat Command (9th Armored Division) closed in an assembly area in the vicinity of TRAUSNITZ (P21), Combat Command "B" was enroute to an assembly area. The 102d Cavalry Group patrolled in the corps rear areas and guarded installations.

An attack to the northeast was launched by the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) in XII Corps zone. Consolidating positions, the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) consolidated positions and patrolled the corps right flank. Operational control of the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) was taken over by the 11th Armored Division. The 90th Infantry Division closed in assembly areas. Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division), with the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) attached, continued to advance southeast, capturing the important city of LINZ (V88). A bridge over the DANUBE (DONAU) River northeast of LINZ (V88) was captured intact. While Reserve Combat Command (11th Armored Division) moved to the vicinity of ZWETTL (Q80), Combat Command "B" continued its advance to the east and captured KATTSTORF (V99). The 4th Armored Division remained in assembly area, and the 2d Cavalry Group maintained positions, patrolling in zone.

A rapid advance eastward was continued by the 65th Infantry Divi-

sion in XX Corps zone. Continuing to advance east, the 5th Infantry (71st Infantry Division) reached the vicinity of STEYR (V96), capturing bridges intact over the TRAUN and AGER Rivers at WELS (V67) and LAMBACK (V56), respectively. SCHWANENSTADT (V45) and VOCKLABRUCK (V45) were captured by the 80th Infantry Division in a rapid advance east and southeast, while bridges over the AGER and TRAUN Rivers also were seized intact. The 13th Armored Division remained assembled in areas west of BRAUNAU (Z97). Crossing the INN River at BRAUNAU (Z97), the 3d Cavalry Squadron (3d Cavalry Group) took up positions on the corps right flank from NEUKIRCHEN (Z96) to STRASSWALCHEN (V14). These positions were taken up by the 43d Cavalry Squadron (3d Cavalry Group), while the 3d Cavalry Squadron (3d Cavalry Group) advanced east, capturing a bridge intact over the AGER River at KAMMER (V33).

XIX Tactical Air Command flew one hundred and fifty successful sorties in which 426 motor vehicles, ten tanks or armored vehicles, twenty-five locomotives, 231 railroad cars, eleven gun positions, sixteen buildings, forty-two horse-drawn vehicles and one roundhouse were destroyed or damaged.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack east and southeast in zone during the period, capturing numerous towns, including the important communications center of LINZ (V88). Several bridges were captured intact and the Army launched a new attack in the north portion of its zone.

With assignment of V Corps and four divisions to Third U.S. Army, plans were made for supply in a northeasterly direction in addition to continued supply in a southeasterly direction. An additional Army transfer point for Classes I and III supplies opened at REGENSBURG (U15), the transfer point at NURNBERG (040) remaining in operation. The new point was made possible by the opening of rail facilities to NURNBERG (040). Advance Section Communications Zone was scheduled to deliver supplies to NURNBERG (040) by rail and from there to the REGENSBURG (U15) transfer point by truck, from where the Army distributed by truck to forward supply points.

In FRANKFURT (M67) specialists in civil service who were anti-Nazi in sentiment were screened and investigated for appointment to an advisory board to assist military government in making appointments to important civil posts. Experts in public health, labor, law, industry and other specialized fields were selected for this work.



Riflemen Creep Towards Enemy Objective

5 MAY *(D+333)*

While enemy resistance before Third U.S. Army's rapidly advancing columns continued to be scattered, the Czechoslovakian city of PILSEN (L04) was cleared. The enemy garrison had been confined to its barracks and Czech partisans were in control of the city when Army troops entered. German Army Group "G", consisting of the First and Nineteenth Armies, surrendered to Sixth U.S. Army Group.

Third U.S. Army sent to III Corps an Operational Directive, dated 5 May 1945, concerning certain occupational plans. A letter of instructions was issued to the 4th and 70th Infantry Divisions and the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade relative to rear area responsibility.

Effective on 4 May, the 70th Infantry Division was to assume responsibility for an additional area as directed, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and Military Government of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, and with the Commanding General of the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

Effective without delay, the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade was to assume responsibility for the Army area as directed, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and Military Government of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, and the Commanding Generals of the 4th and 70th Infantry Divisions. Within the prescribed area it was to control traffic on main supply routes and maintain law and order, both civil and military. It was to guard Third U.S. Army's Rear Command Post, railroad and highway bridges, railroad tunnels, Army supply installations, signal installations, Allied prisoner of war and displaced persons camps. It was also to administer Allied prisoner of war camps.

The 4th Infantry Division was to move without delay to the Army area NURNBERG (040)--WEISZENBURG (T35)--INGOLSTADT (T72), all inclusive, REGENSBURG (U15), exclusive until vacated by Third U.S. Army Headquarters, SULZBACH (081), inclusive. It was to assume responsibility for its area as elements arrived successively, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and Military Government of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army; the Commanding General of the 38th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate). Within its area it was to control traffic on main supply routes and maintain law and order, both civil and military. It was to guard railroad and highway bridges, railroad tunnels, signal and Army supply installations, Allied prisoner of war, displaced persons and civilian internment camps. It was to administer Allied prisoner of war camps and be prepared to extend its area of responsibility upon Army order.

The 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) continued to police their assigned areas. As the 12th and 22d Infantry Regiments (4th Infantry Division) closed at SULZBACH (080) and NURNBERG (040), respectively, the remainder of the division continued to move to the vicinity of NURNBERG (040).

While the remainder of the division remained in assembly areas in III Corps zone, the 393d Infantry (99th Infantry Division) moved to LANDSHUT (U20). The 14th Armored Division and 14th Cavalry Group also remained assembled.

Continuing its attack, the 1st Infantry Division (with attached Combat Command "A", 9th Armored Division) advanced up to four miles in V Corps zone. Passing through infantry elements, Combat Command "A" (9th Armored Division) advanced to the vicinity of KLINGEN (P47). The remainder of the 9th Armored Division remained in assembly areas. Each advancing up to six miles, the 2d and 97th Infantry Divisions continued to attack east. After the 16th Armored Division closed in corps zone, Combat Command "B" followed by Combat Command "A" attacked east through the 97th Infantry Division and captured PILSEN (L04), while Reserve Combat Command remained in assembly area. Patrolling and protection of the corps rear areas were continued by the 102d Cavalry Group.



Nazi Concentration Camp Prisoners Liberated by Third Army

The advance to the northeast was continued by the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division), while the 11th Infantry (5th Infantry Division) was relieved in position by the 101st Infantry (26th Infantry Division). Reverting to division control from the 11th Armored Division, the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) joined other elements of the division in assembly near ZWETTL (Q80). As the 357th Infantry (90th Infantry Division) continued its attack northeast, the 358th Infantry moved out of assembly area and launched an attack late in the period on the right flank of the 357th Infantry. Combat Commands "A" and "B" (4th Armored Division) moved out of assembly positions to pass through elements of the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions. While Combat Command "A" (11th Armored Division) was enroute to an assembly area in the vicinity of HELIMONSO (Q80), Reserve Combat Command and the 41st Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (11th Armored Division) sent patrols to the east and northeast. Advancing north, the 2d Cavalry Squadron (2d Cavalry Group) occupied KLATOVY (L00), while the 42d Cavalry Squadron (2d Cavalry Group) maintained positions and patrolled.

The 65th Infantry Division continued to advance east in XX Corps zone. LINZ (V88) was occupied by the 260th Infantry (65th Infantry Division) which also relieved XII Corps elements south of the DANUBE (DONAU) River. The 259th Infantry (65th Infantry Division) moved to positions along the ENNS River. Advancing rapidly east, the 5th Infantry (71st Infantry Division) relieved elements of the 80th Infantry Division along the ENNS River south of STEYR (V96). While the 318th Infantry (80th Infantry Division) remained in assembly in the vicinity of BRAUNAU (Z97), the 317th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) continued their advance and reached the ENNS River. The 13th Armored Division remained in an assembly area in the vicinity of TANN (Z88). The right (west) flank continued to be protected by the 3d Cavalry Group.

Bad weather limited XIX Tactical Air Command's operations to reconnaissance.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack in zone during the period, capturing the important communications center of PILSEN (L04).

All Third U.S. Army units except those with V and XII Corps were limited to a daily gasoline drawing of fifty percent of their average draw for the period 26 April to 4 May. Units not requiring gasoline were not to draw any until further notice.

6 MAY (D + 334)

During a week highlighted by piecemeal, large-scale surrenders of enemy troops, significant order of battle facts were the collapse of all semblance of central control of enemy forces, puncture of the German National Redoubt myth and the sudden disappearance from prominence of the Nazi Party hierarchy shortly following the announcement by the Germans of Hitler's death. The capture of MUNICH (Y85), INNSBRUCK (D75) and BERCHTESGADEN (Z90), without substantial resistance, indicated that the Redoubt fortress was no more than a dream of the Nazi war machine. Half-finished defensive preparations and attempts to concentrate considerable troops in the area revealed that the enemy might have had high

hopes for his mountain fortress. However, the overwhelming rapidity of the Allied advances, coupled with the enemy's tremendous logistical problem, smashed whatever plan existed to make the Redoubt fortress a legend in German military history.

Enemy resistance stiffened north of the EGER River, but elsewhere in Third U.S. Army zone no aggressive activity was evident. Enemy units assembled in compliance with surrender instructions. In VIII Corps zone patrols advanced against scattered opposition and established contact with Soviet forces in the vicinity of (K7088).

A Third U.S. Army Operational Directive, confirming fragmentary orders, assigned corps missions, amended boundaries and stated that "the enemy's position in the Czechoslovakian pocket is untenable, logistically and tactically. He has only two alternatives: (1) to defend, delay and die fighting; (2) to surrender."

As a matter of information, the operational directive stated that VIII Corps (First or Ninth U.S. Army) was protecting the left (north) flank of Third U.S. Army, that Seventh U.S. Army was continuing to advance south on the right (west) to occupy that part of Austria in zone, and that XIX Tactical Air Command would continue to cooperate closely with Third U.S. Army.

Third U.S. Army was ordered to advance to the line ENNS River--CESKE BUDEJOVICE (BUDWEIS) (Q96)--PILSEN (LO4)--KARLSBAD (P69) and to be prepared for further advance east. The Army was to transfer one infantry division with normal attachments and those portions of KURHESSEN, NASSAU, and HESSEN then in Third U.S. Army zone to Ninth U.S. Army. It was to assume command of V Corps and supporting troops in place.

III Corps (4th and 99th Infantry Divisions, 14th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to assume responsibility for line of communications security in its assigned portion of the Army area and was to occupy, under provisions of the occupation plan, that portion of III Corps which was then in the Army area.

V Corps (1st, 2d and 97th Infantry Divisions, 9th and 16th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to assume command of the 16th Armored Division, advance northeast to the general line KARLSBAD (P69)--PILSEN (LO4), clearing all enemy in zone, and was to be prepared for further advance east.

XII Corps (5th, 26th and 90th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 11th Armored Divisions and supporting troops) was to advance northeast to the general line PILSEN (LO4)--CESKE BUDEJOVICE (BUDWEIS) (Q96), clear all enemy in its zone and be prepared to continue the advance to the east.

The corps was to continue the advance east in the DANUBE Valley to the railroad running from (WO38827) to CESKE BUDEJOVICE (BUDWEIS) (Q96), sending only reconnaissance east of this line.

XX Corps (65th, 71st and 80th Infantry Divisions, 13th Armored Division and supporting troops) was to continue the advance east to the ENNS River in its zone, protect the right (southwest) flank of III Corps, maintain contact with Seventh U.S. Army on the right (west) and send patrols south in zone, and be prepared to continue the advance east and/or south.

The 70th Infantry Division was to continue its current mission until relieved by elements of III Corps and pass to Ninth U.S. Army con-

Third U.S. Army Liberated These Airmen

trol on Third U.S. Army order. The 474th Infantry Regiment was to continue its current mission.

Amplification of Letter of Instructions Number Twenty-two, restricting penetration into Austria and giving restraining lines in Czechoslovakia, was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group.

Policing of assigned areas was continued by the 70th Infantry Division and 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate), while the 4th Infantry Division continued movement to the vicinity of NURNBERG (040).

All III Corps units, (99th Infantry Division, 14th Armored Division and 14th Cavalry Group) remained in assembly areas.

Making good progress in V Corps zone, the 1st Infantry Division (Combat Command "A", 9th Armored Division attached), 2d and 97th Infantry Divisions continued to advance to the southeast. The 9th Armored Division (less Combat Command "A") remained in assembly. While Combat Command "B" (16th Armored Division) remained in PILSEN (L04), Combat Command "A" and Reserve Combat Command moved up to that vicinity. As the 102d Cavalry Squadron (102d Cavalry Group) maintained security of corps installations, the 38th Cavalry Squadron (102d Cavalry Group) and attachments moved to vicinity of AS (P18).

In XII Corps zone the 2d and 10th Infantry Regiments (5th Infantry Division) continued their advance. The 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments (26th Infantry Division) continued to clear the enemy in their zone, while the 328th Infantry (26th Infantry Division) moved into blocking positions on the division right flank. Following the 4th Armored Division, the 90th Infantry Division continued to advance in zone. Advancing to the northeast, Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B" (4th Armored Division) reached the restraining line which was their objective. Reserve Combat Command (4th Armored Division) followed Combat Command "A". The 11th Armored Division patrolled in zone and maintained positions. As the 2d Cavalry Squadron (2d Cavalry Group) continued clearing and screening the corps left flank, the 42d Cavalry Squadron (2d Cavalry Group) moved to positions to the northwest.

Positions along the ENNS River in XX Corps zone were consolidated by the 65th and 71st Infantry Divisions, the latter completing relief of elements of the 80th Infantry Division. Assembling in the vicinity of SCHWANENSTADT (V45) and VORCHDORF (V65), respectively, the 318th and 319th Infantry Regiments (80th Infantry Division) sent patrols to the south. The 13th Armored Division remained in assembly area in the vicinity of TANN (Z88), while the 3d Cavalry Group provided protection for the corps right flank and patrolled to the south.

Weather again prohibited operations by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Third U.S. Army continued to attack and patrol aggressively in its zone during the first part of the period. No further advances were made as a result of orders received from higher headquarters.

The average receipts of V-80 gasoline for the previous week was 555,880 gallons daily and the average issued 657,121 gallons, 101,241 gallons daily more than the receipts. Because of increasing receipts and lessening demands, however, the gasoline situation was improving.

Throughout the Army zone, German nationals received copies of the FRANKFURT PRESSE with great enthusiasm. A report to military government from Landkreis BAD KISSINGEN stated that the paper was popular both in urban and rural areas, and that in order to achieve maximum circulation papers were posted in prominent places and the people urged to share their copies with others.

7-8 MAY

(Including period to 0001 9 MAY D+335-336)

A TWX was received from GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Allied Commander, which terminated the European war. It stated:

"1. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND SIGNED THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF ALL GERMAN LAND, SEA, AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE TO THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND AT 0141 HOURS CENTRAL EUROPEAN TIME, 7 MAY UNDER WHICH ALL FORCES WILL CEASE ACTIVE OPERATIONS AT 0001 B HOURS 9 MAY.

"2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE WILL CEASE AND TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN PRESENT POSITIONS. MOVES INVOLVED IN OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES WILL CONTINUE. DUE TO DIFFICULTIES OF COMMUNICATION THERE MAY BE SOME DELAY IN SIMILAR ORDERS REACHING ENEMY TROOPS SO FULL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN.

"3. ALL INFORMED DOWN TO AND INCLUDING DIVISIONS, TACTICAL AIR COMMANDS AND GROUPS, BASE SECTIONS, AND EQUIVALENT. NO REPEAT NO RELEASE WILL BE MADE TO THE PRESS PENDING AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS."

Only infrequent, small fire fights were encountered by Third U.S. Army's advancing columns as the enemy continued to surrender in large numbers. Patrols made contact with Russian forces in the vicinity of AMSTETTIN (W37). The Commanding General of German Army Group South surrendered all troops under his command to the Commanding General of XX Corps. The enemy garrison at LORIENT (G72) surrendered on 7 May and the garrison at ST NAZAIRE (N56) on 8 May.

Meantime, Letter of Instructions Number Twenty-two was received from Twelfth U.S. Army Group, giving in part the following information and orders:

* * * * *

"2. a. (1) 12th Army Group continuing the defense along the line of the MULDE and ELBE Rivers in zone north of CHEMNITZ will advance to the line ENNS River - BUDEJOVICE - PILSEN - KARLSBAD - CHEMNITZ prepared for further advance to the east on this front.

(2) 12th Army Group will reorganize immediately in order to release First Army Headquarters and Special Troops and dispose itself for the occupation of its zones in GERMANY and AUSTRIA under ECLIPSE conditions.

* * * * *

b. Third Army.

(1) Advance to the line ENNS River - BUDEJOVICE - PILSEN - KARLSBAD and be prepared for further advance to the east.

(2) Transfer to Ninth Army without delay those portions of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN now in Third Army zone and one infantry division, with normal attachments.

(3) Take over V Corps and supporting troops in place from First Army, (see par 3. a. (1)).

* * * * *

A Letter of Instruction was sent to the 33d Field Artillery Brigade which stated in part:

"1. Effective at once the 33d FA Brig, with attached troops, will constitute the Army Agency responsible for:

a. Collecting, protecting, supplying, administering and evacuating all Allied Prisoners of War and civilian internees within the Army area, coordinating with the Army G-1.

b. Collecting, guarding and protecting displaced persons within the Army area, coordinating with the Army G-5.

c. Where such responsibilities have been specifically delegated to other commands in designated areas the 33d FA Brig will supervise, coordinate and inspect such activities.

"2. General Instructions.

a. Allied Prisoner of War installations will be established when necessary and serviced in accordance with Standing Operating Procedure No. 58, 3 April 1945, Headquarters, ETO, US Army, and letter this headquarters, file AG 383.6 GNMCA-4, 26 April 1945, subject: "Processing of Recovered Allied Military Personnel."

b. Civilian Internment Camps will be established and serviced in accordance with unnumbered publication, this headquarters, subject: "Internment Camps."

c. (1) Displaced Persons will be collected and placed in temporary camps when necessary and will be evacuated to permanent camps in accordance with directives of Military Government.

(2) Camps will be guarded to enforce the "stay put" policy.

(3) Camps will be placed off limits, and the entry of unauthorized persons prevented.

(4) Camps will be supplied and administered where necessary due to the absence of Military Government personnel and facilities for that purpose."

* * * * *

As the 70th Infantry Division and the 474th Infantry Regiment (Separate) continued to police assigned Army areas, the 4th Infantry Division continued movement to an area east of NURNBERG (040).

In III Corps zone, the 99th Infantry Division, 14th Armored Division and 14th Cavalry Group remained in assembly areas. Near the end of the period the 99th Infantry Division began movement to an area in the vicinity of WURZBURG (N53).

While the 1st Infantry Division (Combat Command "A", 9th Armored Division, attached) consolidated and maintained positions, the 9th Armored Division's Combat Command "A" assembled in the vicinity of LUKET (P58) and HORSLAVKOV (P68). Positions were improved and maintained by the 2d and 97th Infantry Divisions. The 9th Armored Division (less Combat Command "A") stayed in assembly areas as the 16th Armored Division maintained positions in the vicinity of PILSEN (L04). As the 102d Cavalry Squadron (102d Cavalry Group) moved to PILSEN (L04) to guard V Corps installations, the 38th Cavalry Squadron (102d Cavalry Group) and attachments remained in assembly in the vicinity of AS (P18).

All units of XII Corps (5th, 26th, 90th Infantry Divisions, 4th and 11th Armored Divisions and 2d Cavalry Group) maintained and consolidated positions.

Maintaining positions, the 66th, 71st and 80th Infantry Divisions of the XX Corps processed large numbers of German troops which surrendered during the period. The 13th Armored Division remained in assembly area in the vicinity of TANN (Z88), and the 3d Cavalry Group maintained positions along the corps south flank.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew nine defensive patrol missions over Third U.S. Army front and five demonstration missions over prisoner of war camps. No claims were made.

The Army Commander held his last operational briefing for officers of the Headquarters and talked with the assembled section chiefs.



Liberated Allied Prisoners

MOVEMENT OF THIRD U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS 1–9 MAY 1945 AND ENEMY SITUATION 9 MAY 1945

CONCLUSION CAMPAIGN

CROSSING THE DANUBE AND ENTERING CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND AUSTRIA

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 MAY 1945

III CORPS
- 86TH INF DIV
- 99TH INF DIV
- 14TH ARMD DIV

XII CORPS
- 5TH INF DIV
- 26TH INF DIV
- 90TH INF DIV
- 97TH INF DIV
- 4TH ARMD DIV
- 11TH ARMD DIV

XV CORPS
- 17TH INF DIV
- 80TH INF DIV
- 13TH ARMD DIV

ARMY
- 70TH INF DIV
- 6TH ARMD DIV
- 474TH INF REGT (SEP)

0001 9 MAY 1945

III CORPS
- 4TH INF DIV
- 99TH INF DIV
- 14TH ARMD DIV

V CORPS
- 1ST INF DIV
- 2ND INF DIV
- 97TH INF DIV
- 9TH ARMD DIV
- 16TH ARMD DIV

XII CORPS
- 5TH INF DIV
- 26TH INF DIV
- 90TH INF DIV
- 4TH ARMD DIV
- 11TH ARMD DIV

XV CORPS
- 65TH INF DIV
- 71ST INF DIV
- 80TH INF DIV
- 13TH ARMD DIV

ARMY
- 70TH INF DIV
- 474TH INF REGT (SEP)

BATTLE LINE 1 MAY

BATTLE LINE 9 MAY

FROM ASSEMBLY

FROM ASSEMBLY

3 ARMORED DIVISION
1 E, 8, 97 INF DIV
FROM FUSS 4 MAY

12 A G CONTROL 1-4 MAY
TO THIRD U S ARMY 8 MAY

BOUNDARY EFFECTIVE 4 MAY

FIRST
XXIV
CORPS


90
4
5
7-9
26
11
7-9
90
65
6-9

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

During May Third U.S. Army smashed relentlessly through all defenses the enemy threw in its path, playing its part in the destruction of the German war machine which reached its climax with the unconditional surrender of all enemy armed forces at 0001B, 9 May 1945. The final surrender was preceded by a mounting tide of piecemeal surrenders of battle groups, divisions, corps and entire armies.

At the beginning of May, Third U.S. Army had improved its bridgeheads over the ISAR River, while armored spearheads had driven to the Austrian border in the vicinity of BRAUNAU (Z97) on the INN River and ten miles down the DANUBE River toward LINZ (V88). Opposing the Army was the equivalent of two and one-half enemy divisions, including the 11 Panzer Division on the Army's left flank northeast of FURTH (U79). The Army's powerful three-corps attack met little enemy resistance except as its forces closed to the INN River. From 3 May until the final capitulation the story was one of contagious spread of the enemy's desire to surrender. South of the INN River, road blocks, craters and blown bridges comprised the chief obstacles to the Army's advance.

On 4 May the 11 Panzer Division accepted unconditional surrender and began movement to the designated assembly area, the surrender coinciding with Third U.S. Army's attack to the northeast in Czechoslovakia for which V Corps was attached from First U.S. Army. Crushing all resistance, V Corps captured PILSEN (L04), an important communications center. On 5 May LINZ (V88) and STEYR (V96) were cleared and armored units swept twenty miles past LINZ (V88) down the DANUBE River.

The enemy continued to surrender in increasing numbers, failing to stand fast as the terms of the final surrender required. Heavy movement westward away from the Russians was reported by ground and air observation from 7 to 11 May. During the period 1 to 8 May, Third U.S. Army captured 90,698 prisoners plus 12,206 admitted to Army hospitals, but they continued to pour in after the official end of the war. In two more days the prisoner of war count reached 120,538.

During the 1-9 May part of the "Campaign of Southern Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria", Third U.S. Army captured 5,727 square miles of territory. The Army reached the greatest strength in its history during 4-5 May when it was comprised of twelve infantry divisions, six armored divisions and three cavalry groups, operating under four corps.

Gasoline rationing, instituted on 5 May, was discontinued on 8 May, but unit commanders were directed to insure conservation by strict supervision and control of gasoline consumption. As the tactical situation became more quiet, demands for gasoline decreased. Classes II and IV supplies were arriving in increasing quantities, but the demand for Class I supplies, however, increased because of the great number of prisoners of war captured. An increasingly difficult problem was the feeding of liberated Allied prisoners of war and thousands of Allied displaced persons. Rail priorities to Third U.S. Army were revised in order to stop shipment of material not required by the Army, with decisions based on an estimate of 600 cars daily in the Army area. Captured enemy food stocks were utilized to the maximum extent for feeding prisoners of war and Allied displaced persons. Third U.S. Army received a total of 47,180 tons of supplies during the period 1 to 8 May, including 12,367 tons of Class I, 5,370 tons of Classes II and IV; 27,355 tons of Class III and 2,088 tons of Class V. Supplies on hand as of 9 May included 1,505,194 rations, 39,412 tons of Classes II and IV supplies, 967,956 gallons of gasoline, 93,142 gallons of kerosene, 79, 345 gallons of diesel fuel, and 23,219 tons of Class V supplies. Supply by air of gasoline and rations continued to assist materially during May in keeping those items within reach of combat troops. A total of 767,050 gallons of gasoline and 52,600 rations was flown in. Allied prisoners of war evacuated by air during the first eight days of the month totalled 19,191 with 12,687 being evacuated by rail.

Ration strength of Third U.S. Army as of 9 May was a record 699,336. The Army's ground and service forces totalled 564,065, Air Force personnel, 30,764; United States hospital patients 1,858; Allied hospital patients, 2,328; enemy prisoner of war hospital patients, 1,047; British forces, 5,838; French forces, 579; Belgian forces, seventy-eight; liberated Russian prisoners of war, 13,165; liberated Polish prisoners of war, 5,694; liberated French (and other) prisoners of war, 1,325; enemy prisoners of war, 71,495, and miscellaneous, 1,100.

A record number of ammunition supply points continued to support Third U.S. Army during the May fighting. The total amount of ammunition handled by the Army was 26,243 long tons, with twenty-four tons received from Advance Section Communications Zone.

Tactical bridging operations continued at a high rate during the May campaign, a total of 110 bridges with a footage of 10,612 being constructed. Engineer troops were called upon to build prisoner of war enclosures to hold approximately 300,000 prisoners.

Investigation of war crimes engaged the attention of fourteen officers and twenty-nine enlisted men in the capacities of investigating officers, interpreters, stenographers, typists, photographers and drivers. In addition, during May, eleven officers and eighteen enlisted men devoted their full time to Military Justice courts. Fifteen new cases of war crimes were reported during the period 1 to 9 May.

With Victory in Europe Day about which to write, correspondents with Third U.S. Army submitted to field censorship 1,320 stories with a total wordage of 289,052. Photographers submitted 325 photographs, while two "Army Hour", seven "Combat Diary" programs and a victory message from the Army Commander were recorded for dissemination in the United States.

During the May fighting Third U.S. Army lost eighty-nine killed, 571 wounded and 101 missing, for total battle casualties of 761. Non-battle casualties were 2,348, making total casualties of 3,109. Reinforcements received totalled 8,390. The strength of the Command at 0001 hours, 9 May 1945, was 438,004.

★ ★ ★ ★

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



*CUMULATIVE FROM 1 AUGUST

TOWNS CAPTURED MAY

TOWN	CORPS	DATE CAPTURED
ALT-OETTING	XX	2 May
BRAUNAU	XX	2 "
KATTSTORF	XII	4 "
LINZ	XX	5 "
NEU-OETTING	XX	2 "
PASSAU	XX	2 "
PILSEN	V	5 "
SULZBACH	XX	1 "
SCHWANENSTADT	XX	4 "
VOECKLABRUCK	XX	4 "

MAY —	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
DEAD (EST)	300	200	200	100	300	500	200	0
WOUNDED (EST)	1000	500	500	300	800	1500	500	0
DAILY CAPTURED	15,976	8,736	5,421	6,854	17,174	14,436	14,887	534,625
TOTAL	17,276	9,436	6,121	7,254	18,274	16,436	15,587	534,625

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622,000
620,000

625,009

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16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0

DAILY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
DEAD	12	14	4	11	17	17	12	2
WOUNDED	112	85	61	76	76	100	56	5
MISSING	5	8	50	9	3	19	3	4
TOTAL	129	107	115	96	96	136	71	11

761

COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD U S ARMY & THE ENEMY

LEGEND

[redacted] ENEMY

[redacted] THIRD U S ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH — DAILY ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH — THIRD U S ARMY CASUALTIES



SECRET

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL



EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 5 TANKS



EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 5 TANKS



EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 10 PIECES



EACH SYMBOL REPRESENTS 30 V

SECRET

CHIEFS OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS

(8 MAY 1945)

COMMANDING GENERAL
General G. S. Patton, Jr.

CHIEF OF STAFF
Major General Hobart R. Gay

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
Colonel Paul D. Harkins

SECRETARY TO GENERAL STAFF
Lt Colonel George R. Pfann

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-1
Colonel Frederick S. Matthews

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
Colonel Oscar W. Koch

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-3
Brigadier General Halley G. Maddox

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-4
Brigadier General Walter J. Muller

ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G-5
Colonel Roy L. Dalferes

ADJUTANT GENERAL
Colonel Robert E. Cummings

AIR
Colonel Harold McC. Forde

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
Colonel Frederick R. Chamberlain, Jr.

ARTILLERY
Brigadier General Edward T. Williams

CHAPLAIN
Colonel James H. O'Neill

CHEMICAL WARFARE
Colonel Edward C. Wallington

ENGINEER
Brigadier General John F. Conklin

FINANCE
Colonel Charles B. Milliken

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT
Colonel Fred H. Kelley

INSPECTOR GENERAL
Colonel Clarence C. Park

JUDGE ADVOCATE
Colonel Charles E. Cheever

MEDICAL
Colonel Thomas J. Hartford

ORDNANCE
Colonel Thomas H. Nixon

PROVOST MARSHAL
Colonel Philip C. Clayton

PUBLIC RELATIONS
Lt Colonel James T. Quirk

QUARTERMASTER
Colonel Everett Busch

SIGNAL
Colonel Elton F. Hammond

SPECIAL SERVICE
Lt Colonel Kenneth E. Van Buskirk

TANK DESTROYER
Colonel Logan C. Berry

THIRD U.S. ARMY
MAIN SUPPLY ROADS, AIRFIELDS OPERATING RAILROADS and SUPPLY INSTALLATIONS
1-8 MAY 1945



O- OPENED
C- CLOSED
NOTE:
WEATHER CONDITIONS PROHIBITED AIR SUPPLY 4-5 MAY

FROM THE CHANNEL TO THE ALPS

In nine months and eight days of campaigning, Third U.S. Army compiled a record of offensive operations that could only be measured in superlatives, for not only did the Army's achievements astonish the world but its deeds in terms of figures challenged the imagination. The Army's operations in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Austria gave a new and terrible meaning to fluid warfare, for the Army had only one general order--seek out the enemy, trap and destroy him. To this end, the Army mastered the swift exploitation of tactical opportunity to a degree that struck fear into the hearts of the enemy, who found it was impossible to "G-2" Third U.S. Army except to predict the worst. The enemy invariably realized his worst fears--his line was breached, his forces were trapped or all but enveloped, and he was forced to flee to save what he could.

The history of Third U.S. Army's eight campaigns was a story of attack--driving on in fair weather or foul, across favorable terrain or across mud, ice and snow. It was a story of teamwork--aircraft teamed with infantry and armor to a perfection that amazed the enemy who considered that he was the master of such tactics, artillery teamed with infantry and armor to a perfection of timing and precision that wrecked enemy hopes to profit by American inexperience. It was a story of wheels--thousands of truck wheels carrying forward the supplies an Army must have to keep moving. It was a story of American ingenuity in mechanics--of creating new instruments of war on the spot to overcome new problems. It was the story of the front-line fighting men-infantry, tankers, tank destroyers, engineers--who rose to meet every challenge of courage and endurance they faced. It was the story of all the soldiers back of the front lines whose teamwork enabled a squad to capture and hold a piece of ground. And it was the story of Command--of the planners who told the soldiers what to do and then bent every effort to help them do it.

In scope and speed of advance, in ground liberated or captured, in losses inflicted upon a powerful enemy flushed with past triumphs, there was never anything like the sweep across France. On the breath-taking picture of the Campaign of France, Avranches--Brest to the Moselle stood highlights such as the supply of an entire Army through the narrow corridor at AVRANCHES (T21), the dash across the BRITTANY Peninsula to attack BREST (V99), the debacle that befell the enemy in the ARGENTAN (U21) - FALAISE (U13) pocket and the tremendous spectacle of one Army fighting on fronts 500 miles apart and with a flank 458 miles long.

Roaring through the gap made by First U.S. Army in the ST LO (T46) breakthrough, Third U. S. Army began operations on 1 August at 1200 hours. An accident of geographical position enabled the Army on 5 August to advance in every direction--east toward LE MANS (V46), south and southwest through LAVAL (Y64) and toward LORIENT (G72), west toward BREST (V99) and north toward ST MALO (S71)--but the dash and drive with which the Army carried the fight to the enemy wherever he could be found was no accident. That was the way Third U.S. Army fought. Sweeping out the BRITTANY Peninsula before the enemy could commit his reserves south of the LOIRE River, two tank columns of the 6th Armored Division forced the enemy to withdraw into the fortified ports of ST MALO (S71), LORIENT (G72), ST NAZAIRE (N56) and BREST (V99). ST MALO (S71) fell on 3 September, BREST (V99) on 20 September (when VIII Corps was under the control of Ninth U.S. Army), but the other ports were still being contained at the cessation of hostilities.

Threatened with severance of the vital supply line where it narrowed to a ten-mile-wide strip at AVRANCHES (T21), the Army poured supplies down the lifeline despite nightly air attacks, while repulsing an enemy counterattack at MORTAIN (T51). Facing complete encirclement, the enemy withdrew to the east, then continued his retreat into the ARGENTAN (U21) FALAISE (U13) pocket, from which he extricated a considerable portion of his armor only at a tremendous cost of men and materiel. With Third U.S. Army holding the lower jaw of the pocket, the enemy ran the gauntlet of the combined fires of two armies and their supporting Air Commands, racing toward the SEINE River to which Third U.S. Army's armored spearheads also were charging. Fearing a second encirclement west of the SEINE River, the enemy fought desperately to save his escape routes across the river between MANTES GASSICOURT (R66) and LE HAVRE (L42), crossing his troops despite air and artillery bombardment that exacted another fearful toll.

With columns racing toward PARIS (S04) and to the northeast of the capital, Third U.S. Army was directed to relinquish control of XV Corps (79th Infantry Division and 2d French Armored Division) and this corps sector to First U.S. Army. Meanwhile, the Army continued to advance to the south, southeast and southwest of PARIS (S04), while holding the line of the LOIRE River on the south. Under continuous attack by the Army's infantry and tank forces and by XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers, the enemy lost all hope of restoring the line of the SEINE River. The speed of Third U.S. Army's advance forced him into headlong retreat, gave him no time to occupy natural defense lines and strongpoints. The retreat continued across the MARNE, AISNE and MEUSE Rivers, until only the MOSELLE River and the SIEGFRIED Line lay in front of Third U.S. Army and Germany proper. As August drew to a close there was evidence that the Army would have to slow its advance, for at this time the Army's eastern and western fronts were 500 miles apart and the LOIRE River flank, for which the Army was responsible, was 458 miles long; and more important, the supply services were having great difficulty in keeping up with the fast forward pace of Third U.S. Army troops.

Despite shattered communications and huge losses, the enemy had not collapsed but was able to maintain an overall control of his tactical situation throughout the retreat across France. When in September the shortage of gasoline forced Third U.S. Army to slow and finally to halt its advance, the enemy took full advantage of the situation. Reinforcing his line with hastily-reorganized units, augmented by non-battle tested, incompletely-trained and up-graded troops used hitherto only in non-combatant duties, the enemy entrenched frantically in an effort to stabilize his front. One counterattack followed the other as the Germans sought to gain time to strengthen the favorable terrain with fortifications, but the enemy was unable to prevent the Forcing of the Line of the Moselle, the Army's second campaign.

Aided by the most intensive use of artillery since the beginning of operations, Third U.S. Army pushed across the MEURTHE River and established bridgeheads across the MOSELLE River, with progress slow and costly. Terrific battles were fought along the MOSELLE River as the Army battled to breach the outer defenses of METZ (U85), including the famed FORT DRIANT. Even considering his losses in personnel and mater-

REINFORCEMENTS RECEIVED BY THIRD U S ARMY



iel, the enemy had succeeded in stabilizing his front when Third U.S. Army was ordered to hold its positions until a supply build-up permitted a resumption of the offensive, for by this time there was a shortage of ammunition as well as gasoline. A period of waiting followed, during which the Army improved its bridgeheads over the MOSELLE in order to secure the best possible jumping-off positions, patrolled aggressively and built up supplies of gasoline, ammunition and winter clothing. The buildup continued through October and the first week of November.

On 8 November, Third U.S. Army resumed the offensive, opening the Capture of Metz and the Saar Campaign and dashing the enemy's hopes for a winter stalemate. The siege of METZ (U85) was carried forward with dash and determination by XX Corps, while XII Corps established bridgeheads across the SAAR River. Operations were begun during weather so unfavorable that the Army achieved tactical surprise, the enemy believing that an offensive was impossible. Heavy rains left the terrain muddy and the rivers at record flood level, which called for prodigious labors by the bridge-building engineers. Wet and cold weather caused an epidemic of trenchfoot among Army troops, but a program of individual foot care was instituted by medical officers which lowered the casualty rate and broke the epidemic. Aided by the severe weather, the enemy succeeded in preventing a major breakthrough, but he withdrew slowly into Germany and his SIEGFRIED Line defenses. Despite fanatic enemy resistance, METZ (U85) was captured by assault for the first time since 451 A.D. The city was entered on 18 November after being encircled, while the belts of forts protecting the city were reduced one by one until the last stronghold, FORT JEANNE D'ARC, fell on 13 December. FORT ST QUENTIN, FORT PLAPPEVILLE and FORT DRIANT surrendered on 6, 7 and 8 December, respectively.

Driving into the SIEGFRIED Line which barred its way to the coal mines of the SAAR, Third U.S. Army was forced to abandon its offensive when it was given a new mission on 18 December. VON RUNDSTEDT had struck on 16 December against VIII and VII Corps of First U.S. Army and had made alarming progress toward what higher headquarters believed was his objective: the capture of LIEGE (K42) and ANTWERP (J79). With the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, given command under Twelfth U.S. Army group of all First U.S. Army forces south of the enemy's penetration, the Army was ordered to attack the enemy's south flank. In the BASTOGNE - ST VITH Campaign the Army's first mission was to relieve BASTOGNE (P55), where the 101st Airborne Division (reinforced) was holding out and fighting off fierce attempts to overrun the town. The rapidity with which Third U.S. Army disengaged its forces, swung its striking power on a ninety-degree angle from the east to the north to smash into the southern flank of the enemy's salient on the morning of 22 December, helped to disrupt VON RUNDSTEDT'S great gamble. On 26 December a task force of the 4th Armored Division made contact with the besieged garrison at BASTOGNE (P55) and the embattled strongpoint which had been bypassed by enemy armor became the point of a dagger aimed at the enemy's supply lines and his tactical security. By this time snow camouflage for troops and vehicles was urgently needed and swiftly supplied, and a means to prevent tanks from slipping on the icy terrain had become critical and had been solved by the use of cleats on tanks tracks.

The enemy threw everything he had into an effort to smash the corridor to BASTOGNE (P55), attacking with eight divisions on 28 December in an effort to relieve the situation. Failing, he began to withdraw his armor behind the SIEGFRIED Line, screened by his badly battered infantry. This decision was made all the more necessary by the Russian drive on BERLIN (Z75) on the Eastern Front and the pressure maintained by First U.S. Army. Handicapped by bitterly cold weather, ice and snow, the Army continued its pressure on the south flank of the enemy penetration, making contact on the left flank with a British drive from the north on 16 January, by which time the enemy, aided by the severe weather, had succeeded in extricating what armor had not been knocked out. The enemy penetration became a wedge, then a bulge, and the BASTOGNE-ST VITH Campaign ended on 28 January with all lost ground regained. The enemy again was being pushed back into Germany.

The Campaign of the Eifel to the Rhine and the Capture of TRIER (L22) began with the advance to the KYLL River, preparatory to the capture of TRIER (L22), key communications center, and the clearing of the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle. The enemy's manpower troubles became more and more evident in the Army's overrunning of the SAAR-MOSELLE triangle, for he threw quantities of rear echelon and Volkssturm troops into the fight to retain TRIER (L22), which despite these improvisations fell on 1 March. The enemy was totally incapable of halting Third U.S. Army's sweep across the EIFEL and to the RHINE River north of KOBLENZ (L89). Elements of eleven German divisions were pocketed between Third and First U.S. Armies and chopped to pieces, only a small fraction managing to escape across the RHINE River. Remnants of nine enemy divisions cut off in the area west of COCHEM (L57) withdrew south of the MOSELLE River and by 12 March established a hastily-formed defense line in the HUNSRUCK Mountains to protect the north flank of German Army Group "G". The enemy realized the danger to his forces manning the SIEGFRIED Line on Third U. S. Army's right flank and in Seventh U.S. Army's zone.

The enemy's fears were fully justified, for by driving to the RHINE Third U.S. Army exposed the enemy's right flank and created the opportunity to reopen a devastating war of movement for the first time since the campaigning in France. Crossing the MOSELLE River south of KOBLENZ (L89), the 4th Armored Division ripped across the enemy's rear, followed closely by XII Corps Infantry units. Shortly afterwards, XX Corps armor plunged through the SIEGFRIED Line and toward the RHINE River, linking with XII Corps units to trap the remnants of ten enemy divisions in the HUNSRUCK Mountains. Seventh U.S. Army attacked north through the SIEGFRIED Line. The panic-stricken enemy attempted to set up a defense line west of MAINZ (M35) and MANNHEIM (R59), but it failed to hold Third U.S. Army's charging armor. The 4th Armored Division penetrated far into the PALATINATE and into Seventh U.S. Army's zone, cutting off all but one of the enemy's escape crossings of the RHINE River. The 10th and 12th Armored Divisions drove the enemy eastward toward the RHINE. His withdrawal quickly becoming a rout, the enemy dashed for SPEYER (R58), the only crossing of the RHINE left to him. Chopped to pieces by the armor rushing on him from three directions, attacked relentlessly by the fighter-bombers of XIX Tactical Air Command and pursued closely by the infantry, the enemy lost the greater part of two entire armies, including more than 31,000 taken as prisoners of war. Meanwhile, other Third U.S. Army units gained control of KOBLENZ (L89) by 13 March. The Capture of KOBLENZ (L89) and the Palatinate Campaign ended on 21 March with the enemy pushed across the RHINE and lacking sufficient manpower to hold his positions.

Giving the enemy no chance to recover from his mauling in the PALATINATE, Third U.S. Army flung two bridgeheads over the RHINE River within five days, then followed with two additional bridgeheads. The 5th Infantry Division made a perfectly-executed assault crossing of the RHINE early on the morning of 23 March without artillery or air support, the surprised enemy being able to offer only scattered resistance. VIII Corps units made the second assault crossing of the RHINE south of KOBLENZ (L89) on 26 March. The four bridgeheads were expanded rapidly, for the enemy's terrific losses in the PALATINATE and his concern over First U.S. Army's bridgehead at REMAGEN (F62) left him with inadequate forces to contain the Army within the bridgeheads and with insufficient time to move reserves to the threatened areas. Storming through the MAINZ (M35)--FRANKFURT (M57)--DARMSTADT (M64) triangle, Third U.S. Army advanced to the MAIN River and on 25 March seized bridgeheads over the river in the vicinity of HANAU (M87) and ASCHAFFENBURG (N05). The enemy's attempt to contain the MAIN River bridgeheads ended also in failure to prevent a breakthrough, for by 28 March the 4th Armored Division had driven thirty miles northward to join forces with First U.S. Army and pocket thousands of enemy troops in the WIESBADEN (M36) BINGEN (M15) area. Advancing rapidly toward KASSEL (C20) and FULDA (H31), Third U.S. Army again gave the enemy no time to man his proposed defense lines. Armor drove swiftly down both sides of the WERRA River to EISENACH (H86), across the FULDA River and twenty miles beyond FULDA (H31), blasting any possibility of the enemy making a strong stand along the EDER, FULDA and WERRA Rivers. Meeting strong enemy resistance only at KASSEL (C20), the onrushing armor seized MUHLHAUSEN (H99), GOTHA (J06) and SUHL (J02), then held up its advance until infantry units mopped up by-passed enemy forces and until the Army's flanks were protected by the advances of First and Seventh U.S. Armies. By 10 April Third U.S. Army was pushing toward the MULDE River, the armor breaking loose again the following day to by-pass ERFURT (J37), WEIMAR (J57), JENA (J76) and GERA (K06) and pull up on the outskirts of CHEMNITZ (K66) in a five-day drive of eighty miles. The Campaign Forcing the RHINE--FRANKFURT on MAIN--and across the MULDE ended on 21 April with Third U.S. Army restrained by higher headquarters from advancing east of the line MULDE River--ZWICH-MULDE River--PLAUEN (K10)--HOF (099)--BAYREUTH (075).

After four days of preparation and regrouping of its units, Third U.S. Army on 22 April jumped off on a new mission--to shift the axis of its advance to the southeast into BAVARIA to attack the National Redoubt area, for at this time it was still not known whether the enemy would make a last-ditch stand in the mountainous natural fortress. Meeting enemy opposition only at NEUMARKT (T78) and REGENSBURG (U15) and along the lines of the ALTMUHL, DANUBE and ISAR Rivers, the Army's powerful three corps attack swept the enemy into Austria, which was entered late in April. Enemy resistance appeared to be on the point of collapsing and final victory was in the air. On 4 May the 11th Panzer Division, which was disposed in Czechoslovakia and constituted a threat to the Army's left flank, surrendered unconditionally. V Corps, assigned from First U.S. Army, began a drive into Czechoslovakia the same day and entered PILSEN (L04) on 5 May. LINZ (V88) and STEYR (V96) fell and armored columns swept twenty miles past LINZ (V88) along the DANUBE River. Making it clear that he had no desire to defend the Redoubt region, the enemy surrendered in ever-increasing numbers. The Campaign Crossing the DANUBE and entering Czechoslovakia and Austria ended with the cessation of hostilities at 0001 on 9 May.

Reduced to cold figures, the feats of Third U.S. Army in 281 days of campaigning were all the more astonishing. The Army liberated or captured 81,522 square miles of territory, including 47,828 square miles in France, 1,010 in Luxembourg, 156 in Belgium, 26,940 in Germany, 3,485 in Czechoslovakia and 2,103 in Austria. During the greater part of the nine months and eight days of fighting the Army maintained a front of from seventy-five to 100 air miles, the front being longest on 20 April 1945 when it measured 200 miles. An estimated 12,000 cities, towns and communities were liberated or captured, including twenty-seven cities of more than 50,000 population.

Six Corps were assigned to Third U.S. Army for operations during the period.

CORPS	TIME	NUMBER OF DAYS
XII	1 August 1944 -- 8 May 1945	281
XX	1 August 1944 -- 8 May 1945	281
VIII	1 August 1944 -- 5 September 1944	
	21 December 1944 -- 22 April 1945	160
III	10 October 1944 -- 11 February 1945	
	18 April 1945 -- 8 May 1945	145
XV	1 August 1944 -- 24 August 1944	
	26 August 1944 -- 29 September 1944	61
V	6 May 1945 -- 8 May 1945	3

The 4th Armored Division operated under Third U.S. Army for all except one day of the 281 days of operations. This unit, along with the 80th, 90th and 5th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Armored Division, were with the Army during practically all of its tactical operations.

DIVISION	TIME	NUMBER OF DAYS
4th Armored Division	1 August 1944 -- 22 April 1945	280
	24 April 1945 -- 8 May 1945	
5th Infantry Division	5 August 1944 -- 8 May 1945	276
80th Infantry Division	1 August 1944 -- 16 August 1944	
	24 August 1944 -- 8 May 1945	274
90th Infantry Division	1 August 1944 -- 16 August 1944	
	26 August 1944 -- 8 May 1945	272
6th Armored Division	1 August 1944 -- 4 September 1944	
	17 September 1944 -- 22 April 1945	252

Forty-two divisions were under operational control of Third U.S. Army during the period 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, including twenty-five infantry and fourteen armored assigned and two airborne divisions attached.

INFANTRY DIVISIONS	ARMORED DIVISIONS
1st Infantry Division	2d French Armored Division
2d Infantry Division	4th Armored Division
4th Infantry Division	5th Armored Division
5th Infantry Division	6th Armored Division
8th Infantry Division	7th Armored Division
26th Infantry Division	8th Armored Division
28th Infantry Division	9th Armored Division

COMPARATIVE CASUALTY CHART

THIRD US ARMY & THE ENEMY

		AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY
MONTHLY	DEAD (EST)	18500	13700	9950	13050	20600	21200	11400	20600	13700	1800
	WOUNDED (EST)	59900	36600	19300	35500	60000	59200	34800	43400	32400	5100
	CAPTURED	70046	28072	4222	25912	18420	16625	24161	142217	332904	618109
	TOTAL	148446	78372	33472	74462	99020	97025	70361	206217	379004	625009

LEGEND

ENEMY

THIRD U S ARMY

NOTE: TOP OF GRAPH — ENEMY CASUALTIES
BOTTOM OF GRAPH — THIRD U S ARMY CASUALTIES

MONTHLY: 624,000 612,000 600,000 588,000 576,000 564,000 552,000 540,000 528,000 516,000 504,000 492,000 480,000 468,000 456,000 444,000 432,000 420,000 408,000 396,000 384,000 372,000 360,000 348,000 336,000 324,000 312,000 300,000 288,000 276,000 264,000 252,000 240,000 228,000 216,000 204,000 192,000 180,000 168,000 156,000 144,000 132,000 120,000 108,000 96,000 84,000 72,000 60,000 48,000 36,000 24,000 12,000 0

CUMULATIVE: 1,820,000 1,785,000 1,750,000 1,715,000 1,680,000 1,645,000 1,610,000 1,575,000 1,540,000 1,505,000 1,470,000 1,435,000 1,400,000 1,365,000 1,330,000 1,295,000 1,260,000 1,225,000 1,190,000 1,155,000 1,120,000 1,085,000 1,050,000 1,015,000 980,000 945,000 910,000 875,000 840,000 805,000 770,000 735,000 700,000 665,000 630,000 595,000 560,000 525,000 490,000 455,000 420,000 385,000 350,000 315,000 280,000 245,000 210,000 175,000 140,000 105,000 70,000 35,000 0

1,811,388

139,646

		AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY
MONTHLY	DEAD	89	2445	2130	795	2214	2032	2526	1494	1855	1016
	WOUNDED	11487	12307	3758	15235	12788	15150	10563	9915	4467	571
	MISSING	2056	4100	1436	5324	5814	3765	1627	1803	783	101
	TOTAL	15988	18537	5989	22773	20634	21441	13684	13573	6266	761

DEAD 144,500

WOUNDED 386,200

CAPTURED 1,280,688

DEAD 16,596
WOUNDED 96,241
MISSING 26,809



29th Infantry Division
35th Infantry Division
42d Infantry Division
65th Infantry Division
69th Infantry Division
70th Infantry Division
71st Infantry Division
76th Infantry Division
79th Infantry Division
80th Infantry Division
83d Infantry Division
86th Infantry Division
87th Infantry Division
89th Infantry Division
90th Infantry Division
94th Infantry Division
95th Infantry Division
97th Infantry Division
99th Infantry Division

10th Armored Division
11th Armored Division
12th Armored Division
13th Armored Division
14th Armored Division
16th Armored Division
20th Armored Division

AIRBORNE DIVISIONS

17th Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division

The strength of Third U.S. Army was at its greatest when the final campaign ended on 8 May 1945, with 437,860 assigned personnel. The Army's strength was 92,187 on 1 August, 220,169 on 31 August, 138,639 on 30 September, 252,514 on 31 October, 247,150 on 30 November, 347,660 on 31 December, 353,981 on 31 January, 304,542 on 28 February, 312,205 on 31 March and 346,839 on 30 April. Reinforcements received during the period totalled 258,924.

Third U.S. Army captured 1,280,688 prisoners of war, from 1 August 1944 -- 13 May 1945, including 485,405 who were processed in Corps and Division cages from 9 to 13 May, inclusive. The enemy lost an estimated 47,500 killed and 115,700 wounded by Third U.S. Army.

CAMPAIGN	PRISONERS CAPTURED	AVERAGE PER DAY
The Campaign of France, Avranches - Brest, to the Moselle 1 August 1944 -- 24 September 1944	94,199	1,713
Forcing the Line of the Moselle 25 September 1944 -- 7 November 1944	8,481	193
The Capture of Metz and the Saar Campaign 8 November 1944 -- 18 December 1944	36,489	890
The Bastogne -- St Vith Campaign 19 December 1944 -- 28 January 1945	23,218	566
The Eifel to the Rhine and the Capture of Trier 29 January 1945 -- 12 March 1945	58,781	1,367
The Capture of Koblenz and the Palatinate Campaign 13 March 1945 -- 21 March 1945	81,692	8,169
Forcing the Rhine -- Frankfurt on Main -- and across the Mulde 22 March 1945 -- 21 April 1945	240,661	8,022
Crossing the Danube and Entering Czechoslovakia and Austria 22 April 1945 -- 8 May 1945	221,962	13,057
Total for period 1 August 1944 -- 8 May 1945	765,483	2,724
Total from 9 to 13 May 1945, inclusive	515,205	
Grand total	1,280,688	

In marked contrast to the terrific enemy casualties, Third U.S. Army suffered total casualties of 160,692, including 27,104 killed, 86,267 wounded, 18,957 injured, 28,237 missing in action, of whom many later were reported captured, and 127 captured by the enemy. The Army's casualties included 8,372 officers and 152,324 enlisted men, approximately one officer to eighteen enlisted men. Of the total casualties, 33,004 were returned to duty from a previously reported casualty status.

Intelligence troops apprehended forty-two enemy agents and/or saboteurs from 337 cases investigated and interrogated 2,500 civilians for tactical information. Aircraft and artillery of Third U.S. Army dropped 31,552,700 psychological warfare leaflets to enemy troops, while 722 combat and Military Government loudspeaker missions to induce enemy troops to surrender were successfully completed. XIX Tactical Air Command, at the request of intelligence units, completed 1,767 tactical reconnaissance and seventy-seven photo reconnaissance missions which resulted in 3,205,670 aerial photographic prints being distributed.

XIX Tactical Air Command flew 7,326 missions and 74,447 sorties during the 281 days of campaigning. Third U. S. Army's air support arm dropped 17,486 tons of bombs, 3,205 Napalm tanks and launched 4,599 rockets. The Air Command destroyed 1,640 enemy planes and lost 582 aircraft of its own from all causes. The busiest month of operation was August, when 12,229 sorties were flown, but more bombs were dropped in December, 2,134 tons, than in any other month.

Targets destroyed or damaged by XIX Tactical Air Command included:

Tanks and armored cars	3,833
Motor vehicles	38,541
Locomotives	4,337
Railroad lines cut	2,585
Marshalling yards	974
Towns and villages	816
Factories	3,664
Supply dumps	220
Military installations	1,730
Gun installations	2,809
Highway and railroad bridges	285
Miscellaneous naval vessels	654
Miscellaneous targets	3,010

COMPARATIVE CHARTS--LOSSES OF MATERIEL









THIRD U S ARMY



CAMPAIGNS

1 AUGUST 1944 TO 9 MAY 1945

Antiaircraft artillery claimed 1,084 enemy planes destroyed and 564 probably destroyed of 6,192 enemy planes over Third U.S. Army area during the period 1 August -- 8 May. Antiaircraft artillery claimed 26.6 percent of enemy aircraft over the Army's area were destroyed or probably destroyed by its batteries. The most enemy planes claimed destroyed or probably destroyed was on 2 April 1945, when sixty-eight in the first category and thirty-two in the second were claimed.

Artillery with Third U.S. Army fired 5,870,843 rounds, or 158, 207 tons of ammunition during the campaigning. Artillery observation aircraft executed 87,002 missions totaling 93,933 flying hours, of which 22,865 were fire missions, 31,191 for purposes of reconnaissance and patrol, and 32,946 liaison and miscellaneous missions. The Army became operational with 636 field artillery pieces of 105mm caliber or larger and excluding tank destroyer, antiaircraft artillery and infantry weapons. On 8 May the number of artillery pieces was at a high of 1,464.

Tank destroyers with Third U.S. Army knocked out 648 enemy tanks and 211 self-propelled guns from 1 August -- 8 May. Acting as assault guns in support of infantry and armored units, tank destroyers knocked out 349 enemy anti-tank guns, 175 artillery pieces, 519 machine guns and 1,556 general purpose vehicles. In the campaigning to breach the MAGINOT and SIEGFRIED Lines, tank destroyers eliminated 801 pillboxes. Tank destroyers expended 101,178 rounds of ammunition on direct fire missions and 231,998 rounds on indirect fire missions.

All classes of supplies brought into the Army area by all means of transportation during 1 August -- 8 May totaled 1,234,529 long tons. Within the Army area, 2,186,792 tons of supplies were transported 141,081,336 ton miles by trucks in the Army's transportation pool, convoys totalling 264,606 vehicles being given 2,242 highway clearances. A total of 3,655,322 vehicles passed through 109 traffic regulating points. A total of 2,092 miles of railway track, extending from ST GERMAIN (X48), France to the Redoubt area in Germany, was reconstructed and placed into operation. Four hundred ninety-six railheads were surveyed in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, of which approximately two-thirds were actively used by supply services of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army. Receipts of all Quartermaster supplies totalled 774,541.86 long tons. Receipts in long tons by methods of transportation and by class of supply follow:

	RAIL AND TRUCK	PERCENT OF TOTAL	AIR	PERCENT OF TOTAL	TOTAL
August	69,400.5	97.99	1,442.6	2.01	70,843.1
September	53,791.81	90.56	5,648.7	9.44	59,440.51
October	52,205.28	96.17	2,078.5	3.83	54,283.78
November	77,441.94	99.15	665.7	0.85	78,107.64
December	75,751.4	99.33	508.4	0.67	76,259.8
January	97,576.43	100.0	0		97,576.43
February	87,196.2	99.95	41.6	0.05	87,237.8
March	104,264.8	99.06	985.0	0.94	105,249.8
April	91,593.2	82.44	19,507.2	17.56	111,100.4
May (To 082400)	31,980.0	92.85	2,462.6	7.15	34,442.6
TOTAL	741,201.56		33,340.3		774,541.86

	CLASS I	CLASS II	CLASS IV	CLASS III POL	CLASS III SOLID FUELS	TOTAL
August	27,141.2	205.05	64.75	43,432.1	0	70,843.1
September	23,048.9	1,418.4	447.91	34,525.3	0	59,440.51
October	24,139.0	3,458.53	1,092.17	25,594.08	0	54,283.78
November	25,028.4	2,719.28	858.72	40,823.25	8,678.0	78,107.65
December	29,085.1	3,405.03	1,075.27	36,553.4	6,141.0	76,259.8
January	36,138.5	4,540.05	1,433.7	49,799.18	5,665.0	97,576.43
February	28,284.2	5,384.8	429.2	44,652.6	8,487.0	87,237.8
March	33,401.1	2,291.4	571.5	63,842.2	5,143.6	105,249.8
April	32,621.9	435.2	335.7	77,007.6	700.0	111,100.4
May (To 082400)	10,081.4	551.7	752.3	23,057.2	0	34,442.6
TOTAL	268,969.7	24,409.44	7,061.22	439,286.91	34,814.6	774,541.87
Percent of Total	34.7	3.2	.9	56.7	4.5	100.0

Ammunition received by Third U. S. Army from 1 August -- 8 May totalled 533,825 long tons, with 482,345 long tons being issued to units. A total of 1,549,993 long tons of ammunition, involving 14,101,977 miles of hauling by trucks, was handled within the Army area. Issued to units of the Army were 26,905 general purpose vehicles, 7,581 combat vehicles, 4,482 artillery pieces, 193,910 small arms and 47,611 tons of spare parts. The Army repaired 99,114 general purpose vehicles, 21,761 combat vehicles, 11,613 artillery pieces, 125,083 small arms and 32,740 instruments.

Third U.S. Army made thirty-two major river crossings during the campaigning. The MOSELLE River was crossed five times in five different places during the months of September, October and November 1944, February and March 1945. The SEILLE, OUR and SAAR Rivers were crossed twice. Other principal rivers which were bridged were the MAYENNE, SARTHE, SEINE, YONNE, MARNE, MEUSE, MEURTHE, NIED, BLIES, SAUER, SURE, PRUM, KYLL, RHINE, MAIN, NAHE, LAHN, ALTMUHL, DANUBE, ISAR and INN. In these crossings and in the crossings of numerous smaller rivers and streams 2,498 bridges with a total footage of 255,520, nearly forty-eight and one-half miles of bridging, were constructed, including 705 assault bridges with a total footage of 70,169 and 1,793 Bailey and fixed bridges with a total footage of 185,351. During the campaigns Third U.S. Army maintained an average of 2,240 miles of road at all times.

Nine chemical mortar companies, assigned to Third U.S. Army for varying periods, expended 349,097 rounds of 4.2" chemical mortar shells, including 189,095 rounds of high explosive and 160,002 rounds of white phosphorous. Chemical warfare supplies issued to Army units during the campaigns included 32,454 gallons of flame thrower fuel and 335,944 grenades of all types.

Third U.S. Army signal troops laid 3,747 miles of W-110 wire, 8,179 miles of spiral-four wire and 4,551 miles of open wire during the campaigns. Of this amount, 1,232 miles of W-110 wire and 1,883 miles of spiral-four wire were recovered. Signal troops rehabilitated 3,965 circuit miles of French and German open wire and 36,338 circuit miles of

underground cable. Third U.S. Army Message Center handled a total of 7,220,261 code groups during the campaigns, while Forward and Rear echelon switchboard operators handled an estimated average of 13,968 telephone calls daily during the 281 days of campaigning.

Patients transferred by Army ambulances from division clearing stations and similar levels to Army hospitals during 1 August to 8 May numbered 269,187. Evacuated from the Army area were 164,810 patients, 28,826 by air, 91,005 by road, 1,164 by boat and 43,815 by rail. Mortality from all types of battle casualties treated in Third U.S. Army hospitals amounted to 2.78 percent. The percentage of deaths from all causes to dispositions made of all cases was 1.4 percent. U.S. Army patients returned to duty without evacuation from the Army area numbered 114,024, or 43.5 percent as compared to dispositions.

Military personnel in Third U. S. Army were paid a total of $240,539,569 from 1 August to 30 April, inclusive. Of this amount, approximately 43.83 percent went to family and individual allotments, 7.13 percent to government insurance, 6.56 percent to war bonds, 1.9 percent to soldiers' deposits, 23.99 percent to personal transfers, 5.49 percent to other collections and 11.1 percent was retained.

Civil Affairs administrations were provided in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Czechoslovakia and Military Government administrations in Germany and Austria by Third U.S. Army for approximately 30,000,000 people. During December, administration was provided for four of these countries, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Belgium, at one time. Military Government courts tried 1,015 cases involving 1,323 persons, found 1,194 guilty and 129 not guilty. Total fines of 116,405 Reichsmarks were collected and imprisonment totalling 17,817 days was imposed. Military Government took charge of five concentration camps formerly operated by the Nazis, with a total of 47,645 political prisoners, and prisons with a population of 7,473. Of 875,000 displaced persons cared for from 1 August -- 8 May, 175,000 were repatriated by 9 May 1945.

Forward Echelon of Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, traveled 1,225 miles in making nineteen moves from 1 August to 8 May, while the Rear Echelon traveled 957 miles in making twelve moves.

FORWARD ECHELON

DATE	LOCATION	DISTANCE TRAVELED
5-7 July	NEHOU (O19), FRANCE	
1 August	LEBIGNARD (T26), FRANCE	25
2-3 August	BEAUCHAMPS (T23), FRANCE	36
8 August	POILLEY (Y39), FRANCE	32
12 August	ST OUEN des TOITS (Y65), FRANCE	35
14-15 August	LA BAZOGE (Z34), FRANCE	67
20 August	BROU (W18), FRANCE	73
25 August	COURCY-aux-LOGES (W95), FRANCE	68
30 August	LA CHAUME (X87), FRANCE	80
4 September	MARSON (T64), FRANCE	99
15 September	BRAQUIS (U46), FRANCE	68
22-28 September	ETAIN (U47), FRANCE	5
11 October	NANCY (U81), FRANCE	60
28 December	LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81), LUXEMBOURG	90
27-28 March	IDAR-OBERSTEIN (L72), GERMANY	80
3 April	FRANKFURT on MAIN (M67), GERMANY	85
11 April	HERSFELD (H35), GERMANY	85
22 April	ERLANGEN (O35), GERMANY	150
2-3 May	REGENSBURG (U15), GERMANY	87
	TOTAL MILES	1,225

REAR ECHELON

DATE	LOCATION	DISTANCE TRAVELED
17-18 July	NEHOU (O19), FRANCE	
3 August	BEAUCHAMPS (T23), FRANCE	59
10-11 August	POILLEY (Y39), FRANCE	32
17-18 August	LA BAZOGE (Z34), FRANCE	102
27 August	COURCY-aux-LOGES (W95), FRANCE	102
6 September	MARSON (T64), FRANCE	150
18 September	BRAQUIS (U46), FRANCE	70
5 October	NANCY (U81), FRANCE	60
7-9 January	ESCH-sur-ALZETTE (P70), LUXEMBOURG	65
6-7 February	LUXEMBOURG CITY (P81), LUXEMBOURG	12
29-30 March	TRIER (L22), GERMANY	30
6 April	FRANKFURT on MAIN (M67), GERMANY	135
24-26 April	ERLANGEN (O35), GERMANY	140
	TOTAL MILES	957

An average of 320 chaplains, representing twenty-five different denominations, were assigned to Third U.S. Army during the campaigns. Seven chaplains were killed in action, five were missing in action, three were captured, three were captured and released, and forty-five were wounded in action.

Decorations awarded to Third U.S. Army personnel from 1 August 1944 to 8 May 1945, inclusive, totalled 34,840. They included: Medal of Honor, nineteen; Distinguished Service Medal, forty-four; Distinguished Service Cross, 291; Legion of Merit, 159; Silver Star, 4,990; Soldier's Medal, 247, and Bronze Star, 29,090. Normal promotions processed numbered 6,464, battlefield promotions, 1,817, and combat appointments, 848.

Correspondents with Third U.S. Army and soldier correspondents in the field wrote 30,326 stories totalling 7,010,963 words and submitted 7,129 photographs about the Army's campaigns.

General court-martial cases tried and reviewed numbered 325, special courtmartial cases received, reviewed and passed on numbered 1,205 and summary courtmartial cases received, reviewed and passed on totalled 6,474. General courtmartial cases referred for trial numbered 406. One hundred eight investigations and 150 inspections were made by the Inspector General Section.

Attendance at motion picture shows was 11,230,000, at United Service Organization shows, 650,000, and at soldier talent shows, 625,000.

Thus, Third U.S. Army played its proud part in crushing the Nazi war machine. Wherever and whenever men talk of this war the name of Third U.S. Army and its Commander will awaken a martial thrill. The world learned to expect good news from Third U.S. Army, for more often than not the progress of Allied arms was marked by the oft-repeated headline: "Third Army Loose Again." As much as any other Army under the command of GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, Third U.S. Army deserved the accolade the Supreme Commander conferred on all of his soldiers in his 9 May 1945 Order of the Day: "Working and fighting together in a single indestructible partnership you have achieved perfection in unification of air, ground and naval power that will stand as a model in our time."



ROSTER OF THIRD U.S. ARMY HEADQUARTERS OFFICERS

Note: The following is a list of officers who were assigned to Third U.S. Army Headquarters during the period covered by this Report, or who were attached to this Headquarters for at least six-months during this period.

COMMANDING GENERAL AND AIDES

Gen	Patton, G. S. Jr	O 2605	USA
Lt Col	Codman, Charles R.	O 448161	MI
Maj	Stiller, Alexander C.	O 1010000	ADC
Capt	Graves, Francis P. Jr	O 439195	FA

CHIEF OF STAFF SECTION

Maj Gen	Gaffey, Hugh J.	O 8435	GSC
Maj Gen	Gay, Hobart R.	O 7323	GSC
Col	Harkins, Paul D.	O 17625	GSC
Maj	Murnane, George F. Jr	O 1010331	CAV
Capt	Taylor, Elliott R.	O 379074	CAV
Capt	Wysong, Alison C. Jr	O 453526	INF

SECRETARY TO GENERAL STAFF

Lt Col	Pfann, George R.	O 469770	GSC
Capt	Maurer, Roy B.	O 2053898	AUS
CWO	Buels, Monroe T.	W 2108647	NMB

G-1 SECTION

Col	Matthews, Frederick S.	O 5625	GSC
Col	Horne, William A. Jr	O 296165	GSC
Lt Col	Foote, Thomas C.	O 19488	FA
Lt Col	Thomas, T. K.	O 364492	GSC
Lt Col	Wing, Robert B.	O 275785	CAV
Lt Col	Pelton, Joseph A.	O 329 346	GSC
Lt Col	Eklund, Coy G.	O 379547	CAV
Maj	La Rue, Robert G.	O 216396	INF
Maj	Renfro, Forney Jr	O 313676	FA
Maj	Richardson, Hugh F.	O 461042	INF
Capt	Hess, Buie	O 1002647	AGD
Capt	Veitenthal, Carl E. Jr	O 1003060	AGD
1st Lt	Cassell, Ray E.	O 1312123	INF
CWO	Miller, Richard F.	W 2108639	NMB

G-2 SECTION

Col	Koch, Oscar W.	O 10851	GSC
Col	Allen, Robert S.	O 481033	GSC
Lt Col	Carter, Bernard S.	O 885628	GSC
Lt Col	Franklin, Horace A.	O 221725	GSC
Lt Col	Schmuck, Edward J.	O 349795	AGD
Lt Col	Huot, Louis C.	O 914204	INF
Maj	Popovsky, Nicholas T.	O 275566	AC
Maj	Cheadle, John F.	O 353837	FA
Maj	Swanson, George D.	O 329738	CAV
Maj	Ordway, Howard E.	O 342012	INF
Maj	Rose, Edward A.	O 885076	AUS
Capt	Twelmeyer, Theodore A.	O 355058	CAV
Capt	Du Bose, Horace M. Jr	O 506094	MI
Capt	Newman, John A.	O 325448	CE
Capt	Robinson, James J.	O 885436	INF
Capt	Goolrick, William K. Jr	O 438144	INF
Capt	Benson, Walter L.	O 394619	CAV
Capt	Dieter, John P.	O 1030357	CAV
Capt	Kritser, Tom M.	O 479170	CAV
Capt	Dimmler, George F	O 1040911	CAC
1st Lt	Katz, Abraham A.	O 912666	ORD
1st Lt	Wilson, Neal B.	O 1320267	INF
2nd Lt	Grosso, Louis J.	O 1946972	TC
2nd Lt	Law, Howard A. Jr	O 885668	INF
WOJG	Hose, Fred H.	W 2121157	NMB

G-2 AIR

Col	Forde, Harold M.	O 16409	GSC
Lt Col	McIntosh, Kenneth	O 204150	INF
Lt Col	Pajerski, Frank J.	O 358905	CE
Maj	Scheerer, Theodore J.	O 258891	INF
Maj	Bigger, Chester H.	O 24212	FA
Maj	Clark, James C.	O 409383	FA
Maj	Patterson, Dallas M.	O 408938	INF
Capt	Reiner, Lawrence J.	O 370014	INF
Capt	Mershon, Carroll M.	O 391959	FA
Capt	Scott, Gordon W.	O 303546	CAV
Capt	Eastham, William K.	O 1042278	CAC
Capt	Foltz, Albert B.	O 293514	INF
Capt	Gilliam, Richard C.	O 316749	INF
Capt	Campbell, William R.	O 345074	INF
Capt	Clark, James F.	O 449745	INF
1st Lt	Moncure, Thomas R.	O 408203	INF
1st Lt	Barlow, Lester	O 1298486	INF
1st Lt	Levy, Jerome K.	O 1285445	INF
1st Lt	Marchus, David E.	O 1284356	INF

ATTACHED

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS

Capt	Hallett, James B.	O 1304523	INF
Capt	Callan, Albert S.	O 1305891	INF
Capt	Ray, James E.	O 1031121	CAV
Capt	Sayers, Sam R. Jr	O 1320567	INF
1st Lt	Yarnevich, Ernest N.	O 1318392	INF
2nd Lt	Oliver, Paul E.	O 1998023	AUS
2nd Lt	Burglund, Oliver O.	O 1997991	AUS
2nd Lt	Cody, Charles J.	O 2000155	AUS
2nd Lt	Coyne, Martin J.	O 1997990	AUS
2nd Lt	Vaivada, Anthony S.	O 2001159	AUS
2nd Lt	Fanning, Julius N. Jr	O 2001133	AUS

ENEMY DOCUMENT SECTION

Capt	Pressler, John I.	O 1109599	CE
2nd Lt	Stein, Joseph	O 2015831	AUS

FIELD INTERROGATION DETACHMENT

Maj	Marechal, Hans H.	O 129146	INF
Capt	Van Dam, Bernard E.	O 1298789	INF

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INTERPRETER TEAMS

Capt	Wege, Hans F.	O 275181	SIG C
1st Lt	Thompson, Cyril S.	O 1311705	INF
1st Lt	Onffroy, Paul D.	O 1053289	CAC

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES DETACHMENT

Lt Col	Shallcross, Lawrence B.	O 298590	CAV
Maj	Haensel, Andrew	O 444029	SN C
Capt	Barnes, Charles de M.	O 1284450	INF
Capt	Tarrant, Warren J.	O 1004527	AGD
1st Lt	Moller, Mogens P.	O 1299451	INF
1st Lt	Mueller, Gustave A.	O 1593973	QMC
1st Lt	Perry, John S.	O 886330	AUS

ORDER OF BATTLE UNIT

Capt	Gerber, Helmut E.	O 1589850	QMC

PHOTO INTERPRETATION TEAMS

Capt	Chalif, Edward L.	O 1305726	INF
Capt	Knight, Franklin Jr	O 1171633	FA
Capt	Ward, Maurice A.	O 1583813	ORD
Capt	Snow, Richard S.	O 1040128	CAC
Capt	Cicero, Raymond F.	O 1302602	INF
Capt	Martin, Evans J.	O 1043159	CAC
1st Lt	Morus, Henry P.	O 1317989	INF
1st Lt	Pisano, Joseph F.	O 1323352	INF
1st Lt	Schlappich, Leon N.	O 1049334	CAC
1st Lt	Macon, Boise	O 526757	CAC
1st Lt	Sporcic, Stephen	O 1037919	CAC
1st Lt	OLear, Mike	O 10336833	CAC
1st Lt	Wright, Albert S.	O 361669	CAC
1st Lt	Wruble, Harvey M.	O 1059689	CAC

PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATION TEAMS

Capt	Kovach, Frank Z.	O 407698	CAV
Capt	Neumann, Fred S.	O 1179985	FA
1st Lt	Jann, Edmund C.	O 1317088	INF
1st Lt	Lang, Herman L.	O 1326099	INF
2nd Lt	Goldschmidt, Lucien C.	O 2015942	AUS
2nd Lt	Sheridan, Henry	O 2011941	AUS
2nd Lt	Wallach, Ernest	O 2015941	AUS
2nd Lt	Heilbrunn, Martin	O 2015969	AUS

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH

1st Lt	Collette, Jack T.	O 437097	CAV
2nd Lt	Littman, Edward H.	O 2010514	AUS
2nd Lt	Nilson, Nils C.	O 2010513	AUS

SPECIAL LIAISON UNIT

1st Lt	Hull, Lawrence C.	O 1821872	CAV
1st Lt	Brown, William N.	O 2041083	INF

G-3 SECTION

Brig Gen,	Maddox, Halley G.	O 12852	GSC
Col	Wallace, Brenton G.	O 185391	FA
Col	Hensey, Walter R. Jr	O 14950	FA
Col	Griffin, William E.	O 11894	CAC
Col	Borders, William A.	O 222335	GSC
Lt Col	Goodwin, James E.	O 20158	FA
Lt Col	Wright, Joseph H.	O 267842	GSC
Lt Col	Keehn, Roy D. Jr	O 246642	CAV
Lt Col	Stillman, Richard J.	O 25038	INF
Lt Col	Hanson, Reuben N.	O 235903	FA
Lt Col	Hoover, Richard A.	O 270135	GSC
Lt Col	Pester, Eugene W.	O 338294	INF
Lt Col	Dungan, Harold M.	O 289317	INF
Lt Col	Doerr, Paul L.	O 247717	INF
Lt Col	Leeney, Lewis W.	O 25206	INF
Maj	Lindau, Fred I.	O 225962	CE
Maj	Sutton, Alexander G. Jr	O 328595	CE
Maj	Paynter, Charles A.	O 322898	INF
Maj	Shirley, John E.	O 352763	CAC
Maj	Bredin, Ryerson A.	O 297346	ORD
Maj	Davis, John M.	O 314057	CAV
Maj	Hilliard, Lee H.	O 404242	INF
Maj	Wolf, John F.	O 373131	INF
Maj	James, Ernest J.	O 241849	CE
Maj	Helbig, Herbert R. Jr	O 379956	FA
Maj	Holton, Ira J.	O 453734	INF
Maj	Stinemeyer, Edwin H. Jr	O 270546	CE

Maj	Gundlach, Robert L.	O 430533	CAV
Maj	Graham, Donald	O 452825	INF
Capt	Littrell, Ralph S.	O 382403	QMC
Capt	Mantler, Marshall J.	O 1293078	INF
Capt	Dennis, William J.	O 1303120	INF
Capt	Carrington, Philip S.	O 425925	INF
1st Lt	Stafford, George T. Jr	O 433709	CAV
1st Lt	Townsend, Robert F.	O 1318344	INF
2nd Lt	Dietrich, John L.	O 2011242	INF
WOJG	Nier, John E.	W 2119520	NMB

G-3 AIR

Lt Col	Murray, Irvin P.	O 305565	AC
Maj	Piper, Joe H.	O 281955	INF
Maj	Page, John W.	O 325634	INF
Capt	Basinger, Virgil D.	O 1286231	INF

AIR LIAISON

Lt Col	Goodwin, Homer L.	O 279814	INF
Lt Col	Bravos, George J.	O 183018	INF
Lt Col	Martin, James G. IV	O 292980	FA
Lt Col	Dunning, Chester H.	O 373618	CAV
Maj	Linden, Norman E.	O 362243	CAV
Maj	Walton, John W.	O 232842	INF
Maj	Buckles, Roscoe C.	O 390668	CAV
Maj	Carvey, John C.	O 357374	INF
Maj	Baldwin, Richard M.	O 268172	INF
Maj	Cothran, James C.	O 342661	INF
Maj	Fry, Kenneth L.	O 354246	INF
Maj	Castle, Alexander M.	O 450580	INF
Maj	Corbin, Walter E.	O 450583	INF
Capt	Marsden, Henry H.	O 329983	INF
Capt	Dubey, William	O 1011863	INF
Capt	Chingos, Peter G.	O 286245	INF
Capt	Rush, James B. L.	O 453578	INF
Capt	Converse, Charles D.	O 1167372	FA
Capt	Adams, William R.	O 1167560	FA
Capt	Watson, James W.	O 376546	INF
Capt	Van Horn, Richard	O 1114317	CE

ATTACHED

11TH SPECIAL FORCE DETACHMENT

Lt Col	Powell, Robert I.	O 329025	CAV
Maj	Bartlett, Eben B. Jr	O 366695	FA
Maj	Davis, Gerald W.	O 366979	CAC
Maj	Thomas, Allison K.	O 1284241	INF
1st Lt	Babineau, Raymond P.	O 1319466	INF
1st Lt	Ripley, William T.	O 1165940	FA
1st Lt	Rosett, Francis C.	O 1014505	INF
1st Lt	Le Blanc, Robert J.	O 446454	INF
1st Lt	L'Hereault, Roger C.	O 1301169	INF
1st Lt	Walsh, Rutherford T.	O 1185152	FA
1st Lt	Carroll, Rene E.	O 1002771	INF
1st Lt	Kelso, Andrew R.	O 1647118	AUS
2nd Lt	Niel, Charles	O 1895386	AUS

3D INFORMATION AND HISTORICAL SERVICE

Lt Col	Cole, Hugh M.	O 907578	ORD
Maj	Dayton, Dello G.	O 363889	CAC
Capt	Clark, Ledyard B.	O 1995389	AUS
Capt	Dunkerley, William J.	O 1296185	INF
1st Lt	Morris, Harry A.	O 1323465	INF
1st Lt	Burts, Theron E. Jr	O 523601	FA

G-4 SECTION

Brig Gen	Muller, Walter J.	O 12224	GSC
Col	Perry, Redding F.	O 9900	GSC
Col	Cooke, Joseph R.	O 100239	TC
Col	Harrison, William H.	O 292346	GSC
Lt Col	Hertzler, John V.	O 348154	QMC
Lt Col	Weissinger, William T. III	O 21154	FA
Lt Col	Stegner, Albert L.	O 240196	GSC
Lt Col	Anderson, Charles E. Jr	O 348456	FA
Lt Col	Burroughs, Vernon R.	O 365881	FA
Lt Col	Pirkle, Charles G.	O 354475	CAC
Lt Col	Hazelett, Charles W.	O 361771	INF
Maj	McKenna, John F.	O 298952	QMC
Maj	Sandoz, Thomas R.	O 293213	QMC
Maj	Walton, Richard E.	O 311774	INF
Maj	Knecht, Charles H.	O 365420	FA
Maj	Buchan, John	O 311022	CAV
Maj	Morris, Donald K.	O 365296	FA
Maj	Shackelford, Virginius R. Jr	O 453211	INF
Maj	Gilbert, Harry T. Jr	O 324211	FA
Maj	Bracewell, Joseph S. Jr	O 374240	CAV
Maj	Dunlap, Walter H.	O 353142	CAV
Capt	Baldwin, Lewis W. Jr	O 374058	FA
Capt	Simmon, B. Jr	O 405842	CE
Capt	Johnson, Joseph C.	O 1292891	INF
Capt	McCann, John K.	O 1574482	QMC
1st Lt	Cox, Clarence B. Jr	O 1944904	TC
1st Lt	Ethier, Raymond E.	O 1595496	QMC
CWO	Pense, Jesse B.	W 2119265	NMB
WOJG	Tapp, Marion E.	W 2109702	NMB

ATTACHED

Col	Speidel, George S.	O 18406	GSC
Lt Col	Weetman, Harold R.	O 300244	CAV
Lt Col	Bretzke, Louis E.	O 267000	TC
Maj	Nagel, William E.	O 475372	TC
Maj	Fuquay, James N.	O 1103170	INF
Capt	Platson, Kenneth F.	O 1994678	CMP

G-5 SECTION

Col	Campanole, Nicholas W.	O 1777	GSC
Col	Dalferes, Roy L.	O 10279	GSC
Lt Col	Hatch, Azel F.	O 180398	FA
Lt Col	Nielson, David J.	O 135938	AUS
Lt Col	Hamilton, Paul	O 16455	INF
Lt Col	Phelps, Robert K.	O 178811	INF
Lt Col	Bacon, Gaspar G.	O 282952	AC
Lt Col	Pattou, Albert B.	O 116506	ORD
Lt Col	Stephenson, William A. F.	O 506836	CMP
Lt Col	Goodwin, George E.	O 271865	FA
Lt Col	Lindley, Thomas A.	O 327212	INF
Lt Col	Erion, George L.	O 916562	TC
Lt Col	McEwan, Oswald B.	O 328192	FA
Maj	Van Wagenen, James H.	O 265568	FA
Maj	Croft, Richard G.	O 900067	AUS
Maj	Swaim, William R.	O 305192	FA
Maj	Borchert, Joseph J.	O 297890	INF
Maj	Peddy, George E. B.	O 497007	AGD
Maj	Bowman, Clair F.	O 245952	CE
Maj	St Claire, William K.	O 171154	AC
Maj	Weaver, Frank M.	O 236358	INF
Maj	Hanrahan, James C.	O 520279	AUS
Maj	Rainwater, Julius H.	O 518064	AUS
Maj	Dutton, William S.	O 534819	AUS
Maj	Williams, Mick G.	O 389531	CAV
Maj	Sewall, Loyall F.	O 479244	CMP
Maj	Coker, Edwin H.	O 920003	SIG C
Maj	Igloe, Max C.	O 274490	MC
Maj	Perera, Lionel C.	O 900986	SIG C
Maj	Schafer, Philip	O 518292	AUS
Capt	Scott, Thomas W.	O 335776	INF
Capt	Denunzio, Vincent L.	O 175395	CE
Capt	Bentley, Garth A.	O 921983	ORD
Capt	Baxter, William J.	O 161146	CMP
Capt	Davis, George W.	O 524746	AUS
Capt	Ritchie, George D.	O 531445	AUS
Capt	Engel, Abraham L.	O 534711	AUS
Capt	Blythe, William W.	O 305895	CMP
1st Lt	Ogg, Joseph C.	O 512179	SN C
1st Lt	Story, Charles H.	O 1004245	AUS
1st Lt	Cooper, John S.	O 1798336	CMP
1st Lt	Bleshman, Norman	O 581405	AUS
2nd Lt	Booth, George H.	O 2026175	AUS

ATTACHED

Maj	Hughes, Merritt Y.	O 531053	AUS
Capt	Posey, Robert K.	O 228681	CE

ADJUTANT GENERAL SECTION

Col	Cummings, Robert E.	O 7512	AGD
Lt Col	Anderson, George E.	O 135060	AGD
Lt Col	Manly, Lorraine L.	O 300272	AGD
Lt Col	Hartman, Robert W.	O 474092	AGD
Lt Col	Carlin, Ralph R.	O 315859	AGD
Lt Col	Frey, Clarence V.	O 338891	AGD
Maj	Hill, Samuel T.	O 445356	AGD
Maj	Hamlin, John J.	O 1573254	AGD
Maj	Grass, Frank R.	O 1001793	AGD
Maj	Slosson, Richard L. Jr	O 1001049	AGD
Capt	Bunin, David C.	O 885356	AGD
Capt	Cory, Charles F.	O 1001760	AGD
Capt	Engler, Howard A.	O 2046628	AGD
Capt	Peden, Jowell L.	O 487956	AGD
Capt	Cahill, Thomas F. Jr	O 1002591	AGD
Capt	Shwiff, Morris	O 1003840	AGD
1st Lt	Turner, Jesse L.	O 497429	AGD
1st Lt	Evans, James I.	O 479 910	AGD
1st Lt	Hamilton, Charles C.	O 1001143	AGD
2nd Lt	Burns, William T. Jr	O 2010500	AGD
CWO	Self, Charlie E.	W 2108565	NMB
CWO	Jones, Floyd M.	W 2108638	NMB

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SECTION

Col	Gallagher, Ferdinand F.	O 4503	CAC
Col	Chamberlain, Frederick R. Jr	O 10785	CAC
Lt Col	Cox, William A.	O 320286	CAC
Lt Col	Watkins, Dacy P.	O 268246	CAC
Lt Col	Beldon, Morris C.	O 308851	CAC
Maj	Lockwood, Myron D.	O 315056	CAC
Maj	Graham, Harold E.	O 293467	CAC
Maj	Larsen, Lester J.	O 375774	CAC
Maj	Dunn, Gerold C.	O 1042276	CAC
Capt	Townsend, Lee E.	O 379585	CAC
Capt	Robinson, Michel A. G.	O 25523	CAC
1st Lt	Wood, Harry F. Jr	O 1041063	CAC
1st Lt	Walsh, Robert R.	O 1052619	CAC
1st Lt	Wynn, John G.	O 521271	CAC
CWO	Schrock, Elmer W.	W 2114296	NMB
WOJG	Kidd, John M. Jr	W 2132833	NMB

ATTACHED

Capt	Gillis, Thomas S.	O 465829	CAC
1st Lt	Walker, Frederick L. Jr	O 448865	CAC
1st Lt	Lovell, Jack R.	O 515473	CAC

ARTILLERY SECTION

Brig Gen	Williams, Edward T.	O 12818	USA
Col	Singer, Richard C.	O 12756	FA
Col	Heitman, Charles L. Jr	O 18059	FA
Lt Col	Martin, William J.	O 287196	FA
Lt Col	Tilghman, Mayo T.	O 269816	FA
Lt Col	Ross, Philip R.	O 245130	FA
Maj	Anderson, Jesse G.	O 366586	FA
Maj	Dunn, Jerry F.	O 397765	FA
Maj	Cross, James F. III	O 350647	FA
Maj	Grier, William A.	O 306867	FA

Maj	Wilson, Bryce	O 364893	FA
Maj	Butts, Mitchell B.	O 1165165	FA
Capt	Mape, Vance C. Jr	O 423474	FA
Capt	Morse, Charles A. II	O 411574	FA
Capt	Evans, James H. Jr	O 1165069	FA
Capt	Chamberlin, James C.	O 1165481	FA
Capt	Andersen, Arthur V.	O 1172733	FA
1st Lt	Yurkanan, George M.	O 516503	FA
CWO	Brooks, Charles H.	W 2119343	NMB

CHAPLAIN SECTION

Col	O'Neill, James H.	O 16370	CH
Maj	Zorn, George L.	O 354487	CH
Maj	Metcalf, George R.	O 484009	CH
Capt	Callanan, John J.	O 439175	CH
Capt	Hagemann, Frank G. Jr	O 442271	CH
Capt	Hanley, Philip L.	O 526808	CH
Capt	Anderson, Walter R.	O 526889	CH

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE SECTION

Col	Wallington, Edward C.	O 3838	CWS
Maj	Latta, James E.	O 301747	CWS
Capt	Truslow, Frank O.	O 399823	CWS
Capt	Vaughan, John G. Jr	O 501474	CWS
1st Lt	Bolton, Raymond F.	O 1038336	CWS
WOJG	Johnson, Max F.	W 2121091	NMB

ATTACHED

Maj	Munn, James F.	O 395991	CWS

ENGINEER SECTION

Brig Gen	Conklin, John F.	O 3777	CE
Col	Tulley, David H.	O 16075	CE
Col	Morris, George A.	O 266651	CE
Col	Starbird, Alfred D.	O 18961	CE
Lt Col	Foley, Robert J.	O 299855	CE
Lt Col	Smith, C. Cabanne	O 225519	CE
Lt Col	Luna, Raymond C.	O 339326	CE
Lt Col	Privette, William P.	O 264574	CE
Maj	Anderlitch, Frank	O 271147	CE
Maj	Hogan, William J.	O 316959	CE
Maj	Garlick, James M.	O 342479	CE
Maj	Rodes, Wilmer E.	O 376507	CE
Maj	Lancaster, Lawrence S.	O 409326	CE
Maj	Merzweiler, John M.	O 285489	CE
Maj	Dickson, Fielding B.	O 316513	CE
Capt	Meyer, George S.	O 295082	CE
Capt	McKelvy, Volney L.	O 381243	CE
Capt	Bernard, Edgar L.	O 391727	CE
Capt	Baker, Donald A.	O 296848	CE
Capt	Austin, James W. Jr	O 284080	CE
Capt	Cahill, William A.	O 1107842	CE
1st Lt	Brackbill, Cletus R.	O 412595	CE
1st Lt	Ireton, Hap W.	O 1106845	CE
1st Lt	Silvermann Arthur	O 1110256	CE
1st Lt	Solomekin, Walter J.	O 1112992	CE
1st Lt	Collins, Elijah A. Jr	O 1109211	CE
1st Lt	Hartwell, Charles M.	O 520530	CE
1st Lt	Kallendorf, Charles E.	O 1114577	CE
2nd Lt	Heybeck, Kingston S.	O 1111120	CE
2nd Lt	Benton, Kelly E.	O 2006617	CE
CWO	Hilton, George W. Jr	W 2114297	NMB

ATTACHED

1681st Engineer Survey Liaison Team, Type No 1

Lt Col	Kennedy, Daniel	O 469535	CE
Maj	Winkelman, Paul F.	O 304140	CE
Maj	Warren, Vernon J.	O 378016	CE
Capt	Bird, Hugh M.	O 453302	CE
1st Lt	Niska, Oiva R.	O 1105062	CE

ATTACHED

2890th Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Research)

Capt	Dennehy, Alexander S.	O 1107903	CE
1st Lt	Purtell, John D.	O 1108249	CE
1st Lt	Jordan, James C.	O 1550828	CE
2nd Lt	Keller, Sidney B.	O 1111161	CE
2nd Lt	Schulze, Thomas R.	O 2007875	CE
2nd Lt	Winterfelt, Rolf	O 2015728	CE

ATTACHED

Detachment, 652d Engineer Topographic Battalion

1st Lt	Van Kamerik, John G.	O 1113497	CE
1st Lt	Carney, Edward F.	O 1113133	CE

FINANCE SECTION

Col	Milliken, Charles B.	O 20340	FD
Maj	Rebori, John N.	O 395516	FD
Capt	Zedler, Leonard W.	O 1280277	FD
1st Lt	Packett, Wilbern L.	O 510523	FD
2nd Lt	Skovron, Joseph W.	O 2015684	FD
2nd Lt	Bonano, Peter R.	O 2026169	FD

HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT SECTION

Col	Bratton, Rufus S.	O 3726	INF
Col	Hoag, John A.	O 3251	FA
Col	Kelley, Fred H.	O 174046	INF
Lt Col	Baker, Denzil L.	O 307437	INF
Maj	Gooding, Clarence E.	O 20253	INF
Capt	McAlister, James E.	O 386876	INF
Capt	Marsden, Henry H.	O 329983	INF
Capt	Cochran, Raymond P.	O 390500	INF
Capt	Straw, Robert A.	O 1295622	INF
Capt	Bright, Sterrell J.	O 1300592	INF
1st Lt	Silverman, Arthur	O 1110256	CE
1st Lt	Campbell, Arthur W.	O 1180144	FA
1st Lt	Campbell, Robert E.	O 456021	INF
1st Lt	Walters, Vernon A.	O 1582243	QMC
WOJG	Zintgraff, Alfred C.	W 2108750	NMB

INSPECTOR GENERAL SECTION

Col	Park, Clarence C.	O 7176	IGD
Col	Bower, Ralph E.	O 6610	IGD
Lt Col	Curtis, Karl W.	O 183810	IGD
Lt Col	Reeves, Lewis A.	O 244583	IGD
Lt Col	Duff, Peter D.	O 420540	IGD
Lt Col	Nelson, Clarence J.	O 291394	IGD
Lt Col	Ronan, Edward I.	O 307986	IGD
Maj	Helm, Floyd H. Jr	O 328650	IGD
Capt	Muse, Moses P.	O 237167	IGD
Capt	Rodgers, Ben O.	O 283454	CAC
Capt	Erdmann, Charles W.	O 392438	IGD
Capt	Latham, Brice M.	O 348994	IGD
Capt	Sproul, Archibald A.	O 406823	IGD
Capt	Patterson, Arthur V. Jr	O 347318	IGD
Capt	Duwe, Miles S.	O 367081	IGD
Capt	Thorne, Rodger H.	O 408716	IGD
Capt	Hayes, Julian M.	O 1041163	IGD
Capt	Murray, Lemuel F.	O 363659	IGD
Capt	Cude, Harold E. Jr	O 367705	IGD
Capt	Sage, Nathaniel M. Jr	O 409194	IGD
Capt	Church, Edward H.	O 407879	IGD
Capt	Cordes, Erwin H.	O 466327	IGD
1st Lt	Konopka, Wenceslaus F.	O 1109427	CE
WOJG	Leoni, Eli	W 2119421	NMB

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SECTION

Col	Cheever, Charles E.	O 14712	JAGD
Col	Joseph, Robert E.	O 301342	JAGD
Lt Col	Givens, Raymond	O 275830	FA
Lt Col	Allen, Gilbert M. Jr	O 16912	INF
Lt Col	O'Connell, Edward M.	O 19563	INF
Lt Col	Wade, Ralph M.	O 173499	INF
Lt Col	Langeluttig, Albert G.	O 171236	INF
Maj	Thomsen, Purroy E.	O 289470	INF
Maj	Moore, Andre B.	O 426645	JAGD
Maj	Denson, William D.	O 900415	JAGD
Maj	Smith, Everett E.	O 2051920	JAGD
Capt	Wilson, Kenneth R.	O 278317	INF
Capt	Hofstetter, Fred W.	O 271250	INF
1st Lt	Vaughn, Clarence R. Jr	O 445784	CAV
1st Lt	McKay, Dwight	O 1012042	AUS
1st Lt	Beitelshees, Richard D.	O 1184351	FA
2nd Lt	McMahon, Patrick W.	O 280076	INF
2nd Lt	Wright, Morris	O 2001188	AUS
2nd Lt	Reid, John J.	O 2015848	AUS
2nd Lt	Raelson, Arthur I.	O 2015880	AUS

MEDICAL SECTION

Brig Gen	Hurley, Thomas D.	O 4090	USA
Col	Hartford, Thomas J.	O 18330	MC
Col	Perkins, Clell B.	O 8678	VC
Col	Weeks, James J.	O 8738	DC
Col	Sperry, James R.	O 9478	VC
Col	Coates, John B. Jr	O 20924	MC
Col	Odom, Charles B.	O 480718	MC
Lt Col	Jones, Thomas B.	O 905675	MC
Lt Col	Weil, Nathan Jr	O 355583	MC
Lt Col	Hood, Robert I.	O 360548	MC
Lt Col	Dubuy, Carl T.	O 23650	MC
Lt Col	Talkington, Perry C.	O 317931	MC
Lt Col	Killingsworth, Winfred P.	O 467018	MC
Maj	Agar, Charles C.	O 442415	SNC
Maj	Chartock, Abraham	O 24638	MC
Maj	Lyman, Irving R.	O 24319	MC
Maj	Brown, Sherman W.	O 452434	MAC
Maj	Sinclair, Bernice J.	N 720948	ANC
Maj	Stubbins, William M.	O 369466	MC
Maj	Ingmand, Eugene B.	O 350176	VC
Maj	Hood, George B.	O 426174	MC
Maj	Weitz, Henry A.	O 419889	MC
Maj	Cassidy, John L.	O 1684844	MC
Maj	Cooper, Theodore W.	O 1541730	MAC
Capt	Kastner, Manuel C.	O 304957	VC
Capt	Avery, S. Kingdon	O 23684	DC
Capt	Allen, Frank Jr	O 357214	DC
Capt	Connors, David A.	O 307065	MC
Capt	McNicholas, James D.	O 1533631	MAC
Capt	Hamilton, William M.	O 1542621	MAC
Capt	Wise, Richard K.	O 1534192	MAC
Capt	Blair, Max K.	O 1544332	MAC
1st Lt	Hedlund, Arthur R.	O 1546737	MAC
1st Lt	Schumacher, Peter J.	O 1546559	MAC
CWO	Monuszko, Stanley	W 2119516	NMB

ORDNANCE SECTION

Col	Bricker, L. Monroe	O 7245	ORD
Col	Nixon, Thomas H.	O 9326	ORD
Col	O'Grady, Gerald B.	O 164475	ORD
Col	Van Syckle, David L.	O 16425	ORD
Col	Horridge, Joseph	O 17555	ORD
Lt Col	De Guire, Merlin L.	O 19446	ORD
Lt Col	Kling, Carl V.	O 370791	ORD

Lt Col	Daniel, Kenneth R.	O 343224	ORD
Lt Col	Pfeiffer, Gilbert L.	O 370776	ORD
Maj	Bessom, Leonard C.	O 420056	ORD
Maj	Rumazza, Carlo R.	O 308842	ORD
Maj	Burke, Hubert D.	O 341064	ORD
Maj	Foltz, Warren D.	O 290854	ORD
Maj	Beidler, John K.	O 321099	ORD
Maj	Frisch, Lawrence V.	O 497047	ORD
Maj	Burch, Sanford B.	O 1573820	ORD
Maj	Sell, Russell B.	O 503239	ORD
Capt	Del Colliano, Gerard V.	O 316444	ORD
Capt	Thompson, Paul V.	O 489923	ORD
Capt	Leitner, Elmer J.	O 1573358	ORD
Capt	Heidenheim, Roger S.	O 912541	ORD
Capt	Miller, Ervin	O 1550455	ORD
Capt	Hansen, Frederick O.	O 1548827	ORD
Capt	Flanigan, William A.	O 1552063	ORD
Capt	Williams, James E.	O 1555788	ORD
1st Lt	Cottingham, James C.	O 1555675	ORD
WOJG	Johnston, Purl H.	W 2107944	NMB
WOJG	Perry, Robert E.	W 2121081	NMB

ATTACHED

Capt	Lord, Wilfred J.	O 364916	ORD
1st Lt	Englert, Robert L.	O 1551200	ORD

PROVOST MARSHAL SECTION

Col	Clayton, Philip C.	O 5210	CAV
Col	Engerud, Harold	O 11716	CAV
Col	MacDonald, John C.	O 8402	CAV
Lt Col	Edwards, Johnson P.	O 235024	FA
Lt Col	Moore, Harley L. Jr	O 387634	INF
Maj	McDowell, Joseph E.	O 353069	INF
Capt	Thom, Victor L.	O 334635	CAV
Capt	Lewis, Robert D.	O 388475	CMP
Capt	Millard, George B.	O 473123	CWS
Capt	Dannenfeldt, Karl H.	O 1283919	INF
Capt	Gunner, William R.	O 1797993	CMP
1st Lt	Emrich, Harold L.	O 1798661	CMP
1st Lt	McAuliffe, Eugene V.	O 1320064	INF
1st Lt	Oberleitner, Michael E.	O 1798047	CMP
1st Lt	O'Connell, William L.	O 1798696	CMP
2nd Lt	Hartman, Sidney	O 1030250	CAV
2nd Lt	Klein, Charles E.	O 2008300	CMP
2nd Lt	Norman, Henry J.	O 2015729	AUS
WOJG	Broyles, Edward S.	W 2113919	NMB

13th CID (Attached to Provost Marshal Section)

Capt	Rosengarden, Joseph	O 1798402	CMP

9th CID (Attached to Provost Marshal Section)

1st Lt	Gorham, John H.	O 1798348	CMP

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

Col	Guenther, Gustav B.	O 6741	GSC
Col	Blakeney, Charles C.	O 15438	GSC
Lt Col	Hunter, Kent A.	O 114009	AUS
Lt Col	Quirk, James T.	O 904528	QMC
Maj	Owens, James P.	O 1030280	CAV
Maj	Widmer, Percy D.	O 508707	INF
Maj	Deane, Ernest C.	O 412496	QMC
Capt	Drake, William A.	O 243164	INF
Capt	Mayo, John B.	O 423686	INF
Capt	Witty, Donald L.	O 2044495	AUS
1st Lt	Long, Theodore S.	O 1001398	AGD
2nd Lt	Hahn, Erwin W.	O 2009318	AUS

ATTACHED

Capt	Brown, Lester C.	O 1894884	AUS
Capt	Campbell, James W.	O 1010317	CAV
Capt	Straub, Edwin C.	O 1177201	FA
Capt	Durant, Cecil B.	O 1294636	INF
Capt	Prout, Ralph H.	O 560243	AC
Capt	Lamb, Joe B.	O 1314794	INF
1st Lt	Nedelman, Julius	O 1173727	FA
1st Lt	Darby, Roy E. Jr	O 1002405	AUS
1st Lt	Schleicher, Everett M.	O 1183758	FA
1st Lt	Wolever, John F.	O 1307607	INF
1st Lt	Exner, Herbert G.	O 1644204	SIG C
1st Lt	Manzi, Arthur J.	O 1306441	INF
1st Lt	Schutter, Robert E.	O 520762	FA

QUARTERMASTER SECTION

Col	Busch, Everett	O 7260	QMC
Col	Wood, Fenton M.	O 166365	QMC
Col	West, R. John Jr	O 16925	QMC
Col	Beine, Helmuth E.	O 11910	QMC
Lt Col	Bender, James W.	O 297342	QMC
Lt Col	Pack, Dallas B.	O 370539	QMC
Lt Col	Warner, William A.	O 257460	QMC
Lt Col	Lynch, Charles E.	O 340754	QMC
Maj	Gimblin, Bert H.	O 277462	QMC
Maj	Kemmerer, Frank	O 486914	QMC
Maj	Samuels, Howard J.	O 423227	QMC
Maj	Hemerda, Louis Jr	O 401969	QMC
Maj	Hoy, Charles E.	O 394824	QMC
Maj	Cotter, Edward T.	O 1573133	QMC
Capt	Kane, Leo M.	O 24569	QMC
Capt	Matthews, Emmitt L.	O 1573396	QMC
Capt	Creed, Edward P.	O 911619	QMC
Capt	Smith, Thomas P.	O 453030	QMC
Capt	Bartlett, Anderson G.	O 311168	QMC
Capt	Kiehl, Elmer R.	O 467258	QMC
Capt	Hollister, Robert S.	O 1574447	QMC
Capt	Broughton, William R.	O 1573072	QMC
Capt	Cohen, Harold W.	O 1585288	QMC
Capt	Shaw, Kenneth W.	O 379069	QMC
1st Lt	Cozad, William W.	O 24552	QMC
1st Lt	Lee, Robert E.	O 1591261	QMC
1st Lt	Den Adel, Glenn C.	O 2000172	QMC
2nd Lt	Updegraft, Kenneth E.	O 2015722	QMC
CWO	Bugden, George B.	W 2108752	NMB
WOJG	Pinnell, William H.	W 2129369	NMB

SIGNAL SECTION

Col	Hammond, Elton F.	O 12291	SIG C
Col	Pulsifer, Arthur	O 12211	SIG C
Col	Haswell, Claude E.	O 12731	SIG C
Lt Col	Brickson, Herbert O.	O 263512	SIG C
Lt Col	Dias, Arthur F.	O 204905	SIG C
Lt Col	Lowdermilk, Lee O.	O 279353	SIG C
Lt Col	Riggs, Homer	O 230222	SIG C
Lt Col	Nagle, Gerald F.	O 220660	SIG C
Lt Col	Germain, Louis V.	O 398283	SIG C
Lt Col	Wood, Walter H. Jr	O 365766	SIG C
Maj	Flint, Charles W.	O 371887	SIG C
Maj	Kee, J. Martin	O 372948	SIG C
Maj	Higinbotham, Stephen C.	O 452734	SIG C
Maj	Williamson, Willard J.	O 441855	SIG C
Capt	Warren, Edward D.	O 905009	SIG C
Capt	Rus, Albert F.	O 272765	SIG C
Capt	Harral, Philip W.	O 372316	SIG C
Capt	Sprague, Denton E.	O 360211	SIG C
Capt	Devine, Edmund A. Jr	O 1633157	SIG C
Capt	Schoenenberger, Paul H.	O 516015	SIG C
1st Lt	Scott, Clarence E.	O 492665	SIG C
1st Lt	Silber, Gene R.	O 1635331	SIG C
1st Lt	Buchanan, Ronald E.	O 1639965	SIG C
1st Lt	Walker, Julius B.	O 1634440	SIG C
1st Lt	Dalton, Orson A.	O 1641117	SIG C
1st Lt	Carpenter, Deverton	O 1637158	SIG C
WOJG	Hickman, Rolland H.	W 2109716	NMB

ATTACHED

Lt Col	Harmon, David	O 508784	SIG C
Maj	Semple, Wesley A.	O 444432	SIG C
Maj	Shockley, Thomas R.	O 317075	SIG C
Capt	Heiwinkel, Hans W.	O 1633954	SIG C
1st Lt	Parsons, Don E.	O 1644650	SIG C
1st Lt	Caulfield, Donald B.	O 1640882	SIG C
1st Lt	Wilson, Cecil L.	O 1643462	SIG C

SPECIAL SERVICE SECTION

Col	Van Buskirk, Kenneth E.	O 255812	FA
Maj	Browning, Homer F.	O 279252	INF
Capt	Gersten, Alvin	O 397776	INF
Capt	Farrell, Paul V.	O 1175430	FA

TANK DESTROYER SECTION

Brig Gen	Earnest, Herbert L.	O 7282	USA
Col	Berry, Logan C.	O 15752	Cav.

(Note: These officers served as commanders of the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, which served as the Tank Destroyer Section of Third US Army Headquarters. Other commissioned personnel of the Brigade are not listed herein since it is anticipated that a separate report will be rendered by the Brigade through regular channels.)

★ ★ ★ ★

THIRD U S ARMY CORPS AND DIVISIONS

1 AUGUST 1944 TO 9 MAY 1945



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

V CORPS

VIII CORPS

XII CORPS

XV CORPS

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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11th ARMD DIV

12th ARMD DIV

13th ARMD DIV

14th ARMD DIV

16th ARMD DIV

20th ARMD DIV

17th DIV

101st DIV

2d FRENCH

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THIRD US ARMY AFTER ACTION REPORT

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EXTRA	20
TOTAL	182

AN APPRECIATION

Although all of the editorial and most of the illustrative matter of Volume II of the Third U. S. Army After-Action Report was prepared by the Report Staffs of the General and Special Staff Sections, to whom full credit is due for the excellent and all inclusive manner in which their material of this Report is presented, a permanent Editorial and Reproduction Staff was necessary to lay overall plans and to carry the Report, as herewith presented, to a final conclusion. Editing and reproduction of the entire Report was their mission, Volume I being their entire charge by compiling reports submitted by the various General and Special Staff Sections of Third U. S. Army Headquarters and the XIX Tactical Air Command. They functioned either part or full time from September 1944 to its completion. Their results are testimony to their efforts.

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HOBART R. GAY,
Major General U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Annex No. 1

TWELFTH US ARMY GROUP DIRECTIVES

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CC, 12 AG
Init: JHB
Date: 29 Jul 44

Reg No G-254

Copy No 55

LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 1

Subject: Operations to Expand to Initial Lodgement Area.

To : Army Commanders.

1. Information.

a. The instructions contained herein are effective at 1200 hours, 1 August 1944. These instructions are in amplification and modification of Joint Operations Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD (revised 8 May 1944) which remains in force except where in conflict herewith. The period covered by these instructions is referred to as Stage I of Phase II in the Joint Operations Plan.

b. Situation.

(1) Enemy. See Annex 2, Intelligence.

(2) Own troops.

British Forces operating on our left (east) flank continue operations to secure the general line: VIRE-LE BENY BOCAGE - ST MARTIN DES BESACES - NOYERES - EVREUX GOUVIX - CAUVICOURT - River MUANCE to BURES - River DIVES to the sea.

c. Supporting Forces.

(1) Air Force.
Ninth Air Force supports the Twelfth Army Group.

IX Tactical Air Command will be in direct support of First Army.

XIX Tactical Air Command will be in direct support of Third Army.

(2) Naval Force.

Naval Task Force 125 continues the transport of U.S. troops to the Continent.

It will furnish naval support necessary for the capture of BRITTANY ports.

It will assist in the opening of the port and beach areas of ST MALO, QUIBERON BAY and BREST, furnish necessary protection for convoys to these ports and assist in the opening of other BRITTANY ports as necessary.

(3) Communications Zone.

Communications Zone supports the operation.

Advance Section Communications zone organized the COTENTIN Peninsula including the port of CHERBOURG.

Communications Zone opens and develops the ports of ST MALO, QUIBERON BAY and BREST as soon as possible after capture. Other BRITTANY ports will be opened and developed as necessary.

2. Mission and Organization.

a. Twelfth Army Group operating on the right (west) flank of the Allied Forces will drive southward and westward to gain possession of the whole COTENTIN and BRITTANY Peninsulas, secure ST MALO , the QUIBERON BAY port area and BREST at the earliest practicable date, and will capture other BRITTANY ports as necessary. Third Army will operate on the right (west) of the First Army.

b. Boundaries.

(1) Army Group: PORT EN BESSIN (T7587) - ESQUAY (T7585) exclusive to Twelfth Army Group, VAUCELLES (T7681) - COURTELAY (T7182) - LONGEAU (T7077) - inclusive to Twelfth Army Group, BALLEROY (T6869) - CORMOLAIN (T6764) - La LANDE SUR DROME (T6557) - PLACY MONTAIGU (T6353) - exclusive to Twelfth Army Group, GDE RENOUDIERE (T6251) - MONT BERTRAND (T6146) - ETOUVY (T6437) - L'AUBESHIERE (T6928) TINCHEBRAY (T7423) - DOMFRONT (T8003) - inclusive to Twelfth Army Group.

(2) Army: LE MESNIL VIGOT (T3668) - HAUTVILLE LA GUICHARD (T3464) - CERISY LA SALLE (T3553) - HAMBYE (T3544) - SOURDEVAL LES BOIS (T3641) - VILLEDIEU LES POELES (T3932) - inclusive to First Army, CHERENCEY LE HERON (T4028) - BREGEY (T4220) REFFUVEILLE (T4513) - inclusive to Third Army, ST HILLAIRE DU HARCOUET (T4703) - LANDIVY (Y5192) - ERNEE (Y5771) inclusive to First Army.

c. Troops.

(1) (a) FIRST ARMY

V Corps
VII Corps
XIX Corps
1st Infantry Division
2d Infantry Division
4th Infantry Division
9th Infantry Division
28th Infantry Division
30th Infantry Division
*29th Infantry Division
*5th Infantry Division
*35th Infantry Division
2d Armored Division
3d Armored Division
7th Armored Division

*Until withdrawn to Army Group Reserve

(b) THIRD ARMY

VIII Corps
XV Corps
XX Corps
XII Corps
8th Infantry Division
79th Infantry Division
83d Infantry Division
90th Infantry Division
80th Infantry Division
4th Armored Division
5th Armored Division
6th Armored Division
2d French Armored Division

(c) TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

Hq. & Sp Trs, Twelfth Army Group
Army Group Reserve:
5th Infantry Division) When withdrawn
35th Infantry Division) from line.
29th Infantry Division)

(2) Detailed troop assignment: See Annex 3, Troop List

3. Operations.

a. First Army will drive south in its zone and seize the area: MORTAIN - VIRE (Operation Map).

b. Third Army will drive south in its zone and seize the area: RENNES - FOUGERES: Thence it will turn westward into BRITTANY with the mission of securing (1) ST MALO, (2) QUIBERON BAY area, and (3) BREST and of clearing the rest of the BRITTANY Peninsula (Operation Map).

c. Army Group Reserve divisions will be withdrawn from the line when the situation permits and will remain attached for administration to First Army until further orders.

d. For planning purposes direct communication is authorized between armies, Ninth Air Force, Naval Task Force 125 and Communications Zone.

4. Administration and Supply.

See Administrative Instructions Number 1.

5. Communications.

a. Command Posts: To be announced.

b. See Annex 4, Signal Communications.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: AGC
Date: 2 Aug 44

SUBJECT: Directive for Current Operations.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.

1. We have been working on the general idea that we would have to launch a coordinated attack to secure crossings on the LA SEE and LA SELUNE Rivers. With this in mind,we have been planning on seizing the road centers at VIRE, MORTAIN, and FOUGERES, after which we would throw a suitable force around the corner into the BRITTANY PENINSULA.

2. Due to the rapidity of the movement of the VIII Corps in Operation COBRA, we secured the crossings of these two rivers while the left flank was still heavily engaged in the vicinity of VILLEDIEU, PERCY and TESSY.

3. In order to take advantage of this bridgehead on the southside of the two rivers, our timing in seizing road centers is somewhat changed. While the FIRST ARMY is still fighting toward VIRE and MORTAIN, the THIRD ARMY has reached the vicinity of RENNES and PONTORSON. In order to take full advantage of this bridgehead, we must make it secure by pushing our attack vigorously until we secure the road center at VIRE, MORTAIN, and FOUGERES as the main GERMAN threat will be from the east and southeast. With this in view, the armies are assigned immediate objectives as indicated below:

FIRST ARMY: Continuing in its designated zone of action to secure VIRE and MORTAIN.

THIRD ARMY: Secure the line ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET - FOUGERES RENNES. When this line is secure, forces will be pushed vigorously into the BRITTANY PENINSULA with the object of seizing QUIBERON BAY and clearing the enemy out of the rest of the peninsula. ST MALO may be by-passed and contained if its reduction takes too large a force and too much time.

/s/ O. N. Bradley
/t/ O. N. BRADLEY
Lieutenant General, Commanding

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: MDH
Date: 3 Aug 44

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Two.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. The enemy is being driven back along our entire front.

b. British forces on our left (east) flank are advancing to the south and east in their zone of operations, on the general line FLEURS - CABOURG.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group maintaining relentless pressure on the enemy will continue to clear the BRITTANY Peninsula and secure ports thereon and will initiate a drive to the east to secure the lodgement area. (See Annex 1, Operations Map).

b. Boundaries

Present boundaries between Army Group and Armies are extended as follows:

(1) Twelfth Army Group:

VIRE (T6331) (inclusive) - TINCHEBRAY (T7442) - ST CLAIR D'HALOUSE (T8213) - LE CHATELLIER (T8512) (all exclusive) - LA COULONCHE (T9509) - RANES (U1207) - SEES (Q438) (all inclusive).

(2) Army:

VILLEDIEU LES POELES (T3832) (inclusive to First Army) CR at (T405303) (to both Armies) - ERNEEY (T4219) - REFFUVILLE (T4513) - LA PIGEONNIERE (T4905) - LANDIVY (Y5092) - ERNEE (Y5771) - ST GERMAIN - LE GUILLAUME (Y6561) - MONTSURS (Y8452) (all inclusive to Third Army) TORCE EN CHARNIE (Z0647) (to both Armies) - NEUBY EN CHAMPAGNE (Z2345) - (inclusive to Third Army) - LE MANS (Z3937) (to both Armies)

c. Troops:- No change.

3. a. First Army will advance in zone from the MORTAIN - VIRE area to secure the area MAYENNE - DOMFRONT prepared for further action to the east (Operations Map).

b. Third Army will complete the securing of the BRITTANY Ports and the clearance of the Peninsula with a minimum of forces. Secure crossings of the MAYENNE River in zone as far south as CHATEAU GONTIER (inclusive) prepared for further action with strong armored forces towards the east and southeast. Clear the area west of the MAYENNE River as far south as the LOIRE River and protect the right (south) flank with minimum forces necessary (Operations Map).

4. Administration:- No change.

5. Communications.

a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group	ST SAUVEUR - LENDELIN
First Army	CANISY
Third Army	BEAUCHAMPS

b. Axes of Signal Communication to be reported.

c. Signal Instructions:- No change.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC,
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

Auth: CG 12 AG
Init:
Date: 6 Aug 44

6 August 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Three.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. Enemy resistance in BRITTANY now consists of scattered pockets and port garrisons apparently to defend ST NAZAIRE, LORIENT, BREST and the Peninsula North of GUIMCAMP. Total mobile troops strength in BRITTANY is estimated at the equivalent of 15 battalions. Along the front RENNES - DOMFRONT, the enemy is withdrawing scattered anti-tank elements to positions East of the line LAVAL - MAYENNE. From DOMFRONT NE to the British left flank, the enemy has a continuously occupied line which is withdrawing to the SE, pivoting on the sea. Coupled with this withdrawal a lengthening of the line can be expected in the direction of LOIRE. This extension may be accomplished by thinning the line North of DOMFRONT or by bringing in reinforcements from outside the battle area or by both. Reinforcements that may reach the battle area during the next two weeks are, 1 or 2 Panzer and 2 infantry divisions from the BISCAY and MEDITERRANEAN areas, and 3 or 4 infantry divisions from North of the SEINE. In connection with the withdrawal, the enemy is capable of assembling strong armored forces of at least Corps strength in the area of DOMFRONT and attacking in the direction of AVRANCHES. Such an attack, if successful, might be exploited in an effort to isolate our forces now in BRITTANY and in any event might prove effective in delaying our eastward advance.

b. 21 Army Group is launching a converging attack on the FALAISE - ARGENTAN area at midnight 7/8 August 1944. Canadian Army will advance on FALAISE from the vicinity of CAEN, the Second British Army advancing on ARGENTAN from the VIRE - CAUMONT area.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will secure a bridgehead over the SARTHE River in the area LE MANS - ALENCON, prepared for further operations to the east. (See Annex 1, Operations Map).

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between Army Groups:

Boundary designated in letter of Instructions Number Two is revised and extended as follows:

RJ at (T647348) - VIRE (T6331) - TINCHEBRAY (T7424) (open to First Army traffic) - ST CLAIR D'HALOUSE (T8213) LE CHATELLIER (T8512) (both to 21 Army Group) - LA COULONCHE (T9509) - RANES (U1207) - SEES (Q4388) - MOULINS LA MARCHE (Q6632) (all to 12 Army Group) - VERNEUIL (R0038) - DREUX (R3235) - MANTES GASSICOURT (R5061) (all to 21 Army Group.)

(2) Between Armies:

(a) Boundary designated in letter of instructions Number Two remains in force and is extended as follows:

LE MANS (Z3937) (to Third Army, open to First Army traffic) - MONTMIRAIL (Y8469) (to Third Army) - NEOU (W1278) - CHARTRES (R5902) (both to First Army).

(b) For the capture of MAYENNE by Third Army, the following temporary boundary will be in force:

SAVIGNY LE VIEUX (Y5097) (to Third Army) - LA DORIE (Y5688) (to First Army, open to Third Army traffic) - LAVARE (Y5985) - BRECE (Y6982) (both to First Army) - CHATILLON SUR COLMONT (Y7176) (to First Army, open to Third Army traffic) - RJ at (Y846743) (to First Army). Upon relief by elements of the First Army, Third Army troops will promptly move south of permanent boundary (paragraph) 2 b (2) (a).

(c) For the capture of LE MANS by Third Army the following temporary boundary will be in force:

MONTSURS (Y8452) (to Third Army) - PARENNES (Z1249) (to First Army) - TENNIE (Z2048) (to Third Army) - COULIE (Z2449) (to First Army, open to Third Army traffic) - JOUE L'ABBE (Y6175) (to First Army). Upon the capture of LE MANS the permanent boundary becomes effective.

c. Troops.

5th Division has been assigned to Third Army. 35th Division is assigned to Third Army effective at once.

3. a. First Army will seize VIRE, advance in zone with main effort on its right to seize the area DOMFRONT - AMBRIERES. Continue advance on ALENCON to secure crossings of the SARTHE River in zone, prepared for further action to the east. Relieve Third Army troops north of the permanent boundary when they have captured MAYENNE.

b. Third Army will advance east in zone securing crossings of the MAYENNE River from MAYENNE to LAVAL. Elements will move south of permanent army boundary upon relief by First Army. Occupy NANTES and ANGERS and protect the south flank. Advance from the line of the MAYENNE River to secure the crossings of the SARTHE River from ANGERS to LE MANS inclusive, prepared for further action with strong armored forces

in the direction of the ORLEANS - PARIS gap. Continue the reduction of BRITTANY with minimum forces.

4. Administration: - No change.

5. Communications.

a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group	ST SAUVEUR - LENDELIN
First Army	CANISY
Third Army	BEAUCHAMPS

b. Axes of Signal Communication to be reported.

c. Signal Instructions: - No change.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC,
A. C. of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

ADVANCE COPY

Auth: CG 12 AG
Init:
Date: 8 Aug 44

8 August 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Four.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. The enemy's counterattack against the MORTAIN area has apparently been contained. In concentrating his armored forces for the counterattack he has incurred the risk of encirclement from the South and North previously referred to. See current Intelligence Summary. Recent losses, deterioration in morale, supply shortages and confused communications now accentuate the seriousness of the enemy's position.

b. 21 Army Group is attacking South on two Corps fronts and maintaining pressure on the remaining two Corps fronts. II Canadian Corps is attacking South from below CAEN with the objectives FALAISE and the high ground at (U0929). At 081030 hrs the situation was that the 2d Canadian Division had reached the line May - SUR - ORNE (U0259) - RJ (U076560) and the 51st Highland Division the line RJ (U076560) - GRAMES NIL (U0857) - SECQUEVILLE (U0959). 4th Canadian Armored Division and the Polish Armored Division are moving South to pass through the infantry this afternoon to drive simultaneously for their objectives. Polish Armored Division on the left. XXX British Corps is attacking South from MONT PINCON (T8345) with the mission of seizing CONDE - SUR - NOIREU T8832). At (081030) hours the 7th Armored Division, followed by the 50th Infantry Division, had reached LE PLESSIS GRIMOULT (T8444) and were continuing the attack.

2. a. 12th Army Group will attack with least practicable delay in the direction of ARGENTAN to isolate and destroy the German forces on our front.

b. Boundaries (1) Between Army Groups:- No Change initially.

(2) Between Armies: Permanent boundary designated in Letter of Instructions Number Three is changed for this operation as follows: ERNEE (X5771) - MAYENNE (X8171) - LE HORPS (T9381) - CHARCHIGNE (T9683) - COUPTRAIN (Z0590) - CARROUGES (Z1699) - LA PELISTRIE (U2108) ARGENTAN (U2619) (all to Third Army). First Army troops South and East of this line to have running rights on roads until clear of Third Army area.

c. Troops: - 35th Division reverts to Third Army without delay. 2nd French Armored Division released to Third Army at once.

3. a. First Army.

(1) Continue to reduce the enemy salient in zone.

(2) Pivoting on MORTAIN, advance to the line DOMFRONT (7903) BARENTON (T6604) prepared for further action against the enemy flank and rear in the direction of FLERS (T8620).

b. Third Army.

(1) Advance on the axis ALENCON - SEES to the line SEES (Q4328) - CARROUGES (Z1699) prepared for further action against the enemy flank and rear in the direction of ARGENTAN (U20718).

(2) Seize and hold bridgehead over the SARTHE River in the vicinity of LE MANS.

(3) Occupy NANTES and ANGERS and cover the South flank.

(4) Continue the capture of BRITTANY ports and the reduction of the Peninsula.

4. Administration: See current administrative instructions.

5. Communications.

a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group	ST SAUVEUR - LENDELIN
First Army	CANISY
Third Army	BEAUCHAMPS, moving to LA BOURDONNIERE (Y3190)

b. Axes of Signal Communication to be reported.

c. Signal Instructions:- No change.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG Twelfth:
Init:
Date: 15 Aug 44:

SUBJECT: Directive for Current Operations.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. Due to the delay in closing the gap between ARGENTAN and FALAISE, it is believed that many of the German divisions which were in the pocket have now escaped. In order to hold those that are left and complete their destruction, it is believed that part of the XV Corps and the 80th Division, together with the VII Corps will be sufficient for the southern jaw of the trap.

2. In order to take advantage of the confusion existing, the Third Army will now initiate a movement towards the east. It will, therefore, start an armored division and an infantry division of the XV Corps at once with DREUX as their first objective.

3. The XX Corps, consisting of the 7th Armored and the 5th Infantry Divisions, now advancing towards DREUX, will change its objective to CHARTRES.

4. The XII Corps, consisting of the 4th Armored and the 35th Infantry Divisions, will start as soon as ready with ORLEANS as its initial objective. The 80th Division will remain in Third Army reserve pending the outcome of the fight in the pocket. When the situation in the pocket is cleared, this division can be used towards the east.

5. In order to speed up the capture of the BRITTANY Peninsula, a corps of three infantry divisions of the First Army will be attached to the Third Army as soon as pinched out of the present operation. The composition of this corps will be designated later.

6. As soon as the pocket is cleared up, the First Army, following behind the XV Corps, will take over that part of the front in its zone as designated in Letter of Instructions Number Three. The XV Corps, less certain divisions to be designated later, will then be attached to the First Army.

/s/ O. N. Bradley
/t/ O. N. BRADLEY
Lieutenant General, U.S. A.
Commanding.

SECRET

ADVANCE
HEADQUARTERS
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

17 August 1944

The new temporary boundary between the 1st and 3rd Army is designated as follows: Gage, La Merlera, Sees, inclusive, 1st Army; Alencon, inclusive, 3d Army (running rights on northern routes to 1st Army); Villarnes, Mayenne, inclusive, 3d Army.

Effective at once, the following divisions assigned to 1st Army: 2d French Armored, 80th Infantry (less one combat team), 90th Infantry, and such corps troops as are now supporting them. As fast as these corps troops can be replaced by 1st Army, said corps troops will revert to XV Corps. 1st Army, thus changed, is given mission of seizing Chambois, Trun, and continue to advance to the north until contact is gained with the British and complete the liquidation of the Germans caught in the pocket. Upon completion of this liquidation, and after other divisions of the 1st Army have passed through to the east, these divisions will revert to 3d Army. The 1st Army will send the 2d Infantry Division to the VIII Corps as soon as suitable arrangements are made between 1st Army and VIII Corps. Another infantry division will follow this one at approximately 48 hours. 1st Army will furnish the necessary truck companies for this movement. These trucks will be returned to the 1st Army without delay.

Two Ranger battalions now at Mayenne will also be turned over to the VIII Corps. The two divisions reporting to VIII Corps will take their TD battalions but will leave behind under 1st Army control their tank and AA battalions.

3d Army to seize the road center at Mantes Gassicourt when the supply situation permits. As soon as other divisions are pinched out on the left of the 1st Army, they should be moved to the northeast of Alencon to fill the gap between Argentan and Dreux.

/s/ O. N. Bradley
/t/ O. N. BRADLEY
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.
Commanding.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init:
Date: 17 Aug 44

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Five.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. See Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 2.

b. 21 Army Group is attacking south with the main effort in the direction of TRUN (U3029) in coordination with our advance, to destroy the enemy forces in the pocket.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group maintaining relentless pressure on the enemy will complete the encirclement of his south flank and destroy the enemy forces west of the SEINE and northwest of PARIS.

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between Army Groups: - VIRE (T6331) - TINCHEBRAY (T7422) (both to Twelfth Army Group) - otherwise no change.

(2) Between Armies: - Permanent boundary designated in Letter of Instructions Number Three is changed for this operation only as follows: ERNEE (Y5971) - MAYENNE (X8171) - VILLAINES LA JUHEL (Z0675) (all to Third Army) - ALENCON (Z3383) (to Third Army with traffic rights en routes north to First Army) - SEES (Q4328) LE MERLERAUL (Q5338) - GACE (Q5448) (all to First Army)

c. Troops.

(1) 80th Division, 90th Division and 2d French Armored Division are attached to First Army, effective at once. Corps troops of the Third Army now in support of these divisions will remain until relieved, when they revert to Third Army. This relief will be effected by First Army as fast as these corps troops can be replaced. Upon completion of the First Army mission (par 3 a.) these divisions will revert to Third Army.

(2) 2d Infantry Division, effective at once and another infantry division within 48 hours, are attached with their Tank Destroyer battalions to Third Army for use in the BRITTANY Peninsula. First Army will furnish truck transportation for this movement. These trucks will be returned to First Army without delay.

(3) 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions are attached to Third Army effective immediately for use in the BRITTANY Peninsula.

3. a. First Army.

(1) Seize the area CHAMBOIS (Q4051) - TRUN (U3029) and continue the advance to the north until contact is gained with the British. Complete the destruction of the Germans caught in the pocket.

(2) As divisions are pinched out on the left of the First Army they will be moved to the northeast of ALENCON to fill the gap between ARGENTAN and DREUX. Inter-army boundary will be adjusted as the situation dictates.

b. Third Army.

(1) Seize the MANTES GASSICOURT communications center as soon as the supply situation permits, and prevent the escape of the enemy to the southeast. Be prepared for further operations against the enemy flanks and rear.

(2) Protect the south flank and complete the reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula.

4. Administration: - See current administrative instructions.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group	
Main:	ST SAUVEUR-LENDELIN
Advance:	POILLEY
First Army	
Main:	T4726
Advance:	Y6899
Third Army	Z3648

b. Axes of Signal Communications.

Twelfth Army Group:	LAVAL - LE MANS
First Army:	DOMFRONT - ALENCON
Third Army:	LE MANS - CHATEAUDUN

c. Signal Instruction: - No change.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

Auth: CG 12 AG
Init:
Date: 19 Aug 44

SUBJECT: Addenda to Letter of Instructions Number Five.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. Boundaries designated in Letter of Instructions Number Five are adjusted as follows:

a. Between Army Groups the existing boundary is temporarily changed as follows: MOULINS LA MARCHE (Q6631) VERNEUIL (R0038) - BRETEUIL (R0048) - CONCHES (R0362) - LE NEUBOURG (R0283) - BOURGTHEROULDE (M0100) -ST OUEN (M0306) (all to Twelfth Army Group).

b. Between Armies the permanent boundary is temporarily changed as follows: LE MANS (Z4037) (to Third Army, open to First Army traffic) - BONNETABLE (V5779) (to First Army) - NOGENT LE ROTROU (V8892) (to First Army, open to Third Army traffic) - COURVILLE SUR EURE (R2003) to First Army) - DREUX (R3235) - road on west bank of EURE River to its junction with the SEINE River (all inclusive to Third Army). Third Army to have running rights on the NOGENT LE ROTROU - DREUX road until their dumps in the vicinity are cleared.

2. a. First Army will direct one corps to advance to the SEINE River from the area west of DREUX, in zone and prevent the escape of the enemy across the river.

b. Third Army employing one corps will seize and hold a bridgehead across the SEINE River at MANTES GASSICOURT and will also direct a sufficient force to the northwest from that area to seize the west bank of the SEINE River within its zone of action and prevent the escape of the enemy across the river.

c. Other missions remain unchanged.

3. First Army will take over the supply of the V Corps as soon as practicable, coordinating with Third Army.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN,
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-3

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG 12 AG
Init:
Date: 23 Aug 44

TO: Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Adv Sec Com Z.
Commanding General, Com Z.

The XV Corps including 5th Armored and 79th Infantry Division is attached to the First Army effective 0600 24 August. Supporting troops now operating with the XV Corps will remain with it pending the publication of the detailed assignment order. The permanent boundary between armies designated in par 2.b.(2)(a) Letter of Instructions number Three becomes effective at 0600 24 August 1944 and is extended along the line CHARTRES (R3802) (to First Army) - ETAMPES (W8897) (to First Army, open to Third Army traffic) - MILLY (X1091) (to Third Army) - MELUN (to First Army after bridgehead has been established by Third Army) - GUIGNES (S3616) (to First Army).

/s/ O. N. Bradley,
/t/ O. N. BRADLEY,
Lieutenant General, Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

/s/ A. C. Cunkle
/t/ A. C. CUNKLE
Colonel, GSC,
Ex O, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init:
Date: 25 Aug 44

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Six.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. See current Weekly Intelligence Summary.

b. Upon completion of destruction of the enemy west of the SEINE River, 21 Army Group will cross the SEINE in zone, armies abreast, British Second Army on the right (east) flank. The British Second Army will advance north to the line of the SOMME River while the Canadian First Army clears the whole HAVRE Peninsula. The advance beyond the SOMME will be northwards into the PAS DE CALAIS area assisted by airborne operations with the object of destroying all enemy forces in that area.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will regroup and resume its advance to the northeast in zone, cross the SEINE and encircle PARIS: continue the advance to the northeast with the main effort initially on the left (west) flank prepared for further advance into Germany. (See Annex 1, Operation Map).

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between Army Groups: The permanent boundary is extended as follows: MANTES GASSICOURT (R6061) - BEAUVAIS (M9007) - BRETEUIL (M0728) - ALBERT (M3568) - BAPAUME (M5178) - DOUAI (M6907) - TOURNAI (M9231) - BRUSSELS (J6050) (all inclusive to 21 Army Group).

(2) Between Armies: GUIGNES (S3616) - CHAUMES EN BRIE (S4019) - LA FERTE SOUS JOUARRE (S6349) (all to First Army) - CHATEAU THIERRY (S8358) - FISMES (T0586) - AISNE River and ARDENNES Canal from PONTAVERET (T1697) to SEDAN (09925) - LUZERY (P5556) - WEISWAMPACH (P8172) (all inclusive to Third Army).

c. Troops.

(1) First Army

V Corps
VII Corps
XIX Corps
1st Div
4th Div
9th Div
28th Div
30th Div
79th Div
2nd Armd Div
3rd Armd Div
5th Armd Div

(2) Third Army

XII Corps
XV Corps
XX Corps
5th Div
35th Div
80th Div
90th Div
4th Armd Div
7th Armd Div
2nd French Armd Div

VIII Corps
2nd Div
8th Div
29th Div
83d Div
6th Armd Div

(3) Available in early September for assignment to armies according to the situation:

94th Div
95th Div
9th Armd Div

3. a. First Army.

Cross the SEINE Between MANTES GASSICOURT and MELUN (both inclusive), advance in zone, seize the line LAON-PERONNE encircle PARIS, and continue the advance rapidly to the northeast.

b. Third Army.

(1) Cross the line of SEINE and YONNE Rivers in zone. Advance to the line TROYES - CHALON SUR MARNE - RETMS. Protect the right flank eastward from ORLEANS (inclusive) with at least one division.

(2) Be prepared to continue the advance rapidly on order to seize crossings of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ.

(3) Employing the VIII Corps, complete reduction of BRITTANY Peninsula.

(4) Protect south flank along the LOIRE River.

4. Administration: See current administrative instructions.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group: Forward: LAVAL Advance: CHARTRES
First Army: COUTERNE LA LOUPE
Third Army: PITHIVIERS

b. Axes of Signal Communications.

Twelfth Army Group: CHARTRES - MEAUX - LAON - to be announced.

First Army: LA LOUPE - VERSAILLES - SOISSONS - to be announced.

Third Army: PITHIVIERS - MONTEREAU - SEZANNE - CHALONS SUR MARNE - to be announced.

c. Signal Instructions: No Change.

By command of the Army Group Commander:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
/t/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3.

Distribution:
Eliminated.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP:
APO 655
(Corrected Copy)

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG:
Init:
Date: 29 Aug 44

Subject: Letter of Instructions Number Six.

To : Army Commanders.

1. a. See current Weekly Intelligence Summary.

b. Upon completion of destruction of the enemy west of the SEINE River, 21 Army Group will cross the SEINE in zone, armies abreast, British Second Army on the right (east) flank. The British Second Army will advance north to the line of the SOMME River while the Canadian First Army clears the whole HAVRE Peninsula. The advance beyond the SOMME will be northwards into the PAS DE CALAIS area assisted by airborne operations with the object of destroying all enemy forces in that area.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will regroup and resume its advance to the northeast in zone, cross the SEINE and encircle PARIS; continue the advance to the northeast with the main effort initially on the left (west) flank prepared for further advance into Germany. (See Annex 1, Operation Map.)

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between Army Groups: The permanent boundary is extended as follows: MANTES GASSICOURT (R 6061) - BEAUVAIS (M9007) - BRETEUIL (M0728) - ALBERT (M3568) - BAPAUME (M5178) - DOUAI (M6907) - TOURNAI (M 9231) - BRUSSELS (J6055) (all inclusive to 21 Army Group).

(2) Between Armies: CHARTRES (R3802) - ETAMPES (M8897), (both to First Army, running rights to Third Army through ETAMPES) - MILLY (X1091) (to Third Army)- MELUN (S2505) - GUIGNES (S3616) - PEZARCHES (S5126) - COULOMMIERS (S5934) - CHATEAU THIERRY (S8358) - FISMES (T0586) - AISNE River and ARDENNES Canal from PONTAVERET (T1697) to SEDAN (09925) - LUZERY (P5556) WEISWAMPACH (P8172) (all inclusive to First Army, running rights to Third Army through CHATEAU THIERRY).

c. Troops.

(1) First Army

V Corps
VII Corps
XIX Corps
1st Div
4th Div
9th Div
28th Div
30th Div
79th Div
2nd Armd Div
3rd Armd Div
5th Armd Div

(2) Third Army

XII Corps
XX Corps
5th Div
35th Div
80th Div
90th Div
4th Armd Div
7th Armd Div
XV Corps (upon release by First Army)
2nd French Armd Div (upon relief from Paris area)

VIII Corps
2nd Div
8th Div
29th Div
83rd Div
6th Armd Div

(3) Available in early September for assignment to Armies according to the situation:

94th Div
95th Div
9th Armd Div

3. a. First Army.

Cross the SEINE between MANTES GASSICOURT and MELUN (both inclusive), advance in zone, seize the line LOAN - PERONNE, encircle PARIS, and continue the advance rapidly to the northeast. Elements of the First Army now north of the Army Group boundary at MANTES GASSICOURT will move south of that boundary as soon as tactical requirements permit.

b. Third Army.

(1) Cross the line of SEINE and YONNE Rivers in zone. Advance and seize the line VITRY LE FRANCOIS - CHALON SUR MARNE - RETMS. Be prepared to continue the advance on Army Group order to seize the crossings of the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ (both inclusive).

(2) Employing the VIII Corps, complete reduction of BRITTANY Peninsula.

(3) Protect the south flank along the LOIRE River to ORLEANS and thence to the east. For this purpose at least one division will be employed in the area: ORLEANS - MONTARGIS - SENS - TROYES.

4. See Administrative Instructions No 13.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group: Forward: LAVAL Advance: CHARTRES
First Army COUTERNE LA LOUPE
Third Army PITHIVIERS

b. Axes of Signal Communication.

Twelfth Army Group: CHARTRES - MEAUX - LOAN - to be announced.

First Army: LA LOUPE - VERSAILLES - SOISSONS - to be announced.

Third Army: PITHIVIERS - MONTREAU - SEZANNE - CHALONS SUR MARNE - to be announced.

c. Signal Instruction: No change.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-3.

S-E-C-R-E-T

SEPTEMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AGp
Init:
Date: 5 Sept 44

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Seven.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. The Ninth Army, effective at 1200 hours, 5 September 1944, assumes command of the VIII Corps, as now constituted, with the mission of reducing the BRITTANY Peninsula and protecting the south flank of the Twelfth Army Group along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS exclusive. Ninth Army will prepare for further action to the east on the right (south) flank of the Third Army.

2. Boundaries.

a. Between Third and Ninth Armies: Road GC 3 from Cross Roads with road N 826 (W 4944) south to MEUNG SUR LOIRE (F 5015) (all inclusive to Ninth Army).

b. Between Ninth Army and Communications Zone: Road N 155 from LE VIVIER SUR MER (89708) to DOL (89803) - road N 795 to HEDE (X9374) - road N 137 to RENNES (Y0153) - VILAINE River to MESSAC (H8922) - road N 772 to CHATEAUBRIANT (J2108) - road N 775 to POUANCE (J3610) (all inclusive to Communications Zone) road N 775 to SEGRE (J5904) - N 163 to LE LION D'ANGERS (O 7197) - road N770 to CHATEAUNEUF SUR SARTHE (J8802) - roads GC 39 and GC 24 to SEICHES (09890) - road N 766 to BAUGE (P1686) to NOYANT (P3382) to CHATEAU LA VALLIERE (P4885) to CHATEAU RENAULT (P9389) - road N 10 to VENDOME (F1512) to Cross Roads with road N 826 thence east along road N 826 to MOREE (W1544) to Cross Roads with road GC 3 (W4944) (all inclusive to Ninth Army.)

3. Troops Lists, Annex No. 1, giving detailed troop assignment to armies is attached. As soon as 94th Division can relieve it, the 6th Armored Division (less one light tank company) will be released to Third Army. Headquarters Twelfth Army Group will be notified of date 6th Armored Division is available.

4. Ninth Army will comply with the provisions of current Administrative Instructions, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group.

5. Ninth Army Command Post will remain at RENNES for the present. Future locations will be reported. The provisions of Signal Communications Instructions, Annex 4 to letter of Instructions No. 1, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, apply.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AGp
Init:
Date: 10 Sept 44

10 September 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Eight.

TO : Army Commanders.

NOTE: This Letter of Instructions confirms verbal orders of the Army Group Commander already issued but does not supplement them.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. 21 Army Group continues advance to the East to isolate and occupy the RUHR. The capture of the Channel ports, the rocket bomb sites and the destruction of the enemy trapped along the coast will be completed.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group advances to the East to secure bridgeheads over the RHINE River from MANNHEIM to KOLN both inclusive.

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between Army Groups the boundary is extended as follows: TOURNAI (H 9231) - ATH (J 1932) (All inclusive to 21 Army Group) - WAVRE (J 7939) - TIRLEMONT (K 0219) - HASSELT (K 3162) - SITTARD (K 6868) - GARZWEILER (P 1275) LEVERKUSEN (P 4668) (all to Twelfth Army Group).

(2) Between First and Third Armies the boundary designated in Letter of Instructions Number Six (corrected copy) is adjusted beyond PONTAVERT (T 1697) as follows:

The AISNE Canal and Canal DES ARDENNES TO TANNAY (O 8906) - STONNE (O 9609) (all inclusive to Third Army) - STENAY (P 1502) - LONGUYON (U 4596) - LUXEMBOURG (P 8312) - TRIER (L 2029) - BERNKASTEL OUES (1 5246) - LAHNSTEIN (L 9089) (all inclusive to First Army).

(3) Between Third and Ninth Armies the boundary designated in Letter of Instructions Number Seven remains in effect.

3. a. First Army.

(1) Continue the advance to the East, to secure crossings over the RHINE River in the vicinity of KOBLENZ, BONN and KOLN.

(2) Maintain contact with 21 Army Group and protect the left (north) flank.

b. Third Army.

(1) Continue the advance to the East in zone and secure crossings of the RHINE River in the vicinity of MANNHEIM and MAINZ. If sufficient forces become available to Third Army, it will also seize a bridgehead in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.

(2) Protect the south flank East of ORLEANS inclusive.

c. Ninth Army. Reduce the BRITTANY Peninsula and protect the south flank along the LOIRE River from its mouth to ORLEANS exclusive.

4. Armies will have equal priorities of supply except that the capture of BREST area will have first priority. Other administrative instructions, no change.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group: VERSAILLES.

First Army : CHAUNY.

Third Army : CHALONS SUR MARNE.

b. Axes of Signal Communications.

Twelfth Army Group: VERSAILLES - REIMS - VERDUN - METZ.

First Army : CHAUNY - CHARLEROI - LIEGE.

Third Army : CHALONS SUR MARNE - VERDUN - SAARBRUCKEN - FRANKFURT.

c. Signal Instructions: No change.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AGp
Init:
Date: 25 Sept 44

25 September 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Nine.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. The strong defensive positions held by the enemy along the SIEGFRIED Line in the north facing the First U. S. Army and along the MOSELLE River in the south facing the Third U. S. Army have given him an opportunity to regroup and strengthen his forces defending the approaches to GERMANY. New divisions have been arriving from training areas in GERMANY and DENMARK and from the RUSSIAN Front. The latest arrivals have been employed in the area east of AACHEN where the First U. S. Army is driving toward KOLN. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. (1) For the immediate future the Allied Expeditionary Force will make its main effort on the left. The Twenty-one Army Group has been directed that the clearing and opening of the port of ANTWERP is of first importance. At the same time it will continue its present drive to the northeast with the object of enveloping the RUHR Valley on the North.

(2) Sixth Army Group continues to attack northeastward to seize the RHINE crossings between SPEYER and MULHOUSE, inclusive.

2. a. Since the support of the attack of Twenty-one Army Group is the primary consideration, the Twelfth Army Group will:

(1) Clear the area between its left (north) boundary and the MEUSE River and protect the right flank of Twenty-one Army Group as far north as MAASHEES.

(2) After mission (1) is assured and when sufficient forces become available push the attack on KOLN.

(3) Assume the defensive except as indicated in (1) and (2) above.

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between Twenty-one Army Group and Twelfth Army Groups: HASSELT (K 3161) - WEERT (X 5897) - ASTEN (X 6113) - DEURNE (X 6520) - VENRAIJ (X 7825) - MAASHEES (X 8231) (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group).

(2) Between Twelfth Army and Sixth Army Groups: LANGERS (J 2423) - EPINAL (Y 0553) - SAARBURG (Q 4915) - LANDAU (R 2766) - SPEYER (R 5180) - HOCKENHEIM (R 5980) (all inclusive to Sixth Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies the temporary boundary will be: LONGUYON (U 4595) (inclusive to First Army) WALFERDANGE (P 8418) - BOLLENDOR (L 0140) - DAUN (L 3577) (all inclusive to Third Army).

(4) Between Ninth Army and the First and Third Armies, boundaries will be announced later according to the situation at the time.

3. a. First Army.

(1) Clear the area between the left (north) boundary and the MEUSE River and protect the right flank of the Twenty-one Army Group.

(2) When the accomplishment of (1) is assured and when, in the opinion of the Army Commander sufficient forces and supplies are available, thrust forward vigorously to the RHINE in the vicinity of KOLN and BONN.

(3) 7th Armored and 29th Divisions (reinforced) are assigned to First Army at once.

b. Third Army.

(1) Hold present positions until supply situation permits the resumption of the offensive.

(2) 83rd Division (reinforced) is assigned to the Third Army at once. 7th Armored Division is transferred to First Army and will be moved to LONGUYON and passed to First Army control without delay.

c. Ninth Army.

(1) As soon as transportation is available, move the VIII Corps to occupy the front progressively between BOLLENDOR (L 0140) and present north boundary of V Corps as vacated by elements of the First Army. Corps troops committed to action will be kept to a minimum until the present supply situation is improved. As additional divisions become available the Ninth Army front will be extended southward to include METZ, relieving Third Army units in that zone.

(2) Ninth Army will contain the enemy on its front.

(3) Move its headquarters to the LUXEMBOURG area as and when the situation requires. So long as elements of Ninth Army Headquarters remain in BRITTANY that army will retain responsibility for containing enemy garrisons remaining in BRITTANY and for protection of our south flank along the LOIRE and eastward to the YONNE River, inclusive. It is contemplated that the 94th Division, reinforced by one light tank company and one cavalry squadron and other elements considered essential by Ninth Army, will be employed for this purpose. When Ninth Army Headquarters clears BRITTANY the 94th Division, reinforced as above, will pass to control of Twelfth Army Group and will continue to execute this mission. Ninth Army will notify the 94th Division and this headquarters when control passes. It is now expected that this division will be relieved of this mission by an incoming division after a reasonable time.

(4) 29th and 83rd Divisions (reinforced) are relieved from assignment to Ninth Army at once. Responsibility for the movement of these divisions rests with Ninth Army which will make necessary arrangements directly with the Communications Zone and the armies to which the divisions are to be assigned. Movement of these divisions will be expedited.

4. See Administrative Instructions No. 31.

5. a. Axes of Signal Communications.

Twelfth Army Group	: VERDUN	-	WIESBADEN
First Army	: VERVIERS	-	KOLN
Third Army	: ETAIN	-	SAARBRUCKEN
Ninth Army	: RENNES	-	LUXEMBOURG

b. See current Signal Instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AGp:
Init:
Date: 28 Sept 44

28 September 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number One to Letter of Instructions Number Nine.

To : Army Commanders.

1. The instructions herein are issued in order to carry out the directives of the Supreme Allied Commander contained in SHAEF Cable No. FWD 15934, of 27 September 1944.

2. Effective 0001A hours 29 September, XV Corps is assigned to Sixth Army Group. A detailed list follows giving units affected.

3. Boundary between Army Groups will then be CHAUMONT (Z 0850) - LUNEVILLE (Q 0800) - SAARBURG (Q 5015) - LANDAU (R 2966) - HEIDELBERG (R 7090), all to Sixth Army Group.

4. Sixth Army Group has been charged with the protection of the right (south) flank of Twelfth Army Group and will initially secure the LUNEVILLE Area. The Sixth Army Group also has the mission of destroying the enemy in its zone west of the RHINE, securing crossings over the RHINE and breaching the SIEGFRIED line. Seventh Army is being instructed to keep Third Army fully informed by direct liaison of his dispositions and of all developments of operations.

5. Mission of Third Army remains unchanged.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

OFFICIAL:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

OCTOBER

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG:
Init:
Date: 21 Oct 44

21 October 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. a. See current intelligence summary.

b. 21 Army Group has the immediate task of clearing the enemy from the west of the MEUSE in the VENLO area and from the seaward approaches to ANTWERP. When these missions have been accomplished they plan an attack southward between the RHINE and MEUSE Rivers.

Sixth Army Group continue its attack on our south flank to seize the BELFORT gap and secure crossings of the RHINE in the vicinity of STRASSBURG.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will regroup and prepare for an advance by all three armies to the RHINE River. Target date, First and Ninth Armies, 5 November. However, attack will not be made more than two days prior to attack of Second British Army. Target date, Third Army, 10 November.

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between 21 and Twelfth Army Groups: TIRLEMONT (K0249) - HASSELT (K3161) (both to Twelfth Army Group) - (K6270) - HEINSBERG (K8575) (both inclusive to 21 Army Group) - ERKELENZ (F0177) - NEUSS (F2789) (both inclusive to Twelfth Army Group.)

(2) Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (G9311) (inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - CHAUMONT (Z0850) (inclusive to Sixth Army Group) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z5075) - MARNE AU RHIN CANAL from CREVIC (Q0205) to CONDRE-XANGE (Q4011) thence along SAAR-KOHLEN KANAL to ALBERSCHAUX (Q4021) (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - FINSTINGEN (Q4828) - LEMBERG (Q9563) - FRANKENSTEIN (R1893) - FRANKENTHAL (M4504) - SANDHOFEN (M5205) (all inclusive to Sixth Army Group.)

(3) Between Ninth and First Armies: TAVIERS (K0127) - GRAND AXHE (K2234) - VIVEGNIS (K5235) - BOCHOLTZ (K7747) - WURSELEN (K8648) (all inclusive to First Army) - JULICH (F0259) - ELSDORF (F1760) - OPLADEN (F4874) (all inclusive to Ninth Army).

(4) Between First and Third Armies: STENAY (P1502) - LONGUYON (U4596) - AUMETZ (U6922) (all inclusive to First Army) - SIERCK (Q0094) - SAARBURG (L1413) (both inclusive to Third Army) - TRIER (L2029) - TRARBACH (L5550) - KOBLENZ (L8995) (all inclusive to First Army).

c. Troops.

Ninth Army	First Army	Third Army
XIX Corps	VII Corps	XX Corps
29th Div	V Corps	XII Corps
30th Div	VIII Corps	5th Div
2d Armd Div	1st Div	26th Div
	2d Div	35th Div
Assigned:	4th Div	80th Div
XIII Corps	8th Div	90th Div
102d Div	9th Div	95th Div
*104th Div	28th Div	4th Armd Div
*7th Armd Div	83d Div	6th Armd Div
	3d Armd Div	Assigned:
*Attached temporarily to 21 Army Group	5th Armd Div	III Corps
	Assigned:	10th Armd Div
	9th Armd Div	

3. a. Ninth Army

(1) Continue the present action of the XIX Corps in coordination with the First Army effort. XIX Corps cavalry now outside the Army Group boundary will remain in position. Authority is granted to make minor temporary adjustments of boundary direct with Second British Army.

(2) Attack in zone to the RHINE in close conjunction with First Army, protecting its left flank.

Any necessary coordination along boundary between First and Ninth Armies will be effected by C. G. First Army.

(3) After the attack of the First Army has reached the RHINE, Ninth Army will attack northward between the RHINE and the MEUSE Rivers and gain contact with the British Second Army. It will then take over the area west of the RHINE to REES, inclusive. New Inter - Group boundary will be announced later.

b. First Army.

(1) Attack to the east with the object of reaching the RHINE in vicinity of KOLN - BONN and seize a bridgehead immediately if the situation permits. If it is impracticable to seize a bridgehead, First Army will clear the enemy from the area north of the MOSELLE.

c. Third Army.

(1) Advance in zone to the RHINE in the MAINZ - WORMS area and seize a bridgehead immediately if the situation permits. If it is impracticable to seize a bridgehead, Third Army will attack to the north and clear the area to the MOSELLE.

d. 94th Division, reinforced.

Contain the enemy garrisons remaining in BRITTANY and protect the south flank of Twelfth Army Group along the LOIRE and eastward to the YONNE River, inclusive.

x. Plans for airborne operations to assist crossings of the RHINE in each Army zone of action are now being prepared by the First Allied Airborne Army. Airborne troops, however, are not available to support more than two crossings of the river.

4. See Administrative Instructions No. 40

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group: VERDUN (Main), LUXEMBOURG (TAC).

Ninth Army: MAASTRICHT

First Army: VERVIERS

Third Army: NANCY

94th Division: CHATEAUBRIANT

b. See current Signal Instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A.C. of S., G-3

Reg. No. G-2255

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: _____:
:Date: 29 Oct 44:

29 October 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number One to Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. Paragraph 2 h, Letter of Instructions Number Ten, is amended as follows:

* * * *

(3) Between Ninth and First Armies: TAVIERS (K0127) - GRAND AXHE (K2234) - VIVEGNIS (K5235) - NEUFCHATEAU (K6237) - TEUVEN (K6741) - KIRSPELICH (K9491) (all inclusive to First Army) - ALTDORF (F0354) - RAMBACH (F0956) - HILSDORF (F1860) (all inclusive to Ninth Army - QUADRATH (F2961) (inclusive to First Army) - FULHEIM (F3467) - VOLXHEIM (F4570) - MERKENICH (F5570) (all inclusive to Ninth Army).

(4) Between First and Third Armies: STENAY (P1502) - LONGUYON (U4596) - ESCH (P7302) - SIERCK (Q0094) - SAARBURG (L1413) (all inclusive to Third Army) - TRIER (L2029) - TRARBACH (L5550) - KOBLENZ (L8995) (all inclusive to First Army).

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY.

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Reg. No. G-2350

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 30 Oct 44 :

370 (CG) 30 October 1944

SUBJECT: Directive for Current Operations.

TO : Commanding General, Third Army.

1. In order to assist you in your operations which are scheduled to take place in the near future, I would like to place at your disposal certain uses of the 83d Division, which is part of the First Army. This is the matter we discussed this date. In order to make it absolutely clear to everyone concerned as to just what use is to be made of this division, I would like to state it here.

2. The 83d Division is placed under your operational control for the following purposes and to the extent stated below. I do not want this division to have to make a separate river crossing as this would involve too much bridging equipment and too much artillery support. Any initial crossing by this division should be made through the bridgehead already established by your own divisions. After a bridgehead has been established by your divisions, one regimental combat team could be used to cross over in the bridgehead and then turned to the northeast to protect that flank and to advance up the east side of the Moselle River. As it advances, it will wipe out the defenses facing the right regimental combat team of this division now in the front line. As this right regimental combat team is freed by the advance up the other side of the river, it can also be brought down, put through the bridgehead and used on the east side of the Moselle to give the original attack by the regiment of the 83d more depth and power. These elements of the 83d Division may be used to clean out the terrain between the Moselle River and the Saar River which runs through Saarburg, and seize crossings of the Saar River in the vicinity of Saarburg for future use by your other divisions. No elements of the 83d Division should be used beyond this point.

3. Any future adjustment of the boundaries between your Third Army and the First Army made necessary by the 83d Division's having crossed the Moselle will be made by me after conference with you.

O. N. BRADLEY,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Commanding

REG, NO. G-725

TOP SECRET

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: _____:
:Date: 30 Oct 44:

30 October 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number Two to Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. In the initial stage of the advance to the RHINE, the Commanding General, Third Army, will exercise operational control over the 83rd Infantry Division for the purpose of directing the employment of elements of the Division comprising two regimental combat teams in their movement across the MOSELLE through a bridgehead established by divisions of the Third Army, in clearing the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers, and in the seizure of crossings of the SAAR in the vicinity of SAARBURG. These operations will be conducted in accordance with further detailed instructions contained in letter from the Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, to the Commanding General, Third Army, dated 30 October 1944. Third Army will relinquish operational control over the 83rd Division upon completion of these operations.

2. To facilitate deployment of the XX Corps in preparation for the advance, Third Army is granted access to that part of LUXEMBOURG lying south of an east-west line through BETTEMBURG (P8203).

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY.

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Reg. No. G-2351

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

NOVEMBER

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 4 Nov 1944:

4 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number Three to Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. In compliance with SHAEF Directive, dated 2 November 1944, Letter of Instructions Number Ten, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, is amended as indicated below.

2. Delete paragraphs 1b, 2a and 3a (3). Substitute:

"1. b. (1) The 21 Army Group first priority mission is to open the port of ANTWERP. When operations to open ANTWERP have been completed, they will attack the enemy west of the MEUSE and advance to the RHINE in conjunction with the attack of Twelfth Army Group and protect the Twelfth Army Group north flank. The target date of this attack will be 10 November.

(2) Sixth Army Group will continue the offensive in conjunction with Third Army attack with the objective of capturing STRASSBURG and protecting the south flank of Twelfth Army Group.

"2. a. Twelfth Army Group will re-group and prepare for an advance by all three (3) Armies to the RHINE River. Target date First and Ninth Armies, 10 November. Target date Third Army, 5 November.

"3. a. (3) After the attack of First Army has reached the RHINE, Ninth Army will attack northward between the RHINE and the MEUSE Rivers in conjunction with Second British Army. It will then take over the area west of the RHINE to REES inclusive. A new inter-group boundary will be announced later.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Copy No. 56

Reg. No. G-2419

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: F. C. H.
Date: 12 Nov 44

12 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number Four to Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. Amendment Number Two to Letter of Instructions Number Ten, dated 30 October, is revised as indicated below.

2. Paragraph 1, which refers to the employment of two RCT's of the 83rd Division by Third Army, is revoked.

3. Paragraph 2, which concerns the allotment to Third Army of roads in the BEITEMBURG area, remains in effect.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Reg. No. G-2490

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: F. C. H.
Date: 21 Nov 44

21 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number Five to Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

The boundary between First and Third Armies designated in Letter of Instructions Number Ten and Amendment Number One thereto is adjusted as follows:

STENAY (P1502) - LONGUYON (U4596) - ESCH (F7302) - SIERCK (Q0094) (all inclusive to Third Army) - thence along the MOSELLE RIVER to KOBLENZ (L8995) (all inclusive to First Army).

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Reg. No. G-2561

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: F. C. H.
Date: 29 Nov 44

29 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment Number Six to Letter of Instructions Number Ten.

TO : Army Commanders.

1. In compliance with SHAEF cablegram S-68560, dated 27 November 1944, Letter of Instructions Number Ten, Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, is amended as indicated below.

2. Delete that part of paragraph 1b, as amended, which refers to the Sixth Army Group, and substitute:

"(2) Sixth Army Group, continuing the offensive in conjunction with Third Army, will launch a strong attack west of the PFALZERWALD to breach the SIEGFRIED LINE west of the RHINE and destroy the enemy in zone".

3. Delete paragraph 2b (2) and substitute:

Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (09311) (inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - CHAUMONT (Z0850) - NEUFCHATEAU * (Z5075) (inclusive to Sixth Army Group) - MARNE AU RHIN CANAL from CREVIC (Q0205) to GONDREXANGE (Q4011) thence along SAAR-KOHLEN KANAL to ALBERSCHAUX (Q4021) (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - FINSTINGEN (Q4828) - THAL (Q5735) (both to Sixth Army Group) - LORENZEN (Q5939) - ROHRBACK (Q6649) - WEISSKIRCHEN (Q7157) - WINTERBACH (Q8178) (all to Twelfth Army Group) - RAMSTEIN (Q8794) - road junction (R0196) (both to Sixth Army Group) - MEHLINGEN (R0899) (to Twelfth Army Group) - EISENBERG (M2407) - GRUNSTADT (M3107) - NIEDERSHEIM GROSS (M4208) (all to Sixth Army Group) - LAMPERTHEIM (M5311) (to Twelfth Army Group).

* Certain installations in NEUFCHATEAU remain under control of Third Army.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

Reg. No. G-2624

TOP SECRET

DECEMBER

TOP SECRET

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC (TOP SECRET NR 10) .. 22 December 1944

TO : NINTH US ARMY MAIN (ACTION)
FIRST US ARMY COMMAND (ACTION)
THIRD US ARMY MAIN (ACTION)
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN (INFO)
NINTH AIR FORCE (INFO)
EXFOR MAIN (INFO)

1. PORTION OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS IN CONFLICT HEREWITH ARE CANCELLED. PENDING PUBLICATION OF A NEW DIRECTIVE, THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE.

2. BOUNDARIES: A. BETWEEN TWENTY ONE AND TWELFTH ARMY GROUPS: GIVET DASH PRUM DASH KOLN (ALL INCLUSIVE TO TWENTY ONE ARMY GROUP) SUBJECT MODIFICATION BETWEEN ARMY COMMANDERS CONCERNED. B. BETWEEN TWELFTH AND SIXTH ARMY GROUPS: AS AT PRESENT TO NEUFCHATEAU (INCLUSIVE SIXTH ARMY GROUP) DASH THENCE DOMBASLE DASH CHATEAU SALINS DASH BARONVILLE DASH FAULQUEMONT (FALKENBERG) DASH ST AVOLD DASH CARLING (KARLINGEN) DASH BOUSSE (BUSS) DASH (ALL INCLUSIVE TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP, WITH RUNNING RIGHTS TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP ON THE ROAD WEST OF THIS BOUNDARY (DASH NEUNKIRCHEN DASH LANDSTUHL DASH KAISERSLAUTERN) ALL INCLUSIVE TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP). THIRD ARMY RETAINS RUNNING RIGHTS IN THAT AREA EAST OF ABOVE AND WEST OF FORMER BOUNDARY WHICH LIES BEHIND FRONT LINE.

3. A. FIRST AND NINTH ARMIES PASS TO OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF C IN C TWENTY ONE ARMY GROUP AT ONCE. TWELFTH ARMY GROUP RETAINS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION.

B. THIRD ARMY:

(1) HOLD ALONG PRESENT FRONT LINE BETWEEN SAARLAUTERN AND VICINITY OF ECHTERNACH.

(2) CONTAIN THE ENEMYS ADVANCE EAST OF THE MEUSE.

(3) LAUNCH WITHOUT DELAY A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE ENEMY SALIENT FROM GENERAL AREA LUXEMBOURG DASH ARLON IN DIRECTION OF ST VITH.

4. TROOPS: THIRD ARMY WILL BE AS NOW CONSTITUTED LESS EIGHT SEVENTH INFANTRY DIVISION (TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP) PLUS HEADQUARTERS VIII CORPS, FOURTH AND TWENTY EIGHTH INFANTRY DIVISIONS NINTH ARMORED DIVISION, ONE ZERO ONE AIRBORNE DIVISION AND FIRST ARMY AND CORPS TROOPS NOW SOUTH OF ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY (DETAILS LATER).

5. COINCIDENT WITH THREE A ABOVE, OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF NINTH AND TWO NINTH TACT WILL PASS FROM NINTH AIR FORCE TO SECOND TAF.

BRADLEY

QUEEN XRAY THREE ZERO SEVEN FIVE TWO.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: _____:
:Date: 25 Dec 44:

25 December 1944

Subject: Letter of Instructions Eleven. (Confirming instructions previously issued in fragmentary form)

To : Army Commanders.

1. a. See current Intelligence Summary.

b. 21 Army Group has the mission of checking, in its area, the enemy's advance east and south of the MEUSE, and launching a counteroffensive in conjunction with Twelfth Army Group against the enemy's salient.

c. Sixth Army Group has been directed to discontinue its present offensive and to assist Twelfth Army Group to the maximum possible extent.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group has the mission of checking, in zone the enemy's advance east of the MEUSE and launching a counteroffensive against the enemy's salient in conjunction with 21 Army Group.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between 21 and Twelfth Army Group: GIVET (09275) - PRUM (L0780) - KOLN (F4560) - (all inclusive to 21 Army Group), subject to modification between Army Commanders concerned.

(2) Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups: As at present to NEUFCHATEAU (Z5075) (inclusive to Sixth Army Group) - thence DOMBASLE (U9805) - CHATEAU SALINS (Q1025) - BARONVILLE - BARONVLG (Q1738) - FAULQUEMONT/FALKENBERG (Q1750) - ST AVOLD (Q2557) - CARLING/KARLINGEN (Q2663) - BOUSSE/BUSS (Q3275) (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group, with running rights to Sixth Army Group on the road west of this boundary), NEUNKIRCHEN (Q6083) - LANDSTURL (Q8890) - KAISERSLAUTERN (R0395) (all inclusive to Sixth Army Group). Third Army retains running rights on the roads in that area East of the boundary defined above and West of that portion of the former boundary which lies behind the front lines.

c. Troops:

(1) The Third Army will consist of:

III Corps	4th Inf Div	95th Inf Div
VIII Corps	5th Inf Div	101st Airborne Div
XII Corps	26th Inf Div	4th Armd Div
XX Corps	28th Inf Div	6th Armd Div
	35th Inf Div	9th Armd Div
	80th Inf Div	10th Armd Div
	90th Inf Div	

(2) Supporting troops will be as indicated in current troop assignment orders.

(3) 3rd and 4th SAS Bns (French) are placed under operational control of Third Army.

3. a. First and Ninth Armies pass to operational control of C in C, 21 Army Group at once. Twelfth Army Group retains responsibility for their supply and administration.

b. Third Army:

(1) Hold along present line between SAARLAUTERN and vicinity of ECHTERNACH.

(2) Contain the enemy's advance east of the MEUSE.

(3) Launch without delay a counter-offensive against the southern flank of the enemy's salient from the general area ARLON - LUXEMBOURG in the direction of ST VITH.

(4) Defend the crossings of the MEUSE River from GIVET (exclusive) to VERDUN (inclusive). OISE Base Section has established road blocks and prepared for demolition all crossings of the MEUSE in this zone. All troops assigned to defense of the river line in zone by Communications Zone are available to Third Army for performance of this mission. 11th Armored Division is temporarily attached to Third Army for defense of the MEUSE River line only. 17th Airborne Division upon arrival in the REIMS area is attached to Third Army for immediate relief of 11th Armored Division in defense of the MEUSE River line only. Upon relief by 17th Airborne Division the 11th Armored Division will revert to operational command of SHAEF, in the area north of REIMS, with the primary role of being prepared to reinforce the defense of the MEUSE River line in Twelfth or 21 Army Group zones.

c. 94th Division, reinforced, continues present mission.

4. Current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group:	Main - VERDUN	TAC - LUXEMBOURG
Third Army	NANCY	LUXEMBOURG

b. See current signal instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

TOP SECRET

★ ★ ★

JANUARY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: _____
Date: 4 Jan 45

4 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Twelve.

TO : Commanding General, First Army, APO #230, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, Third Army, APO #403, U.S. Army.

1. When junction is effected between elements of the First and Third Armies in the HOUFFALIZE area, the First Army will come under command of Twelfth Army Group. It is proposed that the boundary between the Armies will extend east along L'OURTHE River - OURTHE (P-7478) - RJ at P-822825 - ST. VITH (P-8588) - SCHONBERG (P-9588) - HALLSCHLAG (L-0896) (all inclusive to First Army). (See overlay).

2. Twelfth Army Group will destroy enemy troops trapped west of HOUFFALIZE and continue the attack to the northeast on ST. VITH.

3. a. First Army, leaving sufficient forces to destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, will continue its attack towards ST. VITH assisted by an attack from the MALMEDY area.

b. Third Army defending along the line of the SAAR, MOSELLE and SAUER Rivers, and leaving sufficient forces to destroy the enemy trapped in its zone, will continue the attack toward the northeast and protect the right flank of the First Army.

4. Upon the capture of ST. VITH, it is proposed to continue the attack to the northeast to the RHINE River in the vicinity of BONN; First and Third Armies abreast on the front PRUM - MONSCHAU.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
A FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
AC of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: P C H
Date: 6 Jan 45

6 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen.

TO : Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, APO #408, U. S. Army.

1. Under the provisions of SHAEF directive, Headquarters Fifteenth Army is assigned to Twelfth Army Group.

2. For the present, Fifteenth Army is charged with the following missions:

a. Command of United States Units in SHAEF reserve.

b. Supervision of the staging, equipping and training of new units assigned to Twelfth Army Group with the object of preparing them for active operations at the earliest practicable date.

c. Supervision of the re-organization, re-equipping and training of Twelfth Army Group units returned from the combat zone and assigned or attached to the Fifteenth Army.

d. Preparation of plans for:

(1) Following the advance of Twelfth Army Group into GERMANY, occupying rear areas and protecting lines of communication.

(2) Occupying the RHINELAND within Twelfth Army Group zone, and protecting the lines of communication therein.

(3) Assuming an operational role in the advance if need therefor should arise. Further instructions will be issued at a later date.

e. Assumption of command, on orders of this headquarters, of the units engaged in containing the enemy garrisons in the BRITTANY-LOIRE region and the units employed in defense of the MEUSE River south of GIVET, exclusive. Fifteenth Army will report to this headquarters when it is fully prepared to assume this mission, at which time further detailed instructions will be issued.

3. Headquarters Fifteenth Army, will be located initially in the vicinity of SUIPPES (T-6764).

4. The strictest security will be maintained with regard to the location and activities of Fifteenth Army.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. Franklin Kibler
A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG
Init: _____
Date: 11 Jan 45

11 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment Number One to Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen.

TO : Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, APO #408, U. S. Army.

Paragraph 4 of Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen is amended to read as follows:

"4. a. Security restrictions are relaxed for normal administrative functions, to include bumper markings, letterhead designation, etc.

b. Complete publicity stop and radio silence will be maintained until further orders."

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MC DTG 161743A MC NR 989 ORIG DTG 161630A 16 JAN 45

TT NO 80

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

ACTION TO: FIRST US ARMY COMD
THIRD US ARMY MAIN

INFO COPIES TO:
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN
SHAEF MAIN
EXFOR MAIN
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
ADVANCE SECTION COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

FIRST ARMY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SHAEF INSTRUCTIONS REVERTS TO COMMAND OF TWELFTH ARMY GROUP 172400A JAN. SIMULTANEOUSLY, INTER ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY SHIFTS TO PRESENT BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND NINTH ARMIES AND PROVISIONS OF TWELFTH ARMY GROUP LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 12 BECOME EFFECTIVE.

SIGNED BRADLEY
QX30983

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MC DTG 161830 A MC MR 996 ORIG DTG 161645 A
16 JAN 45

TT NR W-114

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TOFOR ACTION: THIRD US ARMY MAIN
FIFTEEN ARMY

INFO: SHAEF MAIN
EXFOR MAIN
FIRST US ARMY COMD
COM ZONE
OISE BASE SECTION
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN

REF NR QUEEN XRAY DASH THREE ZERO NINE EIGHT FOUR

PARA ONE PD

PURSUANT TO SHAEF INSTRUCTIONS THIRD ARMY IS HEREBY RELIEVED OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE MEUSE RIVER LINE SOUTH OF GIVET AND OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OVER ANY TROOPS TURNED OVER TO THEM FOR THIS MISSION REFERENCE CABLES QUEEN XRAY DASH THREE ZERO SEVEN SIX ONE CMA QUEEN XRAY DASH THREE ZERO EIGHT FOUR EIGHT PAREN PD THIRD ARMY IS RESPONSIBLE THAT ALL ROAD BLOCKS CMA MINES AND DEMOLITION CHARGES PLACED IN DEFENSE OF THE MEUSE RIVER LINE ARE REMOVED WITHOUT DELAY PD

PARA TWO PD

INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN CABLE QUEEN XRAY DASH TWO FIVE FOUR FIVE SEVEN DATED TWO NINE ONE SEVEN ZERO ZERO ABLE DECEMBER WHICH PRESCRIBE AN OPERATIONAL REAR BOUNDARY FOR TWELFTH ARMY GROUP ARE HEREBY RESCINDED PD

PARA THREE PD

FIFTEENTH ARMY WILL SURVEY THE LINE OF THE MEUSE RIVER SOUTHWARD FROM LIEGE INCLUSIVE WITH A VIEW TO ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF THIS LINE IN THE EVENT OF AN ENEMY BREAKTHROUGH PD

SIGNED BRADLEY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 182110 M/C NR 933 ORIG DTG 181935A

TT NR W-859 & W-856

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TO : SIXTH ARMY GROUP
THIRD US ARMY MAIN

INFO: SHAEF MAIN
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

BY AUTHORITY CONTAINED IN SHAEF CABLE S-75440 JAN 17, THE FOLLOWING BOUNDARY WILL TAKE EFFECT BETWEEN TWELFTH AND SIXTH ARMY GROUPS AS OF 2400 JAN 20, PROVIDED SIXTH ARMY GROUP HAS NO OBJECTION TO THIS TIMING. BUSS-COURCELLES SUR NIED-ARNAVILLE-RAMBUCOURT - TO JUNCTION TWELFTH ARMY GROUP REAR BOUNDARY, ALL INCLUSIVE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP. ABOVE IS PROVISIONS REGARDING THIRD ARMY INSTALLATIONS S OF THE BOUNDARY (GIVEN IN OUR QX-30928 JAN 10, NOT TO ALL), AS AGREED BY SIXTH ARMY GROUP

REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF NR QX-31011

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CO, 12AG :
:Init: :
:Date: 19 Jan 45:

19 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment Number Two to Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen.

TO : Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, APO #408, U. S. Army.

In compliance with the provisions of SHAEF cablegram S-75448, dated 17 January, paragraph 2b of Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen is amended to read as follows:

"2. * * * * *

b. Supervision of the staging, equipping and training of all United States ground force units assigned, or intended for assignment, to Army Groups, which enter the Continent from northern ports."

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 221731A M/C NR 711 ORIG DTG 221630A

TT NO 130 22 JAN 45

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

ACTION TO: COMMANDING GENERAL THIRD US ARMY

INFO TO:
SHAEF MAIN
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

MOVE THE 35 DIV LESS RCT NOW ENGAGED WITH ATTACHED TD AND AW BNS LESS THE UNITS WITH THE ONE RCT WITHOUT DELAY TO SAVERNE Q7115. ADVANCE PARTY TO REPORT HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH US ARMY AT LUNEVILLE Q0801. COMPLETE SECRECY TO INCLUDE MAINTENANCE OF RADIO SILENCE UNTIL COMMITTED REMOVAL OF VEHICLE MARKINGS AND SHOULDER PATCHES NO USE OF UNIT IDENTIFICATION ON ROAD SIGNS AND NO USE OF CODE NAMES IN TELEPHONIC CONVERSATION WILL BE OBSERVED.

SIGNED BRADLEY

QX 31044

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: :
:Date: 24 Jan 45:

24 January 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Fourteen.

TO : Commanding General, First Army, APO #230, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, Third Army, APO #403, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, APO #408, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, 66th Division, APO #66, U.S. Army.

1. a. The enemy is withdrawing from the ARDENNES salient and his retreating columns have already suffered heavy casualties from our air forces. See Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 24 and Current G-2 Periodic Report.

b. 21 Army Group with Ninth U.S. Army under operational control continues its advance to the ROER River between LINNICH and ROERMOND, remaining on the defensive for the present, elsewhere.

c. Sixth Army Group continues its attack to reduce the COLMAR pocket while defending the rest of its zone.

d. Air Forces continue their present attack to paralyze enemy communications west of the RHINE and isolate the battlefield. Ninth Air Force supports Twelfth Army Group.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group defending aggressively in zone south of the MOSELLE River, will continue its attack to the east with the main effort along the axis ST. VITH -BONN with the objective of penetrating the SIEGFRIED LINE and closing to the RHINE River in zone north of the MOSELLE. First objective: The high ground in the BLANKENHEIM area.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Operational boundary between 21 and Twelfth Army Groups: ST. TROND - BJ at K-355367 (both inclusive to 21 Army Group) - EUPEN - GEMUND - EUSKIRCHEN (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group).

(2) Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: RAMBUCOURT - ARNAVILLE - COURCELLES SUR NIED -BUSS (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - NEUNKIRCHEN - KAISERSLAUTERN - GRUNSTADT - ROXHEIM (all inclusive to Sixth Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies: GIVET (inclusive to First Army) WELLIN (inclusive to Third Army) - CHAMPLON - L'OURTHE River in the vicinity of MADRIN - east along L'OURTHE River - OURTHE (all inclusive to First Army) - ST. VITH (inclusive to Third Army - running rights to First Army) - LOSHEIM (inclusive to Third Army) - FRAUENKRON (inclusive to First Army) - KRONENBURG -STADTKYLL - ALENDORF (all inclusive to Third Army) HUNGERSDORF (inclusive to First Army). The road from LOSHEIM through KRONENBURG to STADTKYLL is assigned to Third Army with running rights to First Army.

3. a. First Army attack without delay in zone with its main effort on the right (south) flank, breach the SIEGFRIED LINE and seize the high ground in the vicinity of BLANKENHEIM - MARMAGEN. Be prepared to continue the advance in zone on EUSKIRCHEN and BONN.

b. Third Army attack without delay with the main effort on the left (north) flank in conjunction with First Army, penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE and protect the right flank of the attack along the line PRUM - HILLESHEIM. Assume the aggressive defense in zone south of DASBURG with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops. Be prepared to continue the attack to the RHINE or by flanking the SIEGFRIED LINE from the north, to advance to the line of the KYLL River.

c. Fifteenth Army will continue missions prescribed in Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen.

d. 66th Division, reinforced, continue present mission.

4. Current Administration Instructions apply.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group MAIN	- VERDUN
Twelfth Army Group TAC closes LUXEMBOURG 261800A Jan and opens NAMUR 280900A Jan:	
First Army	- SPA
Third Army	- LUXEMBOURG
Fifteenth Army	- SUIPPES

b. See Current Signal Instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 270038 M/C NR 968 ORIG DTG 262252 A

TT NR T 743 27 JAN 45

FROM: 12TH ARMY GROUP

ACTION: TO: CG THIRD ARMY
CG FIFTEENTH ARMY OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

REF NR QX-26364

REF QX-31002 DATED 181245 A JAN 45.

CONFIRMING TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WHALEN-WRIGHT AND LEONARD-WRIGHT.

AUTHORIZATION TO EMPLOY ELEMENTS OF EIGHTH ARMORED DIVISION FOR COMBAT TRAINING BY THIRD ARMY IN SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS OF 94TH INFANTRY DIVISION IS REVOKED EFFECTIVE 26 JAN FOUR FIVE

SIGNED BRADLEY

RECEIVED IN CODE

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE PARAPHRASED

IF RELEASED FOR ANY PURPOSE

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

FEBRUARY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

1 FEBRUARY 1945

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

TO : THIRD US ARMY
NINTH US ARMY OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

INFO TO: EAGLE TAC
SHAEF
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
SOLOC
FIFTEENTH US ARMY
COMMUNICATION ZONE

REFERENCE S-77325.

1. EIGHTH ARMORED DIVISION IS RELIEVED FROM ASSIGNMENT TO FIFTEENTH US ARMY, FROM ATTACHMENT TO THIRD ARMY FOR SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATION AND IS ASSIGNED TO NINTH ARMY, ALL EFFECTIVE 1 FEBRUARY 1945.

2. THIRD ARMY WILL MOVE EIGHT ARMORED DIV EFD TO FOLLOWING DESTINATIONS: (MOVE TO BE COORDINATED WITH NINTH ARMY) RAIL ELEMENTS TO VALKENBURG K-6854 AND MOTOR ELEMENTS TO HERE K-6051.

3. ADVANCE PARTIES FROM DIVISION (INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF G-1, G-2, AND G-3), EACH COMBAT COMMAND AND DIVISIONAL ARTY WILL REPORT TO G-3 NINTH ARMY AT MAASTRICHT (K-55).

4. RADIO SILENCE WILL BE OBSERVED UNTIL UNIT IS COMMITTED.

5. THIRD ARMY WILL FURNISH NINTH ARMY ETA OF ADVANCE PARTY AND OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF MAIN PARTY.

6. DISREGARD REF TO ATTACHED AAA AW BN MENTIONED IN CABLE S-77325. NINTH ARMY WILL FURNISH AAA AW BN FOR THIS DIVISION FROM UNITS NOW AVAILABLE TO THAT HEADQUARTERS.

SIGNED BRADLEY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG DTC 012015

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY
CG NINTH US ARMY

INFO: FIRST US ARMY COMD HQ
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN URGENT

MOVE NINE FIVE INFANTRY DIVISION NINTH ARMY AT ONCE. DIVISION MUST, REPEAT, MUST CLOSE IN AREA DESIGNATED BY NINTH ARMY BUT NO LATER THAN TWO FOUR ZERO ZERO FEBRUARY SIX, ONE NINE FOUR FIVE. DIVISION WILL MOVE WITH TARE DOG, ABLE WILLIAM AND TANK BATTALION ATTACHED. COORDINATE MOVE AS TO DESTINATION AND ROUTES WITH NINTH ARMY AND AS TO ROUTES THROUGH THEIR AREA, AND TIMING WITH FIRST ARMY. COMPLETE SECRECY TO INCLUDE MAINTENANCE OF RADIO SILENCE UNTIL COMMITTED, REMOVAL OF VEHICLE MARKINGS AND SHOULDER PATCHES, NO USE OF UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS ON ROAD SIGNS AND NO USE OF CODE NAMES IN TELEPHONIC CONVERSATIONS, WILL BE OBSERVED. UNIT WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH WINTER CLOTHING IN SO FAR AS POSSIBLE.

INFORMATION FOLLOWS REGARDING SUPPORTING TROOPS.

SIGNED BRADLEY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

:::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: :
:Date: 7 Feb 45 :
:::::::::::::::::

7 February 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Fifteen.

TO : Commanding General, First Army, APO #230, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, Third Army, APO #403, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army, APO #408, U.S. Army.
Commanding General, 66th Division, APO #66, U.S. Army.

1. a. The enemy's withdrawal from the ARDENNES salient is now almost completed, and there are indications that his commitments on the western front are being appreciably reduced to meet the threat offered by the Russian offensive. See Weekly Intelligence Summary No 26.

b. While 21 Army Group carries out Operation VERITABLE, Ninth U.S. Army will execute Operation GRENADE under operational control of 21 Army Group. Target dates for these operations have been announced separately.

c. Sixth Army group continues its attack to reduce the COLMAR pocket while defending in the rest of its zone.

d. Air Forces continue their present attack to paralyse enemy communications which affect the immediate battle area. Ninth Air Force operates with Twelfth Army Group and Ninth Army.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will secure the ROER dams, clear the enemy from the area west of the approximate line: ROER River - GEMUND - SCHLEIDEN - FRAUENKRON, and will attack on its left to support Operation GRENADE and protect the right (south) flank of 21 Army Group. Throughout the remainder of its zone, Twelfth Army Group will assume an aggressive defense generally along the existing front line.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Operational boundary between 21 and Twelfth Army Groups: ST. TROND - RJ at K-355367 (both to 21 Army Group) - bridge across MEUSE at K-5232 (to Twelfth Army Group) - VISE (K-5639) (to 21 Army Group) - AACHEN (K-8443) (jointly, as agreed by the Army Commanders concerned; civil government to First Army) - VERLAUTENHEIDE (K-8945) (to 21 Army Group) - thence south of AUTOBAHN to ESCHWEILER (K-9748) (to Twelfth Army Group) and CR at F-008493 (to 21 Army Group, running rights to Twelfth Army Group) - MERKEN (F-0750) (to Twelfth Army Group) - NIEDERZIER (F-1055) - STEINSTRASS (F-1260) - NIEDEREMBT (F-1663) - BLERICHEN (F-1866) - thence north along ERFT River to the RHINE (all to 21 Army Group).

(2) Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: As at present, i.e., RAMBUCOURT - ARNAVILLE - COURCELLES SUR NIED - BUSS (all to Twelfth Army Group) - NEUNKIRCHEN - KAISERSLAUTERN - GRUNSTADT - ROXHEIM (all to Sixth Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies: As at present, i.e., GIVET (to First Army) - WELLIN (to Third Army) - CHAMPLON - L'OURTHE River in the vicinity of HADRIN - east along L'OURTHE River - OURTHE (all to First Army) - ST. VITH (to Third Army - running rights to First Army) - LOSHEIM (to Third Army) - FRAUENKRON (to First Army) - KRONENBURG - STADTKYLL - ALENDORF (all to Third Army) - HUNGERSDORF (to First Army). The road from LOSHEIM through KRONENBURG to STADTKYLL is assigned to Third Army with running rights to First Army.

c. Troops - The initial assignment of Corps and Divisions is as follows:

First Army	Third Army	Ninth Army
V Corps	III Corps	XIII Corps
VII Corps	VIII Corps	XVI Corps
XVIII A/B Corps	XII Corps	XIX Corps

First Army	Third Army	Ninth Army
1 Inf Div	XX Corps	29 Inf Div
2 Inf Div	4 Inf Div	30 Inf Div
8 Inf Div	5 Inf Div	35 Inf Div
9 Inf Div	26 Inf Div	83 Inf Div
78 Inf Div	76 Inf Div	84 Inf Div
99 Inf Div	80 Inf Div	95 Inf Div
104 Inf Div	87 Inf Div	102 Inf Div
69 Inf Div	90 Inf Div	2 Armd Div
82 A/B Div	94 Inf Div	5 Armd Div
3 Armd Div	4 Armd Div	8 Armd Div
7 Armd Div	6 Armd Div	
	11 Armd Div	

3. a. First Army secure the ROER dams and establish the approximate frontline: ROER River - GEMUND - SCHLEIDEN - FRAUENKRON. Thereafter, with target date of 10 February, attack across the ROER River on the left of zone, maintain contact with and protect the right (south) flank of Ninth Army. Assume an aggressive defense elsewhere in zone. See sub-paragraph 3x.

b. Until receipt of contrary orders from this headquarters, Third Army will continue the probing attacks now in progress, maintaining the defense elsewhere on its front. Purpose of these probing attacks is to prevent movement of enemy forces to the front of 21 Army Group, and to take advantage of any weakening of the enemy to improve the position of Third Army. On orders from this headquarters, Third Army will assume the defense throughout its front. See paragraph 3x.

c. Fifteenth Army will continue missions prescribed in Letter of Instructions Number Thirteen.

d. 66th Division, re-inforced, continue present mission.

x. The cessation of the offensive along the Third Army front and part of First Army front is specifically intended to permit the withdrawal of the maximum possible units to Army rear areas for rest and refitting.

4. Current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group MAIN	- VERDUN
Twelfth Army Group TAC	- NAMUR
First Army	- SPA
Third Army	- LUXEMBOURG
Fifteenth Army	- SUIPPES

b. See Current Signal Instructions.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 091745A M/C NR 684 ORIG DTG 091450A

TT NR W-237

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TO : FIRST US ARMY COMMAND
THIRD US ARMY MAIN

INFO: SUPREME HQ ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE MAIN
TWENTY-ONE ARMY GROUP MAIN
SIXTH ARMY GROUP
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN
COM ZONE
NINTH AIR FORCE
FIFTEENTH ARMY
NINTH US ARMY
ADVANCE SEC COM ZONE

EFFECTIVE 110001A FEBRUARY, THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD ARMIES PRESCRIBED IN LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO 15, THIS HQ, IS CHANGED AS FOLLOWS: CHAMPLON GR (P5870) - LA ROCHE (94578) - SAMREE (P5081) (ALL TO THIRD ARMY) - VIELSALM (P7089) (TO FIRST ARMY, RUNNING RIGHTS TO THIRD ARMY) POTEAU (P7791) - ST VITH (P8588) (BOTH TO THIRD ARMY).

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF NR QX31149

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 131927A M/C NR 783 ORIG DTG 131617A

TT NR 25 13 Feb 45

FROM: CG SIXTH ARMY GROUP

TO : ACTION: SEVENTH ARMY
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

INFO TO: ETOUSA
CONAD
THIRD ARMY

WITH EFFECT FROM ZERO ZERO ZERO ONE ABLE HOURS ONE ZERO FEBRUARY ONE ZERO ARMORED DIVISION, SEVEN NINE SIX ABLE ABLE ABLE AW BN (SP), SIX ZERO NINE T/D BN (SP), FOUR FOUR TWO AND FOUR FOUR EIGHT QUEEN MIKE TRUCK COMPANIES ARE RELIEVED FROM ATTACHMENT TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP AND FURTHER ATTACHMENT TO SEVENTH ARMY REVERT TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP CONTROL.

SIGNED DEVERS

REF NR BX24320

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 200220A ORIG DTG 200100A

FROM: CG TWELFTH ARMY GROUP URGENT

TO: CG THIRD US ARMY

PARA 1. 10TH ARMD DIV IS TEMPORARILY RELEASED FROM SHAEF RESERVE SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS BELOW:

SUB PARA A. DIV WILL BE USED ONLY FOR THE LIMITED OPERATIONS PRESENTLY BEING CONDUCTED BY XX CORPS BETWEEN MOSELLE AND SAAR RIVERS.

SUB PARA B. IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION OF THIS OPERATION, DIV WILL BE RETURNED PROMPTLY TO SHAEF RESERVE.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF NR Q-27179

Read G-3 Opns
200325A

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MARCH

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 202322A ORIG DTG 202100A

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP PRIORITY

TO : FIRST US ARMY
THIRD US ARMY

INFO: FIFTEENTH US ARMY

DESIRE THIRD ARMY MOVE THE 9TH ARMD DIV, 482 AAA AW BN (SP), 3600 QM TRK CO AND 3458 QM TRK CO TO FIRST ARMY. MOVEMENT WILL COMMENCE 22 FEBRUARY 1945. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ABOVE TRANSFERS IS 22 FEBRUARY 1945.

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF NR QX 27206

Received G-3 Opns 210055A

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

TT NR W-60 URGENT ORIG DTG 261425A

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TO THIRD US ARMY

INFO: SHAEF MAIN
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN

THE 90TH INF DIV WILL BE HELD AVAILABLE IN SHAEF RESERVE AND WILL NOT BE COMMITTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THIS HEADQUARTERS. LOCATION OF THIS DIVISION WILL BE SELECTED BY YOU AND REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS.

REF NR QX - 31256 SIGNED BRADLEY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 031800A M/C NR 570 ORIG DTG 031645A

TT NR W-322

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY MAIN
SHAEF FORWARD
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN

THE 90 INF DIV IS RELEASED FROM SHAEF RESERVE TO THIRD ARMY EFFECTIVE 4 MARCH 1945. AT THE SAME TIME THE SIXTH ARMORED DIV WILL BE PLACED IN SHAEF RESERVE. THIS DIV WILL NOT BE COMMITTED WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THIS HQS. LOCATION OF THE DIV WILL BE SELECTED BY YOU AND REPORTED TO THIS HQS.

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF NR QX-31291

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12th AG:
:Init: :
:Date: 3 March 45 :

3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Sixteen.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.
Commanding General, 66th Division.

1. a. This Letter of Instructions confirms instructions previously issued orally and in Outline Operations Plan dated 23 February 1945.

b. LUMBERJACK is designated as the code name f operations prescribed herein.

c. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 29 for week ending 27 February 1945.

d. 21 Army Group with Ninth U. S. Army under operational command, is engaged in Operations VERITABLE and GRENADE which have the objective of closing to the RHINE in zone. Subsequently, they plan to seize a bridgehead over the RHINE north of the RUHR.

e. Sixth Army Group will remain for the present on the defensive.

f. Ninth Air Force will cooperate with Twelfth Army Group. Strategic Bomber Forces may be available for a minimum number of vital specific missions.

g. The Communications Zone will support logistically the operations of Twelfth Army Group, Sixth Army Group and Ninth Army.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will clear the enemy from the area west of the RHINE and north of the MOSELLE in zone to insure the security of the main lines of communication in the north. The front south of the MOSELLE will remain for the present on the defensive. Operations north of the MOSELLE are divided into three stages. (See Operations Map).

Stage I - Complete the current operation in support of GRENADE to protect the right flank and communications of Ninth Army.

Stage II - Invest KOLN from the north and northwest. Advance from the northwest and west to secure the KOBLENZ area.

Stage III - Complete closure to the RHINE in zone north of MOSELLE.

b. Boundaries between Army Groups and Armies no change. (See Operations Map).

3. a. FIRST ARMY.

Stage I - Complete current operation in support of GRENADE to seize the high ground east of the ERFT River north and northwest of KOLN and close to the RHINE in the area south of DUSSELDORF. Seize the road center at EUSKIRCHEN, establish bridgeheads over the ERFT in that vicinity, and concentrate forces in preparation for an advance to the southeast. Maintain defense south of GEMUND.

Stage II - Invest KOLN from north and northwest. Be prepared on orders of Twelfth Army Group to launch a strong attack on a narrow front to the southeast from the EUSKIRCHEN area to converge with the attack of Third Army. Complete closure to the SWIST River. Continue defense south of GEMUND.

Stage III - Complete closure to the RHINE in zone.

b. THIRD ARMY.

Stage I - Secure the necessary bridgeheads over the KYLL River and concentrate forces in preparation for further advance to the east.

Stage II - Be prepared on orders of Twelfth Army Group to launch a strong attack on a narrow front from the KYLL River to seize the MAYEN - KOBLENZ area, and if enemy defenses are weak, secure a bridgehead across the MOSELLE to the southeast. (See Operations Map).

Stage III - Complete the clearing of the enemy from the area between the MOSELLE and the AHR Rivers.

Maintain the defensive south of the MOSELLE in zone.

c. FIFTEENTH ARMY.

Continue present mission.

d. 66th DIVISION.

Continue present mission.

4. Current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. a. Command Posts.

Twelfth Army Group MAIN	- VERDUN
Twelfth Army Group TAC	- NAMUR
First Army	- STOLBERG
Third Army	- LUXEMBOURG
Fifteenth Army	- DINANT
66th Division	- CHATEAUBRIANT

b. Current Signal Communications Instructions apply.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MD DTG 061930A

FROM TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ACTION TO ONE PD COMMANDING GENERAL FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY
TWO PD COMMANDING GENERAL THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

INFORMATION TO THREE PD SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

FOUR PD TWO ONE ARMY GROUP

FIVE PD SIXTH ARMY GROUP

SIX PD NINTH ARMY

SEVEN PD NINTH ARMY

EIGHT PD NINTH AIR FORCE

NINE TWELFTH ARMY GROUP MAIN

BOOK MESSAGE

CONFIRMING VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ARMY GROUP COMMANDER

STAGE ROMAN TWO OF OPERATION LUMBERJACK RPT LUMBERJACK PRESCRIBED

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MC DTG 082215A

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP PRIORITY

ACTION TO: CHARLIE GEORGES SIXTH ARMY GROUP
THIRD ARMY

INFO TO: CHARLIE GEORGES SHAEF FWD
EAGLE TAC
ETOUSA
SEVENTH ARMY

DESIRE THIRD ARMY MOVE THE EIGHT SEVEN INF DIV TOGETHER WITH ONE RPT ONE ABLE ABLE ABLE ABLE WILLIAM BATTALION PAREN MIKE PAREN CMA ONE RPT ONE TARE DOG BATTALION AND ONE RPT ONE TANK BATTALION TO SEVENTH ARMY PD THIRD ARMY WILL FURNISH UNIT DESIGNATION FOR THE ABLE ABLE ABLE ABLE WILLIAM BATTALION CMA TARE DOG BATTALION AND TANK BATTALION TO ALL ADDRESSEES PD ABOVE UNITS WILL BE ATTACHED TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP AND MOVEMENT TO SEVENTH ARMY WILL COMMENCE ON TEN MARCH ONE NINE FOUR FIVE CMA WHICH WILL BE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF ATTACHMENT PD THIRD ARMY AND SEVENTH ARMY WILL DEAL DIRECT CONCERNING DETAILS OF MOVES PD PARA COMPLETE SECRECY TO INCLUDE MAINTENANCE OF RADIO SILENCE UNTIL COMMITTED CMA REMOVAL OF VEHICLE MARKINGS AND SHOULDER PATCHES CMA NO USE ON ROAD SIGNS OF UNIT IDENTIFICATION INCLUDING CODE NAMES CUSTOMARILY USED PD MAXIMUM SECURITY WILL BE OBSERVED IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION PD

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF MR QUEEN XRAY TWO SEVEN SEVEN ONE SIX

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 091619A

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

TO : CG SIXTH ARMY GROUP PRIORITY
CG THIRD US ARMY

INFO TO: SHAEF FWD
EAGLE TAC
CG ETOUSA
CG SEVENTH US ARMY

REFERENCE OUR QX27716

SUBSTITUTE FOURTH INF DIV FOR THE 87TH INF DIV ALL OTHER INSTRUCTIONS REMAIN THE SAME.

SIGNED BRADLEY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: _____:
:Date: 13 Mar 45:

13 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Seventeen.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.
Commanding General, 66th Division.

1. a. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 31 for week ending 13 March 1945.

b. 21 Army Group with Ninth U. S. Army under operational control continues operations to secure crossings over the RHINE north of the RUHR. Sixth Army Group will initiate Operation UNDERTONE to close to the RHINE in zone and establish bridgeheads over the RHINE in the MAINZ-MANNHEIM Sector.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will secure the REMAGEN bridgehead over the RHINE River, complete clearance of the enemy from zone west of the RHINE and assist the attack of the Sixth Army Group.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups: CONFLANS - BUSS - LERACH - THOLEY - NOHFELDEN - thence following railroad along NAHE River to BINGEN (all to Twelfth Army Group).

(2) Operational boundary between 21 and Twelfth Army Groups: VISE (to 21 Army Group) - AACHEN (joint use as at present) - VERLAUTENHEIDE (to 21 Army Group) - thence south of autobahn to ESCHWEILER (to Twelfth Army Group) and GR at F-008493 (to 21 Army Group, running rights to Twelfth Army Group) - MERKEN (to Twelfth Army Group) - NIEDERZIER - STEINSTRASS - NIEDEREMBT - BLERICHEN - FRAUWEILER (F-2167) - ROMMERSKIRCHEN - BUTZHEIM - HACKENBROICH (all to 21 Army Group) - WORRINGEN (to Twelfth Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies: Crossroads at P-5785 - VIELSALM (to First Army, running rights to Third Army) - POTEAU - ST VITH - LOSHEIM (all to Third Army) - FRAUKESKRON (to First Army) - KRONENBURG - STADTKYLL - ALENDORF (all to Third Army) - HUNGERSDORF thence along AHR River to DUMPELFELD (all to First Army) - ANDERNACH (to Third Army). The road from LOSHEIM through KRONENBURG to STADTKYLL is assigned to Third Army with running rights to First Army.

3. a. First Army.

(1) Secure the REMAGEN bridgehead along the general line LEUTESDORF - EPPERT - KIRCHEIB - UCKERATH - HENNEF - BONN, all inclusive.

(2) Defend the line of the RHINE River elsewhere in zone.

b. Third Army.

(1) Defend the line of the RHINE River in zone.

(2) Attack in conjunction with Seventh Army (Sixth Army Group) from the TRIER bridgehead and southeast across the MOSELLE River to strike the enemy in flank and rear and protect the left flank of the Seventh Army. Third Army is authorized to deal directly with Seventh Army regarding the form, method, location and timing of this attack.

(3) Complete the clearance of the enemy from zone west of the RHINE.

c. Fifteenth Army.

Continue present mission.

d. 66th Division.

Continue present mission.

4. Twelfth Army Group units will retain possession and use of their existing installations in the Sixth Army Group zone. Current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. Current Signal Communication Instructions apply.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C NR 701 M/C DTG 162010

ORIG DTG 161911B

SECRET URGENT

FROM: HQ TWELFTH ARMY GROUP

TO : ACTION TO CG FIRST US ARMY

CG THIRD US ARMY

DESIRE FIRST ARMY MOVE TWO EIGHTH INF DIV CMA FOUR FOUR SEVENTH ABLE ABLE ABLE SPACE ABLE WILLIAM BN PAREN MIKE PAREN AND SEVEN SEVENTH TANK BN TO THIRD ARMY IMMEDIATELY PD ABOVE UNITS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THIRD ARMY EFFECTIVE ONE SIX MARCH ONE NINE FOUR FIVE PD COMPLETE SECURITY WILL BE OBSERVED FOR THE MOVEMENT OF ABOVE UNITS PD

SIGNED BRADLEY

REF MR QUEEN XRAY DASH TWO EIGHT ZERO TWO FOUR

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

PRIORITY

M/C DTG 221940 M/C NR 883 ORIG DTG 221940A

FROM: SHAEF FORWARD

TO : FOR ACTION ETOUSA
TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC
SIXTH ARMY GROUP TAC
INFO: THIRD ARMY
SEVENTH ARMY
COM ZONE

THE TWELFTH ARMORED DIVISION CMA WITH FIVE SEVEN TWO ABLE ABLE ABLE PAREN ABLE WILLIAM INFANTRY BATTALION PAREN SUGAR FEVER UNPAREN AND THE THREE SIX FIVE NINE QM TRUCK COMPANY ARE RELIEVED FROM ATTACHMENT TO TWELFTH ARMY GROUP EFFECTIVE AS SOON AFTER CONTACT WITH SEVENTH ARMY AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION PERMITS PD OUR FORWARD ONE SEVEN NINE THREE FIVE OF SEVENTEENTH MARCH REFERS.

SIGNED SHAEF

CITE SHGCT FWD ONE EIGHT ZERO EIGHT EIGHT

S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MSG GEN DTG 221432 MSG GEN NR 819 ORIG DTG 221300

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP TAC

TO : CG THIRD ARMY OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

BOOK MESSAGE

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY FIRST DASH THIRD ARMY BOUNDARY BEYOND HUNGERSDORF BECOMES CLN MULLENBACH PAREN LOVE FOUR ONE NINE ONE PAREN DASH VIRNEBURG PAREN LOVE FIVE THREE NINE FOUR PAREN DASH KURRENBERG PAREN LOVE FIVE NINE NINE THREE PAREN DASH MAYEN PAREN LOVE SIX THREE NINE TWO PAREN DASH OCHTENDUNG PAREN LOVE SEVEN FIVE NINE FOUR PAREN DASH BASSENHEIM PAREN LOVE EIGHT ZERO NINE FIVE PAREN DASH RUBENACH PAREN LOVE EIGHT FIVE NINE SEVEN PAREN DASH LUTXEL PAREN LOVE EIGHT NINE NINE SIX PAREN DASH THENCE ALONG EAST BANK OF RHINE TO LOVE NINE ZERO NINE ZERO DASH THENCE ALONG LAHN RIVER TO DIEX PAREN MIKE ONE NINE NINE SEVEN PAREN PAREN ALL TO FIRST ARMY PAREN PD THIRD ARMY RETAINS ROAD RIGHTS AND USE OF OWN INSTALLATIONS IN OLD AREA UNTIL CHANGE CAN BE MADE PD

TWO EIGHTH DIVISION WITH ATTACHED TANK AND ABLE WILLIAM BATTALIONS IS TRANSFERRED TO FIRST ARMY THIS DATE PD

SIGNED BRADLEY

QUEEN XRAY THREE ONE FOUR FOUR ZERO

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: _____:
:Date 25 Mar 45 :

25 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Eighteen.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.
Commanding General, 66th Division.

1. a. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 32 for week ending 20 March 1945.

b. 21 Army Group, with Ninth U S Army under operational control continues operations to secure a bridgehead over the RHINE River north of the RUHR.

c. Sixth Army Group will occupy its zone west of the RHINE River and establish a bridgehead over the RHINE and south of the MAIN River on the right of Twelfth Army Group.

d. Ninth Air Force will cooperate with Twelfth Army Group.

e. Communication Zone will support logistically the operations of the Twelfth Army Group, Sixth Army Group and Ninth Army.

2. a. Twelfth Army Group will establish a bridgehead across the RHINE River north of the MAIN River from which an advance in strength can be made in the direction of KASSEL.

b. Bridgehead Line: HANAU - GIESSEN - SIEGEN - SIEG River to its junction with the RHINE.

c. Boundaries:

(1) Operational boundary between 21 and Twelfth Army Groups, effective upon the taking over of an area of responsibility by Fifteenth Army, will be for Phase 1: Line of railroad from Dutch-German Frontier at K-9084 - WEGBERG (K-9783) - RHEINDAHLEN (F-0384) - WICKRATH (F-0782) - GLEHN (F-1986) - Rd junction F-242862 - NEUSS (F-2789) (all to 21 Army Group). Further adjustment of boundary for Phase 2 will be as agree to between the Commanding Generals Ninth and Fifteenth Armies and published at a later date.

(2) Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - NEUKIRCHEN - MORFELDEN - thence along railroad following NAHE River to BAD KREUZNACH - MAINZ - MAIN River to FRANKFURT (all to Twelfth Army Group) - thence along railroad north of MAIN River - HANAU - FULDA (all to Sixth Army Group). Present temporary boundary agreed to between Commanding Generals Third and Seventh Armies to remain in effect while operationally necessary.

(3) Between First and Third Armies, the existing boundary will remain in effect for the present: LOSHEIM (to Third Army) - FRAUENKRON (to First Army) - STADTKYLL - ALSDORF (all to Third Army) - HUNGERSDORF - MULLENBACH - VIRNEBURG - KURRENBERG - MAYEN - OCHTENDUNG - BASSENHEIM - RUBENACH - LUTZEL - thence along east bank of RHINE River to L 9090 thence along LAHN River to DIEZ (all to First Army).

(4) Between First and Fifteenth Armies, effective as agreed to between the Army Commanders concerned: MONSCHAU - EUSKIRCHEN - BONN (all to First Army).

3. a. Third Army.

(1) Exploit existing crossings over the RHINE River and attack vigorously to seize the line HANAU - GIESSEN and clear enemy from zone.

(2) Vacate Sixth Army Group zone as soon as the situation permits unless the present boundary is changed.

(3) Be prepared to continue the advance on the KASSEL area.

b. First Army.

(1) Attack vigorously from the REMAGEN bridgehead to seize the line GIESSEN - SIEGEN - SIEG River to its junction with the RHINE and clear enemy from zone.

(2) Be prepared to assist the advance of the Third Army by flanking action from LIMBURG on the FRANKFURT - WIESBADEN area.

(3) Be prepared to continue the advance on the KASSEL area.

c. Fifteenth Army.

(1) Phase 1. With one corps take over, by 1 April 1945, the defense of the west bank of the RHINE River between BONN and MEUSS (both exclusive).

Phase 2. Extend the defensive sector on the west bank of the RHINE northward to include HOMBERG by 5 April 1945.

Details of assumption of responsibility will be arranged directly with Commanding Generals, First and Ninth Armies respectively.

(2) Assume command of the 66th Division, reinforced, and responsibility for containing the enemy garrisons in LORIENT and ST NAZAIRE. This will include operational control of French Forces operating with the 66th Division on this mission.

(3) Be prepared to occupy, organize and govern the RHINE Province progressively as the advance proceeds eastward from the RHINE River.

d. 66th Division.

Assigned with attached troops to Fifteenth Army, (par 3.c. (2).)

4. Assumption of area command by Fifteenth Army will be taken with the least practicable delay and, by arrangement between Army Commanders concerned, may be taken piecemeal. First and Ninth Armies will retain control of present installations and facilities until they can be removed from area assigned Fifteenth Army. Use of roads through areas and other necessary details will be by mutual agreement of Army Commanders concerned. Otherwise, current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. Current Signal Communication Instructions apply.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

ORIG DTG 271845 M/C HR 540

TT HR T-400 27 MARCH 45

FROM: TWELFTH ARMY GROUP URGENT

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY

REFERENCE FOX WILLIAM DOG DASH ONE EIGHT ONE EIGHT TWO AND BAKER ABLE XRAY DASH TWO FIVE FOUR THREE ZERO FD ONE PD REQUEST SEVENTY INF DIV GMA WITH FOUR THREE THREE ABLE ABLE ABLE ABLE WILLIAM BATTALION PAREN MIKE PAREN SMOLN SEVEN ONE INF DIV WITH FIVE THREE ZERO ABLE ABLE ABLE ABLE WILLIAM BATTALION PAREN MIKE PAREN GMA SIX THREE FIVE TARE DOG BATTALION AND SEVEN SIX ONE TANK BATTALION SMOLN THIRTEEN ARMD DIV WITH FIVE SEVEN FOUR ABLE ABLE ABLE ABLE WILLIAM BATTALION PAREN SUGAR PETER PAREN AND SIX THREE ZERO TARE DOG BATTALION BE MOVED EASY PETER DOG TO THIRD ARMY FD SEVENTH ARMY AND THIRD ARMY DEAL DIRECT CONCERNING DETAILS OF MOVE FD INSTRUCTIONS ONE TARE DOG BATTALION FOR SEVENTY INF DIV WILL FOLLOW FROM THIRD ARMY GEN SEVENTY INF DIV AND ONE THREE ARMD DIV WILL BE HELD IN SHAEF RESERVE AND WILL NOT BE MOVED EAST OF RHINE RIVER FD

THESE DIVS MAY BE EMPLOYED ON OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES OF THE RHINE PROVIDED THEY ARE AVAILABLE FOR MOVEMENT AS DIRECTED BY THIS HQS ON TWO FOUR HOURS NOTICE FD LOCATION OF ABOVE UNITS WILL BE FURNISHED THIS HQS WITH INFORMATION COPY TO SHAEF FORWARD GMA ATTN CLN GEORGE THREE PD TWO PD REQUEST SEVEN FOUR ZERO TANK BATTALION BE MOVED EASY PETER DOG TO FIRST ARMY FD FIRST AND SEVENTH ARMIES TO DEAL DIRECT PD

SIGNED .....BRADLEY
QX-28420

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init. :
:Date 28 Mar 45 :

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Nineteen.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.

1. a. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 33 for week ending 27 March 1945.

b. 21 Army Group, with Ninth U S Army under operational control will expand its bridgehead north of the RUHR with the objective of gaining contact with 12th Army Group in the KASSEL - PADERBORN area.

c. 6th Army Group, advancing from its present bridgehead over the RHINE will protect the right flank of 12th Army Group as far north as the HOHE RHON HILL Mass.

d. Ninth Air Force will cooperate with 12th Army Group.

e. First Allied Airborne Army is prepared to assist the advance of 12th Army Group with a division airborne drop in the KASSEL area to seize airfields and the EDER River dam.

f. Communication Zone will support logistically the operations of the 12th Army Group, 6th Army Group and Ninth Army.

2. a. 12th Army Group, upon completion of mopping up the RHINE bridgehead, will advance northeast to make junction with 21 Army Group in the KASSEL - PADERBORN area. In conjunction with 21 Army Group clear the enemy from the pocket formed by the juncture of their forces and be prepared for further advance into Germany.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Operational boundary between 21 and 12th Army Groups: Line of railroad from Dutch-German frontier at K-9084 - WESBERG (K-9783) - RHEINDAHLEN (F-0384) - WICKRATH (F-0782) - GIESENKIRCHEN (F-1384) (all to 21 Army Group) - SCHIENBAHN (F-1694) - WILLICH (F-1796) - KREFELD (A-1804) Road Junction at A-183132 - Road Junction at A-231182 - Railroad bridge over RHINE River at A-267206 (all to 12th Army Group), effective 5 April 1945, subject to further adjustment between Commanding Generals, Ninth and Fifteenth Armies and final approval by SHAEF.

(2) Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - MEUNKIRCHEN - NOHFELDEN - OBERSTEIN - MEISENHEIM - ALZEY - OPPENHEIM - GR GERAU - FRANKFURT (all to 12th Army Group) - railroad north of MAIN River to HANAU - FULDA - MEININGEN (all to 6th Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies: LOSHEIM - STADTKILL (to Third Army) - MULLENBACH - MAYEN - LUTZEL thence along east bank of RHINE River and along LAHN River to ADMONAT - GIESSEN - BERNSFELD - KIRTORF - KREMSA - FRITZLAR - WARBURG (all to First Army). First and Third Armies to have equal running rights over FRITZLAR - KASSEL - WARBURG road.

(4) Between First and Fifteenth Armies: AACHEN (to Fifteenth Army) DUREN - BONN (both to First Army).

3. a. Third Army.

(1) Complete clearing enemy from zone in RHINE bridgehead area. Vacate Seventh Army (6th Army Group) zone as soon as practicable.

(2) Advance on the HERSFELD - KASSEL area and drive the enemy east of the line: HOHE RHON (Mtn) - WERRA River - WESER River.

(3) Be prepared to leave one uncommitted infantry division in the area south of GIESSEN to be committed on Army Group order only. One Cavalry Group (now in Army Group Reserve) will be moved to this area at such time as will not interfere with the movement of other troops and supplies.

(4) Be prepared for further advance into Germany toward the east or southeast.

b. First Army.

(1) Complete clearing enemy from zone in RHINE bridgehead area.

(2) Advance on the WARBURG - PADERBORN area protecting the left (north) flank of 12th Army Group east of the RHINE.

(3) Be prepared to leave one uncommitted infantry division in the area north of LIMBURG to be committed on Army Group order only.

(4) Make junction with 21 Army Group and in cooperation with them clear enemy from pocket between forces.

(5) Be prepared for further advance into Germany toward the east.

c. Fifteenth Army.

(1) Defend the west bank of the RHINE River from BONN (exclusive) to HOMBERG (inclusive). Assumption of responsibility for sector will be completed by 5 April 1945; details will be arranged directly with Commanding Generals, First and Ninth Armies.

(2) Continue mission of containing ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT garrisons.

(3) Be prepared, at an early date, to occupy, organize and govern the RHINE Province, the SAAR and the PALATINATE progressively as the advance of adjacent armies proceeds eastward.

x. Units in SHAEF and 12th Army Group Reserve may be employed in occupational roles provided they are available for movement on 24 hour notice.

4. Assumption of area command by Fifteenth Army will be taken with the least practicable delay and, by arrangement between Army Commanders concerned, may be taken piecemeal. First and Ninth Armies will retain control of present installations and facilities until they can be removed from area assigned Fifteenth Army. Use of roads through areas and other necessary details will be by mutual agreement of Army Commanders concerned. Otherwise, current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. Current Signal Communication Instructions apply.

By command of Lieutenant General BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-3

TOP SECRET

APRIL

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

MSG CEN DTG 032213 MSG CEN NR 157 ORIG DTG 031850

FROM: ONE TWO ARMY GROUP TAC OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : THIRD US ARMY

BOOK MESSAGE

NINTH ARMY PASSES TO ONE TWO ARMY GROUP CONTROL AT ZERO FOUR ZERO ZERO ZERO ONE BAKER APRIL PD

TEMPORARY BOUNDARY BETWEEN ONE TWO AND TWO ONE ARMY GROUPS FOLLOWS THE EXISTING BOUNDARY BETWEEN NINTH UNITED STATES AND SECOND BRITISH ARMIES PD PARA

BOUNDARY BETWEEN NINTH AND FIRST ARMIES CLN RUHR RIVER TO MOHNE DASH MOHNE TALSPERRE DASH RUTHEN DASH BUREN DASH BRENKEN DASH AHDEN DASH NIEDERN PAREN ALL TO NINTH ARMY PAREN DASH PADERBORN PAREN TO FIRST ARMY CMA RUNNING RIGHTS TO NINTH ARMY PAREN DASH BAD DRIBURG DASH BRAKEL DASH GODELHEIM DASH BAFFZEN DASH SILBERBORN DASH DASSEL DASH EINBECK DASH BILLERBECK DASH BAD GRUND DASH CLAUSTHAL ZELLERFEWD PAREN ALL TO FIRST ARMY PAREN PD PARA

BOUNDARY BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD ARMIES IS CHANGED AS FOLLOWS CLN KIRTORF DASH TREYSA PAREN BOTH TO FIRST ARMY PAREN DASH ZIEGENHAIN PAREN TO THIRD ARMY PAREN DASH BORKEN DASH LENDORF DASH WABERN DASH DEUTZ DASH GRIFTE DASH BETTENHAUSEN DASH WINDHAUSEN DASH WITZENHAUSEN DASH HOHENGANDERN DASH KALTENNEBR DASH MARTINFELD PAREN ALL TO FIRST ARMY PAREN DASH MULHAUSEN TO THIRD ARMY CMA RUNNING RIGHTS TO FIRST ARMY DASH BOLLSTEDT DASH KIRCH DASH URLEBEN PAREN ALL TO FIRST ARMY PAREN DASH BAD TENNSTEDT DASH STRAUSSFURT DASH SOMMERDA PAREN ALL TO THIRD ARMY PAREN PD PARA OTHER BOUNDARIES NO CHANGE PD PARA FIRST AND NINTH ARMIES WILL CLEAR THE RUHR POCKET IN THEIR RESPECTIVE ZONES PD THIRD ARMY WILL COMPLETE THE CAPTURE OF KASSEL PD PARA ALL ARMIES WILL SEIZE ABLE BRIDGEHEAD OVER THE WERRA AND ZESER RIVERS TO THE GENERAL LINE CLN MEININGEN DASH GOTHA DASH SCHLOTHEIM DASH DUDERSTADT DASH NORTHEIM DASH EINBECK DASH ALFELD DASH DIESTER GEBIRGE PAREN KING TWO ZERO ONE ZERO PAREN AND PROTECT THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF TWO ONE ARMY GROUP SO AS TO INSURE ITS RAPID ADVANCE TO THE RIVER LEINE PD BE PREPARED FOR FURTHER STRONG THRUST TO THE EAST ON THE AXIS KASSEL DASH LEIPZIG PD

SIGNED BRADLEY QUEEN XRAY THREE ONE FIVE FOUR ONE

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

:::::::::::::::::
: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, 12 AG:
:Init: _____:
:Date: 4 Apr 45:
:::::::::::::::::

4 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Twenty.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Ninth Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.

1. a. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 34 for week ending 3 April 1945.

b. 21 Army Group continues its advance to the River LEINE and BREMEN; thereafter it launches a thrust to the River ELBE in conjunction with and protecting the left (north) flank of 12th Army Group. Ninth U S Army reverted to 12th Army Group control at 040001B April 1945.

c. 6th Army Group protects the right (south) flank of 12th Army Group west of the BAYREUTH area where it maintains contact with 12th Army Group.

d. Ninth Air Force cooperates with 12th Army Group.

e. Communications Zone supports logistically the operations of the 6th and 12th Army Groups.

2. a. 12th Army Group:

Phase I. Will mop up the RUHR pocket, seize the line MEININGEN - GOTHA - SCHLOTHEIM - DUDERSTADT - NORTHEIM - EINBECK - ALFELD - DIESTER GEBIRGE Hill Mass and protect the right (south) flank of 21 Army Group so as to ensure its rapid advance to the River LEINE and regroup for strong offensive action to the east.

Phase II. Will attack on order along the axis KASSEL - LEIPZIG to gain contact with the Soviet forces. It will exploit any opportunity for seizing a bridgehead over the ELBE River and be prepared to continue the advance to the east thereof.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between 12th and 21 Army Groups: International boundary at (R-940125) - thence along road to GELDERN - RJ (A-074262) - RJ (A-088264) - RJ (A-101279) - ALPEN - WESEL - BRUNEN - RAESFELD - HEIDEN - VELEN - COESFELD - MUNSTER - MELLE - LUBBECKE - MINDEN - NIENSTORF - CELLE - ELDINGEN - WITTINGEN - SALZWEDEL - WITTENBERGE (all to 12th Army Group).

(2) Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN - NEUNKIRCHEN - HOMBURG - OBERSTEIN - MEISENHEIM - ALZEY - OPPENHEIM - GR GERAU - FRANKFURT (all to 12th Army Group) - railroad north of MAIN River to HANAU - FULDA (all to 6th Army Group) - MEININGEN - COBURG - BAYREUTH (all to 12th Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies: LAHN River from its mouth to AUMENAU - GIESSEN - BERNSFELD - KIRTORF - TREYSA (all to First Army) - ZIEGENHAIN (to Third Army) - BORKEN - LENDORF - WABERN - DEUTZ - GRIFTE - BETTENHAUSEN - WINDHAUSEN - WITZENHAUSEN - HOHENGANDERN - KALTENNEBER - MARTINFELD (all to First Army) - MULHAUSEN (to Third Army, running rights to First Army) - BOLLSTEDT - KIRCHHELLINGEN - URLEBEN (all to First Army) - BAD TENNSTEDT - STRAUSSFURT - SOMMERDA - ECKARTSBERGA (all to Third Army) - the road; BAD KOSEN - NAUMBURG - STOSSEN (all to First Army, running rights to Third Army) - ZEITZ (to Third Army) FROHBURG (to First Army) - GEITHAIN - DOBELN (both to Third Army) - MEISSEN (to First Army).

(4) Boundary between Ninth and First Armies: RUHR River to MUTTLAR - ESSHOFF (all to Ninth Army) - RUTHEN (to Ninth Army, running rights to First Army) the road: GESEKE - SALZKOTTEN - PADERBORN (all to First Army, running rights to Ninth Army) - BAD DRIBURG - BRAKEL - GODELHEIM - BOFFZEN - SILBERBORN - DASSEL - EINBECK - BILLERBECK - BAD GRUND - CLAUSTHAL ZELLERFELD - ELBINGERODE - BLANKENBURG - QUEDLINBURG - GUSTEN - AKEN (all to First Army).

(5) Present inter-army boundaries west of the RHINE River remain in effect, subject to future change (see par. 3. d. (1).)

3. a. First Army.

Phase I. Clear the RUHR pocket in zone in conjunction with Ninth Army; the XVIII Airborne Corps (Headquarters and Corps Troops) is available for this operation only and will revert to First Allied Airborne Army at completion of this mission. Advance to the line SCHOLTHEIM - DUDERSTADT - NORTHEIM - EINBECK and regroup for strong offensive action to the east.

Phase II. Drive to the east on order along the axis KASSEL - LEIPZIG to gain contact with the Soviet forces. Exploit any opportunity for seizing a bridgehead over the ELBE River and be prepared to continue the advance to the east thereof.

b. Third Army.

Phase I. Complete capture of KASSEL before turning it over to First Army. Seize the line MEININGEN - GOTHA - LANGENSALZA and regroup for strong offensive action to the east.

Phase II. Advance on order to the east in zone, maintaining contact with 6th Army Group troops on the right as far as BAYREUTH. Be prepared to continue the advance to the east or southeast.

c. Ninth Army.

Phase I. Complete clearance of the RUHR pocket in zone in conjunction with First Army. Support the T-Force operations in the RUHR with not to exceed three battalions. Seize the line EINBECK (exclusive) - ALFELD - DIESTER GEBIRGE Hill Mass, protect the right (south) flank of 21 Army Group and assist its rapid advance to the River LEINE. Regroup for strong offensive action to the east.

Phase II. Advance on order to the east in zone, maintaining contact with 21 Army Group on the left. Exploit any opportunity for seizing a bridgehead over the ELBE River and be prepared to continue the advance to the east on BERLIN or to the northeast.

d. Fifteenth Army.

(1) Occupy, organize and govern all German territory west of the RHINE River and south of the 12th-21 Army Group boundary. This territory will be taken over progressively by agreement between the Army Commanders concerned.

(2) Be prepared as soon as cleared to take over the occupation, organization and government of the RUHR pocket and such additional territory east of the RHINE as is designated by Headquarters 12th Army Group.

(3) Continue mission of containing ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT garrisons.

x. Units in SHAEF and 12th Army Group Reserve may be employed in occupational roles provided they are available for emergency movement on 24 hour notice.

4. Current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. Current Signal Communication Instructions apply.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-3

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP
APO 655, U S Army

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG 12 A Gp:
Init: _____
Date: 11 Apr 45

11 April 1945.

370 (CG)

SUBJECT: Current Operations.

TO : Commanding General, First U. S. Army, APO 230
Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403
Commanding General, Ninth U. S. Army, APO 339

1. The purposes of present operations are, first, to reduce the RUHR pocket and, second, to advance to the general line WITTENBERGE-MAGDEBURG-DESSAU-LEIPZIG-ALTENBURG-PLAUEN-BAYREUTH and to seize bridgeheads across the ELBE River from MAGDEBURG to DESSAU, both inclusive.

2. This position will then permit us to operate either toward BERLIN, directly to the east, if such move is necessary to gain contact with the Russians, or launch an attack to the southeast. If the advance to this general line is made rapidly, we will have about reached the limit of our supply until such time as the railroads can be brought into operation. Any advances in force beyond this general line will be limited to those necessary to take advantage of proper obstacles such as the MULDE River.

/s/ O.N. Bradley
O.N. BRADLEY
General, U. S. Army
Commanding

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

M/C DTG 131820 M/C NR 538 ORIG DTG 131610

TT NR W-335 APRIL 13, 1945

FROM: ONETWO ARMY GROUP TAC

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
BOOK MESSAGE

RECOMMEND THAT SIX DASH ONE TWO ARMY GROUP BOUNDARY BETOND OPPENHEIM BE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS CLM LANGEN PAREN MIKE SIX FIVE FIVE FIVE PAREN DASH HANAU PAREN MIKE EIGHT FOUR SEVEN ZERO PAREN DASH BAD ORB PAREN MAN TWO FIVE EIGHT TWO PAREN DASH GERSFELD PAREN HOW FIVE FIVE ZERO EIGHT PAREN DASH MEININGEN PAREN HOW EIGHT NINE TWO THREE PAREN DASH KABURG PAREN OBOE TWO NINE EIGHT NINE PAREN DASH BAYREUTH PAREN OBOE SEVEN FIVE FIVE FIVE PAREN PAREN ALL INCLUSIVE TO ONE TWO ARMY GROUP PAREN PD REQUEST YOUR PROMPT CONCURRENCE OR RECOMMENDATIONS PD

QUKEN XRAY 31603 SIGNED BRADLEY

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 12TH ARMY GROUP
APO 655

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, 12 AG:
Init: _____
Date: 17 Apr 45:

17 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Twenty One.

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Ninth Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.

Maps: GSGS No 4346 (A), Scale 1:250,000, Germany - Boundaries, First Edition. Operation Map, Annex No. 1, Scale 1:1,400,000.

1. a. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 36 for week ending 17 April 1945.

b. 21 Army Group continues its advance to the northeast to defeat the enemy in its zone, (see Operation Map).

c. 6th Army Group attacks to the southeast in zone, in conjunction with and protecting the right flank of 12th Army Group, to occupy western AUSTRIA and that part of GERMANY within its zone of advance.

d. Ninth Air Force cooperates with 12th Army Group.

e. Communications Zone supports logistically the operations of the 6th and 12th Army Groups.

2. a. (1) 12th Army Group will defend the general line ERZ GEBIRGE - MULDE River - ELBE River in zone and hold the existing bridgehead over the ELBE River as a threat to BERLIN unless driven back by superior enemy forces.

(2) 12th Army Group will launch a powerful attack to gain contact with the Soviet forces in the DANUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG.

b. Boundaries, (see Operation Map).

(1) Between 6th and 12th Army Groups (effective date to be announced by SHAEF): OPPENHEIM - DARMSTADT (both to 12th Army Group) - OBERBURG - STADTPROZELTEN (both to 6th Army Group) - WURTZBURG - COBSENFURT - UFFENHEIM - ANSBACH - GUNZENHAUSEN - EICHSTATT - INGOLSTADT - thence south along autobahn to SCHWEITENKIRCHEN - FREISING - ERDING - DORFEN - ROSENHEIM (all to 12th Army Group) (running rights on the road WURTZBURG - ANSBACH - INGOLSTADT to 6th Army Group).

(2) Between 12th and 21 Army Groups: International boundary at E-940125 - thence along road to GELDERN - RJ at A-074262 - RJ at A-088264 - RJ at A-101279 - ALPEN - WESEL - BRUNEN - RAESFELD - HEIDEN - VELEN - COESFELD - MUNSTER - MELLE - LUBBECKE - MINDEN - WUNSTORF (running rights to 21 Army Group) (all to 12th Army Group) - RJ at K-258288 - SCHULENBURG - RJ at K-360329 - GR BURGWEDEL - ENGENSEN - EHLERSHAUSEN - CELLE (running rights to 12th Army Group) RJ at K-652540 (all to 21 Army Group) - thence (at a time to be announced by SHAEF) UELZEN - NEUHAUS - LUDWIGSLUST - PLAU (all to 21 Army Group).

(3) Between First and Third Armies (effective as agreed between Army Commanders): LAHN River from its mouth to AUMENAU - GIESSEN - ULRICHSTEIN - FULDA - WUSTENSACHSEN (all to First Army) thence along the north boundary of the State of BAVARIA to the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border, (see Boundary Map, sheets L 51 and M 51).

(4) Between First and Ninth Armies (effective as agreed between Army Commanders): From LIPPE (G-2235) (to Ninth Army) eastward along the north boundaries of the Provinces of NASSAU, KURHESSEN and THURINGEN, (see Boundary Map, Sheets K 51, L51, L52, M52), to GUNTERSBERGE - THALE - QUEDLINBURG - GUSTEN - AKEN (all to First Army).

(5) Between Fifteenth Army and Sixth Army Group, Third, First and Ninth Armies (effective as agreed between Army Commanders): RHINE River from LAUTERBURG to MEDER LAHNSTEIN thence along the east boundary of the RHINE Province to its junction with 12th - 21 Army Group boundary at A-3253, (see Boundary Map sheets K51 and K52).

c. Troops.

A. Third Army

(1) Corps (4)

III
XII
**XVIIIA/B
XX

(2) Infantry Divisions (11)

**5	80
**8	86
26	90
65	97
*70	99
71	

(3) Armored Divisions (5)

** 4	16
11	20
13	

C. Ninth Army.

(1) Corps (3)

XIII
XVI
XIX

(2) Infantry Divisions (7)

30	84
35	95
75	102
83	

(3) Armored Divisions (3)

3
5
8

(4) Airborne Divisions (1)

17

B. First Army.

(1) Corps (3)

V
VII
VIII

(2) Infantry Divisions (10)

1	76
2	78
9	87
29	89
69	104

(3) Armored Divisions (4)

3	*7
6	9

(4) Airborne Divisions (1)

*82

D. Fifteenth Army.

(1) Corps (2)

XXII
XXIII

(2) Infantry Divisions (5)

28	94
66	106 (Attchd to CZ)
79	

* - SHAEF Reserve
** - Army Group Reserve

Note: Corps troops of the III, VIII and XX Corps will remain with their corps, subject to such adjustments as are necessary to maintain the balance of supporting troops in the armies to which assigned.

3. a. Third Army.

(1) Complete closure to the general line ERZ GEBIRGE and MULDE River on the front BAYREUTH - ROCHLITZ and regroup for advance to the southeast, (see par. 3. b. (2) below). Relief of elements of Seventh Army in Third Army zone will be accomplished progressively as agreed between the Army Commanders.

(2) Attack in zone to gain contact with the Soviet forces in the DANUBE Valley and seize SALZBURG. Protect the left flank of the advance south of the juncture with First Army.

(3) Hold one corps (XVIII Airborne Corps with two infantry and one armored Divisions) initially in Army Group Reserve in the area southeast of FULDA.

b. First Army.

(1) Defend the line of the MULDE River in zone.

(2) Take over that portion of zone of responsibility now occupied by Third Army as mutually agreed.

c. Ninth Army.

(1) Defend the line of the ELBE River in zone.

(2) Hold the existing bridgehead in the DESSAU - MAGDEBURG area as a threat to BERLIN unless driven back by superior enemy forces.

(3) Relieve elements of 21 Army Group northward along the ELBE River to NEUHAUS (excl.) when mutually agreed.

d. Fifteenth Army.

(1) Occupy, organize and govern that portion of the RHINE Province Military District (RHINE Province, SAARLAND, the PALATINATE and that portion of HESSEN which lies west of the RHINE) south of the 12th - 21 Army Group boundary.

(a) Relieve Third Army in zone with the least practicable delay. This must be accomplished prior to 22 April 1945.

(b) As soon as possible after the area is cleared, take over that portion of the RHINE Province in zone lying east of the RHINE River. 79th Division will pass to control of Fifteenth Army upon occupation of this area.

(c) Take over from 6th Army Group the area occupied by the Seventh Army in zone at the earliest practicable date and that portion of the zone occupied by the First French Army as soon as it has been evacuated by the French.

(2) Continue mission of containing ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT garrisons.

x. (1) The regrouping of troops for this operation will be coordinated by this Headquarters, priority being given to the movement of troops for the Third Army attack.

(2) Each Army, from divisions allotted to it, must furnish occupational troops for its own area of responsibility. SHAEF and 12th Army Group Reserve units are not available for occupational duties. Those now so employed will be relieved by 22 April 1945.

4. Third Army will move present service installations and supplies into its new area as promptly as possible: use of roads and control of supply areas to be arranged between armies. Current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. Current Signal Communication Instructions apply.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-3

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

M/C DTG 271629 M/C NR 894 ORIG DTG 271415

FROM: ONE TWO ARMY GROUP TAC OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY BOOK MESSAGE

PARA ONE PD FIRST ARMY CMA AS TROOPS BECOME AVAILABLE CMA WILL TAKE OVER THE PROTECTION OF THE LEFT FLANK OF THIRD ARMY ALONG THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN BORDER PD PARA TWO PD FIRST DASH THIRD ARMY BOUNDARY PRESCRIBED IN LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TWO ONE IS TEMPORARILY CHANGED BEYOND LINDENHOU PAREN CROE ONE FIVE EIGHT EIGHT PAREN AS FOLLOWS CLN KALTENBRUTH PAREN CROE TWO FOUR SEVEN FOUR PAREN DASH SCHESSLITZ PAREN CROE THREE SIX FIVE EIGHT PAREN PAREN ALL TO FIRST ARMY PAREN DASH EBERMANNSTADT PAREN CROE FOUR EIGHT THREE SEVEN PAREN PAREN TO THIRD ARMY PAREN DASH AUERBACH PAREN CROE EIGHT ZERO TWO EIGHT PAREN PAREN TO FIRST ARMY PAREN DASH SULZBACH PAREN CROE EIGHT NINE ZERO EIGHT PAREN PAREN TO THIRD ARMY PAREN DASH NABBURG PAREN PETER TWO ONE ZERO FOUR PAREN DASH OBR RPT OBR VIECHTACH PAREN PETER THREE NINE ZERO FIVE PAREN DASH RONSPERG PAREN PETER SIX SEVEN ONE THREE PAREN PAREN ALL TO FIRST ARMY PAREN PD THIS AREA WILL BE TAKEN OVER PROGRESSIVELY BY FIRST ARMY WITH LEAST PRACTICABLE DELAY CMA AS AGREED BETWEEN COMMANDING GENERALS FIRST AND THIRD ARMIES PD FIRST ARMY WILL BE PREPARED TO EXTEND THEIR SECTOR OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE SOUTHEAST AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS PD PARA THREE PD USE OF INSTALLATIONS AND ROADS THROUGH AREAS AND OTHER NECESSARY DETAILS WILL BE BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF ARMY COMMANDERS CONCERNED PD

SIGNED BRADLEY QUEEN XRAY THREE ONE EIGHT THREE TWO

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

M/C DTG 281425 M/C NR 598 ORIG DTG 281230

FROM: ONE TWO ARMY GROUP TAC

ACTION TO: ONE PD THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY TAC
INFO TO : TWO PD FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY TAC
THREE PD NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY FORWARD OPERATIONAL
FOUR PD FIFTEENTH UNITED STATES ARMY FORWARD PRIORITY
FIVE PD ONE TWO ARMY GROUP MAIN

PARA ONE PD IN COMPLIANCE WITH SHAEF DIRECTIVE DATED TWO SEVEN APRIL LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER TWENTY ONE THIS HEADQUARTERS IS AMENDED BY THE FOLLOWING PD PARA TWO PD ONE TWO ARMY GROUP PAREN THIRD ARMY PAREN WILL CONTINUE PRESENT DRIVE TO EFFECT JUNCTION WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE DANUBE VALLEY AND TO SEIZE SALZBURG SEMI CLN AND WILL ADVANCE RAPIDLY TO SEIZE THE BRUCK PAREN EASY DASH EIGHT FOUR SIX SEVEN PAREN DASH REDSTADT PAREN ABLE DASH THREE ONE EIGHT ONE PAREN AREA AND OCCUPY THAT PART OF AUSTRIA IN ZONE PD PARA THREE PD SIXTH ARMY GROUP CONTINUES UNDER CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS CMA SEIZES THE LANDECK AND INNSBRUCK AREAS CMA SEALS THE BRENNER PASS AND OCCUPIES THAT PART OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA IN ZONE PD PARA FOUR PD SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT IN DETAIL BY ARMY COMMANDERS CONCERNED CMA BOUNDARY BETWEEN ONE TWO AND SIX ARMY GROUPS CMA EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY CMA IS AS BEFORE TO FREISING PAREN TO ONE TWO ARMY GROUP PAREN DASH THENCE EDLING DASH PRIEN PAREN BOTH TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP PAREN DASH ST JOHANN AND ROAD TO KITZBUHEL DASH BRAMBERG DASH LIENZ PAREN ALL TO ONE TWO ARMY GROUP PAREN PD PARA FIVE PD ACTION ADDRESSEE ACKNOWLEDGE PD

SIGNED BRADLEY QUEEN XRAY THREE ONE EIGHT FOUR EIGHT PAREN

TOP SECRET

M A Y

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 032101 M/C NR 874 ORIG DTG 031830

FROM: ONE TWO ARMY GROUP TAC BOOK MESSAGE

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY SIGNED BRADLEY QUEEN XRAY 31881

PARA ONE PD THIS CABLE SUPERSEDES ONE SIX ARMY GROUP CABLE PAREN XRAY THREE ONE EIGHT FOUR EIGHT OF TWO EIGHT APRIL ONE NINE FOUR FIVE PARA TWO PD LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER TWO ONE THIS HEADQUARTERS IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS CLN SUB PARA ABLE PD SIXTH ARMY GROUP CONTINUES OPERATIONS TO REDUCE THE REDOUBT AREA AND OCCUPY THAT PART OF AUSTRIA IN ZONE PD SUB PARA BAKER PD BOUNDARY BETWEEN SIXTH AND ONE TWO ARMY GROUPS BEYOND FREISTING PAREN TO ONE TWO ARMY GROUP PAREN IS CHANGED AS FOLLOWS CLN MUHLDORF THEN ALONG INN RIVER TO ITS JUNCTION WITH THE SALZACH RIVER PAREN TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP PAREN STRASSWALCHEN PAREN TO ONE TWO ARMY GROUP PAREN BAD ISCHL DASH SCHLADMING DASH MAUTERNDORF DASH VILLACH PAREN ALL TO SIXTH ARMY GROUP PAREN PD SUB PARA CHARLIE PD FIRST AND THIRD ARMY BOUNDARY AS AMENDED BY CABLE QUEEN XRAY THREE ONE EIGHT THREE TWO OF TWO SEVEN APRIL ONE NINE FOUR FIVE IS FURTHER AMENDED BEYOND NABBURG PAREN TO FIRST ARMY PAREN AS FOLLOWS CLN THENCE ALONG THE NAAB RIVER TO SCHARFENFELD PAREN TO THIRD ARMY PAREN THENCE ALONG THE SCHWARXACH RIVER TO NEUNBURG PAREN TO FIRST ARMY PAREN DASH CHAM PAREN TO FIRST ARMY PAREN THENCE ALONG THE REGEN AND WEISSER REGEN RIVERS TO THIERNSTEIN PAREN TO FIRST ARMY PAREN THENCE EASTWARD TO THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN BORDER DASH RUNNING RIGHTS ON THE ROAD CHAM DASH CHAMERAU DASH MITTACH PAREN TO THIRD ARMY PAREN PD SUB PARA DOG PD THIRD ARMY WILL CONTINUE OPERATIONS TO CONTACT THE RUSSIANS IN THE DANUBE VALLEY AND OCCUPY THAT PART OF AUSTRIA IN ZONE PD SUB PARA EASY PD FIRST ARMY WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT THE LEFT FLANK OF THIRD ARMY ALONG THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN BORDER IN ZONE PD PARA THREE PD ACTION ADDRESSEES ACKNOWLEDGE PD

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS 12th ARMY GROUP
APO 655

: S E C R E T :
:Auth., CG, 12 AG :
:Init. :
:Date 4 May 45 :

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions Number Twenty Two. 4 May 1945

TO : Commanding General, First Army.
Commanding General, Third Army.
Commanding General, Ninth Army.
Commanding General, Fifteenth Army.

Map: GSGS No 4346 (A), Scale 1:250,000, Germany - Boundaries, First Edition.

1. a. See G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 38 for week ending 1 May 1945.

b. 21 Army Group, with XVIII U S Airborne Corps under operational control, continues its advance to the northeast to defeat the enemy in zone.

c. 6th Army Group continues the operation to reduce the REDOUBT area and occupy that part of AUSTRIA in zone.

d. Ninth Air Force cooperates with 12th Army Group.

e. Communications Zone supports logistically the operations of the 6th and 12th Army Groups.

2. a. (1) 12th Army Group continuing the defense along the line of the MULDE and ELBE Rivers in zone north of CHEMNITZ will advance to the line ERMS River - BUDEJOVICE - PILSEN - KARLSBAD - CHEMNITZ prepared for further advance to the east on this front.

(2) 12th Army Group will reorganize immediately in order to release First Army Headquarters and Special Troops and dispose itself for the occupation of its zones in GERMANY and AUSTRIA under ECLIPSE conditions.

b. Boundaries.

(1) Between 6th and 12th Army Groups: OPPENHEIM - DARMSTADT (both to 12th Army Group) - OBERNBURG - STADTPROZELTEN (both to 6th Army Group) - WURZBURG - OCHSENFURT - UFFENHEIM - ANSBACH - GUNZENHAUSEN - BIBERSTATT - INGOLSTADT - thence south along autobahn to SCHWEITENKIRCHEN - FREISING (to 12th Army Group) - MUHLDORF - thence along INN River to its junction with the SALZACH River (to 6th Army Group) - STRASZWALCHEN (to 12th Army Group) - BAD ISCHL - SCHLADMING - MAUTERNDORF - VILLACH (all to 6th Army Group).

(2) Between 12th and 21 Army Groups: International boundary at E-940125 - thence along road to GELDERN - RJ at A-074262 - RJ at A-088264 - RJ at A-101279 - ALPEN - WESEL - BRUNEN - thence to A-3451 - north boundary of RECKLINGHAUSEN KREIS - west boundary of COESFELD KREIS to A-5067 - A-7275 - thence along north boundary of MUNSTER KREIS to A-8679 - B-0481 - north boundary of WARENDORF KREIS - north boundary of HALLE KREIS - western and northern boundaries of HERFORD KREIS and west boundary of MINDEN KREIS to M-6712 - MINDEN - WUNSTORF (running rights to 21 Army Group) (all to 12th Army Group) - RJ at X-258288 - SCHULENBURG - RJ at X-360329 - GR BURGWEDEL - ENGENSEN - EHLERSHAUSEN - CELLE - RJ at 856744 - UELZEN - ZERNIEN (all to 21 Army Group) - HITZACKER (to 12th Army Group) - LUDWIGSLUST - PLAU (both to 21 Army Group).

(3) Between Third and Ninth Armies: From the junction of the west boundary of the State of BAVARIA with the 6th and 12th Army Group boundary northward and eastward along the boundary of the State of BAVARIA to the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border, thence northeastward along the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border.

(4) Between the Fifteenth Army and 6th Army Group and Ninth Army: RHINE River from LAUTERBURG north to NIEDER LAHNSTEIN thence north along the east boundary of the RHINE Province to its junction with 12th - 21 Army Group boundary at A-3253.

(5) At a time to be agreed between Ninth and Fifteenth Armies, the boundary between these armies will be changed so as to give Fifteenth Army responsibility for that portion of the states of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN in 12th Army Group zone.

3. a. First Army.

(1) First Army will transfer the V Corps and supporting troops in place to Third Army without delay.

(2) All other First Army troops (except Headquarters and Special Troops, First Army), and corresponding area responsibility, will be transferred to Ninth Army at the earliest practicable date.

b. Third Army.

(1) Advance to the line ERMS River - BUDEJOVICE - PILSEN - KARLSBAD and be prepared for further advance to the east.

(2) Transfer to Ninth Army without delay those portions of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN now in Third Army zone and one infantry division, with normal attachments.

(3) Take over V Corps and supporting troops in place from First Army, (see par 3. a. (1).

c. Ninth Army.

(1) Protect the left (north) flank of Third Army in its advance, (see par 3. b. (1)).

(2) Continue the defensive along the present line of contact on the MULDE and ELBE Rivers north of CHEMNITZ until uncovered by Soviet Forces.

(3) Take over First Army troops and area remaining after transfer of V Corps to Third Army, (see par 3. a. (2)).

(4) Take over from Third Army those areas of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN now held by Third Army together with one division with normal attachments, (see par 3. b. (2)).

(5) Organize the occupational area of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN in zone under the XIX Corps and upon completion of this organization transfer this area and the Corps with its supporting troops to Fifteenth Army control.

(6) Be prepared to dispatch troops to the BERLIN District and the BREMEN Enclave on order.

d. Fifteenth Army.

(1) Continue to occupy, organize and govern that portion of the RHINE Province Military District (RHINE Province, SAARLAND, the PALATINATE and that portion of HESSEN which lies west of the RHINE) south of the 12th - 21 Army Group boundary.

(2) Be prepared to take over from Ninth Army, at a date to be mutually agreed, the occupational area of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN in zone and the XIX Corps, with its supporting troops, (see par 3. c. (4)).

(3) Continue mission of containing ST NAZAIRE and LORIENT garrisons, until relieved.

x. Every effort will be made to expedite the relief of Headquarters First Army from its present duties.

4. a. Ninth Army will initially assume control of all installations and facilities of First Army except those required for the support of V Corps.

b. Third Army will retain control of their present installations and facilities in Ninth Army zone until they can be removed from that area.

c. Use of roads through areas and other necessary details will be by mutual agreement of Army Commanders concerned.

d. Except as noted above, current Administrative Instructions apply.

5. Current Signal Communication Instructions apply.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL BRADLEY:

LEVEN C. ALLEN
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:
A. FRANKLIN KIBLER
Brigadier General, GSC
A. G. of S., G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T O P S E C R E T

M/C DTG 061735B M/C Nr 874 ORIG DTG 061550B

FROM ONE TWO ARMY GROUP TAC

ACTION TO ONE PD THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY TAC
TWO PD NINTH UNITED STATES ARMY FORWARD

INFO TO THREE PD FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY TAC

PARA ONE THE FOLLOWING AMPLIFIES PARA THREE CMA OUR LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER TWO TWO PD PARA TWO PD THIRD ARMY WILL CLN SUBPARA ABLE PD RESTRICT INITIALLY THE PENETRATION INTO AUSTRIA TO THE GENERAL LINE OF THE INNS VALLEY AND THE MAIN NORTH SIANT SOUTH RAILWAY LINE EAST OF LINZ PD SUBPARA BAKER PD IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CMA CONDUCT OPERATIONS TO THE GENERAL LINE OF CML AND SEIZE CMA BUDEJOVICEIE CMA PILSEN AND KARLSBAD PD PARA THREE PD TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE INCIDENTS WITH SOVIET FORCES CMA UNITED STATES FORCES WILL NOT RPT NOT ADVANCE BEYOND THE LINE BUDEJOVICE CMA PILSEN CMA KARLSBAD CMA CHEMNITZ PD PARA FOUR PD

ACTION ADDRESSEES ACKNOWLEDGE PD

SIGNED BRADLEY

QUSEN XRAY THREE ONE NINE ZERO FOUR

REC'D IN CODE

PARAPHRASE BEFORE

RETRANSMISSION OR PUBLICATION

T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

M/C DTG 070749 M/C NR 985 ORIG DTG 070410B
7 MAY 1945

FROM: SHAEF FORWARD

TO : CG THIRD US ARMY U R G E N T

BOOK MESSAGE

1. A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND SIGNED THE UNCONDITIONALLY SURRENDER OF ALL GERMAN LAND, SEA, AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE TO THE ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND AT 0141 HOURS CENTRAL EUROPEAN TIME, 7 MAY UNDER WHICH ALL FORCES WILL CEASE ACTIVE OPERATIONS AT 0001 B HOURS 9 MAY.

2. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE WILL CEASE AND TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN PRESENT POSITIONS. MOVES INVOLVED IN OCCUPATIONAL DUTIES WILL CONTINUE. DUE TO DIFFICULTIES OF COMMUNICATION THERE MAY BE SOME DELAY IN SIMILAR ORDERS REACHING ENEMY TROOPS SO FULL DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS WILL BE TAKEN.

3. ALL INFORMED DOWN TO AND INCLUDING DIVISIONS, TACTICAL AIR COMMANDS AND GROUPS, BASE SECTIONS, AND EQUIVALENT. NO REPEAT NO RELEASE WILL BE MADE TO THE PRESS PENDING AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS.

SIGNED EISENHOWER
CITE SHGCT
EF NR FWD DASH 20801

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

THIRD U.S. ARMY DIRECTIVES

Annex No. 2

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: CG TUSA
Init: WAB
Date: 4 Aug 44

Field Order:
No 1:

(Confirmation of verbal orders issued 011200B Aug 44) HQ THIRD US ARMY
APO 403
4 Aug 1944

Maps: GSGS

1. a. See Intelligence Annex No 3.

b. First U S Army continues advance south and southeast on left (east).

2. Third U S Army drives south and southwest to cut off and capture BRITTANY PENINSULA and open BRITTANY ports.

3. a. VIII Corps (8th Inf Div, 79th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and Supporting Troops) - Continue advance to seize BREST and QUIBERON BAY area.

b. XV Corps (83d Inf Div, 90th Inf. Div, 5th Armd Div and Supporting Troops)-- Move south within assigned zone, coordinating with VII Corps and VIII Corps.

c. XX Corps (2d Fr Armd Div - upon arrival; and Supporting Troops) -- Be prepared to move south on Army order, initially vicinity FOUGERES.

d. XII Corps (80th Inf Div - upon arrival; and Supporting Troops) -- Continue staging all Third U S Army Troops arriving on Continent; be prepared to move south on Army order.

e. Arty (See Annex No 2).

x. Toxic chemicals will be employed only on Army order.

4. See Administrative Order No 4, 1 Aug 44.

5. a. Axes Signal Communication
(1) Third U S Army - BINGARD - LE REPAS - AVRANCHES - ANTRAIN - RENNES.
(2) VIII Corps - PHILLIPE - MALICORNE - AVRANCHES-PONTORSON.
(3) XV Corps - ST MARTIN D'AUBIGNY - GAVRAY - ST HILAIRE.
(4) XX Corps - ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (155968).
(5) XII Corps - QUETTETO (087077).

b. See current SOI.

PATTON
Comdg

Maddox
MADDOX
G-3

ANNEXES:
1 - Operation Overlay
2 - Artillery
3 - Intelligence

SECRET

ANNEX 2 TO FO 1, THIRD US ARMY

FIELD ARTILLERY

Hq Third US Army
APO 403, ETO
011200B Aug 44

Maps: GSGS 4249, 1/100,000 sheets 6F, 7F, 6G, 7G.

1. See FO 1, Hq Third US Army.

2. General mission - arty with each corps will aggressively support the attack with all available means.

3. a. Arty with the corps

(1) VIII Corps

12 FA Obsn Bn
174 FA Gp
196 FA Gp
202 FA Gp
*333 FA Gp
687 FA Bn (105 H)
204 FA Bn (155 H)
*333 FA Bn (155 H)
965 FA Bn (155 H)
*969 FA Bn (155 H)
559 FA Bn (155 G)
561 FA Bn (155 G)
733 FA Bn (155 G)
*578 FA Bn (8" H)
174 FA Bn (155 G)(SP)
5 FA Gp
83 Armd FA Bn
695 Armd FA Bn
696 Armd FA Bn
177 FA Bn (155 H)

Attached at time and place to be designated by CG, VIII Corps

269 FA Bn (240 H) available for attachment on request in present location vicinity of BRIOQUEBEC (1303)

(2) XV Corps

3 FA Obsn Bn
40 FA Gp
144 FA Gp
173 FA Gp
208 FA Gp
400 Armd FA Bn
250 FA Bn (105 H)
693 FA Bn (105 H)
182 FA Bn (155 H)
202 FA Bn (155 H)
961 FA Bn (155 H)
974 FA Bn (155 H)
975 FA Bn (155 H)
208 FA Bn (155 G)
731 FA Bn (155 G)
989 FA Bn (155 G)
*999 FA Bn (8" H)

270 FA Bn (240 H) available for attachment on request in present location vicinity BRIOQUEBEC (1303)

(3) XX Corps

5 FA Gp
83 Armd FA Bn
695 Armd FA Bn
696 Armd FA Bn
177 FA Bn (155 H)

Attached VIII Corps at time and place designated by CG, VIII Corps

(4) Coordination between corps -

Location of sound and flash bases, OPs, and fires in adjacent corps and army zones of action will be coordinated where necessary by Corps Arty Comdrs.

Communication will be established and liaison officers will be exchanged by adjacent corps arty and by flank division arty of adjacent corps.

b. Army Arty

(1) Organization for combat -

269th and 279th FA Bns remain in present location until further orders.

c. Arty with the Army.

(1) Ammunition - to be announced.

(2) Obsn -

Ground, air map and photo recn will be pushed with view to maintaining maximum support as attack progresses.

Arty/R will be available for search, adjustment and surveillance missions.

Air OPs will maintain counter flak patrols during Arty/R missions and close support air bombardment.

(3) AAA and AT -

Use of AA and TD units to reinf arty to fire harassing

and interdiction missions at the discretion of Corps Comdrs.

4. See FO 1.

a. Am Depots

(1) VIII Corps - To be announced.

(2) XV Corps - To be announced.

5. See FO 1.

*Colored personnel

PATTON
Comdg

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Maddox
/t/ MADDOX
G - 3

ANNEX #3 to FO #1.

HQ THIRD US ARMY
APO 403
4 August

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

(Confirmation of Verbal Orders Issued 011200B August 44)
Maps: GSGS 2738, Air/Ground Map FRANCE, Scale 1/250000.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION:

a. See G-2 Situation Map 011200 August (Appendix 1).

b. The fluid situation precludes the enemy from establishing a cohesive line in Third US Army zone. Elms of all units shown in this zone in Appendix 1 have been identified, but the only organized resistance is in Vic PONTORSON (T2602). The unrelenting sledge-hammer blows of the US Armor - Air - Artillery assaults and the speed and effectiveness of the Infantry support have thrown the enemy off his balance and are keeping him that way. There are indications that the enemy is attempting to assemble a Panzer-Para force in the area E of ST JAMES (T29) for a counterattack against our E flank, possibly in the triangular wedge between the LA SEE and SELUNE Rivers, in an effort to split our N and S columns.

c. Reserves immediately available to the enemy include 2 Para Div, last located in the CAP DU NORD - FINISTERE area of BRITTANY, Elms of 265, 266 and 343 Inf Divs and four (estimated) Ost Bns in BRITTANY, 319 Inf Div, Elms of which were reported evacuating from JERSEY ISLAND, to the BRITTANY Peninsula, and Inf-Tk battle group of an estimated one-half of the 11 Pz Div reported N of LOIRE River, and 363 Inf Div reported W of SEINE River 29 July. Elms of other Pz Divs, particularly 2 Pz and 9 SS, can be shifted Westward to Third US Army East flank.

d. The bulk of reinforcements from outside the German Seventh Army apparently must come from German Fifteenth Army which might provide four to six additional Inf Divs, but, based on the enemy's laborious movement experience to date these units could not be committed before 8 August and then only piecemeal. The location of 48 and 84 Inf Divs remains unknown, as does that of 9 Pz Div, reported moving in mid-July from the RHONE Valley.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

a. Identification, type and strength of enemy units in BRITTANY Peninsula, particularly Armor.

b. Location, disposition, and morale of enemy in BRITTANY. (Emphasis 2 Para Div).

c. Location, nature and extent of prepared defensive positions, in TUSA zone.

d. Status, extent, type enemy ammunition and oil supplies and sources of supply.

e. Routes, means, and methods used by enemy for troop movements, communications, and supply.

f. Enemy tactics, especially in the use of natural obstacles.

g. Enemy reaction to Air and Arty action.

h. Location, disposition, type, identification and strength immediate Res available to enemy.

i. Movement, strength of Armor and other enemy Res capable of commitment in BRITTANY by 8 August.

j. Withdrawal of 319 Inf Div and other troops from CHANNEL ISLAND.

k. Concentration of shipping in BRITTANY.

l. Enemy movements to E out of BRITTANY, especially along Southern roads.

m. Location, nature, and extent of obstacles, mines, in the TUSA zone of advance.

n. Location, nature and extent of demolitions or preparations for demolition of bridges and public utilities.

o. Nature, extent, disposition, and status of enemy air activity and air and Anti-Aircraft defenses. Location of airfields.

p. Condition of roads and bridges in the TUSA zone of advance. Conditions for cross-country movement, especially of Armored vehicles. Terrain features not shown on existing maps.

q. Meteorological factors which may affect TUSA advance.

r. Attitude of civilians in the TUSA zone of advance.

s. Cooperation from French patriots, such as Maquis.

t. Enemy use of gas, bacteriological agents or secret weapons.

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.

a. AIR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS.

(1) Tactical Reconnaissance (Visual).

(a) By arrangement through 12th Army Group, Third Army reconnaissance missions will not be flown until 2 Aug 44. Prior to 020001B Aug 44, First Army missions will be continued.

(b) Missions after 020001B Aug 44 have been arranged as shown on overlay (Appendix 2).

1. These missions will be flown at irregular intervals.
2. Reports of results will be disseminated to Corps and to Army troops by the fastest available means.
3. Tac/R pilots will communicate with air support parties on Channel "D" (V.H.F.).

(2) Photographic Reconnaissance.

(a) Limited facilities are available to TUSA for photo missions.

(b) Basic cover in twelve copies of areas of interest to each Corps will be distributed by Third Army Photo Center.

(3) Requests.

(a) All requests will be addressed to G-2 (Air), TUSA.

(b) Four copies of requests on form (Appendix 3) will be submitted.

(c) Requests for pre-planned missions will be submitted by 1630B, daily, for the next day's operations.

(d) Emergency requests may be submitted at any time.

b. GROUND.

(1) 6th Cavalry Group will operate in accordance with letter of instructions issued by Headquarters Third US Army, to CO, 6th Cavalry Group, file AG 312.3 - GNMOB, dated 16 May 1944, subject "Directive".

(2) Corps and separate units will be responsible within their zones for the procurement and dissemination of information implementing the Essential Elements of Information.

c. MISCELLANEOUS.

(1) Identifications (to include reports of method and time and place of capture of prisoners or documents), and enemy strength will be stressed and reported promptly.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PRISONERS OF WAR AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

a. Prisoners of War and Deserters.

(See Third US Army Outline Plan, Appendix IV, Annex 8, dated 6 June 1944, Section 3 a (3) and First US Army Group Intelligence Instruction No 7, dated 7 May 1944, Part A).

After tactical interrogation at division level, PW will be sent to Army cages for interrogation by Army IPW teams. Daily consolidated interrogation reports will be disseminated by AC of S, G-2, Third US Army, to higher and lower echelons. Regimental and higher Commanders will be processed without delay, sent to Army Cages for special interrogation, and AC of S, G-2, Third US Army immediately notified. Under no conditions will they be sent directly to the Army Command Post.

b. Refugees.

French refugees have proved a very valuable source of tactical information. They must be interrogated by MII Teams at all echelons, either at organized Refugee Centers, or through coordination with CIC, Civil Affairs or individual investigations. Reports of interrogations will be submitted promptly to appropriate AC of S, G-2. (See Intelligence Instruction No 7, above - Part B).

c. Evaders and Escapers.

Allied evaders and escapers will be sent without delay to nearest E&E units or to Headquarters Third US Army for interrogation through PW channels. (See Intelligence Instruction No 7, above - Part C).

d. Captured Documents.

(See First US Army Group Intelligence Instruction No 5, dated 15 May 1944).

Intelligence information of the greatest importance has been obtained from captured enemy documents. All units must be instructed regarding their seizure, protection, and delivery to Enemy Documents Section, Headquarters Third US Army. Place and time of seizure and capturing unit will be noted on the document.

e. Captured Enemy Materiel.

All units will be instructed regarding regulations covering handling of captured enemy materiel contained in First US Army Group Intelligence Instruction No 6, dated 13 May 1944

5. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

(See Appendix V to Annex 8, Outline Plan, Third US Army, dated 7 May 1944).

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

a. Directives and policies outlined in Counterintelligence Standard Operating Procedure, 12th US Army Group, dated 23 June 1944, will obtain effective this date, with the following exceptions and additions.

(1) Exception:

Paragraph 13, Disclosure of Geographical Location, will be deleted. Letter this Headquarters, Subject: "Censorship", dated 19 July 1944, will be substituted.

(2) Addition:

Passwords and Replies -- Letter this Headquarters, Subject: "Counter-signs", dated 16 July 1944 will be adhered to.

b. Units at present in contact with the enemy will take the necessary steps to adjust conflicting policies now in use with those given in Par 6a at the earliest practicable date.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.

a. To be submitted by Corps and Army troops to Third US Army:

(1) Spot Reports - Important developments in the enemy situation as they occur.

(2) Isums (Intelligence Summary) - At 1200 hours and 2400 hours daily, by TWX or radio.

(3) Daily G-2 Periodic Report - For 24 hours as of 2400 hours daily, to include number of PW and buried enemy dead, and an estimate of total enemy casualties during period covered by the report.

(4) Daily PW Interrogation Report - To accompany the Daily G-2 Periodic Report.

(5) Weekly G-2 Periodic Report - as of 2400 hours each Saturday.

(6) Maps and Overlays with Reports - GSGS 4249, FRANCE, Scale 1/100,000.

b. Six copies each of Daily and Weekly Periodic and Interrogation Reports will be furnished to Third U.S. Army.

c. Three copies each of Corps Daily and Weekly Periodic and Daily PW Interrogation Reports will be furnished direct to Twelfth U.S. Army Group and 21 Army Group.

d. Weather reports, including long range and daily forecasts, will be disseminated by G-2, Third U.S. Army, as available.

PATTON
Commanding

OFFICIAL:

KOCH
G-2

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: WAB
Date: 4 Aug 44

AG 300.4 Gen - GNMCC 4 August 1944

Subject: Confirmation of Verbal Orders Issued 2 August 1944.

To: Commanding General, VIII Corps
Commanding General, XII Corps
Commanding General, XV Corps
Commanding General, XX Corps

1. Third U.S. Army will establish a strong bridgehead on the line DINAN - RENNES - ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET and continue to drive aggressively to BREST and QUIBERON BAY.

2. a. VIII Corps - (8th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div) will:

(1) Advance rapidly on BREST with:
(a) Strong columns, leading with armor, followed by infantry, on center roads.
(b) Composite mobile task force including cavalry, tank destroyers and engineers along north coast road.

(2) Simultaneously a strong column, leading with armor, followed by infantry, will seize RENNES and QUIBERON BAY area.

b. XV Corps - (79th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 5th Armd Div) will secure line ST HILAIRE DU HARCOUET - REMUVIELLE (T456134) and prepare for further action to southeast.

c. XX Corps - (2d Fr Armd Div, upon landing; 5th Inf Div and 35th Inf Div, when released by First U.S. Army) - will continue present mission.

d. XII Corps - (80th Inf Div upon landing) - will continue present mission.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
/t/ H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 5 Aug 44

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 5 August 1944

Subject: Directive.

To: Commanding General, VIII Corps
Commanding General, XII Corps
Commanding General, XV Corps
Commanding General, XX Corps

(Confirmation of fragmentary orders issued 4 August 1944)

1. Third U.S. Army will complete clearing of BRITTANY PENINSULA and securing of BRITTANY ports; secure crossings of MAYENNE RIVER from MAYENNE (inclusive) as far south as LOIRE RIVER; advance rapidly on LE MANS; prepare for further offensive action with strong armored forces to the east, northeast, or north.

2. a. VIII Corps - (8th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div) will complete clearing of BRITTANY PENINSULA and securing BRITTANY ports; prepare for further operations to the east.

b. XII Corps - (80th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div) concentrate vicinity of LE HAYE PESNEL prepared to move south on Army order.

c. XV Corps - (79th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 5th Armd Div) will seize and hold bridgehead east of MAYENNE until relieved by First U.S. Army; seize a bridgehead at LAVAL and secure MAYENNE RIVER as far south as CHATEAU GONTIER; seize LE MANS; prepare for further offensive action to the north, east or northeast.

d. XX Corps - (5th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 2d Fr Armd Div) will concentrate vicinity VITRE; secure crossings of MAYENNE RIVER from CHATEAU GONTIER as far south as LOIRE RIVER; advance rapidly to the east; protect south flank of Army.

3. See current Administrative orders.

4. a. Axes Signal Communication.
(1) Third U.S. Army - LE REPAS - FOUGERES -
(2) VIII Corps - VERGONCEY (T243250) - DOLL -
(3) XII Corps - To be reported.
(4) XV Corps - LES CHERIS (T352100) - (T552525)
(5) XX Corps - ST MARTIN DE LANDELLES - VITRE -

b. Command Posts - To be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
/t/ H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 4 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC 4 August 1944

Subject: Directive

To: Commanding General, XV Corps

1. XV Corps will move early 5 August 1944 initially to seize and secure crossings of MAYENNE RIVER from MAYENNE to LAVAL both inclusive attack with two infantry divisions abreast, one Regimental Combat Team in each division to be motorized and preceded by mechanized cavalry. 5th Armored Division echeloned to right rear prepared to (1) support attack of assaulting divisions, (2), extend front to CHATEAU GONTIER, or (3) extend front as far south as ANGERS.

2. XV Corps will maintain close contact with First U.S. Army on the left. On reaching objective be prepared to move north or northeast on Army order.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HGM
Date: 5 Aug 44

5 August 1944

AG 370.2 GNMCC

Subject: Directive.

To: Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U.S. Army.

(Confirming telephonic orders of 051640B August)

A new temporary boundary between you and VII Corps is attached. If coordinates given you over telephone do not agree with boundary on attached overlay, the boundary on overlay will govern.

Cross river at MAYENNE; secure a bridgehead east of MAYENNE and hold until relieved by VII Corps.

Elements of XV Corps not needed to hold bridgehead east of MAYENNE will be moved south of the inter- Army boundary without dely .

Secure crossings of the MAYENNE RIVER to LAVAL inclusive. Extend this front further south if you deem it necessary.

Advance rapidly on LE MANS.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H.G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 10 Aug 44

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 10 August 1944

Subject: Directive (Confirmation of Fragmentary Orders given on 8 August 1944)

To : Commanding General, VIII Corps
Commanding General, XII Corps
Commanding General, XV Corps
Commanding General, XX Corps

1. Third U.S. Army will -

a. Advance on the axis LE MANS - ALENCON - SEES to the line SEES - CARROUGES prepared for further action against enemy flank and rear.

b. Hold the bridgehead east of the SARTHE RIVER in vicinity of LE MANS.

c. Occupy NANTES and ANGERS and cover the south flank of the Army Group.

d. Continue the capture of BRITTANY ports and the reduction of the Peninsula.

2. a. VIII Corps (6th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div) will continue the capture of BRITTANY ports and the reduction of the Peninsula; occupy NANTES and cover south flank to Corps boundary; prepare for further operations to the east.

b. XV Corps (79th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 5th Armd Div, 2d Fr Armd Div) will advance along the axis LE MANS - ALENCON - SEES; secure line SEES - CARROUGES (both incl); prepare for further advance.

c. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div) will occupy ANGERS and cover south flank of the Army within zone; hold bridgehead east of SARTHE RIVER vicinity of LE MANS; prepare for further operations to the east.

d. XII Corps - Continue present mission.

3. See current Administrative orders.

4. a. Axes of Signal Communication.

(1) Third U.S. Army - LE RHEU - FOUGERES -
(2) VIII Corps - (Z8300) -
(3) XII Corps - (Z8370) -
(4) XV Corps - (Z8010) - (Z0034) -
(5) XX Corps - ST MARTIN DE LANDELLE - VITRE -

b. Command Posts - To be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/ H. G. Maddox,
/t/ H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

8 August 1944

Subject: Letter of Instruction.

To : Major General W. H. Haislip, Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U.S. Army.

The purpose of the ensuing operation along the axis of LE MANS - ALENCON - SEES is to drive the German army, heretofore confronting the First American Army and Second British and Canadian Armies along the Channel Coast, against the SEINE between PARIS and ROUEN.

In consonance with this plan, you will advance along the axis LE MANS - ALENCON - SEES with the purpose of initially securing the line SEES - CARROUGES, both inclusive, prepared for further advance, utilizing the 5th Armored Division, the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 2d French Armored Division, which is hereby attached to your Corps.

You will utilize all available transportation, including tanks to maintain one infantry combat team in the immediate rear of each armored division; the remaining combat teams of the two infantry divisions to proceed by marching.

In view of the shortage of trucks, it will be necessary to shuttle.

The 80th Division of the XX Corps will close on LE MANS, and under orders from that Corps will relieve you of the maintenance of the bridgehead. The 35th Division will close initially on LAVAL.

It is the present purpose of this Army to eventually operate with two corps abreast; the side on which the XX Corps moves to be determined by subsequent circumstances.

This letter is for the purpose of giving you the plans as now envisioned. Irrespective of anything in this letter, your mission is and will continue to be to destroy Germans in your front.

Nothing herein inhibits you from using roads within the zone of action of the Third Army. The boundary between the First U.S. Army and the Third U.S. Army is:

ERNEE (Y5771) - MAYENNE (Y8171) - LE HORPS (Y9361) - CHARCHIGNE (Y9685) - COUPTRAIN (Z0490) - CARROUGES (Z1699) - LA FERTE'RIN (Z8108) ARGENTAN (U8619) (all to Third Army). First Army troops south and east of this line to have running rights on roads until clear of Third Army area.

G. S. PATTON, Jr.,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: WAB
Date: 11 Aug 44

AG 3702. - GNMCC 11 August 1944

Subject: Directive.

To : Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U.S. Army.

1. XX Corps (35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will assemble on the line MAYENNE - LE MANS within zone, attack promptly to northeast to secure line CARROUGES - SEES within zone; prepare for further advance.

2. One Regimental Combat Team (80th Inf Div) will remain in the vicinity of LE MANS to hold a bridgehead east of the SARTHE RIVER.

3. 7th Armd Div will be moved from assembly area northeast of FOUGERES to an area in rear of line of departure to be selected by XX Corps.

4. 35th Inf Div will be released by VII Corps at a point on the inter-army boundary to be designated later and will be moved to an area selected by XX Corps in rear of the line of departure.

5. This headquarters will be notified as to time of attack.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: Chief of Staff TELE NO: LUCKY 5 INITIALS: HJG DATE:12 Aug 44

PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

TO: CG XX CORPS

AS PER PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF OF STAFF THIRD ARMY TODAY COMMA YOU WILL PAREN TO CG XX CORPS SIGNED PATTON PAREN INITIATE ATTACK TO NORTH WITHIN YOUR CORPS ZONE EMPLOYING EIGHT ZERO INFANTRY DIVISION LESS ONE ROGER CHARLIE TARE HOLDING BRIDGEHEAD COMMA SUCH ELEMENTS OF THREE FIVE INFANTRY DIVISION AS HAVE REACHED LINE OF DEPARTURE COMMA AND ELEMENTS OF SEVEN ARMORED DIVISION WHICH HAVE ARRIVED FROM ASSEMBLY AREA X UPON CONTACTING ELEMENTS OF ONE FIVE CORPS IN VICINITY OF ALENCON OR FARTHER NORTH AWAIT FURTHER ORDERS

NO SIG

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 11 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

11 August 1944

SUBJECT: 5th Infantry Division

TO : Commanding General, XX Corps

You will direct that -

1. 1st Bn 2d Inf, upon being relieved at NANTES by CCA, 4th Armd Div, will rejoin 5th Inf Div at ANGERS and will clear area of all scattered enemy groups enroute.

2. One RCT will remain in vicinity of ANGERS and protect the south flank of the Army.

3. 5th Inf Div (-) will move northeast along LE LOIR RIVER to vicinity of CHATEAU DU LOIR clearing area of all scattered enemy groups enroute. Upon arriving in vicinity of CHATEAU DU LOIR it will send reconnaissance to northeast, east and southeast as far as TOURS. It will protect the south flank of the army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL
/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

Date: 12 August 1944

Originator: Chief of Staff Telephone: LUCKY 5 Initials: HJG

Precedence: Operational Priority Classification: SECRET

TO: CG XV CORPS

UPON CAPTURE OF ARGENTAN PAREN TO CG XV CORPS SIGNED PATTON PAREN PUSH ON SLOWLY DIRECTION OF FALAISE ALLOWING YOUR REAR ELEMENTS TO CLOSE X ROAD COLON ARGENTAN DASH FALAISE YOUR BOUNDARY INCLUSIVE X UPON ARRIVAL FALAISE CONTINUE TO PUSH ON SLOWLY UNTIL YOU CONTACT OUR ALLIES

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 13 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

13 August 1944

SUBJECT: Directive (Confirmation of verbal orders issued 13 Aug 44)

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. VIII Corps (8th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, and supporting troops) will continue present mission of clearing BRITTANY PENINSULA including relief of 5th Inf Div at ANGERS.

2. XII Corps (4th Armd Div, 35th Inf Div and supporting troops) will concentrate southeast of LE MANS prepared to operate to north, northeast or east; protect south flank of Army.

3. XV Corps (2d Fr Armd Div, 5th Armd Div, 79th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and supporting troops) will assemble vicinity ARGENTAN prepared for further advance to north, northeast or east.

4. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will advance northeast within zone on DREUX prepared for further advance to north, northeast or east. 80th Inf Div continues attack until contact is made with XV Corps on right and elements First Army on left. It will then halt and await orders.

5. For supporting troops see current Troop Assignment order.

6. a. Axes of signal communication
(1) Third U S Army - Y610550 - LE MANS -
(2) VIII Corps - S905000 - to be announced
(3) XII Corps - T235239 - to be announced
(4) XV Corps - Z345877 - to be announced
(5) XX Corps - Y805435 - to be announced

b. Command Posts
(1) Third U S Army - Y610550
(2) VIII Corps - to be reported
(3) XII Corps - to be reported
(4) XV Corps - to be reported
(5) XX Corps - to be reported

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL
/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

13 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: G-3, VIII Corps.

1. The Army Commander desires that you have Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division move at once to northeast to an area southeast of LE MANS where this unit will come under control of XII Corps. VIII Corps is to continue to occupy and contain NANTES with other troops under your control.

2. The entire 4th Armored Division is to be relieved as soon as possible and move to join the XII Corps.

3. Our communications with XII Corps Headquarters is very poor from our new CP location. Please contact Col Shattuck, G-3 XII Corps and have him give you exact point southeast of LE MANS where advance detachment of Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division can contact XII Corps for assembly area location. I am trying to get notice to XII Corps now to move their forward CP to location they have selected just southeast of LE MANS. Please pass this on to Shattuck and then give necessary instructions to Commanding General, Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division at once, then move Combat Command A without delay.

4. Will send you more detailed directive later today. Please confirm that necessary action is being taken.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

MESSAGE NO. 6 DATE: 13 August 1944

TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, XV CORPS.

HALT IN THE VICINITY OF ARGENTAN. ASSEMBLE YOUR COMMAND PREPARED FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT TO NORTH OR NORTHEAST.

H.J.G.
C of S

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 15 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

15 August 1944

SUBJECT: Directive (Confirmation of verbal orders issued 14 August 1944)

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. VIII Corps (6th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 6th Armd Div and 319th RCT (80th Inf Div)), will -

a. Continue present mission of clearing BRITTANY PENINSULA.
b. Release 6th Armd Div as rapidly as it can be relieved by other elements of VIII Corps.
c. Protect south flank of Army within zone.

2. XII Corps (35th Inf Div and 4th Armd Div) will -

a. Advance east to CHATEAUDUN.
b. Seize and hold ORLEANS.
c. Protect south flank of Army within zone.
d. Prepare for further advance to east, northeast or south east.

3. XV Corps (79th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 2d Fr Armd Div and 5th Armd Div) will -

a. Advance east within zone.
b. Seize and hold bridgehead east of EURE RIVER at DREUX.
c. Be prepared for further advance to east or southeast.
d. 90th Inf Div to occupy position now held by 5th Armd Div (vicinity ARGENTAN).
e. 2d Fr Armd Div to remain present position.

4. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and 7th Armd Div) will -

a. Advance east within zone.
b. Seize and hold bridgehead east of EURE RIVER at CHARTRES.
c. Prepare for further advance to east, northeast or southeast.
d. 80th Inf Div (-) to concentrate vicinity EVRON - MONTSURS and await orders.

5. a. Axes Signal Communication
(1) Third U S Army - LE MANS -
(2) VIII Corps - S905000 - to be announced
(3) XII Corps - V445557 - ORLEANS
(4) XV Corps - Z343867 - DREUX
(5) XX Corps - V742800 - CHARTRES
b. Command Posts
(1) Third U S Army - Z355485
(2) VIII Corps - S905000 - to be reported
(3) XII Corps - V445557 - to be reported
(4) XV Corps - Z343867 - to be reported
(5) XX Corps - V742800 - to be reported

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL
/s/ H. C. Maddox
/t/ H. C. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

14 August 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps.

1. The 80th Division is now disposed as follows: one Regimental Combat Team occupying Angers; two Regimental Combat Teams in the area: LeMans-Alencon-Mayenne-Laval, between the XV Corps and the Army boundary line. XX Corps has moved to positions east of LeMans and is attacking along the General line LeMans-Dreux, maintaining contact with the XV Corps on its left.

2. The 80th Division will be made available to you in the immediate future, possibly today (14 August 1944), on order from this Headquarters. The Army Commander desires that you guard the line Angers-Lorient, inclusive, with such forces as you deem necessary. He feels that with the acquisition of the 80th Division, you will be able to materially speed up the release of the 6th Armored Division, which as soon as relieved from its present mission, is to proceed without delay to the LeMans area, where it will pass to the control of the Third U. S. Army. At present, the 80th Division CP is located at coordinates: W-8193.

3. You will then have at your disposal Task Force "A", the 8th, 80th, 83rd Divisions, and the 2nd Cavalry Group, for the carrying out of your mission of reducing the Brittany ports and clearing out hostile resistance in the Brittany Peninsula.

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, USA,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

14 August 1944

SUBJECT: Directive.

TO : Commanding General, XV Corps.

1. You are to move at once, using your two right divisions, on the position assigned to Walker (DREUX). You will occupy with your left infantry division (90th Infantry Division) the position now occupied by the 5th Armored Division. You will maintain contact with the VII Corps (Collins).

2. The XX Corps, Maj. Gen. Walker, is being directed to change direction and move on CHARTRES, the position which had previously been assigned to the XII Corps. He is being directed to maintain contact with you on his left.

3. Speed is of the essence. You will move without delay and with the greatest possible speed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

NOTE: Time at which movement is to start has been changed as per verbal conversation between CG XV Corps and Gen Gay, Third Army; that is, you may with-hold start of movement until morning if in your best judgement it is so indicated.

H.G.

SECRET

Telephone conversation between XII Corps and General Gaffey, 151740

Take this order. Do not advance any further than ORLEANS. Hold bulk of your force around CHATEAUDUN which is northeast of you. The point is this. Go have a look at ORLEANS but get bulk of your force around CHATEAUDUN. Better push reconnaissance that way.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

15 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, XV Corps

Stop at DREUX. Secure bridgehead at that place, close up and await orders.

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

15 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Commanding General, XX Corps

Stop your advance at CHARTRES. Secure bridgehead at that place. Close up and await orders.

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

16 August 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Commanding General, 80th Division.

1. The Army Commander directs that you reconnoiter the most direct and most expeditious routes for possible movement of your command to a point on the axis: Le Mans - Alencon - Argentan, from which it can be quickly disposed to assist in the defense of a threat against the area now occupied by the 2d French Armored Division and the 90th Division.

2. If your command is ordered to move to the above area, you, being the senior Division Commander in that immediate area, will be prepared to assume charge and coordinate the efforts of the Second French Armored Division, the 90th Division, and your own Division, under the Commanding General, XV Corps. You should effect liaison with the Commanding General, XV Corps, on this matter with the least practicable delay.

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

cc: CG XV Corps

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HGM
Date: 16 Aug 44

16 August 1944

SUBJECT: Provisional Corps.

TO: See Distribution.

2d French Armored Division, 90th Infantry Division and 80th Infantry Division (less 319th Infantry) will operate, effective this date, as a Provisional Corps under command of Major General Hugh J. Gaffey.

/s/ G. S. Patton
/t/ G. S. PATTON, Jr,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Commanding

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 370.2 GHMCC

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H.G.M.
Date: 17 Aug 44

17 August 1944

SUBJECT: Directive

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U.S. Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U.S. Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U.S. Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U.S. Army

1. The next mission of the Third United States Army is to secure a position in the vicinity of MANTES GASSICOURT (R600610), from which it can prevent enemy movement on the road in that vicinity east of the SEINE RIVER, and by barges on the SEINE RIVER. The remainder of the Army will occupy positions from which this operation can be supported.

2. To accomplish this mission, the XV Corps, consisting of 79th Inf Div, 5th Armd Div and Corps troops, will move out at the earliest possible moment on 18 August 1944 to secure a position in the vicinity of MANTES GASSICOURT (R600610), from which it can interdict the SEINE RIVER and the road east of the SEINE RIVER. In addition, the XV Corps is responsible for the maintenance of reconnaissance north of the road SEES - MANTES GASSICOURT.

3. The XX Corps, consisting of 5th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and Corps troops, will take over the occupation and the defense of the bridgehead at DREUX, in addition to its present mission of occupying and defending the bridgehead at CHARTRES. It will make mutual arrangements with the XV Corps so that DREUX will be occupied by elements of the XX Corps prior to its evacuation by the last elements of the XV Corps.

4. The XII Corps, consisting of the 4th Armd Div, 35th Inf Div and Corps troops, will hold ORLEANS with a minimum force, maintaining the bulk of the command in the vicinity of CHATEAUDUN, and placing an armored Combat Command in the vicinity of LA LOUPE (R0608). This Combat Command will only be engaged by authority from the Army.

5. The VIII Corps, consisting of the 8th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 6th Armd Div and the 319th Inf (80th Div) will continue the mission of reducing the BRITTANY PENINSULA. The 2d Inf Div, another Infantry Division and the two Ranger Battalions, all from the First Army, will pass temporarily to the control of the VIII Corps for the accomplishment of the above mission.

6. When the two Infantry Divisions and two Ranger Battalions come under VIII Corps control, the 2d Cavalry Group will be relieved from VIII Corps and revert to Army control.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE 17 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U.S. ARMY

TO: CG XV CORPS

MOVE EARLY 18 AUGUST TO SECURE POSITION PAREN FROM CG THIRD U.S. ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GHMCC PAREN VICINITY MANTES GASSICOURT TO INTERDICT SEINE RIVER AND ROAD EAST OF RIVER STOP MAINTAIN RECONNAISSANCE NORTH OF ROAD SEES - MANTES GASSICOURT STOP DETAILS FOLLOW

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE 17 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U.S. ARMY

TO: CG XX Corps

PREPARE TO RELIEVE XV CORPS BRIDGEHEAD DREUX EARLY 18 AUGUST PD PAREN FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GHMCC PAREN HOLD BRIDGEHEAD CHARTRES PD STOP DETAILS FOLLOW

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H.G.M.
Date: 18 Aug 44

18 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: See Distribution.

New temporary inter-army boundary, as announced by Twelfth Army Group 17 August 1944, is as follows:

GACE, LE MERIERA, SEES, (all incl to First Army), ALENCON, (incl to Third Army but running rights on northern routes to First Army), VILLARNES, MAYENNE both inclusive to Third Army).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

DISTRIBUTION:
"A"

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 18 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GHMCC

18 August 1944

SUBJECT: Directive

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. XII Corps (4th Armd Div, 35th Inf Div and Corps troops) will -

a. Hold ORLEANS with minimum force.
b. Maintain an armored combat command in vicinity of LA LOUPE (R0608)

c. Move the bulk of XII Corps to an area south of JANVILLE (W6572) as shown on overlay.
d. Push reconnaissance to the east.

2. New temporary boundaries between Corps are as shown on attached overlay.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 SEC TEL NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 19 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD US ARMY

TO: CG XII CORPS

CONFIRMING TELEPHONIC INSTRUCTIONS PAREN FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN MOVE CCB FOURTH ARMD DIV FROM VIC LA LOUPE AT ONCE TO REJOIN DIV

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 SEC TEL NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 19 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO: CG XV CORPS

XIX CORPS OPERATING YOUR LEFT PD PAREN FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN INTERARMY BOUNDARY EURE RIVER FROM LOUVIERS TO DREUX INCL TO THIRD ARMY CMA CHATEAUNEUF TO FIRST ARMY CMA NOGENT LE ROTROU AND LE MANS TO BOTH ARMIES PD COORDINATE WITH XIX CORPS PD CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION ON LOUVIERS AND ELBEUF UNTIL RELIEVED BY ELMS XIX CORPS THEN FIFTH ARMD DIV WILL RETURN MANTES GASSICOURT PD WITHDRAW YOUR RGH ELMS FROM SEES DASH DREUX LINE WHEN RELIEVED BY XIX CORPS

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 SEC TEL NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 19 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO: CG VIII CORPS

WHEN RELIEVED BY EIGHT THREE INF DIV THREE ONE NINE INF WILL MOVE TO VIC ST CALAIS VIA ANY ROUTE SOUTH OF LAVAL DASH LE MANS HIGHWAY PD PAREN FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN SEND LN O TO THIS HQ AT ONCE PD SECOND CAV GP DETACHED FROM VIII CORPS AND PASSES TO XII CORPS CONTROL UPON ARRIVAL AT POINT TO BE DESIGNATED BY XII CORPS PD SEND LN O TO CP XII CORPS PAREN VIC CLOYES PAREN FOR MOVEMENT INSTRUCTIONS AT ONCE.

NO SIG

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 20 Aug 44

AG 370.2 - GNMCC

Subject: Directive .

To: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, US Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, US Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, US Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, US Army

1. Third U S Army will -

a. Attack early 21 August to seize and secure bridgeheads east of the YONNE RIVER at SENS and east of the SEINE RIVER at MONTEREAU and MELUN.
b. Complete the reduction of the BRITTANY Peninsula.
c. Hold bridgehead east of the SEINE RIVER at MANTES GASSICOURT and deny use of crossing sites to the enemy as far north as LOUVIERES until relieved by elements of First U S Army.

2. VIII Corps (2d Inf Div, 8th Inf Div, 29th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Complete reduction of BRITTANY Peninsula.
b. Protect south flank of the Army within zone.

3. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 4th Armd and supporting troops) will -

a. Attack east within zone.
b. Seize and hold a bridgehead east of YONNE RIVER at SENS.
c. Protect south flank of Army
d. Be prepared for further advances to east, northeast or north.

4. XV Corps (79th Inf Div, 5th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Hold bridgehead east of the SEINE RIVER at MANTES GASSICOURT and deny use of crossing sites to the enemy as far north as LOUVIERES until relieved by elements of First U S Army.
b. Be prepared to advance east from MANTES GASSICOURT or advance southeast west of the SEINE.

5. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Attack east within zone.
b. Seize and hold bridgeheads east of SEINE RIVER at MONTEREAU and MELUN.
c. Be prepared for further advance to east, northeast or north.

6. See current administrative instructions.

7. a. Axes Signal Communication.
(1) Third U S Army - LE MANS - BROU - PITHIVIERS
(2) VIII Corps - LESNEVEN - to be announced.
(3) XII Corps - CLOYES - to be announced.
(4) XV Corps - HOUDAN - to be announced.
(5) XX Corps - COURVILLE - to be announced.

b. Command Posts.
(1) Third U S Army - Z355485
(2) VIII Corps - LESNEVEN
(3) XII Corps - W160500
(4) XV Corps - R505450
(5) XX Corps - R165300

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U S Army,
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC,
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HGM
Date: 21 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

21 August 1944

SUBJECT: Change in Temporary Boundary

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps
Commanding General, XII Corps
Commanding General, XV Corps
Commanding General, XX Corps

Temporary Army boundary shown on operations overlay inclosure to Directive, this headquarters, 20 August 1944, AG 370.2 GNMCC, has been changed as follows:

LE MANS (Z4037) (to Third Army, open to First Army traffic) - BONNETABLE (V5779) (to First Army) - NOGENT LE ROTROU (V8892) (to First Army, open to Third Army traffic - COURVILLE SUR EURE - (R2003) (to First Army) - DREUX (R3235) - road on west bank of EURE River to its junction with the SEINE River (all inclusive to Third Army). Third Army to have running rights on the NOGENT LE ROTROU - DREUX road until Third Army dumps in the vicinity are cleared.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL
/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 23 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

23 August 1944

SUBJECT: Plans for Operations

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. VIII Corps (2d Inf Div, 8th Inf Div, 29th Inf Div, 83d Inf 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Complete reduction of BRITTANY PENINSULA.
b. Protect south flank of Army along LOIRE RIVER as far east as ORLEANS (exclusive).

2. Plan "A" (to be executed on Army order only - after 241000B Aug)

a. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

(1) Advance north and seize ST. JUST - BEAUVAIS - GISORS road within zone.
(2) Protect right (south and east) flank of Army from ORLEANS (inclusive) to the east. 319th Inf (Mtz) will remain in an area northeast of ORLEANS for this purpose.
(3) Be prepared for further advance.

b. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

(1) Complete securing of present crossings at MELUN and MONTEREAU.
(2) Advance north and seize ST. JUST - BEAUVAIS - GISORS road within zone (PARIS exclusive).
(3) Contact elements XV Corps holding bridgehead at MANTES GASSICOURT.
(4) Be prepared for further advance.

c. (1) Axes Signal Communication.
(a) Third U S Army - BROU - To be announced.
(b) XII Corps - MONTARGIS - To be announced.
(c) XX Corps - MILLY - To be announced.

(2) Command Posts -
(a) Third U S Army - BROU (W105815)
(b) XII Corps - MONTARGIS (X180515) - To be reported.
(c) XX Corps - MILLY (X105920 - To be reported.

3. Plan "B" (to be executed on Army order only-after 241000B Aug)

a. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

(1) Advance east within zone.
(2) Seize and secure a bridgehead east of the SEINE RIVER at TROYES.
(3) Protect south flank of Army from ORLEANS (inclusive) to the east. 319th Inf (Mtz) will remain in an area northeast of ORLEANS for this purpose.
(4) Be prepared for further advance to the east.

b. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

(1) Advance east within zone.
(2) Seize and secure NOGENT SUR SEINE.
(3) Be prepared for further advance to the east.

c. (1) Axes Signal Communication
(a) Third U S Army - BROU - PITHIVIERS - SENS - TROYES.
(b) XII Corps - MONTARGIS - To be announced.
(c) XX Corps - MILLY - To be announced.

(2) Command Posts -
(a) Third U S Army - BROU (W105815) - To be reported.
(b) XII Corps - MONTARGIS (X180515) - To be reported.
(c) XX Corps - MILLY (X105920).

4. a. 80th Inf Div (319th Inf) and 90th Inf Div will be assigned to Corps on Army order as soon as these divisions can be moved from present locations.

b. XII Corps will withdraw reconnaissance elements along LOIRE RIVER west of ORLEANS when relieved by VIII Corps.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TTLE NO: 32 INITIALS: Date: 23 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO : CG XII CORPS

RESTRICTIONS CGR FOURTH ARMD DIV REMOVED PD PAREN FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN YOU MAY MOVE THIS CC EAST TO REJOIN DIV AT ONCE PD THREE ONE NINE INF WILL REMAIN VIC PRESENT AREA PD IT WILL PROTECT ARMY SOUTH FLANK ORLEANS PAREN INCL PAREN TO EAST PD THREE ONE NINE INF WILL BE MOTORIZED PD

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR G-3 Sec Tele No. 32 Initials Date 24 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION Secret PRECEDENCE URGENT

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO : CG XII CORPS
CG XX CORPS

EXECUTE PLAN B PAREN FROM CG THIRD US ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN BUT BE PREPARED TO CHANGE DIRECTION AND EXECUTE PLAN A ON ARMY ORDER.

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

25 August 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: VIII CORPS, Attention G-3

To permit the XII Corps to move east without delay it is necessary that you relieve their elements now protecting the south flank of the Army along the LOIRE River west of ORLEANS just as soon as possible.

Please let me know when this relief can be effected.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 25 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

25 August 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO : Commanding General, XII Corps
Commanding General, XX Corps

1. Third U S Army will seize and secure a bridgehead along the line REIMS - CHALONS - VITRY.

a. XII Corps (4th Armd Div, 35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and supporting troops)

(1) Upon securing bridgehead at TROYES will move on Army order within zone to seize and secure bridgehead vicinity of CHALONS.
(2) Protect Army south flank, using adequate force to hold the line ORLEANS - MONTARGIS - SENS - TROYES inclusive.

b. XX Corps (7th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div (attached) and supporting troops)

Upon securing bridgehead at NOGENT, will move on Army order within zone to seize and secure bridgehead vicinity of REIMS.

2. Prior to reaching the line REIMS - CHALONS - VITRY it is probable that the XV Corps will enter the Third U S Army zone to operate on the north. When so committed it will seize and secure bridgehead vicinity of REIMS; XX Corps will seize and secure bridgehead vicinity of CHALONS; and XII Corps will seize and secure bridgehead vicinity of VITRY. This will necessitate a change of direction to the east and new boundaries will be prescribed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 26 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO : CG XII CORPS
CG XX CORPS

XX CORPS WILL MOVE BETWEEN 271200B AND 271800B WITHIN ZONE TO SEIZE AND SECURE BRIDGEHEAD VIC REIMS PD PAREN FROM CG THIRD US ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN XII CORPS WILL MOVE 280600B WITHIN ZONE TO SEIZE AND SECURE BRIDGEHEAD VIC CHALONS PD CONTACT MUST BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN CORPS PD

NO SIG

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 26 Aug 44

AG 370.2 - GNMCC

Subject: Operational Directive.

To : Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army.

1. When released by First U S Army you will be prepared to move your Corps, less 79th Infantry Division and 5th Armored Division, via RAMBOUILLET - ETAMPES - FONTAINEBLEAU to an assembly area in the vicinity of NANGIS (S5206) - MAISON-ROUGE (S6206) - ST HILLIERS (S7012) - BELOM-BAZOCHES (S7021) - ROZAY-EN-BRIE (S4920).

2. Details of movement including time and routes will be supplied later. Hold staff officer available on call prepared to meet a representative of this headquarters at Advance Command Post, First U S Army, to effect final movement details.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, U S Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX,
Colonel GSC,
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: CS TELE NO: 102 INITIALS: DATE: 27 Aug 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: URGENT (RADIO)

TO: CG 6TH ARMORED DIVISION (ATTN CHIEF OF STAFF)

ALERT CCB TO MARCH NOT LATER THAN TWO EIGHT ONE TWO ZERO ZERO ON ORLEANS VIA NORTH BANK LOIRE RIVER CLEARING ENEMY FROM NORTH BANK EAST OF NANTES STOP TO CG SIXTH ARMORED DIVISION ATTN CHIEF OF STAFF FROM CG THIRD ARMY BY GROW SIGNED PATTON STOP COMPOSITION FOUR FOUR INF SIX NINE TANK TWO ONE TWO FA RC CO AND ONE CO TD TR BAKER OR CHARLIE EIGHT SIX RCN ONE CO TWO FIVE ENGR STOP CCA AND EIGHT SIX RCN TAKE OVER LORIENT FRONT WITH REMAINING TROOPS MAKING MINIMUM CHANGES STOP REDUCE OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY WHERE NECESSARY STOP DIV TNS SUPPORT CCB WITH MINIMUM NECESSARY EFFECTING RESUPPLY FROM NORTH FLANK

GROW

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 30 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC 30 August 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirming orders issued 29 August 1944).

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Third U S Army will -

a. Advance to the east to seize and secure a bridgehead east of the RIVER MEUSE from VERDUN to COMMERCY (both inclusive).
b. Be prepared for further advance to seize crossings of the RHINE RIVER from MANNHEIM to KOBLENZ.
c. Complete reduction of BRITTANY PENINSULA.
d. Protect south flank along the LOIRE RIVER and as far east as NEUFCHATEAU (Z485750).

2. VIII Corps (2d Inf Div, 8th Inf Div, 29th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Complete reduction of BRITTANY PENINSULA.
b. Protect south flank of the Army along the LOIRE RIVER as far east as ORLEANS (exclusive).

3. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Seize and secure bridgehead east of RIVER MEUSE from ST MIHIEL to COMMERCY (both inclusive).
b. Be prepared for further advance to the east.
c. Protect south flank of the Army from ORLEANS (inclusive to NEUFCHATEAU (Z485750).

4. XV Corps will -

a. Concentrate headquarters and Corps troops in the NANGIS - PROVINS - COULOMMIERS area.
b. Be prepared -
(1) To assume command of 2d Fr Armd Div upon arrival in Army area.
(2) To operate within Army area upon order.

5. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

a. Seize and secure a bridgehead east of the RIVER MEUSE from ST MIHIEL (exclusive) to VERDUN (Inclusive).
b. Be prepared for further advance to the east.

6. a. Axes of Signal Communication.
(1) Third U S Army - VILLENEUVE (X855740) - CHALONS SUR MARNE - to be announced.
(2) VIII Corps - LESNEVEN - to be announced.
(3) XII Corps - VILLADIN (X995755) - to be announced.
(4) XV Corps - LA CHAPELLE IGER (S535180) - to be announced.
(5) XX Corps - LOURVOIS (T360623) - to be announced.

b. Command Posts.
(1) Third US Army - VILLENEUVE (X855740) - to be announced.
(2) VIII Corps - LESNEVEN - to be reported.
(3) XII Corps - VILLADIN (X995755) - to be reported.
(4) XV Corps - COURPALAY (S485165) - to be reported.
(5) XX Corps - LOURVOIS (T360623) - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H. G. M.
Date: 29 Aug 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC 29 August 1944

SUBJECT: Change in Army Boundary.

TO : See Distribution.

Pursuant to instructions received from Twelfth Army Group the Army boundary is changed, effective at once, as follows:

MELUN (S2505) - GUIGNES (S3616) - PEZARCHES (S5126) - COULOMMIERS (S5834) - CHATEAU THIERRY (S8358) - FISMES (T0586) - PONTAVERT (T1697) - Thence along the AISNE RIVER and ARDENNES CANAL to SEDAN (09925) - LUZERY (P5556) - WEISWAMPACH (P8172) all inclusive to First Army; running rights to Third Army through CHATEAU THIERRY.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

/s/ H. G. Maddox
/t/ H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SEPTEMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 2 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Urgent

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO: CG VIII CORPS

EXTEND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY TO MONTARGIS PAREN INCLUSIVE PAREN UTILIZING COMBAT COMMAND BAKER SIXTH ARMD DIV PAREN TO CG VIII CORPS FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN COMBAT COMMAND BAKER HAS BEEN NOTIFIED PD YOU SHOULD INFORM SIXTH ARMD DIV PD COMBAT COMMAND BAKER WILL KEEP CONTACT WITH EIGHT THREE INF DIV ON WEST AND THREE FIVE INF DIV ON EAST

NO SIG

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HDM
Date: 5 Sept 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC 5 September 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Third U S Army will -

a. Advance to the east with two Corps abreast; one Corps initially covering right (south) flank and later advancing to the east.
b. Seize bridgehead east of the MOSELLE RIVER.
c. Continue advance to the east to seize a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER from KOBLENTZ (exclusive) to KARLSRUHE (inclusive).

2. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will, without delay -

a. Seize METZ, advance east of the MOSELLE RIVER within zone, continue advance rapidly to the northeast to seize MAINZ and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone.
b. Be prepared to continue advance to seize FRANKFURT, on Army order.
c. Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north).

3. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will, without delay -

a. Seize NANCY and secure a bridgehead east of the MOSELLE RIVER within zone.
b. Protect south flank of Army until relieved by elements of XV Corps.
c. Be prepared to continue advance rapidly to the northeast, on Army order, to seize MANNHEIM and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone.

4. XV Corps (79th Inf Div, 83rd Inf Div, 2d Fr Armd Div and supporting troops) will, without delay -

a. Move Corps troops and 2d Fr Armd Div (upon release by First U S Army) to an area southeast of TROYES.
b. Protect the south flank of the Army from MONTARGIS (exclusive) to the east, relieving elements of XII Corps.
c. Move 79th Inf Div (upon release by First U S Army) to a concentration area southeast of TROYES.
d. Direct the 83d Inf Div (upon release by VIII Corps) to move to an area selected by XV Corps.
e. Seize line of MOSELLE RIVER within zone.
f. Be prepared to -
(1) Continue advance to the northeast to seize KARLSRUHE and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone, or
(2) Move through bridgeheads secured by XII Corps or XX Corps.

5. Army Reserve -

6th Armd Div (upon being released by VIII Corps) will be moved to an area east of TROYES as Army reserve.

6. a. Axes of Signal Communication.
(1) Third U S Army - CHALONS - VERDUN - METZ - SAARBRUCKEN FRANKFURT.
(2) XII Corps - BAR LE DUC - NANCY - SAARBURG - ISSENBOURG.
(3) XV Corps - CHATILLON - CHAUMONT - NEUFCHATEAU - to be announced.
(4) XX Corps - VERDUN - METZ - SAARLAUTERN - LEBACH - BIRKENFELD - MARTINSTEIN - KREUZNACH - MAINZ.

b. Command Posts.
(1) Third U S Army - Vicinity CHALONS (T650420) - to be announced.
(2) XII Corps - Vicinity BAR LE DUC (U172175) - to be reported.
(3) XV Corps - Vicinity NANGIS (S535185) - to be reported.
(4) XX Corps - Vicinity VERDUN (U245615) - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

10 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Commanding General, XV Corps.

In conformance with Operational Directive, this Headquarters, 5 September 1944, you will:

a. Move without delay to seize and secure bridgehead east of MOSELLE RIVER within zone.

b. Leave behind only the minimum force necessary to cover south flank from MONTARGIS to CHAUMONT, inclusive.

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, USA,
Chief of Staff.

Copies sent to:

CG, XII Corps
CG, XX Corps
CG, CCB 6th Armd Div

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 12 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY TELE NO: 32 INITIALS:

TO: CG XV CORPS

NO ADDITIONAL INFANTRY DIVISION AVAILABLE FOR ATTACHMENT YOUR CORPS PAREN TO CG XV CORPS FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER SIXTH ARMD DIV TAKING OVER PROTECTION SOUTH FLANK AS FAR EAST AS TROYES PAREN INCLUSIVE PAREN PD XV CORPS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTION SOUTH FLANK FROM TROYES PAREN EXCLUSIVE PAREN TO THE EAST.

NO SIG

S-E-C-R-E-T

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 12 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO: CO, CCB, 6TH ARMORED DIVISION

INFORMATION TO: CG, NINTH U S ARMY
CG, XV CORPS

PER ORAL INSTRUCTIONS TWELFTH ARMY GROUP YOU ARE NOW RELEASED TO THIRD U S ARMY. MOVE EARLY 13 SEPTEMBER VIA ROUTE N60 TO DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY AREA EAST OF TROYES. FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC. REPORT ARRIVAL AND EXACT LOCATION TO THIS HEADQUARTERS AND TO XV CORPS. EXPECT REMAINDER OF DIVISION TO BE RELEASED SOON FOR MOVEMENT TO SAME ASSEMBLY AREA.

NO SIG

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SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 12 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Urgent

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO: CG XV CORPS

ESTABLISH CONTACT WITHOUT DELAY WITH SEVENTH U S ARMY PAREN TO CG XV CORPS FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN VICINITY BAIGNEUX PAREN NAN SEVEN FOUR NINE ONE PAREN MAINTAINING CONTINUOUS CONTACT THEREAFTER.

S-E-C-R-E-T

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 13 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Urgent

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO: CG XV CORPS

TAKE NEUFCHATEAU PAREN TO CG XV CORPS FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN REPORT WHEN CAPTURED THEN CONTINUE ON ASSIGNED MISSION.

NO SIG

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 15 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Operational Priority

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO : CO, CCB 6TH ARMD DIV

INFORMATION: CG, XV CORPS

CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER SIXTH ARMD DIV WILL EXTEND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AS FAR EAST AS MARNE RIVER AT CHAUMONT RELIEVING ELEMENTS XV CORPS PD PAREN TO CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER SIXTH ARMD DIV INFORMATION TO XV CORPS FROM THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER REMAINS UNDER COMMAND THIRD ARMY

NO SIG

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S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 16 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Urgent

FROM: CG THIRD U S ARMY

TO : CG 6TH ARMD DIV
CG CCB 6TH ARMD DIV

INFORMATION: CG XV CORPS

SIXTH ARMD DIV PAREN MINUS PAREN WILL MOVE WITHOUT DELAY UPON RELEASE BY NINTH ARMY TO AREA EAST OF TROYES PD PAREN TO CG SIXTH ARMD DIV CMA CG CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER SIXTH ARMD DIV CMA INFORMATION TO CG XV CORPS FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC PAREN CHARLIE CHARLIE BAKER SIXTH ARMD DIV MOVE WITHOUT DELAY TO VICINITY NEUFCHATEAU PD CONTINUE PATROLS TO THE SOUTH PD REPORT ARRIVAL TO THIS HEADQUARTERS

NO SIG

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HBM
Date: 16 Sept 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC 16 September 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No. 2 to Operational Directive, 5 September 1944.

TO: Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Boundaries.

a. Corps boundaries given in Operational Directive, this headquarters, dated 5 September 1944, as changed by Amendment No. 1, this headquarters, dated 11 September 1944, are further changed as shown on attached operations overlay.

b. Boundary between First and Third U S Armies remains unchanged.

c. Boundary between Third and Seventh Armies will be announced later.

2. Missions.

a. XX Corps -
(1) Continue advance to seize FRANKFURT.
(2) Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north).

b. XII Corps - Continue advance rapidly to the northeast, to seize DARMSTADT and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone.

c. XV Corps-
(1) Advance to the northeast on Army order, echeloned to the right rear of XII Corps.
(2) Protect right (south) flank of the Army and maintain contact with Seventh U S Army.
(3) Be prepared to:
(a) Seize MANNHEIM and secure a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER within zone, or
(b) Move through bridgehead secured by XII Corps or XX Corps.

3. a. Axes of Signal Communication.
(1) Third U S Army - VERDUN - SAARBRUCKEN - KAISERLAUTERN-FRANKFURT.
(2) XX Corps - CONFLANS - LEBACH - BIRKENFELD - MARTINSTEIN - BINGEN - WIESBADEN.
(3) XII Corps - TOUL - NANCY - CHATEAUSALINS - SAARGEMUND HOMBURG - KAISERLAUTERN - WORMS.
(4) XV Corps - BOULAINCOURT (2771770) - CHARMES - to be announced.

b. Command Posts.
(1) Third U S Army - Vicinity VERDUN (U465650) - to be announced.
(2) XX Corps - Vicinity CONFLANS (U675600) - to be reported.
(3) XII Corps - Vicinity TOUL (U560100) - to be reported.
(4) XV Corps - Vicinity MIREGOURT (2755765) - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 18 Sept 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

18 September 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO: Commanding General, XV Corps, APO 436, U S Army

1. Reference Amendment No 2 to Operational Directive, 5 September 1944, dated 16 September, XV Corps will cross the MOSELLE RIVER and move northeast to secure the line LUNEVILLE - BADENVILLER between Corps left north boundary and a line BACCARAT - BLAMONT.

2. Reconnoiter to the northeast within zone and be prepared for further advance.

3. Protect right (south) flank of Army.

4. Maintain contact with Seventh Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

19 September 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Commanding General, XX Corps.

1. Indications are that there exists on the north flank, in the vicinity of THIONVILLE and to the north, a continued threat which might result in an attempt by the enemy to cross the MOSELLE RIVER in that vicinity, in a force large enough to become a considerable nuisance to your Corps and the Third Army as a whole. It is therefore desired that you keep a sufficient force in that locality to cope with this possible situation. It is thought that, in addition to the Regimental Combat Team and the Cavalry which are now covering that flank, some tank and Tank Destroyer elements in addition to anti-tank guns should be employed there.

2. For the present, it is believed that the 90th Division, less the elements protecting the north flank, mentioned above, should be employed against the perimeter defense to the west of METZ in order to contain it, while the 5th Division and the 7th Armored Division are proceeding on their assigned objectives.

By command of the ARMY COMMANDER:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, USA,
Chief of Staff.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

ORIGINATOR: G-3 Sec TELE NO: 32 INITIALS: DATE: 21 Sept 44

CLASSIFICATION: Secret PRECEDENCE: Urgent

MEET DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF THIRD ARMY ARRIVING BRICY AIRFIELD (W547497) AT 221100A SEPT. HE WILL DISCUSS MOVEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF DIVISION. TO CG 83D INF DIV FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCC. ARRANGE TO MEET 3327 AND 402 QM TRUCK COMPANIES MOVING TO REACH JUNCTION OF N60 AND N50 AT LADON(X1247) BETWEEN 221300A AND 221500A SEPTEMBER TO MOVE ONE RGT TO VICINITY REMICH (L0206). CG OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO RETURN WITH DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THIS HEADQUARTERS THEN TO GO TO CP XX CORPS TO ARRANGE DETAILS OF IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF ENTIRE DIVISION.

NO SIG

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HJM
Date: 23 Sep 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

23 September 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO: Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Temporary boundary between Third and First U S Armies is announced as follows: LONGUYON (U4595) (to First Army) - WALTERLANGE (P8418) - BOLLENDORF (L0140) - DAUN (L3577) (all to Third Army).

2. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 7th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

a. Continue present mission.

b. Extend area of responsibility to the temporary boundary indicated in paragraph 1 effective as 83d Infantry Division closes by successive elements in this area. Particular attention will be given to the protection of the city of LUXEMBOURG. Coordinate with Commanding General, V Corps.

c. Protect left (north) flank of Army.

d. Maintain contact with First U S Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
ADTH: CG, Third Army:
DATE: 26 Sept 1944
INIT: _____

25 September 1944

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction No. 4

TO : Corps Commanders and the Commanding General XIX Tactical Air Command.

1. The acute supply situation confronting us has caused the Supreme Commander to direct that until further orders, the Third Army, with its supporting troops, and those elements of the Ninth Army placed in the line, will assume the defensive.

2. It is evident that the successful accomplishment of this mission will require particular concentration upon two points:

a. First, this change in attitude on our part must be completely concealed from the enemy, who, should he learn of it, would certainly move troops from our front to oppose other Allied Armies.

b. Second, we must be in possession of a suitable line of departure so that we can move rapidly when the Supreme Commander directs us to resume the offensive.

3. In order to carry out the requirements of Paragraph 2a, above, we will not dig in, wire, or mine, but will utilize a thin outpost zone backed at suitable places by powerful mobile reserves. We will further insure that all possible avenues of tank attack are registered in by all batteries,--Division, Corps, and Army,--whose guns can bear. Under the supervision of the Army Artillery Officer these zones of concentration will be numbered from north to south and recorded on a uniform map to be distributed to the units concerned, so that fire may instantly be opened in any zone. Further, a copy of this map will be placed in the possession of the Commanding General XIX Tactical Air Command so that he may coordinate the concentration of planes upon any critical area in the most expeditious manner. Counter-attacks by our mobile reserves should be planned and executed to secure double envelopment of the hostile effort with the purpose of not only defeating it but destroying it.

4. To insure our possessing a suitable line of departure for the future offensive, we shall secure the dotted line shown on the attached overlay by means of limited operations in consonnance with our reduced scale of supply. To provide the necessary means for such limited operations, the utmost parsimony will be used in the expenditure of gasoline and ammunition consistent with the economy of the lives of our troops.

5. Wherever circumstances permit, troops not in the immediate presence of the enemy will be billeted. As soon as the troops so billeted have rested and been equipped, they will be given constant practice in offensive tactics.

6. The defensive instructions contained in this letter will not be circulated below the grade of General Officer.

7. In closing, I desire to again compliment all of you on the magnificent dash and skill which you have shown in the operation to date. We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest.

G. S. PATTON, JR.,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: SECRET :
: Auth: CG, TUSA :
: Init: HGM :
: Date: 28 Sept 44 :

AG 370.2 GNMCC

28 September 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Information.

a. Sixth Army Group continues its attack to the northeast to seize the RHINE crossings south of SPEYER (inclusive).

b. First US Army will clear the area between its left (north) boundary and the MEUSE RIVER and protect the right flank of 21 Army Group. It will be prepared to resume its advance to the RHINE in the vicinity of KOLN and BONN. It will move V Corps to the north when relieved by elements of Ninth U S Army.

c. Ninth U S Army will take over the present front of V Corps. Upon its arrival in the line Ninth U S Army will contain the enemy on its front. As additional units become available it will extend its front south to include METZ, relieving Third U S Army elements in this area.

2. a. Third U S Army will:

(1) Improve present positions by local attacks to seize and secure the line of departure delineated in Letter of Instruction No 4, Headquarters Third U S Army, 25 September 1944.
(2) Continue aggressive reconnaissance.
(3) Be prepared to resume the advance to the northeast to secure crossings of the RHINE and seize the FRANKFURT DARMSTADT area.

b. Boundary Change.

Between Sixth Army Group and Twelfth Army Group: CHAUMONT (Z0749) (inclusive to Sixth Army Group) - NEUFCHATEAU (Z4875) (inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - DAMELEVIERS (V0196) - HEDIVILLER (Q0101) - South bank MARNE RHINE CANAL - HEMING (Q4311) - SAARESBOURG (SAARBURG) (Q5015) - LANDAU (R2866) - HEIDELBERG (R7090)(all inclusive to Sixth Army Group).

3. Corps Missions.

a. XII Corps will:

(1) As set forth in Letter of Instruction No 4, Headquarters Third U S Army, 25 September 1944:
(a) Seize and secure high ground in vicinity of CHATEAU SALINS and along general line VIGNY (U912421) - MONCHEUX (U975385) - LANEUVEVILLE-EN-SAULNOIS (Q045906) (all inclusive).
(b) Improve position from CHATEAU SALINS to boundary between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups to contact elements of Seventh Army vicinity of AVRICOURT (Q315062) (exclusive).
(c) Maintain aggressive reconnaissance.
(2) Protect right (south) flank of Army and maintain contact with Seventh U S Army.
(3) Be prepared to resume advance to secure RHINE crossings and seize DARMSTADT.

b. XX Corps will:

(1) As set forth in Letter of Instruction No 4, Headquarters Third U S Army, 25 September 1944:
(a) Reduce enemy forts to consolidate line shown on overlay.
(b) Seize and hold bridgehead east of SEILLE RIVER along general line MARLY (U845525) - FLEURY (U875502) (both inclusive) - VIGNY (U912421) (exclusive).
(c) Maintain aggressive reconnaissance.
(2) Be prepared to:
(a) Continue advance to secure RHINE crossings and seize WIESBADEN and FRANKFURT.
(b) Protect left (north) flank of the Army.

c. Priority for support of Corps missions:

(1) First Priority - XX Corps (Forts).
(2) Second Priority - XII Corps (CHATEAU SALINS area).
(3) Third Priority - XII Corps (high ground along general line VIGNY (U912421) - MONCHEUX (U975385) - LANEUVEVILLE-EN-SAULNOIS (Q045906).

4. Under the supervision of the Army Artillery Officer, all possible avenues of tank attack will be plotted and data prepared. These concentrations will be numbered from north to south and the accomplished fire charts will be given proper distribution so that a maximum amount of artillery fire and air can be brought to bear on any zone.

4. a. Axes of Signal Communication.

(1) Third U S Army - ETAIN - NANCY - SAARBRUCKEN - KAISERSLAUTERN - FRANKFURT.
(2) XII Corps - NANCY - CHATEAU SALINS - SAARGEMUND - HOMBURG - KAISERLAUTERN - WORMS.
(3) XX Corps - CONFLANS - LEBACH - MARTINSTRIN - BINGEN - WIESBADEN.

b. Command Posts.

(1) Third U S Army - ETAIN - NANCY - to be announced.
(2) XII Corps - NANCY - to be reported.
(3) XX Corps - CONFLANS - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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OCTOBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

. SECRET .
.Auth: CG, TUSA .
.Init: .
.Date: 12 Oct 44.

AG 370.2 GNMCC

12 October 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO : Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army.

Confirming verbal orders issued 11 October 1944, XX Corps will:

1. Contain enemy defenses in the METZ area, withdrawing force from FORT DRIANT.

2. Employ newly-assigned divisions to replace divisions which have been continuously engaged to permit:

a. Resting of troops.

b. Reorganization, refitting and preparation for further offensive action.

c. Training of newly-assigned divisions.

3. Maintain aggressive reconnaissance and continue coverage of all possible avenues of tank approach.

4. Maintain contact with Ninth U S Army on left (North)

5. Be prepared to advance on Army order to secure RHINE crossings and seize WIESBADEN and FRANKFURT.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

. TOP SECRET .
.Auth: CG, TUSA .
.Init: _____ .
.Date: 18 Oct 44 .

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 18 October 1944

SUBJECT: Outline Plans for Resumption of the Offensive.

TO : See distribution.

1. Attached are Outline Plans "A" and "B" for the Resumption of the Offensive by Third U S Army when the supply situation will permit. These plans are transmitted to you so that you may proceed with more detailed planning.

2. To effectively make your own plans you will, of course, be compelled to discuss these plans with others. Due to the extreme secrecy it is desired be attached to them, however, you will discuss only so much as is essential to be discussed, and then only with those who must have the information.

3. To be successful with this offensive the dissemination must be held to the absolute minimum so as to reduce the chances of these plans being compromised by falling into enemy hands. Discussion, therefore, will be further limited to Division Commanders and specially selected Staff Officers of Divisions.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

Reg No TUSA 1472

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

OUTLINE PLAN "A" FOR RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE

1. PURPOSE: To present two plans for the resumption of the offensive which may be used as a basis for detailed planning by Third U.S. Army Staff Sections and by Corps. The Operational Directive which will be issued by this headquarters to effect the resumption of the offensive will conform to one of these two plans.

2. ASSUMPTION: It is assumed that:

a. Third U.S. Army will consist of three Corps, six infantry divisions and three armored divisions as follows:

(1) III Corps, XII Corps and XX Corps
(2) 5th, 26th, 35th, 80th, 90th and 95th Infantry Divisions
(3) 4th, 6th and 10th Armored Divisions

b. The boundary between First and Third U.S. Armies will remain as shown on attached overlay.

c. The boundary between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups will be changed to make MANNHEIM (wR5298) inclusive to Sixth Army Group as shown on attached overlay.

d. The XVIII Corps (Airborne) consisting of the 82d and/or 101st Airborne Divisions may assist the advance by seizing a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER in the general area MAINZ (wM3855) (inclusive) - MANNHEIM (wR5298) (exclusive).

e. The XIX Tactical Air Command will furnish adequate air support and medium and heavy bombardment will be available.

3. TENTATIVE PLAN:

a. General Plan.

Third U.S. Army will:

(1) Envelop METZ defensive works from north and south.
(2) Advance northeast within zone to seize the MAINZ (wM3855) - FRANKFURT (wM6567) - DARMSTADT (wM6542) area.
(3) Be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast.

b. Scheme of Maneuver:

(1) Phase One-
(a) Contain METZ on the west.
(b) Cross MOSELLE River north of METZ and seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of BOULAY (wQ1066).
(c) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (vU7735) and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FAULQUEMONT) (wQ1750)
(d) Destroy enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ area and isolate METZ defensive works.
(2) Phase Two - (After METZ area has been neutralized)
(a) Advance northeast with two Corps abreast. One Corps will remain initially in the area northwest of BRIEY (vU6974), advancing on Army order echeloned to the left rear.
(b) Continue advance rapidly to-
1. Establish a bridgehead east of the RHINE RIVER between MAINZ (wM3855) (inclusive) - and MANNHEIM (wR5298) (exclusive).
2. Seize the MAINZ (M3855) - FRANKFURT (wM6567) - DARMSTADT (wM6542) area.
(c) Be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast.

4. CORPS MISSIONS:

a. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 10th Armd Div and supporting troops) will -

(1) Contain METZ defensive works west of the MOSELLE RIVER.
(2) Cross the MOSELLE RIVER in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (vU8687) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (wQ1066).
(3) In conjunction with XII Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ area and be prepared for further advance to northeast.
(4) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:
(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE RIVER between MAINZ (wM3855) and OPPENHEIM (wM4539) (both inclusive).
(b) Seize MAINZ (wM3855) - FRANKFURT (wM6567) area.
(5) Be prepared for further advance to the northeast.

b. XII Corps (26th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div, and supporting troops) will -

(1) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (vU7735) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of FALKENBERG (FAULQUEMONT) (wQ1750).
(2) In conjunction with XX Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ area and be prepared for further advances to northeast.
(3) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:
(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE RIVER between OPPENHEIM (wM4539) and MANNHEIM (wR5298) (both exclusive).
(b) Seize DARMSTADT (wM6542) area.

c. III Corps (and supporting troops) to -

(1) Assemble in an area northwest of BRIEY (vU6974).
(2) Assume command of troops as may be assigned by Army order.
(3) Advance northeast on Army order, echeloned to left rear.

x. (1) In the advance Corps will be disposed in depth with armor in lead; armor to be reinforced by motorized infantry. These leading elements will pass around obstacles and points of resistance wherever possible in order to continue the advance to the RHINE RIVER. Infantry forces following will advance rapidly, clear enemy resistance and consolidate gains.
(2) Reconnaissance will be pushed to maximum in order to seize intact all possible crossings of major river obstacles (e.g. the SAAR and RHINE rivers).

5. a. Axes of Signal Communication.

(1) Third US Army - NANCY (vU8512) - SAARBRUCKEN (wQ4572) - KAISERLAUTERN (wR0794) - WORMS (wM4515) - FRANKFURT (wM6567).
(2) III Corps - BRIEY (vU6974) - To be announced.
(3) XII Corps - NANCY (U8512) - CHATEAU SALINS (wQ1025) - SAARALBEN (Q4845) - SAARGEMUND (wQ5257) - ZWEIBRUCKEN (Q7372) - LANDSTUHL (wQ8890) - KAISERLAUTERN (wR0794) - ALBISHEIM (wM2617).
(4) XX Corps - CONFLANS (vU6465) - THIONVILLE (vU8687) - SAARLAUTERN (wQ2880) - BIRKENFELD (wL5917) - KIRN (wL8032) - BADKREUZNACH (wM0938).

b. Command Posts.

(1) Third U S Army - NANCY (vU8512) - To be announced.
(2) III Corps - BRIEY (vU6974) - To be reported.
(3) XII Corps - NANCY (vU8512) - To be reported.
(4) XX Corps - CONFLANS (vU6465) - To be reported.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

OUTLINE PLAN "B" FOR RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE
(Assumptions and General Plan same as Plan "A").

1. SCHEME OF MANEUVER:

a. Phase One -

(1) Contain METZ on the west.
(2) Seize and secure all possible crossings of the MOSELLE RIVER in the vicinity of THIONVILLE (vU8687), and advance on BOULAY (wQ1066).
(3) Attack northeast, with two Corps abreast, from the PONT-A-MOUSSON- NANCY area to seize rail and road facilities in the vicinity of FALKENBERG (wQ1750) - BOULAY (wQ1066).
(4) Destroy enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ area and isolate METZ defensive works.

b. Phase Two - (After METZ has been neutralized).

(1) Advance northeast with two Corps abreast, one Corps advancing on Army order, initially echeloned to the left rear.
(2) Continuation of the advance to be same as Plan "A".

2. CORPS MISSIONS:

a. XX Corps (1 armored division, 2 infantry divisions and supporting troops) will -

(1) Attack northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON, (vU7735) with one armored and two infantry divisions and -
(a) Seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (wQ1750).
(b) Seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (wQ1066).
(2) In conjunction with III Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ area and be prepared for further advance to northeast.
(3) Continuation of the advance to be the same as Plan "A".

b. XII Corps (2 infantry divisions, 2 armored divisions and supporting troops) will -

(1) Attack northeast from the NANCY area destroying the enemy in its front and protecting the south flank of Third U S Army.
(2) Assist XX Corps in seizing rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (wQ1750).
(3) Continuation of the advance to be same as Plan "A".

c. III Corps (2 infantry divisions, 1 tank group - to be made up of tank battalions detached from infantry divisions, and 1 tank destroyer group) will -

(1) Contain METZ defense works west of the MOSELLE RIVER.
(2) With a minimum of one infantry division, one tank group and one tank destroyer group, seize and secure all possible crossings in the THIONVILLE area.
(3) Attack southeast and assist XX Corps in seizing rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (wQ1066).
(4) Assist XX Corps in destroying any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ area.
(5) Be prepared to advance to the northeast in XX Corps zone echeloned to left rear.
(6) Protect left (north) flank of Third U S Army.

3. a. Axes of Signal Communication.

(1) Third U S Army - Same as Plan "A".
(2) III Corps - BRIEY (vU6974) - THIONVILLE (vU8687) - To be announced.
(3) XII Corps - Same as Plan "A".
(4) XX Corps - Delete THIONVILLE and add PONT-A-MOUSSON (vU7735) - FALKENBERG (FAULQUEMONT) (wQ1750).

b. Command Post.

Same as Plan "A".

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NOVEMBER

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 3 Nov 44

3 November 1944

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance for Crossing Sites.

TO : Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U. S. Army

1. The Army Commander desires that you include in your plans for the ensuing operation the sending of a strong armored reconnaissance force to locate additional crossings of the SAAR RIVER in addition to your main crossing sites in the vicinity of SAARBURG.

2. This reconnaissance force which should consist of approximately a battalion of tanks, a battalion of motorized infantry, and an armored reconnaissance detachment will cross the MOSELLE as soon as crossings are available in your bridgehead; push rapidly east of the SAAR RIVER and secure any bridges which are intact.

For the Army Commander:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 3 Nov 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

3 November 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U.S. Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U.S. Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U.S. Army

1. a. See Inclosure No 2, G-2 Estimate No 10 (to be issued).

b. First and Seventh U S Armies attack subsequent to Third U S Army.

(1) First U S Army will attack in the direction DUREN (wP1246) - KOELN (wP1560) to reach the RHINE RIVER. VIII Corps will maintain present position and be prepared to advance on KOBLENZ (wL9096).
(2) Seventh U S Army will attack to capture or destroy enemy forces west of the RHINE RIVER within its zone. XV Corps will advance on SARREBOURG (wQ5016) and be prepared for further advance.

2. a. Third U S Army will:

(1) Envelop METZ defensive works from north and south and destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from the METZ area.
(2) Advance northeast within zone to seize the MAINZ (wM3855) - FRANKFURT (wM6567) - DARMSTADT (wM6542) area.
(3) Be prepared for further offensive action to the northeast.

b. Time of attack: To be announced.

c. Boundaries:

(1) Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (wQ9311) (inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - CHAUMONT (vZ0850) (inclusive to Sixth Army Group) - NEUFCHATEAU (vZ5075) - MARNE AU RHIN CANAL from CREVIC (wQ0205) to GONDREXANGE (wQ4011) thence along SAAR-KOHLEN KANAL to ALBERSCHAUX (wQ4021) (all inclusive to Twelfth Army Group) - FINSTINGEN (wQ4828) -LEMBERG (wQ9563) FRANKENSTEIN (wR1893) - FRANKENTHAL (wM6504) - SANDHOFEN (wM5205) (all inclusive to Sixth Army Group).
(2) Between First and Third U S Armies: STENAY (vP1502) - LONGUYON (vU4596) - ESCH (vF7302) - SIERCK (wQ0094) - SAARBURG (wL1413) (all inclusive to Third Army) - TRIER (wL2029) - TRARBACH (wL5550) - KOBLENZ (wL9096) (all inclusive to First Army).
(3) Between XII and XX Corps (See Inclosure No 1 - Operations Overlay).

d. XIX Tactical Air Command will provide a detailed air support schedule based on target priorities submitted by XII and XX Corps.

3. a. XII Corps (26th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Advance northeast from vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON (vU7735) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of FALKENBERG (FAULQUEMONT) (wQ1750).
(2) In conjunction with XX Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ area.
(3) Pass control of 80th Inf Div to XX Corps on Army order.
(4) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:
(a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE RIVER within zone.

(b) Seize the DARMSTADT (wM6542) area.
(5) Be prepared for further advance to the northeast.

b. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 83d Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 10th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Contain METZ defensive works west of the MOSELLE RIVER
(2) Cross the MOSELLE RIVER in the vicinity of HORNING-MACKER (vU949) with a minimum of one infantry and one armored division and seize rail and road facilities in vicinity of BOULAY (wQ1066). XX Corps is granted access to the area south of the line BETTEMBURG (vP8203) - REMICH (wL0106) (both inclusive) - see Inclosure No1 (Operations Overlay).
(3) In conjunction with XII Corps, destroy any enemy forces withdrawing from METZ area.
(4) Exercise operational control over the 83d Inf Div which will move across the MOSELLE through an established bridgehead, clear the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR Rivers and seize crossings of the SAAR in the vicinity of SAARBURG. One RCT will remain west of the MOSELLE RIVER.

(5) Assume command of 80th Inf Div on Army order.
(6) Continue advance rapidly to the northeast to:
  (a) Establish a bridgehead east of RHINE RIVER within zone.
  (b) Seize the MAINZ (wM3855) - FRANKFURT (wM6567) area.
(7) Be prepared for further advance to the northeast.

c. III Corps (and supporting troops) will:

(1) Assemble in vicinity of ETAIN (vU4770).
(2) Assume command of troops to be assigned later.
(3) Be prepared to advance northeast on Army order.

d. Artillery: All artillery with the corps will support the attack aggressively. Corps Artillery Commanders will coordinate the location of sound and flash bases, OPs, and fires in adjacent corps or army zones of action. Counter-battery program in the zone of the 5th Inf Div will be coordinated with the XII Corps attack. Communication will be established and liaison officers exchanged by adjacent Corps Artillery and by flank Division Artillery of adjacent Corps, to include flank divisions of adjacent armies. Ground, air, map and photo reconnaissance will be pushed with view to maintaining maximum support as attack progresses. Arty/R will be available for search, adjustment and surveillance missions. Air OPs will maintain counter-flak patrols during Arty/R missions and close support air bombardment.

e. Timing of Attack:

26th, 35th and 80th Inf Divs: D Day.
4th and 6th Armd Divs: Cross river when crossings are secure and bridges constructed (by D/1).
90th Inf Div: Night of D Day.
95th Inf Div: Six hours prior to 90th Inf Div attack vigorous reconnaissance in force will be pushed across river in division zone prepared to exploit gains on Corps order.
10th Armd Div: Corps order.
83d Inf Div: Corps order.
5th Inf Div: Corps order as soon as the advance of XII Corps will permit.

x. (1) XII Corps will seize the high ground east of the SEILLE RIVER between CHEMINOT (vU8339) and ARLEY (vU8696). XX Corps will move elements of its south division and take over this area promptly to insure the uninterrupted advance of XII Corps.
(2) After the initial crossings, corps will advance disposed in depth with armor in lead; armor reinforced by motorized infantry. Leading elements will by-pass obstacles and points of resistance wherever possible in order to continue the advance to the RHINE RIVER. Infantry forces following will advance rapidly, clear enemy resistance and consolidate gains.
(3) Reconnaissance will be pushed to the maximum in order to seize intact all possible crossings of major river obstacles (e.g. the SAAR and RHINE Rivers).

4. Administrative details to be issued.

5. a. Axes of Signal Communication.

(1) Third U S Army - NANCY (vU8512) - SAARBRUCKEN (wQ4572) KAISERSLAUTERN (wR0394) - WORMS (wM4515) - FRANKFURT (wM6567).
(2) III Corps - ETAIN (vU4770) - To be announced.
(3) XII Corps - NANCY (vU8512) - CHATEAU SALINS (wQ1025) SAARALBEN (wQ1845) - SAARGEMUND (wQ5257) - ZWEIBRUCKEN (wQ7372) - LANDSTUHL (wQ8890) - KAISERSLAUTERN (wR0394) - ALBISHEIM (wR2617).
(4) XX Corps - JARNY (vU6563) - HIRONVILLE (vU8685) - SAARBURG (wL3413) - OTTENHAUSEN (wL4611) - ST WENDEL (wQ5996) - BAUMHOLDER (wL7113) - MEISENHEIM (wL9923) - BAD KREUZNACH (wM0936) - MAINZ (wM3856) - FRANKFURT (wM6768).

b. Command Posts.

(1) Third U S Army - NANCY (vU8512) - To be announced.
(2) III Corps - ETAIN (vU4770) - To be reported.
(3) XII Corps - NANCY (vU8512) - To be reported.
(4) XX Corps - JARNY (vU6563) - To be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

Reg No TUSA 1583

TOP SECRET

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 5 Nov 44

AG 350.05 GNMCC

5 November 1944

SUBJECT: Target Data

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army.
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army.
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army.

1. a. The Air plan contemplates one or more days of intensive heavy and medium bomber effort in the Third U S Army zone.

b. Heavy bombardment targets are ten forts in the METZ area located as follows:

1	vU875473	6	vU905521
2	vU905487	7	vQ008841
3	vU868828	8	vQ038809
4	vU927879	9	vU964518
5	vU910501	10	vU961519

c. Medium bombardment targets are assembly areas as follows:

A BOIS DE SECOURT (vU920380)
B Woods east of DELME RIDGE (wQ030360)
C DIEUZE (wQ250848)
D FALKENMONT (wQ170600)

d. If heavy bombardment is not available due to weather, medium bombardment priorities then become:

Priority (1) Forts 1 and 2
(2) Forts 3 and 4
(3) BOIS DE SECOURT
(4) Woods east of DELME RIDGE
(5) DIEUZE
(6) FALKENMONT

e. Fort targets 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 may be hit at any time subject to cancellation on twelve (12) hours notice, depending on proximity of friendly troops to target after D day. After D day Fort targets 3 and 4 will be hit only on specific request of Third U S Army.

f. Cancellation of any bomber target requires twelve (12) hours notice. Similarly, any target may be recalled on twelve (12) hours notice.

g. The latest date that close-in targets (e.g., BOIS DE SECOURT on 80th Inf Div front) will be bombed by medium bombardment is DARKNESS on 7 Nov, unless recalled.

2. Third U S Army attacks between 5 and 8 Nov depending on the availability of air support. Under no circumstances will the attack be delayed later than 8 Nov.

3. The code word to announce D day is "PLAY BALL." When this word is sent in a message it means that D day will be the following day; H-hour to be early in the morning, the exact hour to be set by Commanding General, XII Corps.

For the Army Commander:

Reg No TUSA 1592

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 9 Nov 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

9 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, Reg. No. TUSA 1583.

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Classification: The classification of Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1583, dated 3 November 1944, is changed from TOP SECRET to SECRET.

2. Change in Corps Boundary: The new inter-corps boundary shown on Overlay "B", Inclosure No 1, to subject directive, is effective 082400A Nov 44.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 11 Nov 44

AG 370.2 GHMCC 11 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No 2 to Operational Directive, Reg. No. TUSA 1583.

TO : Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

Pursuant to verbal orders received 111730A Nov 44 from Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, 83d Inf Div is relieved from operational control of Third U S Army and reverts to control of First U S Army at once.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 23 Nov 44

AG 370.2 GHMCC 23 November 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No 3 to Operational Directive, Reg No TUSA 1583

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

The boundary between First and Third U S Armies designated in Operational Directive, Hq Third U S Army, Reg No TUSA 1583, dated 3 Nov 44, is adjusted as follows:

STENAY (vP-1502) - LONGUYON (vU-4596) - ESCH (vP-7302) - SIERCK (wQ-0094) (all inclusive to Third U S Army) - thence along the MOSELLE RIVER to KOBLENZ (wL-8995) (all inclusive to First U S Army).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 30 Nov 44

AG 370.2 GHMCC 30 November 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. 6th Cav Gp (Reinf) is attached temporarily to XX Corps at once.

a. Composition:

Hq & Hq Tr, 6th Cav Gp
6th Cav Ron Sq
5th Ranger Bn
Co C, 602d TD Bn
Co B, 293d Engr C Bn
Tr E, 28th Cav Ron Sq

b. 28th Cav Ron Sq (- Tr E) remains on present duty (AIS).

2. XX Corps will utilize 6th Cav Gp (Reinf) to extend and cover its right (south) flank.

3. XII Corps will continue to maintain contact with XX Corps on its left (north).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

S-E-C-R-E-T

DECEMBER

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 1 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GHMCC (CORRECTED COPY) 1 December 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No 4 to Operational Directive, Reg No TUSA 1583

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. The amendments noted below are made in Operational Directive, Headquarters Third U S Army, Reg No TUSA 1583, dated 3 November 1944.

2. Delete paragraph 1b(2) and substitute:

"(2) Seventh U S Army, continuing the offensive in conjunction with Third U S Army, will launch a strong attack west of the PFALZERWALD to breach the SIEGFRIED LINE west of the RHINE and destroy the enemy in zone."

3. Delete paragraph 2c(1) and substitute:

"(1) Between Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups: AUXERRE (wG9311) (to Twelfth Army Group) - CHAUMONT (vZ0850) - *NEUFCHATEAU (vZ5075) (to Sixth Army Group) - MARNE AU RHIN CANAL from CREVIC (wQ0205) to GONDREXANGE (wQ4011) thence along SAAR-KOHLEN KANAL to ALBERSCHAUX (wQ4021) (all to Twelfth Army Group) - FIRSTINGEN (FENETRANGE) (wQ4727) - THAL (wQ5634) (both to Sixth Army Group) - LORENTZEN (LORENZEN) (wQ5939) ROHRBACH (wQ6549) - WEISKIRCH (WEISKIRCHEN) (wQ7156) - WINTERBACH (wQ8078) (all to Twelfth Army Group) - RAMSTEIN (wQ8794) - road junction at (wH0095) (both to Sixth Army Group) - MERLINGEN (wH0899) (to Twelfth Army Group) - EISENBERG (wM2406) - GRUNSTADT (wM3107) - WINDESHEIM GROSS (wM4108) (all to Sixth Army Group) - LAMPERTHEIM (wM5311) (to Twelfth Army Group)."

* Certain installations in NEUFCHATEAU remain under control of Third Army.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-3

S E C R E T

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 4 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

4 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. III Corps (87th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

a. Relieve XX Corps of responsibility in the METZ area. (See overlay). Time of relief will be arranged mutually between III and XX Corps.

b. Employ elements of 87th Inf Div successively upon arrival to relieve elements of 5th Inf Div.

c. Contain forts still resisting by exerting maximum pressure without assaulting directly any major fortifications.

d. Assume responsibility for assignment of all billets and accommodations, both U S and Allied, in the METZ area. Assignment of accommodations for other than III Corps elements will be cleared through this headquarters (G-3 Accommodations Sub-section).

e. Be prepared to:

(1) Assume command of additional troops to be assigned.
(2) Advance on Army order.

2. XX Corps (as presently constituted) will:

a. Relinquish responsibility in METZ area to III Corps. (See overlay).

b. Withdraw 5th Inf Div elements from METZ area successively upon relief by elements of 87th Inf Div.

c. Continue offensive as directed in Operational Directive, this headquarters, Reg No TUSA 1583, dated 3 November 1944, as amended.

3. Artillery:

a. Upon arrival of 87th Inf Div Arty, 5th Inf Div Arty will be relieved.

b. Hq & Hq Btry, III Corps Arty will remain attached to XX Corps temporarily.

c. 244th FA Bn (-B Btry) and B Btry, 558th FA Bn are detached from XX Corps and attached to III Corps.

4. French Forces:

Detachments from 16th and 30th Bns (Chasseurs) now with XX Corps in METZ area are detached from XX Corps and attached to III Corps when responsibility for METZ area passes to III Corps.

5. Certain XX Corps installations located in the METZ area will be moved therefrom as the situation permits. Until such installations can be moved III Corps will grant XX Corps units ready access to them.

6. For administration details see current Administrative Order.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 11 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

11 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Third U S Army continues present mission of advancing northeast within zone to seize MAINZ - FRANKFURT - DARMSTADT area, prepared for further offensive action to the northeast.

2. III Corps (26th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

a. Assume command of 6th Armd Div and temporary control of 6th Cav Gp (Mecz)(Reinf). Assume command of 42d Inf Div upon arrival.

b. Continue present mission. (Operational Directive, this headquarters, dated 4 December 1944).

c. Maintain contact with XII Corps on south and XX Corps on north.

d. Maintain maximum pressure on enemy in zone.

e. Upon completion of refitting of 26th Inf Div drive enemy east of SAAR RIVER within zone on Army order.

f. Seize and secure bridgehead across SAAR RIVER within zone on Army order.

g. Advance northeast and seize NEUNKIRCHEN on Army order.

3. XII Corps (35th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

a. Pass control of 6th Armd Div to III Corps at once.

b. Continue present mission.

4. XX Corps (5th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 10th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

a. Pass control of 6th Cav Gp (Mecz) (Reinf) to III Corps at once.

b. Continue present mission.

5. a. Boundaries - See overlay. Boundaries beyond NEUNKIRCHEN will be adjusted as the situation develops.

b. Use of roads leading to Army service installations located within the III Corps zone will be granted to XII and XX Corps.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: W A B
Date: 20 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

20 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirmation of Fragmentary Orders).

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. XII Corps:

a. Relinquish operational control of assigned zone to Seventh U S Army.

b. Pass control of 80th Inf Div and attached troops and 4th Armored Div and attached troops to III Corps.

c. Relinquish control of 87th Inf Div and attached troops to Seventh U S Army.

d. After relief by Seventh U S Army units, withdraw from present zone the 35th Inf Div and attached troops and XII Corps troops to the vicinity of METZ less units transferred to Seventh U S Army.

e. On completion of above reliefs and transfers, move remainder of corps to vicinity of LUXEMBOURG.

f. Assume control of 5th Inf Div and attached troops.

2. III Corps:

a. Relinquish responsibility of corps zone to XX Corps.

b. Pass control of 6th Armd Div and 6th Cav Gp (Reinf) to XX Corps.

c. Move 26th Inf Div and attached troops to ARLON area.

d. Move to vicinity of ARLON and assume control of 4th Armd Div and attached troops and 80th Inf Div and attached troops on arrival.

3. XX Corps:

a. Assume responsibility of III Corps zone.

b. Assume control of 6th Armd Div and attached troops and 6th Cav Gp (Reinf).

c. Relieve 5th Inf Div in SAARLAUTERN bridgehead and move 5th Inf Div and attached troops to vicinity LUXEMBOURG.

d. Pass control of 5th Inf Div and attached troops to XII Corps.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

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Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: W A B
Date: 21 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

21 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303 U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. Enemy armored columns penetrated the First U S Army front in the MALMEDY (vK7904) and BASTOGNE (vP5558) areas and threaten the vital NAMUR - LIEGE communication zone.

b. First U S Army will attack south and restore the front in the MALMEDY area and destroy the enemy in zone.

2. Third U S Army will change direction and will attack to the north from the area LUXEMBOURG - ARLON to destroy the enemy on its front and be prepared to change direction to the northeast and seize crossings of the RHINE RIVER.

3. III Corps (26th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Attack north in zone on Army order in the direction ST VITH (vP8688) and destroy the enemy on its front.

b. Maintain contact with XII Corps on east and with VIII Corps on west.

4. XII Corps (4th Inf Div, 5th Inf Div, 10th Armd Div less CCB plus CCA 9th Armd Div, 2d Cav Gp and attached troops) will:

a. Hold west bank of MOSELLE RIVER in zone.

b. On Army order, attack initially north on the right of III Corps and destroy enemy in zone.

c. Push aggressive patrols to east and northeast to determine location of crossings of SAUER RIVER and OUR RIVER and strength of enemy in ECHTERNACH (wL0536) area. Be prepared on Army order to change direction of attack to the northeast to force crossings and penetrate SIEGFRIED line in zone and advance in direction of BITBURG (wL1354).

d. Maintain contact with XX Corps on south and III Corps on west.

e. Protect right (east) flank of Third U S Army.

5. VIII Corps (101st Airborne Div, 28th Inf Div, 9th Armd Div less CCA plus CCB 10th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Continue defense of zone.

b. Regroup forces in zone prepared to attack north on Army order to destroy enemy in zone.

c. Maintain contact with III Corps on east.

6. XX Corps (90th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div, 10th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. With minimum force continue to hold present sector including SAARLAUTERN bridgehead.

b. On Army order advance north and clear enemy from the area between MOSELLE and SAAR RIVERS.

c. Be prepared to follow XII Corps to the northeast.

7. Timing:

a. VIII Corps will seize high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE early 30 December; prepared to continue attack northeast echeloned to the left rear of III Corps.

b. III Corps will attack on Army order in the direction of ST. VITH.

c. XII Corps will cross SAUER RIVER in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH and on Army order attack north in the PRUM VALLEY to seize crossings of the RHINE RIVER in the vicinity of BONN.

d. XX Corps will clear area between MOSELLE and SAAR RIVERS south of TRIER on Army order.

8. a. The following air support will be provided for this operation:

(1) Heavy bombers by U S Eighth Air Force.

(2) Medium bombers by U S Ninth Bomber Division.

(3) Seven fighter- bomber groups, one tactical reconnaissance group and one night fighter squadron by XIX Tactical Air Command.

b. Air support missions will be requested through Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TUSA Register No 1659
TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 23 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

23 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army.

1. Mission:

a. The mission of VIII Corps as delineated in Operational Directive, this headquarters, dated 21 December 1944, remains unchanged.

b. In addition to the above mission, VIII Corps will immediately assume operational responsibility for the defense of the MEUSE RIVER line south from GIVET (09375) (Excl) to VERDUN (U2865) (Incl).

2. Troops:

a. VIII Corps will immediately assume operational control of the following listed Com Z units with attachments:

(1) 342d Engr GS Regt with 6 Howitzers of 115th FA Bn attached.
(2) 392d Engr GS Regt with 115th FA Bn (less 6 Howitzers) attached.
(3) 366th Engr GS Regt with 6 Guns of AT Co, 118th Inf attached.
(4) 1308th Engr GS Regt with AT Co, 118th Inf (less 6 Guns) attached.
(5) Three Bns French Infantry, available for defense of sector GIVET - MOUZON (P0715) both inclusive. Three additional Bns French Infantry, available for defense of sector MOUZON - VERDUN.

b. Authority is granted for direct communication with Headquarters Oise Section Com Z to facilitate assumption of control of these units.

c. On arrival in the REIMS area, the 11th Armd Div is attached to VIII Corps for defense along the MEUSE RIVER south of GIVET (Excl).

d. On arrival in REIMS area, the 17th Airborne Div is attached to VIII Corps for defense along the MEUSE RIVER south of GIVET (Excl)

3. Employment:

a. 342d Engr GS Regt and attachments will occupy the MEUSE RIVER line between GIVET (09375) (Excl) and MONTHERME (08448) (Incl).

b. 392d Engr GS Regt and attachments will occupy the MEUSE RIVER line between MONTHERME (Excl) and SEDAN (09826) (Excl).

c. 366th Engr GS Regt and attachments will occupy the MEUSE RIVER line between SEDAN (Incl) and STENAY (P1503) (Incl).

d. 1308th Engr GS Regt and attachments will occupy the MEUSE RIVER line between STENAY (Excl) and VERDUN (U2865) (Incl).

e. The French Inf Bns will be employed in sectors indicated in Paragraph 2 a (5) above.

f. Initially the 11th Armd Div will be used immediately to defend the line of MEUSE RIVER south of GIVET (Excl). Upon arrival, the 17th Airborne Div will replace the 11th Armd Div on the MEUSE, after which the 11th Armd Div will be employed as a mobile reserve to support the defense of the river line.

4. Special Instructions:

a. The 11th Armd Div and 17th Airborne Div are attached to VIII Corps for above outlined tasks only.

b. Railroad bridges are to be considered as vital points on the main supply routes.

c. Establish defended road blocks with particular emphasis on halting enemy armor.

d. Prepare MEUSE RIVER bridges for demolition. Destroy bridges only on order of Commanding General, MEUSE RIVER defense sector. This authority may be delegated to selected officers in charge at each bridge when the latter ascertain that the bridge is about to be overrun by troops which are positively identified as enemy.

e. Establish security parties on primary line east of MEUSE RIVER to halt all west-bound vehicles and personnel for identification.

f. Mine fields will be installed to augment road blocks. These installations will be so placed as to cause enemy vehicles maximum delay and confusion within range of our artillery and anti-tank guns emplaced on the west bank of the river.

g. Coordinate defense in GIVET area with Advance Section Com Z.

5. Boundaries: See overlay.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

TOP SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 26 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

26 December 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive dated 21 December 1944

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. III Corps will:

a. Pass control of 80th Inf Div and attached troops (see enclosed troop list) to XII Corps effective 2000 26 Dec 44.

b. Assume temporary control of CCA 9th Armd Div effective immediately.

c. Retain temporary control of 318 RCT (-) until completion of present mission.

d. Assume control of 35th Inf Div and attached troops.

2. XII Corps will:

a. Assume control of 80th inf Div and attached troops effective 2000 26 Dec 44.

b. Move CCA 9th Armd Div to III Corps area immediately.

c. Pass control of 35th Inf Div and attached troops to III Corps.

d. Pass control of 10th Armd Div and attached troops to XX Corps.

e. Assume control of 6th Armd Div and attached troops.

3. XX Corps will:

a. Pass control of 6th Armd Div and attached troops to XII Corps.

b. Assume control of 10th Armd Div and attached troops.

c. Move 35th Inf Div and attached troops to III Corps area.

4. Boundary between III Corps and XII Corps - see overlay.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

Copy No 9 of 50 copies TOP SECRET TUSA Register No 1662

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: H G M
Date: 26 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

26 December 1944

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, TUSA Register No 1659 dated 23 December 1944.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army.

1. Paragraph 3f, Operational Directive, Headquarters Third U S Army, dated 23 December 1944 is amended to read as follows:

Initially the 11th Armd Div will be used immediately to defend the line of the MEUSE RIVER south of GIVET (Excl). Upon arrival, the 17th Airborne Division will replace the 11th Armd Div on the MEUSE. The 11th Armd Div will then revert to SHAEF control to be used as a mobile reserve to support the Twelfth - Twenty First Army Group defense.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: HGM
Date: 28 Dec 44

AG 370.2 GNMCC

28 December 1944

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. First U S Army on the north is containing the enemy on its front.

b. Seventh U S Army on the south will continue to defend present sector.

2. Third U S Army will:

a. Sieze HOUFFALIZE vP6172 and continue the attack northeast in the direction of ST. VITH vP8588.

b. Cross the SAUER RIVER in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH wL0535 and drive up the PRUM VALLEY in the direction of BONN wF5698.

3. III Corps (26th Inf Div, 35th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, and attached troops) will:

a. Assume command of 6th Armd Div and attached troops.

b. Pass 4th Armd Div and attached troops to XII Corps.

c. Pass 318th Inf (-) and attached troops to XII Corps.

d. Pass CCA 9th Armd Div to VIII Corps.

e. Attack northeast on Army order in the direction of ST. VITH vP8588 and, in conjunction with XII Corps, seize crossings of the RHINE RIVER in the vicinity of BONN wF5698.

4. VIII Corps (28th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 101st A/B Div, 9th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Continue present mission. (Responsibility for MEUSE RIVER Defense Sector).

b. Seize the high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE vP6172 in order to control the HOUFFALIZE road net.

c. Protect left (northwest) flank of Third U S Army and attack northeast on Army order echeloned to left rear of III Corps.

5. XII Corps (4th Inf Div, 5th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Maintain contact with III Corps on left (west), continue to exert pressure along present front of 80th Inf Div and on Army order cross SAUER RIVER in the vicinity of ECHTERNACH wL0535.

b. On Army order drive up the PRUM VALLEY in the direction of BONN wF5698.

6. XX Corps (95th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div, 3d Cav Gp, 6th Cav Gp (Reinf) and attached troops) will:

a. Defend SAARLAUTERN bridgehead.

b. Hold and defend present front lines.

c. Pass to Seventh U S Army control of zones now held by 6th Armd Div and 6th Cav Gp (Reinf).

d. On relief of 6th Armd Div and 6th Cav Gp (Reinf), assemble 6th Armd Div in area from which it will be prepared to counterattack in any direction in Third or Seventh U S Army zones.

e. Be prepared to pass control of 6th Cav Gp (Reinf) to III Corps.

f. Maintain contact with XII Corps and Seventh U S Army.

g. Protect southeast flank Third U S Army.

7. In the attack, all Corps will advance in multiple columns, all columns to be composed of tanks and infantry.

8. III Corps will attack 21 December 1944. XII Corps and VIII Corps will attack on Army order.

9. a. The following air support will be provided for this operation:

(1) Heavy bombers by U S Eighth Air Force.
(2) Medium bombers by U S Ninth Bomber Division.
(3) Seven fighter-bomber groups, one tactical reconnaissance group and one night fighter squadron by XIX Tactical Air Command.

b. Air support missions will be requested through Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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JANUARY

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

Register No TUSA 1663

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
A PO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 1 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

1 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. To protect its west flank against the eventuality of an enemy attack forcing withdrawal from the present line, Seventh U S Army is reconnoitering and organizing a reserve battle position along the high ground on the general line: INGWEILER wQ8130 - SAARUNION wQ5338 - BENSDORF wQ2735 to hill east of LANDORF wQ1841.

2. XX Corps will:

a. Reconnoiter and select at once an extension of Seventh U S Army's reserve battle position coordinating directly with XV Corps (Seventh U S Army).

b. Submit plans for organization of position to this headquarters.

c. When approved by this headquarters, organize position, utilizing troops presently assigned.

d. Continue to hold present line, including SAARLAUTERN bridgehead, withdrawing only on Army order.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

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H.G. MADDOX
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TUSA Register No 1670

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 4 January 1945

AG 370.2 GNMCC

4 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. Seventh U S Army on the south will continue to defend present sector.

b. First U S Army on the north will:

(1) Continue attack to the southeast to seize HOUFFALIZE and effect a junction with Third U S Army in the HOUFFALIZE area.
(2) Destroy enemy trapped in its zone.
(3) Continue attack toward ST VITH.

c. Third U S Army will:

(1) Continue attack to the northeast to seize HOUFFALIZE and effect a junction with First U S Army in the HOUFFALIZE area.
(2) Destroy enemy trapped in its zone.
(3) Continue attack toward ST VITH and protect the right flank of First U S Army.
(4) Continue to defend the line of the SAAR, MOSELLE and SAUER RIVERS.

2. a. III Corps will:

(1) Continue attack to the northeast in the direction of ST VITH.
(2) Maintain contact with First U S Army on north.

b. VIII Corps will:

(1) Continue present mission of responsibility for defense of MEUSE RIVER employing troops under operational control of VIII Corps.
(2) Continue attack to seize high ground vicinity HOUFFALIZE.
(3) Attack northwest on Army order and destroy enemy trapped in zone.
(4) Protect left (west) flank of Third U S Army.
(5) Be prepared to attack to the northeast in the direction of ST VITH.

c. XII Corps will:

(1) Clear enemy west of MOSELLE and SAUER RIVERS and defend MOSELLE - SAUER RIVER line in zone.
(2) Attack north on Army order on the axis DIEKIRCH (vP8742) - ST VITH (vP8588) and destroy enemy on its front.
(3) Protect right (east) flank of Third U S Army.

d. XX Corps will continue present mission.

3. When junction is effected between elements of the First and Third Armies in the HOUFFALIZE area, the First Army will come under command of Twelfth Army Group. It is proposed that the boundary between the Armies will extend east along L'OURTHE RIVER - OURTHE (vP7478) - RJ at vP822825 - ST VITH (vP8588) - SCHONBERG (vP9588) - HALLSCHIAG (wL0856) (all inclusive to First Army). (See overlay).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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TUSA Register No 1672

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 5 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

5 January 1945

SUBJECT: Annex No 1 to Operational Directive, TUSA Register No 1670, dated 4 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army.
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army.
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army.
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army.

1. XII Corps Artillery will support the attack of III Corps by fire from positions within its zone.

2. VIII Corps Artillery will assist the attack of III Corps by counterbattery fire on known hostile artillery positions.

3. Coordination of the above artillery fires will be made directly by Corps Artillery Commanders concerned.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

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TUSA Register No 1707

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 8 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 8 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirmation of verbal orders).

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 94th Infantry Division, APO 94, U S Army

1. 94th Inf Div:

a. Assigned to XX Corps.

b. One regimental combat team (302d) is attached temporarily to VIII Corps (28th Inf Div).

2. III Corps:

a. Assume command of 90th Inf Div from XX Corps.

b. 4th Armd Div attached to VIII Corps at once.

c. Attack aggressively 9 January 1945 to cut enemy salient southeast of BASTOGNE vP6558 and destroy enemy encircled.

d. Be prepared to assist VIII Corps in seizing NOVILLE vP6864 and HOUFFALIZE vP6171 or continue attack northeast in the direction of ST VITH vP8588.

e. Maintain contact with VIII Corps until contact is gained with First U S Army on the north; then maintain contact with First U S Army.

3. VIII Corps:

a. Continue defense of MEUSE RIVER line in zone.

b. 4th Armd Div attached at once.

c. Attack aggressively 9 January 1945 to capture NOVILLE vP6864 and seize high ground in the vicinity of HOUFFALIZE vP6171.

d. Attack northwest, on Army order, and destroy enemy trapped in zone.

e. Protect left (west) flank of Third U S Army.

f. Be prepared to attack northeast in the direction of ST VITH vP8588.

4. XII Corps:

a. Continue present mission of clearing enemy west of MOSELLE and SAUER RIVERS and defense of MOSELLE - SAUER RIVER line in zone.

b. Attack north, on Army order, on the axis DIEKIRCH vP8742 - ST VITH vP8588 and destroy enemy on its front.

c. Protect right (east) flank of Third U S Army.

5. XX Corps:

a. Continue present mission.

6. Boundaries: No change.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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TUSA Register No 1725

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 17 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 17 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 2 to Operational Directive, TUSA Register No 1659, dated 23 December 1944.

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army.

1. Paragraph 1b, Operational Directive, TUSA Register No 1659, dated 23 December 1944 is rescinded. VIII Corps is hereby relieved of operational responsibility for the defense of the MEUSE RIVER line south of GIVET and of operational control over any troops turned over to them for this mission .

2. Army Engineer, Third U S Army is responsible that all road blocks, mines and demolition charges placed in defense of the MEUSE RIVER line are removed without delay.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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Register No TUSA 1729

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 19 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 19 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. First U S Army, on the north, continues to attack toward ST VITH vP8588.

b. Seventh U S Army, on the south, continues to defend in its sector.

2. a. Third U S Army continues the attack in the direction of ST VITH vP8588 and clears the area between the MOSELLE and SAAR RIVERS southwest of KONZ-KARTHAUS wL1622.

b. Boundaries:

(1) Between Third and Seventh U S Armies: Present boundary to BUSS wQ3275 - COURCELLES SUR NIED vU0653 - ARNAVILLE vU7547 - RAMBUCOURT vU5528 to junction with Army rear boundary (all inclusive to Third U S Army). (Effective 2024OOA Jan).
(2) Between First and Third U S Armies: L'OURTHE RIVER from LAROCHE vP4677 to OURTHE vP7478 (to First U S Army) - THOMMEN vP8181 (to Third U S Army) - ST VITH vP8588 - STADTKYLL wL1495 (both to First U S Army). (Extension to connect with Army rear boundary to be announced later).
(3) Between XX Corps and XII Corps: No change.
(4) Between XII Corps and III Corps: ARLON vP6122 - ELL vP6431 - FOLSCHETTE vP6636 - CR at vP6740 - RJ at vP7052 (all inclusive to III Corps) - road from vP7153 to vP7056 (to both Corps) - ESELBORN vP7664 (to XII Corps) - WEISWAMPACH vP8172 (to III Corps) - STOUBACH vP8676 - (to XII Corps) - OUR RIVER to vP9083 (to III Corps). (Use of road ARLON to ELL to XII Corps).
(5) Between III Corps and VIII Corps: NEUFCHATEAU vP3440 - road from NEUFCHATEAU to BASTOGNE vP5558 (all to VIII Corps; BASTOGNE to III Corps) - railroad from BASTOGNE to vP6767 - HOLDINGEN vP7775 - THOMMEN vP8181 - (both to VIII Corps).

3. III Corps:

a. Resume the attack early 21 Jan and seize high ground southeast of ST VITH vP8588.

b. Be prepared to continue the attack to the northeast.

4. VIII Corps:

a. Assume command of 76th Inf Div.

b. Resume the attack early 21 Jan within zone and assist III Corps.

c. Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north).

5. XII Corps: Continue present mission of -

a. Attacking north on axis DIEKIRCH vP8742 - ST VITH and destroying enemy on its front.

b. Clearing enemy west of MOSELLE and SAUER RIVERS and defense of MOSELLE - SAUER RIVER line in zone.

c. Protection of right (east) flank of Third U S Army.

6. XX Corps:

Attack aggressively and clear area between MOSELLE and SAAR RIVERS north of present line of contact, continuing to hold balance of sector (including SAARLAUTERN bridgehead) with minimum force.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

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Register No TUSA 1737

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

	TOP SECRET
Auth:	CG, TUSA
Init:	
Date:	21 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

21 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1729, dated 19 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312 U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Paragraph 2 b (1) is amended to show 222400A Jan as the effective date of the boundary between Third and Seventh U S Armies.

2. Paragraph 2 B (2) is amended to read as follows:

"Between First and Third U S Armies: GIVET v0920750 (to First U S Army) - WELLIN vP124680 (to Third U S Army) - CHAMPLON vP1404699 - to L'OURTHE RIVER vicinity vP2510750 - thence along L'OURTHE RIVER to OURTHE vP746781 - RJ at vP822825 - ST VITH vP855882 - SCHONBERG vP952886 - HALLSCHLAG wL079957 (all to First U S Army)."

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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Register No TUSA 1741

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

	TOP SECRET
Auth:	CG, TUSA
Init:	
Date:	23 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

23 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 2 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1729, dated 19 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Boundary between III and XII Corps (paragraph 2 b (4)) is changed as follows: Present boundary to RJ at vP7052 (to III Corps) - road from vP7052 to vP7356 (to III Corps with rights to XII Corps) - DRAUFFELT vP7659 - MARNACH vP8062 (both to III Corps) - RODER vP8163 - IRRHAUSEN vP9165 (both to XII Corps).

2. Boundary between III and VIII Corps (paragraph 2 b (5)) is changed as follows: Present boundary to railroad at vP6767 - HACHIVILLE vP7069 - WILWERDINGEN vP7772 - LEITHUM vP8374 - STOUBACH vP8676 (all to III Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

	SECRET
Auth:	CG, TUSA
Init:	
Date:	24 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

24 January 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 3 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1729, dated 19 January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Change of Classification. The classification of Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1729, dated 19 January 1945, and Amendments No 1 and 2 thereto, Register No TUSA 1737 and 1741 respectively, is changed from TOP SECRET to SECRET.

2. Paragraph 2 b (2) (First and Third U S Army boundary) is amended effective at once, as follows:

No change to OURTHE vP745782 (to First U S Army) - ST VITH vP853882 (to Third U S Army, running rights to First U S Army) - LOSHEIM wL033965 (to Third U S Army) - FRAUENKRON wL072977 (to First U S Army) - KRONENBURG wL105970 - STADTKYLL wL143952 - ALENDORF wL218972 (all to Third U S Army) - HUNGERSDORF wL250002 (to First U S Army).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
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Register No TUSA 1749

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

	TOP SECRET
Auth:	CG, TUSA
Init:	
Date:	26 Jan 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

26 January 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. The enemy is withdrawing from the ARDENNES salient. See current G-2 Periodic Report.

b. Seventh U S Army will continue present mission of assisting in reduction of the COLMAR pocket while defending in the remainder of its zone.

c. First U S Army will attack without delay on the axis ST VITH (vP8588) - BONN (wF5336) with its main effort on the right (south) flank; breach the SIEGFRIED LINE and seize the high ground in the vicinity BLANKENHEIM (wF2305) - MARMAGEN (wF1809) prepared to continue the advance in zone on EUSKIRCHEN (wF5329) and BONN (wF5336).

2. Third U S Army will attack without delay with its main effort on the left (north) flank in conjunction with First U S Army, penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE and protect the right flank of the attack along the line PRUM (wL0675) - HILLESHEIM (wL2488). It will assume an aggressive defense in zone south of DASBURG (vP8562); be prepared to continue the attack to the RHINE RIVER or, by flanking the SIEGFRIED LINE from the north, to advance to the KYLL RIVER.

3. a. III Corps (17th Abn Div, 6th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of the 17th Abn Div and attached troops.
(2) Continue present mission of clearing enemy to the OUR RIVER in zone.

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(3) On completion of (2) above, maintain aggressive defense in zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.
(4) Be prepared to attack northeast or east to advance to the KYLL RIVER.
(5) Maintain contact with VIII Corps on the left (north).

b. VIII Corps (4th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 95th Inf Div and 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of the 4th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and 95th Inf Div and attached troops.
(2) Attack northeast without delay with main effort on the left (north).
(3) Penetrate the SIEGFRIED LINE in zone and continue attack northeast.
(4) Secure the line PRUM (wL0679) - HILLESHEIM (wL2488).
(5) Be prepared to continue the attack northeast, east or southeast.
(6) Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north).

c. XII Corps (5th Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of 76th Inf Div and attached troops.
(2) Continue present mission of clearing enemy to the OUR RIVER in zone.
(3) On completion of (2) above, assume aggressive defense in zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.
(4) Be prepared to attack northeast or east to advance to KYLL RIVER.
(5) Maintain contact with III Corps on the left (north) and XX Corps on the right (south).

d. XX Corps (26th Inf Div and 94th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume control of 26th Inf Div and attached troops.
(2) Maintain aggressive defense in zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between First and Third U S Armies: GIVET (vP0927½)(to First U S Army) - WELLIN (vP1268)(to Third U S Army) - CHAMPLON (vP4070) - L'OURTHE RIVER in the vicinity of NADRIN (vP5175) - east along L'OURTHE RIVER - OURTHE (vP7478)(to First U S Army) - ST VITH (vP8588)(to Third U S Army, running rights to First U S Army) - LOSHEIM (wL0396)(to Third U S Army) FRAUENKRON (wL0797)(to First U S Army) - KRONNENBURG (wL1097) - STADTKYLL (wL1495) - ALENDORF (wL2197)(all to Third U S Army) - HUNGERSDORF (wL2500) (to First U S Army).

b. Between VIII and III Corps: Present boundary to BASTOGNE (vP5558)(to VIII Corps) - LONGVILLY (vP6460) - RJ at vP675614 - ASSELBORN (vP7468)(all to VIII Corps) - HUPPADINGEN (vP8067) - KALBORN (vP8468) - ESCHFELD (vP9069)(all to III Corps) - LEIDENBORN (vP9172)(to VIII Corps).

c. Between III and XII Corps: Present boundary to ROULLINGEN (vP7052)(to III Corps) - WILWERWILTZ (vP7555) - PINTSCH (vP7656) - BOCKHOLZ (vP7958) - HOSINGEN (vP8258) - EISENBACH (vP8657) - NEUERBURG (vP9658)(all to III Corps).

d. Between XII and XX Corps: No change.

5. Command Posts.

a. Third U S Army - LUXEMBOURG - to be announced.

b. III Corps - HAUT-MARTELANGE - to be reported.

c. VIII Corps - BASTOGNE - to be reported.

d. XII Corps - LUXEMBOURG - to be reported.

e. XX Corps - THIONVILLE - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
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Register No TUSA 1805

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 3 Feb 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 3 February 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. The enemy continues to defend and delay with a minimum of troops making maximum use of favorable terrain, fortifications of SIEGFRIED LINE and the effects of severe winter weather.

b. First U S Army continues presently assigned mission, shifting weight of its effort to the left (north) flank.

c. Seventh U S Army continues to defend in sector.

2. Third U S Army will continue the attack on its left and seize PRUM wL0679; attack northeast from vicinity of ECHTERNACH wL0535 and seize BITBURG wL1353; be prepared to continue the attack to the RHINE RIVER.

3. a. III Corps (17th Abn Div, 6th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Extend zone of responsibility to include additional area shown on Operations Overlay.
(2) Continue aggressive defense in new zone with the object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.
(3) Be prepared to attack northeast or east to advance to the KYLL RIVER.
(4) Maintain contact with VIII Corps on the left (north) and with XII Corps on the right (south).

b. VIII Corps (4th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Continue the attack on the left (north) to maintain contact with First U S Army.
(2) Attack east and southeast and seize PRUM wL0679.
(3) Be prepared to continue attack northeast, east or southeast.

c. XII Corps (5th Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Seize and secure bridgehead over SAUER RIVER; attack northeast and seize BITBURG wL1353. (Time of this attack to be announced.)
(2) Be prepared to continue attack east or northeast.

d. XX Corps (26th Inf Div, 94th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Continue aggressive defense in zone with object of containing the maximum number of enemy troops.
(2) Maintain contact with XII Corps on left (north).

4. Boundary changes (To be effected without delay).

a. Between VIII and III Corps: Present boundary to vP7767 - WALPACHERBACH RIVER to BREIDFELD vP8070 (to VIII Corps. Equal running rights on road from vP7767 to BREIDFELD to both Corps) - east to REHBACH CREEK at vP8472 - thence along REHBACH CREEK to junction with OUR RIVER - ESCHFELD vP9069 (to VIII Corps).

b. Between III and XII Corps: ARLON vP6122 (to III Corps) - BISSEN vP7933 - ETTELBRUCK vP8239 - DIEKIRCH vP8642 (all to XII Corps) - VIANDEN vP9049 (to III Corps) - OUTSCHEID wL0156 (to XII Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

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Register No TUSA 1767

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 10 Feb 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 10 February 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1805, dated 3 February 1945.

TO : Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. Headquarters III Corps, with certain attached troops, is relieved from assignment to Third U S Army effective 11 February 1945 per orders Twelfth Army Group, dated 10 February 1945, and will proceed to First U S Army in accordance with movement orders issued separately.

2. So much of Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1805, dated 3 February 1945, as pertains to III Corps is rescinded.

3. In addition to missions delineated in subject directive, VIII Corps will:

a. Extend zone of responsibility to include former III Corps area and assume control of all troops therein.

b. Complete the relief and release of 17th Abn Div and move it to designated division assembly area.

c. Maintain contact with XII Corps on the right (south).

4. a. Boundary between III and VIII Corps is rescinded.

b. Boundary between VIII and XII Corps is former boundary between III and XII Corps without change, viz: ARLON (to VIII Corps) BISSEN - ETTELBRUCK - DIEKIRCH (all to XII Corps) - VIANDEN (to VIII Corps) - OUTSCHEID (to XII Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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Register No TUSA 1819

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: :
:Date: 14 Feb 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 14 February 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1749, dated 26 January 1945

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

In confirmation of instructions issued previously, the boundary between First and Third U S Armies is changed, effective 110001A Feb 45, as follows:

CHAMPLON CR (vP3870) - LA ROCHE (vP4578) - SAMREE (vP5081) (all to Third U S Army) - VIELSALM (vP7089) (to First U S Army with running rights to Third U S Army) POTEAU (vP7791) - ST VITH (vP8588) (both to Third U S Army).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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Register No TUSA 1833

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: :
:Date: 18 Feb 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 18 February 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 2 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1805, dated 3 February 1945

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

Present boundary between VIII and XII Corps is extended as follows: FISCHBACH wL0058 (to XII Corps) - BERKOTH wL0061 - OBERPIERSCHEID wL0263 (both to VIII Corps) - MAUEL wL0464 (to XII Corps) - PLUTSCHEID wL0665 - HARDT wL0867 - NIMS RIVER at wL0967 (all to VIII Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: :
:Date: 25 Feb 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 25 February 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

Effective 252400A Feb 1945 boundary between XII and XX Corps is changed as follows: MOSELLE RIVER from NEUMAGEN wL3939 to STADTBREDIMUS wL0108 thence along road to BOUS vP9807 (all to XX Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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Register No TUSA 1855

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: :
:Date: 25 Feb 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 25 February 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 3 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1805, dated 3 February 1945.

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

Operational directive, Register No TUSA 1805, dated 3 February 1945, is amended as follows: Present boundary between VIII Corps and XII Corps is extended from point on NIMS RIVER at wL0967 to HUSCHEID wL1167 - BALESMND wL1468 - DENSBORN wL1870 - WALLENBORN wL2773 - OBERSTADTFELD wL3075 - DAUN wL3577 - DARSCHEID wL3979 (all to VIII Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA:
:Init: :
:Date: 3 Mar 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 3 March 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

Effective at once, boundaries between VIII and XII Corps and between XII and XX Corps are changed as follows:

1. VIII Corps and XII Corps: Present boundary to KYLL RIVER at DENSBORN wL1970 (to VIII Corps) - SALM wL2573 (to both) - OBERSTADTFELD wL3175 (to XII Corps) - WALDKONIGEN wL3381 - NEICHEN wL3885 (both to XII Corps) - HUNERBACH wL4388 - BOOS wL4890 - KUHRENBERG wL5893 (all to VIII Corps).

2. XII Corps and XX Corps: Present boundary from BOUS vP9807 to TRIER wL2026 - TRIER - EHRANG wL2435 - QUINT wL2536 - ERLENBACH wL3243 - SALMROHR wL3648 (all to XX Corps) - WITTLICH wL3954 (to XII Corps with road rights to XX Corps) - KRINKHOF wL4861 - BEUREN wL5366 (both to XII Corps - BREMM wL5567 (to XX Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 10 Mar 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

10 March 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirmation of fragmentary orders)

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. First U S Army continues its present offensive with mission of clearing enemy in zone and securing crossings of the RHINE RIVER.

b. Seventh U S Army continues to defend its sector, improving positions by local attacks in preparation for early resumption of the offensive.

2. Third U S Army continues present offensive to:

a. Destroy enemy in zone north of MOSELLE RIVER.

b. Attack southeast from KOBLENZ plain to cross the MOSELLE RIVER prepared to continue the attack southeast in the direction of BAD KREUZNACH vs0938.

c. Attack southeast from TRIER - SAARBURG bridgehead in the direction of ST WENDEL wQ5996, destroy enemy in zone and contact Seventh U S Army vicinity of ST WENDEL, prepared to advance to the northeast.

3. a. VIII Corps (87th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Continue present mission of clearing enemy in zone to RHINE RIVER.
(2) Defend line of RHINE RIVER.
(3) Maintain contact with First U S Army on the left (north) and XII Corps on the right (south).

b. XII Corps (89th Inf Div, 76th Inf Div, 5th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Continue present mission of clearing enemy in zone.
(2) Seize and secure crossings over MOSELLE RIVER southeast of MAYEN wL6398 and southeast of KOBLENZ wL9095 and be prepared to attack southeast in the direction of BAD KREUZNACH vs0938.
(3) Maintain contact with XX Corps on right (south).

c. XX Corps (94th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 65th Inf Div, 26th Inf Div, 10th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Maintain and improve bridgehead in SAARLAUTERN area, prepared to launch attack northeast from bridgehead.
(2) Attack on Army order from TRIER wL2189 - SAARBURG wL1518 bridgehead on axis TRIER - ST WENDEL wQ5996, destroy enemy in zone and contact elements of Seventh U S Army vicinity ST WENDEL, prepared to continue attack to the northeast.
(3) Maintain contact with Seventh U S Army on right (south).

4. Boundaries:

a. Between First and Third U S Armies (Tentative): Present boundary from point on AHR RIVER at wA4305 along 05 Northing grid to point on RHINE RIVER at wF7905.

b. Between VIII and XII Corps: Present boundary from RJ at wA6191 to MAYEN wA7292 (to XII Corps with running rights to VIII Corps) - MAYEN wA7292 - OBERMENDIG wA7994 (both to VIII Corps) - WALDEN wA8193 (to XII Corps) - GOLO wA8694 (to VIII Corps).

c. Between XII and XX Corps: Present boundary to OBERBILLIG wL1124 (to XX Corps) - along road OBERBILLIG - EHRANG wL2434 (to XX Corps with running rights to XII Corps) - along MOSELLE RIVER to BERNKASTEL wL5246 (to XII Corps).

d. BETWEEN Twelfth and Sixth Army Groups (Tentative): BUSS wQ3176 - LEBACH wQ4090 - THOLEY wQ4998 - NONFELDEN wL5710, thence along railroad along NAHE RIVER to BINGEN wM1152 (all to Twelfth Army Group).

5. Command Posts:

a. Third U S Army - LUXEMBOURG vP8315 - to be announced.

b. VIII Corps - ADENAU wL4698 - to be reported.

c. XII Corps - BITBURG wL1353 - to be reported.

d. XX Corps - THIONVILLE wU8685 - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 12 Mar 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

12 March 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive (Confirmation of fragmentary orders), Register No TUSA 1906, dated 10 March 1945.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. Boundary between VIII and XII Corps is changed as follows: Present boundary to OCHTENDUNG wL7594 (to VIII Corps) - WALDORFHOF wL7693 - LONNIG wL7690 - DRECKENACH wL7787 - OBERFELL wL7994 - BOPPARD wL8981 (all to XII Corps).

b. Both corps will notify this headquarters when proper relief of troops in area effected by this change has been completed.

2. a. Boundary between Twelfth Army Group and Sixth Army Group has been confirmed as: CONFLANS wU6564 - BUSS wQ3176 - LEBACH wQ4090 - THOLEY wQ4998 - NONFELDEN wL5710, thence along railroad along NAHE RIVER to BINGEN wM1152 (all to Twelfth Army Group).

b. Third U S Army will retain possession and use of their existing installations south of new boundary.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 22 Mar 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

22 March 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirmation of fragmentary orders)

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. a. Completely routed in the SAAR - PALATINATE, the enemy is endeavoring to extricate the remnants of his shattered forces east of the RHINE RIVER in order to continue to oppose our advance into Central Germany.

b. First U S Army attacks east from present bridgehead to seize the general line SIEGEN wQ2053 - GIESSEN wG6622; prepared to continue advance northeast toward KASSEL rC2004.

c. Seventh U S Army continues operations to reach the RHINE RIVER and force crossings in zone.

2. Third U S Army seizes and secures crossings over the RHINE between KOBLENZ wL8895 and GIMBSHEIM wM4631 and continues the attack northeast.

3. a. VIII Corps (76th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume responsibility for RHINE RIVER line in zone to mouth of NAHE RIVER wM1152.
(2) Arrange directly with Commanding General, V Corps, for transfer of 28th Inf Div to V Corps in present area at which time new First - Third U S Army boundary becomes effective.
(3) Cross RHINE RIVER south of the LAHN RIVER in zone and advance generally east.
(4) Assume command of 89th Inf Div from XII Corps.

b. XII Corps (5th Inf Div, 26th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume command of 26th Inf Div from XX Corps.
(2) Pass control of 89th Inf Div to VIII Corps.
(3) Cross RHINE RIVER in zone; advance rapidly northeast crossing MAIN RIVER; continue advance northeast.

c. XX Corps (65th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 94th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Pass control of 10th and 12th Armd Divs to Seventh U S Army and assume control of 6th Armd Div from Seventh U S Army in place as of 231800A
(2) Pass control of 26th Inf Div to XII Corps.
(3) Move troops as soon as possible north of Third - Seventh U S Army temporary boundary with one infantry and one armored division to eastern part of XII Corps zone and two infantry divisions to western part of XX Corps zone.
(4) Be prepared to follow either VIII or XII Corps through secured bridgeheads.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between VIII and XII Corps: BINGEN wM1152 (to XII Corps) - BINGERBRUCK wM1052 - STROMBERG wM0249 - DORRENBACH wL9849 - SIMMERN wL8454 - HASSELBACH wL7960 - GASTELLAUN wL7863 - TREIS wL6975 (all to VIII Corps). Running rights on all roads and MOSELLE RIVER crossings in old XII Corps zone will be retained by XII Corps until supply routes are opened in new zone.

b. Between XII and XX Corps: EHRANG wL2435 - RUWER wL2632 - MERTESDORF wL2831 - TROMM wL3527 - RASCHEID wL4224 - DORFTNK wL5321 - KIESENBERGBACH wL6421 - (all to XII Corps). (TRIER wL2088 to XX Corps with running rights to XII Corps).

c. Between First and Third U S Armies (Temporary): HUNGERSDORF wM2500 - MULLENBACH wL4191 - VIRMEBURG wL5394 - KURRENBERG wL5993 - MAYEN wL6392 - OCHTENDUNG wL7594 - BASSENHEIM wL8095 - KOBLUTZEL wL8896 (all to First U S Army) - south along RHINE RIVER to NIEDER wL9090 - thence along LAHN RIVER to DIEZ wM1996.

d. Between Third and Seventh U S Armies (Temporary): SAARBRUCKEN wQ1641 - NEUNKIRCHEN wQ5983 - KUSEL wL7504 - ROCKENHAUSEN wM0614 (all to Third U S Army) - KIRCHHEIM BOLANDEN wM1918 (to both Armies) - ALZEY wM2727 (to Third U S Army) - GIMBSHEIM wM4531 (to Seventh U S Army). See overlay for probable extension east of the RHINE RIVER.

5. Command Posts to be reported.

By Command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 25 Mar 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

25 March 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 1940, dated 22 March 1945.

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

Temporary operational boundary between Third and Seventh U S Armies is amended to make the road between wM732403, wM873513 and wM007533 inclusive to Seventh U S Army but with road rights to Third U S Army upon request.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 26 Mar 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

26 March 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirmation of verbal orders)

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. VIII Corps (76th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

a. Continue present mission of advancing aggressively east in zone.

b. Without delay gain and maintain contact with bridgehead to be established by XX Corps in MAINZ wM3856 area.

2. XII Corps (5th Inf Div, 26th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Continue present mission of clearing to RHINE RIVER in zone; cross MAIN RIVER and continue advance northeast.

b. Pass one RCT from XX Corps through zone and assist assault crossing of this RCT across MAIN RIVER east of MAINZ wM3856.

c. Support crossing of RCT by fire on call from XX Corps and protect right flank of XX Corps in seizure of bridgehead.

3. XX Corps (65th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 94th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Seize and secure a bridgehead across the RHINE RIVER in the vicinity of MAINZ wM3856. (By coordination with XII Corps one RCT may be passed through XII Corps zone and cross MAIN RIVER east of MAINZ wM3856).

b. Be prepared to advance east or northeast.

c. Time of attack: During hours of darkness 27 - 28 March.

d. 65th and 94th Inf Divs will be committed only on Army order.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between XII and XX Corps: (Temporary, after one RCT of XX Corps crosses MAIN RIVER) - The MAIN RIVER from junction with RHINE RIVER at wM4055 to HOCHST wM5867 (river inclusive to XII Corps).

b. Between VIII and XX Corps: To be announced later.

c. Others: No change.

5. Artillery:

a. Troops: No change.

b. Liaison will be established between adjacent Corps and Division Artillery to include units on each flank of the Army.

c. No fire lines:

(1) Between VIII Corps and XX Corps - wM1153 - wM2065 - wM4080 - wM6090.
(2) Between XX Corps and XII Corps - Will be arranged between the Corps.
(3) No fire lines may be changed by mutual agreement between Corps. This headquarters will be notified of changes.

d. XII Corps Artillery will provide artillery fire support as requested by XX Corps for the assault crossings of the MAIN and RHINE RIVERS.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 28 Mar 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC

28 March 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. VIII Corps (76th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

a. Continue aggressive advance in zone.

b. Maintain contact with First U S Army on left (north) and XX Corps on right (south).

c. When enemy has been cleared to line WEHRHEIM wM5990 - KL LINDEN wG6418), be prepared to advance east or northeast on Army order.

2. XII Corps (4th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, 26th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and supporting troops) will continue aggressive advance in zone and maintain contact with Seventh U S Army on the right (south).

3. XX Corps (6th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 65th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and supporting troops) will continue aggressive advance in zone.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between First and Third U S Armies: LOSHEIM wL0397 - STADTKYLL wL1395 (to Third U S Army) - MULLENBACH wL4292 - MAYEN wL6393 - LUTZEL wL9098 thence along east bank of RHINE RIVER and along LAHN RIVER to AUMENAU wG3700 - GIESSEN wG6721 - BERNSFELD wG8831 - KIRTORF wG9642 - THEYSA wH0358 - FRITZLAR wH0882 - WARBURG rB9822 (all to First U S Army). First and Third U S Armies have equal running rights over FRITZLAR - KASSEL - WARBURG road.

b. Between VIII and XX Corps: From BINGEN wM1152 along RHINE RIVER to ELTVILLE wM2759 - SCHLANGENBAD wM2666 - WEHEN wM3273 - OBERSEELBACH wM4076 - ANSPACH wM5588 (all to VIII Corps) - WEHRHEIM wM5990 - PFAFFENWEISBACH wM6292 - FAUERBACH wM6499 - BUTZBACH wG6604 - GROSSEN-LINDEN wG6515 - KL LINDEN wG6418 (all to XX Corps).

c. Between XII and XX Corps: Junction of MAIN and RHINE RIVERS at wM4055 - MAIN RIVER to wM7269 - DORTELWEIL wM7279 - OKARBEN wM7384 (all to XX Corps) - ILBENSTADT wM7687 - STADEN wM8393 - BAD SALZHAUSEN wG8802 - SCHOTTEN wG9812 - REBGESHAIN wH0620 - DIRLAMMEN wH1024 - HEBLOS wH1428 - UDENHAUSEN wH2036 - NIEDERAULA wH3146 - HERSFELD wH3954 (all to XII Corps).

d. (1) Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups: SAARBRUCKEN wQ4572 - NEUNKIRCHEN wQ6083 - NOHFELDEN wL5712 - OBERSTEIN wL7123 - MEISENHEIM wL9621 - ALZEY wM2727 - OPPENHEIM wM4439 - GROSS GERAU wM5346 - FRANKFURT wM6668 (all to Twelfth Army Group) - Railroad north of MAIN RIVER to HANAU wM8572 - FULDA wH3718 - MEININGEN wH9023 (all to Sixth Army Group).

(2) Temporary operational boundary between Seventh and Third U S Armies: Same as Par 1d (1) above to GR GERAU wM5347 - MORFELDEN wM5953 - LANGEN wM6755 - DIETZENBACH wM7457 - HAINHAUSEN wM8160 - HANAU wM8471 - GELNHAUSEN wN0479 (all to Third U S Army).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
Third United States Army
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, Third US Army:
Date: 31 March 1945
Initials: _____

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 31 March 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive.

TO: Commanding General, 70th Infantry Division, APO 416, U S Army.
Commanding General, 13th Armored Division, APO 263, U S Army.

1. The 70th Infantry Division will be responsible for the Army area RHINE RIVER - BOPPARD (8981) - BRAUNSHORN (8466) - STROMBERG (0349) - BAD KREUZNACH (0938) - OBERNDORF (0523) - OPPENHEIM (4540), all inclusive (overlay). It will effect necessary coordination therein with the Army Provost Marshal and Army G-5; Initially it will:

a. Guard all bridges indicated (overlay).

b. Maintain law and order, both civil and military, in communities indicated (overlay).

c. Regulate and control traffic on MSR (overlay).

d. Guard all public utility and military government installations indicated (overlay).

e. Protect Army supply points and installations indicated (overlay).

f. Be prepared to assemble for movement outside Army area on 24 hours' notice.

2. The 13th Armored Division will be responsible for the Army area TRIER (2328) - WITTLICH (4055) (both inclusive) - BOPPARD (8981) - BRAUNSHORN (8466) - STROMBERG (0349) - BAD KREUZNACH (0938) - OBERNDORF (0523) (all exclusive) - SAARLAUTERN (2880) (inclusive) - to the 1939 German Border, (overlay). It will effect necessary coordination therein with the Army Provost Marshal and Army G-5; Initially it will:

a. Guard all bridges indicated (overlay).

b. Maintain law and order, both civil and military, in communities indicated (overlay).

c. Regulate and control traffic on MSR (overlay).

d. Guard all public utility and military government installations indicated (overlay).

e. Protect Army supply points and installations indicated (overlay).

f. Provide one battalion, or the equivalent, to garrison the city of KOBLENZ.

g. Be prepared to assemble for movement outside Army area on 24 hours' notice.

3. Command Posts:

a. 70th Infantry Division - vicinity BAD KREUZNACH.

b. 13th Armored Division - vicinity IDAR-OBERSTEIN.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA:
Init: _____
Date: 2 Apr 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 2 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army

1. VIII Corps (76th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Assume command of 4th Armd Div in place on Army order.

b. Coordinate with XX Corps on move through its zone to new VIII Corps zone.

c. Advance east in the direction SONTRA wH5476 - LANGENSALZA wJ0383.

2. XII Corps (26th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Pass control of 4th Armd Div to VIII Corps on Army order.

b. Continue advance east in zone.

c. Protect right (south) flank of Third U S Army.

3. XX Corps (65th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 6th Armd Div and attached troops) will:

a. Continue advance east in zone.

b. 5th Inf Div continue mission in FRANKFURT area and woods northwest thereof, after which it will revert to Army control for movement to vicinity GIESSEN wG6621.

c. Protect left (north) flank of Third U S Army.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between VIII and XII Corps: NIEDERAULA wH3246 - HEIM BOLDSHAUSEN wH5653 - MARKSUHL wH7360 - SATTELSTADT wH9364 - GOTHA wJ0865 - ERFURT wJ3268 - WEIMAR wJ5270 - UMPFERSTEDT wJ5870 (all to VIII Corps) - JENA wJ7066 - EISENBURG wJ9272 - LOITZSCHUTZ wK0973 - ALTENBURG wK3075 - LUNZENAU wK5274 - MITTWEIDA wK6878 (all to XII Corps) - NOSSEN wK8988 (to VIII Corps) - DRESDEN xF2090 (to XII Corps).

b. Between VIII and XX Corps: SPANGENBURG wH3581 - OBERHONE wH5890 - MUHLHAUSEN wH9093 - ALLMENHAUSEN wJ0997 - BUCHEL wJ3899 - BAD BIBRA wJ6896 - LAUCHA wJ7599 - WEISSENFELS wJ9597 - KNAUTNAUNDORF rK1604 - GRIMMA rK4804 - OSCHATZ rK7413 - STREHLA rK8320 (all to VIII Corps).

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA:
Init: _____
Date: 5 Apr 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 5 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 5th Infantry Division, APO 5, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Infantry Division, APO 416, U S Army

1. a. His major forces in the west destroyed, the enemy is attempting to defend and delay in our zone of advance with miscellaneous and hastily improvised units in an apparent effort to continue organized resistance.

b. First U S Army clears RUHR in zone and advances east on left (north).

c. Seventh U S Army advances southeast on right (south).

d. XIX TAC continues close cooperation with Third U S Army.

2. Having seized the general line MEININGEN wH8922 - GOTHA wJ0965 - LANGEN - SALZA wJ0382, Third U S Army will:

a. On Twelfth Army Group order, advance east and southeast in zone.

b. Maintain contact with Seventh U S Army on the right (south).

3. a. VIII Corps (4th Armd Div, 65th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Consolidate along the general line GOTHA wJ0965 - OBERHOF wJ1138, pushing aggressive reconnaissance east thereof.
(2) On Army order, advance east and southeast in zone.
(3) On being relieved by infantry, 4th Armd Div will remain in an assembly area in vicinity of OHRDRUF wJ1152 to be committed on Army order only.

b. XII Corps (11th Armd Div, 26th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Consolidate along the general line OBERHOF wJ1138 - MEININGEN wH8922, pushing aggressive reconnaissance east and southeast thereof.
(2) On Army order, advance southeast in zone.
(3) Maintain contact with Seventh U S Army on right (south).

c. XX Corps (6th Armd Div, 13th Armd Div, 76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Consolidate along the general line GOTHA wJ0965 - LANGENSALZA wJ0382, pushing aggressive reconnaissance east thereof.
(2) Maintain contact with First U S Army on left (north).
(3) On Army order, advance east in zone.

d. 5th Inf Div will remain temporarily in an assembly area southeast of GIESSEN wG6621.

e. 70th Inf Div will continue present mission of guarding installations and lines of communication and maintaining law and order in assigned area.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between First and Third U S Armies: KIRTORF wG9642 - TREYSA wH0158 (both to First U S Army) - ZIEGENHAIN wH0558 (to Third U S Army) - BORKEN wH0873 - LENDORF wH1375 - WABERN wH1379 - DEUTE wH1788 - GRIFTE wH1991 - BETTENHAUSEN wG2502 - WITZENHAUSEN wG4806 - HOHENGANDERN wG5310 - KALTENNORD wG6705 - MARTINFELD wG7001 - (all to First U S Army) - MUHLHAUSEN wH9093 (to Third U S Army with running rights to First U S Army) - BOLLSTEDT wH9592 - KIRCHHELLINGEN wJ0791 - URLEBEN wJ1288 (all to First U S Army) - BAD TENNSTEDT wJ1788 - STRAUSSFURT wJ2789 - SOMMERDA wJ3690 - BAD KOSEN wJ7889 - ZLITZ wK0882 (all to Third U S Army).

b. Between VIII and XX Corps: NEUMORSCHEN wH3175 (to XX Corps with running rights to VIII Corps) - HEINEBACH wH3574 - ASMUSHAUSEN wH4670 (both to VIII Corps) - SOLZ wH5069 (to XX Corps) - AUTOBAHN from SALZMANNSHAUSEN wH6669 to LEINA wJ0460 (to VIII Corps with running rights to XX Corps) - AUTOBAHN from LEINA to CR wH8961 (to XX Corps with running rights to VIII Corps) - STADTRODA wH8158 - ST GANGLOFF wJ9258 - GERA wK0562 - CRIMMITSCHAU wK2857 - CHEMNITZ wK6560 (all to XX Corps) - KPFENDORF wK8758 (to XX Corps with running rights to VIII Corps) - to CZECH border at xF1047.

c. Between VIII and XII Corps: SOLMS wH3142 - NEUKIRCHEN wH3843 (both to VIII Corps) - Road from SCHENKELNOSFELD wH4848 through ROSENTHOF wH5752 - DORNDORF wH6561 - BAD SALZUNGEN wH7649 - FAMBACH wH8641 - SONNELAIDEN wH9139 (to XII Corps with running rights to VIII Corps) - STEINBACH-HALLENBERG wJ0097 (to VIII Corps with running rights to XII Corps) - OBERHOF wJ1138 (to VIII Corps) - ILMENAU wJ2436 (to XII Corps with running rights to VIII Corps) - KODALTZ wJ4035 (to XII Corps) - BAD BLANKENBURG wJ4927 (to VIII Corps) - SAALFELD wJ5633 (to VIII Corps with running rights to XII Corps) - RUDNA wJ6533 - ESSBACH wJ7928 - SCHLEIZ wJ8827 - ZEULENRITA wK1411 - ADORF wK2101 (all to VIII Corps).

d. Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups: Present boundary to FULDA wH3819 (to Sixth Army Group) - MEININGEN wH8922 - COBURG wJ0389 - BAYREUTH wJ7556 (all to Twelfth Army Group).

5. Command posts to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

T O P S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

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: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 10 APR 45:
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AG 370.2 GNMCG

10 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO : Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Infantry Division, APO 416, U S Army

1. a. The enemy continues his efforts to defend and delay, utilising hastily-formed miscellaneous units.

b. First U S Army continues advance east on left (north).

c. Seventh U S Army continues advance southeast on right (south).

2. Third U S Army resumes the advance 11 April 1945; main effort on the left (north); seizes a bridgehead over ELBE RIVER in zone; prepared to continue advance east or southeast on orders from Twelfth Army Group.

3. a. VIII Corps (65th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div and supporting troops) will attack east and southeast in zone; maintain contact with and assist the advance of XX Corps on the left (north).

b. XII Corps (26th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and supporting troops) will attack southeast in zone; maintain contact with VIII Corps on the left (north) and Seventh U S Army on the right (south); protect the right (south) flank of Third U S Army.

c. XX Corps (76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will attack east in zone, secure a bridgehead over the ELBE RIVER; be prepared to continue the advance east or southeast on Army order; protect the left (north) flank of Third U S Army.

d. 70th Inf Div will continue present mission of guarding installations and lines of communication and maintaining law and order in assigned area.

4. Boundary extension - Between First and Third U S Armies: Present boundary to SOMMERDA wJ3690 - ECKARTSBERGA wJ6787 (both to Third U S Army) - Road BAD KOSEN wJ7889 - NAUMBURG wJ8591 - STOSSEN wJ9387 (all to First U S Army with running rights to Third U S Army) - ZEITZ wK0881 (to Third U S Army) - FROHBURG wK3784 (to First U S Army) - GEITHAIN wK4784 - DOBELN wK7693 (both to Third U S Army) - MEISSEN xF0099 (to First U S Army).

5. Command Posts to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

T O P S E C R E T

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

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: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: :
:Date: 11 Apr 45:
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AG 370.2 GNMCG

11 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

TO: Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

474th Inf Regt (Sep) will:

1. Move without delay to the vicinity of HERSFELD, Germany wH3954.

2. a. Clear all enemy military personnel from the area shown on attached overlay.

b. Secure this area against enemy raids and infiltration.

3. Coordinate with and render such assistance to the Army Provost Marshal as can be done without interfering in the accomplishment of the mission assigned in paragraph 2, above.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 13 Apr 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 13 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U S Army
Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

1. a. Miscellaneous and hastily formed enemy units continue their efforts to defend and delay in our zone of advance, particularly at cities, communications centers and critical terrain features. (See G-2 Estimated No 13, 10 April 1945).

b. First U S Army on left (north) continues advance east to the line of the MULDE RIVER.

c. Seventh U S Army on right (south) continues advance southeast.

d. XIX TAC continues close cooperation with Third U S Army.

2. Third U S Army will:

a. Continue advance east to the line ZWICKAUER-MULDE RIVER from point on inter-Army boundary vicinity ROCKLITZ wK5484 to WILKAU wK3841 - PLAUEN wK1220 - HOF w09799 - BAYREUTH w07556.

b. Be prepared to resume advance east, southeast or south on Army Group order.

3. a. VIII Corps (65th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Continue advance east to the line ZWICKAUER-MULDE RIVER from inter-Corps boundary at wK3654 to WILKAU wK3841 - thence Reichsautobahn to inter-Corps boundary at wK0913, securing a bridgehead across the ZWICKAUER-MULDE RIVER, pushing light reconnaissance only forward of this line to secure essential terrain features.
(2) Continue advance east, southeast or south on Army order.

b. XII Corps (26th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Continue advance southeast to the line inter-Corps boundary at wK0913 - thence road through BLOSENBERG wK0205 - HOF w09799 - MUNCHBERG w08985 - BERNECK w08168 to inter-Army Group boundary at w07853, pushing light reconnaissance only forward of this line to secure essential terrain features.
(2) Continue advance southeast or south on Army order.

c. XX Corps (76th Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Continue advance east and secure a bridgehead across the ZWICKAUER-MULDE RIVER from inter-Army boundary at wK5486 to inter-Corps boundary at wK3654, pushing light reconnaissance only forward of this bridgehead.
(2) Continue advance east, southeast or south on Army order.

d. 70th Inf Div will continue present mission of guarding installations and lines of communication and maintaining law and order in assigned area.

e. 474th Inf Regt (Sep) will continue present mission of clearing assigned area and the securing of this area against enemy raids and infiltrations.

4. a. Boundary change - Change in VIII - XII Corps boundary is confirmed as follows: No change to wJ5733 - thence follow SAALE RIVER to wJ8323 - thence northeast to point on present boundary at wJ9026 - thence follow present boundary to ADORF wK2101.

b. Limiting points, as shown on attached overlay, are as follows:

(1) XX Corps - wK5486 and wK3654.
(2) VIII Corps - wK3654 and wK0913
(3) XII Corps - wK0913 and w07853.

5. Command posts to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 15 Apr 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 15 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

TO: Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

474th Inf Regt (Sep) will:

1. Move on Army order to the vicinity of WEIMAR, Germany wJ5271.

2. a. Clear all enemy military personnel from the area shown on attached overlay.

b. Secure this area against enemy raids and infiltration.

3. Coordinate with and render such assistance to the Army Provost Marshal as can be done without interfering in the accomplishment of the mission assigned in paragraph 2, above.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 17 Apr 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 17 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XVIII Abn Corps, APO 109, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U S Army
Commanding General, 16th Armd Div, APO 412, U S Army
Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

1. a. Enemy resistance in Third U S Army zone is scattered. The penetration of his defenses east of NURNBERG w04100 and the allied advance west of STUTTGART wS0621 threaten the entire enemy defense line in that area. Enemy movements south and southeast from the NURNBERG area have been reported but there are no other indications of general withdrawal south.

b. First U S Army will defend the line of the MULDE RIVER and extend responsibility south to the new inter-Army boundary.

c. Seventh U S Army will continue the offensive southeast in zone, in conjunction with Third U S Army, to reduce the Redoubt area and seal the SWISS - GERMAN border.

d. XIX TAC will continue close cooperation with Third U S Army.

2. Third U S Army will:

a. Complete closure to the line ZWICKAUER-MULDE RIVER from ROCHLITZ wK5484 to WILKAU wK3741 on the front PLAUEN wK1220 - HOF w09799 - BAYREUTH w07556 and regroup for advance southeast.

b. On order of Twelfth Army Group attack along the axis REGENSBURG wU1855 - LINZ xV8588 to gain contact with Soviet forces in the DANUBE VALLEY and seize SALZBURG wZ9727.

c. Hold XVIII Abn Corps and one armored and two infantry divisions in the area southeast of FULDA wH3719, initially in Army Group reserve.

3. a. III Corps (86th Inf Div, 99th Inf Div, 20th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Pass control of 5th Inf Div to XVIII Abn Corps, and 7th Armd Div to First U S Army.
(2) Move to new zone without delay.
(3) Assume command of 86th Inf Div and 20th Armd Div upon arrival in new zone.
(4) Relieve elements of Seventh U S Army.
(5) On Army order attack southeast in zone.
(6) Maintain contact with XX Corps on left and Seventh U S Army on right.

b. VIII Corps (76th Inf Div, 87th Inf Div, 89th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and 6th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Assume command of 76th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and 6th Armd Div.
(2) Extend responsibility to include present XX Corps zone and that portion of XII Corps zone north of new inter-Army boundary.
(3) Relieve those elements of 90th Inf Div north of new inter-Army boundary without delay.
(4) Assemble 4th Armd Div prepared to move to an area southeast of FULDA wH3719 on Army order.
(5) Be prepared to pass to the control of First U S Army on Third U S Army order.

c. XII Corps (26th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div, 97th Inf Div, 11th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Move 71st Inf Div to relieve elements of XV Corps in left of zone; then pass control to XX Corps.
(2) Relinquish control of that portion of 90th Inf Div zone north of the new inter-Army boundary upon relief by VIII Corps.
(3) Continue attack southeast in zone.
(4) Assume command of 97th Inf Div upon arrival in zone.
(5) Protect left (northeast) flank of Third U S Army.

d. XVIII Abn Corps (5th Inf Div, 8th Inf Div, 4th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Assist movement of III Corps to Third U S Army zone.
(2) Assume command of 5th Inf Div. Move 5th Inf Div, 8th Inf Div and Corps troops to new zone on Third U S Army order.
(3) Assume command of 4th Armd Div in area southeast of FULDA wH3719 on Army order.
(4) Be prepared to move any or all of assigned divisions from FULDA area on 24 hours' notice.

e. XX Corps (65th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 80th Inf Div, 13th Armd Div and supporting troops) will:

(1) Relinquish control of 4th Armd Div, 6th Armd Div and 76th Inf Div.
(2) Relieve 80th Inf Div and move it to new zone without delay.
(3) Assume command of 65th Inf Div and move it to new zone without delay.
(4) Assume command of 71st Inf Div in new zone.
(5) Move Corps troops to new zone and relieve elements of Seventh U S Army.
(6) Assume command of 13th Armd Div upon arrival.
(7) Attack southeast in zone on Army order.
(8) Maintain contact with XII Corps on left.

f. 70th Inf Div and attached troops will:

(1) Continue to secure RHINE RIVER installations.
(2) Upon relief by Fifteenth U S Army move by successive elements into new area east of the RHINE RIVER.

g. 16th Armd Div will assemble in an area southwest of MAINZ wM3856, prepared to move on Army order.

h. 474th Inf Regt (Sep) will continue present mission of securing HERSFELD wH3854 area.

4. Boundaries:

a. Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups (effective date to be announced): OPPENHEIM wM4539 - DARMSTADT wM6542 (both to Twelfth Army Group) - OBERNBURG wN0238 - STADTPROZELTEN wN2134 (both to Sixth Army Group) - WURZBURG wN5835 - OCHSENFURT wN6821 - UFFENHEIM wN8007 - ANSBACH wT0682 - GUNZENHAUSEN wT2063 - EICHSTATT wT5338 - INGOLSTADT wT7125 - thence south along autobahn to SCHWEITENKIRCHEN wT8598 - FREISING wT9686 - ERDING wZ0976 - DORFEN wZ2874 - ROSENHEIM wZ2828 (all to Twelfth Army Group with running rights on WURZBURG - ANSBACH - INGOLSTADT road to Sixth Army Group).

b. Between First and Third U S Armies (effective as agreed between Army Commanders): LAHN RIVER from its mouth to AUMENAU wG3700 - GIESSEN wG6621 - ULRICHSTEIN wH0321 - FULDA wH3719 - WUSTENSACHSEN wH6114 (all to First U S Army) - thence along north boundary of BAVARIA to the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border.

c. Between III and XX Corps (effective as agreed between Corps Commanders): HASZFURT wN9863 - thence along MAIN and REGNITZ RIVERS to BAMBERG wO2749 - thence LUDWIGS KANAL to FORCHHEIM wO3930 - thence REGNITZ RIVER to ERLANGEN wO3616 - thence LUDWIGS KANAL through NUREMBERG wO4100 to wT5290 - NEUMARKT wT7182 - HEMAU wT9558 (all to XX Corps) - KELHEIM wU0344 - HERRNMIESDORF wU1830 - ROHRBERG wU2422 (all to III Corps) - ALTHEIM wU2909 - DIETELSKIRCHEN wZ4199 (both to XX Corps) - NEUMARKT wZ5385 - NEU-OTTING wZ6873 - BURGHAUSEN wZ7864 (all to III Corps).

d. Between XX and XII Corps (effective as agreed between Corps Commanders): KULMBACH wO6674 - BAYREUTH wO7556 (both to XII Corps) - GREUSSEN wO7945 - KIRCHENTHUMBACH wO8735 - HAAG wO9027 - SCHLICH wO9329 - AMBERG wO9902 (all to XX Corps) - SCHWANDORF wU1790 (to XX Corps with running rights to XII Corps) - MITTENAU wU3076 - REITENBACH wU4469 - SALZBURG wU5295 - HOHENSTORF wU5545 - DONAU RIVER TO PASSAU wU7113 (all to XII Corps).

5. a. Axes of Signal Communications:

(1) Third U S Army - FRANKFURT wM6770 - WURZBURG wN5835 - NURNBERG wO4100 - REGENSBURG wU1855.

(2) Corps - to be reported.

b. Command Posts:

(1) Third U S Army - HERSFELD wH3854 - to be announced.

(2) Corps - to be reported.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

H.G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

:: TOP SECRET ::
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 20 Apr 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC

20 April 1945

SUBJECT: Amendment No 1 to Operational Directive, Register No TUSA 2040

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, VIII Corps, APO 308, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U S Army
Commanding General, 16th Armd Div, APO 412, U S Army
Commanding General, 4th Armd Div, APO 254, U S Army
Commanding General, 5th Inf Div, APO 5, U S Army
Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

Operational Directive, this headquarters, Register No TUSA 2040, dated 17 April 1945, is amended as follows:

1. Delete reference to XVIII Abn Corps (Paragraph 3 d).

2. Renumber paragraph 3 e to 3 d.

3. Insert new paragraph 3 e as follows:

e. 5th Inf Div and 4th Armd Div will:

(1) Move to an area southeast of FULDA wH3719 when released by First U S Army.
(2) Be prepared to move from the FULDA area on 24 hours' notice.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

:: SECRET ::
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 20 Apr 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC

20 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

TO: Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

1. Letter of Instruction, this headquarters, AG 370.2 GNMCC, dated 15 April 1945, directing 474th Inf Regt (Sep) to move to the vicinity of WEIMAR, Germany wJ5271, is rescinded.

2. 474th Inf Regt (Sep) will:

a. Move on Army order to the vicinity of ERLANGEN, Germany wO3616.

b. (1) Clear all enemy military personnel from the area shown on attached overlay.
(2) Secure this area against enemy raids and infiltration.

c. Coordinate with and render such assistance to the Army Provost Marshal as can be done without interfering in the accomplishment of the mission assigned in paragraph 2b, above.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

SECRET

TOP SECRET

Chief of Staff 102 PDH 21 Apr 45

SECRET URGENT

CG, III CORPS
CG, VIII CORPS
CG, XII CORPS
CG, XX CORPS

MULTIPLE ADDRESS

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS ARE PAREN TO CG III CORPS CMA CG VIII CORPS CMA CG XII CORPS CMA CG XX CORPS FROM CG THIRD U S ARMY SIGNED PATTON CITE GNMCS TWO ONE PAREN ISSUED WITHOUT ANY INFORMATION AS TO ANY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND COVERING CONDUCT OF THEIR GROUND FORCES WHEN CONTACT IS MADE STOP PARA ALL ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COMMANDERS CONCERNED WILL BE INSTRUCTED AS FOLLOWS COLON PARA ABLE TO

AVOID CONFUSION AND PREVENT EXPANSION INTO AREAS OCCUPIED BY SOVIET FORCES CMA TROOPS WILL HALT IF AND WHERE THEY MEET THE SOVIET FORCES SUBJECT SUCH ADJUSTMENTS AS ARE REQUIRED IN THE OPINION OF THE LOCAL COMMANDER TO DEAL WITH ANY REMAINING ENEMY OPPOSITION STOP PARA BAKER AS TO ADJUSTMENT OF FORCES AFTER CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN AN AREA CMA TROOPS WILL BE DISPOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH MILITARY REQUIREMENTS REGARDLESS OF ULTIMATE ZONAL BOUNDARIES STOP INSOFAR AS IS PERMITTED BY THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION CMA THE APPROVAL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER WILL BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO ANY MAJOR ADJUSTMENTS AS A COUNTER DASH DISTINCTION TO LOCAL ADJUSTMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS STOP PARA CHARLIE BOTH REPORT OF CONTACT AND OF THE SITUATION IN RESPECT TO COORDINATION OF ACTION WITH THE SOVIET FORCES INVOLVED WILL BE MADE TO THIS HEADQUARTERS STOP PARA DOG THE SENIOR COMMANDER ON THE SPOT WILL ENDEAVOR TO CONTACT THE APPROPRIATE SENIOR COMMANDER OF THE SOVIET CMA OFFER CORDIAL GREETINGS AND ENDEAVOR TO ARRANGE MUTUAL CONDUCT OF FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPHS ABLE AND BAKER PRECEDING STOP EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO AVOID ANY ACCIDENTAL CLASHES WITH SOVIET FORCES AND TO PROHIBIT THE DISSEMINATION OF REPORTS OF INCIDENTS OR OF RUMORS WHICH MAY LEAD TO UNFORTUNATE INCIDENTS STOP PARA SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED RELATIVE TO RECOGNITION SYSTEM WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND AND IS EFFECTIVE AT ONCE

TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, Third US Army:
:Date: 26 April 1945 :
:Initials: RAH :

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 26 April 1945

Subject: Letter of Instruction.

To: Commanding General, 70th Infantry Division, APO 416, U S Army.

Effective 290001B April, the 70th Inf Div will assume responsibility for the additional area shown on overlay, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and G-5, this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

OFFICIAL:

HOBART R. GAY,
Major General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3.

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 28 Apr 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 28 April 1945

SUBJECT: Temporary Operational Boundary Between First and Third U S Armies

TO: See Distribution

1. The protection of the left flank Third U S Army along CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border will be taken over by First U S Army as troops become available.

2. Boundary between First and Third U S Armies as prescribed in Operational Directive, this headquarters, dated 17 April, Register No TUSA 2040, is changed temporarily as follows: RONSPERK wP6613 - OBRVIECHTACH wP3906 - NABBURG wP2104 (all to First U S Army) - SULZBACH-ROSENBERG w08908 (to Third U S Army) - AUERBACH w08028 (to First U S Army) - EBERMANNSTADT w04837 (to Third U S Army) - SCHESZLITZ w03658 - KALTENBRUNN w02474 (all to First U S Army) to junction of First - Third U S Army boundary at LINDENAU w01588.

3. As agreed between Commanding Generals, First and Third U S Armies, First U S Army will take over this area progressively as rapidly as is practicable. As the situation develops First U S Army will make preparations to extend their sector of responsibility to the southeast.

4. Mutual agreement of Corps Commanders concerned will settle matters such as use of roads and installations, and other necessary details.

5. Boundary between XII and XX Corps is changed to make road between AMBERG w09802 and SCHWANDORF wU1790 inclusive to XII Corps with running rights to XX Corps upon request.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: JHH :
:Date: 29 Apr 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 29 April 1945

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

TO : Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

474th Inf Regt (Sep) will:

1. Clear all enemy Military personnel from area south of NURNBERG shown on attached overlay. Coordinate with Army Provost Marshal.

2. Move one battalion into the rear area of XX Corps and progressively comb area to the DANUBE RIVER. Coordinate with CG XX Corps.

3. Move one battalion into the rear area of III Corps and progressively comb area to the DANUBE RIVER. Coordinate with CG III Corps.

By command of General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

: TOP SECRET :
:Auth: CG, TUSA :
:Init: _____ :
:Date: 30 Apr 45:

AG 370.2 GNMCC 30 April 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 16th Armd Div, APO 446, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U S Army
Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

1. a. The enemy is continuing to withdraw, attempting to employ favorable terrain features to strengthen his defend-and-delay tactics, while endeavoring to build up his forces in our zone of advance by moving troops from CZECHOSLOVAKIA and other sectors.

b. First U S Army on left (north) extends its zone south, taking over part of Third U S Army zone: maintains positions on the remainder of its front.

c. Seventh U S Army on right (west) continues to advance into AUSTRIA, captures INNSBRUCK wD7758, blocks BRENNER PASS and pushes strong reconnaissance to LANDECK rV3944 and WARTH wC8554 to assist First French Army in blocking RESIA PASS.

d. XIX TAC continues close cooperation with Third U S Army.

2. Third U S Army will:

a. Continue present drive southeast; seize and secure LINZ xV8687; effect a juncture with Soviet forces in the DANUBE VALLEY.

b. Seize SALZBURG wZ9726.

c. Advance rapidly and seize the BRUCK wE8467 - RADSTADT xA3281 area.

d. Occupy that part of AUSTRIA in zone.

3. a. III Corps (14th Armd Div, 86th Inf Div, 99th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assist XX Corps in seizing SALZBURG wZ9726 and BERCHTESGADEN wZ9506.
(2) Advance rapidly in zone and seize BRUCK wE8467.
(3) Seize LEND xA0169.
(4) Seize ST JOHANN wE5391 and KITZBUHEL wE5182.
(5) Maintain contact with Seventh U S Army on right (west).

b. XII Corps (4th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 26th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Continue advance southeast in DANUBE VALLEY to seize and secure LINZ xV8687.
(2) Be prepared on Army order to:
  (a) Push reconnaissance east from LINZ xV8687 to contact Soviet forces.
  (b) Push a force rapidly southwest from vicinity of LINZ xV8687 on SALZBURG wZ9726.
(3) Protect left (northeast) flank of Army.

c. XX Corps (13th Armd Div, 65th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Advance rapidly in zone and seize SALZBURG wZ9726 and BERCHTESGADEN wZ9506.
(2) Continue advance and seize KREUZBURG xA1385 and RADSTADT xA3281.

d. 16th Armd Div reverts to Twelfth Army Group reserve in NURNBERG wT4299 at 301200B Apr 1945.

e. 70th Inf Div will continue present mission.

f. 474th Inf Regt (Sep) will continue present mission.

4. Boundaries.

a. Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Groups (effective at once): No change to FREISING wT9686 (to Twelfth Army Group) - EDLING wZ3049 - PRIEN wZ4428 (both to Sixth Army Group) - ST JOHANN wE5391 and road to KITZBUHEL wE5182 - BRAMBERG wE4863 - LIENZ rK0505 (all to Twelfth Army Group).

b. Between First and Third U S Armies - Permanent boundary: No change. Temporary boundary: RONSPERR wP6613 - OBERVIECHTACH wP3906 - NABBURG wP2204 (all to First U S Army) - SULZBACH-ROSENBERG wO8908 (to Third U S Army) - AUERBACH wO8026 (to First U S Army) - EBERMANNSTADT wO4837 (to Third U S Army) - SCHNEIZLITZ wO3658 - KALTENBRUNN wO2474 (all to First U S Army) to junction of First - Third U S Army boundary at LINDENAU wO1588.

c. Between III and XX Corps: No change to NEU-OTTING wZ6772 (to III Corps) - WAGING wZ7338 (to III Corps) - BAD REICHENHALL wZ8516 (to XX Corps) - ST VEIT xA0973 (to III Corps) - HUTTSCHLAG xA1657 (to XX Corps).

d. Between XII and XX Corps: No change. Equal crossing rights in PASSAU area to both Corps.

5. a. Axes of Signal Communication:

(1) Third U S Army: ERLANGEN wQ3616 - REGENSBURG wU1955 - to be announced.
(2) III Corps: MAINBURG wT2812 - to be reported.
(3) XII Corps: VILSHOFEN wU7566 - to be reported.
(4) XX Corps: REGENSBURG wU1955 - to be reported.

b. Command Posts to be reported.

By command of General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

TOP SECRET

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403.

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 2 May 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 2 May 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive (Confirmation of fragmentary orders)

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army
Commanding General, V Corps, APO 305, U S Army
Commanding General, XII Corps, APO 312, U S Army
Commanding General, XX Corps, APO 340, U S Army
Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U S Army
Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep), APO 403, U S Army

1. a. The enemy's position in the Czechoslovakian pocket is untenable, logistically and tactically. He has only two alternatives: (1) to defend, delay and die fighting; (2) to surrender.

b. VIII Corps (First or Ninth U S Army) protects the left (north) flank of Third U S Army.

c. Seventh U S Army continues advance south on right (west) and occupies that part of AUSTRIA in zone.

d. XIX TAC continues close cooperation with Third U S Army.

2. Third U S Army will:

a. Advance to the line ENNS RIVER - CESKE BUDEJOVICE (BUDWEIS) xQ9263 - PILSEN xL0642 - KARLSBAD wP6694; prepared for further advance east.

b. Transfer one infantry division with normal attachments and those portions of KURHESSEN, NASSAU and HESSEN now in Third U S Army Zone to Ninth U S Army.

c. Assume command of V Corps and supporting troops in place.

3. a. III Corps (14th Armd Div, 4th Inf Div, 99th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume responsibility for line of communication security in assigned portion of the Army area.
(2) Occupy, under ECLIPSE provisions, that portion of III Corps ECLIPSE area presently in the Army area.

b. V Corps (9th Armd Div, 16th Armd Div, 1st Inf Div, 2d Inf Div, 97th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Assume command of 16th Armd Div.
(2) Advance northeast to general line KARLSBAD wP6694 - PILSEN xL0642, clearing all enemy in zone.
(3) Be prepared to continue advance east.

c. XII Corps (4th Armd Div, 11th Armd Div, 5th Inf Div, 26th Inf Div, 90th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Advance northeast to general line PILSEN xL0642 - CESKE BUDEJOVICE (BUDWEIS) xQ9263, clearing all enemy in zone; prepared to continue advance east.
(2) Continue advance east in DANUBE VALLEY to railroad running from xW038827 north to CESKE BUDEJOVICE (BUDWEIS) xQ9263, sending reconnaissance only east of this line.

d. XX Corps (13th Armd Div, 65th Inf Div, 71st Inf Div, 80th Inf Div and attached troops) will:

(1) Continue advance east to ENNS RIVER in zone.
(2) Protect right (southwest) flank of XII Corps.
(3) Maintain contact with Seventh U S Army on right (west) and send patrols south in zone.
(4) Be prepared to continue advance east and/or south.

e. 70th Inf Div will continue present mission until relieved by elements of III Corps; pass to Ninth U S Army control on Third U S Army order.

f. 474th Inf Regt (Sep) will continue present mission.

4. Boundaries (effective at once):

a. Between Sixth and Twelfth Army Group: No change to FREISING wT9686 (to Twelfth Army Group) - MUHLDORF wZ5572 - INN RIVER to junction with SALZACH RIVER (to Sixth Army Group) - STRASSWALCHEN xV1146 (to Twelfth Army Group) - BAD ISCHL xV4218 - SCHLADMING xA4884 - MAUTERNDORF xA5055 - VILLACH rC8880 (all to Sixth Army Group). Running rights on road BAD ISCHL xV4218 - GOISERN xV4111 - BAD AUSSEE xV5407 to Twelfth Army Group.

b. Between First and Third U S Armies: From junction of west boundary of BAVARIA with the Sixth - Twelfth Army Group boundary north and east along the boundary of BAVARIA to the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border - thence northeast along the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border.

c. Between V Corps and XII Corps: REGEN RIVER at wU5581 - REGEN RIVER and WEISSER REGEN RIVER to LAM wU8779 - wU911810 - KLATTAU (KLOTOVY) xL0303 (all to V Corps) - BLOWITZ (BLOVICE) xL1925 - ROKITZAN (ROKYCANY) xL2243 (both to XII Corps).

d. Between XII Corps and XX Corps: Present boundary to PASSAU xQ2313 - thence DANUBE (DONAU) RIVER.

e. Between III Corps and XX Corps: No change.

5. a. Axes of Signal Communication:

(1) Third U S Army - REGENSBURG wU1855 - to be announced.
(2) III Corps - DORFEN wZ2773 - to be reported.
(3) V Corps - GRAFENHOHR wP0132 - to be reported.
(4) XII Corps - GRAFENAU xQ1444 - to be reported.
(5) XX Corps - ST MARTIN xV2482 - to be reported.

b. Command Posts to be reported.

By command of General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, Third U S Army
Date: 3 May 1945
Initials: _____

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 3 May 1945

Subject: Letter of Instruction.

To : Commanding General, 4th Inf Div, APO 4, U S Army.
Commanding General, 70th Inf Div, APO 461, U S Army.
Commanding General, 38th AAA Brig, APO 403, U S Army.

1. Effective 040001B May, the 70th Inf Div will assume responsibility for the additional area shown on overlay, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and G-5, this headquarters, and Commanding General, 38th AAA Brig.

2. Effective without delay the 38th AAA Brig will assume responsibility for the Army area shown on overlay, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and G-5, this headquarters, Commanding General, 4th Inf Div, and Commanding General, 70th Inf Div. Within this area, it will:

a. Control traffic on MSR's.
b. Maintain law and order, both civil and military.
c. Guard the following installations as shown on overlay:

(1) Third Army Rear Command Post.
(2) Railroad and highway bridges.
(3) Railroad tunnels.
(4) Army supply installations.
(5) Signal installations.
(6) Allied prisoner of war camps.
(7) Displaced persons camps.

d. Administer Allied prisoner of war camps.

3. The 4th Inf Div will move without delay to the Army area NURNBERG (T 4299) - WEISZENBURG (T 3651) - INGOLSTADT (T 7123)(all inclusive) - REGENSBURG (U 1953)(exclusive until vacated by Third Army Headquarters) - SULZBACH (O 8919) (inclusive)(overlay). It will assume responsibility for this area as elements arrive successively, coordinating with the Provost Marshal and G-5, this headquarters, Commanding General, 38th AAA Brig and Commanding Officer, 474th Inf Regt (Sep). Within this area, it will:

a. Control traffic on MSR's.
b. Maintain law and order, both civil and military.
c. Guard the following installations as shown on overlay:

(1) Railroad and highway bridges.
(2) Railroad tunnels.
(3) Signal installations.
(4) Army supply installations.
(5) Allied prisoner of war camps.
(6) Displaced persons camps.
(7) Civilian internment camps.

d. Administer Allied prisoner of war camps.
e. Be prepared to extend its area of responsibility upon Army order.

4. General Instructions.

a. Traffic control will be effected as set forth in Circular Number 26, this headquarters, 15 March 1945, subject: "Traffic Regulation and Control for Continental Operation".

b. Guard details will be accomplished in accordance with the policies set forth in memorandum, this headquarters, 12 April 1945, subject: "Operations Instructions - Guarding Lines of Communication".

c. Allied Prisoner of War installations will be serviced in accordance with Standing Operating Procedure Number 58, 3 April 1945, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U S Army.

d. Civilian internment camps will be serviced in accordance with unnumbered publication, this headquarters, subject: "Internment Camps".

e. Displaced persons are a responsibility of Military Government. Units charged with line of communication duties, including the guarding of displaced persons camps, will:

(1) Collect all displaced persons at large, in temporary camps when necessary, and evacuate them to permanent camps in accordance with directions of Military Government authorities.
(2) Prevent all unauthorized traffic into and out of such camps.
(3) Function as Military Government in areas without adequate Military Government personnel, to the extent of procuring food and organizing camps.

By command of General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 5 May 45

AG 370.2 GNMCC 5 May 1945

SUBJECT: Operational Directive

TO: Commanding General, III Corps, APO 303, U S Army

1. Third Corps and attached troops will:

a. Assume responsibility for Line of Communications security in area.

b. Occupy, organize and govern, in accordance with the precepts of Operation "ECLIPSE" (see Second Draft Plan Operation "ECLIPSE," Hq Third U S Army, 24 Apr 45, Reg No TUSA 2070), that portion of III Corps "ECLIPSE" occupational area outlined by:

(1) Present Twelfth - Sixth Army Group boundary.
(2) Present III - XX Corps boundary.
(3) Present Third Army - XX Corps boundary.
(4) Present Third Army - XII Corps boundary.
(5) Present Third Army - V Corps boundary.
(6) Present Third Army - VIII Corps boundary.
(7) Future "ECLIPSE" boundary between HESSEN and NASSAU - BAVARIA.

c. Relieve 70th Inf Div of reponsibility of that portion of its area east of the NASSAU and HESSEN military district boundaries.

d. Be prepared to relinquish control on Army order of that portion of above area (paragraph b) which falls within the "ECLIPSE" areas of occupation of XX and XII Corps.

e. Be prepared to occupy on Army order that portion of III Corps "ECLIPSE" area of occupation presently south of the Twelfth - Sixth Army Group boundary and presently north of the Third Army - V Corps boundary.

2. Troop list:

a. Presently attached troops.

b. 14th Armd Div and presently attached troops.

c. 99th Inf Div and presently attached troops.

d. 4th Inf Div and presently attached troops.

e. 38th AAA Brig and presently attached troops (to revert to Army control at an early date).

By command of General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General U. S. Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

SECRET
Auth: CG, Third U S Army
Date: 7 May 1945
Initials: _____

AG 370.2 - GNMCC 7 May 1945

Subject: Letter of Instruction.

To : Commanding Officer, Hq & Hq Btry, 33d FA Brig, APO 403, U S Army.

1. Effective at once the 33d FA Brig, with attached troops, will constitute the Army Agency responsible for:

a. Collecting, protecting, supplying, administering and evacuating all Allied Prisoners of War and civilian internees within the Army area, coordinating with the Army G-1.

b. Collecting, guarding and protecting displaced persons within the Army area, coordinating with the Army G-5.

c. Where such responsibilities have been specifically delegated to other commands in designated areas the 33d FA Brig will supervise, coordinate and inspect such activities.

2. General Instructions.

a. Allied Prisoner of War installations will be established when necessary and serviced in accordance with Standing Operating Procedure No. 58, 3 April 1945, Headquarters, ETO, U S Army, and letter this headquarters, file AG 383.6 GNMCA-4, 26 April 1945, subject: "Processing of Recovered Allied Military Personnel".

b. Civilian Internment Camps will be established and serviced in accordance with unnumbered publication, this headquarters, subject: "Internment Camps".

c. (1) Displaced Persons will be collected and placed in temporary camps when necessary and will be evacuated to permanent camps in accordance with directives of Military Government.

(2) Camps will be guarded to enforce the "stay put" policy.

(3) Camps will be placed off limits, and the entry of unauthorized persons prevented.

(4) Camps will be supplied and administered where necessary due to the absence of Military Government personnel and facilities for that purpose.

3. Troops.

Hq & Hq Btry, 195th FA Gp
176th FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
558th FA Bn (155mm Gun)(SP)
770th FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
775th FA Bn (4.5" Gun)
304th Truck Co (French)

Hq & Hq Btry, 220th FA Gp
174th FA Bn (155mm Gun)(SP)
277th FA Bn (240mm How)
551st AAA AW Bn (M)

By command of General PATTON:

HOBART R. GAY
Major General, U S Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

H. G. MADDOX
Brigadier General, GSC
AC of S, G-3

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XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND REPORT

SECRET

AUTH: CG XIX TAC
DATE: 30 SEPT 44
INIT:

TWELVE THOUSAND FIGHTER-BOMBER SORTIES

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XIX Tactical Air Command's First Month of Operations

in Support of Third US Army in France

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HEADQUARTERS (ADVANCED)
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

APO 141, U.S. Army.
30 September 1944.

INTRODUCTION

Within one month of the day when the Third U.S. Army and XIX Tactical Air Command of the Ninth Air Force began operations together in France, the armored and infantry divisions and covering fighter-bombers of this new ground-air team had broken out of NORMANDY into BRITTANY, conquered all of that peninsula except three stubborn ports, firmly secured the line of the LOIRE, and swept 140 miles beyond libereted PARIS to within 60 miles of the German border.

While the events are still warm these notes and historical record are written, with the hope that some of the many lessons in teamwork and technique which were learned in that eventful month may be of tactical value.

O.P. WEYLAND
Brigadier General, USA,
Commanding.

NOTES ON ORGANIZATION, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUE

1. General. The operations of the XIX Tactical Air Command in the field have proved the basic concepts of FM 100-20 to be basically sound.

a. The order of priority of tactical missions:

(1) Attainment and maintenance of air superiority.

(2) Isolation of battlefield.

(3) Close air support to ground units in combat.

2. Air Liaison Officers.

a. There is no provision for air liaison officers for assignment to corps and divisions in any Tables of Organization within the Tactical Air Command. Air Liaison Officers are being used and have proved of extremely great value and have assured smooth cooperation in joint operations. Provisions should be made in the Table of Organization of the Tactical Air Command for air liaison officers of field grade. In this Command they have been carried as overages and have consequently been blocked in promotion and have blocked promotions of deserving officers in the Command.

b. It became apparent in the early stages of rapid advances of army divisions that one air support party per armored division was inadequate. The armored divisions of the Third Army habitually advance in two or three columns, each comprising a combat command. Because of their physical separation and rapid movement, it was found necessary to provide an air support party for each combat command. A sufficient number of air support parties, complete with equipment and operating personnel, should be provided for in Air Corps Tables of Organizations to furnish three parties for armored divisions. In the current campaign these parties have been improvised.

3. Communications. Wire communications for the Command, and control between the various elements of the Tactical Air Command, have proved unsatisfactory under conditions of rapid advances. This was due to long lines of communication, cutting of lines by saboteurs, shortage of wire, shortage of repeater and carrier equipment, shortage of maintenance, construction and operating personnel. A system of radio teletype and telephone should be developed capable of carrying all Tactical

Air Force's communication loads. The equipment and personnel to maintain and operate this system should be incorporated in Tables of Organization of Air Forces and Tactical Air Commands.

4. Tactical Air Control. The assignment and operation of a fighter Control Center with Fighter Wings has proven unsatisfactory for offensive Tactical Air Control purposes. To overcome this, all aircraft warning units, fighter control squadrons and radio intercept "Y" service have been organized into a provisional Tactical Control Group and placed directly under the control of the Advanced Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command. Elements of the Tactical Control Group are maintained very close behind the advanced ground troops and close to, but not necessarily with, the Advanced Tactical Air Command Headquarters.

5. Supply and Transportation. An adequate air service command and aviation engineer command are absolutely essential to the mobile tactical air force and have proved their worth in this theater. Because of the pooling of motor transportation in the communications zone, the air Service Command has not always been able to adequately supply or move the tactical units. I strongly believe the Air Service Command should have sufficient motor transport to move and supply the tactical units over distances up to three hundred (300) miles. It is believed the service team should be an organic part of the combat group in a mobile Tactical Air Command.

6. Airdrome Squadrons. Airdrome squadrons have proved invaluable in maintaining tactical operations by refueling and rearming units at advanced landing grounds. They have also proved their worth in temporarily servicing tactical groups at new airdromes while the group's ground personnel was being leap-frogged forward.

7. P-47 Aircraft and API Ammunition. The P-47 airplane has been extensively used with very great success in strafing locomotives, trains, motor transport, horse-drawn transport and armored vehicles. Armor-piercing incendiary ammunition has been shown to be far more effective on these strafing operations than the mixed loading of two armor-piercing, two incendiary and one tracer. Likewise, it has been found far more effective in use against hostile aircraft in the air and on the ground. It is recommended that straight API ammunition be furnished fighter-bomber groups.

8. Rockets. The trackless, high-velocity, five-inch rocket has been thoroughly tested under combat conditions in this Command. It has been found to be accurate and especially effective against tanks, armored vehicles; locomotives and gun positions. It adds little to the plane in weight, detracts little in speed, and, considering its flexibility, it is considered an extremely valuable tactical weapon and is recommended for all fighter-bombers.

9. Armored Column Cover.

a. The practice of assigning to one fighter-bomber group the task of providing continuous cover for one armored column during daylight hours proved most satisfactory. Groups are directed to furnish 8 to 12 aircraft for cover to armored columns. As each flight approaches, the leader checks in by radio with the flight leader being released, also with the Air Support Party radio on the ground. Suitable targets left to be attacked are passed to the flight picking up the patrol. SOP with flights is to patrol ahead to a distance of 35 miles seeking out possible strong points or pockets of resistance which might hamper the forward movement of our armor. Such targets are attacked and also reported to the armored column.

b. The Germans' camouflage discipline is excellent. Pilots, however, after 15 or 20 missions could pick out irregularities of shadow along roads, which disclosed the presence of the enemy.

c. Both the number of planes, 8 or 12, and their bomb load varied with the amount of enemy armor opposing the movement of our column and the possibility of encountering enemy aircraft. For example, in the area between LE MANS and FONTAINEBLEU, where few thick-skinned enemy vehicles were encountered, it was possible almost to dispense with carrying bombs, since the desired results could be obtained by strafing. In the MANTES-GASSICOURT area, close to PARIS and the enemy's fighter fields, only one-third of our aircraft were bombed up because of the frequency of encounters with enemy planes.

d. It has been proven quite conclusively that our .50 cal. API ammunition can, and has, destroyed enemy armor. Pilots have repeatedly reported tanks being set afire by low-altitude strafing from the rear. Evidently ricochet bullets found their way into the engine section through exhaust and cooling vents.

10. Air-Ground Communications. At the outset of the campaign, C Channel was used for all communication between aircraft and ground forces. This channel proved badly over-crowded, however, and early communication difficulities were overcome by assigning frequencies as follows: Button A--Group frequency and homing. Button B--Air-Ground communication with VIII and XII Corps. C--Communication with all aircraft of Ninth Air Force. D--Air-Ground communication with XV and XX Corps.

11. Altitude of Operations. Operations under 3,500 feet were found to be impracticable for fighter-bombers because of the damage inflicted by the intense light flak encountered over concentrations of enemy troops. The P-51 was found to be much more susceptible to serious damage by light flak than the P-47, because of the former's liquid-cooled engine and its somewhat lighter construction.

12. Minimum Weather. For dive-bombing our operations required a 5,000-foot ceiling with broken cloud. For armed reconnaissance the minimum was 3,500 feet with broken cloud. For take-off from base, minimum conditions were 1,000-foot ceiling and three miles visibility.

13. Frequency of Operation. Two group missions, or six squadron missions, per day per group proved to be the most desirable average scale of effort. Our squadrons had been reduced in number from 16 to 12 ships, since this gave added flexibility and was adequate for any task encountered. Two group sorties per day thus meant 72 individual airplane sorties, and it was found that this scale of effort could be maintained day in and day out without affecting maintenance. As a general policy, each group was allowed one day off for maintenance every 7 to 10 days. Also, two missions with 12-plane squadrons was the maximum that could be supported with the flow of replacement aircraft.

14. Bomb Loading.

a. The most frequently used loading consisted of two 500-pound general-purpose bombs with instantaneous fuse. This bomb was found suitable against most military installations not protected by reinforced concrete or heavy masonry. The 500-lb. general-purpose bomb was also used satisfactorily, with 8 to 11 seconds delay fuse, for cutting railroad lines, the bomb being driven into the side of an embankment by minimum-altitude skip-bombing methods. With a 6 to 12-hour delay fuse, the same bomb was dropped on highways to discourage road movement by night. When the Germans were endeavoring to escape across the SEINE, these bombs with long-delay fusing were dropped in the water close to ferry slips.

b. Fragmentation bombs were used less extensively than the 500-pound GP because this swift "end-run" type of campaign offered fewer opportunities for their effective employment. The Argentan pocket was an outstanding exception, and frags were used there with excellent results. Frag clusters and, to a lesser extent, the 260-pound anti-personnel fragmentation bomb, were employed against personnel and thin-skinned vehicles.

c. Napalm was found to be a very good weapon if properly employed on the proper targets. Among its advantages are the fact that:

(1) It can be dropped from a low altitude without danger to the aircraft, and

(2) It completely smothers the target with intense flames, burning everything combustible and destroying personnel by anoxia, carbon monoxide poisoning and burning. It is particularly adapted for attack on deep shelters, because of its effect upon the ventilating system. In attacks on gun positions, the effectiveness of artillery pieces was found to be impaired or destroyed by Napalm's intense heat. For Napalm the regular belly tank (usually the 150-gallon type) was used with a detonator but no fins. Dropping was done from minimum altitude by visual methods, without use of a sight.

d. Virtually no 1,000-pound bombs were used during the mobile warfare of August, two 500-pound bombs being found more effective for most purposes.

15. Radius of Action. Effective radius for the P-47 with full bomb load but without spare tank was 200 miles; the 150-gallon tank increased this to 350 miles. For the P-51 the radius was 325 miles on fighter-sweeps without tanks, or about 600 miles with 150-gallon tank, although this much range is rarely needed in tactical operations of the type conducted thus far by this Command.

16. Airfield Surface. A minimum of 5,000 feet proved necessary for taking off with full tank and two 500-pound bombs, since most of our fields had a dip or roll and acceleration was not so rapid as on a hard-surfaced runway. Hessian waterproof material proved very satisfactory when laid on a graded surface. Considerably better than such landing grounds, however, were established airfields captured from the Germans and repaired, such as those at RENNES, CHATEAUDUN and ST. DIZIER. Such fields had extensive dispersal areas and were large enough to accommodate two groups.

17. Flank Protection. The swift pace of General Patton's advance posed many new problems, one of the most important of which was protection of the long flank along the LOIRE. The task of watching that flank and preventing any dangerous concentration was turned over entirely to the air--an important milestone in the history of air warfare. This task was successfully carried out by vigilant tactical and photographic reconnaissance backed by our fighter--bombers, who were continually attacking enemy troops and transport, interdicting movements by road and rail and keeping the enemy constantly off balance so that small units had little chance to "snowball" into effective opposition. The full results of these efforts were not apparent until the middle of September, when the German general commanding 20,000 troops south of the LOIRE surrendered, with all his officers and men, to the U.S. Ninth Army and to the Commanding General, XIX TAC. His capitulation resulted from three factors: relentless air attack, effective action by French Forces of the Interior, and the cutting of the only remaining escape route by junction of the U.S. Third and Seventh Armies.

18. Operations on Fronts 350 Miles Apart. When BREST still held out and Third Army's main attack meanwhile moved well to the east of PARIS, the Command found itself operating simultaneously on fronts 350 miles apart. This proved entirely practical because of the flexibility and range of the air power.

19. Situation Map. So rapid was the advance and so wide the extent of the front, that it was found impracticable to continue maintaining the general situation on a map of 1 to 100,000 scale. General Patton's spearheads were continually running off the map, even though it was maintained on boards aggregating 16 feet long and 8 feet high. Accordingly the 1 to 250,000 map was substituted and proved satisfactory.

20. Reconnaissance and Intelligence. Reconnaissance, intelligence technique, and teamwork between the A-3 and A-2 sections improved materially in the course of the month, and were reflected in the results achieved in hunting down the enemy's air force and catching his aircraft on the ground, in attacking enemy transport attempting to escape into Germany from south of the LOIRE and in providing direct aid for the ground forces.

THE BACKGROUND, IN BRIEF

Third U.S. Army

Third Army had been in Germany before, as its shoulder patch attests--a white "A" and red "O" on a field of blue representing Army of Occupation.

Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Commanding, made no secret of the fact that his Army was going to Germany again, and in the shortest possible time.

At 1500 hours on 6 July, Third Army arrived in France from England, establishing headquarters at NEHOU, NORMANDY. Assignment of units was as follows:

VIII Corps -- 4th Armored Division, 6th Armored Division, 8th Infantry Division, and 83rd Infantry Division.

XII Corps -- 80th Infantry Division.

XV Corps -- 5th Armored Division, 79th Infantry Division, and 90th Infantry Division.

XX Corps -- 7th Armored Division, 28th Infantry Division, and 2nd French Armored Division.

The initial objective of Third U.S. Army when it became operational on 1 August was: To drive south and southwest from present location (AVRANCHES), secure area RENNES-FOUGERES, then west to capture BRITTANY PENINSULA and to open BRITTANY ports.

XIX Tactical Air Command

XIX Tactical Air Command, under Brigadier General O.P. Weyland had been operating from England for months as a part of IX Fighter Command.

General Weyland had taken command on 4 February 1944 at ALDERMASTON COURT, near READING, BERKSHIRE, and subsequently two wings and seven groups of fighter-bombers had been placed under the administrative control of the Command. These units were the 100th Wing, comprising the 354th, 358th, 362nd and 363rd Groups; and the 303rd Wing, consisting of

the 36th, 373rd and 406th Groups. Five of the seven were P-47 groups, while two -- the 354th and 363rd -- flew P-51s. The crack 354th Group had been the first P-51 outfit to go operational in this theater and all four of the 100th Wing groups had flown many missions from East Anglian bases in support of Eighth Air Force heavy bombers during the winter and early spring.

With the arrival of 303rd Wing in the theater, all seven groups began operating from advanced landing grounds in Kent. They took part in the mounting crescendo of attack which preceded the invasion and aided in supporting both the landing on D-day and the subsequent advance into NORMANDY.

During the period when First Army was the only American army in France, the XIX TAC groups based in NORMANDY were under the operational control of IX Tactical Air Command, Supporting First Army.

When the IX TAC moved to France with the First Army, General Weyland assumed Command of the IX Fighter Command in England, and with it assumed operational control of all fighter-bomber groups of the IX and XIX TACs based in England. These groups were moved to France as rapidly as operating fields became available, and when General Weyland flew over late in July, the Fighter Command was dissolved.

With the advent of Third Army on 1 August, XIX Tactical Air Command took up the task for which it had been created--air support of an army in the Field. The Command's advance headquarters had arrived in France on 2 July, and, after a short stay in the vicinity of CRIQUEVILLE, had moved to the NEHOU area, close to General Patton's headquarters. Army and Air Command had been working together in England during the training and planning stages and accordingly were well prepared to function as a closely integrated team.

The Situation

Following the capture of CHERBOURG and the conquest of most of the COTENTIN PENINSULA, operations had slowed almost to a standstill along a line running roughly east to west, in the American sector, from LESSAY to PERIERS and ST. LO. In this typical Norman "bocage" country, consisting of small fields and orchards with hedges and deep drainage ditches, the enemy had made the most of the terrain and was putting up a strong defense.

To break up the deadlock, "Operation Cobra" was planned. On 25 July 1944, the Cobra struck -- a concentrated attack by some 3,000 aircraft, ranging from heavies and mediums to light and fighter-bombers, upon enemy defenses in a narrow sector along the PERIERS-ST. LO road. This history-making operation had the desired effect. Like the blasting of a dam, it permitted American infantry and armor to break through the defended zone and roll swiftly southward. Just one week after Operation Cobra, came the long awaited jumpoff of Third Army and XIX TAC.

AIR OPERATIONS, DAY BY DAY

Part I: The Brittany Blitz.

1 AUGUST (D+56)

On 31 July 1944, XIX Tactical Air Command moved its advance headquarters southward from the vicinity of NEHOU and pitched its tents in the inevitable Norman apple orchards a mile or so east of the main north-south highway between LESSAY and COUTANCES. Close at hand was Third Army's advance CP.

The time had come to unsheathe Uncle Sam's "secret weapon" -- the Third Army-XIX TAC combination--and at 0001 hours on 1 August this ground-air team became operational. It was a psychological moment, pregnant with huge possibilities affecting the entire future course of the war, for U.S. armor was just making its great drive past AVRANCHES, bursting out of the Norman hedgerow country at last into the comparatively open spaces of BRITTANY.

At the Command's disposal at the outset were three groups of P-47 fighter-bombers--the 365th, 358th, and 371st--operating under 84th Wing. All had previously been under the operational control of IX Tactical Air Command, supporting First U.S. Army, and all were based in the NORMANDY PENINSULA. For tactical and photographic reconnaissance this Command had the 10th Reconnaissance Group, whose accomplishments included remarkable low-level photography of the invasion beaches before D-day. This group, however, was still based in England, except for one squadron which was operating with 67th Reconnaissance Group from a NORMANDY base.

In the Command's first operations order, two of the three fighter-bomber groups were assigned to fly armored column cover for the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, already rolling southward beyond AVRANCHES. The third group was ordered to fly armed reconnaissance over the heart of BRITTANY, toward which General Patton's spearheads were pointed.

Armored column cover was so arranged as to maintain eight fighter-bombers constantly in the air over each armored division, the eight-plane flights being relieved every hour. Theirs was the double duty of preventing attack by enemy air and of knocking out anything which might hold up the armored column. Planes and tanks worked closely together, talking to each other by VHF radio.

Armed recce's task was the longer-range mission of isolating the battlefield, spotting and breaking up any concentration of strength, keeping the enemy constantly off balance and interfering with his efforts either to reinforce or to run away. Bridge-wrecking, however, was tabooed from the outset, lest it interfere with the rapid advance of our forces. So swift was the pace that in most cases the enemy had no time to blow his bridges behind him.

Takeoff of our planes on the first day of operations was delayed until late afternoon by bad weather over the bases, but in the short time remaining they flew ten missions comprising 147 sorties and dropped 22 tons of bombs. No enemy aircraft were encountered and our groups suffered no losses.

Hay wagons carrying concealed AA guns were spotted and bombed by 358th Group, which also dumped high-explosive on the marshalling yard at LAMBALLE and attacked miscellaneous road and rail traffic.

Flying armored column cover to 6th Armored Division, 365th Group reported three 88-mm guns knocked out by three direct hits with 500 pound GP bombs. Covering 4th Armored Division, 371st Group planes put eight 500-pounders in a field reported to contain gun positions.

Other results included cutting of three railroad lines, damage to two freight cars, destruction of 22 motor vehicles and 2 armored vehicles and damage to 9 more of the enemy's dwindling motor transport. Targets attacked included a fuel dump as well as a marshalling yard and six gun positions.

In this highly mobile form of warfare the leading armor often outran its communications, and the army's latest information on the location of its spearheads frequently came from reconnaissance or fighter-bomber pilots.

To make the most of this source of information, our pilots on armored column cover were instructed to include in their reports, whenever possible, the point at which the head of the column was last observed.

2 AUGUST (D+57)

On 2 August, another Wing--the 100th--and two more groups--405th and 363rd--were placed under the Command's operational control. They were needed, for General Patton's armored spearheads, thrusting deep into BRITTANY, required constant column cover and extensive armed reconnaissance ahead and on their flanks.

Equally important was protection of the AVRANCHES bottleneck, where U.S. troops and supplies were pouring over the bridges and where the enemy was beginning to apply pressure in an effort to paralyze the armored fingers probing past the Breton capital of RENNES and toward the great port of BREST.

Accordingly, in addition to ordering continuous fighter cover over the area by 363rd Group's P-51s, General Weyland and his Combat Operations Officer, Colonel James Ferguson, instructed groups flying armored column cover to make periodic sweeps over rear elements of the columns, in the direction of AVRANCHES.

As it developed, 363rd Group was grounded all day by weather, but the other groups were able to operate after about 1000 hours.

Among targets successfully attacked were seven Tiger tanks, destroyed by 500-pound bombs from 405th Group P-47s on armed reconnaissance of the north coast of BRITTANY. The tanks, in a reported assembly area for armor, were endeavoring to hide themselves by a smokescreen.

Our groups on armored column cover were having difficulty in contacting ground control. Targets which they succeeded in knocking out, however, included several troublesome gun positions. In one case, 371st Group P-47s put 16 500-pound bombs on eight gun positions; all were silenced. Another gun knocked out by planes from the same group had been accurately marked by the ground troops with white smoke.

Our armed reconnaissance now was reaching out to cover most of BRITTANY, all the way south to the LOIRE, while tactical reconnaissance began to extend even farther. Eleven Tac/R missions were flown. P-47s of 358th Group, flying armed reconnaissance of the south and east flank in the RENNES-NANTES-ANGERS-LAVAL area, found little to attack, but bombed railroad targets.

In all, 23 combat missions comprising 223 sorties were flown, and 35-3/4 tons of bombs were dropped, representing a decided increase over the previous day's activity. There were no claims against enemy aircraft, but two planes were lost to flak.

Claims against ground targets included a locomotive destroyed and three damaged, a railroad line cut, a freight car destroyed, 35 motor vehicles destroyed and 24 damaged, 7 Tiger tanks and a half-track destroyed, two gun positions destroyed and one damaged, a gas tank destroyed, a marshalling yard and five troop concentrations attacked.

Despite the cover afforded, 4th Armored Division reported it was attacked by enemy aircraft during the day. Most of the enemy's attacking, however, was done under cover of night. By single sortie and small groups, enemy aircraft bombed and strafed roads and bridges in the vicinity of AVRANCHES during the night of 2-3 August, beginning at about dusk. But the southward-flowing torrent of troops and supplies continued, undiminished.

3 AUGUST (D+58)

Over roads filled with Third Army troops and supplies moving up, the Command advanced its headquarters on 3 August to the vicinity of BEAUCHAMPS, east of GRANVILLE, and set up alongside of General Patton's CP amid the usual hedges and apple trees.

The enemy was continuing to withdraw before the armored elements of VIII Corps, but was concentrating in the RENNES and ST. MALO areas and preparing to counterattack west from MORTAIN to cut the corridor at AVRANCHES.

Through the bottleneck General Patton was pouring his XV Corps, to face east below AVRANCHES and protect the rear of VIII Corps' operations in BRITTANY.

Accordingly, the air plan for the day provided cover for the XV Corps' 79th Infantry and 5th Armored Division in the vicinity of FOUGERES and ST. JAMES, in addition to protection of bridges and roads in the AVRANCHES-PONTAUBOULT area and continued cover for the three armored columns thrusting west through BRITTANY. Of these spearheads, the 4th Armored Division was in the vicinity of MORDELLE, southwest of RENNES. The 6th Armored, under orders to advance through the center of the peninsula, had reached the area of JUGON; and General Ernest's Task Force, cutting off the north coast, was some five miles west of DINAN.

Units supporting armored columns were directed in the day's operations order to contact the appropriate ground station when approaching the head of the column. If no targets were given, and if the area was free of enemy aircraft, they were instructed to sweep ahead of the column for up to 30 miles, attacking any military objectives that might obstruct its progress. This move to increase fighter-bomber effectiveness was made possible by the lightness of opposition put up by the German Air Force.

Weather on this date, however, was most unfavorable, with bases non-operational much of the day because of low stratus, nimbo-stratus and light rain showers. Only six missions, of eight aircraft each, were able to take off, and four were unsuccessful because of weather, all bombs being jettisoned or returned to base. The other two missions resulted in destruction or damaging of 40-odd motor and horse-drawn vehicles, including ammunition trucks, in the path of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions. Total sorties were 48; tons of bombs dropped, 3-1/4. One aircraft was lost. Twenty-four tactical reconnaissance and two photographic reconnaissance sorties were flown.

Continued night attacks on troops moving through the AVRANCHES area brought a request from Third Army that night fighter protection be accorded. Since aircraft of the Command do not include night fighters, this request was referred to Ninth Air Force and the desired protection was afforded by IX Air Defense Command.

4 AUGUST (D+59)

The fourth day of Third Army-XIX TAC operations found the enemy still withdrawing south and west before our armored columns in southern and central BRITTANY and retiring into the defenses of ST. MALO in the north, but meanwhile putting pressure on the AVRANCHES corridor from the area of MORTAIN.

XV Corps was now pushing southeast from FOUGERES while VIII Corps armor continued its BRITTANY blitz and the attack on ST. MALO was begun by General Ernest's armored task force and the 83rd Infantry Division.

Although only four groups were available and low ceilings over bases prevented operations until 1030 hours, the scale of air activity rose sharply on this date to 30 missions comprising 424 sorties.

Several air support requests were received through G-3 (Air) of Third Army and were acted upon by dispatching a mission or, if possible, by vectoring planes already in the air.

One urgent request was relayed through VIII Corps because failure of 4th Armored Division's VHF prevented direct contact with the covering aircraft. It called for immediate air attack on a column of enemy tanks in a wood. A squadron of 358th Group was ordered to attack and subsequently reported sixteen 500-pound bombs in the target area, with a good concentration on 15 tanks.

Troops assaulting ST. MALO were encountering strong concrete pillbox defenses and were being shelled by ships in the harbor. Requests for bomber assistance in attacking these targets were transmitted to Ninth Air Force, but in the meantime the warships were bombed and strafed by our Thunderbolts in the face of intense flak.

Besides supporting the attack on ST. MALO and the advance of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, our aircraft flew armed recces as far south as ANGERS and eastward to LAVAL along the route of the swiftly advancing XV Corps. Tactical and photographic reconnaissance planes were also busy along the flanks and routes of advance.

Some aircraft were damaged by flak, but no planes or pilots were lost and there were no claims against enemy aircraft. The four groups in action--the 405th, 365th, 358th and 371st--dropped 52½ tons of bombs on targets, and results of bombing and strafing included a rail line cut, 6 freight cars destroyed, 57 MT destroyed and 5 damaged, 5 supply dumps and a fuel dump destroyed, an armored vehicle damaged, a fuel vehicle destroyed, and a naval vessel set afire. A troop concentration and 15 bivouac areas were attacked.

5 AUGUST (*D*+60)

One more group, the 36th, was placed under command of XIX TAC on 5 August, raising the order of battle to five groups.

Third Army's swift advances continued, both eastward and westward, but otherwise there was little change from the previous day. As before, the air plan provided cover for armored and infantry columns, and armed recces to aid in destruction of the enemy on the BRITTANY PENINSULA and in advance of the eastward-pushing XV Corps, which was now joined by XX Corps.

Only part of the day was flyable, since the wind blew low stratus clouds from the English Channel onto coastal airdromes at about 1100 hours and they were not clear until late afternoon. Nevertheless, 246 combat sorties and 10 successful tactical and photographic reconnaissance missions were flown. Forty-four tons of bombs were dropped, and results included 58 motor vehicles, a headquarters, 9 horse-drawn vehicles, and 8 gun positions destroyed, plus damage to a naval vessel in ST. MALO Harbor.

"A successful day," writes Major James G. Martin, IV, of the G-3 (Air) Section, Third Army, in his "History of the Employment of the Air Arm in Support of Third U.S. Army". "The air was kept comparatively free of enemy aircraft and many ground targets were hit. Progress of the ground attack on all fronts was aided materially."

Among the targets which might have caused the ground troops trouble were three self-propelled heavy guns, knocked out by eight bombs from eight P-47s of 405th Group, flying support for the 4th Armored Division.

Two other 500-pounders, dropped by 371st Group planes supporting 83rd Division in the ST. MALO area, hit buildings which apparently contained explosives. Three or more detonations followed the bomb hits, and red flames shot to 400 feet.

One of the prime objects of our reconnaissance in the area of ANGERS and south of the LOIRE was location of the 11th Panzer Division, which was persistently reported to be moving north to strike our forces around RENNES in the flank. The division never materialized on our front although a few elements may have been present for a time in the vicinity of ANGERS. The division eventually turned up in southern France, opposing the invading U.S. Seventh Army.

In the first five days of Blitz warfare, U.S. style, Third Army had conquered most of BRITTANY and in support XIX TAC fighter-bombers had flown 1,088 sorties. In the face of our patrols, the Luftwaffe had put up no resistance at all by daylight. Our losses totaled only three aircraft and a partial list of the destruction and damage caused by our planes included 250 motor vehicles, 12 tanks, 9 horse-drawn vehicles, 4 locomotives, 9 railroad cars and 2 naval vessels destroyed or damaged; 5 railroad lines cut; 17 gun positions, 7 fuel and supply dumps, 2 marshalling yards, a gas tank, a headquarters, and 21 troop concentrations or bivouac areas attacked.

Part II: Encirclement Starts

6 AUGUST (*D*+61)

By dawn of the sixth day of operations, the campaign was entering a new phase. The enemy was withdrawing to concentration points at BREST, LORIENT, ST. MALO and the PAIMPOL PENINSULA, and except for those hard cores of resistance, virtually all of BRITTANY was in U.S. hands. RENNES had fallen almost without a struggle, and the airfield sites around this capital city of BRITTANY soon became available for our reconnaissance group and for some of our fighter-bombers. These sites were not only much closer to the scene of operations but also usually enjoyed better weather than the bases in the NORMANDY PENINSULA.

With the enemy on the defensive except in the MORTAIN area, where he was still trying to cut our traffic artery through AVRANCHES, General Patton now pressed eastward in an encircling movement which threatened to strike the rear of the German forces facing the First U.S. Army and the British in the area of MORTAIN and VIRE.

Meanwhile he continued the BRITTANY campaign and set out to secure the line of the LOIRE for protection of his right flank.

Below the LOIRE were enough German troops to cause considerable trouble for the relatively small forces available to hold the river line. G-2 estimated the enemy's strength in that area to be about 20,000. The task of taking care of this flank was turned over to General Weyland by General Patton completely, with an expression of his confidence in the ability of the air to spot any danger from this quarter by reconnaissance and to prevent concentrations or large movements by means of its fighter-bombers. In the days which followed, the roads, rails and marshalling yards south of the LOIRE were kept under constant close surveillance, and General Weyland's fighter-bombers were frequently able to dissuade enemy elements from coming up north of the river. The principal cities of the LOIRE were quickly seized by Third Army, and no real threat on this flank ever developed. When large movement eventually took place it was eastward--in the effort to get back to Germany--and XIX TAC's fighter-bombers were able to interfere with that ambition too.

In view of the entrance upon a new phase, the main weight of XIX TAC's air power was shifted on 6 August to the eastern front and LOIRE Valley, with patrols over the danger area in the AVRANCHES corridor.

Squadrons covering XV Corps' 79th, 90th, and 5th Armored Divisions in the area between LAVAL and MAYENNE found the hunting good, especially in tanks. One P-47 was lost; while strafing tanks, it "mushed in" and exploded.

Combat sorties on 6 August totaled 293. There were no enemy aircraft claims, but 35⅝ tons of bombs were dropped on varied targets. Claims included 9 locomotives, 20 freight cars, 135 motor vehicles, 7 armored vehicles and 3 field guns destroyed; also 3 locomotives, 46 MT, 14 armored vehicles and 6 small boats damaged. Attacks were also made on an enemy airdrome, a highway bridge, an ammunition dump and a flak position. In addition, 26 successful tactical and photographic reconnaissance missions were flown, and B-26s of IX Bomber Command attacked the defenses of ST. MALO in response to our request of 4 August.

"A successful day," pronounced Third Army's G-3 (Air) Section, "with attacks on all types of targets, from boats to field guns. Movement east, south and west by ground troops was greatly facilitated."

During the night of 6-7 August the enemy's nocturnal bombing operations struck close to the Third Army - XIX TAC command post. Flares illuminated the entire area and bombs were dropped in the vicinity, causing some damage, although no harm was done to headquarters.

7 AUGUST (*D*+62)

To meet its increased responsibilities, the strength of XIX TAC was now again augmented and its stature rose to nine full groups of fighter-bombers. These consisted of the 36th, 358th, 362nd, 371st, 373rd, 405th and 406th (all equipped with P-47s) and the 354th and 363rd groups (flying P-51s). Seven of these groups and both of the wings (the 100th and 303rd) had been under administrative control of the Command for months in the old IX Fighter Command days in England, so the basis for effective teamwork was firmly laid.

At the same time it became apparent that the enemy's air was growing more aggressive, in the effort to check the threatened encirclement and destruction of his army south of the SEINE. Word was received that in the early morning hours serious damage had been caused by an enemy air attack on a U.S. supply column in the vicinity of ST. HILAIRE DE HARCOUET, southwest of MORTAIN where First Army was holding the line against German counter-attacks toward AVRANCHES.

This augury of action was fully fulfilled. It was a day of hard fighting, and when it was over our claims included destruction of 33 aircraft (14 destroyed, 1 probably destroyed and 3 damaged in the air and 19-0-4 on the ground). Ten planes and pilots were lost.

Sorties hit a new high, with a total of 601. Bomb tons on targets totaled 62, and claims included 2 locomotives, 106 freight cars, 12 tanks, 98 MT, 90 horse-drawn vehicles, and a highway bridge and 5 barges destroyed; also 19 freight cars, 9 MT and 10 armored vehicles damaged; and a marshalling yard attacked. Thirty-two Tac/R sorties were flown.

Part of the bag of enemy aircraft was obtained when information was received that CHARTRES airfield was ripe for attack. Twelve P-47s of 36th Group, flying armored column cover to units of XV Corps, were ordered by radio to attack the field. Eight bombs were dropped, with resulting destruction of six aircraft (3 ME-109s, 2 FW-190s and a JU-52) and damage to three other FW-190s.

Thirteen more enemy planes were wiped out by 12 P-51 pilots of the veteran 354th Group who found a well-camouflaged field six miles east of CHARTRES. Their strafing attack destroyed 12 ME-109s and a JU-88, but cost three of our crack fighters.

Another squadron of P-51s, on patrol in the MAYENNE area, was vectored to intercept 12 ME-109s, destroying five and damaging two for loss of two planes and two pilots, one of whom was seen running from his ship.

Meanwhile Third Army's columns, with their cover of planes divebombing and strafing, pressed forward in BRITTANY and to the east in the area of LAVAL and MAYENNE. Tank battles were seen in the VIRE-MORTAIN sector, and our planes took a hand in them. In one attack, seven P-47s of 405th Group claimed destruction of 12 tanks, five staff cars, four half-tracks (three of them carrying flak guns) and four light flak positions, plus damage to four other tanks.

Our armed recces now were reaching far beyond PARIS as well as south of the LOIRE. Several trains and a power plant were successfully attacked as far east as TROYES and SOISSONS.

On this date Third Army moved its headquarters from the vicinity of BEAUCHAMPS to a point near ST. JAMES, well below the AVRANCHES bottleneck. XIX TAC's forward echelon likewise moved, but serious communications troubles developed and for several days operations continued to be conducted by the small rear echelon at the previous site. The enemy's counter-attack toward AVRANCHES was in progress, and our lines of communication were cut nightly by enemy saboteurs.

Throughout the remainder of the month, XIX TAC's operational headquarters was never able to overtake Third Army's fast-traveling CP. General Patton's headquarters, averaging 20 miles a day, set a pace which the air command could not match and still maintain its essential communications with its airfields far in the rear. Accordingly, a small advance echelon was assigned to Third Army's headquarters, with a direct telephone line to XIX TAC, and General Weyland flew forward every other day or so for personal conference with General Patton or his Chief of Staff.

8 AUGUST (*D*+63)

Beginning its second week in action, the Command on 8 August struck a new high peak of activity by flying 717 sorties. Five enemy aircraft were destroyed and 11 of our planes were lost. Strafing and dropping 94⅜ tons of bombs, XIX TAC fighter-bombers destroyed 29 locomotives, 137 freight cars, 195 motor vehicles, 10 fuel and ammunition vehicles, 16 horse-drawn vehicles, 17 tanks or other armored vehicles, and 11 flak positions; damaged 2 locomotives, 57 freight cars, 28 MT and 26 armored vehicles; cut rail lines at 7 points, and attacked a troop concentration and 5 fuel dumps, one of which was completely destroyed. Recce planes flew 46 tactical, 1 photographic and 6 artillery reconnaissance missions.

The outstanding features of the day's operations were the large bag of enemy transports destroyed and damaged, and the almost continous air cover provided our ground forces. Improved communications with 67th Reconnaissance Group facilitated the flow of information to the Army G-2 Section, and in several instances information of enemy MT and tank concentrations was received in sufficient time to permit A-3 to order a mission.

"A tremendous day," was the Army G-3 (Air) verdict, "particularly in the number of MT destroyed. Attacks of all ground forces were facilitated."

Cooperation with the ground was increasingly close. One flight of P-51s reported circling MORLAIX while ground troops drove the enemy out of town. Another observed 100-plus German vehicles trapped on a road north of BREST by U.S. armor at each end of the road.

The enemy was picking up our call signs and by calling himself "Grandchap Able" (General Ernest's Task Force) or "Eggcup" (4th Armored Division), he was trying to send our planes into traps or on wild goose chases, but the transparent trick usually failed to work. He was clumsy, unfamiliar with our terms, and of course could not authenticate.

Results were being obtained by our pilots regardless of cost. For example, 362nd Group lost 4 P-47s on a 40 plane armed reconnaissance north and east of PARIS in which they accomplished the following.

Put four 500-lb bombs on a gun position; guns were silenced.

Dropped two frag clusters on another gun position with same results.

Put eight frag clusters and two 500-pound GP bombs on 40 boxcars.

Destroyed 40 boxcars and a locomotive by dropping four frag clusters and four 500-pounders on marshalling yard. Damaged eight RR cars by dropping eight 250-pound frags on a second marshalling yard. Damaged 25 freight cars at another point.

Dropped two frag clusters on an airdrome.

Destroyed 7 MT.

Strafed 15 freight cars loaded with 155-mm guns.

Later, on their third group mission of the day, the 362nd's fire-eating fighter-bombers put 26 bombs on seven Tiger tanks, claiming three destroyed, four damaged; and 16 on a marshalling yard, hitting a workshop. On the deck with their caliber .50 machine-guns, they bagged two armored cars, two ammunition trucks, a gasoline truck, a dozen miscellaneous motor vehicles and an enemy-operated jeep.

As the Command moved up in the wake of the Army, it found the roads everywhere littered with the rusting wreckage of trucks, half tracks, tanks, and guns knocked out by our planes and U.S. Artillery.

Not only the enemy's vehicles but the fuel to run them was going up in smoke. On this same day, for instance, 373rd Group, on armed reconnaissance over the "Orleans Gap" between PARIS and the LOIRE, reported: "34 bombs in fuel dump. Totally destroyed".

On another mission in the same area, this group spotted thirty freight cars, mostly oil tankers, entering a marshalling yard in which were fifty more cars. Results: 8 direct hits, 6 near misses, 6 heavy black smoke fires, 25 cars destroyed and 50 damaged. For good measure, the cars were also strafed. The boys were pouring it on.

Before they went home for more bombs and gas, these 32 P-47 pilots put eight 500-pounders on a train, destroying the locomotive and three cars and cutting the tracks; dropped eight more on 25 railroad cars in a marshalling yard, destroying 10 and damaging 10; and cut tracks in three different places.

The enemy's air had no success in trying to break up this disastrous wrecking of road and rail traffic. While 405th Group was destroying some sixty motor vehicles and eight freight cars, three ME-109s bounced a flight of its P-47s. Only one of the three German fighters escaped. Increasingly, the enemy began operating in groups of 20 to 40 or more, and attacking only when he could obtain surprise and local superiority in numbers. His fighters on the excellent fields around PARIS were being forced to fight in defense of their bases. Our fighter bombers were overhead daily now, on armed recces far ahead of the battlefront, one such mission on this date extended to the Belgian border.

The Germans meanwhile were making nightly attacks on the vital bridges around AVRANCHES.

Ninth Air Force interrogation of a German airman shot down on the night of 7 August indicated that in a desperate attempt to knock out the essential bridge at PONTAUBOULT, south of AVRANCHES, on 4 Aug, the HS 293 radio-controlled glider bomb had been used for the first time against a land target. On 7 August another attempt was made with this bomb, which is normally used against shipping. Two of the bombers were hit by night fighters, and one provided the prisoner who yielded this information.

9 AUGUST (D+64)

This was the busiest day since XIX TAC became operational. There were more missions (72) and more sorties (780) than on any previous day. Nineteen enemy planes were destroyed, our claims totaling 13-2-0 in the air and 6-0-2 on the ground. Nine of our planes and pilots were lost.

All but two of the groups flew three missions. The three squadrons of the 363rd Group and the 405th and 406th Squadrons of the 371st Group flew five missions. These squadrons averaged 11 hours and 45 minutes in the air.

The day's outstanding victory was turned in by the 378th Squadron of 362nd Group. While flying air cover for the XV Corps northeast of LE MANS, the P-47s encountered 12 ME-109s at 300 feet and destroyed seven. Continuing on their mission, they destroyed 11 MT and 9 horse-drawn vehicles.

A rocket squadron, the 513th of 406th Group, was now in action, and 16 five-inch rockets were launched against ground targets, in addition to 58½ tons of general-purpose bombs and numerous rounds of calibre .50 ammunition.

The swift advance was continuing. In mid-afternoon, 358th Group reported "our troops and vehicles observed on main road as far east as ST. CALAIS," and "U.S. troops seen fanning out from LE MANS area E and S." Thirty-seven tactical and photographic reconnaissance sorties aided in keeping an eye on the enemy.

Some of our squadrons on armored column cover were having difficulty in contacting ground control and consequently were missing opportunities for attacks. One reported, for instance: "EGGCUP (4th Armored Division) assigned a target to Squadron, but "C" Channel was so faint could not get enough information. All bombs returned to base."

Another reported "Squadron given J-7608 as target but would not authenticate, so no attack made." Still another said: "All bombs returned. No contact with Eggcup."

When contact was established between tanks and planes, the story was entirely different, as these typical reports from groups operating on the BRITTANY PENINSULA show:

"Targets assigned by Eggcup. Two direct hits with 500-lb bombs on small buildings...Completely destroyed." (Report from eight P-47s of 371st Group.)

"Contacted Grandchap Able (Ernest Task Force). 100 plus horse-drawn carts loaded with troops on secondary road...Many troops and horses killed." (Report from 8 strafing P-51s of 363rd Group.)

"Vectored by Grandchap Able to road...Destroyed 50 MT, damaged 80. Destroyed 25 horse-drawn vehicles. 200 troops killed." (Reported by 7 strafing P-51s of 363rd Group).

Under the pounding from ground and air, the enemy was beginning to wave the white flag. Reported eight more P-51s: "Strafed column of 100 plus MT and animal-drawn vehicles...Continued until white flag was seen as our troops closed in on column from SW and E."

Planes covering XV Corps troops advancing in the LE MANS area were encountering enemy fighters.

"Vectored to enemy aircraft by 79th Div", reported 12 P-47s of 362nd Gp. "Two ME-109s observed 1000 hours at 700 feet altitude. One ME-109 destroyed; one evaded combat. Losses: none."

Another squadron of the 362nd was bounced by 25 enemy fighters in the ST. CALAIS area east of LE MANS. Two ME-109s were destroyed for no loss, whereupon the enemy formation broke away and headed east.

Third Army columns were now pushing into the big wasp nest of air bases between the LOIRE and the SEINE, but enemy fighters were having little success in defending their home fields and were chiefly trying to get away. Reported 12 P-47s of 362nd Gp: "Squadron going S at 7,000 feet saw 12 ME-109s going E at 300 feet. Shot down 7." Bombs were jettisoned for the fight, but afterward the squadron went back to work against ground targets, its guns destroying 20 vehicles, most of which exploded. Almost all were going east, which the enemy seemed to consider the healthiest direction.

Trying any strategem to escape our attack, the Germans were using red panels on their vehicles in the hope of masquerading as American. These were reported, for example, in the vicinity of ANGERS by 8 P-47 pilots of 405th Group, who thereupon gave the red-paneled German column the works with bombs and guns.

Far-ranging P-51s of 354th Group, on armed reconnaissance beyond PARIS, sighted 30-plus Ju-88s on REIMS-CHAMPAGNE Airfield and flew almost down the muzzles of its guns to strafe the field from 6,000 feet to deck. Six JU-88s were claimed as destroyed and two probably destroyed. Two light guns and a flak tower were knocked out and one P-51 lost to flak.

In the ALENCON area, 34 P-47s of 373rd Group encountered 25 to 30 single-engine fighters and claimed 3-2-0 for no loss.

10 AUGUST (D+65)

Operations on 10 August were somewhat reduced by low stratus clouds moving in from the Channel late in the afternoon. Nevertheless, 54 missions comprising 659 sorties were flown. Forty-six and a quarter tons of high-explosive were dropped on targets and 4 enemy planes were shot down. Six of our aircraft and pilots were lost.

The main weight of the day's attack fell on railroad targets, with claims of 12 locomotives and 254 cars destroyed or damaged. Other results included 22 tanks and other armored vehicles, 91 MT, 2 horse-drawn vehicles, and 5 bridges destroyed or damaged. Seven gun positions a radar installation, a troop concentration, an ammunition dump and a marshalling yard were attacked and seven rail lines cut.

With Third Army elements striking his rear, the enemy now had swung about in the ALENCON-ARGENTAN area and his tanks and artillery were engaging our troops attacking northward from LE MANS. As a result our fighter-bombers found many good targets for their bombs and guns.

Sometimes a single bomb or strafing pass wiped out considerable firepower. Reported by eight P-47s of 371st GP: "1 bomb on 25 horse-drawn artillery pieces and 100 troops, then strafed. Many soldiers and horses killed." Nobody likes to kill horses, but these were pulling guns.

Our planes operating in the area of the boundary between the First and Third U.S. Armies occasionally got emergency requests from First Army Units needing help. Reported 362nd Group: "Fourteen 500-pound bombs on mortar position at T-6413. Target assigned by Murphy (Combat Command B of 2nd Armored Division, First U.S. Army). Position destroyed. Four aircraft also strafed this position." A similar report came from 371st Group: "Seven 500-pound bombs on gun position T-6712. Area was marked with smoke and bombed accurately. No results observed. Murphy reported guns silenced."

Forty-two railroad cars and a flak battery were knocked out at LORIENT marshalling yard, when eight P-47s of 36th Group dive-bombed the yard in the teeth of intense, accurate heavy and light flak after receiving 4th Armored Division's OK. All returned, though one was badly damaged by the flak over this heavily defended submarine base town.

Wide-sweeping railroad recces north, east and south of PARIS to isolate the eastern battlefield were likewise bearing fruit. Near MONTARGIS, southeast of PARIS, 12 P-47s of 510th Sq, 405th Group, twice strafed a loaded troop train consisting of 25 large personnel cars. The troops detrained with alacrity, but casualties were believed high. On the same mission these twelve planes destroyed a 30-car train by bombing and strafing, blew up three other cars and fired two oil cars. One plane was destroyed by flak, but the pilot was saved.

Observations by our pilots over the battle areas gave a running record of events, in addition to spotting enemy movements, gun positions and other targets: "U.S. troop convoy on all approaches to NANTES. Fire and smoke in NANTES." "ST. MALO harbor covered by smoke." "Observed U.S. troops in red-paneled vehicles in MORTAIN at 1500 hours." "Head of Allied tank column seen at point 8 to 10 miles SW of BONNETABLE."

Thirty sorties were flown by our tactical reconnaissance P-51s, operating chiefly over areas on the outer fringe of operations. These two-plane patrols contributed considerably to the most effective use of the available air-power, since fighter-bombers could be quickly vectored to any important targets spotted and thus less time was wasted in uneventful armed recces. Two artillery reconnaissance and two photographic reconnaissance sorties were flown. These types of recces were

being employed chiefly in connection with the continuing attacks on the stubborn BRITTANY ports.

At ST. MALO bitter resistance was being encountered, and the day's specific air support requests included calls for medium bomber assistance in reducing the town's Citadel, the coastal defense on the ILE DE CEZEMBRE, and other heavy batteries controlling the harbor. These requests were transmitted to Ninth Air Force and the targets were subsequently attacked. Meanwhile XIX TAC fighter-bombers continued the assault on this strongly flak-defended area to the limit of the abilities of this type of aircraft. The ILE DE CEZEMBRE was made a standard last-resort target and dumping ground for planes forced to jettison their bombs, yet at the end of the month the Germans still doggedly held out there. On several occasions emissaries from 83rd Division visited the island by boat under truce and demanded surrender, only to be told that the Commander had orders from Der Fuehrer not to give up and would obey them.

BREST'S far more powerful defenses likewise were obviously beyond the ability of fighter-bombers to crack, and requests for assistance by heavy and medium bombers were transmitted to higher headquarters. Throughout the month, attacks of increasing violence were made by aircraft of all types in cooperation with Third Army troops assaulting this badly needed port, yet September was to find its garrison still holding out.

One of the six casualties of this day was Col. Morton David Magoffin, commanding 362nd Group. Hit by flak while on a dive-bombing and strafing mission in support of XV Corps east of LE MANS, he continued to lead the squadron in its bombing run hoping that the dive would blow out fire in his engine. It failed to do so and he pulled up and bailed out.

The sequel to this episode did not come to light until weeks later: Colonel Magoffin fell into enemy hands and was taken to a hospital in PARIS with a flak wound in his right thigh. When the enemy evacuated PARIS he hid in a closet and escaped notice. French surgeons performed a badly needed operation and the Colonel was subsequently evacuated by air to England.

11 AUGUST (*D*+66)

The big push to the north and northeast to encircle German troops in the MORTAIN-FALAISE-ARGENTAN area was now well under way, and groups supporting the 5th Armored, 2nd French Armored, and 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions were especially busy on 11 August. Combat sorties totaled 454.

With good VHF communications, 36th Group hit many targets assigned by ground control, various squadrons reporting destruction of tanks, 88-mm gun positions, transport and other targets. One was a camouflaged house and tower assigned as a target by 79th Infantry Division. House and tower were destroyed by five direct hits with 500-lb bombs. Ten miles northeast of ALENCON enemy tanks were holding up an American column. Fifteen 500-pounders were dropped and although specific results were not observed the U.S. Column was seen to move forward.

Another feature of the day's operations was the successful bombardment of an enemy railroad gun position which was holding up progress of the 5th Infantry Division near ANGERS. Forty minutes after the request for air attack on this position was received at Combat Operations, Fighter Control at 303rd Wing had vectored the 367th Squadron of 358th Group to the target and the position was destroyed by two direct bomb hits and four near misses.

Good results were also obtained by the 373rd Group on an armed railroad reconnaissance of the area south of PARIS. Attacking rail facilities at nine different points, the group destroyed five locomotives and 50 railroad cars, damaged 47 cars, and cut railroad tracks at three or more places.

For loss of four planes, our groups claimed a total of ten locomotives, 243 railroad cars, 15 tank cars, 42 tanks and other armored vehicles, 119 motor vehicles, and 20 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. Successful attacks were made on six marshalling yards, five field gun positions, a troop concentration, a headquarters, an ammunition dump, a storage building and an airfield, and ten railroad lines were cut. Of 15 reconnaissance sorties flown, 10 were tactical, 3 photographic and 2 for artillery adjustment.

During the afternoon 273 heavy bombers of Eighth Air Forces attacked strongpoints and heavy gun positions in BREST HARBOR as previously requested by Third Army through this Command; 643 tons of bombs were dropped, with results described as "good to excellent". One bomber was lost to flak.

In the evening 36 B-26s of IX Bomber Command dropped 53½ tons of bombs on the gun defenses at ST. MALO, results ranging from fair to excellent.

Part III: Closing the Argentan Trap

12 AUGUST (*D*+67)

Despite the continued efforts of saboteurs, communications through the AVRANCHES gap were sufficiently stable to permit the transfer of operational control to the forward echelon in the vicinity of ST. JAMES on this date.

The principal objectives of the air plan were to cover XV Corps in its fighting progress north from ALENCON and, by strong armed recces between LE MANS and PARIS, to cut off the battlefield and clear the way to the capital. The plan provided for the usual protection of the LOIRE flank and continued incidental attack on the ILE DE CEZEMBRE, but comparatively little coverage for the BREST PENINSULA where fighting was now largely static around the BREST, LORIENT, ST. MALO and PAIMPOL defenses.

In execution of this plan, 41 missions comprising 481 sorties were flown. No planes were lost and there were no claims against enemy aircraft. The day's toll included destruction or damaging of 6 locomotives 247 freight cars, 16 tanks, 201 motor vehicles, 7 horse-drawn vehicles, a gun carriage, a naval vessel, a barge and 4 buildings. Eleven rail lines and a highway were cut; 16 field batteries, 6 flak batteries, 2 troop concentrations, an ammunition dump and four buildings attacked, and 24 fires started.

"A good day. Third Army units aided materially on all fronts," was the G-3 (Air) comment.

The drive north from ALENCON towards ARGENTAN marked the beginning of the closing of the jaws of the trap which eventually netted 57,000 Germans. Troops of the Canadian First Army, driving southward to join Third Army forces near ARGENTAN, played a vital part in the victory. "There were two dead Germans for every live one," says an unofficial report, "and the greatest stench of all time hung over the pocket." On 12 August, however, there was still plenty of fight in the strong German forces thus entrapped, and it was a day of bitter fighting.

In an effort to get our planes off their neck, the Germans again tried trickery, but unfamiliarity with the American idiom--and jazz music--tripped them up. Pretending to be "Exclaim" (79th Infantry Division), an English-speaking German attempted to vector 36th Group P-47s to points where they could do no harm. A slight German accent aroused suspicion and one of our pilots proved the speaker to be a fake by asking him to sing "Mairzie Doats". The Heinie could not make the grade.

13 AUGUST (*D*+68)

The deadly squeeze on entrapped German forces was nearing a complete strangle on 13 August, and the biggest motor transport killing of the entire month was made by 37 P-47 pilots of 36th Group when they found 800 to 1,000 enemy motor vehicles of all descriptions milling about in the pocket west of ARGENTAN. Pouncing upon them with bombs and guns, they claimed 400 to 500 enemy vehicles burned or blown up. One pilot dropped his belly tank on 12 trucks and the resulting explosion left them all on fire.

"American and British forces racing to close gap," said this group's report, which pointed out that the enemy troops in the pocket were heading generally northeast toward the rapidly closing escape route between ARGENTAN and FALAISE.

Other pilots reported street battles in ARGENTAN, many fires and much smoke in the vicinity, and a Typhoon strafing our troops north of the town.

Meanwhile, Third Army spearheads were moving rapidly ahead towards PARIS and ORLEANS. "U.S. troops and vehicles going north and east past DREUX, and south and east near ORLEANS;" reported 358th Group pilots at 1900 hours. "Flew to edge of PARIS and encountered no flak," said a report from 363rd Group P-51s. This observation proved to be a forerunner of the fall of the capital about a week later.

All of the day's bag in aerial combat fell to 382nd Squadron of 363rd Group, which scored 12-2-1 for loss of a single plane. Flying assault area cover in the ALENCON-LE MANS-NOGENT LE ROTROU area, eight P-51s of this squadron bagged 4-1-1 for 1 in an early-morning fight with 12 ME-109s and FW-190s. On an evening mission, eight pilots of the same squadron sighted approximately 25 ME-109s and FW-190s strafing our troops. The Mustangs destroyed eight -- an average of one apiece. Another was probably destroyed and the rest were driven away.

The growing threat to the enemy's air bases was emphasized when a squadron of P-47s from 406th Group attacked a field southeast of CHATEAUDUN, claiming eight twin-engined aircraft damaged on the ground. Rocket-carrying aircraft of the same group attacked railroad rolling stock and armored vehicles, claiming three locomotives, 25 cars and five light tanks destroyed or damaged.

Claims for the day by all groups included destruction or damaging of 12 locomotives, 227 railroad cars, 45 tanks and other armored vehicles, 781 motor vehicles, 10 motorcycles, a barracks, an oil storage tank, and 10 strongpoints. Fourteen railroad lines were cut and a railroad bridge damaged. Successful attacks were made on two troop concentrations, six marshalling yards and an ammunition dump(4 hits). Combat sorties totaled 718 and reconnaissance sorties 38. Claims against enemy aircraft were 12-2-1 in the air and 1-0-8 on the ground. Ten planes were lost (only one to enemy aircraft).

14 AUGUST (*D*+69)

The jig was now plainly up for German troops in the ARGENTAN pocket. Short of supplies and weary of ceaseless attack from ground and air, they were giving themselves up in large numbers. During the day our pilots reported the phenomenon of ground troops surrendering to the air. Five miles northeast of ARGENTAN, at 1100 hours on 14 August, 300 to 400 enemy soldiers surrendered by waving white flags as 405th Group's 511th Squadron circled. Fighter Control was given the position so the nearest ground troops could pick up the prisoners.

Ninth Air Force PW interrogators reported that prisoners taken in the shrinking FALAISE-VIRE-MORTAIN-MAYENNE-ALENCON salient told of extreme shortages of food and gasoline. One boy of 18 from the 84th infantry Division fainted during the interrogation and it developed that he had had no food for four days except one small piece of bread. He and his comrades had been told that their field kitchens had been bombed.

Said a junior officer of 363rd Infantry Division, who surrendered on 13 August: "You have bombed and strafed all the roads, causing complete congestion and heavy traffic jams. You have also destroyed most of our petrol and oil dumps, so there is no future in continuing the fight."

In the minds of most prisoners, however, terror of artillery fire loomed even larger than fear of air bombardment. Among the prisoners were many foreigners--Poles, Russians and Yugoslavs--who said large drafts of these satellite troops had recently been sent into the line as cannon fodder. One Pole displayed to the embarrassed interrogator the marks on his bottom caused by an SS man who had literally booted him into battle.

With his airfields around PARIS endangered and many in process of evacuation, the enemy appears to have flown fewer than 100 single-engine fighter sorties on the Western Front on 14 August. These were chiefly in defense of his ground troops.

The only one of our groups to meet enemy air opposition was the 405th, flying close support to the 7th Armored Division in the DREUX-NOGENT LE ROTROU area. Five P-47s and pilots were lost against claims of 4-2-1. Four of the five losses were suffered when four P-47s pulling up from reconnaissance about 20 miles of DREUX, were bounced from above at 3,000 feet by 16 FW-190s which came in below the four P-47s flying top cover. Three of the attackers were claimed as destroyed plus one probable and one damaged.

It was another day of intense U.S. activity, and aircraft of this Command flew a total of 79 combat missions comprising 665 sorties. In addition, 18 reconnaissance missions involving 36 sorties were flown.

Our aircraft were active from the tip of the Brest Peninsula to PARIS and from north of the narrowing "pocket" to well down below the LOIRE where several marshalling yards were successfully attacked.

Destroyed or damaged were 6 locomotives, 175 railroad cars, 39 armored vehicles, 88 motor vehicles, and a motorcycle. Twelve gun positions, three marshalling yards, a radar installation, an ammunition dump, and a supply depot were attacked, two railroad bridges damaged, and two railroad lines and a highway cut.

In one typical example of effective air support, eight aircraft of 362nd Group were vectored by 4th Armored Division to five 88-mm guns of LORIENT.

They circled until the area was marked with white smoke, then destroyed the guns with 11 direct hits.

Pilots reported, "fires at CHARTRES airfield, which appeared unserviceable, and a violent explosion at DREUX airdrome. The Luftwaffe was pulling out.

15 AUGUST (*D+70*)

Enemy single-engine fighter activity rose sharply on 15 August to an estimated 350 sorties, indicating that more German units had completed their moves to new bases. The enemy was now operating almost entirely from fields east, north and northeast of PARIS.

When eight P-47s of 373rd Group were bounced by eight ME-109s at 9,000 feet over BRETIGNY, our pilots destroyed five and damaged the other three. The enemy pilots were aggressive but seemed untrained. Their evasive action was poor. On the ground the Thunderbolts destroyed an FW-190 and damaged two JU-88s. Three different times between 1615 and 1945, planes from this group bombed or beat up the base at BRETIGNY.

The day's claims against enemy aircraft totaled 13-0-3 in the air (all by 373rd Group) and 2-0-7 on the ground. Five of our planes were lost.

With many German ground troops in a mood for surrender, the dropping of leaflet bombs was begun on this date. These were distributed especially in the area of the pocket, now completely closed, together with less subtle invitations -- 500-pound general purpose bombs and 50-calibre slugs.

Rockets as well as bombs were being used effectively against tanks, including the big heavily armored Tiger. North of DREUX, the 406th Group's Tiger-taming 513th Squadron got four heavy and one light tank with its five-inch rocket projectiles.

In the "pocket" area the situation was so fluid that mistakes were sometimes made, as when P-47s put two bombs on a column of camouflaged trucks heading north between FALAISE and ARGENTAN. The column hurriedly displayed yellow smoke and the attack was checked.

This was another busy day, with 659 combat sorties and 40 tactical reconnaissance and artillery adjustment sorties flown.

On the ground the haul included 5 locomotives, 114 railroad cars, 36 armored vehicles, 97 motor vehicles and 5 barges destroyed or damaged. Nine gun positions, four airfields and a marshalling yard were successfully attacked.

An advance echelon of this Command had leapfrogged forward to a woods north of LAVAL, and during the early morning hours, the Third Army and XIX TAC headquarters there were strafed by P-47s. One was shot down by antiaircraft fire and the pilot's body was identified as that of an Eighth Air Force fighter pilot.

16 AUGUST (*D+71*)

After several days of intensive operations, activity was curtailed on August by low stratus clouds which covered airfields in the CHERBOURG PENINSULA from approximately 1000 to 1500 hours. Many pilots returning from early morning missions were unable to land at their own airfields. One P-51 crashed near ST. MERE EGLISE when it ran out of gas, but the pilot bailed out successfully. Fourteen other pilots of 363rd Group were forced to land in England, where they refuelled and returned to base after the weather cleared.

Third Army's foremost armored spearhead now was only nine miles from the outskirts of PARIS, and the enemy's air was reacting more strongly in the effort to gain time for evacuation of the great complex of airfields in the capital area. Preferring to attack only when they outnumber us, the enemy's fighters were operating usually in patrols ranging from 20 to 80. Our P-51 cover west and southwest of PARIS was strengthened accordingly.

The weather during the day favored the enemy, since our bases were "socked in" for several hours while his were clear. Hourly attacks by three strafing ME-109s were reported by Combat Command A of the 4th Armored Division at ORLEANS. These strafers successfully eluded our fighters, but a probable attack on our ground forces southwest of PARIS was apparently prevented at 1545 hours when 70-plus FW-190s, many carrying bombs, were engaged by 8 P-51s of 354th Group over RAMBOUILLET FOREST, 10 miles west of the capital. Two German planes were shot down and two P-51s were lost, but the enemy force was dispersed toward the south.

Half an hour later, another patrol of eight P-51s sighted 20-plus ME-109s south of DREUX at 11,000 feet. Orbitting in elements of two, the squadron climbed to 14,000 feet and attacked from above. At the same instant, 60 or more ME-109s joined the combat, emerging from cloud cover to the north. In the next 15 minutes our eight aircraft--outnumbered 10 to 1--were busily embattled from 11,000 feet to deck. The enemy was aggressive and apparently experienced, but he tried to turn with our aircraft. When it was all over, our pilots had destroyed 11 and damaged 2 against losses of two planes and pilots.

One of the 14 enemy aircraft destroyed during the day was shot down near PARIS by a P-51 tactical reconnaissance pilot of 10th Reconnaissance Group. These P-51s, operating in pairs, carry the regular fighter armament and are amply able to defend themselves, as they frequently prove to the enemy when bounced by several times their number.

Flying close cover for the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions between DREUX and PARIS, eight P-47s of 362nd Group sighted 50 or more ME-109s on an airfield just southwest of the capital. Field, planes, MT, personnel and a gun position were promptly strafed. At another airfield west of Paris, 20 or more FW-190s were seen and on a third farther east, two JU-88s and a hangar were seen afire. At ETAMPES-MONDESIR airfield, 513th Squadron of 406th Group scored hits on hangars with its rocket projectiles.

Heavily outnumbered and decidedly outfought by the Allied Air Forces ever since the invasion, the Luftwaffe was being forced to make excuses to the Army for its inability to provide proper support. An example was a document found at the Headquarters for Southwest France at ANGERS, in the Third Army area, and translated by the Air PW Interrogation Unit of Ninth Air Force. It was issued by the Military Governor in France for dissemination to troops down to company level, and said in part: "The ground soldier in action on the invasion front feels himself depressed most of all by enemy air superiority. In spite of the numerical inferiority of our air force, there have been successes accomplished, however, which the single soldier, tied down to his own narrow section of the front, cannot appreciate. The following air force information should be made known to the troops so that they may know what great support the fighting forces are receiving from their own air force." (There followed figures emphasizing alleged German air successes against Allied shipping from 6-25 June 1944.)

With the cutting of a number of rail lines leading to PARIS from the east, considerable barge traffic on the SEINE RIVER from MORET north through MELUN and CORBEIL to VILLENEUVE was noted by the A-2 Section. It was pointed out that these barges were believed to transport quantities of motor fuel toward the battle area. In subsequent days this barge traffic was successfully attacked by our fighter-bombers.

Because of the weather, only 280 combat sorties and 36 reconnaissance sorties were flown on 16 August. Thirteen enemy planes were destroyed and four damaged. Five of ours were lost. Five tanks, 25 motor vehicles and 55 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged, two airfields and two gun positions attacked, and three railroad lines cut.

17 AUGUST (*D+72*)

In sharp contrast to the previous day, air opposition to our fighters on 17 August was virtually nil, despite the fact that the enemy's fields in the PARIS area and east of the capital had good weather while ours were cloud-covered part of the day. The only reported enemy activity against our ground forces was strafing of 79th Division units near DREUX. One of the strafers was shot down by AA. This attack occurred in the morning when our fields were closed in and enemy fields near PARIS were clear. Only two enemy planes were seen by our fighters, and both were shot down near DREUX by the same pilot, Captain Emerson, of 355th Sq, 354th Group.

On the BREST PENINSULA, the citadel of ST. MALO surrendered while Third Army troops and circling P-47s of 53rd Sq, 36th Group, loaded with 500-pound bombs, awaited the answer to an ultimatum. After 35 minutes 83rd Infantry Division radioed the squadron that the invitation had been accepted. A white flag appeared over the citadel and the P-47s came home with their 500-pound persuaders.

Incidentally, 83rd Division reported that prisoners captured in the ST. MALO area since the attack began totaled 11,600.

The clean-up of the Germans attempting to escape from the ARGENTAN pocket was now in full swing and there were many good targets, but Allied aircraft were so numerous that they had to "queue up" to attack. For instance, eight P-47s of 373rd Group spotted 100 or more tanks and 200-plus MT ten miles southwest of LISIEUX. The target was already being bombed and strafed by four P-51s and eight Typhoons, and fifty or more fires were burning. The P-47s dumped their two 500-pound bombs and 24 frags into the mess and saw a tank destroyed, but smoke was so thick no other results could be seen.

DREUX, 50 miles from the center of PARIS, had fallen and armored units were driving ahead toward the SEINE. North of DREUX, eight P-47s flying armored column cover were vectored by 5th Armored Division to a road junction where anti-tank guns and infantry were holding up the advance. The ground forces marked the target with white smoke and our Thunderbolts attacked it with six 500-pound bombs, four frag clusters, and strafing. Results were not observed, but the ground forces indicated the guns were destroyed and congratulated the squadron leader.

The day in figures: 331 combat sorties, 56 reconnaissance sorties; 2 enemy planes destroyed in combat, no losses; 10 tanks, 57 motor vehicles, 2 locomotives and 25 railroad cars destroyed or damaged; 7 railroad lines cut; 4 gun positions, a strongpoint and 4 marshalling yards attacked.

As the eastward advance continued, Third Army reported CHATEAUDUN clear of the enemy. Immediate steps were taken to make this good airfield available to our groups, which already were laboring under heavy handicaps of range.

Because of the speed of our advance in this area, the Germans had not had opportunity to carry out demolitions as extensively as at most other fields.

A pre-war military and civil airfield, CHATEAUDUN had been much developed by the German Air Force, which built the runways and dispersal areas and later extended the landing area to the west. Repairs were expedited, and by 27 August the field was occupied by our 10th Reconnaissance Group. It was soon in use also as a re-fueling and re-arming point for our fighter-bomber groups operating to the east.

18 AUGUST (*D+73*)

It was harvest time in the ARGENTAN-TRUN pocket, and Allied aircraft on this date had one of their biggest days of the war.

Our P-47s of 36th Group, on an early-morning armed reconnaissance, reported 1,000 to 1,500 enemy vehicles headed north "bumper to bumper" in the ARGENTAN-TRUN area and later saw a thousand enemy vehicles of all types encircled by yellow smoke in the FALAISE area. To their disappointment our pilots were told not to attack because they were outside of their area. Most of the good targets were in the area of British responsibility, and RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force rolled up one of the biggest scores of the war against a concentration of some 7,000 vehicles jamming the roads beyond the old FALAISE gap, now only two miles wide. Attacking with rockets, bombs, cannon and machine guns, 2nd TAF's Spitfires, Typhoons and Mustangs claimed 1,159 MT destroyed and 1,724 damaged; 124 tanks destroyed and 96 damaged. Fifteen hundred sorties were flown and 25 aircraft were lost. One of General Montgomery's staff officers announced that the power of resistance of the German Seventh Army in Normandy had been smashed in a day of concentrated air attack.

Although denied a chance at the big jackpot, our groups accounted for 17 tanks, 206 MT, 30 horse-drawn vehicles, 7 locomotives and 218 railroad cars. Two troop concentrations, a motor transport park, 5 gun positions, and 3 marshalling yards were attacked. Combat sorties totaled 679; claims were 5-0-2 (air) and losses 7.

During the day, swiftly advancing columns of XV Corps reached the SEINE at MANTES-GASSICOURT and at VERNON, where they controlled important crossing of the river and major road and rail routes into PARIS from the west. With Third Army units now on the SEINE, a new and much bigger pocket was all ready well in process of formation even before the first had been completely liquidated. All the German troops south of the SEINE were endangered as XV Corps began moving eastward along the river and even established bridgeheads on the north bank. Other Third Army spearheads were reported in the PARIS suburb of VERSAILLES, in the vicinity of MILLY south of PARIS, and nearing MELUN on the SEINE 26 miles southeast of the capital.

To complete the picture of disaster for the Germans, it was revealed that Allied forces which had landed in southern France were 30 miles inland at one point and were closing in on the naval base of TOULON. Still a third pocket was now in the making, with U. S. Seventh Army moving northward between the RHONE and the ALPS toward a junction with our Third Army.

Part IV: Paris Falls to the Allies.

19 AUGUST (*D+74*)

Our pilots flying over PARIS on 19 August reported fires and explosions, indicating demolitions. Encirclement of the capital was now well under way. Third army patrols were 12 miles north of the SEINE at a point 30 miles northwest of the capital, while south of the city the enemy was taking up positions on high ground in vain attempts to check General Patton's columns thrusting eastward.

Air operations on this date were sharply curtailed by a cold front moving across our bases and target areas from west to east. Several successful missions were flown in the morning, but the front closed down our bases in the afternoon, then moved into the target areas. Results

included destruction of 20 SEINE RIVER barges and damage to 91 more; other ground targets destroyed or damaged included 18 motor vehicles, an armored vehicle, 2 locomotives, 9 railroad cars and 2 power launches. Two gun positions were attacked and a rail line cut. Combat sorties totaled 212 and reconnaissance sorties 34.

Sharp aerial combat occurred, and 9 enemy aircraft were destroyed (8 of them in the air) against loss of 5 planes and pilots.

Flying close cover to armored units in the DREUX-MANTES GASSICOURT-CHARTRES-ETAMPES area, 8 P-47s of 371st Group chased away 18 enemy fighters apparently dive-bombing five miles east of DREUX and destroyed two for no loss.

While strafing FW-190s on the ground near PONTOISE, 406th Group's 513th Sq was bounced by a number of enemy fighters. When 512th Sq attempted to help, it in turn was bounced by 30 to 40 enemy aircraft at 8,000 feet. The enemy kept some of his aircraft above the overcast, sending them down in twos and fours to take part in the fight. Final claims were 5-0-3 in air and 1 destroyed on the ground for loss of 5.

20 AUGUST (D+75)

Shortly before dark on 20 August, pilots of 406th Group reported the main highway from PARIS to SEZANNE loaded with dispersed enemy motor vehicles headed east. Marshalling yards at JOIGNY and SEZANNE were likewise loaded. Obviously the Germans were pulling out of PARIS, and confirmation came from many quarters, presaging the city's fall.

As Third Army units drove ahead to secure the line of the SEINE both above and below PARIS, the Germans said rioting had broken out in the French capital and threatened to shoot anyone disobeying orders. U.S. patrols were reported ten miles from the center of the city.

West of PARIS, too, the Germans were retreating, many crossing the virtually bridgeless SEINE during the night by pontoon, by ferry, and even by swimming.

At the ferry slips our planes dropped delay-fused bombs set for detonation during the night, at the probable peak of the hurried, nocturnal exodus of supermen.

Rain and low ceilings limited combat sorties to 388 and reconnaissance sorties to 36. Road and rail transport provided the principal targets, and claims included 65 motor vehicles, 33 armored vehicles, 12 locomotives and 150 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Seven rail lines were cut and two marshalling yards, three ferry landings and a machine-gun nest attacked. Claims in aerial combat were 6-0-1 and losses 3.

Despite the weather, 362nd Group had a busy day providing cover to the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions in the DREUX-MANTES GASSICOURT-ETAMPES-CHARTRES area. With frags, 500-pound GP and strafing, they destroyed several tanks and attacked troops. Aircraft of this group also planted delay-fused bombs at ferry landings on the SEINE and accounted for all of the day's claims against enemy aircraft. All the losses were also suffered by the 362nd.

Eight P-47s of the Group's 378th Sq were bounced by 12 ME-109s and 20 FW-190s at 3,000 feet about 12 miles southwest of PARIS at 1545. Despite the odds of 4 to 1, the Thunderbolts destroyed six and damaged one for loss of 2 planes and 2 pilots. A third P-47 was lost on a later mission.

Covering the 5th Armored and 79th Infantry Divisions in the MANTES-GASSICOURT-SEINE RIVER area, 358th Group destroyed or damaged several tanks, shot up barges carrying enemy tanks across the SEINE, chased away two FW-190s and scored a direct bomb hit on a machine-gun nest marked by white smoke.

Armed recces by 371st and 406th Groups caused the enemy considerable havoc in crowded marshalling yards and along his road and rail communications to the east and south.

21 AUGUST (D+76)

All combat aircraft of this command were grounded throughout the day on 21 August by the worst weather of the month. A warm wave occurring in connection with a cold front gave rise to low ceilings and rain over the entire north portion of France, restricting air operations to a single uneventful reconnaissance sortie, flown along the LOIRE in the ANGERS area.

Armored advance elements of Third Army meanwhile were reported in SENS, 65 miles southeast of PARIS; east of PITHIVIERS, 50 miles south of the capital; and moving eastward from ORLEANS along the LOIRE.

22 AUGUST (D+77)

Increasing vulnerability of the German Air Force, driven from some of its best fields to landing grounds north and northeast of PARIS, was demonstrated during 22 August when fighters of XIX Tactical Air Command destroyed 20 enemy fighters for loss of one. Complete claims were 16-3-1 in the air and 4-0-4 on the ground.

Fifteen P-51s of 354th Group, on a fighter sweep in the COMPIEGNE-EPERNAY-SENS area, hit the jackpot, destroying 12 ME-109s without loss. Eight were destroyed in the air as they were taking off from a new grass field five miles east of EPERNAY. At BEAUVAIS-NIVILLIERS, 4 ME-109s on the ground were destroyed by strafing.

Two more victims were added by 362nd Group when one of its squadrons supporting the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions was bounced by 15 to 20 ME-109s at MANTES GASSICOURT.

On armed reconnaissance in the MEAUX-CHALONS-TROYES-MELUN area, 358th Group P-47s ran into 25 or more ME-109s just west of CHALONS and claimed 4-2-1 for loss of one. Later, on a special mission to strafe CREIL airdrome, the Group destroyed two ME-110s in the air and damaged three more of these twin-engined fighters and one HE-111 on the ground.

Flying 333 combat sorties, our aircraft dropped 16-3/4 tons of GP bombs and 26 frag clusters, plus 18 leaflet bombs. Ten gun positions, an ammunition dump and a marshalling yard were attacked, and 120 railroad cars, 2 locomotives, 53 motor vehicles, and 5 tanks were destroyed or damaged. Reconnaissance sorties totaled 60.

One of the AA batteries of Third Army reported that the Germans were using the ancient fake dogfight trick. Two FW-190s with no markings and three ME-109s with U.S. markings simulated aerial combat, then all suddenly dived and strafed a U.S. column.

Third Army was continuing its swift push to the east, with elements of the 4th Armored Division reported 15 miles beyond the crossing of the YONNE RIVER at SENS. XV Corps units, patrolling along the RIVER EURE and advancing northwest along the SEINE toward LOUVIERS, were encountering stiff resistance. In PARIS, French patriots were reported using light artillery against the Germans.

23 AUGUST (D+78)

With the enemy endeavoring to give increased air support to his hard-pressed ground forces, especially along the SEINE west of PARIS, Third Army reported on 23 August that the 79th Division bridgehead in the MANTES GASSICOURT area was attacked by rocket planes intermittently during the day. Our air cover in the area was tripled, but no rocket-firing planes were seen.

Flying armed reconnaissance ahead of our columns thrusting east past SENS and TROYES, P-47s of 362nd Group had just dropped eight 500-lb bombs on a gun position east of JOIGNY when Combat Command A of 4th Armored Division reported it was being strafed 12 miles northeast of SENS. The remaining bombs were jettisoned, and the Thunderbolts, from 9,000 feet, bounced five ME-109s at 6,500 feet, shooting down 2 and probably another for no loss.

In all, this Command flew 463 combat sorties and 70 reconnaissance sorties on 23 August, despite poor visibility, cloud and showers over bases and targets during part of the day.

Claims against enemy aircraft totaled 5-4-7 for loss of two (one of which was to flak).

The day's bag of ground targets included 114 motor vehicles destroyed, 38 others damaged, 63 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged, and 4 tanks stopped or fired. Four gun positions, two ammunition dumps and a marshalling yard were successfully attacked, and our aircraft accounted for 11 locomotives and 64 cars destroyed or damaged. A roundhouse and four lines were cut.

As General Patton's forces meanwhile continued to advance, having crossed the SEINE both above and below PARIS, word was received that the French capital was now in Allied hands, having fallen to French Forces of the Interior. Third Army's 2nd French Armored Division (now placed under First Army control) subsequently entered the capital, together with First Army's 4th Infantry Division. The great encircling thrust by General Patton's Army had caused the capital to fall like the proverbial ripe plum. Another phase was now at an end.

24 AUGUST (D+79)

Low ceilings and poor visibility over the target areas in the vicinity of PARIS restricted our combat activity on 24 August to 12 missions totaling 164 sorties. The weather also handicapped the enemy and probably accounted for the fact that no German planes were seen.

The rocket-firing 513th Squadron of 406th Group launched 12 of its projectiles at 105-mm guns near MANTES and claimed four destroyed and two damaged. Five 88-mm guns also were attacked. Other aircraft of the 406th, on armed reconnaissance southeast of PARIS, destroyed 40 carts of an ammunition convoy and disrupted railroad traffic. Along the LOIRE between ORLEANS and TOURS 371st Group likewise did a little "working on the railroad". The only other group able to operate to any extent was the 362nd, which flew cover to the 7th Armored and 5th Infantry Divisions in the MELUN area, destroying tanks and motor vehicles and incidentally dropping 12 leaflet bombs.

No high-explosive bombs were carried, but rockets and strafing destroyed or damaged a total of 55 railroad cars, two locomotives, 68 motor vehicles, three tanks and armored vehicles, and 40 ammunition cars; 12 field gun positions were attacked and two headquarters left burning. Twenty-nine reconnaissance sorties were flown.

On the ground, Third Army's XII and XX Corps, southeast of Allied-occupied PARIS, continued their swift thrust to the east, while XV Corps, now operating under First Army, moved eastward to aid in entrapping German forces remaining south of the lower SEINE.

Part V: Driving the Luftwaffe out of France.

25 AUGUST (D+80)

This was the day that broke the back of the German fighter force in France.

In aerial combat and in strafing attacks on enemy airfields, P-51s and P-47s of IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands destroyed a total of 127 planes (77 in the air and 50 on the ground). Eleven others were probably destroyed and 33 damaged, making a total of 171 German planes whose destruction, probable destruction, or damaging was claimed. Losses of the two commands totaled 27 aircraft.

In Germany, too, the Luftwaffe suffered serious losses. Eighth Air Force Fighters, escorting heavy bombers, claimed 11 destroyed in the air and 40 on the ground.

Total claims for Ninth and Eighth Air Force fighters during the day (both air and ground) thus came to 178 destroyed, 13 probably destroyed and 63 damaged -- a grand total of 254 planes.

XIX TAC's share of the bag totaled 36-1-8 in the air and 18-4-0 on the ground, or 54-5-8, all told, against loss of 8 planes and 7 pilots.

P-51 pilots of 354th Group, flying fighter sweeps north and northeast of PARIS with special attention to enemy airfields, had one of the biggest days in the history of this crack unit. All of the claims in aerial combat were theirs (36-1-8) and in addition they destroyed 13 single-engine fighters on the ground at fields near BEAUVAIS and REIMS. Operating by squadrons, they were always out-numbered; late in the day, for example, 12 P-51s fought 45 or more FW-190s and ME-109s north of VERAUVAIS, claiming 13-0-3 and losing four.

There were renewed evidences that the LUFTWAFFE was finding its bases in the PARIS area too hot to hold. Our pilots reported that some of the enemy fighters sighted were carrying belly tanks and were headed east. Facilities at ROMILLY-SUR-SEINE, MELUN-VILLAROCHE and TROYES were being destroyed as Third Army's armored columns approached.

Foremost mechanized cavalry elements were now about 15 miles east of TROYES, which meant they were approximately 100 miles southeast of PARIS and 120 miles from the German border. Meanwhile, far to the west, VIII Corps began a determined attack upon beleaguered BREST, which was being heavily bombarded by sea and air.

Flying 692 combat sorties, the Command claimed the following results against ground targets in addition to the harvest reaped in the air; 266 motor vehicles, four tanks, 44 locomotives and 164 cars destroyed or damaged; five marshalling yards attacked and five lines cut; three field gun positions, four troop concentrations, and ammunition dump and eight military buildings destroyed; five airfields attacked and two hangars destroyed. In anti-shipping operations off BREST, two naval vessels are claimed as destroyed and three naval and nine merchant vessels damaged. Four P-51s of 10th Reconnaissance Group flew artillery adjustment sorties for corps artillery at BREST, noting many hits on enemy gun positions and shipping. Reconnaissance sorties totaled 64.

26 AUGUST (D+81)

After his heavy air losses of the previous day, the enemy avoided

XIX TAC
VIII

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LOIRE R.

NANTES

80 O SQUARE LAMBERT ZONE II 80

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

DATE INDICATES APPROX. DAY OF ARRIVAL AT SITE

10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

20 10 0 20 40 60 80 100 120

combat with our fighters on 26 August and the day's bag totaled only two enemy aircraft destroyed and one damaged, all three on the ground.

Our groups on armed recces, patrols and armored column cover flew 528 sorties. Four planes were lost. Targets were successfully attacked both in the BREST area and in advance of our forces pushing on from southeast of PARIS toward Germany. Results included 315 motor vehicles, 22 armored vehicles, 75 horse-drawn vehicles, three motorcycles, eight locomotives and 106 railroad cars destroyed or damaged; 16 rail lines cut, a bridge and nine merchant vessels damaged and 10 barges destroyed or damaged. Attacks also were made on 30 enemy buildings, a radar station, five strongpoints, and oil tank, a factory and three airfields.

Indications were seen that the enemy might bring jet-propelled fighters into action against our aircraft soon if he could muster sufficient numbers. A probable ME-262 twin-jet-propelled fighter was sighted by pilots of 405th Group on 25 August, and on the 26th the same group reported contrails at 20,000 feet in the vicinity of CAEN, traveling at an estimated speed of 500 miles per hour.

27 AUGUST (*D*+82)

With American forces now across the MARNE at two points near MEAUX and advancing rapidly, German fighter bases along that historic river quickly became untenable and the remnants of the Luftwaffe in eastern France were forced to decamp.

Enemy fighters were again conspicuously absent, and the only claims in aerial combat were made by two tactical reconnaissance P-51s of 10th reconnaissance Group, which were bounced by 12 ME-109s between VERDUN and BAR-LE-DUC. Results: one ME-109 destroyed, one probably destroyed. Three more of the Command's total losses of eight planes during the day were suffered by the reconnaissance group. One was shot down by small-arms fire while directing artillery at BREST and two others failed to return from a mission in the DIJON area.

Supporting ground forces in the BREST area, 358th Group scored at least nine direct bomb hits on two gun positions, put several Napalm bombs in a target area marked by smoke and damaged three merchant vessels. In connection with the BREST attack, 362 Group got 19 direct hits on six gun positions and other results were reported good to excellent by ground controller. One flight leader was reported killed apparently by our own artillery fire while flying at 30 feet.

Considerable execution against enemy troops and transport was done by 406th Group, supporting ground forces in the MELUN-PROVINS area with its rockets and guns; by 36th Group on a similar mission; by 363rd Group along highways east of PARIS; and by 405th Group on armed recce south of the LOIRE. A rail-cutting project to cut off main escape route of Germans entrapped south of the LOIRE by Third and Seventh Army successes was begun by the Command, and 371st Group reported cutting railroad tracks at five places in the CHATEAUROUX-BESANCON area.

In all, 650 fighter-bomber sorties and 63 reconnaissance sorties were flown. Results included 44 tanks and other armored vehicles, 379 motor vehicles, 238 horse-drawn vehicles, 11 locomotives, 45 railroad cars and 10 vessels or barges destroyed or damaged. Forty-nine gun positions, 9 troop concentrations, a headquarters, an ammunition dump, 12 barracks buildings, two flak towers and a tunnel were attacked and five rail lines cut.

28 AUGUST (*D*+83)

U.S. Troops of First and Third Armies had crossed the MARNE on a 90-mile front between PARIS and CHALONS and were pressing on toward the AISNE. Our pilots over CHATEAU-THIERRY in the morning reported the streets filled with American soldiers and equipment.

Low cloud during much of the day restricted operations to 196 fighter-bomber and 88 reconnaissance sorties. In the DIJON-BESANCON area the enemy was seen to be making strenuous efforts to escape northeastward toward Germany, and during the brief periods of flying weather effective attacks were made on these transport targets, in addition to the usual fighter sweeps and direct support both to forces attacking BREST and those advancing eastward in the area of the MARNE.

On the armed reconnaissance mission in the BESANCON-DIJON area, the 405th Group destroyed 11 enemy aircraft by bombing and strafing an airfield near NEUFCHATEAU. A train nearby was seen to be carrying 13 JU-88 fuselages, and 11 of these were destroyed the other two being damaged.

Results of the day's attacks included 34 locomotives, 148 freight cars, 158 motor vehicles and 6 tanks destroyed or damaged; two lines cut; four gun positions, a command post, five river craft and an airfield attacked, and seven hangars destroyed. Against enemy aircraft our claims were 3-0-0 in air and 11-0-0 on the ground. Three of our planes were lost. Tactical reconnaissance P-51s accounted for one of the claims and one of the losses.

29 AUGUST (*D*+84)

Because of completely unflyable weather on this date, only one combat mission was undertaken and no targets were attacked. The pilots being forced to return to base 30 minutes after take-off. The days total activities consisted of these Eight abbreviated combat sorties and four reconnaissance sorties.

Despite rain and mud, Allied advances continued, both in the First and Third U.S. Army areas east and northeast of PARIS and in the British-Canadian sector north of the lower SEINE where advances were threatening ROUEN, LE HAVRE and the whole "flying bomb" coast. American forces had secured the line of the MARNE as far east as VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS, only about 100 miles from the German border. CHATEAU-THIERRY and other battlefields in the AISNE-MARNE area which had been fought over for months in the previous world war had been captured within a few hours by U.S. armored columns.

30 AUGUST (*D*+85)

A cold front was sweeping over Western Europe, and the resulting low ceilings and rain continued to blot out our bases and target areas. As a result, all XIX TAC operations were scrubbed with the exception of two weather recces flown by 10th Reconnaissance Group. Third Army, meanwhile, continued its advances, with XX Corps troops beyond REIMS and XII Corps advancing eastward from CHALONS-SUR-MARNE and VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS.

Control of XIX TAC operations now shifted far eastward from the vicinity of LAVAL to a new advance Headquarters site in the FORET DE MARCHENOIR, between ORLEANS on the LOIRE and the airfield at CHATEAUDUN.

31 AUGUST (*D*+86)

With the close of the month, four Allied armies were advancing rapidly north and northeastward on a front extending from the mouth of the SEINE to the MEUSE at VERDUN, 60 miles from the German border. On the eastern end of the front, Third Army units had crossed the MEUSE and were sweeping on past VERDUN and COMMERCY, in the area of the ARGONNE FOREST and ST. MIHIEL. Third Army had now taken more than 70,000 prisoners. To the west, First U.S. Army forces had freed LAON and were in the outskirts of SEDAN, eight miles from the BELGIAN frontier. Still farther west the British had taken AMIENS and established a strong bridgehead across the SOMME. The Canadians, advancing from ROUEN, were within 17 miles of DIEPPE.

In support of Third Army the fighter-bombers of this command on 31 August flew 18 missions comprising 313 sorties, despite continued bad weather, dropping 60-3/4 tons of general purpose bombs 39 tanks of Napalm and 16 leaflet bombs. Twenty rockets were discharged and considerable strafing done. There no claims against enemy aircraft and no losses. Results included 134 motor vehicles and 8 tanks destroyed. Attacks were made on 37 gun positions, a headquarters, a troop concentration, two strongpoints and a barracks and 22 roads were cut.

Our aircraft were now frequently flying over German territory as General Patton's Third Army approached the borders of the Reich. As the month ended, it could be said with truth that the battle for France had ended and the battle for Germany had begun.

RECAPITULATION

During August the groups under operational control of this Command flew a total of 12,292 fighter-bomber sorties. One hundred and fourteen aircraft were lost, but many of the pilots bailed out safely over friendly territory or found their way back through enemy lines. Our pilots claimed 163 enemy aircraft destroyed in aerial combat and 66 on the ground. Complete claims follow:

	Destroyed	Prob. Des.	Damaged
Enemy aircraft (in aerial combat)	163	16	34
Enemy aircraft (on ground)	66	4	28
	229	20	62

Figures give only a partial picture of the results obtained during this crowded month of operation, since smoke, dust and the fleeting nature of fighter-bomber attack frequently make assessment impossible. After many attacks which pilots dismissed simply as "NRO" (no results observed), ground troops reported "guns silenced" or "results excellent" and were seen to move forward.

Pilots' claims against ground targets include destruction or damaging of the following:

4,058 motor vehicles

466 tanks and other armored vehicles

598 horse-drawn vehicles

246 locomotives

2,956 railroad cars

155 barges and other river craft

18 merchant vessels

8 naval vessels

Stationary targets attacked by bombing or strafing, or both, include the following:

222 gun positions

39 marshalling yards

11 ammunition dumps

13 fuel and supply dumps

3 radar installations

17 airfields

7 headquarters

44 troop concentrations and bivouac areas

58 barracks and other enemy buildings

122 rail lines were cut

Reconnaissance aircraft flew a total of 599 missions during August, of which 522 were successful. Missions flown consisted of the following:

Tactical Reconnaissance	329
Photo Reconnaissance (Day)	258
Night Photo	12
Total	599

In awarding General Weyland the Bronze Star, General Patton commended the XIX Tactical Air Command as follows:

"The superior efficiency and co-operation afforded this army by the forces under your command is the best example of the combined use of air and ground troops I have ever witnessed.

"Due to the tireless efforts of your flyers, large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our advancing columns have been harassed or obliterated. The information passed directly to the head of the columns from the air has saved time and lives.

"I am voicing the opinion of all the officers and men in this army when I express to you our admiration and appreciation for your magnificent efforts."

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SEPTEMBER

1. The Month as a Whole:

a. General: September saw a marked change in the nature of the Third Army-XIX TAC campaign across FRANCE. The inordinate length of supply lines, together with the absence of good ports, forced slowing down of Third Army's offensive as its spearheads reached the borders of the REICH, and under cover of bad flying weather the enemy had a chance to build up his defenses centered around the MOSELLE RIVER fortress city of METZ. Meanwhile, valuable dividends on the August campaign were collected, in the form of the fall of the great port of BREST and the liquidation of air-bedeviled German forces south of the LOIRE.

b. Weather: Flying weather grew worse as the month developed. Although there were only two completely non-operational days, air activity was restricted by weather on 15 other days. Fighter-bomber sorties totaled 7,791 compared to 12,292 in August.

c. Enemy Air Activity: Enemy aircraft were encountered in strength only twice during the entire month of September. The striking power of the Luftwaffe had been blunted by its losses in August and by the disorganization resulting from its enforced precipitate withdrawal into GERMANY. Allied capture of French, Dutch and Belgian bases had forced the enemy back to airdromes in western GERMANY, many of which were small, with inadequate dispersal areas and facilities. Moreover, the constant attacks upon oil storage dumps, synthetic oil plants and refineries by Allied bombers had increased the enemy's fuel shortage problem. In the relatively few encounters of the month, the enemy, although aggressive, was observed to be somewhat inexperienced. German jet-propelled aircraft were sighted with increasing frequency, but most of their flights at this stage seemed to be experimental.

d. Communications: During August, one of the main problems of XIX Tactical Air Command was that of keeping pace with the rapidly advancing Army Headquarters and still maintaining communications with air units at bases necessarily far in the rear. This problem disappeared in September as the pace of the ground forces diminished and braked to a virtual halt. But during the first part of the month a large proportion of the Command's air effort was committed to the task of reducing BREST. This compelled fighter-bombers to operate in areas over 500 miles apart and to occupy airfields which were long distances from XIX TAC Headquarters, with resultant strain upon communications facilities.

e. Four Main Phases: Operations during September fall into four main phases, which occurred simultaneously or overlapped:

(1) The continuation of the Third U.S. Army drive across eastern FRANCE, crossing the MEURTHE beyond NANCY but halting before METZ.

(2) The assault and capitulation of BREST.

(3) The protection of the Army flank along the LOIRE RIVER, and the ending of enemy resistance there with the surrender of General ELSTER and his Marsch Gruppe of 20,000 men.

(4) The beginning of the assault against the METZ forts.

2. Chronicle of Operations.

a. Record Number of Motor Vehicles Destroyed on 1 September: The first of September found Third U.S. Army well across the MEUSE RIVER and rolling on beyond VERDUN and COMMERCY, in the area of the ARGONNE FOREST and ST. MIHIEL. While XII, XX, and XV Corps drove forward in eastern FRANCE, VIII Corps continued the assault on BREST.

XIX TAC began September operations with two fighter wings, the 100th and 303rd. Under these were eight fighter-bomber groups - the 36th, 354th, 358th, 362nd, 371st, 373rd, 405th and 406th; and the 10th Photo Group, Rcn. The 363rd Fighter Group, although still assigned to the Command, had been released from operations and was to be converted into a reconnaissance group. XIX TAC airfields stretched from the root of the BRITTANY peninsula to the vicinity of LE MANS. As long as BREST held out, aircraft of the Command covered two general areas, one in the eastern and the other in the western extremity of FRANCE. Advanced Headquarters, XIX TAC, were located on 1 September in the FORET DE MARCHENOIR, near ORLEANS.

On 1 September XIX TAC groups claimed the largest haul of enemy transport since the Command's inception. In all, 833 motor vehicles were destroyed or damaged, a record which was not to be equalled for several months.

The continued swift advances of Third U.S. Army beyond the MEUSE had thrown the retreating Germans into confusion. At the same time, General PATCH'S Seventh U.S. Army, sweeping up from southern FRANCE, had also precipitated a general retreat, creating ideal ground targets. Fighter sweeps and armed recces in the MEZIERES-ARLON-NANCY-VERDUN areas, and in the vicinity of POITIERS-CHATEAUROUX-BOURGES, below the LOIRE, resulted in most of the record claims.

On armed recce in the POITIERS-CHATEAUROUX-BOURGES area the 36th Group provided the high point of the day by destroying or damaging 311 motor transport and 94 armored vehicles. This Group's 53rd Sq attacked an ammunition dump near POITIERS and reported that explosions continued for 15 minutes afterward.

The 405th Group flew six armed recces in the MEZIERES-METZ area and destroyed or damaged 215 motor transport, 26 tanks or armored vehicles, 75 railroad cars and 4 locomotives.

In all, 41 missions comprising 492 sorties were flown and 562¼ tons of GP bombs dropped.

Our efforts were divided between the general battle area in the east, the assault area at BREST and the enemy concentrations south of the LOIRE. Ground troops were given direct support at BREST and QUIMPER in BRITTANY, and in the REIMS-VERDUN and VITRY-TROYES areas.

The 362nd Group flew 7 missions in support of Task Force "B" in the QUIMPER area of BRITTANY, bombing and strafing enemy gun positions, strongpoints and troop concentrations. Six 500-lb GPs dropped squarely on a troop concentration at the request of ground control were acknowledged by the Controller with "Well done!"

Of the day's 41 missions, 12 were flown in cooperation with VIII Corps at BREST. As the assault upon this great port progressed, the intensity of the air effort grew.

Although the groups had no encounters in the air, 514th Sq of 406th Group, on area support in the TROYES-VITRY area, received a call from "Beagle" (CCA, 4th Armored Div) stating that 70 enemy aircraft were attacking. The squadron was vectored toward METZ but could not locate the enemy. At METZ airdrome, however, the P-47 pilots found 35 to 40 enemy aircraft on the ground and claimed 10-6-10 by strafing.

Claims for the day included 33 locomotives, 185 railroad cars and 130 armored vehicles destroyed or damaged, in addition to the 833 motor vehicles. Also attacked were 29 gun positions, 15 barracks and buildings, several troop concentrations, a fort, an ammunition dump and a 500-ton merchant vessel.

Losses were three planes and one pilot.

On 2 September the enemy was still on the run, and our aircraft were ordered to concentrate on road and rail movement.

However, the day's operations were reduced by weather to 8 missions totaling 164 sorties, in which 12½ tons of GP bombs were dropped. Of two missions flown by 358th Group in support of ground troops at BREST, one returned with bombs, unable to drop them because of heavy rain which obscured the targets. The other was successful, four bomb hits being observed on one fortified position and another being claimed destroyed.

Four missions in support of ground forces were flown in the METZ - ST. MIHIEL - VERDUN and NANCY - ST. DIZIER areas, and armed recces below the LOIRE found some more rail targets. Claims for the day included 9 locomotives, 47 railroad cars, 106 motor transport and 9 armored vehicles destroyed or damaged.

The speed of the advancing ground forces was well illustrated in a priority teletype from Hq Ninth Air Force stating that fighter-bombers were to refrain from attacking bridges and marshalling yards. Rail lines were to be cut only when necessary to block current movements for immediate destruction.

b. All-out Attack on BREST Begun: The operations order for 3 September contains the following statement: "The Air Force is beginning an all-out effort for the capture of BREST. The primary objective of the Ninth Air Force is the capture of BREST. This objective continues until achieved." The assault upon this badly needed port had begun late in August and it had continued to resist stubbornly.

From 3 September until the port's final capitulation on 18 September a large portion of the fighter-bomber effort was employed in cooperation with ground forces attacking BREST. Aided by 5 IX TAC groups, XIX TAC flew at least 20 missions per day at BREST whenever weather permitted, and on some days the total exceeded 40 missions.

The 358th Group reported that several of its Napalm tanks failed to explode, and had to be fired by strafing.

On 5 September, VIII Corps passed to control of the newly operational Ninth US Army, but XIX TAC continued air cooperation until the BREST job was accomplished.

On this date also the 363rd Group, which had gone off operations at the end of August to be converted into tactical reconnaissance unit, was formally relieved from assignment to this Command.

Although the day was a highly successful one, it was marred by word that Col. Randolph P. Williams, XIX TAC Chief of Staff, was lost while on a reconnaissance mission in an A-20 south of the LOIRE.

By 6 September Third U.S. Army had reached the MOSELLE between METZ and NANCY and had crossed the river at several points, despite fierce resistance. The assault on BREST made slow but steady progress as mediums and fighter-bombers continued the all-out attack. With another day of favorable weather, seven XIX TAC groups operated, supplemented by four groups from IX TAC at BREST, and results were good. In all, 51 missions totaling 603 sorties were flown and claims included 55 motor transport, 90 railroad cars, 2 tanks, and 1 locomotive destroyed or damaged and 2 marshalling yards attacked.

At BREST the fighter-bombers attacked 39 gun positions, 9 strong points, 22 buildings, several troop concentrations, a headquarters and an ammunition dump. Of the day's 51 missions, 33 were devoted to the BREST assault.

On the other operational fronts, the weather was less favorable, but armed recce and column cover missions in the SAARBRUCKEN-LUXEMBOURG-VERDUN and DIJON-BELFORT-BESANCON areas met with generally good results.

d. Recce and Fighter-Bomber Teamwork Wipes Out a Convoy: On 7 September the spotting of a long enemy column seeking to escape toward GERMANY from south of the LOIRE made possible its complete destruction. The column was sighted by the pilot of one of the night photo A-20s of 10th Photo Group, Rcn, which General Weyland was using temporarily on day duty to supplement our reconnaissance below the LOIRE.

Word was flashed to XIX TAC and the 406th Fighter-bomber Group was ordered to attack. The P-47 pilots readily found the target in the CHATEAUROUX-ISSOUDUN-BOURGES area and bombed and strafed it until out of ammunition. Returning to base for more ammunition, they hurried back to the target and completed destruction of the entire column for loss of one plane to flak. Claims totaled 132 motor transport and 310 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. Pilots reported French civilians were taking the few remaining vehicles in the column as our aircraft left.

BREST continued to receive major attention and 23 of the day's 25 missions were in close support of the ground troops assaulting the port. Ten buildings were destroyed or damaged and attacks were made with good results on 22 gun positions, an ammunition dump and a strongpoint.

Of the 38 XIX TAC missions flown on 3 September, 24 were in support of ground troops at BREST. Among the targets successfully hit were gun positions, forts, buildings, barracks and a motor pool. The 362nd Group, in support of VIII Corps, concluded its sixth mission of the day by strafing 100 fishing boats in the harbor.

Meanwhile, the 354th Group flew seven fighter sweeps in the METZ-NANCY area, as XII Corps entered the outskirts of NANCY. The 405th Group continued hammering the enemy rear with armed recces in the SAARBRUCKEN - STRASBOURG area and returned with a sizeable bag of 71 motor transport, 34 horse-drawn vehicles, 30-plus railroad cars, 5 guns and 1 half-track destroyed or damaged.

The day's losses amounted to 5 aircraft, 3 to flak and 2 to mid-air collision near base.

In the day's 38 missions comprising 510 sorties, 122½ tons of GP bombs were dropped. Claims included 87 motor transport, 6 tanks or armored vehicles, 30-plus railroad cars, 35 horse-drawn vehicles and artillery pieces and 31 buildings destroyed or damaged. Attacks were made on 59 gun positions and strongpoints, 3 dumps, 2 motor transport parks, 2 forts, 2 troop concentrations and a headquarters.

On 4 September a cold front, causing low clouds and rain, prevented operations in the BREST area. Weather improved during the day in

the other battle sectors, however, and 9 missions totaling 159 combat sorties were flown in the SAARBRUCKEN - STRASBOURG - COLMAR areas and south of the LOIRE.

Claims for the day included 4 locomotives, 77 railroad cars and 19 motor transport destroyed or damaged and 14 rail lines cut. Most of these claims were by 405th Group, operating near DIJON. When its 510th Sq strafed a troop train of 15-17 cars, many casualties were caused.

Our reconnaissance at the beginning of the month had shown much rail and road traffic in the DIJON area as German troops fled toward the BELFORT GAP and GERMANY, but the high priority given the BREST operations prevented all-out fighter-bomber attack upon these fleeing Germans, many of whom were thus enabled to reach GERMANY and face us later from behind fixed defenses.

c. Brest Assault Mounts to Peak Intensity: With better weather on 5 September, the pressure on BREST was renewed. Seven groups of this Command were operational, augmented by five groups from IX TAC. The sole target for the day was BREST, with heavies, mediums and fighter-bombers carpeting the port and vicinity with high explosives.

In all, 43 fighter-bomber missions totaling 554 sorties were flown, and 198½ tons of GP bombs, 65 tons of frag clusters and 108 tanks of Napalm were dropped. Ground targets successfully attacked included 41 gun positions, 20 strongpoints, 2 headquarters, 2 troop concentrations and a U-boat pen. Thirty-two buildings, 1 locomotive and 1 motor transport were destroyed and rail lines were cut in 19 places.

The sky above BREST was literally dark with aircraft. "There were too damned many airplanes in the target area," remarked one pilot from the borrowed 474th Group after dropping his bombs.

On 8 September the onslaught on BREST reached its crest as 53 missions were flown in cooperation with the assault on the city and the satellite port of CROZON. Six hundred three fighter-bombers attacked successfully, hitting gun positions, buildings and troop concentrations.

Large fires were reported burning in the port towns and one group stated that BREST would be reduced to "ST. LO devastation" after another day of operations. The enemy was withdrawing to an inner defense ring.

Fighter-bombers attacked 44 gun positions, 11 strong-points, 2 troop concentrations, 2 tank traps, 2 trenches and a town. In BREST itself, 60 enemy-held buildings were destroyed.

Column cover was provided, meanwhile, to XII and XX Corps in the METZ-NANCY-VERDUN area, and armed recces were conducted south of the LOIRE.

In all, 62 missions comprising 729 sorties were flown and 256 5/8 tons of GP bombs dropped on targets; 22 motor transport and 35 railroad cars were destroyed.

Losses for the day amounted to seven aircraft.

Flying weather continued favorable on 9 September, permitting seven Groups of XIX TAC, augmented at BREST by two Groups of IX TAC, to fly 33 missions comprising 370 sorties; 90 tons of GP bombs were dropped.

Fighter-bomber targets before the flaming port of BREST continued to be hit, and other targets included rolling stock in the SAAR, RHINE and MOSELLE valley areas and barracks at NANCY. Among the day's claims were 23 locomotives, 177 railroad cars, 13 tanks and armored vehicles, 88 motor transport, and a barge destroyed or damaged. South of the LOIRE, aircraft also dropped leaflets to German troops who were milling about in great confusion.

Two planes were lost, 1 to flak and 1 to unknown causes.

Flak at BREST had diminished progressively with the growing intensity of the assault. This was attributed to three factors: (1) Much enemy artillery had been put out of action by the bombardment. (2) Most of the heavy guns had been sited for last-ditch defense against ground attacks, making engagement of air targets difficult. (3) Ammunition was getting low.

On 10 September, 81 missions were flown on the MEURTHE-MOSELLE front where Third U.S. Army was beginning a coordinated attack to outflank NANCY. The enemy had massed in the FORET DE HAYE west of the city, preparing defensive positions. The 406th Group's 512th Squadron, on cooperation in the NANCY area, made 40 passes at a concentration of 15 tanks and destroyed them all by strafing. In the METZ area, the 36th Group hit several gun positions and fired an oil dump.

At BREST, the defenders held out with suicidal tenacity, despite the devastating aerial bombardment. At times the smoke and flames in the city were so thick that it was impossible to assess bomb damage.

In all, 36 missions were flown on 10 September by 8 groups of XIX TAC and 2 groups of IX TAC (at BREST) for a total of 467 sorties, 175 of which were in cooperation with ground forces assaulting the BRITTANY port.

Results included 40 armored vehicles, 15 motor transport, 6 horse-drawn vehicles, 3 naval vessels and 3 barges destroyed or damaged, while attacks were made on 37 gun positions, 30 enemy-held buildings and several troop concentrations and strongpoints.

The GAF continued to steer clear of battle, but one lone HE-111 was sighted by 353rd Sq of 354th Group and destroyed in the air. Three aircraft of this Command were lost to flak.

On the same day, 10 September, Advanced Headquarters, XIX TAC, moved from the FORET DE MARCHENOIR to a woods west of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE, about 15 miles from Army Headquarters, thus remedying the communications difficulties which had plagued the ground-air team during August and early September.

Close air cooperation at BREST and in the MEURTHE-MOSELLE area was the principal order of the day on 11 September. The day's 411 sorties were almost equally divided between BREST and the battle areas in eastern FRANCE, with good to excellent results. Gun positions and other enemy installations were attacked in the port defenses. In the east, fighter-bombers continued to hack away at transport and armored vehicles, reducing the German potential before it could be profitably employed.

Total destruction for the day included 2 tanks, 46 motor transport, 35 horse-drawn vehicles, 13 locomotives, 92 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Three squadrons escorted medium bombers attacking targets at METZ.

No enemy aircraft were encountered throughout the day, but three of our own planes were lost to flak.

e. The Luftwaffe Gives Battle: For the first time during the month, strong enemy air opposition was encountered on 12 September when our pilots claimed 35-0-7 against enemy aircraft in combat and 9-0-1 on the ground for loss of 3 planes and pilots. Five others were lost to flak.

Thirty of the 35 aircraft shot down were claimed in a 15-minute battle by P-51s of the 354th Group, which by that time had more than 550 enemy aircraft to its credit. The engagement began when one squadron of the 354th Group, bounced by 40 FW-190's in the FRANKFURT-MANNHEIM area, radioed for help. A second squadron, which had just destroyed 8 JU-88's and FW-190's at an airfield near LIMBURG, got the call while over FRANKFURT, and came to the rescue. Pilots reported that while the German airmen were aggressive, they seemed inexperienced and ill-trained.

P-47s of 405th Group encountered 16 to 20 ME-109s in the PONT-A-MOUSSON area, which was then being assaulted, and claimed 5-0-5 for the loss of 1 P-47.

The day's 37 missions totaled 388 sorties, comprising close cooperation with ground troops at BREST and in the XII, XV and XX Corps zones, as well as fighter sweeps and armed recces in the RHINE and SAAR valleys.

Results included 13 locomotives, 68 railroad cars, 1 tank, 129 motor vehicles and 3 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. In attacks upon gun positions at BREST, 5 out of 9 guns were silenced.

Although the weather on 13 September restricted operations to 22 missions totalling 186 sorties, good results were obtained on the Third U.S. Army front in the east, on armed reconnaissance in the RHINE and SAAR Valleys, and before battered BREST.

The 406th Group, flying 61 sorties in cooperation with the 2nd French Armored and 79th Infantry Divs, used GP bombs, frag clusters and the highly successful rocket projectiles. The Group's pilots claimed 13 tanks destroyed and 15 others damaged. "Excellent results," said the French Commander, and the ground controller congratulated one of the squadrons on "excellent work."

It was a day of good results on ground targets of all sorts. Considerable movement in the SAAR had been reported by our reconnaissance -- evidently troops and equipment moving up to the XX and XII Corps zones to hold the new attacks. In this area, 405th Group claimed 24 locomotives, 6 ammunition cars, 83 freight cars and 19 motor transport and 3 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Total claims for the day included 51 locomotives, 300 railroad cars, 66 tanks and other armored vehicles, 97 motor transport and 3 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

As the air-ground assault on BREST continued, the doomed garrison on 14 September requested surrender terms. These were presented but rejected, and the battle was resumed.

Meanwhile, Third U.S. Army's XII and XX Corps had managed to cross the MOSELLE in the THIONVILLE-METZ-NANCY area in the face of strong resistance. Farther south, the Third and Seventh U.S. Armies had joined at CHAUMONT; NEUFCHATEAU was taken and with it more than 600 German troops.

Flying weather continued to be restrictive; only nine missions comprising 82 sorties were flown on the 14th and five of the nine were unsuccessful because of weather. The four successful missions were to BREST where the usual gun positions, strongpoints and troop concentrations were attacked and 1 motor transport destroyed.

After a four-day outflanking attack, the city of NANCY was captured on 15 September. Farther north, the MOSELLE crossings were going slowly and the enemy was launching successive counter-attacks.

Continuing adverse weather limited operations to 10 missions totaling 108 sorties. Only four of these missions were successful, consisting of cooperation with XX Corps and armed recce in the RHINE VALLEY.

One squadron of the 405th Group, supporting XX Corps, dropped a safe-conduct leaflet bomb and put eight 500-pound GP bombs on a rail and road assembly point as directed by ground control. Several tanks, trucks and a locomotive were destroyed. Another squadron failed to locate a reported tank column, but destroyed 5 locomotives, 19 motor transport and 2 tank trailers in the ST. DIE area.

Weather showed little improvement on 16 September and confined operations chiefly to the BREST area. In all there were 21 missions consisting of 223 sorties, with no losses, or encounters with enemy aircraft.

The 362nd Group, supporting ground troops attacking BREST, dispatched ten missions of 60 sorties. Its pilots dropped 14½ tons of GP bombs on gun positions, strongpoints and pillboxes, reporting generally good results. Most of the other missions were unsuccessful because of weather, but the 358th Group, on armed recce, cut tracks in four places near STRASBOURG and the 362nd dropped leaflets at ST. NAZAIRE.

Third U.S. Army troops continued to sweep on from NANCY. One day after NANCY's surrender, the FORET DE HAYE was in their hands.

f. Watch on the LOIRE Ends in Surrender of 20,000: At Beaugency Bridge on the LOIRE RIVER an event took place on 16 September which marked a milestone in air history -- the formal surrender of Major General Botho Elster and his Marsch Gruppe of 20,000 men.

XIX TAC, asked by General Patton to protect his LOIRE RIVER flank throughout the drive through FRANCE in August and early September, had kept the Germans south of the LOIRE under constant surveillance and frequent attack.

The Seventh US Army had swept up from the MEDITERRANEAN, and on 12 September had joined the Third US Army's 2nd French Armored Division in the CHAUMONT area, thereby cutting off all means of escape.

The Germans by this time were desperate. They were mercilessly pounded by fighter-bombers by day and harried by strong partisan bands at night. Most of their transport had been destroyed by aerial attacks, notably those of 1 and 7 September. By 10 September, General Elster had decided to surrender.

In a lengthy conference with the Commanding General of the 83rd Infantry Div at ISSOUDUN, Elster agreed to capitulate -- subject to some very unusual conditions. Enroute from the general area of ISSOUDUN to the place of surrender -- BEAUGENCY BRIDGE on the LOIRE -- his troops were to be permitted to remain armed for defense against FFI units, who might not have heard of the surrender, and from whom they could expect no mercy. Secondly, he requested that the terrible "JABOS" be called off -- these being the XIX TAC fighter-bombers which had made their life a living hell.

Ninth U.S. Army agreed to the stiuplations, but the Germans were reminded that aircraft would patrol the columns to insure strict compliance with surrender terms.

A single platoon of Ninth U.S. Army Infantry was sent along to maintain order and lead the Marsch Gruppe to BEAUGENCY BRIDGE. It was commanded by Lt. Francis E. Kimble, an officer placed in a curious situ-

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ation. The journey began on 13 September and was not without incident; but they arrived safely at HEADGENCY BRIDGE on 16 September, while overhead the fighter-bombers maintained constant surveillance.

General Simpson considered that the XIX TAC was largely responsible for the capitulation of General Elster's forces and invited General Weyland to participate in the surrender ceremony. It was the first time a US Air Force General had participated in the surrender of enemy ground forces. Said General Weyland in a message to all Groups of his Command:

"The 16th of September saw the successful conclusion of a new chapter in the history of the XIX Tactical Air Command of the US Ninth Air Force.

"I was present on the south bank of the LOIRE RIVER to help accept the surrender of Major General Botho Elster, his staff and 20,000 German troops.

"Since August 6, every group of this Command has participated in this epic of air history. You located the enemy and successfully prevented any offensive action against our Army's south flank or retreat to the east by cutting his rail lines, destroying his rail and motor transport and then decimating his trapped forces.

"This air action was unquestionably the greatest single factor forcing the final capitulation. When requesting a conference with US ground forces, the German commander indicated his willingness to surrender -- provided we stopped our air attacks on his troops. We suspended our offensive operations south of the LOIRE during the negotiations, maintaining only surveillance. He was threatened with all-out fighter-bomber action if he did not surrender.

"I heard and saw his final decision.

"I am intensely proud of your effort. I believe that our comrades who have been lost in action probably looked down yesterday with pride and felt that their sacrifice had not been in vain.

"Please convey to your officers and men this message with my thanks."

Instrumental in bringing about this dramatic episode was the rail interdiction program which had been drawn up by the XIX TAC Target Section and placed in operation in August to cut off Germen "retreat according to plan" into GERMANY via BELFORT GAP. This program provided for regular and frequent attacks by fighter-bombers against rail lines and railway bridges running from an area below ORLEANS to the BELFORT GAP. Rail lines, railway centers and rolling stock were to be blasted steadily, forcing the German to use highways. This would cause him to scrape the barrel of his considerably depleted oil stocks, and would also present excellent targets for prowling aircraft.

The program was accomplished with vigor and reasonable success, although the September rains and the large number of fighter-bombers committed to the assault on BREST reduced the effort considerably.

The fruits of rail interdiction had been realized by early September, and enemy units were taking to the highways providing ideal targets for the fighter-bombers.

As the confusion below the LOIRE grew apace, fighter-bomber pilots showered the enemy with surrender leaflets.

6. BREST Falls at Last: By 17 September the battle of BREST was nearing a finale; already, sizable groups were surrendering, unable to withstand the devastating fire of assault troops or the constant bombardment. The heretofore formidable flak defenses had been steadily reduced, making the task of the fighter-bombers much easier. Close air-ground cooperation was paying big dividends.

The morale of the defenders had been considerably shaken by aerial attack. One prisoner, a forward observer, said his artillery battalion GP was completely destroyed by our planes. Four prisoners remarked that after their observation post was heavily attacked by dive-bombers, they thought it best to give up.

Weather was the only hindrance to final reduction of the forts. Operations for the day were limited to 17 missions comprising 133 sorties.

The 362nd Group had a busy and successful day supporting VIII Corps troops attacking BREST, effectively bombing or strafing troops, artillery and strongpoints. A typical attack on a mortar position caused ground control to report excellent results. Pilots could see enemy troops march east in single file from CROZON to surrender.

The 36th Group, on armed recce in the SAARBRUCKEN area, destroyed railway tracks and rolling stock and a 20-mm gun position. All other missions were unsuccessful because of weather.

After an all-out air and ground assault which had begun on 3 September, the mighty port of BREST fell on 18 September.

The only missions of the day were five flown by 362nd Group and totaling 32 sorties, in a final treatment on BREST. All other bases were weather-bound by fog, drizzle and low ceilings.

As the day wore on, the situation at BREST became increasingly confused. Ground control was reluctant to assign targets because of the rapid advance of US troops. In one instance, eight of our aircraft placed their 16 bombs on a gun position as US troops were observed less than 2,000 yards away. Four others put bombs on a gun position, scoring four direct hits, and pilots observed the enemy laying out Red Cross panels. Ground control advised the flight to continue strafing, saying there was no hospital in the area.

When word was received from ground control that BREST had fallen, other aircraft of the group were already en route to the target. They were fired upon and accordingly continued the attack.

The capture of BREST was swiftly followed by the capitulation of CROZON, its satellite to the south, on 19 September. With these two ports in Allied hands, the full fighter-bomber effort could now be employed on the Third U.S. Army front along the MOSELLE where the situation was virtually static.

Although not ideal, the weather on the 19th showed some improvement. Groups were able to fly 22 missions totaling 262 sorties on escort to bombers attacking marshalling yards in GERMANY, armed recces in the SAAR and close support to XII and XV Corps, plus three missions by 405th Group against flak positions and a radar installation in cooperation with the airborne landings in HOLLAND.

Supporting XII Corps in the area east of NANCY, 36th Group destroyed a highway bridge, 4 motor transport, a locomotive and 5 railroad cars.

The Luftwaffe, a complete stranger since the 12th, made another appearance on the 19th, bouncing 406th Group P-47s near NANCY. Pilots reported that the enemy was aggressive but appeared green, failing to follow up his initial advantage. One P-47 was lost and one ME-109 shot down.

The 405th Group reported sighting an ME-262, one of the newly operational enemy jet aircraft. It was first seen on the deck but climbed rapidly to 8,000 feet and passed the formation.

h. Interdiction Hampered by Bad Flying Weather: With Third U.S. Army's advance slowing down, considerable concern had been felt lest the enemy, with his strong recuperative powers, use the reprieve to strengthen his already powerful defenses in the METZ-NANCY area. Reconnaissance showed that this was indeed taking place and a rail-cutting program was embarked upon, but it met with only limited success because of the bad flying weather.

On 20 September operations were again restricted by weather, especially during the morning, and only 12 missions totaling 165 sorties were flown. These included close cooperation with XV and XX Corps and attacks on transport in the SAAR and RHINELAND and between the SAAR VALLEY and METZ. Results included 13 motor vehicles, 4 armored vehicles, 14 locomotives, 30 railroad cars, 5 gun positions, 4 buildings and a bridge destroyed or damaged.

With slightly better weather on 21 September, six groups of this Command were able to fly 19 missions totaling 245 sorties on armed recce, direct cooperation with ground forces, and bomber escort. Claims included 47 motor transport, 20 tanks, 14 locomotives, 266 railroad cars, 5 gun positions, 2 barges, a bridge and a supply dump destroyed or damaged. Rail lines in western GERMANY were cut in 15 places.

Of the 23 missions on 22 September, 14 were armed recces in Western GERMANY against railways and moving transport. Rails were cut in the SAAR in six places and railway cars loaded with armored vehicles were bombed. Nine missions were flown in cooperation with ground troops and here, too, the harvest of transport was high.

In all, 273 sorties were flown and 61½ tons of GP dropped. Claims for the day included 121 motor transport, 22 tanks or other armored vehicles, 13 locomotives, 155 railroad cars, 5 oil cars, 35 horse-drawn vehicles, 4 barges, 6 gun positions, 7 buildings and 4 supply dumps destroyed or damaged. Rail lines were cut in 21 places.

At this stage XIX TAC's Advance Headquarters moved from the pine woods west of CHALONS-SUR-MARNE to the town of ETAIN, east of VERDUN. For the first time since early August, Air Command and Army Headquarters were now within walking distance of each other.

Progress along the entire western front was slow. Third U.S. Army units were meeting heavy resistance. The airborne operations in HOLLAND had met with only partial success and the enemy was counter-attacking fiercely.

Again restrictive weather set in and permitted only four missions totaling 44 sorties on 23 September. Three of the four missions consisted of area cover for B-26s bombing a bridge in the assault area near VENLO, HOLLAND, and marshalling yards in GERMANY.

On the fourth mission, 405th Group's 510th Sq, cooperating with XII Corps, dropped 8 bombs on 6 flak positions and claimed all destroyed. Six bombs were dropped on an artillery position and although results were not observed, Combat Command "A" of the 4th Armored Div said "Thanks for good bombing."

The Germans continued to resist steady Third U.S. Army pressure, and most of the missions of the 24th were in close cooperation with ground forces. Weather restricted operations until 1730 hours, and as a result only 10 missions comprising 118 sorties were flown.

In the LANEUVEVILLE-EN-SAULNOIS area east of NANCY, a heavy enemy counter-attack was launched against the 4th Armored Division. The 405th Group's 509th Sq was directed to the area and dropped 16 500-lb bombs on enemy tanks in fields and woods. Third U.S. Army reported that this mission helped to break up the counter-attack. The same Group's 510th Sq, cooperating with the same division, reported seven hits on a convoy of 100 MT and armored vehicles.

The 36th Group put 22 250-lb bombs on a woods for 80th Infantry Div, observing smoke and fire afterwards, and also bombed heavy AA guns in the CHATEAU-SALINS area.

On armed recce in the LUNEVILLE-SAARBURG area, the 358th Group destroyed railroad tracks, underpasses and rolling stock, motor transport and a gasoline dump. The dump blew up with a large explosion which damaged one of the attacking planes.

Our fighter-bombers, operating at low level, encountered intense ground fire and three were missing, two definitely to flak.

On 25 September a cold front moving from the North Sea across the bases and target areas brought the first totally non-operational day of the month. Everything was grounded by low ceilings and poor visibility, with intermittent rain.

i. Attack on Metz Forts: While see-saw skirmishes continued along the MOSELLE, Third U.S. Army's XX Corps was preparing to assault METZ. Fighter-bombers were to begin the softening-up process on several forts in the assault area, on 26 September, but weather limited operations to three missions comprising 35 sorties, all by 405th Group. The sole target was FORT DRIANT, on the west side of the MOSELLE, southwest of METZ.

First of 405th Group's squadrons to attack the fort was the 511th, four of its 12 P-47s carrying two 1,000-pound GP apiece and 8 carrying one tank of Napalm each. Two of the 1,000-pounders were returned because of mechanical failure and two Napalms were jettisoned east of the target for the same reason, but the remaining six GPs and six Napalms were dropped inside the fort. A large explosion with intense white smoke to 4,000 feet, resulted, and the area was afterwards strafed. Five minutes later the 510th Sq, with same loading put six 1,000-pounders and all eight of the Napalm bombs inside the fort, reporting many direct hits and many fires. In the last attack, the 509th Sq dropped seven 1,000 pounders and seven Napalms on the fort.

This operation was accomplished at low level, without loss.

Increasingly, now, the ground troops were aiding the air by subjecting flak batteries to artillery fire while the fighter-bombers were attacking. This had become progressively necessary because under the more static conditions of late September, the enemy was concentrating his flak defenses, with the result that his fire was much more formidable than when he was retreating across FRANCE.

The 27th of September was the first good flying day in weeks, and the Command was able to fly 42 missions comprising 517 sorties on armed recces, fighter sweeps, and close cooperation missions including attacks on the METZ forts.

On fighter sweeps, 36th Group pilots destroyed two hangars and a 20-mm gun position at the BIBLIS airfield, destroyed three single-

engine fighters on the ground at GERMERSHEIM airfield, damaged another, destroyed a hangar and two barracks buildings, and silenced a flak tower and another AA position. They also hit the KIRRIACH airfield, damaging three single-engine fighters on the ground.

With a second successive day of good flying weather, fighter-bombers on 28 September were able to continue attacks upon the METZ forts, raid German airfields, and prey upon lines of communication be-

Total claims for the day included 45 motor transport, 19 tanks and armored vehicles, 38 locomotives, 180 railroad cars, 22 gun positions, 2 barges, 2 dumps, 5 hangars, 9 factories and other buildings, and 2 steam rollers destroyed or damaged. Our losses, all to flak, totaled 6 aircraft.

The 406th Group, on armed recce in the STRASBOURG-SAARBURG area, found excellent hunting, chiefly against military trains bearing tanks and ammunition. Its 512th Sq hit the jackpot when it strafed a train and the resulting explosion "blew up the whole countryside for five miles around." Another ammunition train, of 20 cars, was blown up and intense fires were seen among Tiger tanks on flat cars in another train.

The 405th Group, supporting XX Corps, continued its attacks on the METZ forts with 1,000-pound bombs and Napalm. Many fires were started and the ground controller reported he was pleased with the results. The 509th Sq saw three German soldiers running inside one fort, strafed them and claimed 3-0-0.

tween the front and the enemy's supply centers in GERMANY. Results of the day's 39 missions comprising 573 sorties included destruction or damaging of 49 motor transport, 2 tanks, 67 locomotives, 371 railroad cars, a bridge, 18 gun positions, 9 canal boats, 10 enemy buildings, and 2 ammunition buildings which exploded. Against the Luftwaffe our pilots scored 4-0-3 in the air and 12-0-3 on the ground.

While destroying rolling stock in the KARLSRUHE area, 371st Group's 406th Sq was bounced by 20-plus ME-109s. The squadron claimed 1-0-0 for no loss. Three enemy planes were claimed destroyed and three damaged in other encounters for loss of one P-47. P-51s of 354th Group, on a fighter sweep in the FRANKFURT area, attacked four airdromes, claiming 8-0-3 on the ground for loss of one P-51 to flak.

At METZ, 358th Group pilots dropped 21 1,000-lb GP bombs and 24 tanks of Napalm on the JEANNE D'ARC group of forts. They also strafed the METZ airdrome, claiming destruction of a building and four aircraft on the ground.

Divebombing railroad tunnels in the METZ area, 36th Group claimed direct hits on four.

The town of BURES east of NANCY was reported to be full of enemy tanks and troops, and 36th Group pilots leveled it with 23 500-lb bombs.

Enemy aircraft, appearing on the 29th for the second time in two days and in the same general area, interrupted the 406th Group in its work. Thirty-plus ME-109s bounced the 513th Sq which was attacking rail targets in the LANDAU area, but emerged with the customary results. The P-47s claimed 6-0-3 for loss of two. The pilots appeared inexperienced, a fact which supported the belief that fuel shortage was seriously handicapping the Luftwaffe. It was reported that because of lack of fuel, combat training time in the GAF had been sharply reduced and much of the instruction was being given in gliders rather than powered planes.

Elsewhere, the fighter-bombers had one of their most successful days in cooperating with ground troops and attacking enemy supplies and communications. Excellent cooperation was reported in the XII Corps zone where 405th Group was credited by the ground forces with 11 tanks destroyed and 8 damaged, and inestimable aid in breaking up two enemy counter-attacks. Third U.S. Army expressed thanks for splendid support and stated that the Group's 511th Sq contributed to the destruction of six additional tanks by forcing them out into the open where artillery could hit them.

On armed recce in the TRIER-SAARLAUTERN-HOMBURG area, 362nd Group gave rail lines and traffic heavy punishment. One squadron put 22 bombs on the marshalling yard at BAD KREUZNACH, blowing up a locomotive and 30 tank and ammunition cars. Flames rose to 2,000 feet.

While on armed recce, the 362nd Group's 377th Sq dropped 24 bombs on a marshalling yard at SOEMMERHEIM, reporting no results observed because of ground fog. Aerial photographs made shortly after this attack, however, showed at least seven direct hits destroying 200 feet of track and severing the main line. All rolling stock in a 200-foot area was destroyed and fires observed in three large rectangular warehouse buildings.

Groups flew 46 missions totaling 576 sorties and claimed 66 MT, 10 tanks, 43 locomotives, 226 railroad cars, a tunnel, 50 horse-drawn vehicles, 3 docks and a canal lock destroyed or damaged. Rails were cut in 45 places and attacks were made on 3 marshalling yards, 7 troop concentrations, a fort, an ordnance depot, an airfield, 5 towns and a strongpoint. Five planes and pilots were lost.

As the month ended with September's second completely unflyable day, XX Corps' Fifth Infantry Div was pressing its attack on FORT DRIANT, which is typical of the strong fortifications around METZ. Fighter-bombers had dropped 1,000-pound bombs and Napalm on DRIANT and neighboring forts, and, following attack by medium bombers, Fifth Div troops gained entrance to the fort in early October. After bitter fighting they were forced out, however, and the fall of DRIANT did not come until December, when METZ had been by-passed and captured.

The attacks on FORT DRIANT served to bring out clearly the limitations of the fighter-bomber in connection with assault on powerful fixed defenses. They showed that fighter-bomber attack has little effect on heavy fortifications of concrete, steel and earth, such as those at METZ, although Napalm, smoke and HE from fighter-bombers may reduce their effectiveness for a limited time through blinding and harassing effect.

The bad weather of 30 September gave the Germans another opportunity to patch up their mich-cut railroad lines. Plotting of tactical reconnaissance reports of enemy movement on 29 September showed the results of rail-cutting carried out by our fighter-bombers on the previous days in the area between the enemy's front line and his bases in GERMANY. Considerable movement was seen in the immediate vicinity of the METZ battlefront and in the RHINE area from FRANKFURT to STRASBOURG, but in the extensive communication zone between these two areas, virtually no rail movement was noted. Since rail cuts can be quickly repaired, however, they must be repeated at frequent intervals--and with flying weather growing worse, therein lay the rub.

j. Reconnaissance: During the month, XIX TAC's 10th Photo Group, Reconnaissance, had been extremely active, flying 822 visual and 303 photo recce sorties, plus 11 by night photo planes. Weather interfered considerably, but 660 of the visual and 258 of the photo recce sorties were successful. In addition, 26 successful artillery adjustment sorties were flown by tactical reconnaissance P-51 pilots. Three recce planes were lost in the month's operations and one enemy aircraft was shot down by a tactical reconnaissance P-51 (F-6).

In the early part of the month major emphasis was on tactical reconnaissance because of the continued rapidity of movement, but as the pace slowed and Third U.S. Army approached the strong defenses of METZ and the SIEGFRIED LINE the need for thorough photographic coverage kept the P-38s (F-5s) working overtime. By the end of September basic cover of the area in front of Third U.S. Army was well advanced. Daily front line photo cover to a depth of 15,000 yards was begun, and missions also included vertical and oblique cover of the MOSELLE RIVER crossings and pinpoint photos of enemy fortifications. In the meantime the F-5s continued to cover airfields at regular intervals and fly bomb damage assessment missions.

CLAIMS AND RESULTS OF ATTACKS
BY XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

1 September 1944 thru 30 September 1944

	DEST	PROB DEST	DAMAGED
ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN AIR	35	0	5
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ON GROUND	34	6	24
MOTOR TRANSPORT	2,122	20	291
TANKS AND OTHER ARMORED VEHICLES	196	10	132
LOCOMOTIVES	276	47	130
RAILROAD CARS	892	38	1,222
BRIDGES	21	2	4
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	210	60	96
DUMPS	34	3	5
HANGARS	7	0	2
FACTORIES & MISC BLDGS	327	72	407
ROADS CUT	44	0	4
RAILROADS CUT	253	21	59
VESSELS & BARGES--ALL TYPES	66	17	49
HORSE-DRAWN VEHICLES	311	0	23

OTHER STATISTICS

MARSHALLING YARDS ATTACKED	30
TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ATTACKED	52
AIRFIELDS ATTACKED	6
MISSIONS	565
SORTIES	7,791
BOMB TONNAGE	2,015
ROCKETS	46

OCTOBER

1. Introduction.

a. General: The latter half of September had foreshadowed the general nature of operations for the ensuing month. October was marked by extremely poor weather, restricted operations and a reduction in the Command's strength. Two groups and the 303rd Wing were relieved from the command in October, variously to XII TAC and the newly activated XXIX TAC, leaving XIX TAC with 5 fighter-bomber groups and 10th Photo Group Rcn. The ground situation remained relatively static throughout the month as Third U.S. Army forces attacked the stubborn METZ forts, established bridgeheads across the MOSELLE and pressed forward beyond NANCY, against tenacious resistance. As a consequence of this virtual stalemate, there was a distinct reduction in the number of missions flown in cooperation with ground forces, while increased attention was given to railway interdiction and armed recce. Fighter-bomber sorties totaled 4,790 as compared to 7,791 in September and 12,292 in August.

b. Weather: Flying weather was even worse than during the previous month. There were only 12 complete and 12 partially flyable days; the remaining 7 days were completely non-operational.

c. Enemy Air Activity: Time continued to work for the enemy, as the battle line remained relatively static. German aircraft were encountered in greater numbers and the pilots exhibited more skill and aggressiveness. The breathing spell had given the enemy an opportunity to concentrate his single-engine fighter strength, repair and modify his formerly ill-adapted homeland bases, and convert them to the uses of modern warfare. The enemy's widely dispersed industry had been switched from bombers to the production of fighter aircraft and he had been able to build up a strong fighter force. Nevertheless, allied superiority was distinctly evident, both in numbers and in the quality of planes and pilots. Whenever the hun was encountered, he came out a poor second best.

d. Flak: Enemy anti-aircraft defenses showed greater concentration and strength throughout the month. Not forced to keep constantly on the run as he had been in August and early September, the enemy was able to build up flak defenses along static, concentrated lines; and our pilots found flak to be dense and formidable. But by this time they were familiar with the general area and well armed by flak intelligence as to the location and potentialities of enemy defenses.

e. Communications: The problems so prevalent in August and September, caused by the tremendous distances involved and the rapid movement of ground forces, were virtually eliminated in October. The relative immobility of the ground situation, plus the concentration of fighter-bomber groups in a comparatively small area, greatly eased the strain on communications. XIX TAC and Third U.S. Army Headquarters were within walking distance of each other, first in ETAIN and later in NANCY.

2. Chronicle of Operations.

a. Isolation of Battlefield Emphasized During Buildup Phase: After scattering the German armies in FRANCE during August, and mopping up points of resistance in September, the Third U.S. Army drive came to a virtual halt. The ground situation in early October could be described as comparatively static. The XX Corps, consisting of 5th, 83rd and 90th Infantry Divisions, was consolidating bridgeheads across the swollen MOSELLE River, and attacking the outer forts at METZ. XII Corps, made up of the 35th and 80th Infantry and 4th and 6th Armored Divisions, had widened the wedge beyond the MEURTHE, east of NANCY. The buildup phase for the offensive which was to come in November was now under way. The Canadians had liberated the city of CALAIS and were clearing the PAS DE CALAIS area. First U.S. Army was repulsing counter-attacks inside the SIEGFRIED Line, opposite COLOGNE, while the British were doing the same in the NIJMEGEN area. On the Seventh U.S. and First French Army sectors, progress was also slow. All along the Western Front, the Allied advance had bogged down, meeting stubborn resistance everywhere and furious counter-attacks at many points.

The XIX Tactical Air Command began October operations with Advance Headquarters at ETAIN and Rear Headquarters at JUVIGNY, near CHALONS-SUR-MARNE. The 371st and 363rd Groups had been lost in September; and on 1 October the 36th and 373rd Groups were relieved and assigned to XXIX TAC. XIX TAC was thus reduced to five fighter-bomber groups and 10th Photo Group, and to make matters worse, the weather predictions boded ill for the coming month.

These disadvantages were somewhat offset by two factors: (1) Because of the virtual stalemate, fighter-bombers were operating over a limited area, and the fact that our airfields were now closer to the front partly compensated for the fact that days were growing shorter as autumn advanced, (2) Third U.S. Army had lost both its VIII and XV Corps in September and was reduced to XII and XX Corps.

An extensive cold front moving over bases and targets permitted no continental air operations on the first of the month and only a two-plane weather recce was flown by XIX TAC.

On 2 October, weather lifted sufficiently to permit fairly extensive activity; although overcast obsdured assigned targets in several instances, alternative targets were located and effectively attacked. Our fighter-bombers flew a total of 426 sorties with generally good results.

The enemy, taking advantage of the breathing spell, had been repairing his railways feverishly and using them with a boldness not encountered since August. A good deal of movement had been observed in the direction of the METZ bastions and the enemy's determined resistance had been materially assisted by the use of these still intact railway systems. Critically short of fuel, he was risking rail transport in daylight, close to the front.

In order to shatter these supply lines and isolate the battlefield, a new and concerted interdiction program was initiated. It provided for systematic attacks on rail lines, marshalling yards and bridges in the STRASBOURG, SAAR and RHINE areas, with the intention of permitting the enemy no opportunity to complete repairs. The bulk of October's fighter-bomber effort was directed against the aforementioned rail targets, and a climax was reached on 29 October when over 350 railroad cars were destroyed or damaged.

Attacking railway targets on 2 October, the 354th Group bombed marshalling yards and bridges, cut rails and closed both ends of a tunnel. Thirteen locomotives and many freight cars were destroyed or damaged. The 362nd Group, hitting similar targets from METZ to the SAAR and RHINE valleys, wrecked three marshalling yards, rolling stock and a round-house. Bombs and .50 calibres disposed of 34 motor transport, a tank and 18 gun positions.

The 358th Group bombed marshalling yards at HOMBURG and an adjoining supply dump was seen to go up in flames.

Cooperating with XII, XV and XX Corps, the 405th Group silenced gun positions, attacked marshalling yards and struck at dug-in enemy tanks.

The 36th Group, relieved on 1 October from XIX TAC, volunteered to fly a last mission on the following day, making a fighter sweep in the COBLENZ area. It was uneventful, except for an encounter with two P-51s with dark OD upper and sky-blue lower surfaces and with no other discernible markings. The enemy made a climbing head-on attack, firing as he went through, then diving away. The P-47s returned the fire, claiming some hits, and one of our aircraft sustained light damage as a result of the attack.

b. Fort Driant Entered Temporarily: On 3 October, Third U.S. Army began another concentrated attack against the METZ forts. In the wake of bombing by Ninth Air Force mediums, units of XX Corps' 5th Infantry Division drove into FORT DRIANT. Close cooperation was furnished by 405th Group, which reported several direct hits with resultant fire and smoke. In a later mission, the 510th Squadron put all 22 of its 500 pounders on enemy troops counter-attacking in this area and neutralized the attack. The 358th Group placed 25 tanks of Napalm on three METZ forts.

On armed recce in the BAD KREUZNACH-WIESLOCH area, 354th Group hit marshalling yards and rail lines, claiming 17 locomotives, 16 freight cars, a viaduct, 5 motor transport and a switch-house destroyed; and rail lines cut in 5 places. They also strafed the airdrome at WORMS, destroying two HE-111's on the ground.

In addition to the day's 22 missions totaling 302 fighter-bomber sorties, Tac/R flew 43 sorties and one of its pilots destroyed a single ME-109 encountered near WURZBURG.

Enemy jet-propelled aircraft were being observed in greater numbers; five were seen flying east over COBLENZ, and others appeared east of SAARBRUCKEN. But the jets were evidently intent upon other business and did not attack.

On 4 October, although low ceilings, rain and generally poor visibility restricted operations to 13 missions totaling 201 sorties, considerable destruction was accomplished, mainly on rail targets. The 406th Group failed to locate the assigned target, a marshalling yard at LANDAU, but hit another marshalling yard at PFEDDERSHEIM with excellent results. In addition, pilots claimed the destruction or damaging of 11 locomotives and 131 railroad cars; two of the trains destroyed were carrying ammunition and exploded violently.

On the ground at METZ, bitter fighting continued and great difficulty was being encountered in the struggle to gain access to the underground defenses. The enemy had augmented his forces at FORT DRIANT, which was not a mere local strongpoint, but an area two-thirds of a mile long, connected by tunnels to other supporting forts.

Meanwhile, the western banks of the MOSELLE were being cleared and only three small towns remained in enemy hands.

Weather continued to restrict operations, and of the 110 sorties initiated on 5 October, only 57 were successful. Main target of the day was the enemy-occupied village of LANEUVEVILLE (Q-2003). Ground troops marked the target with white smoke and 373rd Group's 410th Squadron, supporting Seventh Army's XV Corps, dropped 24 500-pound bombs, destroying one-half and damaging the other half of the town. The 412th Squadron successfully attacked barges on the RHINE-MARNE Canal, destroying a canal lock.

On 6 October, the weather cleared sufficiently to permit 341 sorties and the fighter-bomber effort was variously employed on escort of medium bombers, attacks on rail and barge traffic, and cooperation with the usual three corps.

The contest for possession of FORT DRIANT'S inner defenses continued to rage furiously. Working with XX Corps in this area, the 358th Group scored three direct hits on the southeast corner of the fort and observed U.S. tanks moving in immediately after the bombing. A troop concentration near the fort received 16 direct hits with 500-pounders, followed by strafing. At the request of 90th Infantry Division, a strongpoint, consisting of a farmhouse and several other buildings near the fort, was destroyed with 14 direct bomb hits, followed by Napalm and strafing. Ground control tendered congratulations as the squadron left the furiously burning area.

Still another target, the enemy-occupied town of WINCHERINGEN (L-0514), on the east bank of the MOSELLE, was given by XX Corps' 83rd Infantry Division. It was hit with 16 bombs and then strafed; Corps later reported that the enemy had moved out of town and U.S. troops had entered.

An additional squadron of the 358th, escorting mediums to DUREN, reported excellent bombing results, thus completing a busy and successful day for the group.

The customarily absent Luftwaffe, put in another appearance when 30-plus ME-109s engaged the 406th Group's cover flight of 513th Squadron, over SAARLAUTERN. The battle which was fought from 12,000 feet to the deck, resulted in claims of 4-0-1 for the loss of one P-47. Other aircraft of this group damaged a bridge northwest of SAARLAUTERN, closed a railroad tunnel northeast of METZ and started large fires in the LANDAU marshalling yard.

On 6 October, the strength of XIX TAC was increased by addition of the 425th Night Fighter Squadron. The night-flying P-61s were to provide insurance against enemy night attack and also to interfere with enemy movement and other ground activity during the increasingly long hours of darkness.

Another day of flyable weather permitted the fighter-bombers to go after railway targets with renewed intensity on 7 October. The 406th Group flew 6 of the day's 32 missions, on rail cuts and armed recces in the TRIER-SAARBRUCKEN area. Lines were cut in 13 places and 6 locomotives, 97 railroad cars and several buildings destroyed or damaged. A similar assignment was carried out by the 362nd Group in the area from SAARBOURG to FRANKFURT, with tracks cut in 15 places and 11 locomotives, 70 railroad cars and a bridge destroyed or damaged.

Covering an area near LISSBERG (M-99), the 406th Group's 377th Squadron encountered 2 stray ME-109s and destroyed them both without loss.

The all-out campaign against rail traffic was paying dividends... Incessant attacks on these targets by the fighter-bombers had thrown the RHINELAND railroad system into a state of disorganization and the enemy was attempting to sneak supplies along the RHINE-MARNE canal. The 358th Group, on three missions against barge movements in the canal, destroyed or damaged 83 barges, bombed the canal and collapsed the wall of one of its locks.

c. Good Hunting Found in Strikes at German Airfields: Tactical reconnaissance operating over Germany had reported increased numbers of aircraft crowding the runways and dispersal areas of REICH airdromes.

These quiescent aircraft, being evidently conserved for a critical emergency, offered an irresistible target. With this in mind, three of the four available groups were dispatched on 8 October to strike at German airfields. Pilots flew 25 missions totaling 311 sorties with splendid results.

Attacking the BIBLIS (M-52) airfield, 406th Group caught 4 ME-109s in the traffic pattern, and destroyed them all. The fighter-bombers poured .50 calibres into aircraft on the ground, claiming one HE-111 destroyed and 3 HE-111s and 2 FW-200s damaged.

The 362nd Group found excellent hunting at the CRAILSHEIM (S-76) and (N-61) airdromes, claiming 15-0-14, mainly ME-109s. Pilots also spotted a DO-217 on the deck south of MAINZ, and sent it down in flames.

At the SACHSENHEIM (N-46) and GERMERSHEIM (R-47) airfields, the 358th Group scored 3-0-7 on the ground. All three of its squadrons had air encounters, but in two cases the enemy fled after making one pass. The 367th Squadron was engaged by 15 ME-109s near CHATEAU-SALINS, a move which cost the enemy 2-0-1 for no losses to the squadron.

Final claims for the day: 7-0-1 in the air; 19-0-26 on the ground.

The Command lost only one aircraft from these operations, and that was to flak - eloquent testimony to the superiority of U.S. planes and pilots and to the achievement of surprise in carrying out the attacks.

Ground force cooperation was provided by the 405th Group. Its 510th Squadron aided the XII Corps attack east of NANCY, breaking up a projected counter-attack by striking a column of enemy vehicles and several troop concentrations. Later reports indicated that these fighter-bomber attacks had facilitated the capture of 2,500 prisoners with practically no losses. Prisoners stated that their casualties were extremely severe. One enemy company commander declared the bombing was the worst thing he had experienced in five years of war and that only 20 men in his company had survived. As our troops advanced through the woods, they found German soldiers hiding behind trees and logs, stunned and unable to offer resistance.

Meanwhile, XX Corps continued to exert pressure on FORT DRIANT, aided by mediums as well as fighter-bombers. The 5th Infantry Division's task force was assembling additional equipment for use in the grim struggle through the fort's maze of tunnels.

On 9 and 10 October, a wave of bad weather swept over ENGLAND and the Continent, paralyzing air operations and preventing all fighter-bomber activity.

Enemy rocket projectiles, however, continued to appear with growing frequency. Several of these new "V" weapons were observed passing over LUXEMBOURG, heading southwest.

d. Air Helps Check Harassing Fire from Railroad Guns: Weather lifted sufficiently on 11 October to permit 124 fighter-bomber sorties, consisting of escort to mediums, armed recce, cooperation with ground forces and attacks on barge traffic.

Resuming its attacks against the RHINE-MARNE canal, 405th Group hit canal locks east of SAARBURG, destroying two and damaging another. In addition, the group put 24 500-pound bombs on the point where a bridge, canal lock and tunnel meet. The bridge was destroyed by seven direct hits and explosions were seen inside the tunnel and in the canal. Later reports by Tac/R indicated that barge traffic was completely halted in this area for days afterward.

During the early morning, nine shells, believed to be fired from a 280-mm railroad gun, fell on the city of NANCY. The 358th Group covered the area southeast of METZ, searching for the gun, and dropped four bombs on a camouflaged installation on railroad tracks. Three direct hits were scored and a large column of white smoke billowed skyward. But several days later the firing was resumed.

Several other installations in the Third U.S. Army area had been shelled by railroad guns, chiefly the command post of XX Corps at CONFLANS. This harassing action had continued and an extensive search was launched to find the guns. On the basis of flash and sound estimates from the artillery sections of Army and Corps, and study of points of shell impact, the areas in which the guns were operating, and certain tunnels in these areas that might be used as hiding places, were established by the Army, while tactical and photo reconnaissance located numerous railroad spurs which did not appear on existing maps. Armed with this information, XIX TAC dispatched fighter-bombers against selected tunnel entrances and bridges in an effort to destroy or bottle up the guns.

The climax was reached on 20 October when information from ground sources indicated that a railroad gun was hidden in a railroad shed at METZ. A request for artillery adjustment was submitted and a successful shoot followed. With XIX TAC P-51s adjusting fire, 8-inch guns fired 140 rounds, destroying one railroad gun and killing 22 of the crew.

e. Air and Ground Headquarters Move to Nancy: On 12 October, Headquarters of Third U.S. Army and XIX TAC Advance Headquarters, moved from ETAIN to the city of NANCY, capital of LORRAINE. Operations were resumed in a group of barracks formerly occupied by the Germans. Air and ground headquarters were within brief walking distance of each other, a boon to communications.

During the 12th, fighter-bombers were able to fly 19 missions comprising 219 sorties on diversified targets. The 362nd Group's 377th Squadron flew escort to mediums and later aided First U.S. Army east of AACHEN, destroying three tanks and damaging three others with its rockets. The other two squadrons cooperated with XII Corps, the 378th destroying four command posts two miles southwest of CHATEAU-SALINS. Returning to base, the 379th Squadron reported enemy operated B-17s northeast of NANCY, but no action was taken since the squadron was approaching the limit of endurance.

The 406th Group rendered cooperation to XX Corps which was then withdrawing its 5th Infantry Division Task Force from FORT DRIANT, preliminary to a containing operation. Pilots silenced twenty-four enemy light gun positions and then, directed by ground control, bombed three villages, claiming one to be half-destroyed. Meanwhile, the 354th Group attacked rolling stock and cut rails in the SAAR.

Good weather continued, and on 13 October, 252 fighter-bomber sorties were flown, chiefly against enemy transport.

The 362nd Group flew armed reconnaissance in the MANNHEIM, DARMSTADT, BINGEN and SAARBRUCKEN areas with excellent results. One squadron put nine 1,000-pound bombs on a bridge at HERMESKEIL (L-41); near BINGEN another squadron attacked an ammunition train, which exploded, sending red flames to 3500 feet. Flying south from FRIEDBURG, the group sighted two ME-109s and, in a brief engagement, shot one down.

While attacking the KAISERSLAUTERN marshalling yard, the 405th Group was interrupted by 30-plus ME-109s; in the subsequent air battle, our pilots claimed 4-0-7 for no losses.

Effective air cooperation was given to XII and XX Corps by 406th Group, whose planes bombed a convoy and railroad tunnels and silenced several gun positions.

Among the day's claims: Destroyed or damaged - 50 motor transport
32 locomotives
226 railroad cars
Attacked - 10 marshalling yards
Executed - 22 rail cuts.

The destruction of air and ground targets had been accomplished without loss of a single plane--an unlucky "Friday the Thirteenth" for the enemy.

Another day of flyable weather on 14 October permitted five groups to fly a total of 230 sorties. Since the static ground situation had reduced requirements for air cooperation, the fighter-bombers were able to concentrate largely on targets in pursuance of the campaign to cripple enemy transport.

The 358th Group had a furiously busy day in the SAAR; they hit a railway bridge near TRIER, set fire to an oil dump, destroyed locomotives and railroad cars and attacked marshalling yards. Operating at low level, they lost three aircraft, two to flak and one to unknown causes.

While on armed reconnaissance in the SAAR, the 354th Group caught a 30-car ammunition train and blew it to pieces.

The 406th Group handled all ground requests, working with XX and XV Corps. They bombed and strafed gun positions, motor transport and an enemy-held town. The 514th Squadron sighted nine light tanks in the SAARBRUCKEN area and claimed 2-3-4 by strafing.

Sole aircraft claim of the day was made by the 362nd Group, which destroyed one twin-engine plane on the ground at GOLHEIM airfield. But results on ground targets were high and included 24 locomotives and 207 railroad cars destroyed or damaged; and 25 rail cuts.

All along the Third U.S. Army front, the situation remained static and only patrol activity was reported. XX Corps was reassembling its forces for another attack upon METZ, and in the MAIZIERES-LES-METZ area small gains were being made. In the XII Corps sector, too, advances were slight. The army was utilizing the respite to repair and replenish equipment and to rest the troops who had been attacking continuously since the AVRANCHES breakthrough. Meanwhile, limited-objective attacks were being planned to secure favorable ground for an offensive in early November.

Once again the weather put a jinx on operations, and on 15 October only 107 sorties could be flown. Nevertheless, the attacks against transport yielded good results. A total of 28 locomotives, 143 railroad cars and 7 barges were claimed destroyed or damaged.

The 358th Group, on armed reconnaissance in the SAAR and RHINE valleys, bombed a marshalling yard near COBLENZ and hit RHINE barge traffic. The 405th Group, also on armed reconnaissance, blew up rolling stock along the RHINE, starting large fires. Leaflets were dropped in the METZ area.

Enemy aircraft were appearing more frequently over Third U.S. Army installations. On 15 October, five planes attempted a total of three raids near NANCY. The ack ack gunners were ready and brought all five aircraft down in flames.

Another spell of bad weather sharply restricted operations on the following four days. On 16 October all missions were cancelled, and on 17 October, only two of the three missions airborne were successful. All were flown by the 362nd Group which went out to attack a tunnel, but could not bomb because of ten-tenth's cloud. Instead, they pounded a marshalling yard south of BAD KREUZNACH, cutting tracks in four places and destroying rolling stock.

On 18 October three missions were dispatched, but all were scrubbed because of rain and overcast.

There was little improvement on 19 October, and only five missions were flown, two of which were recalled. The 362nd Group made the most of restricted conditions, attacking a concentration of enemy tanks east of LUNEVILLE. One squadron placed sixteen 500-pound bombs in an area marked with red smoke and although results could not be observed, ground controller stated that the "observation plane reported very accurate bombing." Another squadron took off to escort medium bombers, but the mission was cancelled in mid-air; they accordingly flew armed reconnaissance northwest of KAISERSLAUTERN, destroying four locomotives and ten boxcars.

Reporting its first operations with XIX TAC, the 425th Night Fighter Squadron flew 5 intruder sorties during the night of 18-19 October in the METZ-NANCY area. Motor transport was strafed and several fires started.

f. Breaching the ETANG DE LINDRE Dam. Third U.S. Army's XX Corps had continued to edge forward in MAIZIERES-LES-METZ, despite fierce resistance, and street fighting going on in the town. In the XII Corps zone our troops were holding a line which ran from PONT-A-MOUSSON southeast to a point beyond ARRACOURT, north of the RHINE-MARNE canal. Plans were being made to break the stalemate in this sector and the groundwork was being laid for a new offensive. An initial limited-objective attack would be made in the direction of DIEUZE, to secure suitable positions and a straightened corps line for the forthcoming jump-off. But one enemy capability in particular had to be considered: possible demolition of the ETANG DE LINDRE dam, which lay three miles southeast of DIEUZE, controlling a lake approximately sixteen miles east of the battle line. If the enemy was permitted to demolish the dam while an attack was in progress, the SEILLE River would overflow, inundating the area; forward elements would be completely cut off and the entire Third U.S. Army advance impeded, if not halted.

After considering these facts, XII Corps commanders decided to beat the enemy to the punch and accordingly requested that aircraft accomplish destruction at a decisive moment. The mission was originally planned for heavy bombers, but because of the high degree of precision required, the assignment was given to P-47's of XIX TAC.

It was planned that just before the dam was breached, one division, with enough supplies for two weeks, would be pushed across the floodable area without displaying evidence of a major offensive. Engineers would have bridging materials ready, and after the breaching of the dam a follow-up force would cross to support the division on the other side

Photo reconnaissance missions were flown to secure information for planning the air assault, and these showed the dam to be of granite block construction, bolstered by earth works. Accordingly, 1,000-pound semi-armor piercing, as well as general purpose bombs were used. Later ground observation proved that the face of the dam was of soft limestone with a twenty-foot earth fill behind; hence GP bombs would have accomplished the job.

Since a large concentration of bombs was to be dropped on a very small point, each member of the attacking force had to be briefed thoroughly. Every pilot had to see all available photographs and drawings of the target in order to insure maximum coordination.

The bombs were to be skipped at fifteen degrees to the target.

Compilation of supplies had been completed; engineers had obtained the necessary bridging equipment and the air was marshalled for action. On 20 October, the army commander gave the "go ahead" signal to blow the dam.

The task was undertaken by XIX TAC's 362nd Group. It was the first time Thunderbolts had been given such an assignment and was an experiment to determine the capabilities of fighter-bombers on this type of target. Therefore they were accompanied by reconnaissance aircraft which would take photos before, during and after the bombing.

The attack was completely successful.

The P-47s dived from 7,000 to 100 feet into intense flak, dropping their bombs on the dam and then machine-gunning the flak positions. The dam was breached by at least six direct hits from 1,000-pounders. The break spread to almost 90 feet and flood waters were soon observed pouring over the lowlands and surrounding the town of DIEUZE.

The inundation was so complete and executed at such a decisive moment that many enemy units were trapped and subsequently captured. German tanks were bogged and general mobility of many elements reduced. Prisoners taken afterward reported that some units, moving laterally, were forced to withdraw to the rear areas in order to reach points only a few miles away. The whole German scheme of maneuver in this area had been disrupted.

As a result of this operation--from which all our aircraft returned safely--Third U.S. Army was able to execute its limited-objective attack which was successfully completed three days later.

In the meantime, the other fighter-bomber groups continued to pound railway targets and cooperate with ground forces. A total of 245 sorties was flown during 20 October and 12 locomotives and 104 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. The 358th Group bombed and strafed rail yards in the COBLENZ area, reporting an explosion, followed by black smoke, in a small marshalling yard east of the city.

The 406th Group, flying armed reconnaissance, in the SAAR, attacked a train consisting of locomotives and 40 to 50 flat cars all loaded with tanks, guns and motor transport. Two locomotives were destroyed, but results on the cars were unobserved. A single-engine enemy aircraft observed on the ground near SAARBRUCKEN, was strafed and destroyed.

Nine squadron missions were flown by the 405th Group, three each in cooperation with XII, XV and XX Corps. They bombed and strafed rolling stock, buildings, bridges and troop concentrations and fired a small town. One aircraft was hit by flak and belly-landed just east of PONT-A-MOUSSON; a XII Corps artillery observer saw the pilot escape from the plane and at the same time saw enemy troops approaching it from nearby woods. Corps artillery destroyed the aircraft before the enemy could reach it--another demonstration of good air-ground cooperation.

The day's losses totaled 3 fighter-bombers and 2 pilots.

g. Fighter-Bombers Aid Limited-Objective Attack. Draining of the ETANG DE LINDRE dam was proceeding according to plan, and on 21 October XII Corps' 26th Infantry Div launched a limited-objective attack in the vicinity of MONCOURT, 22 miles east of NANCY. The 405th Group's 511th Squadron, cooperating, dropped 10 500-pound bombs on the west half of the town and 19 frags on a woods at Q-1813, which was also strafed. The division commander was delighted at the "superb air support" provided and ground controller declared it an "excellent mission."

The 354th Group kept up the momentum of rail attacks, cutting tracks and blasting transport in the RHINE valley. Intense flak over the targets forced pilots to break off one attack; at that moment an ME-410 was sighted, near WURZBURG, and after a brief scuffle, it turned Reichward, badly damaged. The group then strafed an airfield near LISSBERG, destroying two ME-109s on the ground.

The 362nd and 406th Groups also participated in the railway campaign, destroying a railroad bridge northeast of TRIER, and battering much rolling stock, including an ammunition car which blew up.

Although weather was not very favorable, the fighter-bombers were able to put in a busy and effective day, flying 15 missions and a total of 174 sorties. Ground claims included 18 motor transport, 2 armored vehicles, 12 locomotives and 87 railroad cars destroyed or damaged; plus 26 rail cuts and vivid demonstration of air-ground teamwork.

Lt. Gen Carl Spaatz, Commanding U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Forces, boosted the Command's already high morale when he visited XIX TAC Headquarters and, in an informal talk after the briefing, remarked: "The Third U.S. Army-XIX TAC team is the finest we have yet produced."

Low cloud, rain and poor visibility continued to restrict operations, and on 22 October only 11 missions comprising 152 sorties could be flown.

Ranging from METZ to the SAAR, the 358th Group scored two direct hits on a rail bridge, destroyed buildings and trackage, and pounded a marshalling yard. Fifteen flat-cars were destroyed and strafing silenced four 20-mm gun positions. Covering the MANNHEIM area, the 354th Group's 353rd Squadron destroyed 5 locomotives, 16 railroad cars, 3 flak cars and 3 motor transport. The 406th Group, striking at similar targets in the SAAR, destroyed three locomotives and 35 railroad cars, damaged eight locomotives and 25 cars and cut rails in 10 places.

Air cooperation missions were all handled by the 405th Group. The 510th Squadron, working with XV Corps, was prevented by weather from attacking its assigned targets and instead dropped its bombs on a railroad track and heavy flak positions at FOULCREY (Q-3504), claiming the position destroyed. 509th Squadron aided XX Corps near METZ, bombing and firing three towns (MAGNY, MARLY and CUVRY) and a supply dump in BOIS DE DEETY (U-8953).

The Luftwaffe continued to keep out of sight, conserving fuel and planes, and flying an average of only 175 to 225 single-engine fighter sorties per day along the entire Western Front. They appeared to be giving priority to the RUHR area, both because of allied bomber attacks on key cities of the RUHR and because the principal allied ground offensives threatened this vital industrial area.

Nevertheless, small groups of enemy aircraft continued to appear over Third U.S. Army installations. Army gunners reported two three plane raids near METZ During the night of 22 October and claimed one aircraft destroyed.

Third U.S. Army's XX Corps was progressing slowly in MAIZIERES, while in the XII Corps zone, two miles had been gained and lines were being straightened.

Weather trouble continued to plague operations and on 23 and 24 October fog and low visibility completely scrubbed all missions.

Enemy "secret weapons" appeared intermittently, although their lethal quality varied. One species was reported by a French civilian who told Third U.S. Army G-2 in all seriousness that he had seen suspicious-looking pigeons flying formation. He asserted that for three successive days he had seen formations of four pigeons flying over the same route, in the general direction of CONFLANS to METZ, at about 0830 hours each day.

Results were not observed.

On 25 October, weather again grounded most of the groups, but 44 fighter-bomber sorties were able to be dispatched. The 362nd Group's 377th and 378th Squadrons took off to attack a bridge east of TRIER. Because of bad visibility, the target could not be located, but a railroad bridge near by was cut by 1,000-pounders; lines were cut in five places and rolling stock in the TRIER area was shot up. On armed recce and rail cutting west of SAARBRUCKEN, the 379th Squadron destroyed eleven 20-mm gun positions, and four locomotives; they also damaged 8 other gun positions, a bridge and four railroad cars. Meanwhile 354th Group P-51's dropped six leaflet bombs in the METZ area.

h. Enemy Transport Attacked by Day and Night. Although visibility continued poor, fighter-bombers kept up their attacks on German rail transport. On 26 October, 226 missions were flown. Primary targets were frequently obscured by cloud, but most squadrons found alternatives or targets of opportunity.

The 405th Group was dispatched to attack rail bridges, near HAGENAU. Weather thwarted the operation, but one squadron managed to cut tracks at both ends of the target. In a later attack on a marshalling yard in the same general area, they destroyed 10 locomotives and an equal number of cars.

The 362nd Group was sent out on similar targets and also found them weathered in. The 377th Squadron dropped its 1,000-pounders on alternatives to cut tracks and destroy a roundhouse and four locomotives northeast of METZ. The other two squadrons hit a marshalling yard, also near METZ, cutting tracks and wrecking a village.

A railroad bridge at BULLAY was the assigned target for 354th Group, but weather messed up plans. Instead, they hit another bridge at BUDESHEIM (M-35), cut tracks on its north approach, and destroyed a roundhouse. They finished the day by bombing a dam on the MOSELLE and a marshalling yard northeast of MANNHEIM.

During the night of 25-26, the 425th Night Fighter Squadron flew four "Black Widow" sorties, ranging from METZ to the SAAR. They reported motor transport and barracks destroyed and a searchlight probably destroyed at NEUNKIRCHEN.

On the ground, elements of XX Corps were fighting fiercely in MAIZIERES, where possession of a schoolhouse was being bitterly contested. Good progress had been made by XII Corps in the vicinity of DIEUZE. But air activity was lacking. Low ceilings and poor visibility grounded all fighter-bombers on 27 October, although the night fighters had been able to get off 14 sorties on the previous evening, with good results.

On 28 and 29 October, the clouds lifted and our aircraft were able to put in two of the best days of the month.

Rail targets were again attacked on 28 October, as fighter-bombers flew 241 sorties and claimed 33 locomotives, 249 railroad cars, 6 bridges, and 10 gun positions destroyed or damaged.

Throughout the day, many primary targets were obscured but good secondaries were found.

The 358th Group set out in the morning to bomb a railroad bridge near HERMESKEIL (L-41), but only 17 of the 41 planes located the target; however, the others were able to cut tracks in a nearby area and a group of 25 warehouses north of the primary target were hit with 1,000 pound bombs, causing much damage. Later in the day the group attacked a railroad bridge near KAISERSLAUTERN, also with 1,000-pounders, and claimed it destroyed. Three locomotives and 17 railroad cars were destroyed in the SAARBRUCKEN area.

Targets assigned to the 354th Group were also weathered in, and instead, they swept the RHINE, finding excellent hunting. In a bombing and strafing attack near HILLESHEIM they destroyed 25 motor transport, 4 locomotives and 125 railroad cars; a steamboat and five barges were damaged.

The 362nd Group's 377th Squadron closed both ends of a railroad tunnel southwest of SAARLAUTERN and in later strafing attacks over the target area, destroyed 13 locomotives and an ammunition car. The other squadrons failed to locate the assigned target, but managed to scare up a bit of excitement. While in the KARLSRUHE area, they encountered 40-plus FW-190s and claimed 4-1-0- for no losses. Four locomotives and 44 freight cars were destroyed or damaged by strafing.

The night fighters also reported excellent results, on the night of 27-28 October. They flew 17 intruder and recce sorties, strafing transport behind the enemy lines. Attacks on the town of LANDAU resulted in fires and heavy explosions.

i. Blow at Enemy Airdromes Forces the Luftwaffe to Fight. On 29 October, thirty-five P-51s of the 354th Group were dispatched to bomb enemy airdromes in the GRAILSHEIM (S-76) area. Near BOCKINGEN (S-06), they were attacked from above and rear by 100-plus ME-109s at 10,000 feet. They jettisoned all bombs and engaged the enemy in combats from 20,000 feet to the deck, over an area as far as HEIDELBERG. The enemy were reported to be experienced and aggressive and attacked in flights of four, maintaining 30 aircraft as top cover. After a furious 35 minute battle, our pilots had destroyed 24 and damaged 8 enemy planes for the loss of 4 aircraft and 3 pilots.

Weather was excellent over the Continent throughout the day and the fighter-bombers were able to record one of the best scores in a long time--for the last good flying day of the month. They flew 419 sorties and claims included 13 motor transport, 62 locomotives, 368 railroad cars, 18 gun positions, 3 barges and 23 buildings destroyed or damaged. Of eight railroad bridges attacked, five were claimed destroyed and the other three damaged; rails were cut in 35 places.

The 358th Group knocked out a rail bridge near BETTINGEN (Q-39) and claimed 10 locomotives and 157 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. The four other groups ranged over a wide area and reported splendid results on transport targets.

Seventeen sorties were flown by the night fighters with claims of 4 motor transport, 6 locomotives, 9 railroad cars and 4 buildings destroyed or damaged, on night of 28-29 October.

After three weeks of bitter street fighting, the town of MAIZIERES was cleared of the enemy, while in the XII Corps zone, no change was reported.

The last two days of the month were marred by poor weather; all 54 sorties flown on 30 October were recalled. On 31 October 80 sorties were flown. The only successful missions were executed by the 405th Group which attacked an enemy supply dump at Q-554180 (near SAARBURG), destroying all buildings in the central section and several at each end.

The 354th Group could not see its targets for 10/10 cloud and dropped its 500-pounders in salvo over the FRANKFURT and WIESBADEN areas.

XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND - AIR AND GROUND CLAIMS

FOR THE MONTH OF OCTOBER 1944

*** CLAIMS	DESTROYED	PROB DESTROYED	DAMAGED
ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN AIR	44	2	16
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ON GROUND	23	10	16
MILITARY TRANSPORT	317	4	45
ARMD VEHICLES & TANKS	300	3	26
LOCOMOTIVES	387	6	63
RAILROAD CARS	1308	91	1019
BRIDGES	17	3	22
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	190	52	63
DUMPS	2	8	1
HANGARS	---	---	1
FACTORIES & MISC BLDGS	161	29	44
HIGHWAYS CUT	12	---	---
RAILROADS CUT	315	39	78
VESSELS & BARGES	63	7	88

M/Y ATTACKED - 46

AIRFIELDS ATTACKED - 5

TROOP CONC ATTACKED - 37

LOSSES: AIRCRAFT - 31

PILOTS - 29

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NOVEMBER

a. General

Throughout the month of November, XIX TAC fighter-bombers came to grips with miserable weather--an enemy more formidable than the Hun. There were only 11 good flying days; the remainder consisted of 5 partial and 14 completely non-operational days.

Operations were begun with 5 fighter-bomber groups: 354th, 358th, 362nd, 405th and 406th. On 15 November, the 358th Group was lost to XII TAC, and this Command operated with four fighter-bomber groups, the smallest number since it had gone into action.

Command Headquarters remained at NANCY, while 100th Wing and the groups were located in an area near the MARNE RIVER. Cloudy skies limited our aircraft to 3,509 sorties, as compared to 4,790 in October, 7,791 in September and 12,292 in August. But a record was established when on 18 November, 456 railroad cars were claimed destroyed or damaged.

b. Enemy Air Activity

The GAF appeared less frequently during the month and air claims totaled 23-0-6 as compared to 44-2-16 in October. This could be attributed to two main factors: (1) The Third US Army advance, which began on 8 November, forced enemy withdrawal from his advanced airfields and a grand scale return to the REICH. (2) The Germans were building up fighter strength for their projected December counter-offensive.

c. Flak

Our aircraft losses for the month were unusually high and most of them were caused by flak. Enemy anti-aircraft defenses, as in the previous month, were intense. Moreover, with the advance of Third US Army, a greater number of cooperation missions were flown over an active front where flak was thickest. Squadron pilots could not be briefed extensively on these areas, but had to fly subject to exigencies of the ground situation. Losses were 62 aircraft as compared with 31 in October.

d. Prelude to Attack

XIX Tactical Air Command commenced November Operations with 100th Fighter Wing and five fighter-bomber Groups: 354th, 358th, 362nd, 405th and 406th. In addition, reconnaissance requirements continued to be fulfilled by 10th Photo Group, Rcn; while the 425th Night Fighter Squadron, assigned in October, continued to hammer away at enemy installations after dark. Third US Army had almost completed the necessary buildup for its new offensive. Along the MOSELLE and east of NANCY, its infantry and armor were massing for the forthcoming attack.

Although the morning of 1 November was fog-bound, breaks came at midday and the fighter-bombers were able to fly 247 sorties. The 354th Group's P-51s, on armed recce in the RHINE area, found targets weathered in, and subsequently ranged deeper into GERMANY to strafe the GOTHA airdrome. Spurting calibre .50s accounted for 3 ME-110s, 1 ME-109 and 1 JU-88 destroyed, 1 ME-110 probably destroyed and 2 JU-88s damaged.

The 362nd Group attacked an ordnance dump west of PIRMASENS, in the SAAR, claiming excellent results. Pilots dropped 72 500-pound bombs on the target and followed this up with 26 rockets. Reports indicated that 13 buildings were destroyed and brown and black smoke billowed upward to 8,000 feet. They later strafed locomotives and motor transport in the same area and strafed a P-51 which had belly-landed nearby, destroying the aircraft.

Two squadrons of the 358th Group dropped 16 500-pounders on a supply dump southeast of SAARGEMUND, destroying 12 buildings and starting a huge fire. Additional claims included 2 locomotives, 50 freight cars, 2 motor transport, a 20-mm gun position destroyed and 1 locomotive and 40 freight cars damaged. Meanwhile, the other squadron bombed a marshalling yard and several gun batteries further east.

The 405th Group attacked a small dam at Q-4010, southeast of DIEUZE and upon completion of the third squadron mission, water was reported to be pouring out of breaks made by the 1,000-pounders.

Although the Luftwaffe was relatively inactive, one of the Command's reconnaissance aircraft was attacked by an unidentified plane which dove from 30,000 to 20,000 feet, made a single unsuccessful pass and was evaded. Later in the day, two unidentified jet aircraft jumped another recce plane, but the latter turned sharply, made for the deck and escaped.

Little activity was taking place along the Third US Army front and only brief skirmishes were reported. On 2 November, XII Corps' 80th Infantry Division launched a limited-objective attack to clear a narrow neck to the SEILLE RIVER. The operation was successful with only moderate resistance being met. Flying weather was atrocious and rain, fog and low ceilings grounded all fighter-bombers for the day. However, Eighth Air Force heavies were able to keep up their attacks in strength on German synthetic oil plants. For the first time in many weeks, the GAF rose to challenge this mighty armada and succeeded in giving the Fortresses and Liberators one of their biggest days. The bombers and their fighter escort claimed 168-40-52 in the air and 25-0-0 on the ground.

On 3 November, low ceilings limited operations to four squadron missions comprising 51 sorties, all on escort to IX Bombardment Division mediums. Again on 4 November, low cloud and poor visibility sharply restricted fighter-bomber activity to only 80 sorties, all on escort to mediums and target area cover for Eighth Air Force heavies.

During the night of 4-5 November our night fighters flew 3 sorties on defensive patrol. All were uneventful.

e. Attacks On Enemy Airfields Yield Large Haul

Third US Army continued to improve its positions. XX Corps' Task Force Polk, in another limited-objective attack on 5 November, took the town of BERG (U-9793) on the MOSELLE RIVER northeast of THIONVILLE. Flying weather showed definite improvement, clearing in the afternoon to permit 252 fighter-bomber sorties. Frequent reconnaissance reports had indicated large numbers of aircraft at SCHWABISH HALL and adjacent airfields. The 354th Group flew out to CRAILSHEIM (S-7084), SCHWABISH HALL (S-4958) and SACHSENHEIM (R-9741) and found these airfields dotted with a great variety of enemy planes, heavily camouflaged. Bombing and strafing the fields and installations, they ran up one of the best scores in months. They claimed 28-0-16 on the ground, a total which included ME-162s, ME-163s, ME-110s, ME-109s, FW-190s, JU-88s and JU-52s. Flak was moderate and one P-51 went down, but the pilot was seen to bail out and land safely.

The other groups had weather difficulties and were forced in many cases to bomb through overcast without observing results. The 362nd Group's 378th and 379th Squadrons flew escort to mediums. Two planes and pilots of the 379th were seen to collide in mid-air and no chutes were observed. Meanwhile, the 377th Squadron hit a motor transport depot just west of KAISERSLAUTERN, putting 14 500-pound bombs on the target, destroying seven buildings and starting two large fires. A locomotive was destroyed by strafing.

The 406th Group, dive-bombing a stores and ammunition dump northwest of HAGENAU, caused ammunition explosions, cut rail lines and destroyed a loading ramp and locomotive.

Low cloud, rain and poor visibility prevented operations by the fighter-bombers on 6 and 7 November. However, the P-61 night fighters were able to initiate 6 sorties, all of which were uneventful.

f. Third Army Launches Attack and Fighter-Bombers Destroy PELTRE CP

On 8 November, Third US Army opened the "Battle of GERMANY," thus upsetting the enemy's plans for a winter breathing spell. After a tremendous artillery barrage of 500-600 guns, the XII Corps launched an attack and quickly gained from 2 to 4 miles along a 27-mile front. Despite weather which grew progressively worse during the afternoon, our five fighter-bomber groups, aided by 366th and 367th Groups of IX TAC and 50th Group of XII TAC, flew 471 sorties, mostly in cooperation with advancing ground forces.

Prisoner interrogation had revealed that the Command Post of 17th S S Panzer Div was located at PELTRE (U-8955). The 405th Group bombed this site at low level and reported excellent results. This was verified later in the month when prisoners captured by 5th Infantry Div testified to the complete destruction our fighter-bombers had wrought. Buildings housing G-2 and G-3 were completely destroyed. The water main was broken and papers not destroyed by the explosions and falling debris were soaked by the flood of water. Only a few papers could be salvaged. PWs were present when 5 dead bodies were found under the wreckage, and one prisoner was certain that the G-2, Le Cocq, was left under the debris and listed as missing. Subsequent assessment by Air Force ground observers confirmed the statements as to destruction, and this attack was undoubtedly partly responsible for much of the enemy's confusion during the Third US Army advance.

On the same day the 354th Group went after enemy airdromes in Western GERMANY. At the WIESBADEN field, they destroyed 12 barracks, 3 hangars and an administration building. In attacks on the EDDERSHEIM, SACHSENHEIM and DARMSTADT airdromes, they claimed two aircraft, two hangars and several buildings. Strafing attacks accounted for 4 locomotives, 3 motor transport, 5 railroad cars, a railroad bridge and powerhouse destroyed or damaged.

Enemy aircraft appeared once during the day, interrupting the 362nd Group's 378th Squadron while it was bombing a supply depot at BAUMHOLDER. The P-47s claimed 8-0-0 in the air for no loss. The other squadrons successfully attacked enemy GP's at BOULAY and ST. AVOLD and destroyed or damaged 3 locomotives, 30 railroad cars, 4 motor vehicles and 3 flak batteries. Although poor visibility obscured the 358th Group's targets, good bombing patterns were observed and the town of HAMPONT (Q-12) was left burning. On 9 November, XX Corps in the METZ-THIONVILLE area, joined the offensive crossed the flood-swollen MOSELLE RIVER and established a bridgehead in the area of FRECHING, about five miles south of the German border. Aided by fighter-bombers, by over 1200 Eighth Air Force heavies which delivered a saturation attack on the METZ forts and fortified towns, and by mediums which attacked troop concentrations and barracks, the ground forces continued to advance, despite soggy terrain.

The fighter-bombers flew 312 sorties and G-3 Air reported that they afforded the "best example yet seen of air-ground coordination." The 358th Group, cooperating with XII Corps, flew seven missions, bombing troops, tanks and enemy positions at direction of ground control, while armed recces were flown against rail transport targets. The low-swooping Thunderbolts seared enemy columns in the DELME RIDGE area, and an observer in a liaison ship reported that the work done by the fighter-bombers was excellent. "Quite a bit of mileage was knocked out," he said. The following day, DELME was in Third US Army hands. The 365th Squadron, vectored to 8 tanks by XII Corps controller, dropped 3 500-pound GP and 8 frags and claimed all tanks damaged.

405th Group's 510th Squadron destroyed 13 motor transport, 15 horse-drawn vehicles and 8 light flak positions near HANNOCOURT (Q-0436) by bombing and strafing. Aiding XX Corps, the 406th Group started large fires in the towns of BEZANGE (Q-01) and MANDEREN (Q-09) and accounted for a good share of the days total of 51 motor transport, 25 armored vehicles and 32 gun positions destroyed or damaged.

e. Weather Hampers Fighter-Bomber Activity:

Weather difficulties continued to assail the ground troops, with snow and rain making the going exceedingly difficult. But armor and infantry pushed on, making good progress. In the air, the story was different and low clouds limited fighter-bomber operations to 91 sorties on 10 November, all but 12 of which had to be recalled. The latter, flown by 358th Group's 367th Squadron, were on cooperation with XII Corps' 80th Infantry Div and bombs had to be dropped through overcast by radar control.

On 11 November, weather permitted 162 fighter-bomber sorties to be flown, mainly in cooperation with advancing Third Army troops. 406th Group's 512th Squadron, working with XX Corps, sighted a convoy of 25-30 tanks near THIONVILLE, showered them with GP, frags and Napalm, followed this up with a strafing treatment and claimed 10 destroyed and 15 damaged The 513th Squadron attacked an underground strongpoint in the same area, which ground units had marked with smoke, and Corps controller afterward declared, "Good work."

The Luftwaffe put in an appearance just as 362nd Group's 377th Squadron was being vectored to a ground target. Twenty-four FW-190s were sighted north of VIGNY (U-9247) and the Thunderbolts attacked the unaggressive enemy to claim 2-1-1 for no loss. Aiding XII Corps, 405th Group flew three highly successful squadron missions bombing and strafing tanks, troop concentrations, gun positions and transport. They also left parts of MORHANGE (Q-2037) in flames. Three planes and a pilot were lost to flak. 358th Group had a strafing and bombing heyday, in the XII Corps zone, destroying 35 horse-drawn artillery, 53 MT, 8 tanks and 7 factory fuildings.

Third US Army continued to advance, steadily encircling METZ and enlarging the MOSELLE bridgeheads. XII Corps drove through the FORET DE CHATEAU SALINS, clearing it of the enemy, and leading elements had reached the DIEUZE area.

Immoderate rain and fog "socked in" the air bases on 12, 13 and 14 November, forcing the cancellation of all fighter-bomber operations.

h. Third US Army Takes First of METZ Forts.

The outflanking of METZ proceeded a pace, and on 13 November FORT KOENIGSMACHER, one of the large strongholds of the mighty bastion, fell to XX Corps' 90th Infantry Div. Two other forts, near VERNY, in the 5th Infantry Div zone, fell without a struggle and by the following day, approximately 10 of the forts were in our hands, while TUSA's leading armored and infantry elements southeast of METZ swept on, cutting the city's communications.

Fighter-bombers continued to be hog-tied by weather, flying only 30 sorties on 15 November. The 362nd Group's 378th Squadron bombed a motor convoy southeast of THIONVILLE and destroyed 4 vehicles. Results of other attacks could not be observed and the 406th Group's one squadron mission had to be recalled because of weather.

On this date the 358th Group was relieved from assignment and turned over to XII TAC, thus leaving this command with the smallest number of fighter-bomber groups since it had become operational.

On 16 November, the fighter-bombers flew 112 sorties, most of them only mildly successful because of low cloud. The 354th Group, on armed recce along the Third US Army front, could not locate the road junction assigned as a target by XX Corps, but bombed rail lines and traffic, a bridge and warehouse in the area north of SAARBRUCKEN. Supporting XII Corps, 405th Group's 511th Squadron put 8 Napalms and 10 frags on the town of FALKENBURG (Q-1749), bombed two crossroads and damaged 4 tanks. Two planes were lost but one pilot bailed out and returned safely to Allied territory.

Ranging over the XX Corps battle area, 406th Group hit a bridge, destroyed gun positions, transport and buildings in the area east of TRIER, losing one plane and pilot to flak.

The Third US Army attack had become a general Allied offensive on the Western Front, all the way from HOLLAND to SWITZERLAND, and the Ninth and First US Armies were attacking with the aid of one of the heaviest close-cooperation bombing assaults of the war. General Patton's forces had reached the outskirts of METZ and had narrowed the escape gap of the withdrawing enemy to five miles.

The Luftwaffe ventured out once again on 17 November, attacking the 354th Group while it engaged in shooting up roads and rails. Approximately 40-50 ME-109s jumped the group at RASTATT (R-3230) and in the subsequent engagement claims of 2-0-0 were turned in for the loss of a single Mustang. Another flight, this time consisting of 10 ME-109s attacked north of ACHERN (R-20) and the group destroyed one enemy plane without loss. Earlier in the day, 354th Group attacked the ZELLHAUSEN (M-85) airdrome with frags and then strafed, claiming the destruction of 15 HS-111s on the ground and also an oil dump and 10 locomotives in the adjacent area.

The weather gods showed rare benevolence and permitted all five groups to operate. On armed recce in the SAARLAUTERN-HOMBURG-KAISERSLAUTERN and NEUSTADT-LANDAU areas, 362nd Group went after marshalling yards, contributing heavily to the day's toll of 32 locomotives and 211 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Several large explosions were caused in the KAISERSLAUTERN marshalling yard; also in the NEUENKIRCHEN marshalling yard where 30 flat cars carrying vehicles were destroyed.

405th and 406th Groups ranged ahead of XX Corps armor, bombing and strafing transport, troop concentrations and towns. The towns of WALDWISSE and SILWINGEN were bombed and a concentration of 20 vehicles was bombed in the latter, resulting in a large explosion.

The eyes of the XIX TAC, 10th Photo Group, Rcn, were acquitting themselves magnificently in the "silent service." Sometimes the service was not so silent, as exemplified by their growing claims against enemy aircraft. A formation of Tac/R P-51s caught 4 JU-87s five miles west of WORMS and claimed 2-1-0, while in the landing pattern at KIRCH LONS they claimed 0-1-1 all without loss.

It was a full day, with 317 sorties flown and claims of 5-2-1 in the air and 15-0-0 on the ground. Bombing and strafing also accounted for the destruction and damage of 166 motor transport, 16 armored vehicles, 32 locomotives, 211 rail cars, 33 gun positions, 17 buildings, 18 horse-drawn vehicles-- to list but a portion of the claims. Seven aircraft were lost, all but one to flak.

i. FIGHTER-BOMBERS Take Record Toll of Enemy Rail Transport:

Covering the RHINE area, Tactical Reconnaissance on 17 and 18 November disclosed huge enemy rail movement. On the 17th over three hundred trains or engines were reported east and west of the RHINE, and on 18 november an additional 226 were observed in the same general area. It was concluded that the vast majority were moving southwest and west into the Third US Army zone. Some contained armor and substantial reports had indicated that a panzer division and possibly an infantry division were being rushed to support the sagging front in the west.

With improved weather conditions for the first time in weeks, the fighter-bombers went out on 17 and 18 November to reap the harvest of German transport. The targets were even larger than recce had indicated. On 18 November, the P-47s and P-51s flew 347 sorties, relentlessly attacking road and rail communications, and claimed the greatest number of railroad cars destroyed or damaged since the Command's inception. A total of 456 cars were written off, and in addition, 289 motor vehicles, 26 armored vehicles and tanks, 74 locomotives, 42 horse-drawn vehicles, 32 gun positions and 19 buildings were destroyed or damaged.

On armed recce in the SAARLAUTERN, KAISERSLAUTERN, HAGENAU and RASTATT areas, 362nd Group accounted for over 300 railroad cars, the bulk of the day's score. The 378th Squadron attacked a tank detraining point five miles southeast of RASTATT and 500-pound GPs destroyed 8 tanks, 20 freight cars and the unloading ramp.

Cooperating with XII Corps, which was driving eastward north of DIEUZE, 405th Group strafed and bombed enemy rail traffic, gun positions, machine-gun nests, tanks and tank-destroyers, barracks and other enemy positions. The 510th Squadron had the only encounter of the day when it was jumped by 40 to 50 ME-109s near DIEUZE, getting 1-0-1 for the loss of one P-47. 406th Group aided XX Corps, also playing hob with motor transport as its pilots raked enemy columns.

Accelerating the tempo of operations on 19 November, the fighter-bombers flew 403 sorties to claim 56 locos and 429 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Cooperating with XII and XX Corps on eight squadron missions, 405th Group hit towns and troop concentrations. A troop train and marching troops were strafed near SAARGEMUNDE and enemy-held towns were fired. One squadron attacked several tanks in a woods northeast of DIEUZE, and the ground controller reported "Results excellent". Innocent looking objects were deceptive: two haystacks were strafed and one exploded.

The juicy rail targets held out for another day as 354th and 362nd Groups covered the SAAR area and bombed marshalling yards at MEISSENHEIM and HOMBURG and rolled up top scores on rolling stock.

The enemy was withdrawing south of METZ, unseating the largest front-line flak concentration since CAEN. But flak was still intense and 13 planes and 8 pilots were lost.

j. METZ Falls.

Intensification of air operations had helped speed up the Third Army offensive. XX Corps troops were closing in on METZ from the north and south and were already fighting in the streets of that erstwhile "impregnable" city. The enemy's attempts to make a stand, hinged upon the elaborate system of forts, was shattered between 15 and 20 November when pincers formed by 5th Infantry Div from the south and 95th Infantry Div from the north snapped shut east of the city, trapping an estimated 4-5,000 troops. By 19th November, encirclement was complete. To the northeast of METZ, other elements were entering the rich SAAR basin near MERZIG; farther south, XII Corps troops were driving east and had entered the outskirts of DIEUZE.

A final assault on the fortress city reduced the entire METZ sector except for enemy pockets at FORTS DRIANT, VERDUN, JEANNE D'ARC and ST. QUENTIN and one pocket inside the city itself. DIEUZE was captured by XII Corps troops on 20 November. By 21 November Third US Army had taken 22 square miles of German soil and on 22 November the fall of METZ was officially announced. This marked the first storming of this "Bastion of the East" in 2,000 years. Several forts were still holding out, but they had all been encircled and their capitulation was merely a matter of time.

Weather once more limited operations. On 20 November only 60 fighter-bomber sorties could be flown. Rail targets and vehicle concentrations were hit with good results: claims included 48 locomotives, 220 railroad cars and 27 motor transport. North of KAISERSLAUTERN, 354th Group strafed a 25-car ammunition train, which went up with a terrific explosion.

On 21 November, 114 sorties were flown, but in most cases bombs were dropped through overcast or jettisoned because of weather. Escorting 8th Air Force heavies attacking synthetic oil plants at MERSEBURG near LEIPZIG, 354th Group caught 100-plus FW-190s attempting to attack the bombers as they left the target area. A brief fight resulted and the enemy lost 1-1-0 in the air. One 2-plane section of 10th Photo Group encountered 6 FW-190s north of FRANKFURT and destroyed one of the enemy aircraft.

Continuous rain and low clouds "scrubbed" all missions for the next three days and there were no fighter-bomber operations on 22, 23 or 24 November.

Third US Army units continued to press forward north of MERZIG, while, in the XII Corps sector, spearheads were threatening ST. AVOLD and junction was made with advancing Seventh US Army troops. A new attack on 26 November brought additional gains, the important road junction of BOULAY was taken.

As the month drew to a close bad weather put in a final appearance. Only two operational days remained. On 25 November the fighter-bombers were able to fly 210 sorties in the SAAR and RHINE Valleys. Flying armed recces in the FRANKFURT-DARMSTADT area, 405th Group's 511th Squadron attacked the marshalling yard at GEMUNDEN, producing a terrific explosion that destroyed 70 and damaged 40 cars of a 100-car ammunition train. The concussion was felt at 1,000 feet and so damaged one of our aircraft that it was forced to belly-land just inside our lines. Group claims included 11 locomotives, 130 railroad cars and 3 motor vehicles.

XIX

The 362nd Group cooperated with XII Corps and successfully attacked towns and marshalling yards to claim destruction or damage of 36 motor transport, 5 locomotives and 53 railroad cars. The 406th Group, aiding XX Corps, set enemy-held towns aflame in the battle area and uprooted buildings and gun positions.

On 26 November 217 sorties were flown-- the last full day of the month. 362nd Group encountered 24-plus ME-109s and FW-190s while on armed recce in the HANAU area, and another 40, later in the day, in the same general area. In the first attack the 379th Squadron claimed 1-0-1; and in the later scuffle, the 377th Squadron made one pass to also claim 1-0-1.

Cooperating with XX Corps, 406th Group attacked at request of ground control and started fires in enemy-defended towns. After an air attack on FITTEN, near MERZIG, the controller reported that ground troops and tanks were able to enter the town.

Attack on an oil dump northeast of HANAU was successfully undertaken by 354th Group, whose pilots reported a violent explosion with intense fires and black smoke rising to 6,000 feet. The marshalling yard at OBERRODEN was bombed, tracks cut and 12 locomotives and 44 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. One squadron observed a number of enemy troops debarking from a train in the LIMBURG-HANAU area and killed 80 of them.

Escort to mediums was provided by 405th Group, which then carried out an armed recce in the KAISERSLAUTERN-SAARGUEMINES area to destroy 40-50 railroad cars.

When attacked by 30 ME-109s over HANAU, a two-plane Tac/R section of 10th Photo Group successfully evaded and damaged 1 ME-109.

On 27 November poor visibility restricted operations to a 4-plane leaflet dropping mission by 354th Group. All fighter operations were scrubbed on 28 November, although reconnaissance aircraft flew 4 successful sorties. On a weather recce, two P-6s encountered a single HE-111 northwest of WIESBADEN, at a low altitude. The recce aircraft fired, but did not see strikes. However, the enemy plane subsequently crashed into the side of a hill.

All aircraft were grounded by weather on 29 November, while on 30 November only 29 fighter-bomber sorties could be flown. These were all uneventful escort.

Although impeded by rugged terrain, Third Army drove on all along its front. The capture of ST. AVOLD, a key point in the German defenses covering the SAAR Basin, was reported by XII Corps on 27 November, and in the XX Corps zone, Forts VERDUN and PRIVAT were taken, leaving only four of the METZ forts still holding out. By the end of the month, the SAAR RIVER had been crossed and the SIEGFRIED LINE was being assaulted. Leading elements were three miles from SAARLAUTERN; HOMBURG had been captured and the Army held a continuous front of 25 miles in REICH territory.

CLAIMS AND RESULTS OF ATTACKS
BY XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

1 November thru 30 November 1944

	DEST.	PROB.DEST.	DAMAGED
ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN AIR	23	0	6
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ON GROUND	50	1	18
MOTOR TRANSPORT	957	95	365
ARMORED FORCE VEHICLES AND TANKS	79	29	53
LOCOMOTIVES	275	19	51
RAILROAD CARS	957	102	1140
BRIDGES	3	0	2
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	166	42	65
DUMPS	1	0	2
HANGARS	6	3	2
FACTORIES AND MISC BUILDINGS	197	25	59
ROADS CUT	4	1	2
RAILROADS CUT	100	0	13
VESSELS AND BARGES	1	0	20
HORSE-DRAWN VEHICLES	145	0	19

OTHER STATISTICS

MARSHALLING YARDS ATTACKED	50
TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ATTACKED	45
AIRFIELDS ATTACKED	6
SORTIES	3509
BOMB TONNAGE	942

DECEMBER

1. Summary of the Month.

a. General.

Operations of XIX Tactical Air Command during December, like those of its teammate, the Third US Army, fall into two clear-cut phases: (1) Pursuit of the enemy into the SAAR with subsequent attack on the SIEGFRIED LINE; and (2) Attack against the southern flank of the sector created by the enemy's ARDENNES offensive against First US Army's VIII Corps.

Although previous operations had imposed great demands, it was during this month of fierce fighting--especially the second half of the month--that our aircraft were taxed to the utmost. The emergency demanded, and received, from our fighter-bomber, reconnaissance, and night fighter pilots; all the skill, versatility and endurance they possessed. Throughout most of the month they were required to operate from airfields considerable distances from the battle zone, in winter weather and against withering anti-aircraft fire; and, for the first time in months, the Luftwaffe operated against us in strength.

During the first half of the month, the enemy continued to fight a delaying action all along the army front and since poor weather hampered aerial operations, he was able to prevent a major breakthrough. However, Third US Army, policing up behind the front lines, continued to reduce the few remaining forts at METZ, and by 13 December, FORT JEANNE D'ARC fell, thus ending all resistance in that zone. Meanwhile, the drive into SIEGFRIED LINE defenses continued.

The enemy, recognizing that penetration was only a matter of time and that his one chance was to seize the initiative, chose to make a last frantic effort and lashed out on 16 December in an all-out winter offensive against First US Army's lightly-held VIII Corps sector in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. Thereupon, the combined strength of Third US Army and XIX Tactical Air Command, augmented by new divisions and new fighter groups, was suddenly shifted northward and utilized in blunting the enemy thrust, reducing the threat, meting out bitter punishment and finally turning the German offensive into retreat.

By the end of the month, the steel ring around BASTOGNE had been penetrated and its defenders relieved, thousands of enemy vehicles, tanks and guns lay smashed in the snowy hills of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, and new attacks were being launched. The Germans had the choice of either remaining to be destroyed or withdrawing as best they could to their SIEGFRIED LINE.

Until the latter part of the month, XIX Tactical Air Command operations were conducted with four fighter-bomber groups; 354th, 362nd, 405th and 406th. On 23 December, to meet the critical need for a more powerful striking force, three additional groups--365th, 367th and 368th--were assigned, and another, the 361st, was attached. The four original groups operated from their bases near CHALONS-SUR-MARNE, flying long distances to attack their targets, although by the end of the month a general eastward exodus began as 100th Wing moved to METZ.

XIX Tactical Air Command Headquarters (Advanced) remained at NANCY with Third US Army, and communications were good. Late in the month, Third US Army moved to LUXEMBOURG and soon afterwards, in early January, this Command followed. During the month, our fighter-bombers flew 6,651 sorties, a decided increase over the previous two months' 3,509 and 4,790, though somewhat less than the 7,791 flown in September and August's 12,292. Reconnaissance planes flew 1,122 sorties and night fighters carried out 32 patrol, intruder and interception sorties.

b. Weather.

Weather was poor throughout the early part of the month; and of the first 22 days, only six permitted maximum operations. Conditions improved soon after Third Army launched its counter-attack and General Patton besought the Deity to send "fair weather for battle." In the five days of superb flying weather which followed, fighter-bombers helped smash the enemy threat around BASTOGNE and throw the German attack into reverse.

In all, there were 13 full flying days in December, 11 days which permitted only partial operations and 7 days of completely prohibitive weather.

c. Enemy Air Activity.

The carefully husbanded German Air Force made a final effort during the ARDENNES offensive, and encounters were frequent. But the Luftwaffe's back had been broken in August, and though he was able to offer some resistance, the enemy's lack of fuel and well-trained pilots rendered his efforts abortive. The fighter-bombers, reconnaissance, and night fighters claimed a total of 138-14-42 in the air, the best scores since August, and fighter-bombers, mediums and heavies of other commands and air forces took a proportionately high toll of reserves the enemy could ill afford. This Command lost 21 planes to enemy aircraft, 42 to highly concentrated flak installations in the battle zone, 22 to unknown causes, 4 to friendly flak and 4 to other causes, a total of 93 planes, as compared to 62 lost in November.

2. Chronicle of Operations.

a. Poor Weather Plagues Ground and Air.

For both ground and air, the early part of December was a period of miserable weather. It rained frequently, making the ground soggy and swelling the rivers. The rain was accompanied by fog and haze which gave pilots considerably more "sack time" but deprived the "doughs" of sorely needed air cooperation.

Third US Army had swept on beyond METZ, still pressing forward, although the momentum of its November offensive was reduced, and had a line extending from the MOSELLE RIVER on the north to the SAAR. They had reached the SAAR RIVER and the doorway to the rich SAAR VALLEY, where the enemy was fighting a delaying action all along the army front. By 1 December good progress was being made in the battle for the SAAR. Elements of XX Corps were approaching the town of MERZIG (Q-29) at the northern end of the front, while in the XII Corps zone, armor and infantry had reached SAARUNION. Farther back, in the METZ area, III Corps was directed to contain the remaining holdout forts by exerting pressure without directly assaulting any major fortifications.

Flying weather was restrictive on the morning of 1 December, but it improved later in the day, enabling fighter-bombers of this Command to get off 126 sorties on armed recces.

Although it was converting to P-47's, the Pioneer Mustang 354th Group observed its first anniversary in combat by shooting down 3 enemy planes with its remaining P-51's. 353rd Squadron, still flying Mustangs, encountered 30 plus ME 109's with belly tanks over KARLSRUHE at 12,000 feet, and in a brief engagement destroyed 3 of the enemy aircraft. One Mustang was hit and belly-landed in enemy territory, but RT conversation indicated that the pilot was uninjured. Another flight was later attacked by 2 ME-262s near PFORZHEIM (R-8341), but the high speed of these jets prevented our planes from closing on them. Other planes of this group damaged a double-track railroad bridge at GERMERSHEIM, north of KARLSRUHE, while 362nd Group bombed the enemy-held town of NALBACH (Q-3187) with excellent results, hitting a strongpoint and destroying 10 motor vehicles and a building.

Fires were started in the NOHFELDEN (L-5408) marshalling yard and rolling stock in the area was shot up. Frags and strafing destroyed a locomotive and 10 cars moving west near PIRMASENS and 2 motor vehicles and tanks were destroyed in the ZWEIBRUCKEN area.

Cooperating with XX Corps, 405th Group tore up a convoy north of SAARBRUCKEN, claiming 26 motor transport and 27 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed and 1 tank damaged.

b. Strangling Enemy Life Lines.

Pounding targets in the SAAR and ranging eastward to the RHINE, fighter-bombers flew a total of 281 sorties on 2 December, 42 of these by P-47's of IX Tactical Air Command's 404th Group, which was attached for the day, with excellent results against enemy transport and supplies.

XII TAC
XX

Embarking on a new rail interdiction program which was to precede an all-out offensive against the enemy in the vicinity of ZWEIBRUCKEN, our aircraft bombed and strafed marshalling yards and rail traffic, claiming destruction or damage of 35 locomotives and 329 railroad cars and effected 35 rail cuts.

P-47s of 405th Group's 511th Squadron put 20 500-pound GP bombs on a marshalling yard southeast of MANNHEIM, destroying 90 railroad cars, and then strafed to get 30 more. They also attacked LORSCH Airfield (M-6117) claiming 8-0-5, all HE-111s on the ground.

Flak was intense as other planes slugged enemy strong points and troop concentrations on the outskirts of the SIEGFRIED LINE, as well as tank concentrations and front line defenses near SAARUNION. 354th Group's 353rd Squadron placed 30 500-pounders on a train of 40 ammunition cars 6 miles east of ZWEIBRUCKEN, destroying it completely, and terrific explosions continued as the squadron left the area.

c. Bridgeheads Established Across the Saar River.

Mediums from IX Bombardment Division struck hard at SIEGFRIED LINE defenses, as Third US Army continued pushing forward into the SAAR despite stubborn opposition. XX Corps had managed to get 3 of its 4 divisions across the German border and a fourth was on the threshold. XII Corps continued heavy fighting near SAARUNION, which had been captured, lost to the enemy and then recaptured.

Weather was unflyable on 3 December and only 8 sorties could be dispatched. On 4 December, prevailing bad weather limited operations to 57 sorties, with emphasis on destruction of enemy transport.

354th Group's 356th Squadron bombed the marshalling yard at NEUSTADT (R-3084) and railroad tracks farther east, but claimed no hits because of high cross wind. One plane was damaged, apparently by extremely turbulent air currents and, floundering around near the battle zone, was shot down by friendly flak.

Peppering a marshalling yard northwest of SAARBRUCKEN with GP and incendiaries and then strafing, 406th Group claimed destruction or damage of 4 locomotives, 34 railroad cars and 18 motor transport. 362nd Group, on a cooperation mission, tore up rail and road transport and fired towns east of the SAAR.

The enemy continued to put up a bitter defense and was rushing troops and supplies to the SAAR. The extremely heavy westward rail movement observed by reconnaissance pilots indicated a frantic buildup in the Third US Army zone and farther north, in the mountainous SCHNEEEIFEL area, facing the Belgian border.

On the morning of 3 December, XX Corps' 95th Infantry Division crossed the SAAR near SAARLAUTERN, taking the enemy by surprise. One bridge was captured intact and it was later revealed that this had been made possible by a recent medium bomber attack which had cut the wires controlling the demolition charge. Fierce fighting was in progress in SAARLAUTERN, which was heavily mined and booby trapped, and determined resistance was being offered. To the south, XII Corps launched an attack toward SAARGEMUND and SAARBRUCKEN and by the end of the day was within 7 miles of the latter city. On the following day, Third US Army captured its first important German city, when XX Corps 95th Infantry Division cleared SAARLAUTERN and began penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE northeast of the city. XII Corps continued to make good gains, driving up to 12 miles and reaching a point 6½ miles from SAARBRUCKEN, on the outskirts of SAARGUEMINES.

With all four groups operating, this Command flew 168 fighter-bomber sorties on 5 December. However, unstable weather conditions hampered activity, forcing some aircraft to be recalled and others to bomb through overcast with unobserved results.

362nd Group's 379th Squadron, assigned to armed recce in the PIRMASENS-ZWEIBRUCKEN area, found the target area "socked in" and covered the WORMS area instead. All bombs were dropped through overcast east of WORMS when controller reported bandits, which later proved to be friendly. Strafing accounted for destruction or damage of 3 locomotives, 15 railroad cars and 4 20-mm gun positions. 378th Squadron destroyed buildings and a locomotive and destroyed or damaged 18 railroad cars, while 379th Squadron attacked the FFENDERSHEIM (M-3915) and NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5784) marshalling yards, claiming 11 locomotives and 20 railroad cars destroyed or damaged and 3 rail lines cut. 354th Group was generally stymied by weather, but its 355th Squadron was able to bomb and strafe the NEUWEID marshalling yard (F-8204) which contained 300 railroad cars, destroying 10 locos and damaging 52 of the cars.

Of two missions initiated by 406th Group's 512th Squadron, one was recalled because of weather before reaching the target area, but on the other, incendiaries were dropped through overcast on EITZERHOVEN, 10 miles east of SAARLAUTERN, and 95th Infantry Division commented "Good work."

"Black Widows" of 425th Night Fighter Squadron maintained a nocturnal watch along the front and also flew intruder sorties, attacking motor transport on roads between SAARBRUCKEN and KAISERSLAUTERN, where exceptionally heavy motor vehicle traffic was noted. Instant and large explosions resulted from hits, indicating extensive ammunition movement, and 30-plus motor vehicles were destroyed. One night fighter plane crashed on return, killing both occupants. Reconnaissance aircraft were busy during the day, and one Tac-R section was attacked by 4 Me-109s east of LIMBURG (M-2895). The reconnaissance planes were a bit too quick for the enemy, and, while evading, damaged two of the Me-109s.

On 6 December, with very little improvement in the weather, 129 sorties were flown on armed recce and cooperation, and more enemy rolling stock was knocked out. 354th Group bombed a supply dump at BAUMHOLDER (L-6910) through overcast, and another target nearby, but was unable to observe results. On 3 squadron missions, 405th Group piled up a good score against transport. 511th Squadron, bombed marshalling yards at KIRN (L-8031) and BAD KREUZNACH, claimed destruction or damage of 2 locomotives, 78 railroad cars and execution of 30 rail cuts.

Unable to attack its assigned target because of weather, 406th Group's 512th Squadron fired four towns east and northeast of MERZIG and got 13 vehicles. 513th Squadron was able to find the target, a highway bridge near MERZIG, and claimed it damaged. In bombing and strafing attacks nearby, they silenced 16 gun positions, destroyed or damaged 24 railroad cars and 16 motor vehicles, 6 of the latter camouflaged as haystacks. During the night, our P-61s were out disrupting enemy motor columns and starting fires.

General Patton's troops pressed deeper into the SAAR VALLEY, making a new crossing of the river, and XX Corps was inside GERMANY along its entire 35-mile front. Far behind, at METZ, FORT ST QUENTIN fell to elements of III Corps' 5th Infantry Division, yielding 22 officers and 571 enlisted men. Only three of the forts were still holding out. Farther south, in XII Corps zone, SAARBRUCKEN was being shelled and was reported aflame, while part of SAARGUEMINES was reported in Third US Army hands.

d. Forts Plappeville and Driant Surrender.

Although rain and overcast grounded virtually all Allied air power on 7 December, and this Command could not operate, ground forces continued to drive on. Two-thirds of SAARGUEMINES was captured and SAARBRUCKEN was undergoing what appeared to be one of the war's heaviest shellings. XII Corps advances resulted in the capture of SAARALBEN, in the upper reaches of the valley, and the German salient in that area was eliminated. In the METZ area, FORT PLAPPEVILLE surrendered to 5th Infantry Division and on the following day FORT DRIANT was taken, leaving only one hold-out fort--JEANNE D'ARC.

On 8 December, despite atrocious weather, 271 sorties were flown. Most of the activity was in cooperation with XII Corps, and though targets were obscured and assessment of results difficult, units of XII Corps credited two of the groups with "outstanding performances." Cooperating with 35th Infantry Division which was conducting bridgehead operations, 405th Group bombed smoke-marked pillboxes, houses and trenches south of SAARGUEMINES and later bombed and strafed HONZRATH (Q-2792), southeast of MERZIG, leaving huge fires and black smoke. 362nd Group provided close cooperation, bombing motor vehicles and armor in WIESWEILER (L-81). The enemy launched a counter-attack against 80th Infantry Division and 362nd Group Thunderbolts, repeatedly swooping down on enemy columns, helped dissipate the attack. XII Corps specifically complimented both groups for "outstanding and superior performances in support of successful bridgehead operations and for a part in stopping the counterattack".

The aerial menace, such as it was, received the attention of 354th Group as its 356th Squadron, bounced by 20-plus Me-109s while on a bombing mission at MEISENHEIM (L-9523), turned to engage the enemy. The Germans attacked very aggressively in two's and three's, but fled after losing 2 planes, escorting another limping one home.

e. Continued Bad Weather Restricts Siegfried Line Attacks.

Weather continued seriously to hamper operations and the following three days saw very little fighter-bomber activity. On 9 December, only 56 sorties could be flown, on escort and missions to drop medical supplies to our troops and bombs on the enemy. 362nd Group's 379th Squadron took off with wing tanks filled with medical supplies, dropping much-needed blood plasma to 90th Infantry Division troops in their SAAR RIVER bridgehead. Assigned to work with XII Corps, 377th Squadron was unable to see its targets and dropped bombs through overcast at direction of the ground controller. 406th Group, also on cooperation, dropped GP and incendiaries on a smoke-marked tank concentration near DILLINGEN, but results were obscured by low cloud and snow.

On 10 December, low clouds limited operations to 32 sortier, but results were proportionately excellent. Explosives, incendiaries and rocket projectiles accounted for destruction or damage of 20 locomotives and 126 railroad cars, most of them by 354th Group. Its 356th Squadron, on a morning weather recce, bombed the marshalling yard at LAMBRECHT (R-2385), cut electric power lines along tracks and destroyed 10 oil cars and 5 moving locomotives by strafing. Later, 4 more planes from the same squadron destroyed or damaged 9 locomotives, 55 cars, and a horse-drawn vehicle, near KAISERSLAUTERN.

Two P-47s of 355th Squadron, on another weather recce, bombed tracks near FRIEDSTAHL (R-5457) and claimed 1 locomotive, 4 buildings destroyed and 15 to 20 box cars knocked out by strafing. Climbing to 2,000 feet after the attack, this pair was attacked by 20-plus aggressive Me-109s which came through a hole in the overcast and attacked in flights of three. The Thunderbolts shot down one and outran the others on the deck, with water injection. Eight other planes of the same squadron, operating in the KAISERSLAUTERN-WORMS area, claimed 5 locomotives, 46 RR cars, 6 buildings and a motor vehicle destroyed or damaged by strafing.

Eight aircraft of 362nd Group's 378th Squadron destroyed 5 enemy tanks near DILLINGEN, while an additional 8 from 406th Group's 513th Squadron put Napalm, incendiaries and rockets on 25 buildings in the southeast corner of the city, starting many fires, and 90th Infantry Division controller said results were excellent.

Low cloud and intermittent rain grounded all aircraft on 11 December, the first anniversary of XIX Tactical Air Command. A message from its commander, Brig Gen O. P. Weyland, congratulated the members of the Command upon their concerted efforts and said: "There will be many tough days ahead. We must not relax now. I call upon each and every one of you to continue to do a superb job and not to give the enemy a moment's relaxation. We must continue to fly, seek and destroy the enemy wherever we may find him."

Despite weather and seas of mud, ground forces continued to forge ahead. With the flooded SAAR at their back and the tough pillboxes and artillery defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE in front of them, XX Corps troops were locked in battle with a growingly aggressive foe. The enemy had mounted several counterattacks and was concentrating heavy fire on troops expanding the river bridgehead. On XII Corps front the going was a bit easier and more rapid advances were made. SAARGUEMINES was cleared of the enemy, who seemed to be moving his artillery back to the SIEGFRIED LINE, although he fought a strong delaying action in every village.

The program of road and rail interdiction, which was severing enemy supply lines, was resumed on 12 December. The skies cleared, permitting fighter-bombers to fly 256 sorties, most of them in cooperation with XII and XX Corps, and results were excellent.

406th Group flew 5 squadron missions on cooperation and railroad yard attacks. After a Napalm and frag assault on DILLINGEN, 90th Infantry Division commented "Good job." Another attack upon gun positions in a nearby woods left the entire area burning fiercely.

At the direction of 95th Infantry controller, 512th Squadron bombed SCHWALBACH (Q-3387). The division afterward reported that the squadron "rendered excellent air cooperation in hitting the town and adjacent woods and in driving the enemy from the woods and town in the path of division artillery, effecting his destruction."

Attacking enemy gun positions, towns and transport in the SAARGEMUND-ZWEIBRUCKEN area, 362nd Group obtained excellent results, destroying 68 railroad cars and causing violent explosions in a marshalling yard beyond KAISERSLAUTERN. Of this Group's work, XII Corps stated, "Their cooperation materially aided our advance, and morale was tremendously increased as a result of the mere knowledge that your planes were in support."

405th Group flew 6 squadron missions, on uneventful area cover to medium bombers attacking a target near AACHEN, and on armed recce as far as the RHINE.

Over LANDAU, 511th Squadron was bounced by 10 aggressive Me-109s at 2,000 feet; claims were 4-2-0 for no losses. 509th Squadron pulled up after bombing and strafing the KAISERSLAUTERN railroad yard and was jumped by 12 Me-109s and FW-190s. Seven enemy planes were destroyed and 2 damaged in the engagement, but 4 fighter-bombers were lost. "Terrific explosions" were reported by 510th Squadron after an attack on a railway yard at R-7148, near BRETTON. Sixty-four railroad cars were destroyed or damaged, while 354th Group netted the largest slice of the day's total of 278 cars when it claimed 75.

During the day, our fighter-bombers ranged as far east as KOBLENZ, and buildings, storage depots and shops were set on fire.

f. Fort Jeanne D'Arc, last of METZ Strongholds, Falls.

Reduction of the powerful METZ fortifications was completed with the fall of FORT JEANNE D'ARC to elements of 26th Infantry Division on 13 December. The prisoner yield totaled 550. Meanwhile, material gains were made in XX Corps SAAR bridgeheads where the formerly intense enemy artillery fire was somewhat lessened. Air activity was down to 40 sorties because of restrictive visibility. Two of the day's 3 missions were uneventful escort and the third was an attack by 362nd Group's 378th Squadron on railroad rolling stock northeast of SAARLAUTERN with claims of 20 railroad cars destroyed and a rail line cut.

Visibility cleared for a brief period on 14 December, permitting 131 sorties to be flown, most of them during the afternoon. 405th Group, on 3 squadron missions in the HOMBURG and BINGEN areas, hit marshalling yards, rolling stock and barge traffic and claimed 28 motor vehicles, 8 horse-drawn carts, 6 locomotives, 55 railroad cars and a warehouse destroyed or damaged. Weather forced recall of several missions and most of the other squadrons bombed through overcast without observing results. Fires were started at a factory in DILLINGEN and frags dropped on a troop concentration north of SAARLAUTERN, by 406th Group.

Slow expansion of XX Corps bridgeheads across the SAAR continued, with local gains being made against stiff SIEGFRIED LINE pillbox defenses. The enemy continued his build-up of tanks, anti-tank guns and tank destroyers across the river. In the SAARLAUTERN-FRAULAUTERN-ENSDORF area, 95th Infantry Division reported resistance decreasing somewhat and fought its way forward, making good progress.

The fighter-bombers were out for 133 sorties on 15 December, flying close cooperation, armed recce and carrying out attacks on supply and ammunition dumps. A suspected artillery bivouac northeast of SAARGUEMINES was strafed by 378th Squadron, causing large explosions and fires, and 35th Infantry Division radioed; "Excellent strafing." When 405th Group's 511th Squadron dropped 14 500-pound bombs on the northern part of the BAUMHOLDER ammunition dump (L-6914) dark smoke rose to 6,000 feet and explosions followed for 20 minutes. 354th Group attacked transport and supply points.

A smoke-marked wooded area on the 90th Infantry Division front, southeast of MERZIG, was bombed with GP and frags, and among the other targets attacked were a village near BITCHE, the SAARBRUCKEN marshalling yard, rolling stock near ST WENDEL and buildings at PIRMASENS and HOHEINOD. Their claims, the major portion of the day's total, included destruction or damage of 17 buildings, a locomotive, and 40 railroad cars. In general, however, results were not observed because of overcast. No losses were suffered.

g. The Germans Launch All-Out Offensive in ARDENNES.

On 16 December, the enemy opened a general offensive against First US Army's VII and VIII Corps, spearheading the drive with elements of the hoarded Sixth SS Panzer Army. Committing the bulk of his Panzer and Infantry reserved in the West, Von Rundstedt staked all in a supreme effort and First US Army units fell back generally along a 50 mile front. For the first time in months the German Air Force was used extensively. Paratroops were dropped to disrupt communications, US and British tanks were employed and enemy agents in Allied uniforms infiltrated into our lines in attempts to cause general confusion. Disruption of the projected Allied winter drive seemed to be the enemy's design.

Rundstedt's offensive consisted of two prongs. One, in the north through MALMEDY toward LIEGE, made by the Sixth SS Panzer Army, and the other, to the south, carried out by the Fifth Panzer Army, which was aimed at the important communications center of BASTOGNE and a bridgehead across the MEUSE RIVER, with an additional thrust to seize the city of LUXEMBOURG.

The northern attack, involving initially two Panzer, one Paratroop and five Infantry divisions, was intended as a major effort, but heavy resistance at STAVELOT and ST VITH spoiled enemy plans and forced the commitment of three more Panzer, one Panzer Grenadier and one Volks Grenadier divisions. The southern thrust in VIII Corps zone was more successful; by 19 December it had gained up to 25 miles along a 60-mile front and had penetrated defenses leading to BASTOGNE. In the northern zone, penetrations were made up to 40 miles in depth and 30 miles in width along the ST VITH - ST HUBERT axis. The tactical situation was extremely critical for the Allied forces along the entire Western front.

As far as Third US Army was concerned, it was considered that the enemy was capable of mounting drives against the shoulders of any salient the army might create. Plans were quickly effected for shifting of army forces northward.

Meanwhile, small gains continued to be made. XX Corps reported slight progress in the SAAR RIVER bridgeheads, although artillery fire was heavy. By 18 December, XX Corps 90th Infantry Division had cleared all but a small portion of DILLINGEN and advanced in the SAARLAUTERN-ENSDORF bridgehead, while XII Corps troops, battling mud and stiff resistance in the SAAR, pushed the enemy back up to 2 miles on a 2-mile front, and gains of up to 3½ miles were made by 4th Armored Division.

With improvement in the weather, extensive air operations were again resumed, and on 16 December the fighter-bombers flew 237 sorties, blasting enemy transport arteries. It was a field day on ground targets, recalling the good hunting of last summer's sweep across FRANCE. Sighting much traffic because of the offensive, their claims for the day included destruction or damage of 40 locomotives and 608 railroad cars, in addition to 123 motor transport, 5 gun positions, 16 buildings, attacks on 11 marshalling yards and 7 towns. Despite the intensity of operations, no losses were suffered.

405th Group, flying 5 missions in the TRIER-KOBLENZ and HOMBURG areas, got the bulk of the day's big bag of enemy transport, their claims totaling 441 railroad cars destroyed or damaged, of which 20 were loaded with motor vehicles. On armed recce in the TRIER area, 511th Squadron alone destroyed or damaged 236 cars and 10 locomotives.

The day's only air claim was turned in by 406th Group, which sighted a lone Me-109 at 1,000 feet in the SAARBRUCKEN-LEBACH area and damaged the enemy plane. 354th Group attacked the LANDAU marshalling yard and killed 120 enemy troops near NOHEN (L-6415) and HAUSTADT, southeast of MERZIG. 362nd Group flew 6 missions in cooperation with XII Corps and on armed recce. After one attack with incendiaries, frag clusters and .50 calibres on woods northeast of SARRGEMUND, which ground troops had marked with smoke, controller radioed the squadron leader that results were excellent. Another squadron found 200-plus motor vehicles in a woods and claimed 85 damaged by 500-pound bombs.

The 425th Night Fighter Squadron was active, flying 19 P-61 sorties and claiming 40 motor vehicles destroyed or damaged by strafing, plus an undetermined number of others. In addition, numerous fires were started.

Continued good weather and good hunting on 17 December gave the fighter-bombers their busiest day of the month, thus far. They flew 356 sorties in cooperation with Third US Army units as well as with First US Army's VIII Corps in the breakthrough area, and also carried out attacks on an enemy command post and an ammunition dump.

The Luftwaffe, committed in strength for the all-out offensive, was in great evidence for the first time in many weeks. In numerous air engagements, our fighter-bombers claimed 24-3-1 in the air for the loss of 9, only one of which was lost to enemy action. One pilot said, "I chased so many Jerry planes I got confused. There were German parachutes floating down everywhere."

406th Group registered the major portion of the day's claims. It's 513th Squadron, flying west of ZILLTICH (F-1335), joined 3 P-38s chasing 4 Me-109s. Encounter with 40 plus Me-109s followed and 7 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed without loss. 513th Squadron, on a heading from Ripsaw, reached STEFFLA (L-1589) and found 8 P-38s engaging 6 FW-190s. The P-47s jettisoned their bombs and closed on the enemy, claiming 3 destroyed. One P-47 which collided with a P-38 was lost, but the pilot was seen to bail out.

405th Group, cooperating with XX And VIII Corps, attacked an ammunition dump near KOBLENZ, getting 14 direct hits with 500-lb GP, and smoke was seen to rise to 2,000 feet. 510th Squadron observed P-47s in combat with 8-9 Me-109s near KOBLENZ, and in dogfights from deck to 9,000 feet claimed 3-1-0. Later, another flight encountered 20-plus Me-109s and FW-190s in the same general area. The squadron fought until low on fuel and then started to retire without having drawn blood. However, several minutes later, the top flight caught 8 FW-190s and got 2, while 511th Squadron destroyed a lone Me-109 over KOBLENZ, and then, heading home, was bounced by 20-plus Me-109s southwest of the city. One enemy plane was damaged before the Squadron got away.

354th Group attacked a CP at Q-2797, northeast of MERZIG, with many fires resulting, and at USGH, 40 miles north of TRIER, one squadron destroyed a steel railroad bridge and an adjoining tunnel, which caved in. An Me-410, taking off from KITZINGEN Airfield, was destroyed by P-47s on a fighter sweep in the MANNHEIM-FRANKFURT area, and results of attacks by various squadrons on marshalling yards and rail lines included 4 locomotives, 92 railroad cars and 10 buildings destroyed or damaged.

A strafing attack by 362nd Group on an artillery position in woods northeast of SAARGUEMINES resulted in the comment, "Good job," by 35th Infantry Division. Near DAHLEN (L-1598) 40-plus single-engined enemy fighters attacked 8 P-47s of 377th Squadron very aggressively. In the furious engagement, 1 FW-190 was destroyed and 1 damaged without loss. 10th Photo Group, Reconnaissance, also shared in the day's aircraft claims, destroying 2 FW-190s, 2 He-111s and a Ju-88, all without loss.

Patrolling the forward areas after dark, night flying "Black Widows" strafed a ten-mile convoy of enemy motor vehicles moving south between NOHFELDEN and NEUNKIRCHEN and claimed 20 vehicles destroyed and 10 more damaged.

Low ceiling over bases and generally unfavorable weather conditions over target areas limited operations to 66 sorties on 18 December, and only 2 of the Command's 4 groups were active. 362nd Group flew 4 effective missions on armed recce and cooperation with XII Corps, destroying or damaging 58 motor vehicles, 44 railroad cars, 27 gun positions, 2 tanks and a horse-drawn vehicle. A supply dump near ZWEIBRUCKEN was attacked and 3 stacks of supplies destroyed. 354th Group, loaned for the day to IX TAC, flew 1 mission in cooperation with First US Army, east of DUREN. They saw 12 FW-190s dive-bombing our troops and attacked, destroying 4 enemy planes. Two fighter-bombers were lost to unknown causes.

h. Third US Army turns North to Meet the Enemy Threat.

The enemy continued to press forward all along the breakthrough area, and by 19 December his northern spearhead had driven beyond STAVELOT, while the southern prong threatened BASTOGNE. To combat this penetration and disrupting counter-offensive in the First US Army zone and the immediate threat to Third US Army, the Supreme Commander issued orders that the Commanding General of Third US Army assume command of all available forces south of the enemy breakthrough, which could be regrouped and committed, and attack north, thereby cutting off and destroying the enemy. This meant that VIII Corps would be under control of Third US Army, that our forces would disengage the enemy on the SAAR and turn Third US Army's striking force to the north in an attack on the enemy's south flank. XII Corps was to relinquish its zone to Seventh US Army and move to LUXEMBOURG; III Corps would relinquish its zone to XX Corps and move to ARLON. This plan was issued on 18 December and the initial assault came on 22 December. Meanwhile fighting continued in the SAAR where enemy artillery preparations, and the building of a pontoon bridge over the river, indicated the possibility of a new enemy counter-attack on the north sector of XX Corps zone.

In the air, continued poor flying weather made the going tough, and the following 4 days saw only limited operations. On 19 December, 102 sorties were flown on area cover for RAF Lancasters attacking troop concentrations in the TRIER area and direct cooperation with First US Army's VIII Corps. The Luftwaffe was increasingly active and in frequent battles during the day, the fighter-bombers claimed 11-1-1 in the air.

On area cover over TRIER, 405th Group caught 1 Me-109 over the city and destroyed it. The P-47s dropped bombs through the overcast at the direction of Ripsaw, and on armed recces destroyed or damaged 21 motor vehicles, 5 locomotives and 112 railroad cars, 30 of which were loaded with motor transport. In addition, 4 rail cuts were effected. 354th Group worked with VIII Corps and a large explosion followed when it bombed the marshalling yard at KELL (L-3316). Afterwards the group was attacked by 70-plus Me-109s at 4,000 feet and claimed 9-1-1 for the loss of 3. The final aircraft kill of the day was reported by a Tac-R section of 10th Photo Group which destroyed an Me-109 southeast of MALMEDY.

Visibility and ceiling difficulties on 20 December grounded all fighter-bombers and permitted only 2 Tac/R sorties. On 21 December, limited improvement in weather enabled 112 sorties to be flown, once more on escort to RAF Lancasters attacking TRIER and on armed recce. Four P-47s of 354th Group were able to attack an oil dump near SPEICHER, north of TRIER, through a hole in the overcast and reported the target destroyed. Other targets hit by this group included a marshalling yard and factory, the town of KRETTNICH (L-4203) and a suspected ammunition dump.

The enemy offensive went on unabated. The Germans were encircling WILTZ, but BASTOGNE held out against strong attacks. The enemy's southern prong had formed a 10-mile ring around the town, where elements of VIII Corps 101st Airborne Division were fighting hard. Meanwhile, plans were being completed for Third US Army's counter-attack. XX Corps was beginning to evacuate the SAAR RIVER bridgeheads, but continued to maintain its front.

Although all fighter-bombers were again grounded on 22 December, Third US Army began its northward attack, driving with infantry and armor in the area north of ARLON and LUXEMBOURG. By the end of the day, III Corps' 4th Armored Division had reached BURDON (P-54) and MARTELANGE (P-53), making gains of up to 10 miles on a 10-mile front.

In view of the increased need for air power, the strength of XIX Tactical Air Command was augmented on 23 December by the assignment of three additional fighter-bomber groups: 365th, 367th, and 368th, and the attachment of a fourth, the 361st. This brought the total of assigned groups to 7, the largest number in the Command since October.

i. Five Days of Good Weather Enable Fighter-Bombers to Smash Enemy Transport in the "Bulge".

Weather conditions improved, and the following five days brought superb flying weather. Emphasis was shifted from rail to road targets and fighter-bombers found rich hauls of enemy transport cramming the roads leading to, and in, the "Breakthrough Bulge". Operating in perfect unison, Third US Army and XIX Tactical Air Command turned on the pressure and in fierce assaults on the enemy, blunted his spearheads and put him on the defensive. Flights were dispatched as quickly as they could be serviced and loaded, to attack targets in the salient. It was later revealed how deadly had been these attacks on enemy transport. Months later when Marshal Rundstedt was captured, he had the following to say of the campaign, "We had the reserves in men, artillery and tanks, but not the ways and means of bringing them up to the front where they were needed. Our railway system had broken down." Ammunition could not be brought up and men went for days without hot meals because field kitchens had been destroyed.

On 23 December, the fighter-bombers got off 493 sorties and rendered what Third US Army's G-3 (Air) termed "Superb air cooperation". The enemy had implemented his attacks with all available aircraft and the Luftwaffe was everywhere in evidence. Aircraft of this Command alone claimed 34-3-10 in the air.

Cooperating with VIII Corps, 406th Group encountered 20-plus Me-109s near TRIER and, in engagements at 12,000 feet, claimed 6-2-4 for the loss of 2 planes. Strafing the general area, they destroyed or damaged 97 motor vehicles, 11 tanks, 20 horse-drawn vehicles and 24 gun positions. The newly arrived 367th Group (P-38s) had its hands full on escort and patrol. Escorting mediums to EUSKIRCHEN, where direct hits from bombing were observed, 392nd Squadron was attacked by 24-plus Me-109s southeast of the city at 17,000 feet. A furious battle ensued in which the fighter-bombers claimed 11-1-4 for the loss of 1 plane. Later in the day, the same squadron saw 4 FW-190s preparing to join in a fight between 4 other FW-190s and 4 P-47s. The P-38s attacked, claiming 3-0-1 without loss.

368th Group's 396th Squadron saw 25-plus FW-190s attacking westbound B-26s near MAYEN (L-3692) at 20,000 feet from the rear. The enemy were unaggressive and tried to run, but before they got away our planes claimed 11 destroyed and 1 damaged for the loss of 3.

354th Group hit an oil dump at SIEGBURG (F-6246) destroying it. 405th Group got 1 Me-109 of 6 engaged southeast of TRIER. 362nd Group hit transport and armor, claiming 84 motor vehicles, 12 tanks and also destroyed 5 buildings. 379th Squadron alone destroyed 45 to 48 trucks filled with troops near ST HUBERT. They also attacked a tank-truck convoy between HOUFFALIZE (P-6172) and BOURCY (P-6264), destroying or damaging 10 tanks and 28 trucks.

Reconnaissance also got 1 enemy plane, albeit in an unusual fashion. The pilot of an unarmed P-38 was bounced by four FW-190s. He headed for the deck, but one persistent FW-190 kept on his tail. The recce pilot put his plane into a 90-degree vertical climb and topped it off with an Immelman. When he looked back, he saw the enemy aircraft spin to the ground and explode.

With another day of good weather permitting "superb" cooperation on 24 December, Third US Army drove on. III Corps advanced north and with its 4th Armored Division had reached the enemy's ring around BASTOGNE, where 101st Airborne Division was making a gallant stand.

This Command had one of its most successful days against ground targets as the fighter-bombers flew 652 sorties. Record totals of 117 tanks were claimed destroyed or damaged and, in addition, they got 588 motor vehicles, 68 gun positions, 115 railroad cars. In the air 24-3-10 enemy planes were claimed, and 11 fighter-bombers were lost to flak and enemy aircraft.

Our pilots bombed and strafed moving enemy columns in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire, causing chaos. In one strafing attack on a concentration of 300 motor vehicles north of ECHTERNACH by 405th Group's 509th Squadron, 70 gasoline trucks were blown up. Other attacks were made on transport and tanks. Road bridges were hit and many fires started. The Luftwaffe attempted to break up some of these attacks, and an encounter with 3 FW-190s resulted in claims of 2 destroyed, while three lone Me-109s were shot down in subsequent encounters.

506th Group cooperated with VIII Corps, destroying or damaging 15 tanks, 92 motor vehicles and several gun positions. Twelve 40-mm flak positions near PATTIGNY (F-6776) were given a GP and Napalm treatment. All guns were silenced and 30-plus enemy personnel running from the guns were strafed and killed. 362nd Group caused explosions and fires as its planes attacked enemy-held towns and ammunition dumps, troop and gun concentrations. After an attack by 377th Squadron with 16 500-pound GP, 18 rockets and 8 incendiaries on a tank concentration in a woods south of BASTOGNE, Combat Command "A" of 4th Armored Division said results were excellent and division tanks were able to move in.

The day's enemy aircraft totals included claims of 3-1-1 in the air by squadrons of 362nd Group. 354th Group, on armed recce, attacked marshalling yards and towns. On one of these missions, 353rd Squadron was bounced by 16-plus FW-190s at 1,500 feet, northeast of TRIER, and claimed 2-0-1 for no losses. 367th Group registered additional claims of 8-2-9, all FW-190s, in the air. The attached 361st Group also destroyed 4 enemy planes in varied encounters. 10th Photo Group claimed 1 plane, while night fighters got a Do-217 without loss.

The German counter-offensive had come at a period when days are shortest, putting a heavy premium on night photography. In the course of these operations, the 155th Night Photo Squadron had the busiest month in its brief career, flying 99 missions. Among them were some at Christmas time which Major General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, commanding Ninth Air Force, described as "the outstanding performance of night photography done anywhere at any time." The photographs revealed many enemy armor and transport and troop concentrations in the bulge area, information that was urgently needed.

Continuing clear, cold "victory weather" on Christmas Day enabled fighter-bombers to turn in more big scores, taking heavy toll of enemy tanks and transport. Third US Army troops, driving northward in BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG, were engaged in some of the most savage and ruthless warfare yet seen on the Western Front. Two combat commands of 4th Armored Division attempted to break the steel ring around BASTOGNE, but their efforts met with failure. Meanwhile the strong forces encircled there continued to fight magnificently. Resupply to them was excellent, and during the day a surgeon was landed for them safely in an L-1. III and VIII Corps encountered extremely heavy resistance in their push to the north, but made gains ranging up to 3 miles at some points. German spearheads in the breakthrough area had pushed through the ARDENNES and were reported almost in the MEUSE VALLEY, in the region of DINANT. The enemy was pushing his "all-or-nothing" offensive to the utmost and had thrown overboard all recognized rules of warfare. Many were the accounts of wanton cruelty from which not even medical troops were spared.

The fighter-bombers continued their furious attacks on enemy targets, helping to ease the situation in the bulge. On 25 December they flew 599 sorties and recorded claims of 766 motor vehicles, 74 tanks and armored vehicles, 71 gun positions, 70 railroad cars, 46 buildings and 3 oil tanks destroyed or damaged. Attacks were made on 31 towns and 4 marshalling yards, and 9 highway cuts were executed.

362nd Group, cooperating with III Corps, flew 9 missions, firing 7 towns and claiming destruction or damage of 218 motor transport, 6 buildings, which exploded, 8 tanks and 6 gun positions. 377th Squadron followed 406th Group's 513th Squadron in an attack on TINTANGE, south of BASTOGNE. After the former assault, 4th Armored radioed, "Excellent results," and following the latter, our infantry was reported entering the town. An Me-109 which bounced P-47s strafing ST VITH was destroyed. 406th Group turned in claims of 156 motor vehicles, 65 gun positions, 16 tanks and 21 half-tracks destroyed or damaged.

405th Group flew 7 missions in cooperation with XII Corps. Ten miles southeast of PRUM, 510th Squadron was attacked by 6 aggressive FW-190s and claimed 4-0-1 for loss of one plane and pilot. 509th Squadron was bounced by a single Me-109 on the deck in the vicinity of ST VITH and shot it down. Ground claims for this group included 168 motor transport destroyed or damaged. 354th Group claimed 42 motor transport and 15 buildings, killed many enemy troops and tore up locomotives and cars. On armed recce in the bulge area, 365th, 367th and 368th Groups also claimed much rolling stock and damaged 4 enemy planes. Recce aircraft damaged an FW-190 and night fighters shot down an Me-110. The day's losses totaled 7, most of them to flak.

The enemy, desperate in his attempts to succeed, gave us no rest even in rear areas. Day and night attacks were reported on XIX Tactical Air Command and Third US Army installations. On 23 December, Third Army received 70 attacks by a total of 80 planes, claiming 8 of the enemy planes destroyed and 3 probably destroyed. One plane dropped 3 bombs near A-98 and 4 others were dropped near ST DIZIER.

The Germans employed other ruses as well. 406th Group's 514th Squadron, operating near MORHET (P-4654), observed motor vehicles marked with a red cross. When enemy troops ran from their transport on approach of our planes, the squadron gave the convoy a trial burst, and, after one vehicle exploded like an ammunition truck, they attacked in earnest.

Tactical reconnaissance was beginning to show a considerable decrease in enemy vehicular traffic during the daylight hours in the BASTOGNE area, indicating the high transport and supply losses inflicted by this Command.

An enemy "Order to All Units" which was later captured, revealed the fear the Germans had for our fighter-bombers. It stated, "Due to the very favorable weather conditions for enemy operations, we have suffered unreasonably high losses in vehicles through hostile fighter-bombers.

"It is therefore ordered that all ration supply trips be made at night or when weather does not permit air operations."

j. Third Army Breaks Bastogne Ring.

On 26 December, elements of 4th Armored Division's Combat Command "B", driving north, culminated their advance by breaking the armored ring around BASTOGNE, thus relieving and reinforcing the 101st Airborne Division. The relieving force burst through the ring at its southwest perimeter and this juncture gave Third U.S. Army an advance of 11 miles northward in the sector, with east-west lines seven miles long at the top of the BASTOGNE salient. Air activity continued to be on a large scale and army reported that it had "benefitted tremendously from the superb air cooperation during the day." The Commanding General of III Corps personally called General Weyland to thank him for the work.

With our successful penetration of the BASTOGNE ring, the enemy was forced to abandon his northern thrust for LIEGE. He began to shift his Panzers eastward, and his communications lines were in danger.

Although IX TAC was getting most of the enemy air claims because of intense Luftwaffe activity in its zone, our fighter-bombers managed to get their share of the haul. On 26 December, with the critical days of the Bulge all but over, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers claimed 22-1-11 in the air as a result of six separate encounters, while the night fighters added 2 more. In all, 558 sorties were flown, on direct cooperation, armed recce, fighter sweeps and escort.

362nd Group cooperated with III Corps in the Bulge area, claiming destruction or damage of 98 motor vehicles, 2 tanks and 6 gun positions. Six towns, a castle and an enemy-occupied woods were left burning and our troops were able to move into BOURSCHEID (P-8047) immediately after P-47 attack. 379th Squadron had 2 encounters with FW-190s, one group of 25 and the other 5 strong; claims from these battles totaled 8-0-2 and 2 planes were lost. A C-47 and glider, carrying medical aid to BASTOGNE, was provided escort and seen to land safely.

Thunderbolts of 406th Group cooperated with VIII Corps and escorted 100-plus C-47s dropping supplies at BASTOGNE. On one cooperation mission, some 240 stacks of ammunition were seen along roads. These were strafed, resulting in a grand pyrotechnic display. In addition, 32 armored vehicles, 75 motor transport, 13 buildings, and 13 gun positions were destroyed or damaged. In the town of ST HUBERT, every building but the church was reported hit. Two FW-190s which bounced 512th Squadron in the battle area were damaged.

The attached 361st Group's P-51s were out on escort and fighter sweeps. During the former, they ran into 10-15 FW 190s and 6 were destroyed without loss.

Ten FW-190s were caught strafing a village by 354th Group's 353rd Squadron, and in the battle that followed, 1-0-2 were claimed for the loss of 1. 405th Group tangled with 30-plus aggressive FW-190s north of TRIER and claimed 7-1-5 for the loss of 2 fighter-bombers, both of which belly landed in friendly territory. Their ground tally ran to 172 motor transport, 4 armored vehicles and 12 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Ranging deep into the battle area, the fighter-bombers were tearing enemy transport and installations to shreds, making his ARDENNES gamble daily more precarious. The day's ground claims included, destroyed or damaged, 56 railroad cars, 412 motor vehicles, 34 tanks and armored vehicles, 26 gun positions and 61 buildings. In all, 15 planes were lost, including 2 by recce and 1 night fighter, which was shot down by friendly flak.

Third U.S. Army, operating with 15 divisions, continued to make further good progress. Excellent gains were made in the BASTOGNE area despite powerful enemy pressure, and not only were counter attacks repulsed, but the corridor was widened both to the east and west. The enemy time-table had been seriously affected by the refusal of our troops in the BASTOGNE pocket to surrender and by their relief on 26 December. Patrols operating east of the MEUSE beyond the head of the enemy breakthrough area were reinforced to prevent any new penetrations. Meanwhile our north and northeastward drive continued with good gains, and reports indicated that the Germans had pulled their troops back to the SIEGFRIED LINE outposts in several LUXEMBOURG sectors. Conditions also showed definite improvement in the First U.S. Army zone. STAVELOT was half cleared and the enemy spearhead in the vicinity of DINANT had been blunted.

The fifth consecutive day of excellent flying weather, December 27, found fighter-bombers in the skies constantly, for a total of 544 sorties. 406th Group cooperated with VIII Corps, tearing up gun positions, destroying transport, exploding ammunition dumps, where repeated eruptions of smoke and flame were observed, and killing many enemy troops by strafing highways. They claimed 86 motor transport, 53 armored vehicles, and 12 88-mm guns destroyed or damaged. Aiding III Corps on the west, 362nd Group got 107 motor vehicles and 35 tanks, closed a highway tunnel and also blew up ammunition dumps.

405th Group, clearing the way for XII Corps, which was preparing to cross the SAUER RIVER near ECHTERNACH, heaped destruction on enemy troops and transport, started fires in several supply dumps and riddled barracks. One squadron was bounced by 3 FW-190s northwest of TRIER and destroyed one, while on a later mission they shot down an Me-109 speeding along on the deck.

An excellent score was run up by 354th Group on armed recce beyond TRIER, with claims of 142 railroad cars, 3 locomotives and 15 buildings. In an attack on a 100-car train at KANZEN, southwest of TRIER, the train was missed but the entire town was set ablaze by Napalm. An Me-109 which attacked 356th Squadron east of PRUM was probably destroyed, and 353rd Squadron destroyed an Me-109 which had belly-landed in an open field in the vicinity. The Command's total claims for the day included destruction or damage of 434 motor transport, 90 armored vehicles, 15 locomotives, 336 railroad cars, 42 gun positions, 11 dumps and 43 buildings. Attacks were made on 22 towns, 17 marshalling yards and 15 troop concentrations. Nineteen rail and 6 highway cuts were effected and at least 145 Germans killed.

k. Widening the Corridor.

The following day, 28 December, saw a letup in good flying weather, and the only operations able to be flown were 4 Tac/R sorties. But the previous five days had been sufficient in which to smash the enemy and render his striking power ineffective. Roads were littered with German wreckage. In the five-day period of operations, our haul included destruction or damage of 2,450 motor vehicles, 341 armored vehicles and claims of 87-7-36 enemy planes in the air.

Widening of the BASTOGNE corridor continued and extremely heavy fighting was going on in this area against a determined enemy. Our supplies were pouring into the town, while on the west, between the corridor and ST HUBERT, gains of up to 5 miles on an 8-mile front were made. The SURE RIVER bridgehead was enlarged and in XII Corps zone, ECHTERNACH was entered.

On 27 December, 368th Group moved from A-84 to A-68 (Juvincourt). On 29 December, 100th Fighter Wing moved from LISLE-EN-RIGAULT to METZ, while 365th Group moved from A-84 to Y-34 (METZ). Weather on 29 December showed improvement and good air cooperation was resumed as all 8 groups were able to operate, flying a total of 456 sorties. Despite difficulty in finding targets, they were able to claim 72 armored vehicles, 130 motor transport, 4 locomotives, 208 railroad cars, 17 gun positions, 41 buildings and a command post destroyed or damaged. Rail cuts were numerous, totaling 28.

362nd Group claimed 52 tanks and 41 motor vehicles destroyed in III Corps zone as 378th Squadron, bombing a concentration of 35-40 tanks east of HANAVILLE (P-6762) claimed 25 destroyed, and in strafing destroyed 25 halftracks. Pilots reported that enemy tanks were packed on a road, lined up two abreast, and that crews were crawling out of the turrets. Bombs were dropped directly in the center of the concentration, and explosions rocked the trees in the near-by forest.

406th Group peppered a half-mile long pile of ammunition boxes east of HOUFFALIZE and exploded many of them, while elsewhere, 18 tanks and 4 heavy field guns were destroyed or damaged. A command post north of TRIER was destroyed by 405th Group's 511th Squadron, and its 365th Squadron reported an explosion and fires at a factory near TRARBACH.

367th Group dive-bombed a smoke-marked gun position east of BASTOGNE, silencing it. Later, 497th Squadron scored 10 direct hits with 1,000-pound bombs on a V-1 site at DIERFELD, causing a large explosion and considerable damage.

The only aircraft claims were by the night fighters, who, in one of their busiest nights, got 2-1-2 JU-88s in the air. They strafed a marshalling yard at HORNWEILER (L-41) and reported at least 15 separate fires and five explosions.

With heavy fighting, punctuated by tank battles, in the corridor area, Third U.S. Army troops continued to make good progress. Despite the employment of heavy masses of new enemy armor, III Corps widened the relief corridor by 5 square miles on its east side. The BASTOGNE-ARLON highway was clear, and in VIII Corps zone, Third U.S. Army patrols were within three miles of a link-up with First U.S. Army units near the head of the enemy breakthrough.

Weather on 30 December was not particularly good, but the fighter-bombers were able to fly 492 sorties and afforded "excellent cooperation," underlined by a special message of appreciation sent in by VIII Corps.

Many vulnerable concentrations of railroad rolling stock were found, including one solid line of loaded freight cars five miles long, which was located by 365th Group's 386th Squadron south of LAUTERECKEN (L-8916). During the day, bombing and strafing attacks were made on more than 2,200 cars and locomotives. In many cases fire and smoke were so great that pilots could not appraise the damage, but actual claims included 22 locomotives and 468 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

362nd Group worked with III Corps bombing a village near BASTOGNE and, afterwards, infantry was able to move in. Fifteen of 32 tanks seen southeast of BASTOGNE were claimed destroyed or damaged. The NEUNKIRCHEN marshalling yard was hit and fires started among over 1,000 railroad cars.

405th Group encountered bad weather, was forced to bomb 2 towns through overcast by direction of radar, but was able to hit 2 marshalling yards visually with good results. One of its planes was shot down by friendly flak when 511th Squadron was directed to LUXEMBOURG to intercept 2 Me-109s attacking the city. 406th Group cooperated with VIII Corps, firing six towns south of BASTOGNE and HOUFFALIZE. Claims included destruction or damage of 23 tanks, 32 motor transport, 15 flak and 3 88-mm gun positions. An attack by 367th Group on the marshalling yard at SIEGBURG broke the city's water main. Other claims by this Group included 68 railroad cars and 4 locomotives destroyed or damaged. 368th Group got 66 motor vehicles and 101 railroad cars and bombed marshalling yards and troop concentrations.

The last day of the month saw variable weather conditions with snow flurries and low cloud, and only 296 sorties could be flown. In many cases results of attacks were unobserved because of poor visibility and claims were considerably below previous levels.

362nd Group, directed to cooperate with III Corps, found poor weather over the target area and flew farther east to hit TRIER and other German towns. 354th Group, involved in a similar situation with XX Corps primary targets, went east to hit a bridge at BINGEN (M-1254) and fired the town of INGLEHEIM (M-2552), both operations being accomplished by bombing through holes found in the overcast. Targets of 406th Group were also obscured by weather and they attacked TRIER, while 365th Group, on armed recce in the TRIER-SAARBRUCKEN area, claimed destruction or damage of 49 railroad cars. Twenty miles south of MAINZ, 386th Squadron saw 20 Me-109s in combat with P-47s, joined the fray and claimed 4-1-1 without loss.

368th Group's 397th Squadron, reporting excellent control by Ripsaw 3, caused considerable destruction in the area of BLESALF (P-9983), killing many troops and wrecking much artillery. They saw ambulances pulling artillery pieces and destroyed several of these.

As the month came to a close, the enemy plan of attack appeared to undergo a radical revision because of Third U.S. Army's smashing counter offensive. He had all his armor in action, all of his original Panzer reserves in the west being either committed or disposed close to the battle area. He was thus forced to use the "shuttle system" of deployment. In III Corps area enemy counter-attacks against the infantry divisions southeast of BASTOGNE were repelled and seemed to be growing weaker. At the western end of the cold, snowy LUXEMBOURG-BELGIAN front, VIII Corps attacked and made good progress to capture REMAGNE (P-3956), cutting the road northeast of the town. The last day of December saw the situation well in hand. The enemy had gambled and lost. His threat still existed but it was rapidly being neutralized. The powerful Third U.S. Army's drive to the northeast, the pressure of First U.S. Army and British forces, and the staggering losses he had received at the hands of fighter-bombers, left him only two choices, (1) To fight on hopelessly in a losing battle, or (2) To retire to his bastions in the SIEGFRIED LINE, there to secure a respite; brief though it might be.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

1 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	12
Sorties	126
Tons Bombs on Tgts	29.25
Frags	9
Leaflet Bombs	23
Claims (air)	3-0-0
Losses (a/c and pilots)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	14/10

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	41
Tanks	3
Locomotives	9
Railroad Cars	32
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	9
Buildings	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	27

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	1
Towns	3
Rail Cuts	2
Power Lines Cut	1

2 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	26
Sorties	281
Tons Bombs on Tgts	90.75
Frags	18
Napalm	7
M-76	22
Rockets	14
Claims (ground)	7-0-2
Losses (a/c and pilots)	9

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	38/36
P/R Sorties	10/5
Artillery Sorties	2/0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	46
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	10
Locomotives	35
Railroad Cars	229
Gun Positions	8
Vessels and Barges	24
Buildings	12
Docks	2
Oil Depots	2
Horse-drawn Vehicles	8

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	13
Troop Concentrations	1
Towns	6
Rail Cuts	35

XXIV TAC

3 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	1
Sorties	8
Tons Bombs on Tgts	2
Frags	4

One town was attacked.

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4 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	5
Sorties	57
Tons Bombs on Tgts	15
Frags	26
Incendiaries	8
Rockets	26
Losses (a/c and pilots)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	2/1
P/R Sorties	2/2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	22
Locomotives	5
Railroad Cars	49
Buildings	10

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	2
Towns	2
Rail Cuts	4

---

5 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	16
Sorties	168
Tons Bombs on Tgts	46
Frags	4
Leaflets	24
M-76	17
Rockets	52

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	20/14
P/R Sorties	18/5
Artillery Sorties	2/0
Claims	0-0-2

C. Night Fighters:

Sorties	7
Claims	30 Motor Transport
Losses	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Locomotives	30
Railroad Cars	108
Gun Positions	4
Buildings	11

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	5
Towns	3
Bridges	1
Rail Cuts	8

---

6 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	9
Sorties	129
Tons Bombs on Tgts	53.5
Frags	1.5
M-76	3.5
Rockets	24
Losses (a/c and pilots)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

P/R Sorties	2/2

C. Night Fighters:

Sorties	6

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	31
Locomotives	10
Railroad Cars	126
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	20
Buildings	2
Roundhouse	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	6
Towns	4
Supply Dumps	1
Rail Cuts	26

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7 December

No operations because of weather.

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8 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	20
Sorties	271
Bomb Tons on Tgts	67.25
Frags	165
M-76	5.5
Tanks Napalm	134
Rockets	27
Claims (air)	2-0-1
Losses (a/c and pilots)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	16/16
P/R Sorties	15/10
Artillery Sorties	4/0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	7
Locomotives	8
Railroad Cars	6
Gun Positions	20
Buildings	2

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	5
Troop Concentrations	3
Fortresses	11
Towns	13
Rail Cuts	2

---

9 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	5
Sorties	56
Tons Bombs on Tgts	3.5
Tons M-76	2
Rockets	12

B. Reconnaissance:

Weather Recce Sorties	3/3

C. Night Fighters:

Sorties	2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Gun Positions Destroyed	1
Troop Concentrations Attacked	1

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10 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	6
Sorties	32
Tons Bombs on Tgts	10
Tanks Napalm	4
M-76	8
Rockets	6
Claims (air)	1-0-0

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	10/10
P/R Sorties	6/6

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	4
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	5
Locomotives	20
Railroad Cars	126
Buildings	11
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	4
Towns	2
Rail Cuts	5
Power Line Cuts	1

---

11 December

No Operations because of weather.

12 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	20
Sorties	256
Tons Bombs on Tgts	88.5
Frags	64
Tanks Napalm	16
Leaflets	27
Rockets	4
Claims (air)	11-2-2
Losses (a/c)	8
Losses (pilots)	7

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	28/18
P/R Sorties	22/16
Artillery Sorties	6/2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	31
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	2
Locomotives	11
Railroad Cars	278
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	22
Buildings	36
Barracks	1
Railroad Shops	2
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1
Oil Storage Tanks	7

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	13
Troop Concentrations	2
Towns	2
Road Junctions	1
Storage Depots	1
Ammunition Dumps	1
Rail Cuts	11

---

13 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	3
Sorties	40
Tons Bombs on Tgts	3.5
Frags	3

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Locomotives Destroyed	1
Railroad Cars	20
Rail Cuts	1

---

14 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	11
Sorties	131
Tons Bombs on Tgts	35
Frags	26
Tanks Napalm	14
Leaflets	28
Rockets	12

B. Reconnaissance:

Weather Recce Sorties	8/8
Night Photo Sorties	8/5

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	28
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	1
Locomotives	6
Railroad Cars	55
Buildings	2
Gas Tanks	1
Gas Dump	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	8

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	5
Troop Concentrations	2
Towns	7
Rail Cuts	5

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15 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	10
Sorties	133
Tons Bombs on Tgts	41
Frags	69
Tanks Napalm	22

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	20/14
P/R Sorties	9/5
Artillery Sorties	6/2
Night Photo Sorties	3/2

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	5
Claims	5 Motor Transport Destroyed

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	6
Locomotives	7
Railroad Cars	52
Bridges	2
Gun Positions	2
Buildings	27

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	1
Troop Concentrations	3
Towns	4
Supply Dumps	2
Barracks	1
Rail Cuts	1

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16 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	21
Sorties	237
Tons Bombs on Tgts	47.5
M-76	15
Tanks Napalm	81
Frags	106
Leaflets	28
Rockets	22
Claims (air)	0-0-1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	28/22
P/R Sorties	19/17
Artillery Sorties	6/2
Night Photo Sorties	8/1

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	19
Claims	40 Motor Transport Destroyed or Damaged

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	123
Locomotives	40
Railroad Cars	608
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	5
Buildings	16
Round House	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	11
Towns	7
Rail Cuts	10
Enemy Troops Killed	120

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17 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	29
Sorties	356
Tons Bombs on Tgts	93.75
Frags	198
Tanks Napalm	88
M-76	22
Phosphorous Inc	10
Rockets	70
Claims (air)	17-3-1
Losses (a/c and pilots)	9

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	38/38
Tac/R Photo Sorties	6/6
P/R Sorties	17/5
Artillery Sorties	6/5
Night Photo Sorties	6/3
Claims	7-0-0

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	9
Claims	30 Motor Transport Destroyed or Damaged

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	51
Locomotives	12
Railroad Cars	205
Buildings	19
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	2
Gun Positions	54
Railway Station	1
Bridges	2
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2

Attacked:

Fortress	1
Towns	11
Command Posts	2
Marshalling Yards	9
Troop Concentrations	2
Dumps	3
Bridges	1
Rail Cuts	4
Highway Cuts	2

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18 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	5
Sorties	66
Tons Bombs on Tgts	16
Frags	15
M-76	8
Tanks Napalm	15
Phosphorous	14
Claims (air)	4-0-0
Losses (a/c and pilots)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	18/10

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	58
Tanks	2
Locomotives	4
Railroad Cars	46
Gun Positions	27
Buildings	1
Supply Stocks	3
Storage Tanks	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	1
Supply Dumps	1
Rail Cuts	3

---

19 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	8
Sorties	102
Tons Bombs on Tgts	27
Frags	26
M-76	8
Claims (air)	10-1-1
Losses (a/c and pilots)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	24/20
Claims (air)	1-0-0

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	3/2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	49
Tanks	1
Locomotives	5
Railroad Cars	112
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	2
Buildings	7
Horse-drawn Vehicles	11

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	4
Tank Concentrations	1
Towns	2
Rail Cuts	8

---

20 December

No Operations because of weather, except 2 Tac/R Sorties flown.

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21 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	8
Sorties	112
Tons Bombs on Tgts	17.5
Frags	45
Tanks Napalm	60
M-76	7
Losses (a/c and pilots)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	12/10
Night Photo Sorties	6/3

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	5

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	4
Railroad Cars	5
Barges	1
Gun Positions	4
Buildings	2

Attacked:

Towns	1
Highway Cuts	1

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22 December

No Operations because of weather, except 10 night fighter sorties.

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23 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	44
Sorties	493
Tons Bombs on Tgts	54.5
Frags	360
Tanks Napalm	133
M-76	52
M-27	22
Rockets	98
Claims (air)	32-3-10
Losses (a/c)	9

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	28/26
P/R Sorties	12/11
Claims	1-0-0
Losses	1

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	12
Claims (air)	1
Losses	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	263
Locomotives	3
Railroad Cars	57
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	26
Bridges	3
Gun Positions	36
Buildings	19
Oil Dumps	1
Radar Stations	1
Radio Trucks	3
Tents	3
Horse-drawn Vehicles	20

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	4
Troop Concentrations	1
Towns	5
Rail Cuts	5

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24 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	61
Sorties	652
Tons Bombs on Tgts	161
Frags (tons)	28.16
Incendiaries (tons)	50.75
Rockets	96
Claims	22-3-10
Losses (a/c)	9
Losses (pilots)	8

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	62/60
P/R Sorties	19/19
Artillery Sorties	2/2
Night Photo Sorties	10/5
Claims (air)	1-0-0
Losses (a/c)	2
Losses (pilots)	1

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	10
Claims (air)	1-0-0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	588
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	117
Locomotives	3
Railroad Cars	115
Gun Positions	68
Dumps	4
Buildings	14
Horse-drawn Vehicles	31
Barges	24
Bridges	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	7
Troop Concentrations	12
Towns	31
Rail Cuts	15
Highway Cuts	1
Tunnels Blocked	2
Personnel Killed	30

---

25 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	61
Sorties	599
Tons Bombs on Tgts	205.25
Frags	24.28
Napalm (gal)	14,550
M-76	39
Rockets	88

Claims (air)	6-0-3
Losses (a/c and pilots)	7

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	74/72
P/R Sorties	19/18
Night Photo Sorties	8/7
Claims (air)	0-0-1

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	20
Claims (air)	1-0-0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	766
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	74
Locomotives	2
Railroad Cars	70
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	71
Buildings	46
Oil Storage Tanks	3
Horse-drawn Vehicles	8

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	4
Troop Concentrations	2
Towns	31
Tunnels	1
Rail Cuts	2
Highway Cuts	9
Troops Killed	80

---

26 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	59
Sorties	558
Tons Bombs on Targets	157
Frags	54.12
Tanks Napalm	111
M-76	27
Rockets	86
Claims (air)	22-1-11
Losses (a/c)	12
Losses (pilots)	6

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	68/68
P/R Sorties	22/22
Artillery Sorties	2/2
Night Photo Sorties	7/6
Losses	2

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	20
Claims (air)	2-0-0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	412
Locomotives	1
Railroad Cars	56
Buildings	61
Gun Positions	26
Dumps	2
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	34
Horse-drawn Vehicles	26
Ammunition Stacks	83
Bridges	2

Attacked:

Towns	34
Marshalling Yards	3
Rail Cuts	14
Tunnels Blocked	1

---

27 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	57
Sorties	544
Tons Bombs on Tgts	148.75
Tons Incendiaries	47.7
Tons Frags	16.45
Claims (air)	2-0-1
Claims (ground)	1-0-0
Losses (a/c)	5
Losses (pilots)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	72/72
P/R Sorties	20/20
Night Photo Sorties	15/13

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	12

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	434
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	90
Locomotives	15
Railroad Cars	336
Bridges	2
Gun Positions	42
Dumps	11
Buildings	43
Roundhouses	2
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	17
Troop Concentrations	15
Towns	22
Rail Cuts	19
Highway Cuts	6
Personnel Killed	145
Tunnels Blocked	1

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28 December

No Operations because of weather except 4 unsuccessful Tac/R Sorties.

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29 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	38
Sorties	456
Tons Bombs on Tgts	168.5
Tons Frags	26.1
Tanks Napalm	82
M-76	27
M-36	6
Rockets	66
Losses (a/c)	6
Losses (pilots)	5

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	64/63
P/R Sorties	13/11
Night Photo Sorties	16/12

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	15
Claims (air)	2-1-2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	130
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	72
Locomotives	4
Railroad Cars	208
Gun Positions	17
Dumps	2
Buildings	41
Command Post	1
Tunnels	3
Radar Stations	1
Ammunition Stacks	12
Warehouses	2
Barracks	3

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	13
Troop Concentrations	3
Towns	12
V-1 Sites	1
Rail Cuts	28
Highway Cuts	1

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30 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	44
Sorties	492
Tons Bombs on Tgts	203.75
Tons Frags	16.63
Tons Napalm	27
Tons Incendiary	4.25
Rockets	114
Losses (a/c and pilots)	6

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	40/26
P/R Sorties	2/2
Artillery Sorties	6/0

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	165
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	62
Locomotives	22
Railroad Cars	468
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	25
Dumps	4
Buildings	43
Roundhouses	4
Watertower	1
Oil Tanks	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	17
Troop Concentrations	7
Towns	18
Rail Cuts	56
Highway Cuts	1
Personnel Killed	40

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31 December

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	25
Sorties	296
Tons Bombs on Tgts	128
Tons Frags	14.69
Tons Napalm	7.15
Tons Incendiaries	10.25
Rockets	22
Claims (air)	4-1-1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	58/36
P/R Sorties	7/6
Artillery Sorties	4/2

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	15
Claims (air)	1-0-0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	125
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	9
Locomotives	1
Railroad Cars	68
Bridges	4
Gun Position	1
Buildings	17

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	9
Troop Concentrations	1
Towns	13
Rail Cuts	17
Highway Cuts	8

CLAIMS AND RESULTS OF ATTACKS

BY XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

1 December through 31 December 1945

	DEST.	PROB. DEST.	DAMAGED
ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN AIR	138	14	42
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ON GROUND	8	-	5
MOTOR TRANSPORT	2,754	85	37
TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES	332	40	185
LOCOMOTIVES	211	5	53
RAILROAD CARS	1,605	213	2,313
BRIDGES	9	3	16
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	378	36	98
DUMPS	31	1	11
BUILDINGS	444	26	147
HORSE-DRAWN VEHICLES	125	-	54
BARGES	1	-	2

OTHER STATISTICS

MARSHALLING YARDS ATTACKED	114
AIRFIELDS ATTACKED	3
TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ATTACKED	107
RAIL CUTS	314
ROAD CUTS	28

JANUARY

1. INTRODUCTION.

a. General.-- Opening the year of 1945, the XIX Tactical Air Command-Third US Army team had a big job on its hands before it could resume the assault of the SIEGFRIED LINE. The German breakthrough into the ARDENNES had been checked but not yet smashed. The enemy columns which had surged toward the MEUSE were beginning to withdraw, for the wily Rundstedt's best-laid plans had been wrecked on the rock of BASTOGNE.

January was to see the complete reduction of the once-threatening ARDENNES salient. As the German withdrawal turned to hasty retreat, XIX TAC, on 22 January, rolled up its record score of the war against enemy motor transport, destroying or damaging 1,713 vehicles on the roads running east from the ARDENNES. By the end of January the enemy had been driven back to the point from which he launched his desperate offensive, and our forces were hammering hard at his SIEGFRIED LINE defenses.

With the sudden shift of emphasis to the northward in December, Third Army Headquarters had moved from NANCY, FRANCE, to the city of LUXEMBOURG, in the little Duchy of the same name. On 8 January Advance Headquarters of XIX TAC likewise moved from NANCY to LUXEMBOURG, where subsequent operations were conducted from the office building of the ARBED steel corporation.

Operating with 8 combat groups during January, XIX TAC flew 5,937 fighter-bomber sorties, as compared with 6,651 in December, 3,509 in November, 4,790 in October, 7,791 in September and 12,292 in August.

On 1 January operations were begun with the 354th Group at ROSIERES-EN-HAYE; 362nd Group and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron at ETAIN; 405th Group at ST. DIZIER; 406th Group at MOURMELON; 365th Group at METZ; 367th Group and the 368th Group at JUVINCOURT; and the 361st Group (on DS from the Eighth Air Force) at ST DIZIER; all in FRANCE. The 10th Photo Group, Reconnaissance, was located at CONFLANS, FRANCE, and the 100th Fighter Wing was at METZ.

On 4 January the 368th Group moved from JUVINCOURT to METZ and on 30 January the 406th Group moved from MOURMELON to METZ. During the month XIX TAC lost two Groups, the 365th Group on 30 January and the 361st Group on 31 January, as the urgency of the bulge disappeared.

b. Weather.-- Weather favored the enemy considerably during January. Heavy overcast, accompanied by snow and sleet, frequently enabled German motor transport and armored columns to move unhampered by our air power. Only 7 days during January were completely operational, 8 were non-operational and 16 days permitted partial operations.

c. Enemy Air Activity.-- The German Air Force attempted a comeback on 1 January when it struck at 14 Allied airfields including XIX TAC's Y-34 at METZ, FRANCE, which was strafed by 15 ME-109s from 0922 to 0930 hours. The raiders approached at deck level in flights of three and strafed singly in all four directions. The attack destroyed 20 of our aircraft; 11 were damaged Cat AC and 3 Cat A. Anti-aircraft units on the METZ airfield destroyed 12 of the attacking German planes. Third Army anti-aircraft units claimed destruction of 6 out of 10 German planes that hit the METZ area simultaneously with the attack on the METZ airdrome.

Aside from this ill-fated attempt at regaining air supremacy on the Western Front, the Luftwaffe showed itself in strength against XIX TAC units only two other times during January.

On 14 January 368th Group's 397th Squadron was attacked by 50 ME-109s and FW-190s 4 miles west of NEUSTADT at 1030 hours. Six of our aircraft and pilots were lost in the encounter; our pilots claimed the destruction of 2 FW-190s. On the same day five enemy planes were claimed destroyed for no loss when 395th Squadron of the 368th Group encountered 50 to 60 ME-109s and FW-190s just south of MAINZ at 1530 hours.

The greatest claims against the German Air Force, however, came on 16 January when our fighter-bombers claimed 14-0-3 in air encounters with the enemy. Most of this claim was made when 365th Group's 388th Squadron, on armed recce in the WORMS area, was attacked by 20-plus aggressive ME-109s and FW-190s and claimed 10-0-3.

Total claims against enemy aircraft during the month were 39-0-13 in the air and 1-0-2 on the ground.

d. Flak.-- XIX TAC aircraft losses for the month because of flak were unusually high. Out of the 50 aircraft lost, 35 were victims of flak. The enemy, realizing that the greatest threat to the success of its ARDENNES salient was American air power, built up a very strong anti-aircraft defense around the entire area.

The XIX TAC A-2 Flak Officer, reporting near the end of the German retreat from the Bulge area, said:

"The proportion of flak protection to troops and area involved (in the ARDENNES area) was higher than in any previous operation in this war's history.

"Flak units were apparently given the highest priorities in supply of fuel and ammunition. They must also have been given a great degree of freedom in moving over roads always taxed to capacity.

"In addition to the tremendous quantities of mobile flak assigned to this offensive, it would appear from prisoner-of-war reports and an analysis of developments that at least two large self-propelled flak task forces had been organized. It was the mission of these self-propelled units to protect the most important forward communications centers immediately upon their capture. Probably these units were to be relieved as soon as possible by mobile flak units and were to 'leapfrog' one another in movement toward the west.

"At the time of the enemy's farthest advance toward the west, when the attack bogged down, there were 545 light flak guns and 198 heavy flak guns (exclusive of self-propelled units) in the 450-square-mile area of the pocket from HOUFFALIZE westward. So efficient was enemy flak organization that at this time there were no communication centers in the "bulge" without an adequate flak defense."

e. Communications.-- The close proximity of the Command Headquarters of XIX TAC (NANCY, FRANCE) to the 8 fighter-bomber groups, which were located along the MARNE RIVER generally between REIMS and ST. DIZIER, made for good communications. When the Command Headquarters moved from NANCY to LUXEMBOURG on 8 January there was no break in communications. At one time during the month, however, a dynamited bridge in FRANCE caused our underground cable to go out. This created a temporary break in our good communications. Commercial underground cables were used throughout January.

2. CHRONICLE OF OPERATIONS.

The first day of the new year saw fighter-bombers of XIX TAC pounding motor transports of the enemy making their slow retreat from the farthest stretches of the "Breakthrough Bulge". Our pilots had as a priority target rail or highway rolling stock carrying troops or supplies from the ARDENNES area. The enemy was retreating slowly but definitely, fighting bitterly as he withdrew.

On 1 January XIX TAC fighter-bombers flew a successful day of sustained operations against enemy transport, tanks and gun positions. A total of 457 successful sorties were flown by 8 operational groups.

The 368th Group's 397th Squadron, on armed recce in the SINZIG area, located 50 MT in a bivouac area in the woods at L-2436, north of TRIER. Dropping 16 500-pound GP bombs and strafing, the Group claimed them all destroyed. On the same mission the 397th Squadron launched 16 rockets and strafed at L-4046, in the TRIER area, claiming destruction of 24 MT and damage to 14 other motor vehicles. This Group claimed a total of 82 RR cars and 161 MT during the day.

Flying in cooperation with III Corps, the 354th Group bombed a large warehouse at GRUFLANG, southwest of ST. VITH. The warehouse exploded and pilots reported debris that reached 2,000 feet in the air. The building was believed to have contained gasoline. Another explosion was observed by the 405th Group in the RR yards at AIZEY (M-2827) following an attack made by that Group. The pilots reported red flames reaching 1,000 feet.

P-38s of the 367th Group, on armed recce in the WORMS-FRANKFURT area, attacked the marshalling yards at Q-7486, northeast of HOMBURG, and a marshalling yard at NEUSTADT. Pilots claimed destroyed or damaged 102 rail cars.

The night fighter pilots pursued, but lost, a flying bomb believed to have been launched from the woods northeast of BAUMHOLDER at L-4418.

The Luftwaffe attacked 14 Allied airfields on 1 January, (see Enemy Air Activity). XIX TAC aircraft had no encounters with enemy aircraft, but 354th Group lost 2 aircraft and pilots in an attack on a flak position and a troop concentration in the woods northeast of LUTREBOIS (P-5753).

XIX TAC XXIX

Armored and infantry divisions of the Third Army were pushing deeper into the southern flank of the German salient in the ARDENNES despite icing conditions and 9-degree cold. Ground units reported "very excellent air support which played havoc with enemy armor" and made good advances possible.

a. First Fully Operational Day.-- All 8 fighter-bomber groups were able to fly on 2 January, getting off 42 missions totaling 407 successful sorties. In an attack on 20 tanks northeast of CIERVAUX at P-8166, the 405th Group claimed 1 tank and 3 half-tracks destroyed in one of the outstanding missions of the day. The Group lost 1 plane to flak.

Carrying out attacks in support of units of the VIII Corps, the 354th Group lost 4 planes to flak. Meanwhile, pilots of this group, claimed destruction or damage to a total of 10 tanks, 16 MT, 12 gun positions and 2 buildings. On the same day the 365th Group claimed destruction or damage of 111 RR cars and 7 locomotives.

Pilots of the 361st Group, on a fighter sweep in the BONN-FRANKFURT-KARLSRUHE area, intercepted 5 ME-109s north of PFORZHEIM (R-7133) and chased them to a point 8 miles west of STUTTGART where the P-51s destroyed all five enemy aircraft as they were trying to land on a grass field.

The 10th Photo Group flew 78 successful reconnaissance sorties and 13 successful night photo sorties; they lost 1 F-6 aircraft.

b. The Foe Still Formidable.-- At this time ground units were fighting fiercely in the BELGIUM salient. Although the enemy was retreating, his strength was still formidable. Third Army G-2 reports estimated an enemy strength of 17 divisions and 335 tanks in the breakthrough area, opposing Third and First US Armies.

By 3 January the US troops pushed the Germans out of ECHTERNACH, LUXEMBOURG town on the German border, reentering the city after their withdrawal three days before. Particularly heavy fighting took place at TARCHAMPS (P-6152) where enemy tanks were reported to be concentrated on the flank of the BASTOGNE corridor.

All XIX TAC operations were prevented on the 3rd day of the new year by a frontal system which caused an overcast at 600 feet, with freezing, drizzle and rain. Visibility was 1 to 2 miles and occasionally less than a mile in precipitation.

The bitter cold continued through 4 January, precluding any air cooperation with ground units for the second consecutive day. With the cold weather in the enemy's favor, along with the powerful fighting force he had built up on his left flank in the bulge as protection against the Third US Army, little gains were made by our ground units. Moreover, the enemy counterattacked on 4 January and made minor gains on the northwest side of the bulge and in the area of WILTZ (P-7153).

Only 1 uneventful 4-plane scramble mission went out on 4 January. In the morning the weather was ten-tenths, low clouds at 500 to 1,000 feet, with snow showers. In the afternoon the overcast lifted to from 1,000 to 2,000 feet at the bases, but the target areas had ceilings of 500 feet.

Weather continued unfavorable to full fighter-bomber operations on 5 January, but all of the Command's 8 groups were operational and got off 18 missions totaling 191 sorties. Snow had stalemated ground units and III Corps had been completely stopped. General von Rundstedt's forces were making a determined effort to reduce BASTOGNE. 354th Group's 353rd Squadron had 6 P-47s over the airdrome at GROSS OSTHEIM (M-9648) where 2 ME-110s were damaged by 12 M-87 frags. An hour earlier, the 356th Squadron, same group, dropped 2 M-87 frags on a landing field at HIRLIS (M-5281), destroyed 1 ME-109 and left the hangar burning.

The 365th Group had its 386th Squadron on armed recce in the TRIER area attacking the marshalling yards at SIEMERN (L-8553) where 10 P-47s bombed and destroyed 25 rail cars and cut the tracks in several places. Later in the afternoon 12 P-47s of the 378th Squadron dropped Napalm tanks, GP bombs and frags on the town of WORDEN (P-6056) practically annihilating it. Many explosions and fires were seen. One plane and pilot were lost in this mission because of flak.

c. Saar River Bridges.-- When the Third Army was forced to swing its force to the north against the southern flank of the German bulge in BELGIUM, the move left the Third Army front along the SAAR RIVER potentially vulnerable. It was here that reconnaissance played a stellar role in bringing to light a situation that could have upset the combined operations on the Western Front.

Reconnaissance revealed roadbed coverings on barges along the SAAR RIVER between MERZIG (Q-2195) and the MOSELLE RIVER to the north. Bridge ends were under construction at several points. It was believed that the barges could be quickly moved into place at these bridge ends to get nearby Panzer units across and launch an attack in that thinly-held sector.

Captain Robert J. Holbury, of the 10th Photo Group, volunteered to fly the "dicing" run to take low-level pictures of activity along the SAAR RIVER. In spite of a ceiling of 600 feet, he took off in his P-38 on one of the most dangerous missions flown since the Normandy invasion days. Captain Holbury's account of his flight read:

"Jerries were firing at me, but I was too busy to do anything but follow the river. Suddenly red balls, about three-quarters the size of billiard balls, were arching around me. I felt the sharp impacts as the wheel tried to jerk out of my hands and the right rudder went forward. I flew as close to the ground as possible while I looked for the damage. My left coolant gauge began creeping past the red line. I immediately feathered the prop. My speed dropped off from 330 to 250. After I rounded a sharp bend, intense flak again arched up. I felt my rudder jar and I knew I had been hit again. The right engine was hot; the coolant radiator on it had been hit three times. I stayed on the deck to the last minute. I landed OK - climbed out and patted that good right engine".

Captain Holbury returned to his base with the left vertical stabilizer shot off, large holes in the horizontal stabilizer, almost minus the left rudder and with hits all over the plane.

General Patton called it a "very superior performance".

The following day, General Weyland said:

"The 10th Photo Group and Captain Holbury as pilot are commended for the successful accomplishment of a very important, difficult and dangerous assignment when, in the face of intense light flak, very low altitude photographs were secured of the river crossing sites in the vicinity of SAARBURG".

For all practical purposes, the ground situation on 6 January remained static, except for several minor scrimmages where neither side made any noticeable gains. Visibility was 1 mile or less, with ceilings at zero to 1,000 feet over XIX TAC bases, preventing all operations on this day.

Intermittent snow showers, low ceilings and ten-tenths cloud coverage prevented all fighter-bomber operations of XIX TAC on 7 and 8 January. Third Army units fought their way slowly northward through BONNERUE (P-3859), thus cutting the main road between HOUFFALIZE (P-6172) and ST. HUBERT (P-3262) 101st Airborne Division patrols entered FAYS (P-5098).

Operations were limited to a single uneventful bomber escort mission on 9 January, totaling 24 sorties, as adverse flying weather continued.

All 8 fighter-bomber groups were operational on 10 January as the weather improved. Fighter-bombers flew 385 successful sorties in close cooperation and on armed recce west of the RHINE. This day's operations were high-lighted by the destruction or damage of 246 MT and 145 rail cars.

Meanwhile, ground units moved up against stiff opposition to take VILLERS LA BONNE (P-5750) and HARLANGE (P-6050), both southeast of BASTOGNE.

d. River Bridges Bombed.-- 362nd Group sent out 2 missions against the bridges and barges discovered by the "dicing" flight of Capt. Holbury on the 5th of the month. One squadron attacked a bridge with 1,000-pound bombs at L-1528, due east of the city of LUXEMBOURG. Another squadron claimed damage to the bridge at L-1712, while squadrons of the 405th Group attacked a bridge at P-9148, near VIANDEN, rendering it unserviceable. 405th Group also strafed and bombed a bumper-to-bumper MT column at P-8749, southeast of VIANDEN, where its pilots destroyed 45 MT.

The top claims for the day (10 January) came from the 368th Group, flying cooperation with the XX Corps, when it destroyed or damaged 90 MT and 61 rail cars.

Weather again closed in during 11 and 12 January preventing all fighter-bomber operations. Visibility was usually less than a mile with very low ceilings. One successful reconnaissance mission, however, was flown on 11 and 6 on 12 January. In both cases the pilots braved the most adverse weather to take pictures of important movements in the SAARBRUCKEN area. They climbed through an overcast on instruments, timed themselves carefully, then let down through a ceiling of 300 feet in the SAAR VALLEY. Their missions were successful.

During the night of 11-12 January, 17 rocket projectiles hit the city of LUXEMBOURG, killing one officer, wounding two MPs and damaging a number of buildings. Third Army's Artillery Officer stated they were definitely not artillery shells but V-3 "baby rockets". The rockets fell within a 5-mile radius of the city.

Although the fighting strength of the German Air Force was now definitely on the wane, it could still commandeer considerable force. In fact, there was reason to think that the GAF might again attempt an assault on our airfields to neutralize our air supremacy.

On 13 January General Weyland alerted 100th Wing and all the groups of this Command, saying:

> "There is a strong possibility of further German air attacks upon our airfields within the next few days. Request you examine your air defense plan taking all necessary counter measures including constant inspection to insure alertness".

e. Weather Breaks At Last.-- On 13 January, the weather that had been so instrumental in the success of the German drive through BELGIUM improved, and our fighter-bombers had 4 consecutive days of good hunting. From 13 through 16 January 213 missions were flown by the 8 groups, totaling 2,228 successful sorties (more than one-third of the month's total) and some of the best claims of the month were piled up during this period.

On 13 January, XIX TAC fighter-bombers claimed destruction or damage to 157 MT, 16 tanks, 40 buildings and 168 RR cars. 406th Group strafed a CP at BOURCY, northeast of BASTOGNE, and left 3 fires burning, while 405th Group attacked a CP in the XII Corps front with unobserved results. 362nd Group operated along the SAAR RIVER attacking the bridges, piers and barges at L-1717, L-1615, L-1619 and L-1511, all about 3 miles southwest of SAARBURG, with good results.

After bombing the RR yards at NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5964), pilots of the 368th Group observed a terrific explosion with flames reaching 2,000 feet and white smoke to 6,000 feet. A large sheet of red flame covered the city for a moment and the concussion was felt by pilots at 5,000 feet. They said this was the biggest explosion they had ever seen. The group claimed 65 MT and 57 RR cars destroyed or damaged in this attack.

By 14 January, VIII Corps' 17th Airborne Division had reached the 51st British Infantry Division north of BASTOGNE, cutting the enemy salient in the ARDENNES in two. Minor advances were made as fighter-bombers continued their armed recce missions from the Third Army battle front to the RHINE, attacking bridges and convoys in a manner that Third Army's G-3 (Air) saw fit to describe as "magnificent air support".

All 8 fighter-bomber groups took to the air on 14 January in what proved to be the next best day of the month as far as claims are concerned. The weather was ideal, making it possible for the pilots to get off 61 missions, totaling 633 successful sorties. They claimed destruction or damage of 410 MT, 174 RR cars and 45 buildings.

The 406th Group struck at an enemy CP at LONGVILLY (P-6460), destroying 10 buildings and starting 5 fires, while artillery put effective counter-battery fire on flak positions. The town of ALHOUMONT (P-6270) was attacked by the same group after Tac/R P-51s identified the target. In attacking many enemy vehicles at the gate of the ARDENNES breakthrough, 405th Group claimed 217 MT destroyed or damaged.

f. Air-Ground Cooperation.-- An air support highlight of the day was an unusually effective piece of teamwork involving a recce pilot, fighter-bombers and VIII Corps artillery. Captain Bishop and Lieutenant Reed of 10th Photo Group's 12th Tac/R Squadron were adjusting fire for VIII Corps artillery when they saw 50 enemy armored vehicles entering HOUFFALIZE (P-6172). Bishop reported this to VIII Corps, and several volleys were fired into the town, starting fires. The pilot also contacted the XIX TAC Control Group, which directed 354th Group's 355th Squadron to the scene. The recce plane led the fighter-bombers to the target and adjusted artillery fire on flak positions while they bombed HOUFFALIZE. Bombing results on this city were believed good, although smoke prevented an accurate assessment of damage. In three other instances during the day, recce planes led fighter-bombers to targets.

A major day for aircraft losses was 14 January. The 368th Group lost 6 P-47s when 10 planes of the 397th Squadron were attacked by 50 plus Me-109s and FW-190s 4 miles west of NEUSTADT (R-2984). Two aircraft were lost by the 362nd Group, while 1 was lost by the 405th Group and 2 by the 364th Group. One of these losses was because of flak, the other 4 to an unknown cause.

XIX TAC
XXX

On the same day XIX TAC Groups destroyed 8-0-2 enemy aircraft in the air. 368th Groups' 395th Squadron destroyed 5 enemy planes when they encountered 50 to 60 Me-109s and FW-190s just south of MAINZ. The 361st Group destroyed 1 Me-109 while a reconnaissance plane claimed destruction of a He-280 and damage to 2 FW-190s.

The 425th Night Fighter Squadron had 11 P-61s out on patrol and on intruder missions. One plane strafed an MT concentration in the vicinity of NEUNKIRCHEN (Q-5984) and attacked the ST. WENDEL RR yards, with no results observed. Others strafed convoys southwest of KAISERSLAUTERN (R-0394) starting fires. Fires were also started in a town and factory near LEBACH (Q-4191).

Racing against the arrival of unfavorable weather, XIX TAC fighter-bombers got in 48 missions totaling 472 successful sorties on 15 January before a curtain of clouds came over the bases and target areas in the afternoon. Ground units were consolidating their recent gains and clearing out mine fields the enemy had laid in the path of his retreat. Mopping up west of BASTOGNE continued.

g. Rail Interdiction Plan.-- At this stage of the operations in the ARDENNES area the fighter-bombers concentrated on attacks against the enemy's rail lines. By a plan of rail interdiction, set down by the A-2 Target Section of XIX TAC, an attempt was made to isolate the battle field and disrupt the enemy's attempt at an orderly withdrawal from the ARDENNES. The plan proved successful, and the enemy's retreat turned into a rout. On 15 January alone, 41 rail cuts were effected and 159 rail cars destroyed or damaged.

Flying cooperation with the III Corps, 362nd Group struck at the marshalling yards at KRETTNICH (L-4303) destroying 10 to 15 tank cars and starting oil and gasoline fires. At the same site an ammunition car was blown up by strefing. This group had top claims for the day in its destruction of 68 MT.

The 406th Group was on armed recce in the TRIER area and over the eastern part of the ARDENNES salient claiming destruction of 41 MT and 55 RR cars. The 367th Group's P-38s hit a 7-car ammunition train at LINSBURG (G-3203) with 1,000-pound bombs. The cars blew up in a violent explosion.

So effective were fighter-bomber operations and artillery fire against HOUFFALIZE that the next day, 16 January, American troops of the Third Army's 41st Cavalry Squadron were able to enter the city and make juncture with the First Army's 2nd Armored Division. A new enemy pocket was formed to the west in which many German prisoners were taken. In the III Corps zone, the 6th Armored Division advanced to capture MICHAMPS (P-6162), northwest of BASTOGNE.

h. Another Luftwaffe Set-Back.-- Making an effort to fly as many successful sorties as possible before unfavorable weather set in 8 fighter-bomber groups flew 55 missions aggregating 577 successful sorties on 16 January. Fourteen enemy aircraft were destroyed in the day's operations and 3 were damaged, all in the air, while XIX TAC losses were 5 aircraft. The main enemy aircraft claims came when 12 P-47's of the 388th Squadron of the 365th Group were attacked by 20 plus aggressive ME-109s and FW-190s near WORMS. In the engagement the claims were 10-0-3 enemy aircraft in the air for a loss of 2 P-47s.

Besides the best enemy aircraft claims for the month coming under this date, the 8 operational groups struck hard at enemy rolling stock - claiming destruction or damage of 435 MT, 56 tanks and other armored vehicles and 675 RR cars.

The rail interdiction program continued in full force. Air operations of this Command on 16 January were mainly on armed recce between the battle front and the RHINE, emphasizing attacks on rail movements. Pilots claimed having cut 49 rail lines and one RR choke point and destroying or damaging 16 locos.

In one outstanding mission on 16 January, a P-51 of the 10th Photo Group led P-47s of the 511th Squadron of the 405th Group to a vehicle concentration south of ST. VITH (P-8588). The ensuing attack accounted for the destruction of 78 RR cars, while the 367th Group's P-38s claimed knocking out 178 RR cars in the TRIER area.

i. Poor Weather Again.-- On 17 and 18 January, low clouds closed in over the bases and primary targets, with visibility ranging from one-half to two miles. The low clouds were accompanied by a slight snow and drizzle.

By this time the BELGIUM BULGE had been reduced to a mere bump. Third Army's XX Corps, operating inside GERMANY southeast of REMICH on the MOSELLE RIVER, advanced northward up to 2 miles on a 6-mile front and engaged in mopping up an enemy pocket at L-0805, 4 miles southeast of REMICH. On 18 January a heavy armored counter-attack was launched against the XX Corps. Enemy troops rode tanks into the foray; prisoners taken were identified as members of a Panzer Grenadier regiment of the 11th Panzer Division.

The low clouds continued on 19 January, but 5 fighter-bomber groups of this Command nevertheless flew a total of 17 missions amounting to 149 successful sorties. Patrols were flown in the VERDUN-BAR LE DUC and ETAIN-CONFLANS-METZIG and ECHTERNACH-ADEN areas. In many cases the bombs were dropped through the clouds on direction of FDP's.

The 365th Group, operating in the SAAR-MOSELLE river area, reported 6 direct hits in a marshalling yard at Q-4597, 8 miles west of ST. WENDEL, with no results observed. They cut the highway near L-1209, 3 miles south of SAARBURG. The 368th Group, meanwhile, attacked a train of 200 cars in the ECHTERNACH area and claimed the destruction of 45 cars and the damaging of 35 cars. The rails were cut in 8 places in this attack. Four of our aircraft were lost on 14 January.

j. The GAF is Shrinking.-- From 2 January through 19 January the German Air Force flew a total of approximately 1600 to 1900 sorties, according to the A-2 Order of Battle Section of XIX TAC, with unfavorable weather and a reduced gasoline supply as its limiting factor. During the same period, XIX TAC flew 3,785 fighter-bomber sorties.

On 20 January some local enemy withdrawals were reported, but in the meantime there were indications of efforts to reinforce the southern flank in the area of the XII Corps. XII Corps troops were within 2 miles of VIANDEN (P-9050) on the OUR RIVER, gateway town between LUXEMBOURG and GERMANY. Attacks were still being made against the XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division southeast of REMICH.

Weather closed in again on 20 January, sharply restricting fighter-bomber operations. At the bases there was a cloud overcast of from 500 to 1500 feet with rain and snow showers. Targets had an overcast of from 600 to 2,000 feet. Only one Group was operational - the 362nd - and they had only 3 missions totaling 10 successful sorties on weather recce and airfield patrols.

k. Jerry Poses As Ripsaw.-- A report made on 20 January indicated an attempt to get weather information from one of our weather recce pilots. At 0950 hours, about 5 miles south of COLOGNE, the leader of 2 P-47s of the 379th Squadron, 362nd Group, had just given the weather to Ripsaw on D channel and Ripsaw had signed off with "Roger" when a new voice came in and said, "This is Ripsaw. Give me a weather report". The weather recce leader requested a repeat. The voice ignored the request and asked, "How are the oranges"? The leader asked the voice if he was the same controller who had just been working with them. The voice repeated, "How are the oranges"? The leader then told him to go to hell and the voice said, "Listening out". The voice spoke slowly and irregularly, and not like our own Ripsaw.

There could be no mistaking the enemy's withdrawal from the BULGE area on 21 January, although enemy resistance continued on the north and south flanks in an attempt to keep all escape routes open. Unfavorable flying weather again favored the enemy during his retreat.

Fighter-bombers were able to get off but 4 missions totaling 53 successful sorties. Two of the missions were escort to IX Bombardment Division and 2 were armed recce in the TRIER area. Poor visibility prevented observations of bombing and strafing results, but specific claims were 1 MT and 1 tank destroyed and 5 rail lines cut; hits were observed on a supply dump and a RR tunnel in the BITBURG area.

l. Record Day in Destruction of Enemy Transport.-- A surprising break came in the weather over the Third Army front on 22 January and all of XIX TAC fighter-bomber groups took to the air in 57 missions, totaling 627 successful sorties to set a record for this Command in the destruction of enemy transports.

The enemy retreat from the ARDENNES area had been stepped up by 22 January and the shrinking escape routes were packed with columns of enemy vehicles. On the ground, rearguard resistance was still being encountered by XII Corps on the southern flank of the salient. Steady gains were being made, however, and the gateway town of VIANDEN was almost in Allied hands.

On the banner day of 22 January, the Luftwaffe was conspicuous by its absence. XIX TAC pilots dropped high-explosives and incendiaries, fired rockets and strafed the bumper-to-bumper columns of enemy MT, tanks and horse-drawn vehicles to claim the destruction of 1,177 motor vehicles and damage to 536 others!

This total of 1,713 MT destroyed or damaged was more than double the best previous day's record of XIX Tactical Air Command, established on 1 September 1944, when pilots claimed destruction or damage of 843 motor vehicles, chiefly against retreating enemy columns out of the LOIRE.

Fighter-bomber pilots flew armed recce, bomber escort, fighter sweeps and alert patrols in addition to what Third Army's G-3 (Air) representatives described as "wonderful air support" to its advancing ground forces.

The 368th Group piled up the biggest MT score of this record-breaking day, claiming 589 destroyed or damaged. One squadron reported great congestion caused by destruction of the DASBURG bridge over the OUR RIVER by Ninth Air Force medium bombers. "Movement of enemy vehicles was like a rout", pilots reported, "even better than in the liquidation of the FALAISE gap in August".

The 362nd Group flew in cooperation with III and VII Corps and claimed destruction or damage of 445 MT, 45 gun positions and 19 armored vehicles. One squadron, the 378th, on a single mission near PRUM (P-9478), claimed 90 MT destroyed. This group lost 5 of the 8 aircraft that were lost in this day's battle. Two aircraft of 368th Group were forced to belly in and the 406th Group lost 1 aircraft to flak.

The 405th Group was supporting the XII Corps when their pilots claimed destruction of 255 MT, claiming 100 MT in a single concentration hit by 511th Squadron at P-8557, on the OUR RIVER north of VIANDEN. The 367th Group claimed destruction or damage of 128 MT while the 406th Group claimed destruction or damage of 170 MT.

Besides the tremendous MT claims on 22 January, 198 RR cars were claimed destroyed or damaged.

This grand achievement of XIX TAC fighter-bombers did not go unnoticed. General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the United States Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C., wired his congratulations to the Ninth Air Force. The commendation was sent from Ninth Air Force to XIX TAC. It read:

> "It is indicated from preliminary reports of operations for period 22/23 January, inclusive, that your aggressive crews established a new all time high in number of German transport destroyed. The previous record set at Falaise seems to have been almost doubled. This looks like excellent solution to German transport fuel problem. Highly commendable are the speed with which your command reacted to opportunities presented and the thoroughness of attacks. The spirit demonstrated, not only for this show but for the consistent determination of your units to do more than their share, has proved an inspiration to everyone. Please accept my congratulations for yourself and all personnel involved".

Lieutenant General Carl T. Spaatz, Commanding General of the U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Forces in Europe, wired Ninth Air Force Headquarters:

> "Operations of the Ninth Air Force today were most outstanding. Their effect on our enemy must have been terrific. My heartiest congratulations to all concerned, particularly to those pilots who made five sorties during the day".

Major General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force, sent the message to Brigadier General O. P. Weyland, Commanding General of XIX TAC, adding:

> "For this superb performance which reflects great credit on your Command and this Air Force, I add my sincere congratulations".

General Weyland sent the commendation to the groups of XIX TAC, saying:

> "For information on who did it, look in your own ops flashes. Germans claim great strategic withdrawal with only one army NYR. Yesterday was beautiful example of tactical cooperation between recce, fighter control, ground control and fighters. I am plenty proud of you all".

In a separate, earlier commendation, General Weyland said to all personnel of XIX TAC:

> "Today, 22 January 1945, is a banner day in the history of the XIX Tactical Air Command. Your accomplishments today were outstanding, preliminary reports indicating that you have destroyed over seventeen hundred motor transport vehicles as well as numerous guns, enemy troops, et cetera.
>
> "As your Commander, I congratulate you on a job well done. May your good shooting continue".

Although the approach of a frontal system on 23 January brought low ceilings and snow, permitting only 4 fighter-bomber groups to operate and stopping all operations shortly after noon, those squadrons which were able to fly obtained excellent results. The German columns were withdrawing rapidly from the salient at this time, fighting stubborn rearguard action. VIII and III Corps units, pushed eastward hot on the Germans' heels, encountering numerous mines, blown bridges and road blocks that slowed their advance considerably. A counter-attack with 6 tanks in the vicinity of FOUHREN (P-9847), south of VIANDEN, was repulsed. WASSERBILLIG (L-1125), at the junction of the SAUER and MOSELLE rivers, southwest of TRIER, was captured.

m. Another Good Day.-- The fighter-bombers found good targets in their 23 January forenoon forays. In 18 missions, totaling 183 successful sorties, pilots claimed destruction or damage of 482 MT, 60 RR cars and 30 buildings.

The 368th Group, flying 3 missions in cooperation with XII Corps, claimed the destruction or damage of 143 MT in bombing and strafing attacks at the base of the former ARDENNES salient. In the air at the same time, the 362nd Group, in 5 cooperation missions with III and VIII Corps, claimed 307 MT destroyed or damaged. Some of the MT were carrying ammunition and when hit blew up, cratering the highway. The 354th Group bombed and blocked the east end of a tunnel and bridge at L-6617, southeast of OBERSTEIN, (L-7123), while the 365th Group bombed and reported unserviceable a RR bridge at L-3647, north of TRIER.

All the time the fighter-bombers were playing havoc with the enemy from the air reconnaissance pilots were playing a big part in their job of acting as the "eyes" of ground units and for the A-2 Target Section of XIX TAC. On 22 January, reconnaissance pilots flew 56 successful Tac/R sorties and 4 successful P/R sorties; and on 23 January they flew 34 successful Tac/R sorties and 1 successful P/R sortie. Lt. Nichols of the 15th Tac/R Squadron made rendezvous with 2 formations of A-26s over LUXEMBOURG on the 22rd and led them to MT targets at P-8562 and P-8568, 28 miles north of LUXEMBOURG.

n. The Bulge Reduced.-- The ground situation remained virtually unchanged throughout 24 January. American "dough-boys" made minor gains of from 1 to 2 miles in northern LUXEMBOURG, gradually squeezing the Bun from the last vestiges of ground he had taken in his all-out push into BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG. As the enemy withdrew eastward, he covered his retreat by lavish use of mines, booby traps, demolitions and obstacles and by using small groups of infantry to defend key towns and critical terrain features. In the III Corps zone resistance stiffened as our troops reached the CLERF RIVER where the enemy attempted to establish a delaying position. However, the 26th Infantry Division troops crossed the CLERF south of CLERVAUX (P-7763), while III Corps succeeded in capturing BINSFELT (P-7871) and HUPPERDANGE (P-8067).

Despite unfavorable weather, which prevented operations on 24 January until about 1330 hours, fighter-bombers got into the air to fly 16 missions totaling 213 successful sorties in cooperation with Third Army units, armed recce, bridge attacks and fighter patrols and sweeps.

o. Bullay Bridge Attacked.--The 406th Group flew 3 squadron missions on armed recce in the TRIER-COCHEM area and attacks on the BULLAY BRIDGE (L-5661). The BULLAY BRIDGE was a railroad span across the MOSELLE RIVER that proved to be a priority target in XIX TAC's program to frustrate the enemy's orderly retreat into Germany. The bridge was hit time and again by fighter-bombers and mediums of the IX Bombardment Division. On 24 January P-47 pilots of the 406th Group claimed 9 direct hits on the bridge, and after the last attack the squadron leader reported 3 distinct separations in the span, plus rail cuts at both ends and at the mouth of the tunnel at the east end.

The 368th Group dropped 22 500-pound bombs on 75 MT and a fuel dump at P-9985, between ST. VITH and PRUM. One squadron destroyed 20 MT and started a large gasoline fire which made the area too hot to strafe. The 365th Group fired the town of KIRF (L-0906) with 18 direct hits with 500-pound bombs; another town and a tank and MT concentration in a woods at L-1012 were attacked, and 2 highway bridges north of BITBURG at L-1157 and L-1156 were claimed destroyed.

The "Black Widow" P-61 night fighters strafed the barracks at BAUMHOLDER, 3 towns and 1 MT in the OBERSTEIN area and 2 MT convoys near WAXWEILER (L-0266). Seven rockets were fired into a marshalling yard near OBERSTEIN (L-7125) and 2 tanks of Napalm started 3 fires which crews described as "tremendous" in warehouses in the MORFELDEN area.

p. Enemy Transport Problem Acute.-- The first report on the effects of the recent heavy destruction of enemy transport by fighter-bombers was forthcoming from pilots of the 367th Group on a fighter sweep in the COCHEM-SIMMERN area late in the afternoon of 24 January. Troops estimated at between a regiment and a division were observed marching and being shuttled by trucks in an east-northeast direction in the area south and east of COCHEM (L-5978). Approximately a dozen trucks were seen carrying troops short distances, leaving them to continue marching in columns of two, and returning to pick up more troops.

As the bridgehead across the CLERF RIVER was widened and deepened, U. S. elements were only 5 miles from the OUR RIVER, border between LUXEMBOURG and GERMANY.

Only 4 groups were able to operate on 25 January because of fog and poor visibility over the bases. The 405th Group, flying cooperation with the 5th Infantry Division, strafed and started 7 fires in a 30-car train believed half composed of oil cars, at L-2582, near GEROLSTEIN. Also attacking MT concentrations, the group claimed 152 MT destroyed or damaged.

The 406th Group bombed and caved in the south end of a tunnel at L-1654, east of BITBURG, while P-51 pilots of the 361st Group attacked an ME-110 5 miles northeast of MANNHEIM and an ME-109 on the deck east of KIRRLACH airdrome (R-5872), destroying both.

On 26 January ground units cleared WERSWEMPACH (P-8272) and HERMERSCHEID (P-8267) as fighting continued on high ground just in front of the OUR RIVER where the enemy was expected to make a stand.

Again, low cloud bases, fog and snow kept XIX TAC fighter-bombers grounded until midday and limited afternoon operations to 19 missions totaling 189 sorties. Reconnaissance got off 40 successful sorties. The 362nd Group's 379th Squadron dropped 16 500-pound GP bombs on a concentration of approximately 150 MT near PRUM (P-9478) and reported 11 MT destroyed and 20 damaged. The 378th Squadron hit RINSCHEID (P-9367) and 3 large fires were seen in the town.

Pilots of the 367th Group's 394th Squadron strafed a marshalling yard at M-1010, 10 miles northeast of KAISERSLAUTERN, destroying 3 locomotives and damaging 136 RR cars. The 510th Squadron of the 405th Group attacked a vehicle concentration, destroying or damaging 66 MT. The 368th Group, flying in cooperation with the 4th Armored Division, attacked a bridge at MUSTERT (L-4143) with no results observed. A later mission over the bridge, however, reported that the bridge had been demolished.

Enemy air activity during the month was limited because of several factors. First, Germany was faced with a critical gasoline shortage; second, they suffered a shortage of pilots; third, there was a shift of some Luftwaffe units to the Eastern Front at this time because of a build-up of Russian strength; and, lastly, their air activity was limited because of bad weather and snow on the airfields. Reconnaissance showed that most German airfields had only one runway cleared of snow while others had no clearance at all.

q. Poor weather again.-- All daylight operations on 27 January were prevented by a complex of low pressure areas and frontal conditions, resulting in low ceilings, snow and poor visiblity. The 435th Night Fighter Squadron dispatched 1 Mosquito and 7 P-61s on patrol, recce and intruder operations in the TRIER-SAARLAUTERN, PRUM-TRIER and SAARBURG-KAISERSLAUTERN areas. They attacked 2 marshalling yards, strafed 5 towns, and attacked 1 village with rockets, all with results unobserved.

The front line had been brought up to the OUR RIVER, and on 28 January patrols made a crossing of the river into GERMANY, where they met stiff resistance.

With the Third Army ground units pouring across the GERMAN border on 29 January, forcing the Germans to withdraw to their much-publicized SIEGFRIED LINE defense east of the ARDENNES, the fighter-bomber groups of XIX TAC were favored by a day of good flying weather. Pilots got off 38 missions totaling 491 successful sorties. They were supported by 1 group mission of 39 sorties by the 361st Group.

r. Superb Air Cooperation.-- Almost 1200 installations or items of heavy equipment were observed to be destroyed or damaged during the day 29 January in what Third Army G-3 (Air) representatives described as "superb air cooperation". Hunting was especially good when lifting of the weather disclosed large numbers of enemy vehicles still on the roads near PRUM, and a single squadron of the 406th Group destroyed or damaged 285 MT, 4 armored vehicles and 6 heavy artillery pieces, besides killing 30 or more Germans.

The 362nd Group damaged 2 FW-190s and 1 ME-410 in an attack on the BIELIS airdrome (M-5821) and claimed destruction or damage of 109 RR cars and the cutting of railroad tracks in 3 places in an attack on the marshalling yards southeast of FRANKFURT (M-6566) and at WORMS (M-4515), SIMMERN (L-8556), FRANKENTHAL (M-4505). Later the 386th and 387th Squadrons of the 365th Group claimed 5-0-5 Ju-88s in an attack on the OBER-OLM airdrome (M-3053). Our Groups lost 2 aircraft to flak and 1 to an unknown cause.

The 405th Group claimed 92 MT and 20 half-tracks destroyed or damaged and 30 soldiers killed on an armed recce mission in the PRUM area. After an attack on the supply dump at BETTINGEN (L-0450), ground controller reported the Group had excellent results and 12 bomb hits were noted in JUCKEN (P-9262) where an enemy CP was located. Six buildings and a highway bridge were claimed destroyed at PLUMCLENY (L-0742).

The 406th Group attacked the BULLAY bridge (L-5661), making 3 direct hits and 4 near misses. (Note: the BULLAY bridge actually collapsed on 10 February when it was attacked by 12 P-47s of the 395th Squadron of the 368th Group which dropped 8 500-pound bombs on it.) This Group claimed the destruction or damage of 338 MT in the day's operations of which 225 were in a single mission by the 513th Squadron.

In further attacks in the PRUM area on 29 January the 365th Group attacked pontoon bridges at L-1615, L-1111 and L-1609 and claimed them damaged. The Group claimed destruction or damage of 60 MT, while the 368th Group claimed 76 MT destroyed or damaged in the same area. The 367th Group's P-38s got 2 direct hits with 1,000-pound bombs on a 3-span highway bridge south of TRABEN-TRARBACH (L-5550), definitely weakening the structure.

On 30 January only minor gains were made by ground units. In the III Corps zone elements of the Third Army were pushing the enemy back through snow which in some places was waist-deep, forcing him to fight on the "holy soil" of Germany.

s. Month Ends With Poor Weather.-- A warm front on 30 January brought low ceilings, visibility of less than a mile to 2 miles, and snow, virtually preventing operations by this Command. Two fighter-bomber missions were airborne but had to be recalled without attacking, because of weather. All but 2 of 16 daylight recce sorties were unsuccessful for the same reason.

The month of January was closed out with a day of very poor flying weather. On 31 January, a warm front, which extended across Southern ENGLAND and Western FRANCE into Central GERMANY, brought rain, drizzle, poor visibility and ceilings which in some places were as low as 200 feet, preventing all fighter-bomber and reconnaissance sorties.

January ended with one thing established as a firm fact: The German soldier was no longer on the offensive, but instead was fighting a defensive battle. Third U. S. Army troops had spanned the OUR RIVER and had widened their bridgehead. This time they were on the "holy soil" to stay.

t. The Enemy Turned Back.-- January opened with German troops pushing their advantage in the ARDENNES salient relentlessly. The Third Army faced a tremendous job in turning its forces northward to relieve the pressure on the mighty bastion of BASTOGNE by assaulting General von Rundstedt's southern flank. On the last day of January, First Army troops captured MONSCHAU (K-9318), GERMANY, whence von Rundstedt's offensive jumped off.

XIX Tactical Air Command supported the Third Army in its drive with fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. Despite a month of unfavorable flying weather, our pilots were unswerving in their "consistent determination...to do more than their share" and returned to their bases to report some of the best claims against the enemy ever reported by any American Tactical Air Command.

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1 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	42
Sorties	457
Tons Bombs on Tgts	136.5
Napalm, tons	5.4
Rockets	77
M-76	42
Frags	79
Losses (air)	2
Losses (grd)	20-0-14

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	47
Successful	43
P/R Sorties	30
Successful	26
Arty/Adj Sorties	2
Successful	0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	195
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	42
Locos	10
RR cars	274
Bridges	1
Highway overpass	1
Gun Positions	4
Buildings	46
Trailers	4
Mobile guns	2

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	10
Troop concentrations	4
Towns	9
Railroads cut	37

2 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS:

A. Fighters:

Missions	42
Sorties	407
Tons Bombs on Tgts	177.50
Incendiary, tons	34.50
Frags, tons	85.05
Rockets	23
Claims (air)	5-0-0
Losses (a/c)	7
Losses (pilots)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	72
Successful	64
P/R Sorties	14
Successful	14
Arty/Adj Sorties	10
Successful	4
Losses (a/c)	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	180
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	55
Locos	12
RR cars	325
Gun Positions	28
Dumps	1
Buildings	22
Roundhouses	2
RR trestle	1
Horse-drawn vehicles	16
Radio tower	1
Powerhouse	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	8
RR tunnel (closed)	1
Troops (killed)	18
Troop concentrations	11
Towns	8
Railroad cuts	13
Highway cuts	1

3 January 1945

No fighter-bomber, night fighter or reconnaissance operations because of weather.

4 January 1945

Only 1 4-plane scramble mission was flown by 366th and 367th Squadrons of the 365th Group. Weather kept all other aircraft grounded.

5 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS:

A. Fighter:

Missions	18
Sorties	191
Tons Bombs on Tgts	45.5
Napalm, tons	6.1
Incendiary, tons	1
Rockets	14
Claims (grd)	1-0-2
Losses	1

B. Reconnaissance:

P/R Sortie	1
Successful	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	1
Locos	6
RR cars	127
Hangars	3
Buildings	10

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	6
Airdromes	5
Towns	5
Railroad cuts	7
Highway cuts	2

6 January 1945

No fighter-bomber, night fighter or reconnaissance operations because of weather.

7 January 1945

No fighter-bomber, night fighter or reconnaissance operations because of weather.

8 January 1945

No fighter-bomber, night fighter or reconnaissance operations because of weather.

9 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	1
Sorties	24

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	1
Successful	0

10 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	29
Sorties	325
Tons Bombs on Tgts	188.25
Frags, tons	15.73
Incendiary, tons	5.83
Rockets	16
Losses (a/c)	1
Losses (pilots)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	36
Successful	34
P/R Sorties	7
Successful	7

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	5
Successful	5

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	246
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	14
Locos	2
RR cars	145
Bridges	4
Barges	7
Dumps	1
Buildings	31
Horse-drawn Vehicles	14
Roundhouses	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	3
Troop concentrations	1
Towns	12
Railroad cuts	4
Highway cuts	3

11 January 1945

No fighter-bomber missions were flown because of weather, but 2 P/R sorties were initiated of which 1 was successful.

12 January 1945

No fighter-bomber missions were flown because of weather, but 6 Tac/R sorties (2 of which were weather recce) were flown in the SAARBRUCKEN area.

13 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	49
Sorties	546
Tons Bombs on Tgts	259.75
Frags, tons	14.17
Napalm, tons	14.58
Rockets	87
P & PW	28
Losses (a/c)	3
Losses (pilots)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	44
Successful	40
P/R Sorties	18
Successful	11
Arty/Adj Sorties	6
Successful	4

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	10
Successful	9

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	16

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	137
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	16
Locos	2
RR cars	168
Bridges	2
Buildings	40
Horse-drawn vehicles	7
Balloons	1
Piers	2

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	12
Airfields	1
Troop concentrations	12
Towns	12
Command Posts	1
Tunnel (closed)	1

14 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	61
Sorties	633
Tons Bombs on Tgts	209.75
Frags, tons	41.44
Napalm, gals.	6,300
Rockets	97
Claims (air)	7-0-0
Losses (a/c)	11
Losses (pilots)	8

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	64
Successful	64
P/R Sorties	27
Successful	24
Arty/Adj Sorties	6
Successful	6
Night Photo Sorties	11
Successful	10
Claims (air)	1-0-2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	410
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	52
Locos	10
RR cars	174
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	35
Buildings	45
Roundhouses	2
Mobile Guns	2
Prime movers	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	7
Troop concentrations	6
Command Posts	1
Towns	13
Tank concentrations	5
Railroad cuts	9
Highway cuts	2

15 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS:

A. Fighters:

Missions	48
Sorties	472
Tons Bombs on Tgts	168
Frags, tons	20.5
Incendiary, tons	.75
Napalm, gals	3,300
Rockets	48

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	46
Successful	36
P/R Sorties	11
Successful	10
Arty/Adj Sorties	6
Successful	0
Night Photo/R Sorties	4
Successful	3

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	164
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	15
Locos	9
RR cars	259
Horse-drawn vehicles	12
Dumps	2
Buildings	63
Overpasses	1
Gun Positions	36
Bridges	2

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	8
Towns	5
Command Posts	1
Railroad cuts	41
Highway cuts	2
Troops (killed)	50
Tunnels (closed)	7

16 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	55
Sorties	577
Tons Bombs on Tgts	194.5
Frags, tons	11.25
Incendiary, tons	9.5
Napalm, gals.	2,820
Rockets	69
Leaflets	12
Claims (air)	14-0-3
Losses (a/c)	5

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	42
Successful	42
P/R Sorties	14
Successful	14

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS:

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	435
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	56
Locos	16
RR cars	675
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	24
Dumps	1
Buildings	60
Gun carriers	1
Horse-drawn vehicles	41
Radar stations	2
Radio stations	1
Flak wagons	1
Roundhouses	2
Choke points	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	19
Troop concentrations	2
Towns	8
Command Posts	1
Highway cuts	2
Railroad cuts	49

17 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Night Photo/R Sorties	3
Successful	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Nil

18 January 1945

No fighter-bomber, night fighter or reconnaissance operations because of weather.

19 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	17
Sorties	149
Tons Bombs on Tgts	57.5
Frags, tons	2.34
Incendiary, tons	4
Losses (a/c)	

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	28
Successful	22
P/R Sorties	2
Successful	0
Arty/Adj Sorties	2
Successful	0

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	3
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	2
RR cars	80
Gun Positions	6
Buildings	6
Horse-drawn vehicles	20

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	1
Defended localities	4
Tank concentrations	1
Railroad cuts	9
Highway cuts	1

20 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighters:

Missions	3
Sorties	10

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	2
Successful	1
Night Photo/R Sorties	8
Successful	1
Losses (a/c)	2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Nil.

21 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	4
Sorties	53
Tons Bombs on Tgts	18
Frags, tons	8.16

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Night Fighter:

Missions	1
Sorties	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACK

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	1
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	2
Tunnels	1
Dumps	1

Attacked:

Towns	1
Railroad cuts	5

22 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	57
Sorties	627
Tons Bombs on Tgts	280.5
Frags, tons	25.65
Napalm, tons	7.14
Incendiary, tons	9.5
Rockets	54
Leaflets	27
Losses (a/c)	8

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	58
Successful	54
P/R Sorties	5
Successful	4
Arty/Adj Sorties	4
Successful	4

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	1713
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	56
Locos	1
RR cars	198
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	60
Buildings	37
Horse-drawn vehicles	64
Mobile guns	1
Power stations	1
Turn tables	1
Oil cars	3
Fuel storage tanks	1
Radio stations	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	6
Troop concentrations	1
Towns	9
Railroad cuts	28
Highway cuts	11

23 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	18
Sorties	183
Tons Bombs on Tgts	95.75
Frags, tons	6.8
Incendiary, tons	5.85
Rockets	40

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	36
Successful	34
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1
Photo Sorties	6
Successful	6
Arty/Adj Sorties	2
Successful	2
Night Photo/R Sorties	6
Successful	6

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	482
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	9
Locos	1
RR Cars	60
Bridges	3
Gun Positions	29
Buildings	30
Horse-drawn Vehicles	11
Fuel Storage Tanks	1
Power Plants	1

Attacked:

Troop Concentrations	2
Towns	9
Railroad Cuts	10
Highway Cuts	2
Tunnels (Closed)	1

24 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	16
Sorties	213
Tons Bombs on Tgts	76.25
Frags, Tons	11.9
Incendiary, tons	5.75
Rockets	55

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	20
Successful	16
P/R Sorties	4
Successful	4
Arty/Adj Sorties	2
Successful	2
Losses (a/c)	1

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	8
Successful	7

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	177
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	36
Locos	4
RR Cars	56
Bridges	3
Gun positions	37
Dumps	2
Buildings	3
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	2
Towns	3
Railroad cuts	2

25 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	20
Sorties	198
Tons Bombs on Tgts	43.5
Frags, tons	10.16
Rockets	28
Claims (air)	2-0-0
Losses	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	20
Successful	20
P/R Sorties	8
Successful	8
Arty/Adj Sorties	4
Successful	4
Night Photo/R Sorties	6
Successful	5

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	240
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	15
RR Cars	3
Gun Positions	4
Buildings	9
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	2
Towns	3
Railroad cuts	1
Tunnels (Closed)	1

26 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	19
Sorties	197
Tons Bombs on Tgts	38.25
Frags, tons	9.72

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	34
Successful	26
Tac/R Photo Sorties	4
Successful	2
Arty/Adj Sorties	6
Successful	2
P/R Sorties	12
Successful	10

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	219
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	13
Locos	4
RR Cars	145
Bridges	2
Gun Positions	5
Buildings	10
Barrage Balloons	1

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	2
Towns	6
Troops (killed)	80

27 January 1945

All nil except 7 night fighter sorties.

28 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	5
Sorties	70

B. Night Fighter:

Sorties	6

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Nil

29 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Missions	38
Sorties	491
Tons Bombs on Tgts	194.25
Frags, tons	19.40
Napalm (75-gal.)	40
Incendiary, tons	1.25
Rockets	47
P & PW Bombs	28
Claims (grd)	5-0-7
Losses (a/c)	3
Losses (pilots)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	40
Successful	30
P/R Sorties	20
Successful	6
Arty/Adj Sorties	6
Successful	4

C. Night Fighter:

Sorties	19

Destroyed:

Motor Transport	17
Locos	2

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Destroyed or Damaged:

Motor Transport	745
Armd Vehicles and Tanks	29
Locos	6
RR Cars	268
Bridges	3
Gun Positions	1
Barges	1
Hangars	1
Buildings	34
Horse-drawn Vehicles	6
Hvy Arty Pieces	6

Attacked:

Marshalling Yards	11
Airdromes	3
Towns	18
Railroad cuts	16
Highway cuts	4

30 January 1945

1. AIR OPERATIONS

A. Fighter:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	16
Successful	2
Night P/R Sorties	3
Successful	1

2. RESULTS OF ATTACKS

Nil

31 January 1945

No fighter-bomber, night fighter or reconnaissance operations because of weather.

FEBRUARY

I. General Summary of the Month:

XIX Tactical Air Command operated throughout most of February with five fighter-bomber groups, the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron. Aircraft of the Command were able to fly 604 fighter-bomber missions, totaling 5,594 day combat sorties; 639 reconnaissance missions, comprising 1,037 sorties; and 126 night fighter sorties.

Third US Army troops continued to close up on and penetrate the strong defenses of the SIEGFRIED LINE, fighting in FRANCE, BELGIUM, LUXEMBOURG, and GERMANY.

A definite phase of action had begun 18 January with the link-up of Third US Army and First US Army at HOUFFALIZE. This phase, which ended 26 February, was dominated by the establishment of bridgeheads over the OUR, SAUER, and PRUM rivers, and in the DASBURG and ECHTERNACH areas, the clearance of the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle, and the complete penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE on a wide, substantial front.

The primary program of the Command during the period ending 12 February was rail and highway interdiction. Unfavorable flying weather, however, curtailed air efforts.

The remainder of the month was dominated by the Command's attacks on oil storage, ammunition, and motor transport depots, railroad bridges, and commitment of units in close cooperation with ground troops. Towns were frequent targets as troops made these havens of refuge from the winter cold.

Existence of a relatively static ground situation and persistent inclement flying weather early in the month forced our fighter-bombers to range far eastward to smash targets on both sides of the RHINE VALLEY. Good hunting was, generally, found in marshalling yards and rail lines along the RHINE as the enemy attempted to move important forces eastward in an attempt to halt the Russian drive.

Third US Army reported many instances of excellent air cooperation by fighter-bombers as ground troops were engaged in bridgehead operations and in repelling enemy counter-attacks. Four-plane flights were frequently employed to provide constant cover for cooperating ground units.

The full offensive power of the Command was released on 22 February when, with better weather, our fighter-bombers joined in a massive Allied coordinated attack on the enemy's transportation facilities, and intensive operations continued through 25 February, during which time much destruction was wrought upon the enemy.

Following in the wake of the 22 February offensive, our fighter-bombers, on 23 February, piled up one of their best scores of the war, breaking previous records for armored vehicles and railroad cars knocked out. Flying 527 sorties, our fighter-bomber pilots claimed 724 motor transport, 1,308 railroad cars, 36 locomotives, and 269 armored vehicles.

The enemy's air activities during the month were primarily defensive as he sought to draw aircraft from the Western Front to meet the Russian threat in the East. Increasing use of jet-propelled aircraft as interceptors failed to hinder fighter-bomber or reconnaissance activity of the Command.

a. Order of Battle:

February operations were initiated with six fighter-bomber groups --the 354th, 362nd, 367th, 368th, 405th, and 406th Groups--the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, and the 416th and 425th Night Fighter Squadrons.

The 405th and 406th Groups were relieved from assignment on 8 February and the 416th Night Fighter Squadron was relieved from attachment to the Command on 13 February.

On 15 February, the 371st Fighter Group, with its ancillary units, was assigned to the Command and the 100th Fighter Wing.

Location of major units of the Command during the month was as follows (See Appendix A): Command Headquarters, Advanced, LUXEMBOURG; Command Headquarters, Rear, CHALONS-SUR-MARNE; Headquarters, 100th Fighter Wing, 368th and 371st Groups, METZ; 354th Group, ROSIERS-EN-HAYE; 362nd Group, 416th and 425th Night Fighter Squadrons, ETAIN; 367th and 405th Groups, ST DIZIER; 406th Group, MOURMELON-LE-GRAND and METZ; and 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, CONFLANS.

Ground advances were relatively limited and the fields were easily within striking distance of the battle area and targets beyond, necessitating no changes of location of groups.

b. Weather:

Persistent inclement weather during most of the month provided difficult ground conditions for Third US Army armor and infantry units, already handicapped by swollen rivers and difficult terrain, and blunted the effectiveness of air activities.

Weather unfavorable to air operations was prevalent during 22 days of the month, but fighter-bombers were operational 23 days, one more than had been forecast by the Command Weather Section. Operations were restricted, however, to less than 40 sorties on 3 of the 23 days.

c. Communications:

Because of the relatively static ground situation which prevailed throughout February, location of Command units was rarely changed and communications difficulties were at a minimum.

A converter, M-228, was installed at Command Headquarters, Rear and Advanced, and at Headquarters, 100th Fighter Wing and the Fighter Control Center to permit the transmission of a larger volume of classified teletype traffic in a high grade of cipher.

A highly-regarded addition to the Signal Section's equipment during the month was the acquisition of two Type 10 British Wireless Telephone Sets for use by the Command.

d. Enemy Air Activity:

The Luftwaffe was in dire straits during the month. Fierce fighting on the fluid Russian Front necessitated shifting of aircraft from the West to the Eastern Front. At the same time the enemy found it necessary to maintain sufficient air strength to provide an air arm for his forces fighting a delaying action on the Western Front.

An increase in German jet aircraft production and the increasing fuel shortage accounted for the appearance, in increased numbers, of jet-propelled planes. These were employed, primarily, for interception of heavy bombardment and recce aircraft and for reconnaissance flights, although they were also encountered at times by our fighter-bombers. Usual tactics of the ME-262's were to make one pass and then evade.

The German Air Force, comparatively dormant during the early part of the month, came up in force on 22 February to meet the coordinated Allied attack on rail targets and launched an estimated 400 sorties. This was followed by increased activity on the following two days.

XXXVI

Our fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft reported claims during the month totaling 23 enemy aircraft destroyed, 3 probably destroyed, and 19 damaged in air combat; on the ground the total was 7-0-3.

e. Ordnance and Chemical Warfare:

The chief ordnance problem during February was the inadequate supply in the Command of 500-lb GP bombs and caliber .50 aircraft ammunition. Resupply of bombs during February was sufficient only to meet immediate needs, and by 18 February the supply of 500-lb GP bombs was practically exhausted. RDX Comp. -B filled bombs were used instead. Fighter-bombers operations, however, were not hampered.

Caliber .50 aircraft ammunition supply became a "hand-to-mouth" situation and unusually high expenditures made the status even more critical. The situation was soon relieved, however, by resupply via air.

The Command Ordnance Section suggested that a requirement existed for a suitable ground target marker which would last for fifteen to twenty minutes. The marker would be dropped by attacking aircraft to pinpoint targets for other aircraft attacking later. Using the T-7 Target Indicator Bomb with an air burst at the desired altitude to produce a colored cloud with a minimum persistency of ten minutes seemed to be the ideal solution, but since this was not available, combat trials were planned using the British T.I.B. No. 8, Mk, spot fire, either red or green. Arrangements were made through the Ordnance Officer, Ninth Air Force, to obtain ten bombs from the British Air Ministry for combat trials.

It was reported that latest P-51D aircraft were arriving with several improvements, including a split belt holding pawls on all guns; false bottoms in inboard gun trays which limited the number of rounds of ammunition carried in inboard trays to four-hundred; and an improved gun camera compartment with a mechanical shutter protecting the lens, which opens when the wheels are in an "up" position.

In a letter, dated 6 February, to Lt Col Walter Simon, Ordnance Officer, Maj Gen O. P. Weyland commended officers and enlisted men of the Section on the publication of the "Ordnance-Armament Handbook", which was distributed late in January.

Highlighting Chemical Warfare activity during February was a demonstration of the use of HC M-1 Smoke Pots in airfield defense at airstrip A-82, 7 February, which was witnessed by Maj Gen Weyland, Brig Gen Homer L. Sanders, Commanding 100th Wing, Brig. Gen. C. C. Curtis, commanding 51st AAA Brigade, and representatives from the Defense Command and XIX Tactical Air Command.

The use of M-1 Smoke Pots for airfield defense was considered feasible and each Group was instructed to obtain 150 of these from the CWS Officer, 16th Air Depot Group.

A request for the reassignment of Chemical Air Operations Companies, presently servicing our Groups, from IX Air Force Service Command to this Command was not favorably considered by Headquarters, Ninth Air Force.

Preliminary information from the Armament Officer, 262nd Fighter Group, indicated that the use of White Phosphorus 100-lb bombs on flak positions and gun emplacements had been successful. A report and recommendations for the use of this weapon were to be prepared by the Chemical Warfare Officer of the Command when sufficient information was available to support such findings.

f. Research and Development:

Principal studies undertaken by the Operational Research Section of the Command, in coordination with interested staff officers, during the month, were the following: Review of procedure for control of aircraft, bomb strike camera development, missions and photo-calibration flights for Battle Area Control Units, bomb and fuse recommendations and weapon selection for fighter-bombing of various targets, and bridge destruction.

Review of Procedure for Control of Aircraft: At the request of A-3 Operations, the Command Operational Research Section reviewed prescribed control procedure as written in Command SOPs and presented observations of the overall problem in a report to the Chief of Staff, dated 3 February (See Appendix B).

Bomb Strike Camera Development: A visit was made by Dr. Nicholas M. Smith, Jr., Chief of the O.R.S. Section and Lt Col Neil Moler, of A-3, to the Photographic Section of the Office of Technical Service, Ninth Air Force, where Colonel G. W. Goddard, of the Office of Technical Service, Ninth Air Force, was developing mounting and cameras for obtaining bomb strike photographs from fighter-bomber aircraft.

Colonel Goddard had requested an operational P-47 for an installation. On arrival of the aircraft, a P-47-D-30, it was discovered that his method of mounting was impossible in this model (See Appendix C, Par 1-4). Consequently a plan was drawn up for mounting the camera in a bomb unit to hang on the belly shackle. It was considered that this mounting would have the advantages of requiring minimum modification of the aircraft, could be changed from one aircraft to another, and could, therefore, be employed for a maximum number of missions. It had the one disadvantage that it occupied one bomb hook and would be ruined on a crash landing. Colonel Goddard estimated that the camera would shortly be ready for trial.

Missions and Photo-Calibrations Flights for BACUs: Discussions were held during the month by A-3 Operations, Signal Section, the 405th Group, and O.R.S. personnel concerning missions for Close Air Attack Units, later termed Battle Area Control Units, necessary control procedures to be followed, and suitable targets (See Appendix D, Part II, Par 3). Preparation of an SOP was under way.

By 19 February some information had been obtained on the accuracy of positioning an aircraft over a ground point and the Operational Research Section prepared a memorandum on "Pertinant Data on BACU Operations" which was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on that date (See Appendix E).

In general, it reported that studies indicated a need for additional work to improve accuracy of control, although considerable improvement was noted. It was pointed out that all unsuccessful missions occurring between 2 December and 29 January had occurred before 1 January and were primarily due to lack of experience and proper liaison with other controlling radar stations.

A planned photo-calibration flight was run on 14 February. On two targets the errors were:

Range	Azimuth	Total
2076 ft. over	26.8°, ft. positive	218¼
1116 ft. over	49.3°, ft. positive	167¼

Runs were made on other targets but due to crowded channels were unsuccessful. Other than the crowded channel conditions, the mission was very satisfactory, according to the O.R.S. report, particularly the control given by Ripsaw 5, which monitored on radar and VHF during the entire 3 hours of the flight.

It was observed, however, by O.R.S. personnel that the data so far at hand was insufficient to make a statistical determination of control accuracy. It was declared sufficient, however, to indicate need for further such calibration and improvement of control. Discussions were held on suggestions that BACU No 4 be set up as a training unit for controllers and operators.

A new comprehensive SOP covering BACU operation was written by O.R.S. and was being put into effect during February. One of its main effects was to set up procedure for control of aircraft for blind bombing when targets cannot be located visually.

An impromptu photo calibration mission was conducted on 21 February by a tactical reconnaissance aircraft working with BACU No 2. This was done by A-2 Reconnaissance and the necessary arrangements for control were made through the TCC. From the standpoint of control the calibration went off smoothly, but results were somewhat negative. Although three photos were attempted, only one was successful. A quick Bomb Damage Assessment was possible, however, inasmuch as the target, a bridge, had been visually bombed earlier in the day.

Handling of Targets of Opportunity: An investigation, initiated at the request of SHAEF Air, was conducted during the month on the handling of targets of opportunity by TCC and FDP control units during the period 15 December 1944 to 31 January 1945 (Appendix D, Part II, Par 4). A previous report on the general subject had been made in the O.R.S. "Review of Procedure for Control of Aircraft," dated 3 February (See Appendix B, Par 6).

In general, orders are in effect, although not stated in any SOP, that aircraft are not to be diverted from their primary targets except by permission from Combat Operations at Command Headquarters, Advanced. Practically all such missions come under FDP control. Such targets are reported to the FDP controller, relayed to the chief controller at TCC, and then to Combat Operations. If the target is deemed to be of sufficient consequence, the original flight or other flights may be ordered to attack it. In any case the information is given to TCC and then to the FDP which is to control the specified aircraft. Targets are likewise reported by reconnaissance aircraft directly to the TCC, and the same procedure is again followed whereby aircraft are taken to the target by FDP. Other instances, fewer in number, occur whereby aircraft are requested by TCC to go to such a target by visual navigation.

There are, in addition, armed reconnaissance missions scheduled and FDP controlled whose function is to attack targest of opportunity. The efficiency of such procedure and number of attacks, according to O.R.S., had never been determined prior to the SHAEF Air request.

Bomb and Fuze Recommendations and Weapon Selection: Colonel James Ferguson, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3, requested, early in the month, that the O.R.S. Section prepare a chart giving bomb and fuze recommendations (See Appendix C, Par 5).

The O.R.S. Section subsequently recommended to the Chief of Staff that a committee be formed to make weapon recommendations for specific targets on the request of A-3 Operations, and that wall charts giving weapon recommendations be prepared for A-3 Operations by the Section and distributed to the Groups (See Appendix F, Par 1).

A Target Committee on Weapons was appointed by the Chief of Staff and began its functions late in the month. Members of the Committee are: Chief A-3 Duty Officer, Chemical Warfare Officer, A-2 Target Officer, Ordnance Officer and an O.R.S. representative.

Study of Bridge Destruction: Under development during the month was a theoretical analysis of the probability of destroying a double-trussed bridge with (1) a bomb of sufficient size to cut the entire span, both trusses, with one hit and (2) a bomb of such size that it will cut one but not two trusses (See Appendix F, Par 4). If the ratio was high, then on bridges requiring a larger bomb (possibly 2000-lb GP) than fighter-bombers can carry, the fusing should be designed for piers and abutments rather than for the superstructure. The analysis was also to emphasize the importance of choosing a weapon of sufficient size.

g. Reconnaissance:

In general, February proved to be an unfavorable month for reconnaissance operations, with weather eliminating almost all photo reconnaissance and limiting tactical reconnaissance.

The 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, flew 1,037 operational sorties. A summary of the month's operations revealed a total of 639 operational missions, including 227 photo, 392 tactical, and 20 night photo reconnaissance missions. Since becoming operational on 25 February 1944, the Group has flown 5,709 operational missions and 8,616 operational sorties.

On 8 February, the 160th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron reverted to XXIX TAC after being attached to the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, since the German counter-offensive. With three Tac-R squadrons during January it had been possible to schedule 36 Tac-R flights daily. The number was reduced to 24 flights daily on 7 February.

Tac-R fighter-bomber cooperation improved with better weather conditions late in the month and fighter-bombers were frequently led to lucrative targets.

On 22 February, Lt. Robert E. Bruce, with Lt. Leo M. Elliott, both of the 12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, performed an excellent visual and photographic reconnaissance mission under hazardous conditions.

Taking off at 1325, they flew a long route reconnaissance which took them over KOBLENZ, FULDA, and HANAU--locations which were then still deep in enemy territory--and despite very poor weather conditions, heavy haze, and 8/10 clouds, they returned to base two hours and twenty-six minutes later with a full and detailed report on all enemy rail movement in the area. Over 3,000 railroad cars and many locomotives were located and reported on as to loading and direction of movement. More than fifty-four different targets were pin-pointed, many of which necessitated observations at dangerously low altitudes for positive identification. Frequently, intense flak from ground positions around the targets prevented accurate visual observation. Lt. Elliott then made photo runs over the targets, at a safer altitude, to confirm visual information. In addition, bomb damage assessment photos were taken of a target left burning by fighter-bombers.

To facilitate rapid transmission of tactical reconnaissance observations from the plane in flight to the Corps of Third US Army and to the Tactical Control Center, a separate radio channel for all such reports was set up on 26 February. Each Corps Tactical Air Liaison Officer was given an additional VHF radio to be used solely in receiving tactical reconnaissance information and to request specific items to be checked by Tac/R aircraft.

Artillery adjustment missions reached a new high in the number of successful missions flown. Forty-five missions were flown and thirty-two, or seventy-one percent, were successful.

A photographic sortie of low obliques taken along the SAAR RIVER

on 5 January furnished material for a Third US Army artillery adjustment request on 2 February. Numerous targets had already been located from examination of this sortie and these had been engaged by Corps' artillery.

One of the more important targets not so engaged was a heavy pontoon bridge at OCKFEN (L-1614) which lay initially beyond the range of any piece in XX Corps' artillery. This "Bridge" consisted of permanent wooden approaches on either bank of the SAAR RIVER. Upstream were moored a series of double barges; across each set was laid a section of roadway. These sections were being used to form a pontoon bridge.

The artillery adjustment plane adjusted on the first target, the pair of barges nearest the approach. On the fifth round a direct hit was observed.

Adjustments followed on the remaining four sections. During this adjustment, a shell severed the guy ropes of one section of barges and the section started drifting downstream. Although prevented by orders from firing on the target, the pilot made a pass at the motor boat attempting to rescue the barge section and frightened it away from the barge. The mission continued until the remaining barges had all been sunk or damaged.

Third US Army requested 732 reconnaissance missions during the month, all of which were accepted by XIX Tactical Air Command. Of these, 326 missions, or forty-four percent, were flown. Two hundred and eighty, or eighty-six percent, were successful.

Flight "A", of the 39th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, consisting of six F-5 pilots, was attached to the Group, for purposes of training in bomb damage assessment procedure, on 7 February. The 155th Night Photo Squadron was transferred from the Group on 13 February.

II. Chronicle of Operations:

a. Closing Up on the SIEGFRIED LINE:

Third US Army, on 1 February, was hammering its way through the SIEGFRIED LINE along the German frontier (see overlay). A combination of fixed, prepared defenses, swollen rivers, and bad weather made the going hard and progress slow.

Low clouds, rain and poor visibility limited XIX Tactical Air Command to two missions on the 1st, both to escort medium bombers.

With better flying weather on 2 February, Ground units reported excellent air cooperation. Thawing snow and rugged terrain continued to impede operations, but VIII Corps' 87th and 90th Infantry Divisions advanced eastward up to 2 miles inside GERMANY in the area of the GERMAN-LUXEMBOURG-BELGIAN border. As they entered the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses, artillery and mortar fire increased and minefields became more numerous. Other Corps reported no appreciable changes.

Fighter-bombers ranged far eastward to smash rail targets on both sides of the RHINE VALLEY. Good hunting was found in marshalling yards and rail lines along the RHINE as the enemy moved forces eastward in an attempt to stop the Russian advance in the east. Our pilots claimed 585 railroad cars and 32 locomotives destroyed or damaged.

Highlighting the day's missions were attacks by the 362nd Group on rail targets and the 406th's strike at OBER OLM airfield. Pilots of the 362nd Group claimed 325 railroad cars destroyed or damaged and the 513th Squadron, of the 406th Group, claimed 10 enemy aircraft destroyed and five damaged on the ground in a rocket and strafing attack on OBER OLM airfield.

On ground made soggy by melting snows, VIII Corps continued its slow advance into GERMANY at the northern end of the Third US Army front on 3 February. Enemy defensive preparations continued on the III, XII, and XX Corps fronts where no changes in lines were reported.

Low ceilings, poor visibility over bases, and intermittent rain limited XIX Tactical Air Command activities to 3 missions, totaling 35 sorties, all uneventful escorts to medium bombers and weather reconnaissance flights.

Heavy mud and lack of air activity impeded the advance of ground units on 4 February as weather continued to favor the enemy. VIII Corps' 4th Infantry Division reported slight advances.

Continued inclement weather on 5 February prohibited air operations as BRANDSHEID (P-9881) and HABSCHEID (P-9587), the two key defense strongpoints in the north, were captured as the VIII Corps continued its advance. Other Third US Army units again reported no change.

1. VIII Corps Initiates Coordinated Drive:

The combined infantry and armored divisions of VIII Corps jumped off on the morning of 6 February in a coordinated attack into SIEGFRIED LINE defenses east and southeast of ST. VITH in the area of the SCHNEE EIFEL ridge. Gains of 2 to 3 miles were reported in drives through the mud and slush of melting snows and against moderate resistance from pillboxes and bunkers. Several counter-attacks were repulsed. Farther south, III Corps' 6th Armored Division crossed the OUR RIVER. XII and XX Corps reported no changes in their zones.

Weather, meantime, continued to hamper air operations. Although fighter-bombers were airborne, some of the target areas had low overcast at less than 1,000 feet and 1 to 3 miles visibility. Two primary targets near the battle line could not be attacked. Fighter-bombers flew 17 missions, totaling 214 sorties, on armed reconnaissance east and west of the RHINE, rail-cutting, airdrome attack, bomber escort, and alert patrol. Attacks were made on 10 marshalling yards, an airfield, and 10 defended localities; 17 rail cuts were made.

Fires were started, tracks cut and trains hit at the LANDAU marshalling yard by the 405th Group. One train contained flat cars loaded with motor transport.

Although weather prohibited air operations on 7 February, Third US Army ground troops attacked all along the 30-mile front from east of ST. VITH, BELGIUM, to the vicinity of ECHTERNACH, LUXEMBOURG, as well as in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle southwest of TRIER. Advancing 1 to 4 miles under bad weather conditions, crossing heavily swollen rivers, and traversing rugged terrain in the face of fire from SIEGFRIED LINE defenses, all four Corps now had elements inside GERMANY.

VIII Corps gained slightly in the SCHNEE EIFEL area despite counter-attacks. III Corps established bridgeheads on the German side of the OUR RIVER in the vicinity of DASBURG. XII Corps, attacking northeast, crossed the OUR RIVER east of DIEKIRCH and the SAUER RIVER north of ECHTERNACH and began building up these new bridgeheads inside GERMANY. In the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle, XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division attacked northward and cleared SINZ (L-0504) after brief street fighting.

Third US Army reported good air cooperation on 8 February as ground units made new assault crossings of the swift, swollen OUR and SAUER RIVERS despite heavy resistance. Existing bridgeheads were strengthened and short advances made through SIEGFRIED LINE defenses. In the VIII Corps zone, infantry was within a half-mile of PRUM, important railroad and highway hub. III Corps gained in its bridgehead north of DASBURG and XII Corps, reporting excellent air cooperation by the 362nd Group, enlarged its existing bridgehead and initiated a new one. XX Corps reported heavy resistance in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle.

Bad weather over primary targets forced fighter-bombers to seek targets farther eastward, although some close cooperation missions were flown with the XII Corps by the 362nd and 368th Groups. The former was commended by the Corps for its attack on FERSCHWEILER (L-0442) where three large explosions occurred and fires started. Twenty-eight missions were flown, comprising 309 sorties.

Outstanding mission of the day was the destruction or damage of 150 motor transport and armored vehicles by the 368th Group's 397th Squadron which attacked 200-300 motor transport and armored vehicles within a 10-mile radius of L-3090, believed to be the location of the 130th Panzer Lehr Division. Thousand-pound bombs dropped by the squadron caused havoc at marshalling yards, including those at LIMBURG and BAD KREUZNACH. The Group claimed 250 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

Third US Army units continued penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE at the north end of the front, strengthened bridgeheads in the center, and advanced on the right on 9 February, reporting good air cooperation despite inclement weather.

VIII Corps, farthest north, reported small gains in heavy fighting. Its 87th Infantry Division encircled the north portion of the wall of fortifications in its zone, advanced northeast to the PRUM RIVER and captured NEUENDORF (L-0988). III Corps reported no change, but XX Corps infantry in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle advanced slightly in heavy pillbox fighting, encountering severe artillery and rocket fire.

Fighter-bombers flew 18 missions, comprising 192 sorties, on armed reconnaissance and in close cooperation with XII Corps units which advanced in a new bridgehead. Included in the day's missions was the 362nd Group's dropping of belly tanks, containing rations, to the Fifth Infantry Division north of ECHTERNACH.

Flying close cooperation missions with the XII Corps, the 362nd Group, at the direction of the ground controller, dropped 14 500-lb GP and 8 fragmentation bombs on FIRREL (L-0804). Excellent results were reported.

The 368th Group, on armed reconnaissance in the KOBLENZ area, scored 8 direct hits with 500-lb GP bombs on a factory at DREISEN (M-2011).

Although grounded by weather until mid-afternoon our fighter-bombers were able to fly 11 missions, totaling 134 sorties, after 1500 hours on 10 February on armed reconnaissance east of the battle areas, bridge attacks, and close cooperation with Third US Army units.

VIII Corps infantry, in heavy fighting, reached the outskirts of PRUM on two sides and threatened the main highway leading east out of the town. III Corps' 6th Armored Division effected a junction of the two OUR RIVER bridgeheads north of DASBURG. Practically the entire division had crossed to the German side of the river. Farther south, elements of the 17th Airborne Division were forced back to the west bank by fierce counter-attacks. After being forced back in its SAUER RIVER bridgehead, XII Corps infantry, with air cooperation, advanced slightly. Heavy enemy fire and swift currents made crossing operations difficult in the 5th Infantry Division bridgehead. XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division advanced in heavy pillbox fighting in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle and adjusted its line after repulsing counter-attacks. In the SAAR-LAUTERN bridgehead, the 26th Infantry captured two blocks in hard fighting.

The 362nd Group, cooperating with XII Corps, dropped 500-lb GP, incendiaries, and fragmentation bombs, causing explosions and fires in the German towns of HOLSTRUM (L-0544), BETTINGEN (L-0450), and PEFFINGEN (L-0447). Fighter-bombers of the 354th Group also attacked towns, firing WITTLICH (L-3955), MEHRING (L-3534), and WENGEROHR (L-4353).

The railroad bridges at BULLAY (L-5661) and ELLER (L-5767) were claimed destroyed, a highway bridge at TREIS (L-6875) damaged, and a highway overpass at F-2586 destroyed by planes of the 368th Group. Night fighters added to the toll of destruction, starting huge fires with Napalm in DILSBERG (Q-4282) and smaller fires in another town.

b. BULLAY BRIDGE Collapsed by P-47 "Heavy Bombers".

The collapse of the BULLAY railroad bridge after direct hits by the 368th Group on 10 February marked the end of a familiar target of medium bombers and fighter-bombers. Several previous attempts had only resulted in damaging it. Photographs taken following the 10 February bombing, however, revealed that the center span had fallen into the river. Receiving the photographs, Maj. Gen. Weyland was prompted to write Maj. Gen Samuel E. Anderson, Commanding General of the IX Bombardment Division, the following letter:

"Dear Sam:

"Here's the newest picture of that Bullay Bridge you were interested in for some time.

"Any time you find some little job that's too tough for your mediums, just call on us for a few of our P-47 heavy bombers."

Insultingly yours,

O. P. WEYLAND
Major General, USA

Not to be outdone, Maj Gen Anderson retorted thus:

"Dear Opie:

"Congratulations on the Bullay bridge job! In view of the fact that it had been severely weakened by medium bomber attacks on 14 and 16 January (photographs inclosed), I am not surprised that your pea-shooters were able to collapse a span.

"Also in view of the fact that O.R.S. tells me that your claims as to bridges destroyed and railroad cuts are about 70% greater than actual damage, I can appreciate your elation over having one picture to prove one claim."

Equally Insultingly Yours,

SAMUAL E. ANDERSON
Major General, USA

c. Complete Penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE:

Third US Army units, on 11 February, progressed slowly through the SIEGFRIED LINE at both ends of a thirty-mile front and strengthened

river bridgeheads in heavy fighting against bitter resistance as adverse weather conditions prevented effective close air cooperation and sent fighter-bombers in search of targets further eastward.

Armor joined infantry in action on the VIII Corps northern front as small advances were made and PRUM further invested, marking Third Army's first complete penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE. The Corps also assumed command of the III Corps zone in the center. Further south, in the ECHTERNACH area, XII Corps advanced in its bridgehead despite heavy fire. XX Corps infantry fell back slightly before successive counter-attacks in the closely-contested SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle. The 26th Infantry Division continued its limited-objective attack in the SAARLAUTERN bridgehead.

Low clouds and poor visibility obscured many primary targets and limited claims as fighter-bombers bombed targets of opportunity. Fourteen missions, totaling 169 sorties, were flown.

Attacks were made by P-47s of the 362nd Group on 3 marshalling yards and 3 towns, including WAXWEILER (L-0269) where a large explosion and several fires followed a GP, incendiary and fragmentation bomb treatment. Four 1,000-lb bombs were dropped on an eastbound train of 30-plus flatcars carrying tanks and armored vehicles by P-38s of the 367th Group, northeast of LIMBURG. The locomotive was destroyed but other damage was not observed.

PRUM, GERMANY, rail town and highway hub, fell on 12 February and part of VIANDEN, LUXEMBOURG, gateway town on the OUR RIVER, was cleared by Third US Army units although weather grounded all fighter-bombers.

Counter-attacks against the VIII and XII Corps were reported as the Corps forced their way eastward, making slight gains. North of ECHTERNACH, XII Corps infantry emerged from its SAUER RIVER bridgehead and advanced to the outskirts of FERSCHWEILER (L-0442). Corps elements crossed the river at ECHTERNACH. The 26th Infantry Division, meanwhile, cleared 34 blocks in the SAARLAUTERN bridgehead.

Heavy mud impeded the ground advance and poor visibility hampered efforts of close air cooperation on 13 February, but promising penetrations were made into the SIEGFRIED LINE at two important points. FERSCHWEILER (L-0442) and BOLLENDORF (L-0140) in the XII Corps zone were captured and juncture made in the 5th and 80th Infantry Division bridgeheads. A large consolidated bridgehead into the SIEGFRIED LINE had been established on the German side of the SAUER RIVER, north and northwest of ECHTERNACH, and now contained elements of four divisions. Clearing of PRUM in the VIII Corps zone marked complete penetration of the main belt of the SIEGFRIED LINE at another point.

Fighter-bombers, stepping up the offensive against transportation and attacking special targets, flew 22 missions, comprising 225 sorties.

An attack on the espionage school at RAUENTHAL (M-2761) by 11 P-38s of the 393rd Squadron, 367th Group, resulted in much destruction and damage. Ten 1,000-lb bombs and 4 165-gallon tanks of Napalm dropped on the target resulted in pilots' reports that the entire area was demolished and smoke from four fires rose to 4,000 feet.

The 362nd Group, cooperating with XII Corps, claimed 184 motor transport destroyed or damaged, plus 11 gun positions, 5 horse-drawn vehicles, an armored flak car, a fuel dump, and 16 buildings. After a rocket, GP, and fragmentation bomb attack on SCHWANKWEILER (L-0345), the ground controller reported excellent results.

Third US Army reported good air cooperation on 14 February and commended the 354th and 362nd Groups as penetrations into the SIEGFRIED LINE from the PRUM and ECHTERNACH bridgeheads made further progress and counter-attacks were repulsed.

Expanding the big SAUER RIVER bridgehead north and northwest of ECHTERNACH, XII Corps units gained a mile in hard fighting against SIEGFRIED LINE pillboxes and bunkers. AMMELDINGEN (P-9344) and ERNZEN (L-0538) were captured and engineers cleared VIANDEN, on the OUR RIVER, marking complete liberation of the last big LUXEMBOURG town.

Good weather permitted fighter-bombers to fly 30 missions, totaling 322 sorties. Reconnaissance pilots flew 94 successful sorties and night fighters were unusually busy, successfully attacking trains, motor transport, town lights, and other targets.

Third US Army's 4th Infantry Division reported that the 362nd Group's 355th Squadron assisted greatly in repelling a counter-attack. The Group claimed 134 motor transport destroyed or damaged and in a single attack at BADEM (L-1956) claimed 40. In addition, fighter-bombers of the Group fired OBERWEIS (L-0562) and two SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle towns, FREUDENBERG (L-1305) and BUREN (L-0707).

Two attacks were made by P-38s of the 367th Group, loaded with 1,000-lb bombs, on the espionage school at HUNDSBACH (L-8725) with varying results. Although many buildings in the target area were destroyed it is believed that the school was only damaged. Eleven P-38s of the 367th attacked a railroad bridge at BAD MUNSTER and, although results on the bridge were unobserved because of smoke, an explosion resulted in a nearby hill which was believed to have been an ammunition or fuel dump.

Fighter-bombers of the 368th Group attacked railroad bridges at NEUSS (F-2886) and at F-0984, near RHEYDT, claiming both rendered unserviceable.

Night fighters destroyed or damaged 5 motor transport, 3 locomotives, and 20 railroad cars, and attacked activity around the BULLAY bridge which had been knocked into the MOSELLE by the 368th Group on 10 February.

Fog in the morning of 15 February delayed the take-off of fighter-bombers, but they got in 18 missions, totaling 190 sorties in close cooperation with the VIII, XII and XX Corps, armed recce and leaflet dropping.

Slow movement into the SIEGFRIED LINE continued as Third US Army units reported advances of little more than a mile. In a further crossing of the BELGIAN-GERMAN border north of the SCHNEE EIFEL, VIII Corps infantry advanced slightly. Gains were also reported in the XII Corps' bridgehead north of ECHTERNACH and an attack by XX Corps' infantry in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle progressed favorably in the pillbox area east of CAMPHOLZ WOODS (L-0506).

Fighter-bombers attacked 21 towns, 8 marshalling yards, and an airfield; 27 railroad cuts and 5 highway cuts were made.

The 354th Group, flying close cooperation with VIII Corps and armed reconnaissance in the BITBURG area, dropped 11 500-lb GP bombs and 1 white phosphorus bomb on an enemy command post in a large building in DINGDORF (L-0773), claiming it completely destroyed. In other attacks the Group claimed destruction of a railroad bridge at L-2280, PELM, damage to a factory at KRUFT (L-7299) and destruction of many buildings in the front-line German towns of WEINSHEIM (L-0982), WILLERATH (L-0984), REUTH (L-1189), SCHOENEKEN (L-0974), and SHONFELD (L-1390).

Cooperating with the XII Corps, fighter-bombers of the 362nd Group started fires in an ammunition dump from L-1050 to L-0853 and fired the towns of IRREL (L-0839) and FLIESSEM (L-1459).

In support of XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division, 397th Squadron, of the 368th Group strafed towns in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle, bombed woods east of SINZ, and shot up trenches and haystacks south of BILZINGEN (L-0711) believed to be camouflaged motor transportation and tanks.

Two Napalm tanks dropped on warehouses adjacent to the WORMS marshalling yards by night fighters caused a large fire. The P-61s attacked three stationary trains and strafed convoys between TRIER and COCHEM and south of TRIER.

Heavy fighting in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle highlighted ground activity on 16 February as good weather enabled fighter-bombers to provide excellent air cooperation. XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division, in heavy fighting, continued attacks on pillboxes following an enemy night counter-attack which recaptured 5 of 6 newly-won pillboxes. Five enemy tanks were destroyed by the 94th in repulsing counter-attacks south of SINZ.

In other Corps zones, XII Corps units reached high ground overlooking the PRUM RIVER following an advance in the bridgehead over the SAUER RIVER, north of ECHTERNACH. Farther east in the bridgehead, infantry met heavy mortar and artillery fire. VIII Corps reported no change and, in hand-to-hand fighting in the SAARLAUTERN suburb of RODEN, the 26th Infantry Division made slight gains.

Good flying weather enabled fighter-bombers to fly 29 missions, comprising 315 sorties, on the 16th, in close cooperation with ground troops, escort to medium bombers, armed reconnaissance, fighter sweeps, leaflet dropping and special targets. In air combat over TRIER and OBERLAHNSTEIN four enemy planes were destroyed by 354th Group pilots celebrating their return to P-51s. Two others were damaged by 367th Group P-38s over SCHAAFHEIM airfield while additional claims of 1 destroyed and 1 damaged resulted from an attack on DARMSTADT-GRIESHAM at M-6139.

P-47s of the 354th Group, 353rd Squadron, attacked enemy-held towns and smoke-marked woods on the XX Corps front and hit the LEBACH marshalling yards.

Flying close cooperation missions with the XII Corps, fighter-bombers of the 362nd Group started 19 fires in an attack on a command post at AHLDORF (L-0351) and fired the towns of PLUTSCHEID (L-0666), MECKEL (L-1244), and MUHLBACH (L-0453).

Strafing of an armored vehicle concentration by 397th Squadron, of the 368th Group, in the vicinity of L-0671, south of PRUM, resulted in damage to 8 tanks and 21 other armored vehicles.

A repeat performance on the espionage school at HUNDSBACH (L-8725) caused considerable damage in the town, started two fires and destroyed the radio station near the target.

Back in action with the Command, the 371st Group attacked an ordnance depot at M-6319, destroying or damaging 10 buildings and starting 2 large fires. Huge fires were also started in the marshalling yard at WERMELKIRCHEN (F-6382) and 4 buildings of a supply depot at Q-7887 were claimed destroyed.

Weather, a familiar foe in February, grounded all but one fighter-bomber group on 17 February and impeded ground advances by Third US Army units.

In the XII Corps zone, infantry was engaged in heavy fighting in SCHANKWEILER (L-0345) and made slight gains, clearing large numbers of pillboxes. VIII Corps infantry repulsed counter-attacks near PRUM and fierce fighting was reported in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle where XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division made slow progress.

Fighter-bombers of the 354th Group flew 3 missions, totaling 33 sorties, on armed reconnaissance and fighter sweeps. The Group's 356th Squadron dropped 4 500-lb GP bombs on a railroad bridge at MAINZ-KASTLE (M-3758) and reported it destroyed. The same squadron, while on armed reconnaissance in the FRANKFURT area, bombed 3 trains of 60, 20, and 20 cars at ZELLINGEN (N-4947), destroyed or damaged 35 railroad cars and a locomotive and cut rails in 5 places. During the attack 2 ME-262s, jet-propelled fighters, bounced the fighter-bombers, made one pass and evaded after the Mustang pilots scored hits on the fuselages of both aircraft. It was the month's first offensive action on the part of jet-propelled enemy aircraft against our fighter-bombers.

As weather limited fighter-bomber operations to 14 uneventful daytime sorties on 18 February, Third US Army's VIII and XII Corps launched an attack and reported further progress through the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses.

XII Corps' 5th Infantry Division further extended its front along the PRUM RIVER, cleared SCHANKWEILER (L-0345), seized intact two bridges over the ENZ RIVER, and crossed that stream against light but increasing resistance, achieving Third US Army's third complete penetration of the main belt of the SIEGFRIED LINE fortifications. Further east, 76th Infantry Division cleared 95 pillboxes, meeting stubborn resistance and heavy artillery fire. Advancing on the west bank of the OUR RIVER, 80th Infantry Division captured KRUTGHEN (P-9745) and entered HOMMERDINGEN (P-9846).

In the VIII Corps zone further north, Task Force Fickett crossed the OUR RIVER north of VIANDEN and established a new bridgehead inside GERMANY. Other infantry units captured KESFELD (P-9273) and LEIDENBRON (P-9172). New counter-attacks were repulsed in the SAARLAUTERN bridgehead by 26th Infantry Division.

Although grounded until noon on 19 February, our fighter-bombers were airborne to provide what Third US Army reported as good air cooperation, and to fly armed reconnaissance, fighter sweeps, bomber escort and leaflet dropping missions.

Short gains through the SIEGFRIED LINE along a 55-mile front were reported by Third US Army Divisions. Following their penetration of the main belt of SIEGFRIED LINE fortifications in the XII Corps zone, 5th Infantry Division troops captured STOCKEM (L-0348). On their left, 80th Infantry Division, against stiff resistance, advanced and captured NUSBAUM (L-0047) and FREILINGEN (P-9947).

Advancing a mile in its new bridgehead in the VIII Corps zone north of VIANDEN, Task Force Fickett captured BIVELS (P-8952). The 90th Infantry Division cleared MASTHORN (P-9874) and 11th Armored Division captured HERZFELD (P-9172) in advances against stiffening resistance.

d. Clearance of the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle Begins.

XX Corps' 94th Infantry Division began to move in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle against coordinated pockets of resistance, captured MUNZINGEN (L-0805), OBERLEUKEN (L-0802), and began fighting in FAHA (L-0904). Heavy fighting continued in 26th Infantry Division's SAARLAUTERN bridgehead.

Low cloud and poor visibility made targets hard to locate and results difficult to observe. Highlighting the day's air activity was an attack by 13 ME-109s and 8 FW-190s on the 377th Squadron, of the 362nd Group, immediately following the latter's bombing of the marshalling yards at WESTERBURG (G-1718), northeast of KOBLENZ. The enemy was aggressive but inexperienced and the 16 P-47s claimed 3 FW-190s and 3 ME-109s destroyed plus 10 other ME-109s damaged. Planes of the Group also fired KIRF (L-0906) which was later entered by ground troops.

Seventeen P-51s of the 354th Group dropped 16 500-lb GP bombs on a large auto factory near OBERNHURG (M-0137) where more than 100 motor transport were assembled. Several fires were started.

An attack by fighter-bombers of the 368th Group on the command post of the 53rd Panzer Corps at WISSMANNSDORF (L-0755) resulted in 16 500-lb bombs being dropped within a two-block radius of the target with results believed excellent. The target was later strafed.

An attack on the LUDWIGSHAVEN marshalling yard by fighter-bombers of the 367th Group yielded most of the day's rail claims and smoke from resulting fires rose to 1,500 feet. Flying in close cooperation with XX Corps, the Group destroyed many buildings in attacks on SAARBURG (L-1413) and TRASSEM (L-1209).

Highlighting achievements of ground units on 20 February was the rapid progress in the drive to clean up the enemy forces in the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle and the fourth complete penetration of the main SIEGFRIED LINE in the XII Corps zone at the center of the Third U S Army front. XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers provided air cooperation with the XII, XX, and VIII Corps under adverse weather conditions.

Launching a new large-scale clean-up drive in the Triangle, XX Corps' armor and infantry advanced up to 6 miles. XII Corps', 2nd Cavalry Group crossed the MOSELLE at WERR, advanced 3 miles to capture WINCHERINGEN and later made contact with elements of the XX Corps' 10th Armored Division near WINCHERINGEN where they joined and continued to advance.

The 5th Infantry Division crossed the RNZ RIVER, north of ECHTERNACH, and made its second penetration of the main SIEGFRIED LINE. In the VIII Corps zone Task Force Fickett established a new bridgehead across the OUR RIVER opposite VIANDEN and advanced half a mile in its center bridgehead. The Corps expressed thanks "for the exceptionally good job done for it under adverse weather conditions by the 378th Squadron of the 362nd Group today".

Fighter-bombers flew 24 missions, totaling 174 sorties, in weather which deteriorated as the day advanced. The 378th Squadron, of the 362nd Group, in two morning missions in cooperation with VIII Corps, bombed and strafed convoys, personnel and gun positions, claiming 44 motor transport, 10 horse-drawn vehicles, and a tank destroyed or damaged and light guns silenced. Most of the destruction was inflicted when the Squadron caught a convoy of 45 motor transport and 5 horse-drawn vehicles moving into WAXWEILER (L-0263) from the east and moving out to the southwest; the ensuing attack with GP and fragmentation bombs destroyed 38 of the motor transport and all 5 of the horse-drawn vehicles. In the afternoon, the 377th Squadron destroyed or damaged 85 motor transport and a tank in a single mission at FEUERSCHEID (L-0868) and vicinity.

P-47s of the 367th Group dropped 4 500-lb bombs on a supply dump at VOGELBACH (Q-7867) which started several fires and practically demolished the entire area.

371st Group, flying 4-plane missions in close cooperation with XX Corps, attacked command posts at L-1718 and L-1608 with 500-lb GP bombs, destroying several buildings, fired the towns of ESCHEID, TABEN, and TRASSEM, and attacked the marshalling yard at HOHFELDEN (L-5509).

Good weather on 21 February enabled fighter-bombers to afford excellent air cooperation and to fly the largest number of sorties airborne during the month. Third U S Army plunged through the SIEGFRIED LINE after blitzkrieg operations had all but cleaned up the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle. XX Corps armor and infantry broke through the defenses and piled up against the SAAR RIVER at the foot of the WESTWALL proper. Only slight resistance was encountered in the Corps zone, the enemy having been surprised and scattered by the swiftness of the assault.

Small gains were reported in the VIII Corps zone where 6th Armored Division entered the SIEGFRIED LINE and DASBURG was cleared.

XII Corps' 5th Infantry Division advanced east to make its third complete breach of the SIEGFRIED LINE. On its left, 80th Infantry Division made good progress and repulsed a counter-attack.

Five fighter-bomber groups flew 78 missions, comprising 504 sorties, on armed reconnaissance, escort to medium bombers, and 4-plane missions in cooperation with VIII, XII, and XX Corps. Flying 25 4-plane cooperation missions and armed reconnaissance flights in the TRIER and BITBURG areas, the 395th and 397th Squadrons of the 368th Group maintained aircraft over the general area throughout the day.

The fighter-bombers dropped 190.5 tons of GP, 7.11 tons of fragmentation bombs, 9.5 tons of incendiaries, and 27 leaflet bombs to claim 318 motor transport, 28 tanks and armored vehicles, 16 locomotives, 575 railroad cars, 2 bridges, 14 gun positions, 9 barges, a dump, 155 buildings, a hangar, and 13 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. Attacks were made on two troop concentrations, 16 marshalling yards, 3 airfields, and 27 defended localities; 8 highway and 26 railroad cuts were effected.

Flying armed reconnaissance in the MANNHEIM and WURZBURG areas, the 362nd Group reported claims of 254 railroad cars, 30 motor transport, 36 armored vehicles, and 14 buildings destroyed or damaged. The 377th Squadron attacked a marshalling yard at FREIDRICHSDORF (M-6585) and another at M-6847 where 152 railroad cars and a warehouse were claimed destroyed or damaged. The Squadron later strafed an airdrome at WURZBURG, destroyed an ME-109 as it was taking off, and attacked the DARMSTADT (M-0130) airfield where 2 JU-52s and a hangar were claimed damaged. The 379th Squadron claimed 13 buildings destroyed or damaged in attacks on WALDBACH (L-2828) and FELLOBER (L-3130) and bombed and strafed an area near KIRN (L-8232), destroying or damaging 35 railroad cars and cutting rails in 6 places. Fires were started in the NEUEN-KIRCHEN area and 30 cars loaded with armored vehicles were strafed and damaged.

Pilots of the 393rd Squadron, 367th Group, destroyed 9 buildings in the WURZBURG military area and silenced 3 guns at the HETTSTADT airfield (N-4333).

e. Fighter-Bombers In Coordinated Allied Offensive.

Although grounded until mid-day by poor visibility, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers were able to fly 33 missions, totaling 358 sorties, in cooperation with an enormous coordinated Allied attack on the enemy's transportation facilities on 22 February. Third US Army, meanwhile, took advantage of good weather and the stepped-up air offensive to accelerate the smashing of the SIEGFRIED LINE on its left and center, completed clearance of the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle and followed its successes by immediately crossing the SAAR RIVER. Along the entire front army units were now against, in, or through the SIEGFRIED LINE proper.

In the SAAR-MOSELLE Triangle, where 2,600 prisoners had been taken the previous day, armor and infantry divisions piled up against the SAAR, established bridgeheads across it at TABEN and OCKFEN and began driving into the SIEGFRIED LINE east of the river.

Contributing to the air blows dealt at selected points in the enemy communication system by Allied bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers which flew 6,000 sorties in widespread operations, our fighter-bombers were airborne when weather cleared after mid-day, to provide escort for medium bombers, attack bridges east and west of the RHINE in front of the Third US Army, fly fighter sweeps, close cooperation with ground troops, and armed reconnaissance.

P-51s of the 354th Group attacked marshalling yards, rolling stock, bridges and towns and cut tracks in many places. Nine P-51s of the 355th Squadron were attacked by 3 ME-109s over SAARLAUTERN, destroying the 3 enemy aircraft.

The 362nd Group, flying escort to medium bombers and close cooperation with XII and XX Corps, caused considerable destruction on both types of missions. In addition to escorting the bombers on one mission, the fighter-bombers attacked a marshalling yard and destroyed or damaged 16 motor transport, 2 railroad cars, 1 tank, 14 barges, a pile of supplies, 2 horse-drawn vehicles and 4 buildings and cut rails in 3 places. Another squadron, cooperating with XX Corps, attacked 2 towns, 1 of which was claimed completely wrecked, and destroyed or damaged 115 railroad cars, 15 motor transport and a factory building.

Flying in cooperation with VIII Corps, 12 P-47s of the 368th Group destroyed or damaged 6 tanks and 3 armored vehicles, 20 motor transport and a building. While escorting medium bombers, P-47s dropped bombs along with the mediums on highway and railroad bridges.

Railroad yards, bridges, cars, and locomotives were targets of the 367th Group's P-47s and P-38s which were responsible for much of the day's claims. One Squadron, on a single mission, in addition to escorting medium bombers, destroyed a railroad station, damaged a roundhouse, destroyed or damaged 44 railroad cars, 5 buildings, and a locomotive and cut rails in 7 places.

Night fighters added to the day's efforts by strafing trains with 20-mm cannon fire in the WENGEROHR, ST WENDEL, BULLAY, TRABEN-TRARBACH, KIRN, and BIRNKASTEL areas.

Lt Gen Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of USSTAF, through Maj Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Commanding General of Ninth Air Force, commended XIX Tactical Air Command for its achievements in the day's air offensive.

f. XIX TAC Claims Record Destruction.

While XIX Tactical Air Command was piling up one of its best scores of the war on 23 February in the wake of the previous day's major air offensive, Third US Army units, reporting excellent air cooperation, punched their eighth penetration through the SIEGFRIED LINE and advanced all along the front, building new bridgeheads across the SAAR RIVER southwest of TRIER.

Fighter-bombers, meanwhile, were airborne from 0850 to 1910 hours to fly 71 missions, totaling 527 sorties, finding good hunting in front of the Third US Army front and in the enemy's marshalling yards and rail lines. Topping the day's claims were 269 tanks and armored vehicles and 1,308 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Other claims included destruction or damage to 724 motor transport, 36 locomotives, a bridge, 19 gun positions, 6 barges, 136 buildings, 24 horse-drawn vehicles, 3 horse-drawn artillery pieces, 2 trailers, 2 tunnels, 2 roundhouses, a fuel dump, and 19 fuel tanks, a locomotive repair shed and a power plant. Thirty marshalling yards, 21 towns, 2 command posts, and a troop concentration were attacked and 32 rail and 8 highway cuts were effected.

Fighter-bomber pilots dropped a total of 194 tons of GP and RDX, 14.12 tons of fragmentation bombs, 12 tons of incendiaries, 12 tons of white phosphorus, and 28 leaflet bombs.

Although our pilots claimed 4-1-1 enemy aircraft in air combat, our losses were heavy, as 7 fighter-bombers failed to return.

Topping the day's achievements was the record of destruction and damage by the 368th Group which flew armed reconnaissance in the MANNHEIM-KASTEL area, attacked a fuel dump at MANNHEIM, flew 22 4-plane missions in cooperation with XII and VIII Corps, and dropped leaflets. Oil fires and explosions followed each of two attacks on the oil dump. South of MANNHEIM, a 70-car train, on which 60 heavy motor transport were seen, was strafed and claimed completely destroyed. Sixteen P-47s were engaged by 15-plus long-nosed FW190s and 5 ME-109s southwest of MAINZ. The enemy pilots were aggressive but inexperienced and the P-47s claimed 3-1-1 for loss of 1. Many good tank targets were found on the XII and VIII Corps fronts. One flight of P-47s dropped 8 500-lb GP bombs on a tank and motor transport concentration at L-0955, west of BITBURG, claiming 8 tanks, 9 motor transport, and a horse-drawn 88-mm gun destroyed or damaged and also exploded a fuel dump, smoke rising to 3,500 feet.

Maj Gen O. P. Weyland, in a letter dated 27 February, commended the 368th Group for its achievements of 23 February.

The 367th Group contributed heavily to the day's heavy toll of destruction, attacking marshalling yards and rail lines and claiming destruction of an ammunition train of 30 to 40 cars headed east at L-2388, near HILLESHEIM.

The 354th Group dropped 28 500-lb bombs on the fuel storage dump at EBENHAUSEN and blew up 13 out of 14 fuel tanks. Another squadron bombed and strafed a 65-car train consisting partly of flats loaded with approximately 75 armored vehicles and tanks at Q-4590, north of SAARBRUCKEN, and claimed the entire train and cargo destroyed.

Flying 23 missions by 4-plane flights in cooperation with XX Corps, 371st Group attacked marshalling yards and rail traffic as well as targets on the immediate front. Bombing of the marshalling yard at OBERSTEIN not only destroyed or damaged 30 cars but caused four large explosions, apparently ammunition. Many flat cars attacked were carrying tanks or motor transport and violent explosions resulted. One 4-plane flight from 404th Squadron located the tank-carrying train at Q-4590 and damaged it, then turned the target over to 354th Group's 355th Squadron which claimed destruction of the entire train.

With continued good weather the stepped-up air offensive continued on 24 February as Third US Army, reporting excellent fighter-bomber cooperation, advanced through the SIEGFRIED LINE at another point and continued to build up its SAAR RIVER bridgeheads.

Fighter-bombers continued the assault against enemy supply points, communications centers, and road and rail traffic, flying 47 missions, comprising 323 sorties, as good weather again prevailed. Four fighter-bomber groups flew armed reconnaissance, cooperated with VIII, XII and XX Corps, and attacked rail bridges in the SIMMERN and TRIER areas.

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Cooperating with XX Corps, the 406th Squadron, of the 371st Group, dropped 30 bombs on the NONNWEILER bridge, cut rails at the northwest and southeast ends but failed to observe results. In a later attack, 7 500-lb bombs were dropped on the embankment with possible damage to the bridge.

The 368th Group, flying missions in cooperation with VIII, XII, and XX Corps, attacked a railway bridge at SALMOHR (L-3647), cut tracks at both ends and damaged the embankment, but the bridge remained standing.

g. An Outstanding Example of Close Air Cooperation.

Illustrative of the quick and effective cooperation provided by our fighter-bombers is the following excerpt from Headquarters, XX Corps, G-2 Periodic Report for the period ending 2000 hours, 24 February:

"RIPSAW - An OP of the 10th Armd Div reported, at 1630, a column of vehicles, of which he could see only six, moving into the town of OBEREMMEL (L-2018). The information was immediately communicated by the G-2 of the division to the G-2 of XX Corps, who in turn informed XX Corps G-2 Air and requested that the movement be investigated as soon as possible by a Tac/R plane. The G-2 Air stepped across the room to convey the information to the Tactical Air Liaison Officer. The TALO replied by handing him the headphones. 'Hear 'em burning?' he asked. Fighter-bombers already vectored to the spot by the Division TALO had just finished destroying the vehicles, fifteen in all. The trucks had been spotted, reported and destroyed in just under five minutes, an outstanding example of air-ground cooperation."

Four P-47s of the 368th Group's 397th Squadron, flying 4-plane missions in cooperation with XX Corps, had been vectored to the convoy's location, dropped 8 500-lb RDX bombs, and accomplished the desired results.

h. Fluid Warfare Initiated.

The long, tough phase of fighting through powerful fixed defenses gave way to fluid warfare on 25 February as Third US Army again reported excellent cooperation by our fighter-bombers. Ground units breached the SIEGFRIED LINE in the VIII Corps zone on its left, instituted blitzkreig warfare in a XII Corps attack, and joined the SAAR RIVER bridgeheads on the XX Corps front south of TRIER.

Both VIII and XII Corps reported resistance becoming disorganized and scattered as elements progressed in the direction of BITBURG, important communications center and focal point for 8 main roads, and TRIER center of a critical four-way confluence of difficult stream obstacles constituting an exceptionally strong pivot and anchor for the enemy's defenses.

With four groups operating, fighter-bombers flew 53 missions, comprising 434 sorties, including many 4-plane flights in close cooperation with Army Corps, escort to bombers, armed reconnaissance, and attacks on special targets. Pilots dropped 154.5 tons of GP, 17 tons of RDX, 5.19 tons of fragmentation bombs, and 4.25 tons of white phosphorus and launched 32 rockets. Claims included 250 motor transport, 97 armored vehicles and tanks, 21 locomotives, 692 railroad cars, 3 bridges, and 13 horse-drawn vehicles. Twenty towns and 26 marshalling yards were attacked, while 33 rail cuts and 2 highway cuts were made.

Thirty-two P-47s of the 371st Group hit the NONNWEILER Railroad bridge in two attacks, causing damage and cutting rails although the bridge did not fall. Five tanks in the FRANKFURT oil storage depot were destroyed, but no fires were seen, and a bomb hit was scored on a building believed to be a refinery. The town of KRETTNACH (L-2121) was leveled by the Group and a road bridge at KASTEL (L-4508) claimed destroyed.

Bombing of the marshalling yard at DILLENBERG, far east of the RHINE at G-3937 by the 362nd Group, blew up 25 ammunition cars and the huge resulting explosion was believed to have destroyed or damaged 100 other cars in the area. West of DILLENBERG, fighter-bombers destroyed another ammunition train of 30 cars. The Group's claims for the day included 413 railroad cars and 14 locomotives.

Fighter-bombers of the 368th Group flew 20 missions, totaling 122 sorties; 17 were in cooperation with VIII and XII Corps, 2 were attacks on the SALMROHR railroad bridge (L-3647) and one was an armed reconnaissance flight in the WITTLICH area. A large hole in the center of the bridge was reported after 32 P-47s dropped their bomb loads in two attacks; craters were observed in the embankments, and rails cut in 5 places. Though standing, the bridge was thought to be unserviceable. In another attack two tunnels one at L-1758, northeast of BITBURG, and the other at L-2326, south of TRIER, were closed.

1. A New Phase of Action Begins.

Although weather limited air operations on 26 February, Third US Army, having penetrated and passed the SIEGFRIED LINE, made new advances in the center, attacked with VIII Corps in the north, and expanded its SAAR RIVER bridgehead south of TRIER. One phase of action had ended and a new phase had begun.

In the phase which began with the linkup with First US Army at HOUFFALIZE and ended on 26 February with complete penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE on a wide, substantial front, Third US Army advanced up to 31 miles to the northeast, completely cleared the enemy from LUXEMBOURG, crossed the SURE, OUR, SAUER, PRUM, and SAAR rivers in important bridgehead operations, broke the SIEGFRIED LINE and invaded GERMANY anew.

XII Corps' 4th Armored Division now drove east, north of BITBURG, to threaten that important traffic hub, and reached ERDORF (L-1656), KYLL RIVER valley town on the enemy's lateral railway from TRIER to KYLLBURG and the north. Infantry closely followed the armored advance and were within 3 miles of BITBURG. Along a 35-mile stretch of the PRUM RIVER, other Third Army units either closed up to that stream or advanced beyond it. Infantry units advanced in the XX Corps zone and 10th Armored Division cleared a major pillbox pocket.

Low clouds and light intermittent rain limited fighter-bomber operations to 51 sorties. The 354th Group's P-51s strafed a troop train at HERNBERGTHEIM, (N-7813), destroyed the locomotive, damaged 7 passenger cars and killed an estimated 250 personnel.

Armor and infantry reached BITBURG on 27 February as bad weather again restricted fighter-bomber activity. Third US Army units pushed to within five miles of TRIER from the south and cut the highway between BITBURG and that city.

Heavy enemy resistance limited gains in the VIII Corps zone but armor succeeded in crossing the PRUM RIVER. XII Corps, in the center, found light resistance as armor and infantry entered BITBURG and formed a large enemy pocket to the west. South of BITBURG, the 76th Infantry Division advanced to clear MECKEL (L-1244) and GILZEN (L-1241), cutting the BITBURG-TRIER road, and sending a force southward down the highway toward TRIER. In the XX Corps zone, 10th Armored Division tanks broke out of the SAAR RIVER bridgehead and advanced northward toward TRIER in the rear of the SIEGFRIED LINE fortifications along the SAAR.

Weather forced the 362nd Group to drop 1,000-lb and 500-lb GP bombs through the overcast in three missions. The 354th Group, however, claimed 6 locomotives, 50 railroad cars and 22 motor transport destroyed or damaged by strafing in the area east of KARLSRUHE to provide all the day's claims.

Third US Army's three corps, on 28 February, cleared BITBURG, pushed to within 3 miles of TRIER and advanced at many points along the shattered WEST WALL.

Fighter-bombers closed out the month's air offensive with 28 missions, totaling 239 sorties, in cooperation with ground troops, escort to medium bombers, armed reconnaissance and attacks on special targets.

Sixteen P-47s of the 371st Group engaged 20 ME-109s and FW-190s south of FRANKFURT and claimed 4-2-3. The same number of P-51s attacked ROHRENSEE Airfield, near ERFURT and claimed 2-0-4 on the ground.

Fighter-bombers of the 368th Group bombed a supply depot at L-2365, northeast of BITBURG and observed crates flying into the air as a result of the attack. Strafing of a woods northeast of PRUM at L-1190, which ground troops had marked with smoke, was described as an excellent job by ground controller who said that tanks and guns there had been holding up our troops.

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1 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	2
Sorties	32

2 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	33
Sorties	408
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	188.75
Fragmentation	13.12
Rockets	16
Claims (Air)	1-0-0
Claims (Grd)	10-0-5
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	78
Successful	64
P/R Sorties	23
Successful	15
NPR Sorties	4
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Locomotives	32
Railroad Cars	585
Motor Transport	165
Armored Vehicles	6
Bridges	2
Barges	2
Dump	1
Buildings	27
Roundhouses	2
Horse-drawn Vehicles	6
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	14
Towns	6
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	29
Highway Cuts	7

3 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	3
Sorties	35

B. Reconnaissance:

Weather Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil

4 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Weather Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil

5 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Nil

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil

6 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	17
Sorties	214
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	96.5
Fragmentation	19.1
Incendiaries	.9
Rockets	20
Claims (Grd)	0-0-2
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	26
Successful	22
Weather Sorties	1
Successful	1
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	4
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	172
Armored Vehicles	13
Locomotives	4
Railroad Cars	235
Bridges	2
Gun Positions	1
Buildings	30
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	10
Airfields	1
Defended Localities	10
Railroad Cuts	17

7 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Nil

C. Results of Attacks
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil

8 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	28
Sorties	309
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	162
Incendiaries	6.25
Napalm (Tanks)	7650-gals
Rockets	65
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	30
Successful	20
P/R Sorties	10
Successful	6

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Railroad Cars	452
Locomotives	40
Armored Vehicles	42
Motor Transport	173
Gun Positions	3
Bridges	4
Barges and Other Boats	16
Drydock	1
Buildings	153
Switchhouse	1
Roundhouse	1
Fuel Dump	1
Trailers	4
Horse-drawn Vehicles	4
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	15
Airfield	1
Towns	21
Troop Concentrations	1
Strongpoint	1
Rail Junctions	1
Railroad Cuts	35
Highway Cuts	4

9 February 1945

A. Fighters

Missions	18
Sorties	192
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	91.25
Fragmentation	3.78
Napalm	6
Incendiary	7
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	8
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	7
Locomotives	9
Railroad Cars	161
Buildings	27
Fuel Tanks	5
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	8
Defended Localities	15
Railroad Cuts	14
Highway Cuts	4

10 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	11
Sorties	134
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	63
Fragmentation	4.32
Napalm (Tanks)	15 x 75-gal
Incendiaries	6
Rockets	26
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	16
Successful	16
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	4
Successful	4
P/R Sorties	10
Successful	8
NPR Sorties	3
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	37
Locomotives	5
Railroad Cars	131
Bridges	4
Highway Overpass	1
Gun Positions	2
Buildings	17
Attacked:	
Towns	13
Marshalling Yards	5
Stores of Supplies	1
Tank Concentration	1
Troop Concentration	1
Railroad Cuts	7
Highway Cuts	2

11 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	14
Sorties	169
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	81.25
Incendiaries	8
Fragmentation	8.64
Napalm	1.8
Claims (Grd)	0-0-1
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	12
Successful	10
NPR Sorties	7
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Railroad Cars	210
Locomotives	11
Motor Transport	34
Armored Vehicles	4
Bridge	1
Gun Position	1
Buildings	21
Barge	1
Attacked:	
Towns	6
Marshalling Yards	9
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	33

12 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Nil

C. Results of Attacked
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil

13 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	22
Sorties	225
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	112.25
Fragmentation	5.94
Napalm (Tanks)	2250-gals
Incendiaries	8
Rockets	50
Claims (Grd)	1-0-0
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	32
Successful	20
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	8
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	221
Armored Vehicles	4
Locomotives	3
Railroad Cars	187
Gun Positions	13
Dump	1
Buildings	29
Armored Flak Cars	3
Horse-drawn Vehicles	8
Switchhouse	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	3
Towns	17
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	7
Highway Cuts	2

14 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	30
Sorties	322
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	163.75
Fragmentation	4.33
Napalm	2.25
Incendiaries	14
Rockets	98
Claims (Grd)	1-0-5
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	52
Successful	46
Tac/R Photo Sorties	10
Successful	8
P/R Sorties	36
Successful	32

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged	
Motor Transport	220
Armored Vehicles	10
Locomotives	12
Railroad Cars	89
Bridges	3
Gun Positions	14
Dump	1
Hangar	1
Buildings	61
Horse-drawn Vehicles	14
Ammunition Stores	1
Storage Tank	1
Attacked:	
Towns	21
Marshalling Yards	9
Airfields	2
Tank Concentration	1
ilroad Cuts	13
ighway Cuts	1

15 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	18
Sorties	190
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	108.75
Fragmentation	2.16
Napalm	3.06
Incendiary	7.85
PW Bombs	28
Rockets	24
Losses (A/C)	1
Claims (Air)	0-0-1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	48
Successful	46
Tac/R Photo Sorties	2
Successful	0
P/R Sorties	18
Successful	14
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	12
Successful	10

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	57
Armored Vehicles	8
Locomotives	6
Railroad Cars	284
Horse-drawn Vehicles	13
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	12
Barge	1
Buildings	62
Command Post	1
Ammunition Dump	1
Attacked:	
Towns	21
Marshalling Yards	8
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	27
Highway Cuts	5

16 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	29
Sorties	315
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	139.25
Fragmentation	14.31
Smoke Bombs	3
Incendiary	8
WP	4.8
PW Leaflets	28
Rockets	63
Claims (Air)	4-0-2
Claims (Grd)	1-0-1
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	46
Successful	46
Tac/R Photo Sorties	4
Successful	4
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	12
Successful	10
P/R Sorties	20
Successful	18

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Moton Transport	89
Armored Vehicles	37
Locomotives	26
Railroad Cars	453
Gun Positions	20
Barges	2
Buildings	56
Radio Stations	2
Railroad Trestle	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	10
Airfield	1
Command Post	1
Supply Depot	1
Towns	17
Railroad Cuts	27
Highway Cuts	2

17 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	
Sorties	33
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	8.5
Claims (Air)	0-0-2

B. Reconnaissance:

Nil

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	11
Locomotives	8
Railroad Cars	52
Bridge	1
Attacked:	
Towns	1
Buildings	2
Railroad Cuts	5
Enemy Personnel Killed	151

18 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	1
Sorties	14

B. Reconnaissance:

Weather Sorties	1
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or damaged

Nil

19 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	27
Sorties	279
Tons of Bombs On Tgts.	
GP	107.75
Fragmentation	7.02
Incendiary	8.0
Rockets	28
PW Leaflets	28
Claims (Air)	6-0-10

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	26
Successful	22
P/R Sorties	7
Successful	4
Weather Sorties	2
Successful	2
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	8
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	95
Armored Vehicles	8
Locomotives	11
Railroad Cars	285
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	4
Barges	2
Supply Dumps	12
Buildings	82
Roundhouse	1
Power Plant	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	4
Attacked:	
Towns	20
Marshalling Yards	8
Command Posts	3

Railroad Cuts	7
Highway Cuts	5

20 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	24
Sorties	174
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	75
PW Leaflets	28

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	24
Successful	18
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	6
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	257
Armored Vehicles	25
Locomotives	8
Railroad Cars	80
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	7
Barges	18
Docks	2
Dumps	1
Buildings	43
Horse-drawn Vehicles	36
Artillery Piece	1
Attacked:	
Towns	3
Marshalling Yards	8
Command Posts	3
Troop Concentrations	1
Railroad Cuts	7
Highway Cuts	4

21 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	78
Sorties	504
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	190.5
Fragmentation	7.11
Incendiary	9.5
PW Leaflets	28
Claims (Air)	1-0-0
Claims (Grd)	1-0-2
Losses (A/C)	4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	42
Successful	36
P/R Sorties	17
Successful	16
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	6
Successful	4
Tac/R Photo Sorties	10
Successful	10

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	318
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	28
Locomotives	16
Railroad Cars	575
Bridges	2
Gun Positions	14
Barges	9
Dumps	1
Buildings	155
Hangar	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	13
Attacked:	
Troop Concentrations	2
Marshalling Yards	16
Airfields	3
Defended Localities	27
Railroad Cuts	26
Highway Cuts	8

22 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	33
Sorties	358
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	74.50
Fragmentation	5.36
Incendiary	12
Claims (Air)	3-0-0
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	52
Successful	50
Tac/R Photo Sorties	6
Successful	6
P/R sorties	24
Successful	20
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	4
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	74
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	13
Locomotives	15
Railroad Cars	404
Bridges	4
Barges	16
Buildings	44
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2
Railroad Tunnel	1
Radio Tower	1
Railroad Stations	2
Roundhouse	1
Supply Pile	1
Depots	2
Attacked:	
Towns	17
Marshalling Yards	18
Railroad Cuts	78

23 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	71
Sorties	527
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	194
Fragmentation	14.12
Incendiary	12
White Phosporus	12
PW Leaflets	28
Claims (Air)	4-1-1
Losses	7

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	48
Successful	48
Tac/R Photo Sorties	2
Successful	2
P/R Sorties	2
Successful	2
Weather Sorties	2
Successful	1
P/R Sorties	2
Successful	0
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	8
Successful	8

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Tank and Armored Vehicles	269
Railroad Cars	1308
Motor Transport	724
Locomotives	36
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	19
Barges	6
Buildings	135
Horse-drawn Vehicles	24
Horse-drawn Artillery Pieces	3
Trailers	2
Tunnels	2
Roundhouses	2
Fuel Dump	1
Fuel Tanks	19
Locomotive Repair Shed	1
Power Plant	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	30
Towns	21
Command Posts	2
Troop Concentrations	1
Railroad Cuts	32
Highway Cuts	8

24 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	47
Sorties	323
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	39.5
RDX	57.5
Fragmentation	42.5
PW Leaflets	28
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	28
Successful	28
Tac/R Photo Sorties	4
Successful	4
P/R Sorties	10
Successful	10
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	253
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	47
Locomotives	19
Railroad Cars	507
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	10
Barges	3
Buildings	56
Horse-drawn Vehicles	18
Roundhouse	1
Control Towers	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	8
Defended Localities	9
Supply Dumps	2
Command Posts	2
Railroad Cuts	17
Highway Cuts	4

25 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	53
Sorties	434
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	154.5
Fragmentation	5.19
RDX	17
White Phosporus	4.25
Rockets	32
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	46
Successful	42

Tac/R Photo Sorties	2
Successful	0
P/R Sorties	20
Successful	20
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	250
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	97
Locomotives	21
Railroad Cars	692
Bridges	3
Horse-drawn Vehicles	13
Tunnels	2
Roundhouses	3
Powerhouse	1
Barrage Balloons	2
Machine Shop	1
Lumber Mills	2
Command Posts	1
Attacked:	
Towns	20
Marshalling Yards	26
Railroad Cuts	33
Highway Cuts	2

26 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	5
Sorties	51
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Weather Sorties	4
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	3
Locomotives	8
Railroad Cars	40
Buildings	6
Signal Towers	3
Horse-drawn Vehicles	3
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	2
Enemy Personnel Killed	250
Railroad Cuts	1

27 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	9
Sorties	112
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
HE	36
Fragmentation	.78
PW Leaflets	28

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	6
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	22
Locomotives	6
Railroad Cars	50
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yard	1
Defended Localities	2

28 February 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	28
Sorties	239
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	78.5
Fragmentation	2.08
Rockets	4
Claims (Air)	4-2-3
Claims (Grd)	2-0-4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	22
Successful	10
P/R Sorties	11
Successful	6

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	35
Armored Vehicles	5
Railroad Cars	154
Gun Positions	11
Buildings	76
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1
Roundhouses	2
Control House	1
Attacked:	
Towns	20
Marshalling Yards	2
Command Post	1
Supply Depot	1
Troop Concentration	1
Airfield	1
Highway Cuts	7
Rail Cuts	4

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HEADQUARTERS
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (ADV) H-1-M-1
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SECTION

APO 141, U.S. Army
3 February 1945

Memorandum.

SUBJECT : Review of Procedure for Control of Aircraft.

TO : Chief of Staff, XIX Tactical Air Command.

1. Introduction. It has been requested by A-3 Operations of XIX Tactical Air Command that a review of prescribed control procedure as written in command SOP's be made. To this end all SOP's have been examined, and in addition several characteristics of control as actually carried out by the TCC and FDP's have been included in the memorandum. Several discrepancies will be evident. It has not been the writer's purpose to separate control features which are responsibilities of Command or of the TCC, but merely to indicate several observations of the overall picture.

2. SOP Control Procedure. All information pertaining to control and radar procedure is contained in the following SOP's.

100-2	100-44
100-40	100-47
100-41	100-49
100-42	100-22

SOP 100-22, Section II, contains most of the essential procedure pertinent to control, a summary of which is as follows.

a. All operations are to be controlled from the Tactical Control Control Center. Control of a/c is to be usually from the TCC but may be assigned to an FDP. This applies to all flights whether scheduled on a field order or not.

b. All a/c use "A" channel while on their field and while taking off.

c. "A" channel will ordinarily be used by TCC and FDP for control unless the field order specifies another channel. If "A" channel is unusable for some reason the flight will go over to "B" channel; the controller at TCC on this channel will specify the alternate channel to be used.

d. A/c flying on a cooperation mission, ie. under control of a tactical air party, will check in with the TCC on "A" channel and will be told to contact the particular party on "B" or "D" channel. When returning home "A" channel is again used, with fixing and homing being done on "D" channel.

e. Tac-Recce a/c will use their "A" channel at all times unless contacting a tactical air party, or when ordered to contact other a/c on another channel.

f. A/c on artillery recce are to check in on "A" channel, and carry out their mission on "A" or "B" channel.

g. Day photo recces are to check in with TCC on "A" and during the remainder of mission use "B" or "D" channels if other contacts are required.

h. Night photo recces call FDP 5 directly on "B" channel, and if necessary other channels are assigned for use by the controller at FDP 5.

i. Weather recces are carried out on "A" channel.

j. All night fighter a/c contact FDP 5 directly on "A" channel. Channel assignments are made by FDP 5.

3. Notes from Observations of Daytime Control Procedure. Several important facts have been obtained from discussion with controllers and observation of daytime control procedure.

a. No procedure has been made SOP for assignment of missions to FDP's.

b. No definite orders have been given that the TCC shall allot those missions to FDPs which are most suitable for close control.

c. It is implied but not stated that all a/c are to call TCC when airborne.

d. Flights, when airborne do not call the TCC in all cases. Tactical air parties of FDPs are often directly contacted.

e. Recce a/c very seldom check in with TCC when airborne--they are, in effect, not under control except when reporting information to TCC.

f. During November, December, and January practically all missions were given over to FDP "Close" control.

g. Monitors are maintained during operations on all "A" channels and on "B", "C", and "D". However, all channels being used are not necessarily monitored at the TCC, but may be assigned to an FDP. In any case, all channels are being monitored by a controller at all times.

4. Control of Night Fighters and Night Photo Recces. All night fighter a/c are under control of FDP 5, and no direct R/T contact is made with the TCC. Similarly, all King Kong a/c come under the control of FDP 5, which usually consists of "listening out" control and providing assistance when requested. In case FDP 5 is non-operational because of moving or breakdown, assignment is made to one of the other FDPs.

5. Actual Procedure. Daytime control procedure as actually carried out by TCC and FDPs is as follows.

a. TCC assigns those flights to particular FDPs as specified in the field order. A monitor is then maintained on the proper "A" channel by the FDP and TCC.

b. When a/c are airborne and call the TCC, the FDP may or may not be notified of the fact. This requires that the FDP must have a monitor on the channel anyway.

c. The controller at the FDP then vectors the a/c to assigned ground targets or to the vicinity of Tactical air parties to which control is turned over. During the time a/c are under FDP control the actual path of the flight is followed and plotted by the controller on the PPI tube. Other "blips" or a/c which appear near his controlled flight and are not identified as friendly are classified as bogies, and warning is given to the flight under control.

d. While in the target a/c going down to attack ground targets are not seen by the radar although VHF contact may still be maintained. When the a/c come up to sufficiently high altitude, they may again be seen by the controlling radar but must be identified. This is of particular importance if other flights are in the vicinity. For this purpose a D/F is used by the controller to ascertain the bearing of his flight and to vector it to other targets or to take it home.

e. At all times a/c within range of radar stations are being plotted and continuously reported to the TCC. This track information is displayed at TCC as a general situation for observation purposes by the area controllers. Because of the inherent time delays and original inaccuracies of a/c location, identification of particular flights is a rather difficult procedure. Consequently, "area" control of a/c from displayed radar information at the TCC is not efficient.

f. Of most use at the TCC for control purposes is the D/F net which is used to obtain "fixes" of a/c on "B", "C", and "D" channels, although "D" is the specified common fixer channel. This procedure, however, does not lend itself to continuous and accurate tracking of the a/c.

g. It is worthwhile to point out the main differences between "area" control at the TCC and "close" control at an FDP. Area control can be exercised over the entire area of operations but because of time delays of the order of 1 min. in displaying tracks it cannot be very accurate. By comparison, an FDP has a smaller coverage area, but a/c can be much more accurately followed. This is particularly true of FDP 5 which has an inherent accuracy of roughly 3 to 4 times that of other FDPs using lower frequency equipment. Stories of FDP accuracy of control seem to vary widely, but no suitable tests have been made to determine just how reliably an FDP or the MEW can vector a/c to a given ground target.

h. It should not be construed from any of the above observations that present control procedure by TCC and FDPs is necessarily considered lacking. It is certainly true that fairly complete control is exercised and that most fighter and F/B missions are FDP controlled either by "listening out" or "close" control. However, the quality, effectiveness, and accuracy of such control has never been ascertained.

6. Targets of Opportunity. Of particular importance is the procedure for handling targets of opportunity which are reported by a/c on their way to primary targets. Although not stated in any SOP, orders are in effect that a/c are not to be diverted from their primary targets except by permission from Combat Ops. at XIX Tactical Air Command. As pointed out above, practically all such missions come under FDP control. This means that such targets are reported to the FDP controller, which are then relayed to the chief controller at TCC, and thence to Combat Ops. If the target is deemed to be of sufficient consequence, the original flight or other flights may be ordered to attack it. In any case the information is given to TCC and then to the FDP which is to control the specified a/c. Targets are likewise reported by recce a/c directly to the TCC, and the same procedure is again followed whereby a/c are taken to the target by an FDP. Other instances, fewer in number, occur whereby a/c are requested by TCC to go to such a target by visual navigation. There are in addition, of course, armed recce missions scheduled and FDP controlled whose function is to attack targets of opportunity. The efficiency of such procedure and number of attacks has never been determined.

7. CAAU Operations. The two SCR-584 "close Air Attack Units" have been operationally associated with Tactical Air Officers. This was largely due to the ease of maintaining land line communications with Corps Headquarters as compared with the TCC, and because targets were conveniently available for assignment at Corps. Consequently, all CAAU controlled missions to date have been the responsibility of the Tactical Air Officers at Corps, and the TCC has had little knowledge of such operations. It is tentatively required that a particular FDP monitor all flights which are under CAAU control. For flights which check in with the TCC when airborne and are told to go under control of an FDP for reassignment to a CAAU, this procedure is being followed. But it has not been determined whether or not the same is being done for all those flights which are given over to CAAU control by a Tactical Air Officer while over the target area.

8. Blind Bombing with Fighter Bombers. Two CAAU units are operational and have controlled about 65 flights. For the most part this control consisted of navigational assistance in taking the flight to a Tactical Air Party or a specific ground target. Six of the missions were BTOs or those for which the targets were overcast and blind bombing was directed by the CAAUs with the authority of the Tactical Air Officer. Control procedure for blind bombing as a definite procedure has never been laid on.

Memorandum prepared by:

A.C. Mc Lean,
ORS Consultant

DISTRIBUTION:
1 cy Chief of Staff
1 cy A-3 Ops.
1 cy Signal Officer
1 cy C.O. Tactical Control Group (Prov.)
1 cy L.S. Taylor, Operational Research Section, 9th A.F.
1 cy C.L. Zimmerman, Operational Research Section, IX Tactical Air Command.
2 cy Operational Research Section, XIX Tactical Air Command files.

A TRUE COPY:

F.G. VOSBURGH
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

REPRODUCED BY:

Headquarters,
XIX Tactical Air Command,
10 May 1945.

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HEADQUARTERS
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (ADV)
Operational Research Section H-1-S-1

APO 141, U.S. Army
6 February 1945

SUBJECT: Weekly Status Report.

TO : Chief of Staff, XIX Tactical Air Command.

Part I: Smith.

1. Setting up of Operational Research Section Office continues.

2. The bomb strike camera development has been continuously followed. An indorsement was written for the Command to the letter of requirements by the Commanding General, IX Tactical Air Command, as requested by Ninth Air Force. The officer in charge of this project, Lt. Col. R.W. Philbrick, Office of the Director of Reconnaissance and Photography, Ninth Air Force Adv., has been asked to keep us informed as to its progress. A TWX was sent to Col. G.W. Goddard, Office of Technical Service, who is carrying out the prototype development, asking him to inform us of the status of his work, and notify us when he has something ready for inspection. Late yesterday Col. Philbrick telephoned, asking us to send an operational P-47 to A-42 for the prototype installations. Lt. Col. Mohler and myself plan to inspect same.

3. A rough draft of booklet on "The Fighter Bomber" is being revised. This work will continue for several weeks.

4. Photographs of bridges attacked by XIX Tactical Air Command Fighter Bombers have been obtained from the A-2 Target Section for analysis.

5. It is suggested that this status report be submitted on a 10 day or semi-monthly basis, as more than one week is usually required to obtain any reportable results from a given problem.

Part II: Mc Lean.

1. Photo Calibration of the CAAUs has not yet been obtained due to limiting weather conditions, and higher priority targets for the recce planes when weather is suitable. Consequently, investigation is being made to determine whether or not suitable calibration can be carried out by the night photo recce squadron. Indications, so far are that this can be done.

2. At the request of A-3 Ops. a review has been made of SOPs applying to fighter control in XIX Tactical Air Command and how control procedure actually functions. An Operational Research Section Memorandum has been prepared and will soon be distributed.

3. Discussions have been held by A-3 Ops., Signal Section, 405 Gp., and ORS personnel concerning missions for CAAUs, necessary control procedures to be followed and suitable targets. An SOP designed to be sufficiently comprehensive in scope to take care of new CAAUs to be soon operational is undergoing preparation. ORS has been in a position to assist in this activity.

4. Due to a request originating at SHAEF Air concerning handling of targets of opportunity by TCC and FDP control units, a brief investigation has been made covering the period 15 December 1944 to 31 January 1945. The information desired has been requested of all Tactical Air Commands and is of such nature that it is an almost impossible job to obtain the information from the data at hand. However, records are being compiled which will give at least a partial answer.

Submitted by:

NICHOLAS M. SMITH, Jr.
Chief of Section.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 cy Chief of Staff
1 cy Dr. Taylor, ORS 9th Bomb Division
1 cy Files

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Lt. Col., Air Corps.

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Headquarters,
XIX Tactical Air Command,
10 May 1945.

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HEADQUARTERS
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (ADV)
Operational Research Section H-1-S-1

APO 141, U.S. Army
19 February 1945

SUBJECT: Status Report for Period 6 February 1945 to 18 February 1945.

TO : Chief of Staff, XIX Tactical Air Command, APO 141, U.S. Army.

PART I. Smith.

1. A visit was made with Lt. Col. Moler to the Photographic Section of the Office of Technical Services where Col. Goddard is developing

mountings and cameras for obtaining bomb strike photographs. Col. Goddard had requested an operational P-47 for an installation. On the arrival of the A/C, a P-47-D-30, it was discovered that his method of mounting was impossible in this model. Consequently a plan was drawn up for mounting the camera in a bomb unit to hang on the belly shackle. The mounting is to have these specifications:

a. Camera (a K-25) may be pointed straight down, 45 degrees from vertical, or straight back.

b. Camera is to take a series of photographs, one each 2/3 second, for 35 seconds. After the initial operation the camera may be operated manually by pressing the bomb-release button.

2. It is considered that this mounting will have the advantages of requiring minimum modification of the A/C, it may be changed easily from one A/C to another, and therefore can be employed for a maximum number of missions. It has the disadvantage that it occupies one bomb hook--and will be ruined if a crash landing is made.

3. Col. Goddard is very interested in this development and has given it his No. 1 priority. He estimates the new unit will be ready for trial in a few days.

4. When the camera is turned over to the Group for trial, it is desired to have on hand one technician (E/M) from the Photographic Section to service the camera, make any modifications that trial proves necessary, and to train representatives of the Group service squadron in its maintainance. At the same time it is desired that one member of O.R.S. be on hand to develop a method of assessing the film. It is believed that this can be done with minimum disturbance to the Group.

5. Col. Ferguson has requested that a chart giving bomb and fuze recommendations be prepared for the Operations Staff. Work on this has begun. Verbal recommendation was made to Col. Ferguson that the fuzing employed in missions be mentioned in the Ops Flashes.

PART II. Mc Lean.

1. The data referred to in the previous status report pertaining to control of A/C attacking targets of opportunity has been prepared in the form of an unofficial memorandum and presented to A-3. It has been included in the report sent to Ninth Air Force.

2. The photo-calibration flight for the BACUs (Battle Area Control Units) was run on 14 February with the following results.

a. Considerable difficulty was encountered because of crowded VHF channels.

b. Each of the BACUs had control of the A/C for about an hour with Ripsaw 5 serving in the capacity of radar and VHF monitor.

c. Six targets had been set up by each BACU, but due to above mentioned VHF conditions only two targets were photographed. Several runs were made on other targets but suitable control could not be given.

d. The errors of the two targets were:

	Range	Azimuth	Radial
(1)	692 yards over	26.8' or 228 yards plus	728 yards
(2)	372 yards over	49.3' or 471 yards plus	558 yards

e. No statistical analysis can be made on two sets of data, but the indication is that much more can be done in the way of calibration and accuracy improvement.

3. A summary of past operations of the BACUs and present operational status is being prepared. Recommendations will be made which it is hoped will further improve operations.

Submitted by:

NICHOLAS M. SMITH, Jr.,
Chief of Section.

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1 cy C/S
1 cy Dr. Taylor, 9th A.F., O.R.S.
1 cy O.R.S. files

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F.G. VOSBURGH,
Lt. Col., Air Corps.

REPRODUCED BY:

Headquarters,
XIX Tactical Air Command,
10 May 1945.

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HEADQUARTERS
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (ADV)
Operational Research Section H-1-Mc-1

APO 141, U.S. Army
19 February 1945

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Pertinent Data on BACU Operation.

TO : Chief of Staff, XIX Tactical Air Command, APO 141, U.S. Army.

INTRODUCTION

1. It has been considered advisable to present in a brief summary the data which is pertinent to the present operational status of the BACUs (Battle Area Control Units). Some information has been obtained on accuracy of positioning an a/c over a ground point. In general, the results indicate a need for additional work to be done to improve accuracy of control; although the equipment is being utilized to a degree commensurate with its accuracy. Recommendations are made which it is hoped can be followed to improve operations.

I. Missions So Far Run.

1.1 Between 2 December and 29 January 60 missions were run which can be classified as follows:

	Number	Successful
Ground Support	40	36
Armed Recce	11	11
Blind Bombing	8	8
Photo Calibration	1	1

All unsuccessful missions occured before 1 January and were primarily due to lack of experience and proper liaison with other controlling radar stations. 34 of the above missions were controlled between 10 January and 29 January (These figures are incomplete because all data is not available, but there were probably about 10 additional missions). A mission is considered successful if control was satisfactory.

II. Accuracy of Control---Photo Calibration.

2.1 On 10 December a photo calibration flight was run, and the target missed by 7/8 mile.

2.2 A considerable amount of work has been expended to instruct controllers and technical officers at BACUs 1 and 2 on the need and methods of obtaining greater accuracy. Both stations are at present surveyed in and oriented.

2.3 On two blind bombing missions recently run, pilots reported seeing bombs bursting in target areas or fires burning.

2.4 On 14 February a planned photo-calibration flight was run with the following results.

a. On two targets the errors were:

Range	Azimuth	Total
2076 ft. over	26.8', 684 ft. positive	2184 feet
1116 ft. over	49.3', 1251 "	1674 feet

b. Runs were made on other targets, but due to crowded channels they were not successful. Both Junk Box and New Paint had the a/c under control for an hour.

c. Other than the crowded channel conditions the mission was very satisfactory, particularly the control given by Ripsaw 5 which monitored on radar and VHF during the entire 3 hours of the flight.

d. If further such control is to be attempted it will be highly desirable to set up a clear channel. Channel 846 is available and probably can be used.

2.5 The data so far at hand is insufficient to make a statistical determination of control accuracy. It is, however, enough to indicate need for further such calibration and improvement of control.

2.6 Photo cover is being obtained on all targets that have been blind bombed.

2.7 So far as is known these photo calibrations constitute the only real attempt at an evaluation of operational accuracy by any Tactical Air Command.

III. Training of Controllers.

3.1 Present inadequacies of control are due in large part to the lack of previous training of controllers. At the two operational BACUs this has been somewhat alleviated by conducting actual operations. At the two new units no experience and very little training will be evident.

IV. SOPs.

4.1 A new comprehensive SOP (based on experience and determination of inadequacies of present SOPs) has been written and is being put into effect covering BACU operation. One of its main effects is to set up procedure for control of a/c for blind bombing when targets cannot be located visually.

4.2 Data concerning the jettisoning of bombs under such conditions, i.e. formations which would have been suitable for BACU control for dropping bombs blind on a target instead of jettisoning at random or under control of an FDP follow. Not included are those cases in which bomb loads were brought back to base after a/c were over target area. Such data is not included in morning summaries.

Month	No. Flights Jettisoning (usually squadrons)	No. Flights returning w/bombs after take-off	No. Days involved	No. Flights jettisoning at direction of an FDP inc. in A
	A	B	C	D
Dec.	24	5	10	
Jan.	21	9	10	
Feb. 1-13 not inc. 10 & 12 Feb.	10	1	3	7 3 by Rip 3 1 by Rip 1 3 by Rip (unknown)

V. Recommendations.

5.1 In view of the above facts two suggestions can be made, subject to limitations of necessary personnel changes which will be made.

a. Further determination of control accuracy of the operational units can be carried out and assessment of blind bombing accuracy made.

b. One of the two new BACUs can be set up as a practice unit for personnel training and as a means of determining accuracy and operational procedure.

5.2 Advantages to be gained from the first suggestion are undoubtedly evident. If it is decided to set up BACUs 3 and 4 on an operational basis, the same sort of work can be done with them. However, if the second suggestion is followed, a number of worthwhile factors should be pointed out.

a. Facilities can be made available for extension of calibration procedures already established and determining control accuracy under simulated bombing conditions.

b. Practice bomb dropping can be done and evaluated.

c. Extensive work can be done in the training of new controllers and operating personnel. Further training of present personnel and controllers from BACUs 1 and 2 can be carried out. Much needed technical assistance can be utilized from the experience of two lieutenants who are at present on TD with XIX Tactical Air Command. They have probably as wide a technical experience as anyone in the ETO about the equipment and have been associated with several units.

5.3 If such a practice unit is to be set up, a brief outline of required facilities is as follows.

a. Use of one or if possible two F/Bs for practice bombing.

b. Setting up a clear channel for control purposes. One such channel (846) (a night fighter control channel) is available, and involves crystallization of a/c and ground VHF.

c. Use of a photo plane for analysis of practice bombing and/or simulated bomb runs.

d. Coordination with an FDP for subsidiary control purposes. (This may not be necessary).

XLVII

e. Experimentation with the use of IFF equipment currently installed in BACUs 1 and 2 and to be soon available to 3 and 4. This gear is presumably to be utilized, but no procedures have yet been made SOP or even attempted.

5.4 It should be pointed out that formations being controlled by BACUs at present are those over the target area which cannot find visual targets. The formation calls a controlling FDP and requests a "Foxhunt" target. The FDP then turns over control by prescribed procedure to a BACU and blind bombing is carried out. Both units have made use of this procedure with successful results from the standpoint of control. No assessment of bombing accuracy has yet been made. An indication of the number of formations that will make use of this procedure can be obtained from 4.2. It is to be expected that additional missions will be laid on for both day and night time activities. The fact to be pointed out is that the present handling capacity of the two operational BACUs is considerably greater than the number of missions they are now controlling. Consequently, it is to be expected that the addition of two more units would result in diminution of the number of missions to be controlled by each BACU and no increase in operational efficiency. There is, therefore, little to be lost from operations by utilizing one of the two new BACUs as a practice unit.

A. C. Mc LEAN,
O.R.S.

DISTRIBUTION:
1 cy C/S
1 cy A-3 Ops.
1 cy Signal Officer
1 cy C.O. Control Group
1 cy Lt Col N. D. Moler
1 cy Senior Controller, Control Group
1 cy Chief O.R.S. 9th A.F.
1 cy O.R.S. file

A TRUE COPY: REPRODUCED BY:

F. G. VOSBURGH,
Lt Col, Air Corps

Headquarters,
XIX Tactical Air Command,
10 May 1945

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HEADQUARTERS
XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND (ADV)
Operational Research Section H-1-S-1

APO 141, U.S. Army
28 February 1945

SUBJECT: Status Report for Period 19 February 1945, to 28 February 1945.

TO : Chief of Staff, XIX Tactical Air Command, APO 141, U.S. Army.

PART I. Smith.

1. The problem of weapon selection for the fighter-bombing of various targets has been considered. Recommendations were made in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff a) a committee be formed to make weapon recommendations for specific targets on the request of A-3 Ops and b) that wall charts giving weapon recommendations be prepared for A-3 Ops by O.R.S. and distributed to Groups. Our memorandum has been returned by the C/S saying the above recommendations are approved, and that he will appoint such a committee. The wall charts are in preparation.

2. Selection of targets for attack by AIBR equipped A/C were made with A-2. These targets were selected with regard to their tactical value, and to their suitability for use in assessing AIBR accuracy.

3. Status of bomb-strike camera. No information from Col Goddard. Until ready for assessment use this is in the hands of Lt Col Moler.

4. Under development is a theoretical analysis of the probability of destroying a double-trussed bridge with a) a bomb of sufficient size to cut the entire span--both trusses--with one hit and b) a bomb of such size that it will cut one but not two trusses. There is greater value than academic in such an analysis. The ratio will be somewhere between 10 and 100. If the ratio is high, then on bridges requiring a larger bomb (say 2000 lb G.P.) than F/B's can carry the fuzing should be designed for piers and abutments rather than for the superstructure. It will also emphasize the importance of choosing a weapon of sufficient size.

PART II. Mc Lean.

1. A memorandum, "Pertinent Data on BACU Operation", in the form of a summary of operations has been prepared and distributed to interested sections and units of the command.

2. Suggestions have been made for the setting up of BACU No 4 as a training unit for controllers and operators. Discussions have been held with Colonel French concerning the type and extent of such work which can be done.

3. On 21 February it was suggested that an impromptu photo calibration be run by turning over control of a Tac/R A/C scheduled for regular recce work to BACU No 2. This was done by A-2 recce and the necessary arrangements for control made through the TCC. From the standpoint of control the calibration went off very smoothly, but results were somewhat negative. The pilot snapped three photos as directed by the controller but his indicator showed that only one had been taken. However, a fast BDA was facilitated since the target was a bridge which was visually bombed earlier in the day--it was not destroyed.

4. Targets have been selected and procedures involved have been discussed with controllers of BACU No 2 for running of "Portrait" flights. A "Portrait" Consists of photo calibration by control of a Tac/R A/C which is already in the target area and has flying time left for such work. It is anticipated that this procedure will involve less interference to normal operations as well as permit adequate photo-calibration to be carried out.

5. Six P-38 A/C of the 367th Group have been scheduled for "Lighthouse" missions, whereby they are to bomb targets under BACU control during visible bombing conditions. One A/C will take strike photos with a verticle camera. All such results are to be analyzed by O.R.S.

6. Photo cover has been obtained for seven targets that have been blind bombed and an accuracy assessment is being carried out.

7. A memorandum is being prepared indicating the discrepancies in data that are now being taken by the BACUs. Recommendations will be made to standardize mission records and logs to facilitate analysis of BACU operations.

Submitted by:

NICHOLAS M. SMITH Jr.,
Chief of Section

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1 cy O.R.S. files

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F.G. VOSBURGH,
Lt Col, Air Corps

Headquarters,
XIX Tactical Air Command,
10 May 1945.

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MARCH

1. Summary of the Month.

a. General: Operating throughout March with five fighter-bomber Groups- the 354th, 362nd, 367th, 368th and 371st - and the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, and favored with exceptionally good weather during most of the month, XIX Tactical Air Command was able to fly 1350 missions totaling 12,232 sorties, wreaking great destruction upon a retreating enemy.

Although the weather was non-operational on five days of the month and operations were limited early in March, the number of missions and sorties increased until several five-group records were shattered later in the period.

As Third Army armor and infantry advanced in lightning-like drives which revived memories of the BRITTANY blitz, our fighter-bombers were provided lucrative targets which resulted in the destruction of much of the enemy transportation and communication systems and diminished his power of resistance.

Highlighting the achievements of the air-ground team were (1) the drive to the RHINE, north of the MOSELLE, (2) springing of the RHINE-SAAR-MOSELLE trap by driving south of the MOSELLE, and (3) the crossing of the RHINE and penetration into Central GERMANY.

As Army forces overran enemy airfields, forcing German planes to seek fields in other areas, our aircraft sighted larger numbers of enemy planes and succeeded in destroying, probably destroying or damaging 281 in the air and on the ground. Our aircraft losses, to all causes, were 59 planes.

The enemy completed his most chaotic and discouraging one-month period since the NORMANDY campaign, contributing more than 207,000 prisoners of war to Third US Army cages.

b. "Treason In Reverse:" As increasingly good weather permitted a crescendo of operational activity and Third US Army advances produced excellent targets, August and September successes were recalled by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, of Third US Army, in the following letter, dated 21 March 1945, to Maj. Gen. O. P. Weyland, of XIX Tactical Air Command:

"The XIX Tactical Air Command and the Third Army have again been committing treason in reverse as we did so happily in August and September.

"By this I mean that instead of giving aid and comfort to the enemy, we have been giving him pain and discomfort, and doing it in a big way.

"Let us keep it up!"

General Weyland indorsed the letter and forwarded it to all units of his Command. The indorsement read as follows:

"1. With apologies to Patrick Henry I say, if this be treason, let us make the most of it."

"2. XIX TAC-Third Army again is showing the world what a perfectly coordinated fighting air-ground team can do. I knew that you would be with me to a man when I assured General Patton that we would 'keep it up' with the Third Army."

c. Enemy Air Activity: There was a marked increase in the activity of the enemy's ground-attack aircraft on the Western Front. In the face of the growing Allied pressure on the ground, the jet bombers by day, and the JU-87s and FW-190 fighter-bombers by night, made considerable efforts to harass and disorganize Allied troop movements.

The enemy's attempt to present an air defense was particularly apparent in our area late in March, the Luftwaffe flying more than 250 sorties daily on the Western Front, primarily against the Third Army assault area, from 21 through 25 March.

Although the enemy attempted air opposition to the extensive Allied RHINE RIVER crossings, his efforts were short lived. His shortage of fuel and good pilots, plus frequent attacks by fighter-bombers on his airfields, doomed the attempts to failure. Moreover, anti-aircraft took a considerable toll of enemy aircraft over the bridgehead areas.

Our fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft reported claims during the month totaling 122 enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, 5 probably destroyed and 23 damaged; on the ground 43 planes were destroyed and 88 planes and 2 gliders damaged.

Pilots of our fighter-bombers successfully attacked enemy ME-262s during the month. Their reports revealed that these aircraft possess vulnerable fuel installations back of the cockpit. In several instances pilots reported strikes in this area of the aircraft. One pilot described the resulting blaze as resembling a "Christmas tree with Neon lights."

d. Weather: Although weather hampered operations during the period from 4 through 8 March, flying conditions during most of the month were excellent. The Command Weather Section predicted 25 operational days and fighter-bombers were actually able to fly 26 days. In the week from 18 to 25 March they averaged 666 sorties daily.

e. Reconnaissance Has Big Month: "With the Third Army...spearheading to the RHINE, clearing the areas west of the river, and then striking south across the MOSELLE to out-flank the SIEGFRIED LINE, the responsibility of photo and tactical reconnaissance was greatly increased, calling for a maximum effort." Thus wrote the Historical Officer of the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, describing operations during March, which he described as a record-breaking month in every operational respect.

During the month, the Group flew a total of 1743 operational sorties. There were 1,081 operational missions, including 428 photo and 653 tactical reconnaissance missions. Of these 920 were successful.

Time and again alert reconnaissance pilots spotted large concentrations of retreating enemy transport, contacted fighter-bombers and led them to the ripe targets.

A record day of operations was 23 March when all squadrons flew a total of 127 sorties. The 31st Photo Squadron completed 42 of 43 missions attempted and mapped an area of 4,000 square miles in addition to covering other targets.

Included in the outstanding missions of the Group during the month was that of a 12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron pilot who, on 22 March, observed and reported on the status of 54 bridges.

In addition to their reconnaissance activities on 24 March, aircraft of the Group registered all claims against enemy aircraft for that day, with three destroyed. Reconnaissance pilots during the month claimed 13 planes destroyed, 2 probables, and 4 damaged.

The 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron moved to TRIER, GERMANY, on 14 March and was followed on 27 March by Group Headquarters and other subordinate units. The 39th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron was reassigned to a new group forming under the Ninth Air Force.

2. Highlights of the Month: When General Patton's forces compressed the enemy in the SAAR PALATINATE and a withdrawal was attempted our fighter-bombers on 18 March established a new high for the month by destroying 1,033 motor vehicles and incidentally set a short-lived five-group record of 714 sorties. On 27 March, as Third Army forces threatened FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN, our aircraft destroyed or damaged 1,027 motor transport while flying only 401 sorties.

Allied air operations, meantime, had surpassed the D-Day effort when, on 23 March, aircraft flew 10,000 sorties as a prelude to the opening of a new offensive east of the RHINE. Allied aircraft dropped 50,000 tons of bombs in five days prior to the offensive. Our fighter-bombers surpassed the 714 sorties recorded 18 March, flying 775 sorties and claiming 1100 railroad cars and 70 locomotives destroyed or damaged during the day.

Attack on Von Rundstedt's Headquarters: A Ninth Air Force representative, on 18 March, brought to advanced Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command, information which reliably located the Headquarters of the German Commander-In-Chief, West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, in a castle near ZIEGENBURG, six miles west of BAD NAUHEIM. Approval for an attack on this Headquarters was given by Maj. Gen. O. P. Weyland, Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command, and on the morning of 19 March pilots of the 367th Group, chosen for the mission, were specially briefed. On the same day, between 1330 and 1400 hours, the 392nd, 393rd, and 394th Squadrons of the 367th Group successfully attacked the target.

Reconnaissance after the attacks revealed that the building supposedly housing Von Rundstedt and his staff had been completely gutted by fire. The eastern end of the building was destroyed by direct hits. One-third of the garage roof had burned and 11 vehicles nearby were destroyed. The mess buildings and underground shelters were undamaged. Approximately eight small buildings east of Headquarters were gutted by fire.

After the attack an officer prisoner of war who had been at ZIEGENBURG on 18 March 1945 verified the target as Headquarters C-in-C, West.

1. The Capture of TRIER.

TRIER, important MOSELLE RIVER city, was almost completely surrounded 1 March as a definite phase of action was being brought to a successful close.

Although low clouds and poor visibility necessitated bombing through the overcast in many cases, pilots flying below cloud cover located motor vehicles, tanks, and trains seeking to remove the enemy from the TRIER area. Thirty-three of the day's 60 missions were flown in close cooperation with Third Army elements which entered and outflanked the city.

Resulting claims included 111 Motor vehicles, 29 armored vehicles, 12 locomotives, 40 railroad cars, and 63 buildings destroyed or damaged.

The 367th Group made five attacks on fuel and supply depots. Bombing a supply dump at NEUDORF (M-2862), its pilots noted direct hits and orange smoke. Two buildings were damaged at the MANNHEIM fuel dump.

Claims of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed, 1 probable and 3 damaged resulted when the 405th Squadron, 371st Group, was engaged by 30 ME-109s and FW-190s. One plane was lost.

On one mission in cooperation with Third Army a flight of the 368th Group bombed the enemy-occupied town of SEFFERWEICH (L-1363) at direction of ground control and reported it leveled. The 395th Squadron, bombing a fuel storage dump was attacked by 20 FW-190s and ME-109s and claimed 4 destroyed and 1 damaged.

Thirteen towns, a motor transport depot, an airfield and 7 marshalling yards were among targets attacked and 23 railroad cuts were made.

Third Army reported excellent cooperation on 2 March as the fighter-bombers struck at enemy movements, and destroyed fuel, ammunition, and supply dumps. Dropping 234.75 tons of GP, our pilots claimed 204 motor transports, 52 armored vehicles, and tanks, 29 locomotives, 154 railroad cars, 2 bridges and 115 buildings destroyed or damaged. Twenty-four towns and a troop concentration were attacked and 29 rail cuts and 4 highway cuts executed.

The 368th Group reported a hole blown in a concrete bridge on the MOSELLE and the destruction of seven camouflaged buildings, believed to be an ammunition dump. An explosion was seen at the fuel storage depot at LANGENSELBOLD (M-9574) and four fuel storage tanks at MAINZ were destroyed or damaged by aircraft of the Group.

Flames up to 1,000 feet were observed after the 371st Group bombed the FRANKFURT fuel dump. The MAINZ oil depot and a supply dump at WITTLICH (L-3955) were fired by planes of the 367th Group. Another primary target, a radar jamming station north of FRANKFURT, was destroyed by 15 direct hits scored by the 362nd Group.

Five enemy aircraft including 3 ME-262 jet-propelled planes were destroyed by P-51s of the 354th Group.

Driving east and north on 3 March, Third Army armored spearheads established a bridgehead over the KYLL RIVER, east of BITBURG. "Superior and accurate" close cooperation was provided by 368th Group's 396th Squadron which "completely silenced more than 4 artillery positions that had been heavily shelling the near bank of the bridgehead," in the words of a congratulatory telegram sent the squadron from the 5th Infantry Division Commander.

XX and XII Corps effected a junction along the line of the MOSELLE, at TRIER, while further north, the German metal industries center of BADEN (L-1957) was captured with excellent assistance by the same Group.

Despite low clouds, fighter-bombers completed a full day of operations although use of blind-bombing methods limited claims. Destroyed or damaged in the day's attacks were 221 motor transport, 38 armored vehicles and tanks, 17 locomotives, 245 railroad cars, 2 bridges, 16 gun positions, 101 buildings, 24 horsedrawn vehicles and 20 field guns.

Eleven marshalling yards, 22 towns, an airfield, a troop concentration and a command post were attacked and 34 rail and 7 highway cuts were effected.

2. The Breakthrough to the RHINE, north of the MOSELLE.

Third Army on 5 March launched an attack through the KYLL RIVER bridgehead and in lightning-like advances, spearheaded by the 4th Armored Division, established another bridgehead across the RUWER RIVER. Advancing 52 miles in 58 hours, fast-moving tanks reached the RHINE at ANDERNACH on 7 March, by-passing both MAYEN and KOBLENZ. Patrols of the 4th Armored Division crossed the RHINE at ANDERNACH on 8 March while behind them other advances brought Third Army's front completely inside GERMANY.

A spell of bad weather sharply restricted air operations during the period 4-8 March. On 4 March low cloud and visibility limited the fighter-bombers to 6 sorties, 4 of them flown by 371st Group's 406th Squadron on cooperation with XX Corps, with claims of 1 locomotive and a building destroyed, 5 railroad cars damaged and several rail cuts. Two uneventful recces were flown by 368th Group. On 5 March, 53 sorties were flown, 47 by 354th Group Mustangs on escort to IX Bombardment Division mediums which were attacking WETZLAR (G-5418) and NUTTLAR (B-4708) marshalling yards. The 368th Group flew a 2-plane weather recce and two aircraft of 371st Group, also on a weather recce, strafed and damaged a bus, a truck and a personnel carrier. Continuing rain and fog completely grounded our aircraft for the next three days.

Despite continued adverse weather conditions on 9 March fighter-bombers were able to fly 32 missions totaling 309 sorties in cooperation with General Patton's fast-moving troops, on armed reconnaissance and special missions.

Continuing spectacular gains, armored and infantry units cleared the SCHNEE EIFEL and formed new enemy pockets in the area north of the MOSELLE. First Army units were reported nearing COLOGNE.

Pilots of our fighter-bombers dropped 65.75 tons of GP and claimed 42 motor vehicles, 11 locomotives, 104 railroad cars, 18 gun positions, 37 buildings and 4 oil storage tanks destroyed or damaged. Eleven marshalling yards, 5 towns and an airfield were attacked and rails cut in 29 places.

The 367th Group reported successful attacks on a depot and airfield near MAINZ and the WIESBADEN (M-3663) oil depot.

Third Army elements, on 10 March, cleared enemy pockets and formed new pockets, penetrating north of the MOSELLE through the heart of the HOHE EIFEL to make contact with First Army units.

Our fighter-bombers flew 30 missions, totaling 323 sorties.

Ten column cover missions were flown by the 362nd Group for the 4th Armored Division. Claims included 129 motor transport, 8 locomotives, 25 railroad cars, 23 gun positions, 5 buildings, and 11 horse-drawn vehicles. Eleven defended localities were attacked and three rail cuts and a road cut effected.

Low clouds again hampered the XIX Tactical Air Command's air offensive 11 March and limited the day's activity to 25 missions, totaling 205 sorties. Weather prevented dive-bombing operations, but 10 communications centers were attacked through the overcast at the direction of ground controllers.

Third Army units, meanwhile, had reached the confluence of the RHINE and MOSELLE in the outskirts of KOBLENZ. Fourth Armored Division entered the northern suburbs of KOBLENZ and VIII Corps, at the north end of the front, completed reduction of all organized resistance west of the RHINE.

Continuing low cloud cover limited operations on 12 March to 13 missions, totaling 142 sorties. Claims were low because of weather.

a. MEW Close Control Inaugurated: First operational trials of the MEW Close Control Unit, which had been installed and in development at the XIX Tactical Air Command MEW for four months, were flown on the evening of 12 March. Five P-61s of the 425th night fighter squadron made single-ship runs over "Pinpoint" targets under MEW Close Control and dropped Napalm tanks.

On the following two nights seven more drops were made under Close Control. These drops were the first ones made by the controllers and in spite of the fact that the ballistics of Napalm tanks were unknown one night fighter's bombs hit an area apparently filled with explosives, for the pilot observed explosions for some time after the Napalm tanks hit and started burning.

3. Third Army Launches New Attack.

Early on 13 March the Third Army launched a new attack southeastward in the TRIER area by three divisions of the XX Corps, marking the

beginning of a new phase of operations. The attacking divisions reported gains in the rugged SCHWARZWALDER country which presented a barrier before the rich industrial SAAR basin. Third Army reported excellent air cooperation as clearing weather in the afternoon enabled the fighter-bombers to fly 52 missions, totaling 430 sorties. Missions included close cooperation with Third Army, armed reconnaissance, attacks on special targets, escort to bombers, alert scrambles and leaflet dropping.

Nineteen missions, totaling 76 sorties, were flown in cooperation with Third Army units in the new offensive, including assistance to the 65th Infantry Division in repulsing a counter-attack the first air cooperation provided the Division by XIX Tactical Air Command.

Our claims for the day included 8-0-4 enemy planes in aerial combat; plus destruction or damage of 140 motor transport, 21 armored vehicles and tanks, 9 locomotives, 380 railroad cars, 92 buildings and 8 horse-drawn vehicles. Attacks were made on 16 defended localities, 6 marshalling yards, a supply depot, and a motor transport shop; 26 rail cuts and 8 highway cuts were executed.

The three squadrons of the 354th Group encountered 25 enemy fighters in the FRANKFURT area while escorting mediums and claimed 4 ME-109s and 2 FW-190s destroyed, 1 ME-109 and 1 FW-190 damaged.

The 368th Group reported successful attacks on two primary targets, the FRIEDBURG motor transport shop and the WIESBADEN supply depot. Considerable damage was reported as a result of the 367th Group's bombing of the BINGEN (M-1352) marshalling yard.

Night fighters were active, dropping GP, incendiaries, and strafing with 20-mm cannon. A convoy was attacked, two towns were fired and considerable information concerning enemy movement was reported.

Third Army's XII Corps, striking southeastward across the MOSELLE, jumped off before dawn on 14 March, to follow the XX Corps drive in the area south and southeast of TRIER. By nightfall ten battalions, receiving excellent air cooperation from 362nd Group, had crossed the MOSELLE and reported excellent gains. XX Corps reported progress in its zone following its jump-off on 12 March. Third Army processed 6,619 prisoners through its prison cages.

Good weather enabled fighter-bombers to fly 70 missions, totaling 192 sorties, in cooperation with attacking Third Army troops, on armed reconnaissance, escort to mediums, alert scrambles, attacks on supply and storage depots, ammunition dumps, repair shops and railroad bridges, and leaflet-dropping.

Indicative of the day's activity was the bomb load, which included 68.25 tons of GP, 34.75 tons of M-76 incendiaries, plus the launching of 114 rockets.

Claims included 245 motor transport, 18 armored vehicles and tanks, 17 locomotives, 315 railroad cars, 26 gun positions, 135 buildings and 10 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. A command post and 21 defended localities were attacked, while 4 highway and 19 rail cuts were executed.

The 368th Group claimed 10 enemy aircraft destroyed, 1 probable and 1 damaged in the day's only encounters.

Topping the day's activities, however, was the work of the 362nd Group which flew 20 missions in close cooperation with the XII Corps and 5 armed recces. Claims included 229 motor transport, 15 tanks and armored vehicles, 10 locomotives, 197 railroad cars, 25 gun positions, 50 buildings and other destruction. Thirty-four tons of GP and 10 tons of M-76 incendiaries were dropped and 114 rockets launched, accounting for the greater portion of the day's claims.

a. Record Number of Missions Flown: Favored by another day of fine air cooperation Third Army units, on 15 March, completed virtual clearance of the enemy north of the MOSELLE and strengthened bridgeheads with armor.

Long-awaited excellent weather enabled our fighter-bombers to fly 101 missions for a total of 643 sorties, recording the greatest number of missions yet flown in one day by five groups. Many were 4-plane close cooperation missions. Enemy targets were hit with 130.5 tons of GP, 2.16 tons of fragmentation bombs, 85 tons of M-76 incendiaries and 28 leaflet bombs, and 83 rockets were launched.

Successful attacks were claimed on several primary targets. These included a motor transport depot at GELNHAUSEN (M-09), a repair shop at FRIEDBURG (M-79) and the WIESBADEN (M-3671) marshalling yard, all by the 367th Group; a military installation at WERRHEIM (M-6088) was hit by 368th Group's 396th Squadron.

Ground claims included 219 motor transport, 38 tanks and armored vehicles, 15 locomotives, 393 railroad cars, a bridge, 13 gun positions, 161 buildings and 65 horse-drawn vehicles.

Attacks were carried out on 7 marshalling yards, 2 airfields, a motor transport depot and repair shop, 5 storage depots, a supply depot, 16 towns and 4 command posts, eleven highway and 23 rail cuts were executed and 100 enemy troops killed.

Fifty-eight missions were flown in cooperation with Third Army's XX and XII Corps.

As XIX Tactical Air Command continued all-out operations General Patton's 4th Armored Division, on 16 March, was reported crashing through the RHINE PALATINATE, its movements covered by news blackout. VIII Corps units made excellent progress, attacking to the southeast across the MOSELLE RIVER west of KOBLENZ. Advances to the southeast were reported in the XX Corps zone in the OSBURGER and SWARZWALDER HOCHWALD region, with chief resistance being met in the SIEGFRIED LINE.

Good weather prevailed and lucrative targets provided excellent hunting as our fighter-bombers flew 91 missions, totaling 630 sorties. Destruction of the enemy's hard-pressed transportation system continued apace.

Pilots dropped 136.25 tons of GP bombs, 28 leaflet bombs, and 4 tanks of Napalm, and launched 57 rockets.

Sixty-five missions were flown in close cooperation with Third Army.

The day's soaring claims included 730 motor transport, 81 tanks and armored vehicles, 35 locomotives, 398 railroad cars, 16 gun positions, 124 buildings, 77 horse-drawn vehicles, and 5 hangars destroyed or damaged.

Attacks were executed on 8 marshalling yards, 4 airfields, 4 troop concentrations and 15 towns; 29 enemy personnel were killed and 20 rail and 10 highway cuts executed.

Thirteen enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air and 1 damaged, while ground figures included 5 destroyed and 19 damaged. Five of our aircraft were lost.

The enemy was making intensive air efforts to destroy the railroad bridge across the RHINE at REMAGEN, where the First Army had established a bridgehead on 7 March. Many of the attackers were destroyed by anti-aircraft fire and fighters.

XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers on 16 March struck at airfields from which the enemy was launching these attacks and sent interception patrols over the bridgehead itself. Our fighter-bombers destroyed 5, recorded 1 probable, and damaged 18 enemy aircraft at three fields in the FRANKFURT and WURZBURG areas.

Third Army's 4th Armored Division meanwhile was making a lightning-like drive comparable to the previous summer's BRITTANY campaign.

From the MOSELLE RIVER bridgehead the Division had plunged south, and in three days had spearheads within 14 miles of KAISERSLAUTERN. The NAHE RIVER was crossed south of BAD KREUZNACH while one strong armored prong had reached BINGEN and others were thrust in many directions. Motorized elements were rapidly following up the gains. Gains were reported in all other sections. On the right, infantry drives made a juncture with the 4th Armored Division to form a pocket; BOPPARD (L-9080) and ST. GOAR (L-9972) were captured and the assault of KOBLENZ was begun.

Resistance on the entire front was described as scattered and disorganized and the enemy was reported to be attempting a mass withdrawal in the face of the XII Corps advance.

XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers, meanwhile, were grounded by weather in the morning but were airborne in the afternoon to fly 28 missions, totaling 190 sorties, in cooperation with XII and XX Corps, on armed reconnaissance and patrol and escort to mediums.

No bombs were dropped, but 41 rockets were launched and considerable strafing done. Cooperating with Third Army units in the battle area south of the MOSELLE, our fighter-bombers claimed 630 motor transport, 30 tanks and armored vehicles and 6 buildings. A marshalling yard and defended locality were attacked and one highway cut.

The 371st Group flew 17 missions, totaling 75 sorties, in cooperation with the fast-moving XX Corps troops and were responsible for the greater portion of the day's claims.

In three encounters with enemy aircraft our claims were 2 destroyed and 2 damaged.

b. Large Number of Motor Transport Destroyed or Damaged: Troops of VIII Corps' 87th Infantry Division, on 18 March, took nine-tenths of KOBLENZ and advanced to the RHINE, completing occupation of the RHINE bank along the entire front. Other Army units, driving swiftly east and south, compressed the enemy in the SAAR PALATINATE, forcing an attempting withdrawal, which gave XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers one of their best days of the war with over 1,000 enemy motor transport destroyed or damaged.

Eastward-moving transport crammed the highways, providing pilots with excellent targets and enabling them to register 1,033 motor transport destroyed or damaged during a day in which 76 missions were flown, establishing a five-group record of 714 sorties.

Our aircraft dropped 64.25 tons of GP, 4 tanks of Napalm, 8 tons of incendiaries, 12 leaflet bombs, and launched 96 rockets.

Claims, other than motor transport, included 106 tanks and armored vehicles, 49 locomotives, 488 railroad cars, 18 gun positions, 72 buildings, 416 horse-drawn vehicles and 13 horse-drawn guns.

Attacks were made on 1 marshalling yard, 6 towns and a strong point, 180 horses and 94 Germans were killed and 10 rail and 12 highways cuts executed.

Claims during the day included destruction of or damage to over 2500 installations or items of heavy equipment.

An attack by 396th Squadron, of the 368th Group, on the VOLKSMARSEN (B-9211) railroad bridge resulted in 6 to 8 direct hits, 2 on the center of the bridge causing it to go down. In another attack 368th Group pilots succeeded in firing the BUTZBACH (G-6704) Ordnance Depot.

Aerial engagements were reported by the 354th and 362nd Groups, with respective claims of 3-0-1 and 3-0-0.

KOBLENZ, a key communication city on the RHINE and Headquarters city after World War I for the United States Army of Occupation, was cleared on 19 March by Third Army's VIII Corps. Excellent progress was again reported all along the Third Army front. The 4th Armored Division maintained its swift pace, cut deep into the RHENISH HESSE, drove beyond ALZEY (M-1735) on the east, swept on toward the SAAR and reached a point near KAISERSLAUTERN. Infantry units continued to consolidate armored gains. Slicing up the SAAR PALATINATE, XX Corps armored divisions, aided by close air cooperation, sped past rear bastions of the SIEGFRIED LINE, captured ST. WENDEL, by-passed NEUENKIRCHEN and had elements close to KAISERSLAUTERN.

XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers, taking advantage of another day of good weather and excellent targets, flew 72 missions, totaling 678 sorties. Topping the day's activity were 25 missions in cooperation with XX Corps and 17 with XII Corps.

Pilots dropped 85.5 tons of GP, 8.64 tons of fragmentation bombs, 19.25 tons of M-76 incendiaries, 23 tanks of Napalm and 28 leaflet bombs.

Claims included 816 motor transport, 66 armored vehicles, 46 locomotives, 367 railroad cars, 11 gun positions, 97 factories and other buildings, 362 horse-drawn vehicles and 2 hangars destroyed or damaged. Three marshalling yards, 9 towns and an enemy headquarters were attacked, 56 personnel and 18 horses killed and 18 rail and 6 highway cuts effected.

Our aircraft claims were six enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground. One of our planes was lost.

A recapitulation of two days' air activity revealed that 1,849 motor transport and 855 railroad cars had been destroyed or damaged.

An attack was carried out on 19 March on Headquarters, German C-in-C West, by the 367th Group, carrying 1,000-pound GP bombs and Napalm. Reconnaissance afterward showed that the building supposedly housing Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt and his staff had been completely gutted by fire and the eastern end of the building destroyed by direct hits with high explosive bombs. One-third of the garage roof had burned and 11 vehicles nearby were destroyed. The mess buildings and underground shelters were undamaged. Fire gutted eight small buildings east of Headquarters.

A detailed description of the attack on this special target is presented on Page 4 under the sub-title "Highlights of the Month."

A military installation at WERRHEIM was hit by the 368th Group and

violent explosions were seen to result.

WORMS, important RHINE RIVER city, fell to the powerful 4th Armored Division on 20 March as General Patton's armor and infantry slashed through the enemy's rear in the area between the RHINE and the SAAR for tremendous gains with the aid of what Third Army described as "superb air cooperation."

Third Army's drive assumed the proportions of one of the greatest routs of the war as armored prongs, followed closely by infantry, drove deep into the southern areas of the RHINE-MOSELLE-SAAR triangle, overrunning supply dumps and rear echelons, rounding up large numbers of prisoners and cutting more and more of the escape routes between the SIEGFRIED LINE and the RHINE.

General Patton's forces had processed 8,355 prisoners on 19 March and it was estimated that 15,000 had been captured on that day.

The fighter-bombers inflicted great destruction on the enemy as he frantically attempted to escape across the RHINE. Flying 67 missions, totaling 655 sorties, our aircraft cooperated with XII and XX Corps units, flew armed reconnaissance along and beyond the RHINE, attacked airfields, and dive-bombed special targets. Pilots dropped 145 tons of GP.

Claims included 859 motor transport, 283 horse-drawn vehicles, 22 horse-drawn artillery pieces, 10 armored vehicles and tanks, 2 self-propelled guns, 38 locomotives, 173 railroad cars, 30 gun positions, and 104 buildings.

Seven marshalling yards, 2 airfields, and 23 defended localities were attacked and 11 rail cuts and 10 highway cuts were made.

Our aircraft claimed 1 enemy plane in air combat and damaged 17 on the ground. Four of our planes were reported lost.

Special pre-selected targets hit by the 367th Group were the WURZBURG motor transport park and the GELNHAUSEN motor transport depot. The former was fired and direct hits were scored on the latter.

The FRANKFURT repair depot, the ASCHAFFENBURG armored vehicles depot, the WEHRHEIM (M-6088) motor transport depot, and the MARBURG ordnance depot were hit, with excellent results, by planes of the 368th Group.

Third Army units registered new long gains on 21 March, driving to the RHINE at LUDWIGSHAFEN as well as at WORMS and MAINZ, and making juncture with the Seventh Army which had driven northward through the SIEGFRIED LINE. General Patton completed the breach of the SIEGFRIED LINE in his zone and cleared the greater part of the SAAR BASIN. Heavy fighting was reported in MAINZ. XII and XX Corps, reporting "continuing fine air cooperation," made spectacular gains during the day.

Although weather limited operations in the morning of 21 March, improved conditions enabled our fighter-bombers to fly 50 missions, totaling 529 sorties, in cooperation with XII and XX Corps, on armed reconnaissance and rail interdiction east of the RHINE.

A rail interdiction program was initiated on 21 March in the area forming an arc from LIMBURG to as far south as MANNHEIM in an effort to interrupt the enemy's reinforcement of troops in the east side of the RHINE. The first day of the program resulted in the execution of 57 rail cuts.

In all, our fighter-bombers dropped 116.25 tons of GP and launched 51 rockets.

Claims included 284 motor transport, 35 armored vehicles and tanks, 49 locomotives, 272 railroad cars, 14 gun positions, 29 buildings, 20 horse-drawn artillery pieces and 59 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Our pilots claimed 8 enemy planes destroyed and 3 damaged in the air, 2 destroyed and 3 damaged on the ground. Three of our planes were lost.

c. "Personal" Air Combat: A P-51 pilot of the 354th Group claimed an ME-262 in an unusual bit of air combat on 21 March.

Diving on the jet aircraft as it dropped a bomb into the town of OSTHOFEN (M-1434), the pilot succeeded in getting strikes into the fuselage.

After the first burst his gun jammed. The pilot then followed the plane, which slowed to 250 miles per hour, and flew formation with it. As he did so the jet pilot thumbed his nose at our pilot. Infuriated, the P-51 pilot jettisoned his canopy and emptied his pistol at the enemy aircraft, with no observed hits.

At WIESBADEN (N-1772) the jet plane was seen to belly in, with resultant white smoke.

Heavy resistance was encountered on 22 March when XII Corps troops initiated the assault on MAINZ. Other Third Army units proceeded in the final closure of the PALATINATE salient and swept up the west bank of the RHINE. Prevailing good weather permitted the fighter-bombers to afford excellent cooperation. Third Army elements reported gains all along the front, captured a great mass of undamaged railroad equipment and processed 11,300 prisoners for a new record.

Our fighter-bombers flew 68 missions, totaling 661 sorties, on close cooperation with XII and XX Corps, patrol east of the RHINE, special targets and continuation of he rail interdiction program.

Claims included 210 motor transport, 4 tanks and armored vehicles, 68 locomotives, 876 railroad cars, 18 gun positions, 68 buildings, 46 horse-drawn vehicles, and a bridge destroyed or damaged.

The interdiction program continued apace with 55 rail cuts effected.

Eight enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. Two of our planes were reported lost.

The 367th reported excellent results after bombing the EBENHAUSEN (N-7073) oil storage depot, causing large explosions, fire and smoke to 8,000 feet. Other bombs hit storage tanks nearby, causing additional fires.

The 353rd Squadron, of the 354th Group, reported spotting 15 FW-190s northeast of MANNHEIM, bounced them from above and behind and shot down six before the dog fight could begin. Two additional enemy aircraft were claimed when one "spun in" and the other crashed from 500 feet while attempting to land.

The 397th Squadron, 368th Group, while rail cutting east of the RHINE at H-1111, strafed a supply depot with startling results. One building exploded violently, sending flames to 1,000 feet, brownish smoke to 6,000 feet and the concussion was felt at 10,000 feet.

d. Enemy Artillery "Alles Kaputt:" A vivid description of the results of the destructive power of the fighter-bombers and the Third Army's artillery was presented in a report from Headquarters, XX Corps Artillery, dated 22 March, which follows:

"1. ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

"The enemy artillery west of the RHINE is 'Alles Kaput'. Only a few isolated guns are singing their swan song. It is believed that very little, if any, of his arty got away 'to fight another day.' The swift encircling movements, the destructive power of the arty and air, combined to eliminate the arty from the picture.

"He had two choices: to sit and be overrun or to retreat and be destroyed on the roads.

"On the road between FRANKENSTEIN and BAD DURKHEIM, two names faintly suggestive of the conditions on the road, is one of the greatest scenes of destruction we have ever seen. Here on the road, the trains and the artillery of what appears to be a division were caught in a defile and massacred by the Air Corps. Running down the curving roadway, the passerby first notices a few scattered vehicles and dead horses; then it seems to grow in crescendo until finally he is in the midst of such a twisted mass of death and destruction that single items can no longer stand out. It is so enormous that the mind cannot measure it! The only impression made is that this is the acme and ultimate of death, destruction and chaos. It is a scene that should be photographed for the Master Race. Let them see the 'Road to Glory' by courtesy of the Air Corps."

4. Third Army Crosses the RHINE and Penetrates Deep Into Central Germany.

Another major phase of Third Army operations was initiated during the night of 22 March, as XII Corps' 5th Infantry Division crossed the RHINE in strength. Other units of General Patton's army completed occupation of the RHINE's west bank, between KOBLENZ and LUDWIGSHAFEN. SPEYER and MAINZ were captured but heavy fighting was reported in LUDWIGSHAFEN. By 23 March, Third Army occupied more German territory than all other armies on the Western Front combined, having taken a total of 4,600 miles since its jump-off 13 March.

XIX Tactical Air Command, continuing its stepped-up air offensive in ideal weather, flew 84 missions and set another five-group record with 775 sorties.

Missions included area cover for XII Corps' RHINE crossing, armed reconnaissance and direct cooperation with XII and XX Corps.

Topping the day's claims were 1,100 railroad cars, destroyed or damaged. Other claims included 162 motor transport, 21 tanks and armored vehicles, 70 locomotives, 53 gun positions, 21 barges, 103 buildings, and 16 horse-drawn vehicles.

Attacks were carried out on 10 marshalling yards and 4 airfields, and 16 rail and 2 highway cuts were effected.

Twenty-two enemy aircraft were destroyed in air combat, 1 probably destroyed and 6 damaged, plus 9 destroyed and 5 damaged on the ground. Six of our planes were lost.

Operating in the DARMSTADT area, the 355th Squadron, 354th Group, encountered 50 ME-109s and FW-190s. The enemy aircraft jettisoned bombs when attacked. In the engagement our P-51s claimed 10 1/2 destroyed and 5 damaged. The 353rd Squadron, arriving later, claimed an assist on an enemy aircraft.

In another encounter the 356th Squadron engaged 9 ME-109s in the HANAU area and claimed 8 destroyed, and 1 probable.

Reconnaissance activity reached a new high for the month, with 125 successful sorties reported. Night fighters flew 21 successful sorties.

Third Army again reported excellent air cooperation on 24 March as General George S. Patton's forces resumed lightning warfare, expanding the OPPENHEIM bridgehead and driving eastward from the RHINE to the vicinity of DARMSTADT. Again it was the 4th Armored Division which spearheaded the advance and more than 700 prisoners were reported captured during the first 12 hours of the crossing. It was reported that 11,667 prisoners were processed 23 March.

Fighter-bombers provided direct cooperation with Third Army, patrolled over XII Corps' RHINE bridgehead and provided area cover in connection with Field Marshal Montgomery's crossing of the lower RHINE in operations on 24 March.

Claims included 374 motor transport, 27 armored vehicles and tanks, 32 locomotives, 329 railroad cars, 18 gun positions, and 96 buildings destroyed or damaged.

Another highly successful day was reported by the reconnaissance group, which flew 102 successful sorties; night fighters recorded 16 effective sorties.

The night fighters, although making no specific claims, reported an explosion in the middle of the town of WETZLAR (G-5418), a large fire in GIESSEN, fires in two small towns between ASCHAFFENBURG and LOHR, explosions and large fires in the DIEBURG marshalling yard, and fires in the FRIEDBERG yards as a result of its rockets and incendiaries.

General Patton's new campaign east of the RHINE quickly developed into a major thrust on 25 March as DARMSTADT fell and the 4th Armored Division drove eastward, crossing the MAIN at ASCHAFFENBURG. Resistance was disorganized and bridges unblown. South of KOBLENZ two new bridges across the RHINE were established, at BOPPARD and near LAHNSTEIN. Third Army columns were reported closing in on FRANKFURT. It was revealed that Third Army processed 18,818 prisoners on 24 March, setting a new record for the Western Front.

Our fighter-bombers flew 14 missions in close cooperation with XII Corps, attacked special targets, provided cover and softened enemy resistance for the rapid advance of General Patton's forces east of the RHINE. Especial commendation was accorded the 367th Group for operations with the XII Corps by the Corps' Commanding General.

Sixty-four missions were flown, totaling 695 sorties. Claims included 527 motor transport, 36 armored vehicles and tanks, 61 locomotives, 1,067 railroad cars, 27 gun positions, 49 buildings, and 86 horse-drawn vehicles.

Our pilots sighted 43 enemy aircraft in the air and 75 on the ground. Two were destroyed in air combat and 8 destroyed and 18 damaged on the ground. Two of our aircraft were lost.

As XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers screened the Third Army front and attacked transport targets attempting to outrun the armored spearheads on 26 March, XII Corps armor and infantry drove north and entered FRANKFURT. A railroad bridge was captured intact. The 4th Armored Division, meanwhile, thrust spearheads north to HANAU and east to ASCHAFFENBURG.

With splendid teamwork between tactical reconnaissance planes and fighter-bombers, our aircraft were able to destroy much motor transport attempting to escape Third and First Army spearheads. Although weather diminished operations, 46 missions, totaling 461 sorties, were flown on armed reconnaissance, close cooperation with XII Corps, escort to mediums and attacks on special targets.

Ninety-four tanks of Napalm were dropped, 13.5 tons of GP, and 24.78 tons of fragmentation bombs.

Claims included 361 motor transport, 5 tanks and armored vehicles, 25 buildings, 13 locomotives, 119 railroad cars, and 27 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Reconnaissance planes guided squadrons of the 367th and 371st Groups to lucrative targets, resulting in the destruction or damage of 300 motor transport.

Continued rapid progress by Third Army forces on 27 March was featured by a drive to the north toward a link-up with the First Army. Excellent targets for our fighter-bombers were provided as enemy convoys, most of them east-bound, were located on the roads. More than 1,000 motor vehicles were destroyed or damaged.

The 6th Armored Division captured a damaged bridge over the MAIN RIVER and put infantry into FRANKFURT. Fierce resistance was encountered in SACHSENHAUSEN, a FRANKFURT suburb.

Despite cloudy weather, 39 missions, comprising 401 sorties, were flown on armed reconnaissance, direct cooperation with ground troops, and cover over the breakthrough area.

Claims included 1,027 motor transport, 25 armored vehicles and tanks, 19 locomotives, 290 railroad cars, 14 gun positions, 55 buildings, and 25 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Our aircraft destroyed 4 of 8 enemy planes encountered and claimed 1 destroyed and 1 damaged on the ground.

Again reconnaissance pilots were responsible for leading fighter-bombers to good hunting.

The 393rd Squadron reported a Napalm, fragmentation bomb and strafing attack on a convoy of 225 motor and horse-drawn vehicles moving east, north of WETZLAR, and claimed 100-plus motor transport and 5 horse-drawn guns destroyed. Large fires were started in woods where personnel were observed along the road.

The 362nd Group reported great destruction to railroad traffic in the FULDA area, including cars carrying ammunition. In an outstanding mission reported by the 379th Squadron, its bombs, bullets and belly tanks destroyed 114 motor transport, 60 of which were carrying gasoline, northeast of ASCHAFFENBURG, setting fire to four small towns.

Reporting excellent air cooperation, Third Army, on 28 March, changed the axis of its advance from east to northeast and established a new bridgehead across the MAIN RIVER at WIESBADEN, began an outflanking move around FRANKFURT, cleared HANAU and drove armor north to the vicinity of GIESSEN, clearance of the RHINE-MAIN Triangle was completed and Third Army linked up on the MAIN with Seventh Army Units on its right.

Inspite of rain, low clouds and poor visibility all fighter-bomber groups operated during part of the day, flying 28 missions, totaling 292 sorties.

Claims included 649 motor transport, 21 armored vehicles and tanks, 16 locomotives, 49 railroad cars, 37 gun positions, 26 buildings and 53 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Reconnaissance pilots were responsible, again, for much of the day's claims as they vectored fighter-bombers to excellent targets.

Not a single enemy aircraft was encountered in the air by the fighter-bombers.

Weather grounded all aircraft on 29 March but Third Army continued its drive, making contact with the First Army in the LIMBURG area while FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN and WIESBADEN fell.

Third Army forces continued the drive to the northeast, on 30 March, as infantry units drove forward to consolidate the gains.

Weather limited XIX Tactical Air Command operations, and only 17 missions, totaling 167 sorties, were flown by the fighter-bombers, in close cooperation with XII and XX Corps, on weather reconnaissance and in escorting medium bombers.

Claims were limited and included 67 motor transport, 10 armored vehicles and tanks, 14 locomotives, and 194 railroad cars.

As Third Army continued the rout, pursuit and destruction of the enemy on 31 March, fighter-bombers found good hunting along the enemy's rail lines and roads of retreat, his supply dumps, communication centers and airdromes.

The 4th, 6th and 11th Armored Divisions thrust out prongs totaling respectively 104 miles, 46 miles, and 28 miles deep into GERMANY. Infantry, meanwhile, consolidated these gains with swift advances. Resistance was described as weak except in the vicinity of USINGEN (M-5793). Advance elements of the XII and XX Corps were reported along the FULDA RIVER, between KASSEL and HERSFELD, and east of HERSFELD.

At the end of March Third Army had penetrated deep into the heart of GERMANY, after taking TRIER at the beginning of the month, and were approximately 170 airline miles from BERLIN.

XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers completed a highly successful month of air activity, flying 55 missions on 31 March for a total of 580 sorties.

Claims included 685 motor transport, 47 armored vehicles and tanks, 94 locomotives, 722 railroad cars, 39 gun positions, 57 buildings, and 28 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Our aircraft claimed 4 enemy planes destroyed in the air, 7 destroyed and 27 damaged on the ground.

The 354th Group, in airfield strikes at LANGENSALSA (J-0586) and WENIGENLUPNITZ (H-9268), claimed 6 destroyed and 21 damaged.

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1 March 1945

A.	Fighters:	
	Missions	60
	Sorties	485
	Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
	Leaflet Bombs	28
	GP	176.25
	Fragmentation	12.19
	Rockets	28
	Claims (Air)	7-1-3
	Losses (A/C)	3
B.	Reconnaissance:	
	Tac/R Sorties	36
	Successful	28
	P/R Sorties	5
	Successful	2
	Artillery Adjustment Sorties	6
	Successful	2
C.	Results of Attacks:	
	Destroyed or Damaged	
	Motor Transport	111
	Locomotives	12
	Armored Vehicles	29
	Railroad Cars	40
	Gun Positions	1
	Barge	1
	Hangars	2
	Buildings	63
	Horse-drawn Vehicles	2
	Attacked:	
	Towns	13
	Motor Transport Depots	1
	Airfields	1
	Marshalling Yards	7
	Railroad Cuts	23

2 March 1945

A.	Fighters:	
	Missions	74
	Sorties	566
	Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
	GP	234.75
	Fragmentation	14.88
	Leaflet Bombs	28
	Rockets	4
	Claims (Air)	5-0-0
	Losses (A/C)	3
B.	Reconnaissance:	
	Tac/R Sorties	38
	Successful	36
	P/R Sorties	15
	Successful	10
	Artillery Adjustment Sorties	4
	Successful	2
	Tac/R Photo Sorties	4
	Successful	0
C.	Results of A ttacks:	
	Destroyed or Damaged	
	Motor Transport	204
	Armored Vehicles and Tanks	52
	Locomotives	29
	Railroad Cars	154
	Bridges	2
	Gun Positions	3
	Barges	8
	Dumps	4
	Buildings	115
	Fuel Tanks	9
	Overpass	1
	Roundhouse	1
	Radio Station	1
	Radar Station	1
	Water Reservoir	1
	Boxes of Supplies	12
	Attacked:	
	Towns	24
	Troop Concentrations	1
	Railroad Cuts	29
	Highway Cuts	4

3 March 1945

A.	Fighters:	
	Missions	61
	Sorties	527
	Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
	GP	193.75
	Losses (A/C)	2
B.	Reconnaissance:	
	Tac/R Sorties	50
	Successful	36
	P/R Sorties	14
	Successful	5
	Tac/R Photo Sorties	2
	Successful	0
C.	Results of Attacks:	
	Destroyed or Damaged	
	Motor Transport	224
	Armored Vehicles and Tanks	38
	Locomotives	17
	Railroad Cars	245
	Bridges	2
	Gun Positions	16
	Barges	4
	Buildings	101
	Horse-drawn Vehicles	24

XIX TAC
TAC
LII

Headquarters Buildings	1
Field Guns	20
Radio Tower	1
V-2 Site	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	11
Towns	22
Airfield	1
Troop Concentration	1
Command Post	1
Railroad Cuts	34
Highway Cuts	7

4 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	2
Sorties	6
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	4 x 500-lb
Fragmentation	5 x 265-lb

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	10
Successful	6
Tac/R Photo Sorties	4
Successful	0

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Locomotive	1
Railroad Cars	5
Buildings	2
Attacked:	
Railroad Cuts	1

5 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	6
Sorties	53

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	3
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	3

6 March 1945

A. Operations nil except four successful tactical reconnaissance weather sorties.

7 March 1945

A. Operations nil except six tactical reconnaissance sorties; four were successful.

8 March 1945

A. Operations nil except three uneventful weather reconnaissance sorties.

9 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	32
Sorties	309
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	65.75
Rockets	92
Claims (Air)	2-0-0
Claims (Grd)	1-0-0

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	24
Successful	18
P/R Sorties	5
Successful	2
Tac/R Photo Sorties	2
Successful	0

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	42
Tank	1
Locomotives	11
Railroad Cars	104
Gun Positions	18
Barges	2
Dumps	3
Buildings	37
Horse-drawn Vehicle	1
Artillery Pieces	2
Oil Storage Tanks	4
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	11
Towns	5
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	29

10 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	30
Sorties	323
Tons of Bombs on Tgts	
GP	60
Fragmentation	14
Leaflet Bombs	28
Rockets	49
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	18
Successful	12
P/R Sorties	3
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	129
Armored Vehicle	1
Locomotives	8
Railroad Cars	25
Gun Positions	23
Buildings	5
Horse-drawn Vehicles	11
Trailers	3
Radar Installation	1
Switch House	1
High-tension Line	1
Attacked:	
Defended Localities	11
Railroad Cuts	3
Highway Cuts	1

11 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	25
Sorties	205
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	20
Napalm (Tanks)	10 x 165-gal.
Rockets	24

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	8
Successful	6
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil (No specific claims)

Attacked:	
Defended Localities	10

12 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	13
Sorties	142
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	28.5

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	6
Successful	4
P/R Sorties	5
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	1
Locomotives	2
Railroad Cars	21
Flak Cars	5
Buildings	2
Attacked:	
Towns	6
Marshalling Yards	1

13 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	52
Sorties	430
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	87.25
Leaflet Bombs	23
Rockets	60
Claims (Air)	8-0-4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	42
Successful	38
P/R Sorties	26
Successful	22
Tac/R Photo Sorties	6
Successful	6
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	140
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	21
Locomotives	9
Railroad Cars	380
Gun Position	1
Buildings	92
Horse-drawn Vehicles	8
Trailers	2
Attacked:	
Defended Localities	16
Marshalling Yards	6
Supply Depots	1
Motor Transport Depot	1
Railroad Cuts	26
Highway Cuts	8

14 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	70
Sorties	492
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	68.25
RDX	2
Fragmentation	9.18
M-76 Incendiary	34.75
Rockets	114
Claims (Air)	10-1-3
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	52
Successful	48
P/R Sorties	29
Successful	21
Tac/R Photo Sorties	16
Successful	16

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	245
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	18
Locomotives	17
Railroad Cars	315
Gun Positions	26
Barges	4
Dumps	3
Buildings	135
Horse-drawn Vehicles	10
Attacked:	
Command Posts	1
Defended Localities	21
Highway Cuts	4
Railroad Cuts	10

15 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	101
Sorties	613
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	130.50
Fragmentation	2.16
M-76 Incendiaries	85
Leaflet Bombs	28
Rockets	83
Claims (Air)	5-0-0
Claims (Grd)	3-0-3
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	58
Successful	58
P/R Sorties	38
Successful	36
Tac/R Photo Sorties	16
Successful	16
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	4
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	219
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	38
Locomotives	15
Railroad Cars	393
Bridge	1
Guns Positions	13
Barges	3
Buildings	161
Tunnel	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	65
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	7
Airfields	2
Motor Transport Depot	1
Repair Shop	1
Storage Depots	5
Supply Depot	1
Towns	16
Command Posts	4
Highway Cuts	11
Railway Cuts	23
Enemy Troops Killed	100

16 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	91
Sorties	630
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	136.25
Leaflet Bombs	28
Napalm (Tanks)	4
Rockets	57
Claims (Air)	13-0-1
Claims (Grd)	5-0-19
Losses (A/C)	6

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	56
Successful	56
Tac/R Photo Sorties	12
Successful	12
P/R Sorties	36
Successful	28

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	730
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	81
Locomotives	35
Railroad Cars	398
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	16
Barges	3
Hangars	5
Buildings	124
Horse-drawn Vehicles	77
Radio Towers	2
Self-Propelled Guns	2
Motor Transport Workshop	1
Horse-drawn Artillery	9
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	8
Airfields	4
Troop Concentrations	4
Towns	15
Enemy Personnel Killed	89
Railroad Cuts	20
Highway Cuts	10

17 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	28
Sorties	190
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
(No Bombs Dropped)	
Rockets	41
Claims (Air)	2-0-2
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	24
Successful	18
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	2
Successful	0

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	630
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	30
Locomotives	3
Railroad Cars	16
Gun Positions	4
Horse-drawn Vehicles	153
Buildings	6
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yard	1
Defended Locality	1
Highway Cut	1

18 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	76
Sorties	714
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	64.25
Napalm (Tanks)	4
Incendiaries	8
Leaflet Bombs	12
Rockets	96
Claims (Air)	7-2-1
Losses (A/C)	6

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	44
Successful	42
Tac/R Photo Sorties	6
Successful	0
P/R Sorties	16
Successful	5

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	1033
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	106
Locomotives	19
Railroad Cars	488
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	18
Barge	1
Buildings	72
Horse-drawn Vehicles	416
Command Posts	1
Oil Storage Tanks	2
Roundhouse	1
Switchhouse	1
Horse-drawn Guns	13
Radio Station	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	1
Towns	6

Strong Points	1
Horses Killed	180
Personnel Killed	94
Railroad Cuts	10
Highway Cuts	12

19 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	72
Sorties	678
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	85.5
Fragmentation	8.64
RDX	1
Napalm (Tanks)	23
Leaflets	28
Claims (Air)	0-0-1
Claims (Grd)	6-0-0
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	60
Tac/R Photo Sorties	10
Successful	10
P/R Sorties	31
Successful	29

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	816
Armored Vehicles	66
Locomotives	46
Railroad Cars	367
Gun Positions	11
Barges	4
Hangars	2
Factories and Misc. Bldgs.	97
Flak Cars	2
Horse-drawn Vehicles	363
Horse-drawn Artillery	8
Barrage-Balloons	8
Artillery Pieces	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	3
Flak Cars	2
Towns	9
Headquarters	1
Personnel Killed	56
Horses Killed	18
Railroad Cuts	18
Highway Cuts	6

21 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	50
Sorties	529
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	116.25
Rockets	51
Claims (Air)	8-0-3
Claims (Grd)	2-0-3
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	54
Tac/R Photo Sorties	4
Successful	4
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	2
Successful	2
P/R Sorties	23
Successful	21

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	284
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	35
Locomotives	19
Railroad Cars	272
Bridge	1
Highway Overpass	1
Gun Positions	14
Buildings	29
Horse-drawn Artillery Pieces	20
Horse-drawn Vehicles	59
Attacked:	
Airfields	1
Marshalling Yards	2
Defended Localities	1
Railroad Cuts	57
Railway Tunnels	1
Highway Cuts	8

22 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	68
Sorties	661
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	84.5
Fragmentation	3.2
RDX	40
Claims (Air)	8-0-0
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	56
Tac/R Photo Sorties	2
Successful	2
P/R Sorties	27
Successful	25

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	210
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	4
Locomotives	68
Railroad Cars	876
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	18
Barges	2
Dump	1
Buildings	68
Horse-drawn Vehicles	46
Radar Antennae	5
Lumber Mill	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	8
Airfields	1
Towns	3
Horses Killed	2
Personnel Killed	4
Railroad Tunnel	1
Highway Cuts	6
Railroad Cuts	55

23 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	84
Sorties	775
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	47
Fragmentation	52.78
Incendiary	.75
Napalm (Tanks)	41
Rockets	35
Claims (Air)	22-1-6
Claims (Grd)	9-0-5
Losses (A/C)	7

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	74
Successful	74
P/R Sorties	52
Successful	51

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	162
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	21
Locomotives	70
Railroad Cars	1100
Gun Positions	53
Barges	21
Hangars	2
Buildings	103
Horse-drawn Vehicles	16
Railroad Overpass	1
Radio Stations	3
Switch Tower	1
Storage Tanks	2
Barrage Balloons	4
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	10
Airfields	4
Railroad Cuts	16
Highway Cuts	2

24 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	59
Sorties	622
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	14.75
Fragmentation	47.19
Napalm (Tanks)	70
Claims (Air)	3-0-0

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	76
Successful	74
P/R Sorties	29
Successful	28

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	374
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	27
Locomotives	32
Railroad Cars	329
Gun Positions	18
Barges	2
Dump	1
Buildings	96
Horse-drawn Vehicles	1
Oil Drums	30
Radio Tower	1
Command Post	1
Attacked:	
Defended Localities	3
Marshalling Yards	3
Railroad Cuts	10

25 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	64
Sorties	695
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	16

Fragmentation	87.8
RDX	6.5
Napalm (Tanks)	111
Claims (Air)	2-0-0
Claims (Grd)	8-0-18
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	60
Tac/R Photo Sorties	6
Successful	6
P/R Sorties	12
Successful	12
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	527
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	36
Locomotives	61
Railroad Cars	1067
Bridges	2
Gun Positions	27
Barges	7
Buildings	49
Horse-drawn Vehicles	86
Radio Antennae	2
Roundhouse	1
Attacked:	
Towns	8
Marshalling Yards	12
Troop Concentrations	3
Airfields	2
Railroad Cuts	23
Highway Cuts	1
Personnel Killed	166

26 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	46
Sorties	461
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	13.5
Fragmentation	24.78
Napalm (Tanks)	94
Claims (Air)	1-0-0
Claims (Grd)	2-0-1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	58
Successful	52
P/R Sorties	9
Successful	9
Artillery Adjustment Sorties	4
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	361
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	5
Locomotives	13
Railroad Cars	119
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	5
Horse-drawn Vehicles	27
Buildings	25
Railroad Switchhouse	1
Fuel Tanks	3
Water Tanks	2
Boiler House	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	4
Airfields	1
Troop Concentrations	2
Defended Localities	1
Railroad Cuts	4
Highway Cuts	3

27 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	39
Sorties	401
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	26
Fragmentation	46.75
Incendiaries	.19
Napalm (Tanks)	13 x 150-gal 72 x 75-gal
Rockets	54
Claims (Air)	4-0-0
Claims (Grd)	1-0-1
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	66
Successful	64
P/R Sorties	5
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	1027
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	25
Locomotives	19
Railroad Cars	290
Gun Positions	14
Buildings	55
Horse-drawn Vehicles	25
Attacked:	
Towns	3
Marshalling Yards	5
Troop Concentrations	1
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	7
Highway Cuts	4
Personnel Killed	177

28 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	28
Sorties	292
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	5.5
Fragmentation	18.72
RDX	5
Napalm (Tanks)	47
Rockets	32
Claims (Air)	2-0-0
Losses (A/C)	4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	38
Successful	30
P/R Sorties	2
Successful	0

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	649
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	21
Locomotives	16
Railroad Cars	49
Gun Positions	37
Buildings	26
Horse-drawn Vehicles	53
Attacked:	
Towns	1
Railroad Cuts	1
Personnel Killed	125

29 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	0
(All operations nil)	

30 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	17
Sorties	167
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	4
Fragmentation	6.24
Napalm (Tanks)	48
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	8
Successful	8
P/R Sorties	3
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	67
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	10
Locomotives	14
Railroad Cars	194
Gun Positions	1
Buildings	6
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yard	1
Highway Cuts	2
Railroad Cuts	3

31 March 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	55
Sorties	580
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	54.25
Fragmentation	31.2
Napalm	34.8
Rockets	129
Claims (Air)	4-0-0
Claims (Grd)	6-0-27
Losses (A/C)	8

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	80
Successful	78
P/R Sorties	16
Successful	10

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	685
Armored Vehicle and Tanks	47
Locomotives	94
Railroad Cars	722
Gun Positions	39
Dump	1
Hangar	1
Buildings	57
Horse-drawn Vehicles	28
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	2
Defended Localities	3
Airfields	3
Railroad Cuts	14

APRIL

1. Summary of the Month

a. General: Final death blows to the once mighty German war machine were struck during April, with the air-ground team of XIX Tactical Air Command and Third US Army contributing heavily to the mortal strokes and hastening an end to its final convulsions.

Significant features of the month were the reduction of the Luftwaffe to a mere nuisance factor, final destruction of the enemy's transportation system, and the rapid advances of Third US Army, which moved eastward to a restraining line, regrouped its forces, and successfully initiated a new tactical mission down the DANUBE VALLEY.

XIX Tactical Air Command, operating with five fighter-bomber groups, the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron throughout most of the month, claimed hitherto unequalled destruction of enemy aircraft, totaling 1,420 destroyed, probably destroyed, or damaged on the ground and 288 in air combat. Our losses were 55 aircraft.

Fighter-bombers flew 1,066 missions, totaling 10,136 day-time combat sorties; 1,277 reconnaissance missions, comprising 2,179 sorties; and 237 night fighter sorties.

Airfields, marshalling yards, and motor transport concentrations were primary targets during the month, resulting in the above aircraft claims, and 8,821 motor transport, 1,584 locomotives, and 9,327 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

The enemy concentrated large numbers of anti-aircraft guns around his key airfields. Although our fighter-bomber losses increased slightly, fighter-bombers continued airfield attacks, and heavy bombers were called in to bomb some airdromes.

Lack of fuel and the dwindling area for possible operations seriously hampered the enemy's attempted air defensive. Although the Luftwaffe struck at ground troops by day and by night early in the month and appeared in the skies in larger numbers, these efforts were reduced to a mere token before the end of the month.

Reconnaissance planes operated throughout the month with even more than their usual effectiveness, directing fighter-bombers to lucrative targets, and incidentally destroying more than 50 enemy aircraft.

b. Order of Battle: XIX Tactical Air Command operated during April with the 354th, 362nd, 367th, 371st, and 405th Fighter Groups, the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron. The 405th Group was assigned to the Command on 27 April and began operations two days later.

On 1 April, major units of the Command were located at the following cities and towns: Headquarters, Advance, IDAR-OBERSTEIN; Headquarters, Rear, CHALONS-SUR-MARNE; Headquarters, 100th Fighter Wing, 368th and 371st Groups, METZ; 354th Group, ROSIERS-EN-HAYE; 362nd Group and 425th Night Fighter Squadron, ETAIN; 367th Group, CONFLANS; and the 10th Photo Group, Recn., TRIER.

As armored and infantry units moved rapidly eastward and southeastward, major Command units changed locations to sites closer to the Third US Army front. Movements during the month were as follows: Headquarters, Advanced, to FRANKFURT, 7 April, HERSFELD, 12 April, and ERLANGEN, 25 April; Headquarters, Rear, to LUXEMBOURG, 2 April, and BAD MAUHEIM, 20 April; Headquarters, 100th Fighter Wing, to KONIGSTEIN, 14 April; 371st and 354th Groups, to OBER OLM, on 4 and 9 April, respectively; the 362nd and 368th Groups, to FRANKFURT/RHEIN/MAIN, 16 April; the 367th Group, to FRANKFURT/ESCHBORN, 10 April; the 10th Photo Group, Recn., to FURTH/HERZOGENAURACH, 28 April.

The 405th Group was located at KITZINGEN after being assigned to the Command.

c. Weather: Excellent weather prevailed throughout April enabling fighter-bombers to fly the maximum 29 days forecast by the Command Weather Section.

Fighter-bombers were non-operational one day of the month and operations were limited two days because of inclement weather.

d. Communications: Although major Command units moved to advanced locations to carry out tactical missions, no serious difficulties were reported by the Command Signal Section.

Communication was set up between the Headquarters, both Rear and Advance, with subordinate units after each change of location and normal operations continued.

e. Enemy Air Activity: Although the German Air Force attempted early in the month, by day and night, to harass ground troops advancing rapidly on the Western Front, opposition was short-lived. The Allied advance and lack of fuel limited the enemy's total area for operational bases and prevented removal of some aircraft from crowded fields. This situation was evident when, on 13 April, Third US Army reported the capture of ROCKAU (J-8272) Airfield and with it, 30 twin-engined and several single-engine aircraft.

Third US Army frequently reported attacks by the GAF but these diminished to a mere nuisance factor as continued bombing and strafing of enemy airfields and air combat resulted in the destruction of hundreds of aircraft and eliminated operational airstrips sorely needed by the Luftwaffe.

XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft initiated the month by destroying, probably destroying, and damaging 77 planes on the ground and 1 in the air. During the remainder of the month our aircraft claimed destruction of enemy aircraft on all but one day, when weather prevented fighter-bomber operations.

Enemy aircraft claims totaled 748 destroyed, 5 probably destroyed, and 667 damaged on the ground with a total of 207-10-71 in air combat. Reconnaissance planes were responsible for a total of 41-4-9 in the air in fighting following attacks by enemy interceptor aircraft.

The enemy attempted to protect key airfields with large concentrations of anti-aircraft guns. Heavy bombers, however, having successfully completed their strategic tasks, were deployed to tactical missions and wrought much destruction on the enemy's crowded airfields.

Illustrative of the plight of the erstwhile powerful Luftwaffe is the following excerpt from USSAFIE Air Intelligence Summary No 75, for the week ending 15 April 1945:

GERMAN AIR FORCE ORDER OF BATTLE

> During the past week, the only significant feature of the German Air Force has been the vast amount of equipment "written off" on enemy airfields by Allied fighters, bombers, and our advancing ground forces. Not since the German High Command reverted to the policy of expending its Air Force only when the situation apparently seemed most promising has wastage been anywhere near so high. This policy of conservation, more recently involuntary by reason of serious fuel shortages, has been followed for many months, resulting in a numerically strong fighter force still on hand for the final battles of Germany, but one which has not had a high or consistent fighting value, largely due to a natural reluctance on the part of the Luftwaffe to dissipate itself completely before the war was definitely lost on the ground.

XIX Tactical Air Command achieved its highest record of enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged on the ground on 16 April when six airfield attacks resulted in claims of 84-0-74. In addition, fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft claimed 23-0-1 of 47 enemy aircraft sighted during the day. On that day, Eighth Air Force claimed 724-0-373 and total Allied claims amounted to 50-4-9 in the air and 1,000-5-581 on the ground.

Two days later, the 379th Squadron, of the 362nd Group, claimed destruction or damage of 61 enemy aircraft after an attack on CHEB Airfield (P-3375).

On 19 and 21 April, two Luftwaffe pilots landed at XIX Tactical Air Command airfields to surrender. Both explained that they were to be sent to the infantry at the completion of their missions inasmuch as there was no fuel available for further flights.

By the end of April the GAF was unable to fly more than 200 sorties daily, and each day brought further losses of airfields to the Allied advancing ground troops.

f. Reconnaissance: In April, reconnaissance planes of the 10th Photo Group, flying every day of the month, established new records. A summary of the month's operations showed a total of 1,277 operational missions, including 381 photo and 896 tactical reconnaissance. Since becoming operational on 25 February 1944, the Group had flown 8,067 missions, comprising 12,538 sorties.

Attacked frequently by fighter-type aircraft of the Luftwaffe, pilots of the 12th and 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons claimed a total of 41 destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 9 damaged.

As Third US Army drove nearer to the Eastern front, the possibility of the Germans diverting reserves from that front to the west to stop the advance became apparent. Tactical reconnaissance over the battle front of the Army from 1 April to 19 April did not disclose any such move. Recce of the BRENNER PASS later in the month failed to reveal any movements from ITALY to strengthen the Western Front. Communications between armored spearheads and Tac/R aircraft continued to be good. Requests were made directly from the Division Tactical Air Liaison Officer to the pilot for reconnaissance of the roads and surrounding areas. Information on the status of bridges and activity in towns along the routes of advance was promptly passed to the Division concerned by Tac/R aircraft.

Tac/R-fighter-bomber cooperation was excellent. Squadrons on armed recce were instructed to have one pilot listen in on the Tac/R radio channel and to take advantage of "hot" targets discovered by Tac/R.

On 16 April, one Tac/R mission led fighter-bombers to eight different targets during the reconnaissance. Six trains were attacked with the destruction of six engines and fourteen railroad cars; marshalling yards were strafed, destroying eight engines and fifteen railroad cars.

Because of the tactical situation, on 19 April, and in anticipation of Third US Army's extremely wide front and exposed left flank, a tactical reconnaissance key was put into effect. Previously, areas for Tac/R coverage were designated by daily plans and diagrams through coordinated communications to Ninth Air Force and XIX Tactical Air Command units. A master key, covering an area 160 by 140 miles, broken down into 56 subdivisions, each 20 miles square, was effected and resulted in greater flexibility, proving more adaptable to the highly fluid situation, and enabling use of code designation of areas for greater security.

The simplified method of designating each day's operations proved successful in that the plan for operations could be changed by telephone instantly, if the situation warranted the change.

The new tactical reconnaissance plan called for coverage to 50 miles on the exposed Army left flank in CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and for 120 miles to Army's front, particularly emphasizing the flank. Because of the increased Army area of interest, a Third Tac/R Squadron was attached to 10th Photo Group, Recn, and missions increased from 36 daily to 50 daily.

Third US Army requested 1,112 missions which were all accepted but only 894 were flown. The Group also handled 32 photo reconnaissance missions requested by Third US Army. There were no artillery adjustment missions because of the month's fluid situation and the lack of suitable targets.

II. Chronicle of Operations.

a. The Enemy Attempts Last Ditch Resistance: On the Third US Army front the enemy, woefully short of small arms, ammunition, and gasoline and with transport by day hazardous because of fighter-bombers, initiated the month's defensive attempts with a motley parade of miscellaneous units in stop-gap roles, striving to establish some semblance of an organized line.

Reporting excellent air cooperation on 1 April, Third US Army sent its 4th, 6th, and 11th Armored Divisions in armored thrusts northeast and southeast and secured a bridgehead across the FULDA RIVER at MALSFIELD (H-2678). Infantry units rapidly consolidated these gains. Fierce resistance was met along the FULDA RIVER between HERSFELD and KASSEL.

In spite of much cloud cover, fighter-bombers flew 38 missions totaling 381 sorties during a day highlighted by successful attacks on enemy airfields, destruction of more than 100 armored vehicles and tanks, and continued attacks on retreating rail and highway traffic.

Although only one aircraft was sighted in the air and destroyed, airfield attacks resulted in claims of 39 destroyed and 38 damaged on the ground.

Hitting the WENIGEN LUPNITZ Airfield (H-9271) four times, 15 P-47s of the 392nd and 394th Squadrons, 367th Group, claimed 26-0-31 "assorted" enemy aircraft. The Group also contributed 29 tanks, claimed destroyed or damaged, to the day's total.

An attack by 15 P-47s of the 406th Squadron, 371st Group, resulted in claims of 13-0-7 enemy aircraft on the ground at KITZINGEN Airfield. The 371st Group also destroyed or damaged 11 armored vehicles and tanks, contributing to the day's heavy claims.

XIX TAC LVII

Twenty-two missions were flown by the 362nd and 367th Groups in close cooperation with Third US Army's XX and XII Corps, respectively, resulting in the destruction of many tanks, armored vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles, and the killing of an estimated 151 personnel.

As bad weather severely limited fighter-bomber operations on 2 April, Third US Army slowed its advance to the northeast, joined with the enemy in fierce battle along the FULDA RIVER, consolidated and mopped up within the fluid area across which it had advanced, and strengthened its lines.

Flying 12 missions, comprising 73 sorties, the Command continued its attacks on the German Air Force, both in the air and on the ground. Total claims were 17-0-5 in the air and 3-0-1 on the ground.

Outstanding mission of the day was flown by 2 P-51s of the 353rd Squadron, 354th Group, while on weather reconnaissance. Airborne at 0716, the Mustangs had claimed 4 FW-190s destroyed, 1 ME-109 probably destroyed, and 1 FW-190 damaged before 0800 hours. Proceeding to ERFURT Airfield (J-3688), the fighter-bombers destroyed 2 FW-190s attempting to land. At 0815 hours the Mustangs destroyed a FW-190 at GOTHA Airfield (J-1067). Then, sighting 90 plus enemy aircraft flying abreast in six-ship sections, the Mustangs attacked the last section, claiming 1 FW-190 destroyed and 1 ME-109 destroyed and 1 FW-190 damaged.

In another fruitful encounter, 4 P-51s of the 353rd Squadron, 354th Group, attacked 60 single-engine enemy fighters over J-7698 northeast of WEIMAR and claimed 7-0-2. Enemy pilots were reported to have been experienced and aggressive.

b. Ground Situation Parallels August Offensive: With good air cooperation, despite bad weather which grounded fighter-bombers until the afternoon, Third US Army on 3 April protected the rear of the First US Army, continued its attack on KASSEL, and launched elements eastward. A striking parallel to the situation of the previous August in Western France was developing in GERMANY with the Twenty-first Army Group and First US Army to the north forming a hinge and pocketing a large area, while General Patton's forces prepared for a sweeping end-run across the enemy left flank.

Fighter-bombers were airborne in the afternoon of 3 April to fly 27 missions, totaling 212 sorties, on armed recce and close cooperation with the XII and XX Corps. Enemy aircraft claims again highlighted the day's claims with a total of 3-3-8 in the air and 3-0-6 on the ground.

Attacks on retreating rail and highway traffic continued apace as fighter-bombers reported destruction or damage of 32 locomotives, 204 railroad cars, and 185 motor transport.

On 4 April, Third US Army regrouped its forces while advancing eastward. VIII Corps' newly-acquired 4th Armored Division, (formerly with Third US Army), advanced up to 40 miles on a consolidated front and both XII and XX Corps advanced eastward. KASSEL and GOTHA were captured.

Fighter-bombers of the Command flew 40 missions, comprising 451 sorties, striking at enemy air power, rail lines and motor transport convoys while on armed reconnaissance, cooperation with XII and XX Corps and escorting medium bombers. Included in the day's claims were 215 motor transport, 53 locomotives, and 162 railroad cars destroyed or damaged and a total of 16-0-6 enemy aircraft in the air, 20-3-11 on the ground.

The 362nd Group's 378th Squadron, in two encounters, claimed a total of 6-0-5, and P-51s of the 355th Squadron, 354th Group, met and destroyed 3 ME-109s. Strafing of airfields at SCHWEINFURT (M-7465), JENA (J-7065), D-1126, MEISEBURG (D-9515), and E-1045 resulted in claims of 20-3-11.

Reconnaissance planes joined fighter-bombers in the destruction of enemy aircraft, claiming 6 destroyed and 2 damaged.

Third US Army reported excellent air cooperation on 5 April as ground forces continued protection of First US Army's rear, moved out of the THURINGIA FOREST onto the excellent tank country of the THURINGIAN PLAIN, checked its eastward advances and changed the direction of its attack southeastward. VIII Corps' 4th Armored Division neared ERFURT, the 11th Armored Division, of XII Corps thrust prongs deep into the SCHMALKALDEN area, and XX Corps' 6th Armored Division cleared MULHAUSEN, releasing 4,000 British prisoners of war.

Command fighter-bombers flew 41 missions, totaling 365 sorties, in close cooperation with Third US Army's three Corps, on armed reconnaissance and fighter sweeps. Aircraft claims totaling 11-0-10 in air combat and 59-2-56 on the ground resulted from 8 airfield attacks, and excellent claims of 371 motor transport, 25 tanks and armored vehicles, 85 locomotives, and 536 railroad cars were reported.

Significant of increased German Air Force activity was the sighting by XIX TAC fighter-bombers of 102 enemy aircraft in the air in 13 different incidents and the observation of 212 enemy aircraft on the airfields strafed and bombed during the day. Third US Army reported 110 enemy aircraft over its area.

As fighter-bombers continued to increase the daily toll of enemy aircraft destruction, reconnaissance planes also jumped into the fray to claim a total of 3-0-1 in the air and 0-0-1 on the ground.

Low clouds and April showers hampered air cooperation on 6 April as Third US Army further braked its eastward advance to await developments in the RUHR pocket. Meeting determined resistance along the front, and frequent air attacks, ground forces consolidated gains and made preparations to penetrate the ERZ Mountain area. VIII Corps infantry cleared EISENACH and, in the XII Corps zone, MEINENGEN was cleared.

Operations were limited on 6 April to 17 missions, comprising 169 sorties on close cooperation with Third US Army, armed reconnaissance, and fighter sweeps. The stepped up offensive against the Luftwaffe was temporarily hindered as fighter-bomber aircraft claims were limited to 1-0-2 in the air and 2-0-2 on the ground.

As stiffening opposition was encountered, on 7 April, especially on the Third US Army north flank, ground and air combined to repel a heavy counter-attack northwest of MULHAUSEN in the XX Corps area, where 40 German tanks were reported to have been knocked out. Infantry cleared LANGENSALSA (J-0383) and advanced elements were within 5 miles of ERFURT.

Fighter bombers, despite cloud cover, flew 43 missions, totaling 395 sorties, on armed reconnaissance, bomber escort, and close cooperation with Third US Army. Attacks on the Luftwaffe and the enemy's transportation system continued as aircraft claims increased to 13-1-1 in the air and 31-0-51 on the ground. Other destruction included 39 locomotives, 247 motor transport, and 340 railroad cars, destroyed or damaged.

Cooperating with the XX Corps, the 362nd Group's Thunderbolts accounted for all of the 69 armored vehicles and the bulk of the motor transport total, reaping this harvest in the MULHAUSEN area where Third US Army troops repulsed a heavy counter-attack.

Topping the day's efforts toward eliminating the German Air Force was the work of the 371st Group which accounted for scores of 30-0-51 on the ground and 2-1-0 in the air.

Continued good weather on 8 April permitted excellent air cooperation with Third US Army units consolidating gains and repelling counter-attacks. In the XX Corps zone, on the northern flank, counter-attacks involving tanks continued, although on a lesser scale.

Operating from 0700 to 2025 hours, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers flew 37 missions in cooperation with Third US Army's three corps, 16 on armed reconnaissance, 7 on escort to medium bombers and 1 on escort to "very important persons," for a total of 545 sorties. Best claims were against enemy aircraft, motor transport, armored vehicles and tanks, locomotives, and railroad cars.

The enemy was becoming increasingly hard-pressed for a safe place to harbor aircraft, and again fighter-bombers attacked the Luftwaffe in the air and at crowded fields to claim destruction or damage totaling 17-2-10 and 18-0-17, respectively. Indicative of the activity of the enemy in the air were statistics which showed 23 different observations of enemy aircraft in the air, resulting in 16 encounters involving 91 of the 108 planes sighted.

c. Recce Aircraft Have "Banner Day": Reconnaissance planes continued to play an important part in the destruction of the enemy in the air and in the discovery of ground trends. On 8 April, recce pilots claimed 10-1-0 in the air and directed 362nd Group fighter-bombers to a motor transport concentration, which included 20-plus tanks, where they observed excellent results of bombing and strafing.

Advances by Third US Army ground troops were limited on 9 April as a restraining line across its immediate front halted further progress pending developments in the RUHR pocket. General Patton's forces again reported excellent air cooperation and the 6th Armored Division stated that, in the past few days, it had received the finest air cooperation in its history.

The Command's five fighter-bomber groups flew 61 missions, totaling 539 sorties, in cooperation with Third US Army, on Armed recce, patrols, attacks on special targets, and escort to medium bombers. The Luftwaffe was not up in force comparable to that of the previous several days, but ground claims continued to be high. Attacks on highway and rail traffic, and on points of ground resistance, continued with good results.

Included among the day's claims were 180 motor transport, 34 armored vehicles and tanks, 63 locomotives, 300 railroad cars, 10 gun positions, and 116 buildings destroyed or damaged; aircraft claims were 4-0-1 in the air, all by recce pilots, and 19-0-12 on the ground, the work of the 362nd Group.

Illustrative of the excellent recce-fighter-bomber teamwork was the destruction of a fuel dump during the day. At 0740 hours recce pilots observed the fuel dump in the vicinity of BAMBURG (0-2757). The information was flashed to Command Headquarters and the mission given to the 362nd Group. At 1410 hours 8 P-47s of the 379th Squadron bombed and strafed the target, destroying tanks and buildings and reporting that great fires continued for an hour afterward. Recce pilots spotted trains and other targets for fighter-bomber attack.

Fighter-bombers provided continual cooperation on 10 April as Third U.S. Army's three corps attacked eastward, making good progress against generally scattered resistance. XII Corp's 11th Armored Division entered COBURG (0-3089) at the southern end of the Army front and was reported within 40 miles of the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border.

Fighter-bombers were airborne on 10 April before the last night fighter had landed and flew 53 missions, comprising 530 sorties. The Luftwaffe except for small formations was again conspicuous by its absence from the air, but enemy airfields were crowded, providing lucrative targets. The main claims of the day, however, were motor transport and rolling stock.

d. Enemy Rolling Stock Is Hit Hard: Included among the claims by fighter-bomber pilots were 455 motor transport, 59 locomotives, 1,075 railroad cars, and 114 buildings destroyed or damaged; and 14-2-0 enemy aircraft in the air, 30-0-24 on the ground.

Indicative of the effective program of rail and highway interdiction was the total of 37 rail cuts and 6 highway cuts effected during the day.

Highlighting the day's achievements was the toll of destruction reaped by Thunderbolts of the 362nd Group. The P-47s dropped 38.34 tons of fragmentation bombs, launched 73 rockets and strafed to claim 654 railroad cars, 23 locomotives, 286 motor transport, and 1 armored vehicle destroyed or damaged. The Group attacked 10 marshalling yards and an airfield and effected 5 rail cuts. Claims of 12-0-7 enemy aircraft resulted in the Group's attack on KOLLEDA (J-4593) airfield.

Summarizing the ground situation on 10 April, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, in G-2 Estimate No. 13, of that day presented the following recapitulation:

Third U.S. Army's Armored sweep E of the RHINE to the threshold of the Central German Plain has mowed down the impoverished best that German resources and strategy were able to place in its path. The forces committed have demonstrated the lack of a central reserve in GERMANY, the terrific disruption of the communications facilities of the Wehrmacht, and the low quality of personnel remaining to be committed under the disguise of soldiers. The immediate, and indeed the ultimate objective of this policy of desperation is time, not for the improvement of the enemy military situation, but for a few more moments of life for the desperate leaders of the German nation.

As fighter-bombers, with splendid flying weather, claimed excellent results against air and ground targets, on 11 April Third U.S. Army units reached JENA, captured BAD ROSEN and COBURG, surrounded ERFURT, and sent elements to the vicinity of NEUSTADT (0-4197). The enemy garrison at COBURG had refused to surrender, but after an artillery pounding and the appearance of our fighter-bombers, which circled threateningly overhead, the city capitulated.

Our aircraft were airborne to fly 58 missions, comprising 544 sorties, in close cooperation with Third U.S. Army, on armed recce, fighter sweeps, and escort. Indicative of the day's activity was the total of ammunition expended on the enemy, which consisted of 32 tons of GP, 73.71 tons of fragmentation bombs, and 2 tons of incendiaries; 72 rockets were launched.

Claims were high and included 539 motor transport, 17 tanks and armored vehicles, 83 locomotives, 599 railroad cars, 53 buildings, and 31 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged; attacks were carried out on 18 marshalling yards, 6 airfields, and 7 towns.

The offensive against the German Air Force continued as our fighter-bombers claimed 22-0-6 in the air and 21-0-6 on the ground. Highlighting the day's achievements against the Luftwaffe was the work of the 356th Squadron, 354th Group, which engaged 25 plus aircraft over the landing pattern at HALLE Airfield (D-9020). The Mustangs forced the enemy planes to jettison bombs and belly tanks and in the ensuing engagement claimed 19 ME-109s and 1 FW-190 destroyed and 6 ME-109s damaged.

Because of rapid Allied advances, the enemy's airfield situation grew more acute every day. Their total area for operational bases on 11 April was bounded roughly by 12 and 14 degrees E. Longitude on the North and 11 and 14 degrees E. Longitude on the South. In this area they were required to base approximately 1750 single engine fighter and 900 twin engine planes in addition to their transport and miscellaneous aircraft.

Despite low clouds and occasional showers on 12 April, fighter-bombers provided cooperation to Third U.S. Army elements which advanced toward ALTENBURG, cleared WEIMAR, were engaged in house-to-house fighting in ERFURT, and neared the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border in drives to the east and southeast against generally ineffective resistance.

Aircraft flew 50 missions, totaling 461 sorties, in cooperation with Third U.S. Army, on area cover, fighter sweeps, armed recce, and escort to medium bombers. Ground claims were again high and included 516 motor transport, 18 tanks and armored vehicles, 23 locomotives, 428 railroad cars, 10 gun positions, 83 buildings, and 61 horse-drawn vehicles; a troop concentration, 5 marshalling yards, 6 airfields, and 9 towns were attacked and 3 highway and 11 rail cuts effected.

The campaign to eliminate the Luftwaffe continued apace in airfield attacks but the enemy had temporarily abandoned the skies. Results of attacks on enemy airdromes were a total of 24-0-32 GAF aircraft. Two planes were claimed destroyed in air combat and 1 damaged.

e. Claims: "1 Building Destroyed: 1 German General:" "Mark you, if you hit that building, you will get yourself a German General," an 80th Infantry Division ground controller informed the 406th Squadron, of the 371st Group, which was vectored to bomb and strafe a building in ERFURT. The Squadron claimed "1 building, 1 German General destroyed."

Illustrative of the effective close air cooperation provided Third U.S. Army units by fighter-bombers is the following excerpt from a report on the Subject: "Summary of Air Missions in Cooperation With Task Force Sundt From 11 April '45 through 17 April '45," dated 18 April, Headquarters, 87th Infantry Division:

12 April 45 - One Squadron P-47s checked with Air-Ground team at 0830. Requested armed reconnaissance on roads from Stadtilm to Rudol Stadt. Squadron leader reported little enemy traffic and proceeded on to bomb and strafe Rudol Stadt at request of Task Force Commander. 16 x 500 pound bombs on Rudol Stadt, starting many fires. One squadron contacted by Air Ground team at 1130 and requested that tanks in the vicinity of Ehrenstein be bombed and strafed. Squadron destroyed two tanks and left one tank smoking then proceeded to strafe enemy vehicles and troops to the front of the Task Force. Extremely good work was done allowing Task Force Sundt to proceed on mission. Squadron leader reported that road to the front of Task Force was clear of enemy vehicles into Rudol Stadt. One bomb which hit what seemed to be a military barracks area caused a huge explosion and burned all night. A castle O.P. was strafed also a steel frame O.P. was strafed and one house quartering enemy troops in vicinity of the O.P. was destroyed. Four enemy vehicles which were flushed out of the town by the bombing and strafing were destroyed. One motorcycle and one bus were strafed and destroyed in Rudol Stadt. Many fires were started by the bombing and strafing and the entire mission was a complete success due to the extremely accurate bombing and strafing by the participating aircraft.

Highlighting the ground advance of Third U.S. Army on 13 April were the drives of the armored divisions. Fourth Armored thrust prongs east and southeast to CHEMNITZ, 6th Armored drove a spearhead to ALTENBURG, and 11th Armored reached BAYREUTH. Rapidly advancing infantry consolidated gains. XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers, meanwhile, were hampered by low cloud and haze in the morning but were airborne in the afternoon to provide cooperation with the attacking ground units, and to fly missions on area cover and armed recce.

Fighter-bombers flew 27 missions, comprising 242 sorties. Claims were lower than previous days because of weather. Emphasis continued to be placed on destruction of highway and rail traffic while only one airfield was attacked during the day.

Excellent progress along the entire Third U.S. Army front was made on 14 April as weather again hampered fighter-bomber activity. Sixth Armored Division thrust prongs east, northeast, and southeast and threatened LEIPZIG. Fourth Armored Division advanced in its zone and 11th Armored Division captured BAYREUTH. Infantry quickly consolidated the gains.

Cloudy skies and fog limited fighter-bombers to 30 missions, comprising 277 sorties, in cooperation with the Corps, on armed recce, and area cover.

Significant was the decrease in the number of aircraft encountered by our fighter-bombers. Reporting the day's only air combat, squadrons of the 354th Group claimed 9-0-1 in the air, while 362nd Group's 377th Squadron strafed an airdrome to claim 7-0-1 on the ground. Claims against ground targets were limited because of poor visibility.

Armored advances continued to highlight Third U.S. Army ground operations on 15 April as weather continued to limit fighter-bomber operations. Sixth Armored Division had elements near GERINSWALDE (K-6298) and 4th Armored Division advanced to the vicinity of MEERANE (K-3360), VIII Corps' infantry captured NEUSTADT (J-8344), cut the Autobahn, and reached a point near WEIDA.

Four fighter-bomber Groups flew 39 missions, totaling 360 sorties, on armed recce, area cover, escort to mediums, and cooperation with eastward driving Third U.S. Army troops. Rolling stock and airfields were the chief targets hit during the day and claims included 562 motor transport, 24 tanks and armored vehicles, 101 locomotives, and 432 railroad cars destroyed or damaged; aircraft claims were 7-0-1 in the air and 50-0-39 on the ground.

Strafing of airfields brought excellent results as the 354th Group claimed 37-0-24 and 362nd Group claimed 13-0-5 aircraft.

f. XIX TAC Destroys Record Number of E/A on Ground:

Although most of its armor was rolling to a halt on 16 April at the line LEIPZIG (E-2515) - CHEMNITZ (K-6662) because of restraining orders, Third U.S. Army units, with excellent air cooperation, continued rapid consolidation of gains. Sixth Armored Division continued its advances, crossed the MULDE and CHEMNITZ RIVERS, taking ALTENBURG which had been declared an open city. XII Corps units neared the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border.

Attacking the few remaining heavily concentrated enemy airfields, XIX Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers ran up its best score of its history against enemy aircraft on the ground. Thunderbolts of the 367th and 368th Groups accounted for the bulk of the day's claims of 84-0-74 German planes, the former amassing a total of 60-0-29 at RIESA (E-8314) and MARIENBAD airfields and the latter, 22-0-35, at PRAGUE and WSIDEN. Air battles resulted in additional claims of 21-0-1, principally by 354th Group which brought the total air and ground claims of this Group to 900 aircraft destroyed since becoming operational.

Return of good weather permitted fighter-bombers to fly 50 missions, comprising 482 sorties on armed recce, area cover, escort to mediums, and close cooperation with Third US Army. The program against the Luftwaffe and the German transportation system continued as six airfields and 13 marshalling yards were attacked and 1 road and 6 rail cuts effected.

Ground claims included 347 motor transport, 7 tanks and armored vehicles, 111 locomotives, 319 railroad cars, and 40 horse-drawn vehicles, destroyed or damaged.

g. Third US Army's Tactical Mission Changes: On 17 April, the tactical mission of Third US Army was changed. The new mission was to advance down the DANUBE VALLEY with the objective of effecting a junction with the Russians advancing west from VIENNA (X-4095) at LINZ (V-8588). Units prepared for the new advance, and XX Corps armor and infantry combined to capture GLAUCHAU, BURGSTADT, LIMBACH, and many other towns, crossed the ZWICK-MULDE RIVER on a broad front consolidating a powerful bridgehead beyond it, and reached the outskirts of CHEMNITZ where the city's Military Commander refused to negotiate for surrender.

Fighter-bombers flew 50 missions, totaling 494 sorties, on armed reconnaissance, area cover, escort to mediums, and cooperation with Third US Army. Destruction of enemy aircraft continued to highlight operations, and claims against the enemy's transportation system were also high.

Attacks were carried out against 7 airfields, resulting in claims of 47-0-58. The bulk of the aircraft claims were the result of attacks on WEIDEN and CHEB Airfields by P-47s of the 362nd Group which amassed a total of 37-0-3; 371st Group, in three attacks on CHEB, claimed 9-1-13.

Ground claims included 504 motor transport, 9 tanks and armored vehicles, 173 locomotives, 186 railroad cars, 13 gun positions, 68 buildings, and 61 horse-drawn vehicles; twelve marshalling yards, 7 airfields, and 5 towns were attacked and 16 rail cuts effected.

Third US Army, on 18 April, reported some good gains but activity was primarily confined to regrouping of forces. VIII Corps infantry advanced in the center of the Army front and, further south, some progress was made in the XII Corps zone.

Another day of good weather enabled fighter-bombers to fly 33 missions, totaling 390 sorties on armed recce, area cover, escort to medium bombers, fighter sweep, and one mission escort for a low-level photo recce sortie.

Although claims against enemy aircraft diminished to a total of 9-0-5 on the ground and 1-1-2 in the air, destruction of the German transportation system continued apace, with claims which included 333 motor transport, 40 tanks and armored vehicles, 67 locomotives and 383 railroad cars destroyed or damaged. Attacks were made on 15 marshalling yards, 2 airdromes and 1 town; 7 rail cuts were effected.

Reconnaissance planes continued to perform effectively in spite of increased attempts at interception by the enemy. Typical of the results was an attack, on 18 April, by 4 FW-190s on two recce planes near E-6038, which resulted in claims, by the latter, of 1-1-2 without loss.

h. Ground Forces Enter CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Jumping off on the line HOF (O-9899) - NURNBERG (O-4200) on 19 April, Third US Army, less the VIII Corps and with the newly-acquired III Corps, advanced rapidly to the southeast and drove into CZECHOSLOVAKIA against generally scattered resistance from a retreating enemy. There was minor activity on other corps fronts as regrouping continued.

Continued good weather enabled four fighter-bomber groups to fly 41 missions, comprising 396 sorties, on armed recce, cooperation with the XX and XII Corps and escort to mediums. Attacking 7 airfields, the groups claimed 45-0-10 enemy aircraft on the ground, with the bulk of these claims resulting from the attack by 371st Group's 406th Squadron on CHIEFSCH (P-9482). One encounter by the 354th Group resulted in the day's only air claims, totaling 7-0-1.

Our aircraft continued attacks on the enemy's transportation system and the day's claims included 239 motor transport, 13 tanks and armored vehicles, 57 locomotives, and 125 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

Highlighted by 11th Armored Division's drive down the NAAB RIVER valley, Third US Army's advance to the southeast and south on 20 April progressed favorably with XII Corps going 20 miles, XX Corps gaining 10 miles on its front south of BAYREUTH and southeast of NURNBERG, and III Corps continuing to assemble in the NURNBERG area.

Good weather again favored our fighter-bombers, which flew 64 missions, comprising 569 sorties on area cover, armed recce, escort to mediums, and cooperation with VIII, XX, and XII Corps. Attacking 10 enemy airdromes, our pilots claimed 38-0-36 enemy planes on the ground with 393rd Squadron, of the 367th Group, claiming 27-0-20 at DEININGEN Airfield (T-0735). Claims of 4-0-4 resulted from three air encounters. During the week ending 20 April, XIX Tactical Air Command claimed 54-0-3 enemy aircraft in air combat and 280-0-223 on the ground; our losses were 15 planes.

i. New Phase of Campaign Begins: Third US Army, on 21 April, completed southward regrouping of its forces and poised itself for a new offensive as one highly successful phase of its campaign was at an end and a new phase begun. XII Corps units advanced inside CZECHOSLOVAKIA, captured ASCH (P-1889), reached the town of TIRSCHENREUTH (P-3052), and neared NEUSTADT (P-0418). Progress was also reported in the XX Corps zone. Resistance was reported to be scattered and disorganized.

Good weather in the morning deteriorated in the afternoon and limited fighter-bomber activity to 37 missions, totaling 362 sorties on armed recce in the REGENSBURG-NEUSTADT and BRUX-PILSEN areas, area cover, cooperation with the VIII, and XII, and XX Corps, and escort to medium bombers.

Continued attacks on enemy airfields yielded 46-0-19 aircraft on the ground. No enemy planes were sighted in the air.

Thunderbolts of the 367th Group claimed a total of 36-0-10 enemy aircraft in attacks on INGOLSTADT (T-7719), REGENSBURG (U-3552), and STAUBLING (U-5437), and added claims of 33 motor transport, 6 locomotives, 53 railroad cars, 5 gun positions, 1 hanger, 24 buildings, and 2 horse-drawn vehicles for the day's best achievements.

Opening its attack to the south, on 22 April, Third US Army units reported good progress against mild opposition as weather hampered fighter-bomber efforts. Eleventh Armored Division, in the XII Corps zone, rapidly as no major units were contacted and captured WEIDEN (P-1629). XX Corps infantry was engaged in house-to-house fighting in NEUMARKT (T-7082). Other units reported advances to the southeast. VIII Corps was released to First US Army.

Low clouds and frequent showers limited fighter-bomber operations to 8 missions, comprising 79 sorties on armed recce, area cover, and air cooperation with XII Corps. Only two enemy aircraft were sighted in air, and both were destroyed.

Third US Army units maintained their advance to the south and southeast on 23 April as continued poor weather hampered fighter-bomber operations. XII Corps armor and infantry made good progress towards the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN border with spearheads reaching to the city of CHAM (U-8059), less than 60 miles from the AUSTRIAN border. XX Corps infantry, attacking against light opposition, moved to the vicinity of BORMANSDORF (T-9477) and thrust armor to a point near REGENSBURG. III Corps, having completed its regrouping, began its attack in the southern zone of the Army front.

Despite rain and poor visibility, fighter-bombers flew 17 missions, totaling 158 sorties, achieving excellent results against road and rail targets and continuing the month's profitable campaign against the Luftwaffe.

Ground claims included 247 motor transport, 7 tanks and armored vehicles, 36 locomotives, 74 railroad cars and 28 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged. An attack by the 367th Group's 392nd Squadron on INGOLSTADT (T-7720) airfield resulted in claims of 17-0-8 on the ground, one less than the day's entire toll.

Finding resistance light throughout the front, on 24 April Third US Army ground units, including the newly assigned 14th Armored Division, advanced all along the Army zone as returning good weather permitted effective fighter-bomber cooperation. Armored units thrust spearheads northeast of DEGGENDORF, and preceded infantry into HEMAU (T-9758) and REGENSTAUF (U-2067).

Four fighter-bomber groups operated in improving weather conditions, flying 31 missions, totaling 306 sorties, on armed recce, area cover, and cooperation with XX and XII Corps. Ground claims were high as the Command continued its relentless attack on road and rail movement. Only one enemy aircraft was claimed destroyed in air combat, and ground claims diminished to 5-0-12.

XII Corps' 11th Armored Division advanced swiftly southeastward on 25 April to within 6 miles of the AUSTRIAN border at PASSAU as its 50-mile prong from CHAM was being steadily widened to the eastward. In the center of the Third US Army front, XX Corps infantry crossed the DANUBE at REGENSBURG and consolidated possession of the north bank of the river along the 20-mile stretch from REGENSBURG to KELHEIM. Fighter-bombers reaped a lucrative harvest, locating heavy motor transportation traffic on the corps fronts.

Our fighter-bombers flew 41 missions, comprising 380 sorties, to strike at airfields and retreating enemy transport, and to provide cooperation with advancing ground troops.

Heavy road traffic was located on highways paralleling the DANUBE RIVER in the REGENSBURG-PASSAU area resulting in a total of 505 motor transport claimed destroyed or damaged.

Although airfield attacks resulted in a total of 55-0-65, our losses were heavy as 8 planes failed to return. It was apparent that the enemy was concentrating heavy flak defenses around airfields in defense against the daily attacks.

Cooperating with XII Corps, 371st Group accounted for the biggest share of the Command's enemy aircraft total, destroying 23 and damaging 39 in attacks at EFERDING (V-6885), ERDING (Z-1277), and INGOLSTADT (T-7719) airfields, and a landing ground at (V-7981).

Reconnaissance planes were unusually busy, flying more than 100 successful sorties.

Third US Army units continued to advance rapidly to the southeast on 26 April as good weather permitted fighter-bombers to continue highly profitable attacks on airfields and enemy rolling stock. XII Corps units were near and across the AUSTRIAN border and infantry quickly consolidated the gains. Infantry captured EGER (P-3174), where stubborn resistance had been encountered. XX Corps infantry continued to expand a bridgehead across the DANUBE and encircled REGENSBURG. III Corps cleared INGOLSTADT and had elements across the DANUBE.

Flying 46 missions, comprising 459 sorties, our fighter-bombers struck heavy blows against the German Air Force in the air and on the ground and destroyed much rolling stock. Enemy aircraft claims were 18-0-9 in the air and 52-0-39 on the ground with major claims resulting from attacks by 362nd Group's 379th Squadron, which amassed a total of 42-0-20 on the ground, and air combat by P-51s of the 354th Group which claimed 14-0-8.

On 27 April XII Corps armor and infantry patrolled the CZECH and AUSTRIAN borders, XX Corps units built up their DANUBE bridgehead, and III Corps cleared INGOLSTADT and crossed the DANUBE at that point. Bad weather hampered fighter-bomber activity in cooperation with these advances.

Low clouds, haze, and thunder showers limited XIX Tactical Air Command's fighter-bombers to 12 missions, totaling 101 sorties, on armed recce south and east of the battle area, cooperation with XII and XX Corps and patrol. Ground claims were limited and although only 4 enemy aircraft were destroyed in the air, a total of 9-0-25 was claimed in attacks on 5 airfields.

While continuing its drives to the south and southeast, on 28 April, Third US Army consolidated gains, straightened its lines and sent elements probing into AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA as inclement weather limited XIX Tactical Air Command operations to 28 tactical reconnaissance sorties.

Although bad weather continued to hamper air activity, Third US Army units made good progress on 29 April in their drives southward. XII Corps infantry closed up to the DANUBE RIVER near PASSAU, XX Corps armor thrust spearheads south and southeast to FRONTENHAUSEN (U-5406) and OSTERHOFEN (U-8925), and III Corps armor and infantry advanced to LANDSHUT and FREISING, respectively. The 26th Infantry Division, reaching the latter city, freed 27,000 Allied prisoners.

Low ceilings, rain, and sleet limited fighter-bombers to 20 missions, totaling 232 sorties, on cooperation with XII and XX Corps, and on armed reconnaissance in the STRALLING-LINZ and PILSEN-PRAGUE areas.

j. 405th Group Begins Operations: The day's major aircraft claims were by the newly reassigned 405th Group which signalized its return to XIX TAC control by bombing two airfields and claimed a total of 4-0-3 enemy aircraft on the ground.

Reconnaissance planes sighted approximately 1000 vehicles moving south on the highway between PRIBRAM and MIROTITZ, while guarding Third US Army's left flank along the CZECH border, and the 362nd Group attacked the convoy, claiming 260 motor transport destroyed or damaged for the bulk of the day's claims. Total ground claims included 452 motor transport, 28 tanks and armored vehicles, 60 locomotives, 377 railroad cars, and 517 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Meeting mild opposition Third US Army elements, on 30 April, reached PASSAU, crossed the DANUBE and ISAR RIVERS, penetrated the outer defenses of the German National Redoubt, and was 90 miles from the Russian columns striking from VIENNA (X-4095).

Weather again interfered with fighter-bomber operations as fighter-bombers ended the month by flying 19 missions, comprising 175 sorties, effecting continued heavy destruction against enemy rolling stock. Aircraft claims totaled 4-0-5 on the ground, and other claims included 107 motor transport, 3 armored vehicles, 65 locomotives, 588 railroad cars and 109 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

1 April 1945

A. Fighters:	
Missions	38
Sorties	381
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	52.50
Fragmentation	15.83
Napalm (Tanks)	24 x 108-lbs 56 x 75-lbs
Rockets	24
Claims (Air)	1-0-0
Claims (Grd)	39-0-38
Losses (A/C)	1
B. Reconnaissance:	
Tac/R Sorties	44
Successful	32
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1
C. Results of Attacks:	
Destroyed or Damaged	
Motor Transport	398
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	109
Locomotives	32
Railroad Cars	236
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	10
Hangar	1
Buildings	48
Fuel Tanks	11
Radar Towers	5
Horse-drawn Vehicles	75
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	8
Towns	7
Airfields	2
Troop Concentrations	3
Horses Killed	20
Personnel Killed	151
Railroad Cuts	4
Highway Cuts	3

2 April 1945

A. Fighters:	
Missions	12
Sorties	73
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	1.5
Fragmentation	6.9
Napalm (Tanks)	22
Claims (Air)	17-0-5
Claims (Grd)	3-0-1
Losses (A/C)	1
B. Reconnaissance:	
Tac/R Sorties	2
Successful	2
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1
C. Results of Attacks:	
Destroyed or Damaged	
Motor Transport	102
Locomotives	9
Railroad Cars	55
Hangars	2
Buildings	9
Radio Station	1
Horse-drawn Vehicle	1
Attacked:	
Towns	1
Airfields	2

3 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	27
Sorties	212
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	7.75
Fragmentation	11.50
Napalm (Tanks)	24
Rockets	20
Claims (Air)	3-3-8
Claims (Grd)	3-0-6

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	34
Successful	16

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	185
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	3
Locomotives	32
Railroad Cars	204
Gun Positions	6
Barges	2
Buildings	17
Hay Wagon (Explosion)	1
Attacked:	
Enemy Troops Killed	12
Railroad Cuts	4

4 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	40
Sorties	451
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	15
Fragmentation	2.6
Napalm (Tanks)	6
Rockets	50
Claims (Air)	16-0-6
Claims (Grd)	20-3-11
Losses (A/C)	5

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	62
Successful	46
P/R Sorties	19
Successful	12

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	215
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	2
Locomotives	53
Railroad Cars	162
Gun Positions	7
Buildings	9
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2
Trailers	3
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	4
Airfields	3
Towns	2
Highway Cuts	1
Railroad Cuts	3

5 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	41
Sorties	365
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	20.75
Fragmentation	13.81
Napalm (Tanks)	16
Rockets	45
Claims (Air)	11-0-10
Claims (Grd)	59-2-56
Losses (A/C)	4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	46
Successful	40
Weather Recce	1
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	371
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	25
Locomotives	85
Railroad Cars	536
Gun Positions	12
Barge	1
Hangar	1
Buildings	86
Horse-drawn Vehicles	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	11
Airfields	8
Towns	1
Railroad Cuts	9

6 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	17
Sorties	169
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	16
Fragmentation	2.34
Claims (Air)	1-0-2
Claims (Grd)	2-0-2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Weather Sorties	4
Successful	4

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	30
Locomotives	3
Railroad Cars	42
Building	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	3
Attacked:	
Town	1
Marshalling Yard	1
Airfield	1
Railroad Cuts	2

7 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	43
Sorties	395
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	53.25
Fragmentation	10.60
Rockets	66
Claims (Air)	13-1-1
Claims (Grd)	31-0-51
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	74
Successful	68
P/R Sorties	23
Successful	16

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	247
Locomotives	39
Railroad Cars	340
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	19
Dump	1
Hangars	2
Buildings	127
Horse-drawn Vehicles	31
Attacked:	
Airfields	4
Marshalling Yards	3
Towns	6
Railroad Cuts	9
Highway Cuts	4

8 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	61
Sorties	545
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	63.25
Fragmentation	15.43
Rockets	95
Claims (Air)	17-2-10
Claims (Grd)	18-0-17
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	72
Successful	72
P/R Sorties	41
Successful	39

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	432
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	41
Locomotives	49
Railroad Cars	359
Gun Positions	18
Dumps	5
Hangars	4
Buildings	99
Horse-drawn Vehicles	19
Ammunition Sheds	3
Radar Station	1
Roundhouse	1
Guns	14
Storage Tanks	1
Steam Shovel	1
Personnel Killed	27
Horses Killed	4
Attacked:	
Defended Localities	5
Marshalling Yards	3
Airfields	7
Troop Concentrations	4
Railroad Cuts	15
Highway Cuts	3

9 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	61
Sorties	539
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	82
Fragmentation	2.08
Incendiaries	.2
Rockets	53
Claims (Air)	4-0-1
Claims (Grd)	19-0-12

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	76
Successful	74
P/R Sorties	40
Successful	35

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	180
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	34
Locomotives	63
Railroad Cars	300
Gun Positions	10

Buildings	116
Horse-drawn Vehicles	51
Roundhouses	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	8
Defended Localities	2
Airfields	4
Railroad Cuts	21

10 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	53
Sorties	530
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	58
Fragmentation	46.66
Rockets	73
Claims (Air)	14-2-0
Claims (Grd)	30-0-24
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	76
Successful	74
P/R Sorties	37
Successful	35

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	455
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	9
Locomotives	59
Railroad Cars	1075
Gun Position	1
Hangars	3
Buildings	114
Horse-drawn Vehicles	11
Railroad Choke Point	1
Roundhouse	1
Railroad Station	1
Attacked:	
Towns	6
Marshalling Yards	20
Airfields	4
Railroad Cuts	37
Highway Cuts	6

11 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	58
Sorties	544
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	32
Fragmentation	73.71
Incendiaries	2
Rockets	72
Claims (Air)	22-0-6
Claims (Grd)	21-0-6
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	78
Successful	70
P/R Sorties	23
Successful	21

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	539
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	17
Locomotives	83
Railroad Cars	599
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	4
Barges	2
Dumps	2
Buildings	53
Horse-drawn Vehicles	31
Observation Tower	1
Barrage Balloon	1
Radar Tower	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	12
Airfields	6
Towns	7
Railroad Cuts	20

12 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	50
Sorties	461
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	43.75
Fragmentation	12.55
Rockets	70
Claims (Air)	2-0-1
Claims (Grd)	24-0-32
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	56
P/R Sorties	4
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	616
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	18
Locomotives	23
Railroad Cars	428
Gun Positions	10
Hangar	1
Buildings	83
Horse-drawn Vehicles	61
Trailers	10
Attacked:	
Troop Concentration	1
Marshalling Yards	5
Airfields	6
Towns	9
Highway Cuts	3
Railroad Cuts	11

13 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	27
Sorties	242
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	22.75
Claims (Air)	6-1-1
Claims (Grd)	6-0-10
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	32
P/R Sorties	3
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	140
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	7
Locomotives	16
Railroad Cars	239
Gun Positions	34
Buildings	13
Attacked:	
Airfields	1
Marshalling Yards	5
Railroad Cuts	5

14 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	30
Sorties	277
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	16.75
Fragmentation	3.12
Rockets	46
Claims (Air)	9-0-1
Claims (Grd)	7-0-1
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	50
Successful	30
P/R Sorties	4
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	190
Tanks	1
Locomotives	20
Railroad Cars	65
Gun Positions	1
Buildings	6
Horse-drawn Vehicles	30
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	2
Railroad Cuts	10

15 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	39
Sorties	360
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	35
Rockets	125
Claims (Air)	7-0-1
Claims (Grd)	50-0-39
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	72
Successful	70
P/R Sorties	4
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	562
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	24
Locomotives	101
Railroad Cars	432
Bridges	1
Gun Positions	9
Hangars	3
Buildings	23
Horse-drawn Vehicles	7
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	6
Airfields	5
Railroad Cuts	20

16 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	50
Sorties	482
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	18.5
Claims (Air)	23-0-1
Claims (Grd)	84-0-74
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	62
Successful	60
P/R Sorties	38
Successful	33

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	347
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	7
Locomotives	111
Railroad Cars	319
Bridge	1
Gun Positions	5
Barges	6
Buildings	24
Horse-drawn Vehicles	40
Attacked:	
Airfields	6
Marshalling Yards	13
Railroad Cuts	6
Highway Cuts	1

17 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	50
Sorties	494
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	32.50
Fragmentation	4.08
Rockets	46
Claims (Air)	4-0-0
Claims (Grd)	47-0-58
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	62
Successful	60
P/R Sorties	37
Successful	37

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	504
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	9
Locomotives	173
Railroad Cars	186
Gun Positions	13
Mobile Guns	2
Buildings	68
Horse-drawn Vehicles	61
Roundhouses	2
Railroad Stations	2
Fuel Tanks	7
Trailers	13
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	12
Airfields	7
Towns	5
Railroad Cuts	16

18 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	33
Sorties	390
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	24
Napalm (Tanks)	15.05
Rockets	71
Claims (Air)	1-1-2
Claims (Grd)	9-0-5

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	72
Successful	68
P/R Sorties	7
Successful	6

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	333
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	40
Locomotives	67
Railroad Cars	383
Gun Positions	4
Hangars	4
Buildings	15
Horse-drawn Vehicles	3
Trailers	6
Tank Retrievers	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	15
Airdromes	2
Town	1
Railroad Cuts	7

19 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	41
Sorties	395
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	16.25
Fragmentation	3.9
Incendiary	24
Rockets	132
Claims (Air)	7-0-1
Claims (Grd)	45-0-10
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	74
Successful	68
P/R Sorties	24
Successful	19

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	239
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	13
Locomotives	57
Railroad Cars	125
Gun Positions	15
Barges	4
Buildings	94
Horse-drawn Vehicles	14
Tractors	3
Switch House	1
Mobile Gun	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	11
Airfields	7
Towns	7
Railroad Cuts	3

20 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	64
Sorties	569
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	28.75
Fragmentation	2.08
Incendiaries	15
Napalm (Tanks)	64 x 75-gal 11 x 108-gal
Rockets	82
Claims (Air)	4-0-4
Claims (Grd)	38-0-36
Losses (A/C)	4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	70
Successful	70
P/R Sorties	37
Successful	37

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	294
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	11
Locomotives	58
Railroad Cars	617
Gun Positions	18
Dump	1
Hangars	5
Buildings	93
Horse-drawn Vehicles	44
Trailers	63
Radar Towers	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	16
Airfields	10
Towns	14
Railroad Cuts	15
Highway Cuts	1

21 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	37
Sorties	362
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	16.25
Fragmentation	.25
Napalm	8.525
M-76 Incendiaries	5
Rockets	43
Claims (Grd)	46-0-19
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	56
Successful	56
P/R Sorties	3
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	274
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	4
Railroad Cars	182
Locomotives	63
Gun Positions	10
Hangar	1
Horse-drawn Vehicles	31
Radar Stands	52
Attacked:	
Airfields	9
Marshalling Yards	6
Towns	1
Railroad Cuts	1

22 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	8
Sorties	79
Claims (Air)	2-0-0

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	16
Successful	10

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	113
Locomotives	40
Railroad Cars	91
Trailer	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yard	1

23 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	17
Sorties	158
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	6.5
Fragmentation	15.73
Napalm	2
Incendiary	2.225
Rockets	26
Claims (Grd)	18-0-8

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	14
Successful	12

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	247
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	7
Locomotives	36
Railroad Cars	74
Gun Positions	8
Barges	9
Hangar	1
Buildings	8
Horse-drawn Vehicles	28
Attacked	
Airfields	3
Marshalling Yards	8
Towns	2
Railroad Cuts	3
Highway Cuts	1

24 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	31
Sorties	306
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	6.5
Fragmentation	28.64
Napalm	1
Incendiary	3.5
Rockets	69
Claims (Air)	1-0-0
Claims (Grd)	5-0-12
Losses (A/C)	2

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	92
Successful	82
P/R Sorties	3
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	373
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	6
Locomotives	31
Railroad Cars	510
Gun Positions	6
Barges	9
Dumps	2
Buildings	41
Horse-drawn Vehicles	43
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	6
Airfields	4
Towns	1
Railroad Cuts	13
Highway Cuts	5

25 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	41
Sorties	380
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	27
Fragmentation	20.8
Napalm	1
Incendiary	5
HVR	3.5
Rockets	31
Claims (Air)	1-0-1
Claims (Grd)	55-0-65
Losses (A/C)	8

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	100
Successful	92
P/R Sorties	22
Successful	22

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	406
Armored Vehicles and Tanks	20
Locomotives	83
Railroad Cars	281
Horse-drawn Vehicles	42
Gun Positions	12
Boat	1
Hangars	3
Other Buildings	34
Motorcycles	4
Attacked:	
Airfields	10
Towns	2
Marshalling Yards	1
Highway Cuts	1

26 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	46
Sorties	459
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	19.25
Fragmentation	33.26
Incendiary	3.5
Rockets	162
Claims (Air)	18-0-9
Claims (Grd)	52-0-39
Losses (A/C)	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	100
Successful	92
P/R Sorties	7
Successful	3

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	434
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	36
Locomotives	70
Railroad Cars	425
Gun Positions	6
Hangars	3
Buildings	116
Horse-drawn Vehicles	16
Trailers	5
Steam Shovels	2
Tractor	1
Warehouse	23
Mobile Guns	12
Radio Stations	2
Roundhouse	1
Railroad Gun	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	13
Airfields	4
Towns	12
Strongpoint	1
Railroad Cuts	5
Highway Cut	1

27 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	12
Sorties	101
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	8
Fragmentation	0.88
Rockets	41
Claims (Air)	4-0-0
Claims (Grd)	9-0-25

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	90
Successful	84

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	36
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	4
Locomotives	3
Railroad Cars	97
Dumps	1
Hangars	2
Buildings	14
Artillery Pieces	1
Storage Tanks	8
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	5
Airfields	5
Railroad Cuts	9

28 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	34
Successful	28

C. Results of Attacks
Destroyed or Damaged

Nil

29 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	20
Sorties	232
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	60
Fragmentation	7.8
Rockets	44
Claims (Grd)	4-0-5
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	78
Successful	76

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	452
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	28
Locomotives	60
Railroad Cars	377
Buildings	49
Horse-drawn Vehicles	517
Radio Tower	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	17
Airfields	3
Towns	3
Railroad Cuts	28

30 April 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	19
Sorties	175
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	36.25
Fragmentation	6.24
Incendiary	1.5
Leaflet Bombs	26
Rockets	55
Claims (Grd)	4-0-5
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	60
Successful	36

C. Results of Attacks:
Destroyed or Damaged

Motor Transport	107
Armored Vehicles	3
Locomotives	65
Railroad Cars	588
Gun Positions	1
Buildings	37
Horse-drawn Vehicles	109
Roundhouses	2
Radar Towers	2
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	14
Airdromes	1
Highway Cuts	1
Railroad Cuts	13

MAY

I. Summary of the Period 1-8 May, Inclusive. After nine months and eight days of operations, the air-ground team of XIX Tactical Air Command and Third US Army ceased action against the enemy with the unconditional surrender of all German armies, effective 0001 hours, 9 May.

During the period, Third US Army continued its attack into AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA making contact with the Russians at a point about 30 miles southeast of LINZ, AUSTRIA, on 8 May.

XIX TAC meanwhile flew patrols, area cover, fighter sweeps, armed recces, and close cooperation missions, escorted medium bombers, made demonstration flights over PW camps, and provided intensive reconnaissance. The order of battle employed consisted of the 48th, 354th, 362nd, 367th, 368th, 371st, and 405th Fighter Groups, the 10th Photographic Group, Reconnaissance, and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron.

Because of unfavorable weather which scrubbed everything but recces on two days and hampered activities on four other days, operations during the period were limited to 77 daytime fighter-bomber missions toteling 791 sorties, 359 reconnaissance sorties, and 14 night fighter sorties.

Major claims were reported on only one day, 4 May, when 426 motor transport, 10 armored vehicles and tanks, 25 locomotives, and 231 railroad cars were claimed destroyed or damaged. On that day 4 enemy aircraft were destroyed in air combat, and 14 destroyed and 5 damaged on the ground.

Our losses during the period were 6 aircraft.

a. Enemy Air Activity: Enemy air activity was reduced to a minimum as a result of April operations against the Luftwaffe, and attacks against Third US Army installations were ineffective. The only air encounters of the period were reported by the 405th Fighter Group and the 10th Photo Group, Ron., which claimed, respectively, 4-0-0 and 5-0-0, the latter encounters taking place on the last day of the war.

On 8 May, FW-190s and ME-109s strafed DANUBE bridge areas in the vicinity of DEGGENDORF and PASSAU. In the latter attack enemy aircraft included two observation planes which, in a final gesture of defiance, fired "burp" guns at ground targets. The only damage reported from these attacks was a slight injury to AAA fire control equipment caused by strafing.

As capitulation became inevitable, enemy pilots in some instances were provided with civilian clothes, discharge papers, and a demolition charge, and were sent home in liaison-type aircraft. They were directed to land the plane in Allied areas, commit some act of sabotage, and then proceed to their homes.

In the last stages many German pilots on field about to be over-run by the Russians flew into our territory to surrender and were escorted to our bases by XIX TAC fliers.

b. Order of Battle: Major Command units, on 1 May, were located at the following cities and towns: Headquarters, Advance, ERLANGEN; Headquarters, Rear, BAD NAUHEIM; Headquarters, 100th Fighter Wing, KONIGSTEIN; 48th Fighter Group, ILLSHEIN; 354th Fighter Group, OBER OLM; 362nd Fighter Group, FRANKFURT/MAIN; 367th, 368th, and 371st Fighter Groups, FRANKFURT/ESCHBORN; 405th Fighter Group, KITZINGEN; 10th Photographic Group, Recn., FURTH; and 425th Night Fighter Squadron, FRANKFURT/MAIN.

Movements during the period 1 through 8 May were as follows: 354th to ANSBACH and 362nd to FURTH/INDUSTRIEHAFEN, 1 May; 368th and 371st to FURTH/INDUSTRIEHAFEN, 2 May; and 362nd to ILLSHEIN, 4 May.

c. Reconnaissance: Although weather hampered reconnaissance operations, pilots were able to fly 336 visual and 23 photo sorties.

On 4 May reconnaissance pilots sighted 4,000 enemy transport and horse-drawn vehicles. Calling fighter-bombers to the areas, recce planes were chiefly responsible for the major portion of the day's claims of 426 motor transport and 42 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Recce pilots were credited with the final air encounters by XIX TAC aircraft when, on 8 May, they destroyed five single-engine German fighters.

d. Statistics: From the beginning of operations with Third US Army to the conclusion of hostilities in Europe at 0001 hours on 9 May 1945, XIX Tactical Air Command aircraft flew 108,517 sorties and dropped 23,450 1/2 tons of bombs on the enemy. Other figures provided by the Command's Statistical Control Section include:

Enemy aircraft in the air - 1320 destroyed, 113 probably destroyed, and 536 damaged.

Enemy aircraft on the ground - 1,065 destroyed, 50 probably destroyed, and 907 damaged.

Motor transport - 26,676 destroyed, 11,755 damaged.

Armored vehicles and tanks - 2,615 destroyed, 1,696 damaged.

Locomotives - 3,371 destroyed, 1,569 damaged.

Railroad cars - 17,703 destroyed, 27,085 damaged.

Bridges - 166 destroyed, 243 damaged.

Gun emplacements - 1,288 destroyed, 778 damaged.

Dumps - 186 destroyed, 146 damaged.

Hangars - 56 destroyed, 69 damaged.

Factories and miscellaneous buildings - 4,048 destroyed, 2,389 damaged.

Vessels and barges - 315 destroyed, 342 damaged.

Horse-drawn vehicles - 3,413 destroyed, 1,044 damaged.

Attacks were made on 1,070 marshalling yards, 199 airfields, and 379 troop concentrations; 578 definite and 99 probable highway cuts were made; and 3,297 definite and 572 probable railroad cuts effected.

II. Chronicle of Operations. Unfavorable weather limited fighter-bomber operations on 1 May, but Third US Army units continued the drive southeast in AUSTRIA, and south to reach the border on the INN RIVER. It was apparent that the enemy planned to hold the lines of the ISAR and DANUBE RIVERS but the 13th Armored Division broke out of its bridgehead over the ISAR RIVER to pierce the former line and outflank the other. Gains were made by armor and consolidated by infantry along the entire Army front against moderate to strong resistance.

Five fighter-bomber groups, including the newly-acquired 48th Group, flew 17 missions, totaling 113 sorties, as weather restricted operational claims.

The 405th Group dropped the only bomb load of the day. 3 tons of GP, on a marshalling yard in the PILSEN area, and claimed 7 locomotives and 31 railroad cars destroyed or damaged.

An attempted dive-bombing mission on BERCHTESGADEN by the 367th Group Commander was unsuccessful because of weather.

There were no aircraft claims, either in the air or on the ground.

As scattered showers, low clouds and icing conditions restricted fighter-bomber activity to 2 missions on 2 May, Third US Army units made excellent gains against meager and ineffective opposition. XII Corps advanced to a point northwest of LINZ while XX and III Corps units shattered the enemy's lines of defense along the ISAR RIVER and reached the INN RIVER at BRANAU (Z-9376), JETTENBACH (Z-4564) and RIEDEN (Z-3452).

Two missions, comprising 16 sorties, were flown by the 368th Group on area support in the STRAUBING-INGOLSTADT area. There were no claims.

Although mass surrenders of German troops were reported from other fronts, Third US Army units on 3 May continued the attack to the southeast into enemy-held portions of AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Weather continued to restrict fighter-bomber cooperation and although four groups operated they were able to fly only 14 missions, toteling 149 sorties. The 368th Group reported the major claims of the day. Dropping 78 260-pound fragmentation bombs, the Group claimed destruction or damage of 56 motor transport, 4 locomotives, 47 railroad cars, 1 bridge and 8 buildings.

As German armies continued to surrender on the northern and Western battle fronts, rendering other Allied armies inactive, fighting continued on the Third US Army front. The Army continued its attack to the southeast, penetrating farther into AUSTRIA, and commenced envelopment of LINZ. The boundary between Third and First US Armies was dropped to the south, narrowing the former's zone.

Continued inclement weather restricted fighter-bomber operations to 18 missions, comprising 150 sorties. Featuring the day's achievement were the enemy aircraft claims of the 405th Group which totaled 4-0-0 in the air, for the only air claims of the day; and 13-0-4 of the 14-0-5 aircraft claimed on the ground.

In addition, the 405th Group claimed 139 motor transport, 10 tanks and armored vehicles, 9 locomotives, 20 horse-drawn vehicles, 134 railroad cars, 11 gun positions, and 11 buildings destroyed or damaged.

Recce planes reported observations of approximately 4,000 enemy motor transport and horse-drawn vehicles during the day. Principal concentrations were: 1,000 to 2,000 along the highway south of CHIEM (Z-5517 to Z-5609), 300 in the WELS area (V-6050), and 120 plus in two convoys between V-2024 and V-5210. They reported 160-plus motor transport along the highway V-6050 to V-5343. All vehicles were moving away from the battle front or were stationary facing away from the front lines. Fighter-bombers were called and the resulting attacks were responsible for the major portion of the day's claims of 426 motor transport and 42 horse-drawn vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Although continued reports of mass surrenders on 5 May gave indication of an early end to all activity on the Western Front, Third US Army continued its attack east and southeast in occupation of its zone in the vicinity of LINZ, making large gains, and attempting to make contact with the Third Ukranian Army. Advances into the CZECHOSLOVAKIAN mountains on the left of the front continued and large numbers of prisoners of war were taken.

Unfavorable weather prevented operations by XIX TAC fighter-bombers and the only activity consisted of 7 successful recce sorties.

Surrender of German Army Group "G" on the Third US Army front, confirmed on 6 May, did not affect the Army's operations as it attacked northeast with V Corps and advanced northeast and southeast. A new limiting line was set up for the Army as attempts were continued to make contact with the Russians.

Plagued by continued unfavorable weather, XIX TAC operations were limited to two weather recce sorties.

Unconditional surrender of all German armies, ending the European war was signed at REIMS, FRANCE, on 7 May, to become effective at 0001 hours, 9 May. Third US Army meanwhile remained operational in its zone, although units were instructed not to fire unless fired upon.

Good weather enabled fighter-bombers of the Command to fly 12 missions, totaling 168 sorties, on area cover, fighter sweeps, defensive patrols, and demonstration flights over PW camps. One plane and pilot of the 354th Group's 356th Squadron were lost owing to mechanical failure.

Third US Army troops continued to occupy the surrender area on 8 May and at 1550 B hours they made contact with the Russians at STRENGHG (W-1473), 30 miles southeast of LINZ, AUSTRIA.

XIX TAC aircraft flew defensive patrols, armed recce and demonstration flights over prisoner of war camps on this, the long-awaited V-E Day.

With good weather prevailing, fighter-bombers flew 14 missions, totaling 194 sorties. Although the surrender had been signed, recce pilots claimed the destruction of 5 die-hard enemy fighters in three encounters northwest and southwest of PILSEN, and over REGENSBURG. One recce plane was lost to flak.

Fourteen enemy aircraft flew into XIX TAC's R-88 during the day to surrender. More were rounded up by the 353rd Squadron of the 354th Group which sighted 15-plus FW-190s south of SALZBURG (Z-9826), contacted them by radio and told them to follow the Squadron. Other enemy aircraft joined the formation and all were escorted to MUNICH where a total of 51 surrendered.

Maj. Gen. O.P. Weyland, Commanding General of XIX Tactical Air Command, on 9 May, issued the following message to all personnel of his Command:

At one minute past midnight this morning the German enemy's career of crime ended in unconditional surrender to Allied arms, the mightiest concentration of air, land and sea power ever assembled to curb and smash an aggressor nation.

To each of you, this is a personal victory, for the efforts of every officer and man have contributed to the effectiveness of the XIX Tactical Air Command-Third US Army team, which has carried air-ground cooperation to new heights of combat efficiency and beaten the enemy at every turn.

Through the fortunes of war and the aggressiveness of our great comrade-at-arms, the Third Army, this Command has been continually in the forefront of the battle, from Normandy to the heart of the enemy's homeland and on across the borders of Austria and Czechoslovakia. For more than nine months we have had the Hun on the run, until at last he could run no farther. The day of victory finds us rounding up the last scattered remnants of the beaten foe and escorting his once-warlike pilots to our bases in abject surrender.

Upon the successful conclusion of our mission, I want to express my heartfelt admiration and appreciation for all that each of you has done to make possible this victory. Your prowess and devotion are a credit to our country--and there is no higher praise.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

1 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	17
Sorties	113
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	3

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	50
Successful	32
P/R Sorties	2
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:	
Motor Transport	13
Locomotives	10
Railroad Cars	93
Horse-drawn Vehicles	14
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	1
Railroad Cuts	1

2 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	2
Sorties	16

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	10
Successful	4
P/R Sorties	5
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:
Nil

3 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	14
Sorties	149
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
Fragmentation Bombs	10.14

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	56
Successful	30
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:	
Motor Transport	56
Locomotives	4
Railroad Cars	47
Bridge	1
Buildings	8
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	5
Railroad Cuts	1

4 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	18
Sorties	150
Tons of Bombs on Tgts.	
GP	17
Fragmentation Bombs	2.86
Claims (Air)	4-0-0
Claims (Grd)	14-0-5
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	64
Successful	60
P/R Sorties	15
Successful	7

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:	
Motor Transport	426
Tanks and Armored Vehicles	10
Locomotives	25
Railroad Cars	231
Gun Positions	11
Buildings	16
Horse-drawn Vehicles	42
Roundhouse	1
Attacked:	
Marshalling Yards	5
Airdromes	4
Railroad Cuts	14
Highway Cuts	1

5 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	6
Successful	6
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:
Nil

6 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Nil

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	2
Successful	2

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:
Nil

7 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	12
Sorties	168
Losses (A/C)	1

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	78
Successful	72
P/R Sorties	1
Successful	1

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:
Nil

8 May 1945

A. Fighters:

Missions	14
Sorties	194
Claims (Air)	5-0-0
Losses (A/C)	4

B. Reconnaissance:

Tac/R Sorties	90
Successful	88

C. Results of Attacks:

Destroyed or Damaged:
Nil

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

SPECIAL ANNEX A

THIRD U.S. ARMY

OUTLINE PLAN

TO OPERATION

OVERLORD

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

ANNEXES

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HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

THIRD UNITED STATES STATES ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD

APPROVED

G. S. PATTON, JR.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY
COMMANDING

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SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. PURPOSE.

The purpose of Third U.S. Army Outline Plan for Operation OVERLORD is to form a basis for further detailed planning by Corps commanders.

2. CORPS PLANS.

a. Third U.S. Army Plan is indefinite since its employment depends upon the situation at that time. This plan describes, however, the possible means of employment being considered.

b. Corps commanders will make detailed plans for all possible methods of employment. These plans will be kept up-to-date as additional information is received from this headquarters, since the actual operational plan (to be announced later) may conform to one or the plans presently considered.

c. Twenty copies of corps outline plans will be submitted to this Headquarters by 1 June 1944.

SECTION II - SITUATION

1. GENERAL INFORMATION.

a. Object of Operation OVERLORD. - Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) has directed that an operation be conducted to seize and secure a lodgement area on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. This operation is known by the code name "OVERLORD" and will be executed in two phases:

(1) Phase I - The assault and capture of an initial beachhead including the development of airfield sites in the CAEN area and the capture of CHERBOURG.

(2) Phase II - The enlargement of the area captured in Phase I to include the BRITTANY PENINSULA, all ports south to the LOIRE and the area between the LOIRE and the SEINE.

b. Assault. - (See Annex No 1 - Map 1). - The initial assault will be made across selected beaches between CHERBOURG and LE HAVRE by American and British Forces - First U.S. Army on the right (west) and 2d British Army on the left (east), both under command of 21 Army Group (British).

c. First U.S. Army. - (See Annex No 1 - Map 1). - First U.S. Army assaults simultaneously on two beaches between VARREVILLE and COLLEVILLE-SUR-MER, as shown on Map 1, with VII Corps on the right (west) and V Corps on the left (east). After the beach assault VII Corps will turn north to capture CHERBOURG. The 101st Airborne Division will land at H - 4 hours and assist the advance of VII Corps. The 82d Airborne Division, landing after the 101st, has the mission of blocking movement of all enemy reserves from the south into the COTENTIN PENINSULA. XIX Corps will land behind V Corps and operate on its right. After capturing CHERBOURG First U.S. Army begins its drive to the south to cut the BRITTANY PENINSULA and secure the QUIBERON BAY area to include the beaches and facilities at VANNES and the reduction of BELLE ISLE.

d. VIII Corps. - (See Annex No 1 - Maps 2, 3, 4 and 5). VIII Corps will land beginning at about D ∕ 19 at CHERBOURG and/or across the secured beaches to the east and will be employed as directed by First U.S. Army. It is expected that VIII Corps may be ordered to move south through the COTENTIN PENINSULA and turn west to seize and secure ST. MALO. After VIII Corps has secured ST. MALO, it will probably be ordered to move south toward VANNES to secure the QUIBERON BAY area and reduce BELLE ISLE. (See par 1e below for command channels).

VII Corps may be directed to assist the VIII Corps in the advance on VANNES and amphibiously-trained troops will be furnished by First U.S. Army for the sea-borne assault on BELLE ISLE. The attack may be augmented further by airborne troops. When the QUIBERON BAY area (including BELLE ISLE) has been secured, VIII Corps may be ordered to turn west and assist XV Corps in reducing the remainder of the Brittany PENINSULA. It is expected that First U.S. Army will reinforce the VIII Corps with the necessary supporting and service units for the operation against the QUIBERON BAY area and that these troops will continue to support the VIII Corps until Third U.S. Army units of similar type are available.

e. Third U.S. Army. - Headquarters Third U.S. Army and certain army troops will land after VIII Corps (estimated between D ∕ 28 to D ∕ 30) through the COTENTIN PENINSULA and assume command of all Third U.S. Army elements then ashore.

f. XV Corps. - (See Annex No 1 - Maps 3, 4 and 5). - Landing after Headquarters Third U.S. Army through the port of CHERBOURG, across the secured beaches to the east, through the minor ports of ST. MALO or GRANVILLE or across the beaches between those two points, or a combination of these, XV Corps will be employed as follows:

(1) To assist VIII Corps in securing the QUIBERON BAY area, either as a Corps or by successive divisions.

(2) To continue west to reduce the BRITTANY PENINSULA unassisted, or

(3) To reduce the BRITTANY PENINSULA in conjunction with the VIII Corps if it has accomplished its mission of securing the QUIBERON BAY area in sufficient time.

g. XX Corps. - The XX Corps will land after XV Corps at approximately D ∕ 45 through the ports and across the beaches of the COTENTIN PENINSULA (including the beaches previously secured by First U.S. Army), in the QUIBERON BAY area or by forcing a landing on the north coast of BRITTANY to secure and open the port of BREST. After the BRITTANY PENINSULA has been cleared the XX Corps will prepare for operations to the east. (See Annex No 1 - Maps 6 and 7).

h. XII Corps. - The XII Corps will land after XX Corps, through the ports and across the beaches of the COTENTIN PENINSULA (including the beaches previously secured by First U.S. Army), in the QUIBERON BAY area or through other BRITTANY ports if open. It will be concentrated in preparation for operations to the east. (See Annex No 1 Map 7).

i. Regroupment. - (See Annex No 1 - Maps 6 and 7). - The reduction of the BRITTANY PENINSULA may be accomplished by D ∕ 55. In this event it is contemplated that any necessary regrouping of forces (divisions within corps or corps within armies) for the final stage of the operation will then begin. Third U.S. Army will concentrate on the right of First U.S. Army, prepared to operate to the east, either in close conjunction with First U.S. Army, or by swinging south of the LOIRE if a wider envelopment is feasible.

2. NAVAL PARTICIPATION

a. Western Naval Task Force will transport ground and air force elements to the Continent and furnish naval fire support for attacks by land and air forces in coastal areas as required. It will also assist in the rehabilitation and restoration of captured ports and port facilities.

b. The maintenance of sea-borne lines of communication and their protection against enemy air, surface or undersea interference is a responsibility of Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force.

c. The prevention of enemy reinforcement of the BRITTANY PENINSULA across its Atlantic Coast perimeter is a responsibility of the British Admiralty.

3. AIR PARTICIPATION.

a. Operation OVERLORD will be supported by the Eighth and Ninth U.S. Air Forces; the British 2d Tactical Air Force, RAF Bomber Command, Air Defense of Great Britain and Coastal Command (RAF), and U.S. and British Troop Carrier Commands.

b. The Ninth U.S. Air Force will be associated with FUSAG and will be employed as a Tactical Air Force in support of ground forces. The IX Tactical Air Command will be in support of First U.S. Army.

c. Tactical Air Support of the Third U.S. Army will be the function of the XIX Tactical Air Command (formerly XIX Air Support Command). Such support will include tactical reconnaissance squadrons and fighter-bomber groups. Tactical Air Support will consist of:

(1) Gaining and maintaining of the necessary degree of air superiority.

(2) Initially preventing the movement of hostile troops and supplies into the theater of operations, and later, delaying of enemy reserves and reinforcements.

(3) Participation in a combined effort of the air and ground forces, in the battle area, to gain objectives on the immediate front of the ground forces.

d. The XIX Tactical Air Command will provide an air support party at each corps and division headquarters of Third U.S. Army. each air support party will consist of one air support officer with available radio and wire communication facilities and the necessary operating personnel. The air support officer will act in an advisory and liaison capacity with the corps or division staff and communicates direct with Joint Army/Tactical Air Command Headquarters all matters pertaining to requests for air support, tactical and photographic reconnaissance, location of bombline, local weather data, and any other pertinent information. Corps may monitor requests transmitted by divisions to tactical air command. Requests for tactical air support should (1) contribute to the overall picture, (2) specify the results expected and (3) give the ground plans in event the mission is successful. Targets should be (1) well-defined and recognizable from the air, (2) accurately pin-pointed on the map and (3) beyond the capabilities of available ground personnel and supporting artillery.

e. The fighter-bomber force may at this stage of the operations be partially employed purely in fighter roles, maintaining the necessary degree of air supremacy and as escort for other formations. The reconnaissance squadrons are equipped to perform either visual or photographic tactical reconnaissance. Any missions required, which are beyond the capabilities of the XIX Tactical Air Command, will be forwarded to the Ninth U.S. Air Force by the XIX Tactical Air Command.

f. It is expected that by D ∕ 20 the Ninth U.S. Air Force will be operating fighter and fighter bomber groups and tactical reconnaissance squadrons from approximately nine advanced landing grounds on the Continent. After that, as the advance permits completion of advanced landing grounds, the movement of Ninth U.S. Air Force units to the Continent will be: first, remaining units of the Ninth U.S. Air Force Fighter Command, and second, light bombers and transport aircraft. Medium bombers will be brought in as soon as suitably located hard surfaced airfields can be made operational.

g. The capture of areas which contain airfield sites is a vital objective. This responsibility must be impressed upon all commanders down to and including RCTs. When a task or mission is assigned a combat team, great care should be taken to brief it on the probable airfield sites located within the area included in the task. Third U.S. Army will be given timely information by higher headquarters on the location of probable airfield sites within the contemplated zones of advance.

4. MOUNTING OF THIRD U.S. ARMY.

ETOUSA is responsible for mounting operation OVERLORD. The general procedure is prescribed in "European Theater of Operations, Preparation for Overseas Movement - Short Sea Voyage", dated 10 January 1944, as corrected, and in instructions issued previously by Headquarters Third U.S. Army.

5. CHAIN OF COMMAND.

Normal chain of command will be through Headquarters Third U.S. Army. However, during the preparation for movement and mounting period, corps are authorized direct communication with appropriate agencies of ETOUSA whenever it will facilitate planning.

6. SOE/SO OPERATIONS.

Resistance Groups will put into effect throughout FRANCE and BELGIUM certain pre-arranged plans, including particularly attacks on enemy rail, road and telecommunications. In addition, Resistance Groups will perform missions in strategic back areas designed to interfere with the enemy's movements to oppose the advance of the Army. Small specially trained and equipped military units will be prepared to operate in the enemy's rear with resistance elements to carry out specific harrassing and destructive missions. For SOE/SO Plan, see Annex No 9.

7. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

The mission of Civil Affairs is to further the military objectives by such organization and utilization of the civil government, population, agencies and resources as will prevent interference with military operations, and contribute most effectively to the military mission. For Civil Affairs Plan, see Annex No 10.

SECTION III - OPERATIONS

1. MISSION OF THIRD U.S. ARMY.

a. Stage I. Third U.S. Army will land on the Continent, capture the BRITTANY PENINSULA and open the BRITTANY ports, unless this has already been accomplished by First U.S. Army.

b. Stage II. (After clearing BRITTANY PENINSULA) Third U.S. Army will concentrate on the right of First U.S. Army prepared to operate to the east, either in close conjunction with First U.S. Army, or by swinging south of the LOIRE if a wider envelopment is feasible. It will place one armored division in FUSAG reserve near LE MANS.

2. CORPS MISSIONS.

a. VIII Corps.

(1) Troops.

79th Infantry Division
83d Infantry Division
(90th Infantry Division, initially attached to VII Corps, First U.S. Army)
Supporting troops (See Troop List - Annex No 2 and Troop Priority List - Annex No 3)

(2) Mission.

Be Prepared:

(a) To begin landing at about D / 19 at CHERBOURG and/or over the secured beaches to the east.

(b) To move to initial assembly areas designated by the Communications Zone or by the First U.S. Army.

(c) To move from initial assembly areas as prescribed by the First U.S. Army.

(d) After securing the probable first objective of ST. MALO, to move south on VANNES to secure the QUIBERON BAY area, perhaps assisted by VII Corps on the left (east). The final clearing of the QUIBERON BAY area will include the reduction of BELLE ISLE. Amphibiously-trained troops will be furnished by First U.S. Army for the seaborne assault on BELLE ISLE.

b. XV Corps.

(1) Troops.

8th Infantry Division
35th Infantry Division (to be prepared to move from concentration areas to marshalling area on 3 days notice after D / 17.)
4th Armored Division
5th Infantry Division
Supporting troops (See Troop List - Annex No 2 and Troop Priority List - Annex No 3).

(2) Mission.

Be prepared:

(a) To begin landing (estimated at about D / 29), following VIII Corps, through the port of CHERBOURG, over the secured beaches to the east, through the minor ports of ST. MALO or GRANVILLE or across the beaches between those two ports, or a combination of these.

(b) To move to initial assembly areas designated by the Communications Zone or by the Third U.S. Army.

(c) To move from initial assembly areas as prescribed by the Third U.S. Army.

(d) To assist VIII Corps in securing QUIBERON BAY area or to reduce BRITTANY PENINSULA. (See par 1f, Sec II).

(e) For possible employment of 5th Infantry Division as outlined in par 3, sec III.

c. XX Corps.

(1) Troops.

6th Armored Division
28th Infantry Division (SHAEF reserve - not to move from UK unless or until released by SHAEF)
7th Armored Division
Supporting troops (See Troop List - Annex No 2 and Troop Priority List - Annex No 3).

(2) Mission.

Be prepared:

(a) To begin landing (estimated about D / 45) after XV Corps, through the ports and across the beaches of the COTENTIN PENINSULA (including the beaches previously secured by First U.S. Army) or in the QUIBERON BAY area (or see Alternate Plans, paragraph 3, Sec III).

(b) To move to initial assembly areas designated by the Communications Zone or by the Third U.S. Army.

(c) To move from initial assembly areas as prescribed by Third U.S. Army.

d. XII Corps.

(1) Troops.

80th Infantry Division
5th Armored Division
2d French Armored Division (to be employed as directed by higher headquarters)
Supporting troops (See Troop List - Annex No 2 and Troop Priority List - Annex No 3).

(2) Mission.

Be prepared:

(a) To land after XX Corps through the ports and across the beaches of the COTENTIN PENINSULA (including the beaches previously secured by First U.S. Army), in the QUIBERON BAY area or through other Brittany Ports if open.

(b) To move to initial assembly areas designated by the Communications Zone or by the Third U.S. Army.

(c) To move from initial assembly areas as prescribed by Third U.S. Army.

(d) For possible employment of 80th Infantry Division as outlined in paragraph 3, Sec III.

e. Chemical Warfare.

(1) Toxic gas will not be employed and offensive gas ammunition will not be taken overseas nor moved into or through ports or beaches until so ordered by the Army Commander.

(2) Full scales of gas offensive equipment will be provided and held in the UK until such time as gas warfare may begin.

(3) All units will prepare, and keep under review, plans for retaliatory action which can be put into immediate effect if and when gas warfare begins.

(4) For Chemical Plan, see Annex No 17.

3. ALTERNATE PLANS.

It may develop that First U.S. Army, together with the portion of Third U.S. Army then ashore, may be so contained as to be unable to secure the QUIBERON BAY area. In that event, and assuming no additional troops can be supported through the ports and beaches already captured, one or more additional ports must be secured to enable the build-up to continue uninterrupted.

a. If the situation outlined above should develop, Third U.S. Army may be called upon to organize a sea-borne and/or airborne task force to force a landing and secure a beachhead from which further offensive operations could be developed to secure the port of BREST.

b. A beachhead may be forced on the north coast of BRITTANY, in the vicinity of MORLAIX, from which BREST could be taken from the land side. One plan under consideration is for XX Corps to command this force, reinforced by elements of 82d and/or 101st Airborne Divisions if available at the time required. The assault might be made by the 28th Infantry Division, followed by the 5th Infantry Division, if it has not already landed through the COTENTIN PENINSULA ports and beaches. Or, the 80th Infantry Division, from the XII Corps, might be utilized as follow-up for the 28th Infantry Division. Further information on this subject will be issued later.

SECTION IV - COMMAND POSTS

1. COMMAND POSTS.

a. Stage I.

(1) Third U.S. Army - Initial location depends on point of landing. If landing is made at ST. MALO, it may be near DOL; if at CHERBOURG, near PONTORSON. Will probably displace to RENNES.

(2) VIII Corps - To be reported

(3) XV Corps - To be reported

(4) XX Corps - To be reported

(5) XII Corps - To be reported

b. Stage II.

(1) Third U.S. Army - CHATEAUBRIANT - VENDOME

(2) VIII Corps - To be reported

(3) XV Corps - To be reported

(4) XX Corps - To be reported

(5) XII Corps - To be reported

2. AXES OF COMMUNICATION.

a. Third U.S. Army- DOL or PONTORSON - RENNES -CHATEAUBRIANT-VENDOME.

b. VIII Corps - To be reported

c. XV Corps - To be reported

d. XX Corps - To be reported

e. XII Corps - To be reported

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 1 - Maps Showing Possible Employment

SECRET

TOP SECRET

MAP NO. 1

COMBINED ASSAULT AND THIRD U.S. ARMY PLAN

ENGLISH CHANNEL

CHANNEL ISLANDS (to Great Britain)

GUERNSEY

JERSEY

XXX AB 82

XX AB 101

XXX VII

XXX XIX

XXX V

XXXX SECOND (BRITISH) XXXX U.S.

SECRET

SECRET

MAP NO. 2
FORECAST OF SITUATION AT D+19 SHOWING POSSIBLE INITIAL EMPLOYMENT OF VIII CORPS

TOP SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

TOP SECRET

MAP NO. 3

FORECAST OF SITUATION
AT D+29 SHOWING LANDING
OF THIRD U.S. ARMY HQ
AND POSSIBLE INITIAL
MOVEMENT OF XV CORPS

XXX XV D+29 to D+30

XXXX THIRD HQ

D+28 to D+29

D+29

XXX FIRST

XXX (SECOND BRITISH)

XXX (U.S.) FIRST

XXX

XXX

XXX

XXX

CHANNEL

ENGLISH

GUERNSEY

ISLANDS (to Great Britain)

JERSEY

PASSAGE DE LA DERROUTE

IROISE

Baie de Douarnenez

Audierne Bay

Pouldu Bay

Quiberon Bay

Presqu'île de Quiberon

Belle Ile

Ile de Groix

Ile Houat

Ile Hoedic

Ile de Sein

Ile de Batz

Ile de Bréhat

Ile de Bréhat

Ile de Bréhat

TOP SECRET

MAP NO. 4

FORECAST OF SITUATION AT D+40 SHOWING POSSIBLE PLAN "A" FOR EMPLOYMENT OF VIII AND XV CORPS

D+40

ENGLISH CHANNEL

ISLANDS (to Great Britain)

GUERNSEY

JERSEY

St. Helier

St. Peter Port

Cherbourg

le Havre

Caen

Bayeux

St. Lô

Granville

St. Malo

St. Brieuc

Brest

Morlaix

Quimper

Lorient

Vannes

Rennes

Fougères

Mayenne

Laval

Le Mans

Alençon

Lisieux

Falaise

Argentan

Dreux

Evreux

Angers

Château-Gontier

Château-Briant

Redon

Dinan

Combourg

Montauban

Loudéac

Pontivy

Carhaix

Châteaulin

Landerneau

Lannion

Guingamp

Paimpol

Tréguier

Roscoff

Plouescat

Plouigneau

Huelgoat

Carantec

Pleyben

Crozon

Douarnenez

Audierne

Pont-l'Abbé

Concarneau

Quimperlé

Pont-Aven

Hennebont

Pontivy

Plouay

Baud

Ploërmel

Josselin

Malestroit

Rochefort-en-Terre

Questembert

Muzillac

Le Roche Bernard

Pontchâteau

Guérande

Le Croisic

Batz

Le Pouliguen

Le Baule

Pornichet

Saint-Nazaire

Clisson

Ancenis

Nantes

Châteaubriant

Segré

Candé

Craon

Laval

Mayenne

Fougères

Vitré

Rennes

Montfort

Dol

Pontorson

Avranches

Granville

Villedieu

Tessy sur Vire

Torigny sur Vire

Coutances

Périers

Carentan

Isigny

Bayeux

Caumont

Aunay sur Odon

Villers Bocage

Tilly sur Seulles

Thury Harcourt

Falaise

Condé sur Noireau

Vassy

Athis

Flers

Briouze

Domfront

Sées

Argentan

Exmes

Trun

Orbec

Lisieux

Pont l'Evêque

Honfleur

Pont Audemer

Bourg Achard

Fécamp

Valmont

Criquetot l'Esneval

Montivilliers

Harfleur

Bolbec

Lillebonne

Caudebec

Yvetot

Barentin

Pavilly

Duclair

Elbeuf

Rouen

Gournay

Forges les Eaux

Neufchâtel

Dieppe

Eu

Le Tréport

Abbeville

Amiens

Montdidier

Roye

Péronne

Albert

Doullens

Hesdin

Montreuil

Etaples

Boulogne

Calais

Gravelines

Dunkerque

Bergues

Hazebrouck

Armentières

Lille

Roubaix

Tourcoing

Valenciennes

Douai

Arras

Bapaume

Cambrai

Le Cateau

Saint-Quentin

Ham

Peronne

Albert

Corbie

Amiens

Abbeville

Montreuil

TOP SECRET

MAP NO. 5

FORECAST OF SITUATION AT D+40 SHOWING POSSIBLE PLAN "B" FOR EMPLOYMENT OF VIII AND XV CORPS



TOP SECRET

MAP NO. 6

FORECAST OF SITUATIONS (to Great Britain)
AT D+50 TO D+70
SHOWING POSSIBLE
REGROUPMENT FOR
STAGE II OF PHASE II

CHANNEL

ENGLISH

SECRET

XXX XV

XXX VIII

XXX VII

XXX XX

XXXX THIRD

XXXX FIRST (U.S.)

XXXX SECOND (BRITISH)

XXX XXI

XXX V

XXX VI

XXX FIRST

D+60

SECRET

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50

Scale 1:1000000

TOP SECRET

MAP NO. 7

FORECAST OF SITUATION AT D+90

SECRET

CHANNEL

ISLANDS (to Great Britain)

GUERNSEY

JERSEY

St. Helier

D+90

BROAD

BRITISH

XXXX U.S.

XXXX FIRST

XXXX THIRD

XXXX FUSAG

21 GP XXXX FUSAG

(BR)

V

XIX

XX

VII

XV

XIV

O

Cherbourg

Caen

Le Havre

Rouen

Dieppe

Amiens

Evreux

Beauvais

Paris

Orléans

Alençon

Laval

Rennes

Granville

St. Malo

St. Brieuc

Dinan

Fougères

Mayenne

Châteaubriant

Nantes

Blois

Chartres

Fontainebleau

Pithiviers

Romorantin

Vierzon

Scale 1:1000000

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 2 - Troop List

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Initials:
Date: 5 June 1944
Register No TUSA 75

ANNEX 2

TO

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

TROOP LIST

(5 June 1944)

PATTON
Comdg

GAFFEY
C of S

MADDOX
G - 3

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY TROOP LIST

HEADQUARTERS
1 Hq/Hq Co, Army
4 Hq/Hq Co, Corps

DIVISIONS
5 Armd (Including One French)
8 Inf (6 to be moved by Third Army)
(2 to be moved under other Authority)

ARMORED UNITS
3 Hq/Hq Co, Armd Gp
6 M Tk Bn (Sp)
10 Tk Bn (Comp)

ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
1 Hq/Hq Btry, AAA Brig
7 Hq/Hq Btry, AAA Gp
(5 to be moved by Third Army)
(2 to be moved under other Authority)
17 AAA AW Bn, Mbl
(8 to be moved by Third Army)
(9 to be moved under other Authority)
8 AAA AW Bn, SP
(5 to be moved by Third Army)
(3 to be moved under other Authority)
6 AAA G Bn, Mbl
(1 to be moved by Third Army)
(5 to be moved under other Authority)

ARTILLERY
4 Hq/Hq Btry, Corps Arty
2 Hq/Hq Btry, FA Brig
20 Hq/Hq Btry, FA Gp
8 Armd FA Bn (105-mm How)
12 FA Bn (105-mm How)(Trk)
7 FA Bn (4.5" G)(Trac)
3 FA Bn (155-mm G)(Trk or Trac)
10 FA Bn (155-mm G)(Trk or Trac)
19 FA Bn (155-mm How)(Trk or Trac)
3 FA Bn (8"G)(Trac)
7 FA Bn (8" How)(Trac)
7 FA Bn (240-mm How)(Trac)
5 FA Obsn Bn

CAVALRY
5 Hq/Hq Tr, Ca v Gp, Mecz
(3 to be moved by Third Army)
(2 to be moved under other Authority)
10 Cav Ron Sq, Mecz
(6 to be moved by Third Army)
(4 to be moved under other Authority)

CHEMICAL
4 Cml Bn, Mtz
2 Cml Dep Co
1 Cml Lab Co
2 Cml Maint Co

ENGINEER
12 Hq/Hq Co, Engr C Gp
36 Engr C Bn
6 Engr Hv Pon Bn
1 Engr Topo Bn, Army
3 Engr Dep Co
3 Engr Dp Trk Co
8 Engr L Equip Co
10 Engr L Pon Co
6 Engr Maint Co
4 Engr Topo Co, Corps
6 Engr Trdwy Br Co
3 Engr W Sup Co
1 Engr Utility Det (1500)
1 Engr Surv Ln Det

MEDICAL
5 Hq/Hq Det, Med Gp
17 Hq/Hq Det, Med Bn
3 Med Gas Treat Bn
3 Conv Hosp
1 Evac Hosp (750)
14 Evac Hosp, Sem (400)
8 Field Hosp
2 Med Aux Surg Gp
21 Med Amb Co, Mtr
10 Med Clr Co
18 Med Coll Co
3 Med Dep Co
1 Med Lab Co

MILITARY POLICE
4 MP Bn
1 MP Co, Corps
9 MP Esc Gd Co
1 MP PW Process Co
1 Criminal Invest Sq

ORDNANCE
2 Hq/Hq Det, Ord Gp
19 Hq/Hq Det, Ord Bn
1 Hq/Hq Det, Ord Am Bn
17 Ord Am Co
11 Ord Dep Co
7 Ord Evac Co
9 Ord HAM Co
5 Ord HM Co (FA)
8 Ord HM Co (Tk)
7 Ord Maint Co (AA)
19 Ord MAM Co
17 Ord MM Co
1 Ord MVD Co
8 Ord Bomb Disp Sq

QUARTERMASTER
3 Hq/Hq Det, QM Gp
8 Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn
11 Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl
6 QM Bkry Co
2 QM Car Co
2 QM Dep Co
5 QM Fum & Bath Co
17 QM Gas Sup Co
4 QM Gr Reg Co
5 QM Ldry Co
5 QM Rhd Co
1 QM Ref Co
2 QM Sales Co
3 QM Salv Coll Co
3 QM Salv Rep Co
31 QM Serv Co
9 QM Tr T Co
33 QM Trk Co

SIGNAL
4 Sig Bn
2 Sig Cons Bn
1 Sig Opn Bn
2 Sig Dep Co
1 Sig Photo Co
1 Sig Pgn Co
1 Sig Rad Int Co
2 Sig Rep Co
4 Sig Serv Co (RI)
1 Sig Gen Ln Team
4 Sig Crystal Grind Team
1 J or SIAM Unit
1 Enemy Equip Indent Unit
Dets, Wea Sq
Dets, Mbl Com Sq

TANK DESTROYER
1 Hq/Hq Co, TD Brig
6 Hq/Hq Co, TD Gp
13 TD Bn, SP
11 TD Bn, T

G-1 AGENCIES
18 APO
16 Fin Disb Sec
4 MRU, Mbl Type "Y"
1 MRU, Mbl, Type "Z"
1 Hq/Hq Co, Repl Dep
2 Repl Bn (Fxd)(w/4 Cos Ea)
4 Repl Bn (Sep)(w/4 Cos Ea)

G-2 AGENCIES
Sundry Auxilliary Intelligence Agencies and Specialist Teams (attached to Hq of Army, Corps, and Divisions).

G-3 AGENCIES
1 Sp Opns Det
1 Sig (OSS) Det

G-4 AGENCIES
6 Hwy Sec, Type #1, HG
4 Hwy Sec, Type #2, HH
4 Hwy Sec, Type #3, HJ

CIVIL AFFAIRS
4 Cos (From ECA Regt)
12 CA Staff Secs (For Divs)

PUBLICITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENCIES
1 PW Det
1 Mbl Broadcasting Co.
2 Dets, Pub Serv Bn

AIR
1 Ln Sq
15 Air Support Pys
1 Air Support Control Section

MISCELLANEOUS
1 Hq/Hq, Sp Trs (Attached from FUSAG)

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 3 - Troop Priority List

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Initials:
Date: 5 June 1944
Register No TUSA 75

ANNEX 3

TO

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY PLAN

TROOP PRIORITY LIST

(5 June 1944)

PATTON
Comdg

GAFFEY
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MADDOX
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THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
TROOP PRIORITY LIST
(FIELD FORCES)

Note: BREAK indicates grouping of units to be shipped (loaded) in continuous priority.

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
VIII CORPS UNITS			
401 B	463d AAA AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
2267 B	813th TD Bn (SP)	693	162
403 B	749th Tk Bn (Comp)	755	212
406 B	1st Plat, 3042d QM Gr Reg Co	23	4
407 B	#93d Hq/Hq Det, Sp Trs (Adv Det)	321	119
408 B	1st Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
3558 B	13th Ord MM Co	169	48
411 B			
	Total	2787	755
	BREAK		
513 B	Adv Sec, 33d Med Dep Co	33	3
514 B	34th Evac Hosp, (400)(w/2 Surg Teams atchd)	308	47
515 B	429th Med Coll Co	105	20
516 B	581st Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
517 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
518 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
519 B			
520 B			
521 B			
522 B	Air Sup Py (VIII Corps)	10	8
	Total	825	125

INCLUDING: 406 Engr C Co (Sp), 603d Engr Cam Bn (Sp), Sig Co, (Sp)

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
	BREAK		
705 B	Fwd Ech, Hq/Hq Co, VIII Corps	258	45
706 B	Det, 59th Sig Bn	827	218
707 B	3254th Sig Serv Co (RI)	129	35
1437 B1 (ARMY)	Det, Sig Sec, Fwd Ech, Hq/Hq Det, Third Army	12	4
1437 B2 (ARMY)	Det, 113th Sig Rad Int Co	3	1
1437 B3 (ARMY)	Det, 579th Sig Dep Co	3	1
708 B	Co A, 511th MP Bn (- Det)	157	18
709 B	3806th QM Trk Co (- Det)	58	57
710 B	Det, 2d Plat, 122d QM Car Co	3	3
711 B	Det, Int Spec (VIII Corps Hq)	93	47
712 B	Hq/Hq Tr. 106th Cav Gp, Mecz	72	22
713 B	106th Cav Sq, Mecz	774	240
714 B	121st Cav Sq, Mecz	774	240
715 B	83d Inf Div (- Det)	7351	1092
716 B	2d Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
717 B	6th Plat, 187th Sig Rep Co	33	9
718 B	CA Stf Sec (VIII Corps)	7	4
719 B	CA Stf Sec (83d Div)	11	6
	Total	10572	2045
	BREAK		
819 B	83d Inf Div (Remainder)	6935	1099
820 B	456th AAA AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
821 B	802d TD Bn, T	797	200
822 B	712th Tk Bn (Comp)	755	212
823 B	Air Sup Py (83d Inf Div)	7	5
824 B	Det Int Spec (83d Inf Div)	35	1
825 B	2d Plat, 3042d QM Gr Reg Co	23	4
826 B	35th Evac Hosp, Sem (400)(w/2 Surg teams Atchd)	308	47
827 B	438th Med Coll Co	105	20
2866 B	531st Ord HM Co (TK)	210	50
3819 B	488th Ord Evac Co	185	55
831 B			
	Total	10179	1918
	BREAK		
919 B	(T) *Hq/Hq Det, 80th QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
920 B	3598th QM Trk Co	115	104
921 B	*3200th QM Serv Co	219	4
922 B	195th QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
923 B	571st QM Rhd Co	184	8
924 B	Hq/Hq Co, 1102d Engr C Gp	85	24
925 B	44th Engr C Bn	664	126
926 B	159th Engr C Bn	664	126
927 B	145th Engr C Bn	664	126
928 B	628th Engr L Equip Co	123	69
929 B	969th Engr Maint Co	200	70
930 B	511th Engr L Pon Co	203	135
931 B			
932 B			
933 B			
934 B			
	Total	3276	849
	BREAK		
974 B	16th Field Hosp (w/8 Surg Teams, 2 Ortho Teams, 1 Neuro Surg Team)	289	25
975 B	Hq/Hq Det, 167th Med Bn	29	8
976 B	635th Med Clr Co	117	19
977 B	664th Med Clr Co	117	19
978 B	Hq/Hq Det, 169th Med Bn	29	8
979 B	594th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
980 B	465th Med Coll Co	105	20
981 B	498th Med Coll Co	105	20
982 B	Hq/Hq Det, 24th Ord Bn	37	8
983 B	3468th Ord MM Co	169	45
984 B	3530th Ord MAM Co	120	36
985 B	3525th Ord MAM Co	120	36
986 B	2d Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3

* Colored Personnel
(T) Transportation Unit

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
987 B	5th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3
988 B	Hq/Hq Det, 313th Ord Bn (Am)	37	8
989 B	665th Ord Am Co	186	10
(2145 B) 2261 B	537th Ord HM Co (Pa)	198	33
990 B	88th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3
991 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 113th AAA Gp	67	14
992 B	119th AAA G Bn, Mbl	743	186
993 B	455th AAA AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
994 B	635th AAA AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
2162 B	300th Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	39
995 B			
996 B			
997 B			
998 B			
	Total	4383	994
	BREAK		
1071 B	Hq/Hq Btry, VIII Corps Arty	116	29
1072 B	12th FA Obsn Bn	505	122
1073 B	*Hq/Hq Btry, 333d FA Gp	99	28
1074 B	*333d FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
1075 B	*969th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
1076 B	741st FA Bn (8" How)(Trac)	589	118
1077 B	*578th FA Bn (8" How)(Trac)	589	118
1078 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 174th FA Gp	99	28
1079 B	559th FA Bn (155mm G) (Trk or Trac)	562	115
1080 B	561st FA Bn (155mm G)(Trk or Trac)	562	115
	Total	4199	939
	BREAK		
1142 B	Rear Ech, Hq/Hq Co, VIII Corps	135	4
1143 B	59th Sig Bn (- Det)	105	31
1144 B	13th MRU, Type "Y"	42	9
1145 B	Det, Co A, 511th MP Bn	85	16
1146 B	599th APU	12	1
1147 B	63d Fin Disb Sec	20	
1148 B	3042d QM Gr Reg Co (- 2 Plats)	84	11
1149 B	Det, 3806th QM Trk Co	57	52
1150 B	2d Plat, 122d QM Car Co (- Det)	17	11
1151 B	665th Engr Topo Co, Corps	115	25
1152 B	#A Co, 6902d KCA Regt	216	65
1153 B	53d Repl Bn (Sep) (w/4 Cos)	198	13
1154 B			
1438 B	86th Cml Bn (Mtz)	822	308
1155 B			
3259 B	839th Ord Dep Co	186	47
1156 B			
1157 B			
	Total	1894	593
	GRAND TOTAL - VIII	38115	8216
ARMY UNITS			
2055 B	301st Sig Opn Bn	662	168
2056 B	33d Sig Coms Bn	595	169
2059 B	503d MP Bn	566	118
2166 B	473d AAA AW Bn (SP)	711	147
2060 B1	Fwd Ech, Hq/Hq Det. Third Army	563	18
2060 B2	Fwd Ech, Hq Co, Third Army	157	19
2060 B3	Fwd Ech, Sp Tr, Third Army	7	0
2060 B4	Fwd Ech, Med Det, Sp Trs, Third Army	7	2
2060 B5	Field Int Det	4	3
2060 B6	Enemy Doc Sec	8	2
2060 B7	Escape & Envasion Units	11	2
2060 B8	OSS/Secret Int Det	22	12
2060 B9	OSS/Sp C I Det	10	4
2060 B10	Publicity & Psych Warfare Sec	51	0
2062 B1	IPW Teams (4) (#2, #7)	24	12
2062 B2	CB Units #1	3	1

Not Yet assigned to Army
* Colored Personnel

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 3 - Troop Priority List

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
2062 B3	MII Teams (#403 & 406)	12	6
2062 B4	"ZY" Det, 21st Wea Sq)	26	8
2062 B5	"ZY" Det, 40th Mbl Comm Sq)		
2062 B6	CIC Det #30 (Prov)	32	24
2062 B7	Sp Ln Unit	17	8
2062 B8	PRO (2d Serv Gp, Hq Plat & 2d Army Gp, Com Plat. 72d Publicity Serv Bn)	22	
2062 B9	Sp Opns Det (OSS))	62	25
2062 B10	Sig Det (OSS))		
2062 B11	PI Teams #37, #41, #49		
2070 B2	Det, 652d Engr Topo Bn	12	6
2070 B1	168st Engr Survey Ln Det	14	1
2076 B	511th MP Bn (-Cos A, B, & C)	56	21
2068 B	Criminal Investigation Sq	11	3
2063 B	14th Ln Sq	143	30 and 32 Planes
2072 B	573d APU	12	1
2061 B	1092d Engr Utility Det	37	6
2076 B3	Det, 3457th Ord MAM Co	39	9
2058 B	502d QM Car Co (- 3d & 4th Plats)	67	46
2065 B	3597th QM Trk Co	115	104
2057 B	3805th QM Trk Co	115	104
2063 B2	Air Sup Control Sec	136	25
2064 B	*972d QM Serv Co	219	4
2066 B	166th Sig Photo Co (- Dets)	111	23
2074 B	Repl Bn (Sep)(w/4 Cos)	198	13
1432 B	6th Cav Sq, Mecz	774	240
1431 B	Hq/Hq Tr, 6th Cav Gp	68	22
1433 B	28th Cav Sq, Mecz	774	240
2073 B	11th Fin Disb Sec	20	0
2136 B	Hq/Hq Co, 1st TD Brig	69	18
2143 B	579th Sig Dep Co (- Det)	188	35
2147 B	101st Evac Hosp (400)(w/2 Surg teams atchd)	308	47
2154 B	179th Engr C Bn	664	126
2639 B	34th Sig Cons Bn	595	169
1965 B	#*3202d QM Serv Co	219	4
1966 B	3919th QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
1967 B	QM Rhd Co	184	8
	Total	8848	2135
	BREAK		
XV CORPS UNITS			
1285 B	8th Inf Div	14248	2140
1289 B	CA Stf Sec (8th Inf Div)	11	6
1365 B	Air Sup Py (8th Inf Div)	7	5
1366 B	Det, Int Spec (8th Inf Div)	35	19
1286 B	3d Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
1287 B	#250th QM Dep Co	194	8
1288 B	33d Med Dep Co (- Adv Sec)	112	15
	Total	14614	2196
	BREAK		
1362 B	445th AAA AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
1363 B	644th TD Bn Sp	671	164
1364 B	709th Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
1367 B	Hq/Hq Det, 150th Ord Bn (Am)	37	8
1368 B	626th Ord Am Co	186	20
1369 B	Hq/Hq Det, 178th Ord Bn (1st Prov Ord Gp)	37	15
1370 B	104th Evac Hosp, Sem (400) (w/2 Surg teams atchd)	308	47
1371 B	432d Med Coll Co	105	20
1372 B	587th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
1373 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
1374 B	1st Plat, 3043d QM Gr Reg Co	23	4
1375 B	574th QM Rhd Co	184	8
1376 B	*4050th QM Trk Co	115	104
1377 B	*3910th QM Trk Co	115	104
1378 B	471st Ord Evac Co	185	79
1379 B	16th Ord MM Co	169	89
1380 B	Hq/Hq Det, 10th Ord Bn	37	20
1381 B 1	Fwd Echn, Hq/Hq Co, XV Corps	242	24
1381 B 2	CA Stf Sec (XV Corps)	7	4
1382 B	92d Sig Bn (- Det)	466	122
1383 B	3253d Sig Serv Co (RI)	129	35
1384 B	217th MP Co (- Det)	85	19

Must be relieved from atchmt to XV Corps
* Colored Personnel

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
1385 B	136th QM Trk Co (- Det)	58	52
1386 B	2d Plat, 506th QM Car Co (- Det)	18	11
1387 B 1	Det, Int Spec (XV Corps Hq)	93	47
1387 B 2	"FF" Det, 21st Wea Sq)	26	8
1387 B 3	"FF" Det, 40th Mbl Com Sq)		
1434 B	Air Sup Py (XV Corps)	7	5
	Total	5104	1468
	BREAK		
1435 B	650th Med Clr Co	117	19
1436 B			
1439 B			
1440 B			
1441 B			
	Total	117	19
	BREAK		
1485 B	35th Inf Div	14248	2140
1486 B	4th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
1487 B			
1488 B	CA Stf Sec (35th Inf Div)	11	6
1489 B			
	Total	14266	2149
	BREAK		
1524 B	654th TD Bn, SP	671	164
1525 B	737th Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
1526 B	Air Sup Py (35th Inf Div)	7	5
1527 B	Det, Int Spec (35th Inf Div)	35	19
1528 B	599th Ord Am Co	186	20
1529 B	*592d Ord Am Co	186	20
1530 B	32d Evac Hosp, Sem (400) (w/2 Surg Teams Atchd)	308	47
1531 B	494th Med Coll Co	105	20
1532 B	2d Plat, 3043d QM Gr Reg Co	23	4
1533 B	548th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
1534 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
1535 B	*3909th QM Trk Co	115	104
1536 B	*3908th QM Trk Co	115	104
1537 B	3918th QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
1538 B	128th Ord MM Co	169	89
1539 B	837th Ord Dep Co	186	108
1540 B	4th Armd Div (- Dets)	5631	1350
1541 B	5th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
1542 B			
1543 B	CA Stf Sec (4th Armd Div)	8	6
1544 B			
	Total	8862	2365
	BREAK		
1593 B	4th Armd Div (remainder)	5631	1349
1594 B	489th AAA AW Bn, SP	711	147
1595 B	704th TD Bn, Sp	671	164
1596 B	Air Sup Py (4th Armd Div)	7	5
1597 B	Det, Int Spec (4th Armd Div)	35	19
1598 B	194th QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
1599 B	*588th Ord Am Co	186	20
1600 B	3d Plat, 3043d QM Gr Reg Co	23	4
1601 B	3804th QM Trk Co	115	104
1602 B	*444th QM Tr T Co	115	104
1603 B	984th Ord Dep Co	186	108
1604 B	472d Ord Evac Co	185	37
	Total	7993	2111
	BREAK		
1680 B	47th Ord MM Co	169	89
1681 B	103d Evac Hosp (400) (w/2 Surg teams atchd)	308	47
1682 B	Hq/Hq Det, 436th Med Bn	29	8
1683 B	495th Med Coll Co	105	20
1684 B	*591st Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
1685 B	139th APU	12	1

* Colored Personnel.

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
1686 B	*569th Ord Am Co	186	20
1687 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
1688 B	552d Ord HM Co (Tk)	219	91
1689 B	5th Inf Div (- Det)	7124	1070
1812 B	Air Sup Py (5th Inf Div)	7	5
1813 B	Det, Int Spec (5th Inf Div)	35	19
1690 B	6th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
1691 B			
1692 B	CA Stf Sec (5th Inf Div)	11	6
1693 B			
	Total	8113	1120
	BREAK		
1752 B	5th Inf Div (remainder)	7124	1040
1753 B			
1754 B			
1755 B			
1756 B			
	Total	7124	1040
	BREAK		
1810 B	818th TD Bn, SP	671	164
1811 B	735th Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
1814 B	107th Evac Hosp, Sem (400) (w/2 Surg teams atchd)	308	47
1815 B	575th Ord Am Co	186	10
1816 B	496th Med Coll Co	105	20
1817 B	593d Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
1818 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
1819 B	*442d QM Tr T Co	115	104
1820 B	*443d QM Tr T Co	115	104
1821 B	(T)Hq/Hq Det, 3d QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
1822 B	QM Rhd Co	184	8
1823 B	54th Field Hosp (w/2 Surg teams, 1 Orth team, 1 Neuro, 1 Thoracic, 1 Shock, 1 Max Fac and 1 Gas team)	273	32
1824 B	Hq/Hq Det, 55th Med Bn	29	8
1825 B	Hq/Hq Co, 11th Armd Gp	101	26
1826 B	Rear Echn, Hq/Hq Co, XV Corps	243	23
1827 B	Det, 92d Sig Bn	466	127
1828 B	4th MRU Type "T"	42	9
1829 B	Det, 217th MP Co	76	9
1830 B	578th APU	12	1
1831 B	45th Fin Disb Sec	20	
1832 B	3043d QM Gr Reg Co (- 3 Plats)	61	7
1833 B	Det, 136th QM Trk Co	57	52
1834 B	Det, 2d Plat, 506th QM Car Co	17	11
1835 B	666th Engr Topo Co, Corps	115	25
1836 B	#B Co, 6902d ECA Regt	216	65
1837 B	Repl Bn (Sep) (w/4 Cos)	198	13
1838 B			
1839 B	5th Plat, 187th Sig Rep Co	31	6
1840 B			
1841 B			
	Total	4650	1130
	BREAK		
1894 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 23d AAA Gp	67	14
1895 B			
1896 B	546th AAA, AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
1897 B	299th Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	36
1898 B	Hq/Hq Btry, XV Corps Arty	116	29
1899 B	3d FA Obsn Bn	505	122
1900 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 208th FA Gp	99	28
1901 B	974th FA Bn (155-mm How) (Trk or Trac)	539	133
1902 B	975th FA Bn (155-mm How) (Trk or Trac)	539	133

* Colored Personnel
(T) Transportation Unit
Must be relieved from attachment to XV Corps

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 3 - Troop Priority List

LIST INDEX NO		UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
1903 B		*999th FA Bn (8" How)(Trac)	589	118
1904 B		Hq/Hq Btry, 144th FA Gp	99	28
1905 B		731st FA Bn (155mm G) (Trk or Trac)	562	115
1906 B		208th FA Bn (155mm G) (Trk or Trac)	562	115
1907 B		989th FA Bn (155mm G) (Trk or Trac)	562	115
1908 B		Hq/Hq Det, 79th Ord Bn	37	20
1909 B		351th Ord MAM Co	120	88
1910 B		3515th Ord MAM Co	120	88
1911 B		89th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	2
1912 B		Hq/Hq Det, 14th Ord Bn	37	20
1913 B		Hq/Hq Det, 314th Ord Bn	37	20
1914 B				
1915 B				
1916 B				
1917 B				
		Total	3579	1131
		BREAK		
1962 B	(T)	*Hq/Hq Det, 176th QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
1963 B		*4049th QM Trk Co	115	104
1964 B		39th Fin Disb Sec	20	
1968 B	(Q)	*Hq/Hq Det, 91st QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
1969 B		501st Ord HM Co (Tk)	219	91
1970 B		256th Ord MM Co	169	89
1971 B		Hq/Hq Det, 65th Med Gp	34	7
1972 B		Hq/Hq Det, 437th Med Bn	29	8
1973 B		647th Med Clr Co	117	19
1974 B		431st Med Coll Co	105	20
1975 B		Hq/Hq Co, 1101st Engr C Gp	85	24
1976 B		202d Engr C Bn	664	126
1977 B		133d Engr C Bn	664	126
1978 B		35th Engr C Bn	664	126
1979 B		160th Engr C Bn	664	126
1980 B		168th Engr C Bn	664	126
1981 B		608th Engr L Equip Co	123	70
1982 B		970th Engr Maint Co	200	70
1983 B		513th Engr L Pon Co	203	135
1984 B		998th Engr Trdwy Br Co	144	84
1985 B				
1986 B		Mob Broadcasting Co	165	29
1987 B				
1988 B				
		Total	5102	1394
		Grand Total XV Corps	90702	18858
		Cumulative Total	128817	27074
		BREAK		
ARMY UNITS				
2067 B		48th Field Hosp (w/2 Surg teams, 2 Ortho teams, 1 Neruo Surg team, 1 Thoracic, 2 Shock, 1 Max Fac and 2 Gas teams atchd)	286	30
2069 B		QM Rhd Co	184	8
2071 B		118th Sig Rad Int Co (- Det)	288	83
2075 B		648th Med Clr Co	117	19
2135 B		521st Ord HM Co (FA)	198	33
2137 B		204th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
2138 B		965th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
2139 B		770th FA Bn (4.5" G)(Trac)	539	133
2140 B		Hq/Hq Btry, 196th FA Gp	99	28
2141 B		687th FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
2142 B		557th FA Bn (155mm G)(SP)	506	112
2144 B		464th Ord Evac Co	185	37
2146 B		32d Ord MM Co	169	89
2148 B		437th Med Coll Co	105	20
2149 B		32d Med Dep Co (- Adv Sec)	112	15

* Colored Personnel.
(T) Transportation Unit.
(Q) Quartermaster Unit.

LIST INDEX NO		UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
2150 B		344th Ord Dep Co	186	28
2151 B		57th Cml Maint Co	123	11
2152 B		61st Cml Dep Co	184	16
2133 B		Hq/Hq Co, 5th TD Gp	74	23
2132 B		23d Hq/Hq Det, Sp Trs (- Adv Det)	628	204
		Total	5565	1281
		BREAK		
2160 B		QM Traf Reg Gp (14 Hwy Secs)	374	38
2161 B		Hq/Hq Det, 66th Ord Bn	37	13
2163 B		Hq/Hq Co, 1107th Engr C Gp	85	24
2164 B		Engr Dp Trk Co	114	50
2165 B		529th Engr L Pon Co	203	135
2167 B		623d Med Clr Co	117	19
2268 B		Hq/Hq Btry, 38th AAA Brig (w/147th AAA Opns Det Atchd)	118	28
2168 B		90th Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	3
2169 B		771st FA Bn (4.5" G)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
2170 B		Hq/Hq Btry, 202d FA Gp	99	28
2171 B		994th Engr Trdwy Br Co	144	84
2172 B		Hq/Hq Det, Ord Gp	37	15
2173 B		Hq/Hq Det, 317th Ord Bn (2d Prov Ord Gp)	37	13
2174 B		Hq/Hq Det, 170th Med Bn	29	8
2175 B		610th Med Clr Co	117	19
2176 B		585th Med Amb Co	93	37
2177 B		179th APU	12	1
2178 B		Cml Bn, Mtz	622	308
2179 B		566th Med Clr Co	117	19
2180 B		Hq/Hq Det, 64th Med Gp	34	7
2181 B				
2182 B				
		Total	2935	982
		BREAK		
2255 B				
2256 B				
2257 B		165th Engr C Bn	664	126
2258 B		214th FA Bn (155mm G)(Trk or Trac)	562	115
2259 B		550th Ord HM Co (FA)	198	45
2260 B		3524th Ord MAM Co	120	44
2272 B		Ord HM Co (FA)	198	45
2262 B		Engr C Bn	664	126
2263 B		632d Engr L Equip Co	123	70
2264 B		Engr Dp Trk Co	114	50
2265 B		509th Engr L Pon Co	203	135
2266 B		3482d Ord MAM Co	120	44
4185 B		705th TD Bn, SP	671	164
2269 B		Hq/Hq Co, Rpl Dep	200	11
2270 B		Rpl Bn (Fxd)	175	10
2271 B		Rpl Bn (Fxd)	175	10
2273 B				
2274 B				
2275 B				
		Total	4187	995
		BREAK		
2326 B		Hq/Hq Btry, 27th AAA Gp	67	14
2327 B		"A June" AAA AW Bn, Mbl	819	207
2329 B		107th Sig Rep Co (-4 Plats)	58	10
2330 B		78th Fin Disb Sec	20	
2331 B		528th Engr L Pon Co	203	135
2332 B		182d Ord Dep Co	186	47
2333 B		"A June" AAA AW Bn, (SP)	711	147
2334 B		147th APU	12	1
2335 B		88th Fin Disb Sec	20	
2336 B		Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	39
2337 B		Engr C Bn	664	126
2338 B		652d Engr Topo Bn (- Det)	436	91
2164 B		"B June" AAA AW Bn (SP)	711	147
2339 B		Hq/Hq Co, 1117th Engr C Gp	85	24
2340 B		Engr C Bn	664	126
2341 B				
2342 B				
2343 B				
2344 B				
		Total	4819	1141

LIST INDEX NO		UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
		BREAK		
2383 B		733d FA Bn (155mm G)(Trk or Trac)	562	115
2384 B		Engr C Bn	664	126
2385 B		Engr L Equip Co	123	70
2386 B		Engr Maint Co	200	70
2387 B		3208th QM Serv Co	219	4
2388 B		53d Field Hosp (w/8 Surg Teams, 2 Ortho Teams, 1 Neuro Surg Team atchd)	280	28
2389 B		Engr Dp Trk Co	114	50
2390 B		MP PW Proc Co	121	14
2392 B		*3966th QM Trk Co	115	104
2391 B		*Hq/Hq Det, 273d QM Bn	28	3
2393 B				
		Total	2426	581
		BREAK		
2465 B		*3968th QM Trk Co	115	104
2466 B		3326th QM Trk Co	115	104
2467 B		QM Gr Reg Co	130	19
2468 B		Hq/Hq Det, 193d Ord Bn	37	13
2469 B		902d Ord HAM Co	211	46
2470 B		Engr C Bn	664	126
2480 B		QM Rhd Co	184	8
2471 B		15th Ord MM Co	169	48
2472 B		3532d Ord MAM Co	120	44
4085 B	(Q)	Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
2473 B		Hq/Hq Det, 496th QM Bn	28	3
2474 B		QM Serv Co	219	4
2475 B		3920th QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
2476 B		3934d QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
2477 B		Hq/Hq Co, 1134th Engr C Gp	85	24
2478 B		Engr C Bn	664	126
2479 B		Engr L Pon Co	203	135
2481 B				
2482 B				
2483 B				
		Total	3227	911
		BREAK		
2520 B		459th Engr Dep Co	218	24
2521 B		Engr Maint Co	200	70
2522 B		"C June" AAA AW Bn (SP)	711	147
2523 B		Sig Crystal Grind Team	4	2
2524 B		Sig Crystal Grind Team	4	2
2525 B		Sig EEIS Unit	11	3
2526 B		Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn	28	3
2527 B		*3209th QM Serv Co	219	4
2528 B		3234th QM Serv Co	219	4
4309 B		QM Serv Co	219	4
2529 B		577th APU	12	1
2542 B		Ord MAM Co	120	44
2531 B		100th Evac Hosp, Sem (400)w/2 Surg Teams Atchd)	308	47
2532 B		*3327th QM Trk Co	115	104
2533 B		*3203d QM Serv Co	219	4
2534 B		@202d FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
2535 B		@961st FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
2536 B		1277th Engr C Bn	664	126
2537 B		993d Engr Trdwy Br Co	144	84
2538 B		*4051st QM Trk Co	115	104
2539 B				
2540 B				
2541 B				
		Total	4608	1043
		BREAK		

* Colored Personnel
@ Now attached to XV Corps for training only
(Q) Quartermaster Unit

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 3 - Troop Priority List

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
2586 B	Hq/Hq Co, Engr C Gp	85	24
2587 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2588 B	*382d QM Trk Co	115	104
2589 B	87th Engr Hv Pon Bn	396	198
2590 B	39th Evac Hosp, Sem (400) w/2 Surg Team Atchd)	308	45
2591 B	@Hq/Hq Btry, 40th FA Gp	99	28
2592 B	@400th Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
2593 B	253d Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
2594 B	274th Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
2595 B		—	—
2596 B		—	—
2597 B		—	—
2598 B		—	—
	Total	3302	1011
	BREAK		
2637 B	Engr L Equip Co	123	70
2638 B	Engr Maint Co	200	70
2640 B	7th Med Lab Co	58	9
4267 B	QM Salv Coll Co	209	25
3822 B	Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn	28	3
2642 B	102d Evac Hosp, Sem (400)	296	45
2643 B	30th Field Hosp (w/2 Surg Teams, 1 Ortho Team, 1 Neuro, 1 Thoracic, 1 Max Fac, 1 Shock, 1 Gas Team atchd)	273	28
2644 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2645 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2647 B	702d Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
2648 B	Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
2649 B		—	—
2650 B		—	—
2651 B		—	—
2652 B		—	—
	Total	4017	924
	BREAK		
2685 B	512th MP Bn	566	118
2686 B	Sig Crystal Grind Team	4	2
2687 B	Sig Crystal Grind Team	4	2
2688 B	Engr L Equip Co	123	70
2689 B	Hq/Hq Co, Engr C Gp	85	24
2690 B	Hq/Hq Det, 67th Med Gp	34	7
2691 B	Hq/Hq Det, 19th Ord Bn	37	13
2692 B	534th Ord HM Co (Tk)	210	50
2693 B	3446th Ord MAM Co	120	44
2694 B	293d Engr C Bn	664	126
2696 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2697 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2698 B		—	—
2699 B		—	—
	Total	3175	708
	BREAK		
2701 B	574th Ord Am Co	186	20
2702 B	853d Ord HAM Co	211	46
2703 B	Hq/Hq Det, 312th Ord Bn	37	13
2704 B	985th Ord Dep Co	186	47
2705 B	275th Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	39
2706 B	(T)*Hq/Hq Det, 106th QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
2707 B	*3510th QM Trk Co	115	104
2708 B	3511th QM Trk Co	115	104
2709 B	QM Trk Co	115	104
2710 B		—	—
2711 B		—	—
	Total	1155	484
	BREAK		
2771 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2772 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2773 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
2799 B	QM Rhd Co	184	8
2774 B	109th Evac Hosp, Sem (400)	296	45

* Colored Personnel
(T) Transportation Unit

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
2775 B	Hq/Hq Det, 173d Med Bn	2	8
2776 B	428th Med Coll Co	105	20
2777 B	462d Med Coll Co	105	20
2778 B	691st TD Bn, T	797	200
2779 B	584th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
2780 B	4th Aux Surg Gp (- Surg teams)	96	20
2781 B	106th Evac Hosp, Sem (400)	296	45
2782 B	60th Field Hosp	230	23
2783 B	*588th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
2784 B	659th Med Clr Co	117	19
2785 B	91st Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	3
2786 B	*445th QM Tr T Co	115	104
2787 B	Rr Echn, Hq/Hq Det, Third Army	462	21
2788 B	Rr Echn, Hq Co, Third Army	115	10
2789 B	Rr Echn, Sp Trs, Third Army	19	2
2790 B 1	#Hq/Hq Det, 6902d ECA Regt	113	36
2790 B 2	#2d Plat, 6905th ECA Transport Co	76	39
2790 B 3	#Co I, 6902d ECA Regt	216	65
2791 B	3d Plat, 502d QM Car Co	35	22
2792 B	4th Plat, 502d QM Car Co	35	22
2793 B	APU	12	1
2794 B	MII Team	6	3
2795 B	CIC Dets (2)	32	24
2796 B	3457th Ord HAM Co (- Det)	81	35
2797 B	APU	12	1
2798 B	71st Fin Disb Sec	20	0
	Total	4363	948
	BREAK		
2802 B	MP Bn	566	118
2803 B	39th MRU, Type "2"	59	12
2804 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2805 B	8th Conv Hosp	223	18
2806 B	*Hq/Hq Det, 514th QM Gp	32	9
2807 B		—	—
2808 B		—	—
2809 B		—	—
2810 B		—	—
3613 B	Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn	28	3
	Total	1127	164
	BREAK		
2854 B	*3345th QM Trk Co	115	104
2855 B	*3965th QM Trk Co	115	104
3995 B	(Q)Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
4037 B	(T)Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
2856 B	3709th QM Trk Co	115	104
2857 B	Hq/Hq Det, 563d QM Bn	28	3
2858 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2859 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2860 B	Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
2861 B	*620th Ord Am Co	186	20
2862 B	*583d Ord Am Co	186	20
2863 B	Hq/Hq Det, 26th Ord Bn	37	13
2864 B	3450th Ord MAM Co	120	44
2865 B	889th Ord HAM Co	211	46
2867 B	184th Ord Dep Co	186	47
2868 B	Hq/Hq Det, 41st Ord Bn (Am)	37	13
2869 B	Fin Disb Sec	20	
2870 B	APU	12	1
2871 B	570th Ord Am Co	186	20
2872 B	*573d Ord Am Co	186	20
2873 B	*3967th QM Trk Co	115	104
2874 B	131st QM Trk Co	115	104
2875 B	*Hq/Hq Det, 559th QM Bn	28	3
2876 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
2889 B	QM Salv Coll Co	209	25
2877 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2878 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
2879 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
2880 B	Hq/Hq Det, QM Gp	32	9
3231 B	900th QM Ldry Co	273	36
3440 B	QM Ldry Co	273	36
2881 B	Engr Dep Co	218	24

* Colored Personnel
# Not yet assigned to Army
(Q) Quartermaster Unit
(T) Transportation Unit

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
2882 B	*1511th Engr W Sup Co	141	30
2883 B	Hq/Hq Det, 66th Med Gp	34	7
2884 B	Hq/Hq Det, 172d Med Bn	29	8
2885 B	3445th Ord MAM Co	120	44
2886 B	433d Med Coll Co	105	20
2887 B	434th Med Coll Co	105	20
2888 B	*590th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
2890 B		—	—
2891 B		—	—
2892 B		—	—
	Total	4843	1223
	BREAK		
2991 B	Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	39
2992 B	Hq/Hq Co, Engr C Gp	85	24
2993 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2994 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
2995 B	Fin Disb Sec	20	
2996 B	Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn	28	3
2997 B	*3907th QM Trk Co	115	104
2998 B	APU	12	1
2999 B	180th Engr Hv Pon Bn	396	198
3000 B	Engr Maint Co	200	70
3001 B	*3905th QM Trk Co	115	104
3003 B		—	—
3004 B		—	—
3005 B		—	—
	Total	2462	795
	GRAND TOTAL - THIRD ARMY REAR ECH	52207	13167
	CUMULATIVE TOTAL	181024	40241
	BREAK		
XX CORPS UNITS			
3030 B	69th Sig Bn	932	219
3031 B	Fwd Echn, Hq/Hq Co, XX Corps	251	29
3033 B	PWI Teams (3)(#53, #57)	18	9
3034 B	OB Unit #18	3	1
3035 B	MII Teams (2) (#433)	12	6
3036 B	PI Teams (4) (#50)	24	12
3037 B1	"YD" Det, 21st Wea Sq)	26	8
3037 B2	"YD" Det, 40th Mob Com Sq)		
3038 B	CIC Det #28	16	12
3039 B	Det, 4th Plat, 122d QM Car Co	18	11
3040 B	Air Sup Py (XX Corps)	8	5
3570 B	3802d QM Trk Co	115	104
3041 B	Co B, 511th MP Bn	170	32
3043 B	Hq/Hq Btry, XX Corps Arty	116	29
3044 B	7th FA Obsn Bn	505	122
3045 B	3256th Sig Serv Co (RI)	129	35
3046 B	664th Engr Topo Co, Corps	115	25
3047 B	Ord Bomb Disp Sq	7	3
3048 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 112th AAA Gp	67	14
3049 B	6th Armd Div (Leading Elements)	2466	595
3050 B		—	—
3051 B		—	—
3052 B		—	—
3053 B		—	—
	Total	4958	1301
	BREAK		
3085 B	6th Armd Div (Cont'd)	4587	1100
	BREAK		
3116 B	6th Armd Div, Remainder	4223	1011
3118 B	PWI Teams (2)	12	6
3119 B	OB Unit	3	1
3120 B	MII Team	6	3
3121 B	PI Team	6	3
3122 B	CIC Det #7	8	6
3123 B	Air Sup Py (6th Armd Div)	8	5
3124 B		—	—
3125 B		—	—
3126 B		—	—
3127 B		—	—
	Total	8853	2135

* Colored Personnel.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 3 - Troop Priority List

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
	BREAK		
3160 B	603d TD Bn, SP	671	164
3161 B	Hq/Hq Co, 4th TD Gp	74	23
3162 B	774th TD Bn, T	797	200
3163 B	825th TD Bn, T	797	200
3164 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
3165 B	465th Ord Evac Co	185	55
3166 B	7th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
3167 B	4th Plat, 187th Sig Rep Co	33	9
3176 B	Ord HM Co (Tk)	210	50
3169 B	3508th Ord MAM Co	120	44
3170 B	(T) Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
3171 B	3803d QM Trk Co	115	104
3172 B	Cml Bn, Mtz	622	308
3173 B		—	—
3174 B		—	—
3175 B		—	—
	Total	3796	1171
	BREAK		
3203 B	*3911th QM Trk Co	115	104
3204 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
3600 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
3205 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
3206 B	955th QM Serv Co	219	4
3207 B	Repl Bn (Sep)(w/4 Co)	198	13
3002 B	QM Gr Reg Co	130	19
3208 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
4210 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
4311 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
3209 B			
3210 B		—	—
3211 B	#C Co, 6902d ECA Regt	216	65
3213 B	Hq/Hq Det, 168th Med Bn	29	8
3214 B	573d Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
3215 B	595th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
3216 B	(Q) Hq/Hq Det, QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
3218 B	Hq/Hq Det, 171st Med Bn	29	8
3219 B	614th Med Clr Co	117	19
3220 B	439th Med Coll Co	105	20
3221 B	461st Med Coll Co	105	20
3222 B	QM Fum & Bath Co	88	14
3223 B	QM Bkry Co	168	4
3224 B	QM Bkry Co	168	4
3225 B	Field Hosp	230	23
3226 B	Hq/Hq Co, Engr C Gp	85	24
3227 B	990th Engr Trdwy Br Co	144	84
3228 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
3229 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
3230 B	Engr L Equip Co	123	70
3232 B		—	—
3233 B		—	—
3234 B		—	—
	Total	4822	998
	BREAK		
3252 B	88th Engr Hv Pon Bn	396	198
3253 B	@ Hq/Hq Btry, 173d FA Gp	99	28
3254 B	83d Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
3255 B	695th Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
3256 B	696th Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
3257 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 5th FA Gp	99	28
3258 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
3260 B	@ 182d FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3261 B	177th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3262 B			
3263 B		—	—
3264 B		—	—
3265 B		—	—
	Total	3971	1132
	BREAK		
3316 B	Hq/Hq Det, 316th Ord Bn	37	13
3317 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 33d FA Brig	103	22
3318 B	FA Obsn Bn	505	122
3319 B	250th FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3320 B	@ 693d FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3321 B	76th FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3322 B	Ord HM Co (FA)	198	45
3323 B	Cml Maint Co	123	11
3324 B	Cml Dep Co	184	16
3325 B	116th Ord MM Co	169	48
3326 B		—	—
3327 B		—	—
	Total	2831	655
	BREAK		
3330 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 193d FA Gp	99	28
3331 B	FA Bn (155mm G)(SP)	506	112
3332 B	FA Bn (155mm G)(SP)	506	112
3333 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 195th FA Gp	99	28
3334 B	179th FA Bn (155mm How) (Trk or Trac)	539	133
3335 B		—	—
3336 B		—	—
3337 B		—	—
3338 B		—	—
	Total	1749	413
	BREAK		
3377 B	945th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3378 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
3379 B	Hq/Hq Co, 7th TD Gp	74	23
3380 B	610th TD Bn, T	797	200
3381 B	TD Bn, T	797	200
3382 B	28th Inf Div (Leading Elements)	3077	467
3383 B		—	—
3384 B		—	—
3385 B		—	—
3386 B		—	—
	Total	5416	1027
	BREAK		
3406 B	28th Inf Div (Cont'd)	7427	1100
	BREAK		
3428 B	28th Inf Div, Remainder	3758	580
3430 B	PWI Teams (2)	12	6
3431 B	CB Units	3	1
3432 B	MII Teams	6	3
3433 B	PI Team	6	3
3434 B	CIC Det, #14	8	6
3435 B	Air Sup Py (28th Inf Div)	8	5
3436 B	630th TD Bn, T	797	200
3437 B	707th Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
3438 B	8th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
3439 B	108th Evac Hosp (400)	296	45
3441 B		—	—
3442 B		—	—
3443 B		—	—
3444 B		—	—
	Total	13079	2163
	BREAK		
3470 B	*3906th QM Trk Co	115	104
3471 B	*3912th QM Trk Co	115	104
3472 B	MP Esc Gd Co	138	4
3473 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 182d FA Gp	99	28
3474 B	943d FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3475 B	949th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3476 B	734th FA Bn (155mm G)(Trk or Trac)	562	115
3477 B	Mr Esch, Hq/Hq Co, XX Corps	243	23
3478 B	4th Plat, 122d QM Car Co (-Det)	17	11
3480 B	Hq/Hq Btry, FA Gp	99	28
3485 B	Ord Dep Co	186	47
3482 B	FA Bn (8" How)(Trk or Trac)	589	118
3483 B	FA Bn (8" How)(Trk or Trac)	589	118
3484 B	FA Bn (8" How)(Trk or Trac)	589	118
3486 B			
3487 B		—	—
3488 B		—	—
	Total	4419	1084
	BREAK		
3519 B	269th FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
3520 B	19th Fin Disb Sec	20	
3521 B	50th APU	12	1
3522 B	26th Ord MM Co	169	48
3523 B	3510th Ord MAM Co	120	44
3524 B	Hq/Hq Co Engr C Gp	85	24
3525 B	Engr L Pon Co	203	135
3526 B	Engr L Pon Co	203	135
3527 B	Engr L Pon Co	203	135
3528 B	551st Engr Hv Pon Bn	396	198
3530 B	270th FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
3531 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 402d FA Gp	99	28
3532 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
3533 B			
3534 B		—	—
3535 B		—	—
3536 B		—	—
	Total	3154	1116
	BREAK		
3559 B	FA Bn (155mm G)(Trk or Trac)	562	115
3560 B	FA Bn (155mm G)(Trk or Trac)	562	115
3561 B	FA Bn (8" G)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
3562 B	FA Bn (8" G)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
3563 B	598th Ord Am Co	186	20
3564 B	Ord Am Co	186	20
3565 B	QM Serv	219	4
3566 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
3567 B	Engr C Bn	664	126
3568 B	*1145th QM Tr T Co	115	104
3569 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
3571 B	*647th QM Tr T Co	115	104
3572 B			
3573 B		—	—
3574 B		—	—
3575 B		—	—
	Total	4472	980
	BREAK		
3601 B	TD Bn, T	797	200
3602 B	TD Bn, SP	671	164
3603 B	3519th Ord MAM Co	120	44
3604 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
3605 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
3606 B	Hq/Hq Det, QM Gp	32	9
3607 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
3873 B	QM Ldry Co	273	36
4297 B	QM Ldry Co	273	36
3608 B	QM Fum & Bath Co	88	14
3609 B	12th Evac Hosp (750)	409	7
3610 B	38th MRU, Type "Y"	42	9
3611 B	163d APU	12	1
3612 B	66th Fin Disb Sec	20	
3614 B			
3615 B		—	—
3616 B	Hq/Hq Co, Engr C Gp	85	24
3617 B	553d Engr Hv Pon Bn	396	198

*Colored Personnel.
(T) Transportation Unit.
Not yet assigned to Army.
(Q) Quartermaster Unit.
@ Now attached to XV Corps for training only.

* Colored Personnel.
@ Now attached to XV Corps for training only.

* Colored personnel

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 3 - Troop Priority List

LIST INDEX NO		UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
3618 B		———	—	—
3619 B		———	—	—
3620 B		———	—	—
3621 B		———	—	—
		Total	3784	800
		BREAK		
3645 B		Hq/Hq Det, 185th Ord Bn	37	13
3647 B		___Engr C Bn	664	126
3648 B		___Engr C Bn	664	126
3649 B		___Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	39
3650 B		904th Ord HAM Co	211	46
3651 B		3448th Ord MAM Co	120	44
3652 B		129th Ord MM Co	169	48
3653 B		482d Ord Evac Co	185	55
3654 B		Hq/Hq Det, 320th Ord Bn	37	13
3655 B		Hq/Hq Btry, ___FA Brig	103	22
3656 B		255th FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3657 B		___Engr C Bn	664	126
3658 B	(T)	Hq/Hq Det, ___QM Bn, Mbl	27	7
3659 B		___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3660 B		___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3661 B		___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
3662 B		———	—	—
3663 B		———	—	—
3664 B		———	—	—
3665 B		———	—	—
		Total	5060	1569
		BREAK		
3696 B		553d Ord HM Co (Tk)	198	50
3697 B		556th Ord HM Co (Tk)	198	50
3698 B		7th Armd Div (Leading Elements)	3659	881
3699 B		———	—	—
3700 B		———	—	—
3701 B		———	—	—
3702 B		———	—	—
		Total	4055	981
		BREAK		
3731 B		7th Armd Div (Continued)	4588	1100
		BREAK		
3751 B		7th Armd Div (Remainder)	3029	725
3753 B		PWI Teams (2)	12	6
3754 B		OB Units	3	1
3755 B		MII Team	6	3
3756 B		PI Team	6	3
3757 B		CIC Det	8	6
3758 B		Air Sup Py (7th Armd Div)	8	5
3759 B		602d TD Bn, SP	671	164
3760 B		9th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
3761 B		___Field Hosp	228	23
3762 B		Hq/Hq Det, 69th Med Gp	34	7
3763 B		Hq/Hq Det, 174th Med Bn	29	8
3764 B		435th Med Coll Co	105	20
3765 B		436th Med Coll Co	105	20
3766 B		580th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
3767 B		*589th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
3768 B		997th Engr Trdwy Br Co	144	84
3769 B		———	—	—
3770 B		———	—	—
3771 B		———	—	—
3772 B		———	—	—
		Total	9169	2252
		BREAK		
3789 B		Hq/Hq Co, 8th Armd Gp	101	26
3793 B		___Tk Bn (Comp)	751	211
3794 B		___M Tk Bn (Sp) (CDL)	768	164
3795 B		___M Tk Bn (Sp) (CDL)	768	164
3796 B		___M Tk Bn (Sp) (CDL)	768	164
3797 B		___M Tk Bn (Sp) (CDL)	768	164

(T) Transportation Unit
* Colored Personnel

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
3798 B	___M Tk Bn (Sp) (CDL)	768	164
3800 B	———	—	—
3801 B	———	—	—
3802 B	———	—	—
	Total	1692	1057
	BREAK		
3817 B	___M Tk Bn (Sp) (CDL)	768	164
	BREAK		
	Total	768	164
	Total XX Corps	89088	20998
	Cumulative Total - Third Army	270112	61239
XII CORPS UNITS			
3820 B	489th Ord Evac Co	185	55
3821 B	Ord HM Co (Tk)	198	50
3823 B	3801st QM Trk Co	115	104
3824 B	___QM Serv Co	219	4
3825 B	___QM Serv Co	219	4
3826 B	___QM Serv Co	219	4
3827 B	Hq/Hq Co, ___Engr C Gp	85	24
3828 B	93d Sig Bn	932	249
3829 B	Fwd Echn, Hq/Hq Co, XII Corps	251	29
3830 B			
3831 B	PWI Teams (3)(#10)	18	9
3832 B	OB Unit	3	1
3833 B	MII Teams (2)(#25)	12	6
3834 B	PI Teams (4)(#52)	24	12
3835 B 1	___Det, ___Wea Sq)	20	7
3835 B 2	___Det, ___Mbl Com Sq)		
3836 B	CIC Det	16	12
3837 B	Air Sup Py	8	5
4038 B	*4447th QM Tr T Co	115	104
3847 B	Plat, ___QM Car Co	34	23
3838 B	Co C, 511th MP Bn	170	32
3839 B	___Sig Rep Co (For FUSAG)	188	54
3840 B	___Sig Dep Co (For FUSAG)	191	30
4419 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 7th AAA Gp	67	14
4048 B	"B June" AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
3889 B	Hq/Hq Tr, ___Cav Gp, Mecz	72	22
3890 B	___Cav Sq, Mecz	774	240
3891 B	___Cav Sq, Mecz	774	240
3841 B	3d Plat, 187th Sig Rep Co	33	9
3842 B	___QM Salv Coll Co	209	25
3843 B	___QM Salv Rep Co	201	10
3844 B	———		
3845 B	D Co, 6902d EMA Regt	216	65
3846 B	———	—	—
	Total	6387	1662
	BREAK		
3871 B	3255th Sig Serv Co (RI)	129	35
3872 B	Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	3
3874 B	Hq/Hq Btry, 177th FA Gp	99	28
3875 B	Hq/Hq Btry, XII Corps Arty	116	29
3876 B	14th FA Obsn Bn	505	122
3877 B	689th FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3878 B	191st FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3879 B	___FA Bn (8" G)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
3880 B	___FA Bn (4.5" G)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
3881 B	*Hq/Hq Det, 65th Ord Am Bn	37	13
3882 B	___Ord Am Co	186	20
3883 B	___Ord Am Co	186	20
3884 B	___Engr L Equip Co	123	70
3885 B	___Engr C Bn	664	126
3886 B	104th Ord MM Co	169	48
3887 B	3447th Ord MAM Co	120	44
3888 B	———	—	—
	Total	4445	1078

* Colored personnel

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
	BREAK		
3913 B	#80th Inf Div (Leading Elements)	7338	1107
	BREAK		
3935 B	#80th Inf Div (Remainder)	6924	1040
	BREAK		
3961 B	PWI Teams (2)	12	6
3962 B	OB Unit	3	1
3963 B	MII Team	6	3
3964 B	PI Team	6	3
3965 B	CIC Det	8	6
3966 B	Air Sup Py (80th Inf Div)	8	5
3967 B	631st TD Bn, T	797	200
3969 B	10th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
3970 B	___Cml Bn, Mtz	622	308
3971 B	811st Ord Dep Co	186	47
3972 B	910th Ord HAM Co	211	46
3973 B	Hq/Hq Co. 9th TD Gp	74	23
3974 B	611th TD Bn, T	797	200
3975 B	———	—	—
3976 B	———	—	—
3977 B	———	—	—
3978 B	———	—	—
	Total	16999	2998
	BREAK		
3992 B	771st TD Bn, SP	671	164
3993 B	3d Fin Disb Sec	20	-
3994 B	162d APU	12	1
3996 B	*3201st QM Serv Co	219	4
3997 B	___QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
3998 B	___QM Fum & Bath Co	88	14
3212 B	___QM Ref Co	107	72
3999 B	___Engr C Bn	664	126
4000 B	Hq/Hq Det, 427th Med Bn	29	8
4001 B	586th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
4002 B	598th Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
4004 B	___FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
4005 B	___FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
4006 B	___FA Bn (155mm How)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
4007 B	___FA Bn (8" How)(Trk or Trac)	589	118
4008 B	3511th Ord MAM Co	120	44
4009 B	___Aux Surg Gp (- Dets)	212	33
4010 B	92d Med Gas Treat Bn	502	77
4011 B	———	—	—
4012 B	———	—	—
4013 B	———	—	—
4014 B	———	—	—
	Total	5164	1184
	BREAK		
4031 B	6th Conv Hosp	223	18
4032 B	___Engr W Sup Co	120	50
4033 B	___Engr Dep Co	218	24
4034 B	___Engr L Pon Co	203	135
4035 B	___QM Fum & Bath Co	88	12
4036 B	___QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
3527 B	___Engr Topo Co, Corps	115	25
4039 B	*4447th QM Tr T Co	115	104
4040 B	*612d QM Tr T Co	115	104
4042 B	APU	12	1
4043 B	Hq/Hq Btry, ___FA Gp	99	28
4044 B	___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
4045 B	___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
4046 B	___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
4047 B	___FA Bn (105mm How)(Trk)	504	126
4049 B	———	—	—

To be attchd to XII Corps
* Colored personnel

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
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LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
4050 B		—	—
4051 B		—	—
	Total	3432	1055
	BREAK		
4086 B	QM Bkry Co	168	4
4087 B	QM Bkry Co	168	4
4116 B	QM Ldry Co	273	36
4088 B	Plat, Sig Pgn Co	40	28
4089 B	Hq/Hq Det, 550th Ord Bn	37	13
4090 B	576th Ord Am Co	186	20
4091 B	293d Ord MM Co	169	48
4092 B	Ord MAM Co	120	44
4093 B	Hq/Hq Det, Ord Bn	37	13
4094 B	911th Ord HAM Co	211	46
4095 B	Ord Maint Co (AA)	163	39
4096 B	7th Ord MM Co	169	48
4097 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
4098 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
4099 B	QM Serv Co	219	4
4100 B	Hq/Hq Det, 34th Med Bn	29	8
4101 B	613th Med Clr Co	117	19
4102 B	383d Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
4103 B	Med Am Co, Mtr	93	37
4104 B	272d FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
4105 B	265th FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
4106 B	Plat, Sig Pgn Co	40	28
2641 B	QM Salv Rep Co	211	16
4115 B	838th Ord Dep Co	186	47
4107 B	Med Dep Co	178	15
4108 B	APU	12	1
4109 B	75th Fin Disb Sec	20	-
4110 B	267th FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
4111 B	Evac Hosp, (400)	296	45
4113 B	QM Sales Co	178	31
4114 B	Ord HAM Co	211	46
	Total	5532	1048
	BREAK		
4143 B	5th Armd Div (Leading Elements)	4269	1027
	BREAK		
4163 B	5th Armd Div (Continued)	4255	1020
	BREAK		
4177 B	5th Armd Div (Remainder)	2752	659
4179 B	PWI Teams (2)	12	6
4180 B	OB Unit	3	1
4181 B	MII Team	6	3
4182 B	PI Team	6	3
4183 B	CIC Det #6	8	6
4184 B	Air Sup Py (5th Armd Div)	8	5
4193 B	TD Bn (T)	797	200
4186 B	11th Det, 166th Sig Photo Co	7	3
4187 B	Hq/Hq Btry, FA Gp	99	28
4188 B	Hq/Hq Btry, FA Gp	99	28
4189 B	Hq/Hq Det, 37th Med Bn	29	8
4190 B		—	—
4191 B		—	—
4192 B		—	—
	Total	12350	2997
	BREAK		
4219 B	Engr Hv Pon Bn	396	198
4220 B	3076th Ord MVD Co	164	17
4221 B	Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
4222 B	Hq/Hq Btry, FA Gp	99	28
4223 B	Hq/Hq Btry, FA Gp	99	28
4224 B	Armd FA Bn (105mm How)	545	162
4225 B	FA Bn (4.5" G)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
4226 B	FA Bn (4.5" G)(Trk or Trac)	539	133

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
4227 B	FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
4228 B	FA Bn (240mm How)(Trk or Trac)	490	121
4229 B		—	—
4230 B		—	—
4231 B		—	—
4232 B		—	—
	Total	3906	1103
	BREAK		
4257 B	Hq/Hq Co, 6th TD Gp	74	23
4256 B	628th TD Bn (SP)	671	164
4257 B	773d TD Bn (SP)	671	164
4258 B	811th TD Bn (SP)	671	164
4259 B	911th Ord HAM Co	211	46
4271 B	81st Fin Disb Sec	20	-
4260 B	120th APU	12	1
4261 B	FA Bn (4.5"G)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
4262 B	FA Bn (4.5"G)(Trk or Trac)	539	133
4263 B	Hq/Hq Det, 240th Med Bn	29	8
4264 B	Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
4265 B	Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
4266 B	7th Conv Hosp	223	18
4268 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
4269 B		—	—
4270 B		—	—
	Total	3974	976
	BREAK		
4288 B	286th Ord MM Co	169	48
4289 B	3444th Ord MM Co	169	48
4290 B			
4291 B	Hr Sqn, Hq/Hq Co, XII Corps	243	23
4306 B	77th Fin Disb Sec	20	-
4293 B	44th MRU Type "Y"	42	9
4294 B	APU	12	1
4318 B	840th Ord Dep Co	186	47
4295 B	3463d Ord MM Co	169	48
4319 B	QM Sales Co	178	31
4296 B	QM Fum & Bath Co	88	14
4298 B	*1512th Engr W Sup Co	141	50
4299 B	Engr Trdwy Br Co	144	84
4300 B	Hq/Hq Det, Med Bn	29	8
4301 B	Med Amb Co, Mtr	93	37
4302 B	851st Ord HAM Co	211	46
4303 B	94th Med Gas Treat Bn	502	77
4304 B	95th Med Gas Treat Bn	502	77
4305 B			
4292 B	94th Fin Disb Sec	20	-
4307 B	Hq/Hq Det, Med Bn	29	8
4308 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
4418 B	45th Cml Lab Co	59	4
4314 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
2255 B	QM Bkry Co	168	4
2256 B	QM Bkry Co	168	4
3479 B	QM Salv Rep Co	201	16
4312 B	Sig Pgn Co (-2 Plats)	78	34
4313 B	J or SIAM Unit (Army, Corps & Div)	593	174
4315 B	QM Gas Sup Co	128	50
4316 B	Hq/Hq Co, 8th TD Gp	74	23
4317 B			
	Total	4572	1065
	BREAK		
4344 B	French 2d Armd Div (Leading Elements)	2,920	699
4345 B			
2695 B	7th Sig Con Ln Team	21	-
4347 B	Hq/Hq Co, 17th Armd Gp	101	26
	Total	3042	725
	BREAK		
4375 B	French 2d Armd Div (Continued)	4,171	1,000

* Colored personnel

LIST INDEX NO	UNITS IN CONTINUOUS PRIORITY	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
	BREAK		
4391 B	French 2d Armd Div (Continued)	4,171	1,000
	BREAK		
4416 B	French 2d Armd Div (Continued)	2,800	1,000
	BREAK		
4417 B	French 2d Armd Div (Remainder)	1,176	460
	Total Units XII Corps	82244	19353
	Grand Total TUSA	352,356	80,592

THIRD ARMY UNITS TO BE MOVED UNDER OTHER AUTHORITY

LIST INDEX NO	UNIT	PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
	Hq/Hq Tr, 2d Cav Gp	72	22
	2d Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)	774	240
	42d Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)	774	240
832 B 1	Hq/Hq Tr, 15th Cav Gp	72	22
832 B 2	15th Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)	774	240
	17th Cav Ron Sq (Mecz)	774	240
	Hq/Hq Btry, 244th AAA Gp	67	44
	Hq/Hq Btry, 207th AAA Gp	67	44
	438th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	448th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	449th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	452d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	453d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	457th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	550th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	554th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	633d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	819	207
	203d AAA AW Bn (SP)	711	147
	387th AAA AW Bn (SP)	711	147
	777th AAA AW Bn (SP)	711	147
	115th AAA G Bn (Mbl)	817	205
	120th AAA G Bn (Mbl)	817	205
	128th AAA G Bn (Mbl)	817	205
	217th AAA G Bn (Mbl)	817	205
	411th AAA G Bn (Mbl)	817	205
	90th Inf Div	14,286	2,191
400 B	79th Inf Div	14,286	2,191
404 B	Det, Int Specialists (79th Inf Div)	35	19
405 B	Air Support Py (79th Inf Div)	7	5
410 B	CA Staff Sec (79th Inf Div)	11	6
	Total	45,588	8,773

THIRD ARMY UNITS NOT IN PRIORITY LISTS

	114th Sig RI Co	291	84
	116th Sig RI Co	291	84
	121st Sig RI Co	291	84
	124th Sig RI Co	291	84
	129th Sig RI Co	291	84
	137th Sig RI Co	291	84
	510th MP Bn	566	118
	3103d Sig Serv Bn	734	197
	4th Armd Sig Bn	701	197
	Total	3,747	1,016

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 4 - Signal Plan

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: CEH
Date: 27 May 44
Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 4

to

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

SIGNAL PLAN

WITH APPENDICES (Issued Separately):-

Number	Title and Classification	Page Nos.
I	Existing Communication Facilities and Power Supply on the Continent. - BIGOT - TOP SECRET.	24
II	Diagram of Army Radio Nets. BIGOT - TOP SECRET	29
III	Line Route Maps. BIGOT - TOP SECRET	31
IV	Signal Intelligence Radio Nets. BIGOT - TOP SECRET	33
V	Signal Intelligence Circuit Diagram. BIGOT - TOP SECRET	34
VI	Wire Circuit Diagrams. BIGOT - TOP SECRET	34
VII	Procedure Publications Chart. TOP SECRET	36
VIII	Communication Zone Wire. BIGOT - TOP SECRET	36

(Revision 27 May 1944)

MAPS: FRANCE, GSGS 2738, Scale 1:250,000 and NORTHWEST EUROPE, GSGS 4042, Scale 1:250,000.

1. a. Existing communications and power supply on the continent. (See Appendix No. I)

b. Mission and general plan.

(1) Signal troops involved:

(a) The Army signal communication troops involved are as follows:

Unit	Personnel	Vehicles.
301st Signal Operation Battalion	662	166
33rd Signal Construction Battalion	595	169
34th Signal Construction Battalion	595	169
118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company	291	71
166th Signal Photographic Company	188	56
187th Signal Repair Company	188	54
579th Signal Depot Company	191	36
14th Air Liaison Squadron	143	30 (32 planes)
4th Mobile Broadcasting Company	165	29
7th Signal Center Liaison Team	21 (47)*	(13)* 0
1307th Signal Pigeon Company	158	90

(b) The following listed signal communication troops will be announced when numerical designations are made known to this headquarters.

Unit	Personnel	Vehicles.
____ SIAM Company	593	174
____ Signal Construction Battalion	595	169
____ Signal Operation Battalion	662	166
(3) Signal Direction Finding Teams	5 ea.	1 ea.
(4) Signal Crystal Grinding Teams	4 ea.	2 ea.
____ KMIS Signal Unit	11	3
____ OSS Signal Detachment	30	12
____ Signal Repair Company	188	54

* Pending Approval

Unit	Personnel	Vehicles.
____ Signal Depot Company	191	36

(c) Corps Signal Troops:

Unit	Personnel	Vehicles.
59th Signal Battalion (VIII Corps)	932	149
3254th Sig Serv Co (RI) (VIII Corps)	129	35
92nd Signal Battalion (XV Corps)	932	149
3253rd Sig Serv Co (RI) (XV Corps)	129	35
69th Signal Battalion (XX Corps)	932	149
3256th Sig Serv Co (RI) (XX Corps)	129	35
93rd Signal Battalion (XII Corps)	932	149
3255th Sig Serv Co (RI) (XII Corps)	129	35

(d) Division Signal Troops:

Unit	Personnel	Vehicles.
79th Signal Company (79 Div)	249	74
83rd Signal Company (83 Div)	249	74
8th Signal Company (8 Div)	249	74
35th Signal Company (35 Div)	249	74
144th Armd Signal Company (4 Armd Div)	302	59
5th Signal Company (5 Div)	249	74
146th Armd Signal Company (6 Armd Div)	302	59
28th Signal Company (28 Div)	249	74
147th Armd Signal Company (7 Armd Div)	302	59
80th Signal Company (80 Div)	249	74
145th Armd Signal Company (5 Armd Div)	302	59
90th Signal Company (90 Div)	249	74
____ Signal Company (2nd Fr Armd Div)	___	___

(2) Command Posts of principal units in the United Kingdom are as follows:

Unit	Location	Coordinate	APO	Telephone
Third Army	Peover Camp	VK2397	403	LUCKY
VIII Corps	Marbury Hall	K1297	308	MONARCH
XII Corps	Bewdley	P2396	312	ICEBERG
XV Corps	Adderbury	P9255	436	HICKORY
XX Corps	Marlborough	U6389	340	COMET
5th Inf Div	Bryansford, NI	J3432	5	DYNAMITE
8th Inf Div	Vic Omagh, NI	H4774	8	GRANITE
35th Inf Div	Okehampton	T0215	35	JUSTICE
79th Inf Div	Sandiway	K0791	79	BISHOP
80th Inf Div				
83rd Inf Div	Newcastle under Lyme	K2765	83	BLACKSTONE
90th Inf Div	Birmingham	K5308	90	UNICORN
28th Inf Div	Chiselton	U6399	28	HOLIDAY
4th Armd Div	Chippenham	U3694	254	OLYMPIC
5th Armd Div	Ogbourne St. George	U6994	255	VOLCANO
6th Armd Div	Blockley	P6254	256	BAMBOO
7th Armd Div	Kington	07376	257	WORKSHOP
2nd Armd Div (Fr)	South Dalton	WA4365		

Changes in location of command posts, both in the United Kingdom and on the continent will be reported to the Signal Officer, this headquarters, by the fastest available means.

(3) Communications in the United Kingdom:

(a) The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is responsible for the preparation and implementation of the plan for the overall signal communication system for mounting the operation. (par. 2 a, Sec. I, Mounting Plan, Signal Corps, Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA).

(b) Tactical radio equipment will not be used in marshalling camps and embarkation areas unless otherwise directed. The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is responsible for the provision and maintenance of technical control of fixed radio station equipment and personnel. (Par. 2 c, Sec. I, Mounting Plan, Signal Corps, Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA).

(c) (1) The Chief Signal Officer, ETOUSA, will plan and provide the wire communications system required between the Base Sections, and within the Base Section, with respect to activities which are not the responsibility of the Base Section Commander. (Par. 3 a, Sec. I, Mounting Plan, Signal Corps, Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA).

(2) The provision of movement control wire communications facilities in connection with troop movement is a Base Section responsibility. (Par. 3 b, Sec. I, Mounting Plan, Signal Corps. Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA).

(3) Tactical wire communication equipment will not be installed or used except by permission of this headquarters.

(4) Wire circuit diagrams and telephone and telegraph printer traffic diagrams showing available wire communication facilities in and between marshalling camps and embarkation areas will be issued by this headquarters separately at a later date.

(d) (1) The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, will provide operation of trunk route messenger service. (Par. 2 e, Sec. I, Mounting Plan, Signal Corps, Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA).

(2) Locations of Base Section and Tactical Message Centers in marshalling camps and embarkation areas will be published later.

(e) The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is responsible for the handling of cryptographic systems and equipment for U.S. Army Forces. (Par. 2 i, Sec. I, Mounting Plan, Signal Corps, Headquarters SOS, ETOUSA).

2. Mission after debarkation on the continent.

a. General for all signal and communication troops:

To install, operate, and maintain adequate and continuous signal communication facilities between all echelons of the Third U.S. Army to the full extent of the means provided therefor.

b. Specific for Third U.S. Army Signal Troops:

To install, operate, and maintain adequate and continuous signal communication facilities as follows:

(1) To higher headquarters as directed.
(2) To all Corps in the Third U.S. Army.
(3) To all units under direct command of Third U.S. Army.
(4) For special purposes as directed.

3. Instructions or special missions other than routine.

a. Army Signal Troops:

(1) 301st Signal Operation Battalion.

(a) Message Centers

(1) Message Center personnel will be broken down into three (3) teams as follows:

Team 1: Sufficient personnel to operate two M-209's and two SIGABA's. A minimum of four foot and four motor messengers. Sufficient officers, NCO's, and administration personnel to operate the message center.

Teams 2 & 3: The remaining message center personnel in the battalion will be divided between Command Post 'B', and the Rear Echelon, by the Battalion Commander as the situation warrants.

(2) One NCO and two (2) other enlisted men will be detailed to assist in the operation of the ADLS at the air strip, or field, serving Army Headquarters.

(b) Messenger Communication

(1) Motor messenger service to Army units will be scheduled. Special messengers will be dispatched as required.

(2) Third Army will establish motor messenger runs to the First U.S. Army Command Post. Two round trips per day will be made.

(3) For Motor Messenger Schedules see Third Army SOI.

(c) Radio Communication.

(1) See Appendix No. II, Diagram of Army Radio Nets, for information concerning principal radio channels to be established during various phases.

(2) Unless specifically ordered or authorized to do so by this headquarters, no transmissions will be made over the indicated channels by Third U.S. Army units prior to their arrival in the target area.

Net No. A-1: VIII Corps will enter when it returns to control of Third U.S. Army.

XV Corps will enter upon arrival in the target area.

Net No. A-2: XX and XII Corps will enter upon arrival in the target area.

(3) Instructions will be issued separately at a later date concerning the monitoring of tactical radio nets in the target area

by units which have not yet left the United Kingdom.

(d) Wire Operation Instructions

(1) The 301st Signal Operation Battalion will proceed to its assembly area immediately upon landing on the continent. The Battalion will be informed of the location of the assembly area as soon as possible. Present indications point to the vicinity of DOL-DE-B as a possibility.

(2) As soon as possible after arrival, one Operation Company will be detailed to construct the wire installations for the Third U.S. Army Command Post. This same Operation Company will be prepared to furnish detachments to install, operate, and maintain one or more switching centrals at the direction of the Army Signal Officer (See Appendix VI).

(3) The second Operation Company will remain in the assembly area or at such other point as may be designated, until a new location for the Army Command Post has been selected, when it will proceed to that point and will set up wire installations in the same manner as described above. The new installation, when occupied by the Commanding General, will become the Command Post. The previous one will be designated Rear Echelon, Third U.S. Army.

(4) In all further advances of the Third U.S. Army Command Post, the new installation will habitually be made by the Operation Company previously assigned to the Rear Echelon.

(5) The number and priority of initial locals to be installed within the command post at all echelons of Third U.S. Army will be in accordance with Third U.S. Army Signal Circular No. 85. The Signal Center Officer will be prepared to install additional locals at the direction of the Army Signal Officer.

(6) Facsimile equipment will be installed and operated in or near the message center at each echelon in accordance with Third U.S. Army Signal Circular No. 84.

(2) 33rd Signal Construction Battalion

(a) Immediately upon landing on the continent the battalion will proceed to, and establish its headquarters in, the vicinity of the Third U.S. Army Command Post. Thereafter its movement will be guided by its mission. It will be prepared to dispatch construction teams as soon after arrival as possible to accomplish missions designated by the Army Signal Officer.

(b) Insofar as is possible and practicable, wire routes selected will conform to those planned for later use by higher headquarters. The type and method of construction will conform to instructions issued at the time of designation of each mission.

(3) 34th Signal Construction Battalion

(a) Immediately upon landing on the continent the battalion will proceed to and establish its headquarters at a place to be designated by the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army, to whom its Commanding Officer will report with the least possible delay for instructions.

(b) Its procedure in the accomplishment of any assigned missions will be similar to that prescribed for the 33rd Signal Construction Battalion, above.

(4) 1307th Signal Pigeon Company

(a) A pigeon platoon, less breeding section, will be located in the vicinity of the Command Post on or about D plus 45, which will make limited pigeon communication available in the combat zone about D plus 57.

(b) Those birds not required for use by the Army will be available for issue to forward units.

(c) Lofts at the Army Command Post will be connected by telephone to the message center.

(d) The remaining platoons, less their breeding sections, will be attached to subordinate units.

(5) 166th Signal Photographic Company

(a) Instructions regarding the employment of photographic units are contained in Signal Circular No. 111, this headquarters.

(b) The Photo Laboratory and Identification Units will be located in the vicinity of Army Rear Echelon.

(c) The company, less detachments and General Assignment Units, will be located in the vicinity of the Army Command Post. Missions will be assigned by the Army Signal Officer through the Army Photographic Officer, based upon combat developments. A detachment consisting of personnel trained and equipped for still or moving picture coverage will always be held available for immediate dispatch on missions desired by the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army.

(d) One General Assignment Unit will be attached to each Infantry and Armored Division. Signal Officers of these divisions will keep general assignment officers fully informed regarding the tactical situation. Missions insuring the taking of photographs of combat and training value will be assigned to these units.

(6) 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company

(a) Tactical Plan

(1) A representative of Signal Intelligence Service, Third U.S. Army, accompanied by one non-commissioned officer, one driver, and one-quarter ton truck; and one officer accompanied by an enlisted man plus driver and vehicle from the 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company will be attached to the 3254th Signal Service Company (RI) VIII Corps, prior to arrival in marshalling area. These detachments will make as full a reconnaissance as possible of areas into which the Army and the 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company may later operate and will make specific plans for Army radio Intelligence operations.

(2) The 118th Signal Radio Intelligence Company will arrive on the continent approximately one day after establishment of Third U.S. Army Command Post on the continent. It will set up intercept and D/F stations for immediate operations, directing its attention to the west, covering that portion of the target area into which the XV Corps will be operating. Results of radio intelligence efforts of the Army company will be compiled and made available to the 3253rd Signal Service Company (RI), upon arrival of the XV Corps.

(3) As soon as the 3253rd Signal Service Company (RI), is operational in the zone of advance of the XV Corps, intercept and D/F activities of the Army company will be as directed by the Army G-2.

(4) Upon assumption by Third U.S. Army of command of VIII Corps, communications will be established between Third U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service and the 3254th Signal Service Company (RI). If wire is not available, a liaison officer will be dispatched from the 3254th Signal Service Company (RI) to Third U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Service for the purpose of coordinating radio intelligence activities within Army until wire communication is available.

(b) Technical Operation

(1) Direct communication is authorized between Signal Intelligence Service, Third U.S. Army, and Corps Signal Service Companies (RI) for the purpose of exchange of technical and operational traffic.

(2) A representative of the Commanding Officer of each Corps Signal Service Company (RI) which lands on the continent after Third U.S. Army will report as expeditiously as possible to the Third U.S. Army Signal Intelligence Officer for a briefing and coordination of Army radio intelligence activities.

(3) (a) Slidex will be employed for control of direction finders by radio.

(b) No intelligence derived by traffic analysis or cryptanalysis will be transmitted electrically except in special cryptographic systems issued to radio intelligence for the purpose.

(4) In the event that existing communications between Corps Signal Service Companies (RI) and Army Signal Intelligence Service are severed, the Signal Service Company (RI) will immediately dispatch a liaison officer to Army Signal Intelligence Service for the purpose of maintaining as close operational contact as possible.

(c) Use of Wire and radio channels

See Appendix IV for Radio Intelligence Nets. See Appendix V for Radio Intelligence Wire Circuit Diagram.

(7) 14th Air Liaison Squadron

Third Army will operate an Air Messenger Service as follows:

(a) To adjacent Armies; one trip daily.
(b) To Corps; two round trips per day.
(c) To Army units as required.
(d) Headquarters being served by air messenger service will display individual panel numbers when air liaison or air messenger planes signal with two (2) green flicks of landing light, or arrive at a prearranged time. Panel numbers will be published in the Signal Operation Instructions.
(e) Not to exceed five (5) planes will be attached, informally, to each Corps after arrival on the continent. These will be used to execute such prescribed missions as may be assigned by the Corps Commander. The responsibility for the control and dispatch of these planes will remain with the Corps Signal Officer.

(8) Mobile Broadcast Companies

(a) Mobile Broadcast Companies will be controlled by the section controlling P & PW activities.

(b) The Mobile Broadcast Companies will locate stations at such points as the performance of its mission requires.

(c) Frequencies for each Mobile Broadcast Company will be assigned by SHAEF. The frequencies assigned this unit will be those normally used by fixed stations now on the continent. However, in the event that these stations interfere with operational frequencies, the P & PW stations will be silenced until an adjustment can be made.

(9) Signal Intelligence and Monitoring Company (SIAM)

Signal Intelligence and Monitoring service will be provided by such means as are available to the Third U.S. Army. The troops so employed will be under the direction of the A.C.of S, G-2 and A.C. of S, G-3, Third U.S. Army, under the supervision of the Army Signal Officer.

b. Corps Signal Units

(1) VIII Corps

(a) The VIII Corps will report into Net No. A-1 as soon as the Corps reverts to the control of Third U.S. Army.

(b) A wire liaison officer from Third U.S.Army will accompany VIII Corps when it lands. He will return to this headquarters immediately upon its arrival on the continent, and report to the Signal Officer.

(2) XV Corps

Radio silence will be in effect prior to the arrival of XV Corps on the continent, during debarkation, movement to the initial assembly area, and until this silence is lifted for the XV Corps station by the Net Control Station of Net No. A-1. Until this silence is lifted, the XV Corps station will tune its receivers to the frequency of Net No. A-1, copy and decode traffic between Third U.S. Army and VIII Corps, for the information of the Corps Commander.

(3) XX Corps

(a) Radio silence will be in effect prior to arrival on the continent, during debarkation, and until arrival into initial assembly area. Until this silence is lifted, the XX Corps station will tune its receivers to frequency of Net No. A-1 and monitor traffic thereon. It may be required to operate on this net for a period. Upon receipt of instructions for the lifting of radio silence from this headquarters, either over Net No. A-1, or by some other means, the XX Corps radio station will report in on Net No. A-2.

(b) In the event of an amphibious operation by XX Corps, Net No. A-2 will consist of the following stations: Third U.S. Army Net Control Station, fixed radio station at Plymouth, and XX Corps (Headquarters ship and/or Mobile Station). Prior to the lifting of radio silence, the fixed station at Plymouth and/or the Third U.S. Army Net Control Station may operate on this net on a "FOX" schedule. When the necessary radio silence for the XX Corps, incident to an amphibious operation, is lifted by the Commanding General, XX Corps, XX Corps stations will report into this net.

(4) XII Corps

(a) Radio silence will be maintained prior to arrival on the continent, during debarkation, and until lifted by Third U.S. Army after the XII Corps reaches its assembly area. The lifting of radio silence may be directed by this headquarters either by a message to XII Corps over Net No. A-2, or by some other means.

(b) XII Corps will arrange to monitor Nets No. A-1 and A-2 continuously from the opening of operations until silence is lifted, as statedabove.

x. (1) Precautions regarding radio silence

Radio silence is imposed upon all unit nets prior to arrival on the continent, during debarkation, and movement to the assembly area. Radio silence will be lifted in accordance with instructions received in the assembly area (except for XX Corps in case of an amphibious operation) by a transmission over the appropriate radio net, or by other means. Receivers will be employed for monitoring purposes in all nets for which frequencies have been assigned to assure maintenance of radio silence, when imposed, and to insure receipt of instructions for the lifting thereof.

(2) Anti-Jamming Technique

(a) Enemy jamming of radio channels is an ever constant threat. Effective enemy jamming will often deprive a commander of his key radio communication channels just when he needs them most. A complete absence of jamming is unusual.

(b) Planning:

Communication plans will be made with the expectation that the enemy will employ radio jamming. The effect of enemy jamming may be reduced by:

(1) Providing the maximum number of alternate communications.

(2) Constant training of operators in copying through interference.

(3) Judicious assignment of radio frequencies.

(4) Rigid observance of net discipline.

(c) Operating technique

(1) Operators must be trained to distinguish between enemy jamming and difficulties in their own receivers.

(2) Indentification of type of jamming. For the most efficient elimination of effects of enemy jamming, operators must be able to recognize the different conditions which may be met with, such as the effect of spark transmitters; the sweeping through of a carrier frequency; tone jamming (often called 'bagpipe'), consisting of three to five monotonous musical notes repeated over and over again; and random set noises caused either by the local set or by interference from neighboring radio sets or radar.

(3) Working through jamming

This is largely a question of training and of the efficient use of the radio equipment issued the operator. For further information see War Department Technical Bulletin, TB SIG 5, "Defense Against Radio Jamming;" letter HQ ETOUSA, OCSigO, 29 February 1944, subject: "Enemy Jamming of Radio Communications"; and letter HQ Third U.S. Army, 25 April 1944, file AG 353 - CNMCV, subject: "Training Radio Operators to Copy Through Interference."

(3) Radio Counter-Measures (RCM)

Radio counter-measures (deception and jamming) will not be employed by troops of Third U.S. Army unless specifically directed by the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army.

(4) Miscellaneous radio and other communication

(a) Numbering of Radio Channels

The following numbering system will be used:

FUSAG	FG (i.e., FG-1, FG-2, etc.)
COM Z	FZ (i.e., FZ-1, FZ-2, etc.)
Army	A1 - A19
XV Corps	C20 - C39
XX Corps	C40 - C59
VIII Corps	C60 - C79
XII Corps	C80 - C99
Division	D (Actual assignment of
Brigade	B Numbers by major unit
Group or Regt	G assigning frequencies
Bn or Sqdn	S and code signs).

Lateral will be shown as follows:

15 Div 14/D7 14 Div

(b) Army Radio Nets (See Appendix II).

(c) Lateral Radio Communication

(1) Lateral radio communication between flanking units of the Third U.S. Army and First U.S. Army will be accomplished as follows:

(a) Between Armies - First U.S. Army will provide code signs and frequencies. Each Army will furnish a radio and operating personnel.

(b) Between Corps - Third U.S. Army Corps on left will provide frequency and code signs. Each Corps will furnish a radio and operating personnel.

(c) Between Divisions - First U.S. Army will furnish code signs and frequencies. Each division will furnish a radio and operating personnel.

(2) Lateral radio communication for units smaller than a division:

The method of lateral communication is the responsibility of the commanders concerned. The responsibility for initiating the arrangements will rest with the commander on the right.

(3) Corps and Divisions already on the continent adjacent to any amphibious assault will keep receivers tuned to Net No. A-2, ready to enter this net when so required by the tactical situation.

(d) Allocation of Frequencies

Initial Bulk Allotment - The Combined Signal Board, SHAEF, is the sole authority for allocation of frequencies to subordinate headquarters through chain of command. Within the frequencies thus assigned, Third U.S. Army will sub-allot blocks of frequencies to the various major units concerned.

(e) Interference

(1) The traffic carrying capacity of radio circuits is likely to be lower than is normally estimated as increased interference may be anticipated due to:

(a) The concentration of an unprecedented quantity of equipment in a small area.

(b) Possible intensive jamming by the enemy and interference from enemy radio communications.

(c) The fact that the frequency separation between adjacent channels is only four (4) kilocycles.

(2) To alleviate the effect of the factors enumerated above, the following measures have been taken:

(a) An upper limit of power has been imposed for use on each frequency.

(b) Frequencies have been allotted for use only in specified zones.

(c) As far as possible, blocks of consecutive frequencies have been allotted to the ground and air forces, thus permitting the service concerned to clear interference without the need to negotiate with other services.

(d) The exact duplication of frequencies employed by United Kingdom high power transmitters has been avoided.

(e) Arrangements have been made to limit the use of non-essential radio communication in the United Kingdom.

(3) The action taken as set forth above will not provide the maximum possible reduction of interference. The following instructions will therefore be observed:

(a) The number of nets set up by all units will be limited to a minimum. All radio plans will be continually reviewed to this end.

(b) Radio communication will be used only in those cases where other suitable means of communication are not available.

(f) Third U.S. Army Frequencies

See SOI No. 32-( ), this headquarters.

(g) Scene of action frequency

The frequency of 3000 kilocycles will be used as a rendezvous frequency. It will be used by all Allied forces taking part in the invasion. It will be used only by units actually engaged, after communication on all normally assigned frequencies has been found to be impossible, and when immediate contact is necessary. It will be used for rendezvous purposes only, and as briefly as possible. Its purpose is to make arrangements for the use of other frequencies or other means of communication. Except as prescribed above, it will not be used for the transmission of messages. The purpose of this channel will be defeated by any failure to observe the above instructions.

(h) Procedure

See Signal Circular No. 61-( ), this headquarters.

(i) Radio Link Equipment

Radio link equipment, when and if available, will be employed in accordance with a Signal Circular to be published by this headquarters at a later date.

(j) Air Warning Broadcast

(1) Information of doubtful or enemy aircraft, and of friendly aircraft in distress, will be broadcast directly from the Fighter Direction Center (FDC). This information will be transmitted by tone modulated emission (A-2) at a speed of eight (8) words per minute. Warnings will be given by "FOX" type messages. Combined Air Warning Code will be used.

Essential elements of broadcast will be:

(a) Track number of the reporting unit.
(b) The direction of flight.
(c) Position of flight expressed in grid coordinates.
(d) Identification (friendly or enemy) plus type of plane, if known.
(e) Number of aircraft.
(f) Altitude.
(g) Authentication.

(2) All Army troops, Corps, and AAA Units will monitor the warning broadcast frequency.

(3) Those units desiring to relay warning messages will relay in the same code in which received. Any type of emission (A-1, A-2, A-3) may be used for relay.

(k) Tank Attack Warning Net

(1) Information of impending or actual Armored attacks will be broadcast directly over the special Army and Corps Artillery (SCR-193) Radio Nets.

(2) This information will be transmitted by voice. Each warning will be repeated three times. Warning messages will be modified "FLASH FOX" type messages. For "FOX" type messages, see Par. 2, Signal Circular No. 42-1, Prearranged Code. These messages will be transmitted in the clear. Essential elements of the broadcast will be:

(a) Number of tanks.
(b) Identification (type of tanks).
(c) Location of tanks expressed in grid coordinates (clear).
(d) Direction of movement.
(e) Speed of movement.
(f) Time reported.

(3) Upon completion of the transmission, only the following stations will receipt, in the order listed below:

Div Arty Headquarters (from right to left)
F. A. Brig Headquarters
T. D. Brig or Group Headquarters

(4) Using other means of communication, each of the above headquarters will assure themselves that their subordinate units have received the messages.

(5) It is the responsibility of Corps Artillery Headquarters, Division Artillery Headquarters, and direct support Artillery Battalions to transmit the message by fastest practicable means to Corps Headquarters, Division and Infantry Regimental Headquarters, respectively.

(6) A Corps Artillery Headquarters receiving such a flash warning message will transmit it on the Army Artillery Net to the Army Artillery Officer for transmission to the Army Commander.

(l) Broadcast Stations (Existing Facilities)

(1) No Broadcast transmitter will be permitted to operate on the continent without the approval of the Combined Signal Board, AEF, which is the sole authority for frequency allocation.

(2) Military equipment will not be assigned for the repair or replacement of technical equipment in broadcast systems located in the U.S. Zone of Operations on the continent until the project has been approved by the Senior Field Force Commander.

(m) Visual Signals

(1) Forward troops will use yellow smoke, flares, or fluorescent colored panels (U.S.) as prearranged between the ground and air forces concerned. Calls for such displays from the air may be made by a succession of Very-lights, or by calls over radio channels. Yellow smoke, flares, and fluorescent colored panels will not be used for any other purpose. (See SOI Item No. 51-( ), this headquarters).

(2) Combined Panel System, short title CCBP8, will be used in all intra-service, Joint and Combined panel communication.

(3) Headquarters will display the panels as specified below when requested by a friendly aircraft. Such signals may be transmitted by two green Very-colored lights, by an authenticated radio message over the SCR-522 net to Air Support Parties, or by prearranged signals. (All panels are taken from "Combined Panel Code," CCBP8, local assignments).

Headquarters	Panel Signal
Army	No. 94
Corps	No. 93
Division	No. 92
Brigade, Regiment, or similar combat command	No. 91

(4) Specific panel numbers, if used, will be published as an item of SOI, this headquarters. These will be used primarily with Air and Field Artillery Liaison Planes.

(5) When targets are to be indicated by means of panels, the arrow described in Section IV, Par. 10, CCBP8, will be used. The arrow will have a basic range of 1000 yards, and each bar placed below and perpendicular to the shaft will denote an additional 500 yards in range.

(n) Air Messenger Service

(1) Air Dispatch Letter Service (ADLS)

(a) The Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) will operate ADLS between the United Kingdom and the continent, and between air fields serving major headquarters on the continent. In cases of interruption of this service due to inclement weather, or for any other cause, such traffic for the United Kingdom will be sent by boat messenger.

(b) The following personnel from the sources shown will be provided at each field served:

AEAF - Traffic Officer and operating personnel.
TUSA - One NCO and two enlisted men.

(c) Traffic filed by ADLS normally will be handled in the following priority:

1 - Urgent and important messages of such nature or length as to preclude their transmission by electrical means.

2 - Messages normally sent by electrical means which cannot be transmitted because of interference or other reasons.

3 - Messages whose urgency precludes the use of normal mail services, but of insufficient importance to be sent electrically.

4 - All other traffic.

(d) Schedules for airplane and motor messenger services will be prepared to provide inter-locking of schedules and alternate routes by the message centers served by them.

(e) Details concerning airplane and motor messenger service between units in the United Kingdom will be published by this headquarters at a later date.

(f) Air messenger service will serve Army Groups, Armies, Tactical Air Forces, Tactical Air Commands, and other main headquarters on the continent.

(g) Duties of ADLS Traffic Officers:

1 - Receive and record traffic from motor messengers in bulk, and load on aircraft.

2 - Unload, incoming traffic from aircraft, record, and hand over in bulk to motor messengers.

3 - Send, receive, and record traffic by way of boat messenger, when necessary.

(h) Responsibility for ADLS Traffic Offices:

The Air Force Headquarters serving the appropriate headquarters will be completely responsible for the associated ADLS traffic offices.

(i) Couriers

All ADLS traffic, while being conveyed between ADLS offices, whether by plane or by boat, will be accompanied by an officer courier. This officer courier will be given the highest priority as a passenger on all planes or boats which travel the route in question. In single seater aircraft used to transport ADLS traffic, the pilot thereof will be considered the courier, and will be responsible for the traffic while it is in the aircraft, and for its safe delivery to the authorized representatives of the terminal ADLS traffic office.

(2) Third U.S. Army Air Messenger Service

See Par. 3 a (7), above

(o) Pigeon Communication

Pigeon messages bearing a classification of CONFIDENTIAL or higher will be encoded. Pigeons will habitually be released in pairs. One bird will carry the original message and the other a duplicate. The homing capabilities of pigeons are reduced by inclement weather. Except in emergencies, day flying birds should be allowed sufficient time to complete the trip in daylight.

(5) Precautions regarding the use of captured signal equipment

(a) Captured signal equipment will be safe-guarded by Commanders of all echelons to prevent its unauthorized use or destruction.

(b) All personnel are warned that communication equipment, particularly radio equipment, may be converted into booby traps by the enemy. Caution must be exercised when such equipment is captured. It will be handled as directed by Par. 11, Sec. III, Annex No. 13, "G-4 Plan," and Third U.S. Army Administrative Order No. 1.

(c) Units will submit a report through intelligence channels showing types, quantities and locations of captured signal equipment.

(d) Enemy equipment identification teams operating in the Army area will maintain close liaison with intelligence officers of all echelons of Army for the purpose of inspecting and classifying captured signal equipment to recommend one of the following dispositions to the Commanding General Third U.S. Army.

(1) Use by our own troops.
(2) Destruction.
(3) Salvage.
(4) Evacuation to higher echelon for further study.

(e) Under no circumstances will captured signal equipment be used by troops without specific authorization from this headquarters. In the event use of such equipment is desirable, request may be made through command channels to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army. Specific authorization for the use of such equipment may be granted in particular instances.

(6) Local Security for Wire Teams and Repair Units

(a) Wire teams working in advanced areas will be constantly on the alert for enemy infiltration. They will habitually put out advance and flanking guards when working in dangerous areas.

(b) Commanders of signal units are responsible for their own security and for that of their working parties. In cases of emergency they should request additional guards for local protection against enemy infiltration parties from their tactical commander.

(c) Armament on motor vehicles working in forward areas will be manned at all times.

(d) Specific assignments of personnel to man available A/T Rocket Launchers will be made so that in case of an emergency the functioning of such units will be rapid and coordinated.

(e) All personnel will habitually work under arms.

(f) Wherever the temporary halting of communication vehicles on a highway interferes with military traffic, such vehicles will be moved completely off roads, after taking proper precautions to avoid or to remove enemy mines.

(7) Removal of Mines and Booby Traps along Wire Routes

(a) Before rehabilitation of any overhead or underground lines is attempted, the area around poles and along the lead will be cleared. Experience has shown that the areas around the base of poles and the areas along and under the lead are often heavily mined. Communications equipment generally is favored as a means of concealing small, anti-personnel devices, both electrically and mechanically operated. Care will be exercised when opening terminal boxes or containers, or handling hanging wires. Inside plant facilities and equipment in telephone exchanges may be booby trapped, and care will be exercised when such equipment is rehabilitated or placed in operation.

(b) Signal organizations will be issued mine detectors for clearing wire routes and for the security of wire and repair teams.

(c) Unit commanders will train all personnel in construction and wire operation units in the use of the several types of mine detectors.

(d) All personnel will be trained in mine removal.

(e) Booby traps, where found, will be completely avoided, even when it entails re-routing of certain circuits.

(f) The location of all known or suspected booby traps will be reported to the local Engineer Officer immediately.

(g) Areas neutralized will be marked in accordance with the provisions of Signal Circular No. 32, Third U.S. Army.

(8) Regulations regarding Restoration of Civilian Telephone Exchange Facilities:

(a) Telephone exchanges in occupied territory will habitually be rehabilitated by Communication Zone troops.

(b) The Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army, may authorize the use of central office facilities found serviceable with concurrence of the Commanding General, Communication Zone.

(c) When such authorization is given, a complete and exhaustive inspection will be made to insure against wire tapping and/or existing bridged taps in the central office. All pairs, except those actually in use will be opened at the underground or aerial cable side of X connecting frames. Aerial and/or underground cables carrying circuits in use will be inspected and all laterals between the central office and the point of termination will be opened in the standard, approved manner.

(d) If and when Army switchboards are installed in civilian exchanges and connected to existing distribution systems, such switchboards will be located in a room which will be held under guard. In such event, the precautions outlined in the above paragraph will be taken.

(e) Military personnel only will be used as telephone or telegraph operators, except when civilian exchanges are operated under the control of Civil Affairs Staff, specific approval of the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army.

(9) Miscellaneous Wire Instructions

(a) First U.S. Army will construct initial lateral wire axis to Third U.S. Army. Thereafter Third U.S. Army will be responsible for the construction of lateral circuits to First U.S. Army.

(b) Responsibility for lateral circuits between Corps, and between Divisions will be the responsibility of the unit on the right. It will be assisted by the unit on the left.

(c) Every possible expedient will be used to construct the initial circuit rapidly.

(d) Tactical wire communication facilities will not be interrupted or disturbed except by the unit responsible therefor, or after complete coordination with that unit and/or the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army.

(e) Maximum use will be made of abandoned First U.S. Army circuits.

(f) Within the limitations of time and facilities available, any Corps whose axis follows the proposed Army axis will build a standard, 10 pin, open wire system along that axis.

(1) Construction of this system will be coordinated with the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army.

(2) Appendix III shows the routes and types of construction proposed. After a study of the situations on the ground, it will be followed as closely as possible.

(3) Poles less than twenty feet (20') in height will be used only in emergencies. Twenty-five (25') foot poles will be standard. At crossings, thirty foot (30') or longer poles will be used.

(4) Systems for transposition will be of the standard and exposed types for non-phantom circuits. They are shown in Third U.S. Army Signal Circular No. 91.

(g) Whenever the tactical situation permits, the construction of standard pole lines will follow Communication Zone routes as indicated in Appendix VIII.

(h) Where the facilities are available, alternate wire routes will be provided along all axes.

(i) A switching central will habitually be installed at or near the intersection of major wire axis.

(j) The responsibility for the proper allocation of existing wire facilities will rest with the Signal Officer of the Army or Communication Zone having jurisdiction of that area. Parties desiring to use these facilities will coordinate with the responsible Signal Officer prior to actual use.

(1) The Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army, is responsible for the rehabilitation and use of existing commercial wire facilities within the Third U.S. Army area.

(2) Subordinate headquarters desiring to make use of any of these facilities will make necessary arrangements with the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army, prior to so doing.

(3) Unit commanders to whom the use of existing wire facilities are released, will be responsible that the security measures covered in Signal Circular No. 91-1, Third U.S. Army, are complied with.

(k) (1) Unit commanders will be responsible that all field wire or cable used in circuits no longer required is recovered as soon as possible by the unit or units which laid it.

(2) Unit commanders unable to comply with the above will cause reports showing location and identification of all abandoned field wire circuits to be forwarded immediately to this headquarters for the information of the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army. The latter will take necessary action to insure the maximum possible recovery of such wire or cable.

(l) Responsibility for Communications for Special Operations.

The following parties will habitually be responsible for establishing wire communications:

(1) Between land based units and amphibious assault units; the land based unit.
(2) Between a land based unit and an airborne unit; the land based unit.
(3) Between amphibious units and airborne units, the amphibious unit.

(m) Corps Signal Officers and Signal or Communication Officers of units serving directly under Third U.S. Army will forward current circuit diagrams, line route maps, traffic diagrams, and other necessary brief reports daily, as of 0800B, when changes in their systems have occurred. Negative reports will be submitted.

(10) Miscellaneous Signal Installation Instructions

(a) Corps will provide a minimum of two telephone channels to Army Artillery.

(b) Each Corps will provide a through teletypewriter circuit to Army for its Radio Intelligence Company by picking up a direct teletypewriter channel provided by Army in accordance with Circuit Diagram, App. V-b.

(c) Initially, communication with the VIII Corps will be through First U.S. Army Switching Centrals. If the First U.S. Army-VIII Corps axis is near the Third U.S. Army Command Post, the 301st Signal Operation Battalion and the 33rd Signal Construction Battalion will arrange to interrupt these lines and immediately terminate them in the Third U.S. Army Command Post Switching Central. If the axis is remote from the Third U.S. Army Command Post, initial communications with the First U.S. Army and VIII Corps will be obtained as expeditiously as possible after coordination with the parties concerned.

(d) Subordinate units temporarily located in an assembly or concentration area under control of the Communications Zone will arrange to establish wire communication to the nearest Communication Zone switchboard or switching central. The installation, operation, and maintenance of such facilities will be coordinated directly with the Signal Officer, Communication Zone, or with his representative.

(11) Civil Affairs Communications (G-5)

(a) Military commanders will be responsible for providing essential communication facilities for Civil Affairs Staff (A. C. of S. G-5) and detachments in the same manner as for any other staff section or arm. Civil Affairs representatives or detachments located outside areas served by the military system will depend on civil systems for communication.

(b) Signal communications for civilian needs, and rehabilitation of civilian communication systems, will be provided from military resources only when such action will assist the military mission. Proposed plans for providing all signal communication facilities deemed necessary for civilian needs will be submitted for approval to the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army, by the A. C. of S., G-5. Material for approved projects for delivery to authorized representatives of the A. C. of S., G-5, will be requisitioned by the Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army through normal military signal supply channels. Estimates forming the basis for such requisitions will be prepared by the A. C. of S., G-5. Installation, operation, and maintenance will be performed by civilian labor as directed by the A. C. of S., G-5, subject to such restrictions or orders as may be issued by this headquarters.

(c) It is to be expected that civilians will often bring questions concerning the use of civilian telephone, telegraph, and radio facilities to Signal Officers. Signal Officers will refer such questions to the A. C. of S., G-5 (Civil Affairs) for necessary action. Available civilian communication channels will be used for this purpose.

(d) The employment of civilian labor is governed by Administrative Instructions. (See Annex No. 10, Civil Affairs Plan)

(12) Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Signal Detachment.

A suitable detachment will be attached to Headquarters Third U.S. Army to furnish special radio communication to OSS in the U.K. This detachment will be attached to a Signal Corps unit at this headquarters, or at a subordinate headquarters, for administration as required by the situation. The Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army will exercise technical control and coordination over this detachment. The OSS will be responsible for its necessary signal supply and repair. The Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army will assist in the repair of OSS signal equipment, within the means available to him, if requested by OSS.

(13) Publicity and Psychological Warfare (P & PW)

(a) General

The Communication Section of an Army P & PW detachment, consisting of one officer and twenty-one enlisted men, will habitually operate at Army Echelon 'B'. This detachment will provide its own radio, telegraph printer, facsimile, and cryptographic equipment. This signal detachment is included in T/O & E 30-47, 15 December 1943, and operates under the direction of the Public Relations Officer, this Headquarters.

(b) Use of tactical communication equipment.

(1) Press material will be transmitted over tactical communication facilities only after P & PW facilities have been loaded to their maximum capacity, and the use of such tactical equipment has been approved by the tactical commanders concerned.

(2) Press material will not be transmitted by any means liable to interception prior to censorship. After censorship, no changes in text will be made. Press material will never be enciphered or encoded. Prior to censorship, press material will not be delivered to persons other than military personnel.

(3) Important press dispatches may carry a priority classification in accordance with instructions to be promulgated by the Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group at a later date.

(4) Press dispatches must be forwarded to Army Echelon 'B' for censorship. Transmission of such dispatches from forward areas will be accomplished by the correspondent concerned by special courier, and in exceptional cases by use of tactical wire communication facilities under the conditions mentioned in Par. 3 x (13) (b) (1), above.

(c) The Communication Section, P & PW Detachment, will provide radio and facsimile equipment for transmission of censored press dispatches from Third U.S. Army Command Post (Echelon 'B') to the Command Post, First U.S. Army Group. The necessary wire channels for teletype and facsimile circuits will be provided by the Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group, on a common user basis.

(d) The Signal Officer, Third U.S. Army will provide air courier service for the transmission of press dispatches, photographic negatives, films plates, and reels, and other material from Army Echelon 'B' to the nearest air dispatch liaison pick up point on the continent upon the request of the Public Relations Officer, this headquarters.

(e) Psychological Warfare

Directives and administrative traffic pertaining to Psychological Warfare activities may be handled as normal staff traffic and dispatched over operational channels until such time as P & PW communication facilities are available. Special cryptographic systems for such message traffic will be provided and operated by P & PW personnel.

(14) American Red Cross Communications.

(a) The American Red Cross may utilize military communication facilities for the handling of administrative and emergency welfare messages in connection with the activities, functions, and duties prescribed in Army Regulations. All such messages will be identified, classified, and handled in accordance with procedures prescribed by Signal Officers concerned.

(b) Military traffic will always have priority over American Red Cross traffic.

(15) Signal Personnel for Special Assignments.

(a) Attachments of Signal Personnel

The attachment of signal personnel of one nation or service to a unit of another nation or service will invariably be accomplished through appropriate staff channels of the headquarters concerned.

(b) Replacements

(1) See Annex No. 11 to Third U.S. Army Outline Plan, Operation OVERLORD, (G-1 Administrative Plan, 11 May 1944).

(2) When available, reserve signal units will be constituted and held by the Commanding General, ETOUSA. These reserves are for the Supreme Commander, AEF, and for the Commanding General, First U.S. Army Group. They will be committed only upon authority of their respective commanders.

(c) Employment of British or U.S. Civilian Technicians

(1) British of U.S. Civilian Technicians will be used for installation, operation, or maintenance of communication facilities on the continent only under exceptional circumstances. Such use will be coordinated in advance by the Signal officer, Third U.S. Army, and will be subject to the following conditions:

(a) The British and U.S. technicians will remain the employees of the civilian ministry, department or organization to which they belong.

(b) The technicians will be responsible for obtaining from civil sources the living accommodations, rations, and transport they require. If in specific instances this proves impossible, these requirements may be met from military sources. The military commander will be responsible then for making the necessary arrangements, and for informing the civilian agency to which the technicians belong, of the date from which this responsibility was assumed.

(d) Use of Local Inhabitants

(1) Full use will be made of the technical and linguistic services of qualified local inhabitants as technicians and interpreters.

(2) Local labor for the restoration of signal communications will be used when available. Signal Officers will acquaint themselves with current regulations governing the employment, pay, clothing, and ration issues for civilian employees. This information may be obtained from the Engineer Officer, Third U.S. Army. Signal Officers may avail themselves of such local labor as may be found without waiting for formal authorization, where it is operationally desirable, in the early stages. They will be responsible in all such cases, however, for the keeping of sufficiently complete records to implement the regulations as soon as possible.

(3) The local commander will be responsible for such military supervision of civilian labor personnel as he deems necessary.

(4) Local inhabitants will not be used as telephone or telegraph operators in military installations without the prior approval of this headquarters.

(5) See Civil Affairs Plan, Annex No. 10.

4. Signal supply and repair will be in accordance with Third U.S. Army Administrative Order, and other directives to be issued.

a. The 579th Signal Depot Company and two Crystal Grinding Teams will operate the Army Signal Depot, providing storage, issue, and repair of all signal equipment.

(1) Location: To be furnished at a later date.
(2) Fourth Echelon repair will be performed at the Army Signal Depot.
(3) Two mobile and one fixed radar repair teams will be located at the Army Signal Depot. They will perform radar repair work for Third U.S. Army Ground Forces. The mobile radar repair teams will not be subject to attachment to organizations. They will be dispatched on specific missions as required.

b. 187th Signal Repair Company

(1) Location: To be furnished at a later date.
(2) This unit is responsible for all third echelon repair of signal equipment for the Third U.S. Army.
(3) Attachments of radio repair teams or platoons to advance Army Depots or Ordnance Medium Maintenance Companies in the Corps Service Areas, or the Armored Divisions, etc., will be made as required. Specific information on attachments will be furnished from time to time as the need arises.

c. Priority of signal troops and vehicles on roads will be in accordance with Sec. II, par. 2 (a), Circular 10, Traffic Regulations and Control for Continental Operations, this headquarters, dated 4 May 1944.

No. 1 Priority - Messenger vehicles.
No. 2 Priority - Signal troop movements.
No. 5 Priority - Wire construction and trouble teams.
No. 7 Priority - Radio vehicles.

d. Evacuation of Salvage Signal Equipment

All units will habitually use empty vehicles moving to the rear for prompt evacuation of salvage signal equipment to rail heads, truck heads, and designated salvage dumps.

e. Salvage of Signal Equipment

The Army Signal Depot is responsible for the efficient salvage of signal equipment and material evacuated from forward areas.

f. Captured Signal Material and Supplies

(1) See Par. 2, Sec. III Annex 13, Third U.S. Army Outline Plan, Operations OVERLORD, and administrative Order No. 1.

(2) Captured signal material and supplies will be collected in designated dumps in Corps and Division Areas. The Area Commander will be responsible for the proper safe-guarding of these dumps until the salvage signal equipment held therein is evacuated, or until it is removed by authorized representatives of a higher headquarters.

(3) No captured material will be used or employed by any subordinate unit without specific approval from this headquarters.

5. Communication Data

a. The current index to SOI is Item No. 1-1, 5 April 1944. A revised index, now under preparation, will be distributed to organizations concerned as soon as possible.

b. The Army Signal Officer will be located at the Third U.S. Army Command Post. In case the Command Post is divided into Echelons "A" and "B" for the purpose of facilitating command and security, the Army Signal Officer, or his representative will be located at Command Echelon "A".

PATTON
Comdg.

HAMMOND
Sig

GAFFEY
C of S

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: CEH
Date: 13 May 44

APPENDIX I to ANNEX 4

of

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS AND POWER SUPPLY ON THE CONTINENT

(13 May 1944)

APPENDIX I

"EXISTING COMMUNICATIONS AND POWER SUPPLY ON THE CONTINENT"

1. Line Construction - Overhead Lines

a. Routes: It may be assumed that P.T.T. overhead routes will be found along all the more important railways. These routes are on the opposite side of the track to the railway circuits. Where the railways do not provide a suitable route, overhead lines normally follow roads.

b. Poles:

(1) Wooden poles are of fir or pine and are generally impregnated, copper sulphate being commonly used. The part of the pole in the ground is tarred.

(2) The following table gives the dimensions of the various poles in use and the minimum depth of the pole-holes:

Length	Ordinary Poles Minimum Diameter		Light Poles Minimum diameter		
	at 1 m. from base	at top	at 1 m. from base	at top	
6 m. 50	15 cm.	10 cm.			1 m. 20
8 m.	18 cm.	11 cm.	15 cm.	12 cm.	1 m. 50
10 m.	22 cm.	11 cm.	19 cm.	12 cm.	1 m. 75
12 m.	25 cm.	11 cm.	21 cm.	12 cm.	2 m. 20

(3) Arming of Poles (Double route): Each arm carries 10 brackets, 6 between the two poles and two on the outer side of each pole. They are placed on the same side of the arms as the poles. (Where routes carry telegraph as well as telephone wires, the former are placed on the insulators on the outside of one of the poles, normally on the side away from the railway or road). (See Fig. 7 & 6)

c. (1) P.T.T. Routes Along Railways (Single Routes): Supports normally consist of single 8 m. poles carrying arms fixed centrally, and to which the brackets are attached. (See Fig. 17)

(2) P.T.T. Routes Along Roads:

(a) These routes are normally carried on single poles 6 m. 50 or 8 m. high with arms.

(b) The arms are similar to those used on the routes along the railways but are of the following dimensions:

Outer dimension - 35 mm.
Thickness of metal - 2mm. 75
Length - 1 m. 05
(Patt. No. 71-1)

d. Overhead Lines in towns: These are often carried on metal posts which are attached to buildings by wall brackets let into the walls of buildings. In towns, the subscribers lines on the posts attached to buildings are arranged horizontally in pairs. As these lines are normally short, the danger of interference is slight and these pairs are not rotated. In the case of the interurban lines the wires are arranged in groups of four, one at each corner of a square formed by the insulators on two adjacent brackets. Each group consists of two physical and one phantom circuit, the physical circuits being formed by the two wires diametrically opposite to each other.

e. Rotation

(1) Telegraph wires are not rotated.
(2) Telephone lines are rotated at specified points, each rotation consisting of a quarter turn in a clockwise direction. (See Fig. 21 and 17)
(3) The rotation takes place between two successive poles, the rotation being one eighth of a turn on each pole. Special brackets Patt. Nos. 9-9 or 9-18) are used to effect this.
(4) Details of method of rotation:

(a) The arm normally carries four groups of telephone wires, A, B, C, and D. (See Fig. 18) Normal rotations are effected as follows:

Group A - Every 250 m.
Group B - Every 250 m.-
(except at kilometre points)
Group C - Every 500 m.
Group D - Every kilometre
(See Fig. 19)

(b) If the route comprises more than four arms, the 5th, 6th, etc., corresponds to the 1st. 2nd., etc.
(c) Every four kilometres a different arrangement comes into force; the rotations are either doubled or left out altogether (See Fig. 20).
(d) The arrangement of the brackets for a double rotation, as shown, gives the complete layout for a 16 km length of route (See Fig. 22).

f. General Notes on Routes

(1) Routes along railways:

(a) If a crossing is essential it is usually carried out at a station. On straight runs poles are normally 50 m. apart, but must never exceed 55 m. On curves this distance may be reduced to 30 m. The minimum distance from the outer rail to the nearest wire is normally 1 m. 50, but it is occasionally as low as 1 m. 35. It should be remembered that on an inside curve, the point at which the wires are nearest to the rail is at the middle of the span and poles should be placed far enough away to allow the minimum of 1 m. 50 at these points.
(b) At bridges and viaducts, the routes may be taken down into the valley or else built on poles attached to the masonry of the bridge.
(c) At tunnels, the general practice is to take the route over the top. Where this is not practicable, the overhead wires are led into a hut at either end of the tunnel and taken through the tunnel itself in a cable.

(2) Routes along roads:

(a) Both the bracket and arm types of routes are used along roads. Poles are usually placed on the outer side of any ditch running along the side of the road.
(b) Owing to the necessity for providing ease of maintenance and avoiding as far as possible interference with private property, the routes do not normally diverge much from the line of the road. For routes carried on arms, the poles are 50 m. apart while for those on brackets the span may be 60 m. on straight runs. On curves, these distances may be reduced.
(c) The minimum height of the lowest wire at the center of a span for routes along roads is 3 m. The minimum height for railway crossings is 5 m. 50, and for road crossings 6 m.

g. Conductors:

(1) Bronze, copper and iron wire are all used. Bronze wires will seldom be found on routes carrying the other kinds.
(2) Normal diameters of wires are 2.5 mm, 3 mm, 4 mm, and 5 mm. If wires of different diameters are used on one route, the lighter ones are normally on the top.
(3) In towns, where both local and trunk lines are carried on the same poles, the trunk lines are normally placed on the higher arms.

2. Cables for Urban Networks (Subscriber's Lines)

a. Prior to 1937, cables containing 1, 7, 14, 28, 56, 112, 448, and 900 pairs were laid and are still, of course, in use. In cables up to 224 pairs inclusive, the conductors are of either 0.6 mm or 1.0 mm diameter. In the larger cables only conductors of 0.6 mm diameter are used. Star quads are sometimes used in these networks.

b. In February 1937 a new specification for these cables was approved, which laid down the following cable sizes:

Cables of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 21 pairs of 0.5 mm wire.
Cables of 7 and 14 pairs of 0.5 mm or 0.6 mm wire.
Cables of 28, 56, 112, and 224 pairs of 0.5 mm, 0.6 mm, 0.8 mm, or 1mm.
Cables of 336, 448, and 896 pairs of 0.5 mm or 0.6 mm wire.
(One cable of 1344 pairs of 0.5 mm wire)

c. The number of quads per cable is normally 3, 7, 14, or 28, although actual practice seems to be somewhat elastic.

d. Distribution cables over 3 km long may be loaded. In cables from 3 to 8 km the loading is preferably continuous. When they are over 8 km, loading coiles are used.

e. The distribution cables carrying the normal earth return telegraph circuits are always separate from those carrying the telephone circuits.

3. Long Distance Cables

a. (1) All the cables, with the exception of Paris - Bordeaux No. 1 (via Tours and Poitiers) were manufactured and laid by one of the following firms:

Lignes Telephoniquer at Telegraphiques (L. T. T.) at Conflans Ste. Honorine (Seine et Oise)

Societe d ' Etude Pour le Liaisons Telephoniques (S.E. L.T.), 51 Rue De l'Admiral Mouchez, Paris, 13 eme.

Societe Anonyme des Telecommunications (S.A.T.), previously Societe d'Applications Telephoniques, 41 Rue de Cantagrel, Paris, 18 eme.

Le Material Telephonique (L. M. T.) 46, 47, Quai de Boulogne, Boulogne-Billancourt (Seine).

(2) The Paris - Bordeaux No. 1 cable was laid in 1937 by the German firm of Siemens & Halske, as part of the war preparations).

(3) These cables are normally two-pair quad cables with conductors (Definition 2 wire quad) of 0.0 mm, 1.1 mm, 1.2 mm or 1.3 mm diameter.

b. Coil loading is used on all French interurban cables. There are two spacings of loading points, 915 m and 1830 m, the latter being the more common. The letter 'B' is sometimes used to indicate a spacing of 915 m, and the letter 'H' to indicate a spacing of 1830 m.

c. The following table gives details of the types of loading in use and the principal characteristics of the circuits so loaded. The old type loading was designed to give the same cutoff frequency on the phantom as on the side circuits. This meant that the attenuation on the former was much less than on the latter. The new type of loading is designed to give the same attenuation for both phantom and side circuits, the former therefore having the higher cutoff frequency.

Type of Loading	Nature of Circuit	Induction Coils mH.	Impedence Ohms	Cutoff Frequency	Attenuation per km at 800 p.p.s. decimepers Dia. of wire. 0.9 mm.	1.0 mm.	1.1 mm.	1.2 mm.	1.3 mm.	Remarks
	SIDE	177	1600	2900	0.2	0.167	0.143	0.125	0.122	
M (MOYENNE)	PHANTOM	107	970	2900	0.168	0.142	0.122	0.107	0.099	Old Type
	PHANTOM	69	740	3750	0.211	0.190	0.151	0.132	0.117	New Type
	SIDE	110	1250	3600	0.249	0.202	0.172	0.148	0.131	
D (DEMI-LEGERE)	PHANTOM	44	620	4500	0.247	0.208	0.175	0.152	0.135	
	SIDE	44	800	5700	0.357	0.301	0.254	0.217	0.189	
L (LEGERE)	PHANTOM	25	470	5700	0.306	0.252	0.211	0.180	0.154	Old Type
	PHANTOM	18	400	7000	0.356	0.297	0.245	0.208	0.181	New Type

d. In inhabited neighborhoods (villages, hamlets, isolated farms, etc.) or in areas likely to become inhabited, an iron wire grid is placed over the cable. This grid is 30 cm wide and is placed in the ground about 30 cm above the cable. Its purpose is solely to indicate the presence of the cable to anyone digging nearby. In the larger villages, the grid may be replaced by concrete slabs.

e. In particularly exposed places (neighborhood of towns, important crossings, etc.) the cable is placed between two iron tubular sections, which are tarred and about 5 cm thick. Those sections are either circular or trapoidal in form. At less important crossings only one section is placed over the cable. In each case the iron grid is also used.

f. At the crossings of important roads (Routes Nationales and Departmentales) cables are drawn through cast-iron tubes of 25 mm diameter.

g. Mannesmann steel tubes are frequently used for bridge crossings. Under-river crossings are the exceptions.

h. When the level-crossing, as that of an electrified railway, concrete tubes are used. At these crossings, a second tube is generally laid as a reserve either for additional cable or for repair purposes.

i. In important towns, cables use the ducts designed to take the urban cables and the interurban feeder cables. These ducts are generally multi-tubular conduits with chambers from place to place for pulling the cable through. They are sealed with concrete or cast-iron covers flush with the ground.

j. The letters P.T.T. are always cast on these covers. In the center of Paris, the interurban cables are in the underground galleries (manholes) of the Paris network. There they are placed on metal brackets anchored to the walls of the galleries (manholes). The galleries (manholes) are capable of taking 100-200 cables.

k. As each cable was designated for its particular anticipated traffic, no two cables contain the same number of quads, etc. The more recent cables contain about 100 units (90-92 quads and up to 8 radio-diffusion pairs), the outside diameter varying from 5 cm to 8 cm.

l. Cables are, in general, bound with tape armouring covered with two layers of impregnated jute and sprayed with tar. Where cable is pulled through the conduit, wire armouring is used without the jute.

4. Marking of Cable Routes, Joints, Loading Points, etc.

a. Where the cable runs along the same side of the road as a P.T.T. overhead line, a blue plate (30 mm x 50 mm) is placed on each pole of the overhead line, on the side nearest the road and 1 m. 50 above ground level.

b. In the case of a double pole there is only one plate, which is always on the pole nearest to the cable.

c. Loading points and joints are indicated by marking stones placed on the side of the road at each loading point and each intermediate joint.

d. Each stone carries two inscriptions. The first consists of a group of three figures, the first of which indicates the sector (a sector is the portion of the cable between two Repeater Stations), and the two following figures indicate the loading sections.

e. The second inscription consists of the letter 'P', if the stone marks a loading point, or a figure if it indicates a joint. (note that the loading point is at the end of the loading section.) The central joint of each section is marked 'L' if there is no 'B' loading. In the latter case it is often marked '0'. The letter 'D' indicates the point at which a derivation leaves the main road.

EXAMPLE: The stone 224-5 of the PARIS-STRASBOURG cable marks the fifth joint of the 24th loading section of Sector 2, VIELE-MAISONS to CHALONS. The stone 224-P of the same cable designates the 24th loading point of Sector 2, leaving VIELE-MAISONS in the direction of CHALONS.



(Marking stones are also placed at important crossings (roads, bridges, level-crossings, etc.) These stones only bear the letters P.T.T.)

5. Repeater Stations

a. As far as is known, all the repeater stations on the French Cable Network have been made by one or other of the following firms:

Le Material Telephonique (L.M.T.)
Lignes Telegraphiques et Telephoniques (L.T.T.)
Societe d'Etudes pour Liaisons Telephoniques et Telegraphique (S.E.T.T.)
Societe Anonyme des Telecommunications (S.A.T.)
Siemens and Halske (S. & H.)

b. Stations are situated at intervals of from 60 to 120 km along the cable routes. As will be seen from the location list given below, they are sometimes situated in a Post Office or Telephone Exchange Building. Where this is not the case, the repeater station is normally in a specially constructed building of an easily recognizable type. These are rectangular, measuring about 24 m x 30 m, and consist of a ground floor and first floor about 3 m 50 high, with, at one end a second floor of about the same height, the floor plan of which is about 9 m x 13 m.

c. The layout inside the building is usually as follows:

Ground Floor: Leading in of cables, accumulator room emergency power room (usually a Diesel Engine) with cooling tank, garage, stove, and heating apparatus.

1st Floor: Cables heads, connector room, switchroom, distributor frame, repeater bays, office, and storerooms.

2nd Floor: Living quarters for personnel.

(Note: If the station has a basement, the foregoing arrangement stands except that all the equipment is moved down a floor).

d. The newly erected German Repeater Stations are usually wooden buildings protected with sandbags.

6. Power Supply

a. Power is taken from the mains and is 115/200 volt, 3 phase, 50 cycles. It is usually on high tension supply with a transformer near the repeater station. The converter sets in the engine room of the station itself provides the necessary direct current, generally 220 and 24 volts, but in some places 230 or 130 and 12 volts.

b. Personnel

(1) Each station usually has from two to four French technicians and about the same number of Germans. The large and more important stations may have a staff of anything up to fifteen.
(2) Complete information as to the types of Repeater Stations used on the various cables is at present lacking.

7. Existing Radio Facilities

a. Existing radio facilities are classed as:

(1) Broadcast
(2) Other Wireless
  (a) Beacon Station
  (b) Coastal Station
  (c) W/T and R/T Station (Communication purposes)
  (d) Decimetre Station
  (e) D/F Station

b. Only important broadcast stations located at Rennes: frequency 695 kc - power 120 KW.

c. The location of Beacon, D/F, and Coastal Stations follow closely the coastline of the Brittany and Cotentin Peninsula.

d. Stations comprising a "Decimetre" net are located near Lanneur/St. Fiacre, Pleumeaur/Gautier and Plaouha/Kerault.

(1) Decimetre radios furnish 3 channel (2 voice plus 1 telegraph) communication.
(2) Sets are highly directional and operate on a .5 to 1 watt power in the 500 to 600 Mc band.

e. There are four (4) important W/T installations located in the target area:

(1) W/T station located 3-3/4 miles east of the center of Angers. Power unknown. Frequency unknown. Station is reported to serve Admiral Raeder's headquarters.
(2) W/T station (Naval) located at St. Gildas. Power 15 kw. Frequency range 104 - 17230 kc. Reported to handle all submarine communication.
(3) W/T station located at Brest. Power unknown. Frequency 10 - 15 Mc. Officers in charge are interpreters in many languages including Chinese and Japanese.
(4) W/T station at Cherbourg. Power unknown. Frequency unknown. Station reported to be a GAF Headquarters.

f. For information of greater detail see MI 8 previously furnished.

8. Existing Power Facilities

a. (1) A 150 KV power line runs from Landerneau to St. Herbot, to Guerledan, to Pont Chateau, to Nantes.
(2) 45 KV lines run from:

Morlaix, to St. Bruies, to Plancoet, to S. Malo
Plancoet to Rophemel.
St. Herbot to Eau Blanche, to Rospordecm, to Lorient, to Auray, to Vannes.
Auray to Guerledan.
Auray to Vannes.
Merdrignac to Mur de Bretange, to Ploermel, to Redon, to Pont Chateau.
Vannes to Pont Chateau, to St. Nazaire.

b. Power stations are located as follows:

City or Town	Power Rating
Cherbourg	60 KV - 30 KV
La Roche	60 KV
Vezins	30 KV
Rennes	60 KV
Rephemel	60 KV
St. Bruiec	45 KV
Morlaix	45 KV
Brest	45 KV
St. Herbot	150 KV
Quimper	45 KV
Lorient	45 KV
St. Nazaire	45 KV & 60 KV

c. Information pertaining to electrical power supply in cities is as follows:

City or Town	AC or DC	Cycle	Phase	Voltage
Lannion	AC	50	3	115/200
St. Bruiec	AC	50	3	115/200
Londeac	AC	50	3	115/200
Morlaix	AC	50	3	115/200
Brest	AC	50	3	120/190
Landerneau	AC	50	3	115/200
Chateaulin	AC	50	3	120/190
Quimper	DC			2 x 110
Quimperle	AC	50	3	115/200
Rennes	AC	50	3	115/200
Redon	AC	50	3	115/200
St. Malo	DC			220
Vitre	AC	50	3	125
Dole	AC	50	1	120
Chatesubriand	AC	50	3	125/220
Nante	AC	50	3	110/190
St. Nazaire	AC	50	3	115/200
Avranches	AC	50	3	125/216
Cherbourg	AC	50	3	110/190
Granville	AC	50	3	125/200
St. Lo	DC			230
Vire	DC			130
Lorient	AC	50	3	115/200
Ploermel	AC	50	3	115/200
Pontivy	AC	50	3	115/200
Vannes	AC	50	3	115/200



Fig. 6



Fig. 7



Fig. 7



Fig.17 Fig.17



Fig.17



Fig.18

Fig.18



ALLOCATION OF GROUPS ON A "DOUBLE" LINE

Fig.18



Fig.18



ALLOCATION OF GROUPS ON A "SINGLE" LINE ON CROSS ARMS, OR ON A LINE IN CONSOLES IN SYMMETRIC PARALLELOGRAMS.

Fig.18





Fig.19



Fig.21



Fig.20

ROTATION FOR A LINE ON GONSOLES



FIG.20

FIG.21
ROTATION FOR A LINE ON CROSS ARMS



TRANSPOSITION ARRANGEMENT

FIG. 21
DETAIL ARRANGEMENT FOR A LINE ON CROSS ARMS



Fig. 22



Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 4 - Signal Plan

TOP SECRET

29 April 1944

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG TUSA
Init: CWS
Date: 1 May 44

CHERBOURG
Bayeux
Pont l'Eveque
CAEN
St. Lo
Coutances
Falaise
Vire
Avranches
St. Malo
Dol
Mortain
Domfront
Alencon
Minihac
Dinan
Fougeres
Mayenne
RENNES
LAVAL
Le Mans
Pontivy
Mauron
Ploermel
Martigne
Chateaubriant
Segre
Sable
La Fleche
Angers
Seiches
TOURS
NANTES
St. Nazaire
Savenay
VANNES
Redon
Rennebont
Lorient
Quimperle
Quimper
Carhaix
Landerneau
BREST
Morlaix
Lannion
Keramanach
St. Brieuc
ROUEN
Bernay
Bonnieres
Versailles
Maintenon
Chartres
Etampes
Nogent
ORLEANS
Vendome
Vierzonville
Chateauroux
Poitiers
la Roche

LEGEND

- P.T.T. Buried Cable
- German Buried Cable
- P.T.T. Overhead Line (Road)
- P.T.T. Overhead Line (Rail)
- German Overhead Line
- Repeater Station

28

SECRET

TOP SECRET
Auth: CO TUSA
Init:
Date: 13 May 44
Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX 4
OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
DIAGRAM OF ARMY RADIO NETS
(13 May 1944)

TOP SECRET BIGOT

RADIO COM – TUSA TO FUSA
ASSAULT PHASE PRIOR TO LANDING OF VIII CORPS



TOP SECRET BIGOT

TOP SECRET BIGOT

RADIO COM - TUSA TO VIII CORPS
PERIOD BETWEEN LANDING OF VIII CORPS AND LANDING OF FWD ECH TUSA



TOP SECRET BIGOT

RADIO COM TUSA
PERIOD BETWEEN LANDING OF FWD ECH TUSA AND LANDING OF XV CORPS



FURNISHED BY	RADIO TEAMS				
	399	193	177	506	284
THIRD ARMY	5	4	2	0	0
FIRST ARMY	1	0	0	0	0
CORPS	1	0	0	0	0
EACH CAV UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH ARMD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH TD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH ENGR UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EACH FA UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EACH AAA UNIT	0	0	1	0	0

TOP SECRET BIGOT

TOP SECRET BIGOT

TOP SECRET BIGOT

TOP SECRET BIGOT

RAD COM TUSA
PERIOD BETWEEN LANDING OF XV CORPS & XX CORPS



FURNISHED BY	RADIO TEAMS				
	399	193	177	506	284
THIRD ARMY	4	3	3	0	0
FIRST ARMY	1	0	0	0	0
CORPS	2	0	0	0	0
EACH CAV UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH ARMD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH TD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH ENGR UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EACH FA UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EACH AAA UNIT	0	0	1	0	0

LEGEND
⊗ SCR 399
⊖ SCR 193
⊜ SCR 177
⊙ SCR 506
○ SCR 284
● FIXED STATION

TOP SECRET BIGOT

RADIO COM TUSA
PERIOD BETWEEN LANDING OF XX CORPS AND XII CORPS



LEGEND
⊗ SCR 399
⊖ SCR 193
⊜ SCR 177
⊙ SCR 506
○ SCR 284
● FIXED STA

FURNISHED BY	RADIO TEAMS				
	399	193	177	506	284
THIRD ARMY	5	4	4	0	0
FIRST ARMY	1	0	0	0	0
CORPS	3	0	0	0	0
EA CAV UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EA TD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EA ARMD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EA ENGR UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EA FA UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EA AAA UNIT	0	0	1	0	0

TOP SECRET BIGOT

RADIO COM TUSA
PERIOD BETWEEN LANDING OF XII CORPS AND DATE FUSAG BECOMES OPERATIONAL



LEGEND:
⊗ SCR 399
⊖ SCR 193
⊜ SCR 177
⊙ SCR 506
○ SCR 284

FURNISHED BY	RADIO TEAMS				
	399	193	177	506	284
THIRD ARMY	6	4	4	0	0
FIRST ARMY	1	0	0	0	0
CORPS	4	0	0	0	0
EA CAV UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EA ARMD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EA TD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EA ENGR UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EA FA UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EA AAA UNIT	0	0	1	0	0
FUSAG	2	0	0	0	0

TOP SECRET BIGOT

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 4 - Signal Plan

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RADIO COM TUSA

PERIOD BETWEEN LANDING OF XV CORPS & XX CORPS

ALTERNATE PLAN



FURNISHED BY	RADIO TEAMS				
	399	193	177	506	284
THIRD ARMY	6	4	4	0	0
FIRST ARMY	1	0	0	0	0
CORPS	0	0	0	0	0
EACH CAV UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH AR UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH TD UNIT	0	0	0	1	0
EACH ENGR UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EACH FA UNIT	0	0	0	0	1
EACH AAA UNIT	0	0	1	0	0

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Init:
Date: 13 May 44
Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX 4

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

LINE ROUTE MAPS

(13 May 1944)

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LINE ROUTE MAP TUSA

AS OF D 30-50

MAP ~ EUROPE (AIR) LE HAVRE - PARIS



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Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 4 - Signal Plan

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TOP SECRET
Auth: C.G. TUSA
Init. O.R.N.
Date 5-13-44

ANNEX No 4 OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD

LINE ROUTE MAP TUSA

AS OF D30-50 XV CORPS LANDED

MAP ≈ EUROPE (AIR) LE HAVRE - PARIS



LEGEND

---MAL/S4 = MAL and/or S4
---20 (OW) = 20 WIRES OR 10 CIRCUITS
——— 2 (FW) = 2 FIELD WIRE CIRCUITS
(3+4) = 3 SPEECH + 4 Tr or Td
REHABILITATION ON ALL ROUTES WHERE POSSIBLE.

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Init. O.R.N.
Date 5-13-44

ANNEX No 4 OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD

LINE ROUTE MAP TUSA

AS OF D30-50
ALTERNATE PLAN 1

MAP ≈ EUROPE (AIR) LE HAVRE - PARIS



LEGEND

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REHABILITATION ON ALL ROUTES WHERE POSSIBLE.

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Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 4 - Signal Plan

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
Auth CG TUSA
Init ORH
Date 5-13-44

ANNEX N°4 OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD

LINE ROUTE MAP TUSA

AS OF D30-50
ALTERNATE PLAN 2

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

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(3+4) = 3 SPEECH + 4 Tr or Tg

REHABILITATION ON ALL ROUTES WHERE POSSIBLE.

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APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX 4
OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE RADIO NETS

(13 May 1944)

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TOP SECRET BIGOT
AUTH CG TUSA
INIT
DATE 1 JUN 44



THIRD US ARMY
EMERGENCY RAD INT CONTROL NETS
APPENDIX IV

TOP SECRET BIGOT

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Auth: CG, TUSA
Init:
Date: 13 May 44
Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX V TO ANNEX 4

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE CIRCUIT DIAGRAM

(13 May 1944)



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Date: 13 May 44
Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX 4

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

WIRE CIRCUIT DIAGRAMS

(13 May 1944)



APPENDIX 11b TO ANNEX 4 TO OPERATION PLAN TUSA
CIRCUIT DIAGRAM TUSA
EFFECTIVE AS OF D 30 - 30

ANNEX Nº 4 OF
THIRD US ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
Operation OVERLORD



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Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX 4

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

PROCEDURE PUBLICATIONS CHART

(Revised)

(13 May 1944)

PROCEDURE PUBLICATIONS CHART

Procedure	CCBP No	Title Used In RN	USN	US ARMY	RAF	USAAF	REGT SIGS	R SIGNALS
Combined Radio Telegraph (W/T) Procedure	CCBP1	CCBP1	CCBP1	FM 24-10 except Chap 11. "Single Call sign Method" will be used	AP3032	FM 24-10	Signal Training (All Arms) Pamphlet 5 (1943) Parts II and VI	Signal Training (All Arms) Pamphlet 5 (1943) Parts II & VI Will be superseded by Signal Training Pamphlet No. 8, Part I When published
Combined Operating	CCBP2	CCBP2	CCBP2 FM 24-11	FM 24-11 FM 24-11	AP3026 CCBP2	FM 24-11 FM 24-13	CCBP2 and Army Operating Sig- 1943	CCBP2 and Army Operating Signals 1943
Combined Radio Telephone (R/T) Procedure	CCBP3	Spc 16/43	CCBP3	FM 24-9 Procedure phrase "Silence" will not be used *	AP3032	FM 24-9	Signal Training (All Arms) Pamphlet 5, I & III	Signal Training (All Arms) Pamph let 5, I and III
Combined Teleprinter/Teletypewriter Procedure	CCBP4	CCBP4 and DTN Instr 2d ED	CCBP4	FM 24-8 and notes on teleprinter/ Teletypewriter Procedure 23 Aug 43	CCBP4 and DTN Instr 2d ED	FM 24-8 & notes on Teleprinter/ Teletypewriter Procedure 23 Aug 43		CCBP 4 and DTN Instructions 2d Ed. Will be Superseded by Signal Tng Pamphlet 8 Part IV, when published.
Combined Visual Signalling (VS) Procedure	CCBP5	CCBP5	CCBP5	FM 24-22	AP3032	FM 24-22	Signal Training (All Arms) Pamphlet 5 (1943) Part II	Sig Tng (All Arms) Pamphlet 5 (1943) Part 1 Amplified version to meet needs of Royal Signal in preparation will be known as Sig Tng Pamphlet 8, Part I.

* Without proper authentication.

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APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX 4

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

COMMUNICATION ZONE WIRE NETWORK

(13 May 1944)

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PROPOSED COMMUNICATION ZONE - WIRE DIAGRAM



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Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 5 - Engineer Plan

ANNEX 5

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ENGINEER PLAN

WITH APPENDICES:-

NO I - Tabulation of Engineer Troops (Page 39)

NO II - Engineer Operations (Page 39)

NO III - Map Plan (Page 40) with Inclosures:-

No 1 - (Page 41)

No 1a - (Page 41)

No 1b - (Page 41)

No 2 - (Page 41)

(10 May 1944)

PATTON
Comdg

GAFFEY
C of S

CONKLIN
Engr

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Subject	Paragraph
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Engineer Mission	2
Means Available	3
Functions and Responsibilities of Engineer Troops	4
Supply Plan - Prior to Operations	5
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Supply Levels	7
Exploitation of Local Supplies	8
Salvage and Captured Material	9
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Records and Nomenclature	12
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Priority and Requirements for Engineer Work -	
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POL Facilities	20
Engineer Intelligence	21
Engineer Reports	22
Firefighting	23
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ANNEX 5

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ENGINEER PLAN

SECTION I

SCOPE

1. The scope of this annex is to prescribe the mission of engineer troops, enumerate the means available, describe the functions and responsibilities of engineer troops, outline the supply plan, stipulate a general plan of engineer operations, outline priorities and requirements for engineer work, and describe such miscellaneous items as considered pertinent.

SECTION II

ENGINEER MISSION

2. The engineer mission is to support the operation through normal engineer functions.

SECTION III

MEANS AVAILABLE

3. A tabulation of engineer troops available is included in Appendix I.

SECTION IV

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ENGINEER TROOPS

4. The functions and responsibilities of the various echelons of engineer troops are as follows:

a. Division, Corps and Army engineer troops will be responsible for all engineer work within their respective zones. Support to the lower echelon will be accomplished by taking over work rather than by attachment of units.

b. The OVERLORD Engineer Plan prescribes that the engineer troops of the Com Z will support Army by executing the following within the Army Area:

(1) Installation of Bulk POL Facilities.

(2) Reconnaissance and reconstruction of railroads and railway bridges.

(3) Reconstruction of ports.

c. The OVERLORD Engineer Plan Prescribes that aviation engineer elements of the Ninth Air Force will be responsible for the construction of airfields. Assistance by Army engineers in the construction of advanced landing grounds will be limited by the availability of troops.

SECTION V

SUPPLY PLAN

5. Plan of Supply Immediately prior to Operations: (Prior to D-day)

a. Initial Engineer Supply Requirements.

(1) Units will depart with 100% Class II, T/E organizational Engineer equipment.

(2) Class IV Engineer supplies will accompany units in quantities within limits of available transportation.

b. Engineer Maintenance Requirements.

(1) Units will carry a 30-day reserve (an additional 100% of T/E allowances) of Class II expendable Engineer supplies, less explosives.

(2) All units will carry authorized spare parts and spare tool sets.

(3) Class II and IV maintenance reserve will be established by the Army Engineer.

c. Method of Supplying Requirements.

(1) Elements of Third Army will requisition Engineer supplies as required to insure that all units are fully supplied with initial and maintenance requirements prescribed in paragraph 4 a and b above.

(2) Third Army determines Engineer requirements for operations, informs FUSAG, the Advance Section Com Z and ETOUSA of the nature and extent of these requirements, and exercises supervision necessary to insure that requirements are satisfied by the mounting plan.

d. Supply Establishments in UK.

(1) Third Army will not establish Army Engineer Depots in the United Kingdom.

(2) All Engineer supply requirements will be issued from ETOUSA depots at points in the UK determined by ETOUSA.

6. Plan of Engineer Supply on Continent: (after D-day)

a. Prior to the establishment of Third Army Depots on the continent, Engineer supplies, all classes, will be supplied direct from communication zone depots for using units on approval of the Army Engineer.

b. Supply Procedure after Army Depots are Established.

(1) Class II Engineer supply (organizational equipment) will be stocked by Army Engineer Depots. Issue will be direct to divisions and separate troop units. Requisitions for non-controlled and/or non-supervised items of Class II Engineer supplies will be approved by the Engineer Depot Commander. Requisitions for controlled and supervised items will be approved by the Army Engineer.

(2) Class IV Engineer supplies (equipment and construction materials) will be stocked by Army Engineer Supply Depots and Advance Army Engineer Supply Points. Issues from Advance Army Engineer Supply Points will be direct to units on requisitions signed by an officer. Issues from Army Engineer Depots in Army areas will be on requisitions approved by the Army Engineer or against previously established credits.

(3) Spare parts section of Army Engineer Depots will stock and issue 1st, 2d and 3d echelon spare parts and spare tools for Engineer equipment. Issue will be direct to units on requisitions signed by the unit supply officer. No other approval is necessary.

(4) Class V Engineer supplies (explosives and land-mines) will be stocked in Ordnance ASPs in accordance with requirements established by the Army Engineer. Issue will be direct to units against previously established credits. (See Annex No 14, Ordnance Plan)

(5) Requisitioning units will furnish own transportation to move their supplies from Army Engineer Supply installations to destination.

7. Supply Levels.

a. Levels of Class II Engineer Maintenance supplies in all Army Engineer Depots will be seven (7) days.

b. Levels of Class IV Engineer supplies (construction, field fortifications, camouflage, road and bridge materials) in all Army Engineer Supply installations will be as directed by the Army Engineer based on foreseeable operations.

c. Division dumps will stock only such quantities of Class IV Engineer supplies as are required for immediate needs and can be moved by the division.

8. Exploitation of Local Supplies in Operational Area.

a. Local sources of engineer equipment and materials will be exploited to the maximum extent possible by all engineer units.

b. Initially divisions will exploit local engineer resources available in the division area. An immediate report, indicating on a sketch the location and nature of local resources available, will be made through technical channels to the Army Engineer.

c. The Army Engineer will take over, exploit, operate and

control the issue of all engineer equipment and material within the Army area.

d. Procurement of local supplies and rental of local equipment will be in accordance with "U S Forces ETO, Procurement Regulations," dated 24 February 1944.

9. Salvage and Captured Material.

a. Salvage.

(1) All unserviceable items of Engineer Class II supplies having a salvage value will be turned in on a certificate of fair wear and tear to the nearest Quartermaster Salvage Depot with the following exceptions:

(a) Damaged or worn out delicate instruments and drafting equipment will be turned in to the nearest Army Engineer depot for repairs or exchange.

(b) Items of engineer heavy equipment, such as tractors w/angledozer, graders, pneumatic tools, etc., whether damaged by enemy action or unserviceable through fair wear and tear, and which cannot be repaired by the using organization, will be turned in to the nearest Army Engineer Depot. Under no conditions will any of this equipment be cannibalized prior to turning in.

b. Captured Materials.

(1) All captured enemy engineer materials will be reported to the Army Engineer, giving the items on hand, the quantities and the locations. In the event that large dumps are captured, the fact will be reported to the Army Engineer by telephone, giving a general description of the items and location of the dump. The reporting unit will place a guard over the dump to prevent pilfering, until such time as the Army Engineer can take control.

(2) Commanding Officers of troops in the forward areas will not take for their own use, cannibalize, or destroy any captured engineer materials or equipment without prior approval of this headquarters.

10. Motor Transportation.

a. Normally, engineer troops have adequate organic transportation for the transport of unit equipment and supplies required for the current missions.

b. During initial operational phases where delivery of portions of the unit transportation has been delayed by echelon phasing of units, additional motor transportation may be required to implement engineer operations. This will be provided by quartermaster truck units in operational areas.

c. Transportation facilities will be required for the transport of engineer Class II and IV Supplies to and between engineer supply establishments. This will be provided by Transportation Corps and Quartermaster Truck units.

11. Maintenance of Engineer Equipment.

a. Units will perform 1st and 2d echelon maintenance on engineer equipment and in addition as much of higher maintenance as is within their capabilities.

b. Engineer Maintenance Companies normally will not perform 1st and 2d echelon maintenance to engineer equipment of other organizations.

c. Engineer equipment damaged or worn out beyond immediate repair will be evacuated to Army Engineer Depots for replacement.

12. Records and Nomenclature.

a. All issuing and stocking engineer units of Third Army will keep records of the quantities of all engineer items in stock. These records will be kept, using the numerical and alphabetical nomenclature of the ETOUSA Standard Nomenclature List of Engineer Supplies, OCE, ETOUSA, 1 February 1944.

SECTION VI

PLAN OF ENGINEER OPERATIONS

13. A general plan for army and corps operations will be found in Appendix II.

SECTION VII

PRIORITY AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ENGINEER WORK

14. Construction by elements of Third Army will be authorized in accordance with the following order of priority:

a. Priority No. 1:

Roads and Bridges.

b. Priority No. 2:

(1) Airfields.

(2) Hospitals.

(3) Rehabilitation of existing water supply facilities as necessary for military use.

(4) Maintenance Shops.

(5) Covered Storage.

(6) Personnel shelter for combat personnel in rest areas.

c. Priority No. 3:

(1) Personnel shelters.

(2) Rehabilitation of existing water facilities.

d. Priority No. 4:

(1) Electrical Supply Systems.

(2) Rehabilitation of Civil Installations.

15. Housing:

a. Standards of construction will be as specified in C2 SOP No. 1 (American Expeditionary Force Construction Standards) Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations United States Army. Use of British hutting will be limited to the standard types shown in Appendix H thereof.

b. Construction will be limited to those facilities which are indispensible to the support of the military effort.

16. Utilities:

a. Existing installations will be utilized to the maximum extent possible.

b. Construction of new or extensive rehabilitation of existing facilities will be effected only on authority of Army.

c. Utilities staffed and satisfactorily operated by local authorities will be permitted to continue operations under supervision and control of the Army Engineer. Where it is considered to be in the best interests of the military service engineer troops will be assigned to operate local utilities.

17. Roads and Bridges:

a. Classification and Marking.

(1) Classification:

(a) British road, bridge and vehicle classification and marking system will be used (See SHAEF Operation Memorandum No. 26, Load Classification of Bridges).

(b) Unit Engineers will be responsible for classifying bridges within their respective zones.

(2) Marking:

(a) Unit engineers will be responsible for marking within their respective zones the capacity of:

1. All bridges which are constructed (Including floating bridges);

2. Existing civilian bridges on all class 70 and class 40 roads and on such other additional roads as may be directed by higher authority;

3. And in addition road signs will be placed at suitable positions on the road approaching the bridge to classify the road and permit diversion of traffic if necessary.

(b) The Provost Marshall will be responsible for all other sign posting and route marking.

(c) Unit engineers will be responsible for the supply of signs and route marking materials.

b. Construction and maintenance of roads and bridges are area responsibilities of Army, Corps and Division Commanders.

c. Policy governing normal requirements for planning purposes:

(1) Roads to be provided and maintained within combat zone.

(a) One class 40 road per front line division forward of Corps rear boundary.

(b) One class 70 road and one class 40 road per Corps in rear of Corps boundary will be maintained by Army.

(c) Lateral roads at 10 mile intervals in rear of Corps rear boundary alternately class 70 and class 40 will be maintained by Army.

(d) Class 40 roads, except as otherwise noted, will be two-lane with one-lane class 40 bridges.

(e) Class 70 roads will be two-lane with one class 70 and one class 40 bridge at each river crossing.

(f) Operational bridges that can be used again, particularly Bailey Bridges, will be replaced as rapidly as possible. Corps will, to the best of its ability, pick up all surplus bridges on taking over from divisions.

(g) In some instances Army will specify the standards of construction of certain roads. This will generally be where a specific road net has some relation to the road net of another zone.

SECTION VIII

MISCELLANEOUS

18. Maps:

a. Maps for this operation will be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Map Plan - Appendix III

b. Stocks of captured maps will be forwarded promptly through Engineer technical channels to the Army Engineer.

c. Errors and inaccuracies of map details disclosed by direct observation will be reported through Engineer technical channels to the Army Engineer for correction.

19. Camouflage:

a. Supply dumps and other military installations will be camouflaged. Dummy installations may be erected when considered expedient.

b. Camouflage discipline will be closely supervised and rigidly enforced.

20. POL Facilities:

a. Construction, maintenance and operation of bulk facilities is a communication zone responsibility.

21. Engineer Intelligence:

a. Available Information:

The following publications containing engineer intelligence pertinent to this operation will be disseminated down to and including division engineers.

(1) ISIS Report on France, Vol 3, Brittany.

(2) Dossier of France, prepared by Intelligence Division, OCE, ETOUSA.

(3) Study of selected Routes in Northwest France, Intelligence Division, OCE, ETOUSA, 31 Dec 1943, 12 Jan 1944, 11 Feb 1944.

(4) Inland Routes, Northwest France, Intelligence Division, OCE, ETOUSA, 5 Jan 1944.

(5) Engineer Intelligence Notes, Engineer Headquarters, TUSA, (This will be a continuing series).

(6) Road and Bridge Data, Brittany, prepared by Office of the Engineer, TUSA.

b. Reconnaissance.

(1) Engineer intelligence will be collected and disseminated through technical engineer channels. All engineer units will conduct reconnaissance as necessary to procure the essential items of information, will evaluate the intelligence so procured, and will disseminate information promptly to appropriate headquarters and units.

c. Engineer Technical Intelligence Teams:

(1) One (1) Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Research) will be attached to Engineer Section, TUSA. The team will procure, inspect, crate, and prepare enemy equipment for shipment to the Engineer Board for research purposes; and make photos, reports, and recommendations on use of any new enemy equipment.

(2) One (1) Engineer Technical Intelligence Team (Combat) will be attached to each Corps. The team will assist in recognition and advise on use of enemy equipment, advise on and make photographic record of new enemy equipment, fortifications and demolitions, and report items of Engineer interest.

d. Air Reconnaissance Photography.

Requests for air photos required for engineer intelligence will be made by the Unit Engineer through AC of S, G-2 of each unit.

e. Responsibilities.

The collection, collation, evaluation, and dissemination of engineer intelligence will be coordinated and controlled during operational phases as follows:

(1) Prior to establishment of Army Engineer Headquarters in operational area; Corps Engineers.

(2) Subsequent to establishment of Army Engineer Headquarters in operational area; Army Engineer.

22. Engineer Reports:

a. During operations all separate army engineer units, will submit daily, an engineer operations report as of 1800 hours to reach Army Engineer by 0700 hours the following day. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Army Combat Groups will consolidate and submit reports covering attached units. Reports will include the following:

(1) Initial location and changes of CPs.

(2) Casualties of key personnel (company commanders or higher).

(3) Shortages or casualties of major items of equipment or supplies which is affecting combat efficiency.

(4) Operations on which unit is engaged and estimated completion date.

(5) Routine engineer intelligence items not previously reported.

b. Group headquarters and separate army units will report changes in location of CPs and other items of special importance separately by most expeditious means of communication available.

23. Firefighting:

a. Firefighting is a command responsibility. Normally, fire guard and firefighting personnel will be made available by unit commanders from existing personnel allotments and assigned duties as required by the situation.

b. The Army Engineer will exercise technical supervision of firefighting within Third Army And in coordination with communication zone engineer, and civil affairs will act through command and technical engineer channels to effect the necessary control and coordination of all firefighting activities, including the employment of engineer firefighting units, Transportation Corps Fire Boats, and the civilian firefighting units within their respective areas.

24. Real Estate:

a. The term "real estate" as used herein, includes land, buildings, piers, docks and wharves; office and storage space, rights of way, or easements; billets, and any interests which may be acquired or held therein, together with such personal property as is taken and used in connection with the real property on which such personal property is located.

b. The acquisition of real estate is an Engineer Function. (Procedure for acquisition of Real Estate in Occupied and Liberated Territories in the European Theatre of Operations) Hq ETOUSA, dated 18 April 1944.

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX 5

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

TABULATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS

(10 May 1944)

TABULATION OF ENGINEER TROOPS

UNIT	TOTAL	VIII	XV	ARMY	XX	XII
Hq & Hq Co, Engr C Gp	10	1	1	5	2	1
Engr Combat Bn	16	3	5	8	-	-
Engr Hv Pon Bn	6	-	-	6	0	0
Engr Top Bn (Army)	1	-	-	1	-	-
Engr Water Supply Co	3	-	-	3	-	0
Engr Depot Gp	3	-	-	3	-	0
Engr L Equip Co	4	1	1	2	-	-
Engr Maint Co	4	1	1	2	-	-
Engr Dp Trk Co	3	-	-	3	-	-
Engr L Pon Co	10	1	1	4	3	1
Engr Treadway Br Co	6	-	1	2	2	1
Engr Top Co (Corps)	4	1	1	-	1	1
Engr Utility Det	1	-	-	1	-	-
Engr Survey Liaison Det	1	-	-	1	-	-

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX 5

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ENGINEER OPERATIONS

(10 May 1944)

ENGINEER OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. The Engineer Plan contains an assignment of engineer missions for corps and army engineer troops and a general plan for the execution of engineer work in accordance with these missions.

b. For the purpose of planning engineer work, it is anticipated that:

(1) Headquarters Third U.S. Army will become operative on the continent on D plus 28-30.

(2) VIII Corps will revert to Third U.S. Army on D plus 28-30 and will probably be employed to drive to the south-west to assist First U.S. Army in the taking of VANNES.

(3) XV Corps will arrive on the continent beginning on D plus 29 and may be employed to:

(a) Assist VIII Corps or:

(b) Drive west to clear the BRITTANY PENINSULA.

(4) On D plus 40 the reduction of the BRITTANY PENINSULA will have reached the general north-south line of ST BRIEUC - LORIENT at which time the VIII and XV Corps may be employed in one of the following ways:

(a) Either XV Corps alone, or

(b) VIII and XV Corps abreast, with the XV Corps on the north, may be called upon to complete the reduction of the BRITTANY PENINSULA by D plus 55.

(5) The XX and XII Corps will arrive on the continent subsequent to D plus 45 and, together with other Third U.S. Army units, will be consentrated on the right of the First U.S. Army facing east prepared for further action.

(6) An alternate plan is under consideration providing for an amphibious operation by the XX Corps. Details will be announced later.

2. Engineer Operations.

a. Corps Engineer will be responsible for all engineer work in the Corps zone.

b. Army Engineers will support the operations of the corps as soon after D plus 45 as the situation permits and will be responsible for all engineer work in the army area.

3. Engineer Work.

a. Roads and Bridges

(1) Army and Corps.

(a) The minimum density of roads which will be maintained by army and corps is outlined in paragraph 17, Sec VI, Annex 5.

(2) Corps and Division.

(a) Roads which may be needed by divisions and corps for forward movement will not be maintained by army and may be of any class required by the situation.

(3) Corps will be responsible for all road and bridge construction and maintenance until corps rear boundaries have been established by army.

(4) Impetus for road and bridge maintenance will be forwarded from the rear, i.e. corps will take over division roads, and army, corps roads as quickly as possible.

b. Field fortifications will consist of mines and barbed wire with necessary emplacements, other than concrete or steel, to defend the same.

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX 5

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

MAP PLAN

(10 May 1944)

MAP PLAN

1. General.

a. Initially it is anticipated that large topographic and photomaps at scale 1/25,000 will be available over the Northern coastal regions of France to a depth of 100 miles, and topographic maps, scale, 1/50,000 to a depth of 175 miles. The 1/100,000 series will be available over the entire area of France. The 1/250,000 scale over France and extending into Central Germany while smaller scale maps extend still farther. A general evaluation of maps series can be obtained from GSGS publication notes on GSGS maps of France, Belgium and Holland.

b. The following plan stipulates the function and responsibilities of the elements concerned with map supply and distribution.

c. It will prescribe procedure for security and distribution for TUSA during period "D" to "D" plus for the operation "OVERLORD."

d. For convenience of reference the paragraphs have been arranged as follows:

(1) General

(2) Available Maps

(3) Source of Supply

(4) Responsibility for Supply

(5) Distribution and Basis for Issue

(6) Reserve

(7) Salvage and Replacement

(8) Kodaline Negatives

(9) Topographic Units (TUSA)

(10) Photography for Mapping

(11) Control

(12) Model Making

(13) Security

2. Available Maps.

a. Strategical Maps

(1) 1/1,000,000 GSGS 2758 (General use by higher headquarters).

(2) 1/500,000 (Air) GSGS 4072 (Available in operational quantities to Air Forces and limited quantities to Ground Forces.

b. Tactical Maps

(1) 1/250,000 (Air) GSGS 3982 (Same as 1/500,000).

(2) 1/250,000 GSGS 2738, 4042, 4346 (General Issue).

(3) 1/100,000 GSGS 4336, 4219, 4416 (Principally for Armored Forces and Airborne Units).

(4) 1/50,000 GSGS 4250 (General Issue).

(5) 1/25,000 GSGS 4347, 4365, 4041 (Special use by Artillery, Infantry, Engineer and Headquarters).

(6) 1/25,000 (Photo) (Special use by Artillery, Infantry, Engineers and Headquarters).

c. Road Maps

1/200,000 GSGS 4238 (General Use).

d. Town Plans

(1) Selected towns GSGS 4234 (Limited special issue).

(2) Through town plans, France - volumes 1-6 (Distribution governed by availability).

e. Communication Maps

1/800,000 GSGS 4438 (Limited special edition).

f. Gazeteers

1/250,000 (France, Belgium and Holland) (Limited special issue).

g. Trig data sheets: (Limited to Army and Corps Engineers and Artillery Observation Battalions).

h. Map Indices: (Limited to Army, Corps and Division Engineers and G-2 and G-3).

3. Source of Supply.

Source of supply is set forth in Inclosure 2.

4. Responsibility for Supply.

a. The control of supply of maps is the responsibility of the Engineer FUSAG, The Army Engineer and Engineer CZ are responsible for the supply of maps to the elements of their respective organizations.

b. Within the CZ the Engineer CZ is responsible for the operation of such map depots, except Air Force map depots that may be required to effect the bulk distribution of maps. The Engineer Air Force is responsible for the operation of Air Force depots.

c. The Engineer ETOUSA will operate and maintain map depots in the UK for initial map requirements of troops embarking from the UK for the Continent. The Engineer CZ will operate and maintain one advance map depot per army, on the Continent for bulk distribution and such base map depots as he requires. During the time the CZ is under FUSAG control, the establishment of the depot will be directed by the Engineer FUSAG. Each advance map depot will contain not less than 10,000 square feet of covered floor space. The Engineer FUSAG will keep the Engineer CZ informed as to the probable advance requirements, and immediate requirements for the advance depots and will recommend the movement of the advance map depots to comform with the tactical situation.

d. The Army Engineer will draw in bulk from the advance map depot and will be responsible for the setting up of map depots within their own areas to effect distribution.

5. Distribution and Basis for Issue.

a. The maps as listed in Paragraph 2, will form basis of all requests.

b. For operation where surprise is an important element, initial issue of maps will be handled in coded rolls containing 20 and 50 maps each.

c. General principles governing allowances will be those in Section 3, FM 30-20 and Letter, ETOUSA, dated 12 March 1944, subject: "Production, Supply and Distribution of Maps," and will also be shown by allowance tables for organizations to be prepared by Army Engineer.

d. If units of TUSA are to be used as build up troops on the Continent, they will be mapped in the UK with limited numbers of required maps. An advance map depot for TUSA will be set up by the Engineer CZ to provide the troops with operational maps of their tactical areas. Time to set up depot will be determined by FUSAG.

6. Reserve.

a. Advance map depots will maintain a 21-day supply. Army Engineers will maintain a 7-day reserve supply including any reserve distributed to the troops.

b. Replenishment of maps will be on requisition to advance map depots.

c. For estimating purposes Army Engineer will furnish the Engineer FUSAG with a forecast of their probable need of maps by sheet numbers and quantity monthly. Forecasts will be based on anticipated needs 30 days in advance. Forecasts will also be presented when any major change develops that will materially effect the quantity of maps desired in areas concerned.

7. Salvage and Replacement.

a. All maps no longer grquired by troop units for current operations will be turned in at the source of map supply.

b. Map replacement will be effected by the initiative of the troop unit requiring such replacement by requisition (written or oral) through normal map supply channels. Reserve stocks will be established at all map depots to provide normal replenishment of maps.

8. Kodaline Negatives.

a. Kodaline negatives of all pertinent map sheets of the following GSGS series will be available for issue on the basis of (1) set per Engineer Topographic Battalion (Army) and Engineer Topographic Company (Corps):

(1) 1/250,000

(2) 1/100,000

(3) 1/50,000

(4) 1/25,000

b. The TUSA will procure kodaline negatives from FUSAG and will make distribution to topographic units.

9. Topographic Units (TUSA).

Topographic units of Corps and Army will carry but nominal assignments and in addition may be called upon to furnish personnel for map depots.

10. Photography for Mapping.

a. The Engineer FUSAG in connection with G-2 FUSAG will recommend to director of surveys SHAEF aerial photography for the long range mapping program.

b. Each Army Engineer will maintain diagrams showing the availability of existing mapping photography within his area. Insofar as possible the Engineer FUSAG will provide each Army Engineer with negatives of the area in which his troops are operating.

11. Control.

a. Trig lists will be allocated to Army Engineers for topographic and Artillery troops by the Engineer FUSAG. Efforts will be made to secure data for adjusted control for units concerned.

b. Grid system: Normally the British grid system will be used. Tables will be furnished for conversion of geographic positions to grid positions for each zone and will be available to Army and Corps Engineers, Army and topographic units, and Artillery Observation Battalions.

12. Model Making.

Request for model making will be submitted through the Engineer, TUSA to Engineer FUSAG indicating the scale both horizontal and vertical, the number of copies and kind and amount of detail needed.

13. Security.

Prior to "D" day the issue of operations maps will be rigidly restricted and will be made upon request only to Corps and Divisional Headquarters in quantities necessary for staff planning. Operational maps will not be issued until units have been briefed and then only upon approval of the appropriate AC of S, G-2 and will be treated in accordance with provisions of Paragraph 12, "Planning Maps," security memorandum No. 2, this Headquarters, 26 March 1944.

2 Incls:

Incl. No. 1 - Selected Map Coverage
Incl. No. 2 - Source of Map Supply

SELECTED MAP COVERAGE

1. General.

a. This inclosure stipulates the map coverage selected for the first and second phases of "OVERLORD" plan.

b. Specific sheets selected are as follows:

(1) GSGS 2758, Europe, 1/1,000,000

Stage 1: Sheets M30 & Part M31, L30 & Part L31.

Stage 2: Sheets M32 & Part M31, L32 & Part L31.

(2) GSGS 4072, Europe (Air), 1/500,000

Stage 1: Sheets Brest, Le Havre and Nantes.

Stage 2: Sheets Paris, Dijon, Lyon and Bordeaux.

(3) GSGS 3982, Europe (Air), 1/250,000

Stage 1: Sheets M30/8, M30/9, M30/10, M30/11, M30/12, L30/2 and L30/3.

Stage 2: Sheets M31/10, M31/11, L31/1, L31/2. L30/6, L31/4 and L31/5.

(4) GSGS 2738, France, (Army Air), 1/250,000

Stage 1: Sheets 7A & 13A, 7, 3A, and 8,13, 14 and 20.

Stage 2: Sheets 15, 16, 21 and 22.

(5) GSGS 4042, NW Europe (Army Air), 1/250,000

Stage 1: None.

Stage 2: Sheets 7 and 8.

(6) GSGS 4219, France, 1/100,000

Stage 1: Sheets 5E, 6E, 5F, 6F, 7F, 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G, 6G, 2H, 3H, 4H, 5H, 6H, 4J, 5J, 6J, 5K and 6K.

Stage 2: Sheets 7G, 8G, 9G, 10G, 7H, 8H, 9H, 10H, 7J, 8J, 9J, 10J, 7K, 8K, 9K, 10K, 5L, 6L, 7L, 8L, 9L and 10L.

(7) GSGS 4250, France, 1/50,000

Stage 1 & 2: See inclosure 1a.

(8) GSGS 4347, France (Western), 1/25,000

Stage 1 & 2: See inclosure 1b.

(9) GSGS 4041, NE France & Belgium, 1/25,000

Stage 1 & 2: See inclosure 1b.

(10) GSGS 4238, Road Map Michelin, 1/200,000

Stage 1: Sheets 54, 58, 59, 63 and 67.

Stage 2: Sheets 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71,72 and 73.

(11) Photomaps, Western France, 1/25,000

Stage 1 & 2: For use in substitution of maps in (8) and (9) above when not available.

(12) GSGS 4438, Communications Map, 1/800,000

Stage 1: Western France Sheet.

Stage 2: Holland, Belgium and Central Germany sheet and SE France and Switzerland sheet.

(13) GSGS 4234, town plans, France

Stage 1 & 2: As available.

(14) Through Town Plans

Stage 1: Volume 2 and Volume 3.

Stage 2: Volume 4 and Volume 6.

(15) Gazeteers, France. Belgium, Holland, 1/250,000

Stage 1 & 2.

(16) Gazeteers, France, 1/50,000

Stage 1 & 2.

(17) Map Indices

Stage 1 & 2: GSGS 2758, 4072, 3982, 2738, 4042, 4219, 4250, 4347, 4041, 4238, 4438, 4234, Photomaps of Western France.

(18) Hydrographic Charts, Defense Overprints, Trig Data Sheets, Collation Maps.

Stage 1 & 2: As available.

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX 5 TO THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN OPERATIONS OVERLORD

TOP SECRET



INCLOSURE 1a
MAP INDEX, GSGS 4250
SCALE 1/50,000

LEGEND
Stage 1 ___
Stage 2 _ _ _

SECRET

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX 5 TO THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN OPERATION OVERLORD



INCLOSURE 1b
MAP INDEX - GSGS 4041, 4347, & 4365
SCALE 1/25,000

TOP SECRET

SOURCE OF MAP SUPPLY

Description			Supply
Type	Scale	Original Source	Source
Strategic	1/1,000,000 to 1/500,000	War Office (GSGS)	ETOUSA
Tactical	1/250,000 to 1/25,000	War Office (GSGS)	ETOUSA
Road Maps	1/200,000	War Office (GSGS)	ETOUSA
Photomaps	1/25,000	ETOUSA	ETOUSA
Town Plans	Miscellaneous	War Office (GSGS)	ETOUSA
Defense Overprints	1/50,000 to 1/12,500	War Office (GSGS)	ETOUSA
Trig Station data maps	1/50,000	ETOUSA	ETOUSA
Map Indices	Miscellaneous	War Office (GSGS)	ETOUSA
SPecial Maps	Miscellaneous	TUSA	TUSA

INCLOSURE #2

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 6 - Antiaircraft Artillery Plan

TOP SECRET
Register No TUSA 75

ANNEX 6

TO

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

AAA PLAN

WITH APPENDICES:-

I - Organization of Tactical Air Command

II - Organization of Third U. S. Army Antiaircraft Artillery

(13 May 1944)

PATTON
Comdg

CHAMBERLAIN
AA Officer

GAFFEY
C of S

AAA PLAN

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ANNEX 6

TO

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

AAA PLAN

SECTION I

SITUATION

1. Situation.

a. General Situation.

See Annex No 7.

b. Air Situation.

(1) Reference: Third U.S. Army G-2 Estimate No 1 for Operation Overlord, Sec I, par 2d; Sec II, par 3.

(2) By daylight, fighters and fighter-bombers at low altitudes, may be expected to attack SOS installations, shipping in ports and off beaches, and to exert maximum effort to neutralize airfields and to interfere with the advance of the Army.

(3) By darkness, heavy bombers operating at medium and high altitudes, may be expected to attack SOS installations and shipping in ports and off beaches. Fighter-bombers may be expected to make low altitude attacks against SOS installations and airfields. Low-flying aircraft will endeavor to mine waters estimated to be most sensitive to our supply lines.

(4) It seems likely that the enemy's air strength will be conserved for use against only those vital targets which he estimates will most hamper the advance of our field forces and disrupt the supply coming in over beaches and through ports. An attack in strength may be expected against any vital target. It is estimated the GAF can send a force of at least 100 aircraft to attack any vital target, and that this effort can be maintained to D ∕ 60.

(5) By D ∕ 25, it is estimated enemy air strength within striking distance of the target will be approximately 410 aircraft. These, it is assumed, must operate from airfields 200 or more miles from the target area, closer fields being unoperational. Enemy operational fields, will be located in northern France, south central France, and Belgium.

(6) Strength available to attack the target area and maximum sorties possible are estimated to be as follows:

Planes		Sorties
120 Long-range bombers	1 sortie per 24 hrs	120
150 Single-engine fighters	2 sorties per 24 hrs	300
80 Twin-engine fighters	2 sorties per 24 hrs	160
15 Ground attack aircraft	2 sorties per 24 hrs	30
45 Reconnaissance bombers	½ sortie per 24 hrs	22
410		632

(7) Assuming that strategic bombing of occupied Europe will continue, it is estimated that by D ∕ 25, enemy aircraft will be reinforced only by those planes repaired and by small reinforcements from outlying theaters.

(8) It is likely that the GAF, after giving consideration to the apparent missions of the several armies, will concentrate on objectives in the target area in proportion to the relative importance they attach to them after D ∕ 25.

c. Naval Situation.

It is expected that the enemy naval effort will be confined to sporadic attacks on ships and port installations or ships en route by the use of light naval craft, such as destroyers, torpedo boats, E boats, and submarines. The attacks will probably be confined to the hours of darkness.

SECTION II

MISSION

2. Mission.

The primary mission of antiaircraft artillery of Third U.S. Army is to provide antiaircraft artillery protection for vital targets in the Third U.S. Army Zone of action on the Continent against enemy activity. It will also be employed to reinforce field artillery and to provide coast defense protection when appropriate. To accomplish this mission antiaircraft artillery will utilize:

a. The fire power of AA weapons to destroy enemy aircraft and other targets, or to interfere with their effective action.

b. Antiaircraft artillery searchlights, if available, to illuminate hostile aircraft for AA gun fire, to assist friendly fighters and to dazzle enemy pilots.

c. Barrage balloons, if available, as a deterrent against low altitude attacks.

d. Smoke, if available, to screen vital targets.

SECTION III

AIR DEFENSE PLAN

3. Basic Air Defense Plan

a. The Third U.S. Army zone of action includes the area within the Third U.S. Army boundaries from front line to a line to be known as the Army Rear Air Boundary. The Army Rear Air Boundary is a line agreed upon by the Field and Air Force Commanders. All active means of air defense, including antiaircraft artillery guns, automatic weapons, searchlights, barrage balloons, smoke screens, fighter aircraft, and Air Warning Service will be employed in a coordinated and complementary defense over this zone.

b. The Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army is responsible for the antiaircraft artillery defenses of this zone, including airfields within it. All antiaircraft artillery within the zone will be assigned or attached to Third U.S. Army.

c. The Commanding General of the XIX Tactical Air Command is responsible for the fighter defense and the Air Warning Service within the Third U.S. Army zone.

d. Responsibility for air defense measures behind the Third U.S. Army Rear Air Boundary will be in accordance with policies announced by the Army Group Commander.

e. The Commanding Generals of the Third U.S. Army and the XIX Tactical Air Command will coordinate all active means of air defense through a combined Fighter Control-Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Center.

f. To accomplish such coordination, an operations memorandum will be published which will define the responsibilities of antiaircraft artillery and the restrictions on fire which may be imposed by the Tactical Air Commander in the interest of safeguarding or assisting friendly aircraft operating over the area.

g. The Commanding General of the Third U.S. Army will be informed by the Commanding General XIX Tactical Air Command, as to when and where airfields in the Third Army zone will be utilized or constructed, when they will become operational, and the priority for their defense.

h. The Commanding General of the XIX Tactical Air Command will be constantly informed as to the disposition of antiaircraft artillery units and also as to which antiaircraft artillery units are to be employed in a primary field artillery or coast defense role in order that the necessary redistribution of fighter aircraft may be made.

i. Antiaircraft Artillery and Tactical Air Commanders will maintain liaison and coordination with Passive Air and Fire Defense, and Civil Defense agencies in order to insure compliance with and enforcement of policies of the agencies as announced in SHAEF Operations Memoranda.

4. Air Defense Measures.

a. Day.

It is expected during daylight hours that a considerable

degree of air superiority will be maintained over the Third U.S. Army area, using fighter aircraft based on airfields captured or constructed on the Continent, or in the UK. The primary weapon for air defense by day will therefore be fighter aircraft, supplemented by antiaircraft artillery

b. Night.

A comparable degree of air superiority cannot be maintained at night due to limitations on the number of night fighters which can be controlled over the Third U.S. Army area. Maximum reliance will therefore have to be placed on radar-controlled antiaircraft artillery gun batteries.

SECTION IV

ORGANIZATION

5. Organization.

a. The XIX Tactical Air Command consists of the 100th and 303d Fighter Wings, seven Fighter Groups (each group having three Fighter Squadrons), two Fighter Control Squadrons, one Air Warning Battalion, and two Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Group. (See Organization Chart, Appendix I)

b. Antiaircraft artillery units of Third U.S. Army consist of Hq & Hq Btry 38th AAA Brigade, seven AAA Group Hq & Hq Btrys, six AAA Gun Bns (Mbl), seventeen AAA AW Bns (Mbl), and eight AAA AW Bns (SP). (See Organization Chart, Appendix II)

c. Additional AAA units from FUSAG will be requested by Third U.S. Army if the assigned antiaircraft artillery is insufficient to provide adequate defense of all vital installations in Third U.S. Army area.

SECTION V

INITIAL VITAL TARGETS

6. Initial Vital Targets.

a. Artificial Anchorages.

Any artificial anchorage which might be used would be extremely vulnerable to air attack and would be a vital target from the time construction starts. Such anchorages must receive first priority for antiaircraft protection.

b. Beaches and Beach Maintenance Areas.

Initially, beached craft, troops and supplies on the beaches will present a profitable target for air attack. While part of the enemy effort during the early stages may be diverted to troops advancing inland beyond the beach AAA coverage, the maximum air effort can still be concentrated on the beaches, beach exits, road net works and supply and maintenance installations in the beach area. Until such time as reserves of troops and supplies are built up, the entire operation can be seriously impeded by air action if the scale of AAA protection is reduced below minimum requirements.

c. Ports.

Port facilities which are captured will require antiaircraft defenses as a first priority target. Rapid repair and uninterrupted use of these ports are essential to the success of the operation.

d. Airfields.

Continued maximum air effort on the part of the AEAF is largely dependent upon securing airfields on the Continent. It is probable that enemy air effort will be directed towards preventing construction of these fields. When the airfields are completed, the enemy will probably expend every effort to prevent them from becoming operational. The limited number of airfields which can be constructed and placed in operation during the early phase of operations will necessitate giving their defense a first priority at a greater than normal scale.

e. Forward Areas.

Lift available during the assault phase precludes furnishing AAA coverage at the desired scale for targets other than those which have first priority. It is extremely doubtful that large-scale air attacks will be directed at forward areas until the covering position is reached and enemy ground forces are able to counterattack in force. Division and Corps AAA AW Battalions therefore will probably not be required in forward areas until this phase is reached.

7. Scale of AAA Defense.

The scale of antiaircraft artillery defense for vital targets will be published at a later date.

SECTION VI

OPERATIONS

8. Air Defense Operations.

a. General.

(1) Air defense in the Third U.S. Army area will be maintained through the close coordination of fighter aircraft employed in area defense, and antiaircraft artillery employed to provide the close-in defense of vital targets. Pending establishment of the Fighter Control-Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Center and communication facilities on the Continent, coordination will be maintained through adherence to prearranged zones of action and rules for opening fire.

(2) The Antiaircraft Artillery Officer, Third U.S. Army, will coordinate the employment of all antiaircraft artillery, barrage balloons and smoke screens in the Third U.S. Army zone of action and will maintain liaison with adjacent antiaircraft artillery defenses on flanks and in rear of the Third U.S. Army.

(3) (a) The Commanding General 38th AAA Brigade will command Army AAA units, not attached to Corps, including barrage balloon and searchlight units if assigned to Army.

(b) He will coordinate the use of gun battalions attached to Corps with those of Army when an area defense is established which employs both Corps and Army units.

(4) Commanding Officers of Antiaircraft Artillery Groups assigned or attached to Corps will be responsible for the coordination of Corps and Division Antiaircraft Artillery in overlapping zones of action. Operational control of these units, including restrictions on operations will be exercised through the Commanding General 38th AAA Brigade from the Fighter Control-Antiaircraft Artillery Operations Center, when such units are included in the air defense communication system.

(5) Instructions for operational control of antiaircraft artillery will be published in an operations memorandum. Continuously directed fire will normally be employed unless the density of attacking aircraft is such that barrage fire must be resorted to in an effort to force the enemy to abandon the attack.

b. Initial Operations (Amphibious).

(1) Sufficient Army antiaircraft artillery from the 38th AAA Brigade will be included in early assault waves to organize and coordinate the beach antiaircraft defenses for landing operations of following elements.

(2) Corps antiaircraft artillery will be disposed to furnish antiaircraft artillery protection from landing craft while en route from ship to shore; will supplement the beach defenses of (1) above while its units are landing; and will then pass on with the Corps.

(3) Barrage balloons, if available, will be employed as a deterrent.

(4) Smoke screens may be employed, in accordance with operational instructions to be issued, to screen vital targets when smoke generators are available.

c. Subsequent Operations.

(1) Normally antiaircraft artillery units attached to a division will be employed for the protection of artillery, supply trains and troop concentrations.

(2) Antiaircraft artillery units attached to a corps will be employed for the protection of artillery, concentrations, routes of approach and landing strips.

(3) Protection of railheads, landing fields, ammunition supply points, supply installations and important routes of approach will be the responsibility of Corps and Army, coordinated by Army.

9. Coast Defense Operations.

a. The primary means of defense against naval attack will be naval and air forces.

b. Antiaircraft artillery guns and automatic weapons sited near the shore will be prepared to fire at naval targets. During the initial phases of this operation, antiaircraft artillery will fire on water-borne targets identified as enemy by the Navy, only when such fire is requested by the Navy. At a later date, certain AAA gun batteries and automatic weapons may be assigned a primary coast defense role.

c. Smoke screens may be employed in coast defense operations in accordance with instructions to be issued later.

d. Searchlights sited near the shore will illuminate water-borne targets only on request of the Navy, until such time as certain lights are assigned a primary coast defense role. When assigned a primary coast defense role, searchlights will be employed in accordance with instructions to be issued later.

10. Antiaircraft Artillery in Ground Role.

a. When not required for their primary mission, antiaircraft artillery gun units may be employed to reinforce field artillery fire from position or from selected ground-fire positions for a specific mission or time-period.

b. Except to meet an emergency, release will be secured from the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army prior to such employment of Corps units which form part of an area defense coordinated by the Commanding General 38th AAA Brigade.

SECTION VII

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

11. Captured Material.

Captured enemy antiaircraft artillery and coast defense guns, fire control equipment, ammunition, radar, signal equipment, or searchlights will be utilized as far as possible to augment antiaircraft and coast defense fire power. Report on all captured material will be forwarded to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army as soon as practicable.

12. Passive Air and Fire Defense, and Civil Defense.

Fire unit, searchlight, and AAAIS personnel will, when not engaged in action against enemy forces, render every possible assistance to PA & FD and CD personnel.

13. Local Security.

Antiaircraft artillery fire units will provide their own local security, employing organic weapons, in coordination with adjacent field forces. Fire units will be prepared to support adjacent field forces by fire from position in case of enemy break through or mechanized attack.

14. Meteorological Messages.

9th Air Force Mobile Weather Detachments, under G-2, with Army and Corps will furnish Met messages as required. To further the securing of this ballistic data, all AAA units equipped with radar SCR-584 will cooperate to the fullest.

15. Air Identification and Recognition.

a. Identification.

(1) World-wide codes for pyrotechnic means of identification between airplane and ground are established and will be disseminated through SOI.

(2) Plane markings and symbols will be announced from time to time by the 9th Air Force through the 19th Tactical Air Command and G-2, Third U.S. Army.

b. Recognition.

(1) A high measure of efficiency in recognition of airplanes is mandatory for all antiaircraft units.

(2) Minimum requirements, as to airplane types, are listed in TM No. 44, ETOUSA, 1943.

16. Grid System.

The standard British (Military) Grid system will be employed in reporting the location of antiaircraft artillery fire units, as well

as enemy and friendly aircraft. Location of all antiaircraft artillery fire units, barrage balloons and searchlights will be plotted on the air defense operations board at Fighter Control-Antiaircraft Artillery Operations center.

17. Ammunition.

a. All AAA units will carry their basic loads of ammunition as prescribed by letter, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, subject: "Basic Loads of Ammunition", file AG 471 GNMCO-3, dated 24 April 1944.

b. In the event AAA units are required to furnish antiaircraft protection aboard ships, the unit commanders concerned will be responsible for requisitioning additional ammunition for this purpose. Basic load will not be expended.

c. If an AAA unit is designated as an assault unit, it will carry one (1) unit of fire in addition to the prescribed basic load.

Appendix I to Annex 6 of
Third U.S. Army Outline Plan
Operation OVERLORD



Notes:
* Fighter Control Squadrons
1 P-47 Group
3 P-51 Group

Appendix II to Annex 6 of
Third U.S. Army Outline Plan
Operation OVERLORD



Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 7 - G-2 Estimate

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG, TUSA
Init: CEH
Date: 23 April 44
Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 7

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-2 ESTIMATE NO. I

(23 APRIL 1944)

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PLATE NO. 2 - Boundaries of Major Components of ARMY GROUP "D" -- (Page 49)

PLATE NO. 3 - Existing Airfields and Sites -- (Page 50)

PLATE NO. 4 - Enemy Build-Up D/25 -- (Page 51)

PLATE NO. 5 - Enemy Build-Up D/35 -- (Page 51)

PLATE NO. 6 - Enemy Build-Up D/50 -- (Page 51)

PLATE NO. 7 - Battle Order European Theatre -- (Page 52)

23 April 1944

G-2 ESTIMATE NO. 1

OPERATION OVERLORD

Maps: GSGS 2736, FRANCE, 1/250,000, Sheets: 7a & 13a, 7, 13, 3a and 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 37, 41, 42. GSGS 4042, NW EUROPE, 1/250,000, Sheets: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 2a & 3b; and Plate No. 2 appended.

SECTION I. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. ACTUAL CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION IN THE WEST (FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND.)

a. GENERAL.

On the basis of available data (17 April 1944) the Germans are estimated to have a total of fifty-two divisions and one Eastern Legion in the West, (FRANCE, BELGIUM AND HOLLAND) divided as follows: FRANCE forty-four divisions and one Eastern Legion; BELGIUM four divisions; HOLLAND four divisions. (See Plate No. 1).

The West is defended by ARMY GROUP "D" (See Plate No. 2) with headquarters at ST GERMAIN-en-LAYE (P8849), under the command of Generalfeldmarschall Gerd Von RUNDSTEDT, 68, who commanded ARMY GROUP "A" in the Western campaign and ARMY GROUP "S" at the beginning of the RUSSIAN campaign. RUNDSTEDT functions in a dual capacity. As the head of the Occupation Authority in the WEST, he has STUELPNAGEL (FRANCE), FALKENHAUSEN (BELGIUM), and CHRISTIANSEN (HOLLAND) directly under him. As military commander of ARMY GROUP "D" he commands all Armies in the WEST. ARMY GROUP "D" is composed of the First, Seventh, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Armies, and the LXXXVIII Corps.

PLATE NO. 1

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE
FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND

OVERALL FRANCE			NORTHWEST FRANCE		
ARM (Divs)	OFF	DEF	ARM (Divs)	OFF	DEF
INF.	6	20	INF.	2	8
PZ.	2		PZ.	1	
SS PZ.	1		SS PZ.		
PZ. GR.			PZ. GR.		
SS PZ. GR.	1		SS PZ. GR.		
PZ. RES.		3	PZ. RES.		1
INF. RES.		8	INF. RES.		
GAF FIELD		2	GAF FIELD		
PARA.	1		PARA.		
TOTALS	11	33	TOTALS	3	9
COMBINED TOTALS	44		COMBINED TOTALS	12	

BELGIUM			HOLLAND		
ARM (Divs)	OFF	DEF	ARM (Divs)	OFF	DEF
INF.		1	INF.		2
PZ.			PZ.		
SS PZ.	1		SS PZ.		
PZ. GR.			PZ. GR.		
SS PZ. GR.			SS PZ. GR.		
PZ. RES.			PZ. RES.		
INF. RES.		1	INF. RES.		1
GAF FIELD		1	GAF FIELD		1
PARA.			PARA.		
TOTALS	1	3	TOTALS		4
COMBINED TOTALS	4		COMBINED TOTALS	4	

GRAND TOTAL 52

b. DISPOSITIONS.

(1) The coast of the BAY of BISCAY from NANTES (0 0554), to the SPANISH border is defended by the First Army with headquarters at BORDEAUX (06986), and commanded by General-Colonel Johannes BLASKOWITZ, 61, Inf. The First Army took part in the FRENCH Campaign. The following three Corps are in the First Army area:

(?) INFANTRY CORPS - DAX (T2663); no further information is available at present.

LXXXVI INFANTRY CORPS - BORDEAUX (06986); commanded by General of Infantry Bruno BIELER, 56; the LXXXVI CORPS was formed late in 1942 in Southwest FRANCE; in FRANCE since.

LXXX INFANTRY CORPS - POITIERS (U5876); commanded by General of Artillery Kurt GALLENKAMP, 55; the LXXX CORPS was formed early summer 1943; in FRANCE since.

The following six divisions are in the First Army area, the exact tactical assignment of each division not being known:

DIVISION	VICINITY LOCATION	REMARKS
158 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	FONTENAY (T5968)	General-Lieutenant Ernst HAECKEL, 54, Inf; classed as an inferior fighting unit; low morale; replacement and training unit; has RUSSIAN and BRITISH INDIAN elements.
708 INFANTRY DIVISION	ROYAN (Y3775)	General-Lieutenant Herman WILCK, 59, Inf; inferior fighting unit; 2-Regt defensive division holding BORDEAUX (06986), coastal sector.
159 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	LA BOUHEYRE (03918)	General-Lieutenant Mayor RABINGEN, 55, Inf; inferior fighting unit; low morale; replacement and training unit; holds ARCACHON (02168)-BAYONNE (S9240), sector.
17 SS PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION (Goetz V. Berlichingen)	POITIERS (U4678)	Good motorized division in mobile reserve; has one battalion "Panther" (Mark V) tanks, mounting one 75mm gun and three MGs; now full strength in personnel and equipment; reported 17 April 1944 as possibly moving to MEDITERRANEAN coast.
273 PANZER TRAINING DIVISION	LIBOURNE (09496)	Replacement and training unit for armored divisions; in mobile reserve vicinity BORDEAUX (06986); has about 15,000 men; poor equipment.
2 SS PANZER DIVISION (Das Reich)	MONT DE MARSAN (T7261)	Commanded by SS Gruppenfuehrer Walter KRUGER, who commanded SS POLIZEI in opening stages RUSSIAN campaign; rated good division after refitting and re-equipping by 1 May 1944; sent to FRANCE after severe losses in RUSSIA; will have regained fighting efficiency by 1 May 1944; reported 17 April 1944 as possibly moving to MEDITERRANEAN coast.

(2) The MEDITERRANEAN area from the SPANISH border to the ITALIAN border is defended by the Nineteenth Army with headquarters at AVIGNON (T9986), and commanded by General of Infantry George Von SODENSTERN, 55. Formed in 1943 and in FRANCE since. The following six Corps are in the Nineteenth Army area:

LXII INFANTRY TRAINING CORPS - NARBONNE (W3599); commanded by General of Infantry Ferdinand NEULING, 59, Inf; formed Sept in 1942 and fought in POLAND.

LXVII INFANTRY TRAINING CORPS - MONTPELLIER (S2447); commander unknown; made reserve Corps late in 1942; in FRANCE since.

LXXXIII INFANTRY CORPS - AVIGNON (T9986); commander unknown; formed in summer 1942 and in FRANCE since.

(?) INFANTRY CORPS - GRASSE (S27); no further information is available at present.

LXVI INFANTRY CORPS - ROYAT (W5685) commanded by General of Infantry KNIESS, 55; control South-central FRANCE area around CLERMONT-FERRAND (W5987).

LXIV INFANTRY CORPS - DIJON (0 06); commanded by General of Infantry Wilhelm WETZEL, 56; converted to Reserve Corps in autumn 1942 and in FRANCE since.

The following nine divisions and the EASTERN LEGION, (a training group of 25,000 men from the territories of the Soviet RUSSIA) are in the Nineteenth Army area. Their tactical assignment is unknown.

SECRET

DIVISION	VICINITY LOCATION	REMARKS
272 INFANTRY DIVISION	PERPIGNAN (S4544)	General-Major SCHACK, Inf; under strength; recently moved to coast from inland; 3-Regt defensive division formed late in 1943 from elements of 5 light and 216 Infantry Divisions.
277 INFANTRY DIVISION	NARBONNE (W3599)	Under strength; 3-Regt defensive division formed late in 1943 from elements of 262 Infantry Division which was destroyed at STALINGRAD.
271 INFANTRY DIVISION	MONTPELLIER (S2447)	Still in formative stage; formed with elements from divisions destroyed in RUSSIA; holds a coastal sector.
338 INFANTRY DIVISION	Mouth of the RHONE (S9525)	General-Lieutenant FOLTMANN Inf; 3-Regt defensive coastal division; over 25 percent RUSSIAN elements.
244 INFANTRY DIVISION	MARSEILLES (T4815)	Under strength; 3-Regt defensive division holding MARSEILLES coastal sector.
242 INFANTRY DIVISION	TOULON (Y9893)	Under strength; 3-Regt defensive division holding TOULON coastal sector; POLES and MONGOL elements; GERMAN cadre fought in RUSSIA.
148 INFANTRY TRAINING	NICE (S57)	Commanded by General-Lieutenant Hermann BOETTCHER 59, Inf, who commanded 216 Infantry Division in FRENCH campaign; inferior troops; replacement and training unit.
189 INFANTRY TRAINING	CLERMONT-FERRAND (W5987)	General-Major Von SCHWERIN 48, Inf; replacement and training unit of 15,000 troops as of Dec 43.
157 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	GRENOBLE (J6527)	Commanded by General-Lieutenant Karl PFLAUM, 53, who formerly commanded 19 Inf Regt; replacement and training unit.
EASTERN LEGION	MILIAU (M0059)	General-Lieutenant HELIMICH, 52, Inf, commander of all Eastern units; General-Major HEYGENDORF, Inf, is commander of the MILIAU unit which has 25,000 troops from the territories of SOVIET RUSSIA in training; believed infantry elements only.

(3) Northern FRANCE and BELGIUM are defended by the fifteenth Army with headquarters at TOURCOING (H7746), and commanded by General Colonel Hans SALMUTH, 56, Inf. The Fifteenth Army was formed late in 1940 and has been in FRANCE since. The following four Corps are in the Fifteenth Army area:

LXXXIX INFANTRY CORPS - ANTWERP (J6995); commanded by General-Lieutenant Freiherr WERNER Albrecht von und zu GILSA who commanded an Infantry Regiment in World War I and led 216 Infantry Division in RUSSIA. LXXXIX CORPS defends the SCHELDE ESTUARY.

LXXXI INFANTRY CORPS - ROUEN (M1915); commanded by General of Armored Troops Adolf KUNTZEN, 55, who fought in POLAND. LXXXI CORPS was converted to active Corps in summer 1942, and has been in FRANCE since.

(?) INFANTRY CORPS - ARRAS (H4000); commander unknown; controls divisions in the PAS DE CALAIS area which are not on the coast.

LXXXII INFANTRY CORPS - AIRE-sur-la-LYS (H2240); converted to active Corps in summer 1942, and in FRANCE since.

I SS PANZER CORPS - BRUSSELS (J6155); commander unknown; first identified April 1944; controls SS training system and SS divisions in BELGIUM and also possibly those in FRANCE.

The following eighteen divisions are in the Fifteenth Army area; their exact tactical assignment is unknown;

DIVISION	VICINITY LOCATION	REMARKS
711 INFANTRY DIVISION	PONT L'EVEQUE (L5203)	General-Major Kurt DEUTSCH 52, INF; troops well-trained and better equipped than most 2-Regt defensive divisions; 40 percent DUTCH, FLEMISH, and RUSSIAN troops.
348 INFANTRY DIVISION	ST VAAST D'EQUIQUEVILLE (M3555)	Inferior fighting value; low morale; static 2-Regt coastal division; has two ARMENIAN Bns attached.
346 INFANTRY DIVISION	LE HAVRE (L5028)	Troops aged 35-45; 3-Regt coastal defensive division has RUSSIAN Bn attached.
712 INFANTRY DIVISION	BRUGES Area (H8500)	General-Lieutenant NEUMANN, INF; commanded 17 Infantry REGT in POLAND and 340 INFANTRY Division in RUSSIA; 2-Regt coastal division; low morale; POLISH and AUSTRIAN elements in 732 Regiment are reported anti German.
17 GAF FIELD DIVISION	S.W. ABBEVILLE (M7985)	Static, 2-Regt division; young and well-trained troops.
344 INFANTRY DIVISION	N. ABBEVILLE (M7985)	3-Regt defensive division; 3d Regt composed of RUSSIANS; no heavy weapons.
326 INFANTRY DIVISION	S. ST OMER (H1454)	Commanded by General-Lieutenant DRABICH-WAECHTER, 52, who was in the Personnel Dept from 1937-42; not up to strength; incompletely equipped (Feb 44); 3-Regt defensive division; over 25 percent RUSSIANS and POLES.
18 GAF FIELD DIVISION	DUNKERQUE (H2584)	2-Regt division; well-trained troops; average age 23-30; not up to strength; has MG 42 and flame throwers.
191 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	MONTREUIL (G7725)	General-Major von DEWITZ gennant KREBS; 50 percent POLES; equipped with FRENCH weapons including 75mm artillery; replacement and training division holding coastal sector.
19 GAF FIELD DIVISION	GHENT (H1980)	Good quality troops; 7,000 strength; more motor transport than usual for this type 2-Regt division.
156 INFANTRY DIVISION	GUINES (G8868)	General-Lieutenant BALTZER, 57, Inf; young troops cadre of veterans; 25 percent POLES, CZECHS, and BELGIANS; replacement and training division.
182 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	ST. OMER (H1454)	General-Major LETTOW; average age of troops 25; contains 25 percent POLES and AUSTRIANS; replacement and training division.
171 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	DIXMUDE (H5882)	Commanded by General-Lieutenant Friedrich FUERST, 54, Inf, who commanded 7th Motorized Regiment in FRENCH campaign and 14th Motorized Division in RUSSIA; troops young but inexperienced with cadre of veterans; poor equipment; 60 percent POLES and one ARMENIAN Regt attached; replacement and training unit.
179 PANZER TRAINING DIVISION	PARIS (S1545) NANTES (R6061)	Formidable fighting unit; at least one Bn tanks, type unknown; elements may fight as independent Bns.
2 PANZER DIVISION	AMIENS (N1059)	BALKAN campaign in 1941; in RUSSIA two and one-half years where it sustained heavy losses; now up to approximate full strength; in mobile reserve.
12 SS PANZER DIVISION (Hitler Jugend)		Commanded by Oberfuehrer Fritz WITT who commanded a Waffen SS Regiment in RUSSIA; very good fighting unit; young Nazis trained by experienced cadre; well equipped.
? INFANTRY DIVISION	ROUEN (M1915)	No further information available at present.
? INFANTRY DIVISION	PAS DE CALAIS	No further information available at present.

(4) HOLLAND is defended by the LXXXVIII CORPS with headquarters at UTRECHT (D2090), and commanded by General of Infantry Hans Wolfgan REINHARD, 55, who commanded 35 Infantry Division in FRENCH campaign and was awarded Knight's Cross as commander of LI CORPS in RUSSIA. The LXXXVIII CORPS was formed early in 1942 and has been in HOLLAND since. The following four divisions are under the control of LXXXVII CORPS:

DIVISION	VICINITY LOCATION	REMARKS
347 INFANTRY DIVISION	SCHAGEN (Z0269)	Inferior 2-Regt defensive division; average of troops 35; cadre of veterans from RUSSIAN campaign; good motor transport; includes a TURKOSTANIAN Bn.
719 INFANTRY DIVISION	DORDRECHT (D8961)	General-Lieutenant Erich HOEKER 58, Inf; under strength (March 44); 2-Regt coastal division; a 3d Regt of ARMENIAN troops attached.
16 GAF DIVISION	AMSTELVEEN (Y0216)	2-Regt coastal division; 8/9,000 troops; RUSSIAN Bn attached.
165 INFANTRY TRAINING DIVISION	MIDDELBURG (D1520) (WALCHEREN ISLAND)	General-Lieutenant Freiherr von SCHACKY auf SCHOENFIELD, 58, Inf; troops 30-40 years old; has over 25 percent mixed foreign elements.

(5) The following two Corps are in the interior of FRANCE and are not known to be assigned tactically to any Army:

II PARATROOP CORPS - MELUN (S2505); moved from GHENT (H1980), area to MELUN 7 April 44.

XI AIRBORNE CORPS - PONT FAVERGER (T5283); first reported 28 Jan 44. The following division is in the interior of FRANCE and not tactically assigned to any Army:

3 PARATROOP DIVISION	RHEIMS (T9080)	High quality offensive division.

The following two divisions are listed as unlocated in the west:

243 INFANTRY DIVISION	3-Regt defensive; may possibly be the unidentified division in COUTANCES (T2456)
276 INFANTRY DIVISION	Composition unknown, probably defensive.

(6) These dispositions indicate a defensive system consisting of:

(a) A perimeter of so-called defensive Infantry divisions, with little motor transport and many of them with considerable proportions of RUSSIANS, POLES, CZECHS and other non-German elements, which man the crust of fixed positions and obstacles that defend the coastlines.

(b) A core of mobile, well-equipped and well-led offensive divisions, centrally located and available for prompt employment as reserves.

(c) The enemy divisions rated as the best in the WEST are the following eleven:

DIVISION	VICINITY LOCATION	
12 SS PANZER DIVISION (Hitler Jugend)	TURNHOUT	(E0605)
2 PANZER DIVISION	AMIENS	(N1059)
21 PANZER DIVISION	RENNES	(Y0154)
17 SS PANZER GRENADIER (Goetz v. Berlichingen)	POITIERS	(U4678)
2 SS PANZER (Das Reich)	MONT DE MARSAN	(T7281)
3 PARATROOP DIVISION	RHEIMS	(T3080)
352 INFANTRY DIVISION	ST LO	(T4962)
353 INFANTRY DIVISION	HUELGOAT	(W5092)
155 PANZER TRAINING DIVISION	FOUGERES	(Y3778)
179 PANZER TRAINING DIVISION	PARIS	(S1545)
273 PANZER TRAINING DIVISION	LIBOURNE	(09496)

Unconfirmed reports 17 April 44 place the 12 SS Panzer division and the 3 Paratroop Divisions in the Seventh Army area (See Plate No. 2). This puts ten of those eleven divisions in the area North of the LOIRE River.

2. ACTUAL CURRENT ENEMY SITUATION - (LODGEMENT area - West of line CAEN (U0368) - NANTES (00554).

a. GROUND.

(1) The LODGEMENT area is defended by the Seventh Army (See Plate No. 2) with headquarters at LE MANS (V4236), and commanded by General-Colonel Friedrich DOLLMAN, 62, Artilleryman; he has commanded the Seventh Army since it was formed on mobilization and led it in FRENCH campaign in 1940. The following five Corps are in the Seventh Army area:

LXXXIV INFANTRY CORPS - ST LO (T4962); commanded by General of Artillery ERHELENDORFF, 55, who commanded the 34 Infantry Division in POLISH, FRENCH, and RUSSIAN campaigns. The LXXXIV CORPS was formed in summer 1942 and has remained in FRANCE since.

XXV INFANTRY CORPS - PONTIVY (X0454); commanded by General of Artillery FAHRMBACHER, 56, XXV INFANTRY CORPS took part in EASTERN campaign, 1940.

LXXIV INFANTRY CORPS - GUINGAMP (R9510); commander unknown.

2 SS PANZER CORPS - ALENCON (Z3484); commander unknown.

(?) PANZER TRAINING CORPS - ANGERS (0 8279); commander unknown.

(2) As of 17 April 1944, there were twelve divisions in the Seventh Army area. The exact tactical assignment of these divisions is not known. The divisions follow:

DIVISION	VICINITY LOCATION	REMARKS
716 INFANTRY DIVISION	CAEN (U0368)	Inferior 2-Regt coastal division, considerable percentage elderly personnel; poor equipment.
709 INFANTRY DIVISION	VALOGNES (02408)	Inferior 2-Regt coastal division; over 25 percent POLES, CZECHS and RUSSIANS; in addition a Regt of RUSSIANS attached.
319 INFANTRY DIVISION	CHANNEL ISLANDS (S67)	General-Lieutenant Erich MUELLER, 55, Cav; 3-Regt division now classified as defensive type; good personnel; one Bn RUSSIANS attached.
266 INFANTRY DIVISION	LAMBALLE (X4197)	3-Regt defensive coastal division; Has two RUSSIAN Bns.
343 INFANTRY DIVISION	LANDERNEAU (R1304)	Inferior 2-Regt coastal division; poor equipment; over 25 percent RUSSIANS, CZECHS, POLES and AUSTRIANS in addition one Bn RUSSIANS
265 INFANTRY DIVISION	QUIMPERLE (W5935)	Inferior 3-Regt coastal division; has one Regt RUSSIANS.
275 INFANTRY DIVISION	REDON (H6804)	Inferior 3-Regt coastal division; receiving new troops and equipment.
352 INFANTRY DIVISION	ST LO (T4962)	3-Regt offensive division: newly formed; not up to strength.
353 INFANTRY DIVISION	HUELGOAT (W5092)	General-Major Paul MAHLMANN, Inf; 3-Regt offensive division; newly formed not up to strength.
(?) INFANTRY DIVISION (243?)	COUTANCES (T2456)	New formation; not up to strength.
21 PANZER DIVISION	RENNES Area (Y0154)	Good armored division with high fighting value; probably has two tank Regts each with one Bn of Panther (Mark V) tanks and one Bn Tiger (Mark VI) tanks.
155 PANZER TRAINING DIVISION	FOUGERES (Y3778)	Replacement and training division for armored units; combines duties of mobile reserve and training recruits.

b. Coastal Defenses. (Reference) Dossier; Tactical Targets, CHERBOURG area; TIS/DIII/4, Overprints, 18 Feb 44; TIS/RI/DEF/2, Defense Traces, TIS/RI/DEF/3, Text)

(1) General.

From available data it is indicated that the German system against invasion of the Continent consists of a crust of coastal defenses and obstacles of wide variety and great strength, buttressed by large centrally located mobile reserves. This crust of coastal defenses apparently extends to a depth of ten miles at critical points, such as major ports and good beach areas. There are no known lines of prepared defenses in the interior. The Germans appear to consider the rigorous coast and its numerous natural obstacles their first line of defense, the powerful crust of prepared coastal defenses their second line of defense, and the centrally located mobile reserves of offensive divisions their third line of defense.

The crust of coastal defenses is reported to consist of a series of mutually supporting strong points covering the ports, beaches and exits from the beaches. The density of the strong points appears to be greater around ports and good beach areas. Where the coast is rugged and tidal and other hydrological conditions are unfavorable, the known strong points are relatively scarce.

Strong points appear to consist of fire positions, shelters and OPs, communication trenches, AT and anti-personnel obstacles. Mine fields are not known to be sited in depth behind the beach defenses. They apparently consist of protective belts around the strong points and of tactical belts between strong points.

The major ports are indicated as defended by three lines of defenses; a sea front of heavy guns to oppose naval attack, an even stronger land front, and concrete and steel emplacements and pill-boxes on all the quays and other port installations.

(2) Around the coastline from CAEN (U0368) to ST NAZAIRE (N5669) (approximately 400 miles) there is an estimated total of 620 guns of the following calibre: 50 heavy, 140 medium, 280 light and 150 heavy AA. Their coast defense guns, located at strategic points, are grouped in batteries averaging three guns per battery. Field artillery batteries average four guns per battery. Calibre classifications and estimated ranges are as follows:

TYPE	CALIBRE	MAXIMUM RANGE (Yards)
Heavy Railway	203mm (8 in.) and up	35,000 - 40,000
Heavy Coast Defense	203mm (8 in.) and up	25,000 - 44,000
Medium Coast Defense	over 115mm (4.5 in.) and under 203mm (8 in.)	15,000 - 26,000
Light Coast Defense	115mm (4.5 in.) and under	10,000 - 19,000
Heavy Anti-Aircraft	88mm (3.3 in.) and up	17,000 - 30,000
Medium Field Artillery	over 115mm (4.5 in.) and under 203mm (8 in.)	12,000 - 25,000
Light Field Artillery	115mm (4.5 in.) and under	10,000 - 15,000

(3) Within the areas listed below are located the following batteries with calibres as shown in subparagraph b. (2). (Map references are to GSGS 4250, Map, 1:50,000, FRANCE, BELGIUM & HOLLAND)

AREA	MAP SHEET	TYPE
OUISTREHAM (U1179)	W Part of 7E/6	2 Medium CD Batteries 1 Light Battery
CREULLY (T9180)	7E/5	1 Medium Battery 4 Light Batteries
ISIGNY (T5085)	6E/6	5 Medium Batteries (4 CD)
VALOGNES (02408)	6E/3 & 4	4 Medium Batteries (3 CD) 5 Light Batteries (1 CD)
CHERBOURG (01423)	6E/1	3 Heavy CD Batteries 3 Medium CD Batteries 6 Light Batteries (4 CD) 6 Heavy AA Batteries
BEAUMONT-HAGUE (N9826)	5E/2	1 Heavy Battery, Railway 5 Medium Batteries (2 CD) 12 Light Batteries (7 CD) 2 Heavy AA Batteries
LES PIEUX (N0010)	5E/4	1 Light Battery 6 Heavy AA Batteries
BARNEVILLE (0 0395)	5E/6	1 Heavy Battery, Railway 1 Light Battery
GRANVILLE (T1034)	5F/4 & 6 and 6F/5	1 Medium CD Battery 1 Light CD Battery
CHANNEL ISLANDS		
ALDERNEY	GSGS 2558	1 Heavy CD Battery 2 Medium CD Batteries 4 Heavy AA Batteries
GUERNSEY	GSGS 4205	8 Heavy CD Batteries 4 Medium CD Batteries 5 Light Batteries (3 CD) 6 Heavy AA Batteries
JERSEY	GSGS 3967	4 Heavy CD Batteries 2 Medium CD Batteries 8 Light Batteries (4 CD) 6 Heavy AA Batteries
DOL DE BRETAGNE (S9803)	5F/6 & 5G/2	1 Light CD Battery 1 Heavy AA Battery
ST MALO (S7815)	5G/1	6 Medium Batteries (5 CD) 6 Light Batteries (2 CD) 4 Heavy AA Batteries
ST BRIEUC (S2303)	4F/6 & 4G/2	3 Medium Batteries (1 CD)
TREGUIER (R9135)	4F/5	1 Heavy Battery, Railway 1 Medium Battery 3 Light Batteries
LANNION (R7431)	3F/6	1 Heavy AA Battery
ST POL DE LEON (R3529)	3F/5	1 Medium Battery 1 Light Battery
MORLAIX (R4516)	3G/1	1 Heavy AA Battery
PLOUGUERNEAU (Q9624)	2F/6	5 Light Batteries

LANDERNEAU (R1306)	2G/2	1 Medium Battery 7 Heavy AA Batteries
ST RENAN (Q8605)	2F/5 & 2G/1	1 Medium Battery 2 Light Batteries
LE CONQUET (V7398)	2G/3	1 Heavy CD Battery 4 Medium Batteries (3 CD) 5 Light Batteries (3 CD) 2 Heavy AA Batteries
BREST (V9699)	2G/4	2 Medium Batteries (1 CD) 8 Light Batteries (4 CD) 14 Heavy AA Batteries (10, 105mm AA/CD)
DOUARNENEZ (W0466)	2G/6	1 Heavy CD Battery 1 Medium Battery 3 Light Batteries (2 CD)
QUIMPER (W1854)	2H/2	3 Light Batteries 1 Heavy AA Battery
PONT L'ABBE (W1040)	2H/4	1 Heavy CD Battery 2 Light Batteries

Information of the coastal defenses from PONT L'ABBE (W1040) to ST NAZAIRE (N5669) will be published later.

c. Navy. (Reference: Annex 4, Joint Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD: G-2 Weekly Report No. 60 ETOUSA)

Active enemy naval units available in the CHANNEL-BRITTANY PENINSULA WATERS ON D day are estimated as follows: 2-4 destroyers, 5-7 torpedo boats, 30-40 E boats, 30-40 R boats (minesweepers), 20-25 M class minesweepers, 30-40 miscellaneous small craft, 100 submarines (over 300 tons), 20 short-range submarines (300 tons or less). It is estimated that the same force would be available to the enemy in the waters near the mouth of the LOIRE RIVER with the following variations; minus 15-20 E boats, minus 20-25 R boats, minus 5-10 miscellaneous small craft. The exact hostile Naval situation by D plus 25 will depend on the extent to which the enemy employs the Naval forces he has available as of D day and the attrition they suffer as a result of this employment. As the enemy's total Naval force is small, any heavy losses suffered by him between D and D plus 25 would materially affect the Naval situation as on the later date.

d. Air. (Reference: Annex 4, Joint Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD, 8 April 1944).

(1) General.

It is assumed that by D plus 25 the great majority of enemy airfields within 200 miles of the target area will be unoperational and that the enemy will be using fields in Northern FRANCE, South central FRANCE, and BELGIUM. The location of the fields that the enemy will be using on D plus 25 are not known at this time. The Ninth Air Force will secure this information as the situation develops.

(2) Situation on D plus 25.

(a) Present known airfields within 200 mile radius of target area. (See Plate No. 3).

(b) It is estimated that by D plus 25 the following enemy aircraft will be available against Operation OVERLORD.

120	long range bombers
150	single engine fighters
80	twin-engine fighters
15	ground attack aircraft
45	reconnaissance bombers
Total 410	

(c) Based on the assumption that the strategic bombing of occupied Europe will continue, it is indicated that enemy reinforcements will be limited to input from repair and a small number of aircraft from other areas.

(3) Airfields.

The exact location of fields that the enemy could use by D plus 25 is not definable at this time. The Ninth Air Force will secure this information as the situation develops.

SECTION II. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

1. GROUND.

a. See Order of Battle Plates Nos. 1 and 4.

b. In addition to the divisional units, an estimated fifty heavy guns, 150 heavy AA guns, 140 medium and 280 light coast defense guns (total 640) are emplaced between CAEN (U0368) (Incl) and ST NAZAIRE (N5663) (Incl).

2. NAVY. (Reference: Annex 4, Joint Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD: G-2 Weekly Report No. 60 ETOUSA).

Enemy Naval dispositions in the CHANNEL-BRITTANY PENINSULA WATERS are capable of harassing the seaborne passage of TUSA elements and affecting considerable losses in the absence of adequate escort protection. It is assumed that Allied Naval Superiority will have been firmly established by D plus 25, but vigilant Naval support will be necessary notwithstanding. The enemy can be expected to employ every available agency and means to block a powerful build-up of Allied lodgement forces and the use particularly of submersibles of all types must be considered. It also can be expected that minesweepers and other small craft will be used to mine the approaches and basins of the principal ports and landing beaches. New types of mines must also be anticipated.

3. AIR. (Reference: Annex 4, Joint Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD, 8 April 1944).

a. It is indicated that the enemy will have approximately 410 operational aircraft within striking distance of the target area by D plus 25. After his initial effort to defeat the assault, it is considered likely that the enemy will have been forced by D plus 25 to carefully conserve his dwindling air strength. It is believed that by D plus 25 the enemy's air effort will be directed only against carefully selected critical targets.

b. Reinforcements or Withdrawals.

(1) Based on the assumption that massive strategic bombing of occupied Europe will continue, it is estimated that by D plus 25 the enemy will be able to reinforce his air strength only by those planes that he repaired and by small increments from other areas.

(2) The estimated strength of the GAF within striking distance of the target area on D plus 25 and the number of sorties the enemy will be capable of flying is as follows:

120	long range bombers	- 1 sortie per 24 H	= 120
150	single engine fighters	- 2 sorties per 24 H	=300
80	twin-engine fighters	- 2 sorties per 24 H	=160
15	ground attack aircraft	- 2 sorties per 24 H	= 30
45	reconnaissance bombers	- ½ sorties per 24 H	= 22
Total 410			Total 632

(3) Estimated GAF reaction to entry of TUSA.

(a) The GAF as estimated will be capable of approximately 816 sorties per 24 hours over the target area.

(b) It is considered likely that the GAF effort will be divided between FUSA and TUSA in proportion to what the enemy considers is the relative importance of the missions assigned to each after D plus 25.

(c) After D plus 25 it is indicated that the strength of the GAF will continue to decline at an increasing rate.

SECTION III. OVERALL EUROPEAN SITUATION

1. RUSSIA.

As of 20 April 1944 Russian forces have recaptured all of CRIMEA except the Southwestern tip and put under siege the important Naval base and port of SEVASTOPOL located there. Further North, Marshal Koniev's Second Ukranian Army Group has penetrated some 75 miles into RUMANIA and laid siege to JASSY, last important rail center before GALATZ, 100 miles to the South and key to control of the vital PLOESTI oilfields, 75 miles to the Southwest of GALATZ. North of Koniev's Army Group, Marshal Zhukov's First Ukranian Army Group has pushed its penetration of RUMANIA into the TARTAR PASS, one of the four main routes through the CARPATHIAN MOUNTAINS into the Valley of the DANUBE. Countering these Soviet gains, German Marshal Von Mannstein has launched an offensive on a 125 mile front between STANISTALOW and COWEL for the purpose of driving a wedge between Zhukov and Koniev and unhinging their pincer squeeze. Mannstein is reported employing twenty divisions in his drive, a large proportion of them armored. In the face of this German counteroffensive, Zhukov's forces have captured TARNOPOL, opening the way for a drive on LWOW's crucial German Communications center 75 miles to the Northwest and 500 miles to BERLIN. With Mannstein's offensive in motion the Zhukov-Koniev drives face a new set of conditions. If Mannstein succeeds in splitting the Russian Armies the entire military situation on the EASTERN Front might undergo a radical change that could profoundly effect major considerations as regards the WESTERN Front. For one, the current serious man-power problem straining the enemy presumably would be eased for several or more months, and he would be freer to strengthen the recently reported dilutions of his forces (by reductions of divisions to 6 Bns and an increase of foreigners, Russians, Czechs, Poles, etc., in divisions) in the WEST, to meet any Allied operations there. On the other hand, if Mannstein's desperate counteroffensive proves abortive, the consequences to the enemy could be far-reaching, both in the EAST and the WEST. In the former, instead of pursuing a defensive attitude through the use of favorable strategic terrain held by relative minimum of units, the enemy might be compelled, as a result of the loss of important defensive terrain, troops, materiel, and impaired morale, to employ a maximum of forces to contain the situation. Such a development it is indicated would be reflected in the WEST by reducing the enemy's margin of reinforcement potential from the EAST. Estimating that under favorable conditions the enemy could withdraw a possible 10 per cent of his EASTERN forces to resist an Allied assault in the WEST, it would make a great deal of difference if the enemy could reinforce against OVERLORD with only ten instead of 20 or more divisions. The latter figure would mean a strengthening of approximately 50 per cent in FRANCE, the first figure only 25 or less per cent. In any event, unless seriously confronted by the threat of a complete collapse on the EASTERN Front, it can be assumed that the enemy will withdraw the maximum resources possible from the EASTERN theater in an effort to defeat or stalemate an Allied assault in the WEST in its early stages.

2. ITALY.

It is assumed that Allied pressure will continue undiminished in ITALY. Although not foreseen now the enemy, powerfully buttressed by control of dominating terrain factors which have been organized into a series of lines of defense in depth of great strength, might be able, if necessary, to wage a slow and tedious delaying action with a minimum of the 24 divisions estimated in ITALY on 17 April 1944, thus freeing the others for displacement as quick reinforcements in the WEST. This would permit the enemy to avoid withdrawals from more distant and less accessible Fronts pending his determination of Allied plans and commitments.

3. NORWAY, FINLAND, DENMARK.

After our actual operational plan is clarified the situation in NORWAY, FINLAND and DENMARK is such that the enemy might be able to withdraw a considerable proportion of the estimated twenty-four (24) divisions currently in these three countries. This is at this time not considered likely.

4. THE BALKANS AND GERMANY.

a. In the BALKANS at present, there are twenty-four (24) German divisions. Conceivably, the enemy might withdraw ten percent of his strength in this area for use against OVERLORD. The constant activity of the Partisans, the increasing threat of the Red Army, the political unrest in the BALKANS, and the threat of Allied invasion or reinforcement to Tito's Partisans make the German position in the BALKANS a very difficult one.

It is unlikely that a large force can be withdrawn from the BALKANS.

b. In GERMANY and WESTERN POLAND, there are six (6) divisions. Generally, these divisions are of low combat effectiveness. Only one of them is an offensive division. Out of these miscellaneous divisions, it is doubtful that more than one or two could be employed against OVERLORD.

SECTION IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. General.

A computation of long range capabilities against OVERLORD as a whole and TUSA as a part thereof is dependent upon a number of now intangible factors, among which are:

(1) The immediate enemy reaction to the assault.

(2) The enemy's decision that Operation OVERLORD is the major assault effort, and acting on this decision he would withdraw some coastal troops from nearby areas for employment against OVERLORD.

(3) The situation on the RUSSIAN and ITALIAN Fronts.

(4) The internal situation in occupied countries, FINLAND, NORWAY, HUNGARY, RUMANIA, the BALKANS.

(5) The attitude of the neutrals, TURKEY, SPAIN, SWEDEN.

(6) Other Allied operations, major or special, undertaken to support OVERLORD by compelling the enemy to employ all or a considerable proportion of his forces in these areas.

(7) The effectiveness of resistance groups favorable to the Allies.

(8) Allied ability to maintain air and sea superiority in the target area.

(9) The internal situation in GERMANY proper.

b. Against Operation OVERLORD.

As a starting point for estimates projected as of and beyond D plus 25, it is assumed:

(1) That the enemy reaction to the initial assault is as forecast in the capabilities against ground forces enumerated in the G-2 Estimate, FUSA, dated 10 Feb 1944 as follows:

D day	(H-Hour	3 Infantry divisions	Total 3
	(H to H plus 24	1 Panzer division 1 Panzer Grenadier division 1 Infantry division	" 3

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 7 - G-2 Estimate

D plus 1	(H plus 24 to (H plus 48	1 Panzer Grenadier division 1 Panzer division	" 2
D plus 2	(H plus 48 to (H plus 72	1 Panzer Grenadier division 1 paratroop division	" 2
D plus 3	(H plus 72 to (H plus 96	2 Panzer divisions 1 Motorized division	" 3
		Total	13

(2) That pressure on the Russian front will be such as to prevent the enemy from making large-scale withdrawals; i.e. up to 10 per cent of the 190 divisions now reported engaged there.

(3) That the presence and pressure of Allied forces in the MEDITERRANEAN theater, plus the organized resistance of internal groups will block major withdrawals (over 10 per cent) of German forces from the BALKANS, ITALY, and Southern FRANCE.

(4) That the FINNISH situation remains in status quo.

(5) That the threat of an operation against NORWAY will contain all or the bulk of the 12 enemy divisions now reported there.

(6) That the 5 defensive divisions now in DENMARK and the 6 in GERMANY and POLAND are a minimum and cannot be reduced further.

(7) That there is no change in the present non-intervention attitude of the neutrals, TURKEY, SPAIN, SWEDEN.

(8) That if enemy troops are moved (no enforced delays considered) the rate of build-up, after D plus 3, will be approximately at the rate of one division every two days until D plus 90.

(9) That as the OVERLORD plan is executed the enemy will make withdrawals from BRITTANY intact.

(10) That the enemy will suffer no major tactical defeat in the period D to D plus 90.

(11) That time and space is computed without encountering forced delays.

2. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. (Under assumptions outlined above)

a. Of the 52 divisions now reported in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND, the rate of employment in terms of D day could be; (See Plate No. 4).

D - Day - 6 Divisions (709; 716; 711; SS PG Frundsberge; Unidentified Infantry; SS PG Goetz).
D plus 1 - 2 Divisions (SS PG Hohenstaufen *; 21 Pz Div).
D plus 2 - 2 Divisions (164 PG *; 3d Prcht).
D plus 3 - 3 Divisions (SS Pz Hit Jug; Unidentified Motorized, 10 Pz *).
D plus 4 - 3 Divisions (155 Pz Tng; 179 Pz Tng; 2 Pz).
Total -16 Divisions

(*) Latest OB information changes status of divisions to an unidentified location. 245 Infantry Division (defensive) reported in COTENTIN PENINSULA and 352 Infantry Division (offensive) at base of COTENTIN PENINSULA may replace those moved.

b. Beginning D plus 6, drawing from other Fronts, the enemy's build-up against the target area could be at the following rate:

D plus 6 - One division from other Fronts.
D plus 8 - One division from other Fronts.
D plus 9 - One division from other Fronts.
D plus 10- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 11- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 12- One division from CHANNEL ISLES (319 Infantry division).
D plus 13- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 14- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 15- One division from BRITTANY PENINSULA (353 Infantry division).
D plus 16- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 17- One division from South of ABBEVILLE (M7673)(GAF 17).
D plus 18- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 19- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 20- One division from DIEPPE (M2969) (348 Infantry division).
D plus 21- One division from other Fronts.
D plus 25- Two divisions - One division from LE HAVRE (L5026) (346 Infantry division) and one division from ST BRIEUC (S0525) (266 Infantry division).
D plus 27- One division from FONTENAY LE COMTE (T5969) (158 Infantry division).
D plus 30- five divisions from other Fronts.
D plus 31- One division from REDON (M7205) (275 Infantry division).
D plus 33- One division from MONT DE MARSAN (T7261) (Pz SS Das Reich).
D plus 35- One division from LIBOURNE (09496) (273 Pz Tng).
D plus 36- Two divisions from BRITTANY PENINSULA (343 & 265 infantry divisions).
D plus 50 onward - Eight divisions from other Fronts.
Total - Fifty-two (52) divisions.

c. CONCLUSIONS.

As regards the initial assault, FUSA (G-2 Estimate, dated 10 Feb 1944) favors the following enemy capabilities as of highest probability;

(1) Rigid defense of the beaches by manning the crust of coast defenses with the forces now reported in the assault area. (See Plate No. 4).

(2) Defense in depth of the coastal crust through the employment of mobile reserves in the assault area. (See Plate No. 4).

(3) Piecemeal counterattacks, beginning D day, by mobile reserves in the target area.

c. THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY.

Except for the estimate of enemy capabilities to bring to and commit reinforcements in the target area, it is not feasible at this time to forecast the situation likely to confront TUSA when its first elements debark on the COTENTIN PENINSULA. Plates Nos. 4, 5 and 6 project estimated enemy (ground) capabilities against Operation OVERLORD from D plus 25 to D plus 50. These estimates do not take into consideration either enemy losses or interruptions to troop movements. Beyond these estimates the situation as it might affect TUSA is currently too obscure to prognosticate further at this time.

OSCAR W. KOCH
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2


LXXXVIII CORPS
XXX
LXXXVIII
FIFTEENTH ARMY
XV
FIFTEEN
ARMY GROUP "D"
XXXX
SEVEN
XXXX
ONE
XXXX
NINETEEN
NINETEENTH ARMY
ISLANDS
W. FRISIAN ISLANDS
Wesermünde
Emden
Groningen
Bremen
Leeuwarden
Helder
HOLLAND
IJmuiden
Haarlem
AMSTERDAM
Deventer
THE HAGUE
Utrecht
Rotterdam
Münster
Essen
Duisburg
Zeebrugge
Blankenberge
Ostend
Dunkerque
Calais
Boulogne
St Omer
Lille
Maastricht
Aachen
Cologne
BRUSSELS
Eupen
Namur
Malmedy
Wiesbaden
Mainz
Trier
Luxembourg
Saarbrucken
Arlon
Mézières
Reims
Verdun
Metz
Strasbourg
Nancy
Toul
Langres
Mulhouse
Belfort
Vesoul
Dijon
Troyes
Auxerre
Chartres
Orléans
Blois
Le Mans
Tours
Angers
Nantes
Vierzon
Bourges
Nevers
Moulins
Montlucon
Paray-le-Monial
Roanne
Lyons
St Etienne
Grenoble
Geneva
Gex
Dôle
Mouchard
Poligny
Besançon
Belfort
Abbeville
Dieppe
St Quentin
Arras
Cambrai
Douai
Cherbourg
Caen
Le Havre
Rouen
Beauvais
Evreux
Reims
Verdun
Metz
Saarbrucken
Strasbourg
Nancy
Epinal
Colmar
Mulhouse
Belfort
Langres
Dijon
Auxerre
Troyes

TOP SECRET

ANNEX 7 - PLATE NO. 3

EXISTING AIRFIELDS & SITES



(REF. JOINT OPERATIONS PLAN, U.S. FORCES OPERATION "OVERLORD", ANNEX 1, MAP 1)

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 7 - G-2 Estimate

TOP SECRET

PLATE #4 - D+25



G-2 TUSA
10 APRIL 1944
SCALE 1:2,500,000

LEGEND
- Defensive Divs. 6-8
- Offensive Divs. 11-14
- * Divs Other Fronts 9-11
- --- May be employed on D+25 front

D+25 AREA TOTAL 26-33 DIVS

* Reference: Annex 4, Joint Plan U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PLATE #5
D+35
(Refer to Plate #4)



LE HAVRE - NANTES LINE.

LEGEND
- DEFENSIVE
- OFFENSIVE
- OTHER FRONTS

D+35 AREA, TOTAL 35-42 DIVS

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

PLATE #6 D+50
(Refer to plate #4)



LEGEND
- DEFENSIVE
- OFFENSIVE
- OTHER FRONTS

D+50 AREA, TOTAL 45-52

TOP SECRET

PLATE NO 7

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY
APO 403
23 APRIL 1944

BATTLE ORDER EUROPEAN THEATRE AS OF 15 APRIL 1944 (DATA RUSSIAN FRONT TO INCLUDE 1 DEC 1943) TO ACCOMPANY G-2 ESTIMATE #1

KOCH
G-2

PATTON
COMDG

GAFFEY
C/S

ANNEX 7 TO
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE
OPERATION OVERLORD

SECRET

OSLO
STOCKHOLM
SS NORD
FINLAND
TALLINN
RIGA
KAUNAS
COPENHAGEN
LONDON
THE HAGUE
BRUSSELS
PARIS
BERNE
PRAGUE
WARSAW
BUDAPEST
BUCHAREST
BELGRADE
ROME
TIRANA
ATHENS

EASTERN LEGION

LEGEND

- OFFENSIVE, MOBILE DIV
- DEFENSIVE, STATIC or TNG DIV
- STATUS UNCERTAIN
- FRONTLINE

UNLOCATED

SCALE 1/6,000,000 1 INCH = APPROX 95 MILES

SP A - SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIV
FG - FRONTIER GUARD DIV
G - GARRISON DIVISION
MOB - MOBILIZATION DIV

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 8-G-2 Plan

Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-2 PLAN

WITH APPENDICES:-

NO I - Combat Intelligence Plan (Page 55)
NO II - Air Tactical and Photo Reconnaissance Plan (Page 56)
NO III - Counterintelligence Plan (Page 58)
NO IV - G-2 Auxiliary Agencies Plan (Page 61)
NO V - G-2 Map Plan (Page 63)
NO VI - G-2 Administrative Plan (Page 64)

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1. General	53	
2. Summary of the Situation	53	
3. Mission	53	
4. Combat Intelligence Plan	53	I
5. Air Tactical and Photo Reconnaissance	53	II
6. Counterintelligence Plan	53	III
7. G-2 Auxiliary Agencies	54	IV
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10. Miscellaneous	54	

G-2 PLAN

1. GENERAL.

a. Organization and Purpose of Outline Plan.

(1) The G-2 Plan is designed to serve as a guide to Headquarters Third Army and its component units in the planning and execution of intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of the operation.

(2) The G-2 Outline Plan consists of a brief synopsis of the complete G-2 Plan with its various appendices. When issued with the appendices, it becomes the G-2 Plan. Basic distribution will be made of the complete Plan. Additional distribution will be made of the appendices as requested.

(3) The purpose of the above organization is to facilitate rapid orientation and reference to the G-2 Plan and the directives it contains by Commanders, with the details supplied in numbered appendices for appropriate staff study and guidance.

b. Coordination of Intelligence Activities.

(1) Coordination of intelligence activities will be effected by this headquarters through higher headquarters (FUSAG), with lateral ground headquarters and with Naval and Air Headquarters concerned.

(2) Coordination of intelligence activities between headquarters Third Army and its component elements will be normal through channels of command as the assignment of such elements becomes effective. All requests and contacts involving agencies under control of headquarters higher than Third Army will be routed through this headquarters.

2. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION.

a. See Annex 7, G-2 Estimate No. 1, Headquarters Third Army, (dated 23 April 1944). Additional G-2 Estimates will be issued at appropriate intervals.

b. Supplementary situation materials will be issued when they become available. See Appendix VI for list of Intelligence Material available.

3. MISSION.

Stage I. Third Army will land on the continent, capture the Brittany Peninsular, and open Brittany ports, unless this has already been accomplished by First U.S. Army.

Stage II. (After clearing the Brittany Peninsular) Third U.S. Army will concentrate on right of First U.S. Army prepared for offensive operation to the East.

4. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE PLAN. (For details see Appendix I).

a. Phases.

(1) During the Planning Phase effort will be concentrated on studies of terrain; enemy battle order, equipment, and methods; and the full exploitation of all agencies under G-2 guidance and control.

(2) During the Operational Phase attention will be focused on enemy capabilities as determined by the terrain and the location, strength, composition and disposition of his forces; and on the profitable employment of operational agencies under G-2 direction.

b. Essential Elements of Information.

(1) The Essential Elements of Information are initially concerned with naval defenses and activity; ground forces and defenses; air and antiaircraft defenses; topographic, meteorological, and hydrographic data; and public utilities and civilian attitude.

(2) The Essential Elements of Information announced by First U.S. Army Group and Third Army (see Appendix I) will serve as the basic directive for the search for military information by all elements of the command.

c. Analysis of Essential Elements of Information (Indications).

An analysis of the Essential Elements of Information into significant indications may be found in Appendix I. Appropriate echelons are responsible for detailed analyses of Essential Elements Of Information in order to furnish Combat Intelligence Agencies with specific missions.

d. Combat Intelligence Agencies.

(1) Normal intelligence agencies in Corps and lower echelons will be augmented by specialized intelligence agencies as available:

(a) Prisoner of War Interrogators, Battle Order Specialists, Military Intelligence and Photo Interpreters, and Mobile Weather Detachments. (See Appendix IV)

(b) Tactical Air Reconnaissance, Photo Reconnaissance and photo interpretation personnel and equipment. (For details see Appendix II).

(c) Counterintelligence Corps detachments. (See Appendix III).

(d) OSS Agencies (see par 7 below), the several censorship agencies (see par 7 below), signal intelligence agencies, captured materiel intelligence agencies, and liaison and information services. (See Appendix IV).

e. Combat Intelligence Missions and Instructions.

(1) Each Corps and separate unit will be responsible for such ground reconnaissance as can be made within its boundaries as established to obtain information based on indications derived from the essential elements of information.

(2) Special missions and instructions for the production of Combat Intelligence will be included in intelligence instructions as required.

f. Reports: To be submitted by Corps and Army Troops to TUSA.

REPORT	HOW SUBMITTED	TIME
(1) Spot Reports	Most expeditious means	At once.
(2) Intelligence Summaries (ISUMS)	By TWX or Radio	As of 1200 and 2400 daily.
(3) G-2 Periodic Report	Formal written Report, to be submitted by most rapid means.	(Army closes 2400) Corps close as of 2000; Divisions under Corps as of 1600; Separate Units close as of 2000 daily.

Note: Any message sent by two or more means must be parapghrased.

(4) Weather Reports, including long-range and daily forecasts will be disseminated by G-2, Third Army, as available. (Units supplied with Mobile Weather Detachments will be serviced direct thereby. See Appendix IV par. 3 g.)

5. AIR TACTICAL AND PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE. (For details see Appendix II).

a. Tactical (Air) and Photo Reconnaissance Missions will be flown by appropriate squadrons through the XIX Tactical Air Command, Ninth Air Force which is detailed in support of Third Army. Night photography will be available.

b. Establishment of an "Army Photo Center" at an airfield will be at the earliest date practical. It is proposed that the "Army Photo Center" will include G-2 representatives of Army and Corps, a Photographic Print Library, and Ground Photo Interpretation Teams. A Mobile Reproduction unit of the XIX Tactical Air Command will be available for rapid reproduction of prints.

c. Air Support Parties. At each Corps and Division Headquarters there will be an Air Support Party, consisting of one Air Support Officer, with radio and wire communication facilities and enlisted personnel for their operation. The ASP officer will act in an advisory and liaison capacity in connection with requests for tactical and photographic reconnaissance.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN. (For details see Appendix III).

a. Phases.

(1) Planning Phase: Maximum attention will be given to security of planning areas, care of classified documents, control and supervision over security of Top Secret material, discretion of personnel, and surveillance of the telephone traffic and personal mail of planning Headquarters Staffs.

Security training and supervision will be conducted in accordance with the following directives: Security Memorandum #1, "Security Training", dated 8 April 1944, and Security Memorandum #5, (reference Briefing of Commands), dated 8 April 1944, this Headquarters.

(2) Operational Phase: Primary attention will be given to headquarters security; and the execution of special security missions, including protection of enemy installations and material desired for our own use, and the countering by sabotage, espionage, and other means of enemy intelligence and communication facilities.

b. Special Counterintelligence Measures.

Special measures including cover plans, countersubversive control, passwords and replies, camouflage, countersabotage, and document security, will be taken in accordance with subsequent instructions.

c. Counterintelligence Agencies.

All troops, both combat and service, have counterintelligence responsibilities and are therefore counterintelligence agencies. They will be augmented by appropriate teams from Counter Intelligence Corps. Teams will be allocated as follows: Army - 4 Teams; Corps - 1 Team; Divisions - ½ Team. A team consists of 2 Officers and 14 Enlisted Men. Civil Affairs and Provost Marshal Staffs will assist CI Staffs in the implementation of CI plans. Close liaison will be maintained to insure full coordination of effort.

d. Counterintelligence Instructions.

Basic counterintelligence instructions will from time to time be published by higher headquarters. For security measures and training directives see Security Memorandum #2,(reference Headquarters Security), this Headquarters, dated 26 March 1944, and Security Memorandum #3, "Intelligence Funds", this Headquarters, dated 5 April 1944. Additional counterintelligence instructions will be issued in subsequent publications.

e. Counterintelligence Reports.

(1) Immediate reports of sabotage, espionage, or subversion, will be made through channels by most expeditious means to AC of S, G-2, Third Army.

(2) During the planning phase, periodic counterintelligence reports will be submitted to the AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, through channels, at the close of the 10th, 20th and 30th day of each month by each Division and Corps. Division reports will not be consolidated by Corps. (For details see Appendix III).

(3) During the operational phase FUSAG procedure will govern. Intelligence instructions No. ____, "Dissemination of Information" (to be issued later by FUSAG), are applicable and reports will be submitted as prescribed therein by:

(a) Third Army.
(b) First Army when it reverts to FUSAG control.
(c) Separate Corps or Divisions under direct FUSAG control
(d) Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, where applicable

(4) CIC Situation Reports.

(a) Counter Intelligence Corps Situation Reports will be submitted through intelligence channels as directed in TM 30-215, "Counter Intelligence Corps", WD 22 September 1943, Par 22 F.

f. Intelligence Funds.

(1) Intelligence funds will be handled by appropriate elements of this Command, namely, Corps and Divisions, in accordance with Security Memorandum #3, this Headquarters, dated 5 April 1944, "Intelligence Funds", and attached monthly report forms used by Commanders of Counter-Intelligence Corps Teams.

(2) In general the use of Intelligence Funds for confidential purposes, will be limited to necessary expenses of confidential investigations and to the direct or indirect purchase of information.

(3) Estimates of Intelligence Funds for use during the operational phase will be submitted by Corps, separate Divisions, and unit S-2s under Army control, as early as practicable. Estimates should be based on the amounts of the following types of specie:

(a) Gold Napoleons
(b) Banque de France notes (used in German controlled France)
(c) Free French currency supported by Allies
(d) American blue seal currency

7. G-2 AUXILIARY AGENCIES. (For details see Appendix IV).

a. Auxiliary agencies will, if practicable, be represented on the planning staff of each Headquarters by a coordinating officer qualified and authorized to participate responsible in planning activities. He will stress the importance of proper attachment and movement orders for agency personnel and prescribed channels for communication, correspondence, and reports.

(Note: The letters "A" (Army), "C" (Corps), and "D" (Division) as used in Par b and c below indicate the echelons directly concerned).

b. Auxiliary Agencies under G-2 control include:

(1) Prisoner of War Interrogator Teams, Tactical (A-C-D)
(2) Order of Battle Specialist Units (A-C-D)
(3) Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (French linguists) (A-C-D)
(4) Photo Interpreter Teams (A-C-D)
(5) Mobile Weather Detachments (A-C)
(6) Counter Intelligence Detachments (A-C-D)
(7) Document Examination Sections (A)
(8) Evasion and Escape Units (A)

c. Auxiliary Agencies under administrative control of higher headquarters but whose forward elements are under G-2 Tactical direction and supervision include:

(1) Special Liaison Units (A)
(2) Mobile Interrogation Units (FUSAG)
(3) OSS/SI (Office of Strategic Services-Secret Intelligence) (A)
(4) OSS/SCI (Office of Strategic Services-Special Counter Intelligence)

d. Auxiliary Agencies, normally attached and operating under control of other staff sections, but requiring close coordination with G-2 include:

(1) Signal Intelligence Services (Signal Section)
(2) Air Warning Service (Air Corps through G-3)
(3) J-Service (G-3)
(4) Army Liaison Service (G-3)
(5) Public Relations (P & PW)
(6) Relationships in liberated territory (Civil Affairs Officer)
(7) Technical Intelligence Teams - (AA, Arty, Surg, Ord, Engr, CWS, QM and Sig)
(8) Psychological Warfare Detachments (P & PW)
(9) Field Press Censors (P & PW)
(10) Civilian Press Censors (FUSAG)
(11) Base Censors (FUSAG)
(12) Prisoner of War Censors (FUSAG)
(13) Civilian Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Censors (FUSAG)

8. MAPS, MODELS, AND CHARTS. (For details see Appendix V).

a. Map Supply.

(1) Planning Maps of various types will be furnished subordinate units by Engineer, Third Army, on requisition approved by AC of S, G-2, Third Army, and may be distributed to subordinate Headquarters when briefed. (See Security Memorandum #5,) (reference Briefing of Commands) dated 8 April 1944, this Headquarters.)

(2) "Operational Maps will be obtained in accordance with the Third Army Engineer Plan. No unit bundle will be broken down for organizational use until the unit is in an area under rigid security control through which these maps and the information they contain cannot leak."

(3) Except for local sketches, all map reproduction will be coordinated with the Engineer, Third Army.

b. Aerial Photography and Collation Maps. (See Appendix II, Air Tactical and Photo Reconnaissance Plan).

Scale 1/25,000 collated maps of the coastal strip, if needed, will be issued to planning and assault units on a basis to be determined.

c. Relief Models, as obtainable, will be distributed automatically to subordinate units on the basis of one per Corps and one per Division or major assault unit.

d. Hydrographic Charts.

AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, will coordinate with the Navy through higher headquarters in the procurement and issue of appropriate hydrographic charts. Distribution will be made to Ground Force units on request only. Requests will be addressed to AC of S, G-2, Third Army.

e. Topographic and Geodetic Data.

Topographic and geodetic data will be reported to AC of S, G-2, Third Army, as prescribed in Appendix V.

9. G-2 ADMINISTRATION. (For details see Appendix VI).

a. Organization of G-2 Section, Headquarters Third Army is set up on the basis of five functional sub-sections capable of unified operation in the planning phase, and of appropriate sub-division between Advance Echelons "A" and "B" and the Rear Echelon for the operational phase.

b. G-2 Publications of Third Army will include:

(1) Target Area Analyses - a numbered series issued at unstated intervals to cover strategic and tactical appreciation of terrain, social and economic factors, and military aeronautical and Naval on-shore and off-shore features.

(2) G-2 Estimates of the Enemy Situation - published at intervals dictated by the status of plans or the situation. So far as possible, Naval and Air considerations will be included by collaboration, concurrence, or special supplement.

(3) G-2 Information Bulletins - a numbered series serving as a supplement to the analyses in (1) above.

(4) Periodic Reports, Cositintreps (combined situation - intelligence reports), Isums (intelligence summaries) etc, will be issued in radio form as outlined in Appendix I.

c. G-2 Dissemination.

Planning material will be furnished automatically to appropriate subordinate units on notification of briefing to FUSAG and other issuing agencies. The G-2 dissemination policy of Headquarters Third Army will be to issue publications in sufficient quantities to make reproduction unnecessary. Every effort will be made to fill special supplementary requests as made, therefore, request quantities will be held to actual needs.

10. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. Intelligence Personnel.

Authorized personnel and special equipment for G-2 Auxiliary agencies (see Appendix IV) will be supplied by this or higher headquarters unless otherwise prescribed in subsequent directives.

b. Intelligence Training.

(1) Continuous intelligence training in all commands is directed. As far as practicable, this training should not be confined to personnel presently assigned intelligence duties but should include a sufficient number of additional personnel to insure the immediate availability of qualified men as replacements. Enemy battle order, organization, tactics and recognition of aircraft will be stressed as well as an understanding of British Intelligence practices. Particular attention will be paid to G-2 procedure, hachured maps, camouflage training and discipline, abbreviations, variance in nomenclature, conventional signs and symbols, and map coordinate systems. Legends prescribed by higher headquarters will be the standard code for symbols and conventional signs for all elements of this command. Any additions will be prescribed through this headquarters. Instruction to all ranks must include thorough familiarity with the British Grid System in location and description.

(2) Intelligence will habitually be evaluated by source as (a) reliable, (b) credible, or (c) doubtful.

(3) The following are equivalents used in classification of documents:

US		BRITISH
Top Secret	equals	Top Secret
Secret	"	Most Secret & Secret
Confidential	"	Confidential
Restricted	"	Restricted

(4) Forms shown in FM 101-5 relating to G-2 Activities will be used as applicable.

c. Espionage

Espionage will be undertaken only by the Commanding General, Headquarters Third Army, through agencies provided by higher headquarters. Lower echelons will not engage in espionage without prior approval of AC of S, G-2, this Headquarters, to whom recommendations for the employment of O.S.S. Agencies on clandestine missions of espionage or security will be submitted. (See Appendix IV)

d. Liaison (G-2)

The army liaison service, as tentatively planned, will operate under direction of AC of S, G-3; however, close liaison between G-2s of successive and adjacent elements for purposes of coordination and avoidance of duplication is enjoined.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 8-G-2 Plan

Register No TUSA 75

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE PLAN

7 May 1944

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE PLAN

1. PHASES

a. Planning Phase.

During the planning phase, and until D Day, effort will be concentrated on studies of terrain; beaches and ports; coastal defenses; enemy battle order, equipment, and methods; and the full exploitation of agencies available to G-2 in long-range and strategic missions. During this phase close coordination will be maintained with higher, and similar Navy and Air Planning headquarters for the mutual exchange of pertinent information and for the most effective employment of operational agencies in the search for information.

b. Operational Phase.

During the operational phase, D Day and thereafter, attention will be focused on enemy capabilities as determined by the terrain, and the location, strength, composition, and disposition of his forces. During this phase the information gathering possibilities of combat units, associated arms, and special intelligence agencies will be fully exploited.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

The essential elements of enemy information listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 and the pertinent indications in paragraph 5 will serve as the basic directive for the search for military information by all elements of the command.

3. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION - FUSAG.

a. Ground.

(1) What is the extent of the interference that may be expected from enemy naval or air forces against the movement of Third Army units from the United Kingdom to points of debarkation?

(2) What main rail lines and highways are used to supply each enemy sector on D plus 25 line and from what principal depots are such supplies obtained?

(3) Will the enemy mount a major counter-offensive? If so, when, where, in what direction, and with what forces?

(4) Will the enemy employ essentially defensive tactics along the D plus 25 line? If so, what is the location and strength of his local and general reserves in each sector and what is the nature and location of his defensive works?

(5) Will the enemy withdraw from the D plus 25 line? If so, when, where, and in what direction?

(6) In the event of such withdrawal, will the enemy move forces and prepare defensive positions to give:

(a) Strong defense of both the LOIRE Ports and BRITTANY PENINSULA?

(b) Light defense of the LOIRE Ports and strong defense of BREST and the BRITTANY PENINSULA?

(c) Strong defense of the LOIRE Ports and a line of communication to BREST along the Southern portion of the BRITTANY PENINSULA?

(d) Strong defense of the LOIRE ports and abandon BRITTANY except for delaying actions and the defense of BREST?

(e) Light defense of the LOIRE Ports and BRITTANY with strong defense against ALLIED forces moving in the direction of the RIVER SEINE or PARIS?

(7) In the event of a withdrawal by the enemy to the South from the D plus 25 line, will he concentrate counter-attacking forces to menace the Eastern, Western, or both flanks of our advancing forces? If so, when and in what strength?

(8) Will the enemy attempt to interfere with the operation of the COM Z or threaten its security by airborne or seaborne attack, sabotage, psychological warfare or organized hostile groups? If so, when, where and by what means?

(9) Will the enemy attempt a seaborne movement of the forces that may be still on the CHANNEL ISLANDS to either the COTENTIN or the BRITTANY PENINSULA?

(10) Will the enemy move additional reinforcements to the Allied lodgement area from elsewhere in FRANCE and from other fronts or areas outside of FRANCE?

(11) Will the enemy use gas, bacteriological agents or secret weapons?

(12) Will the enemy demolish transportation, public utility and port facilities in that part of the lodgement area that is not yet under our control? If so, what, where and to what extent?

(13) Will the enemy evacuate civilian labor, the civilian population, or material and/or carry out demolitions in such a way as to interfere with the organization of the COM Z? If so, where, when and by what means?

(14) What is the state of morale of divisions opposing D plus 25 line and defending BRITTANY and the LOIRE Ports?

b. Air.

(1) What GAF units are employed against our effort?

(2) What is the operational strength of German fighter units employed against our effort?

(3) Where are the German fighters based?

(4) What is the operational strength of the German bomber force opposing us?

(5) Where are the bombers based?

(6) What serviceable airfields are available to the enemy?

(7) What are his available stored reserves?

(8) Where are his stored reserves located?

(9) What repair facilities are available to him?

(10) Where are they located?

(11) What types of aircraft is the enemy employing against us?

(12) What tactics are being employed by the enemy?

(13) What is the caliber of the air crews of the enemy?

(14) Is the enemy employing advanced landing grounds?

(15) Where are his A.L.Gs located?

(16) Where are the headquarters of the GAF units employed in the battle?

(17) What are the dispositions of enemy static defenses (anti-aircraft, smoke, balloons, camouflage, dummies, searchlights)?

(18) What are the dispositions of enemy air warning devices (Freyas, Wursburgs, Jafue controls)?

(19) To what further extent will the enemy divert his air forces from Germany and other fronts to oppose our effort?

(20) To what extent will the enemy divert his available air forces from the Western Front to strengthen his positions on other fronts and in Germany?

(21) To what extent has the enemy rendered unserviceable those airfields which may become available to us through capture?

c. Naval.

(1) Location, disposition, speed and course of enemy naval units?

(2) Loss or damage inflicted on enemy naval units?

(3) Beach information affecting landings and showing conditions markedly different than indicated by previous information. Immediate reconnaissance of the assault and adjoining beaches, with emphasis on bars, gradients, rocks, currents, tidal conditions, etc., must be made as soon as possible so that the most favorable location may be utilized for the unloading of supplies?

(4) Location and composition of previously unreported mine fields?

(5) Location of control stations for mine fields?

(6) Enemy plans and preparations for demolition and blocking of ports?

(7) Location and characteristics of enemy batteries, defenses, searchlights and radar not previously identified?

(8) Information on channels not previously known?

4. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION - TUSA.

a. What is the nature and extent of Naval defenses and activity in the target area?

b. What is the nature, extent, disposition, and the status of the ground forces and defenses?

c. What is the nature, extent, disposition, and status of the air and antiaircraft defenses?

d. What are the topographic, meteorological, and hydrographic factors which affect our mission?

e. What is the status of public utilities and civilian attitude as they affect our mission?

5. ANALYSIS OF ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION. (INDICATIONS).

a. Naval Defenses and Activity.

(1) Number, type, and condition of captured or salvaged naval craft?

(2) Number, type, location, and effectiveness of German Naval units?

(a) Destroyer, submarine, PT boats, etc.?

(b) Status of training and morale of crews?

(3) Type, extent, fire-cover, and control of underwater defenses (obstructions, wire, mines, underwater port obstructions, etc.)?

(4) Number, type, direction, and time of enemy water movements by sea and inland waterways?

b. GROUND FORCES AND DEFENSES.

(1) Details of location, type, caliber, and firing efficiency of enemy land and shore batteries including flame throwers?

(2) Size, composition, location, identification, weapons, and status of supply and equipment of coastal defense units and local reserves?

(3) Location, nature, extent, and defense of obstacles (demolitions, port obstructions, mines and minefields, road blocks, wire, booby traps, sabotage, etc.)?

(4) Size, composition, location, identification, weapons, and status of supply and equipment of major reserves and reinforcements?

(5) Location, identification, equipment, and combat effectiveness of armored elements, including armored trains?

(6) Location, identification, equipment, and combat effectiveness of parachute and airborne elements; including number, type, and availability of troop-carrier organizations and aircraft?

(7) Troop movements on roads; direction, type, and volume? Location, extent, and type of road congestion, military and civilian?

(8) Railway traffic to and from the area; type, direction, volume, and cargo?

(9) Combat effectiveness; including organizational history, and status of physical condition, training, morale, and military attitude of enemy troops involved?

(10) Nature and extent of enemy chemical activity; extent of gas mask training and usage by enemy military and enemy-sympathetic civilian personnel; location, type, and amount of enemy chemical stores?

(11) Main supply roads and rail lines used to supply enemy sectors on D plus 25 line and location, type, capacity, condition and stockage of supply depots?

(12) Location, type, capacity, concentration and movement of enemy barges, boats and landing craft from the CHANNEL ISLANDS.

c. Air and Anti-aircraft Defense.

(1) Nature and type of enemy air activity:

(a) Number and types of aircraft?

(b) Time, number and direction of flights; and results achieved?

(2) Status of enemy airfields and airfield supplies, repair facilities and equipment?

(3) Results of Allied bombings prior to and during operation?

(4) Location, size and condition of landing areas suitable for Airborne Troops?

(5) Location, type, caliber, and intensity of anti-aircraft fire?

(6) Location and type of air warning devices?

d. Topographic, Meteorological and Hydrographic Factors.

(1) Location of unmapped terrain features (lakes, rivers, defiles, inundations)?

(2) Terrain and road information for map correction?

(3) Forecasts as to visibility, humidity, high and low pressure areas, wind directions and velocity, and temperatures?

(4) Effects of forecasts on streams, employment of chemical smoke, visual observation, and actual smoke due to burning?

(5) Daylight and dark, sunrise and sunset, moonrise and moonset tables?

(6) Beach detail, including offshore currents, approaches, gradients, obstructions, dimensions, exits, and backing terrain?

(7) Changes in channels of major rivers and ports not previously known?

e. Public Utilities and Civilian Attitude.

(1) Utilities.

(a) Condition of utilities; railway, electrical, telephone, telegraph, and water?

(b) Water pollution?

(c) Condition of wells, springs and streams?

(2) Civilian Attitude.

(a) Nature and extent of cooperation, resistance, sabotage, or espionage by local population?

(b) Assistance from "underground" semi-military agencies?

6. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

Normal intelligence agencies in corps and lower echelons will be augmented by specialized intelligence agencies as available, in accordance with data already furnished.

a. Air Reconnaissance Agencies (For details see Appendix II).
(1) Tactical air reconnaissance (For details see Appendix II).
(2) Photo reconnaissance (For details see Appendix II).
(3) Air photo interpretation (For details see Appendix II).
b. Counterintelligence Agencies (For details see Appendix III).
c. Order of Battle Specialist Units (For details see Appendix IV).
d. Intelligence Specialists (For details see Appendix IV).
e. Office of Strategic Service Agencies (For details see Appendix IV).
f. Censorship (For details see Appendix IV).
g. Signal Intelligence Service (For details see Appendix IV).
h. Air Warning Service (For details see Appendix IV).
i. Technical Intelligence Teams (For details see Appendix IV).
j. Special Liaison Unit (For details see Appendix IV).

7. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE MISSIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Each corps and separate unit, will be responsible for such ground reconnaissance as can be made within its boundaries as established to obtain information based on indications derived from the essential elements of information, above.

b. All agencies listed in paragraph 5 will, within the limits of their means and missions, seek to obtain the answers to Essential Elements of Enemy Information in paragraphs 2 and 3, bearing in mind the indications in paragraph 4, which are the results of analysis of these essential elements of information.

c. Requests for Tactical Air and Photo Reconnaissance. (For details see Appendix II).

d. Requests for clandestine intelligence missions. (For details see Appendix IV).

8. REPORTS

a. Spot Reports.
Important information pertaining to enemy action will be transmitted by Corps and Army units to this headquarters in the form of brief spot reports. This headquarters will make the necessary dissemination and distribution, both within the staff and to the tactical units immediately concerned. Great care will be observed by lower units to determine the method of dissemination, so as not to compromise codes or ciphers used in transmittal. All such messages will be paraphrased from the original text.

b. Intelligence Summaries (ISUMS).
Intelligence Summaries (ISUMS) will be transmitted by radio or TWX as of 1200 and 2400 hours daily.

c. Radio Intelligence Summaries:
It will be the policy of this headquarters to transmit by radio or TWX to higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters, brief summarized reports every six hours. The last report in each 24-hour period will be issued at 2400 daily. Negative reports will not be issued.

d. Weather Reports. (For details see Appendix IV)

e. Periodic Reports.
(1) Written (formal) G-2 Periodic Reports will be submitted by Corps and Separate Units daily as of 2000 hours and will be transmitted by the most expeditious means. The spot reports and ISUMS referred to above, will cover enemy activities during this period, and the written G-2 Periodic Report will constitute a complete record of the 24-hour period.

(2) Periodic Reports will follow the general pattern of form No. 16, Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, with particular emphasis as far as applicable, including air and naval information, on:
(a) Lines of contact, front lines, or areas held by enemy.
(b) Estimated strength, composition, disposition and attitude of major enemy elements.
(c) Identifications.
(d) Evidences of chemical warfare. (See Annex 17, Section I, Par 5.)
(e) Number of prisoners taken (by unit to include battalions), and their attitude.
(f) Attitude of civil population, sabotage or 5th Column activities.
(g) Enemy air activity and strength; main areas of enemy fighter and bomber activities; enemy air reconnaissance; airborne and paratroop efforts.
(h) Enemy naval activity affecting land operations.
(i) Condition of sea during landing operations, and effect on immediate future landings.
(j) Meteorological conditions.

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

AIR TACTICAL AND PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

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AIR TACTICAL AND PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

1. AIR RECONNAISSANCE. GENERAL

Both tactical and photo reconnaissance of the XIX Tactical Air Command will cooperate with the Third Army in operation "Overlord". In case of need, the XIX Tactical Air Command may in turn call upon other units inside or outside the Ninth Air Force supporting the First U.S. Army Group. All ground-force requests for air tactical or photo reconnaissance will normally be channelized by G-2 channels through Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 Third Army; in the exceptional case where other channels are employed (eg: the air-support channel), G-2, Third Army; will be so informed without delay by the Air Reconnaissance Coordinating Officer at airfield. In no other way can duplication of requests be minimized. The Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command, and staff plan throughout to be in close physical proximity to the Commanding General, Third Army.

2. TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE (P-51s armed)

Tactical Reconnaissance flown at low level by day or semi-darkness, mostly between 5000 and 7000 feet, furnished the larger part of its information in photographic form, both vertical and oblique. The resultant intelligence may be short range and may require quick action.

a. Function: - To reconnoiter the tactical area.

b. Planning Phase: - Reconnaissance during the planning phase is now being flown on a low scale of activity, in order not to give the appearance of interest concentrated in any one locality.

c. Operational Phase:

(1) Organization: - It is contemplated that two Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons will be assigned to the XIX Tactical Air Command, and stationed on one of its airfields. One Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, discussed below, will probably be based there as well. To derive full advantage from this concentration of reconnaissance agencies, a "Photo Center", a sub-section of G-2, Third Army, will take station at the same airfield and at subsequent airfields to which displacement is made. Responsibilities of the Photo Center will be creative intelligence, coordination, second and third phase interpretation, reproduction and dissemination. Though information from the fighters and bombers will gravitate to the Photo Center, its main reliance will fall upon the battle performance of the Tactical and Photo Reconnaissance aircraft.

(2) Employment: - Operational control of aircraft remains with Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command. Neither Tactical nor Photo Reconnaissance units will be attached to Third Army nor to any of its subordinate commands. Whenever practicable, missions will be suballotted in advance to Corps and Divisions in accordance with the number available to Third Army.

3. PHOTO-RECONNAISSANCE (P-38s, unarmed)

a. Function: - To provide both high and low altitude coverage of superior technical quality, mainly verticals, with capacity for distant or strategic penetration. The resultant intelligence may be long-range and may permit of more deliberate action.

b. Planning Phase:

(1) General: Missions will be flown to complete basic coverage, to study localities in detail, to maintain current information on enemy defenses, and to control mapping well in advance of movement.

(2) Photo Interpretation reports will be issued furnishing additions or corrections to known enemy defenses.

(3) Collated maps, scale 1/25,000, of the coastal strip will be issued to planning and assault units on a basis to be determined.

(4) Reprints of selected photographs will be made and distributed in quantity to interested headquarters.

(5) Coastal mosaics are available in limited quantity for planners.

(6) Reproduction facilities are at hand for laying and printing mosaics.

(7) Communication and dissemination:

(a) G-2 channels will normally be used in requests for all photo coverage, reprints, mosaics, etc.

(b) A daily air liaison courier service is contemplated for the purpose of deliveries, reprints or request missions, weather permitting.

(c) Photographs, reports and mosaics will be distributed through normal G-2 channels.

c. Operational Phase:

(1) Personnel during the operational phase will be, with few exceptions the same as during the planning phase. Among the Ground Liaison Officers at airfields of reconnaissance aircraft will be certain officers, representing G-2, Third Army, of selected experience from the several arms of the ground forces. Their function in the operational phase may differ from that of the planning phase due in part to the time-element, and in part to the high level of reconnaissance effort that will be required prior to the entrance into operations of the Third Army.

(2) Equipment for reconnaissance photographs except that required for their dissemination will be furnished and maintained by the XIX Tactical Air Command.

(3) Employment

(a) Weather permitting, planned day and night missions are contemplated for the purpose of providing both tactical and strategical information of the enemy.

(b) It is contemplated that photographs will be taken daily over most of the entire forward area of the ground troops to a depth of about 20 kilometers. In mobile situations and in advanced planning to forecast such situations, photographs will be taken to a greater depth along routes of advance.

(c) Although it is anticipated that planned missions will cover most requirements of Corps and Divisions, subordinate headquarters to Army may in emergency request reconnaissance through their Air Support Party. Such requests will be given highest priority.

(d) Operational Control of aircraft remains with Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command, and no attachments to ground units will be made. A Ground Liaison Officer to coordinate air reconnaissance requests from ground sources will be present at the airfield to represent G-2, Third Army.

(4) Reports, requests, reprints and mosaics:

(a) Tactical information will be sent to interested units by most expeditious means.

(b) Mimeographed reports on the findings of interpretation, collated maps, or mosaics of target areas at proper scale will be issued periodically.

(c) Requests for reconnaissance will conform with "Intelligence Instructions No. 10", First U.S. Army Group, 29 April 1944, page 1, paragraph 5, "Requests", and page 4, "Check-list - Requests". For this purpose, the use of form shown on page 20a is suggested.

(5) Communications: (See Charts Nos. 1 & 2.)

All means of communication will be used to insure the prompt transmittal of requests and reports.

4. NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE

Since the enemy with his loss of air superiority will move mainly by night, air reconnaissance by night is in some respects more vital than by day. The British have organized satisfactory night reconnaissance by fast Mosquitos equipped with navigational aids and carrying a maximum of eight 100-lb or 300-lb magnesium flash-bombs. A U.S. project exists for night photography by a high-intensity quartz gas-filled flash-lamp. This headquarters understands that night air photography will be available, and plans are being made involving its exploitation.

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Chart 1

CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH
THIRD ARMY RECONNAISSANCE AIRFIELD AND "PHOTO CENTER"



Chart 2

G-2 (AIR) SUB-SECTIONS OF ARMY AND CORPS



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(Submit in quadruplicate. Training requests should reach XIX Tactical Air Command two weeks before reconnaissance is required. Information returned on this form will be classified).

REQUEST FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

A. From:_____ C. Request No:_____

B. To:_____ D. Priority:_____

_____ E. Date & Time:_____

When sent by telephone, TWX, or radio, serial letters will denote headings. Requests on this form should follow by quickest available means.

F. Coordinates of objective and map sheet:_____
(1) Foreground line (If gridded oblique):____Facing:____

G. Type of reconnaissance (See Rear of this sheet):_____
(2) Focal length (If gridded oblique):_____

H. Purpose for which required:_____

J. Dissemination of Report: (1) How:_____
(2) To whom:_____

K. Sets of prints required: (1) Initially:_____
(2) Later:_____
(3) Prints useless after:_____

L. Delivery of prints: (1) To whom:_____
(2) Date initial prints required:_____
(3) Date additional prints required:_____

M. Remarks:_____

N. If mission cannot be accomplished by_____it will be automatically cancelled.

For Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,__

(Do not write below this line)

Approved:_____Disapproved:_____ Name & Rank:_____

Remarks:_____ Unit:_____

EXPLANATION

A. Unit initiating request.

B. Unit to which request is addressed.

C. Request number.

D. Priority categories: (1) Most urgent
(2) Urgent
(3) Operational
(4) Non-operational

E. Date and time of initial request.

F. Coordinates and map sheet of objective. (G.S.G.S., 1/50,000 if possible).
Delimit Areas. Send overlays if feasible.
(1) Gridded Obliques-give coordinates of foreground line and direction of view. (I.E. Facing NORTH)

G. Type of reconnaissance:

S : Visual
VL: Vertical large (1/10,000 or less)
VM: Vertical medium (1/10,000 - 1/14,000)
VS: Vertical small (over 1/14,000)
OC: Oblique close (suitable for close study, exceptional requirements only)
OM: Oblique medium (suitable for normal requirements)
OL: Oblique long (suitable for topographical survey)
(1) Give focal length of cone. (7 or 8 inches or 20 inches.)

H. Reasons for requesting mission that may aid in laying on mission or interpretation.

J. How and where will reports, visual or interpretation, be sent. Telephone, TWX, Radio, or VHF.

K. Intelligence from photographs is sent more quickly by radio or telephone than by prints.
(1) State the quantity of prints required initially (keep to minimum.)
(2) State the quantity required later.
(3) State the last useful date.

L. (1) State where prints are to be delivered and to whom.
(2) Give dates when prints are required.
(3) If prints are to be delivered by liaison plane state location of nearest landing ground. (Ground Forces will distribute their own prints.)

M. Any special remarks pertinent to the fulfillment of this mission.

N. Fill in date when mission can be cancelled if weather or other factors interfere with the flying of the mission.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 8 - G-2 Plan

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Chart "3

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AUTH: C.G. TUSA
DATE: 3 JUNE 1944
INIT: JAMC

THIRD ARMY CHANNEL
FOR REQUEST AND DELIVERY OF PHOTOS



NORMAL CHANNELS OF AIR PHOTO REQUESTS AND DISTRIBUTION

Note: a. - Dispatch of photos in priority of origination of request.

a. - No objection to emergency requests direct to Tusa Photo Center.

c. - Attached and supporting units serviced by hqs to which attached or supported.

d. - Normally, Divs process lower units. Corps monitors, or has representative at TUSA Photo Center.

e. - This chart augments and does not supercede Chart no 1, Annex 8, Appendix 2.

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Register No TUSA 75

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

7 May 1944

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

1. SUMMARY OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION

a. The enemy is reported to be preparing for a landing in France by reinforcing its espionage and sabotage agencies to function in areas where Allied troops are to be trained or staged during and after landing operations and extensive radio nets have been established along the coasts of France manned by agents trained to operate during the landings and after retreat of the German forces. These agents include men and women of several nationalities. The enemy will attempt to create dissention between the Allies by propaganda; will attempt to cause panic among civilians and troops; will attempt to block military movement by creating large numbers of refugees; may attempt to counter-mand combat orders to troops; and otherwise hamper our operations by every clandestine means at his well-organized command. Details will be disseminated with counterintelligence reports.

b. Our forces will be opposed by the following:
(1) Enemy and indigenous intelligence agencies and/or agents.
(2) Para-military and subversive agencies and/or agents. These forces are divided into two groups:
(a) German staffed or trained.
(b) Indigenous.
German opposition will consist of well-trained Abwehr agents, Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and other agents of varied nationalities.

c. Successful maintenance of friendly relations with the civil populations will be of great benefit in countering local and enemy opposition. Much will depend on the discipline and conduct of our forces, who will be inevitably compared with the "correctness" of the German occupation troops. Successful relations with the population will also require adroit handling of situations caused by the political upheavals now in evidence and which will increase in tempo after the Allied landing.

d. Although it can be expected that the majority of the French police will be cooperative, precautions must be taken against those elements within the police known to be German selected or inspired. The existing police forces will be primary agencies available to assist in control of the civil population. Foremost in this control will be insuring that mass movements of local populations do not hinder military operations or serve as an aid to enemy intelligence infiltrants.

e. Security checks of local labor and other personnel also will require considerable care and security. It is known that this fertile field is already being used as a sphere of operations for infiltration by the enemy.

2. PHASES.

a. Planning Phase.
(1) Maximum attention will be given to security of planning areas, safeguarding of classified documents, discretion of classified personnel and surveillance of the telephone and personal mail of planning headquarters staffs.
(2) All classified officers and Security clerks will certify in writing to their respective headquarters that they have read and understand TUSA Security Memorandum No. 2, Security Instructions for Planning Staffs, 26 March 1944, and pertinent parts of TUSA Security Memorandum No. 4, 8 April 1944 and Security Memorandum No. 5, 8 April 1944.

b. Operational Phase.
(1) Primary attention will be given to headquarters security; and the execution of special security missions, including the protection of enemy installations and material desired for our own use, and the countering by sabotage, espionage and other means of enemy intelligence and communications.
(a) CI operations will keep abreast of tactical operations.
(b) Detailed intelligence instructions on Military and Civil Security, Censorship, and other agencies will be provided by higher authority.
(c) Information obtained from special agencies concerning Resistance Groups will be disseminated by this headquarters thru G-2 channels and will assist in establishing the bona fides of persons who claim to have been working for Allied Underground Organizations or resistance groups.
(d) Allied CI units (other than British) will be attached to G-2 TUSA; their exact role will be defined later. Until specific authorization is obtained, no direct contact will be made with such personnel.
(e) Close liaison and assistance will be maintained between Civil Affairs (CA) and Provost Marshal Staffs to insure full co-

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ordination of effort.

(f) Special Interrogators will be held at Headquarters FUSAG for duty as required.

(g) Forward Echelon Communication Zone (FE/COM Z) plan designates that:

1 Its CI functions will include counter espionage, counter sabotage and military security.

2 FE/COM Z is responsible for CI within COM Z to include detailed planning. Plans will include both supply and allocation of Port CIC Sections and the provision to coordinate with tactical forces by such COM Z CI personnel as are necessary to insure continuous CI coverage of COM Z ports and installations within the Combat Zone.

3 CIC - COM Z personnel will form a network throughout the U S controlled area on the continent, from, and including, the coastline up to the rear Third Army boundary, except in such area or installations as may be specifically allotted to other agencies. This personnel will assist local commanders in preserving military security and will prevent, detect, investigate, report and take the necessary action with regards to suspected subversive actions either civil or military and prevent the passage in or out of, and the circulation within, the prescribed area of suspected subversive persons, material or important military information.

3. SPECIAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES.

a. All Cover Plans, if used, and detailed instructions pertinent thereto will be prescribed by higher Headquarters.

b. Priority of Security Missions.

(1) Priority of Security Missions to prevent destruction of vital installations by sabotage or our own gunfire and aerial bombardment will be determined by AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, based on recommendations from interested Staff Sections of this headquarters, and specific requests from Commanding Generals of Corps and Divisions, and lower echelons of command through channels.

(2) The following scale of priorities will apply:

(a) Facilities vital to the mission.
(b) Facilities essential to the mission.
(c) All others.

(3) Priority targets will be announced in appropriate annexes to Field Orders, as required.

c. Personality and Organization Lists.

(1) A card index file will be maintained at TUSA Headquarters giving coverage regarding:

(a) Persons connected or believed to be connected with Abwhr, SD and other Subversive Organizations.

(b) Political Quislings and suspected Collaborationists.

(c) Friendly persons.

(2) Information regarding the above together with lists and locations of Subversive Organizations and civilians will be published by this headquarters.

(3) Under direction of the appropriate AC of S, G-2, all suspects will be dealt with promptly and efficiently, not only in order to apprehend dangerous persons but also to satisfy local civilians that action will be taken where justified. Prompt handling will prevent action by local elements to take the law into their hands. Security grounds alone will justify the detention of denounced person by CIC. If it is clearly established that no violation or danger to security exists, the names of persons denounced will be given to Civil Affairs Detachments for further action.

(4) In forward areas, civilians arrested as suspects will be handed over to the Provost Marshal for detention and evacuation through Division and Army PW cages, unless considered important enough for special handling. If local conditions permit, suspects will be processed through a Refugee Interrogation Post before detention. Preliminary sifting should be carried out as early as possible to relieve the Provost Marshal of the burden of evacuating and accomodating harmless civilians.

(5) The CIC, under direction of appropriate AC of S, G-2, is responsible for action in respect to subversive or hostile political organizations.

(a) G-2's and S-2's must be guided by the general consideration that is not desirable for Allied military forces to intervene in purely internal political disputes, and that their responsibility does not extend beyond the task of securing Allied forces against attack by enemy agents or subversive elements. Local political situations are the responsibility of Civil Affairs

(b) Civilians arrested by CIC personnel will not be released by Civil Affairs or Provost Marshal without consultation with the AC of S, G-2 concerned.

d. Passwords and Replies.

(1) Passwords and Replies will be issued by Headquarters Third Army for all elements of this command by the Signal Officer, this headquarters, through Signal channels. Initial date to be announced later.

(2) The daily Password and Reply for a period of ten (10) days will be forwarded through SOI channels to all units by this headquarters ten (10) days in advance of use. The unit or headquarters receiving this list is responsible that the Password and Reply is disseminated on the following basis:

(a) Companies : Day by day on effective date.
(b) Battalions: In groups of two days, prior to effective date.
(c) Regiments : In groups of three days, prior to effective date.
(d) Divisions : In groups of five days, prior to effective date.
(e) Corps : In groups of seven days, prior to effective date.

Troops will be cautioned to give Password and Reply in a low voice, to preclude possibility of compromise.

(3) Passwords and Replies will be employed in a question and answer manner. For example: The challenger gives the Password (question) and the person challenged replies with the Reply (answer). The manner of using the Password and Reply is prescribed in Section V, WD Cir. 300, 1943.

e. Code Names.

Code names will be used as directed by SHAEF. Instructions will be issued thru Headquarters Third Army as received.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CORPS.

a. Functions:

(1) CIC personnel are trained to carry out specialized counterintelligence missions and to assist the command to which assigned or attached in the accomplishment of these missions. The commander is responsible for all counterintelligence within his command, the appropriate AC of S, G-2 will be responsible for the immediate direction of the CIC Detachment attached or assigned to his unit and will employ them as indicated below. CIC will be used to combat espionage, sabotage, and subversion affecting the success of combat missions, to prevent leakage of information to the enemy and to deliver security lectures to troops. Close liaison and cooperation will be maintained between all Counterintelligence agencies, Civil Affairs, and the Provost Marshal.

(2) In addition to normal counterintelligence duties within Army, Corps, and Division in the field, CIC Detachments will perform tactical CIC functions, such as search of enemy CPs and the questioning of civilians, informers and agents in occupied territory

b. Organization:

CIC Detachments will be attached to TUSA on the following scale as available:

(1) Army Detachment -- 1 Team -- 2 Officers and 14 Enlisted men. (assigned)
(2) Army Reserve (attached) -- 3 Teams - 6 Officers and 42 Enlisted men.
(3) Corps -- 1 Team -- 2 Officers and 14 Enlisted men.
(4) Division -- 1 Team -- 2 Officers and 14 Enlisted men.

c. Planning and Operational Phase.

(1) Counterintelligence agencies during the planning phase will assist in security training of troops, safeguard planning headquarters and documents, and take such other steps necessary to prevent the leakage of planning information.

(2) In the assault, the primary duty of Counterintelligence personnel is to secure Counterintelligence targets in the area of the objective. Such targets will be selected by the appropriate G-2. Vital target areas will be disseminated to Divisions by TUSA. Foremost among those targets will be:-

(a) Known and suspect enemy agents.

(b) Known enemy collaborationists, sympathizers, and other person whose presence menaces the security of the Allied Forces.

(c) Buildings, billets and installations known or suspected to contain documents of Counterintelligence value.

(3) Counterintelligence Corps will be used only for counterintelligence missions affecting military security, except in dire emergency, as directed in Technical Manual 30-215, as follows:

(a) (Army Detachment) General investigative, rear echelon missions including safeguarding military information, security against the activities of enemy agents and rear echelon counterintelligence functions in general.

(b) (Corps and Division Detachments) Field security missions including counterintelligence measures performed in forward echelon.

(c) These missions will not include assumption of responsibilities with which the Provost Marshal or Civil Affairs Officer is charged; tactical work or combat intelligence or missions more suitable for combat troops.

d. Equipment.

CIC Detachments will report for duty fully equipped, as provided by War Department directive, 29 November 1943, Subject: "Special list of Equipment and Supplies for the Counterintelligence Corps". Maintenance and replacement of equipment will be by units to which they are attached.

e. Credentials.

Counterintelligence Corps personnel will be given every cooperation in carrying out missions. Credentials and badges will be honored at all times. Full power of arrest is vested in CIC agents. CIC personnel on duty will be exempted from all curfew restrictions.

f. Research.

A CI Laboratory will be available at Headquarters FUSAG to carry out CI examinations of scientific nature. A list of available facilities will be published thru G-2 channels.

g. Employment. It is anticipated and planned that:

(1) To provide maximum counterintelligence coverage in a mobile situation CIC Detachments of Corps and Divisions will be reinforced from the Army Detachment pool as the necessity arises.

(2) Army CIC pool personnel will revert to Army control as predetermined counterintelligence objectives are reached. While in Corps and Division, Army personnel will be under command of Corps or Division CIC Detachment Commanders.

(3) CIC personnel may be transferred from Corps or Division to Army CIC Detachment Pool when the necessity for reinforcement arises in critical areas, but Corps and Division Detachments will not be reduced below strength of one (1) officer and seven (7) enlisted men. Such personnel will be returned to their unit without delay as soon as the situation permits.

(4) Other duties of counterintelligence personnel in forward areas will include:

(a) Contacting local authorities and persons known to be friendly to the Allied cause, to secure all possible Counterintelligence information.

(b) Advising and assisting in securing against sabotage all public and private installations whose continued operation is essential to the Allied forces.

(c) Checking upon the observance by the civil population of all security provisions contained in the proclamations and orders issued by Civil Affairs staffs and detachments.

(d) Assisting in the discovery and collection of any hidden armaments or equipment which have not been surrendered or reported in accordance with proclamation.

(e) The seizure of civil communications until taken over by other authorities.

(f) Seizing and impounding civilian mail until it is taken over by censorship personnel.

(g) Advising on the immediate establishment of guards at all captured ordnance and ammunition dumps, especially those which may be accessible to the local population.

(h) Under certain circumstances, Intelligence personnel, if limited to their own resources, may be unable to carry out all necessary security measures. They may require the assistance of other troops in seising suspect premises and in the execution of other counterintelligence duties. Unit Commanders will give assistance as necessary to execute such missions.

(i) Enemy documents seized may contain information of vital targets desired by Document sections. CI personnel will cooperate with and assist Document sections and Combat Intelligence staffs in the procurement of such material.

(j) Certain documents containing statistical data will be of primary interest to Civil Affairs, these will be preserved intact if practicable.

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS.

a. Mission.

To deny to the enemy all vital information during the mounting of the operation, with particular reference to:-

(1) Assault date.
(2) Assault targets.
(3) Composition of forces to be employed, their relative strengths, and any indication that might convey information of our main and subsidiary or diversionary efforts.
(4) Secret equipment to be employed.

b. Responsibilities.

Security is the responsibility of Unit Commanders.

c. Security Training.

Security Training will be intensified during the planning phase. See Security Memorandum No. 4, 8 April 1944, this headquarters.

d. Security of Movements.

(1) When so directed, troops will be sealed in camps, training and staging areas, or aboard ships.

(2) When troops are sealed, no personnel will be permitted to leave except on official business. Permission in such case must be specifically authorized by the Commander under whose orders the troops were sealed.

(3) Rigid precautions will be instituted to prevent contact between sealed troops and all other persons, military, naval, or civilians. Mail and newspapers will be delivered only by designated classified officers.

(4) Telephones will be used for official matters only as authorized in (2) above.

(5) Attention is directed to censorship restrictions forbidding the mention of any unit change of location in personal correspondence by direct statement or inference.

(6) Convoy Security: Static Commanders and Security Officers will assure themselves that in each case appropriate Tactical Commanders have designated an Officer or NCO whose duty is to prevent violations of security within each vehicle load, particularly when in convoy and at halts, scheduled or otherwise. This measure is to supplement those within the static security framework such as guards at halts, regulating points, and roving patrols. Consideration should be given to possible air attack on convoys with the resulting disruption of security controls.

(7) Searches: CIC personnel will search camp sites immediately upon departure of tactical troops for any evidence of identification that might jeopardize security. Report of violations will be made to Headquarters TUSA thru Intelligence channels.

(8) Casualties: Special arrangements will be made with regards to casualties among tactical, Navy, or SOS personnel evacuated to hospitals after briefing commences. These will be segregated from other patients until the assault has commenced, and staffs at the selected hospitals must be indoctrinated in the need for security.

(9) Enemy Agents: It is highly probable that the enemy will attempt to land agents, some of whom may be equipped with short wave radio transmitters, in marshalling areas through such means as parachutes, airplanes, submarines, small boats, etc. The possibility that some of these agents may wear American or Allied uniforms must be borne in mind.

(10) General:

(a) Tactical unit commanders will place interior guards around marshalling area camps to prevent the entrance of unauthorized persons and to restrict troops in the area when required. Insofar as time, materials and non-interference with mounting permit, wire fencing will be strung by tactical units first occupying marshalling areas.

(b) SOS - MPs and CIC agents and British Field security personnel, MPs and civilian police will assist in maintaining exterior security around marshalling and embarkation areas and in neighboring towns.

(c) SOS troops and civilian personnel such as American Red Cross and Civil Defense will be subject to the same restrictions as tactical troops.

(11) Interpreters: Interpreters will not be attached to their headquarters or unit until necessary. Their attachment will be delayed until the appropriate time for the briefing of the headquarters or unit concerned.

(12) Issue of Maps: The bulk issue of maps of the operation will conform with the policy prescribed in TUSA Engineer Annex No. 3, Operation OVERLORD, Appendicies No. 3, Section 18(a) Par. 18.

(13) Before Briefing:

(a) Leaves and furloughs will be granted only in cases of extreme emergency.

(b) Troops will be periodically confined to camps before briefing begins in order not to create undue attention when final restrictions are imposed.

(c) All tactical personnel not embarking will be segregated before briefing commences. These troops will be kept in areas where security precautions similar to those for troops involved in the operation will be in effect.

(d) Personnel sent to hospitals will be warned by company officers and unit medical officers regarding security precautions.

(14) Briefing:

(a) Briefing prior to H-hour will be carried out in marshalling areas for troops to be embarked on craft too small to permit briefing on board.

(b) Map depots will be situated in, or near, marshalling areas.

(c) Huts, tents or requisitioned buildings in camps in marshalling areas will be used for briefing. Briefing buildings or tents will be guarded when in use, and when they contain classified information.

(d) Briefing will take place at the latest practicable moment.

(15) After Briefing:

(a) All personnel will be confined to camp once briefing has begun. Camp commanders will issue special passes for personnel leaving or entering camps on official duties. Commanders and staff officers from higher Headquarters will be admitted only by classification card.

(b) Only official telephone calls and telegrams, approved by the camp commander will be permitted after briefing starts.

(c) Special arrangements will be made in respect to casualties among operational troops and SOS staffs evacuated to hospitals after briefing. They must be segregated from other patients until the assault is announced officially.

(d) Personnel remaining with vehicles parked outside of sealed marshalling areas, will not be briefed prior to embarking except when essential. When necessary to brief these troops, they will be held in sealed areas after briefing while non-briefed personnel guard vehicles. The guard personnel will be removed so as to prevent contact with briefed troops, who will return to vehicles at the latest practicable time before departure.

(e) Personnel will not be permitted to write letters after embarkation unless provisions have been made for the collection of such mail prior to the assault.

(f) No letters, diaries, soldier's deposit books or other papers of any description will be carried on the operation. All papers will be collected by battalions and separate units prior to briefing, in accordance with Par. 12, TC 14, WD 16 February 1943.

(g) No orders, marked maps or documents, other than those essential to the operation will be carried. Only such documents, or extracts, as are relevant to the allotted task will be issued to individual officers. Maps of the UK will not be carried in the assault.

(16) Embarkation Security.

(a) Craft load commanders will prevent communication between troops in their craft load and civilians or military personnel of other units; and also personnel manning any supply or messenger craft that might come within voice distance.

(b) SOS - MPs and CIC personnel and British MPs and Field Security personnel will furnish patrols and guards to augment unit security precautions along routes to and within embarkation areas.

(17) Return after Embarkation.

(a) In the event of postponement of D-day, troops will be returned to concentration areas or to special camps near embarkation points where security measures prescribed in Par. (10) General, page 28.

(b) In the event of damage to landing craft, necessitating a return to port, troops will be held aboard until H-hour, or, if disembarked before H-hour, they will be segregated until H-hour.

(18) Document Security.

(a) Classified Documents, including maps containing operational markings, will be given primary security consideration by all headquarters against observation by unauthorized persons, loss or capture.

(b) Loss, capture or compromise of classified documents, codes and ciphers, will be reported immediately to the AC of S, G-2, Third Army, through intelligence channels.

(c) Files, records, plans, and baggage will be secured against loss, pilferage or capture during movements by ship, rail, or by marching.

(19) Plan for Destruction of Classified Matter.

See "Plan for Destruction of Classified Material", Security Memorandum No. 10, 5 May 1944, TUSA.

6. CIVILIAN CONTROL.

a. General.

(1) For the purpose of this section the term "civilian" will apply to any person not authorized to hold a recognized British or US military, Naval or Air Force identity card (e.g. AF. B2606, AB 64 WD, AGO Form No. 65 series, ETOUSA Enlisted Man's Identification Card).

(2) In the operational zone the following classes of persons must be regarded as suspect and will require examination and interrogation for counter intelligence purposes:-

(a) Refugees reaching our lines from enemy territory.

(b) Civilians who have aroused suspicion and failed to establish their bona fides.

(c) Released or escaped allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. The object of such interrogation is to provide an effective screen to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents.

1 In addition interrogation will be conducted by appropriate AC of S, G-2 with the aim of collecting Counterintelligence information, as well as intelligence of value for operational, propaganda, and other purposes.

2 Control of civilians in Battle Areas will be effected to prevent infiltration of enemy agents, male or female.

3 All civilians found attempting to cross our lines to the enemy will be treated as civil prisoners and espionage suspects until their innocence has been established.

(3) Proclamations: General Proclamations imposing restrictions upon the civil population of liberated territory will be promulgated by the Civil Affairs SHAEF. Local restrictions will be issued by Civil Affairs operating with subordinate units TUSA, coordinating with the appropriate AC of S, G-2 at the direction of the responsible General commanding.

(4) Security Regulations: AC of S, G-2 will be responsible for recommending to Civil Affairs, security regulations affecting the civil population. Civil Affairs Detachments will be responsible for implementing such regulations through the local civil administration. G-2 personnel will initiate checks to ensure that such regulations are carried out and will report any infractions to the appropriate AC of S, G-2 and to Civil Affairs Officers.

(5) The evacuation of civilians from the forward areas for relief purposes or for operational reasons, will be a responsibility of Provost Marshal and Civil Affairs Detachments. For this purpose, refugee clearing stations will be established in the forward areas, where refugees will be marshalled and directed to the Refugee Camps which will be established, as required, by the Civil Affairs Officer of Army Headquarters.

(6) Security Control Posts: CIC Detachments in the forward areas will be responsible for establishing security control posts to divert from the main stream of refugees those who will be required for interrogation, and for directing them to the Refugee Interrogation Posts. The Civil Affairs Detachments will assist in this when possible. The security control posts may be conveniently established at the refugee clearing stations. It must be made clear to all concerned in handling refugees in forward areas that security interests must have priority over welfare.

(7) Refugee Interrogation Posts:

(a) It will be the responsibility of Corps AC of S, G-2 to determine where to establish the refugee Interrogation Posts. It may be found convenient to establish them as annexes to the Corps P/W cages, since civilian suspects may then be attached to parties of P/W and escorted with them from the forward areas, and, if necessary, evacuated with them to the Army P/W cage. Measures will be taken to segregate such suspects from the P/W during the move.

(b) Refugee Interrogation Posts will be provided with Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams (MIT) by TUSA for "screening" suspect persons and it will be at this stage that the bulk of the information of intelligence value will be obtained. Combat Intelligence and Political Survey Officers should be granted permission for interrogating persons passing through the Refugee Interrogation Post.

(8) Interrogation Centers: Persons whose cases clearly require detailed examination will be passed back from Refugee Interrogation Posts to the civilian annex to the Army PW cage.

(9) Enemy Agents: No publicity should be given to capture of enemy agents in order to ensure secrecy, G-2s and S-2s should arrange for suitably guarded secret premises in which captured enemy agents may be segregated and detained.

(10) Relations with Civilian Authorities:

(a) Initial contact with civil authorities, including police, will normally be made in conjunction with Civil Affairs. CIC personnel will make direct contact on day to day routine matters.

(b) The suspension and appointment of civilian officials is a Civil Affairs responsibility. CIC personnel will furnish Civil Affairs Detachments with any information they possess on the reliability of officials and Civil Affairs Detachment will consult CIC personnel in cases where the reliability of an official is in doubt from the security aspect. CIC personnel will only arrest those officials who might continue to assist the enemy or be required for interrogation, and in such cases will keep Civil Affairs Detachments informed of any action taken.

(11) Relations with Indigenous Police:

(a) Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments will supervise all indigenous police forces in liberated territory. Supervision of the security branches of the indigenous police forces will be carried out in accordance with policies laid down by the appropriate commanders.

(b) Civil Affairs Detachments will insure that CIC have at all times free access to the records of the local police. If it is found necessary to seize records the Civil Affairs Detachments will be informed. The records will be returned as soon as practicable.

(12) Civil Censorship:

(a) Civil censorship is defined as the censorship of civilian communications to all types including postal, telegraphic, telephone, radio (other than broadcast), cable, and communications carried by travelers.

(b) Troops engaged in the initial phases are charged with the seizure and "freezing" of all civilian means of communications. This will include the guarding of mail found in Post Offices. No channel of communication leaving the area controlled by Third Army will be opened for civilian use without approval of AC of S, G-2 TUSA. Within the area controlled by Third Army no channel of communication will be opened without the approval of the G-2 of the appropriate controlling command.

(c) In liberated territory, AC of S, G-2 TUSA will impose such civil censorship measures as deemed necessary for the security of the military operation.

(d) Civil Censorship will be established when and as directed by SHAEF.

(13) Civilian Labor:

(a) Normal investigation will not be possible prior to employment. Where practicable, however it is desirable that lists of employees shall be checked against suspect lists by CIC.

(b) Where civilians are to be engaged on work which presents opportunities for espionage and sabotage, the CIC and Civil affairs should be informed in order that the bona fides of all such persons can be checked as far as possible.

(c) No civilians will be permitted to handle classified documents or material.

(14) Civilian Passes:

(a) Only one type of Civilian Pass is authorized, it is known as an "Exemption Card". This card is issued by Civil Affairs SHAEF and will be distributed to subordinate units by Headquarters Third United States Army. The "Exemption Card" will cover the following items; Curfew, Travel, Possession of Prohibited Articles and Prohibited Areas. No other civilian passes will be issued or honored by Units Third United States Army.

(b) All unauthorized passes will be immediately confiscated and personnel detained.

7. COUNTER SUBVERSIVE CONTROL.

a. No further details concerning Counter Subversive Control will be issued at this time. Information regarding new development and detailed instructions will be published when necessary.

b. Clandestine Radio Transmitters: Radio Direction Finders for the location of clandestine transmitters will be operated by AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army. Coordination will be made with SIS.

c. Signal Security:

(1) All signal security and procedure to insure security in the use of radio, telephone, and telegraph will be in accordance with Signal Operating Instructions, Headquarters Third Army, and Signal Annex No. 4, Operation OVERLORD.

(2) Refer to standing War Department Signal Instructions as further amplified by Signal Intelligence Circular 121-1, dated 12 April 1944, and Signal Security Circular 122-1, dated 24 April 1944, this headquarters.

8. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING.

a. Plans will embrace:

(1) Safeguarding of all information relating to the objective area and the known or surmised date of the operation together with the strength of force and methods to be employed.

(2) Security discipline of troop movement.

(3) Discouraging of rumors and speculation about any special devices or methods to be used.

(4) Denial to unauthorized press men and photographers of access to troops.

(5) The compromising of information or of documents concerning plans.

(a) This will be reported immediately to AC of S, G-2, Third Army thru Intelligence channels.

(6) Exclusion of civilians from training areas while exercises are in progress.

(7) Units below Divisions: In addition to the written counter-intelligence plans of Corps and Division Headquarters, written CI plans for the concentration and embarkation period will be prepared by Regimental and Battalion Headquarters with a written checklist furnished to Company commanders. Special attention will be given to attached and supporting units. These counterintelligence plans will be coordinated with the CI plans of higher Headquarters.

(8) All security regulations will be strictly enforced and punishments for security violations will be promptly administered and widely publicized. No relaxation will be made of any security measures until authority is received from higher Headquarters.

(9) All major breaches of security, and general tendencies or the prevalence of minor breaches of security which might require the issue of supplementary security instructions or counteracting measures, will be promptly reported to next higher Headquarters with recommendation.

b. Camouflage.

See Engineer Annex No. 3, Section VIII, Par 19, Operation OVERLORD, TUSA.

c. Counter Sabotage.

See Security Memorandum No. 14, Dated 23 May 1944

9. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE REPORTS.

a. Spot Reports.

(1) Immediate reports will be made by all units through Intelligence channels to AC of S, G-2, Third Army, of enemy sabotage, espionage and subversion likely to effect operations of other units.

b. Periodic Reports.

(1) Periodic counterintelligence reports will be submitted to the AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, through channels, at the close of the 10th, 20th and 30th day of each month by each Division and Corps. Division reports will not be consolidated by Corps.

(2) Periodic reports will include complete details under the following headings:

(a) Subversion: Type of effort and effect on troops of all subversive attempts.

(b) Sabotage: List of cases of actual or suspected sabotage including object attacked, time, method employed, degree of success, number of saboteurs involved in each case if known, description of sabotage equipment, number and names by nationality and arm or service of persons captured, if any.

(c) Espionage: Names and details of each espionage agent or suspected agent and method used to transmit information to the enemy. List of cases of information leakage and indications showing whether they resulted from actual or suspected efforts by the enemy. Violations of security of military establishments where such violations are actual or suspected results of enemy efforts.

(d) Propaganda: Samples of written or printed locally inspired propaganda, types of rumors circulating among troops, and all other types of enemy inspired propaganda.

(e) Attitude of Civilian Population: Examples showing pro-Allied or pro-Axis tendencies of civilian officials or population, and examples of relations existing between military forces and civilians to show whether pro-Allied or pro-Axis. List disturbances, riots, and causes.

(f) Counter Espionage:

1 Information on enemy intelligence activities will be disseminated to AC of S, G-2s of Corps and Divisions by the AC of S, G-2, Third Army.

2 Arrests of enemy agents or suspected enemy agents will be reported immediately through intelligence channels to AC of S, G-2 Third Army.

3 Reports made of any G-2 Intelligence agencies of TUSA of Interrogations and statements made by captured enemy agents will be forwarded through G-2 channels to AC of S, G-2 TUSA. A copy of the report should accompany the prisoner. Documents found in his possession will be taken from him but will accompany the prisoner wherever he is sent for interrogation.

4 CIC will completely segregate from civil detainees or PWs any prisoner known or believed to be an agent. Special arrangements will be made to expedite escorting these individuals to the rear for further questioning.

CIC Situation Reports.

Counter Intelligence Corps Situation Reports will be submitted through intelligence channels as directed in TM 30-215, "Counterintelligence Corps", WD 22 September 1943, Par. 22 f.

10. INTELLIGENCE FUNDS.

a. General.

(1) Intelligence Funds will be employed as directed in Security Memorandum No. 3, "Intelligence Funds", this Headquarters, 5 April 1944, and Appendix No. 1.

b. Estimates for Operational Phase.

(1) Estimates of Intelligence Funds for operational phase, will be submitted by Corps, separate Division and Army unit AC of S, G-2s as early as practicable. Estimates should be based on the amounts of the following types of currency:

(a) Gold Napoleons
(b) Banque de France Notes (used in German controlled France)
(c) Free French Currency supported by Allies
(d) American blue seal currency.

(2) Requirements for subsequent phases of operations will be submitted at a later date when consideration will be given to amounts and types of currency needed in Germany.

(3) In general, Banque de France currency will be used for informers or agents penetrating enemy lines where possession of any other type of currency would render them suspects. The use of gold will be limited to the minimum and in general will be confined to informants in the combat zone whose faith in Allied victory against Germany is not firm. Liberated French or Free French currency, will be used as much as possible for all informants in the rear of our lines. American blue seal currency will be used sparingly and normally only to reward those who are departing for the United Kingdom and the United States.

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-2 AUXILIARY AGENCIES PLAN

(12 June 1944)

G-2 AUXILIARY AGENCIES PLAN

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G-2 AUXILIARY AGENCIES PLAN

1. GENERAL.

a. Proper Orders.

For purposes of security, all Auxiliary Intelligence Agencies attached to Headquarters Third Army will be required to present properly authenticated and detailed orders from appropriate headquarters containing names of all personnel, and specifying the responsible commanding officer of the detachment. This includes such agencies as:

(1) Intelligence Specialist Teams
(2) OSS Agencies
(3) Special Liaison Agencies
(4) Document Sections
(5) Evasion and Escape Units

b. Coordination and Supervision.

Immediately on arrival in Third Army area, commanding officers of above detachments will register with Adjutant General and then report to AC of S, G-2, who will be responsible for the control, coordination and supervision of their activities while attached, and for administrative details, i.e. arrangements for travel and movement orders, rations, quarters, etc. AC of S, G-2, will be kept constantly informed of all proposed operations, and of results obtained therefrom.

c. Channels of Communication, Correspondence and Reports.

Intelligence Agencies attached to this headquarters will direct all communications, correspondence and reports which they originate through AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, even though communication direct to higher headquarters has been specifically authorized.

d. All details contained in this Appendix in regard to personnel, equipment, dates, and methods of operation, are subject to alteration as changes in the Tactical Plan may require.

2. PHASES.

a. Planning Phase.

During this phase full details are being worked out well in advance with higher headquarters through planning representatives of each related agency, especially attached to G-2 Section, Headquarters Third Army. Detailed plans will be made by and for such agencies covering their function, composition, equipment, and duties, so as to insure that they become available in the proper place at the proper time. Appropriate Staff Sections of this headquarters and of lower echelons will be kept informed as to their method of functioning and how they can most effectively be utilized.

b. Operational Phase.

(1) As outlined in Paragraph 1, b, all attached Intelligence Agencies will:

(a) Operate under the control or supervision of AC of S, G-2, Third Army.
(b) Arrange for representation with G-2 Section, Third Army, for coordination and liaison.
(c) Furnish Periodic Activity Reports to AC of S, G-2, Third Army.

(2) AC of S, G-2, Third Army will with means at his disposal insure that:

(a) They are supplied with necessary authority and physical means to accomplish their missions.
(b) Their activities are coordinated and do not duplicate or conflict with the operations of other agencies.
(c) The information they obtain is communicated as promptly as possible to the proper place.

3. INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS. (For more detailed directives see following FUSAG Intelligence Instructions:

No. 4, "Intelligence Specialist Teams", dated 25 April 1944
No. 5, "Information from Enemy Documents" dated 15 May 1944
No. 7, "Interrogation of Prisoners of War, Refugees and Evaders and Escapers", dated 17 May 1944

a. Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams. (IPW Teams)

(1) The function of Prisoner of War Interrogation is to obtain military information by questioning enemy personnel and examining captured documents.

(2) Planning Phase

(a) Personnel.

i. As now composed, each team consists of two officers and four enlisted men, all German speaking, and at least one trained as expert enemy document examiner.

ii. The following distribution of Prisoner of War Interrogation Teams is being made by this headquarters to arrive as available:

Army Headquarters	- 4 teams
Corps Headquarters	- 3 teams each
Division Headquarters	- 2 teams each

iii. Interrogation teams attached to divisions will be employed as deemed best by the G-2 concerned; however, attachments are made on the basis of one for division headquarters and one available for splitting between two forward regiments or combat teams.

iv. In case of necessity it is contemplated that teams may be dispatched from higher to lower echelons to handle urgent situations.

(b) Equipment.

i. Each team will report for duty furnished with organizational equipment authorized by letter, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, dated 7 April 1944, file SPX 400 (April 44) OB-S-SPMOO-M, subject, "Special List of Equipment for Intelligence Specialists", copies of which accompany the team.

ii. Major equipment for 1 IPW team consists of:

2 - ¼ ton 4x4s
1 - ¼ ton Trailer, 2 Wheel
1 - Portable Typewriter

(3) Operational Phase.

(a) Teams will not be used for missions which do not utilize their special training and qualifications, such as prisoner guards, etc.

(b) Teams will be under the administrative control of the AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army, who, through the Assistant G-2 in charge of Auxiliary Agencies and Field Interrogation Detachment will adjust their distribution in accordance with changing circumstances and requirements. They will be attached to lower units for operational purposes, but will be employed in such a way as to serve the interests of the command as a whole, rather than the exclusive interest of the unit to which attached. However, though attachments of teams are not permanent, they will be disturbed as little as possible.

(c) G-2s of units to which teams are attached will inform the IPW officer in charge of interrogation teams what enemy information is desired, (Essential Elements of Information) so that those items may be stressed in interrogation. Interrogating officers will keep themselves continually informed and be frequently briefed by G-2s on the tactical situation and also the tactical plan pertaining to the echelon of command for which they are functioning.

(d) Method of handling of prisoners of war will be governed by Field Manual 30-15; Military Intelligence, Examination of Enemy Personnel, Repatriates, Documents and Materiel (revised), dated 7 December 1943, and by FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 7 mentioned above.

(e) Prisoner of War Reports.

Division and Corps G-2s will include in Daily Periodic Reports numbers and identifications of PWs by enemy units - separately officers and enlisted men - (down to enemy battalion). Caution must be exercised to prevent duplications.

b. Mobile Interrogation Unit. (MIU)

(1) The purpose of this unit is the detailed interrogation of a strategic nature of Prisoners of War, Escaped Allied Prisoners of War, refugees, and civilians.

(2) A unit will be attached to FUSAG and primarily serve that headquarters.

c. Air Interrogators.

(1) Captured German Air Force personnel, both flying and ground, will be interrogated by Air Interrogation Officers only. AA personnel, parachute and airborne troops, and members of "Herman Goering" units and GAF Field Divisions will however be treated as German Army prisoners.

(2) Any unit capturing GAF personnel will immediately notify higher headquarters of such capture. Commanders are responsible for reporting such fact through command or intelligence channels to Division, Corps or Army. At any headquarters where an Air Support Party or A-2 is stationed the report will be transferred to this Air channel for relaying to the nearest Air P/W Interrogation Party attached to XIX Tactical Air Command.

(3) Similar procedure will be followed in reporting the discovery of any GAF equipment.

(4) Documents found in crashed aircraft or on the persons of GAF Prisoners of War will be evacuated with the prisoners, or bodies, and not retained by Ground Force Intelligence Officers or Prisoner of War Interrogators.

(5) It must be emphasized to all personnel that German Air Force personnel and equipment must be specially handled as above in order to obtain the maximum benefit therefrom.

d. Order of Battle Units. (OB Units)

(1) Function.

(a) One unit each will be attached to Headquarters of Army, Corps, and Divisions for the purpose of working in G-2 Section on location, organization, tactics, and equipment of German forces. They are highly trained in the study and compilation of new developments and trends in enemy forces, and are prepared to set up and maintain charts and graphs showing existing enemy units and installations in a given locality.

(b) When their specialties permit this personnel will be at the disposal of AC of S, G-2 for other combat intelligence duties.

(2) Each unit will consist of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men, equipped with 1 ¼ ton 4x4. (See authorization cited in Par. 3 a (2) (b) i above.)

e. Military Intelligence Interpreter Teams. (MII Teams)

(1) The personnel of these teams are fluent French linguists. They are primarily intended to obtain operational information by interrogating French speaking personnel, whether friendly or hostile, and examination of documents written in French. French refugees should prove a fruitful source of tactical information. MII personnel should not normally be utilized as routine interpreters. It will be the duty of AC of S, G-2 to brief these teams as to the type of information desired. (For further details, see FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 7 mentioned above.)

(2) Each team consists of 2 officers and 4 enlisted men, equipped with 2 ¼ ton 4x4s and 1 trailer. (See authorization cited in Par. 3 a (2) (b) i above.)

(3) The following distribution of MII Teams will be made by this headquarters to arrive as available:

Army Headquarters	- 3 teams
Corps Headquarters	- 2 teams
Division Headquarters	- 1 team

(4) For the purpose of supplementing interpreter facilities of each unit, this headquarters has directed (letter AG 350.03 - GNMCB, dated 30 March 1944, subject, "Language Proficiency Surveys") that surveys be conducted among all troops in this command to determine the individuals, both officers and enlisted men, having a fluent knowledge of the French and German languages.

f. Field Interrogation Detachments. (FID)

(1) An FID is attached to G-2 Section, Third Army for the purpose of controlling, coordinating and supervising all interrogation activities in Third Army, chiefly those of IPW and MII Teams. It will also organize educational programs on interrogation in all echelons, and will make recommendations to AC of S, G-2, Third Army for temporary readjustment in attachment of teams as tactical situation requires.

(2) FID consists of 2 officers and 2 enlisted men equipped with 2 ¼ ton 4x4s and 1 trailer.

g. Document Sections.

(1) An Enemy Documents Section will be attached to G-2 Section, Army Headquarters for the detailed examination and analysis of captured enemy documents.

(2) The section consists of 1 officer and 4 enlisted men equipped with 2 ¼ ton 4x4s.

(3) An Advance Documents Section will be attached to G-2 Section, Army Headquarters, by the Theater Document Section, G-2 (Intelligence) Division, SHAEF consisting of 1 officer and 2 enlisted men equipped with 1 ¼ ton 4x4 and trailer.

It will facilitate the seizure, examination and rapid evacuation of captured enemy documents to higher headquarters.

(4) For detailed instructions covering seizure, identification, protection, and disposal of captured enemy documents and mail, see FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 5, "Information from Enemy Documents", dated 15 May 1944.

h. Photo Interpreter Teams. (PI Teams)

(1) These teams each consisting of 2 officers and 4 enlisted men will be attached as follows:

Army Headquarters	- 4 teams
Corps Headquarters	- 4 teams
Division Headquarters	- 1 team

(2) Each team will be equipped with the following vehicles:

1 - 3/4 ton Weapons Carrier, or 1½ ton 6x6
1 - ¼ ton 4x4
1 - trailer

(For other equipment see authorization cited in Par. 3 a (2) (b) i above, supplemented by letter Headquarters ETOUSA dated 29 May 1944, file AG 400 OpGB, subject, "Organizational Equipment for Intelligence Specialists".)

(3) For details of operation see Appendix II - "Air Intelligence Plan".

i. Special Liaison Unit. (SLU)

(1) This unit will be attached to AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army for the maintenance of direct liaison with higher echelons of command.

(2) It will be supplemented by a Special Communications Unit.

(3) SLU/SCU will consist of 4 officers and 13 enlisted men equipped with the following vehicles:

3 - 1½ ton 6x6 (Cargo)
1 - 3/4 ton 4x4, Ambulance (Converted)

j. Evasion and Escape Units. (E&E Units)

(1) One E & E Unit will be attached to Headquarters Third Army by P.W and X Detachment, M.I.S., ETOUSA, for the purpose of:

(a) Identifying and interrogating allied escapees and evaders.
(b) Facilitating the escape of allied prisoners of war.
(c) Instructing troops regarding security, interrogation, prison camps, and escape methods in case of capture by the enemy.

(2) This unit will consist of 5 officers and 7 enlisted men, equipped with:

1 - 3/4 ton C & R Car
1 - ¼ ton 4x4
1 - Trailer

(3) During operations this unit will be supplemented by Field Teams supplied by higher headquarters consisting of 2 officers and 5 enlisted men equipped with:

2 - ¼ ton 4x4s
2 - Trailers
1 - Motorcycle

(4) For details of duties and operation see FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 8, "Precapture Training and E & E Units", to be published.

4. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE AGENCIES.

a. Secret Intelligence. (SI)

(1) The function of OSS/SI is to gather strategic and tactical intelligence through its agents located in enemy or neutral territory, and to recruit personnel in the field to be trained as agents.

(2) A Field Detachment is attached to AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army and consists of 8 officers, 1 civilian and 13 enlisted men equipped with the following vehicles.

4 - ¼ ton 4x4s
1 - 3/4 ton Weapons Carrier
1 - Truck, Cargo, 2½ ton 6x6
4 - Trailers; ¼ ton
2 - Trailers, 1 ton

(3) This detachment will maintain direct liaison with higher headquarters through an OSS Signal Detachment attached to Headquarters Third Army, recruit local agents for training, furnish intelligence information to AC of S, G-2, Third Army, and arrange for special missions which he may direct.

(4) For further details see FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 9, "Espionage", dated 25 April 1944.

b. Special Counter Intelligence. (SCI)

(1) The function of OSS/SCI is to locate, identify, and if possible utilize enemy agents in liberated territory. For this purpose it works in close collaboration with Counter Intelligence Corps, and OSS/SO (Special Operations). The latter organization will obtain information of enemy agents from French Resistance Groups.

(2) An OSS/SCI Field Detachment will be attached to AC of S, G-2, Headquarters Third Army to consist of 3 officers and 7 enlisted men equipped with the following vehicles:

1 - 3/4 ton Weapons Carrier
3 - ¼ ton 4x4s
1 - Trailer

(3) This detachment will have at its disposal through an OSS Signal Detachment attached to Headquarters Third Army a direct radio communication channel to higher headquarters, as well as a Mobile "Vehicular Radio Set" for use in forward zones to communicate with Army Headquarters.

5. ARMY INFORMATION SERVICE.

a. Army Cavalry will establish an "Army Information Service". Friendly radio nets, to include front-line battalions, will be monitored; commanders and staffs of all echelons will be visited, to obtain latest possible information of our operations and enemy activities. This information (un-evaluated) is passed directly to Army Headquarters, thus eliminating the long delays inherent in communication between lowest and highest echelons of command. This is intended only as a means of keeping the Army Commander informed of the progress of operations by the fastest means available. Corps and Divisions may monitor the frequency on which reports are relayed to Army, if they so desire.

b. The Army Signal Officer, Third Army, will exercise technical direction of this service, and will determine general policies with respect to methods of procedure, employment, and coordination.

6. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENTS.

a. CI. Detachments each consisting of 2 officers and 14 enlisted men will be attached as follows:

Army Headquarters	- 4 detachments
Corps Headquarters	- 1 detachment
Division Headquarters	- 1 detachment

b. Each detachment will be equipped with the following vehicles:

8 - ¼ ton 4x4s
4 - Trailers

c. For details of operation see Appendix III - "Counter Intelligence Plan".

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS.

a. The function of these teams is the collection and study of captured enemy material and documents related thereto.

b. Technical Intelligence will be the function of Surgeon, Ordnance, Engineer, Chemical Warfare Service, Quartermaster and Signal Sections, Headquarters Third Army within their respective fields.

c. Teams will be under the operational control of the Chiefs of respective sections, who will coordinate their employment with AC of S, G-2, Third Army, to whom copies of reports on examination of captured equipment will be submitted.

d. For detailed instructions covering the operation of these teams and the preservation of captured enemy equipment see FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 6, "Technical Intelligence", dated 13 May 1944.

8. MOBILE WEATHER DETACHMENTS.

a. Purpose.

These detachments are provided by the Ninth Air Force for attachment to Army and Corps Headquarters to furnish forecasts of weather, state of sea, fordability of rivers and streams, trafficability of roads and terrain and meteorological messages for artillery fire.

b. Operation.

The weather station at Headquarters FUSAG will coordinate forecasts with higher echelons, then prepare and disseminate weather forecasts to ground force weather stations by weather communications radio. Administrative and tactical channels should be used for transmitting forecasts below Corps. Detachments will radio observations every 2 hours to Headquarters, Ninth Air Force. At Army Headquarters MW Detachment is attached to Signal Section to facilitate communications and supply. This service is of special interest to G-2, G-3, AA, Arty, Engr and CWS Sections. (For details see FUSAG Intelligence Instruction No. 11, "Topographic and Weather Data", dated 1 May 1944 and reproduced in Third Army Intelligence Bulletin No. 4 dated 14 May 1944.)

c. Personnel.

Army Headquarters	3 officers - 23 enlisted men
Corps Headquarters	2 officers - 18 enlisted men

d. Equipment.

(1) Vehicles:

1 - Weather Van (2½ ton 6x6)
1 - Communications Van (Conv. Amb.) with SCR 299 or 399
1 - ¼ ton 4x4
1 - 3/4 ton personnel Carrier
1 - 3/4 ton Weapons Carrier (For Army Detachment)
3 - Trailers

(2) 1 - Radiosonde Set (For Army Detachment)
2 - Pyramidal Tents
1 - Wall Tent
1 - Command Tent

9. CENSORSHIP. (For details see Appendix VI.)

For purposes of military security, AC of S, G-2, Third Army, will supervise in Third Army Area the following forms of censorship which will be under the operational control of higher headquarters:

Field Press Censors - Under P & PW Section, Third Army (G-6)
Civilian Press Censors
Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Censors
Troop Mail Censorship
Prisoner of War Censors

10. LIAISON.

The coordination and control of liaison services in Third Army between echelons of command, Air and Navy, is charged to AC of S, G-3, Third Army. However G-2s of Third Army units are enjoined to maintain close liaison with adjacent and successive G-2s, in order to insure coordination, to avoid duplication, and to exploit fully the intelligence possibilities of the tactical liaison organization.

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX V TO ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-2 MAP PLAN

(7 May 1944)

G-2 MAP PLAN

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Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 8 - G-2 Plan

G-2 MAP PLAN

1. MAP SUPPLY

a. General Mapping Program.

(1) Initially it is anticipated that large scale topographic and photo maps 1/25,000, will be available over the Northern coastal regions of France to a depth of 100 miles and that topographic maps at a scale 1/50,000 will be available to a depth of 175 miles. The 1/100,000 series will be available over the entire area of France, the 1/250,000 over France and extending into central Germany, while smaller scale maps extend still further. The rate of advance by our troops will determine the availability of additional large scale coverage, but it is planned to provide the Armies with large scale topographic and controlled photo maps if possible. Hachured maps may be issued for the area East of Paris and South of 47° North latitude.

(2) For general evaluation of map series, see GSGS Publication. "Notes on GSGS Maps of France, Belgium, and Holland", authorized for automatic issue to Corps and Divisions upon briefing.

(3) For progress of mapping, see semi-monthly "Map Progress Report", by Map and Survey Section, G-3, SHAEF.

b. Planning Maps.

(1) Planning maps of each type and scale were issued to Corps Headquarters when Corps planning staffs were briefed. Divisional planning staffs will be supplied by Corps requisitions. These maps may be distributed to subordinate unit commanders when briefed, subject to approval of the Division AC of S, G-2.

(2) Additional limited quantities of planning maps may be furnished by Engineer, Third Army, on requests approved by AC of S, G-2, Third Army.

c. Operational Maps.

For details of storage, shipment, and issue of operational maps, see Engineer Annex No. 5, Operation Overlord.

2. MAP DISTRIBUTION.

While a number of series have been published, not all are for operational use. The following list gives the series that Third Army will use:

MAP	BASIS OF ISSUE
	NOTE: "General issue use" indicates that stocks sufficient for EM distribution are available. "Limited" or "special issue" indicates large stocks not available.
1/1,000,000 GSGS 2758	General use by higher headquarters
1/800,000 (Communications) GSGS 4438	Limited Special Issue
1/500,000 (Air) GSGS 4072	Available in operational quantity to Air Forces and in limited quantities to higher headquarters of Ground Forces
1/250,000 (Air) GSGS 3982	Same as for 1/500,000 (Air)
1/250,000 (Army/Air) GSGS 2738	General Issue
1/200,000 (Road Maps)	One per officer One per vehicle
1/100,000 GSGS 4336 " 4249 " 4416	Principally for Armored and Airborne Units
1/50,000 GSGS 4250	General Issue
1/25,000 (Topographic) GSGS 4347 " 4365 " 4041	Special use (by Artillery, Infantry, Engineers, Hq)

MAP	BASIS OF ISSUE
1/25,000 (Photo-maps)	Same as 1/25,000 (topographic)
Selected Towns GSGS 4234	Limited Special Issue
Through-town Plans France, Vols, I-VI	Distribution governed by the quantities available
Gazeteers, 1/250,000 Map (France, Belgium, Holland)	Limited Special Issue
Gazeteers, 1/50,000 (France)	Limited Special Issue
Map Indices	Limited to Engineer, G-3, G-2 of Army, Corps, and Divisions.
Hydrographic Charts (various scales)	Limited to planning staffs of interested Corps and Divisions.
Trig Data Sheets	Limited to Army and Corps Engineers and Artillery Observation Battalions
Defense Overprints 1/50,000	Initially limited to planning staffs; later issued generally to units as needed
Collated Maps, 1/25,000	Same as for Defense Overprints
French-English glossaries	Limited Issue

3. MAP SECURITY.

a. Prior to D-day, it is essential that all operational maps, requisitions for maps, and any transactions relative thereto be treated with the utmost regard for security. Issue will be made only on requisitions approved by the appropriate AC of S, G-2, in accordance with plans in paragraph 1 a, above. Direct requisition by unit officers, through Engineer channels, is authorized after arrival of the unit on the Continent.

b. No cover plan maps are contemplated.

4. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND COLLATION MAPS.

See Appendix No. 2, Air Tactical and Photo Reconnaissance Plan.

5. RELIEF MODELS.

a. Relief models will be distributed, on a scale of issue to be determined, based on availability and specific request. Such requests will be forwarded to AC of S, G-2 Third Army without delay.

6. HYDROGRAPHIC CHARTS.

a. Limited quantities of hydrographic charts are available and will be furnished to planning staffs on request.

7. TOPOGRAPHIC DATA.

a. Maps found available locally during the operation will not be used.

b. Except for local sketches all map reproduction will be coordinated with the Engineer, Third Army.

c. Errors in existing maps will be noted and forwarded immediately to the AC of S, G-2, Third Army, for immediate dissemination and to the Engineer, Third Army, for future map revision.

8. GEODETIC DATA.

a. Trig Data Sheets will be issued to Army and Corps Engineers, and to Artillery Observation Battalions. For details see Engineer Annex No. 5.

b. Geodetic data and large scale maps of high accuracy, as well as samples of captured maps, will be forwarded through channels, to the AC of S, G-2, Third Army. Intermediate headquarters may extract such information as is of immediate importance. Material received by AC of S, G-2, Third Army will be made available to Engineer, Third Army, for disposition as received.

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX 8

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-2 ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(7 May 1944)

1. ORGANIZATION OF G-2 SECTION, HEADQUARTERS THIRD U.S. ARMY, PLANNING PHASE.

a. See Plate I, attached. For general information only.

2. G-2 PUBLICATIONS, HEADQUARTERS THIRD U.S. ARMY.

a. Target Area Analyses - A numbered series issued at unstated intervals to cover strategic and tactical appreciation of terrain, social and economic factors, and both military on-shore, and off-shore features.

b. G-2 Estimates of the Enemy Situation - Published at intervals dictated by the status of plans for the situation. So far as possible, Naval and Air considerations will be included by collaboration, concurrence, or special supplement.

c. G-2 Information Bulletins - A numbered series including pertinent information not contained in other publications.

d. Periodic Reports. Cositintreps (combined situation - intelligence reports). Isums (intelligence summaries) etc, will be issued in radio form as outlined in Appendix I.

3. G-2 PUBLICATIONS, HIGHER HEADQUARTERS.

a. See FUSAG Report M-10, dated 25 April 1944, which contains a list of Intelligence Material available through FUSAG, as well as a FUSAG distribution list of this material. Corps have received the Report.

4. G-2 DISSEMINATION, HEADQUARTERS THIRD U.S. ARMY.

a. Dissemination, General - intelligence publications originating in this and higher headquarters will be disseminated automatically and, if possible, in quantities sufficient to supply all appropriate echelons without the necessity of their being reproduced. G-2 Section of lower echelons will keep G-2 Section, Third U.S. Army closely advised of any supplementary requirements, through channels. Excessive requests will be avoided.

b. The Adjutant General, Headquarters Third U.S. Army will handle the dissemination of all classified intelligence documents originating in this headquarters in accordance with distribution list prepared by AC of S., G-2, Each copy will be numbered and charged to the receiving organization against receipt.

c. During the Planning Phase, certain G-2 publications will be distributed automatically direct from Headquarters, FUSAG, to major headquarters concerned, but only after the latter have been briefed, and upon specific written request from this headquarters in each instance.

d. Security - All echelons will exercise the greatest care to preserve the security of classified documents during both dissemination and utilization, in accordance with AR 380-5, "Safeguarding Military Information". For detailed instructions in this connection, see Paragraph 5 d (18), "Document Security", Appendix III.

5. INTELLIGENCE FUNDS

a. See Appendix No. III (Counter Intelligence Plan).

SECRET

TOP SECRET

PLATE 1

ORGANIZATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL CHART

G-2 Section Headquarters Third U.S. Army

PLANNING PHASE

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2

ASSISTANT G-2

Coordination Intelligence Activities
Intelligence Training
Intelligence Plan

ADMINISTRATION

G-2 Diary
Incoming G-2 Reports
Personnel Requirements
Schedules
Supplies & Materials
Dissemination
Transportation
Publications

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Outgoing G-2 Reports
G-2 Estimates
Essential Elements of Information
Signal Intelligence
Strategic Targets
Battle Order
Air Targets
G-2 Journal
Topo & Hydrographic Data
Weather Reports
Research

PHOTO AND MAP

Beach Information
Air Tactical Ron
Photo Ron
Photo Interpretation
Defenses
Collation Maps
Models
Reprints
Mosaics
Map Requirements & Distribution

SECURITY

Hq Security
Camouflage
CI
C/Subversive
C/Sabotage
Cover Plan
Censorship
Intelligence Funds
Security Missions
Civil Affairs
Passwords & Replies

MISCELLANEOUS

P/W Interrogators
Mil Int Interpreters
OB Specialists
Enemy Documents Sec
Adv Documents Sec
Mobile Interrogation Units
Special Liaison Units
Evasion & Escape Units
Mobile Weather Detachment
OSS
SI Detachments
SCI Detachments

TOP SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 9-SOE/SO Plan

TOP SECRET
Date: 12 May 44
Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 9

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

SOE/SO PLAN

(12 May 1944)

PATTON
Comdg

GAFFEY
C of S

MADDOX
G-3

1. RESISTANCE GROUPS

a. Definition.

Resistance Groups in Northwest Europe fall into two broad categories:

(1) Small clandestine organizations whose members form part of sabotage cells or para-military units, while leading apparently inoffensive and normal lives, and

(2) Larger groups of "MAQUIS" living openly in the isolated mountainous or wooded areas of FRANCE, organized for operations and training along military lines.

b. Potentialities.

(1) Supplied with arms from the UK by SOE/SO, Resistance Groups form a force of considerable strength which, if well controlled, should be able to operate in the enemy's rear areas to cause maximum interference with enemy military operations. Plans for the assistance to be given by Resistance Groups to aid the Army advance are designed to accomplish the following:

(a) Dislocation of railways by numerous planned demolitions, by derailments, by interference with the railway signalling system and by a general strike of railway workers.

(b) Interruption of enemy telecommunications by the extensive cutting of overhead and underground wires planned with a view to paralysing all trunk lines in Northern France. No attacks will be planned against repeater or exchange stations.

(c) Interference with the movement of local enemy reserves by various means such as road blocks, mines, tire bursters, harassing fire from small arms and bazookas, etc.

(d) Guerrilla activity of a type to cause maximum confusion in the enemy's rear areas. Such activities include attacks on small enemy headquarters, staff officers, dispatch riders, telecommunications, supply dumps, etc. In the wilder MAQUIS areas of France, it is possible that the guerrilla activities may become so extensive as to cause a minor military diversion.

(2) In general, no demolitions, taking more than eight days to repair will be put into effect.

c. Limitations.

In considering the potentialities of Resistance Groups it should be recognized that little can be done by them in a tactical sense as it must be expected that the enemy will carry out large scale evacuations or otherwise interfere with the mobility of the inhabitants in areas immediately behind the lines. The cumulative effect of their tasks will be essentially of a strategic nature.

d. Conclusion.

The support which Resistance Groups can be expected to give to the land fighting in France while not having a direct bearing on the immediate tactical situation should appreciably affect the strategic development of military operations.

2. CONTROL OF RESISTANCE GROUPS.

To utilize properly the capabilities of Resistance Groups, their actions must be coordinated. This will be achieved to the fullest extent possible by SOE/SO HQ, London, through British, French and American officers already in the field and by others who will be dispatched before and after invasion. These officers will organize, train and lead the Resistance Groups and keep in direct radio communication with SOE/SO HQ for instructions. In addition, prearranged message codes will be broadcast over the B.B.C. (and other radio networks) to enable SOE/SO HQ to pass instructions to Resistance Groups with whom liaison has been established.

3. SO DETACHMENT.

a. Functions.

A Special Operations Detachment will be attached to the Army G-3 Section for the purpose of advising the Army Commander on the potentialities of Resistance Groups and, in consultation with G-3, on the appropriate action to be taken by them in support of the Army Plan. Requirements for support from Resistance Groups for the Army Plan, including mission requests, will be transmitted through SO radio channels to SOE/SO HQ London. There they will be reviewed and acted upon in accordance with the current strategic situation. A similar detachment will be attached to Army Group to coordinate the requests emanating from the various Army Headquarters.

b. Composition.

(1) Main Body (Army HQ).

(7 officers. 19 E.M.) — To carry out functions described in paragraph A. above.

(2) Detachable Staff.

(2 officers. 1 E.M.) — For attachment to an isolated corps, effecting a wide envelopment or break through, to perrorm the same duties as the main body at Army Headquarters.

(3) Liaison Officers.

(4 officers) — To accompany the leading elements of the attack in order to pick up overrun American and Allied officers connected with SOE/SO HQ who have been operating behind the lines and to bring them to Army Headquarters.

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 10-Civil Affairs Plan

TOP SECRET
Auth: CG. TUSA
Initials:
Date: 10 June 1944
Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX NUMBER 10

TO

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

OPERATIONS PLAN OVERLORD

G-5 PLAN

(With Appendices)

10 June 1944

I. Civil Affairs Detachments.
II. Landing of Civil Affairs Personnel
III. Civil Affairs Supplies Designated as Available By G-5 SHAEF.

PATTON
Comdg.

CAMPANOLE
G-5

GAFFEY
C. of S.

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G-5 PLAN

SECTION I

MISSION

1. Primary Purpose: Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments are to advise and assist cooperating local French authorities in securing, or where necessary in inaugurating such organization, control and utilization of the French civil government, population, agencies and resources as will contribute most effectively to the military mission and prevent all interference with it.

2. Coordinated Effort: Civil Affairs plans and operations will carry out the political and economic policies of the Supreme Commander toward the people of France, in coordination with the plans and operations of all tactical commanders affected by them.

3. Control over Civil Affairs Units: Civil Affairs detachments, administrative and other units, whenever within the area of the Third U.S. Army will come under its control.

SECTION II

GOVERNING POLICY

4. Authority: Policies and instructions contained in SHAEF, Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined CA Operations in Northwest Europe, (Revised 1 May 1944) and SHAEF FIELD HANDBOOK FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS FRANCE (Provisional, First Edition) and such supplementing directions or amendments as may be issued by SHAEF will govern Civil Affairs operations in liberated French territory. (In subsequent references herein, these authorities will be identified for brevity as SPAP and SHAEF CA HANDBOOK, FRANCE, respectively).

5. Theater of Operations: The CG, Third U.S. Army is responsible for all Civil Affairs activities in the area occupied by that Army. Corps and Division Commanders will be held commensurately responsible for CA activities in the areas of their Corps and Division. CA control will be relinquished to succeeding commanders in the rear as the Army area is advanced.

6. BASIC RULES:

a. French Civil Rights: It is not intended that Military Government be established in liberated France. Local Civil administration will, as the rule, be conducted and controlled by the French themselves. Only when the French Civil authorities fail to carry out a required action of the military commander, and the success of the military operation is jeopardized and/or allied security is threatened as a result, may direct controls be initiated. Subordinate commanders will take no action toward establishing such controls without the prior approval of this or higher headquarters. (See Pars 13 and 19, Part II and Par 46, Part III, SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE.

b. Governmental Divisions: Commanders will deal with the highest governmental echelons in their respective areas in discharging their Civil Affairs responsibility. When the seat of the appropriate governmental division is outside the operational area of a Corps, the Army Commander will decide on the procedure to be followed. Corps Commanders will make similar decisions for their Divisions. The principle of securing uniformity of policy throughout the total area of the civil administrative unit involved will govern decisions in all such cases.

c. Liaison: CA Staffs and CA Detachments will constitute the liaison between their commanders and the French civil authorities, utilizing to the utmost the services of French liaison officers attached for this purpose. (See Par. 26, Part II SHAEF CA HANDBOOK, FRANCE).

SECTION III

FUNCTIONS

7. Chief Objectives:

a. French Cooperation with CA: It is the policy of SHAEF that French authorities assume responsibility for all actions involving French assistance to the allied forces and French reconstruction. In general, the suspension and appointment of officials will be a French concern and effected by military authority only when military necessity so demands. Attention is directed to Pars. 19 of Part II (as revised), and 38, 39 (as revised), 40, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 49 of Part III, SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE.

b. CA Cooperation with French: Military necessity will require that French civil administration shall be so conducted as to further the military operations. The wishes of the Commander in this respect will be conveyed through CA Staff officers and CA detachments to the proper French authorities, who will be held responsible for their execution. (Para 26 (as revised) Part II, of SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE.)

c. Aid to Civilians: During the initial stages of the operation, the distribution of emergency rations and medical supplies to needy civilians will be a CA responsibility. This distribution will be confined to the minimum essential to prevent the civilian population from hampering the Army.

d. Specific Tasks: CA tasks (during initial stages of the operation) will also include, in coordination with G-2, the Provost Marshal, and French civil authorities:

(1) Keeping civilians from impeding troop movements on highways or anywhere in the Army's Zone of Operations.
(2) Assisting the responsible Army authority in recruiting local labor and transport.
(3) Arranging for the use of local resources.

8. Civilian - Troop Relations: CA Staffs will advise their Commanders, after consultation with attached French Officers, as to measures to insure proper relations of officers and enlisted men with civilians. CA Detachments will secure through attached French Officers the cooperation of local agencies in seeing that civilians observe these measures.

SECTION IV

CONTROL AND ORGANIZATION

9. Channels of Communication: CA Staffs may communicate directly with CA staffs of the next higher or lower echelon on matters peculiar to Civil Affairs. On all other matters, command channels will be used in dealing with higher or lower echelons. Normal Staff procedure will be employed on matters involving other sections of the same staff.

10. Staff Organization:

a. Duty and Status: CA Staffs at Army, Corps and division Hqs will coordinate and supervise all CA operations in the areas for which their respective commanders are responsible. At Hqs of Army and Corps, the CA Staff constitutes a section of the General Staff identified as G-5. The Chief of Section will be known as AC of S, G-5. The status of CA Staffs at Division Hqs has been fixed by the Army Commander at Special Staff level.

b. Composition: CA Staffs have been initially authorized by higher headquarters as follows:

	OFFICERS	EM
ARMY	51	50
CORPS	3	4
DIVISION (INF)	5	6
DIVISION (ARMD)	4	4

c. Regimental Staffs: It is desirable that each Regtl Combat Team have attached to it one (1) Division CA Staff officer of the grade of Major to direct CA activities during operations.

d. Attached Liaison Officers:

(1) Liaison officers of the U.S. Navy are attached to Army G-3 Section.
(2) It is expected that at least one (1) French liaison officer will be attached to each CA Staff section and Detachment on or shortly after D day.
(3) Two (2) British Liaison officers are expected to be attached to Army G-5 Section and one (1) to each flank Corps G-5 Section.

11. CA Troops:

a. Allocations: Attachment of European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) units to Third U.S. Army units is as follows:

Unit	To be attached to
Co. A, 6902 ECA Regt	VIII Corps
Co. B, 6902 ECA Regt	XV Corps
Co. C, 6902 ECA Regt	XX Corps
Co. D, 6902 ECA Regt	XII Corps
Co. I, 6902 ECA Regt	TUSA
2d Plat, 6905 Transportation Co.	TUSA

HQ and HQ Det., 6902 EGA Regt TUSA

b. Strength: These troops are armed and constitute a potential emergency fighting force totalling approximately 1,200 officers and men, and 390 vehicles.

c. Basic Detachments: EGA companies (Companies A, B, C, D, I, etc.) are organized into Basic Detachments of varying sizes and types to conform with varying governmental sub-divisions. As far as possible their officer strength is comprised equally of United States and British officers trained in CA work. Within each company, Detachment types are tentatively of the following strength.

	O	WO	EM	TOTAL
Type "A"	17	2	22	41
"B"	9	2	16	27
"C"	5		9	14
"D"	4		6	10
Co HQ (including 8 Specialist Reserve)	11		27	38
Regt HQ & HQ Det	17		96	113
Transport Co. Platoon	2		74	76

(See also APPENDIX No. I, this Annex.)

d. Reserves: Replacements and specialists to maintain, reinforce or render assistance to Detachments in the field will be requested by requisition through CA channels to Army G-5 Section. Divisional staffs may requisition direct to the Army staff in emergency, but will inform their Corps G-5 staff at the earliest opportunity.

e. Administration: An instruction will be issued by Supreme Headquarters (SHAEF) setting forth the organization and procedures for the domestic administration of CA personnel in the field.

SECTION V

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

12. Movement of EGAD Units: Unless otherwise ordered, EGAD units will join the HQ to which they will be attached approximately two weeks, plus the difference between Y and D days, prior to the probable action dates for Third U.S. Army units, to wit:

DAY	EGAD UNIT	TUSA UNIT
Y + 13	Co. A, 6902 EGA Regt.	VIII Corps
Y + 18	Co. B, 6902 EGA Regt.	XV Corps
Y + 23	Co. C, 6902 EGA Regt.	XXX Corps
Y + 23	2d Plat., 6905 T Co.	TUSA
Y + 23	Co. I, 6902 EGA Regt.	TUSA
Y + 23	HQ and HQ Det, 6902 EGA Regt.	TUSA
Y + 36	Co. D, 6902 EGA Regt.	XII Corps

13. Briefing: EGAD units will be briefed in the marshalling areas to the same extent as the troops to which attached. Additionally, at such date after attachment either to Corps or Divisions as security permits, CA Staff sections in coordination with their G-2 Sections will give CA Detachments such limited information on the general area in which Detachments will operate that a study of that area can be made. (Classify as "Limited Knowledge")

14. Landings: See APPENDIX II (TENTATIVE), this Annex.

15. Basis of Operations:

a. Combat Phases: To gain the maximum effectiveness, Detachments will be moved into advance areas as early as possible. Where no local government exists because of the absence of French officials, temporarily or otherwise, or the existing local government is helpless and unable to function, CA Detachments will take on their own initiative such measures as the emergency demands to establish local civilian control and accomplish their mission. The advice and services of attached French officers will be relied upon. Actions will be coordinated with those of the AC of S, G-2 and the Provost Marshal. Every effort will be made to reconstitute the local government so that it may assume civilian control at the earliest moment. Thereafter CA officers and specialists will serve in advising and assisting capacities only, excepting when security and military necessity may dictate the need for more direct action.

b. Detachments to be kept Intact:

(1) Every effort will be made to maintain the integrity of each CA Detachment as a unit to be placed and left at a destination when reached. Only where justification can be clearly shown, will Detachments be moved after being placed in a locality requiring a CA HQ. (See Para 11 of SPAP)

(2) The CO of a Detachment will be responsible to the area commander of the area in which the CA Detachment is located. The AC of S, G-5 at Army and Corps (Chief of CA Section at Division) will act for the respective commander, under normal staff procedure, in all but the most extraordinary cases. As the tactical rear boundaries move forward of a CA Detachment location, the control of the CA Detachment will revert to the succeeding area commanders.

(3) The expected destinations for CA Detachments in the Third U.S. Army's Zone of Operations will be supplied to Corps and Division commanders by Army HQ.

c. Priority of Action: The following duties will be given special attention by CA staff officers and by CO's of Detachments, as necessary:

(1) Liaison will be immediately established with the Provost Marshal and the Counter Intelligence Corps (G-2) and cooperative action agreed upon in all matters of joint interest.

(2) French police authority will be reconstituted for controlling the civil population, with first emphasis on keeping military roads clear for troops.

(3) French fire-fighting services will be reconstituted and their operations coordinated with those of the military fire-fighting services and the Corps of Engineers.

(4) French civil defense and emergency aid organizations will be reconstituted and their operations coordinated with those of G-1 and the Surgeon.

(5) Refugees, displaced persons and other civilians in the combat area will be evacuated therefrom to the extent that military requirements demand.

d. Passive Air Defense: CA Staff officers, through French liaison officers, will seek the cooperation of civilian authorities with P.A.D. staff officers.

e. Later Phases: CA activities, other than those of emergency character such as usually may be expected only in the immediate combat area, are covered in detail in SHAEF Standard Policy and Procedure for Combined CA Operations in NW Europe. (Revised 1 May 1944). SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE, and W.D. Field Manual 27-5.

f. Refugees and Displaced Persons: The handling, care and screening of refugees and displaced persons to prevent interference with military movements and the deliberate introduction of enemy agents behind our lines constitutes one of the most serious problems of civilian control. In solving this problem CA staffs and Detachments will cooperate with the Provost Marshal, Counter Intelligence Units of G-2, and the French authorities. When large-scale evacuation of civilians may be necessary, the operation will be further coordinated with G-4, the Quartermaster and tactical commanders. A letter of Instruction will be issued on this subject by Army G-5.

g. Signs and Flags:

(1) The HQ of CA Detachments not forming a part of any HQ staff will be designated by standard painted board signs approximately 3 ft x 1½ ft in size, with plain black lettering on white background.

A.E.F.
CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICE

A.E.F.
BUREAU DES AFFAIRES CIVILES

(2) The United States and British flags will be displayed at every administration building used by Civil Affairs Detachments of Third U.S. Army. The U.S. flag will be given precedence. Flags will be of standard size and type and will be displayed on separate staffs and at the same level.

h. Proclamations: They will be issued only by SHAEF and provided by him. Instructions on the issuance of local ordinances and enactments will be given by Army G-5 in a Letter of Instruction, after coordination with the Army P. and P.W. staff section.

i. Signal Communications: Provision of essential signal communications in the Z of O for CA Staffs and Detachments is made the responsibility of the Army Signal Officer by SPAP, (para 15) and SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE (para 99). However, CA Staffs and Detachments will assist the Signal Corps in obtaining use of civil communications, and will depend on civil communications outside the Z of O. (See SPAP, para 77 and 78)

j. Employing Civilian Assistants: When services and supplies are not available from military sources or from public authorities, CA Detachments may make necessary expenditure of funds to perform CA administrative duties. Such expenditures will be guided by financial procedures outlined in SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE. Employment of civilians will be in accord with the security policy of ACs of S, G-2.

16. Working Instructions: As rapidly as they can be prepared and necessary approvals obtained, Army G-5 will issue letters of instructions covering in detail all salient sectors of CA interest and action, including Labor Procurement, Utilization of local Resources, Public Safety, Health and Sanitation, Courts, Fiscal Procedure, Public Relations, Intelligence and others. Any questions arising over interpretation of policies or doubts over procedures will be submitted at once to higher headquarters for decision.

17. Conduct of Officers: Army Officers assigned to CA duties, even in remote areas far from troop units, will strictly conform to all Army Regulations governing deportment and the wearing of the uniform. Disciplinary infractions will not be tolerated. Headquarters and administrative offices will conform to the highest military standards of policing and general orderliness.

18. Naval and Air Forces: Army G-5 is responsible for correlating Army CA interests with those of the Naval and Air Forces insofar as possible.

SECTION VI

SUPPLY

19. Responsibility: See Paragraph 3, Part I, SPAP Combined CA Operations on NW Europe, (as revised 1 May 1944) and hereafter designated in this Section as SPAP.

20. Object: See Paragraph 24, Part II SPAP.

21. Policy: See Paragraphs 53-57 and 62-66, Part II SPAP.

22. Planning:

a. SHAEF Plan: Under the SHAEF Supply Plan for CA Operations in NW Europe, the Third U.S. Army has been allocated through FUSAG tonnages of certain supply items to be brought forward D to D + 90, of which those for D + 24 to D + 41 are firm.

b. Credits: Credits have been allocated by FUSAG against which the Third U.S. Army may draw for the period D + 24 to D + 60 based upon Army's requests. (See Appendix IV, this Annex). Detailed stock requisitions, showing country of origin, have been submitted by Third U.S. Army through command channels to CG, SOS - ETOUSA. Credits for D + 42 to D + 90 will be allocated by FUSAG against which further stock requisitions will be processed by Forward Echelon, Com Z to CG, SOS - ETOUSA.

c. Sub-allocations of Credits: Sub-allotments of Third U.S. Army credits to VIII, XV, XX and XII Corps for the period D + 30 to D + 90 will be forwarded to Corps with the suggestion that these be sub-allocated to Divisions. A reserve amounting to 20% of the total Army allocation will be held by the Army. Corps and Divisions will requisition against established credits, without reference to higher headquarters, for issue from Army Supply Depots, in the quantities and at the locations published by Army from time to time.

d. Local Resources: See Paragraphs 282b, 284, 285, SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE.

e. Local Procurement: See paragraphs 299, 300, 301a, 302 SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE and ETO Procurement Regulations in Occupied and Liberated Territories (SOP No. 10, File AG 400.12, 1 April 1944.)

23. Operations:

a. Additional Supplies: During operations G-5 Section, Third U.S. Army, will submit to SHAEF through command channels additional requirements on which procurement action or further allocation is necessary. (See Paragraph 62 (b), SPAP.)

b. Supply Services: The communication zone will be responsible for delivering CA Supplies from Beaches and base depots to the Army Depots. CA Supplies will be called forward to the Army Depots, from the Communications Zone, by re-requisition, to maintain certain stock levels.

c. Distribution: Beyond the Army Depot and to the point of turnover by CA Detachments to civilian recipients, movement of CA Supplies will be effected in Co-ordination with G-4 Army. Civilian Trucks and drivers will be used whenever available. In all cases when civilian transportation and drivers are used there will be a CA officer in complete charge of the Convoy with full responsibility for receiving the supplies at depot and safe delivery to the Civilian recipient at Point of Turnover. In no case will civilians, other than drivers, accompany the Convoy to Army Depots.

SECRET

d. Issue: Procedure for release of CA Supplies to civilian authorities are covered in a detailed Letter of Instructions. (See CA Operational Supply Instructions).

e. Payment and Marking: (See CA Operational Supply Instructions).

f. Transportation: When French Civil Agencies authorized to receive relief supplies are unable to provide transport from point of turnover, CA Detachment will apply to area commander (through the AC of S, G-5 or Chief of CA Section at Division) for the use of military transport. (See Para 297 SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE).

g. Storage: French authorities will be responsible for storage after authorized release of CA Supplies to them.

h. Local Resources: CA Detachments will report through Command Channels all surplus commodities or resources encountered for consolidation at G-5 Section, Third U.S. Army and for forwarding to HQ FUSAG, instructions as to disposition will be awaited from FUSAG unless urgently required by the area commander for operational needs. (See Para 70, SPAP and Para 300b SHAEF CA HANDBOOK - FRANCE).

i. Estimates: Supply requirements for emergencies and estimates beyond D + 90 day will be consolidated by G-5 Section for submission to FUSAG through G-4 Section as called for in Para 62(b), SPAP.

SECTION VII

REVIEWS AND REPORTS

24. Reviews: Each HQ will submit its detailed Civil Affairs Plan, Instructions and Directives to the next higher HQ for review.

25. Reports:

a. Periodical: Reports will be held to the minimum essential to keep higher headquarters informed of pertinent actions and developing situations that might influence the mission. An Instruction will be issued by Army G-5 later covering reports required periodically by this and higher HQ.

b. Technical: Technical reports may be requested by Branch or Department Chiefs and specialists at any CA Staff HQ of any corresponding officer in a lower echelon, subject to the approval of the CO of the particular lower echelon officer being asked to report.

c. Special: Special reports will be made when directed by higher HQ, or any HQ may initiate them when the CO sees the need.

d. Emergency: Emergency reports will be made only in urgent emergencies, and then by the most expeditious means available to the HQ capable of immediate action. However, any HQ that is by-passed in an Emergency Report must be informed at the earliest opportunity of the situation involved and the action taken or contemplated.

26. Changes in HQ: It is standard procedure for every HQ promptly to inform its next higher and next lower HQS of any change in its communications or locations and if possible to give advance warning of the change.

27. Inspections: Periodic and unscheduled inspections will be made of lower echelons by Staff officers of higher echelons.

APPENDIX NO. I — CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS

OFFICERS

FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENTS		NUMBER AND GRADES U. S.		BRITISH
TYPE "A"				
1 Commanding Officer	Lt. Colonel	2		1
1 Deputy (Administrative)	Major	2		1
2 Legal Officer (Laws and Courts)	Captain	2		4
1 Police Officer	1st. Lt.	2		1
1 Fire	2nd Lt.	1		1
1 Civil Defense		9		8
1 Health Officer				
1 Fiscal Officer				
2 Supply Officer	Warrant O	2		
1 Communications, P.T.T., Intelligence				
1 Transportation				
1 Public Works - (Water-sewage)				
1 Utilities - (Power & Gas)				
1 Economics				
1 Relief Officer				
17 TOTAL COMMISSIONED				
TYPE "B"				
1 Commanding Officer	Lt. Colonel	1		
1 Deputy - Administrative, Legal	Major	1		1
1 Public Safety (Police)	Captain	1		2
1 Fiscal Officer	1st Lt.	1		1
1 Communications - Intelligence	2nd Lt.	1		
1 Economics - Labor		5		4
1 Relief - Agriculture				
1 Supply - Transportation	Warrant O	2		
1 Public Works & Utilities (Power-Gas-Water)				
9 TOTAL COMMISSIONED				
TYPE "C"				
1 Commanding Officer	Lt. Colonel	1		
1 Deputy - Administrative (Legal, Fiscal)	Major			1
1 Police	Captain	1		1
1 Civil Defense	1st Lt.	1		
1 Supply - Transportation - Economics - Labor		3		2
5 TOTAL COMMISSIONED				
TYPE "D"				
1 Commanding Officer	Major	1		
1 Deputy - Administrative, Legal	Captain			1
2 Public Safety - (Police, Fire Civil Defense)	1st Lt.	1		
	2nd Lt.			1
4 TOTAL COMMISSIONED		2		2

CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS

ENLISTED MEN

			Spec. No.
Type "A"	1	Chief Clerk	052
	2	General Clerical	055
	1	Stenographer	213
	3	Typist	247
	1	Draftsman	070
	1	Accountant	268
	1	Auditor	290
	1	Stock Clerk	324
	1	Shipping Clerk	195
	1	Foreman, Warehouse	252
	1	Water Filter Operator	083
	1	Water Supply Engineer	254
	2	Sanitary Technician	196
	1	Medical Supply	825
	1	Investigator	301
	1	Court Reporter	280
	2	Interpreter	320
	22	TOTAL	
Type "B"	1	Chief Clerk	052
	1	General Clerical	055
	1	Stenographer	213
	1	Typist	247
	1	Draftsman	070
	1	Accountant - Auditor	268
	1	Stock - Shipping Clerk	324
	1	Foreman, Warehouse	252
	1	Water Filter Operator	083
	1	Water Supply Engineer	254
	2	Sanitary Technician	196
	1	Medical Supply	825
	1	Investigator	301
	2	Interpreter	320
	16	TOTAL	
Type "C"	1	Chief Clerk	052
	1	General Clerical	055
	1	Stenographer	213
	1	Accountant - Auditor	268
	1	Foreman, Warehouse	252
	1	Water Filter Operator	083
	1	Sanitary Technician	196
	1	Medical Supply	825
	1	Interpreter	320
	9	TOTAL	
Type "D"	2	General Clerical	055
	1	Sanitary Technical	196
	2	Driver - Interpreters	320
	1	Investigator	301
	6	TOTAL	

APPENDIX II — (TENTATIVE)

LANDING OF CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL

NOTE: Index numbers are from troop priority List, ANNEX No. 3 to Third U.S. Army Plan, dated 12 May 1944, or where a question mark appears assignment of that Index number has been requested.

INDEX NO.		PERSONNEL	VEHICLES
VIII CORPS UNITS			
410 B	CA Stf Sec. (79th Inf Div)	11	6
718 B	G-5 Stf Sec (VIII Corps)	7	4
719 B	CA Stf Sec (83d Inf Div)	11	6
1152 B	A Co, 6902 ECA Regt	216	65
THIRD U.S. ARMY UNITS			
2060 Bl	Fwd Ech, Hq/Hq Det, Third Army (G-5 Section only)	10	3
XV CORPS UNITS			
1289 B	CA Stf Sec (8th Inf Div)	11	6
1381 Bl	G-5 Stf Sec (XV Corps)	7	4
1488 B	CA Stf Sec (35th Inf Div)	11	6
1543 B	CA Stf Sec (45th Armd Div)	8	6
1692 B	CA Stf Sec (5th Inf Div)	11	6
1836 B	B Co, 6902 ECA Regt	216	65
THIRD U.S. ARMY			
183	RF Ech, Hq/Hq Det, Third U.S. Army (G-5 Section only)	78	15
(?) 186	CA Pool (Third U.S. Army) Hq & Hq Det, 6902 ECA Det.	113	36
	Co I, 6902 ECA Regt.	216	65
	2d Plat, 6905 T Co	76	39
XX CORPS UNITS			
270	G-5 Stf Sec (XX Corps)	7	4
296	CA Stf Sec (6th Armd Div)	8	6
334	C Co, 6902 ECA Regt	216	65
7289	CA Stf Sec (28th Inf Div)	11	6
494	CA Stf Sec (7th Armd Div)	8	6
XII CORPS UNITS			
542	G-5 Stf Sec (XII Corps)	7	4
568	D Co, 6902 ECA Regt	216	65
590	CA Stf Sec (80th Inf Div)	11	6
701	CA Stf Sec (5th Armd Div)	8	6
	Totals	1484	500

APPENDIX III

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPLIES DESIGNATED AS AVAILABLE BY G-5 SHAEF
(All figures in Long Tons)

ARTICLE:	D + 24	D + 25	D + 26	D + 27	D + 28	D + 29	D + 30	D + 31	D + 32
Food								10.30	10.30
Medical	.61								
Soap	2.00	2.00		1.1	1.1			2.00	2.00
Fuel and Lubricants					18.00	18.00	18.00	21.60	21.60
Clothing	9.2	9.2	9.2	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	14.70	14.70

	D + 33	D + 34	D + 35	D + 36	D + 37	D + 38	D + 39	D + 40	D + 41
Food	10.30	10.30	10.30	20.00	20.00	20.00	20.00	20.00	81.40
Soap	2.00	2.00		4.70	4.70	4.70	4.70	3.00	
Fuel and Lubricants	21.60	21.60	21.60	24.70	24.70	24.70	7.89		
Emergency Feeding Equipment									6.40
Clothing	14.70	14.70	14.70	28.70	28.40	28.40			

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 11-G-1 Plan

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ANNEX 11

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-1 ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(11 May 1944)

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G-1 ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

References

1. European Theater of Operations United States Army - Short Title (ETO-POM- Preparation for Overseas Movement Short Sea Voyage SSV 10 Jan 1944) - (Corrected)

2. European Theater of Operations United States Army - Short Title (ETO-POM- Preparation for Overseas Movement Long Sea Voyage LSV 21 July 1943) (Corrected)

3. SOS Plan - Mounting the Operation 20 March 1944, and Annex No. 19 thereto, (G-1 and Administrative Services).

4. Joint Administration Plan for Operation (Overlord - U.S. Forces) (FUSAG - Ninth Air Force - Western Naval Task Force), dated 19 April 1944.

I. GENERAL

Administrative details in this command will be held to the minimum consistent with efficient operations. It is not the intention of this directive to establish inflexible procedures, nor to dictate the method by which the requirements will be met. Experience has shown that considerable confusion can be avoided if a thorough understanding is reached prior to operations on what is wanted and when it is wanted. For this reason, certain interpretations are given in full. Since the administrative requirements are being reduced to a minimum, it is essential that these few be complied with implicitly. Should any misunderstanding occur prior to, or during operations, or should situations arise which are not covered by these instructions, units are directed to contact G-1 Section of Third Army immediately. At all times, units will use informal, explanatory remarks in forwarding any requisitions, recommendations or reports which are not otherwise perfectly clear. When any headquarters in the command desires additional information, or explanation concerning a report from a lower headquarters, every effort will be made to obtain this information by radio, phone or personal contact. The return of papers to the lower unit will be avoided whenever possible.

II. G-1 PERIODIC REPORTS

1. Commencing on "D" Day a Daily G-1 Report will be submitted as of 2359, covering the preceding 24 hour period. These Reports will be submitted by radio, telephone or courier, and will include the following information:

a. Date (Day covered by Report).
b. Effective Strength.
c. Killed.
d. Missing, Captured, or Interned.
e. Wounded (Hospitalized).
f. Sick or Injured (Non-battle)(Hospitalized).
g. Prisoners captured by our forces.
h. Replacements and RTDs. (Returned to duty).

(A code letter or word will be established for each report entry indicated above, e.g., the letters FY might represent "Killed").

Inasmuch as this Report is to be submitted as of 2359 daily, it will not be necessary to indicate more than the date. For example: 2359, 4 March would appear merely as 4 March. Care should be exercised to assure that the date of the effective period of the Report is shown and not that of the day on which it is submitted.

2. Attention is directed to the following definitions of the terms used in G-1 Periodic Reports:

a. Effective Strength: Effective Strength is the number of personnel "available for duty." It does not mean authorized strength nor assigned strength. Strength figures will include the strength of own and attached units. Total Effective Strength will be consolidated for all units included in the Report.

b. Killed: This figure will indicate the number of personnel known to have been killed. No individual should be reported killed unless positive evidence exists without chance of error. Until such time as this evidence is available, persons thought to be killed should be reported as "missing in action."

c. Missing in Action: All individuals not otherwise accounted for will be listed as "missing in action." Specifically, personnel known or thought to be captured or interned during the 24 hour period covered by the Report will be included with "missing."

d. Wounded (Hospitalized): This figure will indicate the hospitalized wounded admitted to the hospital during the reporting period.

e. Sick and Injured (Non-battle) (Hospitalized): These are non-battle casualties admitted to hospitals during the reporting period.

f. Prisoners Captured by our Forces: All enemy captured by our troops will be grouped under one figure regardless of their rank or nationality. (Example: 1-German Officer, 7-German NCOs, 8-German Pvts, and 3 Hungarian enlisted men will appear as 19.) It should be thoroughly understood that this figure will represent the number of enemy troops which have been taken prisoner by our forces; it must not be confused with the number of our personnel captured by enemy forces. Further, it will include only those prisoners captured during the 24 hour period covered by the Report, and extreme care will be taken to avoid duplication of report by successive headquarters to whose control the prisoners pass. Prisoners will be considered evacuated when removed from control of the reporting unit.

g. Replacements and RTDs: Here will be shown the number of personnel replacements reporting to the unit for the first time, and in addition, all returning personnel previously reported as a loss under (1) "missing," (2) "wounded (hospitalized)", or (3) "Sick and Injured (hospitalized)".

3. The following points must be thoroughly understood:

a. No figures will be cumulative. Once a casualty has been reported, it will not be reported on successive reports even though individual is still "Missing" or still "Hospitalized." Figures cover occurrences since time of last report only. A man whose status at the end of a reporting period is exactly the same as the beginning of the period will not be reported regardless of what injuries, sicknesses or wounds he may have sustained during the period.

b. If no report is received from a subordinate unit, the strength of the unit as of its last report will be used. Unless positive evidence exists that a complete unit is lost, it will be carried in the strength.

c. The G-1 Periodic Reports will be submitted direct to the next higher headquarters to which the reporting unit is attached (if not otherwise attached, then to the higher headquarters to which assigned) except that divisions will report for themselves and attached units directly to Army Headquarters with information copy to Corps Headquarters. Corps Headquarters will report on Corps units only. Army troops will report directly to Army Headquarters. Hospitals will report only on hospital personnel and will not include patients (whether assigned to detachment of patients or merely transient patients).

d. When units are relieved from attachment to one headquarters and attached to another, the Commanding Officers are responsible for submitting their reports to the new headquarters beginning with the day of change; thus a squadron relieved from one corps on the 8th and attached to another, will submit the Daily Report covering the 24 hour period of the 7th to the former Corps, and the Daily Report covering the 24 hour period of the 8th to the new headquarters.

4. In addition to the Daily Report, a Weekly G-1 Report will be submitted as of 2359 each Saturday, commencing the first Saturday following "D" Day. Weekly Reports are to reach Army Headquarters by the most expeditious means available other than radio. The Weekly Report will be prepared on forms similar to those attached, and will be classified SECRET.

5. In compiling the Weekly Report only those events that cause a change in status since the last report will be included. A soldier hospitalized on Monday and returned to duty on Friday will not be reported since he will be effective for duty on 2359 Saturday when the Report is compiled and thus his status is the same as it was at 2359 the preceding Saturday.

6. Each higher headquarters through which this Report passes will consolidate the information on page 1 of the Report with that from other units and submit one consolidated Report to the next higher headquarters. To reduce administrative work Annex 1 to the Report (Station List) need not be consolidated for all subordinate units provided all original annexes are forwarded and are clearly marked to indicate the subordinate unit to which they pertain.

7. Where Annex 1 indicates that the effective strength of a unit is below T/O Strength the next higher headquarters will take immediate action to insure prompt submission of a replacement requisition if warranted.

(See examples 1 and 2 on the following pages for the G-1 Weekly Periodic Report and Annex No 1 to G-1 Report (Station list and strength report).

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THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-1 ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN

(11 May 1944)

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e. Wounded (Hospitalized).
f. Sick or Injured (Non-battle)(Hospitalized).
g. Prisoners captured by our forces.
h. Replacements and RTDs. (Returned to duty).

(A code letter or word will be established for each report entry indicated above, e.g., the letters PY might represent "Killed").

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d. Wounded (Hospitalized): This figure will indicate the hospitalized wounded admitted to the hospital during the reporting period.

e. Sick and Injured (Non-battle) (Hospitalized): These are non-battle casualties admitted to hospitals during the reporting period.

f. Prisoners Captured by our Forces: All enemy captured by our troops will be grouped under one figure regardless of their rank or nationality. (Example: 1-German Officer, 7-German NCOs, 8-German Pvts, and 3 Hungarian enlisted men will appear as 19.) It should be thoroughly understood that this figure will represent the number of enemy troops which have been taken prisoner by our forces; it must not be confused with the number of our personnel captured by enemy forces. Further, it will include only those prisoners captured during the 24 hour period covered by the Report, and extreme care will be taken to avoid duplication of report by successive headquarters to whose control the prisoners pass. Prisoners will be considered evacuated when removed from control of the reporting unit.

g. Replacements and RTDs: Here will be shown the number of personnel replacements reporting to the unit for the first time, and in addition, all returning personnel previously reported as a loss under (1) "missing," (2) "wounded (hospitalized)", or (3) "Sick and Injured (hospitalized)".

3. The following points must be thoroughly understood:

a. No figures will be cumulative. Once a casualty has been reported, it will not be reported on successive reports even though individual is still "Missing" or still "Hospitalized." Figures cover occurrences since time of last report only. A man whose status at the end of a reporting period is exactly the same as the beginning of the period will not be reported regardless of what injuries, sicknesses or wounds he may have sustained during the period.

b. If no report is received from a subordinate unit, the strength of the unit as of its last report will be used. Unless positive evidence exists that a complete unit is lost, it will be carried in the strength.

c. The G-1 Periodic Reports will be submitted direct to the next higher headquarters to which the reporting unit is attached (if not otherwise attached, then to the higher headquarters to which assigned) except that divisions will report for themselves and attached units directly to Army Headquarters with information copy to Corps Headquarters. Corps Headquarters will report on Corps units only. Army troops will report directly to Army Headquarters. Hospitals will report only on hospital personnel and will not include patients (whether assigned to detachment of patients or merely transient patients).

d. When units are relieved from attachment to one headquarters and attached to another, the Commanding Officers are responsible for submitting their reports to the new headquarters beginning with the day of change; thus a squadron relieved from one corps on the 8th and attached to another, will submit the Daily Report covering the 24 hour period of the 7th to the former Corps, and the Daily Report covering the 24 hour period of the 8th to the new headquarters.

4. In addition to the Daily Report, a Weekly G-1 Report will be submitted as of 2359 each Saturday, commencing the first Saturday following "D" Day. Weekly Reports are to reach Army Headquarters by the most expeditious means available other than radio. The Weekly Report will be prepared on forms similar to those attached, and will be classified SECRET.

5. In compiling the Weekly Report only those events that cause a change in status since the last report will be included. A soldier hospitalized on Monday and returned to duty on Friday will not be reported since he will be effective for duty on 2359 Saturday when the Report is compiled and thus his status is the same as it was at 2359 the preceding Saturday.

6. Each higher headquarters through which this Report passes will consolidate the information on page 1 of the Report with that from other units and submit one consolidated Report to the next higher headquarters. To reduce administrative work Annex 1 to the Report (Station List) need not be consolidated for all subordinate units provided all original annexes are forwarded and are clearly marked to indicate the subordinate unit to which they pertain.

7. Where Annex 1 indicates that the effective strength of a unit is below T/O Strength the next higher headquarters will take immediate action to insure prompt submission of a replacement requisition if warranted.

(See examples 1 and 2 on the following pages for the G-1 Weekly Periodic Report and Annex No 1 to G-1 Report (Station list and strength report).

SECRET

G-1 WEEKLY PERIODIC REPORT

NO.___ FROM:_____ UNIT:_____

TO :_____ DATE:_____

1. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTALLATIONS:

	OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS	NURSES	ENLISTED MEN	TOTAL
2. STRENGTH (Effective):					
3. CASUALTIES:					
a. Killed:					
b. Missing, Captured, or Interned:					
c. Wounded (Hospitalized):					
d. Sick or Injured (Hosp):					
Total:					

4. Replacements Received:____Personnel returned to duty:_____.

5. Prisoners of War: Captured:_____Evacuated:_____.

6. Stragglers on Hand from other units:_____.

7. Graves Registration (Cemetery Location and No. Buried):_____

8. State of Morale:_____

9. Civilian Population:_____

_____

(Signature)

ANNEX NO. 1
To G-1 Report of_____(UNIT) STATION LIST AND STRENGTH REPORT (Including Reporting Unit)

UNIT	LOCATION	T/O STR	ASGD STR	EFFECTIVE STRENGTH O	WO	NURSES	EM	TOTAL
PART 1*								
PART 2*								
PART 3*	DATE DETACHED			TO WHOM ATTACHED				

* Part 1 - List of Units Assigned and Directly Controlled by your Headquarters.
* Part 2 - List of Units Assigned and Directly Controlled by your Headquarters.
* Part 3 - Units Assigned but Attached to Another Headquarters for control.

III. PERSONNEL

1. Replacements and Personnel Requisitions.

a. The critical problem of furnishing sufficient trained replacements makes it imperative that each individual be used to the utmost of his ability and that steps be taken to reduce absenteeism and the detailing of personnel on non-essential duties. Each G-1 (S-1) and Personnel Officer will exert continual effort to effect the maximum utilization of personnel in order to hold requisitions for replacements to a minimum.

b. Personnel unable to accompany organizations will be cleared in accordance with Paragraph 11, a, b, c, d, and f. ETO-POM-LSV, dated 21 July 1943, and replacements will be requisitioned immediately. (Note: Paragraph 11 e ETO-POM-LSV will be disregarded.)

c. Personnel in Confinement, AWOL, or in Desertion from alerted Units:

(1) Personnel who are absent without authority on the date of departure of the unit from its concentration area to marshalling and/or embarkation areas will be transferred in grade to 10th Replacement Depot. Such transfer will be automatic and alert orders will be cited as authority for the transfer.

(2) If absence occurs prior to final packing of service records and necessary unit personnel records at concentration area, the following will be forwarded to the 10th Replacement Depot:

Extract copies of Morning Report (WD AGO Form #44) certified by the unit commander, showing the change in status and citing the fact of the soldier's transfer to appropriate Replacement Depot.
Service record with transfer indorsed therein.
Other pertinent records (see par. 9 AR 615-300).
Personal effects, if any.
Letter explaining the circumstances. If any record is not immediately available, the letter will indicate clearly what officer has custody of such record and where he is located.

(3) If absence occurred at any time subsequent to final packing of service records and other pertinent unit personnel records, the following will be forwarded to the 10th Replacement Depot:

Extract copies of Morning Report (WD AGO Form #44) certified by the unit commander, showing the change in status and citing the fact of the soldier's transfer to appropriate Replacement Depot.
Letter stating fact and date of absence, all pertinent circumstances, and that service record and other necessary records will be forwarded when available.
Such other records or items designated in par. (2) above as may be available.
Upon arrival overseas and receipt of organizational baggage containing necessary records, forward to 10th Replacement Depot such records designated in 2 above as were not available for transmittal prior to departure from the United Kingdom.

(4) Absentees who rejoin their unit prior to the departure from the UK will be picked up in the strength of the unit. Necessary disciplinary action will be taken and as soon as possible the records of the individual (see par. (2) above) will be obtained.

(5) All pending summary or special courtmartial matters will be completed prior to departure of the unit to the marshalling and/or embarkation areas.

(6) Personnel awaiting trial in cases involving serious offenses normally tried by general court martial (such as rape, murder, etc) and the witnesses that must remain in the UK for the trial of such offenders, will be reported for disposition to the commander who will exercise general court martial jurisdiction over the individual after the departure of the unit or organization from the UK. In the case of SOS or Field Force personnel, this will normally be the Base Section Commander; in the case of Air Force personnel, the Commanding General of the Command concerned.

(7) Personnel in unit guard houses or in local custody awaiting sentence will be reported for disposition to the Commander under whose general court-martial jurisdiction the individual was tried.

(8) Par. 10 and 11 e, POM-ETO, 21 July 1943, will be disregarded.

2. Return of Hospital Evacuees and Casuals.

a. Return will be accomplished through the replacement system. Personnel returning from UK or from the Army rear area will go initially to the Replacement Depot under Army control.

b. Hospitals in the forward areas will deliver personnel returning to duty to the nearest replacement detachment to them which serves the unit that is to receive the evacuee. The detachment will be responsible for providing the individual with the minimum amount of equipment necessary to insure his safe return to his unit. It will further be responsible for locating the unit and arranging transportation on ration trucks, on vehicles of the unit concerned or by organic transportation. Personnel will be transported by one of the above methods and will not be permitted to hitch hike. Each replacement installation will keep accurate records of all personnel passing through, noting the time of arrival and time of departure.

c. The officer commanding the Replacement Detachment is authorized to place transient personnel on such duties as may be necessary to insure the protection of the installation and the welfare of the personnel present. However, no personnel will be retained by the replacement battalion for such purposes when the performance of such duties will delay their return to their unit. Commanders of the replacement detachments are directly responsible that all personnel are returned to their units with the least practicable delay. Replacements being forwarded to units from the Army Depot will be processed in the same manner.

d. To make use of all available transportation replacement detachments will normally be located near railheads and ration dumps. The commanders of these detachments will be authorized to draw "C" and "K" rations from nearby dumps to feed transient personnel. Since these detachments must be extremely mobile no permanent kitchens will be established forward of Replacement Company Headquarters. Arrangements will be made by the Detachment Commanders with nearby units or medical installations to provide emergency medical treatment.

IV. PERSONNEL RECORDS AND ADMINISTRATION PLAN.

1. Personnel Records. Records of personnel evacuated from units as battle or non-battle casualties will be handled in accordance with Circular No. 8, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, dated 2 May 1944.

2. Personnel Administration Plan. See Circular No. 3, Headquarters Third U.S. Army dated 12 April 1944.

V. AWARDS AND DECORATIONS. In accordance with Circular No. 32, Headquarters ETOUSA, dated 20 March 1944, and Circular No. 6, Hq, Third United States Army, as amended. See Annex E to Inclosure to Annex No. 13, G-4 Plan, for reserves of medals and awards for major headquarters and hospitals.

VI. OFFICER APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS, RECLASSIFICATION AND DEMOTION.

1. Promotion of Officers. Routine promotions will be recommended in accordance with Section II, Circular 4, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, dated 17 April 1944; Circular No. 22, Hq ETOUSA, 1944, and AR 605-12, dated 3 February 1944.

2. Battlefield Promotions and Appointments.

a. Recommendations for battlefield promotions during combat operations, up to and including the grade of Lieutenant Colonel, will be made to Commanding General, Third United States Army, for any officer who demonstrates outstanding ability to command in actual combat or to perform his duties in an outstanding manner under actual combat conditions. Recommendations for the appointment of enlisted men to the grade of Second Lieutenant for the same reasons may be submitted to this headquarters.

b. A position vacancy must exist for either promotion or appointment. Recommendations must contain sufficient information to definitely indicate that the person being recommended has actually demonstrated outstanding ability in actual combat. The description on demonstrated ability must be complete and in detail, citing dates, specific instances and circumstances.

c. No oath of office or letter of acceptance is necessary for promotion of officers but is required when an enlisted man is appointed.

d. All promotions are effective the date of letter or radio announcing promotion, and pay accrues from that date.

e. Recommendations for battlefield promotion or appointment and each succeeding indorsement, indicating approval or disapproval, must be signed by the commander concerned and may not be delegated to a staff officer.

f. Oath of office, report of entry on extended active duty and letter of acceptance must be executed on the same date the appointment is effective. However, the letter of acceptance may be executed prior to effective date of appointment provided the words "accept appointment effective upon date of appointment" are used.

g. When recommendations are made under this authority, by unit commanders, the following data will be included in each recommendation:

1. Full name, current rank or grade, and serial number.
2. Branch of service, component, and present organization.
3. Statement that suitable vacancy exists.
4. Date of present rank.
5. Duty performed as an enlisted man. (If appropriate)
6. Statement on demonstrated outstanding ability to command in actual combat, under fire, citing date or dates, instances and circumstances.

3. Reclassification of Officers.

a. Corps commanders are authorized, under combat conditions, to send unsuitable officers to the rear for reclassification or reassignment and may further delegate this authority to divisions under their command. The following procedure will govern:

(1) At the headquarters of each corps, and at the first replacement depot to be established on the continent, will be one recorder from the ETO Reclassification Board.

(2) Officers returned for reclassification will be directed to proceed to the appropriate corps headquarters with a sealed letter setting forth the circumstances.

(3) The recorder of the corps headquarters will interview the officer and obtain from him the names of individuals from whom he desires sworn statements in his own behalf. The officer will then be ordered to the reclassification center in the United Kingdom to await the arrival of his reclassification file.

(4) After interview with the officer who is to be reclassified, the recorder will go forward to the unit from which officer was returned and will assist the unit commander in the preparation of Form A, and obtain documents required in the reclassification file. Such file upon completion will be returned to the ETO Reclassification Board.

b. Units operating directly under Third Army Headquarters will submit recommendation for reassignment or reclassification using the form letter outlined below, but will retain the officer in the organization until authorized by this headquarters to send him to a depot.

c. Papers required by paragraph 7b, AR 605-230 as amended by Change No. 1, dated 5 November 1943 and War Department Circular No. 280, dated 5 November 1943 will be prepared and forwarded through normal channels to this headquarters within 15 days. The recorder from corps headquarters will assist units when preparing these papers. If papers are not received by Army Headquarters within 15 days, the officer will be returned to his unit. The following form letter will be used by all units as prescribed in paragraph b (2) and (5) above:

HEADQUARTERS

_____

_____
Date

SUBJECT: Reassignment and Reclassification of Officers.

TO : Commanding Officer, ETO Reclassification Center at_____

1. _____ _____ _____ _____
(Name) (Grade) (ASN) (Branch)
_____ has been directed to proceed to_____ on or about_____. His permanent
(Component) (Unit) (Headquarters) (Date he will report)
grade is_____.

2. This action is being taken because: (Explain in detail)
3. I recommend that this officer
a. Be*(reassigned)(reclassified)
b. (*Be)(be not) reduced to his permanent grade.
c. (*Be)(be not) assigned to command troops in his *(present)(lower)(any) grade.
4. I consider this officer qualified to perform the following duties in*(present)(lower) grade.
5. After a fair test, I*(consider)(do not consider) him qualified for combat duty. (If not, state reasons).
6. An appropriate assignment *(does) (does not) exist in this command.

_____
(Signature of Commander)

_____
(Grade)

INSTRUCTIONS:
1. This form will be used for officers being returned for reassignment or reclassification.
2. If officer is recommended for reassignment, he will be returned through command channels. Each commander in the chain will, reassign the officer, or indorse the communication substantially as in paragraph 6.
3. If reclassification is recommended, then supporting papers required by paragraph 7b, AR 605-230 will be forwarded to Hq ETOUSA as soon as practicable.
4. *Line out inappropriate words.

---

4. Demotion of Officers.

a. Demotion of officers, for reasons other than when morale and example require, will be accomplished in accordance with Section II, Circular 68, Hq ETOUSA, dated 27 August 1943.

b. Demotion of officers, where morale and example require, will be accomplished in accordance with Section III of the above named Circular 68. The officer recommended for demotion will be sent to Headquarters Third U.S. Army and will be given sealed letter addressed to the Commanding General, such letter containing detailed information outlined in paragraph 4b of Section III, Circular 68.

VII. SHELTER

1. Use of existing facilities.

a. Maximum use will be made of existing shelter even at the cost of administrative inconvenience. Every effort will be made to obtain in existing buildings at least one-third of the total shelter required for hospitals.

b. Shelter will be procured as required. In liberated countries consideration will be given to the needs of the civil population who will be treated as inhabitants of an allied country and will be allowed the minimum essential space to live on their own property unless the military situation for security or other reason requires their displacement.

c. When covered shelter is not available, tentage will be used.

2. Priority of allotment of shelter for personnel and installations will be as follows:

(1) Hospitals
(2) Headquarters
(3) Shops
(4) Covered Storage
(5) Army Exchanges
(6) Personnel, with priority to combat personnel in rest areas.

Storage will be provided only for items likely to deteriorate from being stored in the open or requiring storage in bins.

3. Methods of obtaining Existing Facilities:

a. The ownership of lands and buildings will not be acquired.

b. The use or lands and buildings will be acquired by rental, requisition or seizure, in accordance with ETO procurement regulations and "Real Estate Procedure in Occupied and Liberated Territories," Hq ETOUSA. (This paper is under preparation and publication to all concerned is imminent).

c. In the early stages full powers of requisition will be given to local commanders for the procurement of shelter. Requisitions will be transferred into lease agreements as soon as practicable.

d. Forcible entry or arbitrary possessions will only be used for practical reasons during progress or expectancy of operations. Under other conditions, forcible entry will only be made on instructions issued by the Army Commander.

4. Payment for existing facilities:

a. Compensation or rents for lands and buildings will not be paid in the combat zone when such lands or buildings have been vacated on account of existing or imminent combat. Methods for assessing rental rates will be published later.

b. Billeting rates for each country will be promulgated by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

5. When British and United States forces require shelter in the same area, allocation will be made by the headquarters controlling the area.

6. USN and USAAF shelters.

a. Shelters for USN and USAAF will be furnished according to the policy outlined in foregoing paragraphs. Air Forces will be given priority on shelter located in the close vicinity of air fields.

VIII. UNIFORM. Uniform will be worn as prescribed by Circular No. 1, this headquarters, dated 6 Apr 1944. For items of uniform, see Annex C, Inclosure to Annex 13, G-4 Plan.

IX. ARMY EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES.

1. Unit exchanges will continue operations at home station or in the concentration area until departure for the marshalling or embarkation area.

2. In areas where both British EFI and United States Army Exchanges are in operation, purchases privileges in each case will be restricted to members of the force under which the facilities operate. In an area in which only one force (British or United States) operates facilities, equal purchases privileges will be extended to members of both British and United States Forces. These equal purchases privileges will be extended to members of one force (British or United States) only so long as they are rationed by the other force.

3. Army Exchanges will be established on the continent as soon as practicable after D plus 30. Technical supervision of all exchanges will be in accordance with AR 210-65.

4. The semi-necessary items (cigarettes, soap, razor blades, etc.) will be issued free as part of the field ration to United States troops and to allied troops rationed by the United States Army, when facilities are not available for the sale of these items.

X. FINANCE.

1. General. French currency only will be used on the Continent. The rate of exchange will be announced at a later date. Neither dollar nor sterling will be legal tender. All personnel are prohibited from accepting British or American currency. Personnel violating this order will be subject to courts-martial. All foreign financial and foreign trade transactions, and all exports and imports of currency by any member of the armed forces is prohibited except as permitted under regulations issued by authority of the CG, ETOUSA. Initially all payments by Disbursing Officers will be in cash.

2. Mounting Operations.

a. Disposition of Surplus Funds.

(1) Unit commanders will be responsible that all sterling and dollar currency, except a sum not exceeding 10 shillings to cover purchases in the concentration and marshalling area, are disposed of or exchanged by all members of their command. Facilities of static SOS Finance Units will be utilized insofar as possible.

(2) Military personnel may dispose of their excess funds by one of the following methods:

(a) Soldiers' Deposits.

(b) Purchase of War Bonds.

(c) Transmission of funds to the United States by PTA.

b. Partial Pay and Currency Exchange.

(1) Personnel officers will prepare partial payment payrolls (WD Forms 366a) by organizations in sufficient copies to provide an original and two copies for each part of his organization called forward from the concentration area or home station. Such payrolls will include the names of all officers and enlisted men, attached and assigned, and one copy for each part of the organization will be properly signed before leaving the concentration area. No amounts will be shown on the rolls until such time as the rate of exchange has been determined.

(2) One signed and two copies of payroll will be furnished the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of each part of the organization which departs from the concentration area or home station or which will be detached from the organization prior to briefing. The names of all personnel not included in that party will be red-lined.

(3) On the triplicate, or retained copy, of the payroll, the amounts turned in for conversion will be entered opposite each name under the column general heading "Collections" or "Analysis of Collections" changed to read "Personal Funds". Separate columns will be used for pounds and shillings, and dollars (if any) and the last collection column will be left blank for use by the Finance Officer in entering therein the converted amounts.

(4) All 3 copies of the payroll, together with the personal funds collected for exchange will be entrusted to the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of each detached party who will deliver payrolls and total cash to be exchanged to the Finance Officer assigned to his camp in the marshalling areas, as soon as the camps are sealed. The Finance Officer will turn over to the unit or detachment commander, currency in proper denominations to cover the partial payments and a separate amount to cover the exchange of personal funds. The unit or detachment commander will complete the certificates as to payments on the original and duplicate copies of Form 366 at the time he obtains the funds. Triplicate copy, on which are shown the amounts to be exchanged for each man, will be retained by him and used for the purpose of paying men the amounts due. The triplicate copy of the payroll will be turned over by the unit or detachment commander to his personnel officer at the earliest opportunity. Partial payments and exchanges of currency will be made to troops immediately after briefing and prior to the further breakdown of units or detachments into unit parties (components of craft loads).

c. Unit and Hospital Funds.

(1) Custodians of Unit or Hospital Funds will turn over funds held in cash to their organizational or other Disbursing Officer who will issue a receipt (WD FD Form 38), or issue a Sterling Check for the amount of the funds.

(2) Repayment will be made by any Disbursing Officer upon surrendering the receipt (WD FD Form 38) or check.

(3) Funds deposited in registered bank accounts in the U.K. will not be withdrawn prior to embarkation. After the completion of the movement, the custodian of the funds will present a Sterling Check covering the balance of the registered bank account to his organizational or other Disbursing Officer who will effect payment in the appropriate currency.

3. Continental Operations.

a. Technical Finance Operating Procedure. Technical Finance operating procedure will be in accordance with "ETO-SOP No. 11 - Finance," Hq ETOUSA, dated 20 April 1944. Disbursing Officers should carry sufficient supplies to operate for sixty (60) days.

b. Army Exchange Funds. Army Exchange Officers will deposit receipts from sales at Army Exchanges with Disbursing Officers.

c. Postal Funds. Postal Officers will turn in funds derived from sale of postal money orders and stamps to Disbursing Officers.

d. Special Service Funds. Stars and Stripes Routemen (enlisted men who are authorized to sell Stars and Stripes) and officers will turn in funds received from sale of Stars and Stripes and Yank, to Disbursing Officers.

e. Fiscal Procedure. See Annex No. 13, G-4 Plan.

f. Procurement Procedure. See Annex No. 13, G-4 Plan.

g. Intelligence Funds. See Par. 25 Section VII of Theater Intelligence Directive #2, dated 27 November 1943, Hq ETO and Appendix 3, Annex No. 8, G-2 Plan.

h. Enemy Funds. Any funds captured or received belonging to the enemy government or any of its departments or agencies which comes into the possession of military personnel will be promptly remitted without deduction to the nearest Disbursing Officer with full information as to the source from which the funds were received.

i. Funds of Deceased Military Personnel. All funds found on deceased military personnel will be turned in to the nearest Disbursing Officer, together with all available information concerning the identity of the individual.

j. Repatriated Prisoners of War. Payment of repatriated Prisoners of War will be in conformity with directive to be issued by SHAEF.

k. Advances of Funds to Civil Affairs Officers. Civil Affairs Officers in need of funds during the early stages of the operation and later in emergency situations, may secure such funds from Disbursing Officers.

l. Troops departing from the Continent. No exchange of currency will be made for troops or civilian personnel when leaving the Continent. The exchange of currency for the appropriate currency of the country which troops or civilian personnel are to enter will be made on arrival at the port of debarkation.

XI. GRAVES REGISTRATION. See Section VI, Page 11, Annex 15 to Operations Plan, OVERLORD, Quartermaster Plan; and Circular 9, Hq TUSA, 1944.

XII. MILITARY POLICE. See Annex 19 to Third U.S. Army Outline Plan, Operation OVERLORD, Provost Marshal Plan.

XIII. POSTAL.

1. General.

a. The delivery and posting of letter mail and packages in concentration Areas, and on the continent will follow the normal procedure. Commanders will warn personnel that all mail must be routed through the U.S. Army Postal Service.

b. Army will establish as soon as practicable adequate facilities for the reception and dispatch of letter mail, packages, air mail, V-mail, Expeditionary Force Messages and postal money orders on the continent.

2. Incoming Mail.

a. Normal mail deliveries cease upon departure of units from the Concentration Areas, or, in the case of units in a concentration status in a Marshalling Area, prior to the time of briefing. Thereafter, mail will be routed to the Postal Regulating Section serving the Embarkation Area through which the unit will pass. Postal Officers of organic or attached APOs and APUs will, in passage through the Marshalling and Embarkation Areas, collect available mail for their units from the Postal Regulating Section for lift to the Continent.

b. On the continent APOs will draw mail from Class I railheads, Postal Regulating Section, or Base Post Office as designated. Regiments and separate organizations will obtain their mail from the APO to which assigned for mail service, irrespective of their military address. Lower units will draw their mail from regimental or battalion postal sections.

c. Mail for individuals listed as "Missing in Action" under the provisions of Circular No. 46, Headquarters ETOUSA, 22 April 1944, will be neither indorsed "Missing in Action" nor returned by unit mail clerks until the expiration of twenty (20) days after such official listing. This interval provides an opportunity for delivery if the individual subsequently rejoins the unit, or for forwarding if a hospitalization report is received. (WD Circular 273, 1943, as amended by Circular 28, 1944).

d. Mail for personnel in hospitals, other than Evacuation and Field Hospitals, will be forwarded through the Army Postal Service as soon as notice of the patient's location is received.

3. Outgoing Mail

a. In the Marshalling Areas, all correspondence will be 100% unit censored and then bagged and forwarded to the Base Censor. No publicity will be given to the fact that more rigid censorship is in effect. All personal telephone, telegraph and cable privileges will be suspended prior to the time that briefing commences. All possible precautions will be taken to prevent the posting of mail through illicit channels. The above procedure will also apply in concentration areas to all troops briefed therein, after the time of briefing.

b. Prior to briefing and after arrival on the continent, all correspondence will be subject to censorship under the current procedure.

c. The APO Mail Address of a unit depends upon its command assignment, regardless of any attachment. The APO address will not be changes unless there is a change in command assignment, regardless of what APO may actually deliver mail to the unit.

d. Personnel will advise correspondents to address them as indicated by the example below:

Grade, name in full, and ASN
Co and Regt or Unit designation
APO No., c/o Postmaster*
New York, N.Y.

* "U.S. Army" will be used in lieu of "c/o Postmaster, New York, N.Y." in addressing mail to military personnel in the same theater.

4. Locator Cards and Directory Service.

a. Each organization will furnish a locator card (WD AGO Form 304-A) of personnel changes to the Postal Officer of the APO assigned and the Base Post Office maintaining the theater locator file within 24 hours after the changes occur.

b. APOs will give prompt directory service to undeliverable mail. Postal Officers will insure that all mail given directory service is properly indorsed, including the unit, date and initials of the directory clerk.

5. Postal Services.

a. Money order, registry and parcel post services, stamps, airmail envelopes and V-mail letters will be available at all APOs. If there is need for a money order clerk during pay periods a request will be made on the postal officer of the APO from which the unit draws its mail. Unit mail clerks may accept money order applications and funds from personnel of their organizations and obtain money orders from the APOs at the time they call for mail.

b. A thirty-day level of reserve stocks of airmail stamps, airmail envelopes and V-mail forms will be maintained by all postal officers.

6. Transportation. Insofar as possible, APOs and unit mail clerks will be provided with separate transportation for mail. Where this is impossible, Class I supply transportation will be used.

XIV. SPECIAL SERVICE

1. All units will institute active special service programs to provide recreation and entertainment for their personnel. Attention is directed to MEMORANDUM, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, dated 1 April 1944 which outlines programs to be followed.

2. In areas where British and American Troops are serving and Special Service activities are established for only American Forces, British personnel will have equal right of attendance. (Four special service companies are provided for Third Army and one will be attached to each Corps to provide entertainment and recreation under the supervision of the Corps Special Service Officer. These companies will serve the Division as well as the Corps Troops).

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 12-Artillery Plan

Register No TUSA 75

ANNEX 12

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ARTILLERY PLAN

(10 May 1944)

PATTON
Comdg

GAFFEY
C of S

WILLIAMS
FA

ARTILLERY PLAN

1. Mission:

Effective artillery support of combat elements under all possible eventualities of battle.

2. Employment and coordination of field artillery:

a. Third Army non-divisional artillery units, other than those attached to corps, will be allotted to corps or held under Third Army control as dictated by the situation. All artillery units to be attached to corps will be moved under army control from ports of debarkation to corps rear boundary or to points designated by army.

b. Units retained under army control will be attached to the 334 FA brigade or the____FA Brigade. These units will be moved under control of their respective Brigade Commanders from ports of debarkation to points designated by army.

c. As field artillery units debark it is tentatively planned to attach to each corps, field artillery units in approximately the following ultimate quantities:

1 - Hq and Hq Btry Corps Arty
1 - FA Observation Bn
4 - Hq and Hq Btry FA Group
5 - FA Bn, 105 How
2 - FA Bn, 4.5" Gun
5 - FA Bn, 155 How
3 - FA Bn, 155 Gun
2 - FA Bn, 8" How

d. Initially 8-inch gun battalions and 240-mm howitzer battalions will be retained under army control subject to assignment to corps as dictated by the situation.

3. Liaison:

Liaison will be established between Corps Artillery Commanders from right to left. Adjacent division artillery headquarters will similarly establish liaison from right to left.

4. Special Radio Nets:

A special army artillery radio net will be available for the dissemination of artillery intelligence and information obtained from the Photo Interpretation Center. A corps artillery radio net will be provided for the same purpose and, in addition, to fire Serenade.

5. Massing of Fire:

The procedure for massing of fires within a corps sector will be as prescribed in Third Army Operations Memorandum No 1, subject: "Serenade".

6. High Performance Aircraft:

High performance aircraft will be available for long-range adjustment of artillery fire upon request through air support channels.

7. Maps:

(See Engineer Plan, Annex No. 5)

8. Gridded Oblique Photographs (Merton):

Will be provided through the Army Photo Center.

9. Photo Interpretation:

A Third Army Photo Center will be established. (See G-2 Plan, Annex No 8) First phase interpretation may be disseminated over the army artillery radio net. Corps artillery will furnish an artillery liaison officer at the Photo Center to facilitate obtaining desired interpretation intelligence.

10. Ammunition Supply:

Basic load as prescribed will be carried by all units. (See Administrative Order No 1, Third U.S. Army)

11. Counterbattery:

Corps Commanders are responsible for the organization of counter-battery measures on their fronts. The Army Commander will effect coordination among the corps.

12. Survey:

Army topographical engineers will establish or extend survey control as far forward as practicable and will advance their control as the action progresses. Survey elements of the corps topographical engineers and the observation battalions will be pushed forward in all situations to check available maps and photomaps and to disseminate information gained, to all artillery units.

13. Antiaircraft, tank and tank destroyer units:

Use of antiaircraft gun battalions, tank battalions and tank destroyer units to reinforce the fires of artillery units will be ordered only when it does not interfere with their primary missions. When this support is ordered, the senior artillery commander will coordinate such fires and assist in furnishing data for firing.

14. Reports:

A daily counterbattery report, closing as of 1800, covering the following, will be required from each corps artillery and each FA brigade.

a. Enemy artillery activities.
b. Enemy dispositions.
c. Counterbattery missions fired.
d. Additions to last complete hostile battery list.
e. Deletions from last complete hostile battery list.
f. General

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 13-G-4 Plan

Register No. TUSA 75.

ANNEX 13

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-4 PLAN

WITH INCLOSURE:-

(Administrative Instructions No. 1 (in 2 Sheets)

(W/Annexes "A" through "P")

(1 May 1944)

ANNEX 13

TO

THIRD ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

G-4 PLAN

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ANNEX 13

TO

THIRD ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

G-4 PLAN

SECTION - I

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Principles of Administration and Supply.

a. The CG, First U.S. Army Group, will control the detailed administrative planning of the Third Army in conformity with the role laid down for that Army by the C-in-C, 21 Army Group.

b. During the initial stages and prior to the establishment of the Communications Zone, the provision of supplies for ground forces and of common items for Air Force and Navy in accordance with the requirements and priorities approved by the C-in-C, 21 Army Group, will be the responsibility of the CG, ETOUSA. Upon the establishment of a Communications Zone, the Commander thereof will be responsible for the provision of supplies for ground forces and common items for the Air Force and Navy.

2. Organization of Communications Zone.

a. Initially there will be no Communications Zone established on the Continent. When an Army rear boundary is designated, a Communications Zone will be established which will include all ports and beaches in operation at that time. It will be attached to 21 Army Group until such time as the First U.S. Army Group is designated to command in the U.S. Sector.

3. Responsibilities.

a. Planning.

(1) The First Army will be responsible for supply planning for the VIII Corps and the 90th Division to include D + 41, and the Third Army will be responsible for supply planning for all other Third Army units to include that date. (See Par. 6d reference Third Army Responsibilities.)

4. Maintenance of Troops.

a. Troops will be maintained primarily over beaches in the opening stages until such time as sufficient ports are captured and developed.

SECTION II

SUPPLY

5. General Plan -- Third Army.

a. In U.K. -- As prescribed in Administrative Order No. 1, Hq. Third Army, dated 14 April 1944, Third Army Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting, and subsequent directives.

b. For Continental Operation:

(1) Until Third Army becomes operative on the continent: In accordance with directives issued by First Army Headquarters.

(2) After Third Army becomes operative on the continent: In accordance with administrative orders and other directives to be issued by this headquarters.

6. Supply Summary.

a. Attached is a copy of Administrative Instructions No. 1 (in chart form) with appropriate annexes which summarize supply and maintenance. Details relating to Administrative Instructions No. 1 are covered in administrative plans issued as annexes to Third Army Outline Plan and in Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting issued by the various staff sections of this headquarters.

b. The object of Administrative Instructions No. 1 is to provide the following:

(1) A basis for supply requirements.

(2) Certain modifications for assault units.

(3) A means of coordination between the various staff sections of participating headquarters.

(4) The supply picture at-a-glance from present stations to time of landing.

c. Column 2, "Individual Reserve", Column 3, "Beach or Unit Reserve," and certain entries under Column 4, "Remarks", will be the responsibility of the commander concerned.

d. Headquarters Third Army will be responsible for the submission of overall supply requirements for daily maintenance and operational reserve for Third Army troops landing on the continent, as follows: (See Par. 3a(1).

(1) Period D to D + 41 -- All Third Army troops (less VIII Corps and 90th Division).

(2) Period after D + 41 -- All Third Army troops unless otherwise directed by higher headquarters.

7. Special Instructions Regarding Supplies and Equipment.

a. Class I supplies drawn from Army or Communications Zone dumps by Air Force units or installations will be broken down as for Army troops or divisions.

b. Civil Affairs.

(1) Civil Affairs supplies will be included in Third Army supply requirements.

(2) Procurement, receipt, storage and distribution of Civil Affairs supplies will be regulated in the same manner as for military supplies. Civil Affairs detachments, except in emergencies, will distribute Civil Affairs supplies from distributing points in the Army or Communications Zone areas.

c. American Red Cross.

(1) Commanders will make provisions to furnish to the American Red Cross the following:

(a) Water from the nearest water point.

(b) Class III supplies, from the nearest Class III supply point.

(c) Maintenance and parts for vehicles and field ranges. Parts for non-standard equipment (such as Hillmans) to be furnished by American Red Cross.

(d) Messing and billeting of American Red Cross personnel will be provided by the organization to which they are attached in accordance with AR 850-75.

d. Additional Equipment: No equipment, individual or organizational, above that authorized will be taken without authority from this headquarters.

SECTION III

EVACUATION

8. Policies and Procedure.

a. Personnel---------- See Medical Plan, Annex No. 16.

b. Motor Vehicles and Weapons---- See Ordnance Plan, Annex No. 14.

c. Other Equipment---------- See appropriate service plans.

9. Burial. -- See G-1 Plan, Annex No. 11.

10. Salvage.

a. Salvage will be held on the continent until such time as ports and base depots are established.

b. Evacuation of salvage from the continent will be coordinated by Supreme Headquarters.

c. Salvage of aircraft is an Air Force responsibility. However, when Allied aircraft crashland, not on airstrips, in either U.S. or British Sectors, the nearest military unit will:

(1) Notify the nearest air strip.

(2) Provide guards for crashed aircraft until arrival of U.S. or British Air Force salvage units.

d. For further details on salvage of all classes of supply, see appropriate service plans.

11. Captured Materiel and Supplies.

a. The looting of captured enemy equipment is forbidden.

b. It is the responsibility of Technical Intelligence Staffs to keep commanders and Intelligence Officers informed of what items of enemy equipment are new items so that immediate reports can be made of their capture. The collection, custody, examination and disposal of such items is under the supervision of Technical Intelligence Staffs.

c. Captured materiel and supplies will be collected in dumps in Corps and division areas and held under supervision of the area commander who will be responsible for guarding dumps until evacuated or taken over by the next higher headquarters.

d. Reports will be submitted under conditions outlined in paragraph 30.

12. Prisoners of War.

a. See G-1 Plan, Annex No. 11

SECTION IV

TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC

13. Railroads.

a. Operation and control of railroads is a responsibility of the Transportation Service of the Communications Zone.

14. Motor Transportation.
a. Army motor transportation will be pooled and operated by the G-4 Transportation Section, Third Army, when that section becomes operative on the continent.

15. Motor Movements and Traffic Control.
a. Road movement will be controlled as follows:
(1) In Army Area -- By Army Headquarters.
(2) In Communications Zone -- By Communications Zone Headquarters.
(3) Major moves involving more than one of the above areas will be coordinated by the next higher headquarters.
b. On the continent all traffic will keep to the right.
c. British route sign system will be used (Cir. #26, Section I, ETO, 12 March 1944.
d. Full details will be covered in a directive "Traffic Regulations and Control for Continental Operations", to be published by this headquarters.

16. Allocation of Shipping.
a. Allocated on the basis of troop priority lists prepared by major field force commanders.

17. Construction and Maintenance of Routes.
a. Reconstruction or new construction and maintenance of railroad right-of-way (permanent way) is a Communications Zone responsibility.
b. Construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, and inland waterways are the area responsibilities of Army and Communications Zone commanders.
c. Tactical and Bailey bridges will be replaced by fixed two-way bridges as soon as possible on roads which are a permanent part of the road net. The bridging will then be released for re-use in forward areas or returned to depots.
d. Roads which will be part of the permanent road net will be brought to final capacity as soon as the tactical and supply situations permit.
e. For details, see Annex No. 5, Engineer Plan.

SECTION V

SERVICE UNITS

18. Phasing of Service Troops.
a. As phased on Troop Priority List, Annex No. 3.

SECTION VI

CONSTRUCTION

19. General. -- See Engineer Plan, Annex No. 5.

20. Rehabilitation of Civil Installations.
a. Commanders will be prepared to render assistance in the provision of water for drinking and cooking for civilians in their areas and for the rehabilitation of any other civilian installation which will aid the military effort.

21. Shelter.
a. Maximum use to be made of existing shelter even at the cost of administrative inconvenience. Every effort will be made to obtain in existing buildings at least one-third of the total shelter required for hospitals.
b. For details, see Engineer Plan, Annex No. 5, and G-1 Plan, Annex No. 11.

SECTION VII

MISCELLANEOUS

22. Surplus Baggage.
a. Baggage in excess of that authorized to accompany individuals will be stored in UK and shipped by SOS ETO when requested through higher headquarters by appropriate Army Headquarters.

23. Procurement Policies and Procedure.
a. Scope - Procurement of all supplies, equipment, facilities, and services by agents and agencies of Third Army in occupied and liberated territories, other than the procurement of civilian labor and real estate, will be accomplished in accordance with ETO Procurement Regulations, (SOP No. 10), 1 April 1944, and the forms illustrated therein.
b. Policy - The policies of the Supreme Allied Commander, as summarized in Section II, ETO Procurement Regulations, will be adhered to. In addition, responsibility will lie with all appointed procurement personnel of Third Army to:
(1) Immediately secure supplies and services necessary to accomplishment of tactical mission.
(2) Insure prompt cash payment for supplies and services where feasible.
(3) Insure prompt consideration and early payment for items for which payment is not made at time of delivery.
c. Appointment of Purchasing and Contracting Officers.
(1) Commanders of corps and divisions, and the Chiefs of supply Services, Third Army, charged with procurement functions, will secure appointment of sufficient Purchasing and Contracting officers to insure compliance with procurement policies set forth in paragraph b, above. In making such appointments, the commander should bear in mind desirability of holding to minimum the number who will thus be entrusted with government funds.
(2) Purchasing and Contracting personnel will be appointed by special orders in conformity with Section III C, ETO Procurement regulations cited above.
(3) Purchasing and Contracting officers will, in addition, be appointed Class "A" agents to appropriate Finance Disbursing Officers from whom they will obtain advances of cash in order that as many purchases as possible may be paid for at time of delivery. The amount which a finance officer will advance such Class "A" agents, at any one time, should not ordinarily exceed $1,000. Prior to the establishment of Army rear boundary, the amount of individual transactions will not be limited. After the establishment of an Army rear boundary, individual transactions exceeding $100 and up to $1,000 will be subject to prior approval of appointing headquarters. Individual transactions over $1000 will require direct approval of the General Purchasing Agent.
d. Forms - An initial supply of ETO Procurement Regulations will be distributed automatically to each corps and division. Additional copies together with procurement forms will be requisitioned by appointing headquarters direct from Adjutant General, ETOUSA. Minimum initial requirements per Purchasing and Contracting officer are; 1 Copy, Regulations; 2 pads, Local Procurement vouchers; 2 pads, Requisition Receipts; 2 pads, Order Forms; 1 pad, Procurement Action Reports.
e. Sub-allotment of Funds.
(1) Funds already sub-allotted in open amounts within the UK will remain available to corps and divisions within combat zone. Upon departure for the Continent, the L 5/0/0 ($20.00) limitation on purchases will no longer apply.
(2) Headquarters appointing Purchasing and Contracting officers in accordance with paragraph c(3), above, will extract obligations from Procurement Action Reports made by Purchasing and Contracting personnel. Obligations will be included in Monthly Obligation Reports, letter form, "Report of Obligations by Appropriations and Sub-Appropriations", to be submitted to this headquarters, attention Finance Officer. Reports will reach this headquarters not later than the 6th day of the month.

24. Claims.
a. All claims arising from procurement will be handled in accordance with ETO Procurement Regulations.
b. Claims other than those defined in paragraph 24a, will be handled in accordance with ETO SOP No. 19. (To be distributed at early date.)

25. Civilian Labor.
a. Detailed information for conditions for and methods of employment of civilian labor will be incorporated in "Labor Regulations", Hq. ETOUSA (to be made available to all concerned at a later date.)

26. Real Estate.
a. See Engineer Plan, Annex 5.

27. Property Accountability and Responsibility.
a. Paragraph 565, Chapter 10, FM 100-10, 15 November 1943, as quoted below will apply:
"In the combat zone no formal accounting for supplies is required. When supplies are issued to troops or are transferred from one service to another the receiving officer receipts for the supplies with a notation showing the organization or the work for which the supplies are required. No further formal accounting for supplies is necessary from the receiving officer. The same care is taken of all equipment, supplies, and material, and the same economy in their use is observed as in cases where a formal accounting is required. All commanders are charged with insuring that neither men nor organizations of their commands waste or misuse supplies, material, and equipment furnished to them, or accumulate an unauthorized surplus thereof. Organizations or individuals demanding much in excess of the average amounts required by other like units under similar conditions are investigated and appropriate action taken."

28. Conservation and Protection of Equipment and Supplies.
a. Commanders and services concerned will be responsible for the conservation of all equipment and supplies and the protection of supply installations against sabotage and pilferage.

29. Civil Affairs.
a. See Civil Affairs Plan, Annex No. 10.

30. Reports.
a. G-4 (S-4 from Army troops) Periodic Reports, Report of Losses and Captured Materiel, and other reports as deemed necessary will be called for as required.

Incl.
Admin. Instr. No. 1 (Ref. No. 303a)
w/Annexes "A" thru "P".

INCLOSURE TO ANNEX 13

OF

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

G-4 PLAN

(1 May 1944)

Administrative Instructions No. 1
(In chart form, w/annexes "A" through "P")

ANNEXES

TO

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1

"PHASING OF MAINTENANCE"

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ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1

SUMMARY OF PHASING OF MAINTENANCE
INCLUDES INITIAL REQUIREMENTS, SUBSEQUENT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY - ALL CLASSES
EXCEPT AIR CORPS, NAVY, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY RESTRICTED

BASED ON LANDING OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES THROUGH PORTS AND/OR BEACHES UNTIL MAJOR PORTS ARE IN OPERATION

(1) CLASS OF SUPPLY	(2) INDIVIDUAL RESERVE (Carried on individual or on vehicle.)	(3) BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE (Carried on unit transportation or to accompany unit)	(4) REMARKS	(5) LEVELS TO BE BUILT UP GRADUALLY AND MAINTAINED
CLASS I RATIONS QUARTERMASTER	(a) Carried on each individual: 1 "D" ration) For subsistence upon landing. Not 1 "K" ration) to be consumed on voyage. 7-day free-issue PX items to each individual as follows: 1 Blade, safety razor. 10 Pkgs. Cigarettes. 2-oz. Tobacco, pipe (only if desired). 280 ea. matches, safety 7 ea. sticks gum, chewing. Indiv. to carry one bottle Halazone tablets. Kits, Prophylactic, Mechanical -- 3. (b) All above items issued in marshalling area. (c) Responsibility: Unit commander. (d) Sea voyage rations will be furnished by Navy. (through SOS).	(a) Carried by each unit: 1 "C" ration) For consumption after landing, un- 2 "K" ration) til other means are provided. (Supplement of 1/3 "D" to be issued as a part of each "C" and each "K".) 15-day supply of condiments. (Securely and compactly packed by unit.) (b) Indicated Medical units will carry following additional unit reserve for patients, pending issue from Army Supply Points: *Div Med Bns (All) 8 ea hospital supplement packs (200 rations) *Evac Hospitals 500 ea "5-in-1" rations. 20 ea hospital supplement packs (500 rations) *Carried on unit vehicles or on same lift. (c) Draw above items (par. (a) & (b) at home stations. To be landed and kept with the unit. Responsibility: Unit commander. (d) All above items will be increased by a safety factor of 30%. (e) Reconstitution of unit reserve will be a command decision.	(a) Maintenance from D/42 will be provided by SOS on automatic basis either by daily shipments from UK or through Com Z establishments on continent. (b) Fresh meat, fresh bread, butter, cheese and fresh vegetables will be issued as soon after D/30 as available. (c) Operational reserve will include, in addition to rations for force, such items as halazone tablets, hospital supplement packs, PX Issue Kits, POW and civilian labor requirements, condiments, etc. (ANNEX "B" (d) Safety factor of 30% will be applied to all shipments of maintenance and reserve. (e) Provisions will be made to include Civil Affairs and Red Cross requirements. (f) Resupply of units on far shore will be from supply points according to circumstances then existing. (g) All packages landed across beaches will be amphibiously packed. (h) Paulins for outside storage -- extra paulins will be shipped by SOS automatically on same craft with supplies to be stored in the open.	(a) Seven days operational reserve necessary for distribution purposes within the Army area for troops ashore will be gradually built up as soon as practicable within limitations of FUSAG tonnage allocations. (For details -- see Annexes "A" and "B").
CLASS II & IV QUARTERMASTER Includes individual clothing and equipment; organizational clothing and equipment; expendable supplies; pest control material.	(a) One (1) 2-oz. can Insecticide Powder Four (4) ea. 1½-oz. heat candles. Normally issued in marshalling area but may be issued at home station. Responsibility: Unit commander. (b) Individual clothing and equipment -- how worn and carried ---- (See Annex "C"). (c) QM Service Units will be equipped with packboards. one (1) per EM. Will be worn on embarkation.	(a) Non-tariff shoes: 1 pr shoes, service, for each EM requiring non-tariff size will be carried by each unit. (b) Sets of individual clothing and equipment as follows: (See Annex "D".) Division QMs 100 sets. Hospital units 50 sets (for patients). Hospital units 3½% Nurses C & E Non-divisional units 3½%, based on unit strength. (c) Medals will be carried as shown in Annex "E" (d) Expendable items: Units will carry: (1) 30-day minimum essential stationery and office supplies. (2) 30-day supply field range parts (Peavy Kits). (3) 30-day supply lantern parts (if lanterns are authorized). (4) 30-day supply POL repair parts. (Annex "F".) (5) 10-day supply miscellaneous items (Annex "F").	(a) Protective clothing will be worn as indicated in Annex "C". (b) Officers' clothing (essential items) will be issued gratuitously from Army Supply Points until approximately D/45 at which time SOS sales stores will be in operation. (c) Sea voyage automatic issues prior to embarkation area: (Turn in on debarkation): 1 lifebelt per individual; 2 vomit bags per individual; 1 ea blanket, wool, OD. (d) Units designated by this headquarters as assault troops will place meat can, knife and fork in blanket roll or duffle bag. Spoon will be carried in the pack. An additional, complete set of utensils will be issued to these troops at home stations and will be left aboard the vessel upon debarkation. (e) Organizational equipment which cannot be moved with organizations in the assault will remain the property of the organization and will be shipped later in accordance with prearranged schedules. (f) All supplies will be amphibiously packed. (g) Paulins for outside storage -- extra paulins will be shipped by SOS automatically on same craft with supplies to be stored in the open. (h) Maintenance from D/42 will be provided by SOS on automatic basis either by daily shipments from UK or through Com Z establishments on continent. (i) Resupply of units on far shore will be from supply points according to circumstances then existing.	(a) Seven days operational reserve necessary for distribution purposes within the Army area for troops ashore will be gradually built up as soon as practicable within limitations of FUSAG tonnage allocations. (b) Operational reserve to consist of beach and follow-up maintenance sets and POL repair parts. For details see Annex "G".
CLASS II & IV MEDICAL	As prescribed by T/E, T/BA, and current allowances of expendable items; plus the following special articles issued to individuals in marshalling area prior to embarkation: Motion Sickness Prevention Capsules -- Basis of ten per individual. (Complete printed instructions for administration of these capsules to be furnished to commanding officers of troops by SOS at that time.)	(a) All units will carry equipment and supplies as prescribed by current T/E or T/BA. (b) Two day supply of essential medical items in addition to normal unit supply - to accompany units designated as assault units. For details see Annex "H". (c) Thirty days supply of Medical blank forms and stationery. (d) Biologicals - Three days supply of Tetanus Toxoid will be carried by all medical components. Tetanus Antitoxin will be stocked by hospital units for prophylactic use for members of the British Services treated in U.S. Army Hospitals in compliance with Circular No. 63, Office of the Chief Surgeon, 3 November 1942.	(a) For units designated by this headquarters as assault units, items of equipment as listed in Annex "H", packed as a unit and carried on each LST in the assault phase of operation until 100 units have been landed. Responsibility for unloading rests with troops on the far shore. (b) (1) "D" Type Medical Maintenance Units (Medical and Surgical) to be provided medical depot companies or other medical supply installations on far shore during initial phases of operation. Basis: Medical supply for 5,000 men for fifteen days. (2) "A" Type Medical Maintenance Units to be provided medical depot companies or other medical supply installations on the far shore subsequent to initial phases of the operation. Basis: Build-up of reserve and medical supply for 10,000 men for thirty days. (Requirements: Responsibility of Surgeon, TUSA). (c) Whole blood to be provided beginning with initial operation. Distribution through normal medical supply channels. Transportation of whole blood to be given highest priority. (d) Medical maintenance supplies and equipment required for shipment to continent prior to D/60 to be amphibiously packed to withstand water damage and ninety days open storage.	Operational Level: Class II -- 10% reserve Class II items based on total strength of forces ashore to be maintained in Army medical depot installations. (Requirements: Responsibility of Surgeon, TUSA.) Class IV -- Seven day reserve of Class IV in Army medical depots. (Requirements: Responsibility of Surgeon, TUSA). Blank forms and stationery: Thirty day reserve in Army medical depots. (Requirements: Responsibility of Surgeon, TUSA).
CLASS II & IV SIGNAL	T/BA or T/E modified as necessary for the operation.	(a) Unit fully equipped prior to departure from the home station with T/E equipment. T/E items required and not available in UK will be secured from units not alerted, as designated by CG ETOUSA. (b) Signal equipment will be augmented with special items and thirty (30) days of selected expendable items and spare parts. Further details to be determined by Signal Officer of Third Army.	(a) Replacement of controlled signal equipment at the home station will be in accordance with Signal Supply Instruction No. 24, revised 20 March 1944. (b) Signal Salvage and Repair is covered by Third Army Administrative Order No. 1, dated 14 April 1944. (Signal Annex). (c) All supplies landed over the beaches to be amphibiously packed. (d) All radio equipment and mechanical wire equipment landed over beaches will be waterproofed.	(a) Thirty day level of expendable and maintenance items. (Requirements: Responsibility of Signal Officer, TUSA). (b) Seven days of special project material provided in TUSA plan. Details to be determined by the Signal O., TUSA.)

(1) CLASS OF SUPPLY	(2) INDIVIDUAL RESERVE (Carried on individual or on vehicle)	(3) BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE (Carried on unit transportation or to accompany unit)	(4) REMARKS	(5) LEVELS TO BE BUILT UP GRADUALLY AND MAINTAINED
CLASS II & IV ENGINEER (General)	Initial Requirements: Class II items as prescribed by T/O&E.	Initial Requirements: (1) Unit to carry 100% Class II T/O&E organizational equipment. (2) Units to carry 1st and 2nd echelon Engineer repair parts sets; maintenance companies to carry 3d echelon repair parts sets. (3) Class IV supplies will accompany units in quantities within limits of available transportation. (4) Special Engineer equipment required for specific forecastable missions as directed by Army may accompany certain Engineer units. Maintenance Requirements: Units will carry a 30-day reserve of T/O&E Engineer Class II expendable items, less explosives, in addition to T/O&E.	(1) Requirements for Class II supplies to be submitted by TUSA Engineer to ETO, based logistically on the number of troops to be supported on the continent from day to day. These tonnages will be broken down into general groupings and shipment requested according to a priority schedule. (2) Requirements for Class IV supplies to be submitted by Engineer TUSA in complete details to ETO by item and by day. These requirements to be broken down into specific project requirements to be laid down on specific days for each project. These lists will not include items intended for replacement of T/O&E equipment or supplies. (3) Depot stocks of spare parts to be requisitioned from ETO by TUSA Engineer for shipment to the continent based on number of each type of Engineer equipment to be supported. (4) Requirements for explosives are included in the project requirements outline in paragraph (2) above. (5) Class II and IV Engineer supplies to be stocked in Army depots for Air Force as required.	(a) Class II Level of Supply: (1) Levels for Class II items will be established at 100% of total expendable and 25% of total non-expendable items authorized for all units on the continent from day to day. These levels will be maintained as the maximum level of supply. (Approx. seven days). (b) Class IV supplies will be requested for lay-down at the ports of debarkation 13 days prior to estimated using date. Issues will be made as required over a specified time. No additional levels for this class of supply will be maintained. (c) Levels of 1st, 2nd, and 3d echelon repair parts sets will be established at a specified number of each for each type of Engineer equipment on the continent under Third Army. Army Depot will maintain this level by requisition on CZ. (d) No levels of explosives will be established other than that included in paragraph (b) above.
Mines	None.	Units to carry 100% of T/O&E allowances of mines.	Requirements for mines will be submitted to ETO through Ordnance Section, TUSA. These requirements to be based on terrain studies and forseeable operations over a specified time and area.	Levels — To be built up at a rate of 32 long tons per day to reach a maximum of 880 long tons.
Maps	Initial Requirements: (1) Unit Commanders will make the necessary distribution of the maps received. Basis shown under Unit Reserve. Issued at marshalling area prior to embarkation.	Initial requirements and reserve of units: Full initial issue of maps as prescribed in paragraph 42, Change 1, dated 6 January 1941 to FM 30-20, with the following modifications. (1) Initial allowance of air maps or charts will be made to Corps and Divisions. (2) Initial allowance of road maps will be based on 50% to 75% of vehicle strength. (3) Initial issue of large scale maps, 1/25,000 or larger, will be on the basis of one (1) set per officer to units with assault missions, plus a 50% additional issue per headquarters, to include companies. NOTE: All reserve or replacement maps will be carried by Advance Depots in assault areas. Issued at marshalling area prior to embarkation.	100% reserve will be stocked by Army. -- 25% in Advance Depots (one (1) per Corps) and 75% in Army Base Depots.	Levels will be maintained at Advance Depots as prescribed by the Army Engineer. NOTE: Map requirements will continually change with change in operating area and nature of tactical situation.
CLASS II CHEMICAL WARFARE	With individual, or as indicated: 1 mask, gas, lightweight, or assault. 4 eyeshields (2 in carrier; 2 in unit supply) 1 Ointment, protective, tube (in carrier) 1 Ointment, BAL, tube (in carrier) 1 Set, anti-dim (in carrier) 2 Sleeves, gas detector (in carrier) 2 Covers, protective (QM Item) (1 in carrier; 1 in pack or bag). 1 Impregnate, shoe, can (Carried in unit supply; available for application in marshalling area). 1 Respirator, dust (Sig. C., TD, and Armd Units). One (1) set of protective clothing (QM Item), as listed below, carried in unit supply to marshalling area for donning at latest practicable date: (a) 1 shirt, flannel, OD, protective, and 1 trousers (pr), wool, OD, protective; or 1 Suit, one-piece, HBT, protective; or 1 Jacket, HBT, protective, and 1 Trousers (pr), HBT, protective. (b)*1 drawers (pr), cotton, protective. (c)*1 undershirt, cotton, protective. (d) 1 socks (pr), wool, light, protective. (e) 1 Leggings (pr), dismounted, canvas, protective. (f)*1 Hood, wool, protective. (g)*1 Gloves (pr), cotton, protective. * Worn only if directed.	Chemical Mortar Battalions will carry 15 days maintenance of chemical mortars and chemical mortar accessories in unit supply. Other units -- None, except organizational equipment as shown in Annex "I".	(a) Troops making an amphibious assault will be issued kits, waterproofing, on the basis of one per mask, gas, lightweight, if assault gas masks are not available. (b) Day of Supply is 0.25 lbs. per man.	Operational Reserve is seven (7) days of supply. (Requirements: Responsibility of Chemical Officer, TUSA). Stock levels of authorized maintenance and reserves of all T/E equipment will be carried by SOS depots in UK.
CLASS II & IV ORDNANCE (Major Items - Vehicles and Weapons)	Normal T/BA or T/E allowance or Special List of Equipment, as modified to permit loading.	(a) No replacement vehicles or weapons will be carried by other than ordnance units. (b) Replacement vehicles and weapons will be carried by non-divisional ordnance maintenance and depot companies in quantities and types to be established by CG, TUSA. Replacement major items will be supplied by CG, SOS ETOUSA, to appropriate units upon request of CG, TUSA. Divisional ordnance units will carry replacement major items as set out in appropriate SNL, supplemented, as necessary, by additional items which will be authorized by CG, TUSA.	(a)(1)Within seven (7) days after alert, all units will submit a Special Status of Equipment Report to Army Ordnance Officer, Shortages will be filled automatically by SOS in accordance with Army priorities. (2) Shortages in T/BA, T/E or SL of E items not listed in Status Report and controlled supplies will be obtained by submitting immediate action requisition, in five (5) copies, to Army Ordnance Officer. Requisitions will accompany Special Status Report mentioned in (a)(1). (3) Deficiencies in authorized divisional major item replacement loads will be obtained by submitting an immediate action requisition, in five copies, to Army Ordnance Officer. This requisition will accompany lists and requisitions mentioned in (a)(1) and (2).	A total of approximately 500 replacement vehicles will be allotted to ordnance maintenance and depot companies. This figure represents a maintenance factor of 5.5% per month based on the vehicles in the hands of Third Army units on the continent, for 13 days plus a 7-day reserve. Upon instructions of CG, TUSA, vehicles moved with ordnance maintenance companies will be transferred to replacement pools maintained by ordnance

(1) CLASS OF SUPPLY	(2) INDIVIDUAL RESERVE (Carried on individual or on vehicle)	(3) BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE (Carried on unit transportation or to accompany unit)	(4) REMARKS	(5) LEVELS TO BE BUILT UP GRADUALLY AND MAINTAINED
CLASS II & IV ORDNANCE (Major Items - Vehicles and Weapons) (Continued)	REMARKS (Continued) (From Column 4) (h) All replacement vehicles and towed artillery to be landed over beaches will be waterproofed by the Base Section concerned. (i) (1) Upon being initially alerted, unit commanders will prepare, in duplicate, list of vehicles and artillery to be waterproofed. A separate list is required for each home station, indicating the quantity of each type item to be waterproofed in that area. Name, location and telephone number of responsible Supply Officer will appear on the list. Lists will be delivered within 24 hours of receipt of alert order to Army Ordnance Officer who will approve and forward lists to Chief Ordnance Officer, SOS, APO 871. (2) Responsible Supply Officer will be notified by Base Section Ordnance Officer where and when waterproofing material is available, and unit transportation will be sent for the material. (3) Full-tracked armored vehicles will be reported as above, but on separate lists. Liaison Officer, representing Chief Ordnance Officer, SOS, will contact organization commanders, who will release vehicles to special crews upon call. Special crews furnished by SOS will mount all waterproofing shrouds, Material for waterproofing this class of vehicle will be delivered to unit home station by SOS. (j) Waterproofing will be phased as follows: (1) Wheeled and half-track vehicles: (a) Home Station: Phase one. (b) Marshalling Area: Phase two and Army inspection. (c) Aboard craft: Phase three and final unit inspection. (2) Full-tracked armored vehicles: (a) Home Station: Installation of shrouds (by SOS) and phase one (by crew). (b) Marshalling Area (or home station if water tank available): Test wade. (c) Quayside: Refuel, final seal and Army inspection. (3) Towed Artillery: (a) Home Station: Complete waterproofing. (b) Marshalling Area: Army inspection. (k) Vehicles which cannot be shipped in assault will remain property of organization and will be shipped in accordance with prearranged schedules; such vehicles will be accompanied by drivers and administrative personnel.		(4) Supplemental loads or replacement items, when authorized Divisions, will be issued automatically by Hq. SOS, upon request of C.G. TUSA. (b) Certain units, which will be notified by SOS 5 days prior to movement, will be required to ship vehicles without loads. Information will be furnished such units as to number and types of vehicles to be so shipped and disposition of displaced loads. (c) Certain units, which will be notified by SOS 3 days prior to shipment, will be required to ship vehicles with cover and bows removed and reduced to their extreme cut-down height. These units will be advised as to number and types of vehicles to be so shipped. Bows and tarps removed from these vehicles will be securely fastened on vehicles in most convenient place. (d) Divisions are responsible that major items reserves are so moved as to be available promptly on the far shore. (e) Special tool sets will be allotted to ordnance maintenance companies by special allocation, of CG, TUSA. (f) Responsibility for waterproofing will rest with the unit commander concerned. All waterproofing of organic vehicles will be subject to inspection by Army. (g) Waterproofing, to withstand salt water to a depth of 3' - 6", will be accomplished in those organizations designated by CG, TUSA. (See continuation of REMARKS in column to the left.)	depot companies. Replacement vehicles required by Army depots after D/41 will be obtained from Com Z through normal procedure.
(Cleaning & Preserving Materials)	See Note under Unit Reserve (Column 3).	Fifteen (15) days' supply of Cleaning & Preserving materials, based on chart (Annex "J") will be carried by units other than Ordnance, and appropriate items will be broken down to individuals prior to embarkation. Ordnance units will carry a maximum of ten (10) days' supply based on C & P Load Chart (Annex "J") for major items shown in basic load basis furnished by CG, TUSA (Annex "K").	Loads of C & P will be obtained by unit submitting requisition to SOS issue depots when alerted.	
(Vehicle and Weapons Spare Parts and Accessories)	(a) Organizational spare parts and accessories for hand and shoulder weapons normally carried on the individual. (b) Each combat vehicle will carry a complete set of vehicular accessories and spare parts as set out in pertinent SNL. All other vehicles will carry vehicular accessories as set out in pertinent SNL and a complete first echelon spare parts kit (Annex "L"). (c) One kit, dewaterproofing, WHT, (contents listed in Annex "M") will be issued automatically in the marshalling area by the Base Section Commander for each vehicle which has been waterproofed, inspected and tested.	(a) All units will carry complete sets of authorized spare parts and accessories for weapons and second echelon spare parts for vehicles, as authorized in lists prepared by CG, TUSA. (b) Beach packs (See Annex "N" for contents) will be carried by organizations designated by CG, TUSA. When authorized, these packs will be so carried as to be immediately available to unit mechanics for accomplishing repairs to items becoming unserviceable, and for use as replenishment of expended parts, accessories and C&P carried on individuals. (c) Basic Loads of spare parts and accessories for ordnance units will be as shown below: (1) Division Ordnance Companies -- In accordance with appropriate SNL. (2) Corps and Army Maintenance Companies -- Fifteen (15) days' supply based on addenda to SNL's for the major items supported. (See par.(g) under REMARKS.) (3) Army Depot Companies -- Fifteen (15) days supply based on addenda to SNL's for the major items supported, except companies designated as main Army Depots by CG, TUSA, which will carry thirty (30) days supply. (See par. g under REMARKS)	(a) Upon alert, shortages in organizational spare parts and accessories and second echelon vehicle spare parts will be obtained by submitting immediate action requisition to designated SOS depot. All unfilled portions of outstanding requisitions will be cancelled when units are alerted. (b) When authorized, beach packs will be supplied automatically by SOS in accordance with Army allocations. (c) Beach packs will not be opened on near shore. However, the contents of these packs should be considered as on hand by units specifically designated to carry them, and requirements reduced accordingly when submitting requisitions for shortages of second echelon spare parts. (d) Dewaterproofing is the responsibility of the unit commander under Army supervision until the Army rear boundary has been established, at which time it becomes the responsibility of the Communications Zone. (e) Upon being alerted, Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies will immediately submit immediate action requisitions, in five (5) copies, shortages in basic loads to Chief Ordnance Officer, SOS, through Army Ordnance Officer. All unfilled portions of outstanding requisitions will be cancelled when units are alerted. (f) It is expected that Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies will be able to carry full basic loads by using T/E vehicles and attached replacement vehicles. (g) Maintenance (other than Divisional) and Depot Companies will be furnished information by CG, TUSA, as to quantities of major items to be considered as being supported for the purpose of computing basic loads of spare parts and accessories.	Thirteen (13) days' maintenance, plus seven (7) days' reserve will be prerequisitioned on SOS by Cg, TUSA, to be phased in accordance with tonnage allocations. C&P requirements of Army Depots after D/41 will be obtained through normal requisition procedure on Com Z. Thirteen (13) days' maintenance, plus seven (7) days' reserve based on total number of major items in Third Army units on the continent will be prerequisitioned on SOS by CG, TUSA, to phased in accordance with tonnage allocations. Requirements for spare parts and accessories after D/41 will be obtained by normal requisition procedure on Com Z.
CLASS III-QUARTERMASTER Motor fuel, lubricants, and diesel fuel for ground vehicles and Engineer equipment.	(a) Vehicular tanks (except motorcycle tanks) -- filled. Motorcycle tanks -- 1/3 filled. (b) All grease guns filled. (c) Each carburetor vehicle (except motorcycles) will be equipped with one (1) flexible nozzle and one (1) nozzle adapter (truncated funnel) prior to movement from home station. (d) Lubricants of proper grade: Motorcycles 1 qt. Other wheeled vehicles 5 qts. Half and full tracked vehicles Complete oil change.	(a) Extra cans to be drawn from SOS depot and filled prior to departure from home station: Vehicles carry the following: ½-ton and ¾-ton C&R . . . . . 2 cans. ¾-ton to 1½-ton trks . . . . . 5 cans. Trks 2½-ton . . . . . 10 cans. Trks over 2½-ton . . . . .) Fuel for 150 addi- Full-track vehicles . . . . .) tional operational Diesel burning vehicles . . . . .) miles (based on unit experience. Half-track vehicles . . . . . 15 cans. DUKWS . . . . . 20 cans. (b) Sufficient extra fuel will be carried to complete filling of motorcycle tanks after debarkation. (c) Three (3) day operational requirements of POL and solid fuels for all equipment other than vehicles will be carried by organizations.	(a) Basis for maintenance and reserve: Fifty (50) operational miles per day. A safety factor of 30% is added to adjust for combat losses, miscellaneous equipment and other contingencies. (See Annex "O"). (b) Solid Fuels: Initially, small shipments of coal and coke from UK for hospital needs on basis of 5 lbs per day per hospital bed. Later, to be furnished by SOS at continental ports. (Sacked). (c) Method of shipment: All packaged, unless SOS has developed complete and adequate bulk storage and canning facilities on the continent. (d) Maintenance from D/42 by SOS on automatic basis either by daily shipments from UK or through Com Zone establishments on continent. (e) Resupply of units on far shore will be from supply points according to circumstances then existing.	(a) Seven days operational reserve necessary for distribution purposes within the Army area for troops ashore will be gradually built up as soon as practicable within limitations of FUSAG tonnage allocations. (b) For factors used in planning, see Annex "O".

(1) CLASS OF SUPPLY	(2) INDIVIDUAL RESERVE (Carried on individual or on vehicle)	(3) BEACH OR UNIT RESERVE (Carried on unit transportation or to accompany unit)	(4) REMARKS	(5) LEVELS TO BE BUILT UP GRADUALLY AND MAINTAINED
CLASS V AMMUNITION (Except Air Force) ORDNANCE	Carried on individuals, on prime movers, on self-propelled weapons, and their accompanying vehicles, as prescribed by TUSA basic load charts. Under circumstances requiring additional ammunition to be carried on the above, unit commanders may distribute as they deem advisable a portion of ammunition ordinarily carried on unit trains. Unit commanders may similarly direct to be carried on the above any given portion of the extra fuzes and primers prescribed by basic load charts.	Carried on unit trains as prescribed by TUSA basic load charts -- Annex "P". In instances in which unit commanders increase the individual reserves as authorized in column 2, the unit reserves will necessarily be decreased by similar quantities. That portion of prescribed basic load which cannot be carried by unit, in the event of reduced transportation, will be supplied with first day's maintenance, or as soon thereafter as practicable.	(1) Principle of ammunition resupply for units will be maintenance of basic loads. Unit commanders will be responsible that these are maintained at all times. Amounts in excess of basic loads may be carried only upon authorization by Corps or Army Commanders. Procedure to be followed in resupply will be as prescribed in Ordnance Annex to Administrative Order No. 1, TUSA, dated 14 April 1944. (2) All medium and heavy artillery units will carry an overage of primers and fuzes, as prescribed in basic load charts. (3) Toxic gas will not be employed and offensive gas ammunition will not be taken overseas nor moved into or through beaches until so ordered by the Supreme Commander. Full scales of gas offensive equipment will be provided and held in UK until gas warfare begins. All units will prepare and keep under review plans for retaliatory action if and when gas warfare begins. (4) Supply from the UK to the continent to meet estimated combat expenditures and to build up prescribed reserves will be automatic, based on pre-scheduled requisitions. (5) Unit of Fire will be as prescribed in Letter, Hq. ETOUSA, 471/MGC dated 10 Dec. 1943.	(1) An operational reserve of 7 units of fire for distribution purposes within the Army area for troops ashore will be gradually built up as soon as practicable within limitations of FUSAG tonnage allocations. (2) Basis for computation: An estimated expenditure rate of 1/3 unit of fire per day for all weapons ashore.
CHEMICAL WARFARE	Basic Load (Annex "P")	All units will carry basic loads as indicated in Annex "P".	(a) Daily Maintenance Factor is 1/3 unit of fire. (b) Full scales of gas offensive ammunition will be immediately available in the UK. It will not be taken overseas except on orders of higher authority.	Same as Ord. Class V.
WATER	Each individual will debark with at least one full canteen. Each vehicle radiator filled. At least one 5-gal. Water can per vehicle (except kitchen vehicles, which will carry at least four (4) 5-gallon water cans each.)	T/E water purification equipment to be landed with Engineer units and water points to be established as soon as practical.	Existing water supply and distribution to be utilized to maximum extent possible. Construction of new facilities or extensive rehabilitation of existing water supply facilities will be effected only upon authority from Army headquarters.	

OFFICIAL:

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By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

HUGH J. GAFFEY,
Major General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

CLASS I MAINTENANCE ITEMS BY TYPES FOR PERIOD D ≠ 29 THROUGH D ≠ 41
(All items to be increased by 30% Safety Factor)

ARRIVAL DATES	RATIONS: "B" (W/condiments) % of Strength	RATIONS: 5-in-1 (For Hospitals) % of Strength	RATIONS: 10-in-1 % of Strength	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: "C" % of Strength	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: "K" % of Strength	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: "C" FOR PW AND CIVIL LA OR No. of rations.	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: "D" % of Strength	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: HOSPITAL SUPPLEMENT PACK % of Strength	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: RAC KITS % of Strength	RATION SUPPLEMENTS: HEAT UNITS (3 oz.) % of Strength
D ≠ 29		8	60	20	20	1000	20	8	100	27.2
D ≠ 30		8	60	20	20	1000	20	8	100	27.2
D ≠ 31		8	60	20	20	1000	20	8	100	27.2
D ≠ 32		8	60	20	20	1000	20	8	100	27.2
D ≠ 33		8	60	20	20	1000	20	8	100	27.2
D ≠ 34	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 35	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 36	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 37	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 38	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 39	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 40	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2
D ≠ 41	57		23	10	10	1000	10	8	100	9.2

Annex "A".

Annex "A" to
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
No. 1, TUSA.

ARRIVAL SCHEDULE — CLASS I SEVEN DAY OPERATIONAL RESERVE
FOR ENTIRE FORCE ON FAR SHORE D ≠ 41

	One Day Reserve	D+28	D+29	D+30	D+31	D+32	D+33	D+34	D+35	D+36	D+37	D+38	D+39	D+40	D+41	Total Reserve
PRINCIPAL RATION	100%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	700%
SUPPLEMENTARY RATIONS:																
"D" Ration	20%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	10%	140%
Hosp. Supp. packs	8%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	56%
RACK Kits	100%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	700%
"C" Rations for PW and Civl. Labor	1000 ea.	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	7000
Heat Units (3-oz.)	10%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	5%	70%

NOTES:
(1) Principal ration shipped in ratio of: 35% - "B" with condiments 20% - "C"
20% - "K" 25% - "10-in-1"
(2) "D" Ration issued to supplement "C" and "K" of principal ration: Ratio: 1/3 "D" to each "K"
2/3 "D" to each "C"
(3) Hospital Supplement Packs issued to hospitals only to supplement "10-in-1" or "5-in-1" rations for patients.
(4) All factors based on strength of Force on far shore as of D ≠ 41.
(5) All items to be increased 30% to provide safety factor.

Annex "B"

ANNEX "B" to
ADMIN. INSTR. No. 1.

SECRET

INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT
WORN & CARRIED — Annex "C"

ITEM	GROUP A: DESIGNATED DIV,TD,FA, RCN & TANK TROOPS — WORN	GROUP A — PACK OR BAG	GROUP A — BLANKET ROLL	GROUP B: ALL TROOPS OTHER THAN GROUP A — WORN	GROUP B — PACK OR BAG	GROUP B — DUFFLE OR OD BARR'K BAG
CLOTHING			(Note 2)			(Note 3)
Belt, web waist (Note 7)	1	1		1	1	
Drawers, cotton						3
Drawers, wool	1		1	1		1
Gloves - Mittens (Note #5)						
Handkerchiefs	2	2	2	2	2	2
Helmets, steel, complete (Incl Cap, wool, knit)	1			1		
Jackets, field (or combat)	1			1		
Jackets, HBT, Prot.	1*			1*		
Jackets, HBT (Note #1)			1			2
Leggings, canvas, prot.	1			1		1 Non Prot.
Raincoat		1			1	
Shirt, wool or shirt, wool, prot.	1*			1*		1 Non Prot.
Shoes, service or boots (if auth)	1		1	1		1
Socks, cotton						2
Socks, wool		2	1		2	1
Socks, wool, prot.	1	1		1	1	
Towel, bath			1			1
Towel, huck		1			1	
Trousers, HBT, prot.	1*			1*		
Trousers, HBT (Note #1)			1			2
Trousers, wool or trousers wool, prot.	1*			1*		
Undershirts, cotton						3
Undershirts, wool	1		1	1		1
EQUIPAGE						
Bag, canvas, field (or Haversack)(complete)	1			1		
Bag, duffel, or Bag, barrack- (Note #3).						1
Belt, cartridge (or pistol B-A-R)	1			1		
Blanket		1	1		1	1
Can, meat		**			1	
Canteen, & cover, canteen	1			1		
Cover, indiv., prot.	1(in Gas Mask)	1		1 (in Gas Mask)	1	
Cover, water-proof, plastic, small arms (If available)	1	1		1	1	
Cup, canteen	1			1		
Flag, U.S., Arm Band Type (when directed by Army Commander)	1			1		

INDIVIDUAL CLOTHING & EQUIPMENT
WORN & CARRIED (Cont'd)

ITEM	GROUP A: DESIGNATED DIV,TD,FA, RCN & TANK TROOPS — WORN	GROUP A — PACK OR BAG	GROUP A — BLANKET ROLL	GROUP B: ALL TROOPS OTHER THAN GROUP A — WORN	GROUP B — PACK OR BAG	GROUP B — DUFFLE OR OD BARR'K BAG
EQUIPAGE (Cont'd)			(Note 2)			(Note 3)
Fork		**1			1	
Knife		**1			1	
Necklace, ident. (Heat Resistant)	1			1		
Pins, tent, shelter half (Note 8)			5			5
Pocket, mag., double web (Or Carbine)	(T/E Allow)			(T/E Allow)		
Pole, tent, shelter half (Note 8)			1			1
Pouch, first aid	1			1		
Spoon		1			1	
Tag, ident.	2			2		
Tent, shelter half (Note8)			1			1
Toilet kit		1			1	
SPECIAL SUPPLIES (Issued in marshalling area)						
Heating units, 2 oz candles		4		4		
Powder, body, insect 2oz.		1		1		
Prophylactics, mechanical		3		3		
Tablets, water steril. (Btl)		1		1		
Toilet paper (sheets)		50		50		

* Depending on item issued (as decided by Army Commander). (If not worn, these items will be carried in unit supply. See par. 5, CWS Annex for further details).

Troops will wear either
(1) Trousers, wool, prot, and shirt, wool, prot.
(2) or, trousers, wool, and shirt, wool, with trousers HBT, prot., and jacket, HBT prot., as outer garment. (Suit, HBT, one-piece, prot., may be substitued for trousers and jacket, HBT, prot.)
(3) Underclothing, prot.; Hood, wool, prot.; and gloves, cotton, prot. will be worn if directed by Army Commander. (See par. 5, CWS Annex for further details.)

** Units, if specifically designated by this Headquarters as assault troops, will place meat cans, knife, and fork in blanket roll or duffel bag. Spoon will be carried in the pack. An additional complete set of utensils will be issued to these troops at home stations, and will be left aboard vessel upon debarkation.

NOTES:

1. Suit, HBT, one piece may be substituted for Trousers, HBT, and Jacket, HBT.

2. Blanket rolls and officers' bedding rolls will be carried on unit transportation. Each blanket roll will be marked in order to return to original owner, if practicable. In addition, rolls will be marked "Small" (34-36), "Medium" (38-40), "Large" (42-above). Sizes will be based upon size of undershirt.

3. Duffel (or OD Barracks) Bags will be carried by individuals or in unit transport as prescribed.

4. Clothing will be marked in accordance with Sec II, Cir 45, Hq ETOUSA, 21 April 1944.

5. Appropriate handwear (gloves or mittens) will be worn or carried as directed by unit commander.

6. Shoulder sleeve insignia will be worn by all personnel of units authorized by this or higher headquarters to wear such insignia.
7. Troops wearing impregnated HBT two-piece suits over OD wool clothing will wear 2 belts, web, waist.

8. Officers will carry 2 tents, shelter half; 2 poles, tent, shelter half; and 10 pins, tent, shelter half.

SETS OF INDIVIDUAL C. & E. - UNIT RESERVE — Annex "D"

1. a. Units will carry as unit reserve following number of complete sets of C & E as outlined below;

Division 100
Hospital 50 (For Discharged patients)
Non-Div 35 per 1000 men (based on unit strength)

b. Sets will include one (1) each of following items:

CLOTHING	EQUIPAGE
Drawers, wool	Belt, cartridge
Handkerchief	Blanket, wool
Helmet, stsel, complete	Can, meat
Jacket, field	Canteen
Leggings, canvas	Cover, canteen
Raincoat	Cup, canteen
Shirt, wool, OD	Fork
Shoes, service	Haversack
Socks, wool	Knife
Trousers, wool, OD	Spoon
Undershirt, wool	Tent, shelter half, w/poles and pins

2. Hospital units will, in addition, carry sets of Nurses' clothing, on the basis of 35 per 1000 Nurses, consisting of following items:

a. Special clothing, Nurses (One each)

Gloves, wool, OD, women
Leggings, canvas, women
Panties, women, winter
Shirt, HBT, women
Shoes, Field, women
Stockings, wool
Trousers, women, winter
Vest, women, winter
Waist, wool

b. Special Equipage

Belt, sanitary - 12 each per set
Napkin, sanitary (12's) 12 each per set

UNIT RESERVE EXPENDABLE AND REPLACEMENT SUPPLIES — Annex "F"

1. A ten day reserve of expendable supplies will be carried in unit transportation to provide immediate requirements on Far Shore as follows:

ITEM	QUANTITY	BASIS
1. Soap	0.2 lbs	1 man
2. Brushes, scrub, floor, hand	1 brush	50 men
3. Brooms, corn	1 broom	50 men
4. Matches	1 box	10 men
5. Calcium Hypohlorite	1 ampule	10 men
6. Methyl Bromide (if bags, delousing are carried by unit)	1 ampule	10 men
7. Paper, toilet		5 men
8. Tablets, water, sterilizing	30 units	1 man

2. Units will carry 30 days supply minimum essential Expendable Stationery Supplies.
3. Shoes: All units will carry in unit transportation one (1) pair of non-tariff shoes for each man requiring such sizes, and will maintain this unit to provide for immediate replacement.
4. Repair Parts: Units will carry repair parts as follows: (If not equipped):

a. 30 days supply Field Range Maintenance Parts (Pevey Kit).
b. 30 days supply Lantern Parts.
c. 30 days supply POL maintenance as follows; on basis of T/E allowances:

(1)	Funnels	1 per 10 funnels
(2)	Gaskets for 5 gal. Gas cans	1 per 10 cans
(3)	Gaskets for 5 gal. water cans	1 per 10 cans
(4)	Tube, Flexible, nozzle, Gas cans	1 per 10 tubes
(5)	Cap Assemblies for 5-gal gas cans	1 per 100 cans

d. 30 days supply for special equipment in Quartermaster Refrigeration, Gasoline Supply, Railhead, Laundry, Bakery, Fumigation and Bath, and Salvage Repair units.

5. Operating Supplies: Initial operating supplies will be carried with unit:

a. 30 days supply for Quartermaster Salvage Repair, Fumigation and Bath and Laundry units.

b. 1 days supply flour and 7 days supply other ingredients for Quartermaster Bakery units.

POL REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT PARTS — Annex "F"
MAINTENANCE AND RESERVE
QUARTERMASTER CLASS IV

ITEM	UNIT	TOTAL
Cap., closures, w/seating rings for 5.4 gal. Jerri-cans	ea	5,000
Hinge pins for 5.4 gal. Jerri-cans	ea	2,000
Gasket, rubber, for 5.4 gal. Jerri-cans	ea	5,000
Neck; for 5.4 gal. Jerri-cans	ea	1,000
Pin, hinge, cotter, for Ameri-cans	ea	5,000
Washer, for Ameri-cans	ea	10,000
Link, cap connector, Ameri-cans	ea	5,000
Screen, screw-cap, for flexible detachable nozzle	ea	2,000
POL identification disc (Red) marked "80"	ea	75,000
POL identification disc (Black) marked "D"	ea	20,000
POL identification disc (Grey) marked "K"	ea	10,000
Bung, Tri-sure, 2"	ea	2,000
Bung, Tri-sure, 3/4"	ea	2,000
2" Gasket, for Bungs, Tri-sure 2"	ea	10,000
3/4" Gasket, for Bungs, Tri-sure 3/4"	ea	10,000
Cap, assembly, w/pins for 5 gallon water can	ea	500
#2 Gasket for 5 gallon water can	ea	10,000

RESERVE EQUIPMENT - QUARTERMASTER CLASS II

Tube, flexible nozzle, for 5 gal refillable gasoline drums	ea	5,000
Funnels, trunicated, M1	ea	500
Machine, POL can-washing, British Type, 6 spout	ea	30
Machine, POL barrel-washing, British Type	ea	2
Pump, Barrel, Rotary, Kerosene-or-Gasoline, with 6-foot hose and nozzle	ea	60
Wrench, POL, drum, bung, 3/4" and 2"	ea	20

RESERVE EQUIPMENT - SIGNAL CORPS CLASS II

Torch, Inspection w/2, less bulbs, batteries and terminals	ea	10
Bulb, for Torch, Inspection w/2	ea	20
Battery, 4V, for Torch, Inspection w/2 terminals	ea	20
Terminal, for Torch, Inspection w/2	sets	10

QUARTERMASTER BEACH MAINTENANCE SET

BASIS: 5,000 Men 15 Days (75,000 Man-Days of Supply)

SUMMARY SHEET

ITEM	UNIT	TOTAL
CLOTHING		
1. Drawers, wool	ea	500
2. Gloves, leather, heavy	pr	600
3. Headbands, liner, steel helmet, Adj.	ea	800
4. Helmet, steel, M-1	ea	200
5. Jackets, field, od	ea	450
6. Jackets, HBT, prot	ea	280
7. Leggings, canvas, dismtd protective	pr	600
8. Liners, steel helmet	ea	450
9. Neckbands, liner, steel helmet	ea	800
10. Shirts, flannel, od	ea	500
11. Shoes, service, type III	pr	1,500
12. Socks, wool	pr	5,040
13. Suits, 1-piece, HBT, prot	ea	270
14. Trousers, HBT, prot	ea	280
15. Trousers, wool, od	ea	480
16. Undershirts, wool	ea	500

ITEM	UNIT	TOTAL
EQUIPAGE		
1. Axes, intrenching	ea	100
2. Bags, canvas, field	ea	200
3. Bags, carrying, ammunition	ea	40
4. Belts, cartridge, cal..30	ea	160
5. Belts, magazine, B-A-R	ea	60
6. Belts, pistol or revolver	ea	200
7. Blankets, wool, od	ea	1,000
8. Cans, meat	ea	240
9. Canteens	ea	300
10. Carriers, axe, intrenching	ea	100
11. Carriers, cutter, wire	ea	100
12. Carriers, pack, M-1928	ea	200
13. Carriers, pickmattock, intrenching	ea	100
14. Carriers, shovel, intrenching	ea	200
15. Covers, canteen	ea	360
16. Covers, mattress	ea	200
17. Cups, canteen	ea	210
18. Cutters, wire, heavy	ea	100
19. Forks, M-1926	ea	1,000
20. Haversacks, M-1928	ea	200
21. Knives, M-1926	ea	1,000
22. Pickmattocks, intrenching	ea	100
23. Pockets, magazine, Double web, M-1923	ea	150
24. Pockets, magazine, Double web, Carbine	ea	150
25. Pouches, first-aid	ea	500
26. Shovels, intrenching	ea	200
27. Slings, carrying, M.G. & Ammunition	ea	60
28. Spoons, M-1926	ea	1,000
29. Suspenders, belt	ea	120

ITEM	UNIT	TOTAL
REGULAR SUPPLIES		
1. Adapter, gasoline, lantern	ea	100
2. Batteries, electric hand lantern	ea	250
3. Bulbs, electric, hand lantern	ea	250
4. Candles, Type II	ea	900
5. Lanterns, electric portable, hand	ea	20
6. Lanterns, gasoline, w/adapter	ea	24
7. Matches, waterproof	box	1,000
8. Paper, toilet	roll	2,400
9. Ranges, field, Pack "B"	ea	1
10. Soap, laundry, ordinary issue	lb	1,020
11. Tablets, water sterilizing	btl	1,152

GRAND TOTALS, CLOTHING, EQUIPAGE, AND REGULAR SUPPLIES:

GRAND TOTAL: In long tons 12.92
In ship (measurement) tons 39.91

FACTORS: Per Man Per Day -
.3859 lbs.
.00053 Ship Tons.

II. CLASS II QUARTERMASTER
FOLLOW-UP MAINTENANCE.

BASIS: 15,000 MEN FOR 30 DAYS (450,000 MAN-DAYS OF SUPPLY)

SUMMARY SHEET

ITEM	UNIT	TOTAL
CLOTHING		
1. Belts, web, waist	ea	1,200
2. Caps, wool, knit	ea	1,200
3. Coats, mackinaw, od	ea	680
4. Drawers, cotton, shorts	ea	4,000
5. Drawers, wool	ea	3,800
6. Gauntlets, barbed wire	pr	100
7. Gloves, HH, riding, unlined	pr	600
8. Gloves, leather, heavy	pr	1,600
9. Gloves, wool, od. leather palm	pr	1,800
10. Handkerchiefs, otn., white	ea	16,800
11. Headbands, liner, adj.	ea	1,600
12. Helmets, steel	ea	630
13. Jackets, field	ea	2,115
14. Jackets, HBT, protective	ea	2,100
15. Laces, leggings	pr	4,320
16. Laces, shoe	pr	3,000
17. Leggings, canvas, dismounted, protective	pr	3,000
18. Liners, steel helmet	ea	1,260
19. Mittens, asbestos	pr	80
20. Neckbands, liner, helmet	ea	1,800
21. Overshoes, Arctic	pr	480
22. Raincoats, dismounted	ea	1,875
23. Shirts, flannel, od	ea	3,800
24. Shoes, service, type III	pr	6,000
25. Socks, wool	pr	30,240
26. Suits, 1-piece, HBT, protective	ea	1,680
27. Trousers, HBT, protective	ea	3,500
28. Trousers, wool, od	ea	3,780
29. Undershirts, cotton, summer, sleeveless	ea	3,780
30. Undershirts, wool	ea	3,800
31. Wristlets, knit	pr	300
SPECIAL CLOTHING		
32. Helmets, combat, winter	ea	1,400
33. Jackets, combat, winter	ea	1,380
34. Trousers, combat, winter	ea	1,380
EQUIPAGE, INDIVIDUAL		
1. Bags, canvas, field, od, M-1936	ea	650
2. Bags, duffle	ea	640
3. Belts, cartridge, Cal..30	ea	440
4. Belts, magazine, B-A-R	ea	180
5. Belts, pistol or revolver	ea	400
6. Blankets, wool, od	ea	4,020
7. Cans, meat, M-1932	ea	1,260
8. Canteen, M-1910	ea	900
9. Carriers, pack, M-1928	ea	600
10. Covers, canteen, dismounted, M-1910	ea	1,980
11. Cups, M-1910	ea	945
12. Forks, M-1926	ea	2,000
13. Haversacks, M-1928	ea	600
14. Knives, M-1926	ea	2,000
15. Pins, tent, shelter, wood	ea	10,800
16. Pockets, magazine, double-web, M-1923	ea	100
17. Pockets, magazine, double-web, carbine	ea	400
18. Poles, tent, shelter	ea	1,100
19. Pouches, first aid pack, M-1924	ea	1,500
20. Spoons, M-1926	ea	2,250
21. Straps, carrying, bag, od, canvas	ea	500
22. Suspenders, belt, M-1936	ea	360
23. Tent, shelter half	ea	2,250
EQUIPAGE, ORGANIZATIONAL		
1. Axes, intrenching	ea	100
2. Bags, canvas, water, sterilizing	ea	18
3. Bags, carrying, ammunition	ea	160
4. Bags, carrying rocket	ea	120
5. Buckets, canvas, folding, 18-quart	ea	30
6. Carriers, axe, intrenching	ea	60
7. Carriers, cutter, wire	ea	60
8. Carriers, pickmattock, intrenching	ea	150
9. Carriers, shovel, intrenching	ea	300
10. Cases, canvas, dispatch	ea	40
11. Covers, mattress	ea	1,000
12. Covers, waterproof, plastic, Small Arms:		
type 1 - pistol	ea	1,500
type 2 - rifle	ea	11,250
type 3 - SMG	ea	1,800
type 4 - MG	ea	450
13. Cutters, wire, heavy	ea	50
14. Desks, field, empty, fiber, company	ea	8
15. Desks, field, empty, fiber, headquarters	ea	3
16. Flags, Geneva Convention, R.C.	ea	15
17. Flags, National Ensign, storm	ea	70
18. Pickmattocks, intrench.	ea	250
19. Shovels, intrenching	ea	480
20. Slings, carrying, M.G. and ammunition	ea	60
21. Tents, command post, complete	ea	8
REGULAR SUPPLIES, EXPENDABLE		
1. Batteries, electric, hand, lantern	ea	750
2. Brooms, corn	ea	204
3. Brushes, scrubbing, floor, hand	ea	432
4. Bulbs, electric, hand lantern	ea	300
5. Calcium Hypochlorite, ampules	ea	4,000
6. Calcium Hypochlorite, (3 3/4-lb. can)	ea	180
7. Candles, type II	ea	600
8. Compound, germicidal rinse	can	5,472
9. Dubbin, (2oz. can	ea	7,632
10. Insecticide Powder body, insect (2-oz can)	ea	4,992
11. Kit, maintenance Range, Field (1 range-90 days)	ea	100
12. Kit, maintenance, Range, Field (20 ranges - 30 days)	ea	15
13. Kit, office supply, expendable	ea	150
14. Matches, waterproof	box	3,800
15. Methyl Bromide, 20 CC, ampules	ea	1,500
16. Paper, toilet, rolls (1,000 sheets)	ea	10,000
17. Prophylactics, mechanical (packets of 3)	pkt	30,240
18. Soap, laundry, ordinary issue	lb	15,000
REGULAR SUPPLIES, NON-EXPENDABLE		
1. Adapter Kits, gasoline, lantern	ea	100
2. Axes, handled, chopping (4-lb)	ea	30
3. Bags, delousing	ea	40
4. Bags, personal effects	ea	225
5. Bars, wrecking, type "D", gooseneck	ea	15
6. Buckets, GP, 14-qt.	ea	80
7. Cans, GI, w/cover (10-gal)	ea	13
8. Cans, GI, w/cover (16-gal)	ea	14
9. Cans, GI, w/cover (24-gal)	ea	14
10. Cans, GI, w/cover (32-gal)	ea	14
11. Chairs, folding, wood	ea	300
12. Containers, round, insulated, w/inserts	ea	35
13. Hatchets, claw, 4"	ea	15
14. Heaters, water, immersion type	ea	15
15. Lanterns, electric, portable hand	ea	36
16. Lanterns, gasoline, w/adapter	ea	24
17. Markers, grave (pegs)	ea	250
18. Outfits, cooking, (20-Man)	ea	5
19. Picks, handled, RR (6-7 lb)	ea	24
20. Ranges, field, Pack "A"	ea	1
21. Ranges, field, Pack "B"	ea	5
22. Safes, field, key-lock	ea	3
23. Saws, cross-cut (1-man) (3-ft.)	ea	8
24. Shovels, D-Handled, R.P. #2	ea	54
25. Stoves, cooking, gasoline, one burner	ea	36
26. Tables, folding, wood	ea	18
27. Tool-sets, blacksmits'	ea	1
28. Tool-sets, carpenters'	ea	3
29. Tool-sets, carpenters and wheelwrights'	ea	2
30. Typewriters, portable, elite type	ea	8
31. Units, water heating (including case)	ea	7

GRAND TOTALS, CLOTHING, EQUIPAGE AND REGULAR SUPPLIES:

Grand Total, in Long Tons - 97.16
Grand Total, in Ship Tons - 286.45

Factors, Per Man Per Day:

Pounds - .484
Ship Tons - .000637

ITEM	UNIT	TOTAL
SPECIAL CLOTHING, PARATROOPS	(a)	
1. Boots, parachutist	pr	1,260
2. Coats, parachutist	ea	320
3. Helmets, parachutist	ea	168
4. Trousers, parachutist	pr	320
SPECIAL EQUIPAGE, PARATROOPS	(a)	
1. Knives, pocket, M-2	ea	270
2. Ropes, parachutist, (5/8" x 30")	ea	630
3. Supporters, athletic	ea	750
SPECIAL CLOTHING, NURSES'	(b)	
1. Gloves, wool, od, women	pr	250
2. Leggings, canvas, women	pr	250
3. Overshoes, Arctic, 4 buckle, women	pr	120
4. Panties, women, winter	pr	1,000
5. Shirt, HBT, women	ea	490
6. Shoes, field, women	pr	504
7. Stockings, wool	pr	750
8. Trousers, HBT, women	pr	560
9. Vest, women, winter	ea	1,500
10. Waist, wool	ea	500
SPECIAL EQUIPAGE, NURSES'	(b)	
1. Belts, sanitary	ea	750
2. Napkins, sanitary, (12's)	box	4,512

SECRET

ANNEX "H" TO PHASING OF MAINTENANCE PLAN

MEDICAL SUPPLY ANNEX

PART I

FOR UNITS DESIGNATED BY THIS HEADQUARTERS AS ASSAULT UNITS

The following items of equipment, packed as a unit, will be carried by each LST in the assault phase of the initial operation until 100 units have been landed. Responsibility for unloading will rest with troops on the far shore.

Item	Unit	No.	Total Weight	Cubage
Blanket, Set, Small	Each	40	2,000	180
Litter, Straight Steel	Each	100	2,100	125
Splint Set	Each	4	220	14
Surgical Dressings	Each	3	150	10
Plasma	Each	8	520	24

PART II

ADDITIONAL MEDICAL EQUIPMENT TO ACCOMPANY UNITS DESIGNATED AS ASSAULT UNITS

a. Litters, Folding, Straight Steel or Wooden
   12 per Inf Bn, Arty Bn, Chem Bn and Engr Bn
   180 per Med Bn (Inf Div); Med Bn (Engr Special Brigade)
b. Chest, MD #1
   2 per Collecting Company
   4 per Clearing Company
   6 per Medical Battalion (ESB)
c. Splint Set
   1 per Inf Bn, Arty Bn, Chem Bn and Engr Bn
   5 per Collecting Company
   10 per Med Bn (Inf Bn)
d. Blanket Set, Small
   3 per Inf Bn, Arty Bn, Chem Bn, Engr Bn
   4 per Collecting Company
   10 per Med Bn (ESB)

PART III

SUPPLEMENTAL ITEMS FOR "D" TYPE MEDICAL MAINTENANCE UNIT TO BE ISSUED TO UNITS DESIGNATED AS ASSAULT UNITS

a. The following items of medical equipment will be amphibiously packed in eight (8) small containers and will be carried or floated ashore by enlisted personnel of the Medical Department in units designated as assault units:

Item	Unit	Amount
Dressings, first aid, large	Each	50
Dressings, first aid, small	Each	50
Gauze, plain, sterilized, compressed	Pkg	50
Bandage, gauze, 3 inch	Each	50
Sulfanilamide, crystalline	Pkg	10
Morphine Tartrate Syrettes	Box	25
Serum, normal human plasma, dried	Pkg	7
Sulfadiazine, USP, 7.7 gr tabs	1000	1
Malasone, 1/10 gr tabs (100 in bottle)	Bottle	1
Sterile gauze packet, (impregnated with boric acid)	Each	1

b. Basis for Issue:
   1 per Inf Bn, Arty Bn, Chem Bn, and Engr Bn
   2 per Collecting Company, Division
   4 per Clearing Company, Division
   6 per Medical Battalion (ESB)

ANNEX "I"

CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Agent, decon, bleach	100 lbs per Co or similar unit 1000 lbs per Apparatus, decon, PD
Brush, decon	1 per 100 lbs of bleach
Agent, decon, non-corr (4.32-gal cont)	Sufficient for filling authorized 1½-qt & 3-gal decon apparatus
Alarm, gas warning, Br	1 per 50 men or fraction
Apparatus, decon, 1½-qt (freshly filled and placed on all vehicles)	1 per motor fuel consuming vehicle 2 per combat vehicle
Curtain, gas proof	2 per Hq, Bn or Sep Co
Kit, repair, gas mask, Univ, M-8	1 per Regt or Sep Bn
Kit, repair, gas mask, Co	2 per Co or similar unit
Kit, eml agent detector, M-9	1 per Co or similar unit
Disinfectant, gas mask, 4-oz bottle	1 per Co or similar unit
Sack, gas resistant	1 per 4 individuals
Sign, gas warning	5 per 100 men (min 5 signs)
Paint, LVD, can	1 per fuel consuming motor vehicle; 1 per airplane
Paper, LVD, book	2 per Co or similar unit
Crayon, VD	12 per Co or similar unit (incl Armd Force and TD); 12 per AAF squadron and sep platoon
Flamethrower, portable, M1A1	24 per engineer Combat Battalion
Kit, fuel-filling, PFT	12 per Parachute Inf Regt
Kit, fuel-mixing, PFT	22 per 2½ flamethrowers
Kit, service, PFT	11 per 2½ PFT or fraction
Apparatus, decon, PD	1 per 2½ PFT or fraction
Carrier, shell, 4.2 cml mortar	3 per Serv Co, Armd Div
Cart, ammunition, 4.2 cml mortar	5 per squad, Cml Wpns Co
Cart, mortar, 4.2	1 per squad, Cml Wpns Co
Laboratory, field, CWS, M-2	1 per squad, Cml Wpns Co
Respirator, dust	1 per Laboratory Co
	2 per fuel consuming vehicle when directed by CO.
Rule, mil, cml mortar	4 per Hq, Wpns Co.
	8 per plat, Cml Wpns Co
Set, acc and spare parts, 4.2 cml mortar	1 per mortar, 4.2
Set, acc, cml mortar cart	1 per cart
Sight, 4.2 cml mortar, w/case	1 per mortar
Set, equipment, maintenance and repair	1 per Maint Co, Cml
Apparatus, decon, 3-gal	3 per Co or similar unit

ANNEX "J" TO ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS #1, TUSA

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	MORTAR, 60 MM	MORTAR, 81 MM	GUN, AUTO., 20 MM, AN-M2 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, 37MM, M6; MOUNT, Z1 (TANK)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; CARRIAGE, M4A1 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; MOUNT, M25, M26 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M1A2; CARRIAGE, M3A1, (AA)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M1A2; MOUNT, COMB., M2 (AA)	GUN, AUTO., 37 MM, M4 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, AUTO., 40 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M2 (AA)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; MOUNT, T5 (AT)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1A2 (AT)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M3A3 (FIELD HOW.)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M1 (PACK HOW.)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, MOTOR, M8	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; CARRIAGE, M2A1	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; MOUNT, M2, M5	GUN, 75 MM, M3; ALL MOUNTS (TANK)	GUN, 75 MM, M4; MOUNT, AIRPLANE, M6	GUN, 3", M5; CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 3", M7; MOUNT, M5	GUN, 3" M3; MOUNT, M1A1, M1A2, M2A1, M2A2 (MOBILE) (AA)
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat (med. gr.) No. 1, 3 in.	1	Ea	5	5	5	5	5	5	10	5	5	10	10	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	5	10	
2. BURLAP, jute, 8 oz., 40 in. wide	2	Yd	60	70	-	60	60	50	80	80	60	80	80	70	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
3. CHALK, blue/white, railroad, 1" x 4"		Gr	2.5	2.5	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	
4. CLEANER, rifle bore	3	Qt	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
5. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 5/0-180 (Fine)		Gr	0.8	0.8	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	
6. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 3/0-120 (Med)		Gr	0.8	0.8	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	
7. CLOTH, crocus		Sht	60	80	40	60	60	60	100	60	60	100	80	80	80	80	90	80	90	90	90	90	90	90	
8. CLOTH, wiping, cotton, mixed	4	Lb	150	150	100	100	100	100	125	100	100	125	100	100	90	90	100	90	100	100	100	125	100	150	
9. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	5	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	
10. COMPOUND, rust-preventive, light		Lb	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	10	
11. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	6	Gal	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	0.5	2	0.5	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1.5	1	2	
12. GLYCERINE, Grade A, U.S.P.	7	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
13. GREASE, general purpose, No. 0/1	8	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
14. GREASE, general purpose, No. 2	9	Lb	-	-	-	-	7	-	10	-	-	10	-	7	10	5	-	10	-	-	-	10	-	15	
15. GREASE, O.D., No. 0/00	10	Lb	-	-	-	10	20	15	60	10	10	60	20	25	30	30	30	30	20	20	20	40	20	80	
16. GREASE, water-pump		Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	
17. LEAD, white, basic-carbonate	11	Lb	As required - Maximum - one pound per weapon per month.																						
18. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80/90	12	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
19. NEEDLES, sacking, steel, 4-1/2"		Ea	20	20	-	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	
20. OIL, castor, technical, grade	13	Pt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
21. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10/30	14	Qt	-	-	-	30	30	30	75	30	-	75	30	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	50	40	100	
22. OIL, hydraulic	15	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	-	-	10	10	
23. OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments	16	Qt	1	1	-	2	2	2	2	2	-	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	2.5	2.5	5
24. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light	17	Qt	50	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	GUN, 3", M4, MOUNT, M3A1 (Fixed) (AA)	GUN, 76 MM, M1; MOUNT, COMB., M34A1	GUN, 90 MM, M1A1; MOUNT, M1A1 (MOBILE)(AA)	GUN, 90 MM, M2; MOUNT, M2 (MOBILE) (AA)	GUN, 90MM, MOUNT, T3 (FIXED)(AA)	How., 105MM, M2A1; CARRIAGE, M2	How., 105MM, M3; CARRIAGE, M3A1 (AIRBORNE)	How., 105MM, M2A1, MOUNT, M4	GUN, 105MM, M3; MOUNT, M1 (FIXED) (AA)	GUN, 4.5", M1; CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 4.7", M1; MOUNT, M1 (MOBILE) (AA)	How., 155MM, M1917-18; M1 CARRIAGES	How., 155MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 155MM, M1917-18; MOUNT, M2	GUN, 155MM, M1917-18, M1, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M1917-18, M1, M1A1	How., 8" M1; CARRIAGE, M1	How., 240MM, M1917-18; CARRIAGE, M1917-18	How., 240MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat(med.gr.)No.1,3 in.	1	ea	5	5	10	10	10	5	5	10	10	5	10	5	5	5	7	7	10	10
2. BURLAP, jute, 8 oz., 4" in wide	2	yd	100	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	140	150	150	150	150	150	150	175	200	200
3. CHALK, blue/white, railroad, 1" x 4"		Gr	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
4. CLEANER, rifle bore	3	Qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 5/0-180 (Fine)		Or	2.5	2.5	5	5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
6. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 3/0-120 (Med)		Or	2.5	2.5	5	5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
7. CLOTH, crocus		Sht	120	100	120	120	125	100	100	100	125	150	200	125	125	140	140	250	300	300
8. CLOTH, wiping, cotton, mixed	4	lb	125	150	175	175	150	125	100	100	150	160	250	150	150	160	160	300	350	350
9. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	5	Gal	2.5	-	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	-	-	2.5	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10. COMPOUND, rust-preventive, light		lb	10	7	10	10	10	7	5	5	10	10	15	10	10	12	12	12	50	50
11. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	6	Gal	2.5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	3	3	5	5
12. GLYCERINE, grade A, U.S.P.	7	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	10	-
13. GREASE, general purpose, No. 0/1	8	lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	120	-	140
14. GREASE, general purpose, No. 2	9	lb	-	10	15	15	-	10	10	-	-	10	30	20	20	30	30	30	40	40
15. GREASE, O.D., No. 0/00	10	lb	60	40	80	80	60	40	30	40	40	40	90	50	50	-	-	-	120	-
16. GREASE, water-pump		lb	0.3	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17. LEAD, white, basic-carbonate	11	lb	As required - Maximum - one pound per weapon per month.																	
18. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80/90	12	lb	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
19. NEEDLES, sacking, steel, 4-1/2"		ea	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
20. OIL, castor, technical grade	13	pt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	12	-	-
21. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10/30	14	qt	90	90	135	135	50	50	40	50	50	60	175	90	90	90	120	180	180	180
22. OIL, hydraulic	15	gal	10	-	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	-	-	2.5	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23. OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments	16	qt	5	2.5	5	5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	2.5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
24. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light	17	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	GUN, 3", M7; MOUNT, M5	GUN, 3" M3; MOUNT M1A1, M1A2, M2A1, M2A2 (Mobile) (AA)	GUN, 3" M4; MOUNT, M3A1, (FIXED) (AA)	GUN, 76 MM, M1; MOUNT, COMB., M34A1	GUN, 90 MM, M1A1; MOUNT, M1A1 (Mobile) (AA)	GUN, 90 MM, M2; MOUNT, M2 (MOBILE)(AA)	GUN, 90 MM, Mount T3 (FIXED) (AA)	How., 105 MM, M2A1; CARRIAGE, M2	How., 105 MM, M3; CARRIAGE, M2A1 (AIRBORNE)	How., 105 MM, M2A1, MOUNT, M4	GUN, 105 MM, M3; MOUNT, M1 (FIXED) (AA)	GUN, 4.5", M1; CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 4.7", M1; MOUNT, M1 (MOBILE) (AA)	How., 155 MM, M1917-18; ALL CARRIAGES	How., 155 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 155 MM, M1917-18; MOUNT, M2	GUN, 155 MM, M1917-18, M1, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M1917-18, M1, M1A1	How., 8" M1; CARRIAGE, M1	How., 240 MM, M1917-18; CARRIAGE, M1917-18	How., 240 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
25. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium	18	Qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special	19	Qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27. OIL, neat's-foot	20	Qt	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
28. OIL, potentiometer	21	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. OIL, recoil, heavy	22	Gal	10	20	20	20	25	25	25	-	-	50	85	50	60	-	60	150	150	150	-	160
30. OIL, recoil, light		Gal	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31. OIL, recoil, special		Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32. PAPER, lens, tissue		Qr	10	15	15	10	15	15	15	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
33. PAPER, litmus	23	T	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	1	-
34. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	24	Gal	1	2	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2	1.2	1.2	2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.3	3	3	3	5	5
36. SODA, ash, type 1	25	Lb	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	175	150	150	175	200	225	200	200	225	225	250	275	275
37. SODA, caustic (lye)	26	Lb	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	12	10	10	12	15	15	15	15
38. SODIUM HYDROXIDE (pellets)	27	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	10	-
39. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	40	60	40	40	60	60	40	40	40	40	40	60	75	75	75	75	90	90	100	100
40. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	30	30	30	30	30	30	20	40	30	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	60	60
41. TWINE, jute	28	Lb	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
42. WASTE, cotton, white	29	Lb	50	75	50	50	100	100	50	75	50	50	50	75	100	100	100	75	100	100	125	125

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	MORTAR, 60 MM	MORTAR, 81 MM	GUN, AUTO., 20 MM, AN-M2 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN 37MM, M6; MOUNT, 21- (TANK)	GUN 37 MM, M3A1; CARRIAGE, M4A1 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; MOUNT, M25, M26 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M1A2; CARRIAGE, M3A1, (AA)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M1A2; MOUNT, COMB., M42 (AA)	GUN, AUTO., 37 MM, M4 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, AUTO. 40 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M2 (AA)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; MOUNT, T5 (AT)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M2A2 (AT)	How., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M3A3 (FIELD HOW.)	How., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M1 (PACK HOW.)	How., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M8 MOTOR	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; CARRIAGE, M2A3	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; MOUNT, M3, M5; M3; ALL MOUNTS (TANK)	GUN, 75 MM, M4; MOUNT, AIRPLANE, M6	GUN, 3", M5; CARRIAGE, M1
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
25. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium	18	Qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special	19	Qt	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-
27. OIL, neat's-foot	20	Qt	-	-	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5
28. OIL, potentiometer	21	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. OIL, recoil, heavy	22	Gal	-	-	-	30	30	30	-	-	-	-	3	3	4	4	5	10	10	10	-	10
30. OIL, recoil, light		Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	5	3	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
31. OIL, recoil, special		Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
32. PAPER, lens, tissue		Qr	2.5	2.5	-	10	10	10	10	10	-	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	-	10
33. PAPER, litmus	23	T	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
34. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	24	Gal	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	1.5	0.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1	1.5
36. SODA, ash, type 1	25	Lb	75	100	-	100	100	100	100	100	100	130	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
37. SODA, caustic (lye)	26	Lb	5	7	2	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
38. SODIUM HYDROXIDE (pellets)	27	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	30	30	30	30	30	50	30	20	50	40	40	40	30	40	40	40	40	40	40	40
40. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	10	10	10	10	20	10	20	10	10	20	20	20	30	20	30	30	30	30	20	30
41. TWINE, jute	28	Lb	2	2	-	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
42. WASTE, cotton, white	29	Lb	10	10	10	20	20	20	75	20	10	75	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	25	50

FOOT NOTES ON ARTILLERY

For latest instructions on cleaning and preserving materials, see proper Technical Manuals (TM) and W.D. Lubrication Guide (Chek-chart) for specific weapons.

Ordnance personnel: Check latest OFSB 6-series for latest instructions pertaining to specific weapon. Note especially OFSB 6-3 through 6-11 for general instructions, including special lubricants for cold weather operation.

Allowances for the weapons also include necessary supplies for Fire Control instruments and Remote Control equipment, including motor generator units. Weapons mounted on self-propelled carriages have supplies for the mount, but not for the carriage. Allowances for self-propelled carriages must be figured from the table on Vehicles.

1. BRUSH, artist or paint...When not available, any small paint brush may be substituted.

2. BURLAP, jute...Acceptable substitute is CLOTH, cotton, Osnaburg.

3. CLEANER, rifle bore...When not available, hot soapy water (issue soap), sal soda, or SODA, ash, type I, may be substituted.

4. CLOTH, wiping...When not available, WASTE, cotton, white, may be substituted.

5. COMPOUND, anti-freeze...For winter use in motor generator units. Quantities listed are for replacement purposes, and do not include initial mixtures.

6. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab...For touch-up purposes. When not available, any suitable and available olive-drab paint may be substituted.

7. GLYCERINE, grade A, U.S.P....For use in glycerine-water recoil fluids.

8. a. GREASE, general purpose, No. 0...Chassis lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, O.D. No. 00, may be substituted.

SECRET

b. GREASE, general purpose, No. 1...Chassis lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, O.D. No. 0, GREASE, general purpose, No. 0, or GREASE, O.D., No. 00, may be substituted.

c. In very hot weather, GREASE, general purpose, No. 2, may be substituted.

9. GREASE, general purpose, No. 2...Wheel bearing grease.

10. a. GREASE, O.D., No. 0....Artillery lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, general purpose, No. 1, GREASE, O.D., No. 00, or GREASE, general purpose, No. 0, may be substituted.

b. GREASE, O.D., No. 00...Artillery lubricant below 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, general purpose, No. 0, may be substituted.

11. LEAD, white...For threaded fittings of weapons used at seacoast emplacements. One pound per weapon per month is recommended.

12. a. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80...For use below 32°F.

b. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 90...For use above 32°F. In emergency, LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80 may be substituted.

13. OIL, castor...For use with glycerine-water recoil mechanisms.

14. a. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10...Artillery and generator lubricant from 32°F to 0°F. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, preservative, light, or oil, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns may be substituted, for other than engine use.

b. For lubrication below 0°F., of artillery and all bearings, gear cases, and mechanisms other than in engines, substitute OIL, lubricating, preservative, light. For lubrication below 0°F., of engines, dilute OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10 with 20% of gasoline or SOLVENT, dry cleaning.

c. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 30...Artillery and generator lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10 may be substituted.

d. Under conditions of high temperatures and humidity, such as in the tropics, or in emergency under any conditions, substitute OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium for other than engine use.

e. For 4.7" AA Gun, provide 100 gal. of OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10, and 75 gal. of OIL, engine, S.A.E. 30 at all temperatures above 0°F.

15. OIL, hydraulic...For remote control oil gears, turret traversing systems, stabilizer systems, and 40mm AA gun recoil fluid, above 0°F. Below 0°F, substitute OIL, recoil, special in 40mm AA gun recoil fluid. For other uses of OIL, hydraulic, check latest Technical Manual (or OFSB) for approved substitution.

16. OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns...For use on Knobs, etc. of fire control instruments. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, preservative, special, OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10, or OIL, lubricating, preservative, light may be substituted.

17. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light...Not recommended for use where excessive rainfall or salt spray are to be encountered. Under these conditions, substitute OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium.

18. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium...Used on the outside of spare tubes for the 40mm AA gun.

19. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special...In emergency, OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns may be substituted.

20. OIL, neat's-foot...For cleaning and preserving leather including holders of fire control instruments. When not available, SOAP, saddle, may be substituted in the ratio of 5 lbs. of SOAP, saddle, for 1 qt. of OIL, neat's-foot.

21. OIL, potentiometer...Used in M9 and M10 directors.

22. OIL, recoil, heavy...When authorized, will be replaced by OIL, recoil, special in temperatures below 0°F.

23. PAPER, litmus...For use with glycerine-water recoil fluids.

24. PRIMER, synthetic...For touch-up purposes, for use in the protection of metallic surfaces from rust, and as a priming coat for painting. In emergency, LEAD, red, dry, and MIXTURE, liquid, for red lead paint may be substituted.

25. SODA, ash, type 1...For cleaning artillery tubes. In emergency, hot soapy water (issue soap), hot water, or cold water may be substituted.

26. SODA, caustic lye...For removing paint from metal.

27. SODIUM HYDROXIDE....For use in glycerine-water recoil fluids.

28. TWINE, jute...For use with NEEDLE, sacking, in sewing swabs.

29. WASTE, cotton, white...When not available, CLOTH, wiping, cotton, mixed, may be substituted.

VEHICLES C&P ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	COMPANY OR BATTERY	MOTORCYCLES	TRUCKS, PASSENGER CARS, 1TON AND LESS	TRUCKS, 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 TON, AND SCOUT CARS	TRUCKS, 3 TON AND OVER	TRUCKS, AMPHIBIAN, 1 TON AND LESS	TRUCKS, AMPHIBIAN, 1-1/2 TON AND OVER	TRAILERS	HALF TRACK VEHICLES	LIGHT	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: MEDIUM	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: HEAVY	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: AMPHIBIAN
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS				10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat, No. 1, 3 in.	1	Ea	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. CARBON DIOXIDE (CO_2)	2	Refill	As required - Maximum - one refill per extinguisher per month.												
3. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide 5/0-180 (Fine)		Sh	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. CLOTH, wiping, cotton	3	Lb	-	10	10	15	20	15	20	10	15	15	30	35	25
5. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	4	Gal	-	-	3	4	5	4	5	-	5	25	30	30	10
6. COMPOUND, anti-seize	5	Lb	As required - Maximum - 1/4 lb per vehicle per month.												
7. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	6	Gal	-	0.5	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
8. FLUID, brake, hydraulic		Gal	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
9. FLUID, shock-absorber, heavy	7	Gal	-	-	-	0.5	1	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-
10. FLUID, shock-absorber, light	8	Gal	-	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	-	-	-
11. OIL, hydraulic	9	Gal	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	1	-	-
12. OIL, lard	10	Gal	As required - Maximum - 1 gal. per active lathe per month.												
13. OIL, neat's-foot	11	Gal	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14. PAPER, flint, class B, grade 2/0		Sh	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	12	Gal	-	0.5	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
16. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	-	2	5	5	7	5	5	1	8	8	10	12	8
17. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	-	1	2	2	3	2	2	1	3	4	4	5	4

FOOT NOTES ON VEHICLES

For latest instructions on cleaning and preserving materials, see proper Technical Manuals (TM) and W.D. Lubrication Guide (chek-chart) for specific vehicle. For operational requirements see FM 101-10.

Ordnance personnel: Check latest OFSB 6-series for latest instructions pertaining to specific vehicle. Note especially OFSB 6-3 through 6-11 for general instructions, including special lubricants for cold weather operation.

Allowances of supplies are those for the vehicle only, and do not include supplies for weapons mounted thereon. For the weapons, see appropriate table, e.g., Small Arms and Artillery.

1. BRUSH, paint--When not available, any small paint brush may be substituted.

2. CARBON DIOXIDE, or LIQUID, extinguishing, fire--Issued according to type of Fire Extinguisher. One refill per extinguisher. See TM 9-850, pars. 109-111 for refilling instructions.

3. CLOTH, wiping, cotton--When not available, Waste, cotton, white may be substituted.

4. COMPOUND, anti-freeze--For winter use with water-cooled engines. Quantities listed are for replacement purposes only, and do not include original mixtures.

5. COMPOUND, anti-freeze--For vehicles with radial engines. 1/4 lb. per vehicle per month is recommended.

6. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab--For touch-up purposes. When not available, any suitable and available olive-drab paint may be substituted.

7. FLUID, shock absorber, heavy--When shown for the same group of vehicles as FLUID, shock absorber, light, the appropriate OFSB must be checked to see which fluid is applicable. The heavy type is for use with Houdaille and similar shock-absorbers.

8. FLUID, shock absorber, light--For use with Delco and similar shock-absorbers.

9. OIL, hydraulic--For turret traversing systems, stabilizer systems, and brake vacuum cylinders.

10. OIL, lard--One gallon per active lathe (in shop truck).

11. OIL, neat's-foot--For cleaning and preserving leather. When not available, SOAP, saddle, may be substituted in the ratio of 5 lbs. of SOAP, saddle, for 1 qt. of OIL, neat's-foot.

12. PRIMER, synthetic--For touch-up purposes, for use in the protection of metallic surfaces from rust, and as a priming coat for painting. In emergency, LEAD, red, dry and MIXTURE, liquid, for red lead paint may be substituted.

SMALL ARMS C&P ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	COMPANY OR BATTERY	CARBINE, CAL. .30	RIFLE, CAL. .30, M1903-17	RIFLE, CAL. .30, M1	RIFLE, B.A.R., CAL. .30	PISTOL, CAL. .45	GUN, SUBMACHINE, CAL. .45	GUN, MACHINE, CAL. .30, AIR-COOLED	GUN, MACHINE, CAL. .30, WATER-COOLED	GUN, MACHINE, CAL. .50, HEAVY BARREL	GUN, MACHINE, CAL. .50, WATER-COOLED	LAUNCHER, ROCKET, A.T., 2.36 INCH
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS				100	100	100	100	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, artist, bristle, flat, 3/4 in.	1	Ea	-	3	3	3	3	1	1	4	4	4	4	1
2. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat, No.1, 3 in.	1	Ea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	-
3. CLEANER, rifle bore	2	6 oz	-	100	100	100	100	10	10	-	-	-	-	10
)	2	Qt	-	10	10	10	10	1	1	4	4	4	4	1
4. CLOTH, crocus		Sht	-	10	10	10	10	1	1	4	4	4	4	1
5. CLOTH, wiping, cotton	3	Lb	-	40	50	50	50	3	4	25	25	25	25	50
6. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	4	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	60	-
7. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	5	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
8. GREASE, rifle	6	C	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. OIL, linseed, raw, type A	7	Gal	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1
10. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light	8	4 oz	-	100	100	100	100	10	10	-	-	-	-	10
	8	Qt	-	13	13	13	13	1	1.5	20	20	30	30	1
11. OIL, neat's-foot	9	Qt	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12. OIL, recoil, light	10	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-
13. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	12	18	18	30	2	3	4	4	4	4	-
14. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	-	5	5	5	5	1	2	3	3	5	5	1

RESERVES OF MEDALS AND AWARDS FOR MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND HOSPITALS. Annex "E"

TYPE OF AWARD	ARMY HQ	CORPS HQ	INF DIV HQ	ARMD DIV HQ	FIELD HOSP	EVAC HOSP 750 Bed	EVAC HOSP 400 Bed	CONV HOSP	MED DET OF SEP. REGTS & BNS.
Medal of Honor	2								
Distinguished Service Medal	9								
Legion of Merit	50	25	10	8					
Distinguished Service Cross	25	5	10	8					
Distinguished Flying Cross	30	10	2	2					
Air Medal	10	10	5	5					
Oak Leaf Cluster (Large)	500	200	100	80	75	150	75	60	
Oak Leaf Cluster (Small)	250	100	50	40	40	75	40	30	
Silver Star	50	100	300	240					
Purple Heart	1110	300	500	400	400	750	400	300	50
Soldiers Medal	25	10	20	16					
Good Conduct Medal	1000	500	1000	800					
Bronze Star	500	250	500	400					

FOOT NOTES ON SMALL ARMS

For latest instructions on cleaning and preserving materials, see proper Technical Manuals (TM) for specific weapon.

Ordnance personnel: Check OFSB 6-3 for general instructions.

1. BRUSH, artists, and BRUSH, flowing...When not available, any small paint brush may be substituted.

2. CLEANER, rifle bore...6 oz. containers to be carried by all units. Quart containers to be carried in addition to the 6 oz. containers by rifle companies, and those units authorized cal..30 and cal..50 machine guns. In emergency, hot soapy water (issue soap), sal soda, SODA, ash, type 1, or hot water may be substituted.

3. CLOTH, wiping....When not available, WASTE, cotton, white, may be substituted.

4. COMPOUND, anti-freeze...For winter use in water-cooled machine guns. Quantities listed are for replacement purposes only, and do not include initial mixtures.

5. ENAMEL, synthetic...For touch-up purposes. When not available, any suitable olive-drab paint may be substituted.

6. GREASE, rifle...For use in cal..30 M1 rifles only. Issued in CONTAINER, grease, M1.

7. OIL, linseed...For use in hot climates (humid or dry) to keep wooden parts in condition.

8. a. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light...Quantities based on needs of an infantry unit. For use on ground small arms above 0°F. Issued in 4 oz. containers for small arms use. Quart containers to be carried in addition to the 4 oz. containers by infantry rifle companies and those units authorized cal..30 and cal..50 machine guns. In emergency, OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10 may be substituted.

b. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special is to be used on all ground small arms below 0°F, and on all aircraft guns under all conditions. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns may be substituted.

c. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium...For lubrication of ground small arms in regions of excessive rainfall. For use on small arms during landing operations, or regions of salt spray. May be used for temporary storage of small arms.

9. OIL, neat's-foot...For cleaning and preserving leather. When not available, SOAP, saddle, may be substituted in the ration of 5 lbs. of SOAP, saddle, for 1 qt. of OIL, neat's-foot.

10. OIL, recoil, light...For oil buffer in cal..50 machine gun M2. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, preservative, special, may be substituted.

ANNEX "K"

to

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1, TUSA.

1. This annex applies only to Army Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies and the Divisional Ordnance Maintenance Companies and Battalions. Annex "K" will be furnished to Army Ordnance Companies by the Army Ordnance Officer when their mission has been definitely determined.

2. The basis for computing basic loads of division ordnance maintenance companies and battalions will be in accordance with SNL N8 for infantry divisions and SNL N65 for armored divisions.

SECRET

ANNEX "L"

FIRST ECHELON SPARE PARTS KITS FOR ORDNANCE VEHICLES

Truck Kits

Cotter Pins (assorted)	1 small box
Fan belt	1 set
Friction tap	1 4 oz. roll
Fuzes	2 of each type
Light Bulbs (for markers, blackout and tail lamps)	1 set
Shear Pins (for trucks with winch)	4 each
Soft wire (22 gage)	1 coil (1/4 lb)
Spark Plug (with gasket)	1 each
Valve caps (screwdriver type)	2 each
Valve cores	6 each

Motorcycle Kits

Blackout Tail & Stoplight (replacement unit)	1 each
Connecting link (primary chain)	2 each
Double Repair Link (generator chain)	1 each
Double Repair Link (rear drive chain)	1 each
Headlight Bulb	1 each
Marker Light (front, replacement bulb)	1 each
Repair Kit (cold patch)	1 tube
Spark Plug	1 each
Tail Light (replacement unit)	1 each
Tape	1 roll 4 oz.
Valve caps (screw type)	2 each
Valve Inserts	5 each

ANNEX "M"

KIT, DE-WATERPROOFING, WHT

SIZE: 9" x 18" x 28". WEIGHT: 55 lbs.

1 - 2 gal. can motor oil, 30 HD
1 - 1 qt. can starter and generator flushing compound
1 - 2 lb. can G S Grease # 3
1 - 1 qt. can hydraulic brake fluid
1 - cold patch tube repair kit
1 - strip 0 0 sand paper
1 - brush, cleaning
1 - 2 gal. can kerosene
3 - Rags, cleaning

ANNEX "N" TO ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS # 1, TUSA

BEACH PACKS OF ORGANIZATION SPARE PARTS - ORDNANCE

	No. boxes	Cu. Ft. per bx.	Weight per box	Basis of Issue
Truck, 3/4 ton 4x4, all models	2	2.3	58)	1 per 10 vehicles
	1	2.0	66)	
Truck, 2 1/2 ton 6x6, all models	1	2.2	74)	1 per 10 vehicles
			50)	
Truck, 1½ ton 4x4 (Chevrolet)	1	2.0	56	1 per 10 vehicles
Truck, 1/4 ton 4x4	1	1.5	51)	1 per 10 vehicles
			61)	
Rifle, auto. cal. 30 Brg. M1918A2	1	2.3	35	1 per 10 weapons
Gun, mach. cal.30, M1917A1, M1917A1 flex. M1919A6	1	2.3	35	1 per 5 weapons
Gun, sub-mach.cal.45 M1928, M1, M2, M3	1	2.3	37	1 per 25 weapons
Carbine, U.S. cal.30, M1, M1A1	1	2.3	40	1 per 50 weapons
Rifle, US, cal.30, M1903	1	2.3	40	1 per 50 weapons
Rifle, US, cal.30, M1	1	2.3	38	1 per 50 weapons
Gun, 37mm, M3, M3A1, M5, M6	1	2.3	41	1 per 5 weapons
Pistol, auto., cal.45, M1911, M1911	1	2.3	37	1 per 25 weapons
Gun, mach.cal.50 M2, HB, Flex. M2, WC, Flex.	1	2.3	37	1 per 50 weapons
Car, scout, M3A1	2	2.3 /	75/	1 per 15 vehicles
Tank, Medium, M4	1	2.3 /	75/	1 per 15 vehicles
Tank, Light, M5	2	2.3 /	75/	1 per 15 vehicles
Car, Half-track, all models	2	2.3 /	75/	1 per 15 vehicles

Note: Figures marked with (/) are estimated but will not exceed figures given.

BEACH PACKS OF ORGANIZATION SPARE PARTS - ORDNANCE

Seven day Beach Pack for Guns, Machine, Cal. .50 A/c and W/c composed of the following:

A-19

B-8976	EXTENSION, firing pin, assy.	4 ea.
B-8959	EXTRACTOR, assy.	4 ea.
B-17171	PIN, firing	4 ea.
C-64305	ROD, driving spring, w/spring assy.	4 ea.
A-9522	SPRING, belt, holding pawl	4 ea.
B-8908	SPRING, locking barrel	2 ea.
C-4037	BRUSH, cleaning, M4, cal. .50	2 ea.
D-35441	ROD, cleaning, jointed, cal. .50, M7	2 ea.

K-1

RIXS-205	CLEANER, rifle bore, 6 oz. can	4 ea.
	PATCHES, cut, canton flannel	500 ea.
2-27 3GE	OIL, lubricating, for AC & MG	1 Qt.

Basis of issue: 1 Pack for 5 Machine Guns

Seven day Beach Pack for Pistol, Automatic, Cal. .45 M1911 or M1911A1 composed of the following:

B-6

C-8694	Magazine	15 ea.
B-8599	Pin, firing	3 ea.
A-13201	Plug recoil spring	2 ea.
A-13205	Stop, firing pin	3 ea.
B-8596	Bushing, Barrel	3 ea.
B-8598	Extractor	2 ea.

M-3

C-4036	Brush, cleaning, cal.45 M5	2 ea.
C-64102	Rod, cleaning, pistol cal.45 M4	2 ea.

K-1

RIXS-203	Cleaner, rifle bore	3 ea.
	Patches, cut, canton flannel	1 ea.
AXS-772	Oil, lubricating, preservative, light 4 oz. can	6 ea.

Basis of issue: 1 Pack per 25 Pistols

Seven Day Beach Pack for Gun, 37mm, M3, M3A1, M5 and M6 composed of the following:

A-19

A-25213	Detent operating handle	3 ea.
B-18441-A	Extractor, LH	1 ea.
B-18441-B	Extractor, R.H.	1 ea.
A-25201	Pin, firing	5 ea.
A-25209	Plunger, trigger	3 ea.
A-25205	Plunger, cooking lever	3 ea.
B-8445	Sear	1 ea.
A-25206	Spring, cooking lever plunger	3 ea.
FTAXIF	Spring, comp. 037D str. .370" O.D. 8 coils	3 ea.
A-25204	Spring, firing	1 ea.

H-10

	Rod, drill rd, 0.09375" diam. (for cutting pin BFDXIBF)	2 in.

K-1

Fed. CCC-B-8-111	Burlap, jute, 8 oz.	3 yds.
Fed. P-C-451	Cloth, abrasive, aluminium oxide, 3/0 Medium	6 sheets
	Cloth, crocus	6 sheets
Fed.DDD-C-503	Cloth, wiping	3 lbs.
CFSB-6-2	Grease, O.D., 00 or 0	1 lb.
USA-2-104-a	Oil, lubricating engine, SAE 10 or 30	2 qts.
USA-2-96-a	Oil, recoil heavy	1 qt.
	Soap, G.I.	2 cakes

Basis of issue: 1 pack per 5 guns.

Seven day Beach Pack for Carbine, Cal. .30 M1 or M1A1 composed of the following:

B-28

B212603	Magazine assy.	15 ea.
A196450	Pin, retaining, trigger housing	5 ea.

M-3

C4035	Brush, cleaning, Cal. .30, M2	3 ea.
D44045	Rod, jointed, cleaning, cal. .30 M8	3 ea.

K-1

	Patches, cut, canton, flannel	2m
RIXS-205	Cleaner, rifle bore, 6-oz. can	6 ea.
AXS-702	Oil, lubricating, preservative, light 4-oz. can	12 ea.

Basis of issue: 1 Kit per 50 Carbines.

Seven day Beach Pack for Gun, Sub Machine, cal. .45 M1928 or M1 composed of the following.

A-32

B-197678	Pin, firing	5 ea.
D-35506	Magazine, Bo/0 rd.	5 ea.
B-108828	Brush, chamber, cleaning M6	3 ea.
C-64183	Rod, cleaning, sub-mach. gun, M3	3 ea.
C-4036	Brush, cleaning, cal. .45 M5	3 ea.

K-1

RIXS-205	Cleaner, rifle bore, 6 oz. can	3 ea.
	Patches, cut, canton, flannel	1m
AXS-702	Oil lubricating, preservative light, 4 oz. can	6 ea.

Basis of issue: 1 Kit per 25 SMC

Seven day Beach Pack for CHEVROLET 1½ ton, 4 x 4 TM 10-1176 - each Kit to contain the following:

839676	Oil line assy., oil gauge at engine	2 ea.
3663382	Inlet tube assy.	2 ea.
3663382	Outlet tube assy.	2 ea.
839656	Carburetor assy.	2 ea.
1537714	Fuel pump assy.	3 ea.
1523096	Gasket, fuel pump bowl	4 ea.
1537056	Bowl, fuel, pump metal	4 ea.
3660282	Hose, radiator inlet	3 ea.
3651048	Hose, radiator outlet, upper & lower	3 ea.
1110136	Distributor assy.	2 ea.
1883500	Rotor, distributor	4 ea.

1867722	Cap, distributor	4 ea.
186904	Condenser assy.	4 ea.
005628	Voltage regulator	1 ea.
1115149	Coil assy.	3 ea.
476719	Hose assy., ft. & rear brake	4 ea.
839968	Belt, fan	1 ea.
1855720	Breaker, points	1 ea.
1105854	Generator assy.	1 ea.

PARTS COMMON

17-P-5355	Spark plugs	18 ea.
17-P-16218 -50	Fuses	4 sets
17-T-805	Tape, friction general use, black 3/4	5 rolls
17-T-1445	Tape, rubber insulating 3/4"	1 roll
22-T-1067	Wire, 22 gauge, soft (stove pipe) 50 ft.	2 rolls
15-C-2185	Cable, low tension No. 8 gauge spools	1 spool
8-A-1950	Clamps, radiator hose, universal type	4 ea.
51-H-158	Fluid, brake hydraulic	2 qts.
15-C-2150	Cable high tension ignition	25 ft.
51-C-1605	Sealer, cooling system (10-oz. can)	2 ea.

Seven day Beach Pack for FORD, ¼ ton, GPW, 4x4 - TM 10-1348 - Each kit to contain the following:

GPW 9316	Tube assy., oil gauge	2 ea.
" 9510	Carburetor assy.	2 ea.
9350	Fuel pump	3 ea.
9364	Gasket, fuel pump bowl	4 ea.
9355	Bowl, fuel pump metal	4 ea.
8260	Hose, radiator water outlet	3 ea.
8286	Hose, radiator upper outlet	3 ea.
12100	Distributor assy.	2 ea.
12200	Rotor, distributor	4 ea.
12106	Cap, distributor	4 ea.
12300	Condenser, assy.	4 ea.
10505	Voltage regulator & circuit breaker	1 ea.
12000	Coil, ignition and breaker assy.	3 ea.
GP 2078	Hose assy, brake rear, 15 inches	4 each
GPW 2078	" " " front 11 inches	4 each
2079	" " " " 6 inches	4 each
12405	Spark plug	18 each
17-F-16218-50	Fuses	4 each
8 A 1950	Clamp, radiator hose, univ. type	4 each
51-H-158	Fluid, brake, 2 quarts	2 quarts
15 C 2150	Cable, high tension, ignition sets	25 ft.
17 T 805	Tape, friction, general use, black, 3/4"	5 rolls
17 T 1445	" rubber, insulating, 3/4"	1 roll
22 W 1067	Wire, 22ga, soft, stove pipe, 50 ft.	50 2 rolls
15 C 2185	Cable, low tension No. 8 ga	1 spool
51 C 1605	Sealer, cooling system 10 oz can	2 each
GPW 8620	Belt, fan & generator	1 each
100000A	Generator assy	1 each
18354	Breaker pts	2 each

Basis of issue: 1 per 10 vehicles

Seven day Beach Pack for RIFLE, cal .30 M1. SNL B-21, consisting of the following:

B 8617	Lock, rearsight, mut assy	6 Each
B 147799	Nut, " "	6
C113697	Pinion, elevating rear sight	2
20-18-2025	Sling, gun, M1907	2
B 8879	Pin, firing	2
C 57156	Bolt, assy	2

M-3

6 4035	Brush, cleaning, cal.30,M2	3
D 8237	Rod, cleaning, jointed cal.30,M1	3

K-1

	Patches, cut, canton flannel	2 M
RIXS 205	Cleaner, Rifle Bore, 6 oz can	6 each
AXS 702	Oil, lub, preservative, light 4 oz can	12
C 121059	Container, grease, M1, filled w/grease, Rifle, lubri.plate 130-A	1

Basis of issue, one kit per 50 rifles

Seven day Beach Pack for Rifle, U. S. Cal.30, M-1903, composed of the following:

B-3

C 45028	Extractor	3 each
B 146871	Mainspring	3
B 128431	Pin, firing	5
B 128417	Sleeve, firing, pin	3
B 128425	Striker	5
C 45034	Spring, magazine	5

M-3

C 4035	Brush, cleaning, cal.30, M2	3
D 8237	Rod, cleaning, jointed, M1	3

K-1

	Patches, cut, canton-flannel	2 M
RIXS 205	Cleaner, rifle bore, 6 oz can	6 each
AXS 702	Oil, lub, preservative, light, 4 oz can	12

Basis of issue: 1 per 50 rifles

Seven Day Beach Pack for Cal..30 Machine Gun, composed of the following:

A-19

C 64135	Extractor assy	3 ea
B 9718	Lever cocking	3 ea
B 17503	Lever feed belt	3 ea
C 9186	Pin, firing assy	3 ea
B 147225	Spring belt holding pawl	3 ea
B 212654	Spring driving	3 ea
B 108828	Brush, chamber cleaning M6	1 ea

M-3

C 4035	BRUSH, cleaning cal. 30 M2	2 ea.
D 354141	ROD, cleaning jointed M7	2 ea

K-1

RIXS 205	CLEANER, rifle bore 6 oz. can	4 ea
	Patches, cut, canton flannel	400 ea
2-27B	OIL lub. for AC & Mg.	1 qt.

Basis of issue: 1 Kit per 5 M.G. Cal.30

Seven Day Beach Pack for Browning auto Rifle M1918, M1918A1 and M1918 A2 composed as follows:

A-4

C 9090	EXTRACTOR	2 ea
B 19662	PIN, firing	10 ea
A 22202	Spring, extractor	2 ea
B 147333	Washer friction assy magazine	2 ea
C 7912	EXTRACTOR ruptured cartridge Mk IV Mach gun Cal. 30	1 ea
C 3854	Extractor ruptured cartridge MKII	1 ea
B 6939	Tool Combination	1 ea

M 1 1

C 4035	Brush cleaning Cal..30 M2	2 ea
D 8237	Rod, cleaning jointed Cal..30 M1	2 ea

K-1

RIXS 205	CLEANER, rifle bore 6 oz. cans	3 ea
	Patches cut, canton flannel	500 ea
AXS	OIL lub. preservative lt. 4 oz.	5 ea

BASIS of issue: 1 kit per 10 B.A.R.

Seven day Beach Pack GMC 2-1/2 Ton 6x6 TM 10-1268- each kit to contain the following:

2126429	OIL line assy oil gauge at engine.	2 ea
2136145	Inlet tube assy	2 ea
2136146	Outlet tube assy	2 ea
2135998	Carburetor assy	2 ea
1537714	Fuel pump assy	3 ea
1523096	Fuel pump bowl gasket	4 ea
1537065	Fuel pump bowl	4 ea
2140818	Hose radiator inlet	3 ea
2140852	Hose radiator to pipe	3 ea
2140852	Hose pipe to water pump	3 ea

1110075	Distributor assy	2 ea
820145	Rotor distributor	4 ea
824735	Cap, distributor	4 ea
1869704	Condenser assy	4 ea
005628	Voltage regulator	1 ea
1115143	Coil assy ignition	3 ea
2076248	Brake hose rear	4 ea
2100591	Brake hose frt.	4 ea
Del 1118468	Voltage regulator	1 ea
Del 2090464	Belt generator	1 ea
Del 1105864	Generator assy	1 ea
1855720	Breaker points	2 ea

PARTS COMMON

17-B-5355	Spark Plugs	18 ea
17 F 16218 -50	Fuses assorted	4 sets
17 T 805	Tape friction general use black 3/4"	5 rolls
17 T 1445	Tape rubber insulating 3/4"	1 roll
22 T 1067	Wire, 22 gauge soft (stove pipe) 50	5 rolls
15 C 2185	Cable low tension No, 8 gauge	1 spool
8 A 1950	Clamps radiator hose universal type	4 ea.
51 H 158	Fluid, brake hydraulic	2 qts.
15 C 22150	Cable high tension	25 ft.
51 C 1605	Sealer cooling system (10-oz cans)	2 ea.

Basis of issue: 1 per 10 vehicles.

Seven day Beach Pack for DODGE 3/4 ton, 4 x 4 - TM, 10-1530, each kit to contain the following:

655074	Hose, engine to oil filter.	2 ea
655074	Hose, engine to oil gauge.	2 ea
922260	Carburetor, assy.	3 ea
639110	Fuel pump bowl gasket	4 ea
922057	Fuel pump bowl	4 ea
6396328	Radiator hose outlet upper 4"	3 sets
6638518	Radiator hose inlet 2 1/4"	3 sets
923891	Distributer assy	2 ea
868095	Rotor, distributor	4 ea
643822	Cap, distributor	4 ea
921274	Condenser, assy	4 ea
922487	Voltage regulator (6 volt)	1 ea
913344	VOLTAGE regulator (12 volt)	1 ea
920367	Coil assy, ignition (6 volt)	3 ea
924053	Coil assy, ignition (12 volt)	3 ea
922386	Hose assy to front wheels	4 ea
926559	Hose assy frame to front axle	4 ea
922799	Hose assy to rear axle.	4 ea
922420	Hose assy to rear axle (ambulance)	4 ea
617171	Belt, fan & gen, 12 volt	1 ea
614966	Belt, fan & gen, 6 volt	1 ea
922488	Generator, assy, 6 volt	1 ea
918720	Generator, assy, 12 volt	1 ea
921022	Fuel pump assy	1 ea
592477	Breaker points	2 ea

PARTS COMMON

925380	Spark plugs	18 ea
17-T-805	Tape, friction, general use, black 3/4"	5 rolls
17-T-1445	Tape, rubber, insulating, 3/4"	1 roll
22-T-1067	Wire, 22 gauge soft (Soft pipe)(50 rolls)	2 rolls
15-C-2185	CABLE, low tension No. 8 gauge.	1 spool
8-A-1950	Clamps, radiator hose, universal type	12 ea
51-H-158	Fluid brake, hydraulic	2 qts.
15-C-2150	Cable, high tension ignition	25 ft.
51-C-1605	Sealer, cooling system (10 oz. cans)	2 ea
830819	Fuse, 2 amp. unit 148086	1 box
830820	Fuse, 5 amp. unit 126049	1 box
830821	Fuse, 14 amp. unit 147685	1 box
831822	Fuse, 15 amp. unit 120151	1 box
830823	Fuse, 20 amp. unit 106653	1 box
830824	Fuse, 30 amp. unit 120114	1 box
830825	Fuse, 30 amp. unit 147586	1 box

Seven day Beach Pack for Tank, Medium M4, MK. TM-1, composed of the following:

147582	Carburetor, assy.	1 ea
092050	Pump, fuel.	2 ea
GWR20193	Magneto, Model VAG-9D-FA	2 ea
B158135	Plug, spark assy	100 ea
B170175	Pump, primer.	2 ea
066761	Filter, oil	2 ea
084893	Regulator, voltage.	1 ea

S-18170-H-3	Motor Hose, control valve to motor tube 24 1/2"	2 ea
S-18170-L-2	Pressure hose, hydraulic pump to control valve 31	2 ea
S187170-K-2	Motor tubes, motor hose to hydraulic motor	2 ea
S18170-D-2	Return hose, control valve to oil reservoir	2 ea
S-18170-M-2	Suction hose, oil reservoir to hydraulic pump	2 ea
S-18170-V-3	Motor drain tube, hydraulic motor to reservoir	2 ea
S-18170-U-3	Breather tube, installed top of oil reservoir	2 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 10 amps.	20 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 20 amps.	20 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 30 amps.	20 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 60 amps.	30 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 80 amps.	30 ea
G104-15-24212 or A122301	Cap, screws, sprocket.	24 ea

Basis for issue: 1 Kit per 4 - 15 vehicles inclusive
2 Kits per 16 - 30 vehicles inclusive
3 Kits per 31 - 45 vehicles inclusive
4 Kits per 46 - 60 vehicles inclusive
5 Kits per 61 - 75 vehicles inclusive
6 Kits per 76 - 90 vehicles inclusive
7 Kits per 91 - 105 vehicles inclusive
8 Kits per 106 - 120 vehicles inclusive

NOTE: A complete Kit for Tank, Medium M4 series consists of 1 Kit marked TM-1.

Seven day Beach Pack for Scout Car, Mk. SC-1, each composed of the following:

C74117	Arm, front axle steering knuckle.	2 ea
B156068	Belt, engine fan, rubber fabric V-type	10 ea
B167753	Carburetor, assembly	1 ea
CMAXIG	Clamp, hose w/hardware	5 ea
A175391	Fuse, cartridge, type 0.5 amp.	15 ea
A167692	Fuse, cartridge, type 10 Amp.	20 ea
A167692-C	Fuse, cartridge, type 20 amp.	30 ea
A175250	Fuse, cartridge, type 50 amp.	20 ea
B167776	Hose, oil assembly	5 ea
A171682	Hose, stem rubber, water pump	5 ea
A175400	Hose, radiator, rubber, 1-1/2"	5 ea
A186862	Line, fuel assembly	10 ea
A186865	Line, fuel assembly	10 ea
C74145	Line, fuel assembly	10 ea
W1400753	Line, fuel assembly	6 ea
C74115	Pump, fuel and vacuum assembly	2 ea
W1344910	Generator	1 ea
B156000	Coil ignition	1 ea

Scout Car, Mk, SC-2, Kits consisting of the following:

B167664	Generator, ass'y	1 ea
B156103	Hose, front wheel brake ass'y	10 ea
B156034	Hose, rear wheel brake ass'y	5 ea
WI-B81615	Hose, rear wheel brake assembly	5 ea
B167780	Line, vacuum, check valve to engine inlet manifold ass'y	10 ea
WL-363114	Plug, spark, w/ gasket ass'y, 14mm Champion J-10	50 ea
AL-VRM-3008A	Regulator, current, generator regulator complete ass'y	2 ea
AL-VRH-3071A	Regulator, voltage, generator regulator complete ass'y	2 ea

Basis of issue: 1 Kit per 4 - 15 vehicles inclusive
2 Kits per 16 - 30 vehicles inclusive
3 Kits per 31 - 45 vehicles inclusive
4 Kits per 46 - 60 vehicles inclusive

NOTE: A complete Kit per Car, Scout, M3A1 consists of Kit marked SC-1, and Kit SC-2. It is important that these 2 Kits be issued as 1 Kit, complete, for Car, Scout, M3A1.

Seven day Beach Pack for Tank, light, M5, T1-5-1 composed of the following:

C103-15-39650	Coil, ignition	1 ea
C107514	Distributor, assy	1 ea
B226447	Filter, ignition coil feed	2 ea
A261919	Plug, spark (AC-10mm-type 104)	100 ea
C107584	Generator, engine assy	1 ea
A261976	Resistor, spark plug	4 ea
C105542	Pump, fuel assy	2 ea
C105674	Filter, fuel engine assy	2 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 10 space	20 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 20 amps	20 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 30 amps	20 ea
	Fuse, cartridge type, 60 amps	30 ea
A123043	Studs, sprocket	12 ea

Kit, Tank, light, M5, Mk T1-5-2 and composed of the following:

B226230	Belt, fan drive	10 ea
C105552	Belt, waterpump and generator	10 ea
A261603	Hose, by pass, water pump	10 ea
A261910	Hose, inner, connection cylinder head	10 ea
A21602	Hose, outer, cylinder head to radiator	10 ea
A261601	Hose, water pump to radiator	10 ea
D60080	Carburetor assy	2 ea

Basis of issue: 1 Kit per 4 - 15 vehicles inclusive
2 Kits per 16 - 30 vehicles inclusive

NOTE: A complete kit for Tank, light, M5 series consists of Kit marked T1-5-1 and Kit marked T1-512. It is important that these 2 kits be issued together as Kit, complete per Tank, light M5 series.

Seven day Beach Pack for Armored Car, M8:

Basis for issue: One kit per using company.

2 - AL-1AC11016	-	Rotor
1 - C118305	-	Carburetor
2 - Al-1AC1051	-	Cap Distributor
2 - B248695	-	Coil ignition assy
1 - D67369-A	-	Generator, w/ pulley assy
1 - C118073	-	Regulator, voltage
1 - C118130	-	Fuel pump
2 - Al-10PO-3028FS	-	Points, breaker, dist.
1 - 38990	-	Condenser, assy. (Al-1G-267IN)
2 - A-284017A	-	Hose, brake, assy
1 - A-284017B	-	Hose, brake, assy
2 - A-285128A	-	Hose, brake, assy

PARTS COMMON

6 - 17-P-5355	-	Plug, spark, 14mm
1 qt 51-H-158	-	Fluid, brake, hydraulic
1 ft 53-H-775	-	Hose, radiator, rubber
1 - 17-T-805	-	Tape, friction, 3/4". (roll)

Beach Packs of Organization Spare Parts - Ordnance - cont.

Seven day Beach Pack for Half Track, marked HT-1, composed of the following:

C85547	Distributor, assy	1 ea
C85548	Carburetor assy	1 ea
C85756	Arm, steering knuckle front axle	2 ea
A214425	Arm, steering gear w/ball assy	2 ea
D48144	Belt, fan assy	5 ea
B167722	Hose, flexible metallic assy	5 ea
A214907	Hose, brake vacuam booster air cleaner to tube	5 ea
A214911	Hose, brake vacuam booster check valve pipe to power cylinder.	5 ea
A214912	Hose, brake vacuam booster tubing to power cylinder	5 ea
B-184318	Hose, hydraulic brake front wheel assy	5 ea
A186757	Hose, hydraulic brake near connection to axle tee	5 ea
B184222	Cable, low tension coil to distributor w/shielding assy	3 ea
B184161	Cable, shielded, ignition coil to distributor w/wire assy	3 ea
B184162	Cable, shielded, ignition choke coil to ignition switch assy	3 ea
B184158	Cable, shielded to No. 1 & No. 6, engine cylinders w/wire assy	3 ea
B184159	Cable, shielded to No. 2 & No. 5 engine cylinders w/wire assy	3 ea
B184160	Cable, shielded to No. 3 & No. 4 engine cylinders w/wire assy	3 ea
DR-000985	Generator	1 ea
D-48144	Belt, fan	1 ea
B-156000	Coil, Ignition	1 ea

Kits, Half Track, marked MT-2 composed of the following:

D48138	Generator assy	1 ea
B184433	Regulator, current generator regulator assy	2 ea
D48141	Regulator, generator assy	2 ea
B184434	Regulator, voltage, generator regulator assy	2 ea
B184432	Relay, cut-out, generator regulator assy	2 ea
A175391	Fuse, 0.5 amperes, cartridge type, glass enclosed	15 ea
A16792	Fuse, 10 amperes, cartridge type, glass enclosed	30 ea
A186591	Fuse, 20 amperes, cartridge type, glass enclosed	20 ea
A175250	Fuse, 50 amperes, cartridge type, glass enclosed	20 ea
A167716	Hose, radiator 1-1/2 in.	5 ea
AQRXI	Hose, radiator 1-3/4 in.	5 ea
A214380	Condenser, generator armature assy	5 ea
A215207	Condenser, generator, filter assy	5 ea
B184215	Plug, spark assy	100 ea
C85536	Pump, fuel and vacuam assy	1 ea
B-185718	Breaker, circuit assy	2 ea

Basis of issue: 1 Kit per 4 - 15 vehicles inclusive
2 Kits per 16 - 30 vehicles inclusive
4 Kits per 31 - 45 vehicles inclusive
5 Kits per 61 - 75 vehicles inclusive
6 Kits per 90 vehicles

NOTE: A complete Kit per Car, half-track, all models consists of Kit marked HT-1 and Kit marked HT-2. It is important that these 2 Kits be issued one Kit, complete, for Car, half-track, all models.

PHASING SCHEDULE CLASS III SUPPLIES Annex "O"

SCHEDULE I - SHIPMENT OF MAINTENANCE SUPPLIES (D ⁄ 29 thru D ⁄ 41)

LANDING DATE	NO. OF DAYS' SUPPLY	FOR
POL		
D ⁄ 29	Two days	All vehicles and equipment scheduled to land D ⁄ 29.
D ⁄ 30	Two days	All vehicles and equipment scheduled to land D ⁄ 30.
	One day	All vehicles and equipment previously landed.
D ⁄ 31 and each day thereafter thru D ⁄ 41	One day	All vehicles and equipment scheduled to land current day plus all vehicles and equipment previously landed.
SOLID FUELS		
Daily (D ⁄ 29 thru D ⁄ 41)	One day	Hospitals only.

SCHEDULE II - SHIPMENT OF ARMY RESERVE - (POL and Coal for hospitals)

a. Seven days' reserve for force on far shore, based on strength D ⁄ 41 and an additional reserve tonnage of Class III supplies to cover unforseen fluctuations in vehicle strengths, will be landed as shown below:

LANDING DATE	SEVEN DAYS' RESERVE BASED ON STRENGTH OF D ⁄ 41	ADDITIONAL RESERVE
D ⁄ 24	1/13 of Total Reserve	4.3 Tons - Gasoline only
D ⁄ 25		4.3 Tons - Gasoline only
D ⁄ 26		26.5 Tons - Gasoline only
D ⁄ 27		145.3 Tons - Gasoline only
D ⁄ 28		191.7 Tons - Gasoline only
D ⁄ 29	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 30	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 31	1/13 of Total Reserve	328.1 Tons - Balanced Class III
D ⁄ 32	1/13 of Total Reserve	175.9 Tons - Balanced Class III
D ⁄ 33	1/13 of Total Reserve	68.0 Tons - Balanced Class III
D ⁄ 34	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 35	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 36	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 37	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 39	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 40	1/13 of Total Reserve	
D ⁄ 41	1/13 of Total Reserve	
TOTAL	7 Days	944.1 Tons

b. Seven days' reserve for all troops landed subsequent to D ⁄ 41 will be shipped to far shore as soon as tonnage allocations are made available to TUSA.

SCHEDULE III-FACTORS IN PLANNING DAY OF SUPPLY FOR MAINTENANCE & RESERVE

ITEM	BASIS	FACTOR (30% safety factor included)
FUEL		
Fuel, vehicles with carburators	50 operational miles per day.	8 gal per wheeled vehicle 32 gal per half-tracked vehicle 65 gal per full-tracked vehicle
Fuel for misc. powered equipment (T/O&E)		
Gasoline	10-hour day	9% of total vehicle fuel
Diesel fuel	10-hour day	1.4% of total vehicle fuel
Diesel fuel for misc. powered equipment (non T/O & E)	10-hour day	9.8% of total vehicle fuel
Gasoline for Field Ranges	Normal Use	6% of total vehicle fuel
Kerosene	Normal Use	.005 gal per man per day
LUBRICANTS		
Total Engine Oils	50 operational miles per day.	3% of total fuel (less gasoline for field ranges)
Engine Oil		
SAE 10	" " "	10% of total Engine Oil
SAE 30	" " "	60% of total Engine Oil
SAE 50	" " "	30% of total Engine Oil
Gear Oil	" " "	1% of total fuel (less gasoline for field ranges)
Total Greases	" " "	1.5 lbs per 100 gals total fuel
Grease GP #1	" " "	70% of total greases
GP #2	" " "	10% of total greases
WB #3	" " "	10% of total greases
WP #4	" " "	10% of total greases
Coal	Normal Use	5 lbs per Hospital bed per day.

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

Annex "P"

AG 471 GNMCD-3

4 May 1944

SUBJECT: Basic Loads of Ammunition.

TO : See Distribution.

1. Letter, this headquarters, subject as above, dated 24 April 1944, and Inclosure thereto, is rescinded.

2. The attached charts, furnished for your information and guidance, indicate the "Basic Loads of Ammunition" established for all units assigned or attached to this headquarters. Previously established loads have been changed herein in the following respect:

a. Grenades: -- Loads have been changed.

b. Tank Destroyer Units: --Loads have been changed.

c. Antiaircraft Units: -- Certain ammunition percentages have been changed.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

1 Incl:
Basic Load of Ammunition Chart.

R. W. HARTMAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:
"A" & "D"
Plus 10 copies each Div and higher Hq.

RESTRICTED

BASIC LOAD FOR INFANTRY
"PER WEAPON" FIGURES

Weapon and Ammunition	Carried on Individual	Carried on Prime Mover	Carried on Unit Train	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30, M1	60		15	75	100% Ball
Rifle, Cal..30, M1 (In rifle squads)	80		48	128	55% Ball 40% AP 5% Tr
Rifle, Cal..30, M1 (Not in rifle squads)	80			80	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1903	50		50	100	55% Ball 40% AP 5% Tr
Rifle, Auto., Cal..30 M1918A2	380		444	824	
Gun, Mach., Cal..30 M1917A1		8000	1000	9000	Types discretionary with Div. Commanders
Gun, Mach., Cal..30 M1919A6		2500	2500	5000	
Pistol, Auto., Cal..45	21		7	28	100% Ball
Gun, Machine, Cal..50 M2		330	110	440	AP, I & T (2-2-1)
Gun, 57mm (AT)		60		60	100% AP
Mortar, 60mm		54	72	126	95% HE; 5% Illum.
Mortar, 81mm		96	60	156	70% HE Lt; 15% HE Hvy; 15% Smoke
Howitzer, 105mm (M3)		30	78 (on Co. transportation)	108	60% HE w/PDFM4A1 25% HE w/PDF154 10% Smoke 5% HEAT
Launcher, Rocket AT	6		4	10	
Launcher, Grenade-M7 (for Rifle M1)	6		1	7	50% AT; 50% Frag.
Launcher, Grenade-M8 (for Carbine M1)	2		1	3	50% AT; 50% Frag.
Signal, Pyro. (per Projector)					To conform to SOI
Grenade, Hand, Frag.				1000	
Grenade, Hand, Off., w/fuze				1000	Per regiment, to be distributed at discretion of regimental commanders
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC-M8				400	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP M15				400	
Grenade, Hand, Incendiary, M14					12 per Div Hq 8 per Sep Bn 8 per Regtl Hq 4 per Co. or Btry 4 per Bn Hq 1 per Motor Veh, except Med Veh used for evacuation of personnel 5 per Gun, or How., 75mm or larger
Flare, Troop, Recognition, Yellow					To conform to SOI
Mine, AT, M1				400	Per Regiment
Torpedo, Bangalore				30	Per Regiment
Pot, Smoke, M1 or M2		54		54	Per Regiment
Demolitions					As prescribed by T/E
Grenade, Rifle, Smoke Colored, T8E1				200	Distributed as determined by Regtl. C.O.
Grenade, Hand, Smoke Colored, M16 and M18 (assorted colors)				400	
Signals, Ground (for Launchers) M17A1, to M22A1, and M51A1 and M52A1					To conform to SOI
Devices, Firing				900	
Flare, Trip, Parachute, M48				30	Per Regiment
Flare, Trip, Parachute, M49					

NOTE: In all instances in which ammunition percentages by types are not indicated in these basic load charts, percentages prescribed in WD, Day of Supply Instructions, will be used.

BASIC AMMUNITION LOADS FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS BATTALION
PER WEAPON (4.2 MORTAR)

Weapon	Carried on Individual	Carried on Prime Mover or its Trailer or accompanying Veh.	Carried on Battalion Trains	Total	Remarks
Carbine	60	40		100	
Pistol	21			21	
Gun, Machine, Cal..50		795		795	AP-I-Tr (2-2-1)
Launcher, Rocket		4		4	
Launcher, Grenade		2	1	3	50% AP; 5% Frag.
Grenade, Hand, Frag.				200	Per battalion.
Grenade, Hand, Off., w/fuze				200	Distribution at discretion of C.O.
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC M8					2 per Mtr Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP M15					2 per Mtr Veh except Med. Veh.
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18 5 assorted colors					2 per Mtr Vehicle
Grenade, Incendiary M14					8 per Sep Bn Hq 4 per Co 5 per Cml Mortar 4.2" 1 per Mtr Veh.except Med Veh
Rifle, Automatic	540	120	240	700	55% Ball; 40% AP; 5% Tr
Mortar, Cml, 4.2"		36	44	80	50% HE; 50% smoke
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80		48	128	55% Ball; 40% AP, 5% Tracer

BASIC LOAD FOR COMBAT ENGINEER UNITS
"PER WEAPON" FIGURES

Weapon and Ammunition	Carried on Individual	Carried on Prime Mover	Carried on Unit Train	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30 M1	60		15	75	100% Ball
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80		48	128	5% Tr; 40% AP; 55% Ball
Gun, Machine, Cal. .30 M1917A1		2000	500	2500	AP & T (4-1)
Pistol, Auto., Cal..45	21			21	100% Ball
Gun, SMG, Cal..45	90	60	90	240	100% Ball
Gun, Machine, Cal. .50 M2		530		530	AP-I-T (2-2-1)
Launcher, Rocket, AT		6	4	10	
Launcher, Grenade, M7 (for M1 Rifle)		4	6	10	50% AT; 50% Frag.
Launcher, Grenade, M8 (for Carbine)		2	1	3	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.				360	Per Battalion. Distribution at discretion of Bn Commander
Grenade, Hand, Off., w/fuze				360	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC M8				40	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, (WP) M15				40	
Grenade, Hand, Incend., M14					8 per Bn Hq, Regtl Hq, Gp Hq 4 per Co 1 per Mtr Veh except Med Veh
Flare, Troop, Recognition, Yellow					To conform to SOI
Mine, AT, M1		1000		1000	
Mine, AP, M2 or M3		100	100	200	
Mine, AP, MK II			25	25	
Torpedo, Bangalore		100	50	150	
TNT, ½ lb Blocks			5150 lbs	5150lbs	
Charge, Beehive, M1, M2 and/or M3		40	300	340	Per Battalion of Combat Engineers
Block, Demolition, M2, Individual			1800 lbs	1800lbs	
Cap, Blasting, Non-electric			3710	3710	
Cap, Blasting, Elec.			2575	2575	
Fuse, Blasting, Time			3700 ft	3700 ft	
Cord, Detonating			11700 ft	11700 ft	
Lighter, Fuse			2210	2210	
Flare, Trip, Parachute, M48			30	30	Per Battalion of Combat Engineers
Flare, Trip, Parachute, M49			100	100	
Grenade, Rifle, Smoke, Colored, T8E1				40	Per Battalion

SECRET

Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Asst'd Colors, M16 or M18	40	Distribution by type as determined by Bn. Commander.
Signals, Ground (for launchers) M17A1 to M22A1 & M51A1 & M52A1		To conform to SOI
Filling, PPT, M1A1 (5-gal Fuel "K") 8 cu.ft. H2, 40 cu.ft. N2 1.31 lb		1 per flame thrower

BASIC LOAD FOR FIELD ARTILLERY
"PER WEAPON" FIGURES

Weapon and Ammunition	Carried on Indiv	Carried on Prime Mover	Carried in 5th Sect.	Carried in Bn Trains	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30	60				60	
Pistol, Cal..45	21				21	
Cal..45 SMG	90			90	180	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1903	50				50	55% Ball; 40% AP; 5% Tr
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80				80	55% Ball; 40% AP; 5% Tr
Gun, Mach., Cal..50		795			795	AP-I-Tr (2-2-1)
Launcher, Rocket, AT		4			4	
Launcher, Grenade, M8 for Carbine M1		2		1	3	50% AP; 50% Frag.
Grenade, Rifle, Smk, Colored, M28A1					10	Per Btry. Types and quantities to conform to SOI
Grenade, Hand, Smk, Colored, M16 or M18					10	
Flare, Troop, Recognition, Yellow						To conform to SOI
Signals, Pyro.						
Grenades, Hand, Smk, HC M8						2 per vehicle except motorcycle
Grenade, Hand, Smk, WP M15						2 per vehicle except Medical
Grenade, Hand, Incendiary, M14						8 per Bn or Gp Hq 4 per Btry 1 per Mtr Vehicle except Medical 5 per Gun or How. 75mm or larger
Grenade, Hand, Frag.					100	Per Battalion
Grenade, Hand, Off., w/fuze					100	Distribution discretionary with C.O.
How., 105mm M2 Truck Drawn	42	78	116		236	50% HE, W/PDF, M48A1, 35% HE, W/PDF, M64; 15% Smoke, ½ WP, ½ HC M84 plus 5 rds HEAT
How., 105mm M2, SP	123	23	78		224	
How., 155mm M1 or 1918, Truck Drawn	36	37	46		119	85% HE, 15% Smoke (½HC-½WP). Fuses 72½% M51A1, 5% M67A1;25% M55A1, 7½% M54. Propelling Charge: 60% WB, 40% GB
How., 155mm M1 or 1918 (Trac. Drawn)	24	53	46		123	Same as 155mm How. (Trk Drawn) above
4.5 in Gun (Trk Dr)	48	46	67		161	100% Shell HE. Propelling Charge 50% SC, 50% NC. Fuzes: 100% M51A1, 10% M67A1
4.5 in. Gun (Trac. Dr)	38	73	68		179	Same as for 4.5" Gun (Truck Dr) above
Gun, 155mm, (Trk Dr)	36	54			90	85% Shell HE, 15% Shell, Smoke WP. Fuses: 10% M67A1, 70% M51A1, 30% M55 A1. Propelling Charge: 100%
Gun, 155mm (Trk Dr)*	15	89			104	Same as for 155mm Gun, (Trk Dr) above
Gun, 155mm, SP	50	30			80	Same as for 155mm Gun (Trk Dr) above
How., 8 in (Trk Dr)	21	16			37	100% Shell HE; Fuzes: 100% M51A1; 10% M67. Propelling Charge 70% WB, 30% GB
How., 8 in (Trac Dr)*	12	40			52	Same as for 8" How (Trk Dr) above
Gun, 8 in (Trac Dr) T/E	30	68			98	100% Shell, HE, Fuzes: 100% M51A1 (mod.1) 10% M67. Propelling Charge: 100%
Gun, 8 in (Trac Dr) (Sub. Equip)		53			53	
How., 240mm (Trac Dr) T/E	28	59			87	100% Shell HE. Fuzes: 100% M51A1 10% M67. Propelling Charge 100%
How., 240mm (Trac Dr) (Sub. Equip)		59			59	
How., 240mm (Trk Dr)	36	25			61	Same as for 240mm How. (Trac Dr) above

* T/O & E 6-357 and T/O & E 6-367 will be changed to provide one 2½-ton truck w/trailer per weapon; pending availability of 10-ton ammunition trailer.

BASIC LOADS FOR ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
"PER WEAPON" FIGURE

Weapon	Carried on Individual	On Prime Mover or H/Track in SP Bn	Accompanying Trans.	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30	45		15	60	
Rifle, M1, Cal..30	80			80	55% Ball, 40% AP 5% Tracer
Rifle, 1903, Cal..30	50			50	55% Ball, 40% AP 5% Tracer
Pistol, Cal..45	21			21	
Sub MG, Cal..45	90			90	
Cal..50MG (HB) M2 M37 Mts		795		795	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
Cal..50 MG (AA) Water cooled		2120	265	2385	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
Launcher, Grenade	4			4	A.T.
Signals, Pyro., per Projector					To conform to SOI
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh except Med Veh, fuel. Prime Movers
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M18 (5 assorted colors)					10 per battery
Grenade, Smoke, White HC, M8					2 per Veh incl. Prime Movers
Grenade, Hand Incendiary, M14					8 per Bn or Gp Hq 4 per Btry; 1 per Mtr Veh except Med; 5 per Gun, 75mm or larger
H/Track, M2					
Cal..30 MG	3000			3000	AP & T (4-1)
Cal..50 MG	1060			1060	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
H/Track, M5					
Cal..30 MG	1250			1250	AP & T (4-1)
Mount, SP, M16 Quad Mount Cal..50 MG	5000			5000	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
Mount, SP, M15 Twin, Cal..50 MG	3400			3400	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
Mount, SP, M15A1 Twin, Cal..50 MG	1200			1200	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
37mm AA Gun	200			200	90% HE, 10% AP
Carriage, MG, Multiple, Cal. .50, M51	5000			5000	AP-I & T (2-2-1)
37mm or 40mm AA Gun (SP)	240			240	95% HE, 5% AP
40mm AA Gun (Towed)	336			336	95% HE, 5% AP
90mm AA Gun (Towed)	54	68		122	95% HE, 5% AP or APC

BASIC LOAD FOR COMBAT VEHICLES
"PER WEAPON" - "PER VEHICLE" FIGURES

Weapons in Combat Vehicles; allowance per Vehicle	On Individual Armed	On Combat Veh. or its Trailer or Accompanying Vehicle	On Unit Train Except for Sep. Units	Total	Remarks
Carrier, Pers., HT, M3					
Cal..30 MG		3750 (TD-1500)	1250	5000	
Cal..50 MG		795 (TD-1100)	265	1060	
Cal..45 SMG	90	450 (TD-180)	150	690	
Grenade, Hand, Off.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand Frag., w/Fuze		6		6	
Grenade, Hand Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Vehicle except Med
Grenade, Hand, Smk, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Incend., M14					1 per Vehicle
Grenade, Rifle. AT, or Frag.	4	10		14	
Mines, AT, M1		26		26	
Rocket, AT, M6	4	6		10	
Carriage, Motor, 75mm, M8 75mm		133	111	244	85% HE; (50% w/ fuse M48, 35% w/ fuse M54; 10% smoke, 5% HEAT
Carriage, Motor, 75mm, M8 Cal..50 MG		330		330	
Cal..45 SMG	90	240		330	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incendiary					1 per Veh, except Medical
Carrier, 81mm Mortar HT, M4 81mm Mortar		96	60	156	(For Armd Regt: 75% Smk; 15% HE Lt; 10% HE Hvy. For Armd Inf: 75% HE Lt; 10% Hvy; 15% Smoke
Cal..30 MG		3750	1250(a) 5000		(a) except in Armd Regt
Cal..50 MG		795	265(a) 1060		
Cal..45 SMG	90	450	540		
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6	6		
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6	6		
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incendiary, M14					1 per Vehicle
Grenade, Rifle, AT or Frag.	4	6	10		
Mines, H.E.A.T., M1		M1	M1		
Rocket AT	4	6	10		
Carriage, Motor 105mm How., M7 105mm How., M2, M2A1		141	80 221		(50% HE M48A1, 35% HE M54, 15% Smk (½HC - ½WP), plus 10 add. rds. per gun HEAT M67 carried
Cal..50 MG		1325	1325		
Cal..45SMG	90	210	300		
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6	6		
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6	6		
Carriage, Motor, 105mm How., M7					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per vehicle

Grenade, Hand, Incendiary					1 per Veh. 5 per Gun or Howe. 75mm or larger
Tank, Light, M5A1					(45% APC, 45% HE, 10% Cans)
Gun, 37mm		123	5	128	
Cal..30 MG		6750	50	6800	
Cal..45 SMG	90	420		510	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Veh. 2 per Howe., 75mm or larger
Tank, Medium, M4 and Variations					(a) Or as modifications allow. 50% HE Se w/fuze M48A1, 35% APC, 10% WP, 5% Smoke
Gun, 75mm		(a)72	20	92	
Cal..50 MG		265	30	295	
Cal..30 MG		6250		6250	
Cal..45 SMG	90	1110		1200	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Veh. 5 per Gun or Howe. 75mm or larger
Carriage, Motor, 3", M10					
Gun 3"		54	28	82	50% APC; 50% HE
Cal..50 MG		1060		1060	
Carriage, Motor, 3", M10					
Cal..30 Carbine	75	105		180	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Veh. 5 per Gun or Howe. 75mm or larger
Grenade, Rifle	4	6		10	100% AT, M9A1
Pot, Smoke, HC, M1		4		4	
Car, Armored, Utility, M20					
Cal..50 MG		1060	265	1325	
Cal..50 MG		1250	1250	2500	
Cal..45 SMG	90	180		270	
Carbine, Cal..30	75	105	90	270	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80	80	40	200	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1903	60		60	120	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Vehicle
Launcher, Rocket		10		10	
Pot, Smoke		4		4	
Car, HT, M2 in Armd Inf. Units					
Cal..30 MG		3750	1250	5000	
Cal..50 MG		530	265	795	
Cal..45 SMG	90	180		270	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Car, HT, M2 in Armd Inf. Units					
Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Vehicle
Mine, AT, M1		4		4	
Rocket, AT, M9A1	4	6		10	
Car, HT, M2 in Other Units					
Cal..30 MG		1250	(a)1250	2500	
Cal..50 MG		530	265	795	
Cal..45 SMG	90	180		270	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 Per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, Except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Vehicle
(a) Except in Armored Regiment					
Mine, AT, M1		4		4	
Rocket, AT, M6		4		4	
Car, Armored, Recon, M8					
Gun, 37mm		80	5	(b)85	
Cal..30 MG		1250	1250	2500	
Cal..45 SMG	90	180	12	282	
Carbine, Cal..30	75	105	90	270	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80	80	40	200	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1903	60		60	120	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Granade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Medical
Grenade, Smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Vehicle
Pot, Smoke, M1 or M2		4		4	
Mines, AT, M1		6		6	
Launcher, Rocket M8		10		10	
(b) 50% HE, 30% APC, 20% Cannister					
Car, Scout, M3A1					
Cal..30 MG		1250	(a)1250	2500	
Cal..50 MG		530	265	795	
Cal..45 SMG	90	180		270	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Offensive		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh Except Med
Grenade, Smoke, Colored M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Rocket, AT, M9		4	6	10	
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Veh, except Med

BASIC LOADS FOR WEAPONS OF THE ARMORED DIVISION NOT ON COMBAT VEHICLES
"PER WEAPON" FIGURES

Weapon	On Indiv. Armed	On Prime Mover	On Unit Train Except for Sep. Units	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30 M1	60	30	15	105	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1903	50	60	60	170	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80	96	48	224	
Pistol, Cal..45	21			21	
Grenade, Rifle, AT or Frag.	4			4	
60mm Mortar					
(If carried in HT)		76	72	148	
(If carried in ¼-T Trk)		36	54	90	
Gun, Machine, Cal..30 M1919A1:					
(In Inf. LMG Squad)		3125	2500	5625	
(In Train Defense)		1250	650	1900	
Gun, Machine, Cal..50 HB, Brng:					
(Train Defense)		265	265	530	
(Pedestal Mount, M31)		265	265	530	
Gun, 37mm:					
(Towed by HT)		80	5	85	
(Towed by ¾ Ton Trk)		40	5	45	
Gun, 57mm (Towed)		60	5	65	
Signals, Pyro (Per Pr.)					To conform to SOI
Mine, AP, M3	(a)250			250	(a) Hq. Co., Engr Bn
Mine, AT, M1A1, w/fuze	(b)264			264	(b) Per Bridge Co., Engr Bn
	(c)962			962	(c) Per Hq Co., Engr Bn
	(d)1274			1274	(d) Per Ltr Co., Engr Bn
Cal..45 SMG	90			90	
Grenade, Hand, Frag.					6 per Veh. except Med
Grenade, Hand, Off.					6 per Veh, except Med
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per Vehicle
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					2 per Veh Except Med
Grenade, Smoke, Colored M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					2 per Vehicle
Rocket, AT, M9		4	6	10	
Grenade, Hand, Incend.					1 per Veh, except Med

BASIC LOADS FOR TANK DESTROYER UNITS FOR WEAPONS NOT ON COMBAT VEHICLES

** Applies to both TD and Tank Units

SECRET

Weapon	On Indiv.	On Prime Mover or Trailer	On Unit Train	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30	75	105	90	270	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80	80	40	200	
Rifle, Cal..30, M1903	60		60	120	
Gun, SMG, Cal..45	30	240	210	480	
Pistol, Cal..45	21			21	
MG, Cal..30		750	750	1500	
MG, Cal..50		1060	530	1590	
Launcher, Rocket	4	6	10	20	
Launcher, Grenade	4	6		10	
Projector, Pyro.					To conform to SOI
Mine, AT		3		3	Per Veh, except motorcycle in Pioneer Plat.
		300		300	Per Pioneer Platoon
Pot, Smoke HC, M1		4		4	Per Veh, except motor- and ¼-T Trk; 2 per ½-T Trk
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Off.		6		6	
Grenade, Smoke, Colored. M16 to M18, 5 assorted colors					10 per company
Grenade, Hand, Incend, M14					1 per Veh, 5 ea 75mm Gun or larger

BASIC LOADS FOR TANK DESTROYER UNITS
FOR WEAPONS ON COMBAT VEHICLES

Weapon	On Indiv.	On Prime Mover or Trailer	On Unit Train	Total	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30	75	105	90	270	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80	80	40	200	
Rifle, Cal..30, M1903	60		60	120	
Gun, SMG, Cal..45	30	240	210	480	
Pistol, Cal..45	21			21	
MG, Cal..30		1250	1500	2750	
MG, Cal..50		1060	1060	2120	
57mm Gun		80	40	120	50% APC; 30% HE; 20% Cannister
3" Gun, SP		54	23	77	50% APC; 40% HE; 10% Smoke
3" Gun, Towed		32	43	75	
76mm Gun, SP		48	23	71	
81mm Mortar		20	40	60	75% Smoke; 25% HE Lt
Launcher, Rocket	4	6	10	20	
Launcher, Grenade	4	6		10	
Projector, Pyro.					To conform to SOI
Pot, Smoke, HC, M1		4		4	Per Veh, except motorcycle and ¼-T Trk. 2 per ½-T Trk
Grenade, Hand, Frag.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Off.		6		6	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					2 per vehicle
Grenade, Hand, WP, M15					2 per Veh, except Med
Grenade, Colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					10 per company
Grenade, Hand, Incend., M14					5 ea 75mm Gun or larger and 1 per Veh

BASIC LOADS FOR SEPARATE TANK UNITS
FOR WEAPONS NOT ON COMBAT VEHICLES

Weapon	On Indiv.	On Prime Mover or Trailer	On Accompanying Vehicles	Total Rounds	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30	45	30	15	90	
Pistol, Cal..45	21			21	
Projector, Pyro.					To conform to SOI
Rifle, M1	80	144	144	368	
Cal..30 MG		1250	500	1750	
Cal..50 MG		530	265	795	
Launcher, Rocket	4	6	2	12	
Launcher, Grenade	4	6	2	12	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC, M8					1 per GPV except M/C
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, WP, M15					1 per GPV except M/C and Med Veh.
Grenade, Smoke, Colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors					10 per company
Grenade, Incend.					1 per Vehicle

UNIT TRAIN LOADS FOR SEPARATE TANK UNITS
FOR WEAPONS ON COMBAT VEHICLES AND FOR
OTHER WEAPONS - "PER WEAPON" FIGURES*

WEAPON	UNIT TRAIN	REMARKS
MG, Cal..30	580	
MG, Cal..50	265	
Cal..45 SMG	10	
Mortar, 81mm	60	
Gun, 75mm	40	
105mm, How.	40	
57mm, Gun	10	
Mines, AT, M1	225	Per Battalion
Mines, AP	75	Per Battalion
Launcher, Rocket	2	

* Additional data listed under "Combat Vehicles"

BASIC LOAD FOR MECHANIZED CAVALRY
FOR WEAPONS ON COMBAT VEHICLES, SEE "COMBAT VEHICLES"
(UNIT TRAIN LOADS ARE DISCRETIONARY WITH UNIT COMMANDERS).

Weapon	On Individual	On Prime Mover or other available Transportation	Total	Remarks
Launcher, Grenade, M8	2	1	3	
Launcher, Grenade, M7	6	2	8	
Pistol, Cal..45	21	10	31	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80	48	128	
Carbine, Cal..30	45	30	75	
SMG, Cal..45	90	60	150	
MG, Cal..30		1250	1250	
MG, Cal..50		530	530	
Signals, Pyro				To conform to SOI
Rockets, AT	6	2	8	
Mortar, 50mm		36	36	
Grenade, Hand, Smoke WP, M15				2 per ¼-T Truck
Grenade, smoke, colored, M16 or M18, 5 assorted colors				2 per GPV except motorcycle

BASIC AMMUNITION LOADS FOR:
HQ & HQ COMPANIES OF DIVISIONS, CORPS AND ARMY, ENGINEERS (EXCEPT COMBAT ENGINEERS), ORDNANCE, SIGNAL, QUARTERMASTER, MILITARY POLICE, POSTAL UNIT, CHEMICAL (EXCEPT WEAPONS BNS) SPECIAL SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION CORPS, FINANCE UNITS

Weapons	Carried on Individual	Carried on Prime Mover	Total Rounds	Remarks
Carbine, Cal..30, M1	60		60	
Rifle, Cal..30 M1	80		80	55% Ball, 30% AP, 5% tracer
Rifle, Cal..30 M1903	50		50	55% Ball, 40% AP, 5% tracer
Pistol, Cal..45	21		21	
Launcher, Grenade, for Rifle, M1 or M1903	6		6	50% AT, 50% Frag.
Launcher, Grenade, for Carbine	6		6	50% AT, 50% Frag.
Launcher, Rocket	6	2	8	
Cal..45, SMG	150		150	
Gun, Machine, Cal..50		660	660	AP-I & T
Gun, 75mm		48	48	
Signals, Pyro. (Per Projector)		9	9	Per Co. or similar organization. Types to conform to SOI
Grenades, Hand, Frag.		50	50	Per Co. or Similar organization except Med unit
Grenades, Hand, Off.		50	50	2 per GPV except M/C
Grenades, Hand, HC, M8				1 per GPV except Med Veh
Grenades, Hand, Incend.				1 per GPV except motorcycle and Med
Grenades, Hand, Smoke, (WP) M15		1	1	Per Co. or similar organization. Types to conform to SOI
Grenades, Smoke, Colored Hand, M18 (5 assorted colors)		10	10	
Gun, Machine, Cal..30		1250	1250	

FOR ORDNANCE COMPANIES THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL:

TNT, ½-lb Blocks	400	400
Cap, blasting, non-elec.	100	100
Cap, blasting, electric	50	50
Fuse, blasting, time	100 ft	100 ft
Fuse, det. primer	200 ft	200 ft
Fuse, Lighter	100	100

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

AG 471 GNMCD-2 — 25 April 1944.

SUBJECT: UNIT OF FIRE.

TO : See distribution.

Attached letter, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army, AG 471 MGC, 10 December 1943, subject: "Unit of Fire", is for your information.

By command of Lieutenant General PATTON:

Incl:
Letter, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, AG 471 MGC, 10 December 1943, subject: "Unit of Fire", with Incl #1: "Unit of Fire by type".

R. W. HARTHAN,
Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

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CG, each Division of TUSA..(10)

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY — RPF/GAS/eg

AG 471 MGC — 10 DECEMBER 1943

SUBJECT: UNIT OF FIRE.

TO : See distribution.

1. In accordance with authority contained in War Department letter AG 471 (2-13-43) OB-S-D-M, dated 16 February 1943, subject: "Ammunition Supply Policy", a Unit of Fire has been established for this theater as indicated in Inclosure #1.

2. In establishing this Unit of Fire, the following definition will be used in this theater:

The Unit of Fire is a yardstick or unit of measure used in the supply of ammunition during initial stages of combat and in specifying stock levels for Army depots. It is that amount of ammunition which may be expected to be expended in one day of intense combat or 2-1/2 days of average combat. It is expressed in rounds per type weapon.

3. In applying the Unit of Fire to planning and actual operations, the following doctrine will be followed:

a. It is applied to the weapons of the combat elements of a substantial force (not less than a division).
b. For smaller forces or special missions, this chart is nor applicable.
c. In operations, supply on the Unit of Fire basis should be used only so long as is absolutely necessary. Replacement on the basis of specified numbers of rounds of specified types should be inaugurated at the earliest possible moment.
d. The Unit of Fire has no application to the "Basic Load".

4. Class V items not included in the Unit of Fire are expected to be computed on a stock pile or gross reserve bases.

By command of Lieutenant General DEVERS:

Incl #1 Unit of Fire by type.

/s/ Richard P. Fisk,
RICHARD P. FISK,
Lt. Colonel, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General

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FUSA	(2)
USAAF, UK	(4)
SOS, ETOUSA	(4)
Iceland Base Command	(2)
G-3, ETOUSA	(1)
AG Misc, ETOUSA	(1)
AG Records, ETOUSA	(1)

Incl. #1

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD

Annex No. 14-Ordnance Plan

INCLOSURE NO 1

UNIT OF FIRE

Weapon & Percentage by Type	ROUNDS
Carbine, Cal..30	15
Rifle, BAR, Cal..30, 55% Ball, 40% AP, 5% Tracer	75
Rifle, M1 or 03, Cal..30, 55% Ball, 40% AP, 5% Tracer	20
Gun, Machine, Cal..30, 100% AP & Tracer (4-1)	250
Pistol, Cal..45	2
Gun, sub-machine, Cal..45	30
Gun, Machine, Cal..50, AP, Incendiary & Tracer (2-2-1)	250
Gun, 37mm, Tank or Anti-tank, 60% HE, 30% APC, 10% Cannister	40
Gun, 37mm or 40mm Anti-aircraft, 95% HE, 5% APC	125
Gun, 57mm, Anti-tank	40
Mortar, 60mm, 95% HE, 5% Illuminating	60
Mortar, 81mm (Infantry) 70% HE Lt, 20% HE Hvy, 10% Smoke	75
Mortar, 81mm (Armored Units) 50% HE LT, 20% HE Hvy, 30% Smoke	75
Mortar, 4.2, 50% HE, 45% WP, 5% FS	60
Gun, 75mm Tank or Anti-Tank, 40% APC, 50% HE, So Fuzed M48, 10% Smoke (See Note 1 below)	50
Gun, 76mm Tank or Anti-Tank, 50% APC, 40% HE, 10% Smoke HC, HE	50
Gun, 3" Anti-Tank, 50% HE, 50% AP	50
Howitzer, 75mm, 50% HE fuzed M48, 35% HE fuzed M54, 10% Smoke, 5% HEAT	50
Gun, 90mm, Anti-aircraft, 95% HE, 5% AP	50
Howitzer, 105mm Field or S.P., 65% HE fuzed M48A1, 25% HE fuzed M54, 10% Smoke (See Note 1 below)	125
Howitzer, 105mm Field or S.P., Special Ammunition, 75% colored smoke, (1/3 green, 1/3 violet, 1/3 red), 25% HEAT	8
Howitzer, 105mm M3, 60% HE fuzed M48A1, 25% HE fuzed M54, 10% Smoke, (See Note 1 below), 5% HEAT	60
Gun, 4.5", Field, 80% HE fuzed M51, 20% HE fuzed M67 (40% NC 60% SC)	75
Howitzer, 155mm M1918, 80% HE fuzed M51, 10% HE fuzed M55, 10% Smoke (25% Green Bag Charge, 75% White Bag Charge) (See Note 1 below)	75
Howitzer, 155mm M1 and M1918, Special Ammunition, Colored Smoke (1/3 Green, 1/3 Red, 1/3 Violet)	3
Howitzer, 155mm M1, 70% HE fuzed M51, 20% HE fuzed M67, 10% Smoke (25% Green Bag Charge, 75% White Bag Charge) (See Note 1 below)	75
Gun, 155mm Field or S.P., 80% HE fuzed M51, 10% HE fuzed M67, 10% Smoke	50
Howitzer, 8", 90% HE fuzed M51, 10% HE fuzed M67 (30% Green Bag Charge, 70% White Bag Charge)	50
Gun, 8", 95% HE fuzed M51, 5% HE fuzed M67	35
Howitzer, 240mm, 95% HE fuzed M51, 5% HE fuzed M67	25
Grenade, Rifle, all types	1
Rocket, AT, M6	1
Signal, Pyrotechnics, all types, assorted	3
Grenade, hand, per Company or similar unit of Inf, Cav, Tank or T.D., 80% Fragmentation, 5% Incendiary, 5% Colored Smoke, 5% smoke MC, 5% Smoke WP	25
Grenade, hand, offensive, per Tank Destroyer Co., Tank Co, or Cav Tr	20

Note 1 - Smoke for this weapon will be 50% White Phosphorus and 50% Base Ejection, H.C.

Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 14

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ORDNANCE PLAN

WITH APPENDICES

I - Reports.
(To be published at a later date)
II - Typical Layout of Army Ordnance Maintenance.
(To be published at a later date)
III - Typical Layout of Army Ordnance Supply.
(To be published at a later date)
IV - Basic Load Basis Non-Divisional Ordnance Companies.
V - Basic Load Basis - Depot Companies.
VI - Major Item Replacements to Accompany Ordnance Units.
VII - Vehicle and Towed Artillery Pools - Ordnance Companies.
VIII - Increase in T/O & T/E - Ordnance Units.
IX - Increase in T/O & T/E - Other than Ordnance Units.
(To be published at a later date)
X - Cleaning and Preserving Material Charts.
(To be published at a later date)
XI - Tool Stockage Chart - Ordnance Units.
(To be published at a later date)
XII - Expected Life of Artillery Tubes, Equilibrators, Gas Check Pads.
(To be published at a later date)

25 May 1944

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SECTION I

GENERAL

1. Purpose.

The purpose of this annex is to define the responsibilities and to outline the operations of Army Ordnance Service.

2. Command and Organization.

a. In accordance with Chapter 7, FM 9-5, amended by Change 2, dated 7 September 1943, all non-divisional Ordnance units are commanded by the Army Ordnance Officer, except when attached to Corps or Divisions when command is exercised by the Ordnance Officer or the senior commander.

b. Tactical and administrative control of Ordnance units normally will be through Ordnance groups in accordance with directives from the Army Ordnance Officer.

c. The battalion commanders are responsible for administration of attached units. Company records will be maintained separately and administration so conducted as to permit immediate transfer of companies to other battalions. Unattached Army Ordnance organizations will operate under the Army Ordnance Officer. Army Ordnance organizations attached to Corps will revert to Army at a date to be announced after arrival of Army on the Continent.

d. Maintenance and Supply units are organized as follows:

(1) Forward Battalions in direct support of Corps. Composition to vary according to composition of Corps. These battalions will at all times remain mobile. No work should be undertaken by Medium Maintenance Companies which will require more than 24 hours or by Heavy Maintenance (Tank) Companies which will require more than 48 hours. The time requirement will vary with the tactical situation at the discretion of the battalion commander. Maximum use will be made of major item replacement.

(2) Intermediate Battalions support forward battalions and Corps and Army troops within area. These battalions will remain as mobile as possible. They should be able to accomplish a tactical move in two (2) days without assistance by "leap frogging" sections. Medium Companies in these battalions will remain mobile, as possible replacement for forward battalions.

(3) Rear Battalions are charged with fourth echelon maintenance of forward units, and Army and reserve units in area. Normally this battalion will not move except when Army rear boundary is moved and will require assistance from QM Truck Companies if it is to be moved within a reasonable time.

(4) Forward Depot Companies. These are of two (2) types, "Armored" and "General".

(a) Armored Depot Companies will support armored divisions, tank battalions, tank destroyer battalions, and mechanized cavalry squadrons only. Parts will be stocked for these units only. Normally these companies will be located close to the rear boundary of armored divisions beyond the range of light artillery and masked from medium artillery. Camouflage is essential. Dispersion will be normal. Maximum turn-around for any unit served should not exceed 60 miles. These companies will remain mobile.

(b) General Depot Companies. These companies will operate similarly to armored depot companies except that they will stock parts for all except armored units.

(5) Main Depot Companies will be of three (3) types: "General Purpose", "Combat Vehicle" and "Armament".

(a) General Purpose Depots: This depot will stock parts for general purpose vehicles, parts common, commercial gases, tires of all types, cleaning and preserving materials, and tools. Its primary function is to service forward Depot Companies and Army troops. It will make use of available buildings for stock and should be located on an excellent vertical and lateral road net. Railroad siding space is desirable but not essential. It is relatively immobile. It may be augmented with civilian labor.

(b) Combat Vehicle Depots: This Depot Co will stock parts for combat vehicles. In all other respects it is similar to the General Purpose Depot.

(c) Armament Depots: This Depot Company will stock parts for armament. In all other respects it is similar to the General

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Purpose Depot.

(6) Diagrams of typical Army maintenance and supply layouts are shown in Appendices II and III.

3. Operation.

a. Ordnance organizations attached to Corps prior to assumption of command by Third Army on the Continent: - In accordance with paragraph 2 a.

b. After arrival of Third Army on the Continent and relief from attachment of attached Ordnance troops: -

(1) To expedite reaction to tactical and service requirements, Ordnance troops may be moved by the following Ordnance Commanders:

(a) By the Company Commander of a company in direct support of a division:- the section parties of his company within the divisional area after consultation with and approval from the Ordnance Officer and G-4 of the Corps.

(b) By the Battalion Commander of a battalion in direct support of a corps:- Companies of a battalion within the Corps and Divisional areas after consultation with and approval from Ordnance Officer and G-4 of the Corps.

(c) By Ammunition Battalion Commanders:- ASP's will be established on recommendation of the Ordnance Officer and G-4 of divisions and corps after approval by Army Headquarters. When such recommendation is forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer, it must specifically state that Corps or Division clearance has been obtained. (As desired by Corps Commander).

(d) By Ordnance Group Commanders:- Battalion and battalion headquarters after Army approval of recommendation of the Group Commander.

(e) By the nearest Corps and Division Commander:- In case of failure of communications or in a tactical emergency.

(2) All other movements will be directed by Army.

(3) Reports (accompanied by overlays and giving time of opening and closing of installations) of all movements of Ordnance organizations to new locations will be forwarded immediately to the Army Ordnance Officer through Ordnance channels.

(4) The closest possible contact (both as to the tactical situation and service requirements) will be maintained by the Ordnance commanders with appropriate officers of supported line organizations. Each Ordnance unit (battalion and company) will be given a special task assignment and specific instructions regarding its execution.

c. Groups will be the normal operational headquarters through which Army Ordnance units are controlled.

4. Ordnance Troops.

a. List of Ordnance troops is given in Annex No. 2; Priorities for Ordnance Troops are given in Annex No. 3.

b. Ordnance organizations will move at full T/O & E strength plus personnel overstrength and PROCO existing at that time.

SECTION II

SUPPLY

5. Original Stockage and Build-up.

a. Spare parts, replacement vehicles, weapons, and cleaning and preserving materials.

(1) All troops will arrive on the Continent with complete organic load of spare parts and cleaning and preserving materials.

(2) Ordnance maintenance and depot companies scheduled to arrive on the Continent prior to D ∕ 42 are issued additional weapons, vehicles, and spare parts to provide for battle losses and an operational reserve for troops arriving on Continent during this period.

(3) Operational reserves (replacements for battle losses) and maintenance requirements for troops arriving on the Continent after D ∕ 41 will be obtained by Army demand on Com. Z. Estimated requirements for successive periods to include D ∕ 90 have been transmitted to Com. Z.

b. Ammunition.

(1) All units will arrive on the Continent with a minimum supply of ammunition as shown in Appendix "P", to Annex No. 13, Ltr AG 471 GNMOD-3, 4 May 1944, to G-4.

(2) Reserve of seven (7) U.F. to be built up by Com. Z, available on demand of Third Army.

(3) Maintenance:- The estimated rate of expenditure of 1/3 U.F. per day to be available from Com. Z, on demand. Estimated requirements by periods have been transmitted to Com. Z.

6. Responsibility.

a. Unit commanders are responsible that their organizations are completely equipped with Ordnance materiel (major items, basic load of spare parts, as prescribed in pertinent T/O & E's, T/BA's, SNL's) and basic load of ammunition. After being alerted, these will be obtained as prescribed in Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting, Headquarters Third Army, dated 26 April 1944.

b. Supply Discipline - Supply Discipline will be enforced with particular attention to the following:

(1) Stocking of excess quantities of materiel and supplies beyond estimated or anticipated current requirements.

(2) Wasteful use of expendable supplies, such as cleaning and preserving materials, metal stocks, standard hardware, parts common, and small maintenance parts.

(3) Careless handling and storage of supplies and materiel, including damaging of containers in opening and failure to close or reseal containers from which a portion of the contents has been removed.

c. Weapons of Hospital Patients. Weapons coming under medical control due to evacuation of patients, etc., will be turned in promptly by hospitals, and other Medical installations, to the nearest Ordnance maintenance company, and a receipt obtained therefor.

7. Method of Issue.

a. General Supplies.

(1) Major Items:

(a) Ordnance Maintenance and Depot Companies will issue major items to using troops whom they support in exchange for:

1. An unserviceable major item of the same type.

2. A certificate, signed by an officer, that a major item of the same type has been totally destroyed due to enemy action or accident, abandoned due to enemy action, or destroyed to prevent capture by enemy.

3. In case a unit requires a major item which cannot be supplied from stocks on hand, the unserviceable item will be tallied in or the certificate in (b) accepted. Replacement will be procured from the depot company in the normal manner.

(b) Ordnance companies will report to the Army Ordnance Officer all major items issued troops of other nations, showing designation of organization to which issue is made.

(c) Major items excluding vehicles and towed artillery will be stocked by maintenance and depot companies as indicated in Appendix VI. Maintenance and Depot companies will maintain a vehicle and towed artillery pool as prescribed in Appendix VII.

(2) Spare Parts and Cleaning and Preserving Material:

(a) Basic Loads of Spare Parts.

1. Tactical Units. Requisitions will be submitted in triplicate on the basis shown on blank forms furnished by the Army Ordnance Officer.

2. Divisional Ordnance Units. Basic Loads as prescribed in SNL's will be supplied automatically by SOS upon request submitted through the Ordnance Officer. Requisitions for supplemental items deemed necessary will be submitted through the Army Ordnance Officer in quintuplicate.

3. Non-Divisional Ordnance Units. Prepared blank requisition forms for the initial basic load will be furnished by the Ordnance Officer. The basic loads for Forward Depot & Maintenance companies will be a minimum of 15 day supply prepared on addenda to SNL list for the major items listed in Appendices IV and V. The basic load for the main depot companies will be a minimum of 30 day supply based on addenda on SNL list for the major items listed in Appendix V. Loads of spare parts and replacement major items carried at time of embarkation will be limited by the ability of the organization to carry same on total vehicles (T/OE PROCO and reserve) in their hands. Priority will be given to (1) Replacement weapons, (2) Binned spare parts and (3) Large or Heavy replacement units. For remainder of authorized loads, not transported by the organization to the Continent, requisitions will be prepared for submission to COMZ upon arrival at destination. Responsibility of COMZ to fill these requisitions.

4. Tires: Requisitions for tires for stock will be prepared by the Army Ordnance Officer and the interested Ordnance companies furnished information copies.

5. After arrival on the Continent, Ordnance Commanders will adjust stocks and maintain close stock control.

(b) Basic Load of Cleaning and Preserving Material.

1. Tactical units will maintain a fifteen (15) day stock of cleaning and preserving material. See Appendix No. X.

2. Ordnance units, in addition to their own requirements, will stock a ten (10) day supply for the units they support and for the major items listed in Appendices VI, VII, VIII and IX for their units.

(c) Spare Parts and Cleaning and Preserving Material Other Than Basic Loads. Normally, except for bulk requisition spare parts and C.P., material will be issued by Ordnance maintenance companies to the troops whom they support. Bulk requisitions will be filled by depot companies, See Appendix X - Cleaning and Preserving Materials.

(3) Tools: Appendix XI indicates the stockage of tools for maintenance and depot companies. Requisitions will be prepared and submitted by the Army Ordnance Officer. Depot and maintenance companies will be furnished an information copy at the time the requisition is submitted.

(4) Combat Loading.

(a) All vehicles delivered to units will be "combat loaded" and made complete with all accessories as listed in appropriate SNL's and Technical Manuals, by the ordnance unit making the delivery. "Combat Loading" requires that the vehicle or weapon is complete and ready to enter combat.

1. All "must items", basic ammunition load, mines, CWS supplies decontaminating apparatus, fire control equipment, radio, medical supplies, and QM items including rations will be drawn and properly stowed in the vehicle.

2. All vehicles will be fully serviced with gasoline, oil and water ready for operation. Standard U.S. (or French, if applicable) ground force identification marking will be accomplished before making delivery.

(b) All weapons delivered to units in combat must be complete with all accessories. Special attention will be given to artillery pieces to insure all "must items" and fire control equipment are present.

(c) Prior to issue, each weapon or vehicle will be inspected by the issuing company which will prepare "emergency" requisitions for direct delivery to the unit receiving the materiel covering the items that are short at time of delivery. A copy of requisitions which shows action taken and shortages, will accompany vehicle or weapon. Copies will also be sent to the supporting ordnance organization.

(5) Commercial Gases and Helium - The Corps of Engineers is responsible for supplying cylinders of commercial gases (oxygen, acetylene, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide) and helium in exchange for empty cylinders. Ordnance depot companies will stock an adequate quantity of the above items for supplying the needs of ordnance units who will normally turn in empties to ordnance depots and draw full cylinders. In emergencies, ordnance maintenance companies may draw direct from engineer depots.

(6) Back Orders - Ordnance maintenance and depot companies will establish "back order systems" to insure that all requirements of

the using troops for ordnance materiel are filled.

(7) Special Equipment for Ordnance Units: Appendix VIII lists equipment which has been requested as an increase in T/E for Ordnance units. It will be supplied automatically when the unit is alerted.

(8) Special Equipment for Other Than Ordnance Units. Special equipment for other than Ordnance units will be as listed in Appendix IX. This equipment will be issued automatically when the unit is alerted. In most instances tactical units will be equipped under their present T/O and T/E or T/BA.

(9) Beach Packs: Beach Packs are amphibiously packed kits of fast moving second echelon parts, capable of being carried by one man, for issue to assault units. They will be issued as directed by the Commanding General, TUSA. See Appendix "N", Annex 13, for the composition of beach packs. Units issued beach packs will reduce their second echelon basic loads by the parts contained in the beach packs.

(10) Reports: "Materiel in Hands of Troops" and "Combat Loss" reports will be submitted by all combat and service units on the form shown in Appendix I, Form I. Reports will be submitted as of 1200 hours on the 20th day of each month covering the period since last report and will arrive at this headquarters not later than 1200 hours on the 23rd day of each month. (See G-4)(Annex on "Reports"). In case of excess over T/O & E authorization will be given. Other reports will be as indicated in Appendix I.

b. Ammunition.

(1) All units in the Army will secure replacement of expended basic load Class V ammunition on presentation of a request or transportation order to the nearest ASP or Army depot. This request will contain a certificate to the effect that the ammunition required is to replace expenditure from basic load. No ammunition in excess of basic load will be issued except on specific authority of the Army.

(2) Unit of fire will be that prescribed by Hq ETOUSA Ltr., dated 10 December 1943, AG 471 NGG, reproduced as Appendix "F", Annex #13.

(3) Unserviceable ammunition with its location clearly defined will be reported to the nearest Ordnance Officer for disposition. U.S. Artillery ammunition unserviceable only by reason of dented cartridge cases will be evacuated to the nearest Class V Supply Point. Malfunctions of ammunition will be reported immediately to the Army Ordnance Officer through channels. Reports will include all available details.

(4) A daily status of stocks report of all Class V Supplies will be submitted by each ASP and Army depot as of 1800 hours, two copies from each service, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 0800 hours the following day, one copy to battalion headquarters. Status of stocks report will be submitted on Form 2 App. 1. The following information is required in rounds on above reports:

Column 4 - Balance on hand last report.
Column 5 - Transferred to ASP #_____.
Column 6 - Issued.
Column 7 - Received.
Column 8 - Balance on hand.
Column 9 - Target level.

(5) A monthly ammunition supply report will be submitted by all combat and service units, as of 0600 the 20th day, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 1800 of the 23rd day. Army units will submit reports direct to Army Headquarters, reports from units assigned or attached to Corps will be consolidated by Corps before forwarding to Army. This report will include for each item (a) Balance on Hand (b) Expended in Combat (c) Expended for training (d) Loss due to enemy action.

8. Supply from Com. Z.

a. Prior to assumption of command by Third Army, to be made in accordance with instructions issued by Ordnance Officer on staff or senior ground commander.

b. Upon assumption of command by Third Army, to be made available on demand of Army Ordnance Officer or Commanding Officers of Army supply or rear maintenance battalions. Delivery to be made as indicated on the supply request.

SECTION III

Maintenance

9. Responsibility.

a. Responsibility for maintenance of motor vehicles is clearly defined in AR 850-15. Maintenance of equipment in the hands of using troops is a direct responsibility of the commanding officers concerned.

b. Particular attention will be devoted to preventive maintenance. Commanding Officers will make frequent checks to assure that all operations classified under this heading are performed regularly.

c. Ordnance maintenance commanders (Group, Battalion, and Company) will aggressively push maintenance and Ordnance Service forward to the troops supported.

10. Exchange. Vehicle and weapon replacement or exchange, together with prompt evacuation, will be as dictated by the tactical situation.

11. Files. Ordnance maintenance companies will at all times maintain files of pertinent data for each of the organizations they support, showing types of major items with which the organization is equipped, existing shortages, status of action being taken to fill shortages, condition of materiel, and other important information. When the organization moves, this file will be forwarded through Ordnance channels to the maintenance company designated to support the organization in its new location.

12. Records.

a. The following records will be kept:

(1) Duty Roster - WD, AGO Form Number 6.

(2) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 461.

(3) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 462.

(4) Preventive Maintenance Service and Technical Inspection Work Sheet #1 - WD, AGO Form Number 463.

b. All vehicles will be properly dispatched and records maintained on daily dispatching Record of Motor Vehicles, WD, 00 Form 7361 (old WD, QMC Form Number 754)

c. Drivers of motor vehicles will have the following in their possession:

(1) Drivers' Trip Ticket and Preventive Maintenance Service Record, WD, AGO Form Number 48 (old WD, QMC Form Number 237)

(2) Army Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit, WD, 00 Form Number 7360 (old WD, QMC Form Number 228)

(3) Drivers' Accident Report, Standard Form Number 26.

13. Artillery Tubes: Ordnance units supporting artillery will report when 75% of the life of a tube has been shot away. Appendix XII will be referred to for the expected life of a tube. The report will be forwarded to the Army Ordnance Officer for action.

14. Signal Repair Teams: Signal repair teams will be attached to designated Ordnance companies for the purpose of repair and salvage of radio sets.

SECTION IV

Evacuation and Salvage

15. Evacuation.

a. The purpose of evacuation is to conserve critical equipment by recovering unserviceable Ordnance materiel for repair or salvage purposes in the shortest possible time. Evacuation is the responsibility of all commanders.

b. Tactical units are responsible for evacuation to designated collecting points, generally in the vicinity of an ordnance maintenance or supply organization. Collecting axis may be designated if the situation warrants, and will coincide with the maintenance axis. The evacuation service of tactical units will be augmented by organic Ordnance units.

c. Evacuation from tactical unit collecting points to Army collecting points will be accomplished by Army Ordnance units. Army collecting points normally will be located near depot companies.

d. General Policy for Ordnance Units. Prompt evacuation of repairable equipment which is beyond the repair facilities, available spare parts, and available time of the organization, will be to the next rear maintenance unit. (This will include tires, tubes, engines, transmissions, axles, generators, starters, carburetors, fuel pumps, and similar items.) Materiel being evacuated will have attached a tag showing nature of repairs required, unit initiating the evacuation, and the signature of an ordnance officer.

e. Army Ordnance will promptly evacuate, to the Base, equipment beyond repair within the policy annunciated in sub-paragraph a.

f. Cannabilization will be held to the absolute minimum dictated by military necessity.

16. Salvage. Ordnance salvage materiel will be evacuated through ordnance channels to the rear battalions.

a. The rear maintenance battalions will, as far as possible, repair and replace in stock repairable sub-assemblies and other usable parts. If beyond their capacity, materiel will be evacuated to the Base Ordnance Shops if repairable and if not repairable, to the Base Quartermaster Salvage Yards.

b. Competent personnel from the Rear Maintenance battalions will make daily visits to Quartermaster Salvage Yards within the Army area to recover usable or recoverable ordnance materiel which may have been delivered direct to the salvage yards.

SECTION V

Bomb Disposal

17. Location. It is the responsibility of unit commanders to make reconnaissance, mark the location, establish safety precautions and report all unexploded bombs and "duds" wherever found to the Corps or Army Ordnance Officer by the fastest means available. Reports will specify exact location of the bomb or "dud" in terms of six (6) number coordinates of an easily recognized terrain feature. The location of the bomb or "dud" will be given as a definite distance on a given azimuth from terrain feature given as a reference. The report will state whether or not the unexploded bomb or "dud" is hampering operations or endangering important facilities and give name of officer and organization originating the report.

18. Disposal. Disposal of unexploded bombs and "duds" (except land and AP mines) is an ordnance responsibility. Bomb Disposal units (Ordnance) will be employed for this purpose. When necessary, the appropriate Ordnance Officer will request the cooperation and assistance of Engineers. Bomb Disposal units will be attached to Corps until the disposal problem indicates other attachments are desirable.

19. Bomb Cemeteries. All disposal will be carried out in place, except where personnel or property, that it is desirable to preserve, will be endangered. Bombs and other unexploded missiles that cannot be disposed of in place will be taken to bomb cemeteries for disposal. Bomb cemeteries will be located in cooperation with G-4. Cemeteries will be located a minimum of 400 yards from main highways, railroads, habitable areas, and important installations.

20. Souvenirs. The inerting of anything of an explosive nature for souvenirs is strictly forbidden.

21. Priorities. Priorities for handling unexploded bombs will be established by the Army Bomb Disposal Officer.

SECTION VI

Waterproofing and De-Waterproofing

22. Waterproofing. All units of TUSA will be prepared to waterproof their vehicles and guns for submergence to a depth of 3 feet 6 inches. If a submergence greater than 3 feet 6 inches is desired, the unit will be specifically notified by Commanding General TUSA. Unit commanders are responsible for waterproofing of their equipment. Inspection will be accomplished by Army personnel in the marshalling area.

23. De-Waterproofing. United commanders are responsible for de-waterproofing. De-Waterproofing of "must" items will be accomplished as soon as the vehicle is landed over the beach.

a. "Must Items - De-Waterproofing".

(1) Completely unseal booster cylinder intakes, or compressor (Air brakes) air intake.

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(2) Replace air cleaner if removed and refill with proper oil.

(3) Unseal distributor.

(4) Unseal battery vents.

(5) Unseal crankcase filler tube cap breather.

(6) Unseal crankcase ventilator outlet pipe.

(7) Unseal oil measuring well and insert oil measuring stick.

(8) Unseal vents on differentials, transfer, and transmission cases.

(9) Crankcase and all housing should be checked for water, if water is found, change lubricant immediately.

b. All waterproofing materiel such as asbestos grease, flexible tubing, soft steel tubing, etc., will be saved and turned in to the nearest Ordnance company. Ordnance companies will immediately turn in all waterproofing materials to the nearest SOS agency. This material is critical. Ordnance companies will aid in de-waterproofing by furnishing contact parties who will collect the waterproofing material. Every effort must be made to keep waterproofing material clean as dirt seriously reduces its effectiveness for re-use.

SECTION VII

Inspection

24. General: Inspection of Ordnance equipment is a continuous responsibility of all commanders. Equipment determined unserviceable as a result of inspection will be turned in for replacement. Upon request, Ordnance battalion commanders will furnish inspection teams to determine the serviceability of questionable equipment only. If a unit is ordered to be refitted by the Commanding General, the Army Ordnance Officer will furnish technical inspection and repair teams. Ordnance battalion commanders will be furnished sample inspection forms for all types of equipment. These will be reproduced locally.

25. Command Inspections.

a. The Army Ordnance Inspection Service will make command inspections of ordnance materiel in hands of using arms and services of all components of the Third Army.

b. Periodic inspections of units will be made to determine the following:

(1) Operation.

(a) Use of equipment as intended.

(b) Equipment properly designed for the use intended.

(c) Proper training of personnel in use of equipment.

(2) Maintenance.

(a) Performance of adequate and correct first and second echelon maintenance by using personnel.

(b) Availability and proper utilization of third echelon divisional and Army Ordnance maintenance.

(c) Availability and proper utilization of fourth echelon ordnance maintenance.

(d) Execution of authorized modifications in accordance with current Field Service Modification Work Orders.

(e) Determination of any unauthorized modifications.

(3) Supply.

(a) Unit replacement and direct exchange principle functioning to the maximum degree (i.e., using troops obtaining serviceable equipment by direct exchange for like unserviceable equipment.)

(b) Availability of spare parts and prompt repair of unserviceable equipment.

(c) Critical shortages of Class II and IV Supplies in forward ordnance maintenance echelons will be reported to Army Ordnance Officer.

(d) Responsibility for receipt of NEW Ordnance equipment in unserviceable condition as result of production methods, faulty inspections, improper crating, rough handling, etc.

(e) Utilization by troops of normal ordnance channels of supply.

(f) Proper functioning of depot supply installations.

(4) Special Inspections.

(a) Make such special inspections as may be directed by the Commanding General or the Ordnance Officer.

c. To implement this service, the inspector will:

(1) Utilize personnel of the Army Maintenance units as inspectors.

(2) Maintain records of inspections and a schedule of proposed inspections.

(3) Prepare necessary command letters directing inspections.

d. All reports of inspections will be made in duplicate to the Commanding General through the Army Ordnance Officer, a copy being furnished by the Inspector direct to the Commanding Officer of the unit inspected.

SECTION VIII

Captured Ordnance Materiel

26. Captured Enemy Ordnance Materiel. Corps and Division Commanders are responsible that all captured enemy ordnance materiel, other than ammunition, is turned in to the nearest ordnance maintenance or depot company which will apply temporary preservative measures and will evacuate the materiel through ordnance channels to ordnance battalions. All commanders will exercise the closest supervision to prevent collecting of souvenirs at the expense of possible future use by ourselves or our allies. Care will be taken that captured materiel is not damaged in any manner or stripped of any parts or accessories, with special attention being paid to preserving complete all optical instruments, sighting and fire control equipment, etc.

27. Location. When captured enemy materiel cannot be moved to areas under ordnance supervision, the Army Ordnance Officer will be notified promptly of the location by coordinates and position relative to towns, roads or other landmarks, together with a brief description of types and quantities of materiel at that point.

28. Ammunition. Captured enemy ammunition, except toxic chemicals, found in original containers showing no evidence of tampering, artillery projectiles, and powder, will be evacuated through ammunition companies to specified, enemy ammunition, dumps. All loose small arms ammunition, grenades, mines, etc., except toxic chemicals, will be destroyed in place under supervision of qualified ordnance personnel, or engineer personnel. Toxic chemical ammunition will not be handled by ordnance personnel, but will be turned over to CWS. Personnel not especially trained will not move, disturb, fire, or discharge, loose and scattered enemy munitions.

29. Grenades. Under no circumstances will enemy grenades in any condition be moved.

30. Mines, Booby Traps, and Sabotage Kits. Enemy mines, booby traps, and sabotage kits, whether loose or in original containers, will not be evacuated to ASP's or Depots, but will be disposed of or destroyed as directed by the appropriate engineer officer.

31. Reports. Designated battalions will submit weekly reports as of 1800 hours each Saturday covering the period since last report to reach the Army Ordnance Office by 0830 hours each Monday, showing information called for on Form # 9, Appendix I.

32. Technical Intelligence. When new or unusual items of enemy ordnance materiel are captured, report will be rendered by the most expeditious means to the Army Ordnance Officer who will cause the materiel to be inspected by Ordnance Intelligence personnel.

33. Use. Where considered necessary by the unit commander, combat units may use any enemy materiel and ammunition. Report will be made to the Army Ordnance Officer of all enemy materiel used by our troops for combat purposes.

SECTION IX

Miscellaneous

34. Destruction of Materiel: The destruction of ordnance equipment is a command decision. Commanders are authorized to destroy ordnance equipment when capture is imminent. Each unit is authorized to requisition the necessary explosives and carry them on hand for this purpose. Priority will be given to the destruction of captured enemy materiel in case of recapture is imminent.

35. Standards of Serviceability: Standards of serviceability for shipment of equipment overseas will be as prescribed in OFSB 4-47, dated 4 February 1943, and changes thereto, for combat serviceability. In addition, the following stands will apply.

a. Tires must be capable of operating the following number of miles before recapping is necessary.

Operating Tires.....1,000 Miles.
Spare Tires.....500 Miles.

b. Continuous band and block type rubber tracks must not have been run more than 500 miles.

c. Steel tracks must not have been run more than 500 miles on medium tanks and 800 miles on tractors.

d. Rubber bogie wheels must present a smooth appearance without serious cuts or large pieces torn off. Bogie wheels should be examined for heat blisters or separation of rubber and steel.

36. Preparation of Artillery and Small Arms for Salt Water Voyage:

a. Unit commanders are responsible for the proper protection against salt water and spray of all small arms and artillery under their control.

b. All parts of artillery and small arms will be coated with oil, lubricating, preservative, medium, as prescribed in the appropriate Field Manuals with the exceptions listed in paragraph c, below. Preservative will be completely removed as quickly as practicable after landing in order that excessive dirt and dust will not accumulate and result in serious damage and stoppage.

c. The following parts of U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30 M1 will be lubricated with grease, rifle:

(1) Surface of the bolt actuating cam on the operating rod.

(2) Locking recesses in the receiver.

(3) Hammer actuating cam on the rear of the bolt.

(4) Upper and lower circular surfaces forming the receiver bridge at rear end of the bolt.

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX 14

OF

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ORDNANCE PLAN

REPORTS

REPORTS TO BE SUBMITTED

Form 1. "Materiel in Hands of Troops" and "Combat Loss", Third Army Ordnance Form No. 2, consisting of 14 pages, submitted monthly as of 1200 hours on 20th day of each month, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 1200 hours on the 23rd day of each month. Reference Annex 14, par. 7 a (10).

Form 2. "Status of Ammunition", Third Army Ordnance Form No. 1, consisting of 9 pages, submitted daily by Ordnance ASPs and Ammunition Depots as of 1800 hours, to reach Army Ordnance Office not later than 0800 hours the following day. Reference Annex 14, par. 7 b (4).

Form 2. "Status of Ammunition", Third Army Ordnance Form No. 1, consisting of 9 pages, submitted monthly as of 0600 hours the 20th day, to reach Army Headquarters not later than 1800 hours of the 23rd day. Reference Annex 14, par. 7 b (5).

Form 3. "Captured Enemy Materiel Report", Third Army Ordnance Form No. 9, consisting of 1 page, submitted weekly by designated Ordnance Battalions as of 1800 hours each Saturday, to reach Army Ordnance Office not later than 0830 hours following Monday. Reference Annex 14, par. 31.

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

ORDNANCE MATERIEL IN HANDS OF TROOPS AND COMBAT LOSS REPORT

UNIT REPORTING _____ DATE - 1200A20 _____

ORGANIZED UNDER T/O & E _____ DATED _____ OR T/O _____ DATED _____

T/BA _____ DATED _____

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Nomenclature	Active with Troops: Auth. by T/BA	Active with Troops: Auth. in Excess of T/BA	Active with Troops: Total on Hand	Reserve with Troops: Serviceable	Reserve with Troops: Unserviceable	Losses Since Last Report
"A" GROUP						
1. CART, hand, M2 & M2A1						
2. CART, hand, M3 & M3A4						
3. CART, hand, M4 & M4A1						
4. CART, hand, M5 & M5A1						
5. CART, hand, M6 & M6A1						
6. CART, mortar, light, M1						
7. GUN, 37mm, AT, M3, w/ carriage, M4						
8. GUN, 37mm, AT, M3A1, w/carriage, M4A1						
9. GUN, auto., 37mm, AA, M1A2, w/cart, M2A1						
10. GUN, auto., 37mm, AA, M1A2, w/cart, M3						
11. GUN, auto., 37mm, AA, M1A2, w/cart, M3A1						
12. GUN, auto., 40mm, AA, M1, w/cart., M1						
13. GUN, auto., 40mm, AA, M1, w/cart, M2						
14. GUN, auto., 40mm, AA, M1, w/mount, M5 (AB)						
15. GUN, mach., Cal..30, M1917						
16. GUN, mach., Cal..30, M1917A1, (Flex)						
17. GUN, mach., Cal..30, M1917A1, (Flex) Pack						
18. GUN, mach., Cal..30, M1919A4 (Flex)						
19. GUN, mach., Cal..30, M1919A4 (Flex)(Pack)						
20. GUN, mach., Cal..30, M1919A6 (Flex)						
21. GUN, mach., Cal..50, M2,HB, (Flex)						
22. GUN, mach., Cal..50, HB, Flex, M2 (Pack)						
23. GUN, mach., Cal..50, M2, W/C, (Flex)						
24. GUN, mach., Cal..50, M2, HB, TT						
25. GUN, sub-mach., Cal..45, M3						
26. GUN, sub-mach., Cal..45 M1928A1						
27. GUN, sub-mach., Cal..45, M1 & M1A1						
28. MORTAR & MOUNT, 60mm, M2						
29. MORTAR & MOUNT, 81mm, M1						
30. MORTAR & MOUNT, 81mm, M1 (Pack)						
31. MORTAR, 2", M3 (Tank Mtd)						
32. MOUNT, M3, AA, Cal..50 M2						
33. MOUNT, M1, AA, Cal..50, M2A1						
34. MOUNT, M1, AA, Cal..50, M3						
35. MOUNTING, BRACKET, M40						
36. MOUNT, M3, Pedestal, Cal. .50, M39 (Boat AC Guns)						
37. MOUNT, pedestal, M3, AA, Cal..50 Amp.						
38. MOUNT, pedestal, M3, Cal. .50, M49, AA						
39. MOUNT, M3, twin Cal..50, M49						
40. MOUNT M3, Cal..30, M48						
41. MOUNT, M3, Cal..50, T91E3						
42. MOUNT, tripod, MG, Cal. .30, M2						
43. MOUNT, tripod, MG, Cal. .30, M2 (Pack)						
44. MOUNT, tripod, MG, Cal. .50, M3						
45. MOUNT, tripod, Cal..50, M3 (Pack)						
46. MOUNT, tripod, MG, Cal.50 M3, Comp. w/elev. & cradle assy, M1						
47. MOUNT, tripod, MG, Cal. .30, M1917A1						
48. MOUNT, bow gun, M27						
49. MOUNT, bracket, MG, Cal. .30, M20						
50. MOUNT, bracket, MG, Cal. .30, M40 w/cradle						
51. MOUNT, ring, MG, Cal..30, M21						
52. MOUNT, truck pedestal, M3, M31 & T47						
53. MOUNT, truck, M32						
54. MOUNT, truck, M36						
55. MOUNT, truck, M37						
56. MOUNT, truck, M37A1						
57. MOUNT, truck, M37A2						
58. MOUNT, truck, M37A3						
59. MOUNT, truck pedestal, M2A						
60. MOUNT, truck pedestal, M2A1						
61. MOUNT, truck pedestal, M2A2						
62. MOUNT, mult. gun, Cal. .50, M45						
63. MOUNT, truck, M50						
64. RIFLE, auto., Cal..30, M1918						
65. RIFLE, auto., Cal..30, M1918A1						
66. RIFLE, auto., Cal..30, M1918A2						
67. TRAINER, MG, AA, M9						
68. PARACAISSON, M9						
69. PARACHEST, M8						
70. PARACRATE (M1 through M7)						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
71. RIFLE, AT, .55 Cal. (Boys)						
72.						
73.						
74.						
75.						
76.						
77.						
"B" GROUP						
78. BAYONET, M1905						
79. BAYONET, M1917						
80. BAYONET, M1						
81. CARBINE, Cal..30, M1						
82. CARBINE, Cal..30 M1A1, w/folding stock						
83. CARBINE, Cal..30, M1A3, w/folding stock						
84. KNIFE, trench, w/scabbard						
85. LAUNCHER, grenade, M1						
86. LAUNCHER, grenade, M2						
87. LAUNCHER, grenade, M7						
88. LAUNCHER, grenade, M8						
89. LAUNCHER, rocket, AT, M1						
90. LAUNCHER, rocket, AT, M1A1						
91. LAUNCHER, rocket, AT, M9						
92. PISTOL, auto., Cal..45, M1911, & M1911A1						
93. PISTOL, pyro., M2						
94. PISTOL, pyro., AN-M8						
95. PISTOL, pyro., AN-M8 w/mount						
96. PISTOL, very, 10-gauge, MK.III						
97. PISTOL, very, 10-gauge, M5						
98. PISTOL, very, 25mm, MK.IV						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
99. PROJECTOR, pyro., nana, M9						
100. PROJECTOR, Signal, ground, M1A1						
101. PROJECTOR, Signal, ground, M3 & M4						
102. REVOLVER, Cal..45, M1917			X	X	X	X
a. Colt b. S & W	X X	X X				
103. REVOLVER, Cal..38 (all models)						
104. RIFLE, US, Cal..30, M1903 & M1903A1						
105. RIFLE, US, Cal..30, M1903A3						
106. RIFLE, US, Cal..30, M1903A4 (Snipers)						
107. RIFLE, US, Cal..30, M1917						
108. RIFLE, US, Cal..30, M1						
109. SHOTGUN, 12-gauge, riot type						
110. SHOTGUN, 12-gauge, sporting type						
111. SHOTGUN, 12-gauge, skeet type						
112. SCABBARD, (for 1905 Bayonet)						
113. SCABBARD, (for 1917 Bayonet)						
114. SCABBARD, (for M1 Bayonet)						
115.						
116.						
117.						
118.						
119.						
120.						
"C" GROUP						
121. GUN, 57mm, M1, (AT) w/carr. M1A2						
122. GUN, 57mm, M1, (AT) w/carr. M1A3						
123. GUN, 75mm, M1897A4, w/carr. M2A2						
124. GUN, 3", M5, AT, towed, w/carr. M1						
125. GUN, 4.5" M1, w/carr., M1A1						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
126. HOWITZER, pack., 75mm, M1A1, w/pack, carr. M1						
127. HOWITZER, pack., 75mm, M1A1, w/pack carr. M8						
128. HOWITZER, 75mm, M1A1, w/field carr. M3A3						
129. HOWITZER, 105mm, M2A1, w/carr. M2						
130. HOWITZER, 105mm, M2A1, w/carr. M2A1						
131. HOWITZER, 105mm (SB) M3, w/carr. M3						
132. HOWITZER, 105mm, (SB) M3, w/carr. M3A1						
133. HOWITZER, 155mm, M1, w/carr., M1						
134. HOWITZER, 155mm, M1, w/carr., M1A1						
135. HOWITZER, 155mm, M1917A1, w/carr., M1917 A4						
136. HOWITZER, 155mm, M1917A2 w/carr., M1917 A4						
137. HOWITZER, M1918, 155mm, w/carr., M1918A3						
138. GUN, 6-pdr., (Brit) w/carr.						
139. TRAILER, ammo., M10						
140. FRAME, ammo., M14						
141. FRAME, ammo., M17						
142. FRAME, ammo., M21						
143. FRAME, ammo., M22						
144. FRAME, ammo., M25						
145. FRAME, ammo., 240mm How., (5 rd)						
146. FRAME, ammo., 8" gun, Spec.						
147.						
148.						
149.						
150.						
151.						
152.						
"D" GROUP						
153. GUN (AA) 3", by models, fixed						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
154. GUN (AA) 3", by models, mobile						
155. GUN, 90mm (AA) M1 on mount AA M1						
156. GUN, 90mm (AA) M1, on mount AA M1A1						
157. GUN, 90mm (AA) M1A1 on mount AA M1A1						
158. GUN, 90mm. (AA) M1A1 on mount AA M1						
159. GUN 90mm (AA) M1A1 on mount AA T2E1						
160. GUN, 90mm (AA) M1 AMTB fixed on mount T3						
161. GUN, 90mm (AA) M2 on mount AA M2						
162. GUN, 4.7" AA, M1, on mount, AA, M2						
163. GUN, 155mm, M1, w/carr. M1						
164. GUN, 155mm M1, w/carr., M1A1						
165. GUN, 155mm, M1A1, w/carr. M1A1						
166. GUN, 155mm, M1A1, w/carr. M1						
167. GUN, 155mm, M1917 & 1917A1, w/carr. M1917A1						
168. GUN, 155mm, M1917 & M 1917A1 w/carr M1918						
169. GUN, 155mm, M1918M1, w/ carr. M1917A1						
170. GUN, 155mm, M1918M1, w/ carr. M1918A1						
171. GUN, 8" M1, w/carr., M1 (Comp)						
172. GUN, 8" M1, w/carr., M2						
173. HOWITZER, 240mm, M1, w/ carr., M1, (Comp)						
174. HOWITZER, 8" m1, w/carr M1 (Comp)						
175. LIMBER, heavy, M2						
176. WAGON, cannon, transport M1A1 (8" gun)						
177. WAGON, carriage, transport, M3A1 (8" gun)						
178. WAGON, cannon transport M2A1, (240mm How)						
179. WAGON, carriage, transport, M3A1, (240mm How)						
180.						
181.						
182.						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
183.						
184.						
185.						
186.						
"F" GROUP						
187. BINOCULARS, 7x50 M14						
188. BINOCULARS, 7x50, M15						
189. BINOCULARS, 7x50, M16						
190. BINOCULARS, 7x50, M17						
191. BINOCULARS, 7x50, MK XXI (Navy)						
192. BINOCULARS, 6x30, M3						
193. BINOCULARS, 6x30, M6						
194. BINOCULARS, 6x30, M8						
195. BINOCULARS, 6x30, M9						
196. BINOCULARS, 6x30, M13						
197. BOARD Adjustment, fire, by models						
198. BOARD, Correction range by models						
199. BOARD, Deflection, by models						
200. BOARD, Plotting, sound ranging, M1						
201. BOARD, Plotting, flash ranging, M5						
202. BOARD, Plotting, and relocating by models						
203. BOARD, Spotting, by models						
204. CHEST, lighting equip., M21						
205. CIRCLE, aiming, M1						
206. CIRCLE, aiming, M1916 & M1916M1						
207. CLOCK, message center, M1						
208. CLINOMETER, M1, M1917						
209. COMPASS, M2						
210. COMPASS, Prismatic, M1918						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
211. CORRECTOR, wind sound ranging, M1						
212. CORRECTOR, percentage, M1						
213. DIRECTOR, AA, M5, (37mm & 40mm)						
214. DIRECTOR, AA, M5A1, (37mm & 40mm)						
215. DIRECTOR, No. 5 British						
216. DIRECTOR, AA, M10 (4.7" Gun)						
217. DIRECTOR, AA, M4 (90mm & 3" AA Guns)						
218. DIRECTOR, AA, M6 (British)						
219. DIRECTOR, AA, M7 (90mm & 3" AA guns)						
220. DIRECTOR, AA, M7A1 (90mm & 3" AA guns)						
221. DIRECTOR, M9 (90mm & 3" AA guns)						
222. FINDER, depression, position, by models						
223. FINDER, height, 13½' M1						
224. FINDER, height, 13½' M2						
225. FINDER, range, 1 meter base M1916 (FA)						
226. FINDER, range, 1 meter base M7 (FA)						
227. FINDER, range, 1 meter base, M9 (FA)						
228. FINDER, range, 1 meter base M9A1 (FA)						
229. FINDER, range, M9A1 (TD)						
230. FINDER, range, M9A1 (Tank)						
231. FINDER, range, 80cm base M1914						
232. FINDER, range, 80 cm base M1914M1						
233. FINDER, range, 80 cm base M1917						
234. FINDER, range, 80 cm base M1917M1						
235. FINDER, range 80 cm base M1918						
236. FINDER, range, horizontal base, by models						
237. GLASSES, field, all Models						
238. INDICATOR, range, by models						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
239. INSTRUMENT, Obsvn., AA, BC, M8						
240. INSTRUMENT, Angle of Sight, M1917						
241. INSTRUMENT, Azimuth, M2 by models						
242. INSTRUMENT, Azimuth, (Mils) M1						
243. INSTRUMENT, Azimuth (Mils) M1918						
244. INSTRUMENT, Azimuth (Mils) M1918A1						
245. INSTRUMENT, Azimuth (Mils) M1918A2						
246. INSTRUMENT, Binoural Trng (All mod)						
247. INSTRUMENT, Spotting, M2						
248. KIT, Helium filling M6A1						
249. KIT, Helium filling, M8						
250. POST, aiming, M1						
251. POST, aiming, M14						
252. POST, aiming, M5						
253. POST, aiming, M6						
254. POST, aiming, M7						
255. POST, aiming, M8						
256. POST, aiming, M9						
257. QUADRANT, gunners, M1						
258. QUADRANT, Gunners, M1918						
259. RULE, set forward type A & B						
260. RULE, slide, M1						
261. SCALE, Prediction, M1						
262. SETTER, Fuze, M13 (for 90mm Gun)						
263. SETTER, Fuze, M14						
264. SYSTEM, Cable, M1						
265. SYSTEM, Cable, M8						
266. SIGHT, computing, M7						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
267. SYSTEM, Data Transmission						
268. SYSTEM, remote control, M1 (37 mm AA)						
269. SYSTEM, remote control, M2 (90mm)						
270. SYSTEM, remote control, M5 & M10 (40mm)						
271. SYSTEM, remote control, M6 (4.7" Gun)						
272. TELESCOPE, BC, M65						
273. TELESCOPE, BC, M1915A1						
274. TELESCOPE, BC, M1917B1, B2, B3 & B4						
275. TELESCOPE, Obsvn., (TD) by mod.						
276. TELESCOPE, Obsvn., (Inf. Cav.) M4						
277. TELESCOPE, Obsvn. (Inf Cav.) M48						
278. TELESCOPE, Obsvn. (Inf. Cav.) M49						
279. TELESCOPE, Panoramic (M1)						
280. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M2						
281. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M6						
282. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M12						
283. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M12A1						
284. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M12A2						
285. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M12A3						
286. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M12A4						
287. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, M12A5						
288. TELESCOPE, Panoramic, HD. by models						
289. TELESCOPE, sight, M1						
290. TESTER, stereoscopic, M1A1						
291. TRAILER, sound locator, by models						
292. TRAILER, M18						
293. TRAILER, Generator, M7						
294. TRAINER, stereoscopic, M7						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
295. TRAINER, director, M8						
296. UNIT, Generating, M1						
297. UNIT, Generating, M5 & M5A1 (37mm & 40mm)						
298. UNIT, Generating, M6 (for director M4 & M7)						
299. UNIT, Generating, M7 or M7A1 (90mm or 3" or 4.7" guns) with trailer						
299a. UNIT, Generating, M7 (90mm) w/skids						
300. WATCH, wrist a. 7 or 16 jewel Elgin b. 9 jewel Waltham c. 15 jewel Bulova d. 17 jewel Hamilton						
301. WATCH, pocket a. 7 jewel Elgin b. 9 or 15 jewel Waltham c. Rlwy grade 21 jew Hamilton						
302. WATCH, stop, Type (A & B)						
303. UNIT, Generating, M15 (4.7" Gun)						
304. UNIT, Generating, M17 (37mm & 40mm)						
305. UNIT, Generating, M18 (90mm) w/trlr						
306. UNIT, Generating, M18 (90mm) w/skids						
307. ENGINE, Gen., e.g. 30-361 w/trlr						
308. ENGINE, gen., e.g. 30-361 w/skids						
309. ENGINE, gen. e.g. 2.5-361 (for trlr M5 & M5A1)						
310.						
311.						
312.						
313.						
314.						
315.						
"G" GROUP - COMBAT						
316. CAR, arm., light, M8, w/o/arm	X	X				
317. CAR, arm., light, M8, w/arm						
318. CAR, arm., T-18, T-17 & T-17-E-1						
319. CAR, arm., medium (by models) wo/arm						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
320. CAR, srm., medium, (by models) w/srm						
321. CAR, Arm., heavy (by models) w/o/arm						
322. CAR, srm., heavy, (by models) w/srm						
323. CAR, srm., Utility, M20, w/o/srm						
324. CAR, half-track, M2, w/w,w/o/srm						
325. CAR, half-track, M2, w/roller, wo/srm						
326. CAR, half-track, M2A1, w/o/srm,w/w						
327. CAR, half-track, M2A1, w/o/srm, w/roller						
328. CAR, half-track, M3A2, w/o/srm,w/w						
329. CAR, half-track, M3A2, w/o/srm, w/roller						
330. CAR, half-track, M5A2, w/o/srm,w/w						
331. CAR, half-track, M5A2, w/o/srm, w/roller						
332. CAR, half-track, M9, w/o/srm,w/w						
333. CAR, half-track, M9, w/o/srm, w/roller						
334. CAR, half-track, M9A1, w/o/srm w/w						
335. CAR, half-track, M9A1, w/o/srm w/roller						
336. CAR, scout, M3A1, w/o/srm						
337. CAR, scout, M3A1, w/srm						
338. CARRIAGE, motor, morter, M2, w/srm						
339. CARRIAGE, motor, morter, M2, w/o/srm	X	X				
340. CARRIAGE, motor, 57mm Gun, T48, w/srm						
341. CARRIAGE, motor, 57mm Gun, T48, w/o/srm	X	X				
342. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm Gun, M3 (T12) w/srm						
343. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm Gun, M3 (T12) w/o/srm	X	X				
344. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm, Gun, M3A1, w/srm						
345. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm Gun, M3A1, w/o/srm	X	X				
346. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm How., M8, w/srm						
347. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm How., M8 w/o/srm	X	X				
348. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm How., T30, w/srm						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
349. CARRIAGE, motor, 75mm How., T-30 w/o/srm	X	X				
350. CARRIAGE, motor, 76mm Gun, M18, w/srm (T-70)						
351. CARRIAGE, motor, 76mm Gun, M18, w/o/srm (T-70)	X	X				
352. CARRIAGE, motor, 105mm How., T19, w/srm						
353. CARRIAGE, motor, 105mm How., T19, w/o/srm	X	X				
354. CARRIAGE, motor, 105mm How., M7, w/srm						
355. CARRIAGE, motor, 105mm How., M7 w/o/srm	X	X				
356. CARRIAGE, motor, 155mm Gun, M12 T26 w/srm						
357. CARRIAGE, motor, 155mm Gun, M12, T26, wo/srm	X	X				
358. CARRIAGE, motor, mult. gun, AA, M3, w/srm (Twin cal .50)						
359. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun AA, M3, w/o/srm (Twin Cal .50)	X	X				
360. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun M4, w/srm						
361. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun M4, w/o/srm	X	X				
362. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun with 37mm, AA, M15, w/srm						
363. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun with 37mm AA, M15, w/o/srm	X	X				
364. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun, M16, (Quad Cal .50) w/srm						
365. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun, M16 (Quad Cal .50) w/o/srm	X	X				
366. CARRIAGE, motor, mult gun, M17, w/srm						
367. CARRIAGE, Motor, mult gun, M17, w/o/srm	X	X				
368. CARRIAGE, motor, 37mm Gun, M6, w/srm						
369. CARRIAGE, motor, 37mm Gun, M6, w/o/srm	X	X				
370. CARRIAGE, motor, 3" Gun, M10, w/srm						
371. CARRIAGE, motor, 3" Gun, M10, w/o/srm						
372. CARRIAGE, motor, 3" Gun, M10A1, w/srm						
373. CARRIAGE, motor, 3" Gun, M10A1, w/o/srm						
374. CARRIAGE, mult MG, Cal .50, M51, w/srm						
375. CARRIAGE, mult MG, Cal .50, M51, w/o/srm	X	X				
376. CARRIER, cargo, M30 (Med Tank M3 Chassis)						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
377. CARRIER, cargo, light, T15 (Studebaker)						
378. CARRIER, cargo, light, T15 (Studebaker)						
379. CARRIER, cargo, light, M29 (T24)						
380. CARRIER, 81mm mortar, half-track, M4 w/srm						
381. CARRIER, 81mm, mortar, half-track, M4, w/o/srm	X	X				
382. CARRIER, 81mm, mortar, half-track, M4A1, w/srm						
383. CARRIER, 81mm mortar, half-track, M4A1, w/o/srm	X	X				
384. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M3, w/o/srm w/w						
385. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M3, w/o/srm w/roller						
386. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M3A1, w/o/srm w/w						
387. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M3A1, w/o/srm w/roller						
388. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M5, w/o/srm w/w						
389. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M5, w/o/srm w/roller						
390. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M5A1, w/o/srm w/w						
391. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M5A1, w/o/srm w/roller						
392. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M9, (Amb)						
393. CARRIER, personnel, half-track, M5 (Amb)						
394. CARRIER, Universal, T16						
395. CRANE, truck mounted M2 (T6)						
396. TRACTOR, medium M4, high speed 18-ton (90mm Gun)						
397. TRACTOR, medium, M4 high sped 18-ton (155mm Gun)						
398. TRACTOR, medium, M4, high speed 18-ton, (8" How)						
399. TRACTOR, medium, M5, high sped 13-ton, (155mm How)						
400. TRACTOR, medium, M5, high speed, 13-ton, (4.5" Gun)						
401. TRACTOR, heavy, M6, high speed, 38-ton, (240mm How)						
402. TRACTOR, heavy, M6, high speed 38-ton, (8" Gun)						
403. TRACTOR, crane, 2-ton, M5						
404. TRAILER, Clamshell, M16 (for 8" Gun)						
405. TRAILER, Clamshell, M16, (for 240mm How)						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
406. TRAILER, Bomb, M5						
407. TRAILER, Armored, M8						
408. TRAILER, ammo., M10						
409. TRAILER, ammo., M21,4-ton						
410. TRAILER, ammo., 10-ton Dovel type						
411. TRAILER, smoke gen., M7						
412. TANK, light, M3 (Gas) w/arm						
413. TANK, light, M3 (Gas) w/o/arm	X	X				
414. TANK, light, M3, Diesel, w/arm						
415. TANK, light, M3, Diesel, w/o/arm	X	X				
416. TANK, light, M3a1, Gas, w/arm						
417. TANK, light, M3a1, Gas w/o/arm	X	X				
418. TANK, light, M3a1, Diesel, w/arm						
419. TANK, light, M3a1, Diesel, w/o/arm	X	X				
420. TANK, light, M3A3, M3a2 & M3A4, w/arm						
421. TANK, light, M3A3, M3a2, & M3A4, w/o/arm	X	X				
422. TANK, light, M5, Gas, w/arm						
423. TANK, light, M5, Gas w/o/arm	X	X				
424. TANK, light, M5a1, Gas w/arm						
425. TANK, light, M5a1, Gas w/o/arm	X	X				
426. TANK, light, T9E1, & T16 (Marmon-Harrington) w/arm						
427. TANK, light, T9E1 & T16 (Marmon-Harrington) w/o/arm	X	X				
428. TANK, medium, M3, Gas, w/arm						
429. TANK, medium, M3, Gas, w/o/arm	X	X				
430. TANK, medium, M3a1, w/arm						
431. TANK, medium, M3a1, w/o/arm	X	X				
432. TANK, medium, M3A3, M3A2, M3A4 & M3A5, w/arm						
433. TANK, medium, M3A2, M3A3, M3A4 & M3A5, w/o/arm	X	X				

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
434. TANK, medium, M4, gas w/arm						
435. TANK, medium, M4, gas, w/o/arm	X	X				
436. TANK, medium, M4a1, gas, w/arm						
437. TANK, medium, M4a1, gas, w/o/arm	X	X				
438. TANK, medium, M4a2, Diesel, w/arm						
439. TANK, medium, M4a2, Diesel, w/o/arm	X	X				
440. TANK, medium, M4a3, gas, w/arm						
441. TANK, medium, M4a3, gas, w/o/arm	X	X				
442. TANK, medium, M4a4, Gas, w/arm						
443. TANK, medium, M4a4, Gas, w/o/arm	X	X				
444. TANK, medium, M4a5, w/arm						
445. TANK, medium, M4a5, w/o/arm	X	X				
446. TANK, medium, with 76mm Gun, w/arm						
447. TANK, medium, with 76mm Gun, w/o/arm	X	X				
448. TANK, medium, with 105mm How w/arm						
449. TANK, medium, with 105mm How w/o/arm	X	X				
450. TANK, medium, M7, w/arm						
451. TANK, medium M7, w/o/arm	X	X				
452. TANK, medium, spec w/arm						
453. TANK, medium, spec w/o/arm	X	X				
454. TANK, heavy, M6 or M6a1 w/arm						
455. TANK, heavy M6 or M6a1, w/o/arm	X	X				
456. EXPLODER, mine, T3						
457. EXPLODER, mine, T1E1						
458. EXPLODER, mine, T1E3						
459. EXPLODER, mine, T9E1 Crab						
460. EXPLODER, mine, T9E1 cent						
461. VEHICLE, Tank Recovery, T2, Gas						
462. VEHICLE, Tank Recovery, T2, Diesel						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
463. VEHICLE, Tank Recovery, T2 (PM for 240mm How)						
464. VEHICLE, Tank Recovery, T6 (Light)						
465. VEHICLE, Tank Recovery, T5, Gas						
466. VEHICLE, landing, tracked, (T33) MK I (Unarmored)						
467. VEHICLE, landing tracked (T34) MK II (Unarmored)						
468. VEHICLE, landing tracked, (T34) MK II (Armored)						
469. LAUNCHER, rocket, Mult 4.5" T27, T27E1						
470. LAUNCHER, rocket mult 4.5" T34						
471. LAUNCHER, rocket, mult 7.2" T40						
472. TRUCK, tractor, M26 (T25) (For Truck, trailer, 40-ton Tank Recovery, M25 (T21)						
473. TRAILER, M15 (T28) (For Truck, trailer, 40-ton, tank recovery) (M25, T21)						
474. TRUCK, 12-ton, 6x4, M20 (For truck, trailer 45-ton, (Tank trans M19)						
475. TRAILER, 45-ton, 12-wheels, M9 (For Truck trailer, 45-ton,) (Tank trans, M19)						
476. TRUCK, Bomb service, M1						
477. TRUCK, Bomb Service, M6						
478. TRUCK, Bomb lift, M1						
479. TRUCK, Bomb lift, M22 w/cradle						
480. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Art repair M9	X	X				
481. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Art repair M9A1						
482. TRUCK, Art repair, M 1 & M2 (G.O.H.)	X	X				
483. TRUCK, 2½-tON, 6x6, Auto repair M8 (Load A)	X	X				
484. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Auto repair M8A1 (Load A)						
485. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Auto repair M8 (Load B)	X	X				
486. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Auto repair, M8A1 (Load B)						
487. TRUCK, Auto repair M1 & M2 (G.O.H.)	X	X				
488. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Elect repair, M18	X	X				
489. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Elect repair, M18A1						
490. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Inst repair, M10	X	X				

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
491. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Inst repair, M10A1						
492. TRUCK, Inst repair, M1 (C.O.E.)	X	X				
493. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Inst Bench, M23						
494. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16, (Load A)	X	X				
495. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16A1, (Load A)						
496. TRUCK, Mach shop, M4 (Load A) (C.O.E.)	X	X				
497. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16, (Load B)	X	X				
498. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16A1 (Load B)						
499. TRUCK, Mach shop, M4, (Load B) (C.O.E.)	X	X				
500. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16 (Load C)	X	X				
501. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16A1 (Load C)						
502. TRUCK, mach shop, M4 (Load C) (C.O.E.)	X	X				
503. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16 (Load D)	X	X				
504. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16A1 (Load D)						
505. TRUCK, Mach shop, M4 (Load D) (C.O.E.)	X	X				
506. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16, (Load F)	X	X				
507. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Mach shop, M16A1, (Load F)						
508. TRUCK, Mach shop, M4 (Load F) (C.O.E.)	X	X				
509. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, small arms repair M7	X	X				
510. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, small arms repair, M7A1						
511. TRUCK, small arms, M1 (C.O.E.)	X	X				
512. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, small arms repair, M7 (Signal)	X	X				
513. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, small arms repair M7A1 (Signal)						
514. TRUCK, spare parts, M1, M2 (Loads A,B,C, & D) (C.O.E.)	X	X				
515. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, spare parts, M1A	X	X				
516. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, spare parts, M2A1						
517. TRUCK, Tank Maint M1 (C.O.E.)	X	X				
518. TRUCK, Welding, M2 & M3 (C.O.E.)	X	X				
519. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, welding M12	X	X				
520. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, welding M12A1						
521. TRUCK, tool & bench, M2 (C.O.E.)	X	X				
522. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, tool & bench, M13	X	X				
523. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, tool & bench M13A1						
524. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, emerg repair, M2						
525. TRAILER, amn., 4-ton, M21						
526. TRAILER, amn., 10-ton, T34						
527. TRAILER, tractor crane, (7-ton) T26						
528.						
529.						
530.						
531.						
532.						
533.						
534.						
535.						
536.						
537.						
538.						
539.						
540.						
541.						
"G" GROUP - TACTICAL						
542. AMBULANCE, ¼-ton, 4x4	X	X				
543. AMBULANCE, 3/4-ton, 4x4						
544. BICYCLE (All types)						
545. CAR, 5-pass., light sedan a. (Ford 8-cyl. 1941) b. (Ford 8-cyl. 1942) c. (Ford 6-cyl. 1941) d. (Ford 6-cyl. 1942) e. (Chevrolet 1941) f. (Chevrolet 1942) g. (Plymouth 1941) h. (Plymouth 1942)						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
546. CAR, 5-pass, Medium sedan a. (Packard model 120) b. (Packard model 160) c. (Packard Model 180)						
547. MOTORCYCLE, solo a. Chain Drive (Harley Davidson) b. Chain Drive (Indian) c. Shaft Drive (Harley Davidson) d. Shaft Drive (Indian)						
548. TANK, gas, skid mounted						
549. TRAILER, ¼-ton, 2-wheel, cargo						
550. TRAILER, ¼-ton, 2-wheel, public address van						
551. TRAILER3/4-ton, 2-wheel communications						
552. TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-wheel cargo						
553. TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-wheel, water tank, 250-gal						
554. TRAILER, Athey, 6-ton						
555. TRAILER, 1-ton, 2-wheel, with 15 kwt. mtr. gen. mtd.						
556. TRAILER, Tech Alemite						
557. TRAILER, 6-ton, Payload, 4-wheel						
558. TRAILER, 8-ton, flat bed Engr						
559. TRAILER, 8-ton, conv. flat bed						
560. SEMI-TRAILER, 3-ton, payload (6-ton gross) 2-whl van						
561. SEMI-TRAILER, 3-ton, payload (6-ton gross) 2-whl stake & platform						
562. SEMI-TRAILER, 3½-ton, payload, (6-ton gross) 2-whl van						
563. SEMI-TRAILER, 3½-ton, payload, (6-ton gross) 2-whl stake & platform						
564. SEMI-TRAILER, 5-ton, 2 whl. stake & platform						
565. SEMI-TRAILER, 6-ton, payload (10-ton gross) 2 wheel, van						
566. SEMI-TRAILER, 6-ton, payload, (10-ton gross) 2 wheel, stake & platform						
567. SEMI-TRAILER, 6-ton, payload, (10-ton gross) 2 wheel, combination, animal & cargo						
568. SEMI-TRAILER, 6-ton, K-67-A						
569. SEMI-TRAILER, 7-ton, Flat Bed						
570. SEMI-TRAILER, 2,000 gal Gas						

SECRET

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
571. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, (w/6 volt elect syst)						
572. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4 (w/12 volt elect. syst)						
573. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, Amphibian						
574. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, Panel						
575. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4 Panel						
576. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, Command, w/w	X	X				
577. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, Command, w/o/w	X	X				
578. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, Command w/w						
579. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, Command, w/o/w						
580. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, W/C, w/w	X	X				
581. TRUCK, ¼-ton, 4x4, W/C, w/o/w						
582. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, W/C w/w						
583. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, W/C, w/o/w						
584. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, Carryall						
585. TRUCK, 3/4-ton, 4x4, Carryall						
586. TRUCK, 1½-ton 4x4, Cargo, w/w						
587. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 4x4, Cargo, w/o/w						
588. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 4x4, 15' special body						
589. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 4x4, Panel Delivery						
590. TRUCK, 1½-ton, Dump, 4x4 w/w						
591. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 4x4, Dump, w/o/w						
592. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 4x4, tractor						
593. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 6x6, personnel & cargo, w/w						
594. TRUCK, 1½-ton, 6x6, personnel & cargo w/o/w						
595. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, amphibian						
596. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, SWB, w/w						
597. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo SWB, w/o/w						
598. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, LWB, w/w						
599. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, LWB, w/o/w						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
600. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Dump, w/w						
601. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, Dump, w/o/w						
602. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, 750 gallon, gas tank						
603. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, 700 gallon, water tank						
604. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, tractor						
605. TRUCK, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, 15' special body						
606. TRUCK, 4-ton, 6x6, cargo, w/w						
607. TRUCK, 4-ton, 6x6, pontoon, LWB, w/w						
608. TRUCK, 4-ton, 6x6, wrecker, w/w						
609. TRUCK, 4-ton, 6x6, Dump, w/w						
610. TRUCK, 4-5-ton, 4x4, tractor a. (Federal) b. (Autocar)						
611. TRUCK, 5-6-ton, 4x4, tractor, w/w a. (Autocar) b. (Mack)						
612. TRUCK, 6-ton, 6x6, prime Mover, w/w a. (Mack) b. (White) c. (Corbitt)						
613. TRUCK, 7½-ton, 6x6, prime Mover, w/w						
614. TRUCK, 10-ton, 6x6, heavy wrecker, M1 w/w						
615. TRUCK, 10-ton, 6x4, cargo (Mack)						
616. MOTOR SCOOTER (All Types)						
617. SERVICYCLE						
618.						
619.						
620.						
621.						
622.						
623.						
"N" GROUP						
624. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET A (Emerg Repair Trk) AAF						
625. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET B (Emerg Repair Trk) AGF						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
626. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET C (Spare Parts, Truck)						
627. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET D (Spare Parts Truck)						
628. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET E (Tool & Bench, Truck)						
629. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET F (Art Rpr Truck)						
630. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET G (Mach Shop Equip)						
631. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET H (Mach Shop Equip)						
632. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET K (Pneumatic Tool & Equip)						
633. ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE SET L (Welding Equip)						
634.						
635.						
636.						
637.						
638.						
639.						
TOOL SETS						
640. AXE, Hd. SB 4lbs						
641. BAR, towing, univ. type						
642. CABINET, spare parts, type 1, 1940						
643. CABINET, assy., metal spare parts type II, Class A.						
644. CABINET, assy., metal spare parts type II, Class A-B						
645. CHAIN, Mot. veh. tow, 16'x7/16"						
646. CHAIN, Mot. veh. tow, 20'x5/8"						
647. CHEST, miscellaneous spare parts						
648. CHEST, cleaning mat. & small stores						
649. COMPASS, Veh. GP Hull Sherr						
650. COMPRESSOR, air, gas driven						
651. DISPENSER, grease, port.						
652. GRINDER, bench, hand 6" wheel						
653. GUN, lubricating manually operated HP 25 lb						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
654. HITCH, tandem ½-ton 4x4						
655. KIT, Carpenters w/metal case						
656. KIT, 12-volt conversion						
657. MACHINE, sewing portable single needle						
658. MATTOCK, pick, type II, Class F						
659. ROPE, tow, 1" x 20'						
660. SHOVEL, S.P. Rd. pt. #2						
661. STILL, water, port. gas operated						
662. THERMOMETER, powder, temp. M1						
663. TRACTION, device, grouser type						
664. TOOL SET, Armorer, TD Bn.						
665. TOOL SET, Armorer, FA Bn.						
666. TOOL SET, Artillery Mechanic						
667. TOOL SET, Battery Expert						
668. TOOL SET, Blacksmith #2						
669. TOOL SET, Body mechs.						
670. TOOL SET, Carburetor mechanic						
671. TOOL SET, Elect. carburetor						
672. TOOL SET, Ignition mechanic						
673. TOOL SET, half-track, Company						
674. TOOL SET, half-track, Bn. crew						
675. TOOL SET, half-track, Regtl. Maint. Plat						
676. TOOL SET, Machinists						
677. TOOL SET, Gen. mechs						
678. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set A Emerg. rpr. AAF						
679. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set B Emerg. Rep. GF						
680. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set C, cabinet, spare parts set						
681. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint Set D, cabinet spare parts set						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
682. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set E						
683. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set F						
684. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set G						
685. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set H						
686. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set K						
687. TOOL SET, Ord. Maint. Set L						
688. TOOL SET, Painters						
689. TOOL SET, Sheet metal radiator						
690. TOOL SET, Battalion Crew, M10, M10A1						
691. TOOL SET, Company, for M31, M32, M10A1 PM						
692. TOOL SET, Battalion, for M31, M32, M10A1, PM						
693. TOOL SET, Spec. car armored recon. mechanic						
694. TOOL SET, Spec. Armored car recon. Co.						
695. TOOL SET, Spec. car armored battalion crew						
696. TOOL SET, Special, car, arm. Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
697. TOOL SET, Special, car, scout, mechanic						
698. TOOL SET, Special, car, scout, Co.						
699. TOOL SET, Spec., car, scout, Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
700. TOOL SET, Spec., carriage motor M8 mechanics						
701. TOOL SET, Spec., carriage, motor M8 Company						
702. TOOL SET, Spec., carriage, motor, M8, Bn. crew						
703. TOOL SET, Spec., carriage, motor, M8 Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
704. TOOL SET, Spec., motor 105mm How., M7 mechanics						
705. TOOL SET, Spec., motor, 105mm How., M7 Company						
706. TOOL SET, Spec., motor, 105mm How., M7 Bn. crew						
707. TOOL SET, Spec., motor 105mm How., M7 Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
708. TOOL SET, Spec. Armored Command Co.						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
709. TOOL SET, Spec. Armored Command, Separate Bn.						
710. TOOL SET, Spec. Armored F Co.						
711. TOOL SET, Spec. Armored F Seperate Battalion						
712. TOOL SET, Spec armored F Regt. crew.						
713. TOOL SET, Spec. armored F Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
714. TOOL SET, Spec. truck armored F Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
715. TOOL SET, Spec. light tank, mechanic						
716. TOOL SET, Spec. light tank Co.						
717. TOOL SET, Spec. light tank, Bn. crew						
718. TOOL SET, Spec. light tank, Regtl. Maint.Plat.						
719. TOOL SET, Spec. Med. tank, Mechanic						
720. TOOL SET, Spec. Med. tank, Co.						
721. TOOL SET, Spec. Med. Tank, Bn., Crew.						
722. TOOL SET, Spec. Med. Tank, Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
723. TOOL SET, Tank Recovery Vehicle T2, Regtl. Maint. Plat.						
724. TOOL SET, Trimmers						
725. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #1						
726. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #2						
727. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #3						
728. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #4						
729. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #5						
730. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #6						
731. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #7						
732. TOOL SET, 2nd Echelon set #9						
733. TOOL SET, 3rd Echelon set #1						
734. TOOL SET, 4th Echelon set #2						
735. TOOL SET, Vulcanizers						
736. TOOL SET, Welders						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
737. BELT PRIMER, M8						
738.						
739.						
740.						
741.						
742.						
743.						
SNL - SPECIAL TOOL SETS						
744. TOOL SET, Gun, 37mm, M3 M9A1, & Carr., M4, M4A1						
745. TOOL SET, Gun., 37mm, M5 M9A1, & M6						
746. TOOL SET, Gun, auto., M1A2 & Mt. Comb. Gun M42						
747. TOOL SET, Gun, auto., 40mm, M1 & Carr M2						
748. TOOL SET, Gun, Mach., Cal. .30, all models & Mts.						
749. TOOL SET, Gun, mach., Cal. .50, All models & Mounts						
750. TOOL SET, Gun, sub-mach., Cal..45, all models						
751. TOOL SET, Mortar, 60mm, M2 & Mortar 81mm M1, w/mounts						
752. TOOL SET, Mount, comb. gun, M23, M23A1 & M44						
753. TOOL SET, Rifle, BAR, all models						
754. TOOL SET, Carbine, Cal. .30, all models						
755. TOOL SET, Pistol, auto., Cal..45 & revolver, Cal. .45, all models						
756. TOOL SET, Rifle, US, Cal .30, M1						
757. TOOL SET, Rifle, US, Cal. .30, M1903 A1, A3, A4 & model 1917						
758. TOOL SET, Gun, 57mm M1 & carr. M1, M1A1, M1A2, M1A3 & T5						
759. TOOL SET, Gun, 75mm, M2 & M3 (Tank) & Mount, M1						
760. TOOL SET, Gun, 75mm, M3 & Mount M34, M34A1, & M 47						
761. TOOL SET, Mount, gun, comb. M34 & M34A1						
762. TOOL SET, Gun, 75mm, M6 & Mount T1						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
763. TOOL SET, Gun, 3" M5 on carr. M1 & M6						
764. TOOL SET, Gun, 3" M7 and Mount M5						
765. TOOL SET, Gun, 4.5", M1 & Carr, M1 & M1A1						
766. TOOL SET, How. (Pack) 75mm, M1 & M1A1 & Carr. M2A1, M3, M3A1, M3A2, M3A3						
767. TOOL SET, How. (Pack) 75mm, M1, & M1A1 & Carr. M1						
768. TOOL SET, How., 75mm, M1A1, Mount, How. 75mm M8						
769. TOOL SET, How., 105mm, M2 & M2A1 & Carr., M1A1, M2 & M2A1						
770. TOOL SET, How., 105mm, M2A1, & Mount M4						
771. TOOL SET, How., 105mm, M3 & Carr., 105mm, M3, M3A1, T6						
772. TOOL SET, How., 155mm, M1 & Carr., M1						
773. TOOL SET, Spec/tools for repair of Stabilizer						
774. TOOL SET, Gun, 155mm, M1						
775. TOOL SET, How., 8" M1						
776. TOOL SET, Gun, 8" M2						
777. TOOL SET, How., 240mm M1						
778. TOOL SET, Gun, 50mm AA, M1 & M1A1						
779. TOOL SET, Gun, 90mm, M2						
780. TOOL SET, Gun, 90mm, M3						
781. TOOL SET, Gun, 4.7", M1						
782. TOOL SET, Kit, cable repair, M7 (Univ. Kit issue to Ord M Co's only)						
783. TOOL SET, wrench, tubular set						
784. TOOL SET, tools special for general instruments						
785. TOOL SET, Fixtures, spec. for general instruments						
786. TOOL SET, Set, junior watch repair #2						
787. TOOL SET, Director, M9 & M10						
788. TOOL SET, Director, M4, M7						
789. TOOL SET, System remote control, M2						

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
790. TOOL SET, Finder height M1 & M2						
791. TOOL SET, Director, M5, M5A1, M6						
792. TOOL SET, Kit, Instrument repair						
793. TOOL SET, System, remote control, M1, etc.						
794.						
795.						
796.						
797.						
798.						
799.						

STATUS OF AMMUNITION

Period of Report

Date:_____ No._____

Signature:_____

SUBJECT:_____ From:_____ (Hour & Date)

TO:_____ From:_____ TO:_____

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
		37mm AA Gun									
97	P5EAB	HE, M54 w/SD TR. & PDF M56									
98	P5EIA	APC, M59 w/TR									
		37mm Gun, T & AT									
17	R1GBA	HE, M63 w/BDF M58									
19	R1GHB	Canister, M2									
18	R1GIB	APC, M51 w/TR 2900 F/S MV									
		40mm AA Gun									
100	P5HBA	AP-T, M81									
90	P5HCA	HE-T (SD) MK II w/PDF, M64A1									
		57mm Gun, AT									
20	R1IDA	AP-T, M70 (Incl. 6 pdr. BR)									
150	R1I--	HE-									
21	R1IAB	APC, M86									
		2 In. Mortar, M3									
246	R4AAA	Bomb, Smoke, MK I/L, M3									
		60 & 81mm Trench Mortar									
22	R4CAA	HE, M49A2 w/PDF M56 (60mm)									
23	R4CDA	Illum. M83 w/TF M65 (60mm)									
26	R4FCA	HE, M43A1 w/PFD M52 (Lt) (81mm)									
27	R4MLA	HE, M56 w/PDF M54 (HV) (81mm)									
28	R4FPA	Smoke, WP, M57 w/PDF M52 (81mm)									
		75mm Gun									
108	R1LCA	HE, M48 w/PDF M48, S.C.									
236	R1FCA	" " " M48A1, S.C.									
237	R1LDA	HE, M48 w/PDF M48A1, N.C.									
109	R1LFA	HE, M48 w/PDF M54, S.C.									
118	R1LGA	HE, M48 w/PDF M54, N.C.									
110	R1LIA	APC, M61 w/TR, S.C.									
	R1LLB	GAS, HE, ML, II unf., N.C.									
239	R1LNA	APC, M61 w/TR & BDF, M66 or M66A1 S.C.									

111	R1LPA	Smoke, WP, Mk. II unf. N.C.
240	R1RJA	Smoke, WP, M64
151	R1RKA	Smoke, HC, BI, M89 (fzd)
		75mm Howitzer
114	R1MCA	HE, M48 w/PDF M48
115	R1MDA	HE, M48 w/PDF M54
117	R1MTA	Smoke, WP, M64 w/PDF M57
	R1MUA	Gas, HS, M64 w/PDF M57
116	R1MMA	HE, AT, M66 w/BDF M62
		76mm Gun
154	R1PBA	HE, N.C. w/f M48
155		HE, R.C. w/f M48A1
156	R1PAA	APC, w/f BD M66A1
157	R1PCA	Smoke, HC, BI,
241	R1PFA	APC M62 w/tracer
242		Shell, Smoke WP
		3" Gun, T & AT
105	P3NHA	APC, M62 w/TR
243	P3NTA	APC, M62 w/TR & BDF M66A1
245	P3NUA	AP, M79 w/TR
104	P60CA	HE, M42A1 w/PDF M48 or M48A1 (P60DA) N.C.
107	R1K[illegible]	Shell, Smoke, HC, BI
244		Smoke, WP
		90mm AA Gun
253		HE, M71, unfuzed
101	P5SBA	HE, M71 w/TMF M43
103	P5SCA	AP, M77, w/TR
254	P5SHA	APC, M82 w/TR & BDF M68
102	P5SGB	HE, M71 w/PDF M48 or M48A1 (P5SDB)
		105mm Howitzer, M2
65	R1QBB	HE, M1 w/PDF M48
66	R1QDA	HE, M1 w/PDF M48A1
67	R1QCB	HE, M1 w/PDF M54
68	R1QEA	HE, AT, M67 w/BDF M62
	R1QIB	Gas, HS, M60 w/PDF M57
69	R1QJB	Smoke, WP, M60 w/PDF M57
70	R1QLA	Smoke, HC, BE, M84 w/PDF M54
71		Smoke, Red, BE, M84 w/PDF M54
72		Smoke, Green, BE, M84 w/PDF M54
73		Smoke, Violet, BE, M84 w/PDF M54
74		Smokeless, BE, M84 w/PDF M54 (for FWB)
		105mm Howitzer, M3
37	R1SBA	HE, AT, M67 w/PDF M62
40	R1SCA	HE, M1 w/PDF M54
38	R1SDA	HE, M1 w/PDF M48
39	R1SDA	HE, M1 w/PDF M48A1
41	R1S---	Smoke, M60, WP
42	R1SFA	Smoke, HC, BE, M84
230		Colored Smoke, red
231		Colored Smoke, green
232		Colored Smoke, violet
		4.5" Gun, M1
118	R2DAA	HE, M65 (unf)
119	R2EAA	Charge, Prop., M8 (Super)
120	R2EBA	Charge, Prop., M7 (normal)
158		HE, w/Smoke Spotting Charge (British)
		4.7" Gun (120mm)
	P5UBA	Shell, HE, M73, w/TMF M61A1
	P5UAA	Shell, HE, M73, w/TMF M61
		155mm Gun M1917-18 and M1
85	P1EAA	HE, M101, unf.
	P1EBA	Gas, HS, M104, unf.
86	P1ECA	Smoke, WP, M104, unf.
87	P1EDA	AP, M112, BDF, M60
88	P2EAA	Charge, prop. B&I, NH PDR, Gun, M1
89	P2FCC	Charge, prop. B&I, NH PDR, Gun, M1917-18
252	P1FAA	HE, Mk. IIIA1 (M1917-18 only)
		155mm Howitzer, M1917-17A1-18
75	R2ADA	HE, M102 unf.
	R2AFA	Gas, HS, M105 unf.
76	R2AQA	Smoke, WP, M105 unf.
77	R2ARA	Smoke, HC, BE, M115 unf.
78	R2LCA	Charge, prop. M4A1 (GB)
79	R2LDA	Charge, prop. M2 (WB)
		155mm Howitzer, M1
80	R2BAA	HE, M107 unf.
	R2BCA	Gas, HS, M110 unf.
81	R2BDA	Smoke, WP, M110 unf.
82	R2BFA	Smoke, HC, BE, M116, unf.
83	R2MAA	Charge, prop. M3 (GB)
84	R2MBA	Charge, prop. M4 (WB)
233		Colored Smoke, red
234		Colored Smoke, green
235		Colored Smoke, violet
		8" Gun
126	P1JAA	Shell, HE, M106
127	P2KAA	Charge, prop. M9 (GB)
128	P2KBA	Charge, Prop. M10 (WB)
		8" Howitzer, M1
121	P1QAA	HE, 200 lb. M106, unf.
122	P2QAA	Charge, pop. M4 (GB)
123	P2QBA	Charge, prop. M2 (WB)
		240mm Howitzer, M1
124	P1SAA	Shell, HE, M114, unf.
125	P2SAA	Charge, prop. B&I, NH
		Fuzes and Primers
112	R3BEA	Fuze, PD, M46 (SQ)
93	R3BIA	Fuze, PD, M54
248	R3BSA	Fuze, PD, M51 or M51A1 w/booster M21A1
249		Fuze, PD, M51A1 w/booster M20A1
91	R3BTA	Fuze, PD, M55 or M55A1 (SQ or T)
251		Fuze, CP, T105
92	R3EAA	Fuze, M67, TM
250		Fuze, T74 MX
95	R3DBA	Primer, perc., M36IIA1 (21gr)
94	R3DCA	Primer, perc., M36IIA3 (18gr)
90		Fuze, PD, M51A3 (SQ or Delay)
247		Fuze, PD, M119 (British)
		Cartridge, Cal..30
1	T1CAD	Cartridge, carbine, M1
4	T1EDV	AP, 8/clip
2	T1EDG	AP, 5/clip
7	T1EDD	AP & TR, 4-1 250/FB
194	T1EEN	AP, 20/ctn
9	T1EEC	AP & TR, 9-1, 250/FB
3	T1EGK	Ball, 5/clip
5	T1EHA	Ball, 8/clip
6	T1EHE	Ball & TR, 4-1, 250/FB
195	T1EHO	Ball, 20/ctn
8	T1EHB	Ball & TR, 9-1, 250/FB
10	T1EPE	Tracer, 20/ctn
		Cartridge, Cal. 38
200	T2EAA	Ball, in/ctns
		Cartridge, Cal..45
13	T3AAA	Ball, 20/ctn
		Cartridge, Cal..50
14	T1IBD	AP & TR, 4-1, 265/MLB
	T1IBK	AP, 10/ctn
15	T1ICN	AP-I-TR, 2-2-1, 265/MLB
16	T1ICG	AP & TR, 9-1, 265/MLB
201	T1IDA	AP-Inc. T16, 10/ctns
	T1IKB	Incendiary, 10/ctn
	T1IPD	Tracer, 10/ctn
		Shotgun, 12 ga.
38	T3AAA	Brass No. 00 Buckshot
		Grenades
33	S4GBA	Hand, Frag. MkII w/f M10A1 & M10A2
		Hand, Frag. No. 36 w/f (BR)
34	S4GAA	Hand, Off. Mk IIIA1 unf.
35	S4SPA	Fuze, Det. M6A2 or M6A3
		Hand, Off. No. 69 w/f (BR)
30	S4NBA	Rifle, HE, AT, M9A1
32	S4NJA	Rifle, Smoke, HC, T6
31	S4NHA	Rifle, Frag. Impact, M17
210		Rifle, Smoke, WP T-5
211	S4NLA	Rifle, colored smoke, red
212	S4NKA	Rifle, colored smoke, violet
213	S4NQA	Rifle, colored smoke, green
214	S4NMA	Rifle, colored smoke, yellow
215	S4NNA	Rifle, colored smoke, orange
11	S4PAA	Cartridge, Gren. M3 Cal..30
12	S4 PBA	Cartridge, Gren, M6 (Carbine)
217	S4PCA	Cart., booster, Aur. Gren M7
216	S4QFA	Adapter, Gren., Projector M1
		Pyrotechnics
43	S5LAA	Signal, AC, Red Star Para. M11
44	S5LCA	Signal, AC, White Star Para. M15
45	S5LDA	Signal, AC, Green Star Para. M16
		Signal, AC, Double Star, Green-Green, AN-M39
		Signal, AC, Double Star, Yellow-Yellow, AN-M38
18	S5PGA	Signal, AC, Single Star, Green, AN-M45
46	S5PHA	Signal, AC, Single Star, Red, AN-M43
47	S5PIA	Signal, AC, Single Star, Yellow, AN-M44
222	S5RAA	Signal GR, M22, Amber Star Clus
51	S5RBA	Signal GR, M21, Amber Star Para
221	S5RCA	Signal GR, M20, Green Star Clus
50	S5RDA	Signal GR, M19, Green Star Para
220	S5REA	Signal GR, M18, White Star Clus,
49	S5RFA	Signal GR, M17, White Star Para
53	S5RGA	Signal GR, M17A1, White Star Para
223	S5RHA	Signal, GR, M18A1, White Star Clus
54	S5RKA	Signal GR, M19A1, Green Star Para
224	S5RPA	Signal GR, M20A1, Green Star Clus
55	S5RQA	Signal GR, M21A1, Amber Star Para
225	S5RVA	Signal GR, M22A1, Amber Star Clus
56	S5RTA	Signal GR, M51A1, Red Star, Para
226	S5RUA	Signal GR, M52A1, Red Star, Clus
57		Flare, Troop Recog. Yellow (BR)
218	S5IBA	Flare, Trip, Para, M48
219	S5ICA	Flare, Trip, Para, M49
		Rockets
29	S9ACA	Anti Tank 2.36" M6A1
227	S9CHA	4.5 Inch
228		7.2 Inch
		Ground Mines
61	R7AAA	HE, AT, M1 or M1A1 w/f M1 and M1A1 or M1A2
59	R7ACA	AP, M2, w/f, M1
60	R7AEA	AP, M3, w/f, M3
	R7AJA	AT, HE, M4 w/f HE, M4
63	R7AHA	AT, HE, M5 w/f HE, M5 (non-metallic)
		Mine, Shrapnel, (BR)

SECRET

58		HE. AT. Mk II w/f (BR)
		HE. AT. CONTACT Mk V unf. (BR)
		Fuze, Mine, Contact, No. 3 (BR)
		Grenade, No. 75 Hawkins (BR)
		Miscellaneous
161		Beehive, 5-lb
162		Beehive, 10-lb
	R7EVA	Explosive, Shaped Charge M1
	R7EAA	Explosive, Shaped Charge M2
	R7EUA	Explosive, Shaped Charge M2A1
	R7EVA	Explosive, Shaped Charge T3
62	R7EPA	Torpedo, Bangalore, M1 (AM)
		Torpedo, Bangalore, British

Ord Form No. 3
Third Army

TOP SECRET - BIGOT

CAPTURED ENEMY MATERIEL REPORT

Organization Reporting_____

Date_____ 1800

(To be submitted weekly by designated Ordnance Bns as of 1800 hours each Saturday, covering period since last report, to arrive at Army Ordnance office not later than 0830 following Monday.)

Appropriate Nomenclature	Quantity on hand at end of previous week	Quantity received during week	Quantity evacuated during week	Quantity issued to troops during week	Quantity remaining in stock

REGISTER NO. TUSA 75

APPENDIX II TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN
TYPICAL LAYOUT OF ARMY
ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE

TOP-SECRET

TYPICAL LAYOUT OF ARMY ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE



REGISTER NO. TUSA 75

APPENDIX III TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN
TYPICAL LAYOUT OF ARMY
ORDNANCE SUPPLY

TOP-SECRET

TYPICAL LAYOUT OF ARMY ORDNANCE SUPPLY



*Channels for "Normal Supply" and "Flow of Exchange Parts and Requisitions" are identical but flow in opposite directions.

REGISTER NO. TUSA 75.

APPENDIX IV TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN
BASIC LOAD BASIS NON-DIVISIONAL
ORDNANCE COMPANIES

25 May 1944

BASIC LOAD BASIS NON-DIVISIONAL MAINTENANCE COMPANIES

Each type Ordnance Maintenance Company will stock spare parts and cleaning and preserving material for the number of major items indicated in the appropriate column. Maintenance Companies will also stock a minimum of fifteen (15) days supply of parts common (tires, tire patches, valve caps, windshield wiper blades, lamp bulbs, etc.), standard hardware (nuts, bolts, screws, metal stock, etc.), Group K-2 material, and any other items which experience has shown to be necessary, and for which transportation is available.	Medium Maintenance Company	Medium Automotive Maintenance Company	Maintenance Company (AA)	Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company	Heavy Maintenance Company (FA)	Heavy Maintenance Company (TK)
MAJOR ITEM						
Carr, gun, 40mm (AA) (all models)	10		80			
Cart, hand, M3A4	25				25	
Gun, 40mm, auto. M1 (AA)	10		80			
Gun, mach, cal..30, M1917A1	50	50	15	25	50	25
Gun, mach, cal..30, M1919A4 (Flex)	100	50	50	50	50	50
Gun, mach, cal..30, M1919A6	50	50		20	20	
Gun, mach, cal..50, Brg. M2, HB, (Flex)	150	150	150	150	150	
Gun, mach, cal..50, W/C, (Flex) M2	10		50		50	
Gun, sub-mach. cal..45, M3	400	400	200	400	400	400
Mortar, 60mm, M2, w/mount, M2, M1	100				50	40
Mortar, 81mm, M1, w/mount, M1	100				50	20
Mount, AA, MG, cal..50, M3, M3A1	5		10		5	5
Mount, tripod, MG, cal..30, M1917A1	100	50	25	25	25	25
Mount, tripod, MG, cal..30, M2	100	100	50	50	50	50
Mount, tripod, MG, cal..50, M3	50	50	50	50	50	50
Elev & Cradle, AA, cal..50, M1	75	50	200		100	100
Mount, MG, cal..30, M18	100	100	25	100	100	100
Mount, truck, M32, M36, M37, M37A2	30	30		30	30	30
Mount, truck, pedestal, M24, M24A1	20	20		10	10	10
Mount, truck, pedestal, M24A2	5	5		5		
Mount, truck, pedestal, M31	30	30		30	10	10
Rifle, auto. Brg. cal..30, M1918A2	200	50		30	30	
Bayonet, M1	1500	1500	500	1500	1500	1500
Carbine, US, cal..30, M1 (w/folding stock)	4000	2000	500	1000	3000	3000
Launcher, grenade, M1, (03 Rifle)	50	30	50	50	50	50
Launcher, grenade, M7, (M1 Rifle)	300	300	100	300	300	300
Launcher, grenade, M8, (Carbine)	150	150	100	150	150	150
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M9	200	100	100	100	200	200
Knife, trench, M1, M3, w/scabbard	1000	500	500	1000	1000	1000
Pistol, auto. cal..45, M1911A1, M1911	300	200	100	300	300	300
Pistol, pyrotechnic, AN-M8, w/mount	10	10	10		10	10
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9	50	20	20	50	50	50
Projector, signal, ground, M4	60				60	60
Rifle, US, cal..30, M1	1000	500	500	1000	1000	1000

BASIC LOAD BASIS NON-DIVISIONAL MAINTENANCE COMPANIES

Each type Ordnance Maintenance Company will stock spare parts and cleaning and preserving material for the number of major items indicated in the appropriate column. Maintenance Companies will also stock a minimum of fifteen (15) days supply of parts common (tires, tire patches, valve caps, windshield wiper blades, lamp bulbs, etc.), standard hardware (nuts, bolts, screws, metal stock, etc.), Group K-2 material, and any other items which experience has shown to be necessary, and for which transportation is available.	Medium Maintenance Company	Medium Automotive Maintenance Company	Maintenance Company (AA)	Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company	Heavy Maintenance Company (FA)	Heavy Maintenance Company (TK)
MAJOR ITEM						
Rifle, US, cal..30, M1903, M1903A1, M1903A3	300	200	100	100	300	100
Rifle, US, cal..30, M1903A4 (Sniper's)	50	50	20	50	50	50
Scabbard, bayonet, M7, (for M1 bayonet)	2000	1000	1000	1000	2000	2000
Carr. gun, 57mm (AT) (All models)	50				50	20
Carr. gun, 3" M1	30				30	15
Carr. gun, 4.5", M1, M1A1	10				10	10
Carr, how, 105mm, M1A1, M2, M2A1, M2A2	30				30	30
Carr, How, 105mm, M3, M3A1	20				20	
Carr. How, 155mm, M1, M1A1	15				25	15
Gun, 57mm, M1 (AT)	30				30	20
Gun, 3" towed, M5	30				30	15
Gun, 4.5", M1	10				10	10
Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1	30				30	30
Howitzer, 105mm, M3	20				20	10
Howitzer, 155mm, M1	15				15	15
Carr. gun, 155mm, M1	10				30	10
Gun, 90mm, M1	10		20		10	
Gun, 155mm, M1, M1A1					25	
How., 8", M1, w/carr., M1					20	
Limber, carr., heavy, M2					25	
Mount, AA, 90mm gun, M1, M1A1			20			
Trailer, elam shell, M16					6	
Binoculars, M3	200		500		300	300
Binoculars, M17 (7x50) (w/mil reticle)	50				50	
Circle, aiming, M1	50				50	50
Clock, message center, M1	10				10	10
Compass, M2	50				50	25
Director, AA, M5A1, (for 37mm & 40mm AA guns)			100		25	
Director, AA, M7 for 3", 90mm & 105mm AA guns)			6			
Engine, gen. E.G. 2.5-3G1 (Prev M10) ((for dir M5) & M5A1 & for seacoast use)			90	30	10	
Finder, height (all models)			6			
Finder, range, 1-meter base, M7, M9	20				50	
Finder, range, M9A1 (T.D)	10				10	10
Finder, range, 80cm base	10				10	10
Indicator, range, (all models)			50			
Quadrant, gunners, (all models)	30		30		30	30
System, cables, (all models)			5			
System, date transmission, (all models)			5			
System, remote control, M10, (f/40mm AA gun mount, M2)	10		50		20	
Telescope, BC, M65	30				30	30
Telescope, obsvn, M4, M18, M19	30				30	30
Unit, generating, M18 (f/90mm AA guns) w/trailer			10			
Watch, pocket, 15-jewel	100		50		100	100
Watch, pocket, 21-jewel, railway grade	100				100	
Watch, wrist, all types	800		600		800	800
Watch, stop, type "B"	50		50		50	50
Telescope, panoramic, M1 (105mm How, M3	20				20	20
Telescope, panoramic, M12 (4.5"M1, 155mm How, M1 155mm M1, M1A1	50				50	50
Telescope, panoramic, M12A2 (105mm How, M2A1)	30				50	50
Telescope, panoramic, M12A3 (3" Towed (M5))	30				50	50

BASIC LOAD BASIS NON-DIVISIONAL MAINTENANCE COMPANIES

Each type Ordnance Maintenance Company will stock spare parts and cleaning and preserving material for the number of major items indicated in the appropriate column. Maintenance Companies will also stock a minimum of fifteen (15) days supply of parts common (tires, tire patches, valve caps, windshield wiper blades, lamp bulbs, etc.), standard hardware (nuts, bolts, screws, metal stock, etc.), Group K-2 material, and any other items which experience has shown to be necessary, and for which transportation is available.	Medium Maintenance Company	Medium Automotive Maintenance Company	Maintenance Company (AA)	Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company	Heavy Maintenance Company (FA)	Heavy Maintenance Company (TK)
MAJOR ITEM						
Telescope, elbow, M16 (105mm How, M2A1)	30				50	50
Telescope, elbow, M17 (40mm auto M1 (AA))	30		50		50	50
Telescope, elbow, M29 (3" Towed (M5))	30				50	50
Telescope, elbow, M61 (105mm, M3)	20				30	30
Quadrant, range (105mm How, M2A1), M4	30				50	50
Quadrant, range (105mm How, M3) M8	20				30	30
Mount, telescope, M16(105 How, M3)	20				30	30
Mount, telescope, M18A1 (155 Gun, M1)	20				30	30
Mount, telescope, M21 (105mm, M2A1)	30				50	50
Mount, telescope, M23 (105mm, M2A1)	30				50	50
Mount, telescope, M24 (57mm, M1)	40				50	50
Mount, telescope, M25 (4.5, M1,155mm)	30				30	30
Mount, telescope, M30 (8" M1, 240mm)	20				30	30
Mount, telescope, M41A1 (3" Towed, M5)	30				50	50
Mount, telescope, M50 (3" Towed, M5)	30				50	50
Light, Instrument, M19	20				20	20
Light, Instrument, M32	20				20	20
Car, armd. light, M8, w/arm	50	20	10	100	100	50
Car, armd. utility, M20, w/arm	30	10		30	30	30
Car, half-track, M3A2, (amb)	40	20		50	50	50
Carr. mtr., 3" gun, M10, w/arm	15				30	40
Carr. mtr., 155mm gun, M12 (T26) w/arm	10				10	10
Carr. mtr., 75mm How. M8, w/arm	10				10	20
Carr. mtr., 105mm How. M7, w/arm	15				30	40
Carr. mtr., multiple gun, M15, M15A1, w/arm	15		15		20	20
Carr. mtr., multiple gun, M16, w/arm	15		15		20	20
Carr. multiple gun, M51 (on Trlr M17)	20		50		50	50
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3 (amb)						30
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3, w/w, w/arm	20				20	20
Carrier, personnel, half-track M3, wo/w, w/arm	40				40	40
Carrier, 81mm mortar, half-track, M4A1, w/arm	10				10	10
Carrier, 81mm mortar, half-track, M21, w/arm	20				20	20
Tank, light, M5 (gas)	20				50	100
Tank, medium M4A1	40				50	100
Tank, medium, M4A1 (105mm How)	10				20	30
Tractor, high spead, 13-ton, M5 (International Harvester)(for 4.5" gun)	15				50	30
Tractor, high speed, 18-ton, M4, (Allis Chalmers)(for 155mm gun)					30	10
Trailer, ammunition, M10	50			30	50	
Truck, trailer, 40-ton tank transporter, M25 (T21)				30	30	30
Truck, Heavy, 10-ton, 6x6, M1, Wrecker	50	50		50	50	50
Vehicle, tank recover, M32 (T5)(Medium Tk M4 Chassis, (gas)						10
Vehicle, tank recovery, M32, (T5) (diesel)	20					30
Truck, 6-ton, 6x6, prime mover	10			10	10	10
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4	50	50		50	50	50
Motorcycle, solo	20	20		30	30	30
Semi-trailer, 6-ton, gross, van mobile				10	10	

SECRET

Semi-trailer, 6-ton, comb. animal & cargo (10-ton gross)				10	10	
Trailer, ¼-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	50	150	50	150	50	50
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo	200	200	50	200	200	200
Truck, ¼-ton, 4x4	300	400	100	400	300	400
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, C/R, w & wo/winch	50	100	30	100	50	30
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, W/C, w & wo/winch	100	150	50	200	100	200
Truck, 1½-ton, 6x6, cargo, (P/C) w & wo/winch w & wo/ring mt.	100	100	50	100	100	100
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, w & wo/winch, w & wo/ring mt.	300	400	100	400	300	400
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, dump, w/w	30	50		50		
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, SWB, w & wo/ winch, w & wo/ring mt.	50	100		100	100	100
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, cargo	20	20		30	20	20
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, wrecker, w/w	20	20		30	20	20
Truck, 4-5-ton, 4x4, tractor	20	20		30	20	20
Setter, Fuse, AA, M13			30			
Light, aiming post, M14	50				30	30
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3A1, w & wo/winch, wo/arm						
Car, half-track, M3A2, w & wo/winch, wo/arm	50				50	100
Truck, 5-6-ton, Tractor	20	20		20	20	20
Periscope, M4	100					100
Periscope, M6	100					100
Setter fuze, M17	40				40	
Setter fuze, M21	20				20	
Sight, Mortar, M4	100					
Gun, sub-machine, cal..45, Thomp. M1928A1, M1, M1A1	100	100				
Clinometer, MG, M1917	100	100				

NOTE: In all cases where major items are listed as, for example: Carriage, Motor, 3" gun, M10, w/arm; Spare parts will be requisitioned for all items relative to this major item such as, armament, fire control instrument, etc. In the case of tanks listed, parts must be requisitioned for everything relative to the tanks, such as, armament, fire control, gyrostabalizer's and etc. Any major items listed as w/armament, requisitions will be placed for spare parts for the armament normally considered as part of the major items.

Register No. TUSA 75.

APPENDIX V TO ANNEX 14

OF

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

ORDNANCE PLAN

BASIC LOAD BASIS

DEPOT COMPANIES

25 May 1944

BASIC LOAD BASIS DEPOT COMPANIES

Depot Companies will stock spare parts, accessories and C&P for the number of major items indicated in the appropriate column. Forward Depots will stock 15 days supply; Main Depots will stock 30 days supply. Depot Companies will also carry a minimum of 15 days supply of parts common, Group H Material, Group K-2 material and any other items considered necessary and for which transportation is available.

MAJOR ITEM	Depot Co. Fwd Genl.	Depot Co. Fwd Armd.	Depot Co. Main Arm.	Depot Co. Main G.P.V.	Depot Co. Main C.V.
Carriage, Gun, 40mm AA, M2	50	50	420		
Cart, hand, M3A4	200		720		
Gun, 40mm Automatic, M1, AA			420		
Gun, machine, cal. .30, M1917A1	500	100	1,750		
Gun, machine, Cal. .30, M1919A4 flex.	500	600	4,400		
Gun, machine, cal. .30, M1919A6	100	50	450		
Gun, machine, cal. .50, M2, HB, flex.	1,300	1,300	10,000		
Gun, machine, cal. .50, W/C, flex. M2	100		100		
Gun, sub-machine, cal. .45, M1, M1A1	600	600	1,000		
Gun, sub-machine, cal. .45, M3	4,000	4,000	34,000		
Mortar, 60mm M2, w/mount M2, M1	300	100	1,300		
Mortar, 81mm, M1, w/mount M1	150	100	700		
Mount, AA, MG, cal. .50, M3, M3A1	100	100	200		
Mount, tripod, MG, cal. .30, M1917A1	400	100	1,700		
Mount, tripod, MG, cal. .30, M2	500	500	4,200		
Mount, tripod, MG, cal. .50, M3	800	800	6,600		
Elevator cradle, AA, cal. .50, M1	700	700	5,000		
Mount, MG, cal. .30, M48	400	400	3,300		
Mount, truck, M32, M36, M37, M37A2	400	400	3,500		
Mount, truck, pedestal, M24, M24A1	150	150	1,000		
Mount, truck, pedestal, M31	200	200	1,400		
Rifle, auto, brg, cal. .30, M1918, M1918A1, M1918A2	500	100	2,000		
Bayonet, M1	15,000	15,000	112,000		
Carbine, US, cal. .30, M1	25,000	25,000	185,000		
Launcher, grenade, M1 (M1903 Rifle)	600	600	4,700		
Launcher, grenade, M7 (M1 Rifle)	500	100	21,000		
Launcher, grenade, M8 (Carbine)	1,200	1,200	9,600		
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M1, M1A1	1,500	1,500	12,000		
Launcher, rocket, 2.36", M9	600	600	5,000		
Knife, trench, M1, M3, w/scabbard	7,000	7,000	55,000		
Pistol, auto,, cal. .45, M1911A1	200	200	17,000		
Pistol, pyrotechnic, AN-M8, w/ mount	100	100	500		
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand M9	400	400	3,000		
Projector, signal, ground, M4	200	200	2,200		
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1	12,000	12,000	98,000		
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1903, M1903A1, M1903A3	1,500	1,500	11,000		
Rifle, US, cal. .30, M1903A4	100	100	800		
Scabbard, bayonet, M7	14,000	14,000	112,000		
Shotgun, 12 gage, sporting type			150		
Carriage, gun, 57mm, AT, all models	200		600		
Carriage, gun, 37mm, M1	100	50	400		
Carriage, gun, 4.5", M1, M1A1	30		100		
Carriage, How, 105mm, M1A1, M2, M2A1, M2A2	150		450		
Carriage, How, 105mm, M3, M3A1	50		150		
Carriage, How, 155mm, M1, M1A1	125		325		
Gun, 57mm, M1, AT	200		600		
Gun, 3", Towed, M5	100	50	400		
Gun, 4.5", M1	30		100		
Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1	150		450		
Howitzer, 105mm, M3	50		150		
Howitzer, 155mm, M1	125		325		
Carriage, 155mm, Gun, M1	40		120		
Carriage, Gun, 8", M1			18		
Gun, 90mm, M1	30		100		
Gun, 155mm, M1, M1A1	40		120		
Gun, 8", M1			18		
Howitzer, 8", M1, w/Carriage, M1			84		
Howitzer, 240mm, M1, w/Carriage, M1, M2			42		

BASIC LOAD BASIS DEPOT COMPANIES

MAJOR ITEM	Depot Co., Fwd Genl.	Depot Co., Fwd Armd.	Depot Co, Main Arm.	Depot Co., Main G.P.V.	Depot Co., Main C.V.
Limber, carriage, heavy, M2	40		120		
Mount, AA, 90mm, M1, M1A1	30		100		
Trailer, clam shell, M16			30		
Wagon, carriage transport, M3, M3A1			60		
Binoculars, M3	3,000	3,000	20,000		
Binoculars, M13	1,000	1,000	10,000		
Binoculars, M16	150	150	1,200		
Board, plotting, flash ranging, M5			15		
Board, plotting, sound ranging, M1			15		
Circle, aiming, all models	400	100	1,900		
Clock, message center, M1			100		
Compass, M2	700	500	4,500		
Corrector, wind, sound ranging, M1			15		
Director, AA, M5A1 (for 37mm & 40mm AA Guns)	100		470		
Director, AA, M7(for 3", 90mm & 105mm AA Guns)			30		
Engine, generator, E.G. 2.5-3G1 (for Dir. M5 and M5A)	150		468		
Engine, generator, E.G. 30-3G1 (for Dir M7A1)			48		
Finder, height, all models			30		
Finder, range, 1 meter base, M7 (FA)	50		100		
Finder, range, 1 meter base M9	100	100	800		
Finder, range, 1 meter base, M1916, M1918 (FA)	50		100		
Finder, range. 80cm base M1916M1	25		100		
Finder, range, 80cm base M1916			50		
Finder, range, 80cm base M1917			50		
Finder, range, 80cm base M1918			50		
Indicator, range, Mk I	200	100	1,000		
Instrument, azimuth, all models			60		
Instrument, Obsn, AA, BC, M1			30		
Kit, helium filling, M8			6		
Light, aiming post, M14	150	100	1,000		
Mount, range finder, M58		100	375		
Rule, slide, M1			50		
Sight, Mortar, M4	500	100	2,000		
System, cables, M1			30		
System, data transmission,			30		
System, remote control M10	100		470		
Telescope, BC, M65	200	50	900		
Telescope, Obsn, M4, M48, M49	300		900		
Quadrant, Gunners, M1	300	300	3,000		
Watch, pocket, 15-jewel	300	300	2,100		
Watch, wrist, 7-jewel	400	400	30,000		
Watch, pocket, 21-jewel,railway grade			50		
Watch, wrist, 15 or more jewel	200	200	2,000		
Watch, stop, type B	100	100	600		
Setter, fuze, M13			100		
Setter, fuze, M17	100	100	800		
Setter, fuze, M21	100		400		
Telescope, panoramic M1	50		150		
Telescope, panoramic M12	100		550		
Telescope, panoramic M12A2	100	100	1,000		
Telescope, panoramic M12A3	100	50	400		
Telescope, elbow, M16	100	100	850		
Telescope, elbow, M17	100		400		
Telescope, elbow, M29	100	50	400		
Telescope, elbow, M61	50		150		
Quadrant, range, M4	100	100	850		
Quadrant, range, M8	50		150		
Mount, telescope, M16	50		150		
Mount, telescope, M16A1			200		
Mount, telescope, M21	100	100	850		
Mount, telescope, M23	100	100	850		
Mount, telescope, M24	200		600		
Mount, telescope. M25			200		
Mount, telescope, M30			100		
Mount, telescope, M4A1	100		400		
Mount, telescope, M50	100		400		
Light, instrument, M16	100		300		

BASIC LOAD BASIS DEPOT COMPANIES

MAJOR ITEM	Depot Co., Fwd Genl.	Depot Co., Fwd Armd.	Depot Co., Main Arm.	Depot Co., Main G.P.V.	Depot Co., Main C.V.
Light, instrument, M19	100	100	800		
Light, instrument, M20	50		200		
Light, instrument, M35			100		
Periscope, M4, w/telescope, M38		400	1,700		
Periscope, M4, w/telescope, M40		200	1,000		
Periscope, M6		600	3,000		
Telescope, M70c		50	150		
Telescope, M70d	100	200	1,000		
Telescope, M70f		400	2,000		
Telescope, M70g		100	400		
Telescope, M18	200		600		
Quadrant, elevation, M9		400	2,000		
Car, armored, light, M8, w/arm	50	150	900*		900
Car, armored, utility, M20, w/arm	25	50	325*		325
Car, half-track, M2			100*		100
Carriage, motor, 76mm Gun, M18 (T70)		50	150*		150
Carriage, motor, 3" Gun, M10, w/arm		75	325*		325
Carriage, motor, 155mm Gun, M12 (T26) w/arm			36*		36
Carriage, mtr, 75mm How, M8, w/arm		30	150*		150
Carriage, mtr, 105mm How, M7, w/arm		100	415*		415
Carriage, mtr, multiple gun, M15, M15A1, w/arm		30	130*		130
Carriage, mtr, multiple gun, M16, w/arm		30	130*		130
Carriage, multiple gun, M51 (on trailer M7)	100		420*	420	
Carrier, cargo, M30 (T14)					36
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M5, Amb.		50			230
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3A1, w/roller	50	300	1,500*		1,500
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3A1, w/winch	50	400	2,100*		2,100
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M5			350*		350
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M9			200*		200
Carrier, 81mm Mortar, half-track, M4A1, w/arm		30	160*		160
Carrier, 81mm Mortar, half-track M21, w/arm					50
Tank, light, M5A1		150	890*		890
Tank, medium, M4A1		300	1,400*		1,400
Tank, medium, 105mm How, M4A1		40	190*		190
Tank, medium, M4A2			170*		170
Tank, light, M3A3			100*		100
Tank, medium, M3, M3A1					325
Tractor, high speed, 13-ton, M5, IH	100				600
Tractor, high speed, 18-ton, M4, AC	100				430
Carriage, motor, 3" Gun, M10A1, wo/arm					180
Trailer, 4-ton, 2-whl, Am, M21, (T33E1)				160	
Trailer, ammunition, M10	200	300		2,750	
Trailer, Bomb, M5				70	
Truck, artillery repair, M9A1, 2½-ton, 6x6				30	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, auto. repair, M8A1 (Load A)				30	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, auto. repair, M8 (Load B)				30	
Truck, Bomb Service, M6, 1½-ton 4x4				35	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Electrical repair, M18				10	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Electrical repair, M18A1				65	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Instrument repair, M10 (Load A)				10	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Instrument repair, M10A1 (Load A)				65	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Instrument Bench				15	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Machine Shop, M16, (Load A)				10	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Machine Shop, M16A1 (Load A)				60	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Machine Shop, M16 (Load B)				5	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Machine Shop, M16A1 (Load C)				25	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Machine Shop, M16A1 (Load D)				15	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Machine Shop, M16A1, (Load F)				15	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Small arms repair, M7				30	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Small Arms repair, M7A1				70	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Small Arms repair, M7A1 (Signal Load)				100	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Welding, M12A1				50	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Welding, M12				10	
Truck, trailer, 45-ton tank transporter, M19					90
Truck, trailer, 40-ton Tank transporter, M25 (T21)					100
Truck, heavy wrecking, M1	50	50		385	
Vehicle, tank recovery M32(T5)(mas)		20			80
Vehicle, tank recovery, M32 (T5) (Diesel)		20			80
Vehicle, tank recovery, T2		10			50
Crane, truck mounted, M2, 20-ton, for 8" Gun & 240mm How				30	
Truck, 5-6-ton, tractor	100	50		560	
Truck, 6-ton, 6x6, Prime mover	10	10		70	
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4	200	200		1,300	
Motorcycle, solo	50	50		400	
Semi-trailer, 6-ton, stake and platform				5	
Semi-trailer, 6-ton, van mobile				300	
Semi-trailer, animal and cargo, 10-ton gross				130	
Trailer, ¼-ton, 2-whl cargo	500	500		4,900	
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-whl cargo	1,500	1,500		13,000	
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-whl, 250-gal water tank	50	50		300	
Truck, ¼-ton, 4x4	2,000	2,000		16,000	
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, C&R, wo/w	200	200		1,800	
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, C&R, w/w	100	100		600	
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, weapons carrier, wo/w	300	300		2,800	
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, weapons carrier, w/w	400	400		3,000	
Truck, 1½-ton, 4x4, tractor, w/w	30			70	
Truck, 1½-ton, 6x6, Cargo, wo/w	40	40		300	
Truck, 1½-ton, 6x6, cargo, w/w	150	150		1,000	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, wo/w	1,500	1,500		10,000	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, w/w	500	500		4,300	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, wo/w, w/ring mt.	100	100		800	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, w/w, w/ring mt.	30	30		150	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Dump, w/w	200	200		1,500	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, SWB, w/w	150	150		1,200	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo, SWB, w/w, w/ring mt.	80			250	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, van K53				50	
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, cargo	100			180	
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, cargo, w/12' leading bed				40	
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, Wrecker, w/w	50	50		220	
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, Dump				20	
Truck, 4-5-ton, 4x4, Tractor	50	10		180	
Truck, 4-5-ton, 4x4, Tractor, w/ring mt.				30	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, 700-gal water tank				20	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, 15' body				50	

*Main Armament Depot will stock only parts and accessories for armament of combat vehicles shown. No parts and accessories for armament of combat vehicles will be stocked by Main Combat Vehicle Depot.

Register No. TUSA 75.

APPENDIX VI TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN

MAJOR ITEM REPLACEMENTS
TO
ACCOMPANY ORDNANCE UNITS

25 MAY 1944

MAJOR ITEM REPLACEMENTS TO ACCOMPANY ORDNANCE UNITS

MAJOR ITEM	Medium Maintenance Company (17)	Medium Automotive Maintenance Company (17)	Maintenance Company (AA) (5)	Depot Company (Fwd. Gen'l.) (5)	Depot Company (Fwd. Armd.) (5)	Depot Company (Main Arm.) (1)	Depot Company (Main G.V.) (1)	Depot Company (Main G.P.V.) (1)
Cart, hand, M3A4				1		5		
Gun, mach, cal..30, M1917A1	3	1	1	4		10		
Gun, mach, cal..30, M1919A4 (Flex)	2	2	1	6	6	20		
Gun, mach, cal..30, M1919A6	1	1		2		5		
Gun, mach, cal..50, Brg, M2, HB, (Flex)	4	2	2	20	20	40		
Gun, mach, cal..50, H/C, (Flex) M2			1	1	1	4		
Gun, sub-mach. cal..45, M3	10	5	5	50	50	500		
Mortar, 60mm, M2, w/mount, M2, M1	2			4	4	10		
Mortar, 81mm, M1, w/mount, M1	1			2	2	4		
Mount, AA, MG, cal..50, M3, M3A1				1	1	1		
Mount, tripod, MG, cal..30, M1917A1	2			2	2	4		
Mount, tripod, MG, cal..30, M2	4	2		4	4	12		
Mount, tripod, MG, cal..50, M3	4	2		4	4	12		
Elev & Cradle, AA, cal..50, M1	4	4	4	8	8	20		
Mount, MG, cal..30, M4	4	4	4	8	8	20		
Mount, truck, M32, M36, M37, M37A2	1	1		2	2	6		
Mount, truck, pedestal, M2, M2A1				2	2	6		
Mount, truck, pedestal, M2A2				1	1	4		
Mount, truck, pedestal, M31	1	1		2	2	6		
Rifle, auto. Brg. cal..30, M1918A2	3	1		6	6	12		
Bayonet, M1	30	20	10	100	100	500		
Carbine, US, cal..30, M1 (wo/folding stock)	20	20	10	100	100	500		
Launcher, grenade, M1, (03 Rifle)	5	5	5	10	10	50		
Launcher, grenade, M7 (M1 Rifle)	10	5	5	50	50	200		
Launcher, grenade, M8 (Carbine)	2	2	2	20	20	100		
Launcher, rocket, AT, 2.36", M9	5	2	2	30	30	70		
Knife, trench, M1, M3, w/scabboard	20	20	10	200	200	470		
Pistol, auto. cal..45, M1911A1, M1911	10	5	5	50	50	300		
Pistol, pyrotechnic, AN-M8, w/mount				3	3	3		
Projector, pyrotechnic, hand, M9	2	2	2	5	5	10		
Projector, signal, ground, M4	2	1	1	3	3	5		
Rifle, US, cal..30, M1	30	20	10	100	100	500		
Rifle, US, cal..30, M1903, M1903A1, M1903A3	10	5	5	50	50	100		
Rifle, US, cal. 30, M1903A4 (Snipers)	1	1		2	2	10		
Scabbard, bayonet, M7, (for M1 bayonet)	20	20	10	100	100	500		
Shotgun, 12-gage, sporting type (all models)						2		
Binoculars, M3 or M13	10		10	50	50	100		
Binoculars, M16 (7x50)(w/mil reticle)	1		1	1	1	2		

MAJOR ITEM	Medium Maintenance Company (17)	Medium Automotive Maintenance Company (17)	Maintenance Company (AA) (5)	Depot Company (Fwd. Gen'l.) (3)	Depot Company (Fwd. Armd.) (5)	Depot Company (Main Arm.) (1)	Depot Company (Main G.P.V.) (1)	Depot Company (Main G.P.W.) (1)
Board, plotting, M5 (for flash ranging						1		
Board, plotting, sound ranging, M1						1		
Circle, aiming, M1	1			2	2	5		
Clock, message center, M1						1		
Compass, M2	2		1	10	10	50		
Periscope, M4				10	20	30		
Periscope, M6				20	30	30		
Corrector, wind, sound ranging M3						1		
Director, AA, M5A1, (for 37mm & 40mm AA guns)			1			3		
Director, AA, M7 for 3", 90 & 105mm AA guns)						3		
Engine, gen. E.G. 2.5-3G1 (Prev M10 (for dir M5) & M5A1 & for sea-coast use)			2	2		12		
Finder, height (all models)						1		
Finder, range, 1-meter base, (all models)				2	2	5		
Finder, range, M9A1 (T.D.)				1	1	1		
Finder, range, 80cm base				1	1	2		
Indicator, range, (all models)			4	2		5		
Instrument azimuth, (all other models) (degree)						2		
Kit, helium filling, M8						1		
Mount, range finder, M58				2	2	5		
Quadrant, gunners, (all models)	2		2	5	5	16		
Rule, slide, M1						3		
System, cables, (all models)						1		
System, remote control, M10, (f/40mm AA gun mount, M2)			1	1	1	2		
Telescope, BC, M65	1			2	1	2		
Telescope, observn, M4, M48, M49				2	2	4		
Unit, generating, M16 (f/90mm AA guns) w/trailer						1		
Watch, pocket, 15-jewel	2		1	2	2	4		
Watch, pocket, 21-jewel, railway grade						1		
Watch, wrist, 7, 9, & 15-jewel or more	10		5	20	20	100		
Watch, stop, type "B"	1		1	1	1	2		
Thermometer, temperature, powder, M1				1	1	2		
Telescope, panoramic, M1(105mm How M3	1			1	1	2		
Telescope, panoramic, M12(4.5"M1, 155mm How, M1, 155mm, M1, M1A1) (8" M1, 240mm, M1)	1			2	2	4		
Telescope, panoramic, M12A2 (105mm How. M2A1)				1	1	5		
Telescope, panoramic, M12A3 (3" Towed (M5)				1	1	1		
Telescope, elbow, M16 (105mm How, M2A1)	1			1	1	7		
Telescope, elbow, M17 (40mm auto, M1 ( )			1	1	1	2		
Telescope, elbow, M23 (3" Towed(M5))				1	1	2		
Telescope, elbow, M61 (105mm, M3)				1	1	1		
Quadrant, range, (105 How, M2A1) M4	1			1	1	1		
Quadrant, range, (105 How, M3), M8				1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M16 (105mm How, M3)				1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M18A1(8" How, 155mm, M1)				1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M21 (105mm. M2A1)	1			1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M23 (105mm, M2A1)	1			1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M24 (57mm, M1)	1			2	2	2		
Mount, telescope, M25 (4.5", M1, 155mm, M1)	1			1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M30, (8" M1, 240mm)				1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M1A1 (3" Towed M5)	1			1	1	1		
Mount, telescope, M50 (3" Towed, M5)	1			1	1	1		
Light, Instrument, M19	1			1	1	2		
Light, Instrument, M32	1			2	2	1		
Mine, Probe, M1						1		
Setter, Fuze, AA, M13						2		
Light, aiming post, M14	2			5	5	20		

Register No. TUSA 75.

APPENDIX VII TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN
VEHICLE AND TOWED ARTILLERY POOLS
ORDNANCE COMPANIES
25 May 1944

Pool levels to be maintained by type companies indicated. VEHICLE AND TOWED ARTILLERY POOLS - ORDNANCE COMPANIES.	Forward Depot Co. (General)	Forward Depot Co. (Armored)	Main Depot Co. (G. P.)	Main Depot Co. (Combat)	Main Depot Co. (Armament)	MM Co.	MM (AA) Co.	MAM Co.	HM (TK) Co.
Gun, Auto, 40mm M1 (AA) & Carr. M2	1				1				
Gun, 57mm M1 (AT) & Carr. all models	3				3				
Gun, 90mm M1 & Mount M1 & M1A1					1				
Gun, 3" Towed M5 & Carr. M1 & M6	1				3				
How, 105mm M2A1 & Carr. M1A1, M2, M2A1, M2A2	1				2				
How, 105mm M3 & Carr. M3 & M3A1	1				2				
How, 155mm M1 & Carr. M1 & M1A1					3				
How, 8" M1 & Carr. M1					2				
How, 240mm M1 & Carr M1 & M2					1				
Gun, 155mm M1A1 & Carr. M1					1				
Gun, 4.5" M1 & Carr. M1 & M1A1					2				
Gun, 8" M1 & Carr. M1 & M2					1				
Car Armored, Light M8 w/arm		2		3					
Car Armored, Utility, M20 w/arm	1								
Carrier, Pers. H/T, M3 & M3A2 (Ambulance)				3					
Carrier, Pers. H/T, M3A1 & M3A2 w/w	2	1		11					
Carrier, Pers. H/T, M3A1 & M3A2 w/roller	1			2					1
Carrier, 81mm Mortar H/T, M21 w/arm				2					
Carriage, Motor, 3" Gun, M10A1 w/arm		1		4					1
Carriage, Motor, 155mm, Gun, M12 w/arm				1					
Carriage, Motor, 75mm, How. M8 w/arm				4					
Carriage, Motor, 105mm, How, M7 w/arm		1		5					
Carriage, Motor, Multiple Gun, M15 w/arm				2					
Carriage, Motor, Multiple Gun, M16 w/arm				2					
Carriage, M. G. Multiple, Cal..50, M51 (on trailer M17)					3				
Carrier, Cargo, M30				1					
Tank, Light, M5A1 (Gas)		2		5					2
Tank, Medium, M7				2					
Tank, Medium, M4A1 (76mm Gun)		5		22					3
Tank, Medium, M4A1 (105mm How)				1					
Trailer, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel	5	2	20		3				2
Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel	2	2	10		1		1		
Trailer, 1-ton, water tank (250 gal)			5						
Semi-trailer, Comb. Animal & Cargo			1						
Semi-trailer, 6-ton Van	1								
Trailer, Ammunition, M10	3	1	7		1				1
Tractor, Medium, M4				2					
Tractor, high speed, M5	1			1					
Tractor, high speed, M6				1					
Truck, 1/4-ton, 4x4	15	4	30		3	3	3	3	
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, C/R, w/w	3	1	10						1
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, W/C, w/w	5	2	10		1		1		
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, W/C, w/w	5	2	15		1	1	1	1	
Truck, 1-1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo, (F/C) wo/w	2		5						
Truck, 1-1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo, (F/C) w/w	2		10		1				
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo, w/w (20% w/ring mount)	2	2	10				2	2	
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo, wo/w	10	5	25		3	1	1		
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, SWB, w/w	2		10		1				
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, Dump, w/w	1	1	5						
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, Mach.shop, M16A1, Load A			1						

Pool levels to be maintained by type companies indicated. VEHICLE AND TOWED ARTILLERY POOLS - ORDNANCE COMPANIES.	Forward Depot Co. (General)	Forward Depot Co. (Armored)	Main Depot Co. (G.P.)	Main Depot Co. (Combat)	Main Depot Co. (Armament)	MM Co.	MM (AA) Co.	MAM Co.	HM (TK) Co.
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, Small Arms Repair, M7A1			1						
Truck, 2-1/2 ton, 6x6, Small Arms Repair, M7A1 (Sig. Corps)			1						
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, Cargo			5						
Truck, 4-ton, 6x6, Wrecker, w/w			5						
Truck, 4-5 ton, 4x4, Tractor	1		3						
Truck, 5-6 ton, 4x4, Tractor	1		3						
Truck, wrecking, heavy, M1	1	2	10						
Truck, trailer, 40-ton Tank Transporter, M25			3						
Vehicle, Tank Recovery, M32 (Gas)	1	2		10					1
Ambulance, 3/4-ton, 4x4	2		4						
Motorcycle, solo			5						
Wagon, carrier, transport, M3 M3A1					2				
Limber, carrier, heavy, M2					1				
Trailer, Clam Shell, M16			1						
Crane, truck, mounted, M2 (20-ton)			1						

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX VIII TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN
INCREASE IN T/O & T/E
ORDNANCE UNITS
25 May 1944

INCREASE IN T/O AND T/E ORDNANCE UNITS	MM Co. 9-7	MAM Co. 9-127	MM (AA) Co. 9-217	HAM Co. 9-197	HM (TK) Co. 9-37	HM (FA) Co. 9-9	Armd. Co. T/BA 9	Depot Co. 9-57	Hvad. Co. 9-187	Bn Hq. 9-76	Armd. Bn. Hq. 9-35	Bn. Dr. Squad 9-179	MAM Co. w/Engr. Sp. Eqp.	Lt. Maint. Co. 9-8	Maint. Bn. 9-37	Bn. Hq. 9-66 &
Truck, 1/4-Ton, 4x4		4	2	1	3	2		1	1	3	3	1				
Truck, 3/4-Ton, W/C									1	1	1					
Truck, 1½-Ton, 6x6				2	1			2		3	3					
Truck, 2½-Ton, 6x6				2	2	10		2	3							4
Truck, 2½-Ton, 750-Gal. Gas		1														
Wrecker, 4-Ton	1	2		1				1								4

Wrecker, 10-Ton	1	1		1	2	2			3						
Trailer, 250-Gal. Water	1	1	1	1	1	1		1	1						
Tractor, Hv. TD-18															
"A" Frame	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	0						8
Truck, Machine Shop, Load "B"					1	1									
Truck, Welding					1										
Truck, Tractor, 4-5-Ton, 4x4				3	4	4		12*					10		
Truck, 2½-Ton, DUKW (sub. for 2½-Ton, 6x6													6		
Lathe, Engine, Motor Driven 12"		1											2	1	2
Filler, Fire Ext. CO_2				1	1	1									3
Still, Water, Portable				1	1	1									1
Truck, 2½-Ton, w/Spare Parts Cabinets, Set "C"															3
Truck, 2½-Ton, w/Spare Parts Cabinets, Set "D"															3
Truck, 40-Ton, Recovery															
TOTAL VEHICLES	3	8	3	7	17	13	10	19	18	7	7	1	16	0	14

* This number required for 7 forward companies only.
4 rear companies require 5 additional tractors.

APPENDIX IX - WITHDRAWN

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX X TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN

CLEANING AND PRESERVING
MATERIAL CHARTS

Appendix X to Annex 14 Third U.S. Army outline plan Operation Overlord

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES

	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	MORTAR, 60 MM	MORTAR, 81 MM	GUN, AUTO., 20 MM, AN-M2 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, 37 MM, M9; MOUNT, Z1	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; CARRIAGE, (TANK)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; CARRIAGE, M4A1 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; MOUNT: M25, M26 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M4A2; CARRIAGE, M3A1, (AA)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M4A2; MOUNT, COMB., M42 (AA)	GUN, AUTO., 37 MM, M4 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, AUTO., 40 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M2 (AA)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; MOUNT, T5 (AT)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; CARRIAGE M1A2 (AT)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M3A3 (FIELD HOW.)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M1 (PACK HOW.)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, MOTOR, M8	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; CARRIAGE, M2-3	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; MOUNT, M5, M5c	GUN, 75 MM, M3; ALL MOUNTS (TANK)	GUN, 75 MM, M4; MOUNT, AIRPLANE, M6	GUN, 3", M5; CARRIAGE, M4	GUN, 3", M7; MOUNT M5	GUN, 3", M5; MOUNT, M4A1, M4A2, M4A3, M2A2 (MOBILE) (AA)
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat (med.gr) No 1,3 in.	1	ea	5	5	-	5	5	5	5	10	5	5	10	10	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	5	10
2. BURLAP, jute, 8 oz., 40 in. wide	2	yd	60	70	-	60	60	50	80	80	60	80	80	80	70	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
3. CHALK, blue/white, railroad, 1" x 4"		Gr	2.5	2.5	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5	0.5
4. CLEANER, rifle bore	3	Qt	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 5/0-180 (Fine)		Gr	0.8	0.8	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
6. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 3/0-120 (Med)		Gr	0.8	0.8	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
7. CLOTH, crocus		Sht	60	80	40	60	60	60	100	60	60	100	80	80	80	80	90	90	80	90	90	90	90	120
8. CLOTH, wiping, cotton, mixed	4	Lb	150	150	100	100	100	100	125	100	100	125	100	100	90	90	100	90	100	100	100	125	100	150
9. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	5	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.5
10. COMPOUND, rust-preventive, light		Lb	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	10
11. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	6	Gal	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	2	0.5	2	0.5	1	2	1	2	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1.5	1	2
12. GLYCERINE, Grade A, U.S.P.	7	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13. GREASE, general purpose, No. 0/1	8	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14. GREASE, general purpose, No. 2	9	Lb	-	-	-	7	-	-	10	-	-	10	-	7	10	5	-	10	-	-	-	10	-	15
15. GREASE, G.D., No. 0/00	10	Lb	-	-	-	10	20	15	60	10	10	60	20	25	30	30	30	30	20	20	20	40	20	80
16. GREASE, water-pump		Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	-	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3
17. LEAD, white, basic-carbonate	11	Lb	As required - Maximum - one pound per weapon per month.																					
18. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80/90	12	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
19. NEEDLES, sacking, steel, 4-1/2"		Ea	20	20	-	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
20. OIL, castor, technical, grade	13	Pt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
21. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10/30	14	Qt	-	-	-	30	30	30	75	30	-	75	30	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	40	-	50	100
22. OIL, hydraulic	15	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	-	-	10	10	
23. OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments	16	Qt	1	1	-	2	2	2	2	2	-	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	2.5	5
24. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light	17	Qt	50	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix X to Annex 14 Third U.S. Army outline plan Operation Overlord

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES

	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	GUN, 3", M5; MOUNT, M4A1 (FIXED) (AA)	GUN, 76 MM, M1; MOUNT, COMB, M34A1	GUN, 90 MM, M1A1; MOUNT, M4A1 (MOBILE)(AA)	GUN, 90 MM, M2; MOUNT, M2 (MOBILE) (AA)	GUN, 90 MM, MOUNT T5 (FIXED) (AA)	HOW., 105 MM, M2A1; CARRIAGE, M2	HOW., 105 MM, M3 (AIRBORNE) CARRIAGE, M3A1	HOW., 105 MM, M4A1, MOUNT, M4	GUN, 105 MM, M4; MOUNT, M5; CARRIAGE, M4 (AT)	GUN, 4.5", M1; CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 4.7", M1; MOUNT, M1 (MOBILE) (AA)	HOW., 155 MM, M1917-18; ALL CARRIAGES	HOW., 155 MM, M1, CARRIAGE, M1	GUN, 155 MM, M1917-18; MOUNT, M2	GUN, 155 MM, M1917-18; M1, M1A1; CARR, M1917-18, M1, M1A1	HOW., 8" M1; CARRIAGE, M1	HOW., 240 MM, M1937-18T CARRIAGES M1917-18	HOW., 240 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat (med.gr.)No.1,3 in.	1	ea	5	5	10	10	10	5	5	10	10	5	10	5	5	5	7	7	10	10
2. BURLAP, jute, 8oz., 40 in side	2	yd	100	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	140	150	150	150	150	150	150	175	200	200
3. CHALK, blue/white, railroad, 1" x 4"		Gr	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
4. CLEANER, rifle bore	3	Qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 5/0-180 (Fine)		Gr	2.5	2.5	5	5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
6. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide, 3/0-120 (Med)		Gr	2.5	2.5	5	5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
7. CLOTH, crocus		Sht	120	100	120	120	125	100	100	100	125	150	200	125	125	140	140	250	300	300
8. CLOTH, wiping, cotton, mixed	4	lb	125	150	175	175	150	125	100	100	150	160	250	150	150	160	160	300	350	350
9. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	5	Gal	2.5	-	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	-	-	2.5	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
10. COMPOUND, rust-preventive, light		lb	10	7	10	10	10	7	5	5	10	10	15	10	10	12	12	12	50	50
11. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	6	Gal	2.5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	9	2	2	2	3	9	5	5
12. GLYCERINE, grade A, U.S.P.	7	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	10	-
13. GREASE, general purpose, No. 0/1	8	lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	120	-	140
14. GREASE, general purpose, No. 2	9	lb	-	10	15	15	-	10	10	-	-	10	30	20	20	30	30	30	40	40
15. GREASE, G.D., No. 0/00	10	lb	60	40	80	80	60	40	30	40	40	40	90	50	50	-	-	-	120	-
16. GREASE, water-pump		lb	0.3	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	-	-	0.3	-	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
17. LEAD, white, basic-carbonate	11	lb	As required - Maximum - one pound per weapon per month.																	
18. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80/90	12	lb	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
19. NEEDLES, sacking, steel, 4-1/2"		ea	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20
20. OIL, castor, technical, grade	13	pt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	12	-	-
21. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10/30	14	qt	90	90	135	135	90	60	40	60	80	60	175	90	90	90	120	180	180	180
22. OIL, hydraulic	15	gal	10	-	2.5	2.5	2.5	-	-	-	2.5	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
23. OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments	16	qt	5	2.5	5	5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	2.5	5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
24. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light	17	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix X to Annex 14 Third U. S. Army Outline Plan Operation Overlord

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	MORTAR, 60 MM	MORTAR, 81 MM	GUN, AUTO., 20 MM, AN-M2 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, 37 MM, M9; MOUNT, 21 (TANK)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; CARRIAGE, M4A1 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, M3A1; MOUNT, M25, M26 (AT)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., M3A1; CARRIAGE, M3A1 (AA)	GUN, 37 MM, AUTO., (AA) M1A2; MOUNT, COMB., M2	GUN, AUTO., 37 MM, M4 (AIRCRAFT)	GUN, AUTO., 40 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M2 (AA)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; MOUNT, T5 (AT)	GUN, 57 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1A2 (AT)
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
25. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium	18	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-
26. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special	19	qt	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-
27. OIL, neat's foot	20	qt	-	-	-	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5	0.5	0.5
28. OIL, potentiometer	21	Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. OIL, recoil, heavy	22	Qal	-	-	-	30	30	30	-	-	-	3	3	-
30. OIL, recoil, light		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	5	3	3	3
31. OIL, recoil, special		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32. PAPER, lens, tissue		Qr	2.5	2.5	-	10	10	10	10	10	-	10	10	10
33. PAPER, litmus	23	T	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
34. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	24	Gal	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	1	0.5	0.5	1.5	0.5	1.2
36. SODA, ash, type 1	25	Lb	75	100	-	100	100	100	100	100	100	130	150	150
37. SODA, caustic (lye)	26	Lb	5	7	2	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
38. SODIUM HYDROXIDE (pellets)	27	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	30	30	30	30	30	30	50	30	20	50	40	40
40. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	10	10	10	10	20	10	20	10	10	20	20	20
41. TWINE, jute	28	Lb	2	2	-	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
42. WASTE, cotton, white	29	Lb	10	10	10	20	20	20	75	20	10	75	50	50

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	GUN, 75 MM, M3A1; CARRIAGE, M2A1 (FIELD HOW.)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M1 (PACK HOW.)	HOW., 75 MM, M1A1; CARRIAGE, M8	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; CARRIAGE, M2A3	GUN, 75 MM, M1897A4; MOUNT, M2, M5	GUN, 75 MM, M3; ALL MOUNTS (TANK)	GUN, 75 MM, M4; MOUNT, AIRPLANE, M6	GUN, 3", M5; CARRIAGE, M4
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
25. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium	18	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special	19	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-
27. OIL, neat's foot	20	qt	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	-	0.5
28. OIL, potentiometer	21	Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. OIL, recoil, heavy	22	Qal	4	4	5	10	10	10	-	10
30. OIL, recoil, light		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-
31. OIL, recoil, special		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32. PAPER, lens, tissue		Qr	10	10	10	10	10	10	-	10
33. PAPER, litmus	23	T	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
34. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	24	Gal	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1	1.5
36. SODA, ash, type 1	25	Lb	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	150
37. SODA, caustic (lye)	26	Lb	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
38. SODIUM HYDROXIDE (pellets)	27	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	40	30	40	40	40	40	40	40
40. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	30	20	30	30	30	30	50	30
41. TWINE, jute	28	Lb	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
42. WASTE, cotton, white	29	Lb	50	50	50	50	50	50	25	50

Appendix X to Annex 14 Third U. S. Army Outline Plan Operation Overlord

ARTILLERY C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	GUN, 3", M7; MOUNT, M3	GUN, 3", M5; MOUNTAIN, M4A2 M6A1, M6A2 (Mobile)(AA)	GUN, 3", M4; MOUNT, M4A1, (FIXED)(AA)	GUN, 76 MM, M1; MOUNT, COMB., M3A1	GUN, 90 MM, M1A1; MOUNT, M1A1 (Mobile) (AA)	GUN, 90 MM, M1; MOUNT, M2 (Mobile) (AA)	GUN, 90 MM, M1; MOUNT T5 (FIXED) (AA)	HOW., 105 MM, M2; CARRIAGE, M3 (AIRBORNE)	HOW., 105 MM, M2A1, MOUNT, M4	GUN, 105 MM, M1; MOUNT, M1 (FIXED) (AA)	GUN, 4.5", M3 CARRIAGE, M1
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
25. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium	18	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special	19	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27. OIL, neat's-foot	20	qt	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
28. OIL, potentiometer	21	Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. OIL, recoil, heavy	22	Qal	10	20	20	20	25	25	25	-	-	50	85	50
30. OIL, recoil, light		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
31. OIL, recoil, special		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-
32. PAPER, lens, tissue		Qr	10	15	15	10	15	15	15	10	10	10	10	10
33. PAPER, litmus	23	T	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
34. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	24	Gal	1	2	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	2	1.2	1.2	2	2.5
36. SODA, ash, type 1	25	Lb	150	150	150	150	150	150	150	175	150	150	175	200
37. SODA, caustic (lye)	26	Lb	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
38. SODIUM HYDROXIDE (pellets)	27	Lb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
39. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	40	60	40	40	60	60	40	40	40	40	40	60
40. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	30	30	30	30	30	30	20	40	30	40	40	40
41. TWINE, jute	28	Lb	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
42. WASTE, cotton, white	29	Lb	50	75	50	50	100	100	50	75	50	50	50	75

SUPPLIES	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	GUN, 4.7", M1; MOUNT, M6 (AA)	HOW., 155 MM, M1917-18; ALL CARRIAGES	HOW., 155 MM, M1; CARRIAGE M2	GUN, 155 MM, M1917-18; MOUNT, M1, M1A1, CARRIAGE, M1917-18, M1, M1A1	HOW., 155 MM, M1917-18; CARRIAGE, M1	HOW., 240 MM, M1917-18; CARRIAGE, M1917-18	HOW., 240 MM, M1; CARRIAGE, M1
BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS			10	10	10	10	10	10	10
25. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium	18	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special	19	qt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
27. OIL, neat's-foot	20	qt	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
28. OIL, potentiometer	21	Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. OIL, recoil, heavy	22	Qal	60	-	60	150	150	-	160
30. OIL, recoil, light		Qal	50	-	-	-	-	-	-
31. OIL, recoil, special		Qal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32. PAPER, lens, tissue		Qr	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
33. PAPER, litmus	23	T	-	0.5	-	-	-	1	-
34. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
35. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	24	Gal	2.5	2.5	2.5	3	3	3	5
36. SODA, ash, type 1	25	Lb	225	200	200	225	225	250	275
37. SODA, caustic (lye)	26	Lb	12	10	10	12	15	15	15
38. SODIUM HYDROXIDE (pellets)	27	Lb	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	-
39. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	75	75	75	75	90	90	100
40. SPONGE, cellulose, coarse pore, type A		Ea	40	40	40	40	40	40	60
41. TWINE, jute	28	Lb	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
42. WASTE, cotton, white	29	Lb	100	100	100	75	100	100	125

FOOT NOTES ON ARTILLERY

For latest instructions on cleaning and preserving materials, see proper Technical Manuals (TM) and W.D. Lubrication Guide (Chak-chart) for specific weapons.

Ordnance personnel: Check latest OFSB 6-series for latest instructions pertaining to specific weapon. Note especially OFSB 6-3 through 6-11 for general instructions, including special lubricants for cold weather operation.

Allowances for the weapons also include necessary supplies for Fire Control instruments and Remote Control equipment, including motor generator units. Weapons mounted on self-propelled carriages have supplies for the mount, but not for the carriage. Allowances for self-propelled carriages must be figured from the table on Vehicles.

1. BRUSH, artist or paint...When not available, any small paint brush may be substituted.

2. BURLAP, jute...Acceptable substitute is CLOTH, cotton, Osnaburg.

3. CLEANER, rifle bore...When not available, hot soapy water (issue soap), sal soda, or SODA, ash, type I, may be substituted.

4. CLOTH, wiping...When not available, WASTE, cotton, white, may be substituted.

5. COMPOUND, anti-freeze...For winter use in motor generator units. Quantities listed are for replacement purposes, and do not include initial mixtures.

6. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab...For touch-up purposes. When not available, any suitable and available olive-drab paint may be substituted.

7. GLYCERINE, grade A, U.S.P....For use in glycerine-water recoil fluids.

8. a. GREASE, general purpose, No. O...Chassis lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, O.D. No. OO, may be substituted.

b. GREASE, general purpose, No. 1...Chassis lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, O.D. No. 0, GREASE, general Purpose, No. 0, or GREASE, O.D., No. OO, may be substituted.

c. In very hot weather, GREASE, general purpose, No. 2, may be substituted.

9. GREASE, general purpose, No. 2...Wheel bearing grease.

10. a. GREASE, O.D., No. O....Artillery lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, general purpose, No. 1, GREASE, O.D., No. OO, or GREASE, general purpose, No. 0, may be substituted.

b. GREASE, O.D., No. OO...Artillery lubricant below 32°F. In emergency, GREASE, general purpose, No. 0, may be substituted.

11. LEAD, white...For threaded fittings of weapons used at seacoast emplacements. One pound per weapon per month is recommended.

12. a. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80...For use below 32°F.

b. LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 90...For use above 32°F. In emergency, LUBRICANT, gear, universal, S.A.E. 80 may be substituted.

13. OIL, castor...For use with glycerine-water recoil mechanisms.

14. a. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10...Artillery and generator lubricant from 32°F to 0°F. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, preservative, light, or OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns may be substituted, for other than engine use.

b. For lubrication below 0°F., of artillery and all bearings, gear, cases, and mechanisms other than in engines, substitute OIL, lubricating, preservative, light. For lubrication below 0°F., of engines, dilute OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10 with 20% of gasoline or SOLVENT, dry cleaning.

c. OIL, engine, S.A.E. 30...Artillery and generator lubricant above 32°F. In emergency, OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10 may be substituted.

d. Under conditions of high temperatures and humidity, such as in the tropics, or in emergency under any conditions, substitute OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium for other than engine use.

e. For 4.7" AA Gun, provide 100 gal. of OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10, and 75 gal. of OIL, engine, S.A.E. 30 at all temperatures above 0°F.

15. OIL, hydraulic...For remote control oil gears, turret traversing systems, stablizor systems, and 40mm AA gun recoil fluid, above 0°F. Below 0°F, substitute OIL, recoil, special in 40mm AA gun recoil fluid. For other uses of OIL, hydraulic, check latest Technical Manual (or OFSB) for approved substitution.

16. OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns...For use on knobs, etc. of fire control instruments. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, preservative, special, OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10, or OIL, lubricating, preservative, light may be substituted.

17. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light...Not recommended for use where excessive rainfall or salt spray are to be encountered. Under these conditions, substitute OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium.

18. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium...Used on the outside of spare tubes for the 40mm AA gun.

19. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special...In emergency, OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns may be substituted.

20. OIL, neat's-foot...For cleaning and preserving leather including holders of fire control instruments. When not available, SOAP, saddle, may be substituted in the ratio of 5 lbs. of SOAP, saddle, for 1 qt. of OIL, neat's-foot.

21. OIL, potentiometer...Used in M9 and M10 directors.

22. OIL, recoil, heavy...When authorized, will be replaced by OIL, recoil, special in temperatures below 0°F.

23. PAPER, litmus...For use with glycerine-water recoil fluids.

24. PRIMER, synthetic...For touch-up purposes, for use in the protection of metallic surfaces from rust, and as a priming coat for painting. In emergency, LEAD, red, dry, and MIXTURE, liquid, for red lead paint may be substituted.

25. SODA, ash, type 1...For cleaning artillery tubes. In emergency, hot soapy water (issue soap), hot water, or cold water may be substituted.

26. SODA, caustic lye...For removing paint from metal.

27. SODIUM HYDROXIDE...For use in glycerine-water recoil fluids.

28. TWINE, jute...For use with NEEDLE, sacking, in sewing swabs.

29. WASTE, cotton, white...When not available, CLOTH, wiping, cotton, mixed, may be substituted.

FOOT NOTES ON VEHICLES

For latest instructions on cleaning and preserving materials, see proper Technical Manuals (TM) and W.D. Lubricating Guide (chek-chart) for specific vehicle. For operational requirements see FM 101-10.

Ordnance personnel: Check latest OFSB 6-series for latest instructions pertaining to specific vehicle. Note expecially OFSB 6-3 through 6-11 for general instructions, including special lubricants for cold weather operation.

Allowances of supplies are those for the vehicle only, and do not include supplies for weapons mounted thereon. For the weapons, see appropriate table, e.g., Small Arms and Artillery.

1. BRUSH, paint--When not available, any small paint brush may be substituted.

2. CARBON DIOXIDE, or LIQUID, extinguishing, fire--Issued according to type of Fire Extinguisher. One refill per extinguisher. See TM 9-850, pars. 109-111 for refilling instructions.

3. CLOTH, wiping, cotton--When not available, Waste, cotton, white may be substituted.

4. COMPOUND, anti-freeze--For winter use with water-cooled engines. Quantities listed are for replacement purposes only, and do not include original mixtures.

5. COMPOUND, anti-seize--For vehicles with radial engines. 1/4 lb. per vehicle per month is recommended.

6. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab--For touch-up purposes. When not available, any suitable and available olive-drab paint may be substituted.

7. FLUID, shock absorber, heavy--When shown for the same group of vehicles as FLUID, shock absorber, light, the appropriate OFSB must be checked to see which fluid is applicable. The heavy type is for use with Houdaille and similar shock absorbers.

8. FLUID, shock absorber, light--For use with Delco and similar shock absorbers.

9. OIL, hydraulic--For turret traversing systems, stabilizer systems, and brake vacuum cylinders.

10. OIL, lard--One gallon per active lathe (in shop truck).

11. OIL, neat's-foot--For cleaning and preserving leather. When not available, SOAP, saddle, may be substituted in the ratio of 5 lbs. of SOAP, saddle, for 1 qt. of OIL, neat's-foot.

12. PRIMER, synthetic--For touch-up purposes, for use in the protection of metallic surfaces from rust, and as a priming coat for painting. In emergency, LEAD, red, dry and MIXTURE, liquid, for red lead paint may be substituted.

VEHICLES C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES / BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	COMPANY OR BATTERY	MOTORCYCLES	PASSENGER CARS, 1 TON AND LESS	TRUCKS, 1 TON AND LESS	TRUCKS, 1½ to 2½ TON AND SCOUT CARS	TRUCKS, 3 TON AND OVER	TRUCKS, AMPHIBIAN, 1 TON AND LESS	TRUCKS, AMPHIBIAN, 1½ TON AND OVER	TRAILERS	HALF TRACK VEHICLES	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: LIGHT	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: MEDIUM	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: HEAVY	FULL TRACK VEHICLES: AMPHIBIAN
				10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat, No. 1, 3 in.	1	Ea	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. CARBON DIOXIDE (CO_2)	2	Refill as required - Maximum - one refill per extinguisher per month.														
3. CLOTH, abrasive, aluminum-oxide 5/0-180 (Fine)		Qr	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. CLOTH, wiping, cotton	3	Lb	-	10	10	15	20	15	20	10	15	15	30	35	25	
5. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	4	Gal	-	-	3	4	5	4	5	-	5	25	30	30	10	
6. COMPOUND, anti-seize	5	Lb	As required - Maximum - ½ lb per vehicle per month.													
7. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	6	Gal	-	0.5	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	
8. FLUID, brake, hydraulic		Gal	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	
9. FLUID, shock-absorber, heavy	7	Gal	-	-	-	0.5	1	-	-	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	
10. FLUID, shock-absorber, light	8	Gal	-	-	0.5	0.5	-	-	0.5	-	0.5	-	-	-	-	
11. OIL, hydraulic	9	Qt	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	
12. OIL, lard	10	Gal	As required - Maximum - 1 gal per active lathe per month													
13. OIL, neat's-foot	11	Qt	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14. PAPER, flint, class B, grade 2/0		Qr	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15. PRIMER, synthetic, rust-inhibitive	12	Gal	-	0.5	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	
16. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	-	2	5	5	7	5	5	1	8	8	10	12	8	
17. SPONGE, cellulouse, coarse pore, type A		Ea	-	1	2	2	3	2	2	1	3	4	4	5	4	

SMALL ARMS C&P

ESTIMATED QUANTITIES FOR 30 DAYS

SUPPLIES / BASIS - NUMBER OF WEAPONS	NOTE SYMBOL	UNIT OF MEASURE	COMPANY OR BATTERY	CARBINE, CAL..30	RIFLE, CAL..30, M1903-17	RIFLE, CAL..30, M1	RIFLE, B.A.R., CAL..30	PISTOL, CAL..45	GUN, SUBMACHINE, CAL..45	GUN, MACHINE, CAL..30, AIR-COOLED	GUN, MACHINE, CAL..30, WATER-COOLED	GUN, MACHINE, CAL..30, HEAVY-BARREL	GUN, MACHINE, CAL..50, WATER-COOLED	LAUNCHER, ROCKET, A.T., 2.36 INCH
				100	100	100	100	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
1. BRUSH, artist, bristle, flat, 3/4 in.	1	Ea	-	3	3	3	1	1	4	4				1
2. BRUSH, paint, metal-bound, flat, No. 1, 3 in.	1	Ea	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2				-
3. CLEANER, rifle bore	2	6 oz	-	100	100	100	100	10	10	-	-	-	-	10
	2	Qt	-	10	10	10	10	1	1	4	4	4	4	1
4. CLOTH, crocus		Sht	-	10	10	10	10	1	1	4	4	4	4	1
5. CLOTH, wiping, cotton	3	Lb	-	40	50	50	50	5	4	25	25	25	25	50
6. COMPOUND, anti-freeze	4	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	80	-	
7. ENAMEL, synthetic, olive-drab	5	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1
8. GREASE, rifle	6	C	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9. OIL, linseed, raw, type A	7	Gal	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	-	0.1	-	-	-	-	0.1
10. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light	8	4 oz	-	100	100	100	100	10	10	-	-	-	-	10
	8	Qt	-	13	13	13	13	1	1.5	20	20	30	30	1
11. OIL, neat's-foot	9	Qt	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12. OIL, recoil, light	10	Gal	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
13. PATCHES, cut (canton, flannel)		M	-	12	18	18	30	2	3	4	4	4	4	-
14. SOLVENT, dry cleaning		Gal	-	5	5	5	5	1	2	3	3	5	5	1

SECRET

FOOT NOTES ON SMALL ARMS

For latest instructions on cleaning and preserving materials, see proper Technical Manuals (TM) for specific weapon.

Ordnance personnel: Check OFSB 6-3 for general instructions.

1. BRUSH, artists, and BRUSH, flowing...When not available, any small paint brush may be substituted.

2. CLEANER, rifle bore...6 oz. containers to be carried by all units. Quart containers to be carried in addition to the 6 oz. containers by rifle companies, and those units authorized cal..30 and cal..50 machine guns. In emergency, hot soapy water (issue soap), sal soda, SODA, ash, type 1, or hot water may be substituted.

3. CLOTH, wiping...When not available, WASTE, cotton, white, may be substituted.

4. COMPOUND, anti-freeze...For winter use in water-cooled machine guns. Quantities listed are for replacement purposes only, and do not include initial mixtures.

5. ENAMEL, synthetic...For touch-up purposes. When not available, any suitable olive-drab paint may be substituted.

6. GREASE, rifle...For use in cal..30 M1 rifles only. Issued in CONTAINER, grease, M1.

7. OIL, linseed...For use in hot climates (humid or dry) to keep wooden parts in condition.

8. a. OIL, lubricating, preservative, light...Quantities based on needs of an infantry unit. For use on ground small arms above 0°F. Issued in 4 oz. containers for small arms use. Quart containers to be carried in addition to the 4 oz. containers by infantry rifle companies and those units authorized cal..30 and cal..50 machine guns. In emergency, OIL, engine, S.A.E. 10 may be substituted.

b. OIL, lubricating, preservative, special is to be used on all ground small arms below 0°F, and on all aircraft guns under all conditions. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, for aircraft instruments and machine guns may be substituted.

c. OIL, lubricating, preservative, medium...For lubrication of ground small arms in regions of excessive rainfall. For use on small arms during landing operations, or regions of salt spray. May be used for temporary storage of small arms.

9. OIL, neat's-foot...For cleaning and preserving leather. When not available, SOAP, saddle, may be substituted in the ration of 5 lbs. of SOAP, saddle, for 1 qt. of OIL, neat's-foot.

10. OIL, recoil, light...For oil buffer in cal..50 machine gun M2. In emergency, OIL, lubricating, preservative, special, may be substituted.

Register No. TUSA-75

APPENDIX XI TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN

TOOL STOCKAGE CHART
ORDNANCE UNITS

SPECIAL MAINTENANCE TOOL SETS	Med Auto Maint Co.	Med Maint Co.	Maint Co. (AA)	Heavy Maint Co. (FA)	Heavy Maint Co. (TK)	Heavy Auto Maint. Co.	Depot Co. (Main G.P.V.)
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 3", M5 and Carriage, Gun, 3", M6 (Anti-Tank)		1		1	1		
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 3", M7 and Mount, Gun, 3", M5.		1		1	1		1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 4.5", M1 and Carriage, Gun, 4.5", M1 and M1A1		1		1			2
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Howitzer, 75mm, M2 and M3, and Mount Howitzer, 75mm, M7		1		1	1		1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Howitzer, 105mm, M2 and M2A1 and Carriage, Howitzer, 104mm, M1A1, M2, and M2A1		1		1			1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1 and Mount, Howitzer, 105mm, M4.		1		1			1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Howitzer, 105mm, M3 and Carriage, Howitzer, 105mm, M3, M3A1 and T6		1		1			1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Howitzer, 155mm, M1 and Carriage, Howitzer, 155mm, M1.		1		1			1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Stabilizers		1		1	1		
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of 155mm, Gun Materiel M1		1		1			
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of 8", Howitzer Materiel M1				1			1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of 8" Gun Materiel M2							2
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of 240mm Howitzer Materiel M1							2
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of 90mm Antiaircraft Gun Materiel M1 and M1A1			1				
Field Maintenance Tools for General Instruments:							
Kit, Instrument Repair		1	1	1	1		
Wrench, Tubular, Set		1	1	1	1		
Tools, Special		1	1	1	1		
Fixtures, Special		1	1	1	1		
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Browning Automatic Rifle, Cal. .30, M1918, M1918A1 and M1918A2.	1	1		1		1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of BMG, Cal..30, M1917, M1917A1, M1919A4, M1919A5, and M2, and BAMG, M1918M1, M1919, and M2, all types, fixed andflexible, and mounts.	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Thompson Sub-machine Gun Cal. .45, M1928A1 and M1	1	1	1	1	1	1	

SPECIAL MAINTENANCE TOOL SETS	Med Auto Maint Co.	Med Maint Co.	Maint Co. (AA)	Heavy Maint Co. (FA)	Heavy Maint Co. (TK)	Heavy Auto Maint. Co.	Depot Co. (Main G.P.V.)
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of BMG and BAMG, Cal..50, M1921, M1921A1, and M2, all types, fixed and flexible, and mounts.	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 37mm, M5 and M6 (Tank)		1		1	1		
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, Automatic, 40mm, M1, and Carriage, Gun, 40mm, M2 (A.A.)			1				1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of 60mm Mortar M2, and 81mm Mortar, M1, and Mounts.	1	1		1	1		
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Rifle, U.S. Cal..30, M1903, M1903A1, M1903A3, and M1917	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Rifle, U.S. Cal..30, M1.	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Carbine, Cal..30, M1 and M1A1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Pistol, Automatic, Cal..45, M1911 and M1911A1; Revolver, Colt, Cal..45, M1917; Revolver, Cal..45, Smith & Wesson, M1917	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 57mm, M1 and Carriage, Gun, 57mm, M1, M1A1, M1A2, M1A3		1		1	1		
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 75mm, M2 and M3 (Tank) and Mount Gun, 75mm, M1					1		1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 75mm, M3 and Mount, Gun Combination, M34, M34A1, and M47.					1		1
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Mount, Gun Combination, M34A1							2
Set of Maintenance Tools for Repair of Gun, 76mm, M1 and Mount, Gun, 76mm, T1				1	1		
Set, Junior Watch Repair No. 2		1		1	1		
Field Maintenance Tools for Electrical Units (Anti-Aircraft):			1				
Maintenance Tools for Director, M4 & M7			1				
Maintenance Tools for System, Remote Control, M2 (Includes Indicator System M4; Power Control M4; Cable System M1; Fuze Setter M13 & Indicator Regulator M1)			1				
Maintenance Tools for Electrical M5, M5A1, & M6			1				
Kit, Cable Repair, M7			1				
Car, armored, light, M8 (100)	1	1		1	1	1	
Car, armored, utility, M20 (101)	1	1		1	1	1	
Carriage, motor, 76mm gun, M18 (86)					1		1

SPECIAL MAINTENANCE TOOL SETS	Med Auto Maint Co.	Med Maint Co.	Maint Co. (AA)	Heavy Maint Co. (FA)	Heavy Maint Co. (Tk)	Heavy Auto Maint. Co	Depot Co. (Main G.P.V.)
Carriage, Motor, 3" gun, M10 (74)				1	1		1
Carriage, motor, 3" gun, M10A1 (75)				1	1		
Carriage, motor, 155mm gun, M12 (89)					1		2
Carriage, motor, 75mm Howitzer M8 (78)		1		1	1		
Carriage, motor, 104mm Howitzer, M7 (70)					1		
Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M15A1 (92)		1	1	1	1		
Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M16 (93)		1	1	1	1		
Carrier, 81-mm mortar, half-track, M4A1 (54)		1		1	1		
Carrier, 81mm mortar, half-track, M21, (82)		1		1	1		
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3 (53)	1	1		1	1	1	
Carrier, personnel, half-track, M3A1 (53)	1	1		1	1	1	
Motorcycle, chain drive (Indian) (354)		1				1	
Motorcycle, chain drive, all WLA models (Harley-Davidson) (355)		1				1	
Motorcycle, chain drive, model UA and LE (H-D) (345)		1				1	
Motorcycle, shaft drive (Indian) (T02)		1			1		1
Motorcycle, shaft drive, model XA, solo (Harley Davidson) (T01)		1			1		1
Tank, light, M5 (21)		1		1	1		1
Tank, light, M5A1 (22)		1		1	1		1
Tank, medium, M3A3 (33)					1		2
Tank, medium, M4A1 (41)					1		
Tank, medium, M4A2 (42)					1		1
Truck, ¼-ton, 4x4, command reconnaissance (Ford GPW-Willys MB)(357)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, 1942-43 (Dodge T214) (Models WC-51,52,53,54,56,57, 58,59,60)(360)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Truck, 1½-ton, 6x6, Personnel and Cargo 1943 (Dodge T-223) (353)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6 (GMC) (Models CCKW352, 353-all bodies)(358)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Truck, trailer, 40-ton, tank recovery, M25 (69)					1	1	
Vehicle, tank recovery, M31 (T2) (Diesel) (49)					1		
Vehicle, tank recovery, M31 (T2) (Gas) (39)					1		
Vehicle, tank recovery, M32 (T5) (68)					1		
Absorber, shock, Houde (A)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Brake - Bendix (H)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Brake, air-Bendix-Westinghouse (C)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Brake, electric-Warner (F)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Carburetor-Carter (J)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Carburetor-Carter-Schebler (P)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Carburetor-Stromberg (S)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Carburetor-Zenith (U)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Regulator, voltage - Auto-Lite (W)	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Regulator, voltage - Delco-Remy	1	1	1	1	1	1	

* - These Tool Sets include those authorized in Pertinent SNL's and will be shipped to units without requisitioning.

Register No. TUSA 75

APPENDIX XII TO ANNEX 14
OF
THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN
OPERATION OVERLORD
ORDNANCE PLAN
EXPECTED LIFE OF ARTILLERY TUBES, EQUILIBRATORS
GAS CHECK PADS

Appendix 12a Annex 14 to Third U.S. Army Outline Plan Operation OVERLORD

Artillery Tube Replacement Requirements

	Minimum No. of Rds Life per Artillery Piece	To be Available by D/ 41	To be Available by D/ 51	To be Available by D/ 61	To be Available by D / 71	To be Available by D/ 81	To be Available by D/ 91	To be Available by D/ 104	Total Tube Requirements D / 104	Artillery Tube Requirements each 90 days after D / 104
		Tube Requirements	Tube Requirements	Tube Requirements	Tube Requirements	Tube Requirements	Tube Requirements	Tube Requirements		
Gun, 37mm, M6 (Armd Car Tank)	4,000	20	40	40	60	60	40	51	311	142
Gun, 37mm, M1A2 (M1A1) (AA)	4,000	10	10	10	20	20	20	10	100	51
Gun, 40mm, Auto, M1 (AA)	6,000	20	30	30	30	30	30	36	216	100
Gun, 57mm, M1 (AT)	1,800	20	40	40	40	40	40	15	235	139
Gun, 75mm, M3, (Tank)	8,000	20	20	30	30	30	30	33	193	155
Gun, 76mm, (M18)	2,000	20	20	28	30	20	20	20	158	90
Gun, 90mm, M1A1	900	20	20	20	20	20	30	30	160	80
Gun, 3", M7, (M10)	2,200	20	20	30	30	30	30	2	162	225
Gun, 3", Towed, M5	2,200	20	20	30	30	30	30	2	162	225
Gun, 4.5", M1	1,500	10	10	15	10	10	15	21	91	56
Gun, 155mm, M1918A1 (M12)	7,500			2	2	2	2		8	5
Gun, 155mm, M1, M1A1	1,200	70	70	70	75	70	70	50	480	100
Gun, 8", M1	400	10	10	10	10	10	10	20	80	917
Howitzer, 75mm, M3 (M8)	12,000	0	10	10	0	0	5	0	25	10
Howitzer, 105mm, M2A1	7,500	30	30	30	30	30	30	35	215	197
Howitzer, 105mm, M4	10,000	2	2	5	5	2	2	1	22	25
Howitzer, 105mm, M4 (Tank)	7,500	5	10	10	10	10	10	19	74	43
Howitzer, 155mm, M1	6,000	20	20	20	30	30	30	11	183	54
Howitzer, 8", M1	3,000		10	10	10	10	10	9	59	28
Howitzer, 240mm, M1	1,500		5	5	5	5	5	3	28	21

Appendix 12b Annex 14 to Third U.S. Army Outline Plan Operation OVERLORD Gas Check Pad Requirements	Estimated life Check Pad	To be Available by D ≠ 41	To be Available by D ≠ 51	To be Available by D ≠ 61	To be Available by D ≠ 71	To be Available by D ≠ 81	To be Available by D ≠ 91	To be Available by D ≠ 104	Total Requirements of Check Pad to D ≠ 104	Requirement each 30 days after D ≠ 104
Gun, 4.5, M1	500 rds	40	40	40	40	40	40	37	277	168
Gun, 155mm, M1A1	500 rds	150	200	200	200	200	150	70	1152	240
Gun, 8", M1	500 rds	10	10	10	5	5	10	8	58	24
How, 155mm, M1	500 rds	300	300	300	300	300	300	400	2200	648
How, 240mm, M1	500 rds	10	10	20	10	10	10	14	84	63
How, 8", M1	500 rds	50	50	50	50	50	50	36	336	168

Appendix 12d Annex 14 to Third U.S. Army Outline Plan Operation OVERLORD Equilibrator Replacement Requirements	To be Available by D ≠ 41	To be Available by D ≠ 51	To be Available by D ≠ 61	To be Available by D ≠ 71	To be Available by D ≠ 81	To be Available by D ≠ 91	To be Available by D ≠ 104	Total Requirements to D ≠ 104	Requirements Each 30 Days after D ≠ 104
Gun, auto, 37mm, M1A2 (D42139)	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	2
Gun, 40mm, auto, M1 (D50411)	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	15	6
Gun, 3", M5, w/carriage (38955)	1	1	2	4	2	2	1	13	5
How, 155mm, M1, w/carriage M1 (D37593)	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
How, 75mm, M3, w/carriage M8	4	4	6	10	6	4	4	38	15
How, 105mm, M2A1 (D36732)	6	10	15	26	15	10	6	88	35
How, 105mm, M3 (D31374)	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	15	6
How, 155mm, M1, w/carriage M1 (D39593)	4	4	6	10	6	4	4	38	15
Gun, 155mm, M1A1 (R.H. Assy) (D5774A)	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	2
(L.H. Assy) (D5774B)	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	2
How, 8", M1 (R.H. Assy) (D5774A)	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
(L.H. Assy) (D5774B)	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
Gun, 90mm, M1A1 (D42081)	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
How, 240mm, M1 (D47664)	1	2	3	6	3	2	1	18	7
Gun, 8" M1	2	2	4	7	4	2	2	23	9

Appendix 12c Annex 14 to Third U.S. Army Outline Plan Operation OVERLORD Recoil Mechanism Replacement Requirements	To be Available by D ≠ 41	To be Available by D ≠ 51	To be Available by D ≠ 61	To be Available by D ≠ 71	To be Available by D ≠ 81	To be Available by D ≠ 91	To be Available by D ≠ 104	Total Requirements to D ≠ 104	Requirements Each 30 Days after D ≠ 104
Gun, auto, 37mm, M1A2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
Gun, 40mm, M1	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	15	6
Gun, 57mm, M1	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	15	6
Gun, 3", M5 (W/carriage M1)	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
Gun, 3", M7 (W/mount M5)	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	8	3
Gun, 75mm, M3	1	2	2	4	3	2	1	15	6
How, 75mm, M3	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	2
How, 105mm, M2A1	10	20	45	62	45	20	10	212	85
How, 105mm, M3	4	4	6	10	6	4	4	38	15
Gun, 90mm, M1A1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
Gun, 4.5" M1 (W/carriage M1)	2	2	4	4	4	2	2	20	8
How, 155mm (W/carriage M1)	4	4	6	10	6	4	4	38	15
Gun, 155mm, M1A1	2	2	5	5	5	2	2	23	9
How, 8", M1	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	10	4
Gun, 8", M1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	1
How, 240mm, M1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	2
Gun, 37mm, M6	4	4	6	12	6	4	4	40	16

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 15 - Quartermaster Plan

TOP SECRET
10 May 1944
Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 15

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

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QUARTERMASTER PLAN

WITH INCLOSURE

(10 May 1944)

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

APO 403

ANNEX 15

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

QUARTERMASTER PLAN

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SECTION I - GENERAL

The purpose of this plan is to define the responsibility of the Army Quartermaster in Operation OVERLORD, to outline the operations to be performed by the Army Quartermaster service, and to form a basis for plans of lower echelons. This plan applies to all Third Army units except VIII Corps and attached troops and 90th Infantry Division. These two increments have not been included in QM Supply requirements through D ∕ 41, either for maintenance or for reserve. Details covered in QM Annex to Third Army "Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting", dated 26 April 1944, hereinafter referred to as "Alert Instructions", are not repeated below unless changes have been made. This plan will govern in case of conflict with alert instructions.

SECTION II - SUPPLY

1. CLASS I: D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 41.

a. Individual reserve. See alert instructions.

b. Unit reserve. See alert instructions.

c. Maintenance. Daily maintenance will be shipped from D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 41 for all troops on the far shore, including the troops landing that day.

(1) The maintenance ration will consist of the following types and percentages:

	D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 33	D ∕ 34 thru D ∕ 41
"B" rations (including condiments)	---	57%
"10-in-1" rations	60%	23%
"C" rations	20%	10%
"K" rations	20%	10%

(2) "D" rations will be furnished to supplement the "C" and "K" rations as follows: (Shipped same days as "C" and "K" rations):
From D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 33-----20%
From D ∕ 34 thru D ∕ 41-----10%

(3) PX ration (tobacco, candy, toilet kits, complete) will be shipped daily for gratuitous issue to all troops on far shore from D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 41. Such issues will be made only where PX facilities are not available.

(4) Hospital rations for patients will be shipped daily for troops on far shore, including the increment landing that day, on the basis of following percentages:

	D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 33	D ∕ 34 thru D ∕ 41
"5-in-1" rations	8%	---
Hospital Supplement Packs	8%	8%

Note: "B" rations will arrive starting D ∕ 34 to replace "5-in-1" ration.

(5) Prisoners of War and Civil Labor. 1000 additional "C" rations will be shipped daily commencing D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 41 for maintenance of estimated POW's and Civil Labor requirements. Full use will be made of captured food stocks to feed POW. Special menus will be adopted as soon as bulk rations become available.

(6) Heat units. Candle type 3-oz heat units will be shipped daily on the basis of 40% of the "5-in-1" and "10-in-1" rations shipped that day from D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 41.

(7) Perishable Items:

Fresh bread. It is planned that fresh bread will be available for issue on the far shore after D ∕ 41 for approximately 50% of the troops.

Meat, Dairy Products, and Fresh Vegetables. To commence arriving approximately D ∕ 41, depending upon availability of refrigeration facilities and developement of supply lines.

(8) All items listed above will be increased by 30% to cover losses and other contingencies.

(9) When Air Force Class I supplies are issued from Army Supply Points, such supplies will be broken down as for Army troops.

(10) Maintenance from D ∕ 42 will be provided by SOS on automatic basis, either by daily shipments from the U.K. or through Communications Zone establishments on the continent.

d. Operational Reserve. A seven (7) day level will be built up in Army Depots, at earliest practicable date consistent with available shipping, for all Third Army Troops scheduled to go ashore.

(1) The Reserve Ration from D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41 will be shipped in increments, ½ ration daily, based on strength ashore on D ∕ 41 and will consist of the following types and percentages:

	D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41
"B" (Including condiments)	35%
"10-in-1"	25%
"C"	20%
"K"	20%

(2) "D" rations will be shipped daily from D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41 to supplement the "C" and "K" rations on the basis of 20% of the total Reserve Ration shipped that day.

(3) PX ration (tobacco, candy, toilet kits, complete) will be shipped daily from D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41 on the basis of one per each Reserve Ration shipped that day.

(4) Hospital Supplement Packs will be shipped daily from D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41 on the basis of 8% of the total Reserve Ration shipped that day.

(5) Prisoners of War and Civil Labor. 500 "C" rations will be shipped daily from D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41.

(6) Heat Units, 3-oz, will be shipped daily from D ∕ 28 thru D ∕ 41 on the basis of 40% of "10-in-1" rations shipped that day.

(7) All items listed above will be increased by 30% to cover losses and other contingencies.

(8) The operational reserve build-up from D ∕ 42 will be continued in accordance with circumstances then existing.

e. General Remarks.

(1) All items will be amphibiously packed.

(2) Cleaning and preserving material, toilet paper and soap will be issued with rations from Class I supply points.

(3) Hospital Supplement, packed in wooden box, includes ration supplements for twenty-five (25) patients and will be specially marked with the Red Cross insignia on both ends of the box for immediate identification.

(4) Reconstitution of unit reserve will be a command decision.

(5) Subsistence during sea voyage will be furnished by the Navy.

(6) Paulins for outside storage will be shipped automatically by SOS for such supplies as require protection.

2. CLASS II: D ∕ 29 thru D ∕ 41.

a. Individual clothing and equipment. See alert instructions.

b. Organizations - Authorized allowances to accompany units, or to be shipped force-marked, as directed by Task Force Commander, will be the final allowances on the continent. No supplies of T/E equipment will be available to augment initial issues carried by units; maintenance only will be available.

(1) Expendable supplies. See alert instructions.
(2) Field range parts. See Par. 17, and Inclosure 1.
(3) Stationery supplies, See alert instructions.
(4) Latern parts. See alert instructions.
(5) POL maintenance supplies. See alert instructions.
(6) C & E sets carried by units, including special items for Nurses. See alert instructions.
(7) Non-tariff shoes. See alert instructions.
(8) Special operating supplies for QM repair, service and supply units. See alert instructions.
(9) Spare parts for QM repair, service, and supply units. See alert instructions.
(10) Graves Registration Companies, - special supplies and equipment. See alert instructions.
(11) QM Service companies, - pack boards. See alert instructions.
(12) Medals and decorations. (Revised table)

RESERVES OF MEDALS AND AWARDS FOR MAJOR HEADQUARTERS AND HOSPITALS

Type of Award	Army Hq	Corps Hq	Inf Div Hq	Armd Div Hq	Field Hosp	Evac Hosp	Conv Hosp		Med Det of Sep Regts & Bns
Medal of Honor	2					750 Bed	400 Bed		
Distinguished Service Medal	9								
Legion of Merit	50	25	10	8					
Distinguished Service Cross	25	5	10	8					
Distinguished Flying Cross	30	10	2	2					
Air Medal	10	10	5	5					
Oak Leaf Cluster (Large)	500	200	100	80	75	150	75	60	
Oak Leaf Cluster (small)	250	100	50	40	40	75	40	30	
Silver Star	50	100	300	240					
Purple Heart	1110	300	500	400	400	750	400	300	50
Soldiers Medal	25	10	20	16					
Good Conduct Medal	1000	500	1000	800					
Bronze Star	500	250	500	400					

SECRET

c. Maintenance and Seven Days Operational Reserve will be shipped as follows:

D ∕ 25 - Maintenance Components (17 tons)
D ∕ 26 - Maintenance Components (10 tons)
D ∕ 27 - Maintenance Components (25 tons)
D ∕ 29 - Maintenance Components (12.9 tons)
D ∕ 30 - Maintenance Components (12.9 tons)
D ∕ 31 - One (1) Set, POL Repair Parts
D ∕ 32 - One (1) "Follow-up Maintenance Set" (450,000 man days sup)
D ∕ 35 - One (1) "Follow-up Maintenance Set" (450,000 man days sup) (Includes items of C & E for paratroopers)
D ∕ 37 - One (1) "Follow-up Maintenance Set" (450,000 man days sup) (Includes items of C & E for nurses)

d. General Remarks:

(1) Personal Effects and Excess Personal Baggage. See alert instructions.

(2) Organizational equipment including motor vehicles which cannot accompany unit in movement. See alert instructions.

(3) Special clothing and equipment to be worn by Airborne and Air Force troops will be as prescribed by their respective Commanding Generals.

(4) All supplies will be amphibiously packed.

(5) The following items will be issued immediately prior to embarkation and will be left on board vessel upon debarkation:

1 - life belt per individual.
2 - bags, vomit per individual.
1 - blanket, O.D., per individual.

(6) Extra paulins for outside storage will be shipped by SOS automatically for all supplies requiring protection.

(7) Parts for petrol dispensing pumps will be stocked in Army QM Depots. Will be shipped D ∕ 37.

(8) Issues of Class II maintenance supplies to units on far shore will be from supply points according to circumstances then existing.

(9) Maintenance from D ∕ 42 will be provided by SOS on automatic basis, either by scheduled shipments from the U.K. or through Communications Zone establishments on the Continent.

3. CLASS III.

a. Vehicle reserve.

(1) Vehicle tanks: See alert instructions.

(2) Additional filled cans to be carried on vehicles. See alert instructions.

(3) Flexible nozzle and truncated funnel. See alert instructions.

(4) Final topping of vehicle tanks. See alert instructions.

b. Prescribed loads of T/BA or T/O & E cans. See alert instructions.

c. Operational Maintenance.

(1) POL

Each increment will carry to far shore, balanced POL requirements (See 3e (2) below for basis) as follows:

D ∕ 29 - Two days maintenance for its own fuel consuming vehicles and equipment.

D ∕ 30 - Two days maintenance for its own fuel consuming vehicles plus one days maintenance for the preceding increment.

D ∕ 31 - and each day thereafter thru D ∕ 41 - Each increment will carry one d s maintenance for its own fuel consuming vehicles and equipment plus one days maintenance for all preceding increments.

D ∕ 42 - and thereafter - Maintenance from D ∕ 42 will be provided by SOS on automatic basis either by daily shipments from U.K. or through Communications Zone establishments on continent.

(2) Coal, sacked. Each increment will carry one days maintenance of coal for hospitals, based on 5 lbs per hospital bed per day. (Estimated number of beds, 8% of total troops ashore).

d. Operational Reserve.

(1) A seven-day level of POL products, including coal for hospitals, will be built up in Army Depots, for all troops on far shore, at earliest practicable date consistent with available shipping. Operational POL reserve (balanced stocks except as noted) will be shipped in accordance with following schedule:

Landing date	Seven (7) day balanced POL reserve based on strength ashore on D ∕ 41	Additional reserve shipped per FUSAG tonnage allotment
D ∕ 24	1/13 of total reserve	4.3 tons--Petrol only
D ∕ 25	None	4.3 tons--Petrol only
D ∕ 26	None	26.5 tons--Petrol only
D ∕ 27	None	145.3 tons--Petrol only
D ∕ 28	None	191.7 tons--Petrol only
D ∕ 29	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 30	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 31	1/13 of total reserve	328.1 tons-balanced POL
D ∕ 32	1/13 of total reserve	175.9 tons-balanced POL
D ∕ 33	1/13 of total reserve	68.0 tons-balanced POL
D ∕ 34	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 35	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 36	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 37	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 39	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 40	1/13 of total reserve	
D ∕ 41	1/13 of total reserve	
TOTAL	7 - days	944.1 long tons.

(2) Paulins for outside storage for such POL items as require covering will be automatically shipped by SOS with each reserve shipment.

e. Basis of POL computations (Day of Supply).

(1) Vehicle fuel computation for both maintenance and reserve is based on 50 operational miles per day as outlined in (2) below. A 30% safety factor will be added to cover combat losses, age of vehicles, idling of motors, variable terrain and weather conditions, and other contingencies.

(2) Day of supply factors:

POL

Fuel for vehicles with carburetors
8 gal per wheeled vehicle
24 gal per half-tracked vehicle
52 gal per full-tracked vehicle

Fuel for miscellaneous powered equipment (T/O & E)
Petrol 9% of total vehicle fuel
Diesel fuel 1.4% of total vehicle fuel

Diesel fuel for miscellaneous powered equipment (non T/O & E)
9.8% of total vehicle fuel

Petrol for Field Ranges 6% of total vehicle fuel
Kerosene .005 gal per man per day
Total Engine Oils 3% of total fuel (less petrol for field ranges)
Engine Oil SAE 10 10% of total Engine Oil
Engine Oil SAE 30 60% of total Engine Oil
Engine Oil SAE 50 30% of total Engine Oil
Gear Oil 1% of total fuel (less petrol for field ranges)
Total Greases 1.5 lbs per 100 gals total fuel (less petrol for field ranges)
Grease GP #1 70% of total greases
Grease GP #2 10% of total greases
Grease WB #3 10% of total greases
Grease WP #4 10% of total greases

f. General.

(1) Supply of units on far shore will be from army supply points located according to circumstances then existing. All issues to using units from army supply points will be in 5-gallon cans on a can for can exchange basis.

(2) Packaging of petrol, diesel, and kerosene. Maintenance from D ∕ 29 through D ∕ 41 will be packaged unless SOS is prepared for breakdown of bulk shipments on Continent. Motor oils and lubricants will be 100% packaged.

(3) Advance Requisitions for POL products by Army will cover operational maintenance and reserve only. Unit commanders are responsible for obtaining vehicle reserve and for final filling of vehicle tanks and T/BA cans.

(4) Solid fuels for hospitals from D ∕ 29 through D ∕ 41 will be sacked. Bulk solid fuels will not be shipped to Continent until suitable port facilities are available.

(5) General Purpose Grease #0 - Will not be shipped to Continent for TUSA. White gasoline will not be available.

(6) Can Closure Parts and Marking Tags will be stocked and issued in small quantities at Army POL distributing points. Units desiring large quantities will secure through requisition on appropriate Class II - IV depots.

(7) Excess 5-gallon cans carried to the Continent by organizations will be turned in to POL supply points as soon as operational situation will permit.

(8) Civil Affairs requirements within the Army Area will be stocked and issued at Army Supply Points. Quantities shipped to Continent will be based on estimate submitted by Civil Affairs Section TUSA.

(9) ARC Agencies may be supplied thru Army Supply Points. ARC will submit their own estimates.

(10) Signs required for POL supply installations will be secured by appropriate unit commanders prior to leaving home stations and carried with organizational equipment. Signs will be double faced and free standing.

SECTION III - GENERAL PLAN OF SUPPLY

4. IN U.K. - QM supply for alerted units will be as prescribed in QM Annex to Administrative Order No. 1, Headquarters Third Army, 14 April 1944, "Third Army Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting", and subsequent directives.

5. CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS.

a. Until Third Army becomes operative on the Continent, QM supplies shipped to the Continent for Third Army troops will be controlled and issued in accordance with directives issued by First Army.

b. After Third Army becomes operative on the Continent Third Army troops will be supplied in accordance with administrative orders to be issued by this headquarters.

SECTION IV - SUPPLY OPERATIONS

6. GENERAL.

a. The Army Quartermaster is responsible to the Army Commander for overall QM supply, and maintenance throughout the Army. Close liaison and cooperation between the Army Quartermaster and the Corps and Division Quartermasters is essential.

b. Issues of supplies at army supply points will be direct to using unit transportation. Army will load the trucks at these supply points.

c. Army supply points initially will handle supplies for Civil Affairs requirements.

d. Reserves to be maintained at railheads and other supply points will be as later directed.

e. Railheads are Army agencies exclusively. Railhead officers will command the railheads and will be responsible to the Army Quartermaster. Exceptions, when situation demands, will be announced in Administrative Orders.

f. Corps and divisions may recommend changes in location of railheads or other Army supply points serving their troops. Changes in location will be effected through the Army Quartermaster after coordination with Army G-4.

g. Corps and division Quartermasters and the supply officers of separate units will control and coordinate their units while drawing from railheads in accordance with instructions of Army Quartermaster and/or the railhead (trkhd) officer.

h. Daily telegrams will be submitted in duplicate to Railhead (Trkhd) Officer prior to drawing rations. Each corps, division, and separate organization will prepare a consolidated telegram listing "breakdown" units separately. Telegrams will show the ration strength for following day and the actual requirements of POL products. (See Par 9 f).

7. CLASS I.

a. Rations will be issued daily at Railheads, (Trkhds), on basis of daily telegram submitted previous day. Ration cycle: SBL.

b. Ration items in excess of authorized individual and unit reserves will be returned to Railheads (Trkhds).

c. Changes in unit strength which occur after telegram has been submitted will be reported to Railhead (Trkhd) at or before time for drawing.

d. Schedules for drawing rations will be announced by Army. Coordination and supervision will be exercised by Corps and Division Quartermasters and the Supply Officers of separate units.

e. PX gratuitous issues will be made automatically from Class I supply points on a weekly basis, during such periods as such issues are authorized.

f. Hospital supplements will be issued to hospitals on basis of patients rationed.

g. Cleaning and preserving material, toilet paper and soap will be issued from Railheads (Trkhds).

8. CLASS II AND IV.

a. Class II and IV supplies will be on a requisition basis. Requisitions in duplicate.

b. Requisitions of using units will be assembled by Corps Quartermasters (for organic and attached troops), by Division Quartermasters (for organic and attached troops), and by supply officers of separate organizations. Requisitions will be forwarded direct to Army Quartermaster.

c. Army depots will be able to supply normal emergency requirements. Large requisitions will be forwarded by Army to Communications Zone for shipment to railheads or as directed.

d. Officers will be issued essential items of clothing from enlisted men's stocks until approximately D + 45, at which time QM Sales stores are expected to be in operation. Issues will be made on unit requisitions.

9. CLASS III.

a. Supply points will be of two classes.

(1) DP(W) will stock large quantities and will make wholesale (W) issues only. Vehicle tanks will not be filled at these points.

(2) DP(R) will be established at railheads, depots, and other convenient places on main supply routes to enable vehicles sent to rear for any purpose to be filled with petrol and oil on same trip. Such supply points will be replenished from DP(W). They will operate as retail (R) roadside filling stations.

b. Army POL DP's will be operated by Army QM troops. When operational requirements so demand, QM G/S units will be attached to Corps and Divisions. Army, if so directed, will operate Air Force Class III dumps in vicinity of beaches. Air Force DP's will handle aviation fuels and lubricants exclusively. Vehicle POL will be handled at separate dumps.

c. Army DP's serving divisions will be located as far forward as the situation permits. Divisions and separate units will establish their own supply points for vehicles operating in the forward areas. Petrol will be brought forward from Army DP's either by divisional or regimental trucks.

d. All issues will be made on a can exchange basis. The vital necessity for conserving cans and returning them to the DP's will be impressed upon all concerned. Cans must be kept clean, with covers in place. They will not be used for any other purpose. Cans for the various types of POL products will be kept marked and segregated.

e. Quartermasters and supply officers of all echelons will to the extent possible, keep all cans filled. In general, when a truck-trailer load of empty cans has been accumulated action should be taken to exchange them at the designated DP.

f. Greases and oils will be issued to using units on basis of requirements in daily telegram.

g. Daily telegram will contain the actual requirements for POL products.

SECTION V - QUARTERMASTER SERVICES - SALVAGE

Salvage.....Par. 10
POL Testing.....Par. 11
Laundry.....Par. 12
Shoe Repair.....Par. 13
Fumigation and Bath....Par. 14
Labor.....Par. 15
Sales.....Par. 16
Field Range Repair.....Par. 17

10. SALVAGE.

a. General. The word "Salvage" means to save. Abandoned, partially worn out, and captured material will be collected by troops and promptly evacuated to the rear. Thorough and efficient salvage operations will materially lighten the burden on lines of communication by making great quantities of supplies available for issue to the troops.

b. Command Responsibility. Commanders of all echelons will be responsible for the effectiveness of salvage operations within their own areas. The indoctrination and continuous education of troop commanders and troops with respect to the importance of salvage and the operation of the salvage system is a command function. As a general policy, Troop Commanders are responsible for collection of salvage and captured material within their respective combat and/or rest areas and for its evacuation to Army dumps on supply vehicles.

c. Salvage Officers.

(1) Army, Corps, and Division Quartermasters are specifically charged with the operation of the salvage system under their respective commanders.

(2) Supply officers of separate regiments and other separate units likewise will be charged with salvage operations under their respective commanders.

d. Functional Organization:

(1) The Army Quartermaster is responsible for the overall supervision and coordination of QM salvage activities. Specifically, Army assumes the responsibility for the operation of main dumps, the allocation of labor, salvage collecting personnel, mobile repair units, and the salvage operations of Army troops.

(2) Corps are responsible for the salvage operations of their divisions, Corps troops, and attached units.

(3) Divisions are responsible for the salvage operations of all organic and attached units.

(4) Separate regiments and other separate units are responsible for the salvage operations of their own units.

e. Collection.

(1) Salvage collection is the responsibility of all unit commanders both on the battlefield and in rest areas.

(2) Salvage collecting personnel are not adequate for collecting and evacuating all routine salvage. Therefore, all available personnel will be utilized at every possible opportunity to collect and carry salvage material to unit collecting points, located, when possible, convenient for returning motor transports.

(3) Unit personnel and vehicles returning to the rear will evacuate salvage material from unit collecting points to Army salvage dumps.

(4) Unserviceable clothing and QM equipment of units will be sorted by items and sizes at the time it is turned into the Army Quartermaster, and a receipt obtained therefor. (This does not apply to battlefield salvage).

f. Evacuation.

(1) Salvage dumps, operated by Army Quartermaster Salvage Collecting personnel, will be established as near the front as possible, normally at or near Division and Corps railheads or truckheads. All salvage will be sorted at these dumps. The Army Quartermaster, while primarily responsible only for QM Salvage material will cooperate with the other supply services and will turn over to them items pertaining to their respective services.

(2) All captured supplies, equipment, and material will be delivered intact to the control of the chief of the Army supply arm or service to which the items pertain. This officer will deliver samples of captured items embodying new principles to the proper service officer of the theater staff for preliminary analysis, and for forwarding to the Zone of the Interior for final analysis and report. Captured food stocks will be used to feed POW's.

(3) Serviceable QM articles will be sent from Army dumps to Army supply points for redistribution. Readily repairable QM articles will be evacuated to Army QM Mobile Repair units to the extent of their capacity. All remaining salvage items will be evacuated to QM Salvage depots in the Communications Zone for reclamation or other disposition.

g. Repair. QM Mobile Repair units will operate in conjunction with QM Army Depots for the purpose of repairing QM articles and returning them to supply channels.

11. POL TESTING.

a. A Quartermaster Petroleum Products Laboratory will be available for the purpose of testing POL stocks.

b. Captured enemy stocks will be placed under guard immediately. Samples will be forwarded to the laboratory for identification and analysis. Final disposition of captured POL stocks will be directed by the Army Quartermaster. Captured stocks will not be used until tested and released.

c. Test of lost identity products, and for suspected sabotage also will be run.

12. LAUNDRY.

a. Quartermaster Laundry units (Semi-Mobile), if available will be attached to each hospital unit under Army control.

b. As soon as practicable after landing, laundry units, if available, will be provided for the laundering of enlisted men's clothing.

c. Laundry units (Semi-Mobile) will operate in conjunction with Quartermaster Mobile Repair Companies for the purpose of laundering repairable items of clothing and equipment and in juxtaposition with Fumigation and Bath units, to provide clean clothing for troops assembled in rest areas.

d. Officers' laundry will be handled by private arrangement.

13. SHOE REPAIR.

a. When practicable, QM Mobile Repair units, as available and to the extent of their capacity, will accept shoes for repair from organizations. These shoes will be repaired and returned to the organizations. Allocations will be made by Army for Division, Corps and Army troops. Each shoe will be tagged, laces removed, and the two shoes will be tied together with the strings, leaving not less than two (2) feet between shoes.

14. FUMIGATION AND BATH.

a. Fumigation and Bath units will be operated by Army for the purpose of delousing personnel, divesting clothing of lice and similar parasites, to provide hot water shower baths and a change of clothing for personnel.

b. One Quartermaster Fumigation and Bath unit will be operated in conjunction with each Quartermaster Salvage Repair unit.

15. LABOR. A general Army labor pool, operated by the Army Quartermaster, will be maintained to furnish labor, as available, in accordance with established priorities. Employment of POW will be in accordance with existing international conventions. Prisoners of War will not be employed within 15 miles of an enemy organized point of resistance.

16. SALES. A Quartermaster Sales Company (M), when available, will operate as directed by the Army Quartermaster for the purpose of making sales of Post Exchange supplies, and for sales to Officers, Army Nurses, Red Cross personnel, War Correspondents, and other authorized personnel, of authorized clothing and accessories.

17. FIELD RANGE REPAIR.

a. References: Circular #52, WD 1943; Circular #143, WD 1943; and Inclosure 1.

b. Maintenance.

(1) The operating unit will perform such maintenance as is within its facilities and capabilities. The care of field ranges is a command responsibility. (See Incl. 1).

(2) Divisions will be responsible for maintenance of all field range units of their organic and attached troops. The services of the division ordnance company may be used in this connection.

(3) Corps and Army troops will apply to Army QM depots for maintenance beyond their facilities and capabilities.

(4) Any maintenance that cannot be effected as above indicated will be performed at QM Salvage Repair Co. (Fixed) at a QM Base Depot (Communications Zone). Evacuation will be through Army QM depots.

c. Repair parts.

(1) Units so equipped will carry with them from U.K. the field range equipment, accessories and spare parts as listed in paragraph 1, Incl 1. Units equipped with special cooking equipment will carry a 30-day supply of appropriate spare parts.

(2) Division Quartermasters will stock and carry from U.K. repair parts, on the basis of items listed in paragraph 2, Incl 1. Separate Regiments and Battalions will carry a 30-day supply in proportion to the number of field ranges included in their equipment.

(3) Army QM depots will stock spare parts for replenishing divisional authorized stocks, in addition to replacement parts for Corps and Army troops.

(4) Units will replenish authorized parts at the end of each 30-day period by requisition on the Army QM depot. Unserviceable parts will be saved and turned in to Army QM depots when requisitioning replacement parts.

SECTION VI - GRAVES REGISTRATION AND BURIALS

18. GENERAL POLICIES.

a. Responsibility rests upon all echelons of command for the prompt recovery, identification, evacuation and expeditious burial of the dead, - U.S., Allied, and Enemy. The Army Quartermaster, coordinating with G-1, is charged with operation of graves registration matters and burials within the Army. Each echelon of command down to and in-

cluding companies will organize and instruct detachments to carry out these functions.

b. Cemeteries will be kept to a minimum. They will not be located within sight of main roads whenever it can be avoided. Location of cemeteries will be designated by division, or higher commanders.

c. Isolated graves will be kept to an absolute minimum. These graves must be marked and plotted and reported to GRS serving the command.

d. Covers will be placed over dead bodies at earliest practicable moment.

e. Graves Registration units will not be required to dig graves; neither are they adequate to search the entire battlefield. Unit commanders will search their own areas.

f. The collecting point system will be used. Extra transportation will be furnished by units served.

g. Identification will be prompt, and on the spot. Tags and forms will be meticulously and completely filled out. Personal belongings will be collected and evacuated in accordance with existing orders.

h. Appropriate burial ritual will be accorded to all dead. The same treatment will be given the dead whether Allied, Enemy, or our own. Burials will be accomplished within the minimum of time and in all cases within 24 hours of death.

19. Details concerning burial and registration of graves are contained in Circular No. 9, Headquarters Third U.S. Army, 1944. (To be issued).

SECTION VII - SPECIAL SUPPLIES

20. AMERICAN RED CROSS.

a. ARC supplies stored at Army supply points will be specially marked and separately stored. Issues will be as required by proper ARC representatives.

b. Class III supplies and maintenance for field ranges will be provided on same basis as for Army troops.

21. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. Supplies for Civil Affairs will be stored separately at Army supply points. Army personnel will assist in making issues.

b. Estimates of supplies required is a function of CAA.

SECTION VIII - LOCATION OF QM UNITS

22. To be announced in later Administrative Orders.

INCLOSURE 1, TO QM ANNEX

OPERATION "OVERLORD"

FIELD RANGE SPARE PARTS

1. Allowances of component parts, equipment, accessories, and utensils for range, field, M1937. (Sec VI, Cir No 52, WD, 43).

a. The following table prescribes the allowances of component parts, equipment, accessories, and utensils for 1-cabinet unit; 2-cabinet unit; 3-cabinet unit; and 4-cabinet unit, respectively, of the range, field, M1937. (Note: This table will be used as basis for equipping units)

1-cabinet unit	2-cabinet unit	3-cabinet unit	4-cabinet unit	Quantity	Item
					Component parts
1	2	3	4	Each	Cabinets.
1	2	3	4	do	Cradles, cook pot.
1	2	3	4	do	Units, fire.
					Equipment
1	2	3	4	do	Covers, for 15-gallon cook pot.
1	2	3	4	do	Covers, for 10-gallon insert.
1	2	3	4	do	Covers, for baking and roasting pan (also used as a griddle).
1	2	3	4	do	Grates, wood burning.
1	2	3	4	do	Insert, 10-gallon, for 15 gallon cook pot.
1	2	3	4	do	Pans, baking and roasting.
1	2	3	4	do	Pans, cake.
1	2	3	4	do	Plates, splash, for 15-gallon cook pot.
1	2	3	4	do	Pots, cook, 15-gallon.
					Accessories
1	1	1	1	do	Books, instruction.
1	1	1	1	do	Boxes, tool, metal (empty).
1	1	1	1	do	Brushes, wire, with handle, 19 rows long and 3 rows wide, width of block 15/16 inch, length overall 14 inches.
1	1	1	1	do	Chains, tie-in, left.
1	1	1	1	do	Chains, tie-in, right.
1	1	1	1	do	Cleaners, burner slot.
1	1	1	1	do	Cleaners, generator.
1	1	1	1	do	Containers, empty, for small parts.
1	1	1	1	do	Containers, with graphite grease.
150	150	150	150	do	Disks, filter, in filter disk cans (50 per can).
1	1	1	1	do	Extinguisher, fire, carbon-tetrachloride, 1-quart, pump style.
1	1	1	1	do	Funnels, wire strainer, ½-quart.
2	2	2	2	do	Hooks, hay.
1	2	3	4	do	Protectors, arm, long.
1	2	3	4	do	Protectors, arm, short.
1	1	1	1	do	Pumps, air.
1	1	1	1	do	Reamers, fuel jet.
1	1	1	1	do	Screw drivers, common, type III, normal duty, single grip, length of blade 3 inches.
1	1	1	1	do	Wrenches, engineers', carbon steel, unfinished 15 degree angle, single head, milled opening, 9/16 inch.
1	1	1	1	do	Wrenches, engineers', carbon steel, unfinished 15 degree angle, single head, milled opening, 5/8 inch.
1	1	1	1	do	Wrenches, for setscrew, 22½ degree, carbon steel, unfinished, single head, opening for 5/16 inch setscrew.
					Utensils.
1	1	1	1	do	Cleavers, butchers', blade 8-inch.
1	2	3	4	do	Dippers, 1-quart.
1	2	3	4	do	Forks, cooks', flesh, 15-inch.
1	2	3	4	do	Forks, cooks', flesh, 21-inch.
1	1	1	1	do	Kits, canvas, utensils.
1	2	3	4	do	Knives, butchers' blade, length 10 inches.
2	4	6	8	do	Knives, paring.
1	2	3	4	do	Ladles, diameter of bowl, 4½ inches, length overall 15 inches.
1	1	1	1	do	Machines, hand operated, chopper or grinder, without flywheel, meat and food, small, with three cutters, coarse, medium, and fine.
1	1	1	1	do	Saws, butchers', 14-inch blade.
1	1	1	1	do	Blades, 14-inch C to C, for saw, butchers', 14-inch blade.
1	2	3	4	do	Skimmers, 5- by 15- inch.
1	2	3	4	do	Spoons, basting, length overall 15 inches.
1	2	3	4	do	Spoons, basting, length overall 21 inches.
1	1	1	1	do	Steels, butchers', length of blade 10 inches.
1	1	1	1	do	Stones, sharpening.
1	2	3	4	do	Turners, cake, 15-inch or 21-inch.
1	1	1	1	do	Whips, wire, egg, 12-inch or 16-inch.
					Spare Parts.
4	4	4	4	do	Gaskets, filter case cap screw.
4	4	4	4	do	Jets, fuel. Knobs, valve stem, with 1-pin cutter, beveled points, 3/32 - by 1-inch, bright finish.
1	1	1	1	do	Air
1	1	1	1	do	Flame
1	1	1	1	do	Fuel
4	4	4	4	do	Packings, valve stem (Braided and molded asbestos ring) 3/8- by 17/32- by 9/32-inch.
4	4	4	4	do	Screws, filter case cap.
2	2	2	2	do	Tubes, fuel, short (complete).
2	2	2	2	do	Tubes, fuel, or air, long (complete).
2	2	2	2	do	Tubes, manifold (complete).
2	2	2	2	do	Valves, flame, without knobs.

2. Maintenance and repair of ranges, field, M1937, and fire units pertaining to such ranges. (Sec II, Cir No 143, WD, 43).

a. Table of allowances for maintenance of 100 fire units for 30 days.

(Note: This table lists the basis for spare parts to be carried by division Quartermasters for organic and attached troops, and by supply officers of separate regiments and separate battalions).

Quantity	Part	Stock No.	Part No.
1	Body, flame valve	65-J-1085	138
4	Brush, steel, wire	65-J-1300	213
4	Burner, fire unit	65-J-1310	145
8	Cap, fuel tank filler tube (complete with plug)	65-J-1407	102
8	Cap, generator tube	65-J-1430	151
4	Chamber, mixing	65-J-1490	144
4	Check, air input valve	65-J-1510	122
2	Check, fuel output valve	65-J-1515	107
8	Cleaner, burner slot	65-J-1565	211
8	Cleaner, generator	65-J-1555	212
4	Container, tin, for small parts	65-J-1585	219
24	Container, tin, with graphite grease	*65-J-1590	218
1	Cradle, cook pot	65-J-1645	159
24	Cup, leather, air pump	65-J-1655	197
9,000	Disks, filter (50 per can) (unit each)	*65-J-1665	153
2	Elbow, air output	65-J-1730	110
2	Elbow, air gage	65-J-1740	126
1	Unit, fire	65-J-2605	84
8	Funnel tin, with strainer, ½-quart	64-F-540-65	214
1	Gage, air pressure	65-J-1830	127
64	Gasket, filter case cap screw	*65-J-1845	156
20	Generator, fire unit	65-J-1855	148
1	Gland, packing, air, fuel or flame valve	65-J-1860	131
2	Glass, air pressure gage	65-J-1864	127B
4	Grate, wood burning	65-J-1865	160
8	Hose, air pressure pump complete with thumb lock assembly and hose clamp	65-J-1943	202
32	Jet, fuel	*65-J-1960	140
5	**Knob, valve stem, air	65-J-2015	133
5	**Knob, valve stem, flame	65-J-2021	135
5	**Knob, valve stem, fuel	65-J-2025	134
8	Tube, manifold	65-J-2560	116
4	Nut, burner	65-J-2077	147
8	Nut, flame valve	65-J-2079	141
32	Packing, valve stem	65-J-2085	132
40	Pin, cotter, beveled point, 3/32" x 1"	65-J-2120	136
8	Pin, cotter, beveled point, 3/32" x 1½"	65-J-2123	157B
4	Pump, air pressure	65-J-2160	190
2	Protector, arm, long	65-J-2142	220
2	Protector, arm, short	65-J-2143	221
36	Book, instruction	65-J-1115	---
8	Reamer, fuel jet	65-J-2230	210
4	retainer, check, air input valve	65-J-2245	123
8	Rivet, steel, flathead, 3/16"x3/8"	65-J-2287	93B
12	Rivet, steel, roundhead, 3/16"x3/8"	65-J-2290	88B or 89B
2	Rod, burner control	65-J-2300	146
20	Screw, machine, steel, roundhead, ¼"x ½" NCTS.	65-J-2335	144B
32	Screw, filter case cap, generator	65-J-2330	155
8	Bolt, stove, roundhead, 3/16" x 1" with nut and lock washer, tank anchor strap.	65-J-1101	90
8	Screws, set, steel, hanger point, 5/16" x 3/4" NCTS.	65-J-2370	158
30	Screw, self-tapping, roundhead, ½" x No. 10.	65-J-2345	96 or 101
30	Screw, set, steel, cup point, 5/16" x 5/8"	65-J-2352	98
2	Shutter, air	65-J-2405	142
4	Stem, air input valve	65-J-2484	121
4	Stem, flame valve	65-J-2486	139
8	Tube, fuel or air, long	65-J-2546	118
2	Tube, fuel, short	65-J-2540	117
2	Valve, air or fuel, without knob	65-J-2625	128
2	Valve, air input	65-J-2635	119
8	Valve, flame, without knob	65-J-2655	137
2	Valve, fuel output	65-J-2675	104
2	Yoke, generator, fire unit	65-J-2700	157
2	Stem, air or fuel valve	65-J-2482	130

* Expendable.
** Parts are interchangeable

3. Army QM Depots will maintain adequate stocks of spare parts listed in paragraph 2, above, plus the following. (Note: The following items will not be stocked by divisions).

Part	Stock No.	Part No.
Box, tool, empty	65-J-1145	181
Chain, tie-in, left	65-J-1470	216
Chain, tie-in, right	65-J-1475	215
Cover, heavy, 15-gallon cook pot	64-C-1221-65	223
Cover, light, 10-gallon cook pot	64-C-1222-65	226
Cover, tool box compartment	65-J-1625	187
Mirror, fire unit front panel	65-J-2073	95
Panel, fire unit front	65-J-2100	93
Shield, air tank	65-J-2395	109
Shield, fuel tank	65-J-2398	100
Strap, anchor, fire unit tank, inner	65-J-2494	89
Strap, anchor, fire unit tank, outer	65-J-2495	88
Tank, air	65-J-2498	108
Tank, fuel	65-J-2500	99
Tube, uptake, fuel output valve	65-J-2580	106
Plug, fuel tank filler tube cap	65-J-2139	103
Wrench, engineers, (15° angle, carbon steel, unfinished, single head, milled opening 5/8").	41-W-1304-65	200
Wrench, engineers, (15° angle, carbon steel, unfinished, single head, milled opening, 9/16").	41-W-1303-65	207
Wrench, cap screw, filter case	65-J-2693	205
Wrench, set screw, 22½°, carbon steel, unfinished, single head, open end, 5/16".	41-W-2491-65	208

4. Care of field ranges, accessories and equipment:

"MEMORANDUM" (No. W30-9-43)

"1. Because of conservation of critical metals formerly used in the manufacture of the range, field, M1937, and certain components thereof, specifications now provide for substitute materials in the following items:

Item	Substitute materials
Range cabinets	Thinly enameled steel
Cook pots	Plain iron
Inserts	" "
Splash plate	" "
Griddles	" "
Roasting pans	" "
Covers	" "

"2. It has come to the attention of the War Department that improper cleaning methods, principally the use of abrasives, are being used, with the result that the protective coating of the substitute metals is removed, causing items to rust. The practice of greasing and "burning in" iron cooking utensils is considered essential to their proper maintenance and if properly accomplished the surface is protected from rusting, and excessive polishing is unnecessary.

"3. The following methods will be used in the maintenance and care of range cabinets and cooking utensils:

a. Range cabinets.---Range cabinets should be cleaned with ordinary soap, and if necessary, scouring powder to remove all carbonized grease. Polishing with abrasives injures the protective coating and will be discontinued.

b. Cook pots and bakepans.---Paragraph 74c (3), TM 10-405, which reads as follows, will be adhered to:

(3) Black iron bakepans. -- (a) When received. -- The black iron roasting and baking pans supplied to Army messes should be washed when first received in the mess in warm, soapy water to which a little washing soda has been added. In the case of new and unused pans, this is to remove the protective paraffin coating put on by the manufacturer.

(b) "Burning-in" newly received pans.---It should be a routine practice to "burn in" black iron pans when first received by the mess. After being washed and dried, the pans should be thinly and evenly coated with lard or lard substitute. Lard is better but lard substitute will do. Then the pans are placed in a medium oven (325° to 400° F.---12 to 16 counts) for 1 hour. This burns in the coating of lard and gives a smooth, glazed surface, closing up the tiny pores in the metal and preventing rust. This process is often called "bluing or rebluing."

(c) Periodical rebluing.---Daily use in the mess causes the burned-in coating on these pans to wear off, this being indicated by shiny, light-colored areas. * * *
The treatment outlined above for black iron bakepans is recommended for all plain iron cooking utensils used with the M1937 field range. Pans that emit a rancid odor will be thoroughly washed with a lye solution and then reblued.

"4. These instructions will be brought to the attention of all concerned.

(AG 414.22 (1-8-43) SPQSG-MP-FH)

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J.A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General."

5. Information on the cooking utensils furnished with Gasoline Field Range. If your Gasoline Field Range is equipped with mild steel utensils they will require processing or preseasoning before use to prevent rusting. The following method is recommended.

a. Roast pans, griddle, cooking pots, lids and bake sheets, if made of mild steel:- Remove protective coating of paraffin, cosmolene, or lacquer with which pans are coated when received by warming and rubbing off. If it is not possible to get it all off in this manner they may be washed in warm soapy water. Make sure that this coating is all removed but do not scour or scrape utensils.

b. After being rubbed clean or washed and thoroughly dried, the utensils should be thinly and evenly coated with lard or lard substitute. Lard is better but lard substitute will do. Then place the pans or utensils in a medium oven (325° to 400° F., 12 to 16 count) for 1 hour. (After they have been in the oven for 15 minutes they should be removed and any excess grease which may be collected in drops or running down the sides, wiped off. This will prevent blistering or spotting of the glazed surface). The heat burns in the coating of lard and gives a smooth, glazed surface, closing up the tiny pores in the metal and preventing rust. (This process is more effective if it is done three times before the utensils are used). It may be done in the cabinet of the Field Range with the burner in the lowest position and the utensils in the top position, if care is exercised in controlling the heat of the burner. When bluing the large boiler it is necessary to turn it upside down over the burner, allowing the edges to rest on the rails and using care to prevent boiler from becoming too hot. The insert pot may be turned upside down on the cradle and blued at same time cradle is being blued.

c. When washing mild or sheet steel utensils, they should not be scoured with steel wool, or harsh abrasives as scouring tends to remove the bluing. Soaking will soften particles of food which may have become baked or crusted on inside or outside of pans or kettles. (Should it ever become necessary to scour griddle or roast pan it must be reblued before using again).

d. Periodical rebluing:- Daily use in the mess causes the burned-in coating on these utensils to wear off, this being indicated by shiny, light-colored areas, or rusty spots. When this occurs the utensils should be washed, dried and reblued by the method shown in (b) above.

e. Tinned bake sheets:- If the bake sheets furnished are covered with a thin layer of tin they should be handled as follows:
(1) Wipe out new bake pans with clean cloth, removing storage dust.
(2) Do not grease. Place pans in oven - temperature from 375° to 425° F., for 3 to 4 hours. NEVER PLACE PANS IN AN OVEN ABOVE 425° F.
(3) Remove from oven and grease thoroughly by hand while pans are still warm.
(4) Wipe out the pans well with clean cloth and pans will be ready for use.

f. It is common practice to "burn-out" new "Tinned" bake pans and/or sheets for the following reasons:
(1) Increase baking efficiency
New bake pans are bright and shiny and reflect heat just as a mirror reflects an image. This reflected heat is lost . . . decreased baking efficiency. In the process of burning out bake pans, the outer surface is oxidized to a dull, bluish-amber color. This burned out surface of the pan absorbs heat.

(2) Burning Out Bonds Tin Coating to Iron Base.
Burning out produces a tin-iron alloy which permanently bonds the tin coating to the iron base. Pure tin melts at 449° F., while the tin-iron alloy can withstand a hearth temperature of approximately 100° higher. However, the blued-in surface is very delicate - it can be broken through or rubbed off with an ordinary rubber eraser. NEVER CLEAN TINNED PANS WITH LYE. Special cleaners for this purpose are on the market.

CARE AND USE OF THE GASOLINE FIELD RANGE M-1937

LIST OF DON'TS

DON'T leave cook pot, over flame without water in the pot.
DON'T allow burner to become covered with dirt or scale.
DON'T allow generator tubes to go without cleaning longer than three days when using ETHYL gasoline.
DON'T remove generator tubes from filter case body.
DON'T fail to clean fuel jet daily.
DON'T use too much force in tightening any joint or bolt on fire unit, especially filter case cap screw and generator yoke screw.
DON'T take down any parts of fire unit except generator and flame valve.
DON'T fail to keep gasoline at a safe distance from fire unit.
DON'T grind filter case joint more than necessary.
DON'T permit yellow flame for more than a very short time.
DON'T permit blue flame after the generator is hot.
DON'T fail to change filter discs as often as required.
DON'T attempt to lift or carry the fire unit when burning.
DON'T close flame valve when unit is hot.
DON'T refill fuel tank when burner is hot.
DON'T overfill fuel tank.
DON'T allow water to get into fuel tank.
DON'T drop objects on copper tubing or forget that the fire unit has some comparatively soft metal parts.
DON'T use any other tools than the wrenches furnished with the range.
DON'T fail to inspect unit for leaking gas before starting.
DON'T use anything except gasoline or water to clean mirror.
DON'T forget that you are the operator of the fire unit. It is only an assortment of fabricated metals and it cannot think for you or itself.
DON'T forget that the fuel is gasoline, a highly inflammable fuel and even more explosive.
DON'T forget that it is necessary to refuel the unit about every 4 hours, and must be done in a specially designated place.
DON'T forget that sloppy refueling may cause a serious fire when burner is relighted.
DON'T forget that water cannot be used to extinguish a gasoline fire. Sand or a Foamite charged extinguisher must be used.
DON'T forget that fire can be a splendid servant or a terrible master. Intelligent care insures good performance - neglect invites TROUBLE.

SECRET

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 16 - Medical Plan

Register No: TUSA 75

ANNEX 16

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

MEDICAL PLAN

WITH APPENDICES:-

NO I - Preventive Medicine

NO II - Surgery

NO III - Internal Medicine

NO IV - Neuropsychiatry

NO V - Medical Chemical Warfare

NO VI - Medical Records

(11 May 1944)

PATTON
Comdg.

GAFFEY
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HURLEY
Surg.

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MEDICAL PLAN

1. CASUALTIES:

a. Methods of Estimating Casualties:

(1) Sick and Non-battle Injuries: The rate of 0.25% per day will be used in estimating hospital admissions for sick and non-battle injuries.

(2) Battle Casualties: The following rates in per dent will be used in estimating battle casualties:

TYPE OF UNIT	"LIGHT" BATTLE DAY	"SEVERE" BATTLE DAY	"MAXIMUM" BATTLE DAY
Brigade or Regiment	2.5	15.	25.
Division	1.	8.	15.
Corps	0.5	3.	5.
Army	0.35	1.	2.5
Miscellaneous Troops (Including SOS)	0.25	0.6	1.

(3) To the degree that information is available, the casualty estimate for the entire force will be based on the sum of the separate casualty estimates for each major component. When the stage is reached at which it is no longer possible to forecast the nature of the battle for component elements day by day, the following daily average rate guide will be applied to the entire "effective force":

D plus 15 to D plus 29	0.35%
D plus 30 to D plus 59	0.25%
D plus 60 to D plus 90	0.20%
Thereafter	0.15%

Note: These daily average rates will not be used by any echelon lower than Army.

b. Categories of Battle Casualties: The total number of battle casualties, as estimated above, will be divided into the following categories:

(1) D plus 2 and thereafter:

Killed, captured and missing	25%
Wounded	75%

(2) The numbers of wounded may be further sub-divided as follows:

Litter cases	50%
Walking cases	50%

2. EVACUATION:

a. Avoidance of Unnecessary Evacuation:

(1) Every effort will be made to prevent the unnecessary evacuation of sick and wounded personnel from the continent. Medical officers with all echelons will habitually return casualties to duty as soon as their condition permits.

b. Plan:

(1) In the early stages, the medical plan will be based on the evacuation of all transportable casualties to the UK, through the beaches and on the provision of life saving surgery by the medical units in the beach organizations. Until adequate facilities for rendering emergency treatment are available ashore, casualties occurring in landing craft will be retained in their craft and returned to the ship. The removal, treatment, and evacuation of these patients is a Navy responsibility. To provide against interruption by weather, berthing or mooring facilities for LSTs will be made available at Mulberries. As soon as the progress of operations and the build-up permit, the medical services will function normally.

(2) The type of ships and craft to be used for evacuation of casualties will be DUKWs, LSTs, and other craft.

(3) Provision will be made for the assignment of the necessary number of DUKWs for unloading of medical supplies and evacuation of casualties from shore to ship. Provision will also be made for the use of necessary cargo-unloading DUKWs in returning wounded to LSTs.

Coordination with the Navy medical service relative to the equipping and manning of the LSTs and other naval craft is necessary.

(4) When the port of CHERBOURG becomes available and before BRITTANY PORTS are opened, U.S. casualties and casualties among British personnel operating with U.S. forces will be evacuated from CHERBOURG. When the BRITTANY ports are available to the U.S. forces and before a SEINE port is opened, British casualties will also be evacuated from CHERBOURG.

(5) Aircraft will be used to assist in the evacuation of casualties, but it is not expected that facilities will be available before D plus 14.

(6) Provision will be made in conjunction with the AEAF to use air transport facilities to the maximum for the evacuation of casualties from the continent at the earliest practicable date.

(7) Hospital trains will be transferred to the continent as early as port facilities and railway communications permit. French trains with improvised apparatus for the evacuation of casualties will be made available on all long stretches of line as early as possible. Provision will be made for transportation of casualties by motor ambulances, by air or other available means, pending availability of hospital trains.

(8) For details of casualty handling in amphibious operations, see letter, this headquarters, file AG 370.5 - GNNCN-4, subject as above, dated 4 May 1944.

c. Evacuation Policy:

(1) Army Responsibility for Other Troops: Third U.S. Army will be responsible for medical service of all troops within the Army area.

(2) Until hospital accommodation is adequate for retention of casualties, all casualties except non-transportables will be evacuated from the continent to the UK. As soon as hospital accommodation is adequate, all cases requiring not more than seven (7) days' treatment will be retained on the continent; and, as the build-up of hospitals permits, this period will be extended to fifteen (15) days, thirty (30) days, and ultimately to longer periods. For planning purposes evacuation policy may be taken as follows:

D to D plus 18 - all evacuated
D plus 19 to D plus 39 - 7 day policy
D plus 40 to D plus 59 - 15 day policy
D plus 60 to D plus 90 - 30 day policy

d. Air Evacuation of Casualties:

(1) The limited number of aircraft available in the initial stages will preclude their use for the evacuation of casualties, except in emergency. Detailed instructions for obtaining emergency air transport will be issued at a later date.

(2) Evacuation of casualties by air from the continent will begin at the earliest possible time. In the later stages, air evacuation from Army to Communications Zone installations on the continent will be used to the maximum practicable extent.

(3) The following are the respective responsibilities of the Air Force, Armies and Communications Zone to air evacuation of casualties.

(a) The Air Force will be responsible for:

1. The equipping of all transport aircraft with suitable litter racks and insuring that each transport aircraft carries such equipment at all times.

2. The medical care and treatment of casualties from the time they are loaded on an aircraft until they are unloaded from such aircraft.

3. The temporary medical care and treatment with local resources of such casualties as may be delivered in an emergency at an airdrome at which no provisions for the reception of Casualties have been made.

4. The delivery of casualties to airdromes convenient to fixed hospitals, unless military necessity requires that they be delivered to other airdromes.

5. All transport type aircraft returning from forward areas, during actual operations, will be utilized for air evacuation of the wounded unless military necessity requires otherwise.

(b) Third Army will be responsible for:

1. The establishment and maintenance of a holding medical unit in the immediate vicinity of each airdrome, within its zone of responsibility, from which casualties are to be evacuated.

2. The delivery of casualties to such holding medical units.

3. The loading of casualties upon aircraft within its zone of responsibility.

4. The provisions of such additional equipment, within its zone of responsibility as may be required by the impracticability of effecting property exchange with the Air Force.

5. The necessary liaison with the Air Force concerned, required for the evacuation of its casualties.

6. The receipt of casualties without delay, when notified by the Air Force concerned, at any airdrome within its zone of responsibility at which an aircraft transportang casualties is forced to land and remain on the ground for an extended period.

(c) The Communications Zone will be responsible for:

1. The establishment and maintenance of such holding units in the immediate vicinity of each airdrome, within its zone of responsibility, as may be required for the evacuation and reception of casualties evacuated by air.

2. The loading and unloading of casualties within its zone of responsibility.

3. The reception of casualties without delay at any airdrome within its zone of responsibility, either by previous agreement with, or notification by, the Air Force concerned.

4. The provision of such additional equipment, within its zone of responsibility, as may be required by the impracticability of effecting property exchange with Air Force.

5. The necessary liaison with the Air Force concerned required for the evacuation and reception of casualties within its zone of responsibility.

e. Motor Evacuation of Casualties:

(1) Ambulance: The bulk of all casualties will be transported by motor transportation. All litter cases should be transported by ambulance. All ambulance service in rear of division boundaries will be controlled by the Army Surgeon. The routing and timing of all convoys will be coordinated with G-4 -- Traffic Headquarters, by the Army Surgeon.

(2) Medical Department transportation returning to the front from Army, Corps, and Division medical installations will be utilized to transport exhaustion cases which are ready for duty.

(3) Other Vehicles: The restricted number of ambulances available will make transportation of all casualties by ambulance impossible. Trucks will be used as required.

(4) Maintenance: See G-4 Plan and Ordnance Plan.

3. HOSPITALIZATION:

a. U.S. Army: U.S. Army casualties will be treated in Field, Evacuation and Convalescent hospitals. Originally, only non-transportable cases will be retained in hospitals. When sufficient hospitals have been established, cases with short hospital expectancy will be retained in Army hospitals for treatment.

b. Allied Casualties: Allied casualties in Third Army Zone will be hospitalized in the same manner as American casualties. When Allied personnel are admitted to American medical installations, all reports of admissions, discharges, deaths and serious illness will be rendered by the medical installations through norman channels using the same forms and procedure as would be used for an American casualty. The necessary disposition of these records will be made by the Adjutant General.

c. Civilian Casualties: Medical units will be prepared to receive wounded and injured civilians in Army medical installations for emergency treatment only. As soon as persons so admitted become transportable, they will be moved to civilain facilities operating under suppervision of the Civil Affairs Section.

d. Enemy Casualties: Enemy casualties will be hospitalized in the same manner as American or Allied casualties. Treatment and care of all prisoners of war will conform to provisions of FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare, including provisions of Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929, and interpretations thereof by higher headquarters.

4. POLICY ON THE USE OF THE GENEVA RED CROSS.

a. No unit other than a medical unit will display the GENEVA Red Cross or any symbol representing or resembling it.

b. The GENEVA Red Cross will be displayed at the discretion of the appropriate formation commander as a protective measure (visible from the air), by medical units and establishments unless there is a non-medical unit or installation within 1,000 yards.

c. On occasions when the Red Cross is displayed as a protective measure, every endeavor should be made to insure that it is displayed prominently and unmistakably, and that the layout of the site does not in any way give the appearance of a tatical layout. The Red Cross will NOT be illuminated at night.

d. On occasions when the Red Cross is not displayed as a protective measure, the maximum degree of concealment, camouflage, and dispersion will be used.

e. The above paragraphs, a to d inclusive, apply to the use of the GENEVA Red Cross as a protective measure and are not intended to prevent the use at any time of small flags or signs (not visible from the air) bearing the Red Cross to indentify medical establishments.

5. TREATMENT OF GAS CASUALTIES IN ASSAULT LANDING:

a. If vesicants are encountered, all casualties from contaminated areas or beach sectors will be considered contaminated and have their exposed skin surfaces decontaminated with protective ointment or other means, and their outer clothes and shoes removed before being put on litters. Blankets must be preserved from contamination as far as possible.

b. No attempt will be made to handle vesicant casualties separately in aid stations or shore holding stations.

6. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Medical Service for PW Enclosures: The Army Surgeon will be prepared to furnish medical service to Army PW enclosures on call, utilizing detachments from the Army Medical Groups. Later, this task should be assumed by enemy medical personnel under American supervision.

b. Patients' Mail: (see paragraph 2d, Section XIII, G-1 Annex).

c. Formal Transfer of Patients: Army hospitals do not have a detachment of patients. Units will not, formally by special order, transfer patients to Army hospitals.

d. Dental:

(1) Organizations not having organic dental personnel and requiring dental care will contact the Army, Corps, or Division Surgeon (Army Surgeon for Army troops, Corps Surgeon for Corps troops, and Division Surgeon for Division troops).

(2) During combat, emergency dental treatment will be furnished in forward echelons, and facilities for routine treatment will be maintained in installations of the rear echelons.

(3) Facilities for repair of dentures and other emergency prosthetic procedures will be available at all division clearing stations, evacuation hospitals and at such other installations as the Army Dental Surgeon may designate.

e. Burial of the Dead: (See QM Annex).

7. MEDICAL SUPPLY:

a. Class II and IV Medical Supplies:

(1) See Administrative Chart No 1 and Annex "H", G-4 Annex.

b. Scheme of Supply:

(1) The Base Section of the Army Medical Depot Company will be established near the rear boundary of the Army area, with the Advance Platoon (or Sections) located as far forward as possible. Medical installations will draw medical supplies from the nearest depot installation available.

(2) Division Medical Supply Officers will consolidate requisitions for organic and attached units and make distribution whereever possible.

(3) Corps and Army troops will requisition separately by separate groups, battalions, and companies. When the situation demands, it may be necessary for Corps to operate a separate medical supply installation. To meet these requirements, a section of the Army Medical Depot Company will be designated, or the Corps Medical Battalion Supply Officer may be directed to operate a medical supply dump within the Corps Area.

(4) Requisitions:

(a) Non-controlled items - by informal request to the Army Medical Supply installation normally serving the unit. Requisitions will be written whenever possible giving the item number, when available, a description of the item, unit and quantity desired. Oral requests for supplies will be honored wherever the situation demands.

(b) Controlled items - by written request direct to the Surgeon, TUSA, giving the necessary information as to item number, item, unit, and quantity desired. If equipment is in excess of T/E or T/BA, a brief statement as to the medical necessity of the item will be attached to the requisition.

c. Salvage and Captured Materiel:

(1) Captured enemy medical supplies will be turned in to the nearest railhead supply installation to be returned through normal supply channels to the Army Medical Depot. Care will be exercised to prevent looting and damage to the property in transit. The Army Surgeon or his delegated representative, will inspect the supplies for possible re-issue for the care of prisoners of war and civilians or for salvage. New developments in medical equipment or supplies will be forwarded to the rear for further study.

(2) Salvage - unserviceable medical property will be turned in to the nearest Army Medical Supply Installation where it will be evacuated to the rear for salvage and reclamation.

d. Salvage of Clothing and Equipment.

(1) For disposition of salvage clothing and individual equipment accumulated at medical installations, see Quartermaster Annex.

(2) Army medical installations will notify the Army Ordnance officer of the nearest Ordnance installation when any bulk of Ordnance equipment (Rifles, grenades, etc.) has been accumulated.

e. Maintenance and Repair:

(1) Medical Equipment - Medical Department equipment in need of repair will be turned in to the Base Section of the Army Medical Depot Company. Where repairs are required on large items of equipment, a request will be made on the Depot to furnish maintenance and repairmen for the item.

(2) Generators and Power Units - when repairs are required on these or similar items of equipment, the item will be taken to the nearest Ordnance Shop serving that installation.

f. Clothing and Individual Equipment for Duty cases:

(1) Hospitals will be authorized to carry in stock approximately fifty (50) sets of clothing and individual equipment to be issued to cases, principally exhaustion cases, returning directly to their units from hospitals.

(2) Those cases going to duty through the Army Replacement System will be issued their individual equipment and the bulk of their clothing at the Replacement Depot.

8. AWARD OF THE PURPLE HEART:

a. Policy:

(1) Awards by division, regimental and battalion medical officers will be made only in the cases of those patients who are returned to duty from their installations.

(2) Evacuation and Field Hospitals will make the award as soon as practicable after the patient has been admitted to the hospital, if he has not received the award.

(3) If the patient has not received the award prior to evacuation to a hospital, the following notation will be made on the field medical cards or the emergency medical tag: "Patient entitled to Purple Heart".

(4) When the award has been made, that fact will be entered on the individual's field medical card, WD, MD Form 52c, or emergency medical tag, WD, MD Form 52b. Normally the citation will consist only of the phrase: "For wounds received in action on ____ (date) ____ in ____ area".

b. Supply:

(1) Initial supply - Medical Unit Commanding Officers, including evacuation and field hospitals, divisions, regimental and battalion detachments will requisition an adequate supply of Purple Heart Awards without delay.

(2) Additional supply - additional supply will be obtained from Quartermaster Depots as required.

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE APPENDIX

1. General:

a. The following provisions for the sanitation and prevention of disease for this command are published for the information and compliance of all concerned.

b. The state of health of the civilian population on the continent has deteriorated under German control. In the early stages of occupation little or no assistance from Civil Public Health Authorities can be anticipated. All health control measures will be the responsibility of the occupying military forces.

2. Responsibility:

Commanding officers of all grades are responsible for the health and sanitation of their respective commands. (Ref. Par 2, AR 40-205, pars 1 & 2, AR 40-210, FM 21-10 & pars 1 & 2, FM 8-40).

3. Water:

a. Water is plentiful and the ground water level high. Because of the shortage of chemical supplies, the deterioration of equipment and installations and the universal contamination of ground water, springs and streams resulting from the use of human excreta as fertilizer or indiscriminate sewage disposal, all water regardless of source is unsafe for human consumption without treatment.

b. Polluted water is a serious health hazard in all combat areas.

c. All sources of water will be considered non-potable because of potential and probable bacterial or chemical contamination, or both - accidental or intentional.

d. Water will not be used for drinking or cooking in any instance unless declared potable by Medical Department personnel.

e. Chlorination (and filtration of highly turbid water) will be used for disinfection of water. A residual chlorine content of 1 p.p.m. or slightly more will be maintained in water used for drinking purposes.

f. Lyster bags and chlorination will be used where an approved supply of potable water is not available. Individuals not having an approved supply of water available will treat water by boiling (one (1) full minute) or by use of Halazone Tablets. (With clear water, add two (2) tablets to each canteen, with turbid water, use four (4) tablets. After any chlorine treatment, water will stand thirty (30) minutes before use.

g. Minimum allowance of one (1) gallon of water per capita per day should be provided.

h. Water contaminated by any means or agents (chemical warfare gases, bone oil, dead bodies, etc.) will not be used until treated by methods recommended by competent medical authority and declared potable. (Ref. par 10a, AR 40-205 & change 1, TM 5-295).

4. Waste Disposal:

a. Sewage and waste disposal facilities, never well developed nor sufficient in Western Europe, have suffered deterioration without repair and/or by bombing. These facilities are inadequate and will not tolerate additional loads from military sources. Complete unit disposal will be necessary until facilities can be constructed, expanded or repaired.

b. Intestinal and insect-borne diseases are endemic on the Continent. Extreme care is necessary in the disposal of wastes in accordance with existing regulations.

(1) Human wastes will be disposed of by sub-surface or burial methods.

(a) Cat holes will be used in all emergency situations.

(b) Straddle trenches will be properly constructed and maintained during rest periods or stops longer than one (1) hour's duration.

(c) Fly-proof pit latrines will be constructed in camps of longer than one (1) week's duration. Oil, where available, will be used daily.

(d) Urine soakage pits will be used in camps of longer than one (1) weeks' duration.

(e) Where water carriage systems or sewers are available, such facilities will be utilized as far as practicable. Existing sewage disposal works will be used where feasible and possible with limited repair and maintenance by military authorities. Lacking proper disposal facilities, treatment by septic tanks (or sullage tanks) or pits will be employed where possible, followed by:

1. Sub-surface disposal by cess-pools or leaching pits.

2. Discharge of effluent to a stream if approved by competent medical authority.

(f) Where feasible, facilities for washing hands will be provided at or near latrines. Such facilities will be available to all mess personnel at all times. Cleanliness of mess personnel will be enforced by all commanders.

(g) Latrine orderlies will be posted to assure proper use and maintenance of latrines and urine soakage pits.

(h) Straddle trenches, latrine, garbage and soakage pits will be properly closed, mounded and marked only with type of waste buried.

(2) Kitchen wastes:

(a) Solid wastes by:

1. Burial or incineration.

2. Removal by responsible civilian with avoidance of spillage and disposal remote from camp area.

(b) Liquid wastes by soakage pits or trenches. Precautions will be taken to prevent fly breeding and to control odors. Covered grease traps will be used.

(c) Rubbish - will be burned or buried.

5. Quarters:

a. All buildings will be thoroughly inspected, cleaned and disinfected when necessary before occupancy. A minimum of thirty-five (35) square feet of floor space per capita will be provided in buildings. Effective ventilation of all structures used for housing will be maintained.

b. All barracks, tents or billets will be maintained in a scrupulously clean and sanitary manner. Bedding will be aired and sunned at least once each week, if possible.

6. Insects, Rodents and Animals:

a. Flies:

The common house fly may be expected in abundance during the late spring and summer months. They are mechanical carriers of several intestinal diseases, especially dysentery (bacillary and amoebic), typhoid-paratyphoid fevers, and, may be involved in the spread of infectious hepatitis (jaundice). Control of these insects will be implemented and assiduously carried out by all commanding officers.

b. Lice:

(1) Lice are the carriers of epidemic typhus, trench fever and relapsing fever. German troops have had a large number of cases of trench fever and relapsing fever and these diseases are epidemic throughout Europe. Typhus fever, thus far, has occurred only sporadically but because of the universal louse infestation of the population, the unavoidable movements of population and the refugee problem, this disease may become a serious menace.

(2) While the danger to military personnel from louse borne typhus is reduced to a minimum by immunization throughout our Army, thorough louse control measures will nevertheless be carried out. These will include, in addition to provisions for satisfactory laundering and bathing facilities, the use of DDT Louse powder (QM item 51-I-180) issued to individuals.

(3) Where considered necessary Methyl Bromide fumigation and mass dusting with DDT Louse powder (QM item 51-I-180) will be used. The latter procedure has proved to be a highly successful and fully applicable louse control measure for masses of the population and may be relied upon in the event of typhus outbreaks amongst the civil and/or military population.

(4) It is contemplated that the U.S. Typhus Commission may be called upon for initial advice and assistance in the event of an outbreak of typhus fever in the Civil population.

(5) Control of the situation amongst the civilian population will ultimately become the responsibility of the Civil Affairs Section operating under the appropriate headquarters.

(6) Commanding Officers will include, as a part of training, thorough indoctrination of military personnel as to the danger from typhus fever and other louse borne diseases and the necessity, means, and individual responsibility for keeping free from louse infestation.

c. Mosquitoes:

(1) Malaria exists on the continent but is not prevalent in any part. Anopheles mosquitoes capable of carrying malaria and Aedes mosquitoes, vectors for dengue fever, are indigenous. Special control measures are not deemed necessary at this time.

(2) In the event of the occurrence of malaria, repellents, pyrethrum and DDT Louse Powder (QM item 51-I-180) sprays, protection by screens and bars where practicable, and oiling, draining and filling, if necessary will be utilized. It is not anticipated that the use of suppressive drugs will be required. Sufficient supplies will be held available for suppressive or clinical treatment.

d. Roaches:

Many varieties are present on the continent and will be vigorously controlled in all messes, food storage bins and depots. The proper use of Insecticide, powder, roach, a Quartermaster item, will be sufficient in most instances.

e. Chiggers:

The harvest mite ("Chigger") will be prevalent in the rural areas and may be the cause of much disability in combat troops. The frequent use of Insecticide, powder, body insect, a Quartermaster item of issue in the marshalling area, should be sufficient.

f. Rodents

(1) Rats and mice are prevalent throughout Western Europe. They act as a resorvoir of murine typhus fever, which is spread by the rat flea. These rodents are also carriers for the causative agent that produces Leptospiral Jaundice.

(2) Human infection may result from the ingestion of food or water contaminated with the urine or feces of infected rats. The disease may also occur from rat bites or after handling infected rodents.

(3) Control measures will be necessary in static and base areas, especially in food and storage centers.

g. Animal diseases:

Animals in this theater show an increase in the incidence of rabies, tuberculosis, anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and brucellosis. Therefore the keeping of pets and/or handling of local animals is forbidden.

7. Control of Insects and Pests:

a. The control of insects and pests within an area occupied by troops is a command responsibility.

b. Troops units will conduct pest control measures within their own areas and in areas immediately adjacent thereto.

c. Medical Department personnel are responsible for making necessary surveys relating to insects and pests and appropriate recommendations relating thereto.

d. The Corps of Engineers is responsible for the execution of work on real property required to effectuate control measures in connection with environmental factors of insects, rodents or other vermin in accordance with the recommendations of the Surgeon. Engineer supply warehouses will be stocked with authorized pest control material.

e. The Quartermaster Corps is responsible for operating the larger delousing units for the treatment of troops and maintaining authorized supplies of Quartermaster material for pest control work.

8. Supplies for Pest Control:

a. The following pest control materials will be available at Engineer and Quartermaster supply depots. The fullest possible use of these materials must be made by all organizations in accordance with recommended procedures to prevent typhus fever, malaria, relapsing fever, diarrheal diseases, dysentery, typhoid fever and other diseases which may be carried or transmitted by insects and rodents.

ENGINEER SUPPLIES

Item	Basis of Issue
Sprayers Knapsack anti-mosquito	1 per 1000

QUARTERMASTER SUPPLIES

Diesel Oil-mosquito control	10 cans (5 gal) per 1000 per 30 days, May, June, July, August, September.
Hydrogen cyanide Discoids (fumigation)	As authorized when available.
Calcium Cyanide-fumigation, lb.	2 per 1000 per 30 days.
Barium Carbonate (rat poison), lb.	2 per 1000 per 30 days.
Borax (fly control), lb.	2 per 1000 per 30 days.
Insecticide-freonaerosel 1 lb. dispensers	7½ per 1000 per 30 days March through October.
Insecticide powder, roach, lb.	1 per 1000 per 30 days.
Insecticide, powder, body insect, 2 oz can or DDT Louse Powder, (QM item 51-I-180), 2 oz can	1 per man per 60 days.
Ethocel delousing bags, individual	4 per 1000 per 30 days.
Methyl Bromide; ampules (20 cc.)	1 per 2 men per 30 days.
Paper, fly, ribbon or sheets	50 per 1000 per 30 days.
Swatters, fly	3 per 1000 per 30 days.
Traps, rat	25 per 1000 per 30 days.
Traps, mouse	15 per 1000 per 30 days.
Repellent, insect, 2 oz. bottles	350 per 1000 per 30 days June, July, August, Sept.

b. Organizations will provide themselves with proper equipment and materials to control lice, fleas, rats, mosquitoes, roaches, bedbugs and other pests in their areas. Engineer responsibility for insect and pest control will be as outlined in AR 100-80.

9. Food and Messes:

a. Local supplies of food in civil establishments will be meager or non-existent. Sale of food to military personnel by civilian establishments will be permitted only after thorough inspection of such places, including the dispensing and storage equipment, and personnel, in order to determine those that are acceptable. Street, road and other casual vending will not be permitted. Examination of food handlers among military personnel and civilian food handlers will be carefully and frequently carried out. Close supervision of civilian food handlers is especially important.

b. Organization commanders will promulgate comprehensive educational programs during the pre-invasion period as to health hazards from improper food and drink and of the danger from eating in other than approved messes or establishments. Fresh milk and all milk products obtained from local sources will not be used. Local meats, including poultry and marine foods, inspected and passed by a veterinary officer, will be acceptable but will only be used when imported supplies are unavailable.

c. Human excreta is customarily used for fertilizer throughout the continent. Because of the hazard of intestinal diseases, including amoebic dysentery, from this source, locally produced vegetables will not be served or eaten raw.

d. Soft drinks will not be procured locally.

e. Constant care will be exercised in the preparation and handling of all foods, especially avoiding all use of leftover cooked foods for subsequent meals.

f. During the initial landing phase, troops will not eat out of mess kits until adequate facilities for washing mess gear become available. Troops will be particularly cautioned to eat the meat, egg and cheese components of the combat rations out of the original containers unless adequate facilities for proper washing of mess gear are readily available.

g. Police and cleanliness of messes and mess gear reflect the status of discipline and training of a unit. All commanders are directed to pay special attention to the enforcement of perfect and constant mess sanitation in order to prevent unnecessary outbreaks. Unit commanders will take the necessary disciplinary measures to insure cleanliness of messes and mess personnel.

h. In the event facilities for adequate heating of water cannot be provided and it is necessary to use mess gear, same will be carefully washed and immersed for not less than thirty (30) seconds in a chlorine solution containing at least fifty (50) parts per million of free chlorine. (Ref. par 15c, AR 40-205). In all instances sterilization of mess gear prior to use is desirable. This may be accomplished by immersion in boiling water or a chlorine rinse.

i. Food handlers will be examined and inspected as prescribed in AR 40-205.

j. All food or food products contaminated or suspected of being contaminated by war gases will be considered unfit for consumption by troops until proper inspection and/or decontamination measures have been instituted. (Ref. par 65a, TM 3-220 and par 129a(3), FM 21-40).

10. Diseases of Greatest Military Importance:

a. Intestinal Diseases (typhoid-paratyphoid fevers, bacillary and amoebic dysentery, the common diarrheas, gastro-enteritis, (salmonellosis, staphylococcic entero-toxin) are endimic throughout Europe and during the war years have increased tremendously. Circumstances favoring the spread of these diseases are: failure of normal water supplies, shortages of food, disruption of sewage disposal, lack of pasteurization of such dairy products as are available, the use of night soil for fertilizer, lack of control of insect vectors, poor control of carriers and the general deterioration of health within the occupied countries. These diseases are spread primarily through the medium of contaminated water and food, carriers, the house fly and roaches.

b. Control Measures:

(1) Chlorination of all water used until existing supplies can be brought up to military standards.

(2) The sanitary disposal of all human excreta, kitchen wastes and garbage.

(3) Non consumption of local dairy products, vegetables, meats or food prepared by civilians.

(4) Emphasis on the proper preparation and serving of all food eaten by military personnel (standard mess sanitation).

(5) Vigorous control of house flies and roaches.

(6) Careful examination, instruction and training of all food handlers, especially the proper cleansing of hands after defecation.

(7) Immediate investigation and control of all local outbreaks of enteric infections.

(8) Adequate and vigorous treatment of all military and civilian cases of enteric infections.

(9) Full utilization of all diagnostic facilities (military and civil) for prompt recognition of all kinds of enteric diseases.

(10) Up to date immunization of all military personnel.

c. Serious epidemics may be followed by any relaxation in control measures. Such will not be tolerated in this command. It must be remembered that immunization is not a substitute for sanitation nor can sanitation alone be depended upon to afford full protection. (Ref. sec V, AR 40-210, FM 21-10, FM 8-40 and AG Ltr No. 3 Pub MC, Hq ETO, dated 7 Feb 44).

11. a. Epidemic typhus, Trench and relapsing fevers are now prevalent in continental Europe. They are transmitted by the body louse. Serious outbreaks may occur in troops operating in Europe. The fighting efficiency of troops so infested is seriously affected by the irritation, loss of sleep and secondary infections resulting from louse bites. Under the continual exigencies of war, with mass movement of troops and civilians and breakdown of normal safeguards, these diseases represent a serious hazard to all military forces operating on the continent. Immunity may be developed against typhus fever artificially by use of vaccines but it should not be assumed that absolute protection is thus produced. The principal causes for the increased lice infestation of the population are: lack of soap, fuel and hot water, lack of sufficient clothing and marked overcrowding under unhygienic conditions. Contributing to the above factors are the lack of disinfecting equipment, louse repellents and the deficiency in the dist which has led to lowered mass resistance to the disease.

b. Endemic typhus and tick typhus fever are transmitted respectively by the rat flea and the dog tick. They represent milder forms of typhus fever but in many cases may be of military importance especially if the rat population cannot be controlled.

c. Control Measures:

(1) Frequent bathing and laundering of clothing.

(2) Weekly use of Quartermaster Insecticide, powder, body, insect of DDT Louse Powder (QM item 51-I-180). This powder dusted thoroughly on underclothing and rubbed in protects from 7 - 10 days.

(3) Education of all military personnel in the importance of louse control.

(4) Frequent physical inspections of all military personnel by unit surgeon.

(5) In the face of wide spread lice infestation, the immediate use of the vault method of disinfection of clothing by trained technicians under the supervision of the Quartermaster Corps or the mass dusting with DDT Louse Powder (QM item 51-I-190).

(6) Avoidance of civilian houses, or billets until careful cleaning and fumigation has been done.

(7) Up to date immunization of all military personnel with typhus vaccine.

(8) The control of lice will prevent outbreaks of trench fever and the louse borne type of relapsing fever. Control methods for endemic (flea) typhus depends upon the proper use of the insecticide, powder, body insect and eradication of rats. Tick typhus is controlled by the avoidance and destruction of dogs, infested with ticks. NO lice, fleas or ticks means NO typhus, relapsing or tick fevers. (Ref. sec VI, AR 40-210, FM 21-10, FM 8-40, Cir Ltr No. 19, OCS-ETO, dated 31 Jan 44, Cir Ltr No. 17, OCS-ETO, dated 10 Apr 44).

12. Respiratory Infections:

a. These are common at all times, though their periods of maximum incidence is seasonal. Regardless of the appearance of such infections in the civil population in Western Europe these diseases will always rank as important causes of non-effectiveness among military forces. The most important of these diseases are influenza, bronchitis and pneumonia. Civilian epidemics of influenza are a constant source of danger for armed forces.

b. Control Measures:

(1) Avoidance of over crowding in billets and proper ventilation compatible with existing blackout regulations.

(2) Frequent medical examination of troops during period of maximum seasonal incidence.

(3) Education and instruction of troops in proper personal hygiene, especially mess personnel and food handlers.

(4) Proper disinfection and cleaning of all dishes and eating utensils.

(5) Avoidance of fatigue and chilling.

(6) Avoidance of crowded civilian areas during seasonal rise of cases or any time when local outbreaks occur.

(7) Prompt hospitalization and segregation of all cases of influenza.

(8) Prompt diagnosis and treatment of all cases of pneumonia. (Ref. sec IV, AR 40-210, FM 21-10, FM 8-40, Sec I, Cir Ltr No. 40, OCS-ETO, dated 16 Apr 44)

13. Contagious Diseases:

a. General:

Contagious diseases such as tuberculosis, scarlet fever, diphtheria, meningitis (meningococcic), poliomyelitis, encephalitis, measles and mumps are endemic throughout the European continent and are spread by discharges from the respiratory tract. In general the same control measures listed in par. 12 (b) supra apply.

b. Tuberculosis:

Tuberculosis is the most serious and dangerous of these diseases today as far as the civilian population is concerned and indirectly may become a military hazard. Malnutrition, lack of adequate hospital facilities, the fact that open cases work in factories and at other jobs and go about without restriction, have all contributed to spread the disease far and wide. In its present form, it is rapidly progressive in nature. The widespread use of meats from tuberculous cattle for food in Europe is believed to have added materially to the problem.

(1) Control methods for tuberculosis include:

(a) Avoidance of contact with open cases.

(b) Maintenance of military health standards. The Civil Affairs Section is responsible for supervising the control measures amongst the civilian population.

c. Scarlet Fever:

This disease has been the most prevalent of all the contagious diseases in Western Europe, during the last five (5) years. It has now reached epidemic proportions. In Germany alone there were more than four hundred thousand (400,000) cases in 1943. Scarlet fever on the continent has been characterized by its severity and the frequency of complications.

(1) Control Methods for Scarlet Fever:

(a) Daily examination of all contacts and laboratory examination of suspicious throats. Wound infections with this organism may be common.

(b) When local and widespread outbreaks occur in troops, all known contacts should immediately be put on Sulfadiazine, one (1) gram daily, and all Dick tested. Individuals who are Dick positive should then be placed on two (2) grams of Sulfadiazine daily for seven (7) days and the drug stopped on all Dick negative individuals. Such a procedure has proved effective in controlling outbreaks in staging areas, posts of embarkation and on transports.

d. Diphtheria, while prevalent on the continent, is not expected to become a significant military medical problem. Routine epidemiological control procedures will be carried out in the event cases develop. Active immunization with toxoid will not be required at this time.

e. Control Methods for Meningococcic Meningitis:

(1) The majority of cases of meningococcal infections occur among recruits and the need for prophylactic treatment is therefore greatest in this group. Other personnel may be treated where, in the judgement of the unit surgeon, conditions so warrant. The conditions under which healthy personnel should receive Sulfadiazine during outbreaks cannot be exactly defined. The decision will be based upon the judgement of the surgeon but certain general rules for guidance are suggested. A single case of meningitis rarely justifies general prophylactic treatment. An exception to this rule might be a single case occurring in a group under crowded conditions which are apt to be present for a number of days, as on a troop transport. In general, an incidence of more than 0.2 per thousand per week among large concentrations of troops or the appearance of more than two cases in a week in bodies of troops with a strength of ten thousand (10,000) or less warrants use of this method. Concentration of cases in particular units is important. Instead of treating the entire command it will be better to treat a unit, such as a regiment, battalion or company, in which the incidence is especially high.

(2) Dosage recommended:

Two (2) grams of sulfadiazine administered by mouth in one day in a single or divided dose. This is effective in reducing the carrier rate and causes practically no toxic reactions.

f. Control methods for Poliomyelitis, Encephalitis, Measles, and Mumps are the same as laid down in paragraph 12b.

14. Infections Hepatitis (Jaundice):

a. General:

The incidence of this disease has increased greatly throughout Europe. In other theaters (Africa, Sicily, and Italy) this disease has been responsible for the highest non-effective rates of all diseases encountered. Its epidemiology is not well understood and the mode of transmission is unknown. Unit surgeons will report pertinent information that may lead to the solving of these problems.

b. Control Methods For Infectious Hepatitis:

In the meanwhile and until the issuance of further directives, control measures as apply to insects, (especially flies and mosquitoes), intestinal disease and diseases spread by droplet infection will be carried out in the event the disease manifests itself. (Ref. AR 40-210, FM 21-10, & FM 8-40).

15. Skin Diseases:

a. Parasitic and infectious diseases of the skin have shown a marked increase in the civilian population of Europe. Scabies, fungus infections, impetigo, pemphigus and all types of pustular dermatitis are prevalent. Under normal conditions these should be of little importance to the soldier but under combat condition skin infections may be frequent and assume abnormal proportions. Unless properly cared for, these conditions may be productive of considerable non-effectiveness on the part of our troops.

b. Control Measures:

(1) Frequent bathing with change of clothes.

(2) Prevention of louse, flea and other insect bites.

(3) Use of benzyl benzoate for control of scabies.

(4) Proper foot care and change of socks plus liberal use of issue foot powder.

(5) Prompt diagnosis and proper treatment of all minor skin infections.

(6) Unit commanders will see that the provisions of par. 18d below are complied with. (Ref. Cir. Ltr No. 77, OCS-ETO, 8 May 43 and Cir. Ltr. No. 34, OCS-ETO, 6 May 44).

16. Venereal Diseases:

a. These diseases, especially gonorrhea, syphilis and chancroid are highly prevalent in all occupied countries. Comprehensive educational programs, including the use of lectures, posters, training films, film strips will be carried out assidously by all commanding officers as necessary to insure "venereal disease consciousness" amongst all troops. Adequate supplies of approved prophylactic materials will be made available to all troops at all times and instruction in their correct usage will be given. Prevention of venereal disease is a command responsibility. Commanders will take necessary steps to prevent non-effectiveness due to this disease.

b. Control Measures:

(1) Prophylactic stations, staffed with well trained personnel, properly equipped, conveniently located, well marked (day and night) in or near areas where exposure is likely and sufficient in number to be accessible to all troops, will be established as soon as possible.

(2) Prophylaxis of gonorrhea with the sulfonamides will be at the discretion of each unit commander (upon recommendation of the unit surgeon) concerned and is advocated where other control methods are not practicable. Sulfathiazole administered in accordance with Circular Letter No. 144, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, dated 23 Sep 1943, will be used. The dose is two (2) grams by mouth either as a single dose or in two (2), one (1) gram doses at intervals from two (2) to eight (8) hours. The first dose will be given as soon as possible after exposure.

(3) Unremitting efforts will be made to control prostitution. The assistance of the Provost Marshal and Civilian Authorities will be utilized to the fullest extent. The Civil Affairs Section is responsible for coordinating the efforts of the civilian agencies toward this end.

(4) The "Out of Bounds" procedures, and limiting of hours on pass will be put into effect where the situation justifies their use. Early treatment and, where possible, ambulatory treatment of these diseases will also be considered as control measures.

(5) Recreational facilities, athletic equipment and entertainment will be plentifully supplied in rest areas by the Special Service Section.

(6) Case finding as applied to contacts will become a control measure in areas about rest camps and in rear areas as soon as possible. The responsibility for case finding and treatment of infected civilians will be conducted by the Civil Affairs Section in cooperation with local and military agencies. (AR 40-210, sec VII and changes 1 & 2, Cir Ltr No. 144, OCS-ETO, 23 Sep 43, Ltr Hq ETOUSA, sub "Control of VD, 31 Dec 43, Cir Ltr No. 31 OCS-ETO, 10 Mar 44 and Cir Ltr No. 55 OCS-ETO, 12 Apr 43).

17. Motion Sickness Prevention:

a. All troops will be supplied with Motion Sickness Preventive capsules prior to embarkation. These are safe when given as prescribed below. Their efficacy has been well proven.

b. These capsules will be issued in the marshalling area on the basis of ten (10) capsules for each person on the troops list. When a medical officer or Medical Department personnel is included in the troop list of the craft, he/they will be responsible for the supervision of the administration of Sea Sickness Capsules. When no such personnel is available, the capsules will be given under the supervision of the unit commander in accordance with the schedule given below:

c. The capsules will be given as follows:

(1) One (1) by mouth one half (½) hour before embarkation.

(2) One (1) by mouth when the craft or ship leaves the harbor and is exposed to motion.

(3) One (1) every four (4) hours by mouth, day and night, thereafter for the duration of voyage (or until the entire ten (10) capsules have been taken). (AG Letter 710 Op SUBG, Hq ETO, 16 Mar 44)

18. Personal Hygiene:

a. The highest standards of personal hygiene will be constantly maintained to prevent the occurrence and spread of serious diseases in whatever region this command operates.

b. Physical inspections of all personnel will be held twice monthly and at such other times as recommended by unit surgeons and approved by unit commanders. Frequent bathing will be required. All personnel will report to the unit medical officer immediately upon the discovery of infestation with lice, ticks, or fleas.

c. Troops will receive regular and frequent instruction relative to personal hygiene, dangers of unauthorized food and drink, disease, and the necessity for various special precautions.

d. Special care of feet, skin, and eyes will be emphasized.

(1) At the time of a dental survey and during the monthly physical examination, personnel will be checked for poor dental hygiene, gingivitis, and Vincent's stomatitis. Treatment will be instituted immediately where required. All personnel will be impressed with the need of daily cleansing of the mouth and teeth and with the necessity of early treatment of any disease of the mouth. This must be done to prevent serious infection and to prevent the transmission of the condition to others in the command.

e. Troops will be informed of the location of the nearest dispensary. The hours for sick call will be designated by unit commanders.

f. The clearly marking of all dispensaries will be as directed by the unit commander. (Ref. 7 & 8, AR 40-205).

19. Immunizations:

a. All troops will have been immunized against typhoid-paratyphoid fever, smallpox, tetanus and typhus fever in accordance with AG Letter No. 3 Pub MC, Headquarters ETO, dated 7 Feb 44.

b. Re-immunization will be as follows:

(1) Smallpox (vaccine) ... Revaccinate yearly.

(2) Typhoid-paratyphoid (Triple vaccine)... 0.5 cc yearly, In event of undue prevalence of these fevers, will be at six (6) month intervals.

(3) Tetanus ... 1 cc yearly.

(4) Typhus ... 1 cc every four (4) to six (6) months. In event of epidemics in the civil population, the four (4) month period will apply.

c. Records of immunizations, as well as prescriptions for spectacles and removable or essential dentures (false teeth) will be written in the service record on appropriate pages (par. 12, AR 40-210).

20. Special Physical Inspection:

Pre-embarkation physical inspection will be given to all military personnel twenty-four (24) hours prior to departure from concentration area. (Par. 187 ETO-POM-SSV, 10 Jan 44 and par 8 & 11 ETO-POM-LSV 21 Jul 43).

21. Prevention of Neuropsychiatric Casualties:

a. It has been adequately and repeatedly demonstrated that neuropsychiatric casualties are low when leadership and morale are excellent. The actual prevention of neuropsychiatric casualties is a command function. Decisive and competent leadership builds morale and controls fear. Frequent instructions from the commanding officer in the heat of battle promotes confidence of the men. He must set an example of coolness and efficiency which impels similar and more soldierly behavior in others. Fear fused with hunger and fatigue tends to drive men out of battle. Fear is not controlled by mental magic. It is controlled by making other forces stronger than it is, forces strong enough to instill the will to fight in spite of fear, fatigue and hardships. The net balance is morale. The army services which control hunger, cold, fatigue and contribute to the factual information of the soldier play a constant morale building role. The principal factors in the morale of a soldier are:

b. General Factors:

(1) Physical fitness

(2) Technical proficiency

(3) Zeal

(4) Discipline - the subordination of the individual to the team.

(5) Satisfaction, or the absence of deeper discontent.

(6) Self confidence:

Neuropsychiatric casualties are high when confidence is low. These vary under different circumstances.

c. Specific factors:

(1) Faith in cause and the future: Those soldiers having the most fear and lacking most in confidence have less faith in the cause for which they are fighting. War aims must be concrete, personal and intimate. It is of value to discuss war aims and their importance in the personal lives of the men. Each man should understand that he has a personal stake in the war and understand why we fight.

(2) Belief in unit and personal mission: This is gained by the soldier only if he is told of the importance of the mission and why he does it.

(3) Pride and confidence in outfit: Much can be done about this. He should be informed of the past history of his organization. A successful battle contributes greatly to pride and confidence.

(4) Confidence in training, equipment, and operations. This must be high or the soldier is lacking in zeal, discipline and satisfaction with his job.

(5) Realistic appraisal of the job ahead: This should be done without over optimism or pessimism and without over emphasis on the fearful aspects of battle.

(6) Belief in the Army's concern for the individuals welfare: The company commander instills this belief in many ways, for example by:

a. Personal interest in the soldier's problem.

b. Promotions when deserved reflect the officer's interest.

c. Providing for good food, shelter and smaller comforts of the soldier to the extent permitted by the tactical situation. There is a high correlation between the soldiers opinion of the officer's housekeeping and the conduct of the officer on the field of battle. If he wins the confidence of the soldier before battle, he has it in battle.

d. Rotation of Battalions in combat:

There is a moderate increase in neuropsychiatric casualties during the first 48 hours of battle. The rate again begins to climb on the fourth to sixth day, depending on the severity of action. If a unit goes out of combat on the ninth day it will recover physical efficiency in about three days. If left in combat eighteen days physical efficiency is recovered in eight to nine days. There is, therefore, a geometrical progression of the time of recovery which results in loss of time and manpower if battalions are not rotated on the sixth to tenth day where the tactical situation permits.

e. Division rest areas:

Division rest areas will be provided as directed by the Army Commander.

f. Care between combat periods:

Rest periods are for physical recuperation of the individual and repair of equipment. If living conditions and food are worse in the rest areas than in combat the men cannot rest or relax. There is a tendency to neglect care, food, entertainment, rest, relaxation and repair of equipment between combat periods. Dull lectures during the first few days after combat are resented by the men and tend to tear down morale.

22. Civilians:

All civilians and civilian organizations attached to this command will comply with this order in so far as it applies to them.

MEDICAL ANNEX
SURGERY

1. GENERAL:

a. Early skilled surgical care of battle casualties is the prime function of those medical installations belonging to Army. First aid and primary care only, including dressing of wounds, control of hemorrhage, splinting of fractures and treatment of shock will be carried out in battalion aid station, collecting and clearing stations. Definitive surgery will not be undertaken in installations forward of field hospital platoons. A very important factor in early care is the proper sorting of casualties, so that the lightly wounded can be quickly returned to duty and the serious casualties evacuated. This latter group must be divided in two (2) groups: The "transportable", those who will withstand movement to the rear, and the "non-transportable", those who do poorly when moved and must be treated immediately. The "non-transportable" group includes:

(1) Those casualties, usually with multiple wounds, who remain in shock, in spite of therapy.

(2) Abdominal wounds, particularly those with concealed hemorrhage. The tactical situation permitting, all laparotomies will not be moved for at least seven (7) to ten (10) days. Non-absorbable retention sutures will be used in all laparotomies. Colostomies will be performed on all large bowel injuries.

(3) Chest wounds with a large sucking wound or massive intrathoracic hemorrhage.

(4) Trans-thoracic or abomino-thoracic wounds. These are often difficult to diagnose and are frequently missed: Note that in wounds of the buttock the missile may lodge in the thorax or, similarly, with wounds of the shoulder the missile may lie within the abdominal cavity. If X-rays are available, final lodgement of the missile will make diagnosis easy.

(5) Wounds about the face and neck which cause mechanical interference with respiration: These cases will always have tracheotomies before being transported.

2. WOUNDS:

a. Debridement: All battle wounds will be debrided. This is the most important single feature in proper surgical care. Debridement should include removal of minimal amounts of skin, maximal amounts of devitalized muscle and thorough mechanical cleansing to remove all dirt and debris. The removal of foreign bodies at a distance from the wound should not be attempted. After debridement under field conditions all wounds will be left open, edges being kept open by strips of vaseline gauze lightly placed in the wound. Never pack a wound, a pack acts as a plug. Wounds of the face require special care and conservation in debriding, preserving not only skin but as much muscle, bone and cartilage as possible. Exposed nerves should be covered by fascia and/or muscle and severed ends loosely approximated by one or two non-absorbable sutures to prevent retraction. If nerve defect makes approximation impossible without tension, mark the ends by a single non-absorbable suture. Tendons will be handled the same as nerves.

b. Chemotherapy:

(1) Sulfonamide Therapy:

(a) Soldiers wounded in action are instructed to take 4 gms (8 tablets) of sulfadiazine by mouth from their first aid packet as soon as possible, except when wounded in the abdomen. Following the ingestion of sulfadiazine tablets at least one-half a canteen of water should be taken in 5 - 10 minutes.

(b) The medical officer first dressing the wound should frost it lightly with sulfanilamide powder. Each packet of this drug contains 5 gms. In no case should the contents of more than two (2) packets be used in one individual's wounds, irrespective of their size or number.

(c) Sulfadiazine orally should be continued until definitive surgery is accomplished. The maintenance dosage is 1 gm orally every 4 to 6 hours, or 2 gms parenterally every 8 to 12 hours.

(d) After debridement or following definitive surgery all wounds will be dusted lightly with sulfanilamide.

(e) Sulfonamide therapy will be continued by oral or parenteral routes after surgical treatment.

(f) Medical officers will always be on the alert for possible reactions to the sulfonamide group of drugs. In all such cases the drug will be stopped or continued only with caution and in decreased dosage.

(2) Penicillin Therapy:

(a) General:

1. Penicillin therapy will begin (parenterally) at Clearing Stations and be continued at Field and Evacuation Hospitals. Its use in wounds will begin in Field and Evacuation Hospitals where definitive surgery is carried out.

2. Record on ETT and FLR dosage (in units), method of administration (i.e., parenteral or in wound), and time of administration.

3. Penicillin is unstable and is best preserved at 4° Centigrade. Where refrigerators are not available, keep in coolest spot possible and away from sunlight. Use as soon as possible after removal from hermetically sealed vial, whether in normal saline or sulfanilamide powder. Vials which are out-dated will not be discarded.

(b) Parenteral Therapy:

1. Penetrating and perforating wounds of soft parts; give 20,000 units intramuscularly every four (4) hours from Clearing Station through period of definitive surgery and for 48 hours thereafter.

2. Wounds with compound fractures; give 20,000 units intramuscularly every four (4) hours from Clearing Station through period of definitive surgery and for 72 hours thereafter.

3. Double above doses (pars (1) and (2) where wounds are in region of buttock, perineum and upper thighs.

4. For parenteral use penicillin is dissolved in normal saline. Add 10 cc cold normal saline to 100,000 unit vial of penicillin and inject intramuscularly 2 cc per casualty. Needles and syringes must not be sterilized by use of antiseptic solutions and must be cold because both chemicals and heat inactivate penicillin.

(c) Local Use in Wounds:

1. If a sufficient quantity of the drug is available it may be used to dust into wounds after debridement. It should be used in conjunction with sulfanilamide. The mixing of the two (2) drugs should be carried out in a dry cool vessel in the proportion of 4 gms of sulfanilamide (one teaspoonful) to 20,000 units of penicillin. Penicillin therapy does not contra-indicate or interfere with sulfonamide therapy.

2. It should be remembered that penicillin by the parenteral route has proved superior to local application, and the former route is always to be preferred. Where the supply of the drug is limited its local use is to be eliminated.

c. Secondary Closure of Wounds: Although the first principle for the military surgeon to bear in mind is not to close the wound he has freshly debrided, it is essential that he close this wound at the earliest possible moment that is safe. Early closure means limitation of infection, fibrosis, and an earlier restoration to duty. If the primary debridement has been thorough wounds may be closed as early as the third day, though preferably not until the fifth day. Observation of the signs of inflammation, such as discharge, reddening, pain and swelling, will determine whether or not a wound can be closed. It is wiser not to dress the orginally debrided wound until the day when secondary closure might be practical, since each dressing invites contamination of the wound. If closure is considered safe it should be done loosely without undermining the edges or using sharp instruments, and by using retention sutures of silk, or silk-worm gut, spaced widely apart and loosely tied. Should mild infection appear, hot, moist dressings may save breaking down of the wound and hasten the healing process. Any signs of severe infection dictate immediate removal of the sutures.

3. TREATMENT OF ANAEROBIC INFECTIONS:

a. Gas Gangrene:

(1) Types of Wound: Wounds destroying muscle, either directly or by interruption of the blood supply, are particularly susceptible to anaerobic infections. Such infections are more frequent at the following sites of wounds: (1) Buttock; (2) upper thigh (compound fractures of femur); (3) anterior tibial group; (4) shoulder girdle; (5) short flexors and extensors of forearm.

(2) Diagnosis:

(a) Clinical: The differential diagnosis among the various types of clostridial gas gangrene and streptococcal myositis must be made to avoid unnecessary radical surgical treatment.

1. Clostridial myositis, diffuse: This may develop as early as six (6) hours from the time of wounding, but usually within three (3) days. The onset is acute with a severe systemic reaction. Locally there is pain, marked swelling, frequently profuse serous exudate, slight gas formation, variable odor of decay and pale or blue-grey appearance of involved muscle. The skin is tense and often white, but may be mottled with a livid appearance if the process is widespread.

2. Clostridial myositis, localized: In 5-10% of the cases, localization of the process to a single muscle or group of muscles occurs. Symptoms and signs are the same as for the diffuse type.

3. Clostridial cellulitis: This process is limited to the immediate area of the wound. The onset is gradual, usually after three (3) days, with slight systemic reaction. Locally, there is abundant gas formation with foul odor, slight swelling, and little local change of the muscle and overlying skin.

4. Streptococcal myositis: The onset is delayed for 3-4 days, and severe systemic reactions do not appear until the late steges of the infection. Locally, there is marked swelling with profuse purulent discharge, slight gas formation, and slight odor. The involved muscle is slightly edematous and the overlying skin is tense, often with a coppery tinge. Streptococcal myositis comprises only a few of the cases of gas gangrene.

(b) Labratory: Recognition of infections with anaerobic bacteria is made on clinical findings, which should be checked, where possible, with a smear made from the material in the depth of the wound. A small piece of involved muscle, rubbed on a glass slide and stained by the Gram method, is examined under the microscope. The finding of anaerobic bacteria in a wound is not uncommon, and such finding should not influence the surgical treatment, unless there are local clinical signs of anaerobic infection.

(3) Prophylaxis: Early, adequate debridement of wounds is the best prophylaxis for anaerobic infections. Gas gangrene antitoxin, sulfonamides, and penicillin are not to be considered substitutes for early, adequate debridement.

(4) Therapy:

(a) Surgical: This depends upon the extent of the disease and the type of anaerobic infection.

1. Clostridial myositis diffuse: Amputation as far as possible above the visible evidence of involvement must be carried out immediately, using the guillotine method and leaving the wound open.

2. Clostridial myositis, localized: Extirpation of involved muscle, or group of muscles, should be practiced through long incisions.

3. Clostridial cellulitis: Incise the localized process and remove the devitalized tissue. Radical surgery is not indicated.

4. Streptococcal myositis: Extensively incise and drain the involved muscles. Radical extirpation or immediate amputation are not indicated.

(b) Serum Therapy:

1. Clostridial Infections: Three (3) ampules of gas gangrene antitoxin should be given intravenously and repeated hourly for six (6) doses (see Manual of Therapy, ETO, page 35, par 27). This may be modified according to the condition of the individual case. Test patient for allergy to horse serum before administration of antitoxin. Adrenalin in a syringe should be at hand.

2. Streptococcal Infections: No serotherapy is indicated.

(c) Chemotherapy:

1. Penicillin: Give initial dose of 20,000 units, intravenously and 20,000 units intramuscularly followed by 20,000 units intramuscularly every 2 hours for a period of 3 days. Period of therapy may be modified as seems necessary. Place in the wound 50,000 units

mixed in 4 gms (one (1) teaspoonful) of sulfanilamide, and repeat at dressings.

2. Sulfonamides: Give 5 gms of sulfadiazine by mouth initially, and 1 gm every 4 hours.

(d) Supportive treatment: Since there is rapid destruction of erythrocytes, frequent whole-blood transfusions will be necessary.

(e) Sterilization of instruments: All instruments used in anaerobic infections should be sterilized by autoclaving, when available, and the instruments must not be covered with oil, since bacteria surrounded by oil cannot be wetted and, therefore, are not killed at the usual temperatures.

b. Tetanus:

(1) Types of Wound: Any wound, regardless of size or location, is a potential source of tetanus, particularly small puncture wounds.

(2) Prophylaxis:

(a) Every wounded man will receive 1 cc. of tetanus toxoid, subcutaneously, as soon as possible. This will be recorded on the Emergency Medical Tag, or on the Field Medical Record. If there is no record of the administration of toxoid, or any doubt as to its previous administration, 1 cc. of tetanus toxoid will be given and so recorded.

(b) Early, adequate debridement.

(c) 1 cc. of tetanus toxoid will be given prior to the manipulation or exploration of an old wound.

(d) After appropriate tests for sensitivity, members of Allied Forces (except Canadian), civilians and others will receive 3000 units of tetanus antitoxin intramuscularly. The Canadian forces will receive 1 cc. of tetanus toxoid. A syringe containing 1 cc. of 1:1000 of epinephrine (adrenalin) should always be at hand when tetanus antitoxin is given.

(3) Signs and Symptoms: The rarity of this disease must not prevent its recognition. The earlier tetanus is recognized, the more effective treatment will be. The earliest sign is trismus. The patient may complain of pain and stiffness in the neck, back and abdomen. Dysphagia may be present. Localized tetanic contractions are not uncommon.

(4) Treatment:

(a) General: At the appearance of the earliest signs of tetanus, immediate therapy is indicated. All cases must be treated vigorously. The patient should be isolated in a quiet, darkened place.

(b) Control of Spasms: Trismus may be controlled by administration of barbiturates, e.g., nembutal, which are essentially antispasmodic in action. The dose may be repeated as required, care being taken to guard against cumulative action and the production of anesthesia. Supportive treatment, administration of saline, glucose and/or plasma, is essential: The prime requisite is to maintain oxygenation, all efforts will be defeated if obstruction of the upper respiratory tract is permitted. Tracheotomy will be performed if laryngeal spasm is causing suffocation.

(c) Antitoxin:

1. Locally: After appropriate tests for sensitization, 10,000 units of tetanus antitoxin should be used for infiltration about the wound.

2. Intramuscularly: Therapeutic administration of tetanus antitoxin should be early and adequate. After appropriate tests of sensitization, an initial dose of 40,000 units of antitoxin should be given intramuscularly.

3. Intravenously: 20,000 units may be administered intravenously six (6) hours after the intramuscular injection. This dosage may be repeated on the second and third days if conditions require. Extremely large doses of antitoxin are no longer considered helpful.

4. Intraspinal: Antitoxin should not be given intrathecally.

(d) Surgical: Local debridement: This is based on the fact that the bacterial anaerobes are the sole source of the toxin. The wound must be widely opened and kept open.

4. TREATMENT OF WOUNDS INFECTED WITH DIPHTHERIA BACILLI:

a. General:

(1) At the present time diphtheria is prevalent in parts of Europe. It must be remembered that wounds may become infected with the diphtheria bacilli and cause all of the symptoms common to pharyngeal or laryngeal diphtheria, and may lead to myocardial failure. All medical officers should be alert to this possibility.

b. Diagnosis:

(1) The diagnosis should be suspected from the dirty greyish appearance of the wound, the fact that the wound is delayed in healing, and the presence of any of the bizarre neurologic manifestations common in diphtheria. Smear and cultures from all suspected wounds will confirm or disprove the diagnosis.

c. Treatment:

(1) Diphtheria antitoxin in adequate quantities will be available in all field and evacuation hospitals, and should be given as soon as the diagnosis is made.

5. BURNS:

a. General:

(1) The treatment of burns is divided into three catagories: (1) Treatment of shock; (2) Prevention of early infection; and (3) Skin grafting and cosmetic repair. Army hospitals will be concerned with the first two of these divisions but not the third.

b. Treatment:

(1) First aid treatment for burned front line battle casualties should be carried out at the most forward medical installations, including battalion aid stations, collecting and clearing companies. It consists of covering and protecting the burned area as quickly as possible with clean dressings, triangular bandage or sheets. Do not use litter blankets as they are one of the most potent sources of hemolytic streptoccal infection. Sulfanilamide cream, vaseline, gauze or boric ointment gauze, may be applied if available. Shock therapy with administration of plasma must be begun at the earliest possible moment.

(2) Definitive therapy should not be attempted forward of a field or evacuation hospital. The control or prevention of infection is next in importance to treatment of shock. Get the burned area as clean as possible using good surgical principles. Early chemotherapy in burns is still an adjunct to surgery. 5% sulfadiazine cream and large bulky pressure dressings have been found to be very satisfactory. (Tannic acid solution or other escharotics will not be used.)

(3) Well applied dressings should not have to be changed for several days or even a week or two. Frequent changes of dressings should be avoided. The judicious use of plaster casts and splints on the burned extremities will prevent serious contractures. Evacuation to a hospital in the zone of communications especially equipped and staffed to care for burned cases should be carried out as soon as the patient's condition permits.

6. FRACTURES:

a. General:

(1) No internal fixation or plating will be practiced in field, evacuation hospitals, or other Third Army Medical units.

(2) All compound fractures will be debrided and left open.

(3) No fractures will be transported without proper immobilization with splints or plaster casts.

b. Use of Plaster of Paris Casts:

(1) When Plaster of Paris casts are applied, circular bandages or circular dressings will not be used beneath the cast.

(2) All casts applied to the extremities will be padded.

(3) In the application of a cast for immobilization of the leg, the foot should be put in a neutral position at a right-angle to the leg.

(4) All circular casts of the extremities, after manipulation or operative procedure, must be split through all layers down to the skin; in the lower extremity, from the tips of the toes to well above the knee, and in the upper extremity, from the tips of the fingers to above the elbow.

(5) After application of a cast to the forearm and hand, the cast should be cut back in the palm of the hand to the proximal sulcus so as to permit free and complete motion of the fingers, except in fractures of the metacarpals or phalanges where the cast may extend to the tips of the fingers.

7. USE OF PLASMA AND WHOLE BLOOD:

a. Plasma will be available to all medical units as far forward as the battalion aid stations and should be used as indicated for the treatment and prevention of shock. Whole blood will be supplied to field hospitals and evacuation hospitals through the Army Medical Supply Depot. This blood will be delivered to the Army hospital units in refrigerator trucks. The blood must be stored at a temperature of 35-40° Fahrenheit. Transfusions of this blood will be given cold as warming will cause hemolysis.

b. Discard all blood that has become warm while in storage or has passed the expiration date marked on the bottle.

c. The supply of whole blood from the blood bank will be supplemented in hospital units by the use of the whole blood transfusion sets furnished for this purpose.

d. Plasma and whole blood will be used in the proportion of two pints of plasma to one of blood.

8. MORPHINE:

a. This note appears because, though morphine is one of humanity's greatest aids in warfare, it is also often misused and frequently given in unnecessarily large and dangerous quantities.

(1) Dosage: Morphine sulfate gr 1/4 (15 mgm) is usually adequate; 1/2 gr (30 mgm) may be required and is safe unless repeated. Always record amount and time of injection.

(2) Administration: Subcutaneous or intramuscular injection is employed when a gradual prolonged effect is desired. Massage at the site of injection will hasten absorption. Intravenous injection gr 1/6 (10 mgm) is employed when a rapid effect is desired.

(3) Contra-indications: The doses of morphine given as preoperative medication for seriously wounded patients should be small (grs 1/6 (10 mgm) or less). Morphine should be administered with caution to the walking wounded: to patients to be evacuated by air, or in the presence of jaundice, cranio-cerebral injury, pneumothorax, hemothorax or pleural effusions. Morphine should never be used as a sedative for manic or hysterical states.

(4) Poisoning: Overdosage with morphine is characterized by pinpoint pupils and slow respirations. The outstanding serious effect is anoxia, caused by respiratory depression.

(5) Delayed Morphine Poisoning in Battle Casualties: Subcutaneous injections of morphine are poorly absorbed in patients who are cold, or who have low blood pressure and are in shock. Under such circumstances, pain is not relieved, and repeated doses are sometimes given over a period of many hours. When the peripheral circulation is finally re-established, the unabsorbed deposits of morphine are absorbed so rapidly that morphine poisoning occurs. The use of intravenous morphine in patients who are cold, or who are shocked and have low blood pressure, would eliminate this problem. Always record amount and time given. Check for previous administration.

(6) Treatment of Morphine Poisoning: Provide a clear airway. Administer oxygen, under intermittent pressure if necessary. A maximal dose of ephedrine, gr 1/2 (30 mgm) administered intravenously, using rise in blood pressure as a guide to dosage, may be employed. Caffeine sodium benzoate, grs 7½ (0.5 gm) intravenously may be useful. Empty stomach prior to development of coma. Stimulate diuresis by means of intravenous glucose. Change position of patient frequently.

INTERNAL MEDICINE

1. GENERAL:

a. The object of a well organized and properly functioning Medical Service, is the conservation of manpower and the maintenance of maximum combat strength at all times. It is, therefore, desirable that treatment of illness and disease be standardized to a degree that will assure this. Through this means, hospitalization will be reduced and personnel returned to duty with the least practicable delay.

2. TREATMENT:—

a. The treatment of certain medical conditions, as set forth below, is suggested to be followed in all TUSA medical installations:

(1) Pneumonia, Pneumococcal: Sulfadiazine is the drug of choice; an initial dose of four (4) grams by mouth; followed with doses of one (1) gram every four (4) hours day and night, until temperature has been normal for forty-eight (48) to seventy-two (72) hours. A maintenance dose of one (1) gram, three (3) times daily should be given for seven (7) days following this period. Anti-pneumococcal serum should be used in conjunction with sulfadiazine in the following instances:

(a) Pneumonia which has not responded to treatment within forty-eight (48) hours.

(b) Persistent positive blood culture.

(c) Overwhelming infection.

When sufficient supplies of penicillin are available, it shall be utilized as the preferential method of treatment. The initial dose will be thirty thousand (30,000) units, intramuscularly, followed by twenty-five thousand (25,000) units, intramuscularly, every two (2) hours, until temperature returns to normal; then a maintenance dose of fifty thousand (50,000) to seventy-five thousand (75,000) units per day for three (3) to five (5) days.

(2) Pneumonia, Atypical, Primary. The treatment of primary atypical pneumonia resolves itself to complete bed rest, adequate diet, and administration of adequate fluids. Symptomatic treatment with anti-pyretics and mild hypnotics is indicated. Cough can be controlled, usually, with simple cough mixtures containing small amounts of codeine, sulfonamides are contraindicated unless complications occur. (Circular Letter No. 2, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 7 January 1943).

(3) Influenza: The treatment of influenza may be summarized as complete, prolonged, bed rest, administration of fluids (3,000-5,000 cc per day), and liberal use of anti-pyretics. Diet must be carefully watched to insure maintenance of good nutrition. For restlessness and sleeplessness, Dover's Powder, 0.6 grams every four (4) hours, is recommended. In the presence of bacterial complications, the use of sulfonamides and of penicillin is definitely to be considered. (Circular Letter No. 40, Office of the Chief Surgeon, 16 April 1944).

(4) Tuberculosis: When a case is conclusively diagnosed as pulmonary tuberculosis, the patient should be evacuated to the next higher echelon for further evacuation to the CZ and the ZI. At no time, is the prolonged definitive treatment of pulmonary tuberculosis indicated within the Army Zone.

(5) Meningitis:

(a) In an acute meningococcal infection, suspected or proven, five (5) grams of sodium sulfadiazine will be given intravenously at once. If the patient is over one (1) hours time from a hospital installation, medication will be instituted in the field. A follow-up dose of five (5) grams of sodium sulfadiazine, intravenously, will be administered two (2) to three (3) times within the first twenty-four (24) hours. This should be followed by one and one half (1½) to two (2) grams of sulfadiazine, by mouth, every four (4) hours, day and night. Sodium bicarbonate, 2.5 grams, every four (4) hours, and fluids in the amount of fifteen hundred (1500) to two thousand (2,000) cc per day, are indicated as protection against renal complications. Treatment should be maintained for at least five (5) days; and preferably seven (7) to ten (10) days after temperature has returned to normal. (Letter 710 x 730, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 27 November 1943, and Circular Letter No. 185, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 26 December 1943).

(b) In any command in which meningitis is suspected or diagnosed, prophylaxis of all individuals should be as follows: two (2) grams of sulfadiazine, administered by mouth in one (1) day, in single or divided doses.

(6) Poliomyelitis: In the event that the diagnosis of acute anterior poliomyelitis is made or suspected in any individual, the patient will be evacuated from the Army Zone through normal channels as quickly as possible.

(7) Diphtheria: Immediate and strict isolation of all suspected and diagnosed cases of diphtheria will be followed at all times. When diagnosis has been made, adequate antitoxin will be administered. An initial dosage of ten to twenty thousand (10,000-20,000) units, followed by additional doses of ten to twenty thousand (10,000-20,000) units, as the condition of the patient dictates. Care must be exercised to avoid anaphylactic reactions through skin testing prior to administration of antitoxin. Bed rest must be absolute. Throat irrigations of warm salt solution are indicated for local relief. Adequate diet must be administered in the forms of liquid and semi-solid foods; increased protein feedings are desirable. If laryngeal obstruction is apparent, tracheotomy is indicated as an acute surgical emergency and a life saving procedure.

(8) Scarlet Fever: Immediate, strict isolation is indicated upon the diagnosis of this condition. An initial dose of sulfadiazine of four (4) grams, by mouth, followed by one (1) gram, every four (4) hours, day and night, until throat cultures become negative, is indicated. Sodium bicarbonate, 2.5 grams, every four (4) hours, by mouth, in conjunction with two to three thousand (2,000-3,000) cc of fluids per day, and daily urinalyses, will be employed as a check upon renal complications. Symptomatic treatment includes the use of anti-pyretics and sedatives. Cough is best controlled through use of codeine. Care must be exercised to direct the common ear and kidney complications.

(9) Typhus Fever: The treatment of typhus fever is largely dependent upon expert nursing care. No other condition so strongly demands consistent and accurate attention. Immediately upon admission to hospital, complete delousing of the patient and clothing, must be accomplished. Absolute bed rest is essential. A high caloric, soft to semi-solid diet, and adequate fluid should be administered. Liberal use of anti-pyretics is indicated. Symptomatic treatment of cough and skin lesions should be kept in mind.

(10) Trench Fever: Trench fever is a self limited condition, the outstanding symptoms, of which, are pain and high fever. Delousing of the patient is a primary consideration. Fever can be controlled by liberal use of anti-pyretic drugs, and the pain by ample doses of codeine. Adequate diet and complete rest are essential.

(11) Infectious Jaundice: The treatment of infectious jaundice consists of bed rest, special diet for protection of the liver, and local palliative measures for the patient's comfort. The diet should be high in proteins and carbohydrates, and low in fats; a recommended diet is composed of 70% carbohydrates, 24% proteins, and 6% fats. There is some virtue in the administration of vitamin B complex. Addition of liberal amounts of egg and milk (powdered or fresh) are an excellent method to increase the protein content. The patient should be completely at bed rest until such time as he feels able to gradually be up and about and return to duty. The patient is the best judge of his ability to be up and about, and his reaction should govern this factor.

(12) Bacillery Dysentery: The organisms of this group respond well to the sulfonamides; the drug of choice being sulfaguanidine. An initial dose of three and one half (3½) grams, may be administered, followed by three and one half (3½) grams, every four (4) hours, day and night, until stools become less than five (5) per day. At this point, reduce the dose to three and one half (3½) grams every eight (8) hours, until stools are normal for four (4) days. Anti-dysenteric sera are available and useful. Sulfaguanidine should be supported by adequate uses of fluids and blood plasma, when necessary. In very toxic cases, eighty (80) cc of anti-dysenteric serum, twice a day, to supplement sulfaguanidine, is indicated.

(13) Amoebic Dysentery: Upon the establishing of a diagnosis of amoebic dysentery, treatment should resolve itself to the use of emetine hydrochloride, 0.1 grams, daily, for twelve (12) days, administered intramuscularly. If emetine is not available, carbosone, 0.25 grams, twice a day, for ten (10) days, may be substituted.

(14) Typhoid Fever: A patient suffering from typhoid fever, will be maintained under strict isolation at all times. Absolute bed rest is essential. Bland, high protein, high caloric; low residue diet, of three to four thousand (3,000-4,000) calories per day, is indicated: Adequate fluids (2,500-3,000) cc should be administered. Should gastro-intestinal hemorrhage occur, replacement of blood volume by the use of plasma and whole blood will be followed. Perforation of typhoid ulcer is an acute surgical emergency and will be managed as such. Early evacuation of all cases of typhoid fever through normal channels from the Army Zone, will be followed.

(15) Malaria: The treatment of malaria will conform strictly to the provisions of Circular Letter No. 73, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 20 May 1944. For suppressive treatment, the drug of choice is atabrine, 0.1 grams, once daily, at the evening meal, six (6) days per week. For the treatment of clinical attacks of malaria, the drugs of choice are atabrine and quinine, in combination. Plasmochin is recommended in selected cases. Care must be exercised in the administration of plasmochin, because of toxic reactions. In addition to specific drug therapy, administration of three (3) to four (4) liters of fluid per day, is indicated. High fevers are relieved by cold sponges and the use of cold packs. Avoid anti-pyretics. High vitamin diet must be maintained.

(16) Scabies: Benzyl benzoate has proven to be a satisfactory scabieticide, and possesses advantages over sulfur, in that it is less irritating, practically odorless, and easily incorporated in solutions or washable emulsion bases. Benzyl benzoate ointment, 20% strength, is a standard item of issue. If facilities are available, the patient should take a hot bath for fifteen (15) minutes, scrubbing the affected sites. Apply benzyl benzoate to all parts of the body from the neck down. Repeat this application on two (2) successive days, and if itching is not relieved, a third application may be utilized. Therapy should then be discontinued entirely for one (1) week. If benzyl benzoate is not available, routine sulfur therapy will be followed. (Circular Letter No. 77, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 8 May 1943).

(17) Chemical Warfare Casualties: The treatment of chemical warfare casualties will follow implicitly the methods of treatment set forth in Medical Bulletin No. 17, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 15 March 1944.

(18) Venereal Diseases:

(a) Gonorrhea: In all cases of acute gonorrhea, penicillin is the drug of choice, but in the absence of adequate amounts of penicillin, Sulfonamides will be employed. With the use of penicillin, treatment will be the intramuscular administration of a total of one hundred thousand (100,000) units in a period of twelve (12) hours. An initial dose of twenty thousand (20,000) units of penicillin, followed by twenty thousand (20,000) units every three (3) hours, until the total dose has been administered. Should the foregoing be inadequate to check urethral discharge within three (3) days, another course of therapy is indicated. Treatment of troops in physical contact with the enemy will be carried out at hospitals in the Army Zone, and for troops not in contact with the enemy, treatment of uncomplicated cases will be administered in unit aid stations.

(b) Syphilis: An individual suffering from a penile lesion will be evacuated through proper channels to an Army Hospital for diagnosis and treatment. Following administration of two (2) doses of mapharson, the patient will be returned to his organization and treatment carried out by the unit Surgeon until complete course of treatment has been accomplished.

(c) Lymphogranuloma: Any patient suffering from Lymphogranuloma will be evacuated to a hospital in the Army Zone for treatment.

3. Attention of all concerned is directed to the provisions of the following: Circular Letter No. 34, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 6 March 1944, Subject: Management of Simple Skin Diseases; Circular Letter No. 47, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 10 April 1944, Subject: Delousing of Casualties During Continental Operations; Circular Letter No. 51, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 2 April 1944, Subject: Therapeutic Use of Outdated Penicillin, and Circular Letter No. 53, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 8 April 1944, Subject: Improvement of Nutrition of Combat Troops.

TREATMENT OF NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CONDITIONS IN THE COMBAT ZONE

1. GENERAL:

a. It is incumbent upon each line officer and medical officer to differentiate between cases of true "physical" exhaustion and those with mental manifestations. The former group, with proper handling, can usually be returned to full combat duty in a few hours without ever having been evacuated further than the Battalion Aid Station.

2. DIAGNOSIS:

a. In cases where the officer in question feels that there are no mental manifestations and symptoms are entirely due to physical exhaustion, it shall be so stated on the Emergency Medical Tag. All suspected neuropsychiatric casualties will be given a preliminary diagnosis of "Fatigue". No other neuropsychiatric diagnosis will be used in forward areas except in the case of the obviously psychotic. No patient will be informed directly or by information on the Emergency Medical Tag that a neuropsychiatric diagnosis of any type has been made. The case will be rediagnosed with the proper psychiatric term on the Field Medical Record (MD Form 52a).

3. TREATMENT:

a. Type and Place: In the interests of conservation of manpower, the avoidance of indiscriminate evacuation and the proper selection for treatment on the spot are imperative. Such selection is determined by the severity of the reaction.

(1) In the Line: Mild cases of anxiety and fatigue are markedly reduced by superior leadership and the example of coolness and courage on the part of officers and non-commissioned officers. It is essential that every officer and noncommissioned officer, both line and

medical, who observes such a condition meets it with understanding and dynamic, positive encouragement and reassurance. Without any other treatment many of these men can be returned to full combat duty. No such case will be evacuated unless he has unmistakable symptoms which are neither mild nor transient and which are of such a serious nature as to render him incapable of performing his duties as a soldier. The decision is essentially one of command unless the medical aspects are clear and pronounced. Indiscriminate evacuation of these cases results in unneccessary loss of manpower and will not be tolerated.

(2) At the Aid Station: Battalion or regimental medical officers can return many mild cases of psychoneurosis to duty in a few hours by discussion, explanation of symptoms on the physiological basis of fatigue, sedation and short rest periods in the unit area. In such cases, the patient may be given amytal 0.2 grams or phenobarbital 0.1 grams, to be taken after he has arrived at the unit rest area, to insure sleep. On his return from the rest area it is explained that he merely became more tired than usual. He is returned to full combat duty. Cases of such severity that it is inadvisable to permit them to go to a rest area alone may immediately be given sodium amytal 0.360 grams to 0.60 grams orally, or an equivalent dose of similar rapidly acting sedative may be administered. Phenobarbital 0.325 grams may be used but its slowness of action is a disadvantage in an acutely excited patient. They are then sent to the Clearing Station. Morphine will not be administered. Intravenous sedation will not be administered in forward areas because it converts a sitting or ambulatory case into a litter case. If there is delay at the Collecting Station, doses of sodium amytal up to 1.0 grams, or phenobarbital up to 0.5 grams may be given with safety in twenty-four (24) hours.

(3) In the Clearing Station: Phenobarbital, 0.325 to 0.650 grams may be administered daily and sodium amytal, 0.10 to 0.20 grams, may be administered, in addition, at night to insure sleep. The division psychiatrist will function principally at this point to help in the selection of patients to be returned to duty. Here, favorable cases receive the explanation that there is positively no organic basis for their symptoms; that they are merely due to fatigue and lack of sleep. Such cases should be returned to duty. Cases, which because of their severity or the time element involved cannot be retained in the Clearing Station until such time as they can be returned to effective duty, are evacuated to Evacuation Hospitals.

(4) Treatment at the Evacuation Hospital: Immediately upon arrival a rapid examination will be made to classify the patient for one (1) of the following:

(a) Further evacuation, or,

(b) Retention for treatment.

1. In the first category will be included all psychiatric repeaters; all severe mental deficiency; all cases of severe psychoneurosis, hysteria, with stupors, amnesias, tics, etc.; severe and moderate reactive depressions; psychoneurosis, obsessive-compulsive type, and marked cases of psychopatic personality.

2. In the second category will be included all cases of mild psychoneurosis, hysteria, anxiety states and exhaustion.

3. To be retained also for observation and treatment a third "doubtful" classification will include moderately severe cases of hysteria, mild psychopaths, and mild reactive depressions. This doubtful group will be retained not longer than three (3) days in the Evacuation Hospital, during which time decision will be made to return them to duty or to evacuate further.

4. Those retained should have a more complete history and physical examination, and be sent to separate neuropsychiatric wards, the favorable cases being separated from the unfavorable. The atmosphere in these wards should be that of adherence to military discipline, not a hospital atmosphere. Rules for nurses and attendants should include:

a. Hot drink for each patient on admission.

b. Three (3) full meals a day for each patient unless otherwise ordered.

c. Do not discuss symptoms with the patient.

d. Be firm and optimistic in all dealings with these patients.

e. No one permitted in these wards unless assigned to duty.

f. The rapid cure of these patients depends on food, sleep, exercise and the attitude of hope, treatment and "cure" on the part of those who come in contact with them.

5. All neuropsychiatric patients should read, or have read to them ward routine, including:

a. Each patient shall be up for each meal.

b. Each patient is responsible for policing his bed area.

c. Each patient will help (to a limited extent) with ward routine.

6. Therapy: Each patient is given an explanation for his symptoms and positive reassurance. He is sent to bed for two (2) to three (3) days and phenobarbital, grams 4-8, may be administered daily with additional sodium amytal at night if the patient is restless. Thus, each patient will sleep more than twenty (20) hours a day, yet still be able to get up to stand in line for meals. Sodation should be discontinued twenty-four (24) hours prior to contemplated discharge, and patient placed in a tent containing only those who have reached this stage of treatment. Until this point he will have had no individual psychiatric interviews. During the last twenty-four (24) hours he is interviewed and a decision is made as to disposition. Again, the cause of his symptoms is explained, positively and simply, so that the patient does not feel that he has "lost face", and in terms that the individual soldier can and will understand. The patient's return to duty is based on response to therapy, reaction to rest and attitude and conduct in the ward. If he is free of all but minor symptoms, or, if his symptoms are new, and developed as a reaction against going back to duty he is reassured about these and returned to full combat duty.

7. If the patient is still somewhat worried he may be given two (2) tablets of phenobarbital, 0.060 grams, on discharge, one (1) to be taken fifteen (15) minutes before reporting to his organization, and one (1) when and if his symptoms begin to return

8. Shock therapies such as insulin, metrazol, and electric shock will be administered only by psychiatrists trained in these respective techniques and in hospitals designated for such purpose, by this headquarters.

4. SEGREGATION.

a. In forward areas psychiatric cases will not be given an opportunity to crystallize their symptoms by discussion with other similar type patients. They will not be grouped together in forward areas, but will be handled on an individual basis.

5. DISPOSITION OF NEUROPSYCHIATRIC CASUALTIES:

a. Every individual who is believed to be of potential value in a combat zone will be returned to duty regardless of the psychiatric diagnosis which has been made.

b. Every individual who is believed to be non-effective for full combat duty but potentially capable of some service will be returned to duty with a recommendation to this effect.

c. Neuropsychiatric patients discharged from Evacuation Hospitals to "Duty" will be sent directly to their units without loss of time at Replacement Pools.

EVACUATION POLICY FOR CHEMICAL CASUALTIES

1. GENERAL:

a. A plan for the evacuation and treatment of chemical warfare casualties must be highly flexible and amenable to rapid alteration. The following policy will serve as a guide in the formation of various plans for evacuation of chemical warfare casualties, depending upon the development of enemy chemical warfare tactics. Attention of all concerned is directed to Medical Bulletin No. 17, Office of the Chief Surgeon, ETO, 15 March 1944.

2. PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY:

a. First aid and personal decontamination should be rendered, in all instances, at the earliest possible moment. Personnel must appreciate the tremendous value of speed in first aid procedures, realizing that prevention of a lesion is far more economical than all subsequent therapy. Responsibility of personal decontamination is that of individual and must be practiced immediately upon exposure to chemical agents. In many instances first aid and personal decontamination will suffice to allow individuals to return to combat.

3. DEFINITIVE TREATMENT:

a. Decontamination of casualties should be accomplished as far forward as possible. After completion of decontamination and adequate first aid procedures, evacuation for those individuals requiring further treatment will be through normal channels. Definitive treatment should be instituted as quickly as possible, when indicated, following first aid and decontamination procedures. Initially, separate services for first aid and decontamination, as well as later treatment of gas casualties, will have to be maintained, except in assault landings. Battalion aid stations will designate and utilize certain personnel for carrying out these procedures. The same procedures will be utilized in collecting stations. As the tactical situation dictates, these installations will be supplemented by personnel from Medical Gas Treatment Battalions. It is anticipated that personnel from Medical Gas Treatment Battalions will be operating in the area of clearing stations to care for all chemical warfare casualties. In any event, chemical casualties will be separated from non-chemical casualties until complete and thorough decontamination has been accomplished. Definitive treatment will be initiated in forward areas (aid stations) only as an emergency procedure, but will be initiated as soon as casualties are received by sections or platoons of Medical Gas Treatment Battalions. All medical personnel and installations should be prepared and able to care for small numbers of chemical casualties; especially, if scattered through a command in an irregular manner. In a concerted chemical attack, provisions must be made to support 1st and 2d echelon medical service with specially trained medical units (Medical Gas Treatment Battalions). Elements of such specially trained units will always be in readiness and prepared for sudden movement as the tactical situation demands. It is considered impracticable and unnecessary that certain hospitals be designated as chemical casualty treatment centers, but it is desirable that chemical cases be segregated in an installation hospitalizing patients.

4. EVACUATION:

a. Early evacuation of chemical casualties is a necessity to prevent clogging of the evacuation system, by the sudden influx of great numbers of cases. In the case of lung irritants, during the latent period, before appearance of symptoms, casualties will be evacuated only when released by the line commander; the medical officer only advises and recommends relative to prognosis. After the onset of symptoms, lung irritant casualties will be evacuated as litter cases and treated as severe battle casualties.

b. The following are especially referable to 1st and 2d echelons of the medical service:

(1) The forward medical installations are the most important in the care of chemical warfare casualties. The rates of evacuation and hospitalization are inversely proportional to the speed and effectiveness of personal decontamination and first aid.

(2) Lung irritant casualties are always evacuated as litter cases and treated as severe casualties.

(3) In the event of vesicant contamination to the skin, self decontamination and application of protective ointment will often permit an individual to return to combat until his release is less disadvantageous. Skin contamination alone is insufficient reason for evacuation while action is in progress.

(4) All significant casualties due to Lewisite, mustard and nitrogen mustards should be evacuated as soon as the tactical situation permits.

(5) Skin vesicant and eye casualties are walking wounded cases unless severe local lesions exist.

(6) Irritant smoke and lacrimater casualties are not to be evacuated.

(7) Casualties with both vesicant chemical and surgical wounds may be evacuated through normal channels, the urgency being regulated by the surgical condition. First aid and decontamination should be coincidental.

(8) When vesicant casualties are transported in an ambulance, decontamination of the ambulance will be accomplished before transporting other casualties in the vehicle.

PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF MEDICAL DEPARTMENT REPORTS AND RECORDS.

1. GENERAL:

a. The Medical Department is charged with the responsibility of preparing and preserving adequate records on all sick, injured and wounded. Unit commanders will see that such reports and records are reported accurately and rendered at the specified time. Unnecessary delay and/or carelessness in preparation of reports will not be condoned.

b. Medical Reports and Records listed below will be prepared and rendered in accordance with instructions contained in Circular Letter No. 20, OCS-ETO, dated 2 February 1944, as amended by Circular Letter No. 63, OCS-ETO, dated 21 April 1944, except as amended and clarified below.

2. SICK AND WOUNDED REPORT:

a. Report Sheet MD Form 51:

(1) Rendered by all Medical Department units (including detachments) and installations except ambulance companes, medical depot companies, sanitary companies, group and battalion headquarters detachments. These units will be included in the report of the unit to which they are attached for medical care.

b. Emergency Medical Tag, MD Form 52b:

(1) Additional Instructions: At each medical installation in the chain of evacuation the EMTs received with the patient will be examined for omissions and erroneous entries. Corrections will be made as indicated. The incomplete EMTs attached to patients at aid stations will be completed at clearing stations prior to transfer of patients to hospitals. Special attention is directed to paragraphs 18a and b, Circular Letter No. 20, dated 2 February 1944.

c. Field Medical Record:

(1) Consists of the following:

(a) Field Medical Card, MD Form 52c.

(b) Field Medical Jacket, MD Form 52d.

3. STATISTICAL REPORT, MD FORM 86ab:

a. This report pertains to unit personnel only (including assigned personnel, attached unassigned, and personnel of units attached for medical care).

b. Divisional Units: The surgeons of divisional units will prepare sufficient copies for file and submission to the Division Surgeon in such manner as he may direct.

c. Divisions: Division Surgeon will prepare consolidated reports covering all divisional units and for attached or assigned units not rendering separate reports. The original copy will be submitted to the Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon), one carbon direct to Commanding General, Advance Section, C. Z., APO___, (Attention: Surgeon), and one copy for file.

d. Corps Units:

(1) Original copy to the Commanding General, _____ Corps, APO___, (Attention: Surgeon), one carbon copy direct to Commanding General, Advance Section C.Z., APO___, (Attention: Surgeon), and one copy for file.

After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters Communications Zone is established on the continent, all reports previously rendered to the Commanding General, advance Section, C.Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon), will be submitted direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon).

(2) Corps Surgeon will prepare consolidated reports covering all corps units (not including divisions) and for attached or assigned units not rendering separate reports. The original copy will be submitted direct to the Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon), one copy direct to the Commanding General, Advance Section C.Z., APO___, (Attention: Surgeon), and one copy for file.

After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters Communications Zone is established on the continent, all reports previously rendered to the Commanding General, Advance Section, C.Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon), will be submitted direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon).

e. Army Units: Surgeons of Army Units will submit the original copy to the Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon), one carbon copy direct to Commanding General, Advance Section C.Z., APO____, (Attention: Surgeon), and one copy for file.

f. The Surgeon, Third United States Army, APO 403, will submit a Consolidated Third United States Army Report to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 871, (Attention: Chief Surgeon), through Commanding General, Advance Section C.Z., APO____.

g. Patients in clearing stations will be reported on the Combat Medical Statistical Report, ETOUSA MD Form 323, parts Ia and Ib (see paragraph 13). Patients received in or passing through clearing and collecting stations will not be reported on WD MD Form 86ab.

4. HOSPITAL STATISTICAL REPORT, ETOUSA, MD FORM 310.

a. Copies and Channels: The original copy direct to the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon), a carbon copy direct to the Commanding General, Advance Section C.Z., APO___, (Attention: Surgeon). For units under corps a second carbon copy, marked information, will be forwarded to the Commanding General, _____ Corps, (Attention: Surgeon).

After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters Communications Zone is established on the continent, all reports previously rendered to the Commanding General, Advance Section, C.Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon), will be submitted direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon).

5. MONTHLY SANITARY REPORT AND SPECIAL SANITARY REPORT:

Information copies of this report normally sent direct to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 871, (Attention: Chief Surgeon), will be submitted to the Commanding General, Advance Section, C.Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon). After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters Communications Zone is established on the continent, these reports will be forwarded direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon).

6. MONTHLY VENEREAL DISEASE REPORT:

A typewritten list of all cases of syphilis who have completed the prescribed course of penicillin therapy will accompany this report. Name, rank, army serial number, organization and date of completion of treatment will be shown.

Information copies of this report normally sent direct to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 871, (Attention: Chief Surgeon), will be submitted to the Commanding General, Advance Section, C. Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon). After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters Communications Zone is established on the continent, these reports will be forwarded direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon).

7. INDIVIDUAL VENEREAL DISEASE REPORT, ETOUSA, MD FORM 302.

This form will be prepared in quadruplicate. In addition to channels referred to in paragraph 1b above, each surgeon making such report will, without delay, mail a copy direct to the Commanding General, TUSA, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon).

8. STATISTICAL REPORT MD FORM 86c.

a. Rendered in accordance with the above mentioned circular letters and letter this headquarters, file 319.1 Med. GNMCN-2, subject: Preparation of MD Form 86c, dated 12 May 1944. All copies of reports normally sent direct to Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 871, (Attention: Chief Surgeon) will now be forwarded to Commanding General, Advance Section C.Z., APO___, (Attention: Surgeon).

After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters Communications Zone is established on the continent, all reports previously rendered to the Commanding General, Advance Section, C.Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon), will be submitted direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon).

9. MONTHLY REPORT OF DENTAL SERVICE, ETOUSA, MD FORM 57.

a. Prepared in accordance with paragraph 2a, AR 40-1010, as revised for ETO, by paragraph 12, page 27, Dental Officers Guide, OCS-ETO.

b. Channels and copies: Through command channels to the Commanding General, Third U. S. Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon).

c. The report will be forwarded so that it will reach this headquarters not later than the 7th of the following month.

10. REGISTER OF DENTAL PATIENTS, MD FORM 79:

a. Will be completed in accordance with paragraph 3, AR 40-1010, on all patients treated.

11. SPECIAL EPIDEMIC DISEASE REPORT:

a. Division and Corps Surgeons and commanders of Army Medical Units will immediately notify the Surgeon, Third United States Army, APO 403, by telephone or other most expeditious means. This will be followed by a written report to the Commanding General, Third United States Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon).

b. The Surgeon, TUSA, will notify the Chief Surgeon, ETOUSA, by the most expeditious means when, in his judgement, it is desirable or necessary. After the establishment of FECZ on the continent, this report will be made to the Surgeon, FECZ, APO 350.

12. VETERINARY REPORT:

None will be required at this time.

13. COMBAT MEDICAL STATISTICAL REPORT, ETOUSA, MD FORM NO. 323:

a. Rendered by: All functional hospitals and all clearing stations.

b. Frequency: As indicated in paragraph 13e.

c. Special Instructions: The form is self explanatory.

d. Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

e. Copies and Channels:

(1) Commanding officers of all hospitals (not Clearing Stations) in operation will report data listed in parts Id and II, as of 1200 daily, by telephone or teletype, to reach the Surgeon, Third U.S. Army, not later than 1600. (Teletype service should be available at division and corps message centers). However, if such services are not accessible or available this data will be dispatched by courier to reach the Surgeon, Third U.S. Army not later than the hour specified above.

(2) A complete ETOUSA MD Form 323, covering the period from 0000 to 2400 will be prepared in quadruplicate. The original copy will be dispatched by courier to the Commanding General, TUSA, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon) to reach this headquarters not later than 0800 the following day. The duplicate copy will be dispatched, (Through: Message Center) from each unit submitting this report to the Commanding General, FUSAG, APO 655, (Attention: Surgeon). The triplicate copy will be forwarded to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 871, (Attention: Chief Surgeon) through the Commanding General, C.Z., APO 113, (Attention: Surgeon). After the Forward Echelon, Headquarters C.Z. is established on the continent, the triplicate copy, previously rendered through the Commanding General, Advance Section, C.Z., will be submitted direct to the Commanding General, FECZ, APO 350, (Attention: Surgeon). Quadruplicate copy will be retained for file.

(3) Hospitals attached to corps in addition to complying with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 will submit an information copy of both reports to the Corps Surgeon.

14. REPORT OF HOSPITALIZATION OF U.S. NAVAL PERSONNEL: No Change except by arrangement with representatives of U. S. Navy. Notification of any special arrangements made will be sent to the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, (Attention: Surgeon).

15. ADMISSION AND DISPOSITION REPORT, ETOUSA, MD FORM NO. 324A:

a. Rendered by all hospitals, clearing stations, collecting stations, and battalion and/or regimental aid stations.

b. Frequency: Daily, period covered by the report: 0000 to 2400.

c. Special instructions: An entry will be made for each case admitted and/or disposed of. If admission and disposition occur the same day complete entry on one line will cover both. In column "4", for Battle Casualty enter the serial number of Purple Heart or Oak Leaf Cluster if awarded. In column "8" "Trf" means transferred within Army area. "Evac" means evacuated to Communication Zone. Indicate unit to which "Trf" or "Evac" is made, if known. In column "9", "B.C." should precede battle casualty diagnosis.

d. Date of the report will be that of the day for which the report is rendered.

e. Copies and Channels: Divisional units (assigned and attached) will forward a single copy to the Commanding General, _____ Division, (Attention: A.G. Casualty Branch).

f. Corps units (assigned and attached) will forward a single copy to the corps commander for transmittal to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, (Attention: A.G. Casualty Branch).

g. Army units (assigned and attached) will forward a single copy to the Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, (Attention: A.G. Casualty Branch).

h. Classification: CONFIDENTIAL, (See Cir. No. 46, Hq ETOUSA, dated 22 Apr 44).

16. REPORT OF HOSPITALIZATION OF AMERICAN RED CROSS, U. S. MERCHANT SEAMEN, BRITISH AND OTHER ALLIED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND BRITISH CIVILIANS.

a. Routine reports -- no change. No special reports are required of TUSA hospitals. This information will be furnished to the responsible allied agencies by the Adjutant General, Headquarters TUSA.

17. EVACUATION TAG ETOUSA MD FORM 321: Printed instructions on the reverse of form are self explanatory. To be used by all medical installations designated as holding units at air strips or air fields.

18. GENERAL:

a. The following listed reports will be prepared and rendered by all hospitals in accordance with instructions contained in Circular No. 46, Hq ETOUSA, dated 22 April 1944, and Circular No. 8, Third U.S. Army, dated 2 May 1944:

(1) Daily Disposition Report, ETO-CAS, Form No. 4. No change.

(2) Progress Report, ETO-CAS, Form No. 3. No change.

(3) Immediate Action Letters on seriously ill non-battle casualties. The Casualty Division of AG, Hq ETOUSA, APO 871, will require a report, the original being submitted to Commanding General, Third U.S. Army, APO 403, (Attention: AG Casualty Division) (See Cir No. 8, Hq Third U.S. Army, dated 2 May 1944).

19. ALL NUMBERED FIELD HOSPITALS UNDER THIS COMMAND are considered to be mobile, non-fixed installations in so far as Medical Records and Reports are concerned.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 17 - Chemical Warfare Plan

ANNEX 17

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

CHEMICAL WARFARE PLAN

WITH APPENDICES:-

NO I - Individual and Organizational Equipment

NO II - Reporting Enemy Use of Gas

(11 May 1944)

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CWS

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Section I

GENERAL

1. Purpose of Plan. This plan covers basic policies concerning chemical operations, use of chemical troops, and chemical supply.

2. Use of Gas.

a. The enemy is capable of employing gas on a large scale at any time. He is fully trained in defensive measures and has an adequate supply of suitable equipment and material for extensive defensive use of gas.

b. Other than his capabilities there is no positive intelligence that the enemy plans to use gas against troops invading the continent.

c. Toxic and irritant gas will be employed by Third U. S. Army only when and as directed by higher authority.

d. All units will prepare and keep under review plans for retaliatory action if and when gas warfare begins.

3. Individual Equipment.

a. Individual equipment listed in Appendix No. I will be carried by all troops as directed. All troops on the continent will carry their gas masks at all times.

b. A complete uniform of protective (impregnated) clothing and one (1) can of shoe impregnite will be available for all personnel, and will be worn as indicated in paragraph 2, Appendix No. I.

c. (1) All units will carry authorized organizational equipment, listed in paragraph 3, Appendix No. I.

(2) Where allowances of organizational equipment listed in paragraph 3, Appendix No. 1, varies from those contained in applicable T/O & E and current ETOUSA publications, the items authorized by T/O & E and current ETOUSA publications will govern.

4. Responsibility of Commanders. All commanders are responsible that:

a. Each unit and individual is proficient in the essentials of defense against chemical attack (paragraph 4, FM 21-40).

b. Adequate supplies of decontamination material and equipment are readily available for use in an emergency.

c. Authorized protective equipment is maintained in a serviceable condition.

d. Adequate plans are made for continuance of mission with a minimum of casualties in the event gas is used by the enemy.

5. Reports Concerning Enemy Use of Gas.

a. Any information indicating enemy intentions in connection with gas warfare must reach Army Headquarters in the shortest possible time. Negative, as well as positive information of the enemy's intentions is required.

b. Enemy use of gas, most particularly initial employment must be reported to Army Headquarters and to adjacent units by the most expeditious means available.

c. For details of procedure for reporting use of gas by the enemy see Appendix No. II.

Section II

TROOPS AND OPERATIONS

1. Troops. Available chemical troops are initially under Army control, except the 86th Chemical Battalion, Motorized, which is attached to the VIII Corps.

2. Operations.

a. Chemical Battalions, Motorized, will employ smoke to the fullest extent for defense against enemy action and to screen our own operations. They will support the attack with HE and with WP for casualty effect, as directed by appropriate commanders.

b. (1) Initially the 61st Chemical Depot Company will operate a chemical depot and Chemical ASPs for XV Corps and attached units. As soon as practical, it will perform these duties for two corps.

(2) Initially the 57th Chemical Maintenance Company will maintain weapons and equipment of XV Corps and attached units. As soon as practical, it will perform these duties for two corps.

(3) The remaining Depot and Maintenance Companies will support two additional corps.

Section III

EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

1. Individual and organizational equipment will be carried as shown in Appendix No. 1.

2. All CWS equipment and supplies will be stored and issued by chemical depots. Chemical ammunition, including PFT fuel, will be handled through Chemical ASPs operated by personnel from Chemical Depot Companies. These ASPs will be located in the vicinity of the Ordnance ASPs.

3. CWS supplies of Class II and Class IV will be as follows:

a. Reserves.

(1) For troops landed by D + 41:

(a) 1.7 D/S landed by midnight D + 30.

(b) 4.5 D/S landed by midnight D + 35.

(c) 7.0 D/S landed by midnight D + 41.

(2) For troops landed after D + 41:

As prescribed by communications zone.

b. Maintenance.

Maintenance requirements will be furnished each day for the total number of troops expected to be ashore by midnight of the same day.

c. Factors.

(1) Class II and IV — .43 lbs/man/day (.25 for Class II and .18 for Class IV)

(2) One day of consumption equals one day of reserve.

d. Minimum Scales.

Sufficient protective equipment will be landed during the period D + 29 and D + 30 to accomplish protective reserves, and thereafter the established maintenance factors will apply.

4. Basic Loads. Units will carry maximum quantities possible of basic loads.

5. Salvage.

a. Abandoned, partially worn out, and captured material will be collected by troops and promptly evacuated to the rear. (Details of evacuation are contained in the Quartermaster Service Plan). Chemical warfare material which has been segregated at the Army salvage dumps will be turned over to the Chemical Depots, where serviceable items will be reissued and unserviceable items evacuated to the proper Chemical Maintenance Company. Items repaired by the Chemical Maintenance Company will be returned to the Chemical Depot Company and other items will be evacuated to depots in the Communications Zone for necessary disposition.

b. Captured chemical warfare material which has been segregated at the Army salvage dumps will be held for disposition by the Army Chemical Officer. For disposition of material used in gas attacks or indicating enemy intentions, see Appendix II.

6. Repair.

a. Using arms or services are responsible for 1st and 2nd Echelon Maintenance of CWS equipment and material.

b. CWS material requiring 3rd and 4th Echelon Maintenance, which the unit is unable to perform will be turned in to the nearest Chemical Depot and replacements secured.

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE

INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL EQUIPMENT

1. All troops will be provided with the following Chemical Warefare equipment, carried in the gas mask carrier as directed by Training Memorandum Number 4, Headquarters ETOUSA, 27 January 1944, except as indicated.

Mask, gas, service, Lightweight or Assault	1 per individual
Eyeshields	4 per individual (2 in unit supply)
Ointment, protective, tube	1 per individual

SECRET

Set, anti-dim	1 per individual
Sleeve, gas detector	2 per individual
Cover, protective (QM item)	2 per individual (1 in pack or bag)
Impregnite, shoe, can	1 per individual (in unit supply available for application in marshalling area)
Ointment, eye, BAL (Med. item)	1 per individual
Respirator, dust	1 per individual of Sig C, TD and Armd units (on person)
CW Pocket Reference Card	1 per individual

2. One (1) set of protective clothing (QM item), listed below, will be carried in duffle bag or blanket roll to the marshalling area, unless orders are issued to the contrary all troops will wear one (1) layer (outer) of impregnated clothing on embarkation. Shoes actually worn will be treated with impregnite.

a. 1 Shirt, flannel, OD, protective, and

1 Trousers, pair, wool, OD, protective; or

1 Suit, 1-piece, HBT, protective; or

1 Jacket, HBT, protective, and

1 Trousers, pair, HBT, protective.

b.**1 Drawers, pair, cotton, protective.

c.**1 Undershirt, cotton, protective.

d. 1 Sock, pair, wool, light, protective.

e. 1 leggings, pair, dismounted, canvas, protective.

f.**1 Hood, wool, protective.

g.**1 Gloves, pair, cotton, protective.

**Worn only if directed.

Information contained in this Appendix is also contained in Chemical Warfare Annex to Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting.

3. Organizational equipment is as follows:*

Agent, decontaminating, bleach	100 lbs per Co or similar unit 1000 lbs per Apparatus, decon, power driven
Brush, decontaminating	1 per 100 lbs of bleach
Agent, decontaminating, M-4 (non-corrosive)	Sufficient for filling authorized 1½-qt and 3 gal decon apparatus
Alarm, gas warning, British	1 per 50 men or fraction
Apparatus, decontaminating, 3-gal	3 per Co or similar unit
Apparatus, decontaminating, 1½-qt (freshly filled and placed on all vehicles)	1 per motor fuel-consuming vehicle 2 per combat vehicle
Curtain, gas proof	2 per Hq, Bn and Sep Co
Kit, repair, gas mask, Universal, M-8	1 per Regt or Sep Bn
Kit, repair, gas mask, Company	2 per Co or similar unit
Kit, chemical agent detector, M9	1 per Co or similar unit
Disinfectant, gas mask, bottle	1 per Co or similar unit
Sack, gas resistant	1 per 4 individuals
Sign, gas warning	5 per 100 men (minimum 5 signs)
Paint, LVD, can	1 per fuel-consuming motor vehicle 1 per airplane
Paper, LVD, book	1 per Co or similar unit
Crayon, VD	12 per Co or similar unit (incl Armd Force and TD) 12 per AAF Squadron and separate platoon
Flamethrower, portable, M1A1	24 per Engr Combat Regt 12 per Parachute Inf Regt
Kit, fuel filling, PFT	2 per 24 PFTs
Kit, service, PFT	1 per 24 PFTs or fraction
Kit, fuel mixing PFT	1 per 24 PFTs or fraction
Apparatus, decontaminating, power driven	3 per Serv Co, Armd Div
Carrier, shell, 4.2-inch cml mortar	5 per Squad, Cml Wpns Co

*Information contained in this Appendix is also contained in Chemical Warfare Annex to Administrative Instructions Preliminary to Mounting.

Cart, ammunition, 4.2-inch cml mortar	1 per Squad, Cml Wpns Co
Cart, mortar, 4.2-inch	1 per Squad, Cml Wpns Co
Laboratory, field, CWS, M-2	1 per Cml Lab Co
Respirator, dust	2 per fuel-consuming vehicle when directed by CO
Rule, mil, cml mortar	4 per Hq, Wpns Co 9 per Plat, Wpns Co
Set, accessories and spare parts, 4.2-inch cml mortar	1 per mortar, 4.2-inch
Set, accessories, cml mortar cart	1 per cart
Sight, 4.2-inch cml mortar, w/case	1 per mortar
Set, equipment, maintenance and repair	1 per Maint Co, Cml

INSTRUCTIONS FOR REPORTING THE ENEMY USE OF GAS

IN OPERATIONS OVERSEAS

1. GENERAL

a. The following instructions for reporting and investigating gas attacks and suspected use of gas by the enemy are published for the guidance of all units.

b. It is the duty of all units to provide information and materials required as shown below, and to ensure their speedy transmission to higher headquarters by the fastest means available.

c. All messages concerning the first use or suspected use of gas by the enemy will be secret and will be given URGENT priority.

d. Any information which appears to indicate that the enemy is about to use gas will be reported immediately.

2. FIRST USE OR SUSPECTED USE OF GAS.

Steps will be taken as follows:

a. By organization subjected to or in vicinity of gas attack.

(1) Reports.

(a) IMMEDIATE. As soon as a gas attack takes place, the unit gas officer will determine:

1. Type and name of gas used (if possible).

2. Time and place of attack.

3. Area affected.

4. Type of weapon used (bomb, high level spray, low level spray, mortar fire, artillery fire, cylinders, or other means).

This information is immediately transmitted either in person or by telephone to the unit S-2, and also to the Division Chemical Officer. A normal report is likewise immediately prepared and sent by messenger to the same agencies.

(b) LATER REPORT. A second report will be rendered both to the unit G-2 and to the Division Chemical Officer giving:

1. Number and severity and disposition of casualties.

2. Amount of chemical used as indicated by number and size of bombs, shells, or other means.

3. Protective measures taken.

4. Boundaries of areas made unfit for occupation because of presence of a highly persistent gas.

(2) Information above will be transmitted as obtained to the next higher headquarters.

(3) Samples of any enemy equipment or clothing available which is believed to have chemical warfare significance will be secured and transmitted to the next higher headquarters.

(a) If persistent gas has been used, secure a liberal sample of contaminated earth, bomb fragments, clothing, or other contaminated material. These samples will be placed in a jar or other air-tight container, sealed, and labeled to show contents, date and place obtained and designation of unit securing the sample.

(b) If nonpersistent gas has been used, evidence will be secured from medical officers, gas officers and other qualified witnesses as to the action, effect and result of the chemical agent upon casualties.

b. Corps and divisions will:

(1) Upon receipt of information from lower units on the use of gas, transmit the information through normal channels to Army Headquarters.

(2) Warn lower headquarters not already notified and nearby U. S. ground force, SOS and air force units.

(3) Supervise the investigation of gas attacks and keep Army Headquarters informed.

(4) Examine samples of contaminated materials and equipment sent in by lower units, forwarding through normal command channels at least one sample of all identified material and all samples which cannot be positively identified to the Army Chemical Officer.

c. Army will:

(1) Upon receipt of information from lower units, transmit the information to higher headquarters.

(2) Warn lower headquarters not already notified.

(3) Warn adjacent ground force, SOS, air force and British headquarters.

(4) Render all possible assistance and advice to lower units in the investigation of gas attacks.

(5) Forward known samples for verification and unknown samples for investigation to the Chemical Laboratory Company by the fastest means available.

3. SUBSEQUENT GAS ATTACKS.

After the first use of gas has been officially confirmed and announced, subsequent gas attacks will be reported through normal channels, except that procedure as outlined in paragraph 2 will be followed when:

a. The gas is believed to be a new agent.

b. A new method of dissemination is employed.

c. Heavy casualties have resulted from the attack.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 18-Passive Air Defense Plan

30 May 1944
Register No. TUSA 75

ANNEX 18

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE, CIVIL DEFENSE, AND

FIRE DEFENSE

WITH APPENDICES:-

NO I - PAD Control Center - Smaller Units

NO II - PAD Control Center - Telephone Switchboard

NO III - PAD Services

NO IV - PAD Staff Officers Preplanning Check List

NO V - Responsibility of Civil Affairs In Civil Defense

NO VI - Detailed Planning - Fire Defense

NO VII - Outline of Local Fire Defense Plan

(30 May 1944)

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PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE
PLAN

SECTION - I

GENERAL

1. DEFINITIONS

a. Passive Air Defense (PAD) measures cover all passive action which is required to mitigate the effects of enemy air attack, ground or naval action, and is a military responsibility. It does NOT include any part of the active measures against enemy action, e.g., barrage balloons, smoke screens.

b. Civil Defense covers arrangements made, and action taken by, local civil authorities to mitigate the effects of enemy air attack, ground or naval action on the civil population and installations required to serve their needs.

c. Fire Defense is the prevention or extinction of all fires caused by hostile attack or other means. Fire Defense is carried out by all military personnel; engineer fire fighting units provide mobile protection, assisted, when necessary, by other arms and services and by civil fire defense organization.

2. PAD OPERATIONAL CONTROL

PAD Operational Control is an organization set up by means of Control (and sub-control) Centers in an area of military importance for the purpose of:

a. Receiving immediately, reports of incidents caused by enemy action, e.g. air attack, time mines, long range gunfire, which may cause dislocation of military functions in the area or base.

b. Initiating appropriate action to deal with the situation.

c. Co-ordination of remedial measures at the scene of the incident by the services involved.

3. COMMAND

a. Commanders will be responsible for PAD, Civil Defense and Fire Defense measures in areas under their immediate control. Subject to the qualifications detailed in paragraph 4.

b. The Military Commander in any vital area is responsible for the coordination of all resources in that area although the responsibility for PAD and fire defense at Air Force installations rests with the Air Force Commander; and on ships and at naval establishments ashore with the Naval Commander.

c. A Staff Officer (PAD) will be appointed in the G3/G Ops section at headquarters of Army Groups, Armies, Lines of Communication, Communication Zones, Base Areas, Sections, Lines of Communication Areas and as found necessary in the headquarters of other formations.

d. A Civil Affairs Officer (Civil Defense) will be appointed at any port or town of military importance.

4. CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS AND DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBILITY

a. Forward Areas

(1) Definition	Areas of active operations in which fighting is in progress.
(2) Responsibility	Military Commander; no responsibility for Civil Defense will be undertaken unless essential for military operations.

b. Class "A" Areas

(1) Definition	Areas of military importance immediately in rear of "Forward Areas", and on the lines of Communication, in Communication Zones, including bases, ports and vital centers where organized PAD is a military necessity.
(2) Responsibility	Military Commander; acting under the authority of the military commander, the PAD Officer will normally coordinate PAD measures and will be assisted by the Civil Affairs Officer responsible for the provision of maximum available civil assistance.

c. Class "B" Areas

(1) Definition	Areas on the Lines of Communication, in Communication Zones, where unit PAD will normally be sufficient for military needs, but in which the failure of the local Civil Defense organization is likely to hamper military operations, e.g. damage to essential services, civil unrest, refugees. Such areas will normally be in close proximity to Class "A" Areas.

d. Class "C" Areas

(1) Definition	Areas in which a breakdown of the local Civil Defense arrangements cannot interfere with military operations.
(2) Responsibility	Military Commander; civil defense measures will normally be delegated to the Civil Affairs Officer on the commander's staff.

e. Army groups, armies, communications zones and base sections are responsible for classifying areas and for insuring that plans are prepared and equipment provided for PAD, civil defense and fire defense, as necessary.

5. AIR RAID WARNING SYSTEM

a. The Military Commander, in consultation with the Air Force Commander, will issue orders to cover:

(1) Authority responsible for ordering the sounding of local air raid warnings. No air raid warnings will be sounded unless the order to do so is given by the Army or the Air Force.

(2) The channels of communications for air raid warnings.

b. PAD Control Center will comply with these orders when received.

SECTION II

MISSION

6. PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

The mission of Passive Air Defense is to mitigate the effects of enemy air attack, ground, and naval action on personnel, stores, and equipment in order that the dislocation of normal operational functions is reduced to a minimum.

7. CIVIL DEFENSE

The mission of Civil Defense is to insure that military operations are not adversely affected by the effects of enemy action on civil communities in, or adjacent to, areas of military importance.

8. FIRE DEFENSE

The mission of Fire Defense is the reduction of fire risk; and, by the mobilization and control of the fire fighting resources, prompt extinction of fires.

SECTION III

PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

9. GENERAL

a. The practical experiences of recent campaigns have demonstrated that the effects of enemy air attack on military personnel and installations can be minimized by the application of PAD measures under a central control.

b. Due to the absolute necessity for conserving man-power, supplies, equipment, installations, and utilities; prompt, positive and coordinated security measures will be taken by all commanders.

10. SECURITY MEASURES

Troops will be thoroughly trained in the following subjects:

a. Blackouts;

SECRET

b. Personnel Protection;
c. Air Raid Warning;
d. Fire Prevention;
e. Unexploded Bombs, Mines, and Booby Traps;
f. Defense Against Chemical Agents;
g. First Aid.

11. APPLICATION OF PAD

a. Extent. The situation determines the extent of PAD Operations.

b. Forward Areas. For troops in actual combat, PAD consists of normal security measures.

c. Rear Areas. In areas in rear of Forward Areas, controlled PAD measures must be taken in order to adequately protect supply installations, e.g. railheads, truckheads, gasoline distributing points, ammunition distributing points, etc. The protection of Army installations such as those enumerated above, located in division and corps zones, is the responsibility of division and corps commanders.

d. Bivouacs in Towns and Cities. When units are bivouaced in towns and cities they may be required to establish an extensive PAD Control Center. (See Appendix I)

e. Army Zone. The commanders of supply installations will take positive measures to insure that by planned dispersion; by segregation of inflammable and explosive materials; by trained fire fighting personnel; and, by adequate and sufficient fire fighting equipment, the effect of enemy air attack is minimized.

12. SERVICES DIRECTED THROUGH CONTROL CENTER

The Army PAD Officer, and those of corps and division, will establish a control center to direct the activities of the following services during and after enemy attacks: (1) Light rescue; (2) Heavy rescue; (3) Ambulance; (4) Work Party. (See Appendix II)

13. SERVICES COORDINATED THROUGH CONTROL CENTER

These services, normally employed for security measures must be coordinated through Control Centers:

a. Some, such as blackouts, personnel protection, fire prevention, and so on, do not require specialized personnel.

b. Others require specialized personnel. These are supervised or directed by the following agencies:

(1) Air Raid Warning.
(2) Fire Fighting.
(3) Medical.
(4) Military Police.
(5) Chemical Warfare.
(6) Signal.
(7) Repair (Utilities).
(8) Quartermaster.
(9) Bomb Disposal.
(10) Engineer (General Services) (See Appendix III)

14. FUNCTION OF PAD OFFICER

The function of PAD officer is to:

a. Advise the Commander on matters pertaining to PAD and Civil Defense organization, operations and training.

b. Provide operational control for PAD Services and coordinate other services.

c. Receive, consolidate and interpret data on PAD activities.

d. Maintain PAD records.

e. Make necessary inspections to determine the efficiency of PAD operation and training.

f. Establish and maintain Liaison with Civil Defense through proper channels. (See Appendix IV)

SECTION IV

CIVIL DEFENSE

15. GENERAL

a. Civil Defense in occupied territory is only of importance where it affects military requirements.

b. Passive Air Defense in occupied territory, as elsewhere, is a normal military duty and will be carried out in accordance with military instructions on the subject.

c. In any area of military importance, Passive Air Defense and Civil Defense will be closely related. The two will be planned and executed together.

d. The PAD Staff Officer, of the military commander, will be responsible for giving advice on all matters concerning Passive Air Defense.

e. See Appendix V.

f. See Annex No. 10, CIVIL AFFAIRS.

16. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL DEFENSE TO MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

a. Civil Defense will be a military necessity in those areas where its failure will hinder military operations.

b. Civil Defense may be of importance, even in areas of no Military value, if the failure of Civil Defense organization is likely to result in damage to essential services, stocks of food, serious problems of unrest, refugees, starvation, and disease amongst the civil population.

c. Where it is necessary to raise the standard of Civil Defense to meet military requirements, some assistance from the military will usually be necessary. This may be accomplished either by giving direction or advice, or by making available essential equipment and supplies which cannot otherwise by obtained by the civilian authorities.

17. CLASSIFICATION OF AREAS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

a. The relative importance of Civil Defense to military requirements will be defined by classifying areas of occupied territory as indicated below; the responsibility for Civil Defense, and the responsibility for providing necessary equipment are also indicated:

(1) Class "A" - Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as a military necessity. The local military commander, pending the establishment of the Military Government Administration, will be responsible for organizing minimum standards of Civil Defense. It is a military responsibility to decide the requirements and to provide any necessary equipment or materiel.

(2) Class "B" - Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as of military importance only insofar as there may be repercussions on the military in the event of failure of the Civil Defense organization. Organization and supervision of Civil Defense will be the responsibility of the Military Government Administration or Allied Control Commission. If coordination with the military is required, such coordination will be the responsibility of the local military commander. Available equipment may be sold or rented to the local authorities.

(3) Class "C" - Areas in which Civil Defense is regarded as no military importance.

b. The classification of areas as above, and their reclassification according to changing circumstances, will be the responsibility of Army Commanders in the Combat Zone.

SECTION V

FIRE DEFENSE

18. DEFINITIONS

a. Fire Defense: Fire defense is defined as the measures required to prevent the destruction by fire of installations, supplies, equipment and communications essential to the operation, whether caused by accident, carelessness or enemy action.

b. Fire Defense Includes:

(1) Fire Prevention - the reduction of fire risk by dispersal of supplies and segregation of inflammable and combustible material, and by any other means that common sense may suggest.

(2) Static Fire Defense - The organization of fire squads, fire guards and trailer pump crews to provide defense against fires within a particular installation or within a limited area.

(3) Mobile Fire Defense - The organization and control of organized fire fighting units that are available for immediate assistance wherever any fire is or is likely to be beyond the control of the static fire defense.

c. Classification of Areas:

(1) Forward Areas - areas of combat and beaches where landing operations are in progress.

(2) Class A Areas - areas of military importance immediately in rear of forward areas and in communication zones; normally include bases, ports and vital communication center.

(3) Class B Areas - areas of less vital military importance but where large uncontrolled fires might hamper military operations through damage to essential installations, civil unrest and refugees. Such areas are in close proximity to Class A areas.

(4) Class C Areas - areas of no military importance and in which large fires would have no effect on the military operation.

19. RESPONSIBILITY

a. Fire Defense is a command responsibility.

b. Each commander is responsible for fire defense in his zone of action. Initially and prior to establishment of any Army rear boundary, Army zones may include port areas and outer anchorages. (This responsibility will not include fire prevention or static fire defense in naval shore establishments and fire defense in air establishments, which are the responsibility of ANCXF and AEAF respectively).

c. The Engineer of each echelon provides the technical assistance required to carry out responsibility of his commanding officer for fire defense measures. Planning, organization and operational control of fire defense measures are normally carried out by a trained fire officer on the staff of the Engineer concerned.

20. SCOPE OF FIRE DEFENSE

a. In general, fire defense measures will be planned and organized to cover all phases of the military operation to the extent required to insure the success of the operation. Fire protection will be provided to the degree necessary for each of the following:

(1) Forward Areas:

Mobile Fire Defense -	None
Static Fire Defense -	As provided by troop personnel; equipment will consist primarily of stirrup pumps and a limited number of fire extinguishers.
Fire Prevention -	Dispersal and segregation of supplies.

(2) Class A Areas:

Mobile Fire Defense -	Sufficient number of Engineer fire fighting platoons to prevent fires becoming general conflagrations in ports and vital communication centers. Sufficient number of fire boats to protect ports and outer anchorages.
Static Fire Defense -	Sufficient to protect military installations. Establishment of fire guards, including civilians organized by Civil Affairs.
Fire Prevention -	Segregation of highly inflammable supplies, dispersal of storage facilities to locations outside of towns, and enforcement of fire prevention regulations.

(3) Class B Areas:

Mobile Fire Defense - A limited number of fire fighting platoons for the local protection of military establishments only. Civil Fire Defense, if required to be provided by Civil Affairs.

Fire Prevention - As for Class A areas.

(4) Class C Areas:

Mobile Fire Defense)
Static Fire Defense) - None by military organizations.
Fire Prevention)

b. For Field Forces

(1) Prior to establishment of the Army rear boundary, Army fire defense measures should include protection of the following:

(a) Beach Operations.

(b) Supply dumps.

(c) Railheads.

(d) Communication centers.

(e) Port Areas and outer anchorages.

(f) Any other areas necessary.

(2) Subsequent to establishment of the Army rear boundary, Army fire defense measures should include protection of the following:

(a) Supply dumps.

(b) Railheads.

(c) Communication centers.

21. DETAILED PLANNING. (See Appendix VI)

22. OUTLINE OF LOCAL FIRE DEFENSE PLAN. (See Appendix VII)

APPENDIX I

PAD CONTROL CENTER - SMALLER UNITS

1. Smaller units such as Regiments and Battalions may establish a Regimental or Battalion PAD Control Center. For example:



NOTE: A Control Center should be established at battalion level to dispatch PAD Services, such as light Rescue Squads, to units which need assistance.

2. At Regimental level there should be a Control Center to coordinate the battalions. For example: if a battalion bivouac, barracks, or supply area has received a heavy bombing, it may be necessary to call on adjoining units for PAD Services. This would be handled through a Regimental Control Center. Also, since some battalions may not be self-sufficient they may find it necessary to call on adjoining units for assistance. This will be directed through Regimental Control Center.

APPENDIX II

PAD CONTROL CENTER TELEPHONE SWITCHBOARD



- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lines through Military Exchange

_____ Direct Lines

NOTE:

1. The situation determines the telephone facilities. This diagram is based on a 10 line telephone switchboard. Varying conditions will determine the priority of the direct lines recommended above.

2. PAD Services and Sector Control Posts will normally operate through the Military Telephone Exchange.

APPENDIX III

PAD SERVICES



_____ Directed through Control Center

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Coordinated through Control Center

NOTE:

This diagram indicates the PAD Services directed and other services coordinated through PAD Control Center.

APPENDIX IV

PAD STAFF OFFICERS PREPLANNING CHECK LIST

PAD Staff Officers should consult the following officers for information indicated:

G-3

1. Code name of operation.
2. Time available for planning.
3. Sections represented on planning staff.
4. Units assigned.
5. Air Raid Warning.
6. Blackout regulations.
7. PAD Orders. (Pre-Occupational, Interim and Final).
8. Class of Area.
9. Cargo - Necessary equipment.
10. Organization and equipment required for PAD Control Center.
11. G.O.R. or S.O.R.
12. Location of PAD Control.

G-2

1. Area to be occupied.
2. Maps.
3. Civil Defense Organization.

G-4
1. Cargo space.
2. Signal equipment, etc, for PAD Control.
3. Transportation.

G-1
1. Personnel for PAD organization.

ENGINEER OFFICER
1. Heavy Rescue.
2. Utilities Platoons (repairs).
3. Sirens (supply).
4. Booby traps and delayed action mines.

FIRE MARSHAL
1. Fire coverage on occupation, such as:
   (a) Amount and type of equipment.
   (b) Extra equipment and supplies that can be added to PAD cargo.
2. Plans for coordination.

MEDICAL OFFICER
1. Hospitals.
2. First Aid Stations.
3. Ambulances.
4. First Aid Equipment for Light Rescue Squads.

SIGNAL OFFICER
1. Priority on establishing communications.
2. Switchboard and telephones for PAD control.
3. Priority on PAD calls during alerts.

PROVOST MARSHAL
1. Traffic control during alerts.
2. Enforcement of blackout regulations.
3. Guards and Cordoning.
4. Incident reporting.
5. Incident Report Post.

ORDNANCE OFFICER
1. Rules and regulations on U.X.B.'s.
2. Bomb Disposal and reconaissance.
3. Arrangements for coordination B.D. through PAD.

CWS OFFICER
1. Gas and decontamination instructions.
2. Gas Alarms.
3. C.W Supplies.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT
1. CD plan to include coordination between PAD and CD.
2. Check supplies and equipment for "A", "B" and/or "C" Areas.

CO'S OF UNITS
1. PAD instructions for Sector Controllers and Unit Commanders.

PORT COMMANDERS
1. PAD Measures.

NAVY LIAISON OFFICER.
1. PAD Measures.

TRANSPORTATION OFFICER.
1. PAD equipment in movement.

GOR OR SOR
1. Air Raid Warning.

ARMY PAD OFFICER
1. Coordination.

QM OFFICER
1. Fatal Casualties.

CHAPLAIN
1. Casualties.

APPENDIX V

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN CIVIL DEFENSE

1. During operations overseas, normal army organization continues. In liberated allied or occupied enemy territory the commander will employ the civil affairs branch to insure, through the local civil authorities, that the indigenous civil defense organizations function as efficiently as possible.

2. The senior civil affairs officer will be responsible to the commander for the re-activation of civil defense organization, and will insure that civil defense is organized:

a. To provide such cooperation with PAD as may be required.

b. To prevent civil problems which arise from hostile air, ground or naval action, from impeding military requirements.

3. The senior civil affairs officer will be responsible to the commander for insuring that the civilian air raid communication system is reconstituted as early as possible and connected to the PAD control center.

4. The civil defense services for which civil affairs will be responsible to the commander are:

(1) Wardens.

(2) Report and control centers.

(3) Rescue.

(4) Casualties.

(5) Decontamination, including food, clothing and streets.

(6) Gas identification.

(7) Messenger services.

(8) Rest Centers.

(9) Bomb reconnaissance.

(10) Mortuary.

(11) Information.

(12) Incident control.

APPENDIX VI

DETAILED PLANNING - FIRE DEFENSE

1. Detailed plans of fire defense measures should be prepared for the various areas and installations in zones of action. Plan should include the following:

a. Appropriate fire guard organization and instructions.

b. Fire prevention measures.

c. Co-ordination of military and civil affairs defense measures including system of operational control of all fire defense measures.

d. Number of fire fighting units or platoons required.

e. Quantity and type of fire fighting equipment required.

f. Number of fire boats required (for port or beach area).

g. Fire fighting control.

h. Priorities of fighting simultaneous fires.

i. Fire fighting training.

2. Assessment of Risks: Plans should be based on the fire risks involved: Aerial photographs and intelligence reports should be utilized to obtain accurate information on the following:

a. The extent of the ports including docks and harbor installations and their relation to the port town.

b. Communication system for movement of fire equipment between various parts of the port and the town. Position of bridges, lock gates, etc.

c. Position of any oil storage tanks still intact which may be fired by the enemy upon withdrawal.

d. Location of important facilities in the town, such as telephone exchanges, power stations, gas works, etc.

e. Main routes of communication through the town and possible alternates.

f. Range of tides.

g. Position of natural or artificial water supplies in the area which could be used for fire fighting.

h. Direction of prevailing winds.

3. Special fire Intelligence Reports prepared by I.S.T.D. may be obtained through Troops Division, OCE.

4. Coordination Required:

a. With P.A.D. Officer for:

(1) Probable fire guard and fire prevention needs including necessary instruction and provision of equipment for fire guard use.

(2) Organization and methods of providing parallel systems for reporting and controlling incidents in towns and port areas which may be used by both Fire Service and P.A.D. should one system by put out of action.

(3) Plans for siting fire station and P.A.D. control bases etc.

b. With Civil Affairs Officer for: Arrangements for assistance from reorganized civil fire departments, and provision of equipment and training of civil fire defense services.

c. With own Engineering Staff for:

(1) Assistance on providing static water where natural supplies are inadequate.

(2) Provision for demolition of buildings in the event of necessity to establish fire breaks.

d. With G-4 for: Probable location of dumps, hospitals etc.

e. With Port Commanders for:

(1) Probable limits of the port areas.

(2) Appointment of a port fire officer.

(3) Priorities of fighting simultaneous fires.

(4) Use of fire boats for assisting land fire defense.

(5) Co-ordination with all services using the port area.

f. With Navy and Air Force: Fire defense problems affecting those forces for ports and other required areas.

5. Instructions for training of (1) All personnel in use of minor fire equipment, combating incendiaries and fire prevention, and (2) Personnel of Services in fire trailer pumper operation.

APPENDIX VII

OUTLINE OF LOCAL FIRE DEFENSE PLAN

1. The fire officer of various headquarters will prepare a plan covering the organization and operation of all fire fighting measures for his area. Plan should include:

a. Instructions to commanding officers and others concerned in the area as to:

(1) Detailed fire prevention measures to be carried out.

(2) Organization of static fire defense measures necessary.

(3) Co-ordination with mobile fire defense.

b. A statement that the area fire officer is responsible for the control and direction of all mobile fire defense units.

c. Instructions on action to be taken upon outbreak of fire and method of reporting fire (fire control and P.A.D. control systems in towns, and system of alarm in isolated military installations).

d. Location of mobile fire equipment.

e. Location of static water supplies.

f. Instruction on co-ordination with adjacent units and/or civil fire departments.

g. Instructions on co-operation with Navy or Air Force units, where applicable.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 19-Provost Marshal Plan

Register No TUSA 75

ANNEX 19

TO

THIRD U. S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

PROVOST MARSHAL PLAN

(11 May 1944)

PATTON
Comdg.

MACDONALD
PM

GAFFEY
C. of S.

INDEX

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The Plan is corrected as follows: The prisoner of war installation at a division is properly termed, a "Prisoner of War Collecting Point," and the prisoner of war installation at an army or corps is properly termed a "Prisoner of War Enclosure."

MILITARY POLICE. - Military Police will not be diverted from the operational duties outlined below:

1. Duties.

Military Police duties on the Continent will include:

a. Road traffic control throughout the occupied area.

b. Maintenance of discipline and law and order in the occupied area.

c. Control and disposition of military prisoners of war, displaced and liberated persons, refugees and outlaws.

d. Collection and disposition of stragglers.

e. Coordination with Civil Affairs in matters pertaining to control of the civil population, including circulation of individuals and mass movement of refugees.

f. Coordination with other military agencies in the apprehension and control of special individuals or groups within the occupied area.

g. Criminal investigation in the occupied area, to be conducted by the Criminal Investigation Sections of the Army, Corps, and Divisions in cooperation with Civil Affairs and C. I. C. Detachments.

h. Custody and disposition of civil and military criminals.

2. General Situation.

a. In this operation special situations will arise which will require duties in addition to those usually performed by Military Police units. Special measures will be taken to meet these situations. The landing may be made through secured ports; however, it is reasonable to expect to encounter in addition to enemy military opposition three classes of civilians.

(1) Friendly, liberated civilians.

(2) Civilians hostile to the Allied invasion.

(3) Enemy spies, reconnaissance agents, and saboteurs disguised as refugees or displaced civilians.

b. In handling persons other than military prisoners of war special care must be taken by the initial restraining authority to screen individuals in order to segregate the classes enumerated above. It is not unreasonable to expect that numbers of conquered civilians will escape and seek refuge within Allied lines, or be driven by the Germans along the main invasion roads to impede Allied traffic.

c. Close coordination with Civil Affairs will be effected in order to control these special cases.

3. Maintenance of Discipline and Law and Order in the Occupied Area.

a. General. - Commanders will impress upon each individual in their respective commands that the conduct of the individual will influence the immediate and the post-war attitude of the liberated countries toward his own. Each member of this command will so conduct himself as to reflect credit on his service and Nation. His attitude toward, and his relations with civilians of liberated countries will be such as to inspire respect for and confidence in our Army and our Government.

b. Enforcement. - Military, Naval and Air Force police of all forces of the Allied Expeditionary Forces are authorized and empowered by the Supreme Allied Commander to maintain order, enforce authority and make arrests within the area of his command on the continent without regard to nationality of the personnel concerned or the service to which they belong. Commanders will publish the provisions of this order to all members of their respective commands. Whenever practicable arrests will be effected by police of the same nationality as the offender. When it is necessary for the Military Police of one ally to arrest an offender belonging to forces of another ally the offender will be turned over to the nearest organization (Army, Navy or Air Force, as the case may be) of the ally to whose forces the offender belongs, together with a report of the circumstances.

c. Corps and divisions will be responsible for maintenance of order in their areas.

d. Military Police are authorized to obtain assistance from any United States Army personnel in the vicinity to handle emergencies.

e. Prior to establishment of disciplinary training centers on the continent the Army Provost Marshal will provide facilities only for the detention of general prisoners sentenced to dismissal, dishonorable discharge or confinement for six months or over, after which such sentences will be served in centers on the continent.

f. Military Police will coordinate with Civil Affairs, C.I.C. detachments, criminal investigation detachments and other authorized military agencies in the enforcement of law and order, control and circulation of the civil population, and apprehension of civil or military criminals.

4. Control and Disposition of Military Prisoners of War, Displaced and Liberated Persons, Refugees and Outlaws.

a. Prisoners of War.

(1) Ownership of prisoners of war will be established at the point in processing where the internment serial number is assigned to the prisoner and recorded. In the initial stages when all prisoners of war are evacuated to the UK, serial numbers will be assigned in the UK. When prisoner of war camps or central enclosures are established on the continent, ownership will be established at such camps or enclosures. Commanders of hospitals to which prisoners of war are admitted for treatment will report name, rank and serial number of such prisoners of war to the Army Provost Marshal, with date of admission and expected length of hospitalization. In the event blocks of serial numbers are alloted to hospitals, the Commanding Officer of the hospital will assign a serial number to the prisoner and ownership thereby established. Death and burial of prisoners of war who die in medical installations will be reported by medical and graves registration services in accordance with current instructions.

b. Evacuation of PW:

(1) Capturing units are responsible for delivery of PW to nearest division PW enclosure or collecting point which will be established by each division at the beginning of operations. Attached units will be informed as to the location of these enclosures by the division concerned. Airborne and armored units other than armored divisions are authorized to turn PW over to the nearest Prisoner of War enclosure.

(2) Evacuation to army enclosure from division enclosure will be performed by army escort guard companies, under supervision of the Army Provost Marshal. Corps will be responsible for evacuating to Corps enclosures any prisoner desired for interrogation by Corps G-2. Corps will also be responsible for evacuation from Corps enclosure to Army enclosures.

(3) PW requiring hospitalization will be evacuated through medical channels.

(4) The Army Provost Marshal is authorized to call on Corps or Division Commanders for additional guard and escort personnel when conditions necessitate.

(5) Should it become necessary for Third Army to evacuate PW directly to UK on naval ships the Army Provost Marshal will arrange with the Navy to accept such shipments and will arrange through G-1 for provision of necessary guard personnel and through QM for necessary rations.

c. Treatment and Care.

(1) Treatment and care of all Prisoners of War will conform to all provisions of FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare (including provisions of Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929).

(a) Property rights of prisoners will be fully respected.

(b) Persons and honor of prisoners will be respected.

(c) Employment of Prisoners of War.

1. Except as prohibited in Par. (2) below, prisoners of war may be employed on any work not having a direct relation with war operations, and not involving the manufacture or transportation of arms or munitions, or the transportation of material which is intended for combat units. General types of permissible employment for prisoners of war are shown below. This list is not all-inclusive and is furnished only as a guide to the commanders responsible for such employment:

SECRET

To assist in caring for sick and wounded prisoners of their own nationality.

To assist in maintaining sanitary conditions in PW enclosures.

To assist in control and organization of prisoners of their own nationality. (This applies principally to officers and non-commissioned officers).

To assist in distribution of rations and water to other prisoners.

Construction, maintenance and repair of roads, railroads, public utilities, etc., not used primarily for active military operation.

Construction and repair of buildings not employed directly in support of active military operations.

Employment in factories, provided the products thereof are not "arms or munitions of any kind."

Employment in agriculture, forestry, mines, quarries, and similar industries.

Any labor required for the internal administration of a prisoner of war camp.

Street Cleaning, demolition clearance, and other public services.

Employment as mechanics on vehicles or equipment not destined for combatant use.

2. Prisoners of war will not be employed within twelve (12) miles of the nearest organized enemy forces. Forward of the Line of Communications Area, Communications Zone, prisoners of war will not be employed at any establishment which constitutes a legitimate military objective for hostile aviation.

3. Compulsory work of a degrading nature is prohibited. Employment of prisoners of war as personal servants will be permitted only for officers or assimiles of the same nationality as the prisoner concerned.

4. Prisoners of war will not be employed on work which is contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, even if they volunteer for such work.

d. Roster of Prisoners.

(1) A nominal roster in quadruplicate listed in accordance with segregation (see below) will be made as quickly as possible at division (or Corps for prisoners by-passing division enclosures) enclosures. Disposition will be made as follows:

1 copy to accompany prisoners group
1 copy to G-1 (Army)
1 copy to Provost Marshal (Army)
1 copy to be retained by division collecting points.

(2) These forms will be sent back with prisoner's escort to Army enclosure.

(3) Prisoners will not be held by division or capturing unit but will be evacuated as rapidly as facilities are available, to army enclosure.

e. Wounded Prisoners.

(1) Medical personnel will report the presence of wounded prisoners to interrogating teams or to division, corps, or Army G-2. They will deliver documents taken from such prisoners to G-2. Medical personnel will also report statements made by the prisoners if the statements appear to be of military value.

f. Civilian Prisoners or Internees. Individuals accompanying enemy forces such as correspondents, newspaper reporters, contractors and their employees, shall be entitled to be treated as Prisoners of War. Civilians requiring restraint will be collected and interned the same as Military prisoners; however, they will be segregated from Military personnel. All directives applying to Military personnel apply equally to civilian internees.

g. Refugees and Displaced Persons. In general the Civil Affairs will handle the refugees and displaced persons. Military Police will prepare to assist in any emergency.

h. Spies and War Criminals: Members of the enemy forces apprehended in civilian clothing behind our lines will, pending trial, be treated as spies. These and civilians of whatever nationality suspected of violating the laws of war including war rebels, unauthorized belligerents, and armed prowlers or marauders will be kept segregated from prisoners of war. Such persons will be delivered promptly to the nearest Unit Provost Marshal accompanied by a brief report attached to the nominal roster in triplicate stating the reasons for confinement, and such other pertinent information necessary to classify the individual and process the case for trial, if appropriate.

i. Segregation of Prisoners. Prisoners will be segregated by the capturing unit into the following groups:

(1) Officers
(2) NCO's
(3) Other ranks
(4) Female military personnel
(5) Special prisoners
(6) Deserters
(7) Others

j. Prisoner of War Enclosures. Enclosures will be erected adjacent to the lines of communications in order to facilitate the transportation of prisoners and supplies, but not close enough to subject prisoners of war to bombing directed at the installation.

k. Supply of the Army Prisoner of War Enclosure. The G-4 will be responsible for the supply for the Army Prisoner of War Enclosure.

l. Enclosures. The Army Engineer will be responsible for materials and construction of Prisoner of War Enclosures.

m. Processing Prisoners.

(1) The capturing unit is responsible that prisoners are disarmed, searched, segregated into groups of officers, non-commissioned officers, privates, women auxiliaries and outlaws and a record made of the prisoner's name, time and place of capture, and capturing unit. This record will be given to the senior guard in charge of the prisoners and transmitted in this fashion to division and Army.

(2) The prisoner will be allowed to retain his identification tag, helmet, gas mask, medals and decorations, insignia, money, and other valuables. German military personnel will be allowed to retain the Soldbuch (paybook), unless an attempt to mutilate it is made. All other documents, letters, diaries, military orders, etc., found in the prisoner's possession will be carefully collected, packaged and marked, and sent with prisoner to be turned over to intelligence or interrogating officer.

(3) Mutual cooperation is essential between personnel charged with the evacuation of prisoners and military intelligence personnel. While every effort must be made to expedite the transfer of prisoners from front to rear it must be recognized that the intelligence officer at each echelon must be allowed freedom in selecting personnel for interrogation and is responsible for deciding when an examination has been completed.

(4) Minimum guard consistent with security will be provided. Conversation will be forbidden among prisoners, and between prisoners and anyone else. Only necessary conversation will be allowed between guards and prisoners. Prisoners will not be given candy, cigarettes or other comfort items until the intelligence officer signifies that interrogation is complete.

(5) Prisoners of war captured by Corps troops, and such prisoners as the Corps G-2 or his representative may designate, will be diverted for interrogation at Corps. A receipt will be provided the Division Provost Marshal for prisoners turned over to him. Corps is responsible for evacuation of prisoners so designated from the division collecting point to the Corps collecting point, from the Corps collecting point to the Army enclosure.

n. Reports

(1) Reports will be submitted to the Army Provost Marshal by each Corps and Division Provost Marshal as of 2359 each Saturday, and will include the following information covering the preceding week:

(1) Number of prisoners of war on hand as shown in preceding report.

(2) Number of prisoners of war captured during the preceding week.

(3) Number of prisoners of war gained, other than captured, indicating source.

(4) Losses:

(a) Number transferred to other commands on the continent.

(b) Number shipped from continent, specifying destination.

(c) Other, specifying causes.

(5) Balance on hand.

(Note: Reports will specify number of military personnel civilian personnel, spies and war criminals, and sick and wounded.)

o. References:

FM 27-10 Rules of Land Warfare
FM 29-5 Military Police
Prisoner of War Circulers Nos. 1, 2, and 10, WD, 1943.
Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.

5. Collection and Disposition of Stragglers.

(1) Stragglers and personnel absent without leave will be turned over to the U.S. Military Police and forwarded by the Military Police to their respective units by the most expeditious manner, unless the distance to the unit makes such action impracticable. If disciplinary action appears warranted a report of circumstances will be rendered. In cases where the distance to the unit makes it impracticable for the Military Police to return stragglers and men absent without leave they will be returned to their respective units through normal replacement channels by Military Police.

(2) Military Police straggler control points will be kept informed by Army Provost Marshal of the location of the nearest replacement installation, and upon delivery of stragglers and personnel absent without leave, other than those requiring guard, to that installation, the Military Police will be relieved of further responsibility in returning such personnel to their units. At no stage from the time this personnel reaches the straggle point, or replacement, installation will they be permitted to return by their own methods.

(3) Military Police and replacement installation personnel are authorized to stop vehicles and arrange transportation for individuals on such vehicles, providing such arrangements to not interfere with the mission the vehicle is performing. Hitch-hiking is prohibited.

(4) A record will be kept by name of all personnel passing through straggle points and replacement installations, and this record will include time of arrival, time of departure, designation of unit, and method by which individual is transported. Where a group of individuals is placed on a vehicle the senior officer or enlisted man in the group will be made responsible for the proper return of the individuals to their unit; and individuals will not be considered as having returned to their unit until they have reported to a commissioned officer or non-commissioned officer of that unit. In cases where disciplinary action appears to be warranted a report of the circumstances will be delivered with him to the organization to which he is returned.

b. From Allied Forces. Any straggler from one Allied force collected by another will be turned over as directly and expeditiously as practicable to the nearest organization of the ally to whose forces he belongs. When escorts are required they will normally be provided by the Allied force to which the straggler belongs.

c. Escaped Allied Prisoners of War and Evaders: British and U.S. escaped prisoners of war and evaders will be evacuated to the UK through normal replacement channels. Those requiring medical attention will be evacuated through medical channels.

6. Traffic Regulation and Control.

a. Traffic regulation and control for Continental operations as published in Circular No. 10, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, 4 MAY 1944 will govern road regulation and control.

b. All traffic on the Continent will drive to the right.

c. British road traffic control equipment will be used in accordance with Circular 26, Headquarters, ETOUSA, 12 March 1944.

d. The senior commander ashore is responsible for overall coordination of road traffic regulations and control within his area.

e. Road traffic control is a function principally executed by Military Police, while road traffic regulation is a function principally executed by the transportation service or comparable personnel. They must, therefore, work in close collaboration with each other since the functions are complementary.

f. Individual and small groups of vehicles not travelling as convoys will conform to existing road traffic control.

g. Area commanders may specially exempt from the application of traffic rules special vehicles and vehicles on special missions. Such vehicles will not be afforded immunity from the usual Military Police road traffic control, but will be afforded the priority treatment and right-of-way respect to the less urgent vehicles prescribed by the area commander concerned.

h. The success of military operations may be seriously affected by the degree of effectiveness of road traffic control. Therefore, all commanders of road traffic will ensure by training and supervision strict compliance with announced policies on road traffic regulation and control.

7. Relations Between Provost Marshals and Civil Affairs.

a. Reference: Memorandum No. 2, Headquarters, Third U.S. Army, 26 April 1944, subject: "Duties, Functions and Staff Relationships of Civil Affairs Section."

b. General Responsibilities. The responsibility for dealing with civilian authorities; relationship with, and assistance to, the civilian population; organization and direction of civilian activities; civilian maintenance of law and order; and protection of civilian institutions and establishments devolves on Civil Affairs. Where necessary, the PM will cooperate and assist by providing necessary military police or other military personnel to ensure effective enforcement of rules and regulations affecting the civilian population. It is considered that in the immediate assumption of control over an area such enforcement will be a matter mainly to be accomplished by Military Police or other military personnel, but that as rapidly as the situation permits, civil police and other authorities, through civil affairs personnel, will take over this enforcement. Employment of Military Police or other military personnel for such enforcement purposes will be then confined to emergency measures only.

c. Subjects Requiring Cooperative Action. The activities and duties of the PM and the CA sections are inter-related on the following subjects:

(1) Traffic Circulation and Control.

(2) Maintenance of Law and Order.

(3) Displaced Persons (Other than Prisoners of War).

(4) Criminal Investigation.

(5) Vice Control.

(6) Security.

d. Duties of PM and CA sections with respect to subjects requiring cooperative action.

(1) Traffic Circulation and Control.

Provost Marshal	Civil Affairs
a. Enforcement of regulations relating to civilian traffic, including sign posting, dissemination of route information, patrolling, escorting, restrictions as to use of facilities, etc.	a. Publication of traffic regulations to civilians.
b. Assistance (to G-4) in formulation of traffic regulations.	b. assistance (to G-4) in formulation of traffic regulations so far as they apply to civilian traffic.
c. Supervision of civilian police officers provided by CA.	c. Providing civilian police officers to PM to assist in traffic control (whenever available) on request.
d. Assistance to CA in planning and enforcing a system of passes and permits designed to control the movements of individual civilians (excluding those serving with the Allied forces).	d. Plans and regulations for, and enforcement of, a system of passes and permits designed to control the movements of individual civilians (excluding those serving with the Allied forces.
	e. Obtaining transportation for civilian movements, where available and necessary.

(2) Maintenance of Law and Order

a. Assistance in reorganization and supervision of civil police, when requested by CA.	a. Organization and control of civilian activities affecting the military, including the reorganization and control of civil police and other civil law enforcing agencies.
b. Providing Military Police or other military personnel to protect public works, installations, archives, monuments, works of art, etc., until civilian police are available and deemed competent, and, in emergency situations, seizing and impounding public archives and records for turnover to CA.	b. Protection of public works, installations, archives, monuments, works of art, etc., including the provision of civilian guards and maintenance personnel as soon as possible.
c. In absence of efficient enforcement by civil authorities, enforcement of proclamations, Ordinances, and regulations affecting civilians. Where necessary, providing Military Police or other military personnel for the service of judicial process.	c. Enforcement, through civilian police and other applicable civilian agencies, of laws, proclamations, Ordinances, and regulations affecting civilians.
d. Providing Military Police or other military personnel to seize and confiscate firearms in hands of civilians as soon as a town or area is occupied, for turnover to CA.	d. Receiving confiscated firearms from PM, and storing the same. Coordinate with G-2.
e. Where necessary, and in support of the civil police or in lieu of them, quelling outbreaks and uprisings, and preventing violence against civilians. Prevention of violence by civilians against military troops and installations.	e. Quelling outbreaks and uprisings and preventing violence against civilians, through civil police where competent. Where Military Police or other military personnel are employed the commander thereof will be in charge.

(3) Displaced Persons (other than Prisoners of War)

a; b. Performing with Military Police or other military personnel, the duties in (a) and (b) opposite in emergencies and when they can not be performed by civil affairs personnel.	a. Planning, organizing, establishing, staffing and regulating with civil affairs facilities, establishments for displaced civilians such as collecting stations and enclosures and evacuation centers.
	b. Providing food, shelter, clothing, medical attention, transportation, and other emergency measures only.
c. With the assistance of civil police, policing and otherwise ensuring order at establishments for displaced civilians and enforcing regulations for the conduct of the civilians in them.	c. Providing civil police to assist PM in policing and maintaining order in establishments for displaced civilians.
d. Enforcement of regulations governing association of military personnel with civilians.	d. Publication and enforcement of regulations governing association of civilians with military personnel.
e. Assist CA in (e) opposite.	e. Controlling movement of displaced persons.

(4) Criminal Investigation, Apprehension, and Custody

a. Investigation of offenses affecting the military and committed by civilians or military personnel. Apprehension and custody of persons charged with, or believed to have committed, such offenses.	a. Assistance to PM in(a) opposite.
b. Assistance to CA in (b) opposite.	b. Investigation of offenses affecting civilians only (excluding those serving with the armed forces) and the apprehension of persons charged with, or believed to have committed such offenses.

(5) Vice Control

a. With the assistance of CA, locating all houses of prostitution, and locating, rounding up, and segregating all prostitutes.	a. Assistance to PM in (a) opposite
b. Maintaining close supervision of all houses of prostitution and placing off limits those constituting a nuisance.	b. Enforcement of regulations requiring diseased prostitutes to submit to compulsory medical treatment at civilian agencies, and supervision of such treatment facilities.
c. Enforcement of off limits regulations.	c. Enforcement of off limits regulations in conjunction with the PM.
d, e. Enforcement of regulations referred to in (d) and (e) opposite in so far as military personnel are concerned, and assisting CA in so far as civilians are concerned.	d. Issuance and enforcement of regulations prohibiting sale or use of harmful drugs; suppression of establishments engaging in such traffic; and suppression of homosexual or other perverted or harmful practices.
	e. Suppressing of prostitution in the vicinity of any public eating or drinking establishment or place of entertainment.

(6) Security

a. Assistance to CA in (a) opposite, where Military Police or other military personnel are needed to ensure effective action by CA.	a. Dissolution of hostile civilian organizations including apprehension and detention of leaders, and control of political prisoners and political activities. Coordinate with G-2.
b. Concurrently with CA, the enforcement of regulations concerning gas defense, passive AA measures, firefighting, blackout, curfew, etc. relating to civilians.	b. Concurrently with PM, the enforcement of regulations concerning gas defense, passive AA measures, firefighting, blackout, curfew, etc. relating to civilians. Co-ordinate with G-3.

Third U. S. Army Outline Plan - Operation OVERLORD
Annex No. 20 - Publicity and Psychological Warfare Plan

Register No TUSA 75

ANNEX 20

TO

THIRD U.S. ARMY OUTLINE PLAN

OPERATION OVERLORD

P. & P.W. (G-6 Section) PLAN

(23 May 1944)

PATTON
Cmdg.

GAFFEY
C of S

GUENTHER
G-6

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P. & P.W. (G-6 Section) PLAN

1. GENERAL.

a. TUSA will fulfill its Public Relations and Psychological Warfare mission through the operation of detachments of P. & P.W. personnel under the direction of the Chief, P. & P.W. Section, this Headquarters. These detachments with equipment will be allocated from P. & P.W. Detachment, FUSAG, and the 72d Publicity Service Battalion, Special Troops, FUSAG, according to present minimum approved T/O & T/E.

b. Mission directed by FUSAG will be executed under the direction of Chief of P. & P.W. Section, TUSA, who will have under his command, P. & P.W. Staff Section permanently assigned TUSA, and P. & P.W. Detachments attached TD, TUSA.

c. Under the supervision of FUSAG, Chief, P. & P.W., TUSA, will coordinate Publicity and Psychological Warfare activities within the TUSA zone. Corps, Division and Separate Unit Commanders will be responsible for full cooperation with P. & P.W. personnel who may be operating within their zone of operations.

d. Communication between P. & P.W., TUSA, and P. & P.W., FUSAG, has been authorized. Direct communication relative P. & P.W. matters, between P. & P.W., TUSA and PROs of component units, TUSA, has been authorized.

2. SITUATION.

a. Prior to D-Day, P. & P.W., FUSAG, will have detached to FUSA (then under 21st Army Group) sufficient P. & P.W. operational and service personnel to enable FUSA to carry out its portion of the 21st Army Group, P. & P.W. mission. These detachments will man and service TUSA units that will be attached to FUSA until such time as these detached units again come under TUSA control.

b. Prior to TUSA landing on the continent, P. & P.W., FUSAG will have detached to TUSA operational and service personnel to enable TUSA to carry out its P. & P.W. mission.

3. MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE PUBLICITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SECTION.

a. The P. & P.W. Section, a General Staff Section of TUSA, is divided into the four following branches:

(1) Public Relations Branch.
(2) Psychological Warfare Branch.
(3) Visitors Bureau.
(4) Administrative Branch.

b. The Public Relations Branch.

(1) The mission of the Public Relations Branch is to provide the world press, radio and photographic agencies with an accurate and timely information service concerning activities of TUSA as fully as is consistent with security.

(2) To accomplish this Public Relations mission, Corps, Division and separate Unit Commanders are expected to give full cooperation in all matters of a Public Relations nature. As OVERLORD develops, correspondents (usually accompanied by Conducting Officers) will be attached to component units of TUSA. Plans now call for transportation to be furnished at Army level, however Corps and Divisional Commanders may be called upon to assist in supplying additional transportation and messing facilities. Component Unit Commanders will cooperate in supplying correspondents reasonable needs whenever possible and as the military situation permits.

(3) The Public Relations Branch is headed by the Public Relations Officer, who will be the Public Relations Officer for TUSA, and is responsible for the following through established military channels:

(a) Registration and checking of credentials of all correspondents, radio commentators, photographers, and others assigned to or desiring assignment to TUSA.

(b) Arrangements for correspondents' visits to component units, TUSA.

(c) Assignment of Conducting Officers to correspondents who wish to visit forward zones.

(d) Arrangement of briefing by Commanding General, Chief of Staff or Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, or Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, or representative of G-6 Section.

(e) Assistance in Procuring transportation and providing billets and messing facilities for correspondents.

(f) Arranging for courier or other communication for the movement of copy, photographs, recordings, etc.

(g) Submitting of ideas and suggestions to correspondents through close contact with Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, for news and feature stories, radio programs and photographic coverage.

The following five sections assist the PRO in the fulfillment of the above duties.

a. PRESS SECTION.

(1) FUNCTION.

The function of this section is to provide the world press with an accurate and timely information service concerning activities of TUSA.

(2) OPERATIONS.

This section will pass on copy (written by both army and civilian correspondents) for accuracy. Press Section personnel will provide news and feature stories for the world press and stories of home town interest for the United States press and wire services, and will pass on copy of a similar nature prepared by Public Relations personnel of component units of TUSA. This section will keep a background file of biographic material and photographs of officers in key positions throughout TUSA and component units.

(3) PERSONNEL

One (1) Officer - Chief of Section
Two (2) EM - Reporters

b. RADIO SECTION.

(1) FUNCTION.

It is the function of the Radio Section to assist broadcasters to obtain complete radio coverage of TUSA.

(2) OPERATIONS.

Radio Section operations fall into three categories:

(a) Front-Line Recordings.

In the main this will be done by magnetic wire records. By close contact with AC of S, G-2, and AC of S, G-3, the Radio Section will promptly advise radio correspondents of actions which will be suitable for such a broadcast, suggesting possible slants and methods of coverage.

(b) Scripted Live Programs.

When established on the Continent, a permanent transmitter will be in operation and scripted live programs will be transmitted direct to the United Kingdom and to the United States.

(c) Small Station Recordings.

These recordings will be designed for small United States stations without correspondent representation and will be produced by the taking of portable recording equipment into units for interviews. These will be released through P. & P.W. Section, FUSAG, and Radio Department, PR Section, ETOUSA.

The Radio Officer will also be responsible for clearance of the script or context of any broadcast involving TUSA personnel and no TUSA personnel will appear on a radio program without his written permission.

(3) PERSONNEL.

One (1) Officer - Chief of Section
Two (2) EM - Radio Reporters

c. PICTORIAL SECTION.

(1) FUNCTION.

The function of the Pictorial Section is to supply the world press and photographic services with timely information and assistance so that full still and motion picture coverage of Third U.S. Army units will be accomplished.

(2) OPERATIONS.

This section will pass on photographs and captions (exposed and written by both civilian and Army photographers) for accuracy. Pictorial Section personnel, in conjunction with Signal Photographic Companies and Army Pictorial Service, will provide photographic stories as such and photographic illustrations for news and feature stories produced by the Press Section.

(3) PERSONNEL.

One (1) Officer - Chief of Section
One (1) EM - Assistant

d. INFORMATION SECTION.

(1) FUNCTION.

The function of this section will be the supplying of releasable information for briefing in collaboration with AC of S, G-2, and AC of S, G-3.

(2) OPERATION.

This section will maintain an Information Room made up of portable map boards on which will be posted all releasable information dealing with the sector held by Third U.S. Army, as well as war maps of all other fronts. These will be posted twice daily, information for such posting being supplied by AC of S, G-2; monitored radio news broadcasts and when available, daily newspapers. These war maps will be maintained for the benefit of correspondents and representatives of radio and other media, and will also be used in briefing these news gathering representatives on Third U.S. Army activities. This briefing will be done in collaboration with AC of S, G-2, and AC of S, G-3.

This section will supply local maps to correspondents, Conducting Officers and PW Personnel; and will brief such personnel as to best available routes into combat areas.

This section, in conjunction with AC of S, G-2, and AC of S, G-3, will prepare information for the communiques issued at SHAEF level.

(3) PERSONNEL.

One (1) Officer - Chief of Section
One (1) EM - Draftsman

e. CONDUCTING OFFICERS SECTION.

(1) FUNCTION.

The function of the Conducting Officers Section is to provide trained conducting officers to escort SHAEF-accredited correspondents into combat areas, and to assist them in obtaining and filing their stories, radio broadcasts and photographs.

(2) OPERATIONS.

(a) The delivery of correspondents to the proper assigned area.

(b) All possible assistance to the correspondents in getting material for their stories, photographs and radio broadcasts.

(c) Returning the correspondents to Hq. P. & P.W., Third U.S. Army, where the story can be written, censored (in the event of field censorship) and filed with the Communication Section, or delivered by couriers.

(d) Ensuring that correspondents are as well cared for as possible as regards messing and billeting.

(3) PERSONNEL.

The Conducting Officers Section will consist of ten (10) officers supplied by P. & P.W. Detachment, FUSAG, under the direct supervision of the PRO.

4. FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP.

Field press censorship is the responsibility of FUSAG and there will be no section as such in P. & P.W. However, field press censors will be attached to this Headquarters on T/D as the situation demands. They will then be a responsibility of the P. & P.W. Section for messing, billeting, transportation and communication and office space, but will operate under SHAEF directives. However, on questions of tactical security, they will maintain close contact with AC of S, G-2, and AC of S, G-3, TUSA.

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BRANCH.

a. FUNCTION.

The function of the Psychological Warfare Branch is the preparation, distribution and control of propaganda with the objective of undermining the enemy's will to resist, demoralizing his force, and sustaining the morale of friendly elements.

(1) In the combat area.
(2) In enemy and enemy occupied countries.
(3) In areas occupied by our forces.

(NOTE): Operational data, authorized lists of personnel and equipment will be included in an appendix (to be issued later).

6. VISITORS BUREAU.

a. FUNCTION.

The function of the VISITORS BUREAU is the escorting, billeting and messing of "official" visitors to TUSA.

b. PERSONNEL.

One (1) Officer - Chief of Bureau
One (1) EM - Assistant

7. ADMINISTRATION BRANCH.

a. FUNCTION.

The function of the ADMINISTRATION BRANCH is the administration of the P. & P.W. Section and has command of the Service Group of the 72d Publicity Service Battalion, and the Communications Group of the 72d Publicity Service Battalion while attached to TUSA.

(1) SERVICE GROUP.

(a) FUNCTION.

Primary function of the Service Group is messing, billeting and transporting correspondents and representatives of other media, conducting officers, P. & P.W. Section and "official" visitors. This group consists of 1 officer and 43 enlisted men and is equipped with the following vehicles:

17 - 1/4-ton 4x4
1 - 1½-ton Truck (Cargo)
1 - 2½-ton 6x6 (Kitchen)

(NOTE): Equipment for this Service Group is subject to modification as situation requires.

(2) COMMUNICATIONS GROUP.

(a) FUNCTION.

The function of the communications group is to supply communication facilities for transmission of copy prepared by civilian correspondents and Public Relations personnel. This group consists of 1 officer and 20 enlisted men and is equipped with the following vehicles:

1 - 1/4-ton 4x4
1 - 2½-ton 6x6, Cargo (For SCR 399A)
1 - Trailer, P895

8. DISPOSITION OF P. & P.W. PERSONNEL.

a. Forward "A" Echelon.

One officer and one EM - PRO. One officer, one EM - P.W.B
One officer and one EM - Administrative Section.

b. Forward "B" Echelon.

The War Correspondents' Camp, maintained by P. & P.W. Section will move with the Forward "B" Echelon and will be established in the vicinity of the Forward "B" Echelon bivouac area.

c. Rear Echelon.

The P.W.B. detachment and the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company will move with the Rear Echelon and will operate from the Rear Echelon Bivouac Area.



MAP SUPPLEMENT THIRD U S ARMY AFTER ACTION REPORT

GSGS 1:500,000 SERIES

AREA COVERED BY SUPPLEMENT

REPRODUCED BY 650TH ENGR (TOP) BN. (DET.)

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.

To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE



EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/8

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/4

NOTE

The following sections of the map supplement are missing:

Leipzig
Praha
Brest
Paris
Strasbourg
Dijon
Bolzano

WIEN

1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only Not for sale or distribution

WIEN

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM

(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

SECOND EDITION

E. of Greenwich

PRAHA

MÜNCHEN

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.

To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

Greenwich Meridian

West 180° — 180° East

N. W. | N. E.

Equator

S. W. | S. E.

0°

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

LEIPZIG N.E. 50/10	PRAHA N.E. 50/16	KRAKOW N.E. 50/16
NÜRNBERG N.E. 49/10	WIEN N.E. 48/16	TATRY N.E. 49/16

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

WIEN

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM
(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

SECOND EDITION-AMS 2

N.F. 48/14

E. of Greenwich.

PRAHA

THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE THE RUSSIAN ZONE 4 PURPLE, AND THE NORD DE GUERRE BLUE GRIDS.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS

Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square.
Thus the grid reference of OSTROV is X(00)9631

ALTITUDE TINTS
(NORTHERN ZONE)
SYSTEM

METRES
1,400 and above
1,000
800
600
400
200
100
Sea Level

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
	19,000
5,500	18,000
	17,000
5,000	16,000
	15,000
4,500	14,000
4,000	13,000

TATRY

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

LEIPZIG N.E. 50/10	PRAHA N.E. 50/14	KRAKOW N.E. 50/18
MUNCHEN N.E. 48/10	WIEN N.E. 48/14	TATRY N.E. 48/18
BOLZANO N.E. 46/10	GRAZ N.E. 46/14	BUDAPEST N.E. 46/18

Each sheet carries a 20 minute overlap to the north and east

INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



Geographical Section, General Staff, No 4072.
Published by War Office, 1941.
2nd. Edition 1942.

Annual change about 8 minutes easterly (mean)

REFERENCE

Railways, Two or More Tracks	Tunnel / Station	Rivers	
Single Track and Light Railways	Station	Canals	
Railways Under Construction		Inland Water and Marsh	Marsh, Lake, Reservoir
Main Roads		Contours	
Minor Roads		Coast and Fathom Lines	
Other		Spot Heights	5-20 (1915 Major, 1921 Minor)
Large Towns		International Boundary	
Small Towns and Villages	or	Woods	

Scale 1:500,000
Statute Miles
10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110

Kilometres
10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210

Nautical Miles
10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110

Land aerodrome
Landing ground
Water aerodrome (Centre of circle)
Seaplane mooring area or anchorage
Hangar for airships (Centre of base)
Mooring mast for airships (Centre of base)
Landmark (Centre of circle) description
Radioelectric stations

NOTE: The aeronautical symbols may b

Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minute intervals.
This chart is prepared for use in daylight,
under white, ultra-violet, red and amber lights.

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES
Projection, Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Central Zone)
Compiled and drawn at War Offic
ARMY
1/44

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	18,000
5,000	17,000
4,500	16,000
4,000	15,000
3,500	14,000
3,000	13,000
2,500	12,000
2,000	11,000
1,500	10,000
1,000	9,000
500	8,000
0	7,000
	6,000
	5,000
	4,000
	3,000
	2,000
	1,000
	0

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

First give the code letters denoting the exact degree of latitude and longitude immediately to the South and West of the required point. Then give in figures the distance in minutes of latitude and in minutes of longitude of the point from the degreee intersection so described. Thus if 50°N. is represehted by AB and 23°W. by XY then the position 50°08'N., 22°33'W. will be denoted ABXY 0827. Similarly if 50°N. is represented by AB and 5°E. is represented by PQ then the position 50°17'N., 5°38'E. is ABPQ 1738.

Annual change about 8 minutes easterly (mean)

E. of Greenwich.

EACH DIVISION IN THE BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Projection, Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Central Zone)

Compiled and drawn at War Office, 1940. Heliographed at Ordnance Survey, 1941.

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 103568
7/44—PR. 1944

Scale 1:500,000

Statute Miles

Kilometres

Nautical Miles

Marsh, Lake, Reservoir

1912 Major 1921 Minor

Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minute intervals.

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultra-violet, red and amber lights.

REFERENCE

Land aerodrome		Obstruction over 60 meters (200 feet above ground)	Centre of symbol
Landing ground		Marine light — Lighthouse or light buoy (Centre of star)	
Water aerodrome (Centre of circle)		Marine light — Light vessel (Centre of star)	
Seaplane mooring area or anchorage (Centre of Stock)		Air light	
Hangar for airships (Centre of base)		Overhead high tension cable	
Mooring mast for airships (Centre of base)		Danger area	
Landmark (Centre of circle) description added		Explosives area	
Radioelectric stations			

NOTE: The aeronautical symbols may be combined e.g. Land and water aerodrome with air light and radioelectric station.

P.A. Indicates position approximate.

Heights in metres 559.

WIEN

N4800-E1400/220x420

MÜNCHEN
1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by
War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

MÜNCHEN

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM
(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

2nd. Edition - AMS 3 N.E.

E. of Greenwich

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.
To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

West 180° / Greenwich Meridian		180° East
N. W.	N. E.	
Equator		
S. W.	S. E.	

0°

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

FRANKFURT NE 50/6	LEIPZIG NE 50/10	PRAHA NE 50/14
STRAS-BOURG NE 48/6	MÜNCHEN NE 48/10	WIEN NE 48/14
BERNE NE 46/6	BOLZANO NE 46/10	GRAZ NE 46/14

Each sheet covers a 20 minute quadrant

GERMANY

MÜNCHEN

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only Not for sale or distribution

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM
(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

2nd. Edition.- AMS 3 N.E. 48/10

E. of Greenwich

THE GRID INDICATED ON THIS SHEET IS THE NORD DE GUERRE BLUE GRID.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS

N	O	P		
S	T	U	Q	
X	Y	Z	V	

Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square. Thus the grid reference of SUNCHING is WU 3841.

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Area shown shaded revised from air photographs up to

ALTITUDE TINTS

METRES
1200 and above
800
600
400
200
100
Sea Level

CONVERSION GRAPH

Meters	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	18,000
5,000	17,000
4,500	16,000
4,000	14,000
3,600	13,000
3,000	12,000
	11,000
	10,000
	9,000
	8,000
	7,000

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

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To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

West 180°	Greenwich Meridian	180° East
N. W.	N. E.	
Equator		
S. W.	S. E.	
0°		

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6.

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
S.W. 30/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

FRANKFURT NE 50/6	LEIPZIG NE 50/10	PRAHA NE 50/14
STRASBOURG NE 48/6	MÜNCHEN NE 48/10	WIEN NE 48/14
BERNE NE 46/6	BOLZANO NE 46/10	GRAZ NE 46/14

Each sheet carries a 20 minute overlap to the north and east



Geographical Section, General Staff, No 4072.
Published by War Office, 1940.
2nd Edition 1942.

Compiled and drawn at War Office,

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Projection. Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Central Zone)

Annual change about 9' easterly (mean)

Isogonic data revised by AMS, 1944

Scale 1:500,000

Statute Miles

Kilometers

Nautical Miles

REFERENCE

- Railways, Two or More Tracks
- Single Track and Light Railways
- Railways Under Construction
- State Highways
- Main Roads
- Minor Roads
- Rivers
- Canals
- Inland Water and Marsh
- Contours
- Coast and Fathom Lines
- Spot Heights
- International Boundary
- Woods
- Tunnel / Station
- Completed
- Marsh / Lake / Reservoir
- 1913 Major / 1921 Minor

- Land aerodrome
- Landing ground
- Water aerodrome (Centre of circ
- Seaplane mooring area or ansh
- Hanger for airships (Centre of
- Mooring mast for airships (Cent
- Landmark (Centre of circle)

ALTITUDE TINTS

METRES
1200 and above
800
600
400
200
100
Sea Level

CONVERSION GRAPH

Meters	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	19,000
5,000	18,000
5,000	17,000
4,500	16,000
4,000	15,000
4,000	14,000
3,500	13,000
3,000	12,000
3,000	11,000
2,500	10,000
2,500	9,000
2,000	8,000
1,500	7,000
1,000	6,000
1,000	5,000
500	4,000
500	3,000
0	2,000
0	1,000
	0

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

First give the code letters denoting the exact degree of latitude and longitude immediately to the South and West of the required point. Then give in figures the distance in minutes of latitude and in minutes of longitude of the point from the degree intersection so described. Thus if 50°N. is represented by AB and 23°W. by XY then the position 50°08'N., 22°33'W. will be denoted ABXY 0827. Similarly if 50°N. is represented by AB and 5°E. is represented by PQ then the position 50°17'N., 5°38'E. is ABPQ 1738.

0°44" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.) — 0°48" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.) — 0°52" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.) — 0°56" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)

E. of Greenwich

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Projection. Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Central Zone)
Annual change about 9' easterly (mean).

Compiled and drawn at War Office, 1940. Heliographed at Ordnance Survey, 1940.

Isogonic data revised by AMS, 1944

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 103548
8/44—26
1944

Scale 1:500,000

Statute Miles 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Kilometers 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150

Nautical Miles

REFERENCE

Land aerodrome		Obstruction over 60 meters (200 feet above ground)	Centre of symbol
Landing ground		Marine light: Lighthouse or light buoy (Centre of star)	
Water aerodrome (Centre of circle)		Marine light: Light vessel (Centre of star)	
Seaplane mooring area or anchorage (Centre of Stock)		Air light	
Hangar for airships (Centre of base)		Overhead high tension cable	
Mooring mast for airships (Centre of base)		Danger area	
Landmark (Centre of circle) description added		Explosives area	
Radioelectric stations			

LE

1:500,000



SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

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To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

West 180° — Greenwich Meridian — 180° East

Equator

N.W.	N.E.
S.W.	S.E.

0°

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

BREST N.W. 49/6	LE MANS N.W. 48/6	PARIS N.E. 48/6
	NANTES N.W. 48/6	DIJON N.E. 48/6

Each sheet contains a 20 minutes overlap on the north and east

LE HAVRE
000 EUROPE (AIR)
HEIGHTS IN METRES
For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only Not for sale or distribution
LE HAVRE
2nd Edition
NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM
(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)
ENGLISH CHANNEL
W. of Greenwich
E. of Greenwich
BAY OF THE SEINE
Le Havre
Rouen
Caen
Bayeux
Lisieux
Verneuil

[redacted]

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only. Not for sale or distribution.

LE HAVRE

2nd Edition

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM

(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

SECOND EDITION - AMS 2

FRANCE

NW.48/2

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Area shown shaded revised from air photographs up to October 1941

ALTITUDE TINTS

METERS
400 and above
200
100
Sea Level

FATHOMS
5

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
	19,000
5,500	18,000
	17,000
5,000	16,000
	15,000
4,500	14,000
	13,000
4,000	12,000
	11,000
3,500	10,000
	9,000
3,000	8,000
	7,000

and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.
To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

Greenwich Meridian

West 180° — 180° East

N.W.	N.E.
S.W.	S.E.

Equator

0°

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

BREST N.W. 4620/5	LE HAVRE N.W. 48/2	PARIS N.E. 48/2
	NANTES N.W. 46/2	DIJON N.E. 46/2

Each sheet carries a 20 minutes overlap to the north and east

BREST

GULF OF ST. MALO

NANTES

Elbeuf

Verneuil

Ecrosnes

Bouard

Geographical Section, General Staff, No 4072.
War Office 1942
2nd Edition 1942

25,000/11/42. Wo.

REFERENCE

Railways, two or more tracks	Tunnel / Station	Rivers	
Single track and light railways	Station	Canals	
Railways under construction		Inland water and marsh	Marsh / Lake / Reservoir
State highways	Completed	Contours	
Main roads		Coast and fathom lines	
Minor roads		Spot heights	912 / 1781
Large towns		International boundary	Major / Minor
Small towns and villages		Woods	

Land aerodrome	
Landing ground	
Water aerodrome (Cen	
Seaplane mooring area	
Hangar for airships (C	
Mooring mast for airsh	
Landmark (Centre of c	
Radioelectric stations	

NOTE: The aeronau

0° 08" L.M.T. (Behind G.M.T.)
0° 04" L.M.T. (Behind G.M.T.)
W. of Greenwich
0° 0' Greenwich Mean Time
E. of Greenwich
0° 04" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Projection. Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Control Zone)

Annual change about 10 minutes easterly (mean)

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 103540
3/44 NP 1943

Scale 1:500,000

Statute Miles

Kilometres

Nautical Miles

Fathom lines and low water mark are based on Admiralty Charts.
Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minutes intervals.

HEIGHTS IN METRES

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultraviolet and red and amber lights.

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	19,000
5,000	18,000
4,500	17,000
4,000	16,000
3,500	15,000
3,000	14,000
2,500	13,000
2,000	12,000
1,500	11,000
1,000	10,000
500	9,000
0	8,000
	7,000
	6,000
	5,000
	4,000
	3,000
	2,000
	1,000
	0

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET.

First give the code letters denoting the exact degree of latitude and longitude immediately to the South and West of the required point.

Then give in figures the distance in minutes of latitude and in minutes of longitude of the point from the degree intersection so described.

Thus if 50° N. is represented by AB and 23° W. by XY then the position 50° 08′ N., 22° 33′ W. will be denoted ABXY 0827.

Similarly if 50° N. is represented by AB and 5° E. is represented by PQ then the position 50° 17′ N., 5° 38′ E. is ABPQ 1738.

1° 0° 04" L.M.T. (Behind G.M.T.) 30′ W. of Greenwich 0° 0′ Greenwich Mean Time E. of Greenwich 30′ NANTES 1° 0° 04" L.M.T (Ahead of G.M.T.) 30′ 2° 0° 08" L.M.T (Ahead of G.M.T.) 2° 30′

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Projection. Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Central Zone)

Annual change about 10 minutes easterly (mean)

Scale 1:500000

Statute Miles

Kilometres

Nautical Miles

Fathom lines and low water mark are based on Admiralty Charts.
Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minutes intervals.

HEIGHTS IN METRES

This chart is compiled for use in aircraft under visual, ultra-visual, air and surface navigation.

Compiled and drawn at War Office, 1941.

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C., 103840
7/44 NP 1943

REFERENCE

Land aerodrome		Obstruction over 60 meters (200 feet above ground)	Centre of symbol
Landing ground		Marine light (Lighthouse or light buoy (Centre of star)	
Water aerodrome (Centre of circle)		Marine light (Light vessel (Centre of star)	
Seaplane mooring area or anchorage (Centre of Stock)		Air light	
Hangar for airships (Centre of base)		Overhead high tension cable	
Mooring mast for airships (Centre of base)		Danger area	
Landmark (Centre of circle) description added		Explosives area	
Radioelectric stations			

NOTE: The aeronautical symbols may be combined e.g. Land and water aerodrome with air light and radioelectric station.

P.A. indicates position approximate.

Heights in metres 559.

LE HAVRE

N4800-W200/220x420E

BERNE
1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

BERNE

SOUTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM

E. of Greenwich. STRASBOURG

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.
To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

Greenwich Meridian

West 180° — 180° East

N. W.	N. E.
Equator	
S. W.	S. E.

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
S.W. 40/6

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only Not for sale or distribution

BERNE

SOUTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM

SECOND EDITION - AMS 2

N.E.46/6

E. of Greenwich.

STRASBOURG

BOLZANO

ALTITUDE TINTS (SOUTHERN ZONE) SYSTEM

This is different from the R.A.F. conventional sign card

METRES
3000 and above
2000
1400
1000
600
200
Sea Level

THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE THE NORD DE GUERRE BLUE, FRENCH LAMBERT ZONE 2 PURPLE AND N.ITALY BROWN GRIDS.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS



Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square. Thus the grid reference of ST.GALLEN is W(C)2370

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	18,000
5,000	16,000
4,500	15,000
4,000	13,000
3,500	12,000
3,000	11,000
2,500	10,000

the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.
To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE



EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

PARIS N.E. 48/2	STRASBOURG N.E. 48/6	MUNCHEN N.E. 48/10
DIJON N.E. 46/2	BERNE N.E. 46/6	BOLZANO N.E. 46/10
LYON N.E. 44/2	TORINO N.E. 44/6	VENEZIA N.E. 44/10

Each sheet carries a 20 minute overlap to the north and east

INDEX TO BOUNDARIES





Geographical Section, General Staff. No 4072.

Glaciers and perpetual snow areas

Annual change about 9 minutes easterly (mean)

E. of Greenwich

Projection, Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Southern Zone)

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Scale 1:500,000
Statute Miles
Kilometres
Nautical Miles

REFERENCE

Railways, Two or More Tracks	Tunnel / Station	Rivers	
Single Track and Light Railways	Station	Canals	
Railways Under Construction		Inland Water and Marsh	Marsh / Lake / Reservoir
Main Roads		Contours	
Minor Roads		Coast and Fathom Lines	
Other		Spot Heights	1912 Major / 1721 Minor
Large Towns		International Boundary	
Small Towns and Villages	or	Woods	

Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minute intervals.

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultra-violet, red and amber lights.

Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square. Thus the grid reference of ST.GALLEN is WC(C)2370

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	18,000
5,000	17,000
4,500	16,000
4,000	15,000
3,500	14,000
3,000	13,000
2,500	12,000
2,000	11,000
1,500	10,000
1,000	9,000
500	8,000
0	7,000
	6,000
	5,000
	4,000
	3,000
	2,000
	1,000
	0

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

First give the code letters denoting the exact degree of latitude and longitude immediately to the South and West of the required point. Then give in figures the distance in minutes of latitude and in minutes of longitude of the point from the degree intersection so described. Thus if 50°N. is represented by AB and 23°W. by XY then the position 50°08'N., 22°33'W. will be denoted ABXY 0827. Similarly if 50°N. is represented by AB and 5°E. is represented by PQ then the position 50°17'N., 5°38'E. is ABPQ 1738.

BOLZANO

TORINO

E. of Greenwich

0°28" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)
0°32" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)
0°36" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)
0°40" L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Annual change about 9 minutes easterly (mean)

Projection. Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Southern Zone)

Compiled and drawn at War Office, 1941.

Photographed at Ordnance Survey, 1941

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U.S. ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C., 111337
1/44 KM 1944

Scale 1:500,000

Statute Miles

Kilometres

Nautical Miles

Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minute intervals.

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultra-violet, red and amber lights.

REFERENCE

Land aerodrome		Obstruction over 60 meters (200 feet above ground)	Centre of symbol
Landing ground		Marine light	Lighthouse or light buoy (Centre of star)
Water aerodrome (Centre of circle)			Light vessel (Centre of star)
Seaplane mooring area or anchorage (Centre of Stock)		Air light	
Hangar for airships (Centre of base)		Overhead high tension cable	
Mooring mast for airships (Centre of base)		Danger area	
Landmark (Centre of circle) description added		Explosives area	
Radioelectric stations			

NOTE: The aeronautical symbols may be combined e.g. Land and water aerodrome with air light and radioelectric station.

P.A. indicates position approximate.

Heights in metres 859.

BERNE

N4600-E600/220x420

NANTES

8 9 30° 1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only. Not for sale or distribution

NANTES

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM

W. of Greenwich. 0° E. of Greenwich.

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.

To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

West 180°	Greenwich Meridian	180° East
N.W.	N.E.	
Equator		
S.W.	S.E.	

0°

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled **FRANKFURT** *would be referred to as* **N.E. 50/6**

The sheet titled **MADRID** *would be referred to as* **N.W. 40/6**

Rennes · Laval · Nantes · Angers · Le Mans · La Flèche · Tours · Vierzon · Orléans · Châteauroux · Blois · Vendôme · Châteaudun · Dreux · Chartres · Evreux · Alençon · Fougères · Vitré · Redon · Ancenis · Cholet · Saumur · Loudun · Chinon · Montargis · Gien · Briare · Sancerre · Bourges · Issoudun · Argenton · Poitiers · Niort · Fontenay · Les Sables d'Olonne · La Roche sur Yon · Clisson · Pornic · Guérande · Le Croisic · Pontchâteau · Savenay · Châteaubriant · Segré · Craon · Mayenne · Sablé · Château du Loir · Saint Calais · Mamers · Nogent le Rotrou · Dreux · Mantes · Versailles · Rambouillet · Etampes · Pithiviers · Montargis · Auxerre · Joigny · Sens · Nemours · Fontainebleau · Melun · Meaux · Coulommiers · Provins · Nogent sur Seine · Troyes · Romilly · Bar sur Seine · Châtillon sur Seine · Montbard · Semur · Avallon · Vézelay · Clamecy · Cosne · Pouilly · Sancerre · Gien · Orléans · Pithiviers · Malesherbes · Fontainebleau · Corbeil · Arpajon · Dourdan · Rambouillet · Versailles · Saint Germain · Pontoise · Beaumont sur Oise · Creil · Senlis · Compiègne · Noyon · Roye · Montdidier · Amiens · Abbeville · Le Crotoy · Saint Valery sur Somme · Dieppe · Le Tréport · Eu · Forges les Eaux · Gournay · Neufchâtel · Aumale · Gisors · Les Andelys · Vernon · Evreux · Bernay · Lisieux · Pont l'Evêque · Honfleur · Trouville · Deauville · Cabourg · Dives · Caen · Bayeux · Isigny · Carentan · Valognes · Cherbourg · Barfleur · Saint Lô · Coutances · Granville · Avranches · Pontorson · Mont Saint Michel · Dol · Combourg · Fougères · Vitré · Laval · Mayenne · Evron · Lassay · Domfront · Flers · Condé sur Noireau · Vire · Tinchebray · Falaise · Argentan · Sées · Mortagne · Bellême · Nogent le Rotrou · Chartres · Dreux · Mantes · Meulan · Pontoise · Saint Germain · Versailles · Rambouillet · Dourdan · Etampes · Arpajon · Corbeil · Melun · Fontainebleau · Malesherbes · Pithiviers

HEIGHTS IN METRES

For use by
War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

NANTES

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM 2nd Edition - AMS 3

FRANCE
N.W.46/2

W. of Greenwich. E. of Greenwich.

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Area shown shaded revised from air photographs up to

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
5,500	18,000
5,000	17,000
4,500	16,000
4,000	15,000
3,500	14,000
3,000	12 000
2,500	11,000
2,000	10,000
1,500	9,000
1,000	8,000
500	7,000
0	6,000
	5,000
	4,000
	3,000
	2,000
	1,000
	0

ALTITUDE TINTS

METERS
600 and above
400
200
100
Sea Level Low water FATHOMS
0

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefaced by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.
To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

Greenwich Meridian: West 180° — 180° East

N.W.	N.E.
Equator	
S.W.	S.E.

0°

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

BREST NW. 48/2	LE HAVRE NW. 48/2	PARIS NE. 48/2
	NANTES NW. 46/2	DIJON NE. 46/2
	BORDEAUX NW. 44/2	LYON NE. 44/2

This sheet carries a 20 minutes overlap to the north and east

REFERENCE

Railways, two or more tracks — Tunnel, Station	Rivers
Single track and light railways — Station	Canals — Marsh, Lake, Reservoir
Railways under construction	Inland water and marsh
State highways — Completed	Contours
Main roads	Coast and fathom lines
Minor roads	Spot heights — 1912 Major, 172 Minor
Large towns	International boundary
Small towns and villages — or	Woods

Geographical Section, General Staff, No 4072.

Annual change about 9 minutes easterly (mean)

Scale 1:500,000
Statute Miles: 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Kilometres: 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210
Nautical Miles: 10 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110

Fathom lines and low water mark are based on Admiralty Charts.
Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minutes intervals.

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultra-violet, red and amber lights.

ALTITUDE TINTS

METERS
600 and above
400
200
100
Sea Level
Low water

FATHOMS
5
20

THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE THE FRENCH LAMBERT ZONE I, FRENCH LAMBERT ZONE 2, AND THE NORD DE GUERRE GRIDS.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS



Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-West corner of the lettered square.
Thus the grid reference of MIRÉ is VIII 8810

METHOD OF GIVING A POSITION REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

First give the code letters denoting the exact degree of latitude and longitude immediately to the South and West of the required point.

Then give in figures the distance in minutes of latitude and in minutes of longitude of the point from the degree intersection so described.

Thus if 50° N. is represented by AB and 23° W. by XY then the position 50° 08′ N., 22° 33′ W. will be denoted ABXY 0827.

Similarly if 50° N. is represented by AB and 5° E. is represented by PQ then the position 50° 17′ N., 5° 38′ E. is ABPQ 1738.

0° 04m L.M.T. (Behind G.M.T.) — 30′ — W. of Greenwich. — 0° — E. of Greenwich. — 30′ — 1° 0° 04m L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)

Mean Time

EACH DIVISION IN THIS BORDER EQUALS 10 STATUTE MILES

Projection, Europe (Air) Conical Orthomorphic (Southern Zone)

Compiled and drawn at War Office, 1940. Heliographed at Ordnance Survey, 1941.

ARMY MAP SERVICE, U. S. ARMY WASHINGTON, D. C., 103550 9/44 – PR 1944.

Annual change about 9 minutes easterly (mean)

Scale 1:500,000

Statute Miles

Kilometres

Nautical Miles

Fathom lines and low water mark are based on Admiralty Charts.
Lines of equal magnetic declination are shown at 30 minutes intervals.

This chart is prepared for use in daylight, under white, ultra-violet, red and amber lights.

REFERENCE

Land aerodrome		Obstruction over 60 meters (200 feet above ground)	Centre of symbol
Landing ground		Marine light — Lighthouse or light buoy (Centre of star)	
Water aerodrome (Centre of circle)		Marine light — Light vessel (Centre of star)	
Seaplane mooring area or anchorage (Centre of Stock)		Air light	
Hanger for airships (Centre of base)		Overhead high tension cable	
Mooring mast for airships (Centre of base)		Danger area	
Landmark (Centre of circle) description added		Explosives area	
Radioelectric stations			

NOTE: The aeronautical symbols may be combined e.g. Land and water aerodrome with air light and radioelectric station.

P.A. Indicates position approximate.
Heights in metres 559.

NANTES

N4600-W200/200×420E

1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

GRAZ

SOUTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM

2nd Edition

N.

E. of Greenwich.

WIEN

BOLZANO

(1942)

HEIGHTS IN METRES

GRAZ

SOUTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM 2nd Edition

N.E. 46/14

E. of Greenwich.

WIEN

BUDAPEST

ALTITUDE TINTS (SOUTHERN ZONE) SYSTEM

This is different from the R.A.F. conventional sign card

METRES
2000 and above
1400
1000
600
200
Sea Level

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Area shown shaded revised from air photographs up to

THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE THE NORD DE GUERRE BLUE AND THE NORTH ITALY BROWN GRIDS.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS

Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square.
Thus the grid reference of JOHANN IS XIEL 9685.

BOLZANO
Totes
Kleine Tauern
Gurktaler
Kg
Balaton
DRAVA
Prvačina Kan.
Sárvíz
Rába
Répce
Ikva
Gerencser
Marcal
Pinka
Lafnitz
Raab
Gyor
Sopron
Kapuvár
Csorna
Szombathely
Körmend
Szentgotthárd
Fehérvárcsurgó
Nagykanizsa
Keszthely
Siófok
Balatonboglár
Tihany
Balatonfüred
Veszprém
Zalaegerszeg
Zalaszentgrót
Celldömölk
Szombathely
Pápa
Tapolca
Sümeg
Tata
Komárom
Esztergom
Győr
Mosonszentjános
Frauenkirchen
Neusiedl
Illmitz
Halbturn
Andau
Lébény
Csorna
Kapuvár
Mihályi
Szil
Jobbágyi
Lövő
Csapod
Beled
Szany
Kajár
Lovászpatona
Vaszar
Tét
Nyúlfalu
Mecsér
Tárkány
Nagyigmánd
Bana
Aca
Mocsa
Gönyű
Ásványráró
Mórichida
Ménfőcsanak
Kisbajcs
Nagyszentjános
Mosonmagyaróvár
Hegyeshalom
Fertőszentmiklós
Fertőd
Sarród
Eszterháza
Fertőrákos
Kópháza
Sopronkövesd
Harka
Sopronhorpács
Fertőhomok
Balf
Fertőboz
Sopronbánfalva
Sopronkeresztúr
Und
Ágfalva
Harkaújfalu
Sopronhorpács
Nagylózs
Hegykő
Nagycenk
Fertőszentmiklós
Sarród
Eszterháza
Fertőd
Sarród
Eszterháza
Fertőrákos
Kópháza
Sopronkövesd
Harka
Sopronhorpács
Fertőhomok
Balf
Fertőboz
Sopronbánfalva
Sopronkeresztúr
Und
Ágfalva
Harkaújfalu
Sopronhorpács
Nagylózs
Hegykő
Nagycenk
Fertőszentmiklós

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Area shown shaded revised from air photographs up to

THE GRIDS INDICATED ON THIS SHEET ARE THE NORD DE GUERRE BLUE AND THE NORTH ITALY BROWN GRIDS.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS



Grid references are given in kilometres. Eas and North of the South-west corner of the tattered square.
Thus the grid reference of JOHANN is Xier 2685.

BUDAPEST

E. of Greenwich. 16° 1h 04m L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.) FIUME 17° 1h 08m L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.) 18° 1h 12m L.M.T. (Ahead of G.M.T.)

Compiled and drawn at War Office, 1941. Hellographed at Ordnance Survey, 1941.

FRANKFURT
1:500,000 EUROPE (AIR)

For use by
War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution

HEIGHTS IN METRES
500 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 600 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 700 1 2 3

FRANKFURT

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTE
(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SO

E. of Greenwich

BREMEN

BRUXELLES

SHEET REFERENCE SYSTEM

Sheets are described by their title and by the geographical co-ordinates of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.

To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE

Greenwich
West 180° Meridian 180° East

N.W.	N.E.
Equator	
S.W.	S.E.

0

EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

NORTH SEA N.E. 51/6	BREMEN N.E. 51/6	BERLIN N.E. 51/6
		LEIPZIG N.E. 51/6
		PRAHA N.E. 50/6

For use by
Dept Agencies only
or sale or distribution

HEIGHTS IN METRES

FRANKFURT

NORTHERN ZONE LAYER SYSTEM 2ND EDITION-AMS 3

(LAYER STEPS CORRESPOND TO THOSE ON THE R.A.F. CONVENTIONAL SIGN CARD)

N.E. 50/6

E. of Greenwich

BREMEN

LEIPZIG

THE GRID INDICATED ON THIS SHEET IS THE NORD DE GUERRE BLUE GRID.

INCIDENCE OF GRID LETTERS



Grid references are given in kilometres East and North of the South-west corner of the lettered square.
Thus the grid reference of GÜTERSLOH is R(63) 4468.

RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

Area shown shaded revised from air photographs up to

CONVERSION GRAPH

Metres	Feet
6,000	20,000
	19,000
5,500	18,000
	17,000
5,000	16,000
	15,000
4,500	14,000
4,000	13,000
	12,000
3,500	11,000
3,000	10,000
	9,000
2,500	8,000
2,000	7,000
	6,000
1,500	5,000
	4,000
1,000	3,000
	2,000
500	1,000
0	0

ALTITUDE TINTS

METRES
800 and above
600
400
200
100
Sea Level

of the south-west corner, prefixed by one of four pairs of letters denoting the quarter of the globe in which the south-west corner of the sheet is situated.
To give the co-ordinates, the latitude is given first and separated from the longitude by an oblique stroke.

QUARTERING OF THE GLOBE



EXAMPLES

The sheet titled
FRANKFURT
would be referred to as
N.E. 50/6

The sheet titled
MADRID
would be referred to as
N.W. 40/6

ADJOINING SHEETS

NORTH SEA GSGS 4369	BREMEN NE 52/6	BERLIN NE 52/10
STRAIT OF DOVER	FRANKFURT NE 50/6	LEIPZIG NE 50/10
PARIS NE 48/2	STRAS-BOURG NE 48/6	MUNCHEN NE 48/10

Each sheet carries a 20 minute overlap to the north and east

INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



N = NETHERLANDS B = BELGIUM
L = LUXEMBOURG


BRUXELLES
STRASBOURG
Krefeld Uerdingen
München Gladbach
Rheydt
Neuss
Düsseldorf
Köln
Aachen
Maastricht
Heerlen
Düren
Eupen
Malmedy
Bonn
Koblenz
Trier
Mainz
Wiesbaden
Frankfurt
Darmstadt
Mannheim
Saarbrücken
Metz
Luxembourg
Arlon
Ard
Hunsrück
Eifel
Taunus
Odenkirchen
Viersen
Rheindahlen
Wegberg
Erkelenz
Geilenkirchen
Heinsberg
Jülich
Eschweiler
Stolberg
Monschau
Prüm
Bitburg
Wittlich
Daun
Mayen
Andernach
Neuwied
Siegen
Hachenburg
Limburg
Wetzlar
Gießen
Marburg
Kirchhain
Alsfeld
Schlüchtern
Fulda
Hünfeld
Bad Hersfeld
Eschwege
Kassel
Hofgeismar
Warburg
Paderborn
Detmold
Lippstadt
Soest
Arnsberg
Meschede
Olpe
Siegen
Hilchenbach
Bad Berleburg
Winterberg
Brilon
Marsberg
Höxter
Holzminden
Uslar
Northeim
Einbeck
Alfeld
Hildesheim
Peine
Salzgitter
Braunschweig
Wolfsburg
Gifhorn
Celle
Soltau
Verden
Nienburg
Hoya
Diepholz
Vechta
Cloppenburg
Meppen
Lingen
Rheine
Steinfurt
Ahaus
Borken
Bocholt
Wesel
Dorsten
Recklinghausen
Bottrop
Gelsenkirchen
Herne
Bochum
Hattingen
Witten
Dortmund
Unna
Hamm
Ahlen
Beckum
Warendorf
Münster
Coesfeld
Lüdinghausen
Dülmen
Borken
Ahaus
Enschede
Hengelo
Almelo
Nordhorn
Bentheim
Coevorden
Emmen
Assen
Groningen
Leeuwarden
Sneek
Heerenveen
Meppel
Zwolle
Deventer
Apeldoorn
Arnhem
Nijmegen
Tiel
Culemborg
Utrecht
Amersfoort
Hilversum
Amsterdam
Haarlem
Leiden
Den Haag
Rotterdam
Dordrecht
Breda
Tilburg
's-Hertogenbosch
Eindhoven
Helmond
Venlo
Roermond
Sittard
Geleen
Kerkrade
Vaals
Aachen
Stolberg
Düren
Jülich
Erkelenz
Rheydt
Mönchengladbach
Viersen
Krefeld
Uerdingen
Duisburg
Mülheim
Essen
Oberhausen
Bottrop
Gelsenkirchen
Herne
Bochum
Hattingen
Witten
Dortmund
Unna
Hamm
Ahlen
Beckum
Warendorf
Münster
Coesfeld
Lüdinghausen
Dülmen
Borken
Bocholt
Wesel
Dorsten
Recklinghausen
Marl
Haltern
Lippstadt
Soest
Arnsberg
Meschede
Olpe
Siegen
Hilchenbach
Bad Berleburg
Winterberg
Brilon
Marsberg
Höxter
Holzminden
Uslar
Northeim
Einbeck
Alfeld
Hildesheim
Peine
Salzgitter
Braunschweig
Wolfsburg
Gifhorn
Celle
Soltau
Verden
Nienburg
Hoya
Diepholz
Vechta
Cloppenburg
Meppen
Lingen
Rheine
Steinfurt


LEIPZIG
STRASBOURG
E. of Greenwich
Frankfurt
Fulda
Schweinfurt
Marburg
Kassel
Köln
Aachen
Krefeld
Mönchen-Gladbach
Neuss
Düren
Koblenz
Trier
Saarbrücken
Mannheim
Ludwigshafen
Darmstadt
Wiesbaden
Hanau
Aschaffenburg
Würzburg
Kitzingen
Bad Kissingen
Bad Neustadt
Meiningen
Hersfeld
Eschwege
Göttingen
Northeim
Hildesheim
Paderborn
Siegen
Limburg
Bad Homburg
Offenbach
Hanau
Gelnhausen
Schlüchtern
Bad Orb
Bad Soden
Bad Nauheim
Friedberg
Wetzlar
Gießen
Dillenburg
Siegen
Olpe
Meschede
Arnsberg
Soest
Lippstadt
Warburg
Höxter
Holzminden
Alfeld
Hameln
Minden
Bielefeld
Gütersloh
Rheda
Wiedenbrück
Rheine
Münster
Coesfeld
Borken
Bocholt
Wesel
Duisburg
Essen
Bochum
Dortmund
Hagen
Iserlohn
Lüdenscheid
Remscheid
Solingen
Wuppertal
Leverkusen
Bergisch Gladbach
Siegburg
Troisdorf
Bonn
Euskirchen
Bad Münstereifel
Mayen
Andernach
Neuwied
Montabaur
Bad Ems
Nassau
Diez
Weilburg
Wetzlar
Braunfels
Herborn
Dillenburg
Biedenkopf
Frankenberg
Korbach
Waldeck
Arolsen
Bad Wildungen
Fritzlar
Homberg
Melsungen
Rotenburg
Bebra
Hersfeld
Fulda
Gersfeld
Bad Brückenau
Lohr
Gemünden
Karlstadt
Marktheidenfeld
Miltenberg
Amorbach
Erbach
Michelstadt
Dieburg
Groß-Gerau
Rüsselsheim
Hochheim
Eltville
Rüdesheim
Bingen
Kreuznach
Bad Kreuznach
Idar-Oberstein
Birkenfeld
Simmern
Bad Kreuznach
Alzey
Worms
Ludwigshafen
Speyer
Landau
Bad Bergzabern
Pirmasens
Zweibrücken
Homburg
St. Ingbert
Saarbrücken
Saarlouis
Merzig
Saarburg
Trier
Wittlich
Bernkastel
Cochem
Zell
Mayen
Adenau
Ahrweiler
Bad Neuenahr
Remagen
Linz
Neuwied
Altenkirchen
Hachenburg
Westerburg
Limburg
Usingen
Bad Homburg
Frankfurt