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Title: United States Army, 17th Infantry Regiment

Abstract: **Item 1556:** Initial landing, assault and occupation of Massacre Bay, Holtz Bay Pass, 11-31 May 1943 with overlay 1/20,000; **Item 1557, Part A:** Report of action at Attu, 11 May – 10 June 1943 with synopsis and casualties of the 17th Infantry Regiment; **Part B:** Unit journal, 11 May – 10 June 1943 with notes on Japanese tactics and overlays 1/20,000; **Part C:** Action of BCT 17-2 on Attu, 11-29 May 1943, observations made by BCT 17-2 during and prior to operation on Attu including general information, weapons, and clothing; **Part D:** Journal of BCT 17-2 of action on Attu, 11 May – 1 June 1943; **Part E:** Battle report of 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry action on Attu, 11-31 May 1943; **Part F:** Unit journal, 3rd Battalion, 17th Infantry, 11-31 May 1943 on Attu; **Item 1558:** S-2 journal, 11-31 May 1943 on Attu; **Item 1559:** Memorandum from COL Wayne C. Zimmerman on Attu dated 14 June 1943; **Item 1560:** Field Order #1: Plan E dated 2 May 1943; **Item 1561:** Battle report of Company B, 11 May-6 June 1943 on Attu; **Item 1562:** Report of action on the Island of Attu, 11 May-2 June 1943, reports from BCT 32-3, 32-2, 32-1, journals 32-3, 32-1, and S-2 and S-3 journals from 1st Battalion dated 13-18 May 1943, with overlays; and **Item 1563:** Journal and journal file on the Northern landing force on Attu, 14 May-2 June 1943, with overlays.

Number of pages: 486 p.

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307.21M(17)-0-3
(1906)
Director
17th Inf Regt - Initial Landing, Assault, and Occupation of Messager II-3, May 4
BY - Holts by Press

PHASE I (May 11 to May 17) - Initial landing, assault, and occupation of
MASSACRE BAY-HOLTZ BAY Pass

May 11, 1943

*After Action Rpt.
17 July 43 Rpt.*

1. RLG 17, less BCT 17-1, arrived in transport area at approximately 0800. Troops began to disembark immediately and form boat circles. Control was difficult due to poor visibility. CO, BCT 17-2, gained control of battalion at 1300. CO's party disembarked at 1015 and circled awaiting control vessel to guide leading waves to line of departure. Control vessel was finally located at about 1400 and contact between BCT 17-2 and BCT 17-3 was established, enabling both to approach the line of departure at 1445. CO, RLG 17, contacted CO, Company "F", BCT 32-2, and gave the following instructions: Company "F" will land on the left (south) of YELLOW Beach and proceed on the assigned mission. CO's, Bct's 17-2 and 17-3 were given the following instructions at the line of departure: Troops will push forward as rapidly as landed without regard to time interval as previously instructed. Contact will be made and maintained between battalions. CO's party landed with the third wave.

2. 1st wave, BCT's 17-2 and 17-3 landed simultaneously on Beaches BLUE and YELLOW at 1530 in the following formation: BCT 17-2 on the right, BCT 17-3 on the left. The landing of both battalions and Company "F", BCT 32-2 were unopposed. Both battalions moved forward according to plan (see overlay). Company "F", BCT 32-2, landed on BLUE Beach instead of assigned position on YELLOW Beach. They were ordered to the left flank and to proceed on assigned mission. Dummy entrenchments, consisting of shallow linear trenches, were observed on the high ground 500 yards inland from the beach. BCT's 17-3's front line at 1735 was located in the vicinity of 867.2-3504.7. At 1800, BCT 17-3 was moving forward and received scattered rifle fire from the vicinity of 867.3-3504.7. BCT 17-2 was moving forward at 1846, at which time they received scattered rifle fire from the vicinity of 867.0-3506.4. Both battalions were moving forward at 1900. At 2030, front line location of BCT 17-3 was 866.5-3505.3, at which time they came under enemy artillery fire, which consisted of 1-75mm gun located in the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass. By dawn, 12 May 43, BCT 17-3 had arrived 1500 yards northwest of upper lake in MASSACRE Valley, approximately 865.2-3506.2 - 865.8-3506.4. By dawn, 12 May 43, BCT 17-2 had reached the following position: 866.9-3505.8 - 867.3-3506.0, disposed as follows: Company "E" on the right, Company "F" on the left, Company "G" on the right rear (see overlay). The platoon from Company "I" sent out to protect the left flank of BCT 17-3 arrived in the vicinity of the upper lake in MASSACRE Valley by nightfall. RLG 17 CP was established at 867.1 - 3505.0.

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May 12, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 was ordered to consolidate and hold present positions with the mission of blocking the SARANA-MASSACRE Pass, preventing any movement of enemy into the MASSACRE BAY area. Communication with BCT 17-2 was lost at about 1000.
2. An artillery barrage, on the nose of MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass to support the attack of BCT 17-3 was ordered from 0730 to 0800. Attack by BCT 17-3 on the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass was to jump off at 0800. The artillery barrage began at 0740 and lifted at 0820. BCT 17-3's attack jumped off when artillery barrage lifted; however, the right flank was immediately pinned down by fire. Patrols were ordered to knock out resistance on the ridges to the right and left of MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass. A patrol from Company "K" reported that it was unable to gain the high ground on the right, due to heavy machine gun fire and knee mortar fire. No report was obtained from the company on the left as to its progress during the attack. BCT 17-3 reported that Company "K" had made contact with Company "H", BCT 17-2, at 866.8-3505.8. At this time communication was lost with BCT 17-3. General BROWN arrived at CP requesting the situation of front line units. Colonel EARLE, with Lieut. ABRAHAMSON, Regimental Communications Officer, and a wire crew left for CP, BCT 17-2 to establish communication and to determine the situation. Captain BEATTY, RLG 5-4 left simultaneously for CP. BCT 17-3 with a similar mission Force Headquarters reported that naval gunfire had been placed on the mouth of the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass at approximately 1100. At 1230, friendly artillery fire in the vicinity of target 10 was reported by CP, BCT 17-3. Fourteen inch naval gunfire was placed on the nose of BLACK MOUNTAIN to neutralize enemy strong points holding up the advance of BCT 17-3. CO, RLG 17 was notified that BCT 32-2, minus Company "F", had landed at YELLOW Beach and was under his control. BCT 32-2 (-) was ordered into bivouac in rear of and right of the RLG CP, at which time Lt. Col. NELSON reported to CP for orientation.
3. A coordinated attack with BCT 17-3 on the right, BCT 32-2 on the left, to seize the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass, was ordered for 0700, 13 May 43. BCT 32-2 moved into position in MASSACRE Valley in rear of BCT 17-3 the night of 12-13 May. A message was received from Company "F", BCT 32-2, that they had accomplished their mission. They were ordered to proceed up to what was believed to be the TENNAC-HOLTZ Pass and by flanking action, relieve the pressure on BCT 17-3. Due to the fact that no pass existed between TENNAC and HOLTZ BAY, Company "F", BCT 32-2, was unable to complete the mission and was ordered to rejoin BCT 32-2 in the vicinity of RLG 17 CP.
4. At 1800, BCT 17-3 reported that all forward movement had stopped and that BCT 17-3 was receiving machine gun fire from the right flank and their right rear. BCT 17-3 front lines at the close of 12 May 43 were 866.2-3505.5 - 866.8-3505.8. Dispositions were as follows: Company "L" on the left, Company "I" on the right, and Company "K" in reserve. At 1815 a report was received from Lt. LONG, commanding Company "I" platoon on the left flank, that the platoon was pinned down near the upper lake in the MASSACRE Valley by rifle and machine gun fire from vicinity of entrenchments northwest of the lake.

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May 12, 1943 Cont'd:

5. Captain SIEVERS, RLG 17 S-1, ordered a patrol to follow the route of Colonel EARLE's party, as no word had been received as to his whereabouts for several hours. At 1600, Colonel EARLE's body was located in the vicinity of CP, BCT 17-2. The ADC scout who accompanied the Colonel was found seriously wounded near-by and evacuated.

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May 13, 1943

1. Colonel ZIMMERMAN assumed command of RCG 17 on evening of 13 May 1943.

2. BCT 17-2 consolidated position under cover of fog and continued to dig in. As the fog lifted, during parts of the day, heavy machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire was received from the vicinity of the southeast slope of COLD MOUNTAIN, POINT ABLE, and the nose running generally west from POINT ABLE. BCT 17-2 continued its mission of blocking the pass, denying the enemy access through MASSACRE BAY and Valley from vicinity of CHICHAGOPEBARANA Pass. Company "G", BCT 17-2 was withdrawn to Battalion reserve under cover of fog.

3. BCT 17-3 was ordered to attack MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass. Attack was to be preceded by a 30 minute artillery preparation to commence at 0630, or when visibility permitted. Visibility continued to be poor throughout day until late afternoon at which time the attack was launched. BCT 17-3 jumped off in the attack and reached a line approximately 600 yards from the mouth of the pass. Some scattered elements reached a point within 200 yards of the entrance to the pass. The battalion was pinned down by flanking machine gun and rifle fire coming from the high ground east and west sides MASSACRE Valley, and from positions on the southeast slope of COLD MOUNTAIN. Heavy machine gun fire was also received from the vicinity of the narrow ravines south of FALSE Pass. Mortar fire was received from the shell just above the valley floor, also from the gulch on west side of the mouth of the pass. The battalion received some 75mm fire and heavy mortar fire from the crest of HOLTZ BAY-MASSACRE Pass. Under the cover of darkness, small groups that had moved to within 200 yards of the Table Top, were withdrawn to original positions. BCT 17-3 moved out in its attack in the following formation - "L" Company on the left, "I" Company on the right, "K" Company in rear of "L" Company. "M" Company supported the attack by fire from positions in the series of cuts on the northwest side of MASSACRE Valley hogback. BCT 32-2, less companies "E" and "F" attacked in conjunction with BCT 17-3. "G" Company attacked on BCT 17-3's left, supported by fire from "H" Company directly in rear. "E" Company, BCT 32-2, was located in the vicinity of Force CP, and designated as Force Reserve.

4. "F" Company, BCT 32-2 reported from YELLOW Beach, that they were unable to proceed on their mission because of naval gunfire. (Mission - to move up the TEMNAC-HOLTZ Valley by flanking action to assist the advance of BCT 17-3). This company was then ordered to move up the MASSACRE Valley and report to BCT 32-2. This move was completed the morning of 14 May 43. The platoon of "I" Company, protecting the left of BCT 17-3, Lieut. LONG commanding, continued its mission of blocking enemy action from TEMNAC-MASSACRE Pass and PURPLE Beach from the vicinity of upper lake.

5. "G" Company together with "E" Company, BCT 32-2, which had been released from Force Reserve, joined "F" Co., BCT 32-2 on the west side of the valley floor together with a portion of Company "H" in preparation for an attack which was scheduled for the morning of 14 May 43.

6. CP RCG 17 remained in same position. OP was located at 865.8-3506.7.

May 14, 1943

Col. ZIMMERMAN ASSUMED COMMAND OF REGT ON MORNING OF 14 MAY 43.

1. BCT 17-2 maintained approximately the same positions as on the 13th. This battalion received a considerable amount of machine gun fire from POINT ABLE, positions on nose northwest of POINT ABLE, from the pass proper, and from positions on COLD MOUNTAIN. 37mm guns of BCT 17-2 and heavy mortars were utilized on all located positions. During the day, four (4) 50 Cal. machine guns supplied by the 78th CA were added on the high ground in rear of the battalion. (For position of elements of the battalion - see overlay).
2. At 1400, six (6) Gruman Wild Cats were given the mission of dive bombing and strafing the southeast nose of COLD MOUNTAIN, POINT ABLE, and the ridge extending northwest from POINT ABLE. Planes approached through the valley from the left side of Massacre hogback. One plane crashed on the top of "K" mountain; one plane crashed 600 yards in front of BCT 17-2's front lines, and two others crashed at places unknown. Artillery was placed on enemy entrenchments located on the northwest nose of POINT ABLE and the southeast portion of COLD MOUNTAIN, and the pass proper throughout the day.
3. One platoon, Co "E", BCT 17-2, Lieut. Paulson commanding, returned from mission to the SARANA BAY area. This platoon had worked around from the ALEXAI POINT to the SARANA Valley. It then proceeded north along the west side of SARANA Valley to the head of Lake Nicholas. At this point the platoon received machine gun fire and mortar fire from the vicinity of SARANA NOSE. Several members of the platoon were wounded, and it was necessary to leave two of them behind. This platoon, although it hoped to gain the pass on the Sarana side, was unable to do so, and was finally forced to move straight up the mountain to the sawtooth south of POINT ABLE, and worked its way down into MASSACRE Valley making contact with BCT 17-2. This platoon was so exhausted that it was necessary to send most of the personnel to the beach for rehabilitation. A patrol was sent out under Lieut. Brown to pick up the wounded men, but were unable to locate them.
4. During the early morning of May 14th, BCT 32-2 was reorganized and moved into position in the cuts along the high ground on the west side of MASSACRE Valley. Advance OP for this battalion was established at 864.4-3505.4.
5. During the early morning, supplies, ammunition and sleeping bags for a part of each battalion were brought forward. The supplies were hand carried down the steep sides of the east slope of the valley. These slopes in every case were at approximately a 45 degree angle, and supplies had to be carried and lowered about 500 feet into the valley floor. During the early morning, one 37mm gun was finally placed on the valley floor. The advance command post was established for the Regiment, part way down the slope near the command post of BCT 32-2 in the vicinity of 865.7-3506.6.
6. In accordance with Division order, a coordinated attack of 17-3 and 32-2 had been planned for 0600, or as soon thereafter as 30 minute artillery preparation could aid the advance. (Visibility to determine time of preparation). The general plan for the attack was for BCT 17-3, supported by the heavy weapons, and the artillery fire already mentioned, to attack around the right side of the

valley floor with one platoon moving up toward the slopes of COLD Mountain to eliminate machine gun and mortar fire coming from that direction. BCT 32-2, supported by its heavy weapons, was to move up the left side of the valley floor, and attack in the direction of the table top just below BLACK Mountain. This battalion was to send a strong platoon up the side of Mountain "K" to eliminate machine gun and mortar fire coming from the following positions: side of Mountain "K", ravines in the direction of False Pass, and to the south of False Pass. The artillery barrage started at approximately 1030. At the completion of the artillery fire, leading elements of both BCT 17-3 and BCT 32-2 moved forward but immediately came under rifle and machine gun fire from the pass proper, the deep canyons to the left of the floor of the pass, from the direction of BLACK Mountain, False Pass, the ravines along the right side of the valley, and from positions part way up the southeast slopes of COLD Mountain. Leading elements made no move to push forward and succeeding forces that tried to push forward were stopped at the same positions by fire coming from their flanks. The leading units of BCT 32-2, "F" and "G" Companies reached a position about 300 yards south and east of the Table Top in MASSAGRE - HOLTZ BAY Pass at about 1930. Practically no progress was made by BCT 17-3 throughout the afternoon, although it appeared from observation that they were not under particular heavy fire. Efforts to push this battalion forward throughout the day, or to reduce the fire by flanking action against machine guns on the high ground on the right, were not successful. The advanced elements of BCT 17-3 gradually withdrew to their original position at 865.6-3506.8 to 865.1-3506.4, and remained in these positions during the night. During darkness, leading elements of BCT 32-2 were reconstituted in their original position, approximately 600 yards short of the Table Top in the pass. The front lines extended from 863.7-3506.0 to 864.4-3506.3. Both Battalions dug in and consolidated positions for the night

7. During the late evening of the 14th, a visit was made by the Regimental Commander to the advance CP of BCT 17-3 and the command post of the Battalion Commander of BCT 32-2. It was found that Lieut. Colonel Nelson had fallen, injuring his leg. Major Fredricks had assumed command of the battalion. BCT 32-2 was somewhat demoralized by the fact that its men while suffering many casualties from machine gun fire, were unable to locate exact position from which the fire was coming. In general, it seemed that the battalion was not only receiving fire into its front, but also into its flanks from well concealed positions on the left of False Pass. The attempts of a patrol to work to the top of "K" Mountain were not successful in locating machine gun fire, although they did knock out a trench part way up the side of the mountain. A visit to the battalion commander of the BCT 17-3, disclosed a rather demoralized battalion. This battalion had lost two company commanders, suffering rather heavy casualties in non-commissioned officers, and was suffering from similar demoralization effects already described for BCT 32-2. The battalion commander was ordered to withdraw the companies to a nearby cut in the side of the mountain from which they would have protection from machine gun and mortar fire. In compliance with orders from Force Commander, the following orders were issued to this battalion during the night: BCT 32-2 resumes its attack on MASSAGRE BAY at 0630 on the morning of 15 May 1943, or as soon thereafter as visibility permits.

This attack will be preceded by a 30 minute artillery preparation with the advance being made under the protection of this fire. Companies "K" and "I" to be withdrawn during the night and rest in the cut approximately 300 yards near the present CP of BCT 17-3. Company "M" will remain in its present position and support the attack of BCT 32-2. "I" Company, less one platoon, will move up to the high ground east of the valley floor in the direction of COLD Mountain, and destroy machine guns in the successive cuts that had been holding up the attack of the 3rd Bn. On his return, CO, REG 17 contacted Major Fredricks, commander of BCT 32-2 at the Battalion CP located in the vicinity of 864.7-3506.6. Orders were given approximately as follows: BCT 32-2 will resume its attack at 0630 on 15 May 1943, or as soon thereafter as visibility will permit. The attack to be preceded by an artillery preparation. This artillery barrage will last for 30 minutes. Advantage will be taken of this artillery fire to push on to the objective. Strong detachments will be sent up the side of "K" Mountain, and in the valleys south of False Pass to eliminate machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire from their flanks. Utilize all heavy weapons in your battalion to further the attack, with particular attention to any machine guns that can be located in the cuts in the direction of COLD Mountain. Company "M", BCT 17-3 will support your attack from their present position.

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May 15, 1943

1. In compliance with instructions and conference with General BROWN, CO, RLG 17 issued the following instructions. BCT 17-3 will withdraw to the several gulches located 800 yards southeast of the entrance to MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass. BCT 17-3 withdrew under cover of fog during the early part of the morning as ordered. BCT 32-2 took over the front; their line extended generally to the left of that held by BCT 17-3. BCT 32-2 was under plunging machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire coming from gulches in the vicinity of FALSE PASS, nose of BLACK MOUNTAIN, and first ledge above the floor of the valley. This fire was received intermittently throughout the whole day. Combat patrols were ordered to be sent out by BCT 32-2 and "I" Company, BCT 17-3. Patrol from BCT 32-2 had the mission of cleaning out enemy resistance on "K" MT, FALSE PASS GULCH, and proceed to the top of BLACK MOUNTAIN and be prepared to place fire on the enemy on the upper table of the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass by daylight 16 May 43. Patrol from BCT 32-2 moved to top of "K" MOUNTAIN and reported that they observed an enemy supply dump on the reverse slope of "K" MT. ~~The patrol failed to gain the upper reaches of FALSE PASS, consequently they failed to reach the ridge of BLACK MOUNTAIN.~~ Patrol from Company "I" had the mission of working along the high ground northeast of MASSACRE-HOLTZ Pass to neutralize enemy machine guns and snipers located in adjacent gulches and the high ground west of COLD MOUNTAIN.

2. BCT 17-2 continued its mission of blocking SARANA-CHICAGO Pass. A reconnaissance patrol was sent out from Company "F" at 2330, 15 May 43, consisting of one officer and five men with the mission of determining enemy strength on COLD MOUNTAIN. Patrol reported considerable digging in by the enemy but failed to penetrate enemy outpost system. Patrol gained minor enemy information but did not obtain the desired results. No other action occurred except spasmodic rifle, machine gun and mortar fire throughout the day. This fire was intensified when any movement of the front or rear echelon of BCT 17-2 was observed. Positions held by the enemy in the pass were machine guns well placed on either side of the pass, constituting extremely strong positions.

3. CP and OP, RLG 17, remained in same position as on the previous day.

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May 16, 1943

1. BCT 17-3 rested throughout the day in positions designated. However, Company "I" retained the mission of patrolling high ground on north side of MASSACRE-HOLTZ Valley to neutralize enemy position while Company "M" was ordered to support the attack of BCT 32-2 by fire from position in ravines on the northeast side of MASSACRE Valley.

2. In compliance with telephonic orders, BCT 32-2 jumped off attacking diagonally towards the entrance of the pass, advancing from the southwest to the northeast. The attack moved slowly due to plunging machine gun fire coming from gulches of FALSE PASS. At approximately 1500, "E" Company passed through "G" Company which reverted to battalion reserve. "G" Co positions were on the right of the battalion zone. During the day, "G" Company had suffered some casualties and had been pinned down whenever it attempted to advance. By mid-afternoon, the attack had progressed to a point 400 yards short of the entrance to the pass. Additional forces were ordered from BCT 32-2 to insure the elimination of enemy positions in FALSE PASS and the gulch directly south. Included in this force was an attachment to establish a mortar OP from which observed mortar fire could be laid in the gulches. Some progress was made in eliminating enemy machine guns in the gulches, and by late afternoon, the leading elements of BCT 32-2 reached a position 200 yards short of the entrance to the pass. At approximately 1900, the battalion came under heavy fire and its position was stabilized about 600 yards from the pass. Throughout the day artillery fire was concentrated in all areas where there were any suspected or located enemy weapons, and the heavy weapons of "H" Company, BCT 32-2, were improved and moved forward to bring maximum fire on the pass and high ground overlooking both sides of the pass. By this time, four 75-mm howitzers and two 37-mm antitank guns had been moved into positions on the valley floor to supplement the fire of the heavy weapons.

3. In compliance with Force Order which directed a two day rest for BCT 32-2, preparations were made beginning at 2300 for the relief of BCT 32-2 and the occupation of the ground held by them by BCT 17-3. Plans were made to effect the relief under the cover of darkness. Due to the difficulties of moving heavy weapons, all heavy weapons of BCT 32-2 were left in place and manned by BCT 17-3.

4. BCT 17-2 continued its mission of blocking pass. No change in front line dispositions. Patrol action was instigated and met with no success due to heavy machine gun and mortar fire.

5. CP and OP, RLG 17, remained in same location.

May 17, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 continued its mission of blocking the SARANA-MASSACRE pass, receiving mortar, machine gun and rifle fire at intervals throughout the day. Movement of any part of the battalion was limited during periods of good visibility.

2. BCT 17-2 carried out a night raid against enemy position on COLD Mountain. This patrol, consisting of one officer and 25 men, moved out at 2400. They succeeded in getting six men through to the objective before they were discovered. The patrol then withdrew under the protective fire of battalion heavy weapons company, which was previously registered throughout the day.

3. CO, RLG 17, visited CO, BCT 17-2 at the Battalion CP during the morning, to determine the exact situation and make tentative plans for the relief of BCT 17-2 by BCT 32-2. At approximately 1230, CO reported to RLG CP that he was going to visit BCT 17-3 to determine the progress of BCT 17-3, and to push that battalion through the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY pass if possible.

4. BCT 17-3 completed its relief of BCT 32-2 at 0030. BCT 17-3 positions at 0600 were as follows: "L" Company occupying the left floor of the valley, "I" Company occupying the center of the valley, and "K" Company the right portion of the valley. During the morning, there was no activity by either side except a patrol of "L" and "K" Companies which was sent out with the mission of determining enemy strength in rear of Table Top. Patrol returned at 1700 with a negative report. At this time, CO, RLG 17 arrived at CP, BCT 17-3 from OP, and ordered CO, BCT 17-3 to send out same patrol, which returned at 1700, to proceed directly up the Table Top to determine the enemy situation. Meantime, a patrol from "L" Company was sent out with the mission of gaining the nose of BLACK Mountain. Patrol moved across valley floor and up the nose of BLACK Mountain without incident. Patrol from "K" Company moved to Table Top without resistance. "K" Company at this time outposted the Table Top with one platoon. "I" Company (-) followed the outpost platoon, proceeding through the pass to the saddle, and set up a defensive position. "K" Company passed through "I" Company across the saddle to ledge on the reverse slope of the saddle where they immediately set up a defensive position. Patrol from "K" Company was sent out with the mission of determining the identity of a group of about 50 soldiers. Patrol reported back at 0230 19 May 1943, that men observed were friendly troops, consisting of the 7th Ren Trp. Balance of battalion moved into the pass and set up a defensive position with battalion CP located in the saddle. BCT 17-3 remained in this position for the rest of the night. Due to pressure of patrol action of Co "L" on the right, and Co "K" on the left, BCT 17-3 was able to reach the pass proper. Mortar fire by these two companies also assisted a great deal in knocking out resistance in False Pass Gulch and the gulches on the right side of the pass.

5. BCT 32-2 moved from position in MASSACRE Valley to rest camp, first company arriving at 0300, last company at 0500. Day was spent in rehabilitation and reorganization of all organizations.

A meeting of Regimental and Battalion commanders was called by General LANDRUM to be held at Force CP at 2030. Colonel ZIMMERMAN was unable to be notified and G-3 authorized S-3 to call in battalion commanders. However, due to the success of MASSACRE-HOLTZ pass episode and the fact that Colonel ZIMMERMAN was forward directing the movement of the battalion through the pass, the meeting was called off. CP and OP, RLC 17 remains in the same position.

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PHASE II (May 18 to 20) - Securing and Occupying Hog Back Reaches
SARANA-MASSACRE Pass

May 18, 1943

1. BCT 17-3 continued to occupy defensive positions in the MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY Pass. Major Montague was relieved of command, and Major Siddens assumed command at 1000. Major Wallace was assigned to BCT 17-3, and assumed the duties of Executive Officer. The battalion sent out strong combat patrols to the top of BLACK Mountain, and to the high ground in the vicinity of the junction of COLD Mountain and the ridge leading to CHICAGO Valley, to determine the presence of enemy. Patrols encountered small enemy detachments and destroyed them. In compliance with orders from Commanding Officer, RLG 17, BCT 17-3 less "K" Company moved at 1700 to positions in the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post and reverted to Force Reserve. The battalion closed in this area at approximately 2100. "K" Company, BCT 17-3, continued to occupy defensive positions, blocking the Massacre - Holtz Bay Pass.

2. Telephonic communication was established at 1915 with BCT 32-3 by Lieut. Taylor, Co "I", BCT 32-3. This fact was reported to the Division Communication Office.

3. BCT 32-2 received orders to move from rest camp to a bivouac area 400 yards forward of RLG 17 CP. The battalion completed its move to the bivouac area at 1800 and bivouaced for the night. The battalion commander and reconnaissance party attended a meeting held by Colonel Zimmerman at RLG 17 CP. Coordination of plans for the next days attack was discussed. CO, BCT 17-2 also attended this meeting.

4. 1st Bn, 4th Inf arrived in the MASSACRE BAY Area, and moved into bivouac 1000 yards northwest of the Massacre Beach on the right side of the Hogback. They reverted to control of RLG 17 at 2140. In the meantime, CO and staff reported to CP, RLG 17 to be oriented and acquainted with the situation. CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf was given the following instructions. (See FO #2)

5. BCT 17-2 was ordered to attack the enemy in the MASSACRE-SARANA Pass. The attack to commence on order RLG Commander. In addition to the organic weapons of BCT 17-2, the following weapons were attached to support the attack of May 19. They were as follows: 10 - 37mm A/T guns, 2 - 75mm Pack Howitzers, 3 - .50 Cal. machine guns. All weapons were located in the vicinity of the high ground overlooking MASSACRE-SARANA Pass. Sketches were prepared showing enemy positions and issued to each company commander, Regimental and Division Command Post. Each known enemy position was given a number and the estimated strength of each position was given. During the afternoon of 18 May 43, artillery was registered on each of these known positions. A communication system was established to enable the Battalion Commander to control the fire of all supporting weapons from his OP. This system included communication to the artillery. Communication by wire was established with all companies in the battalion. (For tactical plans, see FO #2). Patrol action was ordered by the battalion commander for the early morning of 19 May 43. Information was received from G-3 to the effect that BCT 32-1, (- Cos "A", "B" and Hqrs Co) had landed and had been given the mission of capturing, occupying, and organizing for defense, the north nose of the ridge between SARANA and MASSACRE Valleys (Point "A").

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SECRET

Movement against POINT "A" did not start until dark, 18-19 May, 1943. Patrol procedure would be followed. The attack would be supported by the fire of BCT 17-2 from present positions and the fire from Company "D", BCT 32-1 from positions on the northwest slope of the hogback. This fire was to be coordinated by Battalion Executive Officer, BCT 32-1. CO, BCT 32-1, reported to CP RLG 17 at 1600 to coordinate this attack.

6. Report was received from BCT 17-1 that the entire HOLTZ BAY area was under their control. Lieut. Colonel Nelson, BCT 32-2 took over duties as Executive Officer, RLG 17 until 2200, at which time Lieut. Colonel Fish arrived and resumed his duties as Executive Officer. Lieut. Colonel Nelson, still suffering from an injured leg restricting his action. As plans had already been made for the attack with Major Fredricks who had been in command of BCT 32-2, Colonel Nelson was held at CP, RLG 17.

7. CP, RLG 17 remained in same position. The new CP, RLG 17 was established at RLG 17.

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May 19, 1943

1. BCT 17-3 continued to rest in position (see overlay). Rehabilitation and reorganization continued throughout the day. Company "K" remained in position in MASSACRE-HOLTZ Pass (see overlay) and continued the mission of blocking the pass, patrolling the high ground and gulches on each side of the pass, and of cleaning out any snipers or machine guns. At 1700, Company "K" was relieved by Company "I", BCT 32-3, at which time they rejoined BCT 17-3 at 2200 in the battalion area.

2. BCT 17-2 sent out a combat patrol at 0630 to determine the extent of enemy positions on COLD MOUNTAIN. This patrol proceeded to a point within 100 yards of Point 3 (see sketch), and observed several men rapidly digging in. The patrol received considerable machine gun fire from nose running northwest from POINT ABLE, rifle fire from trenches at Point 3 (see sketch), and positions above them. Patrol returned at 0400 with very little enemy information. At 0500, a patrol from Company "I", BCT 17-3, under Lt. BROWN, started from the floor of MASSACRE Valley with the mission of enveloping Point 5 from the north. Simultaneously a patrol from Company "F", BCT 17-2, under Lt. PAULSON, was given the mission of attacking enemy positions at Point 4 from the north and then working down to Points 1, 2, and 3 in conjunction with a frontal attack by Company "F", BCT 17-2. At about 1000, a report was received from Major KELLER with Company "C", BCT 32-1, at POINT ABLE, that the company was held up by mortar and machine gun fire and unable to advance. At about 1130, CO. Company "F" reported that enemy occupying Points 4 and 5 were withdrawing. At this time, the decision of the battalion CO of BCT 17-2 was to push Company "F" forward up the southeast slope of COLD MOUNTAIN. The artillery then laid down a ten minute concentration on all known and suspected enemy positions on COLD MOUNTAIN. All other weapons opened fire on enemy positions on the nose at the base of POINT ABLE. Smoke was placed in the saddle of the pass but due to wind conditions, the smoke was carried over enemy positions on COLD MOUNTAIN and greatly aided Company "F" in its attack on COLD MOUNTAIN. *Attack of BCT was coordinated with that of BCT 17-2.*

3. "E" Company, BCT 17-2, occupied the saddle of the pass and sent one platoon to reduce Point 6. "G" Co, BCT 17-2, occupied a position just west of the mouth of the pass in rear of Companies "E" and "F". A platoon from "E" Company succeeded in taking Point 6. Company "F", in the meantime, succeeded in taking Points 1, 2, and 4; however, they came under heavy machine gun fire from Points 3 and 5. "E" Company was then ordered to send out a platoon to reduce Point 3, which it did. "G" Company was ordered to send out a platoon to reduce Point 5. This was not accomplished until the following day. After taking Point 6, a platoon from Company "E" was ordered to take Point 7. This platoon, however, was unable to advance due to machine gun fire coming from the gulch on the west side of the pass proper. A patrol was immediately sent from "F" Company to knock out the machine gun, which they did. Points 5, 7, 8, and 9 were taken in conjunction with BCT 32-2. The action was concluded at about 2200 and companies established defensive positions and dug in for the night.

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May 19, 1943 (cont'd)

4. BCT 32-2 attacked behind BCT 17-2 at 1000, "F" Company leading (one platoon of machine guns in close support) followed by "E" Company and "G" Company, in that order. "F" Company passed through the outpost line formerly held by "F" Company, BCT 17-2, and continued the attack to seize the saddle and the high ground southeast of COLD MOUNTAIN. "E" Company extended the line of "F" Company to the right. A continuous effort was made throughout the day, in conjunction with BCT 17-2, to seize the high ridge running northwest from POINT ABLE. At 2030, "E" Company, supported by "G" Company, and by machine gun from "H" Company, assaulted the high ridge at the base of POINT ABLE, engaging in hand to hand and bayonet fighting; they seized positions 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. "F" Company was then permitted to consolidate its positions in the saddle by the actions of "E" Company. Positions of BCT 32-2 at 2200 were as follows: "E" Company on the base of POINT ABLE, "G" Company to the left of "E", and "F" Company on the left of "G", extending up the nose of COLD MOUNTAIN. Heavy weapons were placed in a defilade area in rear of and center of battalion.

5. 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, was ordered at 1750 to move Company "C" to positions in rear of and south of the SARANA-MASSACRE Pass. At 1840, "C" Company reported they were in position. At 2125, "C" Company received mortar fire as they were advancing towards the saddle of the pass, at which time the front lines broke and the entire company withdrew to the rear. At 2126, "C" Company was ordered back into position and by 2150 were back in their original position.

6. Initial action of Company "C", BCT 32-1, against POINT ABLE was ordered by Force, which placed the company on the ridge south of POINT ABLE on 18 May 43. The company attacked POINT ABLE all day 19 May 43 without any perceptible progress. On 19 May 43, Force released this company to RLG 17. Battalion CO requested permission to move the company to the valley floor, stating that the company was exhausted, in need of supplies, and that there was no hope of dislodging the enemy. Battalion CO was ordered by CO, RLG 17, to remain in position and assist the night attack of Company "E", BCT 32-2, scheduled for midnight, and to effect a junction with Company "E" and then move down the northern slope of POINT ABLE.

7. CP and OP, RLG 17, was located at 866.3 - 3506.7.

SECRET

May 20, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 was passed through by 1st Bn, 4th Inf, and took up positions in reserve in the draw 300 yards west of the SARANA-MASSACRE Pass to reorganize and rest. "E" Company, however, remained in a defensive position nose vicinity of Point 11.

2. BCT 17-3 having been released from Force Reserve at 1030 was ordered to move to a forward assembly area 800 yards west of the saddle of the MASSACRE-SARANA Pass and to await orders. The battalion closed in the area at 1215. At 1900, the battalion was ordered to be prepared to move at 2400. ~~At 2345, Co "L" was ordered to move and occupy a position on the nose north of POINT ABLE. Mission of "L" Company was to feel out and determine the enemy strength by patrol action on SARANA NOSE.~~

3. "C" Company, BCT 32-1, was reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns at 0400. Guns were placed in position on rise 200 yards east of POINT ABLE at 0900. "C" Company attacked POINT ABLE on the south and reached a position within 75 yards of POINT ABLE at which time they were pinned down by grenade and mortar fire. Mortar and artillery fire on POINT ABLE was called for, but due to poor visibility and fog, fire was unobserved and very ineffective. The company was forced to withdraw to their original positions.

4. BCT 32-2 remained in position and was given the mission of sending one company to attack POINT ABLE. "G" Co, BCT 32-2, was selected and endeavored to move up the high ground against POINT ABLE, but was stopped 200 yards short of the peak by heavy mortar and machine gun fire. The company was withdrawn at 1800. CO, RLG 17, ordered BCT 32-2, to continue the attack. Plans were made and orders issued for "E" Co to attack POINT ABLE at 2330. The attack was preceded by 81-mm mortar fire placed on POINT ABLE from 2030 to 2330, 120 rounds fired during the period. At 2330, Co "E" moved from the position on the ridge at the foot of POINT ABLE to attack this point. The attack was made by three platoons, each with a different objective. 1st platoon was to attack up the south side of the mountain, 2nd platoon to attack east side of mountain and to clean out several small ridges, and 3rd platoon to envelope POINT ABLE from the north. This was the platoon that made contact with "C" Co, BCT 32-1, the morning of 21 May 43.

5. (For orders of 1st Bn, 4th Inf, see Field Order #3.) In compliance with the above order, the battalion moved out at 1000 in the following order: "B" Co leading with "D" Co directly in rear advanced through BCT 17-2 toward gulch located on left side of MASSACRE-SARANA Pass. This group cleaned out the gulch and reached a position just below the "ROCK QUARRY". Co's "A" and "C", with "A" leading, moved through BCT 17-2 and climbed north side of COLD MT. This climb to the shelf took approximately four (4) hours. At about 1630, Co "A" was in a position 500 yards short of the "ROCK QUARRY" and was pinned down by five enemy machine guns. "C" Company sent out patrols to comb the flanks of Co "A" and to clean out rear area as the advance progressed.

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May 20, 1943 (con't)

At 1800, Co "A" had surrounded the five machine guns and liquidated them. By 2000, forward progress of the Battalion (-) had ceased, and the Battalion consolidated its positions. Sleeping bags, rations, and ammunition were brought forward by "B" Company during the night. This climb to the shelf took approximately four (4) hours.

6. CP, HLG 17 was moved on the reverse slope of ridge located at the foot of POINT ABLE. CP was moved 500 yards forward on the high ground north of SARANA-MASSACRE Pass, overlooking CHICAGO VALLEY.

SECRET

PHASE III (21 May to 31 May, 43) Occupying CHICHAGOF VALLEY,
CHICHAGOF HARBOR, and High Ground Overlooking Valley.

May 21, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 remained in the same positions as 20 May 43 and were in Force Reserve. The battalion continued to reorganize and rest.

2. BCT 17-3, less "L" Company, was given orders to move to the vicinity of Company "L"'s position. BCT 17-3 moved out at 1030. While moving, the battalion received machine gun fire at 1500 from the vicinity of the high ground west of SARANA NOSE. The move was completed with considerable delay due to difficult terrain and weather conditions. The battalion then remained in place for the night and plans were prepared to attack SARANA NOSE the following morning. (See Field Order #4).

3. Company "E", BCT 32-2, continued the attack against POINT "A", seizing enemy positions just short of peak at 0430 and capturing the peak at 0530, thereby relieving the pressure on Company "C", BCT 32-1, which had been attacking the point for three days. Company "E", together with Company "C", mopped up enemy positions. Company "E" was then ordered to leave one platoon, reinforced, on Point "A" to secure and patrol that high ground. Company "C", BCT 32-1, and the balance of Company "E", BCT 32-2, returned to ridge at foot of POINT "A". The battalion remained in position on nose between MASSACRE and SARANA Valleys and placed machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire on enemy position on SARANA NOSE throughout the day. Plans were made to support BCT 17-3's attack on SARANA NOSE the following day (see FO #4).

4. At 0300, one platoon from Co "C", BCT 32-1 rejoined the company. This platoon had been located at MASSACRE BEACH. "C" Co, BCT 32-1 took positions at 0400 to prevent the withdrawal of enemy from POINT "A" and assisted the attack of Company "E", BCT 32-2, where possible. The junction of Co "C", BCT 32-1, and Co "E", BCT 32-2, was effected at 0900. "C" Company was moved to the nose directly north of MASSACRE-SARANA pass and relieved "E" Co, BCT 17-2, of the defense of the area. "D" Co, BCT 32-1, was also moved to the same vicinity to support the defense. Intermittent fire was placed on SARANA NOSE throughout the day. Patrols were sent out during the night to operate between POINT "A" and COLD Mountain.

5. 1st Bn, 4th Inf, was ordered to continue the attack on the upper ridge (west) of CHICHAGOF Valley at 0700. The battalion was disposed as follows: "A" Co on the right, "C" Co on the left and "B" Co in reserve. "D" Co remained on the valley floor just below the Rock Quarry, supporting by fire the attack of the battalion on the ridge. The battalion met with heavy resistance, consisting of machine guns and sniper fire, and was pinned down at intervals throughout the day. Contact with the North Force was made, although an enemy force estimated to be one company was located between the forces. By dark, 1st Bn, 4th Inf had moved to the north side of the Rock Quarry, and remained there during the night. Strong patrols were sent out to clean out enemy machine guns holding up the advance.

6. The weather was extremely odd, and snow fell during most of the day. Operations on this 800 foot level were extremely difficult. CP position - 866.5-3507.2. OP location - 866.6-3507.6.

SECRET

May 22, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 remained in the same position as on 21 May 43. However, Company "H" was moved forward on 21 May 43 to support by fire the attack of BCT 17-3.

2. Companies "I" and "K", BCT 17-3, at 0430 moved out of their forward assembly areas into positions in the SARANA Valley floor, prepared to attack at 0650. Formation was as follows: "K" Company on the right, "I" Company on the left. At 0640, mortar, machine gun, 37-mm and artillery fire was laid down on SARANA Nose. At 0650, "K" Company jumped off, following the barrage closely. Due to poor visibility, the right and left assault companies lost contact and "K" Company moved forward, seizing the objective. "I" Company followed "K" Company about one hour later. The enemy occupied very strong positions on SARANA Nose. These positions consisted of well concealed fox holes, short linear trenches and well camouflaged machine gun positions. "L" and "M" Companies remained in position on the nose below POINT ABLE, supporting the attack by fire. (Note: Barrage was fired by 32 heavy machine guns, 8 light machine guns, 14 37-mm A/T guns, 23 81-mm mortars, battalion of field artillery and one section of 75-mm pack howitzers. Companies "D", BCT 32-1, "D", 1st Bn, 4th Inf, "H", BCT 32-2, and "H", BCT 17-2 participated in the attack.) Ammunition expended averaged 3000 rounds per heavy machine gun, 1500 rounds per light machine gun, 100 rounds per 81-mm mortar and 37-mm A/T gun, and 80 rounds per pack howitzer. The remainder of the battalion completed the crossing of the valley at 1500, reorganized, and effected the final seizure of SARANA Nose with three companies abreast, continuing to mop up SARANA Nose. "I" Company was on the right, "K" Company in the center, and "L" Company on the left. A position was organized on SARANA Nose, at which time a patrol from "I" Company was sent to SARANA BAY. Route of the patrol was the high ground north of LAKE NICHOLAS; the mission was to report the presence of any enemy activity along the ridge. This patrol made a negative report. In the meantime, a patrol from "L" Company was sent to SARANA PEAK and hence along the ridge to CHECHAGOF Valley to determine enemy's strength and location. Patrol returned and reported that they had observed some enemy activity on MIDDLE PEAK. BCT 17-3 remained on SARANA Nose during the night, with "L" Company outpostting SARANA PEAK.

3. At 1630, BCT 32-2 (less two platoons, Company "E", which were located on POINT ABLE and COLD MOUNTAIN) was ordered to attack down CHECHAGOF Valley with the mission of seizing the high ground between SARANA Nose and ridge occupied by 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry. The attack was supported by one platoon of Company "E" on the nose extending north from MASSACRE-SARANA Pass in vicinity of Point 11 and by machine gun and mortar fire of Company "D", BCT 32-1, located on the ridge at the base of POINT ABLE. Company "G" advanced within 400 yards of the objective on the left

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May 22, 1943 (cont'd)

side of the valley, while "F" Company moved to within 600 yards of the objective. Both companies were pinned down by enemy machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire and consolidated position for the night. Platoon of "E" Company on POINT ABLE was relieved by a platoon from the 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry.

4. Company "E", BCT 32-2, sent out a patrol to reconnoiter the floor on the left of SARANA Valley. The mission of the patrol was to determine and eliminate all enemy positions in that area. Patrol came under heavy rifle fire and by 1630 it had advanced only a few hundred yards into the valley proper.

5. BCT 32-1 remained in Southern Force reserve. A twelve man patrol was sent up SARANA Valley with the mission of determining the location and strength of any enemy in the valley. Patrol proceeded to LAKE NICHOLAS and returned without opposition. From their positions, Companies "C" and "D" supported by fire the attack of BCT 32-2 up the left side of CHICHAGOF Valley. At 2100, one platoon, "C" Company, with machine gun section attached, moved into SARANA Valley to contain SARANA Pass and to protect Force right flank. Patrols operated the SARANA Valley throughout the night and encountered no opposition.

6. 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, continued the advance along the northwest ridge of CHICHAGOF Valley, supported by fire from "D" Company, 4th Infantry, which was still located in CHICHAGOF Valley. By late afternoon, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, was ^{at 2200} south of Point 3. Patrol from "C" Company was sent into SARANA Valley to locate enemy positions and installations. Patrol reported finding approximately ten Japs who were reported moving in the direction of CHICHAGOF. Battalion remained in present position throughout the night, and plans were made to relieve 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, who were to move in positions on high ground overlooking CHICHAGOF Valley, with BCT 17-2 the following day. This battalion had suffered considerably from the cold.

7. At 1500 an air mission was ordered but was unable to fly mission because of reported enemy aircraft in the area. A general air alert was sounded, all troops were notified, and the necessary precautions taken. CP and OP, REG 17, were located on the left edge of SARANA Nose.

May 23, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 relieved 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, on the west ridge ^(near Low) of CHICHAGOF Valley. BCT 17-2 attacked at 1900 and moved about 200 yards against heavy opposition. BCT 17-2 contacted BCT 32-2, who were approximately 1000 yards northwest of the position held by BCT 17-2. The battalion consolidated positions, organized and dug in for the night 500 yards north of ROCK QUARRY.

2. At 0800, BCT 17-3, less Company "L", moved to the base of SARANA NOSE towards CHICHAGOF Valley. At 1600 the battalion again moved, locating Battalion CP at 869.3 - 3508.6. "I" and "K" Companies were extended across the valley floor approximately 800 yards forward of the CP, with "K" Company on the right, "I" on the left, and "M" Company in the vicinity of the CP. At 0800, Company "L" was given the mission of protecting RLG 17's right flank from positions running from SARANA NOSE to SARANA PEAK. Company "L", at 1400, dispatched two (2) five man patrols, one with the mission of locating possible enemy radar station reported to be in the vicinity of CAPE KHLERMIKOF. The other patrol was to move along the ridge overlooking CHICHAGOF Valley to 3508.2. Due to a heavy snowstorm, the patrol returned without accomplishing its mission. The patrol sent out to locate the radar station was unable to find it; however, it made contact with the detachment, 37th Infantry, located on the SARANA BAY beach.

3. During the night of 22-23 May 43, Companies "F" and "G" of BCT 32-2 moved forward in their positions on the valley floor and occupied positions on the low ridge extending from SARANA NOSE west to a point just below CATHEDRAL ROCK. Company "G" was on the left of the CHICHAGOF Valley, Company "F" on the right and Company "E" in reserve. Machine gun platoons of Company "H" were placed with front line companies, and the 81-mm mortars were in a defiladed position, 300 yards to the rear of the front lines. All positions were dug in and the entire battalion area consolidated. Front lines at this time were approximately 1200 yards south of LAKE CORIES. Patrols were sent out to the front and flanks during the night, but enemy machine gun and rifle fire made extended reconnaissance and patrolling difficult.

4. Companies "C" and "D", BCT 32-1, moved in CHICHAGOF Valley at 0800 to support BCT 32-2, BCT 17-3, or to support the defense of SARANA Valley. One (1) platoon of heavy machine guns from Company "D" moved in position behind BCT 17-3 and one (1) behind BCT 32-2. CP's from a mortar platoon from draws behind BCT 32-2 gained observation of the entire valley and were prepared to support either BCT 32-2 or BCT 17-3. "C" Company, less one (1) rifle platoon and one (1) light machine gun section, moved into position in the valley to support either mission. Battalion remained in this position throughout the night and patrols operated the same as during the previous night.

5. CP and OF, RLG 17, nochange.

SECRET

May 24, 1943

1. BCT 17-2, located on the west ridge, gained contact with BCT 32-3 of the North Force and telephonic communications were established. At this time, the North and South Forces initiated action against the top of the ridge (bend in FISHHOOK - see sketch) west of CHICHAGOF HARBOR. The attack jumped off at 1000 in the following formation: "G" Co on the right, "E" Co on the left, and "F" Co was held in reserve in the vicinity of the HOLTZ-SARANA Pass. The front line companies succeeded in penetrating the enemy trenches midway up the bend, but were forced back to a position about 50 yards below the trench which they had held throughout the night.

2. BCT 17-3 less "L" Co on SARANA NOSE continued its progress on the South side of LAKE CORIES. This progress was extremely slow due to fire coming from BUFFALO NOSE. This battalion was responsible for the defense of junction between SARANA and CHICHAGOF Valleys. At 1000 "L" Co, outposting SARANA NOSE PEAK, dispatched the same two patrols as on the previous day. SARANA VALLEY patrol confirmed reports of previous day; the SARANA EAST PEAK patrol reported some enemy activity extending along middle and EAST Peaks to a position 500 yards north of SARANA PEAK.

3. BCT 32-2 remained in position occupied during the previous day for most of the morning. Companies "F" and "G" were moved forward at 1200 to new positions down CHICHAGOF Valley, taking up a new line about 600 yards short of LAKE CORIES. The heavy weapons company was displaced forward and occupied a small ridge in rear of front line companies prepared to deliver overhead fire. During the afternoon, friendly planes bombed front line companies of BCT 32-2. Bombers were notified to discontinue the mission. However, no casualties resulted from the bombing. Action of BCT 32-2 throughout the day was minor.

4. Companies "C" and "D" of BCT 32-1 were ordered to move at 1000 to the ridge west of CHICHAGOF Valley to join and be attached to BCT 17-2. Companies arrived at 1300 and proceeded to work along the shelf just above CHICHAGOF Valley. Some progress was made, and by dark BCT 32-1 (-) reached a position 600 yards north of the "ROCK QUARRY" and on the right of BCT 17-2. Battalion (-) remained here throughout the night.

5. 1st Bn, 4th Inf, in Force Reserve, were given orders to move up into position to support BCT 17-2. Battalion was to be in position prior to 0600 25 May 43. Battalion spent the day resting and making preparations to move during the night.

6. General comments: Action was minor, except for the attack of BCT 17-2. Large part of the day was used to maneuver troops for position to launch attack down west ridge on 25 May 43. A bombing mission was ordered to commence at 1610. Targets were as follows: 1. BUFFALO NOSE. 2. Trench system on ridge west of CHICHAGOF below and West of bend in FISHHOOK. Mission was called off due to bombing of our own front lines. Four P-38's carried out a strafing mission at 1755 which was also called off due to fire falling on our own troops. Location of CP, RLG 17 was at 868.9 - 3508.6, OP located at 868.9 - 3508.8.

SECRET

May 25, 1943

1. The advance echelon forward CP, RLG 17, moved at 0430 and completed the move in the vicinity of CP, BCT 17-2, at 0630. CP was located 800 yards southwest of the ROCK QUARRY. Prior to the move of the CP, CO, RLG 17, had placed Lt. Col. NELSON in charge of units of the South Force on the 800 foot level. Contact was made with Lt. Col. FINN in the vicinity of CATHEDRAL ROCK to coordinate moves of the South Force in conjunction with the North Force, which was to operate against the center of resistance northwest of CATHEDRAL ROCK which had been holding up the advance of a battalion of the North Force operating in that area.

2. Lt. Col. FISH was left in the rear CP, located on the SARANA Nose, to coordinate the attack of BCT 17-3 and BCT 32-2. He was ordered to move two 37-mm guns to the 800 foot level and to concentrate the rest of the 37-mm's behind BCT 17-3. These guns were to be placed where they could bring fire on the enemy strong points southwest of LAKE CURIES and on the high ground in the vicinity of BUFFALO NOSE and the intervening ground between BUFFALO NOSE and BCT 32-1.

3. Although a coordinated attack had been planned with BCT 32-3, CO, BCT 17-2 had been ordered previously to gain ground whenever the opportunity presented itself. CO, Company "F", had been held up throughout the previous day by trenches about one-half way up the mountain at Points 1 and 2 (by strong enemy forces in a trench 600 yards long). At 0800, Company "E" saw an opportunity to improve its position and assaulted the east half of the trench. By rifle and grenade action they cleared out part of the trench and continued up the mountain, gaining a foothold on a narrow plateau on the FISHHOOK between Points 1 and 2. They were immediately involved in a fire fight and suffered heavy losses. Balance of the battalion was immediately moved to support the action of Company "E". They succeeded in gaining the high ground and consolidated their positions. To insure the holding of this ridge, which controlled the HOLTZ-CHICHAGOF Pass, Company "B", 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, were sent up to assist them. BCT 17-2 had been placed on the left flank just southwest of CHICHAGOF-HOLTZ Pass. Due to the rapidity of this action, BCT 32-3 did not participate in the fight. One of the companies were still tied down by fire on the north end of the 600 foot trench over which BCT 17-2 passed. To give them freedom of movement, two platoons of Company "B" were sent back down from the vicinity of the high ground overlooking the HOLTZ-CHICHAGOF Pass to clean out the remainder of the enemy in this trench area. These two platoons operated most efficiently and by means of hand grenades and rifle fire destroyed the balance of the enemy in this trench, thus allowing BCT 32-3 freedom of movement so they could operate against entrenched enemy located in a circular position on the lower level west of the pass. During the remainder of the day and during the entire night,

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May 25, 1943 (cont'd)

BCT 17-2 was subjected to counterattack and machine gun and mortar fire from the high ground across the pass and Point 2 on the right. The plateau which they occupied was about 300 yards in length and not over 50 yards in depth. The right, which gave them an approach to Point 2, was an extremely knifelike ridge over which only one man could pass at a time. BCT 17-2 succeeded in working a combat patrol about 300 yards to the right of this ridge toward Point 2 to protect their right flank. They also sent patrols along the FISHHOOK in the vicinity of the pass to protect their left flank. In the meantime, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, less Company "B", was ordered forward to take the summit of that portion of the FISHHOOK to the right of BCT 17-2. The specific points to be taken are indicated on the sketch as Points 2, 3, and 5. Heavy opposition and extremely precipitous slopes made the progress slow and by night the battalion had succeeded in gaining a foothold on Point 3. They dug in for the night along the slope of Point 3. They were under heavy fire from the direction Points 2, 4, and 5. The saddle at Point 5 and the high ground leading from Point 5 to Point 2 was a knifelike ridge with precipitous slopes on each side. This permitted only one or two men at a time to work on enemy riflemen and mortars on Points 3 and 5.

4. BCT 17-3 remained in a defensive position, delivering supporting fire along the 800-foot level on the west side of CHICHAGOF Valley (see overlay); however, upon the move of BCT 32-2 from the valley to the high ground west of BUFFALO NOSE, BCT 17-3 assumed the responsibility for the defense of SARANA and CHICHAGOF Valleys, at 1730, with "L" Company on the right and "K" Company on the left (see overlay). "I" Company was dispatched along the SARANA ridge on 2000 foot level (see sketch). Night patrols were sent from each company with the mission of determining strength of enemy in vicinity of LAKE CORIES. Patrols moved up the right and left sides of the valley across the southern end of LAKE CORIES and back to their point of origin. Patrols reported negatively throughout the night. At 0600, one platoon of Company "L", reinforced by one light machine gun squad and a section of 60-mm mortars, was sent along the mountains on the east side of CHICHAGOF Valley along the summit, with the mission of destroying enemy located overlooking LAKE CORIES and strong points located on EAST PEAK. At 1000, the platoon returned with the information that enemy activity along EAST PEAK ridge had intensified. At 1030, the same platoon was ordered to push back to saddle and occupy ground overlooking LAKE CORIES, to dig in at a point approximately 100 yards north of SARANA PEAK and block any attempt by the enemy to seize SARANA PEAK. While the platoon was preparing positions, they were attacked at 1130 by approximately one enemy squad. Fire was returned and a patrol was dispatched to flank the enemy, forcing them to withdraw. Relief of Company "L" by Company "I" was effected at 1600 this date. "L" Company having suffered considerably from exposure on the 2000 Foot level for three days.

5. BCT 32-2 was ordered to move to high ground in the vicinity of Point 3 to assist in securing BUFFALO NOSE. Companies "E" and "F" moved up the high ground with Company "F" on the right and Company "E" on the left. Both companies received heavy machine gun and mortar fire and were unable to secure the nose. Heavy weapons company ^{was} placed in position to fire on

May 25, 1943 (cont'd)

enemy from the valley floor. Under the cover of this fire, "E" and "F" Companies were withdrawn from the high ground to the valley floor. They then climbed up to the ridge through gulches which offered protection from enemy fire. Upon arrival on the ridge, a line was established 800 yards south of BUFFALO RIDGE with "C" Company on the left (BCT 32-1 was attached to BCT 32-2 at 1600), "E" Company on the right, with Companies "D" and "H" placed in position just in rear of each front line company. "G" Company was to the right rear of Company "E" and "F" Company was in battalion reserve 200 yards to the rear of front line companies. Battalion remained in this position throughout the night, dug in, and consolidated their positions.

6. At about 1200, CP, RLG 17, moved to the vicinity of three large rocks at 867.2 - 3510.5. An OP was established at 867.2 - 3510.65.

SECRET

May 26, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 remained in position on the top of the ridge (FISHHOOK) and supported by fire the advance of BCT 32-3, enabling them to gain the HOLTZ-CHICAGO Pass. By utilizing approximately 70 men, including a portion of the collecting company, 7th Medical Battalion, a 37-mm gun was moved from the 800 foot level up to the position held by BCT 17-2 on the 2000 foot level and placed in position where it, together with other heavy weapons of BCT 17-2, could fire on the rear of enemy positions holding up a battalion of the North Force engaged in this area.

2. During the entire day of 25 May 43, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, less Company "B", was utilized to reduce enemy resistance on Points 2, 3, and 5 and to reconnoiter approaches to Point 4. Due to the precipitous slopes and the fact that in most cases only a few men could operate at a time, the progress of this battalion in reducing these areas was slow. Several times during the day a foothold was gained on Point 3 and was lost again. Finally, towards evening, the bulk of a company was pushed on Point 3, consolidated, and started to reduce enemy opposition of Points 5, 2, and 4.

3. BCT 17-3 remained in position with orders to give all possible assistance by fire to the attack of BCT 32-2. "I" Company, BCT 17-3, occupied positions on SARANI PEAK and actively patrolled to the north and east. Balance of BCT 17-3 remained in place (see overlay).

4. BCT 32-2 sent patrols from front line companies to the front and left flank in an attempt to locate and destroy enemy positions. These patrols were unable to advance into open terrain beyond Point 4 and BUFFALO HEAD due to heavy enemy fire, including machine gun, rifle, and mortar fire, coming from positions on BUFFALO RIDGE and Points 3 and 4.

5. At 1800, BCT 32-2 attacked BUFFALO RIDGE in the following formations: "E" Company on the left, "G" Company on the right, "F" Company in reserve (see overlay). The attack moved to within 150 yards from the ridge when both attacking companies came under heavy enemy machine gun fire from the front and right and left flanks and they were forced to withdraw during the night. During this attack, Company "F" was given the mission of neutralizing enemy positions on the left of the battalion (Points 3 and 4). However, enemy fire from their left flank forced them to pull back without gaining the high ground on Point 4. Battalion remained just below Point 3 throughout the night.

6. During the day, Companies "C" and "D", BCT 32-1, continued their attack on BUFFALO NOSE but were unable to advance due to heavy sniper, machine gun, and mortar fire.

May 26, 1943 (cont'd)

7. General comments: BUFFALO RIDGE positions overlooking CHICAGO HARBOR as well as the enemy defense positions on the ridge proper overlooking LAKE CORIES afforded the strongest natural position encountered. As long as BUFFALO NOSE was held, no progress could be made up the valley toward LAKE CORIES, or toward strong enemy positions in the valley proper east of LAKE CORIES and southeast of BUFFALO NOSE. The approach to the ridge was a rocky slope about 900 yards in extent. The enemy right flank was strongly established at Point 4. Many ravines on the side of Point 4 afforded perfectly defiladed positions that could put fire across the entire front of the ridge. On the left flank enemy machine gun positions were defiladed in the rough series of mounds in front of BUFFALO RIDGE. They afforded perfect positions for well defiladed machine guns which placed enfilade fire across the entire extent of BUFFALO RIDGE. These same machine guns were in positions so they could fire down into the valley and prevent any progress up the valley between LAKE CORIES and the 800 foot level on the left. The BUFFALO RIDGE area, once taken, would permit our forces to move weapons in position to enfilade the trench system in the valley north of LAKE CORIES and to bring fire on all installations and enemy positions in vicinity of CHICAGO HARBOR. The position on BUFFALO NOSE, however, could not be taken until enemy resistance was reduced or neutralized on the FISHOOK proper, Points 5, 3, 4) and on the many ridges along Point 4 and in the gulleys at the base of it.

8. CP and OP, RIG 17, no change.

SECRET

May 27, 1943

1. The plan for the day was as follows: a. To utilize the entire 1st Bn, 4th Inf to reduce the strong enemy position on point 4, and the ridges below Point 4 overlooking BUFFALO RIDGE. This mountain, one of the largest and highest on the eastern half of the island was the key to the Buffalo Ridge position. As soon as the position was reduced, BCT 32-2 with attachments from BCT 32-1 consisting of companies "C" and "D" were to attack Buffalo Ridge, Buffalo Nose, and secure all the high ground overlooking CHICHAGOF VALLEY and HARBOR. The attack of BCT 32-2 was timed so as to jump off as soon as the 1st Bn, 4th Inf had secured point 4, and the faces of Point 4 both in the direction of BUFFALO RIDGE and CHICHAGOF HARBOR. Co "D", 1st Bn, 4th Inf was ordered to place all of its weapons in position part way up the slope leading to Point 3 to support the attack of BCT 32-2 by overhead fire. This attack was supported by 3 Heavy Weapons Companies.

2. At 0830, a report received from CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf that he had succeeded in reducing Point 4 in view of the fact that no activity could be observed on Point 4. ^{Point 4} ~~Point 4~~ was shrouded by fog. Verification was requested from CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf as to whether or not Point 4 had actually been occupied, and whether or not the forward slopes of the mountain had been cleared of enemy resistance. CO, South Force was unwilling to push the attack of BCT 32-2 until these key positions (Point 4 - slopes of Point 4) had been reduced. In the meantime, the fire of one artillery battalion was placed on BUFFALO RIDGE and NOSE, and enemy trenches north of Lake CORLES. The attack of BCT 32-2 was finally tentatively set for 0930. However, since enemy activity still was in evidence on the slope of Point 4, another request was made to CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf to insure that he had either reduced enemy resistance in that area or had men in that position that could reduce any enemy resistance on the sides of the mountain.

3. The attack finally jumped off at 1000, and was supported by one 75mm Pack Howitzer, 17 37mm A/T guns located in the vicinity of BCT 17-3, one Bn of Field Artillery also supported the attack. Co "F" on the right, Co "C" on the left, Co "G" following company "C" with orders to extend the left flank of Co "C" and protect the left flank of the battalion. They were also again to establish contact with the 4th Inf on the left. Co "F" was able to advance to within 300 yards of BUFFALO RIDGE when enemy machine gun fire pinned them down. They were unable to consolidate their positions and remained in place. Co's "C" and "G" advanced to within 200 yards of the objective when they came under heavy automatic weapons fire and rifle fire from Point 4. They were unable to consolidate position and Co "G" was forced to withdraw. Co "C" gained a foothold on the ridge, 100 yards short of Buffalo Ridge. Companies "F" and "G" remained in these positions during the night. Co "C" during the night made contact with 1st Bn, 4th Inf on the left.

4. By morning of 27 May 43, arrangements had been completed to place BCT 17-3 in Force Reserve with the mission of improving its positions on the valley floor, but not to be utilized by the CO, Southern Force without release from the Force Commander.

SECRET

This force was in the process of being reinforced by Co "B", BCT 32-1. Due to the extent of CHICHAGO VALLEY and the large amount of area, it was necessary to cover the valley which was approximately 2000 yards wide. Direction of the group in the valley was given to Regimental Executive Officer, Lieut. Colonel Fish. Co "I" in addition to occupying the SARANA NOSE was extended along the ridge to saddle overlooking Lake CORIES; the bulk of the company was on SARANA PEAK (2000 foot level). This left three rifle companies and one heavy weapons company and the mass of 37mm guns together with one 75mm Pack Howitzer of the South Force which could not be moved to the high level (800), with the dual mission of guarding the valley floor and acting as Force Reserve. At 1445, Co "L" moved along the left of the valley floor with the objective of securing the high ground between Lake CORIES and BUFFALO HEAD. Co "K" extended to the front and occupied positions evacuated by Co "L". Detachments of Co "M" moved into forward positions to support by fire. At 1445, Co "L" was unable to reach the high ground on the left of the valley because BUFFALO RIDGE was not secure, at which time they withdrew to their original positions.

5. BCT 17-2 was relieved from the battalion sector by BCT 32-2, and the battalion was withdrawn to a reserve position located on the ridge west of CHICHAGO just below Point 3. BCT 17-2 remained in South Force Reserve and were prepared to support by fire the attack of BCT 32-2 on Buffalo. It was so located that it could readily pass through BCT 32-2 and push the attack to CHICHAGO HER.

6. CP and OP, RLG 17 located in right rear of Point 3.

May 28, 1943

1. Throughout the day the 1st Bn, 4th Inf continued to work on the mountain designated as Point 4. Although this strong point had been reported previously to have been cleared, however, this actually had not been accomplished. Actually the 1st Bn, 4th Inf had succeeded in securing the saddle, and had eliminated all resistance on Points 3, 5, and the saddle between Points 3 and 4. All approaches to Point 4, both by the saddle itself which was a knife ridge and along the northern slopes, had been blocked during the day. The CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf was again ordered to utilize his entire battalion if necessary to insure that all of this high ground be taken. He finally moved the bulk of the Bn east of the saddle between points 3 and 5, and operating in this saddle and on the south slope of these mountains, supported by his heavy weapons on the shelf below Point 3. By late afternoon, the bulk of Co "B" had reached the summit, and were beginning to work the forward faces of the mountain. The balance of the Bn less a small reserve held out by Bn CO, systematically fought their way along the sides of the slopes about half way down the mountain eliminating machine gun and sniper fire as they progressed. By approximately 1730 it was evident that this battalion had eliminated the bulk of the enemy resistance on the southeast and northeast slopes of the mountain. At this time intensity of artillery and mortar fire was increased on the ridge, and 37mm fire was concentrated on the trenches in the valley overlooking Lake CORIES and the area overlooking BUFFALO NOSE. The attack of BCT 32-2 which had been planned throughout the day was set for 1830.

2. BCT 32-2 assaulted BUFFALO RIDGE at 1830 with Co "C" on the left and Co "F" on the right and seized the objective. Co "C" was ordered to fill the gap that existed between Co's "C" and "F". Co "E" was sent to the right flank to extend the right of Co "F" and protect the battalion from attack up the side of the mountain from the valley floor. Weapons of Co's "H" and "D" were moved forward to cover ridge to front and flanks. Mortars were placed in defilade just in rear of BUFFALO RIDGE. Battalion remained in this position the balance of the night.

3. Co "B", BCT 32-1 was released to BCT 17-3 on the morning of 28 May 43. Telephonic orders were received ^{given} by the BCT 17-3 at 1745 to shorten their lines which were approximately 2000 yards in width in order to insure the blocking of the valley floor. The battalion moved forward at 1830 in a column of companies - "B" company leading with "L" Co echeloned to the right rear with an interval of 500 yards. Detachments of Co "M" were moved forward to support the attack by fire. At 2030, "L" Co was ordered to extend "B" Company's left which brought Co "L" on line with Co "B". Little enemy fire was received and the attack progressed to a line extending east and west along southern edge of Lake CORIES. The dispositions at 2300 were as follows: Co "B" in a defensive position extending in a line from southwest corner of Lake CORIES north 150 yards and west 200 yards. Co "L" was in position on the high ground 200 yards south of Co "B" and 400 yards west. Contact with BCT 32-2 was established by Co "I". Co's "B" and "L" dug in and remained in that position during the night. Under the cover of heavy fog, Co "I" sent a patrol to reconnoiter enemy positions on MIDDLE PEAK. The patrol returned at 1500 with information that enemy still held positions on MIDDLE PEAK. Co "B" was ordered to withdraw during the night in time to join 1st Bn, 4th Inf on the 800' level. ^{by 1600} CP and OP locations - no change. ^{Barth} ~~was ordered to reconnoiter and take a loggia location to narrow bottom of the valley near Lake Cories.~~

SECRET

May 29, 1943

1. During the evening, word was received from Force that two companies would be released from the valley to move up on the 800 foot level and assist the attack on BUFFALO RIDGE. At the same time 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, was to revert to Force reserve in its present position. This movement was initially planned in order to assist in the attack, 30 May 43, of BCT 32-2. Decision was made to move only one company, initially, since it was realized that this would considerably weaken the defenses in the valley floor. Approximately two and a half hours of climbing to the upper shelf would be required in order to either move troops from the valley floor to the 800 foot level or from this level to the floor. Approximately three hours were required before "I" Company, located on the SARANA PEAK, could be moved to the valley floor to be of any assistance. For this reason, the decision was made to move only one company initially from the valley floor, but to move it in sufficient time so it could reach the 800 foot level by 1100. It was expected, that by the time of the attack, "K" Company would be in a favorable position between LAKE CORRIES and the shelf so that it, together with Company "M", BCT 17-3, and other heavy weapons at the disposal of the CO, BCT 17-3, would be able to defend the valley floor. Initially, it was not planned to move Company "L" to the 800 foot level but rather to use it in conjunction with Company "K" to clean out the shoulder below BUFFALO HEAD, and thus be in position to support Company "K".

2. Co "B" who had been attached to BCT 17-3, began its withdrawal at 0300 to the vicinity of the battalion kitchens. At 0330, the rear guard of Co "B" was hit by the initial elements of the heavy Jap counterattack which passed through Co "B", and proceeded south down the valley floor. Co "B" was alerted by shouts and screams coming from the valley floor. At 0350, the right flank protection of Co "L" reported enemy approaching, and at 0400, approximately 25 of the enemy attacked Co "L"'s front and left flank. The ensuing fight developed into hand to hand combat and continued until 0530, at which time the enemy ceased their attack on Co "L". At 0630 contact patrols were sent out to the right and left in an effort to determine the situation. Results of the patrols were as follows: Co "B" was no longer in position and could not be located. BCT 32-2 was located 300 yards west and 700 yards south of Co "L". However, BCT 32-2 had outposted the interval between their right flank and the left flank of Co "L". At 0830 Co "L" withdrew through BCT 32-2 and made telephonic contact with CO, RLG 17, who ordered them to rejoin their battalion which was located in the same position as the day before. Co "L", plus the CO, Co "B", and 8 men from Co "B" moved down the valley floor (south) through the 7th Medical collecting station where the CO of Co "B" and his men were left for the protection of the medical installation. Co "L" continued through the ravines, encircling the valley floor, passing through the Regimental kitchens, and supply dump. This company was then ordered to reoccupy initial positions. Prior to passing through the kitchens, Co "L" reduced an enemy pocket on the valley floor, destroying 17 enemy and recapturing one of our own heavy machine guns. Reoccupancy of the position was completed at 2030.

3. Positions occupied by Co "K" and "M" were hit by the enemy at 0420. A fire fight ensued which lasted about 25 minutes with all the attacking forces being killed or driven off to the south.

SECRET

Co "K" remained in position throughout the day, sending out patrols to knock out small enemy pockets. Co "M" re-established contact with the battalion at 1200 and throughout the day brought machine gun and mortar fire to bear on enemy groups in the valley.

4. Co "K" notified the battalion at 0425 that the enemy was attacking and passed through their positions. The CP was immediately alerted and received the attack shortly thereafter by a sizeable enemy force. Lt. Colonel SIDDENS, CO, BCT 17-3, was seriously wounded. The enemy employed rifles, grenades, bayonets, light and heavy machine guns and knives against the CP personnel. Another fire fight ensued and enemy was either killed or driven off in the next hour and a half. Steps were immediately taken to reorganize the Bn and to re-establish the lines as they were the morning of 28 May 49. "I" Co's positions were attacked at 0415 by an enemy patrol of 16 men, all of whom were killed. An effort was made to report this action to the CO, RLG 17. However, all communications failed. Contact with CO, RLG 17 was finally made through artillery radio net and orders were issued to hold their positions. ~~Reorganize and reposition with two companies of "Bn" and~~
1st Bn sent to the valley floor to clean up all pockets of enemy resistance

5. The rear CP of RLG 17 at 0450 was attacked by an enemy force of approximately 100 men. This attack was made on the right and left flank of the CP area. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. During the attack, Lieut. Colonel Fish, Executive Officer, RLG 17 was killed.

6. BCT 17-2 remained in position on the shelf just below Point 3, and continued the patrol of the front, flanks and rear. ~~(One Co later sent to~~
clean up a pocket of Sabes near ECT 32)

7. BCT 32-2 was attacked by the enemy in the vicinity of Co "H" CP. at about 0530. Hand to hand fighting ensued and 21 enemy were killed. No further attack was made against BCT 32-2. One platoon of Co "E", assisted by a patrol from Co "C", cleared the enemy pocket of Buffalo Nose and completed the capture of the entire Buffalo ridge and nose. Co "C" and Co "F" sent patrols forward from Buffalo Ridge into the draws in the vicinity of the lakes on the CHICHAGO VALLEY Hog'sback. These patrols were unable to advance due to heavy enemy sniper fire.

8. At 0530, 1st Bn, 4th Inf (-) was alerted with orders to move into the valley to assist in cleaning out enemy resistance. CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf was given orders by CO, RLG 17 to clean the valley of all enemy and reorganize and assist BCT 17-3. At 0700, Co "A" was ordered to move from present position to the valley floor. At 0730 CO, 1st Bn, 4th Inf ordered Co "C" to follow Co "A" to the valley floor to clean out all enemy pockets and assist 3rd Bn in reorganizing. A large pocket of the enemy developed in the vicinity of the rear CP of the South Force. By flanking movements, the platoons of Co "A" advanced to within 200 yards of this pocket, and by excellent rifle and grenade action secured this pocket, ~~and eliminated some 60 Sabes.~~

May 30, 1943

1. Battalion CP of BCT 17-3 was attacked at 0400 by an enemy force which came from the direction of the gulches below COLD MOUNTAIN. A combined force of the CP personnel of BCT 17-3 and CP, RLG 17, and A/T Co, RLG 17, repelled the attack and destroyed approximately 40 of the enemy. During the morning all elements of the battalion, plus Companies "A" and "C", 4th Infantry, sent out patrols to encircle and destroy all enemy forces remaining in the CHICHAGOF Valley. At 1200, Battalion Commander was ordered to attack to secure the high ground just south of LAKE CORIES and be prepared to continue the attack on CHICHAGOF HARBOR. "C" Company, 4th Infantry, was to assist in the attack and was placed on the battalion's left. "A" Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, followed "C" Company at approximately 250 yards. "M" Company and Hqs Company followed "L" Company. "L" Company, BCT 17-3, was on the right with "K" Company in reserve (see sketch). The attack jumped off at 1230 and resulted in the capture of the high ground just south of LAKE CORIES. 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry, was ordered to continue the attack, and BCT 17-3 followed in a column of companies in this order: "I", "M", Hqs, and "K".

2. The attack progressed to the high ground immediately west and to the center of LAKE CORIES, at which time "L" Company was ordered to protect the right flank of 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry. The balance of the battalion continued to follow 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry. "I" Company moved forward on the right and encountered resistance in the vicinity of 871.3 - 3511.5 which necessitated the employment of "K" Company on the left of "I". The combined efforts of these two companies, supported by "M" Company, reduced ~~small~~ pockets in the area and the battalion moved into CHICHAGOF, taking up an organized position for the night in the vicinity of 871.2 - 3512.4 and continuing its elimination of small pockets of resistance. A strong patrol was also sent to block the withdrawal of any enemy from CHICHAGOF HARBOR area.

3. During the morning, "I" Company was not in communication with the battalion; however, at 1630, communications were reestablished and "I" Company was ordered to send two platoons down the right ridge of CHICHAGOF Valley to secure the approaches to MIDDLE PEAK and protect the right flank of the battalion. The approaches were secured at 2000, and "I" Company (-) dug in and consolidated their position for the night. Patrols from "I" Company were sent out to reconnoiter the area between MIDDLE and EAST PEAKS. They returned and reported that the enemy held positions between MIDDLE and EAST PEAKS. However, for the most part, these positions were lightly held. Patrol operating east toward CAPE KHLEENIKOF reported negatively.

4. BCT 17-2 remained in position throughout the day. Company "F" was sent to clean out a large pocket of enemy reported bottled up by the 13th Engineers in the gulch just left of the MASSACRE-SARANA Pass. "F" Company was reinforced by one section of heavy machine guns and one section of 81-mm mortars from Company "H", BCT 17-2. Company "F" moved out and proceeded on its mission at 1300, 29 May 43, and arrived on the high ground on the 800 foot

May 30, 1943 (cont'd)

level overlooking the gulch. During the night of 29 May, patrols operated on the valley floor and in the vicinity of the gulch to locate any enemy pockets. One platoon under Lt. PAULSON was dispatched into the valley floor at 0630 to sweep the floor clean of enemy. PLATOON moved from mouth of the gulch, east along the valley floor toward SARANA Valley. It succeeded in cleaning out all enemy resistance, killing 43 enemy and three officers. The balance of the company moved into the gulch and during the day, 29 May 43, succeeded in cleaning the gulch and killing approximately 60 of the enemy. On the morning of 31 May 43, Company "F" rejoined the battalion.

5. At 1630, an attack was launched from BUFFALO RIDGE by BCT 32-2, with its objective the CHICHAGOF HARBOR area. "F" Company was on the right and "C" Company (BCT 32-1) on the left. "E" Company followed "C" Company and extended their left. Little enemy resistance was met until a line was established across the nose of CHICHAGOF Valley hogback. At this time enemy machine gun and rifle fire slowed the attack of "F" Company. At 2030, contact was made with BCT 32-3, who had moved down CHICHAGOF Valley and extended the line of BCT 32-2 to the high ground on the left of CHICHAGOF HARBOR. Contact was also made with BCT 17-3 on the right flank. Positions were dug in for the night and plans were made for the move against CHICHAGOF HARBOR proper the next day.

6. At this time, the front lines of all battalions were approximately 400 yards from the beach. Strong security measures were ordered for each battalion and contact patrols were to be maintained throughout the night. All battalions remained in this position for the night and made preparation to complete the mopping up of CHICHAGOF HARBOR area. The enemy resistance during the day consisted of small enemy pockets which were unorganized and when attacked were, for the most part, quickly eliminated. However, a small number of enemy were observed retreating around the nose to the right of CHICHAGOF HARBOR toward CAPE KHLENIKOF. This resistance was subsequently eliminated.

7. The plan and the coordination of the movement into CHICHAGOF HARBOR area was as follows: BCT 17-3 was to spearhead the attack, moving from the vicinity of LAKE CORIES. When BCT 17-3 came abreast of BCT 32-2, which was located on BUFFALO RIDGE, BCT 32-2 jumped off their attack, attacking in the direction of CHICHAGOF HARBOR at 1630. In the meantime, CO, South Force, requested from CG, Landing Force, that BCT 32-3 be pushed down the CHICHAGOF Valley from the bend in the FISHHOOK. Request was granted and BCT 32-3 moved into the canyon left of CHICHAGOF HARBOR, making a junction with the left flank of BCT 32-2.

8. CP and OP, RIG 17, no change.

May 31, 1943

1. BCT 17-2 occupied positions vacated by BCT 32-2 prepared to support the attack of BCT 32-2 by fire. BCT 17-2 remained in this position as Force Reserve until it moved to the floor of SARANA Valley 1 June 43.

2. BCT 17-3, spent the day mopping up enemy detachments in the CHICHAGOF HBR Area. At 0800, "L" Co continued mopping up operations on both sides of Lake ADRIAN and south into ATTU Village, and just west of stream connecting lakes ADRIAN and CORIES. Simultaneously, "K" Co moved forward and secured the northwest nose of East Peak and instituted mopping up operations in that area thus preventing withdrawal of enemy from the CHICHAGOF HBR. "M" Co took positions to support both "K" and "L" Co's by fire. This operation was completed at 1500, resulting in approximately 100 enemy dead, and several prisoners. At approximately 1500, forward elements of "I" Co, which had advanced down the ridge just east of CHICHAGOF Valley joined the Bn.

3. At 1115, two forward platoons of "I" Co were ordered to neutralize all enemy resistance between Middle and East Peaks and rejoin the Bn. "K" Co was released from the mission of protecting the right flank and were ordered to rejoin the Bn in CHICHAGOF HBR. One platoon Co "K" remained in place on the northwest nose of East Peak.

4. BCT 32-2 had a similar mission of mopping up enemy resistance in the CHICHAGOF HBR Area. "F" Co was to clean out the right sector and "P" Co left of the Bn sector, Co "G" mopping up in the vicinity of their present position. (See overlay). Co "C", BCT 32-1 mopped up in the area between Co's "E" and "F" of BCT 32-2. One platoon, Co "E" assisted BCT 32-3 in clearing the canyon on the left of the harbor. At 1800, BCT 32-2 was given orders to move from its present location back to the high ground just north of Lake CORIES and revert to South Force Reserve. Bn was in its new position at 2030. 1st Bn of the 4th Inf assisted the mopping up action of CHICHAGOF HBR, moving from its position between BCT 17-2 and BCT 32-2 and proceeded cleaning the area forward to the ocean of all enemy resistance. At 1300, this Bn was moved to the vicinity of SARANA Nose and reverted to Force Control together with other elements of BCT 32-1.

5. BCT 32-3 came under control of the south force for administrative and tactical purposes only. The supply responsibility remained with the North Force. This Bn in conjunction with BCT 17-3 outposted the CHICHAGOF HBR Area and continued to mop up enemy resistance.


6. Forces under the control of South Force Commander when CHICHAGOF HBR was occupied were as follows: BCT 17-2, BCT 17-3, BCT 32-2, BCT 32-1 (less Co "A") and BCT 32-3. However, Force at various times placed limitations, various units to constitute force reserve throughout the entire twenty one days.

7. CP and OP RLG 17 moved to the vicinity of BUFFALO NOSE.

SECRET

~~SARANA - MASSACRE PASS AS SEEN FROM HIGH GROUND FROM~~
~~MASSACRE NO-BACK, OVER-LOOKING MASSACRE-SARANA PASS~~
SARANA - MASSACRE PASS LOOKING NE

SECRET



SKETCH No. 2

FALSE PASS

MASSACRE HOLTZ PASS AS SEEN FROM RECENTRAL OF
AS OF MAY 15, 1943

NOSE OF BLACK MT.

PASS PROPER

TABLE TOP


RANGE RUNNING WEST FROM COLD MT.

BLACK MOUNTAIN


MT K

MASSACRE - HOLTZ PASS

SKETCH No.1



CHICAGO VALLEY AS SEEN FROM SARANA MASSCRE PASS.



SARANA PK.

LAKE CORPES

BUFFALO
RIDGE


BUFFALO
NOSE

RIDGE NORTH OF LAKE
NICKOLAS

SARANA
NOSE

SKETCH No. 3

RIDGE WEST OF CHICAGO VALLEY AS SEEN FROM SARANA NOSE



SKETCH No. 4

3508

863

871

3502

SMALL SCATTERED ELEMENTS REACHED THIS LINE MAY 13 FORCED TO WITHDRAW

LINE OF FARTHEST ADVANCE BCT 17-3 & 32-2(-) MAY 13

2ND BN POSITION FROM MAY 12 TO 16

WOUNDED SGT LEFT AT THIS POINT

ROUTE OF PATROL CO F 17 BACK TO RLG MAY 14

POSITION HELD BY BCT 17-3 32-2(-) NIGHT OF MAY 13 ALSO POSITION OF BCT 17-3 NIGHT OF MAY 14

BCT 17-3 REACHED POSITIONS IN DRAWS ALONG RT SIDE VALLEY 300 YDS N.W. CP MAY 12

2ND BN FRONT LINE POSITIONS AS OF 2030 MAY 11 1943

FRONT LINE POSITIONS BCT 32-2 NIGHT OF MAY 14

3RD BN FRONT LINE POSITIONS AS OF 2030 MAY 11

3RD BN FRONT LINE POSITIONS AS OF 2030 MAY 11

BIV. NIGHT OF MAY 12-13

ROUTE OF PATROL CO "F" 17

ROUTE OF CO F 32-2
THRU HOLTZ PASS
UNABLE TO PASS THRU
JUNEAU MAY 14 VIA YELLOW BEACH
VICINITY RLG CP

17 MAY 11-18

1700 MAY 11

ROUTE OF CO "F" 32-2 TO TEMNAC BAY

F CO 32ND INF 1630

BCT 17-2 1630

BCT 17-3 1630


UNOPPOSED LANDING AT 1630 MAY 11


REPORT AT 1600 MAY 12
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED VICINITY
TEMNAC BAY. ORDERED TO
HOLTZ PASS

MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
1/20,000

RLG 17 OVERLAY OF
OPERATION ON ATTU - PHASE I
FROM 1630 TO 2400 MAY 11, 43

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:
HARRY L. BEATTY
CAPT 17TH INF.
S-3






MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
1:20,000

RIG 17
OPERATION ON ATTU PHASE I
FROM 2400 MAY 14
TO 2400 MAY 18, 43

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

HARRY L. BEATTY
CAPTAIN 12TH INF
S-3



Patrol contacted 7th Recon Trp
at 0100 May 18

864

3509

SET UP DEFENSE
NIGHT OF MAY 17

PASS THRU I Co SET UP
DEFENSE 2350 MAY 17

PASS THRU I Co
OUTPOST & SET UP
DEFENSE IN SADDLE
2230 MAY 17

PATROL CLEARED
RIDGES RETURNING
1400 MAY 17

SAME PATROL REACHED
TABLE TOP 1900 NO
RESISTANCE MAY 17

SIX MEN SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING
COLD MT TROOP SYSTEM 0830 MAY 18

AT 2400 MAY 17

PATROL 12-3
RETURNED 1900
M Co WNS SUP AT 32-2 MAY 16
REST POSITIONS 12-3 TO 2400 MAY 16

864

3507

PATROL GAINED NOSE
OF BLACK MT
AT 1100

POSITIONS NIGHT
OF MAY 17 UPON RELIEF OF BCT 222

PATROL FROM 12-3 LEFT 1900 MAY 16
RETURNED 1900 M Co WNS SUP
ATK 32-2 MAY 16

4-255
CN Co 32

RELIEVED MAY 18 BY DIV


MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
1/20,000

RLG 17

OPERATION ON ATTU END OF PHASE I
FROM 2400 MAY 16
TO 2400 MAY 17, 43

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:
HARRY L BEATTY
CAPTAIN 14TH INF
S-3

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6

3510

864

K 12 - OUTPOST

K 12 - OCCUPIED AND DEFENDED PASS FROM MAY 12 TO MAY 19 RELIEVED AT 1200 BY G 1 322 PATROLS SENT TO HIGH GROUND SURROUNDING PASS TO OUTPOSTS

PATROL TO FLANK POINT B

NIGHT OF MAY 19

NIGHT OF MAY 19

3507

K 12 - OUTPOST

POSITIONS 12-2 MAY 12 TO NIGHT MAY 18

UNABLE TO TAKE POINT A (MORTAR FIRE) 2400 MAY 19

SUPPORTED ACTION C Co 321 MAY 19 AS WELL AS 122 FROM THESE POSITIONS 10 37MM GUNS SUPPORTED ATK 122 & 321 (C) MAY 19

SUPPORTED ACTION "C" Co MAY 19

BN CLOSED IN AT 2100 MAY 18 IN FORCE RESERVE (MAY 18-19) "K" Co REJOINED BN AT 2200 MAY 19

DIV NIGHT OF MAY 18 PREPARED TO TAKE POINT A ON MAY 19 (BN - A B HQ Co)

CLOSED IN ARCH 2140 MAY 18 REVERTED TO RLG 12

MAP OF ATTU ISLAND 1/20,000

RLG 12




OPERATION ON ATTU - BEGINNING PHASE II FROM 2400 MAY 18 TO 2400 MAY 19, 43

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER : Harry L. Beatty CAPTAIN 12th INF S-3

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 2 3 4 5 6



OUTPOST 2400
MAY 22

NIGHT OF
MAY 20
TO 2400
MAY 21

2400 MAY 20
2400 MAY 21
(FORCE RES)

2400 MAY 20
SUPPORTING 123 MAY 22

NIGHT OF
MAY 21
AND MAY 22
LESS 'D' CO

ATT POINT 'A' AT 2330
MAY 20 SECURED 0430
MAY 21 OUTPOST W/ ONE
PLATOON MAY 21 TO 22 RELIEVED
BY PLAT 123 BN 412

'C' CO FAILED TO TAKE POINT A MAY 19-20
REINFORCED BY SEC MG 0400 MAY 20
JOINED 'E' CO 22 AT 0900 MAY 21

MAY CO PLUS MG SEC OCCUPIED SARANA PASS NIGHT OF MAY 22

PATROL ADVANCED TO THIS POINT
WAS HALTED BY HEAVY FIRE 1640 MAY 22


'C' CO WAS ORDERED AT 2330 MAY 20
TO RECONQUIRE SARANA PASS
ARRIVED BY 0430 DUG IN. REMAINED
NIGHT OF MAY 21


DEPORTED BY FIRE MOVEMENT
OF 'C' CO 22 MAY 19-21
REJOINED 'C' CO NIGHT OF MAY 21

MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
1/20000

RLG 12
OPERATION ON ATTU PHASE II
FROM 2400 MAY 19
TO 2400 MAY 22 '43

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:
Harry L. Beatty
HARRY L. BEATTY
CAPTAIN 12 INF
S-3






MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
1:20,000

RLG 17

OPERATION ON ATTU PHASE II
FROM 2400 MAY 23
TO 2400 MAY 24 '43

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:
HARRY L. BEATTY
CAPTAIN 17TH INF
S-3



866

3513

PATROL ACTION MAY 26
SUCCEEDED IN TAKING PTS 324
2500 MAY 26

MAY 25
1ST BN 4TH MOVED
FWD 500 YDS NO PT 3

MAY 26
1000

MAY 25
3000

MAY 25
SUPPORTED BY FIRE
32-3 MAY 26

LINE OF FURTHEST ADVANCE 32-2 MAY 26
FORCED TO WITHDRAW TO ORIGINAL POSITIONS
BY FIRE FROM FWD SCOPES PT 4

PATROL REPORTED TO HAVE REACHED
EAST PEAK NIGHT OF 24-25
SIGHTED SMALL ENEMY DET DIGGING IN
ALONG RIDGES

MAY 26

MAY 26

12-3(L) EXTENDED TO COVER
POSITIONS 32-3 MAY 25
MAY 26

MAY 25 1600

OUTPOSTED & PATROLLED
MAY 25 TO

AT 322
AT 323
AT 324


873

3507

MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
1/20000

RLG IX
OPERATION ON ATTU PHASE II
FROM 2400 MAY 24
TO 2400 MAY 26, '43

COMMANDING OFFICER
Harry L. Bratty
CAPTAIN 12TH INF
S-3



1st BN 4th FINALLY ELIMINATED RESISTANCE ON PT 4 1450 MAY 28

CO 1st BN 4th REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN PT 4 MAY 27 '6" CONTINUED TO FIGHT FOR 4 MAY 28

3/3 TOOK OVER POSITION OF IV-2 MAY 27 IV-2 WENT TO RLG RES

RLG RES MAY 27 & MAY 28 LESS 1/1 CO

1st BN 4th ORDERED ON MAY 28 AT 102 LESS DEFS ON POINT 3, POINT 4 & SADDLE BETWEEN, TO FORCE RESERVE

REVERTED TO 11-2 MORNING OF MAY 28

PATROL TO CONTACT 'L' CO NIGHT MAY 28

CO MOVED TO 100 YDS FROM BUFFALO 'F' CO'S MOVED TO 400 YDS FROM BUFFALO FORCED TO WITHDRAW TO POSITIONS SHOWN MAY 27

PATROL TO CONTACT 32-2 NIGHT MAY 28

CO B ORDERED TO WITHDRAW DURING NIGHT MAY 28 TO JOIN 1st BN 4th LINE ON EAST LEVEL 'G' TO EXTEND LINE OF CO B ON WITHDRAWAL

TO ORIGINAL POSITION. 32-2 UNABLE TO SECURE BUFFALO

'H' CO EXTENDED LINES TO INCLUDE 'L' CO SECTOR 1400 MAY 26 BOTH REGULARS CAME OFFICERS NIGHT OF MAY 27 WHEN 'L' CO FELL BACK

FIRE FROM 17 AT GUNS 2-75'S ASSIST 32-2 MAY 27

PATROL SENT TO MIDDLE PEAK REPORTED ENEMY DIGGING IN RETURNED NIGHT OF MAY 27 PATROL AGAIN SENT 1500 MAY 28 RETURNED AT 1500 - ENEMY STILL DIGGING IN

MAP OF ATTU ISLAND


1/20,000

RLG 17

OPERATION ON ATTU - PHASE III
FROM 2400 MAY 26
TO 2400 MAY 28 '43


FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER
8502 Harry K. Beatty
CAPTAIN 12th INF
S-3

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES 1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6

866
353



H 17
 H 30
 F 17
 1500 YDS
 CO F
 MAY 29
 MAY 30
 (LEG CO F)

TOOK UP POSITIONS ON LEFT 17-3 NIGHT MAY 29

H 17
 H 30
 F 17
 1500 YDS
 CO F
 MAY 29
 MAY 30
 (LEG CO F)

TOOK UP POSITIONS ON LEFT 17-3 NIGHT MAY 29

CLEANED VALLEY FLOOR

REJOINED BN MORNING MAY 31

ENEMY DELAYED ABOUT 865.6 - 3508.8. CO F REMAINED MAY 30

BELOW GOLD MT TOOK MOST OF E CO TO MAKE 70 MEN

CO F SENT MAY 29 TO CLEAN ENEMY IN DRAW

H 17
 H 30
 F 17
 1500 YDS
 CO F
 MAY 29
 MAY 30
 (LEG CO F)

TOOK UP POSITIONS ON LEFT 17-3 NIGHT MAY 29

CLEANED VALLEY FLOOR

REJOINED BN MORNING MAY 31

ENEMY DELAYED ABOUT 865.6 - 3508.8. CO F REMAINED MAY 30

BELOW GOLD MT TOOK MOST OF E CO TO MAKE 70 MEN

CO F SENT MAY 29 TO CLEAN ENEMY IN DRAW

H 17
 H 30
 F 17
 1500 YDS
 CO F
 MAY 29
 MAY 30
 (LEG CO F)

TOOK UP POSITIONS ON LEFT 17-3 NIGHT MAY 29

CLEANED VALLEY FLOOR

REJOINED BN MORNING MAY 31

ENEMY DELAYED ABOUT 865.6 - 3508.8. CO F REMAINED MAY 30


MAP OF ATTU ISLAND
 1/20,000

REG 17
 OPERATION ON ATTU PHASE III
 FROM 2400 MAY 28
 TO MORNING JUNE 1

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER
 HARRY L. BEATTY
 CAPTAIN 10TH INF
 SB

873

3507



37

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO. 1557

307-111(17)-0.5
(1968)
MAY 10 1968
DOZ 17-1 17-2 17-5 - Rpt of Action on Item (w/Attach Data) 11 May 10 1968 AS

HQ. BCT 17-1
APO #726
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 10, 1945

SUBJECT : Report of Action on Attu

TO : C.O. RLG 17

In compliance with Memorandum, Hq. Task Group 16,11 dated 4 June 1945, the following chronological report of action on Attu is submitted. Copies of Unit Journal, day by day Casualty Summary, and overlays showing positions as of 2100 PWT daily are attached as supporting documents.

May 11:

Advance detachment of A.D.C. Scouts and Company "A" report landing on Red Beach feasible. Landing proceeded without event. Weather very foggy. Advance started toward objective reaching position indicated on overlay. Enemy patrol, 4 men, first enemy encountered.

May 12:

"A" Company committed on right, ran into heavy M.G. and mortar fire. "B" Company committed on left, progress slow. "C" Company committed in gap between companies and seized initial bn. objective (Davis Ridge). "A" Company reverted to Bn. reserve. Heavy AA fire received.

May 13:

Front lines fight to improve positions on High Ground overlooking Holtz Bay. Enemy threat on left flank does not develop. Det. of 7th Recon. Troops joins us. Col. Culin assumes command of North Force.

May 14:

Identification of enemy units made. Attack begun against North Creek in West Arm Holtz Bay. Heavy AA fire encountered. BCT 32-3 attacking on our right.

May 15:

Attack into West Arm proceeds successfully. "A" Company on right, "B" Company on left.

May 16:

Fire from ridge between arms of Holtz Bay holds up coordinated attack of North Force, so detachments of "B" and "C" Companies force way to top of "Davis Hill" flanking enemy positions, making possible night advance of entire North Force and occupation of high ground.

CLASSIFICATION

CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Units, with 400
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 15 Aug 46

309-17-0.3
MAY 11 1945
19993
Muster

"Report of Action on Attu" continued from page 1

SECRET

May 17:

Consolidate positions and patrol into East Arm Holtz Bay and find it evacuated.

May 18:

Patrol reports enemy on Zig Zag Trail leading to Chichagof Pass.

May 19:

Organization of guard begins for defense of Holtz Bay Area. Outpost at Scarlett Beach established.

May 20:

Continuation with organization of guard, police of area.

May 21:

Organization and cleanup work continue. En. O.P. established on "Cantor Point."

May 22:

Attempt made to outpost Stellar Cove, but weather would not permit. Hostile aircraft sighted attacking destroyer off Holtz Bay.

May 23:

Air warning system installed. Police and guard organization continue.

May 24:

Companies "A", "C" and part of "D" alerted for movement to Chichagof Pass to assist BCT 32-3.

May 25:

Company "C" attached to BCT 32-3, committed to action. Scarlett Beach outpost captures two prisoners.

May 26:

All troops attached to BCT 32-3 committed to action. Progress favorable. Holtz Guard reconstituted to fill gaps left by "A" and "C" Companies.

May 27:

Companies "A" and "C" continue in action.

SECRET

"Report of Action on Attu" continued from page 2 "

SECRET

May 28:

Patrolling to all entrances of Holtz Bay Area by defense troops.

May 29:

Report received of Jap counterattack in early morning. Extra vigilance being observed by defense elements.

May 30:

Usual duties.

May 31:

"A", "C" and "D" Companies begin return from "Chichagof Area."

June 1: All Bn. again together. All Engineers and C.A. troops to be moved from Holtz Bay.

June 2:

General machine gun suspect area.

June 3:

Captain Johnson and Captain Siegel leave to reconnoiter possible defense areas for 1st Bn.

June 4:

No unusual activity; police work continues.

June 5:

Severe storm; activity limited.

June 6:

Outpost sent to Red Beach.

June 7:

S-3 and G.O. leave for Regimental Headquarters.

June 8:

1715. Battalion alerted for move to "Peaceful Valley" Movement begins at

SECRET

"Report of Action on Attu" continued from page 3.

SECRET

June 9:

Battalion arrives and begins work on defense and housing projects
in approximate center of "Peaceful Valley".

Albert V. Hartl
ALBERT V. HARTL
Lieut. Col., 17th Infantry
COMMANDING

SECRET

SYNOPSIS

SECRET

An Infantry Battalion plus a Cannon Company, and a Battery of 105mm Field Artillery were the principal troops employed. By a series of fire and movement maneuvers the objective was attained.

The enemy encountered was a series of strong points on high ground. Weapons consisted of rifles, LMG's, HMG's, and small mortars. These were supported by batteries of dual purpose 77mm guns and mountain howitzers.

It was necessary for our forces to always seize the highest ground in the vicinity. Once this was accomplished the enemy would evacuate the surrounding territory.

The mission of this Battalion was to clear West Arm of Holtz Bay and seize high ground separating areas of bay. This mission was accomplished.

Very effective supporting fires were received from detachments of Cannon Company and from Battery "A", 48th F.A. Especially beneficial was the fact that these units occupied separate gun positions. Consequently in all instances one or the other was free of counterbattery fire and could deliver fire missions.

Our weapons and allied equipment are excellent, our clothing as issued was not entirely suitable. Warmer equipment and rain suits should have been worn ashore.

Patrol action was constant in order to prevent flanking action by enemy. This filled the gap between the mountains and ocean and contributed greatly to positive destruction of all enemy in our sector.

Lessons derived from the action are:

1. Know terrain and attendant conditions better before you plan your operation.
2. Equip men for most severe possibilities.
3. Our "Conditioning" program must be more strenuous and practical.

Recommendations, in addition to those implied in the paragraph above are that training should be carried on in terrain and under conditions more nearly approaching actual site of operations, subordinate commanders should be given more information of proposed operations, and enemy equipment should be better known by units about to enter combat.

Albert V. Hartl
ALBERT V. HARTL
Lieut. Col., 17th Infantry
COMMANDING

SECRET

CASUALTIES OF 17TH INFANTRY

TROOPS WITH N.L.P.

SECRET

Divided between killed, wounded and exposure by day:

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Killed</u> | <u>Wounded</u> | <u>Exposure</u> |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|-----------------|
| May 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| " 12 | 14 | 15 | 12 |
| " 13 | 11 | 32 | 12 |
| " 14 | 6 | 22 | 14 |
| " 15 | 11 | 21 | 20 |
| " 16 | 1 | 2 | 19 |
| " 17 | 9 | 21 | 7 |
| " 18 | | | 2 |
| " 19 | | | 3 |
| " 20 | | 1 | 3 |
| " 21 | | 1 | 7 |
| " 22 | | 1 | 3 |
| " 23 | | | 2 |
| " 24 | | | |
| " 25 | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| " 26 | 2 | 16 | 4 |
| " 27 | 2 | 3 | 8 |
| " 28 | | | 3 |
| " 29 | | | 2 |
| " 30 | | | |
| " 31 | | | 20 |
| June 1 | | | |
| " 2 | | 2 | |
| " 3 | | | |
| " 4 | | | |
| " 5 | | | |
| " 6 | | | |
| " 7 | | | |
| | | | 144 |
| Killed | 57 | | |
| Wounded | 139 | | |
| Exposure | | | 144 |
| Missing | 11 | | |

SECRET

BCT 17-1 UNIT JOURNAL

SECRET

5-10-43 In Out

1. 0925 x From Dir: Execute plan Easy

5-11-43

1. 1320 x Received go ahead signal

2. 1520 Arrived Beach Red

3. 1555 x To CO RLG 17: Landed at Beach Red at 1520

4. 1640 x To CO RLG 17: BCT 17-1 has established a beachhead generally 1000 yds deep by 1600 yds wide. No enemy contacted. Our position G90-H40.

5. 1600 CP in continuous displacement forward along prescribed A. of S.C.

6. 1730 x Co. A reports their CP located at G6300 R1100. 48th F.A. O.P. approx G9200R1700. They also report they can see 8 enemy in W Arm Holtz Bay & can hear confused yelling & screaming.

7. 1750 x Co. B reports their location as G45550 R250.

8. 1800 x Navy Beach Party received report that BCT 17-3 had landed at Yellow Beach at 1745.

9. 1800 x To CO RLG: 1st Bn. CP moving forward. S-2 patrols report no activity as far forward as G-50, F-30.

10. 1820 x Co. B reports contact with Jap patrol along beach. Killed 2, wounded 1, 1 Jap got away. S-2 reports this information and has captured Jap rifles. Patrol was first contacted at G07900 R1600.

11. 1840 x To S-2: Description of Jap uniform.

12. 1845 x CP BCT 17-1 at G-30 F-50. Still moving forward.

13. 1915 Our CP located at G-30 F-30.

14. ADC Scouts assigned mission of protecting our right flank by patrolling high ground right & forward.

15. 1935 We use mortars against enemy positions.

16. 1945 A & B Co's moving forward supported by D Co's mortar firing on enemy positions.

17. 2000 x To CO RLG 17. We are at G-65 F-30.

18. 2119 CP moves forward & sets up at G-20 B-70.

19. 2200 RLG-17 notified as to our positions as of 2200. No casualties for the day. A on the right, B on the left with platoon near beach.

5/12/43

1. 0700 Companies move out toward high ridge. B Co. on the left, A Co. on the right.

2. 0720 Co's contact enemy entrenched on ridge.

3. 0810 x To CO RLG 17: Position same as last night. Held up by enemy fire. Visibility very poor.

4. 0900 Co. A is pinned down by heavy machine gun & mortar fire. Casualties estimated at 7.

5. 0945 C.O. at CP.

6. 1000 x To CO RLG 17-1: Lines unchanged. 48th F.A. shelling enemy positions.

7. 1035 C.O. returns to CP.

8. 1100 x To CO RLG 17-1: Alerts 500 yds W of Beach West Arm Holtz Bay. 7th Ren Tro Debas joined BCT 17-1.

9. 1200 Enemy holds high ground blocking our entrance in to West Arm Holtz Bay.

10. 1200 Ammunition dump set up across ravine from CP

11. 1220 x To CO BCT 17-1: (message not clear) elements your sector
SAV 1225

8386 AFM. Stay there. Give what help you can. This position L841. Still pursuing our objective. You have been released from our control.

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

| | In | Out | |
|----------------|------|-----|---|
| 12. | 1515 | | Co. C committed between B & A on Co. A's left flank to relieve A Co. which has been held up since morning and has received heavy casualties. |
| 13. | 1535 | | B & A are able to advance slightly with help of Co. C and good Arty support. |
| 14. | | x | From G-2: Counter sign, Lazy Nell |
| 15. | 1910 | x | To CO RLG 17: Receiving air support. Situation somewhat relieved. |
| 16. | 1910 | | |
| 16. | 1910 | x | To CO RLG 17: Have been slowly advancing, but momentarily held up. |
| 17. | 1930 | | Co. C takes saddle followed by Co. B. |
| 18. | 1953 | x | To RLG 17: Have captured last high ground before 7 Arm of Holtz Bay. New fighting band to hold it. |
| 19. | 2000 | x | To RLG 17: Struggle continues for high ground. Casualties very heavy. Enemy infiltration thru high mountain on my right. |
| 20. | 2100 | x | To CO RLG 17: Co. A in reserve. General position in rear of CP. |
| 5/13/43 | | | |
| 1. | 0700 | | CP in same location. Situation remains relatively the same after quiet night. B & C holding ridge over-looking West Arm & Co. A in reserve. |
| 2. | 0845 | | Ack Ack fire overhead of CP & seem to be getting range on first line companies on ridge. Positions of CO's unchanged. |
| 3. | 1045 | | Co. C Bn comes to CP with report he had just escaped from 150 to 200 Japs on beach in cove just below CP. |
| 4. | 1017 | x | To CO RLG 17: Our counter attack apparently successful. Positions unchanged. Great number of casualties continue to come in. |
| 5. | 1050 | | Co. A platoon dispatched to patrol beach & investigate authenticity of man's story. |
| 6. | 1140 | | Co. A platoon found nothing on beach. Returns to reserve. |
| 7. | 1145 | x | Div S-3 releases to Bn. control the Co. C platoon which had been left to protect Red Beach. The platoon is ordered to join its Co. which has suffered heavy casualties from Ack Ack fire. |
| 8. | 1145 | | 7th Recon Trp Det. joining Bn. Given mission of protecting right flank in conjunction with ADC Scouts. |
| 9. | 1500 | | Situation unchanged. B & C hold ridge at heavy cost. |
| 10. | 1430 | x | Regt. notifies us that they are going to attack immediately after a 20 minute Arty barrage. |
| 11. | 1435 | x | Received Msg that Col. Earle had been killed by enemy sniper. Ordered to carry on as he would have wished. |
| 12. | 1515 | | Medics report they have checked & evacuated 85 casualties. Four dead at station. Q.M. holding up on burials until he hears from division. |
| 13. | 1814 | x | To RLG 17: Strafing mission carried out by our planes on enemy front lines. Very effective. |
| 14. | 1824 | x | To CO RLG 17: Co. A in reserve G-30-B-80. CP located at G-30 B-70. |
| 15. | 1900 | | BCT 32-3 beginning to arrive in bivouac area to our rear. |
| 16. | 1915 | x | To CO RLG 17: Positions slightly improved by plane strafing. Wilmas has joined us. Col. Culin has assumed command. |

5/14/43

| | | | |
|----|------|---|--|
| 1. | 0940 | x | CO BCT 17-1 at O.P. |
| 2. | 0940 | x | To G-2: BCT 32-3 troops still arriving. 7th Recon Bn has arrived last night. At least one Btry enemy AA guns still able to fire. |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

3. 1345 In Out To CO RLG 17; BCT 32-3 coordinates attack with BCT 17-1 at 1800 x
4. 1415 x To G-2/LF 7; Co. coordinated attack on West Arm Holtz Bay will begin 1830.
5. 1445 x To CO RLG 17; Captured documents identify the 9th Co. 27 Inf. Regt. 7th Inf. Div. This unit left Japan Oct. 24, 1942 and arrived Oct. 29. Unit has seen service in N. China & Manchuria in 1937. This unit now designated as the No. Pacific Exped. Force. Comd. of NPF is Lt. Gen. Keiichi Hizuichi. Comd. the garrison on Attu is Col. Yakizo Kobayashi. This Msg also sent to G-2 direct
6. 1630 32nd not in position. Attack delayed 45 minutes.
7. 1841 x CG LF-7; Attacking north creek in W Arm Holtz Bay.
8. 2002 x CG LF 7; Advancing slowly. Enemy resistance heavy on center ridge in Holtz Bay. Unable to contact 7th Scout Co. Bn C.O. & S-2 spends night at OP on peak to right of saddle.
9. 2030

5/16/43

1. 0700 CP location unchanged. Enemy activity during night very slight. Waiting for fog to lift to attack into W Arm. Extremely poor visibility. Plan attack at 0830.
2. 0915 Plan to attack at 1030.
3. 0923 x For Col. Culin; Limit objective launched by Co. C 32nd Inf. East ridge right flank main effort attempt to force pass. Advance slow due to enemy automatic weapons in pass.
4. 0945 In contact by radio with 7th Scouts. They say they will be able to support our attack by driving down north creek into West Arm. 48th P.A. trying to assist their advance by firing on pill boxes to their front. BCT 32-3 CU notified.
5. 1030 Attack gets underway. Jap Ack very active. Dp Co heavy MG's directing fire on AA positions.
6. 1130 x For Col. Culin / Request to make 7296 available received .
Your
Designate place.
7. 1130 x For Col. Culin from RLG 17: Our front lines generally 66-0, 7-64, 8-07, 2-63-065. Our progress has been little since reaching the mouth of the pass and we are unable to furnish you any help.
8. 1135 x For Col. Culin from G-2, 7th Div: Our plan to attack at 0630 was delayed due to extremely poor visibility. Situation unchanged during night. From our plotting our position it appears that the Pro. Bn. should be able to join your other force. Is that possible?
9. 1200 x From CO RLG 17: Password Silly Billy from 1200 May 15 to 1200 May 16th.
10. 1358 x To CO RLG 17: Scouts are now at pill boxes. Adv. slowly. Crossing creek into W Arm. Opposition heavy. High overhead A.A. fire at CP.
11. 1410 For Col. Culin: If junction with Pro. Bn. is impossible, advise us to withdrawal of Pro. Bn. to Scarlett Beach.
12. 1445 x To G-2 7th Div: We have Pro. Bn. with us.
13. 1505 x To CO RLG 17: Front line positions are R65 I85 to Y50
14. 1510 x I 85, still moving forward.
15. 1645 Japs spotted withdrawing from Holtz Bay through pass to Chichigoff. We placed Arty fire on them and did some damage.
16. 1800 x To CO RLG 17: Our advance continuing. We have reached N. Creek in W. Arm Holtz Bay. In contact with AA & presumably AA fire. In contact with Scout Co. by radio. They are

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UNIT JOURNAL CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3

SECRET

In Out (No. 17 continued from page 3.)

17. 1800 attacking with us.
 18. 1720 x For Col. Culin from G-2: We make very slow progress in Holtz Bay--Massacre Bay Valley.
 19. 1815 x To Col. Culin: 7th Scout near guard awaiting disposition.
 20. 1815 X From 7th Scout to Col. Culin: Sufficient supplies have been dropped by plane. Troops on hill need immediate relief.
 21. 1855 P-38's strafe enemy positions on ridge between arms of Bay.
 22. 1850 Co. "C" reports they believe Japs are using gas.
 23. 1846 No gas being used.
 24. 1845 x To CO 1st Att. G-2: Enemy holds ridge in center of Holtz Bay. Will dig in for the night in W-Arm Holtz Bay. Column of enemy moving out of E. Arm toward Chichagof.
 25. 2000 Front lines of Bn. have reached center of flat ground in West Arm. Forward Bn. C.P. located across the North Creek in West Arm. Troops are digging in for the night.
 26. 2047 x To CO 7th Scouts: Have taken Black Beach. Are digging in for the night. Report your position.

5/16/45

1. 0830 S-3 & Sgt. Com. O. & Sgt. move to forward C.P.
 2. 0405 x To G-2: Plan to attack ridge in Holtz Bay at 0630. Supply is good.
 3. 0808 Planes strafe enemy positions. Due to lack of BCT-32-3 Co's to display panels planes also strafe friendly troops.
 4. 0805 Planes carry out effective bombing mission on ridge.
 5. 0625 x For Col. Culin from G-4: Supplies must be furnished you from Massacre Bay Area.
 6. 0945 Planes strafe enemy positions.
 7. 0855 Wildcat plane crashes in cove below C.P.
 8. 1115 From G-2: Return observer E. R. Kelliner to transport. He will join his organization.
 9. 1115 x To Col. Fish: Land 4 boats in W. Arm with - Heavy 81 Light 81-80mm, Cal. 30 M.G.
 10. 1215 x From C.O. RLG: Passward Willie Tilly.
 11. 1330 x From G-2: Select cemetery site & accomplish burials as situation permits.
 12. 1358 x To C.G. 7th: Attack progressing slowly. Meeting numerous automatic weapons. Culin
 13. 1715 x To C.G. 7th Div: Request have Chirifkoff unloaded Red Beach. Culin
 14. 1800 Supplies come into W. Arm of Holtz Bay by boat from Red Beach.

5/17/45

1. 0945 Old CP remains at the same location.
 2. 1000 B & C holds ridge after quiet night.
 3. 1030 Preparing to displace CP forward.
 4. 1200 Joined Major Hartl at South Creek in West Arm Holtz Bay. Digging in for the night.
 5. 1455 To C.O. RLG 17: Now holding high ground commanding E. Arm of Holtz Bay.

5/18/45

1. CP location remains the same.
 2. 1215 1st Bn. patrols active in E. Arm of Holtz Bay.
 3. 1515 Col. Wells & Smith visit airport.

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UNIT JOURNAL CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4.

IN/OUT

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4. Password, Village Smithy
 5. 1400 S-2 & Major Griggs inspect enemy Btrys in East Arm.
 6. 1700 Patrol returns & reports Japs on trail to Chichagof.
- 5/19/43
 1. 0755 En. C.O. reports to G.O. Rig-32
 2. O.P. location same.
 3. 1030 En. C.O. holds staff meeting, BOT 17-1 to plan defen-
 sive positions for W. Arm Holts Bay.
 4. 1100 All captured knee mortars are collected & turned over to
 32nd.
 5. 1300 En. C.O. holds O.O. meeting & assigns them their positions
 in the defensive plan.
 6. 1315 Word received from Div. that Major Hartl is appointed
 Lt. Co. & Lt. Datta is appointed Captain.

5/20/43

1. O.P. location same.
 2. Consolidating positions in Bay area. General policing.
 Destroying duds. Digging emplacements.

5/22/43

1. O.P. location remains unchanged.
 2. 1100 Det. started out to Stellar Cove, but had to turn back
 at Red Beach due to bad weather.
 3. 1600 Enemy aircraft sighted by O.P.'s. Enemy aircraft attacks
 destroyers unsuccessfully.
 4. 1700 2nd Lt. Shirley appointed 1st Lt.

5/23/43

1. Air raid warning system established. 3 long for air raid.
 series of shorts for ground attack. One long for all clear.
 2. Co. O.O.'s meeting held by En. O.O. Points stressed—warn
 men against looting. All Saki to be poured out. Supply
 system to be through channels.

5/24/43

1. Our planes give Chichagof harbor heavy bombing. 2nd Lt. Gris-
 ham appointed 1st Lt.
 Co. G, Plat. of Co. D, Medics, Com. Sec. & Co. A alerted for
 movement to Chichagof pass.
 2. 2025 x From Capt. Prather: The use of small arms & grenades for
 killing fish & birds is forbidden.

5/25/43

1. 0100 En. C.O. holds meeting with A Co. C.O., C Co. C.O., D Co. C.O.,
 Medics C.O. & their Co.'s are given order to move out to
 Pass between East Arm and Chichagof.
 2. 1158 Co. C committed in action at pass.
 3. 1130 Scarlett Beach Det. relieved by fresh Det. Lt. Marshall
 remains,
 4. 1410 Co. C makes slight advance.
 5. x To Lt. Marshall, Scarlett Beach: You will established periods.

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5. Cont. periodic patrols to Red Beach & Stellar Cove. Report any unusual activity.
 6. 1900 Co. C reported as carrying burden of advance.
 7. 2100 Scarlett Beach Det. captures 2 prisoners. S-2 leaves on Kane to interrogate them.

5/26/43

1. 1100 S-2 returns from Scarlett beach. Prisoners taken to G-2 by Kane.
 2. 1300 From S-2 R/L 32: Enemy aircraft left Paramushiro island. Destination unknown.
 3. 1452 From Maj. Chandler: Attack not to jump off as planned. O Co. & I Co. (of 32) will have to take high ground to their left front before attack can start. This is the high ground that the 2nd Bn & 4th Inf. were going to take but Gen. Landrum decided he did not want them committed there. Col. Finn has Maj. Chandler at his OP. Capt. Johnson is taking the two Co's and will try to take the high ground. The attack will probably not occur until 1700 today.
 4. 1800 From Maj. Chandler: Attack is underway.
 5. 1900 Excellent progress by Co. C is reported.

5/27/43

1. 0415 Enemy aircraft sighted headed toward Attu. All Co's notified.
 2. 2015 Word received that Co. C is being shifted to relieve 2nd Bn. Co. A is in reserve.
 3. 2100 Chap. Busse visits OP
 4. 2000 Patrol from On. Co. sent to S. end of E. Arm to guard against infiltration to our rear.

5/28/43

1. 0815 Unidentified barges reported entering E. Arm Bay.
 2. 0855 Barges identified as friendly. They are loaded with Eng. & const. equipment.
 3. 1330 Unidentified patrol spotted on hill west of OP. Checkup being made.
 4. 1600 Chap. Busse leaves for 2nd Bn. OP.
 5. 1615 Unidentified patrol identified as 32nd patrol.
 6. 1620 Self inflicted casualty reported at Scarlett Beach. Stretcher team sent from Red Beach.
 7. 2000 Capt. Johnson to Col Hartl: Companies doing fine work and except for extreme cold are getting along okay. Evacuation due to exposure quite heavy. A & C in holding Action.
 8. 2200 Rec'd word that Jap Commander had been sent an ultimatum.
 9. 2400 Naval fire & flares very active all night.
 10. 1800 Lt. Groner sent with patrol to guard South End of E. Arm during night.

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UNIT JOURNAL CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

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5/29/45 In Out

1. 0620 x From Col. Gulin to Col. Hartl: Japs counterattack our right flank during night & approximately a company infiltrated thru our lines. South force to try sweep from right flank while north force holds.
2. 0700 Lt. Groner's patrol from south end of East Arm reports no activity during night.
3. 0730 Casualty from Blind Cove is Gomez of "B" Co. Evac. to Red Beach Medical. Self inflicted wound.
4. 1148 Col. Hartl goes to 32nd C.P.
5. 1300 Col. Hartl returns with information that the breakthrough in 3rd Bn. area was more serious than first reported. Gen. Landrum will continue with his plan. Col. Hartl arranges for protection of East Arm in particular.
6. 1400 Wire Com. linking laid to Scarlett Beach Det.
7. 1500 32nd patrol goes toward Chichagof along beach. O.P. & "D" Co. warned to verify before firing.
8. 1400 1 squad from "B" will move over at 1500 to aid "D" Co. protect high ground.
9. 1900 50% of this command alerted for the night.
10. 1900 13th Eng. Plat. given mission of policing ammunition from area, starting tomorrow morning.
11. 1930 32nd will have detail at far end of White Beach & run 5 man patrol along shore toward Chichagof.

5/30/45

1. 0700 Quiet night. No enemy activity reported in our sector.
2. 1045 Fillmore pulls into West Arm to unload.
3. 1100 Com. Q. leaves to get situation of A, C, D for Bn. C.O.
4. 1130 Sent 54 Parkas (complete) to A & C.
5. 1700 S-2 admitted to Hospital w/sprained knee.
6. 1800 Command alerted for the night.

5/31/45

1. 0700 Quiet night. No enemy activity in this sector.
2. 1030 Lt. Duck reports Chichagof Beach cleared.
3. 1600 Rec'd. word from Capt. Johnson that A & $\frac{1}{2}$ of D. are in pass & C & $\frac{1}{2}$ of D. Co. Det are at Chichagof.
4. 1615 Guard & alert status for tonight remains the same as last night.
5. 1800 Pfc. Capt. Johnson at Chichagof. A Co. w/ part of D will be coming down the pass tonight. O Co. will come to Black Beach by boat.
6. O.P. Cannon, A/T & Lt. Groner notified to be on the lookout for them.
7. 2110 First Boat load of O. Co. arrives from Chichagof.
8. 2215 2nd Boat of Co. O arrives.

6/1/45

1. 0230 Co's A, C & D returned to Bn. Control.
2. 0700 Quiet night. No enemy activity in our sector.
3. 0830 S-1 goes to Red Beach to arrange for moving balance of equipment to Black Beach.
4. 1730 Rec'd. word that Eng. & G-78th are being moved to Massacre Bay.
5. 1800 S-1 returns to O.P. from Red Beach.
6. 2100 Continue guard & 50% alert status.

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UNIT JOURNAL CONTINUED FROM PAGE 7

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6/2/43 In Out

1. 0700 Quiet night. No unusual activity in our sector.
2. 0830 S-1 goes to Red Beach w/detail to continue moving equipment to Black Beach.
3. 0905 Bn. C.O. goes to 32nd C.P.
4. 0945 Password for today, starting, at 1200, Rolling Hills.
5. 1000 Bn. C.O. returns to C.P.
6. 1045 All Co's warned to take greater precautions w/arms & ammunition due to self inflicted wounds yesterday in this sector.
7. 1100 Bn. C.O. talks to Regt. C.O.'s by phone. No indication as to plans given.
8. 1250 Telephone Com. w/Scarlett Beach out.
9. 1300 Col. Hartl goes to 32nd C.P. to meet Gen. Buckner.
10. 1400 Col. Hartl returns to C.P.
11. 1900 Guard & alert status remains unchanged.

6/3/43

1. 0700 No enemy activity. Report of gunfire during night turn out to be Demol. squad blowing duds.
2. 0900 Lt. Morken leaves for Regt'l C.P.
3. 1000 Lt. Smallwood & carrying party went to Regt'l C.P. w/records & to pick up mail.
4. 1000 S-1 & Capt. Siegel left for Div. C.P. to reconnoiter area for future Bn.'s position.
5. 1350 Lt. Morken called that he had arrived at Regt'l. C.P.
6. 1540 Lt. Morken called that he was leaving Regt'l Hq. for 1st Bn. C.P.
7. 1955 Lt. Morken returned from Regt'l. C.P.
8. 2000 Mass & protestant services held for the Bn.
9. 2010 80 man detail called for by 32nd to unload LCT at midnight.
10. 2030 Col. Hartl goes to meeting w/Col. Culin.
11. 2210 Col. Hartl returns to C.P.

6/4/43

1. 0600 Quiet night. No enemy activity. 50% alert status is off. Each unit responsible for its own security.
2. 0830 Co. Com. meeting. Instructed to police area. Gather material. Movement warning.
3. 0930 S-1 couldn't get boat to continue hauling from Red Beach.
4. 1700 1 Bag for each Co. of 3 4th class mail arrives.
5. 1700 80 man work detail for 32nd told to stand by. Will be used later tonight to unload LCT from Fillmore.
6. 1800 Lt's Furtney, Hutchinson, Linebaugh, Youker & Groner transferred to 3rd Bn. Lt. Ludwig to join them as soon as he returns.

6/5/43

1. 0700 Hellava wind & rain. Tentage down. Com. lines out.
2. 0800 Bridges across S-Creek in W. Arm out.
3. 1900 All Co's & men are under canvas.
4. 2200 32nd 3rd Bn. outpost report as having been attacked by Japs. Number unknown.

6/6/43

1. 0700 Bright clear day.
2. 1700 Outpost Det. of (1) Rifle squad & (1) LMG squad was sent to Red Beach.
3. 2000 S-1 & C.O. Co. P return to C.P. from Div. & Regt. Report to Bn. C.O. on reconaissance of Tamnac Bay.

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6/7/45 In Out

1. Captain Weaver leaves for Temp. duty w/3rd Bn. 17.
2. 1300 Bn. C.O. & S-3 leaves for Regt'l. Hq. & Recon. of Purple Beach--Tannac Bay Area for bivouac site of 1st Bn.
3. 1300 Major Chandler is Bn. C.O.
4. 1545 Rec'd alert of enemy aircraft.
5. 1600 Rec'd word that enemy aircraft had been sighted.
6. 1805 Col. Hartl called from Regt. He will be at Regt'l. Cpt. tonight. Capt. Weaver is at 3rd Bn.

6/8/45

1. 1010 Rec'd word that Bn. would have to move to Tannac at 1500.
2. 1030 Col. Hartl called with add. details of move.
3. 1330 Rec'd word that boat would be 2 hrs. late.
4. 1420 Capt. Johnson wants to be notified at Movie Red Forward when troops leave, when boat arrives & when boat departs.
5. 1730 To Capt. Johnson: Foot troops on way at 1715.

6/9/45

1. Left Red Beach for Purple Beach by barge at 0645.
2. Arrived at Purple Beach at 1145. Can't land.
3. Landed 2015.
4. Joined 2nd Co. in Peaceful Valley at 2230.

6/10/45

1. 0700 Quiet night.
2. 0830 Lt. Linebaugh assigned to Co. "B".
3. 0950 Bn. C.O. left for Purple Beach.
4. 1000 Lt. Ludwig will remain with Hq. Co. as Com. O.

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NOTES ON JAPANESE TACTICS

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Compiled From Written Comments of Officers and NCO's of BCT 17-1

GENERAL:

The Japanese soldier, as evidenced by his conduct on ATTU, is stubborn but sometimes stupid; brave but batty. Also his tactics on ATTU were not consistent with those reported from other theaters. He was fighting defensively, along uncoordinated lines, and was taken by surprise, at least in the Holtz Bay Sector. His fighting most of the way would be rigid; then he would suddenly break into an utterly unpredictable maneuver such as the Chichagof breakthrough, or counter-attacking a ridgeline under his own ack-ack fire, or setting himself on fire. He missed many opportunities and seemed content to fight, withdraw, and die bravely. He had to be dug or blown out of his holes one by one.

POSITIONS:

With few exceptions, permanent emplacements were excellently sited and brilliantly camouflaged. The Japs take good advantage of terrain and cover and are adept at remaining still for long periods of time. These factors, plus their smokeless powder, make them exceptionally hard to pick up. They utilized cracks in rocks, and natural formations hard to reach and hard to get into -- from some of which they could only be ejected by our 37mm gun using HE ammunition. Often counteracting their good positions, however, was their habit of using fixed fields of fire, and their seeming inability to shift fires to meet emergencies.

CAMOUFLAGED:

Most of the Jap camouflagage was a work of art. Some emplacements, quarters and even warehouses were not visible from fifty yards or less. Possibly the majority -- at least a very large number -- of their installations on ATTU would not show on a photograph.

WEAPONS:

Consensus of officer and enlisted opinion shows great respect for the Jap light machine gun; considerable respect for and interest in the knee mortar; a wholesome fear of the Jap ack-ack as used against personnel -- for its demoralizing effect though admitting it was not overly effective; derision for the Jap hand grenade; and surprise at poor Jap marksmanship with most weapons except the knee mortar, and including ack-ack against planes. There were some exceptions; Scouts working the high ground on the Bu, right flank reported snipers who were deadly shots, but in general the numerous and annoying snipers, many using light machine guns, shot wildly and in fixed fields, missing many opportunities to do real damage to advancing troops. Booby traps were not resorted to greatly in the Holtz Bay Area, although many were found; more were installed in the Chichagof area where more time was available. Some blanket-doors on huts, moved aside by bayonets, released as many as three booby traps simultaneously.

SNIPING:

The Japs did a great deal of sniping, using chiefly their efficient and easily moved light machine gun, often equipped with telescopic sights and luminous sights for night firing. Much of this sniping was done from extreme ranges, and from positions far removed from their own main bodies. Their sniping positions were cleverly chosen and their smokeless powder made it virtually impossible to pick them up.

INFILTRATIONS: Warned thoroughly against this art, U. S. troops were surprised to find ATTU Japs hardly infiltrating at all. Only in rare instances, and around flanks resting against mountains, did a few Japs attempt to ease around the advancing U. S. forces, and then without success. The Jap strategy seemed to be to delay and withdraw, using darkness for the latter, instead of the infiltration and night tactics so generally expected of him.

MATERIAL:

The Jap was well clothed for the climate, and in general well equipped. His blankets are of good quality. Perhaps the most useful item found (and greatly prized by all ranks) was Japanese canned heat -- faster burning than Sterno but capable of heating quickly, and nearly essential in the conditions found on ATTU. Jap positions were well supplied with warm clothing, blankets, food and a plentiful amount of ammunition of all types.

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INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS: The Jap soldier is no great individualist. As told by prisoners and evidenced by his field conduct, most Japs expected and wanted to die, and tried to inflict as much damage on the enemy as possible before doing so. Therefore in most cases he had to be dug or blown out of his hole, bayoneted, grenaded or bashed with a rifle butt. He had little inclination to close with the bayonet, unless he was making the charge under his own conditions. He feared artillery fire and, even more, airplanes. He fought without any very well coordinated plan, but often made the most of the terrain and his smokeless powder, and repeatedly, with a few men, held up vastly superior forces. His most ingenious act on ATTU was the use of ask-ask against personnel coming over the mountains surrounding the gun positions. He is a good digger; his holes were deep, well placed and often cleverly constructed; they were also numerous. He would stay in them often till the bitter end. The Jap soldier on ATTU would not surrender. Wounded wore grenades around their necks, and when approached by enemy would pull the pin. Wounded Japs were treacherous. Once captured, however, they would talk. The Jap soldier is capable of unpredictable actions and frequently commits them, either individually or en masse.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Unanimous for adoption of a smokeless powder.
 Many suggest mortar similar to Jap knee mortar.
 That BAR's be held further back. Japs pick them up as targets due to bipods.
 That 60mm mortars be used to greater extent and further forward.
 That aiming stakes be NOT painted white on any part, and that they be kept short.
 That Jap tactics can be better met by fighting with small groups rather than attacking in force.
 That artillery use air bursts on reverse slopes.
 That the Technical Manual on Characteristics of Japanese Warfare include instructions on the functioning and operation of the weapons described.
 That in the future troops destined to fight Japs be allowed to examine captured Japanese ordnance while en route to the combat zone.

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
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OPNS OVERLAY OF DISPOSITION
OF BCT 17-1 11 MAY '43

By ORDER OF LT COL. HARTZ

Robert H. Johnson
CAPT 17th INF
S-3

BCT 17-1 LANDED ON
BEACH RED 11 MAY '43
AT 15 15



TERRAIN MAP
OF

Attu ISLAND

Sheets 546

SCALE: 1/20,000

TIME 1044 WT


FRONT LINES OF BCT 17-1 AS OF
11 MAY '43 AT 2100

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GRAPHIC SCALE



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OPNS OVERLAY & DISPOSITION
OF BCT 171 12 MAY '43
By ORDER OF LT. COL. HARTL

Robert H. Johnson
CAPT. 171 INF.
5-3

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FRONT LINES OF BCT 171 AS OF
12 MAY '43 AT 2100 GMT

TERRAIN MAP
OF
ATTU ISLAND
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
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GRAPHIC SCALE



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
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OVERLAY OF DISPOSITION
OF BCT 17-1 13 MAY '43
BY ORDER OF LT. COL. HARTL


ROBERT H JOHNSON
CAPT. 17th INF.
S-3




TERRAIN MAP
OF
ATTU ISLAND
Sheets 5+6
Scale: 1/20,000

Time: 1147 WT

FRONTLINES OF BCT 17-1 AS OF 13 MAY '43
AT 2100 WT



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OPNS OVERLAY OF DISPOSITION
OF BCT 17-1 14 MAY '43

By ORDER OF LI COL. HARTL

Robert H Johnson
CAPT 174 INF

BEACH PATROL

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TERRAIN MAP
OF

ATTU ISLAND

Sheets 5+6

Scale: 1/20,000

TIME: 1444

FRONT LINES OF BCT 17-1 AS OF
14 MAY '43 AT 2100

SECRET

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES

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
OPNS OVERLAY OF DISPOSITION
OF BCT 17-1 15 MAY '43

By ORDER OF LT. COL. HARTL

Robert H. Johnson
CAPT. 17th INF.

SCOUT DET A DC
75 PM
M (CNC)

S-3



TERRAIN MAP
OF
ATTU ISLAND

Sheet: 5+6

SCALE: 1/20,000

Time: 1510WT

SECRET

GRAPHIC SCALE



INCHES

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OPNS OVERLAY OF DISPOSITION
OF BCT 17-1, 16 MAY '43


By ORDER OF LT. COL HARTL

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CAPT. 17TH INF.

S-3

75PH
(CIC)



TERRAIN MAP
OF
ATTU ISLAND


sheets 5+6

SCALE: 1/20,000

TIME: 1421

FRONT LINE POSITIONS OF BCT 17-1 AS OF
16 MAY '43 AT 2100

SECRET



Copy: 2
June 9, 1943

SUBJECT: Action of BCT 17-2 on ATTU ISLAND.

TO : C.O., RIG 17.

SECRET

This Battalion landed on Beach Blue about 1530 May 11, 1943 without opposition. Order of advance, column of companies F, E, G and H to intermediate objective, Massacre-Sarana Pass. First opposition was encountered about 3000 yards from the beach from about six riflemen. The enemy withdrew quickly after one Japanese Officer had been killed. The advance continued according to plan. Company F penetrated the high ground in the vicinity of Cold Mountain and Company E advanced in the saddle and the high ground south of the pass. The enemy opened up with mortar and machine gun fire. Exact location of the weapons could not be discerned due to the dense fog. The companies withdrew to the west side of the pass in defense positions preparatory to renewing the attack in the morning.

May 12, 1943. The attack was resumed, but due to the inability to locate enemy positions in the dense fog, no success was attained and the Battalion was ordered to hold its position covering the Massacre-Sarana Pass until further orders.

Company E took positions on the high ground west of the base of the pass, Company G on Company E's right. Company F was in position in rear of Company E organized for overhead fire, protecting the left flank of the Battalion and developing the position in depth. The Battalion CP was placed at the top of the hog back in Massacre Valley. Company H had one platoon of heavy machine guns with Company E, one section with Company F and one section in Battalion reserve near the Battalion CP. The mortars were fired from battery position in the draw west of the hog back with OP on top of the hog back. Artillery OP was on top of the hog back with Battalion OP.

This position was held during May 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 with friendly machine gun, rifle, mortar, 37mm and artillery fire being placed on known enemy positions. On May 15, 1943 at 2400, a reconnaissance patrol of one Officer and five men was sent from Company F to known enemy positions on top of Cold Mountain. This patrol returned at 0400 without casualties and reported that the enemy held the position with riflemen and machine guns and that they had heard considerable digging. They were unable to penetrate the enemy positions to any great success due to the enemy's alert outpost system, set on alert by a series of bird calls. This patrol, although it did obtain some information, did not obtain the results desired and it is not believed that it was a successful patrol.


On May 16, 1943 at 2400, a night raid was launched against the enemy entrenched on Cold Mountain. The mission of the raid was to enter the enemy entrenchments, cause as much damage as possible to enemy personnel and material and then to withdraw. Protective fires from machine guns were registered during the day, signals, communications net, etc., established. One Officer and twenty-five men participated in the raid. The raiding party managed to get six men through the outpost line and next to the objective before the party was discovered and the enemy opened up with machine gun fire. The leader of the raid called for his protective fires which were promptly laid down while the raiders withdrew. It is believed that the reason that this party was discovered was as follows. In planning the operation, a route was mapped so that the raiders would not have to cross snow patches, thus outlining their forms. This objective was achieved, however, snow on the side of the mountain some 5000 yards away and behind the raiders back did outline the men to the enemy. It is believed that in any future operations of this kind, in this type of terrain, that the operation would have a greater chance of success on a foggy night.

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On May 18, 1943, the Battalion Commander, BCT 17-2, was ordered to attack the enemy in the Massacre-Sarana Pass, attack to commence at 0600 May 19, 1943. In addition to the organic Battalion, the Battalion Commander had the following weapons to support the attack, all located near the top of the hog back in Massacre Valley and firing Northeast into the pass and the high ground south of the pass.

- 10 - 37mm guns (including 4 Bn A/T guns)
- 2 - 75mm pack howitzers
- 3 - 50 Cal. machine guns

The following sketch was drawn up and distributed to each Officer controlling a company or group of supporting weapons.



Each of the above numbers signifies a known enemy entrenched position. All contained machine guns and rifleman except Point 9 which contained a 37mm gun and mortars. Point 11 was believed to contain mortars and Point 10, in addition to being fortified, was believed to contain an OP for dual-purpose guns believed to be located in Sarana Valley. The afternoon of May 18 was spent in registering artillery on each of the known enemy positions as well as mortars and 75's. A rather elaborate system of communications was established to enable the Battalion Commander to control the fire of supporting weapons in furtherance of the tactical plan. The artillery radio as well as telephone was set up at the Battalion Commander's OP on top of the hog back. A sound power telephone was run from the mortar OP to the Battalion Commander, like one from the 75's. A telephone was run from the OP to the Officer in charge of all 37mm firing. Radio and telephone control was run to all the companies in the Battalion. The tactical plan in general was as follows: One company of the 32nd Infantry left at 2400 May 18 for the top of the ridge dividing Massacre and Sarana Valleys and was in position on top of the ridge ready to attack Point A at 0600 May 19, 1943. At 0500 May 19, a patrol from Company I, 17th Infantry under Lt. Brown, was started from the floor of the valley with a mission of enveloping Point 5 from the North. At the same time, a patrol from Company F, 17th Infantry under Lt. Paulsen, was given a mission of attacking the enemy trenches at Point 4 from the North and then working down to 1, 2, and 3 in conjunction with the rest of the company who would attack from the East. 511 Radio was used to contact the C.O. of the company attacking Point A as was that attacking Point 5. 536 was used to the platoon attacking Point 4. It should be borne in mind that the average strength of a rifle company in the Battalion the day of the attack was 50 men. About 1000, a report came in from Major Keller at Point A that he was held up by machine gun and mortar fire and unable to advance. Up until this time no report had been received from the units attacking Points 5 and 4, but shortly thereafter, C.O. of Company F reported that these units were observed to be withdrawing from Cold Mountain. The Battalion Commander decided to attack the position straight on at this point. The artillery laid down a ten-minute concentration on enemy positions at Cold Mountain. All other weapons opened fire on positions 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Smoke was laid in the saddle at H-2 and the wind carried the smoke over the enemy positions at Cold Mountain and greatly aided Company F in its advance into the positions. Company F was ordered to attack the enemy positions on Cold Mountain under cover of artillery fire and smoke. Company E was ordered to occupy the saddle and to send one platoon to Point 6. Company G was ordered to take position in reserve just West of the mouth of the pass in rear of Companies E and F. Fire was lifted on Point 6 which was taken by a platoon of Company E. Company F succeeded in taking Points 4, 1, and 2 but received fire from Points 3 and 5. Company E sent one of its platoons to Point 3 and Company G was ordered to envelope the left flank, secure Point 5 and aid the platoon of Company E in its attack on Point 3. The actual taking of Point 5 by Company G was not accomplished until the

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following day. After taking Point 6, platoon of Company E was ordered to continue to 7 but was unable to advance due to machine gun fire from the draw to their left front. This machine gun was knocked out by a patrol from Company F and Points 5, 7, 8 and 9 were taken with aid of 32-2. This action was concluded about 2200 on May 19 and the companies established defensive positions for the night. The battalion was passed through on the 20th of May by the 1st Bn, 4th Infantry and this battalion took up a reserve position in the draw west of the Massacre-Sarana Pass. The battalion remained in this position until the 23rd of May when it relieved the 1st Bn, 4th Infantry on the high ridge west of Chichagof. On the 24th contact was gained with the 3rd Bn, 32nd Infantry of the North Force and telephone communication established with that force. On the 24th, North and South Forces initiated action against the top of the ridge (Nose of the fishhook) west of Chichagof. Company G attacked on the right, Company E on the left and Company F was held in reserve in the vicinity of the Holtz-Sarana Pass. The attack began at 1800 and the companies succeeded in penetrating the enemy trenches midway up the hill but were forced back to a position about 50 yards below the trenches which they held throughout the night. At 0800 on the 25th of May, the advance again continued and high ground on top of the ridge was gained about 0930 by Companies G and E. Company F was ordered to follow up this advance as well as supporting weapons from Company H. The position was occupied for the night with Company F on the left, Company G on the right and Company E in reserves. This position was held throughout the night and on the 26th, from its position on top of the ridge, supported by fire the advance of the North Force into the Chichagof Pass. On the 27th, the Battalion sector was taken over by the North Force and the battalion was withdrawn to a reserve position behind 32-2 on the ridge west of Chichagof. On the 28th, Company F was moved in on the left, Company G on the right on the ridge behind 32-2 and in position to support their attack by fire. On the nights of the 27, 28, and 29, patrols were sent out to the front from Companies F and G to reconnoiter enemy positions in Chichagof Valley. No contact with the enemy was obtained on any of these nights. On the morning of the 29th, when the Japs counterattacked up Chichagof Valley, the only contact this Battalion had with the enemy came when 21 of the enemy attempted to circle our right flank. They advanced up a draw which was covered by a heavy machine gun from Company H which opened fire and accounted for all 21 of the enemy. About 1100 on the 29th, Company F, with one platoon MMG's and one section flame mortars was sent to clean out 200 Japs who had been reported in the draw East of Cold Mountain. In conjunction with Engineers, Company F succeeded in eliminating the enemy in this area accounting for four Jap Officers and forty-three men without any casualties of its own. The Battalion stayed position until June 1 when it moved to the floor of Sarana Valley North of Lake Nicholas.

EDWARD P. SMITH
Lt. Colonel, 17th Infantry
Commanding

SECRET

June 13, 1943

SUBJECT: Observations made during and prior to operations on ATTU ISLAND.

TO : G.O., HIA 17.

The following observations were made as a result of action against the Japanese and the amphibious operations prior thereto:

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. The amphibious training of this unit is believed to have been complete as well as the combat preparation prior to combat. The exact nature of the preparation for land fighting was not satisfactory for this operation due to the lack of acclimation of troops and the preparation for combat in this type of terrain.
2. It is believed that training troops for physical endurance by means of road marches is not adequate. Much of the conditioning should be marches cross-country over difficult terrain, hand-carrying the equipment. No effort should be spared to harden the men to live under adverse conditions particularly in operations in this sort of terrain.
3. The general plan for combat loading of transports was sound, but completely fell down due to last minute additions to ships cargo and due to the fact that many of the officers in command of units, due to the lack of knowledge on the subject, were unable to furnish the troop commander or TQM with information which would allow the proper loading of their equipment.
4. The Army ship commanders and the Navy ship commanders met and agreed on plans for the actual loading of the ships. After that date and prior to loading, 900 ship tons of equipment were added to the ship of which I was in charge, overloading the ship by that amount and rendering a complete combat loading of the ship impossible. After the details of loading have been worked out, no changes can be made and still gain the required ends of loading.
5. At least 8 Officers and 200 EM should be included in the advance party. Any attempt to cut down in this number results in later confusion due to the fact that the billeting Officer does not have sufficient personnel to perform his duties.
6. The ideal situation which should be sought on an amphibious operation is to load only a Battalion Combat Team with the equipment necessary to carry it through combat plus the necessary boats to get it ashore on one ship. Although it is realized that the ideal is difficult to attain, the closer it is adhered to, the smoother the operation can be expected to function.
7. It should always be borne in mind that the tactical situation and the loading of the ship are very closely woven together and that the BCT Commander should have knowledge of the tactical situation prior to loading the ship, since the ship is in fact, unloaded when it is loaded.
8. It is believed that a very helpful and profitable Field Manual could be written on the subject of amphibious operations, based on the knowledge and experience gained by Officers of this unit to date.

SECRET

WEAPONS

1. All Infantry weapons used in this operation are adequately suited for the purpose for which intended.
2. The M1 Rifle was a complete success and was looked upon with greater favor by the men than the '03 due to its automatic action. It was feared, at first, that the ammunition supply for the M1 would be a problem, but the men quickly learned to fire only when they had targets and the supply problem for this weapon was not a great one. It is believed that much success could be attained by equipping the second-in-command of each squad with a telescopic sight instead of grenade launchers in this type of terrain.
3. The '03 Rifle is a fine rifle but due to its bolt action, it was not as desirable as the M1.
4. The Carbine was not suitable at all due to the fact that most firing was done at long ranges (over 300 yards). There were some reports that it was desirable when in close to the enemy in entrenched positions in the mopping-up stage.
5. The Pistol was seldom used except for the purposes for which intended as a close-in protection weapon and during night operations, both of which requirements it filled.
6. The Hand Offensive Grenade was desired by the men rather than the fragmentation grenade. "One hand offensive grenade in a fox-hole was all that was necessary while a fragmentation grenade did not always do the trick." Recommended that the percentage be about 80% - 20% in favor of hand offensive grenades. Some sort of carrier, to enable the Infantryman to carry four grenades should be devised.
7. Both the 60mm mortar and light machine gun were highly satisfactory and were used just as taught by Infantry tactics.
8. The B.A.R. was one of the best weapons we had due to its mobility, its rapid rate of fire and the numerous positions from which it can be fired. It was used many times fired from the hip to clean out enemy entrenched in position.
9. Both the 81mm mortar and the heavy machine gun were entirely successful and were used according to Infantry teachings. It might be noted that M1 heavy was used on occasion against the enemy in caves. I examined the results of one of the hits of the M1 heavy and it pierced the wooden roof of one of the caves, blew it to bits and had caused casualties within the entrenchment.
10. The 37mm gun was used entirely against point targets at ranges up to 1200 yards and was highly successful. Getting the gun in position due to the nature of the terrain, was a difficult task, but it always paid dividends. Too much praise cannot be given to this weapon.
11. The Anti-Tank Grenade was not used at all due to lack of suitable targets. It is believed that it would be successful against a hard surface such as a concrete pill box but none were encountered in this operation.
12. The 48th F.A. Battalion, which worked with this Battalion, was on a large measure responsible for the success attained by this Battalion. Their firing was very accurate and the employment of barrages with the Infantry following close behind, enabled the Infantry to advance quickly. The men quickly learned to follow behind the barrage.

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CLOTHING

1. Rather than give the shortcomings of the clothing which was issued, the following recommendations for clothing in this type of terrain is offered:
Shoes - Either shoe-packs or loggers boots are a step in the right direction, but some sort of footwear which is more water-proof and lighter should be manufactured.

Heavy Woolen Underwear - One suit worn, none carried originally, but supplied to the front lines at a later date.

One pair Light Wool, One pair Heavy Wool Socks worn and One carried in pack.
Each man equipped with a parka, pair of woolen mittens, topped by a pair of water-repellent mittens with leather palms. Parka to be one-piece instead of two-piece reversible now issued.

Woolen liner to helmet.

Rucksack to be carried with following contents:

1. Sleeping Bag.
2. One pair light wool, one pair heavy wool socks.
3. One K and one D ration.
4. Toilet Articles.
5. Suit Rain clothes.

This pack can be carried until contact is gained, when it can be dropped in company area and brought up at night by Battalion 3-4.

Each rifleman should carry one bandoleer of ammunition and all Infantrymen, four hand offensive grenades.

COMMUNICATIONS

~~1. 596 Radios were not successfully used in this Battalion. Whether this was due to the fact that they were fairly well worn when the action started or the effect of dampness on them, is not known.~~

2. 195 Radio was successfully used probably due to the fact that much of the action permitted line-of-sight use of it.

3. Due to the fact that most of the action was slow-moving, we were dependent almost entirely on telephone communication. In this connection, the use of sound power telephone, particularly by Mortar, was highly successful. Light telephone wire was originally laid, due to the difficult terrain, but had to be replaced as soon as possible by heavy wire.

SUPPLY

1. The Battalion A & P Platoon supplemented by such personnel as company cooks, cooks helpers, etc, supplied the battalion by hand from the Regimental dump. This group was supplemented on occasion by additional Engineer and Coast Artillery troops. On one occasion, 500 additional troops were used to hand-carry to the battalion in one day.

2. Tractors were of great aid, jeeps were not used due to the nature of the terrain.

3. It was difficult to furnish hot meals to the troops due to the demand for ammunition and clothing but hot meals were furnished when possible.

4. In closing, it might be remarked that on many occasions, ammunition was brought forward to the front lines by the A & P Platoon under fire. This applies

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to hand grenades, 60mm mortar and 30 Cal. machine gun ammunition completely. One company fired 300 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition in two hours to keep machine guns pinned down while the Infantry worked on adjacent entrenched positions.

5. Battalion ammunition dumps have to be kept filled and kept forward as much as possible. The closer to the front lines on the MEF, the closer the dump must be. Division, with its tractors and its means of maintaining roads, must be there to run the long supply line.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Logistics, on this type of terrain, take on a new aspect, appreciated only by those who have fought and walked over the terrain. It takes hours to move a Battalion or at times even a company, from one place to another and higher headquarters must take this point into consideration. Large scale assaults are possible against some of the positions with the aid of artillery coverage. However, most of the success is gained by platoon action with grenades initiated by ambitious leaders. Men quickly learn to cover one another with supporting weapons and get used to following closely behind their protection. It is believed that a unit wearing the equipment recommended and acclimated to this type of terrain will be successful in any operation against the enemy in this terrain. Many of the jeeps and trailers loaded on ships could be left in the States and that space gained for more useful equipment.

Edward P. Smith

EDWARD P. SMITH
Lt. Colonel, 17th Infantry
Commanding

SECRET

JOURNAL OF ACTION ON ATTU ISLAND

Tuesday, May 11, 1943

| | | |
|-----|------|---|
| 1. | 0430 | Reveille on board ship. |
| 2. | 0500 | Breakfast Mess. |
| 3. | 0730 | Transports arrived in Transport Area. |
| 4. | 0800 | Boat Teams assembled at Debark Stations. |
| 5. | 0830 | 1st Boat Team debarked ship. |
| 6. | 1130 | All Boats in Rendezvous Area. |
| 7. | 1200 | Parole and countersign - Lulu Belle. |
| 8. | 1500 | 1st Wave boats at Id. |
| 9. | 1615 | 1st Wave boats landed on Blue Beach - no opposition at beach. |
| 10. | 1638 | CP personnel and 5th wave landed on Blue Beach. |
| 11. | 1645 | Initial CP set up about 200 yards off beach. |
| 12. | 1730 | Co F, leading element, contacted enemy 1000 yards from Point 6. |
| 13. | 1745 | Outpost platoon of Co F landed late due to boat trouble and immediately went to its assigned position. |
| 14. | 1800 | Leading elements advanced and CP set up 1000 yards from Point 6. Entire Battalion immediately pinned down by enemy fire |
| 15. | 1915 | Platoon, Co G sent out to destroy enemy MG and mortars but mission unsuccessful - platoon leader casualty. |
| 16. | 2100 | CP unable to move in any direction so it dug in for the night. |
| 17. | 2130 | Securities for CP and Company protection posted. |
| 18. | 2145 | Bn Aid Station set up in rear of CP. |

Wednesday, May 12, 1943

| | | |
|----|------|--|
| 1. | 0630 | CP and Bn still under fire from enemy positions. Front line positions unchanged from night before. |
| 2. | 0845 | CP withdrew behind ridge and temporarily set up in gully. |
| 3. | 1130 | Company G CP and 81mm mortars withdrew to more favorable positions. |
| 4. | 1215 | Company G reorganized and moved forward. |
| 5. | 1400 | CP moved back to position about 2000 yards from beach under heavy enemy fire. |
| 6. | 1415 | Front line stabilized in valley covering pass to Sarana Bay. Company E was west of pass, Company G on Company E's right and Company F in rear of Company E. Bn CP was on top of hog back in Massacre Valley. |
| 7. | 1800 | Casualties and strength reported to Regiment. |
| 8. | 1930 | CP dug in all installations. |
| 9. | 2130 | Securities for CP protection posted. |

Thursday, May 13, 1943

| | | |
|----|------|---|
| 1. | 0630 | Artillery OP set up at Bn CP positions |
| 2. | 0830 | Artillery began firing on enemy positions on high mountain to to right and front of CP position. |
| 3. | | Battalion mission was to cover pass to Sarana Bay with Companies in same positions as yesterday. |
| 4. | | Throughout the day the Battalion was under continuous enemy fire. Our artillery pounded enemy positions to front and right. |
| 5. | 1730 | Casualties and strength reported to Regiment. |

SECRET

6. 2130 Security for CP protection posted.
7. 2330 Small number of Bed rolls and parkas brought up to CP from Beach for distribution to line companies.

Friday, May 14, 1943

1. 0600 Situation remained unchanged, Battalion still in position covering pass to Sarana Bay.
2. Enemy fire somewhat lighter due to our artillery's heavy concentrations of fire on enemy positions.
3. 1430 Navy fighter plane in attempting support of ground forces, crashed near Battalion front lines due to the dense fog.
4. 2100 S-1 arrived at CP from beach.
5. 2300 More bed rolls and parkas brought to CP from beach. Hot chow also brought up for troops.
6. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Saturday, May 15, 1943

1. 0600 Situation still the same, Battalion covering pass to Sarana Bay. Artillery fired on enemy positions throughout the day.
2. 0918 0925 "Patrol from BCT 17-3 is working on the nose of the ridge left of the pass in vicinity of enemy trenches." Message sent to G.O., Company F from Turk (Bn S-3)
3. 1200 Parole and countersign - Silly Billy.
4. 2330 Hot chow brought up to troops from beach. Security for CP protection posted.

Sunday, May 16, 1943

1. 0600 Situation remained the same with 2nd Bn holding pass to Sarana Bay.
2. Positions of companies still the same with Company F on the left, Company E to right of Company F and to the front, Co G on the right.
3. 1200 Parole and countersign - Willy Nilly.
4. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to regiment.
5. 2330 Hot chow brought up and served to troops. Security for CP protection posted.

Monday, May 17, 1943

1. 0600 Situation still the same with Battalion holding pass to Sarana Bay. Positions of line companies remained the same.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Sallys Alley.
3. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
4. 2330 Hot chow brought up and served to troops. Security for CP protection posted.

Tuesday, May 18, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion position remained the same covering pass to Sarana Bay.
2. 1115 Shell fragment with Jap inscription found and sent to Regt'1 S-2 for examination.
3. 1200 Parole and countersign - Village Smithy.

SECRET

4. 2330 Chow brought up to troops. Security for CP protection posted.
5. 2400 Two companies of 32nd Infantry moved through our Battalion positions for attack tomorrow morning.

Wednesday, May 19, 1943

1. 0730 Company F moved forward to attack in coordination with the two companies of the 32nd Infantry.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Little Sympathy.
3. 1430 CP moved forward about 2000 yards toward saddle in pass.
4. 1500 Troops of 4th Infantry began moving through Battalion to go through pass.
5. 1630 Regt'l CP moved forward approximately to site of last Bn CP.
6. 1800 Enemy shelled just to rear of Regt'l CP in kitchen area with light artillery causing several casualties among kitchen personnel.
7. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Thursday, May 20, 1943

1. 0600 Troops of 4th Infantry continued to move through Battalion positions.
2. Company E attacked ridge to right cleaning up enemy entrenched positions. Company D attacked hill to front and cleaned up enemy entrenchments there.
3. CP moved forward to foot of hill to front on saddle.
4. Battalion in reserve behind 4th Infantry troops.
5. Ammo DP and Supply DP moved forward just to rear of CP.
6. 2045 2050 "Accompanying shell case one of those landing in our area. Believe it to be 75mm dual-purpose. For your examination." This message sent to Regt'l S-2 by Bn S-2.
7. 2130 Hot chow served troops by kitchens brought up with Supply DP.
8. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Friday, May 21, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion in reserve behind 4th Infantry troops and located on saddle in Massacre-Sarana Pass.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Jolly Fellow.
3. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
4. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Saturday, May 22, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion still in reserve behind 4th Infantry troops and in same location.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Smooth Sailing.
3. Plans drawn up for moving Battalion onto high ridge just to left of Sarana Valley.
4. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
5. 1744 1755 "A group of about 18 planes crossed here. Silver color, twin motors, single tail fin, resembled B-26." Message sent to Division by BCT 17-1.
6. 1746 1755 "Take pot shot at them. Definitely not ours. No observation planes available." Message sent to BCT 17-1 by Division.

7. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Sunday, May 23, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion moved out of its reserve position to move onto high ridge to left of Sarana-Chichagof Valley. Company F was to the left on top of the ridge, Company E to right of Company F on the table on right slope of hill, Company G in rear of Company E and Bn CP and Aid Station behind Company G.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Sly Sleuth.
3. 1600 Battalion arrived at assigned position and all installations were dug in. No contact with enemy. Bn OP was on top of ridge overlooking Holtz Bay. Ammo and Supply DP's were moved up from saddle in pass.
4. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
5. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Monday, May 24, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion in same position as yesterday. During the day, Company F contacted the enemy and some enemy fire was received by the Battalion.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Lolloping Lou.
3. Plans and preparations were made for attack planned for tomorrow (Tuesday).
4. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Tuesday, May 25, 1943

1. 0700 Company G moved through Companies F and E and led attack on enemy positions on ridge to front and left of Battalion. G Company was reinforced by "C" Company of the 4th Infantry. The attack was supported by Heavy weapons from 32nd Infantry.
2. 1200 Initial objective taken. Companies reorganized with Company G on left, Company F on right and Company E behind Company F. Company C, 4th Infantry in rear of Company G. All installations dug in. Bn Aid Station was in rear of Bn GP, and Ammo DP just in rear of Aid Station.
3. 1200 Parole and countersign - Shallow Lake.
4. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
5. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.
6. 2400 Small enemy force attempted counterattack in 4th Infantry area without success.

Wednesday, May 26, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion in same position as day before, on the high ridge west of Chichagof.
2. The Battalion supported by fire the advance of the North Force into the Chichagof Pass.
3. 1200 Parole and countersign - Thunder Cloud.
4. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Thursday, May 27, 1943

1. Battalion was withdrawn to reserve position behind 32-2 on ridge west of Chichagof.

SECRET

2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Flying Hors.
3. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
4. 2300 Security for CP protection posted.
5. 2400 Patrols from Companies F and G sent out for reconnaissance.

Friday, May 28, 1943

1. Company F was moved to the left, Company G to right behind 32-2 in positions to support their attack by fire.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Little Flower.
3. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
4. 2300 Security for CP protection posted.
5. 2400 Patrols from Companies F and G sent out for reconnaissance of enemy positions in Chichagof valley. No contact with enemy was reported.

Saturday, May 29, 1943

1. The Japanese counterattacked up Chichagof Valley, a small force attempting to circle our right flank. This force of the enemy was wiped out by a heavy machine of Company H.
2. 1100 Company F with one platoon of HMG's of Company H was sent to contact a force of the enemy reported to be in the draw east of Cold Mountain. This mission was successful, Company F destroying 4 Jap Officers and 43 men with no casualties of its own.
3. 1200 Parole and countersign - Lovely Lillian.
4. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
5. 2300 Security for CP protection posted.
6. 2400 Patrols from Companies F and G sent out for reconnaissance of enemy positions in Chichagof Valley. No contact with enemy reported.

Sunday, May 30, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion remained in position on top of ridge west of Chichagof.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Thirsty Mill.
3. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
4. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Monday, May 31, 1943

1. 0600 Battalion still in position on top of ridge west of Chichagof.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Lively Lissy.
3. 1730 Casualties and strength reported to Regiment.
4. 2330 Security for CP protection posted.

Tuesday, June 1, 1943

1. Battalion moved off ridge and moved down to floor of Sarana Valley North of Lake Nicholas.
2. 1200 Parole and countersign - Level Plains.
3. 2330 Battalion in Bivouac. Guards posted for Company protection.
4. All organized resistance had ceased today.

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HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
seventeenth infantry

APO # 726, Seattle, Wash.
9 June 1943

SUBJECT: battle report, action on Attu Island.

TO : CO, 17th Infantry, APO #726, Seattle, Washington.

MAY 11, 1943: Debarkation of BCT 17-3 into landing barges was begun at 0845. Due to poor visibility, BCT 17-3 remained afloat until 1635, at which time the second wave landed on yellow beach, followed closely by the 1st wave which had initially driven toward the wrong beach. The third and fourth waves landed immediately behind the 1st. Battalion CP was established 100 yards from shore at 1845 at (866.2-3504.3). At this time, Co. F, 32d Inf, passed through the 3d Battalion and proceeded toward Tennac Bay.

Two platoons of Co. I were detached from the Battalion, one left at the beach as a rear guard, the other dispatched, under authority RLC 17, to secure high ground at (866.3 - 3504.0). BCT 17-3 (- two platoons Co. I) moved forward in a column of companies, formation I, K, 3d Plat, Co. M, HQ-HQ Co, N Co (-), I Co. (-). No resistance was encountered and the platoon g-2 reported that tracks and fox-holes in Massacre Valley which were shown on aerial photographs were dummies. The platoon continued forward, sighting approximately one platoon of enemy at 1615. Enemy was withdrawing and beyond range for contact. Enemy location (867.4-3504.0). At 2030 the platoon came under first enemy fire from rifle and machine guns; at 2130 the platoon was pinned down approximately 600 yards from the table land in the mouth of Massacre Bay-Holtz Bay Pass. Artillery fire was requested and delivered on target for five minutes. Under cover of darkness, the Battalion reorganized and formed a perimeter defense. (865.2 - 3506.6).

The platoon from I Co. which was dispatched to secure high ground at (866.3-3504.0) captured two enemy 75 mm guns, one tent and provisions for three men without opposition, time 1847.

MAY 12, 1943: At 0740, K Co, on the right flank of the Battalion, attempted to advance under cover of artillery; the attack was halted in place by enemy knee mortars and light machine guns. A five minute naval barrage was delivered on mouth of pass at 1125; at 1230 artillery was placed on target 10. Cannon Co. knocked out enemy CP at 1315; barrage by 14" naval guns placed on enemy positions at 1435. At 1550, companies K & I attempted to attack under cover of combined naval and artillery barrage but were halted at 1800 by heavy machine gun fire, after advancing approximately 100 yards. Positions were then dug from which an attack could be launched in the morning.

MAY 13, 1943: The platoon was ordered to prepare to attack at 0600; at 0725 attack was delayed until further orders. At 0730, Co. K received machine gun fire from strengthened enemy positions on table land and Co. I was placed on Battalion front. During the morning, the enemy was observed moving into prepared positions at mouth of valley. Intermittent artillery fire was received by forward elements and CP during the day.

MAY 14, 1943: Under cover of artillery and machine gun fire, the Battalion launched an attack and by 0815 had moved within 150 yards of the pass where the attack was halted. The forward companies were ordered to withdraw under cover of darkness to positions held the previous night; subsequently, the Battalion was pulled back to draw on the right (865.7-3506.7) to allow the BCT 32-2 to pass through into the attack. The 3d platoon was to support 32-2 by fire.

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Intermittent enemy artillery fire was received during the day. Co. I (-) was sent out to patrol the hog-back. After establishing position, patrols moved along the hog-back nightly, with the patrol route being changed every 24 hours. Friendly artillery fire destroyed enemy ammunition dump at 1700.

MAY 15, 1943. Still in position in the draws, the bn remained in regimental reserve, supporting 32-2 by fire. At 0900, a patrol from I Co was sent out to locate enemy machine gun nest, on returning, they reported that destroyed three machine guns.

MAY 16, 1943. Battalion remained in regimental reserve during the day, under cover of darkness, Co. I moved to (863.4-3505.3) - (864.1-3505.7) and took up positions held by 32-2. A patrol was sent from I Co to vicinity of (863.2-3504.6). K Co remained on left side of valley. I Co was located at (866.2-3506.7) and dispatched a patrol to the ridge on the right. The bn cp moved back 400 yards at 2400 to (865.4 - 3506.3).

MAY 17, 1943. There was no enemy activity during the morning. A patrol from K company's outpost platoon was sent out at 1600 with the specific mission of determining whether or not there was enemy activity directly behind the table top. The patrol returned at approximately 1700 with a negative report and was redispached, by order of CO, REG 17, to move along the table top. At the same time a four man patrol from I Co went out to gain the nose on the high ground immediately left of the table top; the mission was accomplished without incident. The K Co patrol moved forward along the right side of the valley, met no resistance, and moved left up to the table top. No resistance being encountered, the outpost platoon followed the patrol. Co I (-) followed the outpost platoon and the entire company proceeded through the pass, halted on the saddle and set up a defensive position. K Co (-) moved across the saddle, down to the high ground immediately overlooking Holtz Bay, where they went into a defensive position. A contact patrol from "K" Co was sent out to make liaison with friendly troops which could be observed on high ground between the east and west valleys of Holtz Bay. Contact was made with the 7th Recon Co at 0230 May 18, 1943. The balance of the battalion moved into the pass, with elements of K Co joining their organization and the battalion cp being established on the saddle. Immediately prior to the battalion's joining Co I, an enemy force of approximately 10 men attempted to infiltrate through I Co's outpost; the enemy was halted and driven off by rifle and machine gun fire.

MAY 18, 1943. At 1400 the bn received orders to return to Massacre Valley, leaving K Co in position to defend the pass. At 1700 the bn (-) moved out, reached the regimental cp at approximately 2100 and reverted to force reserve.

MAY 19, 1943. I Co, 32d Inf relieved K Co at approximately 1700. K Co rejoined the bn at 2300 in vicinity of the regimental cp. At 2100 the bn was alerted for a possible move. Alert was called off at 2130 and the bn spent the night in position.

MAY 20, 1943. At 1030, bn moved toward Sarana Pass and halted in a forward assembly area at outer entrance to pass at 1215. At 1900, bn received orders to be prepared to move at 2400. Order was revoked and I Co only moved out at 2345 to occupy a position on north side of mountain below point "A".

MAY 21, 1943. At 1130, bn moved to a forward assembly area in vicinity of I Co. As the bn moved into the assembly area at 1500, they received machine gun fire from a position on the high ground to the west of Sarana Pass. Bn remained in place overnight, prepared to attack Sarana Pass the following morning.

May 22, 1943. At 0430, I and K companies moved out of the forward assembly area into positions on Sarana Valley floor prepared to attack at 0650, K on the right, I on the left. At 0640, mortar, machine gun and artillery barrage began; at 0650 K Co jumped off, following the barrage closely. Due to poor visibility, the right and left assault companies lost contact and K Co moved ahead, taking the objective; I Co followed at about one hour. Enemy occupied very strong positions but were well neutralized by the heavy barrage. Attack resulted in 64 enemy dead. During the attack, I and K Co were in position on the mountain side below point A, delivering supporting fire. (NOTE: The barrage was fired by 32 heavy machine guns, 8 light machine guns, 14 37 mm AT guns, 23 81mm mortars, battalion of field artillery and section of 75 mm pack howitzers). Ammunition expended averaged 3000 rds per heavy machine guns, 1500 rounds per light machine gun, 100 rounds per 81 mm mortar and 57 mm AT gun, and 80 rounds per pack howitzer; ammunition expended by field artillery unknown.

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The balance of the battalion completed crossing the valley at 1600, reorganized, and effected final seizure of the garana ridge with three companies abreast, I on the right, K in the center, L on the left. A defensive position was established on the garana nose, with I co sending a patrol to garana bay, to reconnoiter the ridge and report on enemy activity. Report was negative reference enemy. An I co patrol moved to garana peak and along ridge to chichagof valley, returning with report of small enemy activity on middle peak. The bn remained on garana nose for the night with I co outposting garana peak.

MAY 23, 1943. At 0800, bn (- I co) moved to base of garana nose toward chichagof valley. At 1600 the bn again moved, locating the cp at (868.9 - 3509.3) and I and K companies across the valley floor approximately 800 yards forward, with K on the right and I on the left, M in center rear in vicinity of bn cp. At 0800, L co was given the mission of protecting the regimental right flank from positions on garana nose leading up to the peak. At 1400, L co dispatched two five man patrols, one to garana valley to locate possible enemy radar station, the other along the east peak ridge to take and occupy saddle at (869.6 - 3508.2). Due to heavy snow storm, the ridge patrol was forced back without accomplishing its mission. The garana patrol was unable to locate the radar, but made contact with the 37th infantry in garana bay and reported numerous enemy positions, well stocked with food and ammunition, but unoccupied, along ridge overlooking left side of garana valley.

MAY 24, 1943. The bn remained in defensive positions throughout the day, furnishing supporting fires to elements attacking along ridge west of chichagof valley. At 1000 L co dispatched the same two patrols as on the previous day. The garana valley patrol confirmed reports of the previous day; the SARANA - east peak ridge patrol reported light enemy activity extending along middle and east peaks to a position about 500 yards north of garana peak.

MAY 25, 1943. The bn (-) remained in defensive positions, delivering supporting fire along the ridge on the west of chichagof valley.

At 0600, one platoon of I co, reinforced by a light machine gun squad and a 60 mm mortar squad was sent out to destroy enemy on ^{SARANA} east peak ridge and occupy saddle. At 1000 the platoon returned with information of greatly increased enemy activity along the ^{SARANA} east peak ridge. At 1030 the same platoon was ordered to dig in at a point approximately 100 yards north of garana peak and block any enemy attempt to seize garana peak. At 1130, while the platoon was preparing defensive positions, they were attacked by approximately one squad of the enemy. Fire was returned and a patrol from another platoon was sent on a flanking mission to the right. This forced the withdrawal of the enemy. Relief of co L by co I was accomplished at 1600, with the two companies exchanging positions. By 1730 the bn had extended their positions completely across the valley floor. I and K companies instituted nightly patrols, each one moving up ~~the~~ the left and right of chichagof valley respectively, to lake cories, across the southern end of the lake, and thence diagonally back to each cp. I co sent out night patrols from their position on garana peak which reported enemy activity still continuing 1000 yards north of garana peak.

MAY 26, 1943. bn still in defensive positions with orders to give all possible assistance by fire to 32-2 on the left. co I received orders to clear ridge north of garana peak and moved into an all night attack at 2300.

MAY 27, 1943. At 1400, L co attacked along the left of the valley floor with the objective of capturing the high ground between lake cories and buffalo head. K co extended the ~~the~~ front and occupied the positions vacated by I. detachments of M moved into the forward positions to support L co by fire. At 1445 it was learned that the high ground left of the valley was not secure, the 32d being unable to hold the buffalo head, and L co was ordered to withdraw and reoccupy original positions. bn resumed former dispositions for the night.

I co, which had attacked at 2300 the previous night, completed clearing the ^{SARANA} east peak ridge and occupied forward positions at (872.0 - 3510.6) at 0500. The balance of the day was spent in digging defensive positions. Reconnaissance patrols were sent out along the ridges forming a triangle at middle peak which reported lightly held Japanese positions. A reconnaissance patrol was also sent along middle ridge between garana valley ridge and cape Khebnikoff. They returned at 1900 with negative report.

MAY 28, 1943. B co, 32d came under control of the bn. At 1745 orders were received for the bn to attack along the garana valley floor and secure high ground between buffalo head and lake cories. B co 32d and I co 17th were to jump off at 1830, B co leading and I co left rear by 500 yards. detachments of

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M co were moved into the forward lines to support the attack by fire. LD was forward line of 3d bn. initial elements of B co jumped off at 1900; forward elements of L co followed at the prescribed distance, crossing the LD at 2000. At 2030, L co was ordered to extend B co's left. Little enemy fire was received as the attack progressed and the assault companies reached a line extending east and west along southern edge of Lake Groies. At 2300, dispositions were, B co 32d in a defensive position extending from southwest corner of Lake Groies north 150 yards and west 200 yards. L co 17th was in position on high ground 200 yards south of B co and 400 yards west. Contact was established with 32-2 on the left. B and L companies dug in and remained for the night. K and M co and CP remained in positions as previously noted.

At 0315, I co reported attack by small enemy force against forward elements. Attack was repulsed by 0400. Under cover of heavy fog, I co patrols reconnoitered enemy positions on middle peak and returned at 1500 with the information of lightly held enemy positions. Patrol going in direction of Sarana Bay returned at 1700 with report of no enemy activity. Request was made to BN to attack middle peak that night and was granted, but later revoked pending result of BN attack in Chichagof valley floor. I co remained in position for the night.

B co 32d and K co 17th were ordered to withdraw during the night in time to feed a hot breakfast at the regimental kitchen and jump off on the ridge to the right of Chichagof valley by 0700. B co was ordered to join the 4th Infantry in force reserve; K co to revert to regimental reserve.

MAY 29, 1943, At 0300, B co began its withdrawal to the kitchens. At 0330 the rear guard of B co was hit by the initial elements of a heavy Japanese counter-attack which swept through B co and proceeded south down the valley. Concurrently, L co was alerted by shouts and screams in the valley floor. At 0350, right flank guards of L co reported enemy approaching. At 0400 approximately 25 enemy attacked L co's front and left flank. The ensuing fight developed into hand-to-hand combat and continued until 0530 at which time enemy elements ceased their attack of L co's positions. At the initiation of the attack enemy personnel called to L co in English, shouting "lift your fire, red" and "where is that machine gun". At 0630 contact patrols were sent to right and left. B co 32d was no longer in position and could not be located. 2d bn 32d was located 300 yards west and 700 yards south with outposts immediately to L co's left. At 0830 L co withdrew through 32-2 and made telephone contact with regimental commander, 17th Infantry who ordered them to rejoin their battalion at the CP, location of which was same as night before. After evacuating their own dead and wounded, L co, plus the co cmdr of B co 32d and 8 of his men moved down to the valley floor through the 7th medical collecting station, where the co cmdr of B co and his men were left for protection of the medical installation. L co continued through the ravine encircling the valley floor, passed through the regimental kitchens and supply dump and received orders to re-occupy the positions from which they had jumped off in the attack the day before. At 1800, prior to passing through the kitchens, L co reduced an enemy pocket on the valley floor, destroying 17 Japanese. At 2030, reoccupation of positions was completed.

At 0420, the positions occupied by K and M companies were hit by the Japanese counter-attack. A fire fight followed which lasted about 25 minutes with all the attacking force either being killed or driven off to the south. K co remained in position throughout the day, sending out patrols to knock out small enemy pockets. M co regained contact with battalion at 1200 and throughout the day brought machine gun and mortar fire to bear on enemy groups in the valley floor.

At 0425, K co notified BN that the enemy was attacking and passing through their position. The CP was alerted immediately and attacked shortly thereafter by a sizeable Japanese force. The enemy employed rifles, grenades, bayonets and knives as well as light and heavy machine guns against the CP personnel. Fire was returned and the enemy was either killed or driven off within an hour and a half. A count of approximately sixty enemy dead was made around the CP. Steps were then taken to reorganize the battalion with lines reestablished as they were the morning of May 28th, and with the 1st Battalion 2d 4th Infantry taking positions to the left of L co.

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At 0415, I co positions were attacked by an enemy patrol of 16 men, all of whom were killed in the fight that followed. An effort to report to regiment was made but all communication had failed. Contact was finally made through the division radio net and orders were given to hold their positions at all costs. Patrols reported no enemy on middle peak or in the sarana bay area. I co remained in position throughout the ensuing day and night. At 1000, section of 81 mm mortars attached to I co brought fire on group of 40 enemy encircled in valley.

MAY 30, 1943, At 0400 the left flank of the bn cp was attacked by Japanese forces who came from the direction of the gulch below gold mountain. The combined cp personnel of 3d bn, 17th inf and A/T co repelled the attack, destroying approximately forty of the enemy. During the morning, all elements of the bn, plus the 4th infantry, sent out patrols to encircle and destroy enemy remaining in Chichagof valley. At 1200, the bn cmdr issued his order for an attack to secure all ground south of Lake Cories and to be prepared to continue the attack to Chichagof harbor. Formation, C co 4th inf on the left, I co 17th on the right, A co 4th following C co at approximately 250 yards, M co and pn HQ following I co, with K co bringing up the rear. The attack jumped off at 1830, having captured the south eastern portion of Lake Cories, the 3d bn followed the 1st bn 4th infantry in a column of companies at 500 yards, in order L, M, HQ, K. The attack progressed to high ground immediately west of the center of Lake Cories where I co was ordered to protect the right of the attacking force, while the balance of the bn followed the 4th infantry. I co moved ahead on the right and encountered resistance at area in vicinity of (871.3 - 3511.5) which necessitated the employment of K co on the left of I co. Combined efforts of the two companies, assisted by M co reduced the enemy positions and the battalion moved into Chichagof, taking up a perimeter defense in the vicinity of (871.2 - 3512.4).

Throughout the morning, I co had no contact with pn. The I co CP reported the start of the attack at 1230. Two platoons of co I were ordered to move forward, securing the entrance to middle peak and protect the right flank of the pn. Communication with pn was secured at 1800 and forward movement approved. Positions at entrance to middle peak were secured at 2000 and the company dug in for the night. Patrols were sent out to reconnoiter the area between middle and east peaks and reported positions lightly held. Patrol operating east toward Cape Khebnikoff reported no enemy activity.

MAY 31, 1943, At 0800 L co moved out and commenced mopping up operations on both sides of Lake Adrian and south into the enemy settlement just west of brook connecting Lakes Adrian and Cories. Simultaneously, K co moved forward, securing the lower nose of east peak and instituting mopping up operations in that area. M co took positions to support both K and L by fire. Mopping up continued until 1500, resulting in approximately 70 enemy dead and 3 prisoners. At 1500 the forward elements of I co joined the bn. Present dispositions for the defense of Chichagof harbor were then taken up.

THE TWO FORWARD PLATOONS

At 1115, I co ^{was} ordered to wipe out enemy resistance between middle and east peaks and rejoin the bn, together with 1 platoon of heavy machine guns of co M, weapons platoon of co K and balance of co I, all of whom were on the sarana nose, were released from the mission of protecting the right flank, and were ordered to rejoin the bn. By way of Chichagof valley.

for the BATTALION COMMANDER:

W. H. Mapes.

W. H. MAPES,
1st Lieutenant, 17th Infantry,
Adjutant.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
seventeenth infantry

AFO # 726, Seattle, Washington
9 June 1943

APPENDIX "A" TO BATTLE REPORT)
THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY)

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In view of the recent action on Attu Island, the following recommendations are made,

1. This action indicated that there should be more stress placed on the training of small combat groups and patrols, with emphasis placed on reconnaissance and intelligence work.
2. All weapons were found satisfactory for their purposes. However, it is suggested that a rifle grenade with a range of 300 yards be developed for use against personnel and machine gun nests. Also, considerable attention should be given to the possibility of a more mobile type of mortar with less cumbersome ammunition. This weapon would be an integral part of each rifle squad's equipment.
3. The 81 mm mortar sections had considerable difficulty in transporting their ammunition. A pack board would enable ammunition carriers to haul more ammunition with a great deal less fatigue than was evidenced in this operation. It should also be noted that such a pack board should be of sufficient size to carry heavy mortar ammunition as well as light.
4. At least a platoon, and preferably a company of the pack quartermaster should be an integral part of each group.
5. Investigation of the 81 mm mortar HE heavy shell should be made on two counts:
 - a. The shell was usually a "dud" when it struck soft ground or snow.
 - b. The ~~range~~ firing data chart averaged about 150 yards short. In other words, registration for range could be made with the light shell, then 150 yards added to the range indicated to fire the heavy shell on the same target.
6. More emphasis should be placed on night action with units larger than patrols. We need training in coordinating platoons and companies in night attacks to secure limited objectives by night which cannot be gained during daylight hours.
7. Some means of identifying friendly troops should be instituted so that personnel can be recognized at a distance as friendly or enemy, especially in operations against the Japanese who wear OP uniforms.
8. Rifle company headquarters, and possibly heavy weapons platoon headquarters should include personnel (possibly a $\pi/4$ th and two or three basics) whose job should be laying wire and maintaining sound-power units.
9. Machine gun ammunition should be belted in solid ball or AP, with individual boxes of tracer supplied as supplement. Tracer streaks afford perfect lines for counter-battery fire, especially at night. It is more efficient to remove every twentieth or thirtieth cartridge and insert tracer than to remove 80% of the tracer and reset your ball or AP. Furthermore, the ratio of 4 to 1 in use of tracer is excessive, nine or even 14 to 1 during the day. ~~30% to 35% of the rounds is sufficient.~~
10. Heavy stress should be placed on the proper use of parole and counter-sign, the correct use of which has yet to be ~~learned~~ generally noted.

FOR THE BATTALION COMMANDER:

W. H. Mapes.

W. H. MAPES,
1st Lieutenant, 17th Infantry,
Adjutant.

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UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M-- May 10, 1943

TIME:

To : 12:00 N-- May 11, 1943

STATION A.P.O. #726, Seattle, Wash.

May 11, 1943

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|---|--------------|
| | 0845 | Debarcation of BCT 17-3 into landing barges was begun. | |
| | 1635 | Due to poor visibility, BCT 17-3 remained afloat until this time (1635), at which time the second wave landed on Yellow Beach, followed closely by the first wave which had initially driven toward the wrong beach. | |
| | 1645 | Bn. C.P. was established 100 yds. from shore at (869.2-350H.3). At this time, Co.F, 32nd Inf. passed through the 3d Battalion and proceeded toward Tennac Bay. | |
| | | The third and fourth waves landed immediately behind the 1st Bn. | |
| | 1700 | Two platoons of Co. I were detached from the Battalion, one left at the beach as a rear guard, the other dispatched, under authority RLG 17, to secure high ground at (866.3-350H.0). BCT 17-3 (two platoons Co. I) to move forward in a column of companies, formation L, K, 3d platoon Co. M, Hq-Hq. Co., I Co. | |
| | 1700 | O.P. moving forward. No contact with enemy. | |
| | 1710 | Bn. S-2 reports fox holes and trenches showed on aerial photo maps are dummies. | |
| | 1715 | 1st Plat., Co. I reports smoke in draw above lake. | |
| 1 | 1715 | To Co.-RLG 17: Our location is K9-P. | |
| | 1722 | O.P. moving forward again. | |
| | 1723 | O.P.'s position even with N. end unnamed lake and 100 yds. to right. | |
| 2 | 1730 | O.P. at P7A-P2A. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M--
TIME: 16 : 12:00 E--

STATION _____

May 11, 1943 (Continued)

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|---|--------------|
| 1730 | | Bn. C.P. can see Black Mtn. - Troops ahead but cannot identify. | |
| 1735 | | C.P. moving forward. | |
| 1736 | | M. Co. at target 35 - Possible enemy on extreme left flank. | |
| 1810 | | C.P. halted. | |
| 1815 | | 1 platoon of enemy ahead - Too far to make contact - enemy withdrawing. | |
| 1817 | | Forward C.P. Keep moving forward. Enemy position (867.4 - 350H.3). | |
| 1820 | | About 1 platoon of enemy reported by phone to Regt. | |
| 1830 | | C.P. moving forward. | |
| 1844 | | C.P. halted. | |
| 1847 | | M. Co. takes 2 enemy 75's with ammunition also tent and provisions for 13 men. | |
| 1950 | | One Jap grenade and 1 Jap document picked up by L. Co. | |
| 2030 | | Bn. receives first enemy fire from rifles, M. G.'s, and Arty. | |
| 2130 | | Bn. pinned down by fire approx. 600 Yds. from Tabletop in mouth of Massacre Bay - Holtz Bay Pass. Arty. fire requested and delivered on target for 5 minutes. | |
| 2200 | | Patrol sent out to contact C.P. - English, Jenkins, Hannv. | |
| 2205 | | C.I. moving in to rear of C.P. | |
| 2400 | | After dark, the Bn. reorganized and formed a perimeter defence (865.2 - 3506.6) | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M-- May 11, 1943

TIME:

To: 12:00 M-- May 12, 1943

STATION A.P.D. #726, Seattle, Wash.

May 12, 1943

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|--|--------------|
| | 0630 | Bn. C.P. dug in. | |
| | 0634 | M Co. casualty report - none | |
| | 0740 | Arty. Barrage followed by attempt by K Co., on Bn. right flank, to advance under arty. | |
| 1 | 1025 | From K Co. Patrol on rt. flank halted by 3 knee mortars and 3 J.T.M.G.'s. Contacted Holloway Co. 300 S. of K Co. - Recon. patrol reports enemy M.G.'s still in position. 60 MMs ^{sent} to knock out M.G.'s. | |
| | 1125 | 5 in naval gunfire laid on mouth of valley for 5 min. | |
| | 1230 | Arty. Barrage laid on target 10. | |
| | 1250 | Col. Lucas arrives in C.A. | |
| | 1315 | Can. Co. knocks out enemy O.P. | |
| | 1435 | 14 in naval barrage from Nevada (aid on enemy positions). | |
| | 1500 | Countersign remains same till noon tomorrow | |
| | 1550 | K and L Co. attack under naval and arty. barrage | |
| | 1650 | Attack with 32nd at 1715. 100 rounds of 14 inch fire to come at 1900. | |
| | 1725 | Barrage of 14 inch on pass. | |
| | 1735 | Planes bomb and strafe pass. | |
| | 1736 | Mortar fire on M.G. nest. | |
| | 1738 | Regt. informed of situation. | |
| | 1800 | Bn. advance stopped, after advance of approx 100 yds. by M.G. fire on rt. flank | |
| | 1815 | Bn. to attack again. | |
| | 1830 | Positions dug in from which attack can be launched in morning. | |
| | 2100 | Lt. Long reported in - Pinned down near sm. lake. | |
| | 2130 | Shore party reports transports still in transport area and unloading. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M -- May 12, 1943

TIME:

To: 12:00 M -- May 13, 1943

STATION A.P.D.#226, Seattle, Wash.

May 13, 1943

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|--|--------------|
| | 0600 | Coordinated attack to be made by 3rd Bn. and 2nd Bn, 32nd. | |
| | 0725 | Attack delayed till further orders. | |
| | 0730 | From Co. K: Recd. MG fire from strengthened enemy positions on Table top, Hebrew Co. now on Bn. at seems fire from (Nava) Hill is 30 ca). Request arty. fire on MG's. | |
| | 0800 | Enemy moving into trenches at mouth of valley. | |
| | 0925 | From PLG 32-2: Arty. barrage for 30 min. when visibility suitable and move fwd. during barrage. Attack when arty. lifted. | |
| | 0935 | Countersign: Lazy Nellie. | |
| | 0935 | Map coordinates remain same. | |
| | 1015 | From PLG 12: Attack as ordered when fog lifts and after 30 min. arty. barrage. | |
| | 1530 | Bn. casualty total: Dead: 2 E.M. Missing: 2 Off., 4 E.M. Wounded: 2 Off., 19 E.M. | |
| | 2130 | Recd. 40 M.M. fire on C.P. - 1 E.M. wounded. | |
| | 2200 | Regt. reports enemy 303d Independent Bn. - 2000 men. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 W--May 13, 1943

STATION A.P.O #226, Seattle, Wash.

To : 12:00 W--May 14, 1943

May 14, 1943

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|--|--------------|
| | 0630 | Bn. launches attack under arty. barrage. | |
| | 0800 | Rec'd 40 M.M. fire on C.P. | |
| | 0815 | Bn about 150 yd. from pass and halted. | |
| | 0930 | Lt. DeBord says 1 Plat. of L.Co. in high ground in pass. | |
| | 1030 | 2 men in C.P. wounded by 40 M.M. fire. | |
| | 1050 | countersign - Yellow Belly | |
| | 1330 | 4 Grumman fighters fly in, 2 crash. | |
| | 1400 | Japs sighted on crest of ridge. MO. fire placed on them. | |
| | 1700 | Arty. blows up Jap ammunition dump. | |
| | 1730 | Fwd. Co's. to withdraw after dark to positions held previous night. Bn. pulled back to draw on rt. (365.7-3506.7) to allow BCT 32-2 to pass into the attack. BCT 19-3 to support 32-2 by fire. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M -- May 14, 1943

TIME

To: 12:00 M -- May 15, 1943

STATION A.P.O. #226, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|--|--------------|
| 0800 | | Bn. still in position in draws and remains in Regimental reserve supporting 32-2 by fire. | |
| 0900 | | Patrol from Co. I sent out to locate enemy MG. nest. | |
| 1000 | | casualty reports— Dead - 4 Wounded - 40 Missing - 11 Sick - 10 | |
| | | Total casualties to date. Dead - 6 Wounded - 61 Missing - 17 Sick - 10 | |
| 1200 | | Countersign: Silly Billy | |
| 1635 | | 32nd advances to bottom of valley at mouth of canyon. Covered by MG's & Arty. | |
| 2200 | | Capt. Lemmon assigned to Command Co. L. | |
| 2230 | | Effective strength of Bn. Co. I - 91 E.M., 4 Off. Co. K - 108 E.M., 3 Off. Co. L - 133 E.M., 3 Off. | |
| 2400 | | Capt. Lemmon reports in. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M-- May 15, 1943

TIME:

To: 12:00 M-- May 16, 1943

STATION: A.P.D. #726, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|--|--------------|
| | 0800 | Arty. firing on pass. | |
| | 0930 | Recd fire from 40mm. gun. | |
| | 1100 | Capt. Bykerk and Capt. Beatty come into C.P. | |
| | 1130 | Capt. Bykerk and Capt. Beatty leave C.P. | |
| | 1200 | Counter sign - Willie Nilly | |
| | 1600 | ^{C.P.} Bn. to move back 400 yds. | |
| | 1630 | From PLG 17 (Verba) & telephonic order to withdraw during night of May 15-16 and to continue attack on pass are confirmed. Bn. to remain withdrawn during May 16. Continue to hold rt. of Massacre Valley and prevent approach of enemy from Chicago area with 1 Bn. Assist by fire from present position. 2nd Bn. 32nd continues attack against mouth of Massacre-Holtz Bay Pass, force entrance and cover approaches. During night of May 16-17, 2nd Bn. 32nd will withdraw to rest camp for 2 days. BCT 12-3 will replace them. | |
| | 2400 | Bn. C.P. moves back 400 yds. ^(865.H-3506.3) Co. L moves to front at (863.H-3505.3) where BCT 32-2 was. Co. L patrol sent to vicinity of (863.2-3504.6). Co. K remained on left side of valley. Co. I was located at (866.2-3506.7) and sent a patrol to ridge on right. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 12:00 M-- May 16, 1943

TIME:

TO : 12:00 M-- May 17, 1943

STATION: A.P.O. #226, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|--|--------------|
| | 0800 | E.P. dug in. | |
| | 1200 | Countersign - Sally's Alley | |
| | 1500 | Patrol from Outpost Plat. of Co. K sent out to determine whether or not there is enemy activity behind Tabletop. | |
| | 1600 | Col. Zimmerman arrives in C.P. | |
| | 1700 | Col. Zimmerman leaves C.P. | |
| | 1700 | K Co. patrol with negative report on enemy activity on Tabletop. | |
| | 1800 | K Co. patrol redispached to move along Tabletop. | |
| | 1900 | Patrols from Co. K and Co. L move into pass. No opposition. | |
| | 2200 | Co. I proceeds through pass and sets up defensive position on saddle. Co. K moved across saddle and down to high ground overlooking Holtz Bay where defensive position was set up. | |
| | 2300 | Friendly Troops seen on high ground between E. and W. valleys of Holtz Bay and contact patrol sent out from Co. L. | |
| | 2400 | Bn moves into pass. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 12:00 M-- May 17, 1943

TO: 12:00 M-- May 18, 1943

STATION: A.P.D. #726, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|---|--------------|
| 0230 | | Patrol from H Co. contacts 7th Recon. Co. | |
| 0430 | | Bn. C.P. established on saddle. | |
| 1200 | | Countersign - Village Smithy. | |
| 1400 | | Bn. to return to Massacre Valley for reorganization - Co. K remains in position to defend pass. | |
| 0600 | | Maj. Montague goes to Regt. for rest. | |
| | | Maj. Siddens is Bn. Commander | |
| | | Maj. Wallace sent to Bn. as Exec. Off. | |
| 0730 | | H Co. contacts 32nd and 4th Scout Co. to reveal pass. Lt. Frazee made Capt. | |
| 1700 | | Bn. moves out from pass. | |
| 2100 | | Bn. reaches Regt. C.P. and reverts to force reserve. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION /
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 12:00 M-- May 18, 1943

TIME:

TO : 12:00 M-- May 19, 1943

STATION A.P.O. #726, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|---------------------------------|--------------|
| 1700 | | A Co. relieved by Co. I, 32nd. | |
| 2100 | | Bn. alerted for possible move | |
| 2115 | | Counterespion - Little Sympathy | |
| 2130 | | Bn. alert called off. | |
| 2200 | | Co. H rejoins Bn. | |
| 2200 | | Lt. Allen appointed Capt. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD LEGATION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 N -- May 19, 1943

TIME:

To : 12:00 N -- May 20, 1943

STATION: A.P.O. #226, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER: | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|---------|------|--|--------------|
| 1030 | | Bn. moves toward Sarana Pass. | |
| 1215 | | Bn. halts in fwd. assembly area at outer entrance to Sarana Pass. | |
| 1230 | | Countersign - Follow Through | |
| 1900 | | Bn. ordered to move out at 2400. | |
| 2345 | | Bn. ordered not to move. Co. K only moved to occupy reverse slope of Mtn. in front of C.P. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

TIME:

From: 12:00 M-- May 20, 1943

STATION A.P.O. #226, Seattle, Wash.

To: 12:00 K-- May 21, 1943

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|---|--------------|
| | 1000 | Roll up bags and be ready to move. | |
| | 1015 | Flashlights to be displayed to rear for 5 min. every hour on the hour. Display panels when planes are around. | |
| | 1130 | Bn. moves to area near L Co. | |
| | 1200 | Countersign Jolly Fellow. | |
| | 1500 | Bn. halted by MG fire from high ground to west of Sarana Nose as Bn. moved into fwd. assembly area. | |
| | 1600 | Lt. Brown assigned to G.I. S/Sgt. Fly promoted to 1st Sgt. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 12:00 M -- May 21, 1943

TIME:

TO: 12:00 M -- May 22, 1943

STATION: A.P.O. #726, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|---|--------------|
| 0430 | | Co's I and K move fwd. and occupy high ground at entrance of pass to Chicagot Harbor. Move to Sarana Valley floor prepared to attack at 0650. | |
| 0640 | | Mortar, MG., and Arty. barrage begun. | |
| 0650 | | K Co. jumped off. | |
| 0930 | | Bn. E.P. moves forward | |
| 1130 | | Bn. E.P. halts on side of Mtn. opposite line companies. | |
| 1200 | | Countersign - Smooth Sailing | |
| 1330 | | Bn. E.P. moving to high ground behind Co's. | |
| 1500 | | Bn. completes crossing of Sarana Valley. | |
| 1630 | | Bn. halts at high ground. | |
| 1635 | | Bn. CO requests arty. fire in floor of valley. Barrage starts. | |
| 1640 | | From Regt: O.K. on arty. | |
| 1700 | | From Regt: Chow and ammunition being brought up. | |
| 2200 | | Ammunitions and rations arrive. | |
| 2215 | | Capt. Lemmon recalled from Co. L. Capt. Elliott assigned to L Co. | |
| | | Promotions: | |
| | | Cpl. McKay to Sgt. | |
| | | Pfc. Morquado to Cpl. | |
| | | Pfc. Miller to Cpl. | |
| | | Pfc. Erickson to Cpl. | |
| | | Pvt. Strange to Pfc. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTH INFANTRY

From 12:00 M -- May 22 1945

STATION

To 12:00 M -- May 23 1945

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|--|--------------|
| 1 | 0800 | Bn (-1 Co) moved to base of Sarana Hole. L Co to protect Right night flank. | |
| | 1200 | Sign of Counterattack by South | |
| | 1400 | L Co sent (1) patrol to Sarana Valley to locate possible enemy Radar Stations & (1) to along East Peak to take away saddle at 8696-3508.2. | |
| | | 1st Patrol unable to locate Radar Stations | |
| | | 2nd Patrol did not accomplish its mission due to heavy counterattack | |
| | 1600 | Bn Movement with C.P. located at 8699.3509.3 with I & K Co. across Valley floor 800 yds. from I Co. on the left & H Co. on the right. Co in rear in vicinity of C.P. | |
| | | Sarana Patriot made contact with 37. Inf. | |
| | 1700 | Lt Pendrey asg'd BN as acty. BN S 3 | |
| | | Capt. Nelson in L Co. as C. Co. Ld. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD INFANTRY
SIVILIAWIA HARBOR

From: 12:00 M - May 23 1943

STATION

To: 12:00 M - May 24 1943

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|--|---|
| 1000 | | L Co dispatched same patrols as on May 23. | |
| 1000 | | Strength of Co's | K - 1st - 76 E.M. I - 4" - 130" L - 3" - 107" M - 5" - 114" HO - 9" - 108 |
| 1100 | | Lt Pendrey & detail go for sleeping bags | |
| 1300 | | East Peak Patrol reports light ENEMY activity extending along Middle & East Peaks to a position about 500 yds No of Harvar Peak. | |
| 1400 | | Ammunition brought up. | |
| 1500 | | Sgt Pekkunen, Milled to Sgt - Co. I Cpl Ostrow, Milled promoted to Sgt - Co I Pfc Martin, Howard " " to cpl - Co I S/Sgt Beck, Oscar Milled to Sgt. Inefficiency - Ho Co. Cpl Nickles, Sam promoted S/Sgt - Ho Co. Pfc O. Denahue, George promoted Cpl Ho Co. Pfc Mayne, Virgil promoted Cpl Ho Co. 2nd Lt Sawdey & Brown - Milled to Co. K | |
| 1600 | | Heavy Bombet. bomb Chicago Harbor Sign of Landing - Gallop Low 1st Lt. Decker - Med Det. Capt. Captain | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 13:00 H-- 24 MAY 43

STATION: TIME: 13:00 H-- 25 MAY 43

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|---|--------------|
| | 0600 | 1 Plt. Co K, reinforced by LMG sqd. & 60 MM sqd. sent out to destroy enemy on East Peak Ridge & occupy saddle | |
| | 1000 | Co Pitt returns & reports greatly increased enemy activity along East Peak Ridge | |
| | 1050 | Co Pitt ordered to dig in at present approx. 100 yds No. of Sarana Peak & block any enemy attempt to seize Sarana Peak. | |
| | 1130 | Co Pitt attacked by approx one squad of enemy. Were returned & patrol sent to flank enemy on right. Found no indication of enemy sign & counter sign. Skag Lake | |
| | 1600 | Co returned by Co I | |
| | 1730 | BN extended across floor of valley & was to institute night patrols each one moving up the left & right of Chicago Valley up to Lake Corner across So. End of Lake & thence diagonally back to each C. P. To send out night patrols which reported enemy activity 1000 yds No. of Sarana Peak | |
| | 2000 | 1st Lt. M. Lee capt. Lt. Col 2nd Lt. English " 1st Lt. 1st Lt. Elliott " Capt. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS
SEVENTH INFANTRY
STATION

FROM: 12:00 *25 May* 43
TIME: 12:00 M- *26 May* 43

SECRET

| TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|------|--|--------------|
| 0800 | Ben in defensive position with order to give all possible assistance by fire to 322 on left. | |
| 1200 | Sign & Comms to Thunder Cloud | |
| 1700 | Co I ordered to clear ridge North of Parana Peak & start all unit attack at 2300. | |
| 1800 | Casualties & Strength Reports | |
| | Co I - 3 off - 119 E.M. | |
| | 3 Sick | |
| | Co K - 3 off - 20 E.M. | |
| | Co L - 3 off - 100 E.M. | |
| | 1 Sick | |
| | Co M - 5 off - 128 E.M. | |
| | H.Q. Co. 10 off - 103 E.M. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 12:00 A. -- 26 MAY -- 43
TIME: 12:00 P. -- 27 MAY -- 43

STATION _____

SECRET

NUMBER TIME MESSAGE ACTION TAKEN

0500 I Co reports advanced approx. 2000 yds. on East Ridge & began to dig in at 872.0 3510.6 Recon Patrols sent out along ridge formerly through at Middle Peak.

1200 Sign of Camerogon - Flying Calves.

1400 S Co attacked along left of valley floor to capture high ground between Lake Cowie & Buffalo Head. K Co extends front & occupies positions vacated by S Co. Detachment from M Co moved fwd to support S Co.

1445 3rd unable to hold Buffalo Head. S Co ordered to withdraw & re occupy original position.

1600 Enemy light artillery fire resumed.

1800 Casualty & Strength Report
 do. Co - 10 off - 104 E.M. 4 E.M. Sick
 Co. S - 4 off - 98 E.M. 2 E.M. "
 Co. IV - 31 - 73 " 1 " "
 Co. M - 5 " - 129 "
 Co. I - 9 " - 115 = 1 off. Killed,
 3 E.M. Wounded & 1 E.M. Missing.

1900 I Co. Patrols report lightly held gap positions along Middle Peak.

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STATE DEPARTMENT

DATE: 12:00 P.M. - 27 May 42

STATION

TIME: 12:00 P.M. - 28 May 42

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|--|---|
| 1200 | | Sign & Counter sign - Little Flower | |
| 1300 | | B Co. 32nd. came under control of B Co. | |
| 1700 | | Strength of Co's | H Co. 10 ft - 102 E ft. M Co 5 " - 124 " L Co 4 " - 95 " A Co 2 " - 69 " |
| | | | 1 P.M. Wounded 4 P.M. Sick |
| 1745 | | An order to attack along Sarana Valley & secure high ground between Buffalo Head & Lake Carus. B Co & L Co to jump off at 18:30. B Co to lead & L Co to left rear, by 500 yds A Co Det of M Co moved into front lines to support the attack. | |
| 1900 | | Initial Elements of B Co jumped off. | |
| 2000 | | Final Elements of L Co. Crossed S D at | |
| 2030 | | L Co ordered to extend to B Co. left. | |
| | | Little enemy fire rec'd. | |
| 2300 | | B Co 32nd in defensive positions extending from S.E. corner of Lake Carus No. 150 yds & West 200 yds. L Co. in position on high ground 200 yds So. of B Co. & 400 yds West. Contact made with 32-2 on left. P, M & C.P. remains in position. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
SEVENTH MOUNTAIN AREA

FROM: 12:00 N--
TIME: 16 : 12:00 N--

SECTION

SECRET

NUMBER: TIME: MESSAGE:

May 29 ~~2005~~

0415 I Co attack by enemy Patrol of 16 enemy
All enemy killed.

0830 "I" Co withdrawn thru 32.2 & contacted
Regt. Comdr. who ordered them into Ryan
Bn at CP.

1000 Sect of 81 MM mortar attd to I Co.
fired on group of 40 enemy encircled
in Valley.

0445 H Co. 1st Sigs. wounded & evacuated. Maj
Wallace assumed command. Capt HLEN
acts as off. Capt McBee wounded &
evacuated. 1st Lt COVANAUGH killed.

1800 K Co destroyed 17 Japs.

2030 Reoccupation of positions complete.

Casualties & Strength Report
H Co. 4 officers - 68 men.

7 Dead. 12 wounded, 5 missing

5 Sick

L Co. - 4 officers 77 E.M.

4 Dead. 5 Wounded.

M Co. - 5 officers 116 E.M.

1 Dead - 6 Wounded

I Co. 3 off. 100 E.M.

3 Dead - 7 Wounded

K Co. 63 E.M. - 3 off.

3 Dead - 2 Wounded.

1. missing.

SECRET

DATE JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE
SEVENTH INFANTRY

TIME: FROM 02:00

TO 12:00 W--

1964

STATION

SECRET

NUMBER

TITLE

MESSAGE

ACTION TAKEN

May 29 Cont'd

1900 CP Moved to Reg't CP

2000 Out Post Guard doubled

All CP Personnel sleeping 2 men to

a fox hole with one man awake

at all times.

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION

DATE: 12:00 M-- 29 May 1943

STATION: 871.2-3512.4

TIME:

16 : 12:00 M-- 30 May 1943

STATION

SECRET

NUMBER: TIME

MESSAGE

ACTION TAKEN

- 0400 Left flank of Bn CP attack by Japs who came from direction of gulch below road Mountain.
- Combined Regt. & Bn CP with AIT co repelled the attack. Throughout morning heavy war sought out & destroyed.
- 1000 Making of plans for reorganization.
- Maj. Wallace Bn Comdr.
- Capt Allen G. off
- Lt. Parker - S-1453
- Lt. Hall - A & P Det
- 1136 Counterattack - Christy, Meltzer
- 1200 Bn Comd issued order for attack to secure all ground So. of Lake Carrie & to prepare to attack into Chicago/Starke
- 1230 Attack jumped off.
- 1234 Bn E. off left C.P. to contact Bn G.O.
- 1235 2nd Observer Echelon left C.P.
- 1300 C.P. Moves forward.
- 1530 L Co encounters resistance at 871.3-3511.5
- I co patrols observed on ridge on right.
- 1600 Enemy attempted to break thru L Co. C.P. Personnel brought up for 2nd line defense
- 1730 Bn & C.P. moving fwd.
- 1800 Maj. Wallace wounded. Capt Allen assumed command.
- 1900 CP move into Artillery Position Lumber Patch
- 2400 Bn take up Defensive position at 871.2-3512.4

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY

From: 12:00 M--

STATION

TO: 12:00 R--

SECRET

NUMBER / TIME MESSAGE ACTION TAKEN

May 30 (cont'd)

2400 Ring around outpost established few
Bw.

Strength & Casualty of Bw.

400. 2 officers - 68 men

3 off. Wounded - 1 E. M. Wounded.

F Co

2 off. & 996 M.

One man missing,

K Co

3 officers & 63 E M.

M Co

5 officers 115 E M.

1 E man missing

L Co

3 officers 540 M

2 E M. Dead

Sgt Horn made acty. report Sgt & Pvt Riew
made acty. Inll Sgt in H Co.

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION
SEVENTH INFANTRY

FROM: 12:00 M -- May 30, 1943

TIME

TO : 12:00 M -- May 31, 1943

STATION A.P.D. #726, Seattle, Wash.

SECRET

| NUMBER | TIME | MESSAGE | ACTION TAKEN |
|--------|------|--|--------------|
| | 0400 | Bn. alerted against possible enemy suicide attack. | |
| | 0800 | Co. I moves out to mop up both sides of Lake Adrian and S. into enemy village just W of brook between lakes Adrian & Cories. K Co. moved out at same time. | |
| | 1100 | Jap prisoner brought into C.P. and searched. | |
| | 1100 | Capt. Nelson into C.P. and assumed command of Bn. Capt. Allen, Exec. Off. of Bn. | |
| | 1200 | Enemy sign - Live! Live! | |
| | 1300 | 2 prisoners brought into C.P. | |
| | 1500 | 1 Plat. of Co. I reaches Bn. | |
| | 1700 | C.P. moved to new location 150 yds. south. | |

SECRET

307-DM (18)-2.3

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

(15206)
Master



Bldg 17 - S-2 - 1st - 4th Island

DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

11 May-31 May 43

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 1558

S-2 JOURNAL

UNIT RCG 17

OPERATION NUMBER _____

FROM:
TIME: 1655

DATE: 11 MAY 1945

TO:
TIME: 2400

DATE: 11 MAY '45

PLACE: ATTU ISLAND

J. J. J.
M. H. H.
R. H. H.

367-WF(17)-213

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
RESTRICTED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Oliver H. ... Col. 7th
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *12 July 1945*

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Paul J. ... Maj. 16 Aug 46
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

~~SECRET~~

OUT 11 1948
15206
number

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <i>M/C</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>1</i> | DATE <i>11 MAY 1943</i> | |
| TO <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Landing day at 1647. No enemy opposition as yet. Surf and terrain good</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1658</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>W.P. Bunt</i> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>2</i> | DATE <i>11, MAY, 43</i> | |
| TO <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Movie Blue OP P70 - P20</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>I+R SCOUT</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>17.25</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|-------------------------|---|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <i>M/C</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>3</i> | DATE <i>11 MAY 1943</i> | |
| TO <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Two enemy M/G's at 868.7-3508.8. Latest reports state they have withdrawn</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1817</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Hudson Cd.</i> |

| | | |
|---|---|--|
| THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | Radio HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>11 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <p><u>Marie Blue reports scattered enemy Rifle as only resistance</u></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1826</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Henderson Cpl.</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Henderson Cpl.</u> |

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | 11c HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>5</u> | DATE <u>11 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <p><u>Approx one platoon of enemy Riflemen at 865.1-3506.9 withdrawing to North West</u></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1827</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Henderson Cpl.</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Henderson Cpl.</u> |

| | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | Radio HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>6</u> | DATE <u>11 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <p><u>Report From one Company that it has captured 2 AA Guns, one RANGE FINDER. NOT From reliable source.</u></p> <p><u>note:</u> <u>(Ordered to VERIFY OR CORRECT)</u> <u>S-2 RLG 17</u></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>Marie Blue 2</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1830</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>✓</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>✓</u> |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|---|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | CLASSIFICATION <i>10</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>7</i> | DATE <i>11 MAY '43</i> | |
| To <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | |
| <p><i>My Position 867.0-3506.4</i></p> <p><i>Moving Forward on Mission</i></p> <p><i>No enemy Resistance.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>I & R Scout</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1843</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Davidson Pfc</i> |

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|---|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | CLASSIFICATION <i>10</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>8</i> | DATE <i>11 MAY 1943</i> | |
| To <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | |
| <p><i>Scattered Rifle Fire to</i></p> <p><i>our Front. ORIGIN NOT</i></p> <p><i>determined</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>I & R Scout</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1846</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Davidson Pfc</i> |

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|---|------------------------|---|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | CLASSIFICATION <i>10</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>9</i> | DATE <i>11 MAY '43</i> | |
| To <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | |
| <p><i>No enemy Activity</i></p> <p><i>encountered. Moving Forward</i></p> <p><i>with assigned unit. TERRAIN</i></p> <p><i>VERY Rough.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>I & R Scout</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1905</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Davidson Cpl</i> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ H _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 10 DATE 11 MAY '43

To G-1. Landing Force

No Further enemy information to report.

All friendly units still moving inland.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 5-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED 1915

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER R.P. Scout

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ H Radio

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 11 DATE 11 MAY '43

To 5-2 RLG 17

Movie Blue is sending back captured documents + hand grenades

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER I & R Scout TIME SIGNED 1940

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ H Phone

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 12 DATE 11 MAY '43

To 5-2 RLG 17

Movie Blue C.P. receiving 75mm enemy fire from direction of Holtz Bay Area.

note: (to CO + Adj. Units)

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 5-2 Movie Bl. TIME SIGNED 2430

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED: _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT: M/C

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 12 DATE 11 MAY '43
 to G-2 Landing Force

Movie Blue CP receiving 75mm Hrt. fire from Hertz Bay Area at 2430

Possible booby traps in form of 5 Gal. square cans at 866.4-3506.5. Enemy M/G's believed to be 25 cal.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: 5-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED: 2201

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED: _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT: M/C

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 12 MAY '43
 to G-2 Landing Force

No Change on enemy information

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: 5-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED: 0710

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED: _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT: d/o

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 12 MAY '43
 to 5-2 RLG 17

Held down by mortar fire & M/G. Are digging in. Position to follow

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: E+K Scout #2 TIME SIGNED: 0800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED HOW SENT *del*

MSG CEN NO.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 12 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

My Position 866.3-3507.2

MORTAR + M/G FIRE

CONTINUES

I & R Scout #2 *0812*

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

Davidson, Pfc

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED HOW SENT *del*

MSG CEN NO.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 12 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

Enemy M/G still holding up.

our advance visibility

ZERO

I & R Scout #2 *0955*

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

Davidson, Cpl

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED HOW SENT *del*

MSG CEN NO.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 12 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

My position sig T 70

Enemy M/G 200 yds MY

DIRECT FRONT

I & R Scout #3 *1046*

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

Davidson, Sgt

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

| | | |
|---|------------------------|---|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>ON 2</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>6</i> | DATE <i>12 MAY '43</i> | |
| TO <i>CO'S All units Ass. & Att.</i> | | |
| Description of uniform taken from enemy soldier. Shoes are of Rubber on style of Boot-Pak. Trousers & Hat Light OD color. Coat of Light wool, lighter than U.S. Field Jacket. | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1630</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>R P Dent Capt.</i> |

| | | |
|--|------------------------|--|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>ON 2</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>7</i> | DATE <i>12 MAY '43</i> | |
| TO <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| Captured papers of 962 enemy unit, believed to be Infantry | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1250</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Hudson, Cpl</i> |

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|---|------------------------|---|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>ON 2</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>8</i> | DATE <i>12 MAY '43</i> | |
| TO <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| This officer's kit belongs to G-2 ADC. He requests that it be returned to him. Taken from tent believed to be enemy Pvt. Ho | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1325</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>R P Dent Capt.</i> |

| | | |
|--|------------------------|---|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>7/c</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>9</i> | DATE <i>12 MAY '43</i> | |
| To <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| <i>Request Sign + Counter-</i> | | |
| <i>Sign For 13 MAY '43</i> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1335</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Hudson Cpl</i> |

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|--|------------------------|---|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>7/c</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>10</i> | DATE <i>12 MAY '43</i> | |
| To <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| <i>One enemy Sniper killed near RLG 17 CP. His equipment in form of papers + documents. Weapon not turned in. Further check is being made.</i> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1346</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Hudson Cpl</i> |

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|--|------------------------|---|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>7/c</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>L</i> | DATE <i>13 MAY '43</i> | |
| To <i>CO'S All units RLG 17</i> | | |
| <i>Sign LZ4, Counter sign</i> | | |
| <i>Nellie 1200 13 MAY to</i> | | |
| <i>1200 14 MAY '43.</i> | | |
| <i>MAP Grid Coordinate Code</i> | | |
| <i>Remains the same</i> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>0935</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>Hudson Cpl</i> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED ● MSG CEN NO. ● *Phone*

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 13 MAY '43

To G-2 Landing Force

Movie Blue reports enemy Rifleman moving into positions in North Pass, Massacre Pass.

Enemy activity increasing in this area. Time reported 0915

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLR 17 TIME SIGNED 1010

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER *Hudson Cpl* SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED ● MSG CEN NO. ● *Phone*

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 13 MAY '43

To G-2 Landing Force

ADC Scouts Report from patrol with BCT-2.

Enemy information to G-2 by personal report of Scouts

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLR 17 TIME SIGNED 1200

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER *Hudson Cpl* SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED ● MSG CEN NO. ● *Phone*

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 13 MAY '43

To G-2 Landing Force

Enemy Field Regulation Manual and Diary of W.O. taken by Co F-17 12 MAY '43

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLR 17 TIME SIGNED 1345

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER *Hudson Cpl* SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | 1095. HOUR SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>5</u> | DATE <u>13 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <p>Captured documents + Camouflage Suit taken by S-2 Marie White</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1615</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Hudson</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Cpl</u> |

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|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | 1095. HOUR SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>6</u> | DATE <u>13 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <p>No change in MAP Grid Coordinate Code. Disseminate. NOTE: (Refer to Mess. 1)</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>G-2 L.F.</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1900</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|---|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | 1095. HOUR SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>1</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <p>Our RIGHT BN receiving M/G + Mortar FIRE FROM PASS to their front. No further enemy info. available at this time</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>0700</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Hudson Cpl</u> |

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. *Low*
SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. *2* DATE *14 MAY '43*

To *G-2 Landing Force*

Marie Blue + Mansion White
OP's under Heavy Mortar +
M/G Fire From mouth of
Massacre Pass

5-2 RLG 17 *0745*
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

Handerson Col
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. *Phone*
SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. *3* DATE *14 MAY '43*

To *G-2 Landing Force*

ADC scout Reports one
Enemy Hvy Mortar, one possibly
two Hvy M/G'S AT 873.0-350.35

5-2 RLG 17 *0900*
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

Handerson Col
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. *351K*
SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. *4* DATE *14 MAY '43*

To *G-2 Landing Force*

This enemy document was
picked up near Du C.P. +
turned into 5-2 RLG 17
today

5-2 RLG 17 *0945*
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

Handerson Col
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 14 MAY '43

To CO's All Units RLB 17

Sign YELLOW, Countersign
BELLEY 1200 14 MAY to
1200 15 MAY

S-2 RLG 17 1045
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Henderson Col SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 6 DATE 14 MAY '43

To G-2 Landing Force

Friendly units pinned down
by Sniper & M/G fire from
direction MASSACKC PASS. Enemy
positions echeloned in depth
thru mouth of PASS.

S-2 RLG 17 1120
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Henderson Col SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 7 DATE 14 MAY '43

To Sent to G-2 Landing Force

Received overlay of enemy
DP, MAP of JAPAN, list of
enemy positions by Co's. Misc
cards & letters.

From Maricwhite S-2 ✓
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | 10551K HOW SENT |
| | MSG CEN NO. | |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>8</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17 dated 13 May '43 delayed</u> | | |
| <u>Misc documents found in</u> | | |
| <u>AREA of Co 'F'</u> | | |
| <u>Note:</u> | | |
| <u>Documents Forwarded</u> | | |
| <u>to Co-2 L.F. (Bl.)</u> | | |
| | <u>S-2 Bet 17-2</u> | <u>1645</u> |
| | OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>B.S. Juhl</u> |

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | 10551K HOW SENT |
| | MSG CEN NO. | |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>9</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <u>CO Task Force ST reports</u> | | |
| <u>one unidentified AIRCRAFT</u> | | |
| <u>Picked up on RADAR AT 1252</u> | | |
| <u>COPY</u> | | |
| | <u>TFC-2</u> | <u>1305</u> |
| | OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>R.L. Ferguson</u> |

| | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | Phone HOW SENT |
| | MSG CEN NO. | |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>10</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 LANDING Force</u> | | |
| <u>Movie Blue 2 reports that</u> | | |
| <u>From Fire received, he believes</u> | | |
| <u>there are only 3M/A's giving them</u> | | |
| <u>Flanking Fire from both sides</u> | | |
| <u>of Pass</u> | | |
| | <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | <u>1310</u> |
| | OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>Hudson</u> |

| | | |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | CLASSIFICATION |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 11 | DATE 14 MAY '43 | |
| To CO's ALL UNITS, AH S-2's | | |
| G-2 Landing Force Reports previously reported planes are identified as friendly | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | S-2 RLG 17 | 1350 |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | Hudson Cpl |

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|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | CLASSIFICATION |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 12 | DATE 14 MAY '43 | |
| To G-2 Landing Force | | |
| Approx Coordinates of enemy M/G positions - 867.8-3506.15 to 868.0-3506.25 | | |
| Movie Blue OP No 1 at 530-w68 Movie Blue OP No 2 at 582-w70 | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | S-2 RLG 17 | 1445 |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | Hudson Cpl |

| | | |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | CLASSIFICATION |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 13 | DATE 14 MAY '43 | |
| To CO RLG 17 AH S-2 | | |
| Captured documents identify 9th Co, 27th Inf, 7th Inf Div. This unit left Japan Oct. 21 & arrived Attu Is. Oct 29 '42. Unit has seen service in North China & Manchuria in 1937, Paramushiro 1942. Unit now designated as the North Pacific exp. force. CO Force Lt. Gen. Kichiro Higuchi. (OVER) | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | |

| | | |
|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | Radio NO SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>13 Coate</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>CO BLC 17 ATT. 52</u> | | |
| <p>Commander ATTU GARRISON is Col. YOKIZO Kobayashi. Unit CO Lt. Col. YONAKAWA.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>Bct 17-1</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1645</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | FP NO SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>14</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>Movie 2</u> | | |
| <p>40mm Gun has opened fire again Appears to be able to fire from at least two alternate positions. Only enemy activity - M/A's + MORTARS. M/A positions are rapidly replaced when one is destroyed. Believe there is no Infantry Active in the pass.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>Movie Bloc 2</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1710</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | FP NO SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>15</u> | DATE <u>14 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>Movie 2</u> | | |
| <p>Movie white receiving what is believed to be 75mm fire from vicinity of SARANA Valley</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>Movie White 2</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1710</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

SECRET

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 15 MAY 1943
TO Movie 2

Enemy patrols active in front lines.

Notes (to G-2 + Staff)

Movie Blue 2 0100
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 15 MAY 1943
TO G-2 L.F.

Documents captured vicinity of Co. "F" 17: DIARY, Letters, I.N.F. Regulations, U.S. Aircraft Manual, Co. identifications (4th Co. 303 Independent Inf. Bn., Communications Manual, + telescope sight.

S-2 RLC 17 0800
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 15 MAY 1943
TO G-2 L.F.

Enemy M/G's + Mortars in position along N.E. shore Lake Nicholas near beach. Ammunition DP behind Ridge N.E. Lake Nicholas. Enemy Concentrations Hwy in chie. Hbk. AREA.

100 enemy R/men observed moving into Pass to front of Movie white.

S-2 RLC 17 0900
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 15 MAY '45

To Movie 2

2-man enemy patrols infiltrate our lines at Nite - gain Sniper positions for daytime use.
 Checking Report on concrete Pill box in Pass.
 Believe enemy has not been forced Massacre pass with Enb Units.

Movie Blue 2
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

0940
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER English

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 15 MAY '45

To S-2 RLC 17

4 or 5 large Guns seen being moved into position S.W. tip of LAKE Nicholas at 1600 14 May '43
 Note: Sent to G-2 L.F. by T.P. A. -
 F & R Scout

1130
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER by Davies Cpl

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 6 DATE 15 MAY '45

To S-2 RLC 17

Counter sign Sully Billy
 1200 15 MAY to 1200 16 MAY '45
 Note: Cleared to all units by Movie M/C.

1135
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER From G-2 L.F.

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 7 | DATE 15 MAY '43 | |
| TO S-2 RLG 17 | | |
| Enemy M/G's at 866.9-3507.5- 866.0-3507.3 - 866.0-3507.4, 866.6-3507.1, 866.5-3507.3, 866.8-3507.3 | | |
| I & R Scout | | 1200 |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| From Davidson, Pfc | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 7 | DATE 15 MAY '43 | |
| TO S-2 RLG 17 | | |
| Situation now in question. Enemy Sniper, M/G, & MORTAR positions are very cleverly camouflaged & concealed. Impossible to locate these placements. Enemy uses very few trace shells. M/G & MORTAR fire very accurate. Rifle fire inaccurate. | | |
| S-2 Bct 32-2 | | 1215 |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| TO G-2 Force by T.P.B. | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 8 | DATE 15 MAY '43 | |
| TO G-2 Landing Force | | |
| BCT 17-3 Reports they have received more fire from 40mm gun that was reported to have been knocked out Nite of 14 MAY '43. Still receiving Flanking fire from enemy M/G's. | | |
| S-2 RLG 17 | | 1300 |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| Handwritten Signature | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>9</u> | DATE <u>15 MAY '43</u> | |
| TO <u>5-2 RLG-17</u> | | |
| 2 M/B's silenced by FIRE. | | |
| Have received No enemy FIRE | | |
| FOR ONE + ONE HALF hrs. | | |
| Situation unchanged + | | |
| Quiet | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 Bct 17-2</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1600</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>To: G-2 by t.p.</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>10</u> | DATE <u>15 MAY 1943</u> | |
| TO <u>Co RLG-17</u> | | |
| Front Line positions ARE | | |
| <u>R65 I85 TO V50 I85</u> | | |
| Still Moving Forward | | |
| RECEIVED AT <u>1630</u> BY <u>[Signature]</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1537</u> |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>Bct 17-1</u> | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>11</u> | DATE <u>15 MAY '43</u> | |
| TO <u>S-2 RLG-17</u> | | |
| Column of enemy troops Moving | | |
| east From East ARM Holtz | | |
| bay toward Chic. Hbr. | | |
| (to all Lower Units) | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>G-2 LF</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1630</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>T.P</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>12</i> | DATE <i>12 MAY 1943</i> | |
| To <i>G-2 L.F.</i> | | |
| <i>Bct 17-3 Reports one mortar section hit & destroyed one enemy concrete pillbox. M/G's killed 5. REMAINING ENEMY</i> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1745</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>[Signature]</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>[Signature]</i> |

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|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>T.P</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>1</i> | DATE <i>16 MAY 1943</i> | |
| To <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| <i>Bct 17-2: Reports no enemy night action. Very quiet along entire front</i> | | |
| <i>Bct 17-3: Friendly patrol killed 20-25 enemy snipers & silenced 3 MG positions. Front lines receiving very little fire at present time.</i> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|---|--|
| THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>T.P</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>1 Cont'd</i> | DATE <i>16 MAY 1943</i> | |
| To <i>G-2 L.F.</i> | | |
| <i>Bct 32-2: Observed supply dump top of Black Mt. Nite patrol reports negative. No enemy patrols last nite.</i> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>0835</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>[Signature]</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>[Signature]</i> |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOURLY SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE <u>16 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <u>One Co Bct 32-1 on patrol Mission</u> | | |
| <u>top of Mt. to Right of RLG MCP</u> | | |
| <u>Are receiving Small Arms Fire</u> | | |
| <u>From enemy R. Flemer in trenches</u> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>0925</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Henderson</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Col.</u> |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOURLY SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE <u>16 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <u>Counter SN Willy Nilly</u> | | |
| <u>1200 16 MAY to 1200 17 MAY '43</u> | | |
| <u>(Note to all units)</u> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>G-2 Force</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1055</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOURLY SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>16 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <u>Attached Overlay of</u> | | |
| <u>enemy Positions, trenches</u> | | |
| <u>+ M/A's.</u> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1640</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Henderson</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Col.</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 16 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

Patrol on Mt. to our
 Right hit heavy enemy
 fire. Patrol withdrawing
 completely

Don BO132-2 1860
 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 6 DATE 16 MAY '43

To G-2 Landing Force

Negative Report From
 Bais. Scattered Sniper Fire
 only enemy activity

S-2 RLG 17 2020
 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Hudson, Cpl

SECRET

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 17 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

Counter-siege SALLY'S ALLEY
 1200 17 MAY to 1200
 18 MAY '43.

G-2 Landing Force 1030
 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT Radio

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 17 MAY '43

To S-2 RLC 17

Everything Quiet up Front.
Request Batteries For Radio

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 Bet 17-3 TIME SIGNED 1840

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 17 MAY '43

To C.O. RLC 17

Recommendations that following be
learned by US troops: Jap Challenge -
"Mushy-Mushy" meaning "Hello". Answer
to this challenge - "Hi-ee" pronounced
very quickly. This causes Jap to
jabber around themselves, giving
soldier time to act. This knowledge
enabled My Unit to Kill a number
of Jap at Close Range

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Submitted by Lt. Long, 17th Inf. SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THERE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT RP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 17 MAY '43

To S-2 Bet 17-3

It will be SOP. that all
patrols will report by overlay
or sketch, showing route, enemy
installations + No. of men in Patrol
on Completion of Mission.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLC 17 TIME SIGNED 1845

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

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| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>messik</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>5</i> | DATE <i>17 MAY 43</i> | |
| To <i>S-2 RAC 17</i> | | |
| <i>Request on Shell Fragment to determine ORIGIN.</i> | | |
| <i>(Presumed to be US human material)</i> | | |
| <i>S-2 BCT 17-2</i> | | <i>1450</i> |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT <i>JP</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>6</i> | DATE <i>17 MAY 43</i> | |
| To <i>S-2 RAC 17</i> | | |
| <i>No enemy activity to our front. Our Artillery firing on known enemy position, but no results seen</i> | | |
| <i>I+R DP's 142</i> | | <i>1260</i> |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

Message (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1

DATE 19 MAY

TO G-2 Landing Force

- 1 Snipers remain active, moving from one spot to another by use of "V" trenches or tunnels. Their fire inaccurate.
- 2 Movement of enemy reoccupying positions in the morning - time 0630. Visibility was normal.
- 3 Jap observed at various times carrying ammunition from near P.C.
4. Enemy uniforms are very warm,

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Cont'd

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE-CENTER-ONLY

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 Cont'd

DATE 17 MAY '43

TO G-2 Force

- PAR KA type, Mule Grey.
5. 1-LMG will be sent back to-day. Has illuminated sight for night firing. 40 mm Gun fired two rounds 100-150 yds rear of Bct 17-3's CP from vicinity Massacre-Holtz Bay Pass.
6. Enemy M/G's still in position

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Cont'd

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 Cont'd DATE 17 MAY '43

To G-2 Force

IN MASSACRE-HOLTZ BAY PASS. UNABLE to locate definite positions. Not more than two M/G's fire at one time. M/G fire very accurate. 7 Believed to be approx. 200 troops in Pass Area.

8. Friendly units still receiving frontal + flanking fire.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Cont'd

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 Cont'd DATE 17 MAY '43

To G-2 Force

9. BARBARA HUTS reported in Pass Area.

10. Bct 17-2 reports no enemy patrols during the night. No enemy fire since 2300 16 May '43.

Note: Report compiled from notes thru Bu S-2's

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED 0900

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Hedden, Cpl

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 8 DATE 17 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

Estimate enemy strength to be two Inf. Bns + 1 Provisional Bn. Totaling 1500 men. Each Gun Co has 6-75 Mt. Howitzers. Rifle Cos have a 70mm + one 20mm Gun Attached.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER G-2 Force TIME SIGNED 1600

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 9 DATE 17 MAY 1943

To S-2 RLG 17

Nite Patrol of 16 MAY 1943 discovered Jap using bamboo whistle to warn each other. Signal usually given shortly before Jap MORTAR or ART. FIRE commences

(Same to G-2 Force)

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER BCT 17-2 TIME SIGNED 1015

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER [Signature] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 10 DATE 17 MAY 1943

To CD. RLG 17 All S-2

Report from Bct-17-2 Patrol. Contents previously reported to G-2 + G-3.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 1100

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 11 DATE 17 MAY 1943

To S-2

At 2045 spotted and destroyed enemy mortar

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER CO BCT 17-2 TIME SIGNED 2110

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER [Signature] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Hoagland S-2

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|-----------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>11</u> | DATE <u>17 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>Report on MASSACRE PASS: Bn Consolidation on ridge, located a position used by 75MM Mountain Gun evidenced by shell cases. Enemy have evacuated their dead. Guns scattered thru the pass. CO BCG-17 led the assault.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>CO BCG 17-3</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>3134</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>English S-2</u> |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>13</u> | DATE <u>17 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>CP's 1 and 2 report negative, visibility closed down.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>MAPS ASST 52</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>2235</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|-----------------------|---|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>1</u> | DATE <u>18 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>All quiet spasmodic rifle and m/g fire. No Jap PATROL activity during the night.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>CO BCG 17-2</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>0800</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Hoagland S-2</u> |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE <u>18 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>Visibility limited to 100 yards Receiving Fire from our right rear cannot locate where fire is coming from</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>CO BATT 17-3</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>0830</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>English S-2</u> |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE <u>18 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>All units</u> | | |
| <p>Password from <u>18 MAY 43</u> <u>1200 to 19 MAY 43 1200</u> <u>"VILLAG SMITHY"</u></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>CO BATT 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>0915</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Burt S-2</u> |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>18 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>Have crossed by saddle have forward elements going on down the pass. Made contact with scout Co and Recon Unit.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>CO BATT 17-3</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>0900</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>English S-2</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>5</u> | DATE <u>18 May 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2.</u> | | |
| <p>Observed "Barabaras" - have wooden tops, draped with camouflage net - total (5) (Mussacre Pass) average size 10' x 12'</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>M/Plt [unclear]</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1130.</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>6</u> | DATE <u>18 May 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2.</u> | | |
| <p>(MUSACRE PASS) 1000 Report: M/G's emplaced in rock pill boxes firing placed on top fox holes adjacent. Thought to be 50 Cal guns - emplacements high to defilade guns. Dead Jap about 5' 8" 160 lbs, healthy, clean shaven, haircut recently. Clothes in good condition. Gas mask on</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|----------------------|---|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE | |
| To <u>Cont</u> | | |
| <p>Buildings built under ground made of tan paper lumber - appear to be sleeping quarters, mess halls, latrines. Many supplies around the buildings. Such as shoes, clothing, helmets, rifles, etc. 2 hospitals discovered dug in the ground. Complete Report to follow.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>COBCT 17-3</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1130.</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>English S-2.</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

MSG GEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 7 DATE 18 MAY 43
To S-2

OP. set up. OP 2nd Bn remain in place. OP detail with 3rd Bn move forward to establish new OP and will report position. OP 1 will clear to function.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG GEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 8 DATE 18 MAY 43
To S-2

No action on front
OP 2nd Bn at 1300

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG GEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 9 DATE 18 MAY 43
To S-2

OP #2 reports trenches rebuilt during the night. Receiving some M/G fire & Rifle fire, trenches are on extreme right OP.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 10 DATE 18 MAY 43

To S-2

CO ordered a Combat patrol to Recon high ground on left flank of BET 17-3 on ground overlooking TEMNAC Bay

CO Rpt 17

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1840

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 11 DATE 18 MAY 43

To S-2

OP # 2 reports gun firing on our position from vicinity of Lake Nicholas. Believed to be 75 AM.

Wmper Asst S2

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1400

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 12 DATE 18 MAY 43

To S-2

Report from Regt OP with BET 17-3 we are in position report no enemy activity.

Wmper Asst S2

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1420

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 15

DATE 18 May 63

To 5-2.

1st Bn 4th INF will arrive
in Massacre today. will placed
under control of RLG 17.

Don Henderson

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1430

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 14

DATE 18 May 63

To R-2.

No change in situation on
any front from last Report.

CO RLG 17

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1504

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Brust 5-2
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>15</u> | DATE <u>18 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>Meeting of Bu Co's (Notes) 2 platoon from 32 to move over ridge North of S.P. and attack at dawn. 2nd Bu will send group to the trenches to their post. Another group will take the top of Cold Mountain (Platoon from I Co). Plan to use smoke in valley in order to</p> | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED |
| | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE | |
| To | | |
| <p>decide that we are moving through valley. Primary objective is high ground. If high ground is gained 32-2 will pass through 17-2 and move thru Pass.</p> | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED |
| | <u>CO B Co 17.</u> | <u>1500</u> |
| | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>Paul S-2</u> |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>16</u> | DATE <u>18 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>Report of patrol sent out by 2nd Bu. Patrol was fired on 100 yards from trench 3 by 2 sentries. Men are subjected against snow. No casualties but 1 man.</p> | | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED |
| | <u>CO B Co 17-2</u> | <u>1527</u> |
| | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>Howard</u> |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>17</u> | DATE <u>18 May 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>OP. with 3rd BN is now with k co 3rd BN - HAVE observation into Holtz Bay NO enemy activity</p> | | |
| <p><i>Orlando</i> OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER</p> | | <p>1610 TIME SIGNED</p> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>18</u> | DATE <u>18 May 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p><i>Platoon G-2</i> Main force on high ground between Cawden Holtz Bay, observed enemy entrenchments and enemy activity on Carter Point; our forces have received no artillery. All Bay area under our control. Enemy when we would attack to come here in May.</p> | | |
| <p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER</p> | | <p>TIME SIGNED</p> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|-----------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>19</u> | DATE <u>18 May 43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p>Contacted Lt Taylor 3rd BN 32nd reg by wire thru k co 17 giving the communication with Holtz Bay and Col Allen of the North Ridge.</p> | | |
| <p>OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER</p> | | <p>1915 TIME SIGNED</p> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 20 DATE 18 May 43
To G-2

Sent Personal effects, Confidential
Cycles and maps from plane
that crashed during early stages
of the attack. Plane crashed into
side of mountain and pilot was
killed. Found in the plane that it
was impossible to get body out

CO RIG 17 1935
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
Burt 52

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 22 DATE 18 May 43
To G-2

Several men were observed on
Shair (Japs) above the abandon
-ment directly west of OP 1

RIG 17 1930
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
Burt 52

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 23 DATE 18 May 43
To S-2

Maj O'Reilly CO 1st Bn 4th
arrived in area,

OSR 2030
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 24 DATE 18 MAY 43

To S-2

FROM S-2 BCTM-2

Received From 2nd Bn shell

Fragments believed to be 75mm mountain

Gun Forwarded to G-2

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 2055

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 25 DATE 18 MAY 43

To S-2

OP # 2

OP under heavy MG and mortar

Fire coming from ridge to the front

CP is under light fire from

M/G

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER Major Aerts-2 TIME SIGNED 2140

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 26 DATE 18 MAY 43

To G-2

2nd Bn 17th located M/G on high

ground in vicinity of South Nose of

Cold Mountain, believed to have silenced

it

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER CW BCTM-2 TIME SIGNED 2203

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Hogland S-2

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

SECRET

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 19 MAY 43

To G-2

FROM 3rd Bn OP

No enemy action during the night
PATROLS report no contact with
the enemy

CO BCT 17-3 0825
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Analyst S-2

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

SECRET

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 19 MAY 43

To All Bns, Sep ORGANIZATIONS

SIGN "Follow" Countersign THRU
1200 19 MAY 43 to 1200 20 MAY 43.

CO RLG 17 0945
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Burst S-2

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT

SECRET

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 19 MAY 43

To All units, Sep ORG

Change in Countersign as given
by G-2. It is now "Little Sympathy"

CO RLG 17 1025
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Burst S-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>19 MAY 43</u> | |
| TO <u>S-2</u> | | |
| <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">Co K. in MASSACRE - Holtz Bay</p> <p>Pros reports no enemy action for the night. Sending in captured documents and material.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | <u>CO Co. K.</u> | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>Capt. Prasse</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>5</u> | DATE <u>19 MAY 1943</u> | |
| TO <u>G-2 Landing Force</u> | | |
| <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">Co "K" BCT 17-3 report NO enemy activity.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>[Signature]</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>6</u> | DATE <u>19 MAY 1943</u> | |
| TO <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <p style="font-size: 1.2em;">Corrected Countersign</p> <p>Cleared to All Units RLG 17</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |
| | | <u>M/C 19th</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 7 DATE 19 MAY 43

To S-2

From OP #2

Positions 5-7-8 secured request
artillery fire belated.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 BCT 17-2 TIME SIGNED 1520

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Henderson

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 20 MAY 43

To G-2 L.F.

Pt Able still held by enemy.
Attacking units receiving
M/G, Sniper & Mortar fire.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED 1500

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Henderson, Col.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 20 MAY 43

To S-2 RLG 17

Co A 1st Bn 4th Inf knocked
out 5 M/G's near Rock Quarry.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1st of 4th TIME SIGNED 1800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2

DATE

20 MAY '45

To

Summary: Enemy appear to have spent the day with drawing slightly consolidating positions in chichakaf valley proper Sarawa Nose. Small M/G pockets remain in vicinity of Rock Quarry

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1230p
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1

DATE

21 MAY 1945

To

S-2 RLG 17

Captured enemy positions on Pt. Able

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

RLG 17 OP

1530
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2DATE 21 May 43To S-2From: S-2 2nd Bn 32nd INF.

Report on the seizure of POINT ABLE: It was reduced at 1047 by G&C Companies 32nd INF. Strength of enemy approximately 25 of which all were killed. Japanese emplacements were on the west slope of Pt A and along ridge of rocks extending down ward from Summit on SARANTA SIDE. Emplacements were fox hole type well dug in and well

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2

DATE

To

Camouflaged. Each weapon had at least one alternate position. In these emplacements were found quantities of 2mm ammunition of all types. Among the equipment found was the following AMERICAN equipment: 20 M-1 rifles, 3 or 4 BAR's & 60mm mortar, 1 LMG and ammunition for the above weapons was found. Also

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|----------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE _____ | |
| To _____ | | |
| <p>3 or 4 Am sleeping bags. This equipment may have been taken from F Co 17 and E & C Co 32nd who were in the area previous to our occupation. Enemy weapons found were 3 heavy MGs, numerous rifles, 2 knee mortars and ammunition supply more than sufficient. TO G-2.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | 1620 TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | Burns S-2 SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|-----------------------|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE <u>21 MAY 43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2.</u> | | |
| <p>Enclose - Jap field Manuals, stool chest Maps of enemy positions in Chickoqof SARANA PASS,</p> | | |
| CORP 17. OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | 1625. TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | Burns S-2 SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG. GEN. No. TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 21 MAY 1943

To S-2 RRG 17

1st Bn. 4th Inf. advanced thru enemy positions to a pt North side of Rock Quarry.

More enemy M/G positions to their immediate front on High Pentis

S-2 RRG 170P 2600

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Burst SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG. GEN. No. TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 21 MAY 1943

To Henderson S-2 Sector

No Further enemy info. this date.

STRONG Friendly patrols sent out tonight to clear out M/G opposition. No Report AS YET

S-2 Burst

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG. GEN. No. TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 22 MAY 1943

To S-2

40 ENEMY seen retreating in groups of 2 and 4 from positions in Chickasaw Valley on tableland south of Lake Coates. May be start of the collapse of their lines. Enemy observed seem to be confused and without a OFFICER.

CORP 17

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Burst SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ SENT _____

F.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 22 MAY 1943

To Henderson at Rm 100

STRONG enemy positions on SARANA Nose being bombarded by Artillery.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1600

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER English S-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 22 MAY 43

To S-2

From S-2 3rd Bn.

Searched enemy emplacements on SARANA Nose. Documents & equipment on way to you. Approx 75 Japs killed. Full report to follow.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER CO BCT 17-3 TIME SIGNED 1610

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER English S-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 22 MAY 1943

To G-2 Land Force

PATROL "C" Co. 4th Inf done SARANA Valley. Reported seeing only few Japs. they gave no resistance

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 R4 G 17 TIME SIGNED 1730

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Henderson, G-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____

SECRET

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 23 MAY 1943

To G-2 Force

Bct 17-2 meeting Hwy
enemy LMG + Rifle Fire
on West Ridge Sakana Valley.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED 0800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 23 MAY 1943

To S-2 RLG 17

Bct 32-2 held up by
Heavy M/A + Mortar Fire in
Chichagof Valley.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER Maive OP TIME SIGNED 1400

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 23 May 43

To S-2
From G-2

74 Jap torpedo Bombers (97) attempted
to bomb Holtz Bay AREA. Reported
our F4Fs' lightning shot down
Four.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1430

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 23 MAY 43

To G-2

General Summary: Friendly forces maneuvering for position, Enemy withdrawing to high ground between Holtz and Chickasaw. Acl acl Five reported to have been used on our troops on bond in Fishhook - (not verified).

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1600

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Bent S-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 23 MAY 1943

To Henderson CP

No further enemy info. this time.

(to G-2)

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 OP TIME SIGNED 2000

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Bent S-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESS.

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 6 DATE 23 MAY 1943

To S-2 RLG 17

Friendly patrols down SARANA Valley, gaining contact with outpost on SARANA Beach. No enemy encountered.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 Maxie Green TIME SIGNED 2400

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 24 May '43

To: G-2 Landing Force

Report on enemy positions on SARAWA Beach by I+R Patrol. Positions appeared to have abandoned hurriedly leaving large amounts of Ammunition, Rifles, blankets, Glove & other types of clothing supplies. Route of Supply to former position by means of trails thru Mts. into Chehokoh Mts.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLB 17 TIME SIGNED 0100

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Henderson Cpl

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 24 MAY 1943

To: S-2 RLB 17

2 Friendly Co's have over-
come enemy positions on Fishhook
& occupy same.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER Marie Ford CP TIME SIGNED 1030

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER M. Ford Lt

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 24 May

To: S-2

2nd Bn receiving MG and sniper
fire, Estimated strength of enemy
on beach in Fishhook 50 tops dug in
in successive positions,

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER CO BET 17-2 TIME SIGNED 1045

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Hoogland S-2

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4

DATE

24 MAY 1943

To

S-2 RLG 17

One Co. Japs on ridge north of SARANA Nose. They are digging in.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER

Maxiewhite I 1966

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

OP

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5

DATE

24 MAY 1943

To

S-2 RLG 17

12 boats in Chichagof hbr. No activity on boats. Enemy front positions at N20 570 - to G-2

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER

Maxie OP

1400

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Benfell 1st Lt

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1

DATE

25 MAY 1943

To

S-2 RLG 17

Artillery laid on one enemy position in Chichagof Valley.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER

Maxie 20 OP

0800

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|---|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE <u>25 MAY 1943</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Force</u> | | |
| <p>150 Japs officially killed on assault of enemy trenches in Fishhook area.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1600</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>[Signature]</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>[Signature]</u> |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <u>TP</u> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE <u>25 MAY 1943</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <p>enemy MG's + Rifle fire still holding up our troops on Buffalo Nose. Believe this is last enemy line of resistance</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>Movie OP</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1230</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|-------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <u>TP</u> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>25 MAY 1943</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <p>Received Jap Light Code. This^{is} prearranged code of International Morse Code.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>G-2 Force</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1900</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT
T.F

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 DATE 25 MAY 1945
To G-2 Landing Force

Enemy has M/G AT 871.5-3510.0
Commands all high Ground in
that Area. Our troops hold high
peak 1000 yds. South west of
enemy positions. Positions taken
include 40mm Gun, 1 Hvy M/G +
Approx. 50 Dead Japs on S.W. Slope
of hill. Enemy Patrolling of

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 5 Cont'd DATE 25 MAY 1945
To _____

this AREA evident by beaten
trails. Enemy don't appear
to be reinforcing their
positions in this AREA.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER

2330
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 26 MAY '43

To G-2 Force

Sighted 17 Japs moving thru snow-covered pass 800 yds west of Buffalo Nose. Killed two with direct 37mm fire from valley floor. Fire with drew to the east + remainder moved over pass under fire. Believe enemy has been forced.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 (Cont'd) DATE 26 MAY '43

To G-2 Force

their strong points in this AREA. Paths in new snow indicate much movement during night of 25 MAY '43

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 0800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

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|---|--|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <i>T.P.</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>2</i> | DATE <i>26 MAY 143</i> | |
| TO <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | |
| <p><i>Observed small Groups of Japs Digging in on Mt. Peaks east side Chicago Valley. Believed Concentrating M/G positions for Valley defense.</i></p> <p><i>(TO G-2)</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>SARANA Peak OP- I+R Scout</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1000</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>Davis, Col</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <i>T.P.</i> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>3</i> | DATE <i>26 MAY 143</i> | |
| TO <i>G-2 Force</i> | | |
| <p><i>Report from I+R Scout on SARANA Peak - 15-20 enemy attempted attack on our positions there. Attack stopped by throwing of Hand Grenades. No casualties on either side.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1400</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>Henderson, Col</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <i>4</i> | DATE <i>26 MAY 143</i> | |
| TO <i>G-2 Landing Force</i> | | |
| <p><i>U.S. Bombers on mission in Chicago Valley are receiving Heavy AA Fire from objective. Bombers strike positions in spite of AA.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <i>S-2 RLG 17</i> | | TIME SIGNED <i>1535</i> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>Henderson, Col</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT TP |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 5 | DATE 26 MAY '43 | |
| To S-2 RLG 17 | | |
| <p>Alaskan Scout OP able to observe Area at 871.5-3512.0 - No enemy activity in Area 871.2-3511. Observed 21 enemy, heavily loaded, moving up Gulley to high Ground. Apparently are Reinforcements. There is a well camouflaged camp in this Area.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER G-2 L.F. | | TIME SIGNED 1600 |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT TP |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 6 | DATE 26 MAY '43 | |
| To S-2 RLG 17 | | |
| <p>Our bombers silenced enemy AH battery North end of Chichagof Valley</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER G-2 For. Co. | | TIME SIGNED 2215 |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT TP |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 7 | DATE 26 MAY '43 | |
| To S-2 RLG 17 | | |
| <p>Alaskan Scouts have observed Chichagof Valley entire day + Report No enemy Activity. Two prisoners taken at</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

T.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3

DATE 27 MAY '43

TO G-2 Landing Force

IVR Scout with "I" Co. BCT 17-3
No. in Position at 872.0-351d.b.
Contacted & killed ten Japs.
one LMG taken. No other
enemy evident at present
time

5-2 RIG 17
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1000
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

[Signature]
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

T.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4

DATE 27 MAY '43

TO 5-2 RIG 17

Enemy continue to hold
Buffalo Ridge. Our Attack
unsuccessful

Movie OP
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2030
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

[Signature]
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1

DATE 28 MAY '43

TO G-2 Force

Points 3-4 Gained by
our troops. Buffalo Nose
secured at 2230. Some
enemy resistance remains in
Chicagoat Valley floor

5-2 RIG 17
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1645
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

[Signature]
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 28 MAY '43

To Note:

Received 75mm Fire from position some 1500 yds North of Buffalo Nose. Poor shooting indicates enemy firing blind.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1630
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Henderson

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT T.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 28 MAY '43

To G-2 Force

No Further enemy activity this time.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

S-2 RLQ 17 2630
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

Henderson Cpl

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT T.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4 DATE 29 MAY '43

To S-2 RLQ 17

NAVAL STAR shells will illuminate Chickasaw Valley during hours of darkness. Report any & all enemy movement or contact to G-2 Force, or direct to CG Landing Force.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

G-2 L.F. 0130
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

G-2 L.F.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

T.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2

DATE 29 MAY 1943

TO Movie OP + I Co OP Bet 17-3

Stand Alerted to observe any enemy movement in valley thru-out hours of DARKNESS. Due to fog, CO I Co sent one patrol to SARANA beach, one to front of OP + one to Chicago Valley Floor.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

S-2 RLC 17

0140 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Henderson, Cyril

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3

DATE 29 MAY 1943

TO G-2 L.F.

Enemy Team Gun Firing From FAR Slope of Buffalo Nose into Chicago-SARANA Valley Floor. 35 rounds counted by CP Group. Note: This messg not delivered because this fire knocked out communication with G-2.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

S-2 RLC 17

2157 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Henderson, Cyril

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4

DATE 29 MAY 1943

TO S-2 RLC 17

No enemy activity encountered by patrol in valley floor. No enemy movement observed.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

C.O I Co 174

0246 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

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| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>5</u> | DATE <u>29 MAY 1945</u> | |
| To | <u>Heard Sounds of Nvy Fighting in Area of Rear CP. Tried to contact Movie Blue CP + Rear ech. Regt. but enemy cut wires before any message could come thru.</u> | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER | | <u>6430</u> TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Henderson</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>6</u> | DATE <u>29 MAY 1945</u> | |
| To | <u>60 enemy attacked in vicinity of Regt 1 DP + upon being forced back, moved into deep cut of Cold Mt.</u> | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER | | <u>0900</u> TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Henderson Cpl</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|-------------------------|---|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>7</u> | DATE <u>29 MAY 1945</u> | |
| To | <u>C-2 Force</u> | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF BENDER | | <u>1800</u> TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Henderson Cpl</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 8

DATE 27 MAY '43

To Co RLG 17

estimate 60 enemy in cut
of Cold Mt.

Request aid to eliminate
them

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

Co RLG 17

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1

DATE 30 MAY '43

To S-2 RLG 17

30 enemy trying to
escape back to Chichagof
bench. ARE in vicinity Reng
ech, Regt'l CP

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

Reng ech, C.P.

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE <u>30 MAY '43</u> | |
| TO <u>S-2 RLC 17</u> | | |
| <p>All enemy in vicinity have been killed. Many killed themselves with hand grenades. Many not armed. Some carried knives tied to sticks as their only weapons. Captured two prisoners - very drunk + unable to question them due</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
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| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE <u>30 MAY '43</u> | |
| TO _____ | | |
| <p>to their condition. Enemy not very well organized in this attack. believed to be their last desperate effort in this area.</p> | | |
| <u>Rear Ech. C.P.</u> OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | <u>0630</u> TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

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|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE <u>31 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2 Force</u> | | |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Three Enemy AR Guns in Chicago + bbr. Area. Believed to be in Good Condition</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1230</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Henderson</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

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|--|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>30 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Enemy expected to die. Would pull pin on Grenade + Rush toward U.S. troops crying in broken English "we die AMERICANS die too."</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>@O Ho Co</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1500</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

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| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT <u>JP</u> |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>5</u> | DATE <u>30 MAY '43</u> | |
| To <u>G-2</u> | | |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Ret 17-3 Captured one prisoner in Lake Corries AREA. Returned directly to <u>G-2 force</u></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 RLG 17</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1416</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <u>Henderson</u> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW INT **TR**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 6 DATE 30 MAY 1945

To CO RLC 17

Cleaning up enemy
in Cut of Cold Mt.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER CO FC 17 TIME SIGNED 1630

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW INT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 7 DATE 30 MAY 1945

To S-2 RLC 17

Further report from prisoners
state that their forces left
in Chiesan consisted of NO
ORGANIZED RESISTANCE & MANY
wounded

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER Rear Ech. CP 17 TIME SIGNED 1635

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW INT **TR**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 8 DATE 30 MAY 1945

To CO RLC 17

All enemy resistance wiped
out in Cold Mt. AREA. total
counted enemy dead - 62 of
which 3 were officers

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER CO FC 17 TIME SIGNED 1730

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 9 DATE 30 MAY 143

To G-2 LIF

Movie Green 2 Reports enemy in Chickagot beach AREA ARE breaking up into Groups of 5-10 Men & ARE moving around Mt. Slope to right of beach toward Cape Klebnikof. Have counted total of 27 in past two hours

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED 1930

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Henderson Cpl

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT F.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 31 MAY 143

To G-2 Force

Ake in position overlooking Chickagot Hbr & AREA. Enemy position in ATTU VILLAGE AREA on fire. Remaining enemy retreated toward Klebnikof Area. Being wiped up as soon as possible

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1230

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT F.P.

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 31 MAY '43

To G-2 LANDING Force

Three prisoners being held by Bet 17-3. We are picking them up to-day

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 RLG 17 TIME SIGNED 1300

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Burst

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3

DATE 30 MAY 43

To S-2 RLC 17

Enemy dead totalled 250
in the valley. Some were
Jap Sailors & Airmen &
carried previous wounds.
Others found to be wearing
US helmets & PARKAS.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

Reg Ech. Co. P

1210
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE
REPRODUCED IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

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TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 4

DATE 31 MAY 43

To B-2

Report on Prisoners:
Two of the men belong to
AA Unit in Chickago. Hbr Area.
One MAN from Port Co. He
was slightly wounded in the
leg. Prisoners all very
hungry & extremely tired.
Their Co. consisted of 6
AA Guns. they believed CO of

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE
REPRODUCED IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|---|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 4 (Cont) | DATE 31 MAY '43 | |
| To | | |
| <p>Island was a Major + he was reported killed 4-5 days ago. Had no info regarding reinforcements. were told to fight until dead. they were aware of fact that Is. was completely in AM. hands. their unit arrived Httu</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
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| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 4 (Cont'd) | DATE 31 MAY '43 | |
| To | | |
| <p>From YOKAHAMA JAPAN 6 Months ago. Did not know where adjacent units were located. Had heard reports of submarine visiting Is. since our landing, probably for the purpose of evacuation, but were not sure of this. Also believed</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 4 (Cont'd) | DATE 31 MAY '43 | |
| To | | |
| <p>Some Jap ARMS had been sent out. Stated that it is their custom to amputate left ARM of their dead + Return this portion of body to the Family.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**



DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 1559

307-111(17)-3.01
(15558)
Master
17th Div - Memorandum (fr. Col. Wayne C Zimmerman) - Item Dated 14 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS RLG 17
APO #726
Seattle, Washington

SECRET

CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted] June 14, 1943.
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
William D. Top 17 AT R&D
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *20 Aug 46*

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Commanding General, Task Force 16.11

1. In compliance with memorandum, June 4, 1943, relative to written reports of the action on Attu, the following information is submitted by the undersigned, in addition to the narrative of the encounter.

This synopsis covers briefly, data required by Par. 3 & 4 of basic letter.

A. General Action:

(1). The troops initially under the command of the Regimental Commander, 17th Infantry, originally consisted of RLG 17, less one battalion, that is, BCT 17-2; BCT 17-3 and Company "F" of the 32nd Infantry. After assumption of command by the undersigned, this Regimental Landing Group was increased periodically by the addition of other units and was designated as the Southern Force. Throughout most of the action, this South Force consisted of RLG 17 less one battalion, BCT 32-1 less battalion headquarters, BCT 32-2 and the first battalion 4th Infantry. During the final days, the 3rd battalion 32nd Infantry was added to this force. Landing force itself, at various times put restrictions on certain battalions or portions thereof, in order to insure themselves of a force reserve.

(2). The initial attack of the two battalions of the 17th Infantry in the Massacre Valley was greatly hampered by low visibility. The high ground to either side of the attacking forces was in general completely hidden by fog, consequently the Battalion Commanders did not have a clear picture of the opposition holding them up or the direction or location from which they were receiving enemy fire. There was no initial conception on the part of the Battalion Commanders of the height of the mountain areas on their flanks or the strength of the enemy positions.

(3). The enemy resistance encountered was well planned and took every advantage of both the climate and the terrain. The Japanese had prepared very strong defensive positions above both the Massacre - Holtz Pass and the Massacre - Chichagof Pass. These positions were so placed on the high ground that they could change to alternately prepared positions as the fog lifted and consequently fire from somewhere above the fog line. Initially the positions along the north side of the Massacre Valley were so located as to bring all the west side of the

307-116(17)-3.01

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Master

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Hogback under fire of enemy machine guns, mortars and rifles. The Japanese were equipped with both heavy and light mortars. Heavy mortars generally were located on extremely high ground or well back of entrenched positions. By placing observers just below the fog line, the fire of these mortars could be directed on our troops with little chance of the mortar position itself being located. Knee mortars were efficiently used by the Japanese part way down the slope of the mountains. Similarly in front of the Massacre - Holtz Pass, well concealed machine guns, mortars and riflemen were able to bring fire on any movement through the valley proper. Positions already referred to in these mountains were well dug in and well stocked with ammunition and food. This permitted freedom of movement from one position to another with little loss in fire power. The Japanese defense was determined and efficient. Enemy gunners and riflemen in most cases did not leave their positions until close action drove them out.

(4). Due largely to the fog which completely covered the high positions held by the enemy and the difficulty in locating these positions, our forces did not immediately start action up the side of the mountains referred to. As soon as visibility permitted some idea as to enemy locations, action was started to secure the high ground on each side of the valleys concerned before attempting to push along the low ground.

~~and the high strength of our units was greatly reduced by long exposure to the climate and terrain conditions to which they were not accustomed, missions assigned throughout were carried out with success.~~

(6). Supporting fires by artillery were particularly effective against the Massacre - Holtz Bay Pass and later against the Massacre - Chichagof Pass. As the attack progressed beyond the Massacre - Chichagof Pass, the fire of artillery was somewhat restricted, due to the high mass of mountains in the vicinity of Point "A". This was later corrected by the movement of one battery to the Massacre Hogback. The fires of our 81mm mortars were particularly effective and indicated high state of training by personnel involved. The 60mm mortar while less effective was a valuable weapon, far more effective and accurate than the knee mortar used by the Japanese. Prior to the taking of strong enemy positions on Sarana Nose, effective use was made of the mass fires of four heavy weapons companies and a battalion of artillery. This fire was so effective that the attacking battalion was able to destroy the bulk of enemy resistance within their trenches with only minor losses within the battalion itself.

[(7). The weapons in hands of troops were generally satisfactory. The M-1 rifle stood up well and the Browning Automatic rifle was highly effective. The light machine gun was particularly well adapted to this type of mountain warfare. The 37mm gun while most effective against located enemy targets was too difficult to transport up the side of mountains. In one case, 70 men were utilized to get one of these weapons up to approximately the 2000 foot level. The weapon as designed is primarily for haul behind truck transportation. It should be redesigned if it is to be used effectively in mountain warfare.

(8). In my opinion, combat intelligence was not productive of the information that could normally be expected. O.P.'s were established

SECRET

by all echelons of the regiment and they did report valuable information in less time than if it had been processed through the normal chain of communications. However, the amount of information obtained by intelligence personnel attached to patrols was negative in nature.

(9). Patrol action in many cases was not planned in sufficient detail. Directions given for active patrolling throughout any given area often resulted in more harm than good. Night patrolling if effective must be made by carefully selected men, with a definite mission. They must leave front lines at designated points and return to other designated points at specified times. The action of these patrols must be known by all front line units and adjacent troops, to allow promiscuous patrolling, lessens the security of front line troops and invites patrolling by an active enemy.

2. Lessons to derive from this action:

a. The age old rule that high ground must be taken before progress can be made over the ground below, has been fully impressed on all troops concerned. While it is most difficult to get untrained troops up the precipitous sides of mountains, manpower is saved in the long run by so doing.

~~1. Troops that are engaged in mountain warfare, should be trained in this type of fighting and be equipped for it.~~

(1). Clothing should be carefully selected for use in the area involved. Shoes in particular should be carefully considered to meet climatic conditions. If the leather type is selected, these shoes should be in the hands of the troops at least a month prior to the time of use in order to insure proper breaking-in and so that they can be worked over with "dubbin" to render them water and snow proof. Troops that are to stay out in cold weather over long periods of time, such as twenty-one days, much of the time which is to be spent in the snow and water, must be equipped with clothing so that the losses by exposure will be minimized. Such troops should receive their training in a cold climate and get adjusted to living for long periods of time outside in the snow and without fires.

(2). Sleeping bags issued to troops were of great benefit. Although only half of each bag was available for anyone soldier, some relief from the climate resulted whenever bags could be gotten up to troops involved in the fighting. This bag, or substitute should be reduced in size, so that it may be carried by the soldier closer to the point where he becomes involved in the fire fight. A rain proof poncho should be issued in lieu of a shelter half.

(3). Troops should receive more training during time of peace in closely following the fires of the artillery and mortars toward an enemy position. In many cases, troops failed to take advantage of the opportunity to move up close to artillery and mortar fire in order to close on the enemy with a minimum loss.

3. In addition to the recommendations contained in paragraphs

SECRET - 3 -

above, the following is submitted:

a. For the type of warfare involved, the offensive hand grenade has proven to be of more value than the defensive grenade. Men used the offensive grenade close to enemy positions. The grenade could be thrown without danger to themselves. In my opinion, the offensive grenade is more effective due to its shock effect than the defensive grenade. There is an immediate need for some form of grenade carrier. Time after time, men after working into position where they could use grenades against an enemy trench, found it necessary to return to get additional grenades.

b. The 50 caliber ammunition used by the Japanese appears to have less muzzle blast and the smoke was more difficult to detect than the 30 caliber ammunition used by our troops.

c. There is also an immediate need for some form of rifle grenade discharger that will carry the rifle grenade up to 350 yards.

d. In the supply of troops engaged in mountain warfare, many more carrying parties must be planned than under normal conditions, where wheeled vehicles may be used.

e. ~~Methods for carrying hot food to front line troops should be improved so that there is no loss of either food or heat when trays are removed and the food is carried in bulk.~~ Reports indicate that approximately one-third of the food was lost in transit.

f. Both the "K" and "C" rations were satisfactory during the period of combat. The initial issue of sterno lasted approximately one day. After that the only means of heating the "C" ration or the "K" ration or of making coffee was by breaking up the "K" ration boxes and utilizing the paper wrappings of the "K" ration cartons. The Island of Attu afforded no brush or wood that could be used for fires. Each "C" ration box should contain its proportionate share of sterno. In this connection, the sterno captured from the Japanese was in a can about the same size as our own but it seemed to afford a greater number of hours of heating.

g. In general, it is believed that the supply section of battalion and regiment did not contribute to the full extent in the necessary evacuation.

h. Although straggling was not prevalent, except in one company of the South Force, more attention should be given during training to means of preventing straggling. In this same connection the return of casualties who had been evacuated due to exposure or wounds should be carried all the way through to the organization to which they belong. In many cases, casualties were sent back to an organization engaged in a fire fight but did not reach even the vicinity of the battalion command post. They were simply told that their battalion was off in a given direction and expected to locate their organizations and rejoin them. The return of casualties was vital due to the fact that the strength of organizations had been considerably reduced. In the closing phase of the action, for example, the strength of 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry was as follows: Company "E", 30 men, Company "F",

SECRET

28 men, Company "G", 40 men, Company "H", approximately 100.

4. Finally intelligence estimates and reports should be more complete before attempting a landing on a hostile island, such as Attu. Some of the questions that might have been answered by intelligence reports are:

a. Will it be necessary for troops to operate over a considerable period of time in snow and freezing weather?

b. Are the clothes issued adequate for the climate involved?

c. Will it be necessary for troops to operate in mountainous terrain?

d. What approximate level will they have to gain and then be maintained.


e. Will the weather be extremely cold?

f. Will it be necessary to make some provision for the warming and drying of troops?

g. If mountain fighting is involved, will there be a need for substitution in clothing, weapons, and messing facilities?

h. Will it be necessary to supplement the supply lines with manpower in order to hand carry to places that cannot be reached by tractors?

5. Many of these questions were partially answered. However, it should be remembered that air photographs give little accurate information as to elevation of terrain.


WAYNE C. ZIMMERMAN,
Colonel, 17th Infantry,
COMMANDING.

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.

HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION

ROOM MB-920 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM

ITEM NO:

1560

307-INT(17)-3.9

(50788)

Hq. Rgt. 1st AGO (Plan E) Acton

2 May 43

S E C R E T

SECRET

By Authority *MS*

(Initials)

Hqrs, RIG 17

2 May 43

CO, RIG 17

Col Carroll

Field Order

No. 1

PLAN "E" (CORRECTED COPY)

Destroy all previous copies PLAN "E"

MAPS: See Intelligence Annex.

1. a. Intelligence: See Intelligence Annex, Annex #3.

b. Landing Force (Task Force 51.4) of Task Force 51 will embark and land on ATTU to capture ATTU and destroy the enemy. The following units will support RIG 17.

(1) Naval Gunfire and Army and Navy Air will support the landings and shore operations, provide protection for landing areas and neutralize or destroy known or discovered enemy installations. Naval Forces, assisted by Army and Navy Air, will screen the operation. For Plan of Naval Gunfire Support see Annex #1. For Plan of Air Support see Annex #2.

(2) RIG 32 reinforced, less BCT 32-2, awaits orders afloat in rendezvous area in Task Force Reserve.

(3) BCT 32-2 is attached to RIG 17.

(4) BCT 17-1, with detachment, Alaskan Defense Command Scouts, attached, awaits orders in Landing Force Reserve off West Arm of HOLTZ BAY. Reconnoiter Beach RED as soon after beginning of morning twilight as practicable to determine suitability of Beach RED for landing of BCT 17-1. Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Detachment, report promptly results of reconnaissance to Commanding Officer, BCT 17-1, by utilization of all available means to include small boats, visual or other signal or pyrotechnic.

(a) If reconnaissance determines that Beach RED is suitable for landing, land on D Day, H Hour, or as soon thereafter as practicable. After landing, attack, and clear the West Arm of HOLTZ BAY and secure the high ground between East Arm and West Arm HOLTZ BAY. The Provisional Battalion will support the attack by fire. Reorganize and in conjunction with troops advancing from the south, clear the East Arm of HOLTZ BAY, complete the capture of the HOLTZ BAY area and the valley to the west. The Provisional Battalion is attached to BCT 17-1 as soon as the high ground between East and West Arm HOLTZ BAY is secured.

(b) If Beach RED is determined to be unsuitable for landing, await report from Provisional Battalion as to suitability of landing on Beach SCARLET and approaches inland. If report is favorable as to Beach SCARLET and the approaches from the Beach to West Arm HOLTZ BAY proceed to and land on Beach SCARLET, and execute mission stated in (a) above. The Provisional Battalion is attached to BCT 17-1 when passed through by BCT 17-1.

(c) Be prepared on order of Commanding General Landing Force to land on Beach BLACK West Arm HOLTZ BAY and execute mission stated in (a) above.

-REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

S E C R E T SEC ARMY BY TAG/SC 273

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master*

S E C R E T

(d) If Beach RED is found not suitable for landing and if report from Provisional Battalion is unfavorable, then move to Landing Force Reserve in MASSACRE BAY Area and await orders afloat. Be prepared to execute mission assigned Landing Force Reserve under Plan A, Hq Task Force 51.4. Report departure from HOLTZ BAY area and arrival in MASSACRE BAY area to Commanding General, Landing Force.

(e) Report promptly to Landing Force Commander decision made and action taken under (a) and (b).

(5) The 2nd Bn, 78th CA (AA) Regt (less one battery) awaits orders in floating reserve. After landing it will establish aerial protection for the HOLTZ BAY area and the valley to the west, the GHELAGOT HARBOR area, and the troop concentrations in the SARANA BAY, MASSACRE BAY area.

(6) 20th Field Hospital (less 1 section) will land in accordance with schedules prepared with Commanding Officer, RIG 17, and establish medical facilities for the Landing Force in the MASSACRE BAY area. One section will land with BCT 17-1 and establish medical facilities for that battalion.

(7) A Provisional Battalion consisting of the Scout Co and the 7th Reconnaissance Troop (less 1 Plat), (Captain Willoughby commanding) land in BLIND COVE, Beach SCARLET, (seven thousand yards west of Beach RED) move into west end of valley opposite West Arm HOLTZ BAY, attack to the east towards battery position West Arm HOLTZ BAY and contain the maximum enemy force, requiring them to fight facing to the West. Assist the attack of BCT 17-1 in the West Arm the HOLTZ BAY area by fire action. Scout Co lands D Day, 0300 William Time; Reconnaissance Troop (less 1 Plat) lands as soon after daylight as they can be safely put ashore. Report to Commanding Officer, BCT 17-1 and to Landing Force Commander, suitability of BLIND COVE (Beach SCARLET) for landing of BCT 17-1 and of the pass for passage of BCT 17-1 in following the Provisional Battalion into the west end of HOLTZ BAY Valley. Report by radio at or as soon after H Hour as practicable.

(8) 7th Rcn Troop (less detachment) will land one (1) platoon from APA 6 on beach Southern extension of East Cape peninsula at BIG MIKE POINT on ALEXAI POINT (Beach RAINBOW), D Day, H Hour; cover rear of RIG 17 (-) by establishing an outpost across East Cape Peninsula facing east and west of north and south stream line east of ALEXAI POINT; reconnoiter to the west to include area between LAKE NICHOLAS and MASSACRE BAY. After accomplishment of above mission reconnoiter East Cape Peninsula to the east destroying any enemy detachments or installations found; establish OP's at vantage points to promptly transmit to Landing Force OP enemy information. This platoon will make contact and coordinate efforts with platoon, 17th Infantry, in Pass between SARANA BAY and MASSACRE BAY.

2. RIG 17, (less BCT 17-1) with BCT 32-2 attached, will land on Beaches BLUE, YELLOW and PURPLE on D Day, seize beaches, overcome resistance, and advance rapidly to capture ATTU and destroy the enemy.

a. Beaches and Objectives: See Annex #4.

b. Boundaries between BCT's in MASSACRE Valley: Center of valley until BCT's reach pass between MASSACRE and SARANA Valleys; thence northwest along west edge of Hill (2500 ft). BCT 17-2 responsible for Hill (2500 ft).

S E C R E T

- c. Beaches BLUE, YELLOW and PURPLE: Distance LD to Beach - 5,000 yds
Distance Transport Area to LD - 12,900 yds
- d. Boat Allotment Table: Annex #5 for Plans A to D applies in full for Plan E.
- e. Landing Schedules: Annex #6 for Plan E same as Plan C Variant with following exceptions: For Landing Group No. 1 substitute "As ordered" in place of "Beach GREEN". For time of landing substitute "on order of Landing Force Commander". Priorities of landing in second and subsequent trips of boats, change priorities of APA X to following:

49th FA Bn
Co E, 50th Engr Regt
Remainder BCT 32-2 combat troops
All others as boats are available

Boats as listed from APA's 2, 3, and 6 will report to APA X on 3rd trip of boats for reserve Battalion.

f. D Day and H Hour to be announced.

~~g. BCT 17-1 with one (1) platoon Cn Co and detachment Hq. Cn Co. attached, in Landing Force Reserve under control Landing Force Commander. (See para 4) 1st (4)~~

b. BCT 17-2, less one (1) platoon, Cannon Co. will land on Beach BLUE on D Day, H Hour, on a two company front and will:

- (1) Overcome enemy resistance on beach;
- (2) Advance inland rapidly in column of companies and (a) contain the enemy in CHICAGO HARBOR area, (b) assist in the capture of East Arm of HOLTZ BAY and destroy the enemy.
- (3) Immediately upon landing on beach, protect right flank of REG 17 (-) by sending a detachment consisting of one (1) rifle platoon with one (1) section, LMG's, and one (1) 60-mm mortar squad attached: (a) to seize pass between SARANA BAY and MASSACRE BAY, and (b) to seize high ground along right flank extending to northwest, between MASSACRE and SARANA Valleys. One (1) rifle squad, with one (1) LMG squad attached, of this detachment, will establish defensive position in pass (3000 yds NE of Beach BLUE) to prevent movement of enemy from SARANA BAY to MASSACRE BAY. This group will contact platoon, 7th Ron Trp, and coordinate efforts. It will advance down north side of pass to positions from which it can deliver fire on SARANA Beach and east end of LAKE NICHOLAS at ranges not to exceed 800 yards, to prevent enemy movement around east end LAKE NICHOLAS in direction of MASSACRE Valley. The detachment less one (1) rifle squad and one (1) LMG squad, will clear the ridge of enemy, seizing vantage points for artillery observation posts. It will establish OP's at vantage points to transmit enemy information to CP, BCT 17-2. It will take positions generally south of west end of LAKE NICHOLAS, prepared to fire on west end of lake and prevent enemy movement from vicinity of LAKE NICHOLAS to MASSACRE Valley. If practicable, it will assist capture of pass between MASSACRE Valley and SARANA Valley by fire on enemy installations located on west end of ridge.

S E C R E T

(4) Seize the pass between SARANA Valley and MASSACRE Valley as its first intermediate objective. Upon capture of this pass, it will send a force consisting of one (1) rifle company less one (1) rifle platoon and less one (1) section HQ's, with one (1) section RMG's, one section, 81-mm mortars and one (1) section 37-mm A/T Guns attached, to contain enemy in CHICAGO HARBOR area. This force will establish a defensive position in the best locations available, and immediately send out combat patrols to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. It will not attack the CHICAGO HARBOR installations except on order of RIG 17, but will report all enemy information to CP, BCT 17-2.

(5) Seize the pass between SARANA Valley and HOLTZ BAY area as its second intermediate objective. Upon capture of this pass it will be prepared to deliver long range fire with all weapons from the pass to support the attack of RIG 17 on East Arm of HOLTZ BAY.

(6) Prevent (a) movement or escape of enemy from HOLTZ BAY area to north or northeast, and (b) reinforcement of HOLTZ BAY garrison by enemy from CHICAGO HARBOR or SARANA Valley.

(7) After capture of HOLTZ BAY area, BCT 17-2 will reorganize and be prepared to capture the CHICAGO HARBOR area and destroy the enemy in that area.

c. BCT 17-3 will land on Beach YELLOW on D Day, 5 Hour, on a two company front and will:

(1) Overcome enemy resistance on beach;

(2) Advance inland rapidly in column of companies abreast of and to the left of BCT 17-2 and capture East Arm of HOLTZ BAY and destroy the enemy.

(3) Protect left flank of RIG 17 (-) by sending one (1) rifle platoon to seize and reconnoiter high ground between MASSACRE Valley and TELMAC BAY. This detachment will coordinate with 7th Recon Troop in blocking of pass between MASSACRE BAY and TELMAC BAY and in securing of high ground vicinity of southwest pass from MASSACRE Valley to HOLTZ BAY area.

(4) Seize the southwest pass between MASSACRE Valley and HOLTZ BAY area as its intermediate objective. Upon capture of intermediate objective, it will reorganize and be prepared, on order RIG, to launch coordinated attack through the pass, making main effort on its left, and capture East Arm HOLTZ BAY and ridge to the west.

(5) Prevent movement or escape of enemy to the west or southwest from HOLTZ BAY area.

(6) After capture of HOLTZ BAY area, reorganize and be prepared to assist BCT 17-2 in the capture of CHICAGO HARBOR area.

d. BCT 32-2, in RIG Reserve, afloat in MASSACRE BAY, will:

(1) Initially land one (1) rifle company on Beach PURPLE on D Day, 5 Hour. This company will proceed to TELMAC BAY, clearing TELMAC BAY area of enemy; proceed rapidly from TELMAC BAY to the northeast towards HOLTZ BAY, covering left flank of RIG 17 (-) in its movement to the north and assist its advance by clearing enemy installations and detachments.

-4-
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

(2) BCT 32-2 (less one rifle company) will land on Beach YELLOW, on order RIG, advance inland rapidly in column of companies, prepared to (a) assist BCT 17-2 in blocking or seizing the pass between MASSACRE Valley and SARUM Valley or (b) assist BCT 17-2 in seizing pass between HOLTZ BAY and SARUM Valley.

(3) Be prepared to assist BCT 17-3 in the capture of the pass between MASSACRE Valley and HOLTZ BAY by enveloping action to the west through the southern pass.

(4) Reorganize, upon capture of the pass between MASSACRE Valley and HOLTZ BAY, and be prepared, on order RIG, to launch a coordinated attack on the left (west) of BCT 17-3 to capture the East Arm, HOLTZ BAY, and ridge to the west, clearing the area of enemy.

(5) After capture of East Arm, HOLTZ BAY, and ridge between East and West Arms, be prepared to attack and capture West Arm HOLTZ BAY and prevent movement or escape of enemy from HOLTZ BAY area to the west or southwest.

(6) After capture HOLTZ BAY reorganize (a) prepared to take up defensive position in HOLTZ BAY area of (b) support BCT 17-2 in attack on CHICHIGOT HARBOR.

(7) Be prepared, on order RIG, to land Btry BA, 49th FA, on Beach YELLOW, prior to landing BCT.

g. 48th FA Bn (less Btrys A,B,C) will land on Beach BLUE on D Day and initiate action to establish centralized control of artillery fire as early as practicable. All artillery will revert to RIG control on order.

f. Company "K", 7th Med Bn (less detachments) will land on Beach YELLOW on order RIG Commander in accordance with landing schedules.

g. Company "K", 13th Engr Bn (less detachments) will land on Beach YELLOW on order RIG Commander in accordance with landing schedules.

h. Hq Co (less detachments), A/T Co (less detachments), Service Co (less detachments), Cn Co (less detachments), Med Det (less detachments) will land on Beach YELLOW on order RIG Commander in accordance with landing schedules.

x. (1) All BCT's will provide security for their respective Beach areas.

(2) BCT Commanders will be responsible for the all around protection and security of the BCT with particular attention to the rear. BCT Commanders will insist on a constant alert by all personnel to prevent the by-passing of camouflaged and concealed positions.

(3) All troops and supplies must be continuously protected from aerial activity of the enemy through dispersion, digging of foxholes, and use of other cover.

(4) Effort will be made to capture without damage the maximum number of Japanese barges. Captured barges will be secured where captured, and reported to CO, RIG.

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(5) All officers and men will be fully acquainted with this plan. They will be cautioned against enemy trickery including attack by supposedly wounded or disarmed enemy soldiers, from booby traps, and similar installations.

(6) Shore components of the Shore Parties aboard APA 6 and APA X will be disembarked on Beaches BLUE and YELLOW respectively, as soon as practicable after beaches have been secured.

(7) Commanding Officer, APA 6, will furnish necessary small boats and one officer in charge to enable platoon, 7th Recon Troop, to land on Beach RAINFOOT on D Day, H Hour. Officer in charge will return the boats to APA 6, or as directed by CO, REG 17.

(8) Air support will be coordinated through air support parties as outlined in ~~Lesson Plan "Air Support Parties"~~, Hq Task Force 514, dated April 30, 1943.

(9) Naval Gunfire under all phases of this plan will be coordinated by Naval Gunfire Spotters and Liaison Officers with each BCT.

(10) BCT's will report tactical situation to GP, REG 17, every hour on the hour.

(11) For Other Plans, this Operation see:

Plan A
Plan A Variant
Plan B
Plan B Variant
Plan C
Plan C Variant
Plan D

4. a. See Administrative Order, Annex #7. Paragraph 2.e.; Add Provisional Battalion.

b. APA 16 if landed at Beaches RED or SCARLET will unload to the extent necessary to support the operation. If practicable the unloading of this ship will be completed in HOLTZ BAY. However, full use of small boats to secure maximum promptness of unloading in accordance with weather and beach conditions will be made.

c. All APA's in MASSACRE BAY area will unload in that/as rapidly as possible. The unloading in MASSACRE BAY area will cease on order of Commander Task Force 51. As soon as HOLTZ BAY area is cleared, effort will be made to move all APA's to HOLTZ BAY area for completion of unloading.

d. Burials by Landing Force in not to exceed two (2) cemeteries to be located by Landing Force Commander (AC of S, G-1). One in MASSACRE BAY and one in HOLTZ BAY. CO, Provisional Battalion and CO, BCT 17-1, are authorized to establish such cemeteries as they deem necessary, if impractical to transport casualties to Landing Force Cemetery.

e. Plan of Evacuation: See Annex #8.

f. Chemical Warfare: See Annex #9.

S E C R E T

5. a. (1) See Signal Annex. Annex #10.
(2) SGI effective D Day.

b. CP's:

(1) RIG 17:

- (a) APA 8
(b) Between Beaches BLUE and YELLOW.

(2) BCT 17-1:

- (a) APA 16
(b) As directed by Landing Force Commander.

(3) BCT 17-2:

- (a) APA 3
(b) Beach BLUE
(c) Select and report locations.

(4) BCT 17-3:

- (a) APA 2
(b) Beach YELLOW
(c) Select and report locations.

(5) BCT 32-2:

- (a) APA X
(b) Beach YELLOW on order CO, RIG.
(c) Select and report locations.

c. Axis of Signal Communication: Center of MASSACRE Valley to pass between MASSACRE Valley and HOLTZ BAY.

By order of Colonel EARLE:

JOSEPH A. SCHOR
Major, 17th Infantry
S-3

OFFICIAL:

Joseph A. Schor
JOSEPH A. SCHOR
Major, 17th Infantry
S-3

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THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



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HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM

ITEM NO: 1561

307-1111(17)-0-3
(15029)
Master
Battle Rpt of
17th Inf - Artn
11 May-6 Jun 43

Hill "X" - Moore Ridge

BATTLE REPORT OF CO. "B", 17th INFANTRY
Covering following period
May 11, 1943 thru June 6, 1943

41

Battle Report: Company "B", 17th Infantry June 17, 1943
May 11, 1943.

Landed on Red Beach, 2:45 and 4:00PM from landing craft from parent ship J. F. Bell. All personnel of the Co were fully equipped with a large supply of ammunition and two days ration combat equipment. Uniform was Alaskan boots, O.D.'s. Helmets, Alaskan Field Jackets, wool gloves. Landing was unopposed. Entrance to beach was treacherous because of underlying rocks.

Disposition of Co.:

1st Platoon, mission -- protect left flank of the battalion by first sending a patrol along beach which runs along the north side of Holtz Bay, 2nd, remainder of the platoon to move along the high ground above the beach.

*66
7
94*

2-3rd and Weapons platoons and Co. Hq. to follow in column behind Co. "A" which had landed earlier in the day.

~~This disposition was made and Co. proceeded inland over swampy and rough terrain circling all the time.~~

First contact with the enemy was made by the beach patrol of 1st platoon. This patrol observed two Japs moving along the beach. Our patrol fired upon and killed these two Japs. This occurred approximately 6:30-7:00PM in the evening. We suffered no casualties.

all other records mention 4 japs

Advance of the company continued until darkness halted our advance. No further enemy contact had been made.

Co. Disposition during darkness:

Higher Hq. ordered our company to organize a defensive position for the night with a mission of protecting the left flank of the battalion. Our position was bisected by a deep gorge.

1st Platoon.--Was on left of the gorge on the high ground above the beach. The remainder of the Co. organized the high ground to the right of the gorge. 50% of Co. personnel were on the alert continuously.

Light and heavy fog thruout the whole day made observation difficult. Contact within the Co. and to higher Hq. was constant and continuous. Although men were cold and in some cases their feet were wet, morale excellent and spirit was at the best.

May 12, 1943:

Heavy fog which had settled in during the night made observation of forward terrain difficult. As the fog lifted later in the morning the terrain ahead became visible and enemy machine gun and sniper firing began. This fire was not particularly effective, but served as a harrassing agent and made specific areas definitely dangerous.

*27 JUN 1943
15-029
m...*

CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
FOR THE ARMY
14 Oct 46
DOWNGRADING OFFICER

CONFIDENTIAL

1 8598

*370.2
307 INF (7) - 0.3*

The terrain forward consisted of first in the path of the company, the deep gorge which mentioned previously bending right passed across the front of the company. This gorge formed an almost impassable obstacle for foot troops and an impossible obstacle for any type of motor vehicle. Across the gorge lay the forward slope of a series of high points forming a ridge about 800 feet in elevation. This ridge ran north and south, on north and dropped sharply to shallow valley, continued south curving east and running out into a sharp hog back paralleling the beach. Snow banks and swampy ground were characteristic of the ground surface.

Higher Hq. ordered a general advance in the form of a coordinated attack with "B" Company advancing on the left. Disposition of the Co. at this time 6:30AM was as follows.

2nd platoon on the right, 3rd platoon on the left bordering the north side of the gorge. LMG's giving support to the advance from a position in the center of the sector. Two 60mm mortars were in general support.

1st platoon plus one 60mm mortar squad was still in position south of the deep gorge and bordering the beach. It had received orders to remain in position until ordered to advance.

The advance began approximately at 8:00AM. Upon reaching the forward slope facing the gorge, both the 2nd and 3rd platoon received heavy machine gun fire from the high ridge, halting their advance and pinning

*in ditch
2nd + 3rd
withdraw.*
~~down. The first platoon received very heavy fire and convinced to hold their position. Further advance of the company ceased at this point. Enemy fire wounded two of the company messengers during this action. About 10:00AM~~

Considering the area occupied by the first platoon as a possible advance of advance to the high ground the 3rd platoon plus the 2 LMG's were ordered by the Co. Comdr. to proceed to that area and continue the advance; assisted by the 1st platoon which was already in the area. This unit arrived in position approximately 3:00PM. At this time this area became subjected to machine gun fire from undeterminable enemy positions on the high hog back and ridgeknolls. Both platoons attempted to advance, the 3rd on the left and 1st on the right, in the face of enemy fire. This attack was supported by a section of heavy machine guns plus two light machine guns. Several artillery concentrations were placed upon the suspected enemy positions. This advance was halted by the enemy fire. The 3rd platoon leader attempted a rush on the left but was wounded and several casualties occurred within the 1st and 3rd platoon at this time. Total eight wounded, two killed. Platoon leader of 3rd platoon was killed.

Several attempts were made to advance with supporting fire but constant enemy fire held up the advance.

to

After the situation became apparent ~~the~~ higher Hq. the Co. was ordered to hold its position, until "C" Co. which was making progress in its attack on the ridge and completed their attack and flanked the resistance, which held up the advance of our Co. Here the Co. remained until 6:00PM.

At 1800 May 12th "B" Co. moved to the high ground then occupied by Co. "A", relieving them and taking over their positions. The 1st platoon on the high hill fought of Ack Ack point with the 2nd platoon digging in on the point, extending left to contact Co. "C". 3rd platoon was in support

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200 yards in rear of 1st and 2nd platoons. Weapons in support. There was very little firing done by our own troops who were busy digging in. The 2nd platoon suffered two killed casualties by action of enemy patrol.

Early in the morning of May 13th the enemy commenced laying a heavy concentration of Ack Ack upon our positions; continuing most of the day until late that night. The 2nd platoon received the full fury of the concentration driving them from their positions with heavy casualties, leaving the 1st platoon of Co. "B" by itself on the high ground. Upon the reorganization of the 2nd platoon plus the remaining 3rd platoon, they were then returned to their original positions on the high ground. Sniping and machine gun fire was delivered by the enemy all day and all night with few casualties resulting. Early the next morning, May 14th, we again were subjected to a heavy concentration of Ack Ack, also received fire from snipers and machine guns. Casualties were normal during the day. Evening of May 14th Co. "C" sent one rifle platoon to reinforce our positions--arriving that night at midnight. Heavy fire was delivered by our troops with little opposition from the enemy.

A break through was reported at 3:00AM on the morning of the 15th. Mortar fire was placed on the hill upon the withdrawal of our front line troops. Upon the reorganization of the front line troops they returned to their former positions. The Co. had two men killed due to the break through. No further action took place that night.

no mention in records

Very little enemy firing took place the morning of the 15th. The 1st platoon and the 2nd and 3rd platoons were relieved by the 2nd platoon of Co. "B".

Co. "B" moved to a position directly in rear of the high ground and dug in taking advantage of the lull to rest and cook a ration. The Co. remained in this same position until 2:00AM the morning of the 16th. ?

The Co. Comdr. suffering from exposure was evacuated to the aid station during the day.

May 15, 1943:

The Bn. Comdr. at 12:30AM ordered "B" Co. to relieve Co. "C" which had in the late afternoon and evening of the 15th made a charge across the ridge and had occupied positions immediately over the ridge. This was accomplished by 4:00AM, the weather conditions and unfamiliar terrain beyond the ridge hindering a prompt relief.

This position when it became light allowed a view of the low ground in the West Arm of Holtz Bay, the enemy village and the ridge to the valley floor.

A general attack had been ordered for 6:30AM, but had been delayed because of poor visibility for supporting fires. The planned attack took place at 10:30AM. "B" Co. moving on the left and adjacent to the beach side or north side of the bay. "A" Co. on the right. Co. disposition for this attack was as follows: 1st platoon on the left and 2nd and 3rd platoons now combined moving on the right. The entire weapons platoon was in position under the ridge crest to support the advancing rifle platoon until they reached the valley floor. At this time only one officer remained with the Co. One being shell shocked on the 2nd day, 3 having become casualties by exposure and one being killed.

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This attack continued with little opposition reaching the valley floor around noon. The advance continued across the valley floor to the river on the other side where the leading platoons halted in position awaiting the arrival of the weapons platoon and Co. Hq. The Co. received high antiaircraft fire during the afternoon. This fire was not dangerous to the Co. The company effected a reorganization and was ordered to remain in this position. The Co. remained in this position during the night. The company commanders returned during the evening and resumed command.

May 16, 1943:

After a detailed reconnaissance an attack was planned. This attack was to take place in late morning but did not materialize fully until early afternoon. Co. "B" moving with two platoons forward supported by the weapons platoon, began its advance in the left portion of the Bn. sector.

The rifle platoons crossed the stream and moved up the high ground. Having proceeded about 1/3 of the way up the ridge they were pinned down by machine gun fire. "C" Co. also became pinned down while moving upon the companies right.

The terrain at this point was as follows:

Running parallel to the stream generally east and west was the high ridge forming the middle arm at Holtz Bay. High rocky cliffs came to the edge of the water near the beach. Our zone of advance crossed the mouth at the stream at the beach and up the ridge to the right of the cliffs. The enemy fire appeared to be coming from the interior portion of the middle arm and artillery layed fire on this position. This failed to silence the enemy fire. Further advance against the enemy fire being most difficult, the officer in charge began filtering his men around the cliffs in an effort to escape the enemy fire and to continue his advance to the ridge. This advance around the cliff was partially completed and advance enemy scouted the ridge above the cliffs. Finding no enemy there, they held their positions until additional men arrived around the cliffs. Again advance men scouted a second small ridge but found no enemy.

A Co. LMG had crossed the stream and was firing from a position about half way up the ridge. Telephone communication had reached this point. Having scouted the second ridge the same scouting took place on a third and much higher ridge which was found to overlook the airport installations in the east arm of Holtz Bay. No immediate enemy were visible on top of the ridge after hasty reconnaissance. The officer brought up 15-18 men to organize the hill when enemy small arms fire of heavy character began falling on the ridge. All men took cover and positions to carry on the fire fight. Ack Ack and knee mortar fire began falling on the ridge causing some casualties.

Several more men arrived on the position. After heavy enemy fire individual enemy could be seen filtering up to our position. Shortly after this the enemy rushed our position with bayonets and grenades. This rush was met by grenades and rifle fire from our position which caused their attack to fail. The fire fight continued interspersed with enemy Ack Ack fire.

One section of heavy machine guns were coming up the slope to reinforce our position. These weapons upon arrival upon suitable terrain to up positions generally below in rear from which positions they could cover our right and left flank.

The position was reinforced from time to time by additional men which had filtered around the back cliffs from the company. The enemy fire and Ack Ack continued until nightfall. One 60mm mortar reached a position immediately in rear of the ridge during the latter part of the fire fight and delivered very effective fire at close range on enemy positions beyond the hill.

During the fire fight communication reached the ridge position over which the situation was described to higher headquarters and a request for reinforcements was made. A promise of reinforcements was received. The officer in charge of the position became a casualty because of wounds, leaving the position in charge of a NCO of the company. 18 or 20 800 ft. 700 ? 1647? yes

Blood Hill was taken by midnight May 17th at which time we were relieved by one company from the 32nd Infantry. The men of Company "B" moved back into the West Arm of Holtz Bay, the men were fed chow, some blankets were gotten from S-4 and the men were bedded down. At that time what men that were able were sent back to the hill to carry the wounded. Over the difficult terrain five men were carried from the hill that night. The rest were left on the hill, blankets were taken up to the men.

May 18, 1944:

On the morning of the eighteenth, the rest of the wounded were carried from the hill. Fires were started in the morning. Mens clothing was dried. The same morning five men were sent to the hospital with frozen feet they did not know they had the night before. We were in the area for three days, at that time the company was reorganized having a total of seventy eight men and one officer. We organized into one rifle platoon and a weapons platoon, and company headquarters.

Co. "B" was then ordered from the bivouac area to North West Arm of Holtz Bay, with the mission of outposting the high ground toward Red Beach, and also the rehabilitation of the conquered Jap village.

Securing several high points of ground the outposts were placed so as to obtain the most favorable observation possible.

Communication by phone was the next phase in the plan and after several trying days of storms and bad wire, things were shaping up. During this time enemy planes paid us two visits, but no damage was done.


Then came the task of policing the area--scattered Jap equipment was collected. The area was made livable by constant cleanup. Jap equipment was put to good use in the rehabilitation of the Company.

The area occupied by "B" Co. proper had several storehouses, ammunition dumps, gas and oil dumps, etc. The ammunition and fuel were segregated and placed in a dump so as to provide security for the troops in the case of an air raid.

The first few days were spent in Jap hutments and fox holes for housing facilities, but soon gave way to American tents.

By conjunction with the outposts an interior guard was maintained in the Co. area and 50% of the company was on the alert until the island was completely secured from the Japs.

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ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 1562

107-100(32)-0-3

(16895)
Kester

2nd Inf Regt
Island of Ave

(Box 32-1, 32-2, 32-3) Regt of Action on the 11 May-2 Jun 43

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS BCT 32-3

APO #726

c/o Postmaster, Seattle, Washington

June 10, 1943

SUBJECT: Report of the Action of BCT 32-3 on the Island of Attu.

TO : Commanding General, Task Group 16.11, APO #726,
c/o Postmaster, Seattle, Washington.

1. In compliance with Memorandum dated June 4, 1943, the following synopsis of the action from May 13 to June 1 inclusive is submitted:

May 13: Acting on orders of Commander of the USS J. Franklin Bell 50% of the BCT landed on Red Beach using 8 boats from the above named ship. The Bn moved immediately to the assembly area (see overlay). The remainder of the Bn continued to unload. Harrassing ack ack fire was bursting on the beach and near our assembly area.

May 14: This Battalion attacked with Co's I and K in attacking echelon, L held in reserve and supported by M Co from L of D as shown by overlay. Objective--high ground lying between east and west arms of Holtz Bay. Progress of advance (as shown by overlay) was resisted by MG, sniper fire and ack ack fire. Length of time ashore did not permit real test of equipment brought ashore by troops. Combat intelligence was normal and a patrol was sent out during hours of darkness but found no feasible route to move against enemy left flank that could be employed by reserve company in future operations.

May 15: The 3rd Bn launched a coordinated attack at 1030, I and K Cos in the assault echelon, M Co supporting from the high ground, L Co in reserve. Objective high ground between East and West Arm of Holtz Bay. Progress of advance (see overlay). Resisted by MG, sniper and ack ack fire, which was reduced by very effective mortar and artillery concentration. Rifle troops held up by MG and rifle fire in the evening.

May 16: This Battalion was ordered at 0800 I and K in the attacking echelon with gruman fighter, artillery, MG, and mortar support. The fighter planes strafed our front line troops, caused some casualties and was very ineffective. Front lines advanced with difficulty (see overlay). L Co committed on left to seize high ground to left front. Front line still pinned down by MG and sniper fire. Many concentrations of artillery were placed on enemy emplacements, enemy withdrew before our troops reached their positions, during night attack.

CLASSIFICATION

CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Whittle, Capt AGO 14 Feb 46
REVIEWING COMMITTEE

- 1 -

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master

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May 17: This Battalion extended to occupy the high ground between the valleys of East and West Arms of Holtz Bay South as far as the Holtz Massacre Pass without resistance. Observed naval gun fire placed in East arm of Holtz Bay Valley very effective. Patrols were ordered to investigate the East Arm Valley and examine every emplacement and hut in the valley. A few Japs were killed with grenade and rifle fire. Mission accomplished late in the evening.

May 18: I Co took over K Co positions. K Co with a section of HMG's and 81 mm mortar was ordered patrol, investigate, clean out all enemy in the entire East Arm valley floor. This mission was accomplished at 1200. A patrol from the 17th Infantry of the South Force was contacted in the Massacre Holtz Pass. There was no change in position of the front line.

The shoes issued were proved unsatisfactory, they were not waterproof, men could not dry feet. Numerous casualties were being evacuated with frostbite and many men have injured feet. The necessity for hobnails in the boots was very evident. The other clothing brought ashore and available was not sufficient for protection.

May 19: One platoon with a section of light machine gun and an artillery observer departed on the mission to secure the pass between East Arm of Holtz Bay and the shore to get artillery in position. Reached high ground of the South West of Holtz Bay received fire from rifle and MG from higher ground to south. I Co ordered to relieve A Co of the 17th Inf in the Massacre Holtz Pass. MG engaged by mortars and 75 mm fire effective. Front line advanced (see overlay).

May 20: L Co receiving rifle and MG fire at 0530 from high ground south of East Arm of Holtz Bay. 81 mm mortar and 75 mm fire placed on enemy MG positions. Platoons of L Co advanced about 100 yards, but still pinned down by MG fire. More 75 mm fire placed on positions. Late in evening main body of L Co ordered to move to positions held by a platoon of L Co.

May 21: 0230 Japs attempted to smash into L Co positions; two were killed. L Co reinforced with HMG's and ordered to attack Hill No. 4 (high ground south of East Arm) at 1130 following a 20 round 81 mm mortar and 75 mm concentration. Objective taken at 1200. 75 mm and mortars were very effective. Battalion less I Co moved to Hill 4. I Co released from defending Massacre-Holtz Pass to outpost high ground between the valleys of East and West Arm of Holtz Bay. Harassing artillery fire placed on located enemy positions and routes during night. Issued boots proving more unsatisfactory and rain suits also, wearing badly, will not last with this rough wear. These items and shortage of parkas caused many casualties from exposure.

May 22: 4th Infantry contacted in pass above Hill 4 by patrol. Patrol sent around behind 4th Infantry to attempt to get to Sarana Pass but was unable to do so due to enemy action. Artillery concentration placed on known enemy positions in preparation for a night attack by K Co.

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May 23: K Co made night attack at 2400 with mission of capturing Sarana Pass. Moved low around right of Hill 4 but had little room for maneuver and received heavy MG and rifle fire; silenced 3 MG's but had to withdraw on order of Bn CO at 0215. Received several casualties. I Co relieved from outpost on Center Arm at 0630 and ordered to move to Hill 2 in preparation for an attack 0930. Attack jumped off but had to be withdrawn because of poor visibility for fire supporting weapons. Snow and fog limited visibility to 25 to 50 yards.

May 24: Wire contact gained with 2nd Bn 17th Inf and information gained that we could now move the Bn around mountain to right and get to Sarana Pass. I and K Co's plus platoon of MG and one section of mortars moved out to and arrived at Sarana Pass. Orders were issued for a coordinated attack with 2nd Bn 17th at 1755. Objective Chichagof Pass. 1830 all units held up at 1830 in the Sarana Pass. K Co received fire from rear and were forced to move right for cover of ridge. Artillery, cannon, 37 mm fire used were effective. 37 and 75 mm fire especially effective against rock emplacements.

May 25: Co's A, C and D of the 17-1 attacked to the 3rd Bn at 0910. C Co reinforced reported to Col Finn at Sarana Pass. I and K were to resume the attack at 1000. C Co was to attack across rear of I and K Co ~~from the left~~ supported by mortar, MG, 37 mm, 75 mm, cannon, and artillery. A Co 17-1 ordered to attack at 1410 to the east Chichagof Pass from Hill 2. All units held up by fire (see overlay).

May 26: 0900 I and K and C Companies directed to continue the attack but advance was impossible from their position without loss of many casualties. C and K Companies were withdrawn from the left and employed to the right of I Co and ordered to attack at 1800. A Co ordered to attack from Hill 2 toward Chichagof Pass, taken at 1945 with close fighting. Attack on Chichagof Pass resumed at 2030 and Pass was taken at 2130. I Co was ordered to thoroughly clean but all positions in the Bahai and move to a reserve position South West of Chichagof Pass.

It was learned that the rock emplacements must be destroyed before the occupants were destroyed. 37 mm and 75 mm fire was very effective for this purpose.

May 27: I Co and C Co took over the defense of the pass. C Co taking over the position occupied by 17-2. This an ordered to hold its present position until further orders.

Ack ack fire fell on position for 45 minutes without casualties to our men. It was learned that this fire was very ineffective against our personnel when they were dug in.

More pronounced deficiency was noted of the shoes and rain suits. Heavy field jacket not enough protection for trunk of body. More casualties evacuated from exposure.

May 28: This Battalion held defensive position in the Chichagof Pass awaiting orders for a coordinated attack with the South Force. Ack ack fire was placed on or near the pass for 35 minutes but no casualties were suffered. An attempt was made to place artillery fire on the Ack ack positions, but observation was poor because of the fog.

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May 29: Message received that Japs had broken through the lines of the South Force and were working toward Sarana-Holtz Pass. A platoon with a section of M attached was ordered to defend the pass, but were not attacked. I and K Companies replaced the L and C Companies in the defensive positions in the Chichagof Pass and plans were made for the coordinated attack through the valley toward Chichagof.

May 30: Preparations made for continuing the attack on order of Force Commander, but received no order awaiting South Force to straighten their lines after Jap break through.

May 31: This Battalion with attachments attacked at 1730 in a column of companies in the order L, C, and K, with M and I supporting from the high ground. Objectives to clear out valley from Chichagof Pass to Chichagof and contact 32-2 on the right and take Chichagof. Advanced to High ground overlooking Chichagof (see overlay). C Co was ordered to clear out all positions on the point between Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay, but had to be called back to secure their position before darkness and before they had completed their mission. I and A Co's were held to secure Chichagof Pass.

June 1: Attack resumed at 0800. L Co on the right, C Co on the left, and K Co in the center. The attack was directed toward the gorge on northwest side of Chichagof Harbor and the point between Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay. K Co ordered to follow L Co and make a thorough investigation of each emplacement. Chichagof taken at 1000. 102 Japs dead.

L and C Companies drawn back and consolidated defenses of harbor. K Co held in reserve. C Co reinforced moved back to Holtz Bay, by water, relieved by K Co. A Co relieved from defense of Pass, by detachment under Capt Dixon, and moved back to Holtz Bay area by land.

Even though Japs were badly wounded many times they would attempt to grenade our troops. I Co relieved from defense of pass and moved to Battalion reserve position.

2. Lessons derived from the action:

a. In the type of terrain we fought over, where natural objectives were great distances apart, it was found profitable to hold up the attack by foot troops and harass by available fire, until such times as artillery, cannons, 37 mm guns, and 81 mm mortars could place heavy preparatory fires on the enemy positions. I believe this saved us many casualties.

b. It was found that as long as the Japs could keep the Americans ducking from fire, the Jap could aim, the Jap position remained secure. But once the Jap was made to keep his head down and the American could get to his feet the attack was merely a matter of walking up the position and tossing in grenades. To make this possible requires the coordination of fires down to and including the rifleman. It is important that commanders and leaders realize this. Otherwise, troops will remain pinned down when it is not necessary.

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e. The 37 mm gun, 1 front line rifleman with tracer ammunition and a .30 cal MG form a fine team with which to knock out emplacements. The rifleman points out the target which is fired on by the 37 mm gun using H.E. Oftentimes, Japs will evacuate to a safer place and the MG does its work.

d. Every piece of ground taken must be thoroughly policed immediately. The reserve company was used by this Battalion and the motto "If it doesn't stink, stick it" proved a good one. We adopted this motto and we never had a man injured by a Jap within our lines.

e. The smokeless powder used by the Japs made it difficult to pick up a sniper's or MG position.

f. It is important that commanders be seen in the front lines. It means a lot to the men to know that men who order them into the face of enemy fire are willing to go themselves.

g. The slit trench is little protection against air burst artillery and ack ack fire. Due to the difficult digging our men were prone to be satisfied with the slit trench. Leaders must insist that better protection is fashioned.

h. Radio communication within the bn was non-existent. The SCR 536 did not work. The sound powered phone and W 130 wire proved very satisfactory. I not only had phones with each Co but front line platoons carried phones and wire in the attack. This proved invaluable in placing supporting fires and enabled me to exercise maximum control.

i. It is very difficult to destroy the pillboxes that are built in rock with a weapon smaller than a 37 mm gun. The 37 gun proved a very effective weapon for this purpose.

j. It was noted that each time, after a heavy artillery concentration was placed on a position known to be occupied by the enemy, the Jap would pull out leaving a few automatic weapons and snipers to be sacrificed to destroy as many of our men as possible. This characteristic was true except in the last action against their organized defense in the Chichagof Pass.

k. The Jap will attempt to penetrate your position at night unless your security is sufficient to prevent infiltration.

l. OP's with BC scopes, etc., should be kept concealed as well as possible when enemy has observed ack ack fire and mountain howitzer.

m. The Jap will often have prepared positions on the reverse slope of hill within hand grenade range of the crest, and as our troops move up to within a few feet of the crest, the Japs toss grenades over the crest and often follow with a bayonet charge. Our troops learned fast and defeated the Japs by throwing grenades over the crest from about 30 yards, and when the Japs charged they were shot before they could reach our troops.

3. a. I believe that all troops who are to fight the Japs should be given instruction in firing the knee mortar. We captured many of these, gave instruction in their use, and then employed them. The result was pleasing but with better and more instruction the result would have been doubled.

b. All mortar and MG corporals should be equipped with field glasses. In general, our ranges were great, and it was found that glasses were needed to pick up and place fire upon enemy targets.

c. We should have telescopic sights for our MG's and at least two per rifle squad. The Japs used them and had a definite advantage over us.

d. When fighting over this type of terrain each Bn should have a mule pack train. It is not feasible to increase the number of men used as ammunition and supply carriers to the extent necessary for efficient operation. The addition of a mule pack train would keep the fighting forces intact and still insure that the supplies and ammunition keep up with the troops.

e. Our weapons and equipment proved highly satisfactory but our clothing did not. The use of the light shoe pack, heavy Alaskan trousers,

f. Shore Party Commanders should use their MP detachments to better advantage. Rucksacks and barracks bags were looted of personal property, and officers' truck lockers were broken into and looted. We had over a dozen sets of barber tools taken which leaves us with one inferior set of Jap tools in the entire Bn.

g. The 37 mm gun proved itself invaluable but it also proved very difficult to move over the mountains. This type of terrain calls for a gun that can be broken down into pack loads but will still retain the capabilities of the present 37 mm gun.

h. All officers of company grade should be given training and experience in handling a company. We had junior lieutenants commanding 2 of our rifle companies for almost half the battle.

i. Recommend that the Bn Medical Section be increased in personnel strength to 39 men instead of the present 26 men. We found that, even though the Medical Section worked to the limit of their endurance, many casualties remained on the battlefield a great deal longer than could safely be allowed.

j. I believe that a Japanese interpreter should be assigned to each Battalion during the last weeks of the training period. He should accompany the Battalion on the ship and land with them. In this way the men become familiar with his presence and the possibility of his accidental

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injury will be decreased. In addition, he could be used more efficiently and would be of great help to the men in the Battalion; in addition to being the official interpreter.

John M. Finn
JOHN M. FINN,
Lt. Col, 32nd Infantry,
Commanding.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 13, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

- 1200 - Stopped at Massacre Bay
- 1215 - Took off for Red Beach with orders to report to the Capt. of the J. Franklin Bell for instructions.
- 1400 - Grenades being issued to all personnel, command alerted for disembarkation.
- 1800 - Air raid alarm, all army personnel below deck. Received orders from Capt. M G Govern of the A. P. A. J. Franklin Bell that they are sending 8 LCV's to Chocokoff to be used to land personnel.
Chinikof
- ~~1900 - 1st Boat left ship, C. O. & S. in 1st boat. Major Wallendorf to send troops above as boats become available.
Ashong~~
- 2030 - 1st Wave land on Red Beach. Enemy Arty fire landed on beach at irregular intervals - no casualties.
- 2215 - Major Fin reports to Col Culin at CP of 1st Bn 17th Inf ordered to bivouac troops for the night and await orders. Approx. 50% of personnel landed, sea rough, bad to discontinue disembarking all personnel landed were wet and very cold.

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HE ADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 14, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

0700 - Col. Gulin and Maj. Finn made reconnaissance of front lines with C.O. 1st Bn 17th Infantry. Shelled by Jap Mortars and Ak Ak air bursts.

1000 - Remainder of troops disembarking from ship.

1300 - Bn in assembly area. CP set up.

1340 - U.S. airplanes, ~~Gumman~~ Wildcats attack enemy on high ground North ^{AND} ~~of~~ West ^{FROM} ~~Frame~~ of Holtz Bay and in Holtz Bay Valley.

1424 - Maj. Finn issues orders for an attack at 1600. "I" Co on right with 1st Plat of Co "M" in close support. "K" Co on left with 2nd Platoon of Co "M" in close support. "L" Co to remain in assembly area until further orders. "M" Co less 2 Platoons in general support. Attack being made in conjunction with 1st Bn 17th on our left. Objective to seize high ground North & Northwest of West arm of Holtz Bay.

1600 - Attack delayed.

1630 - Attack started supported by Naval and Field Arty gunfire. Attack progressing satisfactorily enemy evacuating positions. Many destroyed.

1700 - 1900 - Heavy enemy arty and ack ack fire. Some casualties. Maj. Finn received wound in head. Remained on duty. High ground overlooking West arm of H.B. seized, defenses established. "L" Co moved up to new assembly area.

1955 - C.P. Moved up 1500 yards. Front lines dig in, hold present position. Normal outposts and patrols. C.O. ordered "L" Co. to send strong patrol around right flank to reconnerter down mountain into Holtz Bay.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 15, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

0605 - Major Finn ~~came up~~ ^{left} to front lines.

0630 - "L" Co patrol reported as to route found into Holtz Bay on the right of Bn. position.

1030 - Coordinated attack launched by 1st Bn 17th Inf and 3rd Bn 32nd Inf. Same dispositions of rifle Co's. "M" Co supporting attack from high ground overlooking West arm of Holtz Bay Valley.

1115 - "I" Co and "K" Co reach creek bottom, North side of valley floor. Jap installations cleaned out. Maj. Finn moved to valley floor.

1130 - "I" and "K" Co's. reorganized and reported situation.

1140 - "I" and "K" Co's ordered to continue the attack with ridge between arms of Holtz Bay. Bn objective. "L" Co moved up to ~~previous~~ ^{new} front line positions. Attack supported by heavy arty and mortar fire.

1200 - ~~Every~~ ^{ENEMY} arty position located and guns silenced by accurate arty and mortar fire.

1230 - 7th Scout Co. C.O. reported to Major Finn with 50 men were in bad shape, had rest. letters despatched to evacuate their casualties.

1400 - Front lines held up by enemy MG and rifle fire.

1430 - C.P. moves forward. "L" Co moved into valley with "M" Co guns put in action. "L" Co mops up creek bottom. Several Jap snipers killed, one squad of "L" Co to guard valley leading up creek.

1730 - Report to Reg. S-2 as to number of casualties.

1845 - U.S. Air attack, P-38's, on enemy in East arm of Holtz Bay and on center arm.

2100 - Arty harassing fire planned for night on center ridge.

2200 - Usual patrols and outposts for front lines. Received arty fire during entire day

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. G. T. 32-3

May 16, 1943.

0001 - 2400

- 0630 - Orders issued to resume attack at 0800 to be supported by air and arty action.
- 0805 - Air attack US by Navy Grumman fighters. Strafed and bombed our own front lines. Two of our own men wounded.
- 0905 - Air attack US P38's on center arm and East arm of Holtz Bay. Troops able to advance 400 yds with great difficulty. Reached creek by 1000.
- 1200 - Front lines still pinned down by enemy MG and rifle fire.
- 1430 - 1st Plat of "L" Co with LMG section attacked, ordered to move across valley and to occupy large nose right of pass to East arm and bring fire on enemy left flank. Lt. Coty in charge.
- 1445 - Orders issued by Major Finn to resume the attack at 1600 under cover of Arty, mortar, and MG fire. Attack coordinated with C.O. 1st Bn 17th Inf.
- 1500 - Major Finn moved to "K" Co CP.
- 1600 - Troops gain South bank of Creek bed. Unable to advance further. 17th Inf takes hill on center point.
- 1615 - Major Wallendorf wounded while moving forward.
- 1630 - Lt. Coty reports that enemy engaged along creek in valley floor. Several snipers killed in Hills to N. W. Lt Coty wounded.
- 1730 - "L" Co less 1st Plat and weapons platoon ordered to move to hill on center point occupied by 17th Inf. to mop up enemy resistance and establish outposts.
- 2000 - Orders issued for night attack by "I" and "K" Co's on center arm. Complete issue of rations and ammunition ordered for troops. "L" Co reports they are established. Arty ordered not to place fire on center arm during night.
- 2100 - Major Finn returns to Bn CP.
- 2200 - Major Finn and Major Wallendorf leave for "K" Co CP.
- 2300 - Cndrs meeting held at "K" Co CP to coordinate night attack.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 17, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

0300 - Night attack started, no resistance met.

0600 - "I" and "K" Co established and dug in on objective. Patrols sent out to make reconnaissance of remainder of center arm. "M" Co weapons ordered forward and into position.

0830 - Patrols report that no enemy occupied center ridge. "I" Co ordered to prepare to occupy defensive position on left half of Bn Zone, "K" Co to do same on right.

0900 - CP moves to West arm Holtz Bay.

~~1000 - Naval Gun Fire placed on targets in East Arm Holtz Bay Valley.~~

1200 - All Co's report they are in position.

1300 - Scouts contacted 3rd Bn 17th Inf. ~~and to cause fire.~~

1400 - Col. Culin visits front lines.

1700 - Patrols sent from "I" and "K" Co to ^{RECONNAITER} ~~reconnaiter~~ East arm Holtz Bay Valley floor.

~~2100 - Patrols report that 2 Co's were encountered and killed.~~

2300 - Major Finn ordered Lt Kashey to take a patrol from "M" Co and destroy AA guns in valley. "K" Co ordered to send 1 rifle plat with 1 sect of 30 Cal MG. Attached to block valley floor opposite Massacre Bay, Holtz Bay pass. Remainder of Co. with 1 sect. 30 Cal MG's, 1 sect. 4.2mm mortars attached, to join outpost and move to end of East Arm Holtz Bay Valley to clear valley of all enemy - move to start at 0700 May 18.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 18, 1943.

0001 - 2400

0715 - CP moved to Stream Junction at beach, Holtz Bay.

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0741 - CP set up.

1000 - Scouts being brought in by litters - majority frozen feet.

0100 - 1st Bn 32nd Hdg Co less AT Plat landed in West Arm Holtz Bay. Lt. Hensly with 1st Bn. Det to relieve 7th Scouts in pass between the two Holtz Bay valleys.

0130 - "K" Co reports that outpost in Holtz Bay valley is in place and had encountered no enemy.

0500 - ~~It's~~ Kasey reports that 7 enemy A.A. guns found and put out of action.

0600 - Major Finn and Capt Connor leave O.P. for "K" Co C.P.

0630 - "I" Co takes over "K" Co's outposts.

0700 - "K" Co less 1 rifle platoon and with 1 Sect .30 Cal MG's and 1 sect .81mm mortars attacked started movement toward Holtz Valley. Maj Finn and Capt Connor and Capt Duncan proceeded move to contact outpost.

1100 - Contact gained with patrol from 3rd Bn 17th of southern force. Wire layed to their CP.

1200 - "K" Co with attachments returns - placed in reserve behind center area. "L" Co notified to move from 1st Bn 17th Inf area to "K" Co's old position on right of Bn. zone. "I" Co to return to own area when relieved by "L" Co.

2200 - Normal outposts ^{Patrols} ordered for the night.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 19, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

- 1230 - "M" Co patrol of 8 men under Lt. Babbitt left on mission to reconnoiter shore line toward Chichagof Harbor for possibility of route for moving sizable force. Directed to move 4000 yds along beach if possible.
- 1500 - Patrol returns; reports they encountered no enemy, and that it was impossible to follow shore line without going inland over very rugged terrain for a distance of at least 1000 yards.
- 1530 - Lt. Neace with a rifle platoon Co "L", one LMG squad and F.A. fwd observer left on mission to secure pass between East arm Holtz Bay and Chichagof valley and not to move further than (866.2 - 3110.6), to contact left flank of 17th Inf. Patrol was given available parkas, white camouflage material, hob-nails for boots, and six Jap knee mortars with ammunition.
- 1600 - "I" Co alerted to relieve "K" Co, 17th Inf in Holtz Bay, Massacre Bay pass, with attached section of .81mm mortar, and platoon of "M" Co. Directed to move when ready. "K" Co Commander alerted for possible landing on Chichagof peninsula by "K" Co with one platoon .30 Cal MG's, one section .81mm mortars, and attached F.A. observer.
- 1630 - Cannon Co firing on enemy positions.
- 1600 - "L" Co less one rifle platoon and one LMG squad alerted to move over mountain.
- 2000 - Reports they are on the right of Lt. Neace's platoon.
- 2010 - "I" Co in position held by "K" Co, 17th Inf.
- 2025 - "L" Co ordered to move out, cross valley, move around to the right of Lt. Neace's platoon, over the mountain, and come in against hills 3 & 4 from above. Outfitted with hob-nails, some white camouflage clothing, and three Jap knee mortars.
- 2105 - "L" Co moves out to position ⁱⁿ to pass.
- 2110 - "K" Co moves out to outpost position - three outposts located with visiting patrols once each hour.
- 2203 - Major Finn promoted to Lt Colonel.
- 2300 - "L" Co reports they are above Hill 4, but are unable to move further because of terrain difficulties. "L" Co detachment reaches Hill 2 and draws enemy fire. Arty, 75mm Cannon, and 81mm mortar fire placed on Hills 3 & 4.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-5

May 20, 1943.

0001-2400.

SECRET

0630 - "L" Co receiving fire from Hills 3 & 4.

0830 - 3 Patrols from "I" Co off on a reconnaissance of Mts. on both sides of pass occupied. "I" Co outposted on Mt. Right front of OP.

0900 - Arty and mortars continuing fire on Hills 3 & 4.

1200 - Patrols of "I" Co return without incident.

1300 - Lt. Neace directed to attack Hill 3 under cover of Arty and mortar fire and rifle and MG fire from "L" Co on Mt. side to the right.

1500 - Hill 3 taken - 1 rifle squad of "L" Co reached Hill 4 but pinned down by heavy enemy MG and rifle fire. Ordered to withdraw as soon as possible so 75mm cannon and .81mm mortar fire could be placed there.

1630 - Squad on Hill 4 with drew - lost one man in the attack.

1700 - Supply train left for "L" Co.

2000 - "K" Co reports observing troops on Mt across valley.

2005 - "K" Co reports troops as friendly.

2200 - Main body of "L" Co ordered back to Hills 1, 2 & 3 to capture Hill 4, the following morning.

2315 - Mental case from "I" Co brought to Bn OP.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 21, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

~~SECRET~~

02 30 - Exchange of fire on knob 4 - "L" Co reports 2 Japs killed attempting to sneak into positions.

1010 - Major Wellendorf leaves OP to take charge of CP.

1030 - MG section from "M" Co left for "L" Co.

1100 - "K" Co alerted to move to Hill 4 ^{when} it is taken by "L" Co.

1200 - "L" Co, supported by cannon and .81mm mortar fire, attack and capture Hill 4.

1300 - ~~"K" Co ordered to move to hill 4 as soon as ready. Col. Finn, Capt. Connor, Capt. Duncan and party leave for Hill 4.~~

1530 - Advance party reaches Hill 4, OP established - "L" Co directed to outpost defensive position on Hills 3 & 4.

1650 - CP moved up 1000 yds.

1800 - "I" Co alerted to return to outpost center arm, when relieved by "A" Co, 32nd Inf.

~~1900 - "A" Co, 32nd Inf. takes over Hill 4 and CP.~~
2 000 - Arty fire plan made to place fire on enemy positions and routes during the night.

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HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 22, 1945.

0001 - 2400.

SECRET

0745 - 4th Inf contacted in pass above Hill 4.

0808 - Lt. Trepanier and patrol sent out behind 4th Inf over the ridge to reconnoiter route around Mt. to Sarana pass.

1125 - GP moved up 2000 yds.

1500 - Lt. Trepanier and patrol returns and has made contact with 4th Inf, reports he was unable to reach Sarana pass due to enemy action.

1615 - Enemy planes attacking destroyers in Holtz Bay, one observed over island; no action.

1700 - Continuing to place Arty and mortar fire on enemy positions east of Hills 3 & 4.

1900 - Plans made for night attack by "K" Co on enemy positions in valley East of Hills 3 & 4. "K" Co to attack in column of platoons - 1st Plat to capture position among rocks, 2nd Plat to pass thru 1st Plat and attack and capture Sarana pass, 3rd Plat and weapons plat to follow 2nd Plat and assist in capture and occupation of Sarana pass. If attack successful, "L" Co to relieve 1st Plat "K" Co and to attack up ridge to capture and occupy Chichagof pass. 1st Plat "K" Co to report to Sarana pass. "K" Co then to attack up ridge from Sarana pass to Chichagof pass to join

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B.C.T. 32-3

May 23, 1943

0001 - 2400

2400 - Attack started with 1st Platoon, "K" Co, under Lt. Garberg with wire and phone.

0030 - Lt. Garberg reports his platoon received heavy enemy rifle, MG, and mortar fire. Still working forward. No room to maneuver 2nd Platoon.

0100 - Lt. Garberg reports 3 enemy MG nests knocked out, but receiving heavy fire from his left and above him. Own casualties mounting.

0125 - Lt. Garberg ordered to withdraw his platoon.

0215 - "K" Co back in their assembly area.

0300 - "I" Co outpost relieved and "I" Co ordered to move to Hill 4. Capt. O'Donnell directed to report to O.P. on Hill 4 at once.

0910 - Attack resumed with heavy Arty preparations and Arty, Cannon, Mortar, and MG support during attack. "I" Co to attack on left towards Chickagof Pass and "K" Co on right toward Sarana Pass.

0930 - Attack failed due to heavy fog and snow limiting visibility to 25 yards.

1200 - Lt. Kretzer with 6 man patrol left O.P. to contact 4th Infantry and to deter above.

1400 - Message from Division warns that enemy planes left their base at Paramashiro, destination unknown. Company's were notified to be on the alert. Work going on as per scheduled. Lt. Edwards directed to move one 37mm gun to Hill 4.

1500 - Lt. Kretzer and party returned. Made contact with Co "F", 17th Infantry. 2nd Bn had relieved 1st Bn, 4th Inf. Their position would not permit our forces to move into Sarana Pass. Japs had been sighted and shots exchanged. Patrol in bad shape due to cold and driving snow storm. Four men fr 17th Infantry with Lt. Kretzer. All sent to Aid Station in Holtz Bay. Artillery fire throughout the night.

2200 - 37mm gun with ammunition in position between Hills 3&4.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 24, 1945.

0001-2400.

~~SECRET~~

0830 - Lt Kretzer and patrol with 4 men from 17th Inf and wire section off for Co "F" 17th Inf.

1000 - Phone contact with CO, 2nd Bn, 17th Inf. He states our forces can now move around Mt. and into Sarana pass without meeting enemy resistance.

1130 - I and K Co's alerted to move around our right flank and attempt to seize pass. One 30 cal. MG plat. and one 81 mm mortar section were attached.

1210 - I and K with M Co. det. moves out.

1630 - Force reaches pass.

Col. Finn contacts Col. Smith of the 2nd Bn, 17th Inf. Plans made for both Bns. to attack across Sarana Pass to high ground forming shank of fish hook. Two Co's of 1st Bn, 32nd Inf. under Major Keller to attack on left of 2nd Bn, 17th Inf. Plan of attack for 3rd Bn, 32nd Inf as follows:

I Co to attack along pass ridge.

K Co to attack along ridge to left of I Co.

M Co det. to support attack from high ground west of Sarana Pass.

Attack to be preceded by bombing and strafing attack by B-24's.

Attack to commence when air attack lifts.

1730 - Attack begins

1830 - All units held up by enemy fire.
Col. Culin at O.

1835 - K Co receiving fire from left rear, and forced to move to right, behind ridge for cover.

1950 - One 75 mm cannon of the Cannon Plat ordered moved up on Hill 4. Detail from 501st C.A. to aid in the movement.

2000 - Close in fighting against isolated enemy positions within 2nd Bn, 17th Inf. area. Major Keller's outfit moving slowly. Other units exchanging fire with enemy.

2100 All units ordered to hold positions and remain alert during the night.

1500 - Major Wellendorf and a patrol on a reconnaissance, killed a Ja. 1st Lt. along the eastern shore of east arm, Holtz Bay north of the zig-zag trail.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 25, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

~~SECRET~~

0300 - Co's A & C 17th Inf attached to 3rd Bn 32nd Inf. "A" Co to remain with "L" Co on Hills 3 & 4. "C" Co, 1 Plat, 30 Cal MG's "D" and 1.81 MM mortar sect., Co "D" to move around Mt. to report to Col Finn in Sarana Pass.

0730 - Col Zimmerman, CO, 17th Inf arrives at advance OP - Attack to be resumed at 1000.

0910 - C Co with D Co, 17th Inf det arrive at Sarana pass. Maj. Chandler and Capt. Johnson, 1st Bn, 17th Inf. report to Col. Finn. C Co ordered to attack across the rear of I and K Co's at 1000 and aid in cleaning up the valley. D Co det to support by fire from positions on ridge.

~~0925 - C Co 17th attacks, captures enemy position and continues on to top of hill. I and K Co's ordered to join in attack. Advance and take 1st position but held up by enemy fire from camel's hump. C Co starts attack thru Sarana pass and down valley.~~

1410 - A Co, 17th ordered to attack from Hill 3 east toward Chichagof to contact C Co.

1510 P 38's were ordered by Force Commander to fly over position, only strafing troops positively identified as Jap. Units to panel front lines. Col Zimmerman lost contact with the enemy.

~~Called for Arty fire in attempt to neutralize enemy position.~~

1630 I Co captures camel's hump with aid of one rifle plat. of Co B, 4th Inf which attacked from top of ridge on the right.

1800 - All units held up by enemy fire. Arty and mortar fire placed on enemy positions.

~~2200~~
~~2200~~ - Attack held up. Col. Culin issues following order for tomorrow's attack: A coordinated attack - I and K Co's, 32nd, and A and C Co's, 17th with Major Smith's Bn of the 17th to start at 0900.

Col. Culin also ordered vigorous patrolling during the night.

A Co, 17th withdrawn to forward slopes of Hills 1 and 2.

Col. Culin returns to Regt.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 26, 1943.

0001 2400

SARANA PASS.

0830 - Attack to start at 0900 with "L" and "K" Co's 22nd on ridge in front of "A" Co. 17th on left and "C" Co. 17th on "K's" left flank.

0845 - Attack delayed due to enemy action on right of 2nd Bn., 17th Inf.

0900 - "I" "K" & "G" Co's directed to continue advance if possible.

1000 - All Co's report the advance impossible without many casualties.

1400 - "C" Co & "K" Co with drew from positions and sent around to right of "I" Co to attack from high ground against bench, hog back and Chichagof pass. Attack to start at 1800 preceded by 30 min. Arty. concentration. "M" Co to join attack from lower valley. Mortar and MG's to support attack.

1615 - Another report from division pertaining to enemy planes leaving their base, destination unknown, usual precautions.

1715 - All units in position for attack.

1730 - Artillery fire starts for 30 minutes.

1945 - Bench and lower hogback taken. Close fighting very vicious. Examples of individual heroism numerous. "A" Co 17th contacted and moved up hogback on left of "I" Co. Col. Finn orders "A's" to reorganize under cover and prepare to assault pass. Col. Finn leaves for front lines. Orders CP and Ait station up to area below bench. "M" Co in position to support further attack.

2030 - Attack on Chichagof pass resumed with "A" Co and "I" Co attacking up hogback "K" and "C" attacking across bench. "L" Co moving up to base of bench in reserve.

2130 - Chichagof pass taken - mopping up operations proceeding. All units ordered into defensive position. "I" Co sent sq. patrol along ridge West of pass. 50% of command ordered to be alert by Col. Finn.

2300 - Defensive positions established, casualties being evacuated. OP established on bench with communication to all units.

2400 - "L" Co and Plat of "M" Co moved up in defensive position. "L" Co on left pass "G" Co 17th on right. In contact with 4th Inf on right of "C" Co 17th.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 27, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

~~SECRET~~

0700 - "L" Co to take defensive position in and West of Chichagof Pass. "C" Co 17th to relieve 2nd Bn., 17th on high ground East of pass. "A" Co 17th, "I" and "K" Co's relieved. "J" and "K" Co's to reserve below bench. "A" Co on lower end of hog-back to outpost Heltz Bay side. "M" Co ordered to install MG. in defensive position in pass and on ridge with .81MM mortars in position on bench. 1 MG Plat and 1 .81MM mortar sect. "D" Co 17th *to take position in C Co area.*

0730 - Col Culin directs that we hold defensive position until further orders.

1105 - CP moved up and installed, *to take position in "C" Co area.* Ammunition and supply dump established near CP. Col Finn requests kitchen stoves and pyramidal tents to be sent up.

1800 - Ack, Ack fire fell on CP and vicinity for approx. 45 minutes without casualties to our forces.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 28, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

SECRET

0600 - Our forces are in defensive position awaiting further orders. Very little action.

1600 - Col Gulin phoned Col Finn regarding situation in pass. Lt Beagle relieved Lt. Mann as Artillery observer, and took charge of artillery party at OP.

1800 - (Col Finn, Capt Taylor and one rifle squad from "L" Co moved out with the objective of clearing trench just below Chichagof Pass of enemy.) The Navy called to ask whether it was safe to fire on Gibson Island. Col Finn called G*3 to confirm the fact that it was safe.

2500 - Col Finn, Capt. Taylor and "L" Co rifle squad returned to OP. Had cleared trench below Pass of all enemy.

2315 - Col Finn ordered a meeting of all company commanders tomorrow at 0900 at the Pass. Ack, Ack fire on and near OP lasted for approx. 35 minutes, but no casualties.

2330 - Col Gulin phoned Col Finn on tentative plan for next days operations.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 29, 1943.

0001 - 2400

~~SECRET~~

- 0850 - Col. Finn left OP to attend meeting with company commanders. He ordered Lt. Edwards to move 37MM gun from Hill 3 into position in Chichagof Pass.
- 1025 - Lt. Downey, I Co, evacuated dug to exposure and exhaustion. Lt. Rabbit was directed to take command.
- 1200 - Col. Finn returned to OP. One platoon, Co I with LMG section ordered to outpost Saranna Pass with three outguards.
- 1250 - Message received that Japs were headed for Holtz Bay (west arm). All company's and OP alerted and directed to take security measures. Col. Finn gives following attack order toward Chichagof Harbor pending orders received from higher Hqs. Co L to advance down the left side of Chichagof Pass along ridge and find route into Chichagof Harbor. I Co to follow behind L Co. K Co to advance over pass and attack down valley. C Co 17th to be prepared to follow K Co in pass. A Co, 17th to be held in reserve initially in present position. MG platoon of M Co to go into position on ridge to the left of Pass and to support attack. 81 mortars to support attack from present positions on the bench below pass. 37MM AT and 75MM cannon to fire on targets of opportunity in support of a tttack.
- ~~1430 - I Co platoon reported in position with LMG section.~~
- 1850 - Capt Taylor reported to Hq. that MG's were in position, no activity in sector, but visibility poor.
- 1745 - Mr. Drake with Reg. line man report in at OP to aid in communication.
- 1800 - Lt Edwards reports his 37MM gun in position with 108 rounds of ammunition.
- 1810 - Col. Finn directed K Co to relieve L Co, which was ordered into reserve.
- ~~1900 - I Co ordered to relieve C Co, 17th Inf., which was ordered into reserve.~~
- 1920 - Col. Finn directs that all organizations maintain strict security precautions at all times.
- 1950 - Lt. Wineland reports position of Jap MG and 2 Ack, Ack, guns.
- 1945 - Capt Langendorf reports that Co L is in position.
- 1950 - Lt Frances reports his platoon in position in Saranna Pass.
- 1955 - Lt Boyd, called regarding 50% of command to be alerted during hours of darkness. Col. Finn issued orders to that effect. Flares were dropped intermittedly during the night.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 30, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

- 0645 - Col. Gulin call and said that Japs tried to get through Col. Zimmermans lines last night, but were driven off - 157 Japs were killed in the attempt. Col. Finn to go ahead with plans for the advance.
- 1015 - Col. Finn departed for I Co.
- 1055 - Col Gulin calls, Capt Taylor, gives position of company's for the attack.
- 1110 - Capt. Taylor departed to C Co.
- 1130 - Capt Taylor returned from C Co.
- 1235 - Col Finn returns to OP.
- 1520 - Regt. Called to notify us that the South Force was moving forward in the attack and this unit was directed to make preparations to continue the attack. Also that friendly planes were in the area prepared to support the general attack; for us to panel our front lines.
- 1525 - Col. Gulin called Co. Finn in connection with instructions as to the attack.
- 1545 - Col. Finn calls all companies, issues following: I Co let them C Co to move down the valley, C Co to move left, S Co when they are in the valley to move to the right what they have and to support with fire if possible; K Co to be prepared to move down the ridge West of D Co, and A Co to stand fast.
- 1555 - L and C Co's move up to plateau.
- 1645 - Col. Finn and party up forward.
- 1734 - Bn., moves out as planned.
- 1735 - Notified that a patrol boat moving out from East Arm Holtz Bay to patrol beach with MG and 6 men under Lt. Turner.
- 1755 - A Co moves in K Co position K Co ordered to move down valley as Bn., reserve.
- 1805 - Capt Dickson and Det. relieves A Co plat in Saranna Pass. The Plat of A Co 17th which had been detached and outposting to the right of I Co, 32nd, was released back to A Co. D Co with section Mortars supporting the Bn.
- 1807 - Major Wellendorf notified that Bn has moved out.
- 1845 - L Co cleaned out bowl below fishhook.
- 1912 - I Co in position.
- 1921 - Capt Taylor reports to Col. Gulin as to progress of attack.
- 1930 - 2nd Bn, 32nd Inf., contacted by L Co on the right, they are digging in. L Co holds up on line, C Co moves to L Co's left and flank on line.
- 1954 - Col Yates calls that there are 700 Japs loose on Island.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-5

May 30, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

SECRET

2005 - Major Wellendorf at OP.

2039 - Col Finn contacts Maj Fredricks who states they have met resistance & will hold up until next day.

2110 - D Co to join C Co on left side of creek.

2125 - Capt. Taylor reports to Regt. S 3.

2150 - C Co directed to move ^{out}peninsula and clean out all ~~jap~~ resistance, and to return to present position when finished. L Co to remain in present position.

2155 - Col. Gulin at OP.

2230 - L Co and C Co has taken left side of creek, but has stopped because of darkness.

2310 - Patrol of C Co reports of row boat leaving harbor at 2305.

2355 - Row boat incident reported to Regt. Outpost of 50% personnel kept, no activity. C Co reports of finding Mountain ~~Hut~~ ^{Hut} and tore same down.
Hut

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

May 31, 1945.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

0752 - Col Finn and Capt Taylor off for L Co.

0800 - Attack resumed.

0835 - L Co and C Co in Chichagof Harbor.

0915 - K Co ordered to go over same territory and clean up all fox holes and huts for booby traps and Japs.

1000 - Chichagof Harbor in U S hands - 1 prisoner - 102 dead Japs, no casualties for US.

1015 - L Co and U Co ordered to go out to peninsula and clean same out. C Co killed 2 Japs

1225 - Col. Culin and Staff at OP. Col. Zimmerman and Col Culin have conf. at OP, by phone.

1400 - A Co directed to move to Holtz Bay and report to Col Hartl. C Co and D Co det. ordered to board boats from peninsula and report to Col Hartl on Black beach.

1700 - Prisonery evacuated.

1900 - Col Culin departs. All personnel bedded down for the night. 50 % alert still on, usual precautions. L Co on right plus 1 plat of M Co. K Co on left plus 1 plat of M Co. J Co on plateau in support. N Co in valley in support. Patrols throughout the night on pass and on beach.

2215 - Major Wellendorf and CP group arrives at OP.

2345 - 3 Japs captured in tunnel. Questioned by S-2 through interpreter.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

June 1, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

SECRET

0730 - Camp awakened.

0900 - Col Finn issues the following orders to all company's. We will start shaving, clean our weapons, no pillaging, rehabilitation, list of shortage of equipment; disposal of trash, digging of fox holes for all men, carrying of arms and wear helmets at all times and policing of the area.

1230 - Meeting called for all Co Cnds. and Ex Off. At 1500 today at OP.

1500 - Meeting called - Col Finn stressed the 10 points sent out this AM. All cases of poor conduct on field to be reported and turned in to the Bn for trial. Meeting ended 1545.

1615 - Capt Mudry orders sick call at 0900 starting tomorrow.

1630 - Call from Regt. of approaching enemy aircraft, unit commanders taking necessary precautions.

1635 - Order issued to all company's - air observers will be posted throughout the day and every man will have a fox hole for any emergency. 50% of Personnel awake at all times still in effect. Usual night patrols and necessary precautions still in existence.

2200 Lt. Durst, Sgt. Danielson and Sgt. Gill escorted three Jap prisoners captured last night aboard YMS - 182 (Naval vessel) in Chichagof Harbor. Planned on remaining aboard for night to guard prisoners while ship remained in harbor.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

June 2, 1943.

0001 - 2400

0500 - Lt. Durst, Sgt. Danielson, and Sgt Gill returned fr aboard YMS-132 and vessel sailed out of harbor shortly thereafter.

0730 - Camp awakened. Order for rifle inspection of all companies keeping up the rehabilitation of area. ~~Men getting ill due to the celebration. Most cases being~~
Diarrhea, pronounced

0930 - Col Yates called and wants Japs 20MM guns brought down to beach and sent to Holtz Bay. Capt Taylor taking care of same.

1000 - Col Finn leaves CP for beach to meet General Buckner and Col. Culin makes a reconnaissance before arriving at CP.

1100 - Col. Finn and party arrive CP.

1130 - Col Nelson arrives at CP.

1230 - Col Culin and General Buckner leave CP to return to Holtz Bay.

1245 - Capt Mudry, Bn Doc., and Lt Kretzer -S2, evacuated to Holtz Bay. Both very ill.

1420 - Col Nelson departs.

1620 - Col Green, and staff arrives, information as to the ammunition of the enemy, and where some can be stacked.

1650 - Col Yates, and staff here, just visiting and waiting to know how things are getting along.

1705 - Col Green and staff depart.

1745 - Col Yates and staff departs.

50% alert still on, also at outposts.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 52-3

June 3, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

- 0730 - Camp awakened.
- 0825 - Col. Finn on reconnaissance tour of the area.
- 0830 - Major Wellendorf has meeting with all C.O. to secure all Jap and American guns and ammunition to be separated and placed in designated dumps. All company's have certain area to cover.
- 0955 - Regt. calls that they are going to test Jap guns at 1500 today behind the Regt. CP. All company's notified.
- 1010 - Detail of men from 50th Eng. here to blow up duds in this area. All company's notified.
- 1130 - Regt. calls that there will be testing of Jap machine guns today at 1500 in the 707th Ordnance vicinity midway on the beach of Holtz Bay. All Co's notified.
- 1200 - Lt. Falussy of 7th Med., Bn Co ^{reports in to work with} ~~is to help~~ Doc. Schwartzbard in the absence of Doc. Mudry.
- 1205 - Col. Finn returns to CP.
- ~~1210 - Col. Finn takes action in securing these~~
- 1615 - Major Wellendorf and detail of men ~~from such company starting toward the area of~~ ~~begin~~ began operations for removal of Japs dead in the area.
- 1645 - Col. Zimmerman calls Col. Finn as to how things are getting along in this area and how well we were getting along in the policing of same. Also instructs Col. Finn that he is in charge of this section of Chichagof Harbor.
- 2055 - Movie 3 calls that the 50% alert off, but listening posts and outposts will be ~~maintained in sufficient numbers as to~~ issue the security of our defense.
- 2050 - Col. Finn makes conference call to all company's commanders, relaying the above message.
- 2105 - Call from Movie 3 that there will be a meeting of all battle commanders at Division June 4, 1943, at 1400.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

June 4, 1943.

0001 - 2400

SECRET

0730 - Camp awakened.

0920 - Major Wellendorf has meeting with C.O.'s, of all companies that blankets will be aired out, also any excess Jap blankets will be turned in to the CP. Also details from all companys to continue the evacuation of dead Japs. Some men can go fishing nearby lake.

1010 - Col. Finn off for division meeting.

1705 - Capt. Taylot reports to Major Mathais that a patrol of our intelligence section encountered some Japs about 300 yards beyond the 17th Inf. outpost on the point of Cape Klebnekoff. This patrol killed 5 Japs, and had some help of the 17th Inf.

1730 - Movie calls that all Jap books, manuals, pistols, sabours, and ordnance equipment will be turned in, but men can put their names on the article stating the circumstances of obtaining possession of same. Turned in articles will be returned to them at some future date.

1855 - Col. Finn returns from Division meeting.

1920 - All Company's notified that defense will stand as usual.

2020 - Rept. calls that a meeting of censors was to be held at Massacre Bay at 1100, 6 June, and that a Jap representative would attend.

2100 - Col. Finn has meeting with all company commanders. Capt. Youens to arrange for a chaplin to be here Sunday, also to have a Bn mass Sunday. General Landrum wants all to know of the splendid work that everyone concerned had done in securing this island from the enemy and thanks them whole heartly, also the Jap attack the night of May 30, 1943, was not a suscide mission, but there was an objective behind it. All this to be relayed to the men. We all must work hard in getting the troops back in shape, by shaving, washing, and haircuts if possible. A weapon inspection every day. It does not necessarily have to be done by an officer, the non-commission officer in charge can do same. List of shortage of equipment to be turned into S4 at once. Number of sleeping bags per company to be turned into this office by 0900, June 5. General Landrum stated there was no news to our leaving or staying on the island, but we ~~did~~ have a lot of work to do here. We will have to build our own roads, installations, and holes. Also complete units will be called from time to time to build roads or unload ships. As have said before this does not mean we are going to stay here permanent. A tentative plan as to the disposal of the Bn, was given out. Plans for building huts was given to all CO's. There were some recruits from Alaska being sent in to fill out the Bn's. Policing of the Battlefield. There will be a perservation of wood, nails, and food. Col. Finn wants a recheck on the act of heroism at once. Collection of Jap equipment from the men.

2110 - Col. Finn and Col. Culin had phone conference as to condition, policing, and evocation of dead Japs. Capt. Oliver said mail would be in soon, and starting at noon tomorrow we were to draw retrions from 17th Inf., as we were part of the Southern force.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

June 4, 1943.

0001 - 2400

(Continued)

2150 - Call from Regt. that Division orders that all T.C.M. from Bn to be at Division at 1400, June 5, to fly back to Ft Ord.

2215 - Meeting ends.

2235 - 10 men from each Co to Lt O'Bannan, at 1000 A.M. June 5, at CP, to pick up all wood and place in dumps.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

June 5, 1943.

0001 - 2400.

Weather windy, raining until afternoon, cleared, but wind persisted throughout the day all details called off. Lt Anderson standing by for orders as to leaving for the states.

0730 - Breakfast.

0930 - Lt. Durst departs for meeting at division Hdq., Massacre Bay, on censorship of mail.

1300 - Dinner.

1700 - Brig General Harris and party, ADC arrived on Coast Guard cutter AP-43 on reconnaissance of AA positions. Escorted by Major Wellendorf and Capt. Taylor. Departed 1850.

1710 - Regt. sent message that all medical supplies will come from 17th Inf also evocate men through them as we are part of the Southern force.

1800 - Daily rations arrived via tractor and trailer to include 47 cartons of cigarettes and candy.

1900 - K Co reports Lt. Solot that his outpost has had enemy fire (rifle and grenade) at 1800. Col. Finn instructs Lt. Solot to take platoon out and clean up, under the command of Lt. Fouracre.

1915 - All company's and 17th Inf notified of such action as to not cause any alarm. Could not call Col. Culin at the time as wire communication was out.

1930 - Major Wellendorf calls all companys that a detail of 50 men and 1 officer, each Company to report to CP at 0900, June 6, to go up in valley for clean up, also details of today will be the same for tomorrow. Men taking 1/3 of ration.

2000 - Capt Youens calls for chaplin to try and be here tomorrow is possible. Col. Finn reports K Co incident to Col. Culin.

2030 - Major Wellendorf calls all Co's that a booty inspection will be held at 2100 to-night and everything turned in to CP at once. Names on articles to that it might be returned.

2245 - Lt. Fouracre, Co K patrol returned and reported that enemy position located in coral rock along beach on point of peninsula between Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay had been over run, with seven Japanese dead and no American Casualties. Lt. Fouracre reported having left small outpost to cover the above position. Col. Finn directed Lt. Solot, Co K, to research entire peninsula area and beach leading back to Holtz Bay, operations to begin in the morning at 0600; also to move mountain gun found at point of peninsula down to Chichagof beach.

2300 - Above incident reported to Lt Allen (G-2 section) and Major Mathias, S-3, 22nd Inf.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS B. C. T. 32-3

June 5, 1943,

(Continued)

2315 - Col. Finn contacted Movie Blue 6 (Major Nelson), regarding next days Policing operations.

2325 - Corp. Coates and 1 man of Bn intelligence returned to OP from the area that K Co encountered enemy.

Enlisted men spent most of day on repairing damage to individual shelters caused by rain, and wind during the night.

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

3516

ADVANCES MADE, POSITION OF FRONT LINES & CPs OF BCT 32-3

MIRLE F. TAYLOR
CAPT. 32ND INFANTRY
S-3

MAP - ATTU ISLAND SHEETS 5 & 6 OF 17
SCALE - 1/20,000
DATE - 11 JUNE 43

DRAWN BY - H. B. WILLIAMS
OPNS. SGT., BCT 32-3



SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 1.

0001-May 11/43
2400-May 11/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 11, 1943
M.S. Perida

MAP: Attu Island, 1/20,000.

1. Enemy

(a) "F" Co. 32nd Inf landed on Beach Yellow. Proceeded against small enemy forces in Temanac Bay area.

(b) None known in that area.

(c) "F" Co. 32nd Inf landed on Beach Yellow at 1540, proceeded to Temanac Bay, destroyed six snipers enroute and destroyed six enemy riflemen occupying a tent in Temanac Bay area. Found numerous dummy emplacements there.

(d) Enemy destroyed except for possible enemy snipers bypassed.

(e) (See Chronological Narrative Papers)

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE PAPERS

1. "F" Co. disembarked from M.S. Perida. Landed on Beach Yellow and proceeded toward Temanac Bay under Landing Force Control.
(See separate report from "F" Co.)

2. "E" and "H" Cos. disembarked from M.S. Perida and landed on Beach Yellow at 2100. Proceeded inland 400 yards and bivouaced for night.

3. Remainder of Batt Lion remained on M.S. Perida.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS "E" COMPANY
32ND INFANTRY

SECRET

June 9, 1943

SUBJECT: Company "E"'s action while in Task Force Reserve

TO : Bn CO, 2nd Bn, 32nd Infantry, ISLAND of ATTU

1. The following is a resume of the action of Co "E" on ATTU ISLAND while in Task Force Reserves:

May 11, 1943: Landed on Beach BLUE, ATTU ISLAND. Bivouac on beach.

May 12, 1943: Task Force reserve - Action in right draw, of MASSACRE Valley, between Hogback and mountains separating SARANA BAY and MASSACRE BAY; Encountering heavy machine gun fire from POINT ABLE, same fire which was firing in rear of "G" Company, 17th Infantry. Contacted "G" Company with leading elements of my company. Believed to have neutralized enemy machine guns with mortar fire. Withdrew to Hogback.

May 13, 1943: Bivouaced on Hogback

May 14-15, 1943: Rejoined 2nd Bn, 32nd Infantry, in action in MASSACRE-BAY-HOLTZ BAY Pass.

I certify that this is a true resume to the best of my belief and knowledge.

s/ HARVEY H. SEVERSON
Captain, Co "E", 32nd Infantry
Commanding

SECRET

Unit Report
No. 2.

0001-5/12/43
2400-5/12/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
5/12/43
400 yds inland Beach
Yellow

MAP: Attu Island, 1/20,000.

1. Enemy

(a) Leading elements BCT 32-2 in contact with unidentified enemy units in left arm of Massacre Valley.

(b) Enemy reserves unknown.

(c) Leading elements met with unidentified enemy snipers, M.G., and mortar fire, which comes from Massacre-Holtz Pass and from right side of valley in late afternoon.

(d) Strength unknown. Material means good, moral unknown. His knowledge of our situation limited to his observation from his C.P. is estimated to be good.

(e) Can attack our bivouac by Patrol action during night.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Papers)

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE PAPERS

1. BCT 32-2 (less 9th F.A., "F" and "H" Cos.) landed on Beach Yellow at 1930.

2. Orders received to proceed up Massacre Valley and establish contact with BCT 17-3 located on right side of valley. "E" Co. under Landing Force Control.

3. "F" co. still on Temnac Bay Mission under Landing Force Control.

4. Bn. (less "E" and "F" Cos.) proceeded up Massacre Valley in uncover approach March formation, "G" Co. leading, followed by Bn. Hq. Co. and "H" Co. Forward Observer Party from Btry "B" 49th F.A. accompanied Bn.

5. "G" Co. under enemy sniper, and machine gun fire at point approximately 1700 yards from Beach. Bn. C.P. established in gorge on right side of Valley 400 yards to rear of C.P. BCT 17-3. "G" Co. deployed on slope right side of valley, received enemy mortar fire. Remained in position until 2000 withdrawing at that time to vicinity Bn. C.P.

6. BCT 32-2 placed under control (by attachment) to RLG-17.

SECRET

SECRET

3. Administrative

1. Strength of command

- (a) 870 enlisted men, 32 Officers. 7 replacements needed.
- (b) 2 enlisted men killed, 4 wounded, 1 evacuated from exposure
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, 1 u/f
- (g) None

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

NO. 3.

0001-May 13/43
2400-May 13/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2

May 13/43

Left Arm Massacre
Valley

1. Enemy

(a) "F" and "G" Cos. abreast extending the left flank of BCT 17-3 on floor of Massacre-Holtz Pass and from right and left flanks of valley.

(b) Enemy reserves unknown.

(c) Under heavy artillery barrage on enemy positions, friendly troops advanced against enemy but were pinned down by enemy MG and mortar fire coming from undisclosed positions.

(d) Enemy strength apparently small but his positions are so well hidden that it takes time to locate them and place fire on them. His material means are apparently good, his captured positions indicate quantities of food and ammunition. Enemy morale unknown. His knowledge of our situation unknown.

(e) Enemy capable of further resistance to our advance.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. "F" Co. rejoins Bn. at 0300.

2. "F" and "G" Cos. with platoon of Heavy M.G. attached to each Co. moved at 0300 to point up Massacre Valley on line with leading Cos. BCT 17-3.

"F" Co. on left, "G" Co. on right and in contact with left Co BCT 17-3. One platoon "G" Co. in Bn. reserve.

3. Bn. attack enemy positions on Table Top Massacre Valley-Holtz Valley Pass at 0630. Moved to within 200 yards of foot of pass, came under enemy machine gun, rifle, mortar and artillery fire. "F" and "G" Cos. withdrew to original positions under cover of darkness.

4. Front lines at that time approximately 2500 yards up Massacre Valley. Bn. C.P. remained in same position.

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Strength of command

(a) 836 enlisted men, 32 Officers. 41 enlisted men replacements needed

(b) 3 enlisted men killed, 24 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 5 enlisted men exposed and evacuated. 2 enlisted men missing.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 1½ u/f.

(g) Poor

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

NO. 4.

0001-May 14/43

2400-May 14/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2

May 14/43

Left Arm Massacre
Valley

Enemy

- (a) Same as May 13/43.
 - (b) Same as May 13/43.
 - (c) Situation repeated.
 - (d) Enemy positions being slowly wiped out. Enemy changes his positions from day to day, disclose his use of alternate and supplementary emplacements and positions.
 - (e) Enemy capable of further resistance to our advance.
2. (See Chronological Narrative Report.)

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. "F" and "G" Cos. again attack enemy positions at foot of Massacre Valley-Holtz Bay Pass; "F" Co. on left. Attack supported by machine gun, mortar and artillery fire. One platoon "G" Co. gained foot of pass. "F" Co. stopped 100 yards short of pass by enemy machine gun fire from high ground on left side of Valley. Leading Cos. under enemy mortar and machine gun fire throughout day. Both "F" and "G" Cos. withdraw 200 yards from positions held during day (withdrawal made under cover of darkness).
2. Lt. Col. Nelson wounded and Maj. C.G. Fredericks assumed command of Bn.
3. "F" Co. released from control of Landing Force and joined Bn. at 1800. Remained in vicinity of Bn. C.P.

ADMINISTRATIVE

1. Strength of Command.
 - a 808 enlisted men, 31 Officers. 69 enlisted men and 1 Officers replacemet needed.
 - b 8 enlisted men killed, 12 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 1 Officer wounded and evacuated. 8 exposed and evacuated
 - c None
 - d Normal
 - e None
 - f 1 ration, 2 u/f
 - g Poor.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

NO. 5.

0001-May 15/43

2400-May 15/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2

May 15/43

Left Arm Massacre
Valley

1. Enemy

(a) Same as May 14/43.

(b) Same as May 14/43.

(c) Situation repeated.

(d) Enemy positions being slowly located and wiped out.

His main positions given heavy artillery fire. Morale believed to be suffering. His knowledge of our situation lessened by lack of access to original positions.

(e) Enemy capable of further resistance to our advance.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

~~CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT~~

1. "F" and "G" Cos. remained in position on floor of Massacre Valley, approximately 300 yards short of foot of pass leading to Holtz Valley.

2. "E" Co. sent patrols to high ground on left side of valley to reconner terrain and enemy positions. Fog and clouds obstructed vision but patrols gained top of peaks on left side of valley. One platoon Co. "E" under command of Lt. Rosenberg remained in position on peaks during night.

3. Bn. C.P. remained in same position.

4. Intermittent enemy machine gun, rifle and mortar fire placed on "F" and "G" Cos. throughout day.

5. Heavy machine guns of "H" Co. continued mission of searching pass and Table Top of Massacre Valley-Holtz Bay pass.

6. Friendly artillery fire placed on pass throughout day.

ADMINISTRATIVE

1 Strength of command.

(a) 787 Enlisted men, 30 Officers. Replacements needed 90 enlisted men, 2 Officers.

(b) 1 Officer, 13 enlisted men wounded 7 enlisted exposed and evacuated. 1 enlisted man missing

2. None

3. Normal

4. None

5. 1 action 2 u/f

6. Poor

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 6.

0001-May 16/43
2400-May 16/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 16/43
Left Arm Massacre
Valley

MAPS: Attu Island. 1/20,000.

1. Enemy

- (a) Situation same as May 15/43.
- (b) Situation same as May 15/43.
- (c) Enemy action limited to sniper fire and occasional machine gun fire.
- (d) Situation same as May 15/43.
- (e) Capable of resisting our further advance

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report.

3. Administrative

1. 79 enlisted men, 30 Officers, Replacement needed 98 enlisted men, 4 Officers.
2. 1 enlisted man wounded. 7 enlisted men and 2 Officers exposed and evacuated.
 - (b) None
 - (c) None
 - (d) Normal
 - (e) None
 - (f) 1 ration, 2 u/f
 - (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. "F" and "G" Cos. remained in position on floor of Valley. "G" Co sent patrol to right side of valley to reconnoiter high ground vicinity of Table Top. Patrol unable to proceed all way to Table Top due to enemy machine-gun fire. "E" Co sent patrol to high ground left side of valley. Lt Rosenberg remained in position with platoon on peaks on left side of vatey. Patrol under Lt Galles of "H" Co. went up high ground on left side of valley to Naval air lane which had crashed against mountainside. Destroyed all instruments and .50 cal Machine Guns. Unable to remove pilot due to badly twisted condition of cockpit.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT NO. 6, BCT 32-2, May 16/43.

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT CONT'D

SECRET

2. BCT 17-3 relieved BCT 32-2 at 2300. Capt Lemmon of Co "D" 17th Inf. took over all patrols and outposts on left side of Massacre Valley. Relief completed at 2400.
3. Orders issued for withdrawal of BCT 32-2 from front line positions to rest camp at Massacre Beach upon relief by BCT 17-3.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 7.

0001-May 17/43
2400-May 17/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 17/43
Rest Camp

MAP: Attu Island, 1/20,000

~~1. Enemy~~

- ~~(a) Units in contact-None.~~
- ~~(b) Enemy reserves-Unknown~~
- ~~(c) None~~
- ~~(d) Unknown~~
- ~~(e) None~~

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 773 enlisted men and 28 Officers
- ~~(b) 101 enlisted men and 4 Officers replacement needed.~~
- ~~(c) 25 enlisted men, 20 command crew members~~
- (d) None
- (e) Normal
- (f) None
- (g) 1 ration, 1/2 U/f
- (h) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Companies "E", "F", "G" and "H" withdrawn from front line positions at 0030 to vicinity Bn. C.P. upon relief by BCT 17-3.
2. BCT 32-2 moved from positions in Massacre Valley to rest camp at Massacre Beach, first Company arriving at 0300, last Company at 0500.
3. Day spent in rehabilitation and reorganization of all organizations BCT 32-2.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

NO. 8.

0001-May 18/43

2400-May 18/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2

May 18/43

Hog Back-Massacre

Valley

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000.

1. Enemy
 - (a) Units in contact-None.
 - (b) Enemy reserves-Unknown.
 - (c) None.
 - (d) Unknown.
 - (e) None.
2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)
3. Administrative
 - (a) Strength of command:
 1. 70 enlisted men, 28 Officers. Replacements needed 119 enlisted men, 4 Officers.
 - (b) 1 enlisted men exposed and evacuated. 17 enlisted men missing.
 - (c) None.
 - (d) Normal
 - (e) None
 - (f) 1 ration, 1 u/f.
 - (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Orders received to move from Rest Camp at Massacre Beach to Bn Bivouac Area 400 yards forward of CP RLG 17 on Hog-Back.
2. Bn. Commander and reconnaissance party attended meeting held at CP RLG 17 by Col. Zimmerman and effected coordination of plans for next days attack with C.O. BCT 17-2.
3. BCT 32-2 moved from Rest Camp to new Bivouac Area from 1300 to 1800. Bn Bivouaced for night.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 9.

0001-May 19/43
2400-May 19/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 19/43
Massacre Valley
(Right Arm)

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000.

1. Enemy

(a) In late PM "E" Co. contacted enemy on right ridge of Massacre-Sarana-Chichagof Pass.

(b) Enemy reserves unknown.

(c) At 1830 "E" Co supported by 2nd Platoon "H" Co. moved up on the right ridge between Cold Mountain and Pt. Able and by hand-to-hand combat, grenades and machine gun fire, destroyed part and caused a herd of enemy to retreat and won the objective.

(d) Enemy strength unknown. His probable means lessened by capture of his field piece and supplies. His morale unknown. His probable knowledge of our situation lessened.

(e) Enemy capable of resisting our further advance from Sarana Nose and Pt. Able.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report.)

3. Administrative

(a) Strength of command: 715 enlisted men, 28 Officers. Replacements needed: 162 enlisted men, 4 Officers.

(b) 4 enlisted men killed, 26 enlisted men wounded and evacuated. 4 exposures and evacuated. 9 missing.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 2 u/f

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. BCT 32-2 attack behind BCT 17-2 at 1000 with "F" Co. leading (one platoon machine guns from "H" Co. in close support) followed by "E" Co. and then "G" Co. "F" Co. passed through outpost line formerly held by "F" Co. 17th Inf. and continued attack to seize saddle and high ground to right of Cold Mt. "F" Co. pinned down in saddle by enemy machine gun and mortar fire.

2. "E" Co. extended line of "F" Co. to the right. Continuous efforts made throughout day to seize high ridge at base of Point Able. One platoon "H" Co. placed in close support of "E" Co.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT NO. 9. BCT 32-2, May 19/43 (Cont'd)

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

SECRET

3. At 2030 Co. "E" supported by Co "G" and machine gun fire from Co. "H" assaulted high ridge at base of Point Able and in courageous hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting seized the position.
4. "F" Co. was permitted to consolidated its position in saddle by action of "E" Co. on the right.
5. At end of days fighting front line extnded from base of Point Able across high ridge to saddle with "E" Co. on right "G" Co. in center and "F" Co. on left. Machine Guns of "H" Co. were placed on line and 81 mm tars were in debladed area to center rear of position.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 10.

0001-May 20/43
2400-May 20/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 20/43

Massacre-Sarana-
Chichagof Pass

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

- (a) "E" and "G" Cos. in contact with enemy on Pt. Able. "F" Co. in contact with enemy on Sarana Nose.
- (b) Enemy reserves unknown.
- (c) Most of day our units received fire from enemy on Pt. Able. In night action Co. "E" moved up toward Pt. Able. In night action Co. "E" moved up toward Pt. Able stormed enemy rifle and machine gun positions in hand to hand and grenades combat and secured Pt. Able thus relieving enemy fire on our right flank.
- (d) Enemy strength unknown. Day was conspicuous by absence of enemy mortar fire or small artillery. His morale unknown.
- (e) Enemy capable of hindering our further advance from the high ground on Sarana Nose.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 705 enlisted men, 28 officers. Replacement needed: 172 enlisted men, 4 officers.
- (b) 2 enlisted men killed, 5 wounded and evacuated, 2 exposed and evacuated, 1 missing.
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, 3 u/f
- (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Bn. O.P. established on forward nose of ridge between Massacre and Sarana Valleys. O.P. set up on reverse slope of same ridge.
2. Artillery fire placed on enemy positions on Sarana Nose and Sarana Valley.
3. Cos. "E", "F" placed in positions along nose of same ridge overlooking Sarana Valley.
4. Co. "G" endeavored to move up high ground against Pt. Able. Enemy mortar fire, rifle and machine gun fire placed on Co. "G" stopped their attack on Point Able 200 yards short of Peak, and Company was withdrawn at 1800.

SECRET

UN IT-REPORT NO. 10. BCT 32-2, May 20/43. Cont'd)

5. Plans were made and orders issued for "F" Co. to attack Point Able at 2330 preceded by 81 MM mortar fire. Mortar fire was placed on enemy positions from 2030 to 2330. 120 rounds being fired during this period.

6. At 2339 Co "E" moved from its position on ridge at foot of Point Able to attack Point Able. Attack was made with three platoons moving up side of Mountain, each platoon with different objective.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 11.

0001-May 21/43
2400-May 21/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
Massacre-Sarana-
Chingof Pass

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

(a) Cos. "F" and "G" in contact with enemy on Sarana Nose holding.

(b) Enemy reserve-unknown.

(c) BCT 32-2 remained in Landing Force Reserve.

(d) Unknown

(e) None

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

(a) Strength of command: 692 enlisted men, 27 officers.
Replacement needed: 187 enlisted men, 9 officers.

(b) 1 officer killed, 1 enlisted man killed, 2 wounded and evacuated. 1 exposed and evacuated. 8 enlisted men missing.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 2 u/f

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. "F" Co. continued attack against Point Able seizing enemy positions just short of peak at 0430 and capturing peak at 0530 thereby relieving pressure on Co. "C" 32nd Inf. which had been attacking Point Able for three days.

2. Co. "E" with Co. "G" mopped up enemy positions on Point Able. Co. "F" left one platoon on Point Able to maintain security and patrol and both Co. "E" and Co. "C" returned to ridge at foot of Point Able.

3. Bn. remained in position on nose between Massacre and Sarana Valleys, continuing to place machine gun, mortar and artillery fire on enemy positions on Sarana Nose.

4. Plans were made for support of BCT 17-3 on Sarana Nose the next day.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 12.

0001-May 22/43
2400-May 22/43

SECRET

BCR 32-2
May 22/43
Chichagof Valley

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

(a) "M" and "P" Cos. supported by "H" Co. M.G. fire in contact with enemy in floor of valley.

(b) Enemy reserve unknown.

(c) BCT 32-2 moved to within 300 yds of Chichagof Pass and was pinned down by enemy M.G. fire from floor of valley. Our 37 MM and artillery fire reduced enemy resistance and BCT 32-2 occupied high ground on left side of valley floor. Large numbers of the enemy were seen to be leaving toward Chichagof Harbor.

(d) Enemy strength unknown material means lessened. Enemy seems disorganized and moral judged to be low.

(e) Enemy still able to resist our further movement forward because he controls the high ground on our left flank.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

(a) 687 enlisted men, 27 officers, strength of command. Replacement needed: 190 enlisted men, 5 officers

(b) 4 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 1 exposed and evacuated, 1 missing

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 3 u.f.

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. "H" Co. assisted by machine gun and mortar fire assisted the attack of BCT 17-3 on Sar na Nose.

2. At 1100 one platoon of Co. "E" instituted a patrol to cover the floor of the valley on left of Sar na Valley and to discover and eliminate enemy positions. Patrol moved slowly under enemy rifle fire and by 1630 had advanced only few hundred yards into valley proper.

3. Platoon of "E" Co. on Point Able was replaced by platoon from 1st Bn. 4th Inf.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT NO. 12, BCT 32-2, May 22/43. Cont'd.

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

4. At 1630 Cos. "F" and "G" with platoon of heavy machine guns in close support of each Company moved from positions on left side of ridge between Massacre and Sarana Valleys to seize ridge to right of 1st Bn 4th Inf. Attack was supported by platoon of Co "E" on nose of ridge and by machine guns and mortars of Co "D" 32nd Inf. on ridge at base of Point Able. Co. "G" advanced to within 400 yards of objective on left side of valley while "F" Co. moved to within 600 yards of objective. Both Cos. were pinned down by enemy machine gun, rifle and mortar fire and dug in. Co. "F" was moved down nose of ridge toward Sarana Valley 300 yards.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 13.

0001-May 23/43
2400-May 23/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 23/43
Chichagof Valley

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

(a) BCT 32-2 in contact with enemy forces on floor of valley, our forces attacking.

(b) Enemy Reserves-unknown.

(c) BCT 32-2 attacked at 0700 advanced against little opposition to within 1000 yards of Cory Lake. Attack stopped because our left flank left exposed if advance continued. Active Patrols were maintained.

(d) Strength of enemy-unknown. His material means-unknown. The enemies have command of the high ground on the left side of Chichagof Valley. His observation should be good. His morale unknown.

(e) Enemy is capable of flanking action against the Battalion and capable of further resistance to our front.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

(a) Strength of command: 673 enlisted men, 27 officers.
Replacements needed 204 enlisted men, 5 officers.

(b) 1 enlisted man killed, 7 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 6 enlisted men exposed and evacuated.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 21/2 u/f

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. During nights of May 22-23 Cos. "F" and "G" moved forward from their positions on floor of valley and occupied positions on ridge across valley from Sarana Nose.

2. Bn. C.P. and C.P. were moved forward during day and C.P. placed in draw at base of ridge across valley from and opposite Sarana Nose. O.P. was established on forward edge of ridge.

SECRET

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

SECRET

3. Co. "G" was on left of table top with Co. "F" on the right. Co. "F" was in reserve. Heavy machine gun platoons of Co "H" were placed with front line companies and 81 MM mortars were in defiladed position 300 yards to rear of front lines. All positions were dug in and entire Bn. area consolidated. Front lines at that time were approximately 1200 yards short of Corie Lake.

4. Small patrols were operated to flanks and front but enemy machine gun fire and rifle fire made extended reconnaissance and patrolling difficult.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

NO. 14.

0001-May 24/43
2400-May 24/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 24/43
On High Ground on
Left of Valley

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000.

1. Enemy

(a) BCT 32-2 with BCT 32-1 minus "A" and "B" Cos. attached are in contact with enemy 500 yards short of Buffalo Ridge.

(b) Enemy reserve-unknown.

(c) BCT 32-2 tried a flanking movement on enemies left flank by rushing up side of valley but were repulsed by enemy automatic fire and grenades. They had to retreat and come back up behind BCT 32-1.

(d) Enemy strength estimated to be 2 companies. His material means the same. His morale unknown but appears to be poor.

(e) Enemy still capable of resisting our further advance.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

(a) Strength of command: 662 enlisted men, 26 officers. Replacements needed: 215 enlisted men 6 officers.

(b) 1 officer exposed and evacuated. 5 enlisted men wounded and evacuated. 2 enlisted men exposed and evacuated. 4 enlisted men missing.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1-ration, 2 1/2 u/f

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Bn. remained in position occupied during previous day for most of the morning.

2. Cos. "F" and "G" were moved forward at 1200 to new positions down Chichagof Valley, taking up new line about 600 yards short of Lake Corie. Heavy machine guns of Co. "H" were displaced forward and occupied small ridge to rear of front line companies prepared to deliver over-head fire.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT No. 12. BCT 32-2. May 24/43

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

SECRET

3. During afternoon friendly bombing planes bombed positions to our front. Some bombs were dropped directly on our front line positions and immediate request was made to have bombing discontinued. No casualties were suffered from bombing.
4. Action throughout the day was minor. Sun was out affording first real opportunity for men to thoroughly dry bedding and personal equipment.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT
NO. 18.

0001-May 25/43
2400-May 25/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2

May 25/43

High Ground on left
of Chichago Valley

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

- (a) Same as May 24/43.
- (b) Enemy reserve unknown.
- (c) BCT 32-2 with BCT 32-1 attached attacked enemy positions on Buffalo Ridge but were held up 500 yards short of objective by enemy fire from the high peaks to our left.
- (d) Strength of enemy estimated to be same. Enemy holds advantage in occupying high ground on our left flank. His morale unknown. His material means unknown.
- (e) Enemy capable of delivering resistance on our left flank and front.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 946 enlisted men, 34 officers. Replacements needed: 9 officers, 295 enlisted men.
- (b) 1 enlisted man killed, 5 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 3 exposed and evacuated, 2 enlisted men missing.
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, 2 u/f
- (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Bn. was ordered to send Companies up high ground to Fish Hook Mt. and to assist in securing Buffalo Ridge.
2. Companies "E" and "F" moved up high ground toward Fish Hook Mt. with Co. "F" on right. Both companies received heavy enemy machine gun fire and were unable to complete attack. Heavy machine guns of "H" Co. were placed in position to fire on enemy and under cover of this fire both "E" and "F" Cos. were withdrawn from high ground to the floor of valley. They then climbed high ground toward Fish Hook Mt. and from ridges in defilade from enemy fire established a new line on table top at foot of Fish Hook Mt.

SECRET

UNIT REPORT NO. 15. BCT 32-2. May 25/43.

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT CONT'D

3. New Bn. C.P. was established on rock ledge looking out toward Buffalo Ridge and about 800 yards from that ridge.
4. Cos "C" and "D" of 32nd Inf. were attached to BCT 32-2 at 1600.
5. Front lines were established on rock ledge 800 yards from Buffalo Ridge - "C" Co. on the left with "E" Co. on the right. Machine Guns of Cos. "D" and "H" were placed in position with front line companies. Co. "G" was to right rear of Co. "C" and Co. "F" was in Bn. Reserve 200 yards to rear of front line Cos.
6. Bn. C.P. remained in draw on floor of valley. Kitchens and aid station were located in same draw with Bn C.P.

SECRET.

UNIT REPORT
NO. 16.

0001-May 26/43
2400-May 26/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 26/43

High Ground on Left
of Chichagof Valley

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000.

1. Enemy

- (a) Same as May 25/43.
- (b) Enemy reserves-unknown.
- (c) BCT 32-2 assisted by "C" and "D" Cos. attack enemy positions on Buffalo Ridge, were pinned down by enemy fire again from front and left flank. BCT 32-2 retired to await the clearing of point 4 by BCT 4-1.

(d) Enemy strength estimated at 1 rifle company. His material means-ammunition fair. His morale poor.

~~(e) Enemy still capable of offering further resistance to our advance from our front and flanks.~~

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report).

3. Administrative.

(a) Strength of command: 936 enlisted men, 34 officers. Replacements needed: 9 officers, 305 enlisted men.

(b) 4 enlisted men wounded and evacuated. 4 enlisted men exposed and evacuated. 2 enlisted men missing.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 2 u/f

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Patrols from front line companies were sent to front and to left flank in effort to locate and destroy enemy positions. Patrols were unable to advance into open terrain between rock ledge and Buffalo nose due to heavy enemy fire including machine gun, rifle and mortar fire coming from positions on Buffalo Ridge and from positions on Points three and four.

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CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT CONT'D

2. Bn. was ordered to attack Buffalo Ridge at 1800, but later orders changed time of attack to 2330. At that time Cos. "G" and "E" with Co. "F" in reserve (Co. "G" on left) made night attack against Buffalo Ridge. Attack moved to within 150 yards of that point when both attacking companies were placed under heavy machine gun fire from flanks and rear and were forced to withdraw during night.

3. Bn. C.P. was moved from draw in valley to vicinity of reserve company 200 yards to rear of front line companies. Kitchens, ammunition dump and aid station remained on floor of valley. Late in afternoon one half of aid station was moved up to vicinity of C.P., the other half of aid station remaining on floor of valley to assist in evacuation from base of hills to collecting company which had been pulled back to vicinity of Jap village in draws at base of Cold Mt.

4. During night attack "F" Co. endeavored to secure enemy positions on left of Bn (Points 3 and 4) but enemy fire from their left flank forced them to pull back without gaining high ground of Point 4.

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UNIT REPORT
NO. 18.

0001-May 27/43
2400-May 27/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 27/43
Buffalo Ridge

MAP: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

- (a) Same as May 26/43.
- (b) Enemy reserves-unknown
- (c) In night attack BCT 32-2 was turned back in attack on Buffalo Ridge at 1630 by enemy rifle and M.G. fire from both right and left flanks. At 1930 BCT 32-2 again attacked enemy positions on Buffalo Ridge and were successful, driving enemy from all high ground.
- (d) Enemy strength on ridge-none. His strength in Chichagof-unknown. His material means apparently lessened by continuous artillery fire. His morale-poor.
- (e) Enemy not able to counter attack in daylight, but able to infiltrate during hours of darkness. He is still able to offer some resistance to our advance to front.

2. (See Chronological Narrative report)

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 922 enlisted men, 34 officers. Replacements needed: 9 officers, 319 enlisted men.
- (b) 2 enlisted men killed. 7 enlisted men wounded and evacuated. 3enlisted men exposed and evacuated. 2 enlisted men missing.
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, 2 u/f.
- (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. During course of the day Buffalo Ridge was subjected to heavy artillery and mortar fire. Heavy Machine Guns of "D" and "H" Cos. searched Buffalo Ridge for enemy positions.
2. 1st Bn. 4th Inf. was meanwhile clearing Points 3 and 4 of enemy automatic weapons and rifleman.

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UNIT REPORT NO. 17. BCT 32-2. May 27/43

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

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3. At 1800 the Bn. attack with Co "F" on the right and Co "C" on the left. Co. "G" followed Co. "C" across the rock ledge marking line of departure and was to extend the left of Co. "C" and protect left flank of the Bn. They were also to establish contact with the 4th Inf. on our left. Co. "F" was able to advance to within 300 yards of Buffalo Ridge when enemy machine gun fire pinned them down. They were able to consolidate their position and remained in place. Cos. "C" and "G" advanced 200 yards from line of departure when they came under heavy automatic weapons fire and rifle fire from Point 4. They were unable to consolidate positions and "G" Co. was forced to withdraw to rock ledge. "C" Co. gained a foothold on ledge 200 yards short of Buffalo Ridge.

4. Cos. "F" and "C" remained in position short of Buffalo Ridge during night of May 27-28 maintaining contact between companies and Co "C" made contact with 1st Bn. 4th Inf. on its left.

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UNIT REPORT
NO. 18.

0001-May 28/43
2400-May 28/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 28/43
Buffalo Ridge

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

- (a) BCT 32-2 plus "G" and "D" Cos. occupy high ground on Buffalo Ridge overlooking enemy positions in Chichagof Harbor area.
- (b) Enemy reserves unknown.
- (c) At 0430 an enemy patrol of 21, armed, some with bayonets mounted on sticks, and balance with rifles attack "H" Co. C.P. Enemy patrol was destroyed. Our right flank was exposed to enemy action but no attack occurred. BCT 32-2 rested balance of day.
- (d) Enemy strength unknown.
- (e) Enemy still able to bring infiltrating patrols through our lines.

Necessary precautions taken.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 888 enlisted men, 33 officers. Replacements needed: 10 officers, 555 enlisted men.
- (b) 1 officer killed, 4 enlisted men killed, 16 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 4 exposed and evacuated, 10 enlisted men missing.
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, 2 u/f
- (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. During day further a tillery and mortar concentrations were placed on Buffalo Ridge and orders were issued to Co. "C" and Co. "F" for attack on Buffalo Ridge.
2. At 1830 Cos. "C" and "F" on the right assaulted Buffalo Ridge and seized their objective. Co. "G" was sent in to fill the gap between Cos. "C" and "F" and Co. "E" was sent to right flank to extend the right of Co. "F" and protect the Bn. from attack up side of Mt. from the valley floor.
3. The heavy machine guns of both "D" and "H" Cos. were moved up to Buffalo Ridge to cover ridge to front and to flanks. 81 MM mortars were placed in draws to rear of Buffalo Ridge.
4. Bn. O.P. was moved up ridge at base of Point 4 while C.P. was moved forward of rock ledge on Fish Hook Mt. and short of Buffalo Ridge about 300 yards.

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UNIT REPORT
NO. 19.

0001-May 29/43
2400-May 29/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 29/43
800 yards short of
Chichagof Harbor

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

- (a) Same as May 28/43.
- (b) Enemy reserves-unknown.
- (c) At 1630 BCT 32-2 attacked into Chichagof Valley encountered only slight enemy action. Action confined to mopping up.
- (d) Enemy reserves-None known.
- (e) Enemy able only feebly to counter attack our positions. Observed unarmed enemy trying to escape around point towards Sarana Bay.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report).

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 798 enlisted men, 32 officers. Replacements needed: 445 enlisted men, 11 officers.
- (b) 1 officer killed, 45 enlisted men killed, 40 enlisted men wounded and evacuated, 6 enlisted men exposed and evacuated, 1 enlisted men missing.
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, 2½ u/f.
- (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Enemy counter-attack reached C.P. of Co. "H" at about 0530. In hand to hand fighting 21 enemy were killed. No further enemy involved in counter-attack were remaining in area of BCT 32-2.
2. Platoon of Co. "E" assisted by patrol from Co. "C" cleared enemy from Buffalo Nose and completed capture of entire Buffalo Ridge and Nose.
3. Cos. "C" and "F" each sent patrols forward from Buffalo Ridge down into draws near lakes on Chichagof Valley hogback. Patrols were unable to advance from center of ridge or on right of Buffalo Nose due to sniper fire.
4. Bn. Kitchens still located in draw at left side of Sarana Valley were destroyed by enemy action during counter-attack.
5. Bn. Anti-tank guns under control of 17th Inf. near Sarana nose were damaged in enemy counter-attack.
6. Machine guns operated from high ground in vicinity of Bn. C.P. were able to fire on groups of isolated enemy near Lake Corie and were effective in destroying numerous small groups.

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UNIT REPORT
NO. 29.

0001-May 30/43
2400-M ay, 30/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 30/43
Chichagof Valley
(Vicinity of Cories Lake)

MAPS: Attu I sland, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

(a) BCT 32-2 plus "G" and "D" Cos in contact with few enemy snipers in Chichogof Harbor area.

(b) No enemy reserves known.

(c) At 0800 BCT 32-2 moved into Harbor area encountered only slight enemy resistance. Action was one of mopping up.

(d) None

(e) Enemy unable to offer any coordinated resistance.

2. (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

(a) 789 enlisted men, 32 officers—strength of command. Replacement needed 452 enlisted men, 11 officers.

(b) 1 enlisted man killed, 7 enlisted men wounded, 1 enlisted man missing.

(c) None

(d) Normal

(e) None

(f) 1 ration, 1½ u/f

(g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. At 1630 attack was launched from Buffalo Ridge "F" Co. on right and "C" Co. on left with mission of pushing into Chichagof Harbor Area. "E" Co. followed "C" Co. and extended their left. Little enemy resistance was met until line was established approximately across the nose of Chichagof Valley Hogback when enemy automatic and rifle fire slowed up attack of "F" Co. on right.

2. Contact was made at with BCT 32-3 at 2030. BCT 32-3 had come down Fish Hook valley and extended line of BCT 32-2 to high ground on left of Chichagof Harbor. Contact was also made with BCT 17-3 on right. Positions were dug in for night and plans made for movement against Chichagof Harbor next day. Front Lines were approximately 400 yards from Beach.

3. Bn C.P. was moved forward to high ground on left flank overlooking Harbor Bn. C.P. was moved to vicinity of small lake at foot of Buffalo Nose

4. Heavy machine guns and 81MM Mortars of both "D" and "H" Cos. were moved forward during attack; machine guns were emplaced with front line Cos. and mortars were in defilade approximately 300 yards to rear of front lines.

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UNIT REPORT
NO. 2.

0001-May 31/43
2400-May 31/43

SECRET

BCT 32-2
May 31/43
Saddle between Cold Mt.
and Pt Able.

MAPS: Attu Island, 1/20,000

1. Enemy

- (a) None
- (b) Unknown
- (c) None
- (d) Unknown
- (e) Attacks by small uncoordinated bands of enemy expected during hours of darkness and early morning areas.

2 (See Chronological Narrative Report)

3. Administrative

- (a) Strength of command: 783 enlisted men, 32 Officers. Replacements needed: 458 enlisted men, 11 officers
- (b) 2 enlisted men killed, 4 enlisted men wounded and evacuated
- (c) None
- (d) Normal
- (e) None
- (f) 1 ration, lu/f
- (g) Poor

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE REPORT

1. Bn. made a coordinated attack at 0800 with mission of securing Chichagof Harbor and Beach. Co. "F" on the right, Co. "C" in center and Co. "E" on the left. Co. "G" was in reserve. Little enemy resistance was encountered and by 1000 Bn. was at waters edge. BCT 32-3 cleared canyon on left of harbor assisted by one platoon from Co. E.
2. Liaison was established with both flanks.
3. At approximately 1800 orders were received to move Bn. from its present location back to first high ground north of Lake Corie and to go into Landing Force Reserve.
4. Companies moved from Chichagof Harbor area starting at 1330 and Bn. was in new position at 2030.

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NARRATIVE REPORT
OF OWN SITUATION

6/1/43

1. Bn. moved from positions north of Lake Corie to new positions as follows:

- a. "F" Co. with one platoon machine guns and one section 81 mm Mortars from Co. "H" to Hog Back between Massacre Valley and Point Able.
- b. "G" Co. to ~~front of~~ Sarana Valley at foot of ridge between Sarana and Massacre Valleys.
- c. Cos. "C" and "D" to top of ridge between Point Able and Cold Mtn.
- d. Co. "B" was on Sarana Nose with outposts on Sarana Peak, Cold Mtn and Point Able.
- f. CO. "E" was on left of ridge between Massacre and Sarana Valleys.
- g. Bn. Hq. Co. and rest of Co. "H" was placed on Massacre Valley side of same ridge.

2. Mission of Bn. was to secure Massacre Valley Hogback in vicinity of "F" Co. - to secure line from Cold Mtn to Point Able to Sarana Peak.

3. Mission was accomplished by use of patrols, listening posts and outposts.

b. LESSONS DERIVED FROM THE ACTION

(1) American soldiers for an operation of this nature should be imbued with the value of employing sniper fire.

(2) Any advance of units on valley floors was utterly useless without first having cleared the enemy from all of his strong points on the high ground in immediate vicinity.

(3) Patrols of approximately one platoon should have been more freely employed initially along ridges to reduce enemy strong points prior to attempting movement of larger bodies of troops along low ground.

c. RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Training

a. In training troops for combat more emphasis should be placed on having men advance in attack problems closely supported by actual artillery fire. Failure to advance in conjunction with artillery fire during this operation was probably due to inexperience and greatly reduced value of the artillery fire.

(2) Planning

a. Greater superiority of strength is necessary for an operation of this nature especially for if troops are not accustomed to the climate. This would have permitted the effecting of more frequent reliefs and greatly lessened our losses due to exposure.

b. Trained mountain troops should be employed in similar terrain to that encountered.

(3) Equipment

a. More durable waterproof clothing than was issued is required.

b. High quality mittens with trigger fingers should be issued.

c. Sleeping bags with more durable waterproof outer covering would be of greater value. Better means of hand carrying such bags should be provided, or proper provisions made for attaching them to the pack. Every effort should be made to have them with the troops every night.

Charles G. Fredericks
Charles G. Fredericks,
Major-2nd Infantry.

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HEADQUARTERS BCT 32-1

In compliance with unnumbered memorandum, Headquarters Task Group 16.11, A.P.O. # 726, dated June 4, 1943, the following report of BCT 32-1 less Companies "A" and "B" is submitted.

May 13, 1943. 1st Bn. Hq and Hq Co., "C" and "D" companies debarked from USS Grant at 1500, landed at beach yellow and moved 2000 yards inland along log road to bivouac east of Division C.P. Remained in position there as Landing Force reserve. Patrolled North and south extremities of bivouac area and division C.P. and East and West valleys of Massacre Valley. One platoon of "C" Co. sent to high ground on West side of West Massacre valley to comb ground to the beach. Encountered only one sniper. Platoons remained on high ground on West side of beach under Landing Force control with mission of protecting that flank of Beach. No other resistance encountered. Remained on mission of protecting Division C.P. area and Landing Force reserve during 24 hours. Combat Intelligence employed consisted of Bn O.P.'s and patrols.

~~May 14, 1943. Patrols remained in bivouac area. No resistance encountered but heavy weapons were fired on few targets on high ground on East side of Massacre valley during daylight. Mission unchanged. No supporting fires. Combat Intelligence as previous day with enemy positions undetermined, strength discovered on Point "A". 2 patrols of 12 men sent into west and east valleys of Massacre at 2330 to locate reported enemy platoon in the rear area in the right Massacre Valley. No resistance.~~

May 15, 1943. Dispositions and mission of Bn. unchanged. No enemy resistance. Continued patrols of Massacre area. Combat intelligence employed same as previous day. Orders received from Landing Force Headquarters to attack Pt. "A" with one rifle company supported by heavy weapons and secure the high ground on East side of Massacre Valley.

May 16, 1943. "C" Co less one rifle platoon advanced from Bn area at 0600 to attack Pt. "A". "D" Co from position on high ground in center of Massacre Valley supported the attack with 2 platoons heavy machine guns and one platoon mortars. Advance of "C" Co continued against scattered sniper fire to line 500 yards from objective. Coordinated attack by "C" Company on objective made at 1100 against heavy machine gun, mortar, and rifle fire. Advance continued to about 100 yards from base of objective where "C" Co. was pinned down by fire and unable to advance. Maneuver of platoon around left flank was stopped by fire. Effectiveness of supporting fires very poor due to lack of visibility due to dense fog. Attack continued to 1600 when "C" Co. was ordered withdraw to base of hill return to original position. Casualties 1 officer killed, 4 enlisted men killed, and 21 enlisted men wounded. Mission not accomplished. Reverted to original mission of protecting Division Area and patrol activity.

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May 17, 1943. Remained in bivouac landing force reserve. Bn. Hq. and Hq. Co. less Med. Det., A.T. Plt., Chaplain, and Executive Officer were ordered to Holtz Bay to join North force. Left at 0830. 1st Bn. Executive Officer remained in command "C" and "D" Companies. Disposition "C" and "D" Cos unchanged. Patrols both sides Massacre Valley remained active by no enemy resistance encountered. Source of intelligence patrols and Bn. O.P. vicinity BCT 17-2 O.P.

May 17, 1943. Action of Hq. and Hq. Co BCT 32-1, 0800 1200, May 17, 1943. Bn. Hq. and Hq. Co less Bn. Executive Officer, Medical Detachment, A.T. Platoon, Chaplain, and motor vehicle operators ordered to proceed to Holtz Bay on the destroyer Kane and report to Colonel Frank L. Culin Jr. and assume the staff, supply and communication duties for that headquarters. This movement began at 0800. All personnel were aboard the Kane at 1430. The Kane departed Massacre Bay at 1700 and arrived at Holtz Bay at about 2030. Troops disembarked at Black Beach immediately and assumed the duties specified above.

Ernest H. Bearss

ERNEST H. BEARSS
Major, 32nd Inf.
Commanding

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b/ Lessons derived from the action.

- (1) Reference to attack of point "A" by 1st Bn., 32nd Inf. less companies A & B one lesson in particular was learned regarding withdrawal of troops from action. That being to avoid, if at all possible, withdrawing troops at a time when the action extends from darkness into daylight or at a place where the action extends from fog into a clear area. As in this case Co C had progressed to a position inside the dense fog of the hill top where the enemy position was also enshrouded in fog. At that time all supporting fires from heavy mortars, heavy machine guns, A.T. guns, Cannon Company weapons, and artillery were forced to cease fire for lack of observation. The enemy had better observation being in the fog looking out and had better knowledge of the terrain and thereby could inflict casualties on us without receiving accurate return fire. Because the C.O. Co. C had lost control within the fog he was ordered to withdraw to the edge of the fog bank to regain it the belief being his numerical superiority would enable him protection during this action. As the men from C Co moved toward the edge of the fog bank the enemy followed and gained an advantage in observation which enabled them to direct fire on the men of Co. C and also mortar fire on the supporting weapons on the hog back in the valley and caused the complete withdrawal of Co C from point "A".

c. Recommendations with particular reference to training and planning stages, organization, weapons, ammunition, equipment, supply and evacuation.

1. Waterproof shoes of similar type now issued.
2. Rain trousers of more durable material plus a parka instead of complete rainsuit.
3. Water repellent trousers (lined).
4. A short period of time at a staging area (3 days) close to point of initiating combat to put troops in better physical conditions after long water voyage.
5. A weapon of knee mortar characteristics or use of old rifle grenade to fill in gap between our hand grenade and 60 mm mortar.
6. Realistic combat training with overhead firing of small arms and using artillery in such training to fire close support missions close to our Infantry troops.
7. Closer supervision of beach by M.P.'s to prevent indiscriminate ransacking of individual and organizational equipment.
8. A larger A. & P. platoon for each Battalion in operations of this kind.
9. Tractors with a wider track and sleds to be used as well as trailers for supply.

Ernest H. Beards

ERNEST H. BEARDS
Lt. Col., 32nd Inf.
Commanding

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COMPANY "A" THIRTY SECOND INFANTRY

Attu Island
June 14, 1943

SUBJECT: Battle Report.

TO : Commanding General, Task Group 16.11.

1. Company "A" 32d Infantry sailed from San Francisco April 15, 1943 on the Richard March Hoe. May 19 the Company was transferred to the President Fillmore while resting at anchor in Adak Harbor. A landing upon the Yellow Beach on Attu was made about noon May 21. Immediately after landing the Company was ordered to relieve Company "I" 32d Infantry which was then defending the Holtz-Massacre Pass. The relief was completed at 1800 the same date.

2. The following disposition was made of the Company: 2 rifle platoons (1st & 2nd) and the weapons platoon were maintained on the high ground overlooking the Holtz Valley, 1 rifle platoon (3rd) was detached to outpost Earl Pass. Outposts of 1 squad and 8 men respectively were maintained at the foot of Black Mt. and in the saddle south of the main Company position.

3. In addition to the defense of the Pass the mission of the Company included certain day and night patrol missions. Contact was maintained with the forces in Holtz Bay and with an outpost of the 37th Inf. near the pass to Temnac Bay. Daily reconnaissance patrols operated in both East and West Holtz valleys, towards the blind canyon in the upper reaches of the Holtz Creek, and along the ridges which extend generally east and west on either side of Earl Pass.

4. The only enemy action encountered was with Jap snipers moving singly or in pairs along the ridges on the north side of Earl Pass. Patrols did not succeed in closing with any of these, and after May 26 observed no more of them. No casualties resulted from sniper fire.

5. The Company was relieved of its separate mission and rejoined the 1st Bn. at 0600 June 10.

7. Little opportunity was given to test the efficiency of the equipment as issued. During cold wet weather the boots and clothing were not entirely satisfactory.

8. Inasmuch as the Company saw no action the most significant lessons learned were in patrolling methods and in the art of living in the field under adverse climatic conditions.

Harry W. Kingham
HARRY W. KINGHAM
Capt., 32nd Inf.
Commanding

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HEADQUARTERS COMPANY "B"

BCT 32-1

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In compliance with unnumbered memorandum, Headquarters Task Group 16, III, A.F.O. # 726, dated June 4, 1943, the following report of Company B, BCT 32-1 is submitted.

May 22, 1943. Landed on Massacre Bay, Attu Island from SS President Fillmore at 1230. Company strength: 185 E.M. and 5 Officers. Moved into bivouac area 1500 yds. north of beach and 400 east of Landing Force Base. Company constituted a part of the Landing Force Reserve. No enemy action.

May 23, 1943. Disposition remained the same, no enemy action.

May 24, 1943. Established an outpost, consisting of one rifle squad and one L.M.G. squad, on Cold Mt. Mission to protect high ground from being taken by enemy and to observe for enemy action. Patrols consisting of 3 men were sent out 4 times daily along ridge to point 2000 yds. north of Cold Mt. peak. Another outpost consisting of 2 rifle squads, 1

L.M.G. squad and a 60mm mortar squad was sent to outpost Point Able. They had the same mission as the one on Cold Mt. A patrol was sent out every three hours to contact a listening post of 3 men that was established about 800 yds. south of Point Able. The remainder of the company moved to a position 200 yds. west of ridge between Point Able and Cold Mountain, remaining in Landing Force Reserve. No enemy action.

May 25, 1943. Disposition of Company remained the same. No enemy action.

May 26, 1943. Disposition of Company remained the same. No enemy action.

May 27, 1943. Outpost on Pt. Able remained the same, 1 L.M.G. squad was withdrawn from Cold Mt. to rejoin the company. The company less detachments attached to BCT 17-3 at about 1500, moved to a position 200 yds. north of base of Sarana Nose and remained in reserve position of BCT 17-3. No enemy action.

May 28, 1943. Orders received from BCT 17-3 at 1830, to move from reserve position, move through the position held by I Company, 17th Inf. The company was to move toward the east over the low ground remaining on the left of Lake Cories about 1500 yds from Line of Departure. The Mission was to seize the high ground at the east end of Lake Cories about 1500 yards from Line of departure. Artillery fire was promised. The company moved from the Line of departure in the formation -- 1st Platoon in advance, supported by fire from weapons platoon less detachments, with the 3rd platoon in support. After moving forward about 300 yds. the 1st platoon was held up by rifle and automatic weapons fire from the high ground to the left. The 3rd platoon was committed and given the mission of clearing the enemy position of high ground and advancing on the left of the 1st platoon until company objective

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would be obtained. The 3rd platoon cleared out enemy position and both 3rd and 1st platoons moved forward abreast. At 2300 the company has secured a ridge extending left from approximately midway the length of Lake Cories and was held up at this position by heavy enemy fire coming from the ridge to the south 400 yards to the left. Darkness was rapidly approaching and the platoons instructed to dig in and to send out 2 small patrols each with a mission of locating enemy positions on high ground to the left. One of the patrols was to go forward 300 yards. Company was about 400 yards from final objective when darkness fell. Casualties - 1 officer wounded, 2 E.M. killed, 4 E.M. wounded.

May 29, 1943. At 0030 orders were received from C.O. BCT 17-3 to withdraw to reserve area of BCT 17-3. Company to be in position at 0600. Platoon leaders received orders to have platoons ready for withdrawal at 0330 in the order, weapons plt. less detachments plus litter case, the 3rd platoon following following at about 15 minutes with the 1st platoon covering the withdrawal of the company. At about 0400 the 1st platoon was hit by a strong enemy force estimated at about 350-400 men with enemy patrols coming down from the high ground on the north of Lake Cories. At this time the weapons platoon was approximately 500 yds. from initial position and the 3rd platoon about 300 yds. from their initial position. The first platoon was just starting to withdraw their left and support squads leaving right squad in position. When the enemy force hit there was considerable firing by this squad but they were over run. In the darkness the company was broken up. At dawn 25 men of the first platoon plus 12 men of the weapons platoon had organized and attached themselves to K Company 17th Inf. About 20 men had attached themselves to the 50th Engineers on ridge between Cold Mt. and Pt. Able. These men remained attached to these units during the remainder of the day. 12 men of the 3rd platoon were assigned to guard Aid Station BCT 32-2. Casualties - 10 E.M. killed, 12 E.M. wounded, 11 E.M. missing.

May 30, 1943. That portion of the company attached to K Company BCT 17-3 was attached to I Company BCT 17-3. An enemy counterattack estimated by a force of 75 - 100 men occurred at about 0500. In this action 1 E.M. was killed, 1 officer wounded. 3 E.M. were sent to hospital due to exposure. At about 1500 Company units detached and company was reorganized and placed in Landing Force Reserve. Moving back to high ground 2000 yds. north of the beach with the mission of guarding the Landing Force C.P. Four 5 man outposts were established, 2 along east draw and 2 along west valley. These were visited by patrol every hour. A 5 man patrol was sent out hourly from the southern outpost on east valley to make contact with a patrol coming up from the beach. Another 5 man patrol was sent out however from southern outpost on west side and made contact with the guards around the L.F. C.P. 2nd Platoon and attachments remained on O.P.s. No enemy action.

May 31, 1943. L.F. Reserve company moved to position 300 yds. west of ridge between Pt. Able and Cold Mt. No enemy action.

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June 1, 1943. Disposition remained unchanged. No enemy action.

June 2, 1943. Company less detachments moved up Sarana nose and established 2 outposts. One platoon on peak of Sarana nose, remainder of company less detachments about 1/2 way up toward the peak. Company relieved "I" company, 17th Inf. at 1700. Mission of company was to hold high ground and observe for enemy action. 5 man patrols, twice daily, were sent out to contact platoon on peak. Platoon on peak sent out 6 man patrols daily to reconnoiter toward Middle peak. No enemy action.

June 3, 1943. Company attached to BCT 32-2, Company Headquarters plus weapons platoon less detachments moved to valley at base of Sarana nose. One rifle squad on Cold Mt. relieved by K Company, 32nd Inf. at 1430. No enemy action.

Observations of weapons, equipment, and training: We found that after leaving the ship the men were in very poor physical condition. The clothing problem appeared to be the most acute. After actual experience it showed that shoes and overshoes were more satisfactory than the leather boots. The rain suits that were issued were not satisfactory in that the trousers were cut quickly, like Li's, and the jackets did not protect the man against the wind around the neck. A weatherproof parka appeared to be more satisfactory. Our weapons are excellent and functioned without failure.

VICTOR A. FENNER
Capt., 32nd Inf.
Commanding, Co "B"

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HEADQUARTERS BCT 32-1

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UNIT REPORT

No 1

From : May 13, 1943 - 1520 P.T.

To : May 14, 1943 - 1200 P.T.

Unit - BCT 32-1 less A & E Cos.

Date - May 14, 1943

Place - Attu Island

1. a. No units in contact.
b. Enemy reserves unknown
c. Ineffective enemy sniper fire from high ground on East and West sides Massacre Valley about 2000 yds. from beach.
d. Enemy strength unknown with probable excellent observation of our positions. Normal Infantry weapons at his disposal to date.
e. Because of favorable positions on high ground and our lack of observation on his positions it is believed enemy will continue to defend and force us to attack him on ground favorable to himself.
2. a. Battalion in Landing Force reserve in bivouac on hogback 2000 yds. from Massacre Beach (See sketch).
b. See sketch.
c. No adjacent units. Support artillery on Massacre Beach
d. Action consisted of patrolling Massacre Valley. Security of Landing Force Hq. and bivouac area
e. Combat efficiency of command excellent.
f. No enemy contact.
3. a. Strength of command Bn Hq & Hq Co., one rifle Co., 1 Heavy Weapons Co., Plt. A.T., Plt. Cannon, Med. Det, Replacements needed - 3 riflemen.
b. Casualties - 1 E.M. wounded
c. No prisoners.
d. Evacuation normal
e. See sketch
f. One days K ration, 1 days D ration, 1 days fire.
g. Conditions of roads poor, possible for tractors pulling light loads.

Earnest H. Bears
EARNEST H. BEARS
Major, 32nd Inf.
Commanding

SECRET

CO 1st Bn

SECRET

16 MAY 43

MEMORANDUM

To : CO 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry

1. CO, 1st Bn, 32nd Inf, will capture and defend the northern nose of the hill mass between Sarana and Massacre Bay with one rifle company (less one platoon). He is authorized to support this advance with heavy weapons at his disposal from positions on the log-bunch in Massacre Valley. H - Hour - 0630 W

2. CO, 2nd Bn, 32nd Inf, will support this attack by fire from his present positions.

3. Artillery will furnish the support of at least one battery when called for

By Command of Major General BROWN:

J. F. STEWART

COL., F. A.

Acting Chief of Staff

OFFICE

F. T. PACHLER

LT. COL., G. S. C.

Ass't Chief of Staff, G-3

SECRET

Hq. BCT 32-1

May 16, 1948

SECRET

1. (A) (See Sketch) Enemy believed to have some snipers and mortars in emplacements on hill A.

(B) (1) Positions and locations of mine traps as known.
(2) Field Art. will lay barrage on hill A on signal.

2. First Bn. less A & B Companies will attack and seize hill A driving out enemy resistance and be prepared to continue on and take hill B on order.

3. (A) C Co. less one rifle platoon will attack up route as shown on sketch. Attack to be carried out on signal.

(B) D Co. will take positions as shown on sketch and support C Co.

(C) A.T. platoon Bn. Hq. Co. general support of attack as shown on sketch.

(D) Cannon Co. platoon from present positions (see sketch) in general support.

4. (A) Each man will roll a modified pack consisting of the outside section of the sleeping bag and one shelter-half and 1 K and 1 D rations. Full Canteen of water to be carried.

(B) Extra ammunition to be taken for night machine guns and 60 mm mortar.

(1) Squad of the A & P. platoon attached to C Co as amm. carriers and assist in carrying weapons of weapons platoon.

(2) Bn. C.P., Aid Station, amm. D.P. present locations.


5. (A) C Co. Commander will carry one 536 radio and

will contact BN on jump off.

(B) (1) BN. C.P. remaining in present location.

(2) C. Co. Ops along route of advance shown on sketch. Final C.P. to be reported.

SECRET



MASSACRE BAY

Scale: APPROX 1:20,000

V.I: MARKED (APPROX)

DATE:

*Complete sub
Capt. Inf.
5/13, 32*

Positions 5/13-5/14-5/15
1 P.I.C. Co. ordered
to position as
shown on west.
SECURITY PATROLS
as shown. ENEMY
sniper fire from
both sides of
valley.

SECRET

8413

HEADQUARTERS BCT 32-1

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

NO. 2

From : May 14, 1943 - 1200

To : May 15, 1943 - 1200

Unit : BCT 32-1 less "A" & "B" Cos.

Date : May 15, 1943

Place : Attu Island

1. a. No units in contact
b. Enemy reserves unknown.
c. Scattered ineffective sniper fire high ground both sides Massacre Valley with occasional machine gun fire from Pt. "A". Few rounds of mortar fire fell in bivouac area.
d. Enemy strength unknown. Believed to have excellent observations of our positions. He has little artillery in addition to normal.
e. Enemy apparently continues to defend. This plan will harm us most since he occupies good defensive ground. Enemy can attack but will put him at disadvantage, because of hand supply and apparent numerical inferiority.
2. a. One rifle platoon "C" Co in defensive position on high ground at West end Massacre Valley beach.
b. See sketch.
c. Unchanged
d. Same as previous report
e. Combat efficiency excellent
f. No enemy contacts.
3. a. Strength of command same. Replacements needed 3 riflemen, 1 machine gunner.
b. Casualties 1 E.M. wounded
c. No prisoners
d. Evacuation normal
e. See sketch
f. 1 days K ration, 1 day D ration, 3 days ammunition.
g. Roads still in poor condition but improved over previous day.

Ernest H. Bearss
ERNEST H. BEARSS
Major, 32nd Inf.
Commanding

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS BCT 32-1

UNIT REPORT

No. 2

From : May 15, 1943 - 1200

To : May 16, 1943 - 1200

Unit : BCT 32-1 less "A" & "B" Cos.

Date : May 16, 1943

Place : Attu Island

1. a. "C" Co. in contact at Pt. "A" from about 0900 May 16, 1943 to 0400 May 16, 1943.
 - b. Enemy reserves unknown
 - c. "C" Co less 1 rifle platoon attacked Pt. "A" from the West and South and encountered heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the peak at Pt. "A". The enemy holds this position in strength and approaches ~~the objective and its approaches. Final protective lines protect~~ defense. Two rifle platoons were repulsed with heavy losses. Supporting fires were ineffective due to dense fog covering the objective and its approaches. Final protective lines protect position from attack from West and South.
 - d. Enemy strength on Pt. "A" estimated to be between 40 & 50 men with four machine guns and undetermined number of mortars. Strength otherwise unknown.
 - e. Enemy positions still favorable for defense and his actions indicate he will continue to defend.

2. a. Unchanged
- b. Unchanged
- c. Unchanged
- d. "C" Co repulsed in attack on Pt. "A" by strong enemy defensive position on Pt. "A". Supporting fires ineffective because of no observation.
- e. Unchanged.
- f. Positions unchanged. Attack on Pt. "A" unsuccessful.

3. a. Strength unchanged. ~~Replacements needed.~~ 1 officer platoon leader, 24 riflemen, 1 aid man, 5 E.M. heavy weapons Co replacements.
- b. Casualties 1 officer wounded
3 E.M. killed
23 E.M. wounded
1 E.M. evacuated for shock
- c. No prisoners.
- d. Evacuation normal
- e. Unchanged
- f. 1 B ration, 1 D ration, 3 days supply ammunition on hand.

SECRET

SECRET

g. Road improved and readily passable for tractors.

Ernest H. Bearss


ERNEST H. BEARSS

17.01 Major, 32nd Inf.

Commanding

SECRET

SECRET



MASSACRE BAY

Scale: 1:20,000 (APPROX)

V.I.: APPROX.

DATE:

W. H. Thompson
5-3, 32-1

5/16/43

Patrols + 1 P.I. Co. remain as shown on sketch for 13, 14 + 15.
 C. Co. (1 R. Pl.) + (ATT. Med. Comm. A + P)
 ATTACKED Pt. A as shown along shown route. D. Co. A.T. Pl. + Cn. Co.
 Pl + Arty from beach suppd.
 Attack.

5/17/43. Reverted back to same.
 25 shown for 13, 14 + 15.

EWK

HEADQUARTERS BCT 32-1

UNIT REPORT

SECRET

No. 4

From : May 16, 1943 - 1200

To : May 17, 1943 - 1200

Unit : BCT 32-1 less "A" & "B" Cos.
Date : May 17, 1943
Place : Attu Island

1. a. No units in contact.
b. Enemy reserves unknown.
c. Enemy sniper fire from high ground vicinity Pt. "A". Occasional mortar and machine gun fire in Bn. bivouac are.
d. Strength unknown.
e. Enemy appears to be determined to defend. To attack our present position would be to our advantage.
2. a. Unchanged
b. Unchanged
c. Unchanged
d. No enemy contact
e. Combat efficiency excellent
f. No contact
3. a. Bn. Hq and Hq Co., less Bn. Executive officer, A.T. Plt., Med. Det., Cannon Platoon moved to beach at 1230. Otherwise strength unchanged. Replacements needed same as previous report.
b. No casualties
c. No prisoners
d. Evacuation normal.
e. Unchanged
f. 1 day B ration, 1 day K ration on hand, 3 days ammunition supply on hand.
g. Roads improved and passable for loaded tractors and trailers.

Ernest H. Bearss

ERNEST H. BEARSS
Major, 32nd Inf.
Commanding

SECRET

UNIT REPORT

No 5

SECRET

From : May 17, 1943 - 1200

To : May 18, 1943 - 0800

Unit - "C" & "D" Cos., BCT 32-1

Date - May 18, 1943

Place - Attu Island

1. a. No units in contact.
- b. Enemy reserves unknown.
- c. Enemy snipers and occasional machine gun and mortar fire.
- d. Enemy strength unknown.
- e. Enemy continues to defend. Any other course of action open to him would be disadvantageous and we may expect him to continue to defend.

2. a. Unchanged
- b. Unchanged
- c. Unchanged
- d. No contact
- e. Combat efficiency excellent.
- f. No contact

3. a. Strength unchanged. Replacements needed same as last report.
- b. No casualties.
- c. No prisoners
- d. Evacuation normal
- e. No change
- f. Two days rations and three days supply ammunition on hand
- g. Unchanged.

James H. Keller
JAMES H. KELLER
Maj., 32nd Inf.
Temp. Commanding

SECRET

FROM: 0530 5/13/43
Date & HourTO: 2030 5/13/43
Date & HourPLACE: U.S.A.T. GRANT
ATTU**SECRET**

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS - MESSAGES - Etc | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0530 | | 1 | 5/13/43 | GENERAL ALARM | |
| 0630 | | 2 | " | ALARM LIFTED | |
| 1245 | | 3 | " | DROPPED ANCHOR IN MASSACRE BAY | |
| 1800 | | 4 | " | OVER THE SIDE OF THE U.S.A.T. GRANT | |
| 1815 | | 5 | " | LANDED AT YELLOW BEACH OF MASSACRE BAY. | |
| 1900 | | 6 | " | ARTILLERY FIRE ON RIDGE TO RIGHT FRONT 2000-YDS. FROM BEACH. | |
| 2030 | | | | OFF ESTABLISHED AT 2000 HRS. (861.25-350012) | |

LEGEND: "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP;
"T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

S-2

JOURNAL, FIRST BATTALION

FROM: 0900 5/14/43

TO 1830 5/14/43

PLACE ATTU (massacre bay)

Date & Hour

Date & Hour

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENT | MESSAGES - Etc | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|----------------|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | | |
| 0900 | | 1 | 5/14/43 | O.P. ESTABLISHED ON LARGE HILL FRONT OF BIVOAC AREA COORD.- (866.2-3506-3). | | |
| 1445 | | 2 | | GRUMAN WILDCAT CRASHED ABOUT 8000 YARDS FROM C.P. | | |
| 1830 | | 3 | | MORTAR FIRE ON OUR ARTILLERY OBSN. POST KNOCKED OUT BY OUR 75mm & 37mm. GUNS. | | |

LEGEND: "M" - Situation map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP;
 "T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

FROM: 0650 5/16/43

TO

PLACE ATTU

Date & Hour

Date & Hour

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS - MESSAGES - Etc | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0650 | | 1 | 5/16/43 | ATTACK ON POINT ABL BY C CO. D CO. IN SUPPORT. | |
| 0815 | | 2 | " | MORTARS AND L.M.G. KNOCKED OUT. SNIPER FIRE FRONT OF O.P. NORTH OF POINT A. | |
| 0900 | | 3 | " | HEAVY FIRE FROM D CO. GUNS ON CREST OF RIDGE | |
| 0940 | | 4 | " | CREST NEARLY REACHED BY OUR C CO. MEN. | |
| 1945 | | 5 | " | C.CO. WITHDRAWING FROM POINT A | |
| | | 6 | " | JAP M.G. & MORTAR FIRE ON OUR O.P. & ARTILLERY OBSN. POST. | |
| | | 7 | " | SNIPERS CONSTANTLY HARASSING OUR TROOPS. MORTAR FIRE SPASMODIC | |
| | | 8 | " | APPROX. 22 CASUALTIES SUFFERED IN THE | |

LEGEND: "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP;
 "T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

FROM: 1000 5/17/43
Date & Hour

TO: 5/17/43
Date & Hour

PLACE: APTG

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS - MESSAGES - Etc | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |

1000

I

5/17/43

HQ. CO. 1ST BN. LEFT BIVOUAC AREA FOR YELLOW BEACH FOR TRANSFER TO WEST ARM OF HOLTZ BAY.

LEGEND: "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP;
"T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

S-3

JOURNAL, FIRST BATTALION

FROM 0500 5/13/43 TO 0500 5/14/43

PLACE Aboard Ship

Date & Hour

Date & Hour

Massacre Bay

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS- MESSAGES-ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| IN | OUT | | | | |
| 0530 | | 1 | 5/13/43 | General quarters aboard ship | |
| 0800 | | 2 | " | Preparation and continuation of plan to debark on order in Massacre Bay. | |
| 1200 | | 3 | " | Arrived in Massacre Bay (Attu Isl.) | |
| 1215 | | 4 | " | Bn C.O. ordered to Zeilin to receive orders. | |
| 1430 | | 5 | " | Ordered to debark | |
| 1520 | | 6 | " | 1st wave landed on yellow beach and C.O. ordered to Div. C.P. | |
| 1600 | | 7 | " | S-3 received orders to send Bn. as arrived on beach by guide to vicinity of Div. C.P. | |
| 1800 | | 8 | " | Hq. C & D Cos. bivouaced 2000 yds. NW Yellow Beach in L.F. reserve. | |
| 1840 | | 9 | " | 1 Plt C Co ordered by Hq LF Seven to proceed to valley direct to west. | |

LEGEND : "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP; "T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

S-3

JOURNAL, FIRST BATTALION

FROM 0500 5/14/43

TO 0500 5/15/43

PLACE Massacre Bay

Date & Hour

Date & Hour

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dtd | INCIDENTS- MESSAGES-ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|----------|---|--------------|
| IN | OUT | | | | |
| 1900 | | 10 | 5/13/43 | Contact Plt of 17th Inf and then proceed over hill to south to beach & establish security on hog back sloping to beach to protect beach installations. | |
| 1900 | | 11 | 5/13/43 | Plans for local security prepared and orders issued. Coordinated with Maj. Smith LF7 Hq Comdt. | |
| 0500 | | 12 | 5/14/43 | Received word casualty report of 2 men | |
| 0800 | | 1 | 5/14/43 | 4 patrols, 4 men each, ordered out of C & D Cos to work to west of valley and check report of 17-2 that about a platoon of Japs had infiltrated thru and around our front lines. Negative report received from patrols. | |
| 0830 | | 2 | " | 2 81 mm mortar sections & 1 Sect. H.M.G placed on east side of valley to protect any breakthrough to L.F. C.P. | |
| 1230 | | 3 | " | Detail of 50 men from D Co ordered out to carry sleeping bags to 17-3. Told to take necessary security precautions. | |
| 1445 | | 4 | " | 4 Gruman Wildcats entered valley from Sea. Entered dense fog, 1 fell to ground to right & front of high knoll center of valley. 1 heard crashing with mountain. Outcome of other 2 unknown. | |
| 1800 | | 5 | " | Preparation, plans & orders were made for security. 2 patrols left flank | |

LEGEND : "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP; "I" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

FROM 0500 5/15/43
Date & HourTO 0500 5/16/43
Date & Hour

PLACE Massacre Bay

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS- MESSAGES-ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| IN | OUT | | | | |
| | | | | valley from D Co. These patrols to proceed up valley to rear Plg 17 C.P. & then cross valley to west side down west side to rear of LFOP and then cross back to East side of valley. Patrols consist of 3 men each. At 1930 C Co takes over these patrols. | |
| 2025 | | 6 | 5/14/43 | Received orders D Co may possibly be used to support attack of leading Bns on 5/15. Co to use 15 men for digging graves. Pass word for 5/14 Yellow Belly | |
| 0800 | | 1 | 5/15/43 | Previous plan to use 15 men C Co to dig graves cancelled. | |
| 1000 | | 2 | 5/15/43 | Lt. Bennett C.O. Plt of C Co sent over hill to east reported 2 for holes which were believed recently occupied. Balance reported negative. | |
| 1200 | | 3 | " | An overlay of present location, gun & patrols & etc was sent to LF C.P. | |
| 1200 | | 4 | " | Preparations made to bring up a few days supplies from the beach. | |
| 2115 | | 5 | " | Received orders L.F. C.P. prepare plan for G Co to seize Pt. A. (Able) on 5/16. Have Co (-1 Plt) at bottom of hill before daylight, climb hill in column of Plts, A & P Plt to assist wpns. Plt in carrying wpns. Communication to consist of radio, wire and flags. | |

LEGEND : "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP; "T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

S-3

JOURNAL, FIRST BATTALION

FROM 0500 5/15/43

TO 0500 5/16/43

Massacre Bay

Date & Hour

Date & Hour

PLACE

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS- MESSAGES-ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| IN | OUT | | | | |
| | | | | Field order & sketch was made up and forwarded to L.F. C.P. for approval. Our aid station assisting in handling casualties from other organization for past two days. | |
| | 2200 | 6 | 5/15/43 | Kitchen and supplies hand carried to bivouac area. | |
| | | 7 | 5/15 | C.O. received O.K. for C Co to attack in A.M. | |
| | 0800 | | 5/16/43 | Protective fire of 57 mm & 81 mm & 75 Pack Howitzer laid down barrage. | |
| | 0740 | 2 | 5/16/43 | C Co (-1 Plt plus att.) started up hill and met resistance M.G. & rifle fire. Communication was maintained C.O. Co C changed positions for attack & assault. (See Battle report C Co for details) Strong resistance met & suffered several casualties. | |
| | 1200 | 3 | " | Impossible locate enemy position in fog. Estimate 10-12 casualties. | |
| | 1515 | 4 | " | C.O. Co C called into Bn. CP. and at 1520 Bn C.O. ordered C Co to withdraw to fog line and dig in where they could could have visibility. A detail of 12 men from D Co was sent to act as litter bearers. Fog is lifting but still dense around enemy locations. | |

LEGEND : "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP; "T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

S-3

JOURNAL, FIRST BATTALION

FROM 0500 5/16/43 TO

0500 5/17/43

PLACE

Massacre Bay

Date & hour

Date & hour

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS - MESSAGES - ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|---------------|---|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1525 | | 5 | 5/16 | Bn C.O. notified L.F. CP of order to withdraw to fog line. | |
| 1532 | | 6 | 5/16 | Bn exec. & S-3 keep calling C Co. to see if area close to enemy was cleared of his men. Preparation made to put all protective fire on Pt. A. | |
| 1600 | | 7 | 5/16 | C Co C.O. called in Bn C.O. notified him to get men down & help keep them down because of heavy supporting fire going up. Further orders given C Co. to again assault hill after and seize it. After supporting fire was lifted, reorganize & send in casualty report | |
| | | | | FROM Bn C.O. | |
| 1700 | | 9 | " | Supporting fire (unobserved due to dense fog) placed on Hill A & immediately the enemy placed mortar fire on our supporting wps Positions. C Co was ordered to withdraw from the hill. Number of casualties is unknown at present. | |
| 1900 | | 10 | " | Bn. C.O. & S-3 to L.F. C.P. to report action. No of casualties will be reported soon as possible. | |
| 1910 | | 11 | " | C Co. Commander reported to Bn. C.P. | |
| 1930 | | 12 | " | XXXXXXXXXX Co. Co. present casualties are 3 dead and 20 wounded & several still missing. | |

LEGEND: "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP;
 "T" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

S-3

JOURNAL, FIRST BATTALION

FROM 0500 5/17/43 TO 0500 5/18/43
Date & hour Date & hour

PLACE ~~Massacre Bay~~

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser No. | Time Rated | INCIDENTS - MESSAGES - ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|---------------|---|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1930 | | 13 | 5/16 | Pass word for 5/16 is Willy Nilly. | |
| 0815 | | 1 | 5/17 | Bn C.O. received orders to get Hq. & Hq Co. 1st Bn organized and be at the beach ready to load on the DD Kane to proceed to Holtz Bay to act as staff of N.L.F. | |

LEGEND: "M" - Situation Map; "S" - Standard distribution at CP;
"I" - Information furnished troops.

SECRET

301-INT (32)-3:2

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON**

(1897)
Master



3rd Int Regt. 1st Western Landing Troop. Attn. - 3rd & 3rd File 14 May-2 Jun 43

DO NOT REMOVE FROM THIS OFFICE

**WAR DEPARTMENT RECORDS BRANCH, A.G.O.
HISTORICAL RECORDS SECTION
ROOM MB-867 PENTAGON**

AGO MICROFILM
ITEM NO: 1563

UNIT JOURNAL

~~SECURITY LANDING PAGE~~
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 15 May 1943

TO: 0000 18 May 1943

CLASSIFICATION STATUS IS TO
SECRET

UNIT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
2nd Platoon, Cal PFA

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time of Post-ec | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|-----------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| | | 1 | | Regt-S-3 contacted 3rd Bn 32, S-3, concerning Scout company and patrols. | |
| | | 2 | | Found ward from 1200, 5/18/43 to 1200 5/19/43 is VILLAGE SMITHY. | |
| | | 3 | | Message sent to Division giving the location of patrols. No enemy resistance to this point (861. - 3512.8) (Message cleared at 1035) | |
| | | 4 | | Regt'1 G0 contacted Capt. Bjork and made arrangements for supplies. | |
| | 1100 | 5 | | Message was sent to G0 7th Div. Requested priority of unloading St Mikael as follows: Nations, ammunition, radio batteries and litter. Have troops come ashore with own sleeping equipment. | |
| | 1500 | 6 | | Received message from Scarlet Beach: Contact Col Gulin for orders for Alaskan Scouts. Lt Thompson and 16 MI are on Beach Scarlet. Made recon of Stellar Cove, 3 exceptional landing beaches, but should be outposted. Other outposts same as yesterday's message. Observed single enemy tracks between Beach Black and Scarlet. Prepare to outpost Stellar Cove from here. | |
| | 1530 | 7 | | Message was sent to Lt Thompson at Scarlet Beach. Continue on present missions Scarlet Beach. Outpost will be relieved by one platoon when available. | |
| | 1400 | 8 | | Sent message to G-2 - 7th Div 3rd Bn 17th Inf definitely located in Manner-Melts pass at 3509.0 - 3509.0 will maintain contact. Reconnoitering in hard rough hills from Meltz Bay to Chicago. My artillery, with airplane spotting, could put effective fire in Chicago if necessary. Request information and instructions. Signed by G0 Regt'1 B. | |

CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
W. H. ...

307-INE(32)-312

1897
M. ...

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHWEST LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 19 May 1943

TO: 1400 19 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Interval | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|---------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0835 | | 1 | | Request location Lt Col Lynn Smith with WDC, if present. Your force direct his present activities as soon as practical per order CG HHC any schedule flight FMV authorized. Cases will arrange. Notify this HQ immediately, from G-2 7th Div. | Noted |
| 0835 | | 2 | | (From G-2 - 7th Div) (To CG Regt) Countersign one two zero nineteenth May to one two zero zero twenty May is LITTLE SYMPATHY. | |
| 1430 | | 3 | | For Col Culin: Notify Maj Earl of his promotion and recommend to him the best of the officers who have demonstrated outstanding qualities of leadership whom you recommend for promotion and for whom vacancies exist, also notify first Lt Wm Davis, Co B, 17th, at once of his promotion to Captain. (From G-2 - 7th Div) (Lanfar) | |
| 1330 | | 4 | | For Culin: Captured materials will be safely guarded. Take as normal IS for care & preservation using field items, issuing to troops authorized on your order. (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| 1459 | | 5 | | To CG Regt: Without delay send reinforced rifle company to take over Co K 3rd Bn 17th Inf Mission of Hebrew at Holtz Bay, Masacre pass. Expect to return company to you day after tomorrow. Let me know how this can be accomplished. This is for Col Culin. (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| 1459 | | 6 | | To CG 32nd Inf (By Air Ground) Plane will arrive at 1600. | |
| | 1515 | 7 | | To G-2 - LF 7: Reference your message 1248, 17-1 moving into position for defense of Holtz Bay Area. Elements 32-3 moving out to attack per Division order. (From Regt's S-2) | |
| | 1515 | 8 | | To: G-2 - 7th LF: Due to patrols going out for long duration, necessary we have pass word for next three days. (From Ass't S-1) 32. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHWEST LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 19 May 1943

TO : 2400 19 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | Incidents, Messages, Etc. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1315 | | 9 | | To Regt 32 CG: Report situation & progress (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| | 1600 | 10 | | To CG 12 7: I Co 32nd Inf leaving shortly to relieve Hebrew & take over their mission per your order message of 1459 (From XI Officer 32) | |
| | 1615 | 11 | | To CG 7th Div: 32-3 patrol progressed across floor East Arm Helix Bay along beach 500 yds & is proceeding up pass to ridge. No opposition as yet. (From XI Officer 32) | |
| 1600 | | 12 | | To CG Regt: CP may be retained in present position. Unloading will have to be done here but may possibly be done at beach. (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| | 1630 | 13 | | To G-4 - 12 7: Estimate only 2 days G & X rations left here for all troops. Request we be kept at least 5 days ahead for 3500 troops. Necessary to keep G & X rations on hand for troops out in front. Need 32-3 & En Hq Co 32-2 kitchens. Need offensive grenades. All LHM's out of commission & can't get balance of tractors off Red Beach. Need 200 reversible parkas & other parkas for balance of 32-3 & En Hq Co 32-2. Recommend Chirikof be unloaded here. (From G-4 12 7) | |
| | 1715 | 14 | | To: CG 12 7: I Co 32-3 left 1640 relieve Hebrew 32-3. Patrol still advancing, no opposition. Artillery fire placed on 15-30 enemy located at 869.7 - 3210.9. Enemy believed suffered 4 casualties. Withdrew toward Chirikof Harbor & artillery fire followed. (From Ence Off 12 7) | |
| | 1730 | 15 | | To: CG - 12 7: 32-3 reports at 1740 that patrol near crest of ridge is receiving rifle fire, but still infiltrating up to top. Some men pinned down. (From Ence Off 12 7) | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHEN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 19 May 1943

TO: 2400 19 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Noted | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1615 | | 16 | | Counter-sign twelve hundred past twenty May to twelve hundred 21 May is JOLLY SMOOCH, 1200 May 21 to 1200 22 May is JOLLY YELLOW, 1200 22 May to 1200 23 May is SMOOTH SAILING. (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| 1600 | | 17 | | To Regt CO: It is desired that all personnel be reminded of the urgent need for prisoners to be questioned. Capture should be accompanied by every security means to guard against treachery but genuine officers should be accepted & consideration be given enemy wounded. (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| 1842 | | 18 | | Artillery fire placed on enemy at reported positions & drove them back, J2-3 patrol still advancing. Sending overlays in morning of new positions. (From Base Off NLF) | |
| 2230 | | 19 | | Maj John M. Finn 3rd Lt capt Lt Col. Capt Leigh E. Mathias S-3, apt Maj per VOOS 7 LF. (This action was taken as a result of telephone request from me at 2230 to CO 7 LF, based on superior performance of duties in battle. /s/ FRANK L. GULIN, JR, Colonel, 32nd Infantry, Comd North Force. | |
| 2155 | | 20 | | To Regt CO: Request reply immediately to whereabouts guests of Col Lynna Smith with WSO observer. (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| 2357 | | 21 | | Col Lynna Smith left by plane at 1600 19 May, 1943, in compliance with earlier orders received same date. (From S-1 NLF) | |
| | | 22 | | Received overlay from Capt Mitchell at 0840 May 19, 1943. He brought it back from Div by air-plane. Also (2) copies of FO #2. | |
| | | 23 | | To G-4 - LF 7: Need immediate replacement of 2 complete 81 MM mortars. Request detachment with repair tools & parts for small arms & 81 MM mortar repairs. (From Base Off NLF) | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

WESTERN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 23 May 1943

TO: 2100 23 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Passed | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|-------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0925 | | 1 | | Message to Regt CO by radio: Counterairn for period 1200 - 23 May to 1200 - 24 May is SLY SLEUTH . (From G-2 - 7th Div) | |
| | 1042 | 2 | | (Urgent message sent to G-2 LF 7 from S-2 MLF) Give us counterairn for next four days from 1200 today on. | |
| | | 3 | | Message to G-2 LF 7 from S-2 MLF: Intelligence patrol reports enemy location (865.9 - 3510.8) - (865.7 - 3510.8) 32-3 located (865.0 - 3510.7) These approximate & conflict with others reported 4th Inf area. Inf started advance at 0945. Encountered Jap small arms fire & no large guns. | |
| | 1100 | 4 | | To Div from MLF: One tank lighter urgent. Need Hase for best repair. Only three LOV's operating. Telephone call to Col Michel - Port CO says 2 tank lighters & the Hase with 40 tons 2 rations on to Helts Bay - tried yesterday but turned back on account of weather. Will send a barge when available with LCM in cradle. | |
| 0919 | | 5 | | (To Regt CO from G-2 - 7th Div) Report your situation without delay. Reports desired 0700 - 1200 - 1900 daily. | |
| 1152 | | 6 | | (To CO Regt Hq from G-2 7th Div) Personnel will be reminded that captured enemy stores & supplies are the property of the Government & willful destruction of materials must cease. The collection & study of captured equipment & material is an intelligence operation of service & supply units. Unit CO's will be responsible that troops are not permitted to loot captured material & be reminded that landing force field orders prohibits the personal appropriation of documents by personnel not assigned to such tasks. | |
| 1200 | | 7 | | To Col Culin from Lt Col Harbl: A meeting was held at 1100 today at which time I charged each | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHWEST LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0601 23 May 1943

TO: 2400 23 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|-----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1808 | | continued | - - - | Company Commander with proper discipline of his men in relation to enemy dumps, I regret yesterday's occurrence & will make every effort to prevent its repetition. | |
| 1950 | | 8 | | To WO Sanders from Lt Col Hartl: The Personnel Clerks from my companies are at Red Beach. I have instructed them to move overland & report to you for duty. | |
| 1430 | | 9 | | To Hq NLF: Lt Col DeLong, Col Talley, Maj Jackson, Capt Greed, Capt Sims, Lt Winterstrom, Lt Jorgensen & Japanese deserter (radio) reported at 1400 May 23, 1943, to this Hq. | |
| 1545 | | 10 | | To all units from Signal Officer. The force Signal Officer is responsible for the prompt dissemination by warning of hostile air activity. That officer will be notified by fastest means using any means available. Messages preceded by word flash take precedence over all others. | |
| 1915 | | 11 | | Lt Col DeLong & Col Talley departed for Massacre Bay 1915 by USS Kane. | |
| | 1930 | 12 | | To G-1 LF 7 from Asst S-1: Assigns Nolan & Prethorn USN departed on Kane for Massacre Bay at 1930. | |
| | 2240 | 13 | | To G-2 7 LF from Asst Adj: 1st Lt Robt Thompson & 22 EM ADC Scouts departed on Kane for Yellow Beach at twenty two thirty. | |
| | | 14 | | To Mr. Boyle from Col Culin: Mr Boyle, you are to notify this Hq before the Kane leaves in view of the fact that two colonels from the Engrs are to return to Massacre Bay when the Kane leaves. | |
| | | 15 | | To S-1 NLF from G-2 7th Div: Following named interpreters are joining you: George Hayashida, Fred Tsumakubo, Shingo Ito. The following EM of G Btry 78 CA are assigned for their protection: Pvtc Hitchings, Ann & Dyer. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 23 May 1943

TO: 2100 23 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| | | 16 | | To Lt Col Probert from S-1 NLF; We are asking you to furnish 5 pyramidal tents & 5 sibly stoves to send to the 3rd Bn 92nd Inf in E Halls. | |
| | | 17 | | To 14 Field Hospital, Co A, 7th Med, from S-1 NLF; Org will send number of men indicated to Mag Center NLF immediately for carrying party. 14 F Hosp: 20 men Co A 7th Med: 10 men | |
| | | 18 | | 1st Lt Robert H. Thompson ADC Scouts & 22 EM ar- rived from Scarlet Beach at 1600. | |
| 2300 | | 19 | | Enemy being shelled by artillery during night. Enemy believed to have withdrawn behind hill mentioned. No mortar fire received from Jays. I & K Co's attack at noon or later. /s/ Olson | |
| 2050 | | 20 | | 20 - 25 - 15 Jays attack our forces down off hill left of Chichagof pass. Our artillery & men opened fire & pinned them to ground. Definite information of strength, ETC, positions unknown. Col Ferguson reported flight of 15 bombers from Paramahiro reached Attu. P-38's intercepted & shot down 5; we lost 1 plane, rescued pilot. 1 plane missing. Lt Kretzer reports negative on patrols. Cap- tured documents on way from 3rd Bn. Sent mes- senger. Captured documents received but no information of value received in such documents. | |

SECRET

FROM: 0001 24 May 1943

TO : 2400 24 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| | 0900 | 1 | | To CO, Det 17 Inf Scarlet Beach: From S-2 NLF; Red Beach reported at 0115 direction NW elevation 30°, 3 distant white lights seen at an estimated distance of 5 miles. Did you note this from your OP? | |
| 1010 | | 2 | | From Scarlet Beach OP to NLF: No lights observed. | |
| | 1200 | 3 | | Col Culin, Maj Mathias, Maj Jackson & Maj Kirtley left for 3rd Bn OP. | |
| | | 4 | | 65% of 81 MM HE were duds. Large number of our ammunition carried explosives | |
| 1315 | | 5 | | 3rd Bn requests jeeps & trailers, 75 MM ammunition & 81 MM ammunition. Reports 5 out of 8 rounds of 81 MM HE ammunition are duds. Ordnance is to investigate & report. | |
| 1500 | | 6 | | Arrived on USS Kane Lt Col Yeats, Capt Oliver, Capt Lovejoy, Capt Sturman, Lt Boyd, Lt Shepard, Capt Manov, Lt Turner, Lt Murray, Capt Habets, Lt Cranham, Lt Egan, & Lt Harrington. | |
| 1500 | | 7 | | Col Farley & Maj Myers ADC arrived by feet from Massena Bay. | |
| 1550 | | 8 | | Btry G & F, 78th CA left skeleton crews on AA guns & left to hand carry two 75 MM pack Howitzers to front lines for close support. | |
| 2030 | | 9 | | Sent all of 37 MM A-T ammunition left on Black Beach to East Arm & all of 75 MM Pack Howitzer to E Arm. Boat is going to Red Beach for more 75 MM Howitzer ammunition. Jeep & trailer sent to East Arm. | |
| 2145 | | 10 | | Col & Party return to NLF CP. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0601 25 May 1943

TO: 2400 25 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| | 0015 | 1 | | (Fr Col Culin to Magic 4) Request a unit fire for all weapons to be delivered in Holtz Bay in East Arm as early as possible. Ship should be equipped with boats. We do not have them. This is urgent. Have Lt Col Howell call me back. | |
| | 0025 | 2 | | (Maj Mathias to Mansion Blue 5) Information of plan for May 25. Guides to meet 17th Inf force at foot of hill to lead them across valley to keep them dry. Expect them about 0300. Guides to meet them at bottom of jeep trail. 3rd Bn needs more rations for labor parties. | |
| | 0045 | 3 | | (Col Higgins to Col Reddin) Co-ordination of artillery for attack on May 25 - a 30 minute preparation was arranged. | |
| 0200 | | 4 | | Hq Co taken aboard Kane Massacre Bay. Supplies loaded. | |
| 0920 | | 5 | | Additional ammunition (75mm) loaded & destroyer Kane underway for Holtz Bay. | |
| 1945 | | 6 | | Kane anchored West Arm of Holtz Bay. Troops remained unload supplies. Staff proceeded to Northern Force CP. CO Northern Force at 3rd Bn CP forward. | |
| 1645 | | 7 | | Message: "Jap position now at (865.8 - 9511.1) Our troops now at hill east of Chicagoof pass. K, L & M Co are on this hill (865.6 - 9511). One of my mortars blew up 90 feet from us, one man badly hurt. I Co to be in reserve, firing now intense." Int. Sgt. (Sgt H W OLSON) | |
| 1700 | | 8 | | Order received from Gen Landrum by phone - To all Unit Commanders concerned. (1) Elements of MIF will advance rapidly northward astride stream running north in valley enclosed by Fish Hook ridge. Protect flanks. (2) MIF will assist MIF in seizing Fish Hook Ridge & entering valley to | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0000 25 May 1943

TO: 2400 25 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | Incidents, Messages, Etc. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1700 | | 8 | | (Cont'd) the north. It will then advance with left across Fish Hook Ridge, seize Buffalo - Fish Hook Ridge, continue attack to north, seize plateau south of Attu Village, then Attu Village. In order to insure that no enemy escapes from Attu Village past our right flank in direction Lake Candren & Lake Corias (S), 17-3 will remain in present location in Chichagof valley floor & will not be moved further forward except on order of Mq LF. | |
| 1930 | | 10 | | Gen LANRUM 1700 Col Gulin called down stating he would remain forward tonight with Maj Mathias. | |
| 2130 | | 11 | | Call from Mq LF received information from 17-3 that A, K & O were half way in the lead advancing N to ridge down which they go to follow creek into Chichagof Rkr - pinned down Mq & rifle fire. | |
| | 1700 | 9 | | Received from G-2 LF 7 & given to units SIF at once. Jap light signals: . - To have LMG at heavy weapons dispose in various positions. Remaining weapons await further orders. - . - To have each platoon take position. - . - To have LMG & heavy weapons commence firing. - . - To have rifles commence firing. - . - To fire flares. - . - To report enemy situation. - . - Take offensive. Circular movement of light - calls attention to right flank unit. Vertical movement of lights - calls attention to left flank units. Horizontal - Attention mountain guns. - - Send out scouts. - - Charge with hand grenades. - . - Prepare for assault. - . - Change one part?? - . - Start message. | |
| 2130 | | 11 | | (Cont'd) Co A, 17-1 started out to knobs - advanced 600 - 800 yds & were pinned down. | |
| 2200 | | 12 | | Call from 17-1, patrols in Stellar Cove encountered Jap patrols, captured 2 prisoners. | |

SECRET

0001 25 May 1943

UNION JOURNAL

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 25 May 1943

TO :

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|---|-----|-------------|---------------|--|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 2200 | | 12 | | (Cont'd) Called Div G-2 thru to Gen Landrum, asking for permission to send Hane & detail up to get prisoners. | |
| 2230 | | 13 | | Fw'd GP reported troops still pinned down. Capt O'Donnell wounded - not expected to live. | |
| 2330 | | 14 | | Lt Johnson & 25 MM 'I' & 'R' platoons left Helms Bay to ED Hane for transp to Scarlet Beach to report to Lt Marshall 17 - 1 for patrolling Steller Cove. | |
| General Comments: On this date HLF & PLS journals consolidated. | | | | | |

SECRET

FROM: 0901 26 May 1943TO: 2100 26 May 1943

~~SECRET~~

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Passed | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|-------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0905 | | | | Div G-9 called stating destroyer Kane was under orders to proceed to Scarlet Beach. | |
| 0908 | | | | Report from Fv'd 3rd Bn OP stated situation unchanged. Heavy snow. Enemy in considerable numbers encountered. Destroyer Kane came into West Arm & discharged Lt Sugden, Lt Ferguson, & Japanese interpreters. Report submitted on captured prisoners. | |
| 1000 | | | | Telephone communications indicated movement of 32nd Inf & 17th Inf troops along Fish Hook Ridge. | |
| 1125 | | | | S-9 - S-3's begin bombing of Chichagof Pass. Troops seen near summit of ridge. S-3's attacking. | |
| 1630 | | | | Attack of NLF on Chichagof pass. Heavy mortar & MG fire. AA guns used by enemy against personnel. Troops moved (1) from ridge top toward pass (2) from bottom of bowl straight up plateau towards pass. Platoon gained troops pinned on ridge top. Reported Capt O'Donnell died this AM. Lt Garburg wounded. | |
| 2200 | | | | Liaison Officer reported: (1) Co I & K 32nd Inf had come from ridge alongside mts to plateau & attack straight up Chichagof pass. Had gained plateau & were continuing up to ridge. (2) Co A of 17th moved from below up to left side of bowl, cleaning up this area. (3) Co G of 17th Inf moved across ridgetop & was pinned by MG & snipers on top of pass. Approx 11 casualties seen. | |
| 2215 | | | | S-9, 32nd reported: Bowl was clear. Knife-ridge was taken. Our men in Chichagof Pass now. Co I & K were advancing up thru center of pass. Co A, 17th Inf, is on left of bowl, Co G, 17th Inf is on ridge between Sarana & Chichagof passes. | |
| 2300 | | | | Col Higgins reported to OP NLF that (1) some AA guns knocked out in days of fighting (2) some remained. (3) Enemy moving up all possible troops. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHVALE LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 27 May 1943

TO : 2400 27 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0315 | | | | Air raid warning from 3rd Bn CP called in. | |
| 0400 | | | | Notified from 3rd Bn CP that Co's I & K 32nd Inf were in a holding Chichagof pass. CO NLF called for rations, tentage, & supplies for troops. Arrangements made for carrying down & transporting to hospital of 50 casualties. | |
| 0805 | | | | Message: To: All Units. *The force Signal Officer is responsible for the prompt dissemination of warnings of hostile air activity. That officer will be notified by fastest means using any means available. Messages preceded by word flash take precedence over all others. | |
| 1130 | | | | Rams unloading supplies Black & White Beaches. Railroad sideway for boats being constructed. 105 AMM landed beach Black preparation movement 105 Howitzers from Beach Red. | |
| 1840 | | | | Two artillery bursts on points between E & W Arms Holts Bay. | |
| 1930 | | | | 3rd Bn CP moving fw'd. AA warning from Div AG Liaison. Report from Col Finn: Co L, 32nd Inf located in Chichagof pass supported by heavy MG from Co M. Co M's mortars on plateau & CP on ridge. Co L has contact with 17-2 on right. Co I has patrol & outposts along Fish Hook Ridge to last peak. On rear of plateau, in reserve, from left to right, I & K Co's, 32nd Inf, then A Co of 17-1 on Hogback. Bn CP is moved up & Bn CP is in pass. | |
| 1400 | | | | Report on G-3: 17-2 is to right of Co L, 32nd on ridge right of Chichagof pass. 4th Inf is to right of 17-2 on ridge. 32-2 plus Co C & D, 1st Bn, 32nd, is below & to the right of 32-2 & are attempting | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 27 May 1943TO: 2400 27 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1400 | | | | (Cont'd) to gain high ground to west of Lake Cories. 17-3 is still in floor of valley being (south) of Lake Cories except I Co which was moved to ridge east of Lake Cories to knoll NE of North edge of Lake Cories at about 1200 ft altitude. | |
| 1600 | | | | Notified by Col Higgins that air alert is over. Notified surf prevents landing boats at Red Beach for 105's. | |
| 2030 | | | | Col Culin, Maj Mathias, Maj Jackson, Lt Grantham returned to CP. | |
| 2030 | | | | (Report from Fwd CP to Col Culin) 2nd Bn of 17 is relieved, 3rd Bn & A & C Co 17th were taking over. | |
| 2100 | | | | CO called Col Zimmerman. Col Zimmerman stated South Force was attacking this evening for high ground. | |
| 2130 | | | | 2nd Lt Selet & 2nd Lt Garberg recommended for promotion. Captain Dixon requested this side. Reported to Gen Landrum that 2nd Bn of 17th had been relieved. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDINGS FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0601 28 May 1943

TO : 2400 28 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Pat ed | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|-------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0730 | | | | Mansion Blue OP first reported tugs & barges coming into Holtz Bay. Subsequent reports confirm. Later identified as friendly. Three tugs & 6 barges reported. Boat sent from shore. Lt Boyle reported CO that tugs were under orders to Attn. Vessels ordered to Alena point. | |
| 0944 | | | | Conference by telephone - CO NLF & Gen Landrum. CO reported little activity on front during night. 2nd Lt Reed promoted to 1st Lt. Evident Southern Force attack not progressing forward rapidly. | |
| 1550 | | | | Capt Lovejoy, Regt 1 B-4 promoted to Major. | |
| 1810 | | | | Col Galin reported to Gen Landrum the positions of the NLF on the Chichagof pass ridgeline after conference with CO 3rd Bn. | |
| 1945 | | | | Hq 17-1 forwarded report from 32nd I and R Plt in Steller Cove that they had found B-24 aircraft & were having difficulty burying dead. Will leave Steller Cove 29 May. Col Huggins reported to CO NLF, Btry not to be moved to Black Beach at present time. Naval gunfire reported. | |
| 1730 | | | | Lt Shepard reported to Col. Saw approximately 15 Japs in bottom of Chichagof. Had counted approx 50 enemy dead to date in bowl. Estimates 150 enemy dead in bowl & Pass. Reported contact "G" Co 17th with 4th Inf. | |
| 1730 | | | | Navy reported tugs leaving harbor. Col Galin reported to Gen Landrum on Lt Shepard's observation after ordering CO 3rd Bn to check. Gen Landrum stated he thought SF had captured Buffalo Ridge | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

REAR LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 20 May 1943

TO: 2400 20 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 2000 | | | | Lt Jorgensen ADC 6-2 reported in with captured documents (Defense orders of Holtz & Chicago? pass areas). Also reported seeing 3 Jap groups in Bay area. | |
| 2200 | | | | Gen Landrum called Col Gulin & asked for information as to what support HLF could make in attack to Harbor. Col Gulin stated perhaps a few men could get down to trenches below the pass & that it might be possible to infiltrate men down the narrow pass. Gen Landrum stated (1) If an conditional surrender would be received tomorrow if group of 5 advanced openly with large white flag. (2) If no surrender, attack harbor about 11 AM. (3) Searchlights be fired tonight by Navy to try outline positions. (4) Buffalo Head taken but inside not cleaned. | |
| 2300 | | | | Lt Col Finn called, outlining possible help in attack. Stated he also saw 3 Japs. | |
| 2300 | | | | Col Gulin talked with Gen Landrum & Gen Landrum adopted plan for 2nd Bn firing down valley & attacking into. Col Finn, CO 2nd Bn, 2nd Inf, CO 17-1, Col Huggins, FA notified. Heavy Jap bombardment on 2nd Bn positions. | |
| 2400 | | | | Enemy AA firing ceased. Mansion Blue CP reported they estimated at least 4 guns (AA) firing. Artillery notified. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

SOUTHERN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 20 May 1943

TO : 0000 20 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME In Out | Ser. No. | Time Entered | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|---------------------|-------------|-----------------|--|-----------------|
| 0530 | | | First report to HLF GP from Div G-3 that enemy had broken through southern forces. | |
| 0630 | | | Similar reports on Jap break through received. 3rd Bn reported no change their situation & no casualties in preceding night's shelling. | |
| 0725 | | | Message: To: GO HLF From: G-3 "Enemy broken through Massacre pass at foot of Gold Mountain." | |
| 1100 | | | 3rd Bn laid wire to Movie Green (17th Inf) establishing contact HLF. Prior to this time no contact between divisions & G-3, result of enemy activity. | |
| 1105 | | | G of S called Col Galin stating: Three hundred Japs had broken through 3rd Bn 17th Inf (Co "K" - 17th, Co "C" - 32nd) using white flag (later determined to be Jap Battle Flag) Attack came through Chichagof valley floor. Enemy reached floor of Sarana Valley & turned west to head of valley by Gold Mountain. Jap patrols had worked up to supply dumps & back into clearing station, killing personnel. Lt Col Fish was in command & is reported killed. Reported Japs captured 37 M4 guns. Div gathering troops to block Japs who worked up to Cathedral Rock. SF sending 2 companies to area. Patrols operating in front of Buffalo gone 1000 yds without resistance. Col Zimmerman reported another group with white flag approaching platoon in this valley. | |
| 1115 | | | Established contact between Col Galin, Col Zimmerman & Col Cartner. (1) From Col Cartner to Col Zimmerman - Three (3) CO's of 17th Regt pinned 250 Japs in upper Chichagof-Sarana valley. Japs are attacking towards Gold Mt & are pinned in open. Forming troops of rear echelon to organize Gold Mt-Sarana area for defense. Wants enough troops from SF to take on Japs to insure their annihilation without depleting own forces for attack. (2) From Col Zimmerman - will send | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHWEST LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 23 May 1943

TO: 2400 23 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|-------------|---------------|--|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1115 | | | | (Cont'd) Reserve Co to Cold Mt (23 men & weapons plat) using 2 CO's of 4th Inf to clean out Japs in area formerly occupied by 3rd Bn 17th Inf. | |
| 1200 | | | | Necessary orders issued to Col Finn, CO Co A, Artillery & Rear echelon Commanders. | |
| 1300 | | | | Col Culin, after conference with Col Finn, reported positions of 3rd Bn. | |
| 1430 | | | | Kinghan's patrol under Francis reported Japs, by sending Co F, 17th, clean out. | |
| 1540 | | | | <p>From Col Zimmerman to Col Culin for relay: To Gen Landrum: There is a pocket of Japs in intersection of Sarana & Chichagof. One of our groups is within 250 yards of them & another within 100 yards. There is one Co on way to Cold Mountain. There are patrols 900 yards from there in gulches trying to locate group Engrs reported. There is an enemy MG on part of hill where Col Zimmerman's CP is located. Now trying to smoke them out. Group of Japanese stood up & waved flags a few minutes ago (had battle flag) then started fighting.</p> <p>Fredericks (2nd Bn, 32nd Inf) has good defense, lots of fire-power.</p> <p>17-3 losses unknown. I Co is fairly strong, K has 70 men. There is no report from L & B Co of 32nd. B is to rejoin Siddens' Bn. In 17-3 2nd Bn of 17 & 32 losses reported very heavy. Col Zimmerman thinks Col Fish & Col Siddens were both killed, also Bn S-1.</p> <p>Col Culin relayed information to Gen Landrum. Gen Landrum had reported that Bn S-1 was alive. Reported units using 61 & 81 MM mortar in cleaning up valley. Wants Zimmerman to realize effect of sniping Japs on supply & evacuation.</p> | |
| 1600 | | | | G-2 reported 50 enemy in west portion of Sarana Valley near Cold Mountain. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDINGS FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 22 May 1943

TO: 2400 22 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Line et al. | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|-------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1745 | | | | <p>Col Gardner to Col Galin for relay to Col Zimmerman - Col Zimmerman is to start thinking about his plan for security & patrolling tonight. Inform Gen Landrum of situation.</p> <p>Col Zimmerman reported: Situation on left point unchanged. 32-B (Fredricks) continues to patrol to the front. Outposts of 27 are out. Is to keep 80% of this command alert.</p> <p>17-B has put one company with HW platoon behind 32-B with line bent back to right overlooking valley.</p> <p>E Co of the 4th Inf is on 32-B's right holding hills A & A protecting 32-B left flank with HMG (1 each).</p> <p>Outpost Co. A. 1st Lt. is going toward Gold Mtn to hunt out Japs. There is heavy firing in that area now. No report as yet.</p> <p>On the other side, Col Zimmerman has only occasional radio contact with Wallace (3rd Bn 17th Inf), I Co is on Sarana Nose; K Co is out ahead towards Lake Goree. Col Zimmerman does not know situation of "L" Co of 17 & "B" of 32.</p> <p>Hjerk with "E" Co men in rear Gold Mtn has contacted about 20 Japs & is fighting them.</p> <p>In the valley, O'Reilly of 4th Inf has started 2 companies towards Wallace & so far has one company around Japs near a lake - has not closed in. The other company is down in a gulch and hasn't moved. Lt Col Nelson had gone to start things. Col Zimmerman has spotted another group of Japs & Nelson is going to send out a strong patrol from O'Reilly Co's (4th) after them near area of Medical installations. To locate this position, draw a line commencing 700 yds N of beginning of Chicago valley. Col Zimmerman is going to protect supply lines as far back as Battalion dumps by patrols. Plans are slow in taking place. O'Reilly's 2 companies will establish defense across Chicago valley with OP in front. Will mop up as possible. Small units will have perimeter defense.</p> | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHEN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 22 May 1943

TO : 2400 23 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Rated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1745 | | | | (Cont'd) It is suggested to Gen Landrum, when attack starts on Chichagof, make it early as possible to keep enemy from getting away under cover of darkness. | |
| 1815 | | | | From Col Zimmerman (SF GO) for relay: Has located Co L 17-B Has driven Japs out of pocket near lake. Japs counter-attack. L Co, with Capt Fomer & 10 men of B-32 has gone to clean out pocket of Japs near start of valley, after which they will join Wallace under the Starline area. | |
| | | | | From: Gen Landrum (Col Carter) to Col Zimmerman: Relayed by Col Oulin: Bottle up Chichagof Valley: From: Col Zimmerman to Gen Landrum: OK, will do it with few less men than last night, but line will be thin due to width of valley. | |
| 2000 | | | | Gen Landrum ordered 80% all personnel alerted. All units informed. | |
| 2100 | | | | Col Redden reported Artillery planned harrasing fire during the night, asked for OK on targets # 4, # 7B, # 16 and east side of river in Chichagof. | |
| 2115 | | | | Col Hertl, 19-1, reported all patrols out. | |
| 2118 | | | | After call to Col Zimmerman, Col Oulin reported to Gen Landrum - Japs pretty well cleaned up in valley. E Co got about 20 in gulch & closed in on them; results unknown. Two companies will continue to clean up & defend valley. Col Zimmerman plans on bringing other troops up for attack tomorrow. It will take 4 hours for fastest units to get up to ridge. | |
| 2140 | | | | Col Oulin called Col Reddin, giving Col Zimmerman's okay on artillery firing. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

~~NORTHWEST LAMAR, PAGE~~

FROM: 0001 30 May 1943

TO: 0000 30 May 1943

~~SECRET~~

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Date | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|--------------------|------|----------|-----------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0030 | | | | 17-1 reported to GP: Asked about Navy Star shells falling in Chicago. | |
| 0030 to 0100 | 0100 | | | 17-1, Beach White & 3rd Bn CP reported to GP: No change in situation. | |
| 0130 to 0200 | | | | Lt Boyd telephoned G-3: No change in situation. | |
| | | | | 17-1, Beach White & 3rd Bn OP reported to GP: No change in situation. | |
| | | | | Lt Boyd telephoned G-3: No change in situation. | |
| | | | | 17-1, Beach White & 3rd Bn OP reported to GP: No change in situation. | |
| | | | | GP to Magic 2: No change in situation. | |
| 0343 to 0354 | 0355 | | | 17-1, Beach White & 3rd Bn OP reported: No change in situation. | |
| | | | | GP to Magic 2: No change in situation. | |
| 0455 to 0458 | | | | 17-1, Beach White & 3rd Bn OP reported: No change in situation. | |
| | | | | GP to Magic 3: No change in situation. | |
| 0500 | | | | 3rd Bn OP to GP: Co I observed tracer fire & noted action up Sarana Pass near Cold Mtn, at about 0445. Fog closed & obscured further observation. | |
| | | | | GP to Magic 3: Reported contents of report of Co I. Lt Allen at Magic 3 stated sniper action had been reported earlier in area near Cold Mtn. | |
| | | | | GP to 3rd Bn OP: Requested Co I to inform GP of any further action in vicinity of Cold Mtn & classify. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

FROM:

(Organization)

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

TO : 0601 23 May 1943

0400 23 May 1943

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Pated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|--------------|------|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0638 | | | | 3rd Bn OP to CP: Co I reported no further action in vicinity Cold Mtn A reports only one tracer bullet observed. | |
| 0640 | | | | 3rd Bn OP to CP: Reported action in vicinity of Cold Mtn: sounds like M2 fire & artillery shells. Too foggy to observe from Co I. | |
| 0642 | | | | Co I to 3rd Bn OP relayed to CP: Action is along north shore of Lake Nicholas. Rifle, M2 & possible M1 grenades rather than artillery. Also some rips in vicinity of Cold Mtn. | |
| 0643 to 0656 | | | | Tracer from Lake Nicholas area occasionally fall into valley towards position held by Co I. | |
| | 0658 | | | 1F-1, Beach White & 3rd Bn OP reported situation unchanged. | |
| 0715 | | | | GP to G-3: Reported information given at 0641 by 3rd Bn OP. Unable to confirm G-3 stated they had report of action in vicinity of Lake Cores. | |
| 0730 | | | | To Col Gulim: From Col Zimmerman: Small group of Japs came out of gulch in Cold Mtn into valley last night - may have been trying to get back into Chickagat within own lines. They made another crack at the CP (presumed to be rear CP of 3rd Bn 17th) but were driven off. Front lines quiet during night. Col Zimmerman wanted rear boundary designated (fix area of responsibility of forward & rear troops). Is checking damage of yesterday. Co F was out all night & thinks there may be some japs in trench #3 on Cold Mtn. The proposed attack will depend on ability to reconstitute forces on top. Found four groups of dead Japs (X1 - 100 - 34 & unknown number). | |
| | | | | From Capt Taylor: Report of action near Lake Nicholas by I Co repeated. All quiet on top of Mountain. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 30 May 1943

TO: 2400 30 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Date | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|-----------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| | 0745 | | | From Col Gulin to Col Stewart: Information listed above reported. | |
| 0916 | | | | 3rd Bn CP Co I reports action Cold Mtn. Tracers seen by Co I some 700 yards to right rear. Upon questioning determined this could have come from (1) Lake Nicholas area (2) Cold Mtn area (3) Sarana valley floor. Fighting is known to be in progress this area. | |
| 0920 | | | | CP to G-3: Report above given. Also report of suspected emplacements of enemy near Naval Landing Area 711. | |
| 0940 | | | | To Col Gulin from Capt Beatty (Col Zimmerman's CP) - continuing action of yesterday. Bjerk cleaning out Cole Mtn. Last night several got down into valley, formed a pocket which was cleaned out at 0800. At time of conversation, was sweeping valley with skirish line, Col Nelson, 32nd Inf, in charge. Col Zimmerman still had plan to get Co "A" & "C" of 4th Inf back on Fish Hook Ridge - intending to put them behind Fredricks (32-2) & Smith (17-3) to bring home attack. Bjerk too. (It is presumed this means "A" & C 4th Inf behind 2nd Bn 17th & Co F 17th behind 32-2). Is leaving in floor of valley Co B, 32nd Inf, now slowly collecting, also K, L & M Co of 17-3, Co I of 17-3 is on nose of Sarana Ridge. Gen Arnold reports considerable amount of troop activity down Chishagof valley towards beach inside the Fish Hook. | |
| 1005 | | | | Above information reported to Gen Landrum by Col Gulin: Gen Landrum asked Col Gulin to relay to Col Zimmerman the following information: Fixing of rear boundary line impracticable. Expects to get a telephone line in the Southern Force in an hour & wants Col Zimmerman to give him a recommendation as to what he can hold as his reserve | |

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UNIP JOURNAL

NORTHWEST LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 30 May 1943

TO: 2400 30 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Pat. ed | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|--------------------|------|----------|--------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| | 1005 | | | <p>(Cont'd) in the regroupment of troops. Gen Landrum wanted to know what Maj Fredricks was doing - Is he following up reported movements? Has been reported troops driven off but not followed. Contact & find out what is going on.</p> <p>17th to Col Gulin: Medics want to get through message to Maj Potter asking for help (litter bearers), in getting casualties down. There are respectively 28, 28, 30 & 100 in Smith's Bn - about 500 including G & D companies in 32-2. Are wiping out basket of about 30 Japs huddled together. Japs took it & refused to surrender.</p> | |
| 1130 to 1230 | | | | <p>Col Gulin talked with Gen Landrum - then Beattie - then Costner about the general situation. Accurate report of positions of all units Southern Force given Gen Landrum.</p> | |
| 1330 | | | | <p>Relay for Gen Landrum to Col Zimmerman (thru Col Gulin) Make sure of co-ordinating line between W & S forces. Make sure of a signal for commitment of W force in mopping up of the valley.</p> | |
| 1455 | | | | <p>Col Gulin called Col Finn, giving corrected position report of troops of Southern Forces & getting information as to time required for preparation for attack.</p> | |
| 1510 | | | | <p>From Col Zimmerman: 3rd Bn, 17th Inf, is attacking down Chichagof Valley & the right of the Bn is at the South end of Lake Ceres. 2nd Bn of the 32nd has not yet moved and will hold until effect of other is seen. 4th Inf holds high ground (present position). Col Zimmerman will inform when 32-2 is starting. Col Gulin called Gen Landrum, giving him the above information. Gen Landrum stated he would inform Col Gulin when Col Finn was to attack.</p> <p>Col Gulin called Col Finn giving this information & information as to the time of his departure from GP.</p> | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 30 May 1943.

TO: 2400 30 May 1943.

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1540 | | | | Message: To: Fillmore From: NLF CP "Land all troops immediately at White Beach with full field equipment, including rucksacks." | |
| 1550 | | | | Col Gulin, Maj Mathias, Maj Jackey & group left for front via White Beach. A-T platoon landed on Black Beach, transferred to Beach White. | |
| 1600 | | | | Message: To: NLF CP From: Fillmore "Does all troops include 50 men of Service Co unloading ship?" | |
| 1610 | | | | Platoon of Cannon Co (Detachment 3rd Bn) landed Black Beach. | |
| 1648 | | | | Message: To: Capt Lowjoy, Fillmore From: NLF CP: Land A-T & Cannon Co organizational equipment White Beach after troops landed. Land Headquarters Co equipment Black Beach when possible. WO Mabs to gather all Regtl Hqs equipment & land Black Beach when possible. | |
| 1700 | | | | Message: From: Fillmore To: NLF CO "Will Cannon Co now on Black Beach remain?" Answer requested for loading of rucksacks. | |
| 1704 | | | | Message: From: NLF CP To: Fillmore "Cannon Co personnel landed, will go to White Beach. Send rucksacks White Beach." | |
| 1710 | | | | Lt Mapes, 17th Inf, Hq, reported that the 2nd Bn 32nd jumped off on time (1830); that the SF was now nearing Chichagof Harbor proper. That two prisoners were taken & that one (1) enemy Lt captured stated that the attack the evening before was an all out effort; that no one was left in Chichagof except the wounded; that care should be taken for booby traps. The above message was forwarded to Col Gulin at White Beach at 1713. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

(Organization)

FROM: _____

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

TO: _____

0001 30 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Serial No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1735 | | | | Col Gulin phoned directing a patrol of one reliable officer & several enlisted men (with machine-gun) patrol the shore line of East Bay. | |
| 1737 | | | | 3rd Bn notified GP that "L" Co had moved down into Chichagof valley at 1734 & at 1802 had moved 500 - 700 yds down valley. Message: To: Fillmore - Maj Lovejoy From: GP "Send all possible individual weapons to White Beach at once." | |
| 1800 | | | | Patrol under Lt Turner left to patrol East Bay in L CM. | |
| 1803 | | | | 3rd Bn GP reported that L Co had progressed a mile down into the valley. Hears firing on right. Has no contact on the right, but patrols are seeking them out. Lt Col Finn now in the bowl, B Co of 17th in behind Co L & filling in gap. | |
| 1818 | | | | Col Gulin called in instructions to Col Yeats. Col Stewart, C of S called. Stated prisoners captured indicated that 1000 enemy had made the attack of the evening before. This would indicate some 700 left on island unaccounted for. | |
| 1835 | | | | Col Huggins, Artillery CO, called, stating he had artillery liaison groups available & could deliver fire. | |
| 1840 | | | | C of S called, stating Southern Force had progressed down almost to Chichagof Harbor. Little resistance. | |
| 1850 | | | | 3rd Bn reported contact with the 2nd Bn, 32nd of the Southern Forces on right. | |
| 2040 | | | | Col Castner called asking that information be relayed to Col Zimmerman that the two prisoners captured had given the following information. One prisoner stated that two groups of 1000 made | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

Southern Landing Force
(Organization)

FROM: 0000 30 May 1943

TO: 2400 30 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser No. | Line No. | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|-------------|---|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 2040 | | | | (Cont'd) attack out of Chichagof the preceding night. The other stated one group of 1000 had broken through. Gen Landrum wants a quick count of Japanese dead in valley to find out number of enemy unaccounted for. Prisoner stated that all seriously wounded Japs in Chichagof had either committed Hari-Kari or had been shot prior to the counter-attack of last night. | |
| 2155 | | | | Message: To: Commanding Officer, Holtz Bay From: Transport commander, "Request you phone Commander Anderson asking time of departure of Rear: 1000 30 May 1943." | |
| 2200 | | | | Message: To: Transport Commander Front Yeats "Information impossible to ascertain. Is known that barge will leave tonight." | |
| 2204 | | | | Col Culin called from forward OP 3rd Bn giving Lt Col Yeats following information to relay to Gen Landrum: "3rd Bn is on Chichagof Beach. Will take up position west of river facing east across end of Bay and across and in front of Southern Landing Force. One Co is searching West Peninsula. Scouts (presumed to be Alaskan Scouts) report enemy going across in direction of Sarana Bay. No resistance 3rd Bn, little resistance encountered by Southern Force." | |
| 2208 | | | | Gen Landrum notified. Unheld positions organized. This called to Col Culin. | |
| 2210 | | | | Message: To: CO Regt From: G-2 "What troops are in Chichagof and what is their disposition?" | |
| 2225 | | | | G-2 reported that Col Green, 17th, reported to them one hour ago that they were 600 yds from beach. Recent report, unconfirmed, indicated that 30 to 75 Japs broke through south of Lake Caries headed SW. Another even more recent report stated there was firing in that area. It may be that rear elements of the Southern Force are engaging these Japs. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 30 May 1943

TO: 2400 30 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser No. | Time Noted | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|---------------|--|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 2250 | | | | Maj Mathias called in stating: Prior information stood. One company is searching Peninsula. If this company cannot complete searching by eleven they will come back and take high positions overlooking this area. Col Culin will stay in 3rd Bn CP. Col Hartl is to be notified that Maj Chandler will be in Lt Col Finn's forward CP. Position is organized as per instruction of Gen Landrum. | |
| 2315 | | | | Col Gertle notified Maj Chandler with Col Finn. | |
| 2330 | | | | Message: "Lt Col Finn, 1st. Please report every two hours. Break through vicinity Lake Goree by 73 enemy has been reported. What information do you have concerning this movement? Indicate depth of your position and lateral contact with 1 Co North Force?" | |
| 2345 | | | | 1st Turners patrol returned CP. Single enemy encountered on East Arm Bay side. | |
| 2350 | | | | Col Finn reported the company he sent out had thoroughly cleared 1000 yds of Chichagof Peninsula and had been moved back on high ground overlooking Peninsula. NW of Co L reported rebent headed North from Peninsula. This reported to G-3. | |
| 2355 | | | | Movie Red & White Beach clear. | |
| 2400 | | | | Reported to G-2 & G-3. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 31 May 1963

TO: 2400 31 May 1963

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Det'd | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0030 | | | | <p>Red Beach reported fire by their HQ's on two (2) unidentified aircraft (barges)</p> <p>CP called Beach Party at Black Beach, informing them of message from Red Beach. Following message sent USS Filmore. "Red Beach friendly HQ's fired on two small aircraft. Possibly two Naval Craft ordered by this Hq. Be alert."</p> <p>S-2 notified G-2, advising them of action & the fact message to Filmore was to be sent in clear.</p> <p>CP called Coast Commander, Navy for information. Anderson stated one XP boat & one LCU had been dispatched from Massacre & were due Holtz Bay at 2230.</p> <p>On calling Red Beach, Lt Henny reported no further identification of craft had been made. Lt Henny cautioned by Col Yeats. Lt Henny reported craft had not been hit.</p> | |
| 0050 | | | | Hq BCT 17-1 (Movie Red Six) reported that they had had unconfirmed report of automatic fire Red Beach area at troops. (Lt Sheffer) | |
| 0055 | | | | Lt Grantham, RLQ Liaison, reported from 3rd Bn rear CP that there was no change in tactical situation. He reported seeing craft in East Arm Holtz during late evening (these are our own craft unloading Filmore) | |
| 0058 | | | | Report from Beach White (No change) | |
| 0100 | | | | Movie Red (17-1) reported change tactical situation. Confirmed Red Beach firing. | |
| 0105 | | | | RLQ S-2 reported to Div G-2 & G-3. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHVALE LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0000 31 May 1943

TO: 2400 31 May 1943

~~SECRET~~

| TIME | | Ser No. | Line Cat # | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|------------|---------------|--|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0130 | | | | <p>Black Beach reported message to Fillmore had not cleared. Following message sent - "Have boats from Massacre reached you? Did they report being fired on? Any hits? Expedite answer." Signed Yeats, Lt Col.</p> <p>Black Beach reported back ship would not receive blinker (coded) continued to try radio.</p> <p>Lt Grantham at Mansion Mine CP (3rd Bn) reported that Capt Dixon, whose force had relieved Co "A" in Holts - Sarana pass, had observed three long flashes of light at 10 minute intervals (last occurring at 0127) looking north Massacre Bay.</p> | |
| 0130 | | | | Movie Red (17-1) reported no change Red Beach. | |
| 0152 | | | | Beach White reported no change. | |
| 0409 | | | | Capt Dixon phoned CP confirming prior information but adding that there was also some intermittent rifle fire in same area, (down Sarana valley towards Massacre Bay from his position). His understanding enemy approaching from that general direction. | |
| | 0420 | | | Above reported to G-2 & G-3 by Lt. Reynolds. | |
| 0430 | | | | Movie Red reported no change in situation. | |
| 0500 | | | | G-2 called in report of Engineers who reported bird calls & intermittent firing in Sarana Massacre pass junction. (This is probably what Capt Dixon observed) | |
| 0501 | | | | Mansion Mine reports Capt Dixon still hears action to his South. | |
| 0502 | | | | Mansion Mine CP reports all quiet. | |
| | 0503 | | | G-3 informed situation MLF. | |

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UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 XI May 1943

TO: 2400 XI May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Taken | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0530 | | | | Relay from G-3 to Movie 3 (17th) can not be accomplished. | |
| 0545 | | | | Movement of about 30 Japs from Cole Mtn to the NW towards the vicinity of Holts-Massacre Pass reported by G-2 & relayed to 3rd Bn S-3. Capt Nixon is aware of situation. | |
| 0550 | | | | White Beach reported all clear. | |
| 0555 | | | | Reported situation to G-2 & G-3. No change. | |
| 0745 | | | | UP hurried 1st landing on beach patrol into east valley of west arm of Holts Bay today. Units notified. | |
| 0750 | | | | Col Gulin (at 3rd Bn CP) advised Hq that 32-3 is to continue mopping up attack this morning 0800. | |
| 0815 | | | | Information as to continuation of attack passed on to Capt Kingham, Co A. Col Probert, 14th FN reported Chap Turner killed in attack night of 29th; Lt Owens, A-T Co hospitalized and in serious condition. | |
| 0830 | | | | Col Higgins reported unconfirmed rumors that 15 - 20 unarmed Japs were in Holts-Massacre Pass wandering around. | |
| 1030 | | | | 1st Jorgensen called from Div CP stating Tokyo radio last night announced fall of Attu. G-2 believes force of 200 Japs moving towards Cape Khlebnikov. Apart from this group, 40 reported in Chichagof valley floor near Massacre end. G-2 now discounts stories of Jap prisoner of 2 forces of 1000 men broke out during evening of 29th. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 11 May 1943

TO: 2400 11 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser No. | Time Ret'd | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|---------------|---|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1030 | | | | Col Culin ordered one (1) LC (Engineer) to Chichagof Beach to check for mines; to send 30 men & 1500 G rations to Beach Boyle. Col Culin calling LFC for permission have Bay swept for mines. Detail sent out under Lt Turner. | |
| 1045 | | | | Message: To: Maj Lovejoy or Lt Thomson, Fillmore. "Load LCV with 1500 G rations, send LCV to beach to pick up 30 men. Both boats to go out to Chichagof arm with rations for 3rd Bn." | |
| 1050 | | | | Platoon of 30 men, including Lt Duncan, evacuated to Fillmore. Capt Duncan, Co K, reported on board Fillmore - serious head wound. | |
| 1105 | | | | Lt Condr Anderson called - Army Hq at Massacre Bay has requested transportation be furnished 40 men & equipment of 75th Sig Co from Holtz to Massacre Bay on June 1. Anderson wanted to know if anything would prevent their being sent to Massacre Bay on LOT now in Bay. Requested Ensign Boyle call him at once. | |
| 1110 | | | | G-2 reported USS Castro would unload guns in 5 minutes by firing. This called to 3rd Bn. | |
| 1200 | | | | Message: To: Maj Lovejoy, Fillmore. "Send all 105 Amn Black Beach" signed Yeats. | |
| 1220 | | | | 3rd Bn reported 99 enemy dead, 1 wounded prisoner in their sector of Chichagof. This information called to Col Gardner. | |
| 1225 | | | | 7 LFC has ordered minesweeper to cover harbor. | |
| 1230 | | | | Maj Potter, Div Surgeon, reported all 32nd Medics & Band Ltr reported safe in attack 22-29th. Capt Haverling promoted to Maj. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHEN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0001 21 May 1943

TO: 2400 21 May 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Pat | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|----------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1930 | | | | Col Culin called in CP. No change. | |
| 1605 | | | | 17th Inf patrol working on East Valley of West Arm of Holts Bay returned. Report negative. | |
| 1805 | | | | Col Culin called, stating "A" Co of 17th Inf was coming down into Holts Bay area by way of signed trail; Co C 17th Inf to be transported to Holts Bay by boat. Rations & heating units are to be transported directly to Chichagof Harbor which has been swept. | |
| 1900 | | | | Lt Grantham reported Col Culin, Col Baber and others were returning. | |
| 2100 | | | | Col Culin, Maj Mathias, Lt Grantham, Lt Shepard, Lt Egan, Lt Col Baber, all returned to CP. | |
| 2215 | | | | Message 3 to Hagie 3 - Reported that A & C companies of 17th Inf were at this time being brought back to the East Arm of Holts Bay; that ROT 32-3 & ROT 17-3 were co-ordinating in the defense of Chichagof Harbor area. | |
| 2218 | | | | Regt'l S-2 reports he is reporting to G-2 direct from Chichagof area. | |
| 2225 | | | | Message: To: CO all Units, From: CG Landrum. "Until further instructions, all personnel will be instructed that in personal mail no comment, no mention will be made of geographical locations & no indication that the individual or unit has been in or near enemy action. Strict confinement to personal matters will be required. Unit censors see training circular 15". | |
| 2230 | | | | CP notified unloading of Fillmore to continue until 030300. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 1 June 1943

TO: 2400 1 June 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Patrol | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|-------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0020 | | | | Lt Col Finn, Commanding Officer BCT 32-9 reported that he had three (3) more prisoners under guard - one badly wounded, two slightly wounded. Capt Manov (Regt'l S-2) is to report as soon as he has them interrogated. One prisoner is thought to be an officer. | |
| 0050 | | | | Movie Red reported all secure. | |
| 0059 | | | | White Beach reported all secure. | |
| | | | 0100 | GP reported all secure to G-3. | |
| 0130 | | | | Capt Manov, S-2, reported that on interrogation of three prisoners captured in Chichagof he found one of them to be a Warrant (Provisional) Officer and two of them to be privates. Prisoners stated that the attack of yesterday was 1000 men strong and was personally led by Col Yamasaki, the Attn Defense Comdr. The original defense of Chichagof Harbor consisted of between 500 to 750 troops; That at the time of the attack of our forces there were only two hundred (200) troops left in Chichagof harbor of which 150 were wounded, the others having either been killed or scattered. When asked "How many escaped into Sarana", one private said "70 or 100". S-2 said complete report would follow. | |
| 0150 | | | | Movie Red reported no change in situation. | |
| 0153 | | | | Beach White reported no change in situation. | |
| | | | 0200 | Reported no change in situation to G-3. | |
| 0240 | | | | S-1 BCT 17-1 reported all of companies A, C & D were back in East Arm of Bolta Bay. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHEN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0000 1 June 1943

TO: 2400 1 June 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Past | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|-----------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0230 | | | | Movie Red to Mansion: No change, all secure. | |
| 0257 | | | | White Beach to Mansion: No change, all secure. | |
| 0301 | | | | Report on last hour to Magic from Mansion. | |
| 0350 | | | | Movie Red to Mansion: No change, all secure. | |
| 0355 | | | | White Beach to Mansion: No change, all secure. | |
| 0455 | | | | Movie Red to Mansion: No Change, all secure. | |
| 0500 | | | | White Beach to Mansion: No change, all secure. | |
| 0500 | | | | Report on last hour from Mansion to Magic 3. Line to Mansion Blue has been out since 0315. Reported fact line was out to G-3. No connection through Movie Green. Linemen are out. | |
| 0545 | | | | Lt Killian reported LOT unloaded that came in at midnight from Pillmore. | |
| 0552 | | | | Beach White reported all clear. | |
| 0600 | | | | Called Movie Red: No Officer on duty. | |
| 0607 | | | | Report to Magic 3 -- No change. | |
| 0640 | | | | Called Capt Kingham who reported that: 50th Engrs had been fired on by enemy at about 2130 last night. Enemy, about 30 strong, thought to have received fire from other end of canyon on side of Cold Mtn & moved forward towards Engrs. Engrs withdrew when dark, leaving squad of Co A's platoon exposed. Kingham sent squad to reinforce platoon. 50th Engrs ordered back after Kingham contacted Maj Beck. Ordered back at 0130 but not in position until about 3:30. Engr fired on Japs on ridge SE of Holtz-Mascewe this AM. Kingham to report whether Japs cleared out - actions of 50th Engrs for morning. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE

(Organization)

FROM: 0001 1 June 1943

TO: 2400 1 June 1943

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0640 | | | | Capt Dixon reported 4 Japs between Sarana Pass & Fish Hook on atolls. Did not know where they came from. | |
| 0645 | | | | Called Hanson Blue OP. Nothing to report. Prisoners captured 2145 last night, -- all wounded. | |
| 0840 | | | | Col Gulia called Col Finn. No activity. 3 prisoners. Found 12 more dead Japs. 3rd Bn to be ready to move when called. Tentatively decided to place them in East Arm Helts Bay when relieved. | |
| 1110 | | | | By message from 1st Lt. ... to ... that and representatives would be allowed to take Japanese equipment. | |
| 1235 | | | | Capt Currell, ADG, (Gen Harris aide) checked out this Bq (A 1 BN) to Massacre Bay, has been working with 78th CA. | |
| 1400 | | | | Message: To: CO ROT Shore Party Black From: Trans Comdr "Can you supply 100 Pr of woolen socks sizes 11 & 12, 200 razor blades & 100 tooth brushes for hospitalized." | |
| 1435 | | | | Message: To: CO 32nd From: Comdr. "FBI with Gen Buckner should land at Helts Bay at 1900. Pilot will pick up Mr. Handelman." | |
| 1920 | | | | Gen Buckner's FBI landed in harbor. | |
| 1945 | | | | 6 of 8 called issuing the following orders: All Engineers & all AA units except Fox Btry to be returned to Massacre Bay tomorrow morning on LOT 995 & LOT 994. LOT 994 towing LCM will arrive at Helts Bay tonight. 40 MM of George Btry to be loaded on LOT 995 tonight. - LCM is for your use to move FA from Red Beach. | |

SECRET

FROM: 2000 1 June 1943

TO: 2100 1 June 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|------------|---------------|---|-----------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1600 | | | | Gen Buckner & Col Culin arrived HIF CP. | |
| 1630 | | | | Gen Buckner, Col Culin & Maj Jackson visit hospitals & inspect area. | |
| 1715 | | | | Message: To: CO all units Front Landing CG "There is a possibility of approaching enemy aircraft. Unit Commanders will pay particular attention to dispersion & proper protection of personnel". | |
| 1730 | | | | All units concerned in movement of A1 & Bng units informed of latest plans. | |
| 1900 | | | | Commander Anderson informed us LPT was to arrive Molts Bay 2300 this evening. Red Beach notified. | |
| 1940 | | | | Capt Manov & Lt Jorgensen arrived from Chichego Wtr, S-2 reported. | |
| 2100 | | | | G-1 called stating: Replacements will start coming in tomorrow. 17th Inf will receive the bulk. Replacements will be received between June 1 - 15th. 400-600 EM & 40 Officers will be received. Ltr was published by Div this date stating men evacuated to base hospitals will for most part be returned in grade & for this reason vacancies should not be filled too readily. Replacements will be received in grade & excess absorbed. To take up slack, some of our HQ's will not be returned & ADC will hold vacancies open for them. We are to hold positions for ADC control for administrative matters this date. | |
| 2300 | | | | Message To: Capt Whiteside From: Mr. Bette. Estimate will take 7 days to unload Fillmore by working from 0600 to 2300 each day. | |

SECRET

FROM: 0001 1 June 1943

TO: 2400 1 June 1943

SECRET

| TIME In | TIME Out | Ser. No. | Time Patrol | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|--|-----------------|
| 2030 | | | | Message: To: Capt Higgins, Fillmore. From: Yeats. "Send Schayer ashore at once." | |
| 2200 | | | | Mansion Blue reported situation unchanged. Movie Red reported all patrols out; nothing to report. Beach White patrols out; nothing to report. Dixon's patrols are out; nothing to report. | |
| | 2220 | | | Reported to G-3. Lt Allen, G-3 Office, stated 32-2 & Co's B, C, & D of 32-1 have been pulled back from Obichagof & are covering the Messengers between point "A" & Cold Water. Co "B" has 1 platoon (in rear) & 70 men. Is known Lt Fenne, Andrews & Hamilton are OK as is Capt Fenne. G-2 not requiring reports. | |
| 2250 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| 2300 | | | | Mansion Blue reported all clear. White Beach reported all clear. | |
| 2340 | | | | Message: To: Lt Yenni or Lt Killian; From: S-1 "Am sending 75th Sig Det to Fillmore tonight to assist Capt Higgins. Send them on first available boat after they arrive at the beach. | |
| 2345 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| 2355 | | | | White Beach reported all clear. | |
| 2358 | | | | Capt Dixon's patrol (Obichagof Pass) reported all clear. | |
| 2400 | | | | Mansion Blue reported all clear. | |
| | 2400 | | | Reported no change in situation to G-2. | |

SECRET

FROM: 0000 2 June 1943

TO: 2400 2 June 1943

SECRET

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|------|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0025 | | | | LOT (#2) has arrived in Holtz Bay. | |
| 0050 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| 0055 | | | | Beach White reported all clear. | |
| 0059 | | | | Mansion Blue reported all clear. | |
| 0148 | | | | Beach White reported all clear. | |
| 0155 | | | | Brown Beach (Chichagof) reported all clear. | |
| 0156 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| | 0200 | | | Reported to G-3 situation unchanged. | |
| 0240 | | | | Dixon's Patrol (Chichagof Pass) reported all clear. | |
| 0243 | | | | Beach White reported all clear. | |
| 0245 | | | | Beach Brown (Chichagof) reported all secure. | |
| 0246 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| 0341 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| 0345 | | | | White Beach reported all clear. | |
| 0400 | | | | Capt Dixon's outpost reports all clear. | |
| 0405 | | | | Brown Beach reports all clear. | |
| 0410 | | | | Mansion reported to Magie 3 all clear. | |
| 0445 | | | | Movie Red reports all clear. | |
| 0452 | | | | White Beach reports all clear. | |
| 0516 | | | | Capt Dixon's outpost reports all clear. | |
| 0551 | | | | Movie Red reports all clear. | |

SECRET

UNIT JOURNAL

NORTHERN LANDING FORCE
(Organization)

FROM: 0000 8 June 1943

TO : 2400 8 June 1943

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|------|-----|----------|------------|---|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 0554 | | | | White Beach reports all clear. | |
| 0559 | | | | Brown Beach reports all clear. | |
| 0600 | | | | Capt Dixon's outpost reports all clear. | |
| 0608 | | | | Mansion reported to Magic 3 all clear. | |
| 0609 | | | | Lt Giller, 75th Sig, phoned to tell Capt Prather that he & his men will go to Fillsore on prescribed detail as soon as LCT is unloaded (around 0700). | |
| 0654 | | | | Mansion Five reports all clear. | |
| 0830 | | | | Gen Buckner, Col Gulin, left CP for West Arm Holts Bay & Chichagof Hbr. | |
| 0930 | | | | G-3 notified CP that Lt Farnham & 25 riflemen & L/MG section would reconnoiter islands at entrance of Chichagof Hbr. | |
| 0935 | | | | Lt Boyd notified 3rd Bn CP (S-3) | |
| 1020 | | | | Lt Col Harrison & Capt Holt (49 FA) reported to CP. Lt Col Baber, ADG Ord Officer reported to CP. | |
| 1215 | | | | Call to Mansion 5 from Col Gulin. Gen Buckner to have FBI at West Arm Holts Bay at 1500. | |
| 1220 | | | | Called Lt Miller, 7th Signal, to get message to port for FBI. | |
| 1324 | | | | Lt Miller stated Navy called stating General's FBI would arrive Holts Bay at 1600 this date. | |
| 1405 | | | | Gen Buckner & Col Gulin arrived at CP. | |
| 1600 | | | | Ex Off, S-1, Ass't S-1 left for Chichagof Hbr, Red & White Beaches with supplies. | |

SECRET

FROM: 0001 2 June 1943TO: 2400 2 June 1943**SECRET**

| TIME | | Ser. No. | Time Dated | INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ETC. | Action Taken |
|--------------------|-----|----------|------------|--|--------------|
| In | Out | | | | |
| 1630 | | | | Gen Buckner & photographer left on PTI. | |
| 1715 | | | | LGT with Coast Arty left Hells Bay area for Massacre Bay. | |
| 1900 | | | | Ex Off, S-1, Ass't S-3 & 4 reported to GP. | |
| No time specified: | | | | (1) Preliminary plans for initial occupation of Attu Island received by CO HLF by telephone in afternoon. | |
| 1900 | | | | (2) Informal Staff conference on plan (grouping | |
| to | | | | discussed approximately 1930. | |
| 2300 | | | | (3) Plans completed for sending Btry G, 78th GA, 3rd Plat Co B, 13th Engr, 1st Plat Co A, 13th Engr & B Co 30th Engrs on foot to Massacre Bay as per division order received earlier in the day completed. Baggage is to be sent on SS Fillmore. | |
| | | | | (4) Plans for reconnaissance of area to be occupied made. | |
| 2346 | | | | Mansion Elms reported all clear. | |
| 2353 | | | | Movie Red reported all clear. | |
| | | 2404 | | Reported to G-3, situation unchanged. | |
| | | | | Comments: Unloading of Fillmore continuing day & night - Maj Bearas in charge of Beach & Capt Whitcomb running boats. Details being taken from all units. | |
| | | | | 30% alert of commands & double guards continuing. | |

SECRET

Messages received prior to Journal being kept.

NOTE: CO NLF had no staff available until 17 May 1943.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. P. 10 HO. 10

COORDINATED ATTACK AT 1600 W. ARM 1512

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

1164 GROUND WEST 1512 1512 HELTZ MAY 14 1943

No. DATE MAY 14, 1943

To BOULDER

COORDINATED ATTACK AT

~~1600~~ ¹⁶⁰⁰ W. REQUEST NAVAL GUNFIRE FROM ~~1600~~ ¹⁶⁰⁰ CONTINUING UNTIL NO LONGER NEEDED. FIRE WILL BE CALL FIRE AND SPOTED BY SFC 3. GENERAL AREA IS BEACH BLACK AND INLAND. REQUEST SHIPS MOVE IN AS CHASE AS POSSIBLE.

REQUEST AIRCRAFT TO BEGIN STRAFING AT ~~1550~~ ¹⁵⁵⁰ MIN. ON SAME TARGET AS FIRED.

1438
3153

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HO. 10

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE

To

ON MAY 13. CONTINUE UNTIL ~~1600~~ ¹⁶⁰⁰ WHEN THEY ARE REQUESTED TO MOVE ~~WEST~~ ^{SOUTH WEST} WITH ADVANCING TROOPS. TROOPS WILL CARRY ORANGE FRONT LINE PANELS. DO NOT STRAFE CLOSER THAN 100 YARDS IN FRONT OF TROOPS. THERE WILL BE TROOPS MOVING FORWARD FROM ~~HILL~~ ^{HILL} ~~TO~~ ^{TO} ~~BEACH~~ ^{BEACH} AND NORTH OF THIS AREA. REQUEST YOU ALSO

1438
3153

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

TO KM0449 TO KM1249 TO KM1443

WIKK UP ~~UNSAFE~~ REQUEST BOMBS
BE DROPPED ON ENEMY INSTAKATIONS
AT M0842. REQUEST YOU ALSO WATCH
FOR AA BATTERIES NORTH OF TARGET 30
ON EAST ARM.

COLLIDER 14/30
SKB

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. 3

DATE 14 MAY 70 13

TO C.O. 1ST BN

THE SCOUT PLAT WAS UNDER FIRE FROM
MG LOCATED ON RIDGE ^{RIGHT} ~~LEFT~~ OF HIGHEST
HILL NOW OCCUPIED BY 1ST BN. THIS GUN
WAS UNDER MORTAR FIRE YESTERDAY AND TODAY
BUT IS AGAIN IN ACTION. THERE IS SMALL ENEMY
PATROL UP THE GULCH FROM ALASKA SCOUT POSN.
OFFENSIVE ACTION BEING TAKEN ON PATROL
CANNOT COMBAT MG FROM THIS RANGE.

ALASKA SCOUT PLAT LDR

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1445

TIME SIGNED

Shampton 1st Lt

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

SECRET

14 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43

To _____

ENEMY IN POSITION VALLEY
EAST OF HOLTZ BAY MOVING TOWARD
BAY USING AA GUNS TRACTOR

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43

To CO 1 BN 17 INF

LITTLE PROGRESS ON HOLTZ BAY
MASSACRE BAY PASS ATTACK BY
32 DASH 1 ON RIDGE SOUTH HOLTZ
BAY SARANA BAY PASS HAS REACHED
CREST OF RIDGE

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1250

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43

To CO 1 BN 17 INF

COLONEL CULIN CONGRATULATIONS
TO YOU AND YOUR COMMAND
ON YOUR FINE PROGRESS KEEP UP

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER M 2 TIME SIGNED 1800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43

To C.G. DIV.

ATTACK PROGRESSING SLOWLY. MEETING NUMEROUS AUTOMATIC WEAPONS
CULIN

S-3 ALG 32 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 1358

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER CAPT. MATHIAS

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT RA

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. 18HV 0LB DATE 16 MAY

To CO 1ST BN 17 INF

CO. C 3RD INF HELD UP BY MACHINE GUN AND MORTAR FIRE, FORCED TO DIG IN WAIT FOR VISIBILITY. MAIN FORCE SITUATION UNCHANGED.

1637
JR.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1646

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 1770 MSG CEN NO. 3 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43

To C.G. 7th DIV.

REQUEST HAVE CHIRIKOFF UNLOADED RED BEACH.
CULIN

161746
CS

C.O. RIG-34 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 1115

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Mathias

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

NO _____ DATE 5/11/43
TO S-3, OR C.O. 3200/NF.

ENCLOSED M.G. RECEIVED
FROM 7TH SCOUT CO - RELAYED
TO YOUR HQ.

S-1, 3RD BN 3200/NF.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2045

TIME SIGNED

John P. Garrison, Cpl. Inf

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED 1720 MSG CEN NO. 4 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43
To C.G. 7th Div

THANK YOU FOR YOUR
COMPLIMENTARY MSG.
WE HOPE TO CONTINUE PRO-
GRESS TO ALL OBJECTIVES.
CULLIN

(Signature)

C.O. RLG 32 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1715 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Mather, Capt SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED 2140 MSG CEN NO. 3 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 16 MAY 43
To HQ 1st Div

FOR COLONEL CULLIN
REPORT PROGRESS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 35-5000 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

16 May 1943

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE | |
| To | | |
| <p>Entire Holtz Bay Area in our position. Bulk of Troops occupy high ground celebrating Fd W. Arms. etc overly showing our complete disposition also captured documents.</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) R |
| No. 6 | DATE 17 May 43 | |
| To GML V Boulder | | |
| <p>For CULIN CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND YOUR TROOPS IN CAPTURING HIGH GROUND BETWEEN VALLEYS THIS</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED 0756 | MSG CEN NO. 1 | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) "O" |
| No. | DATE 17 MAY 43 | |
| To CO 15122000 | | |
| <p>FOR COL. CULIN REQUEST STAFF OF FIRST BN. 32 ND INF IS IN TACT AND AVAILABLE TO YOU INDICATE IF DESIRE</p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 2-701 | | TIME SIGNED 0750 |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

1633

MSG CEN NO.

6

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

17 MAY 43

To

REGT C.O.

RELAY FROM THIRD
PLATOON 7TH RECONNAISSANCE
NEGATIVE ENEMY SIGHTED
2 OR 3 MILES TO YOUR
REAR SEND PATROLS TO
SCARLET BEACH TODAY

G 27D14

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

0926

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

OVER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

1430

MSG CEN NO.

3

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE 17 MAY 48

To

CO 1st BN 17 INF

SIGN SALLEY'S COUNTER SIGN
ALLEY FROM 12 00 MAY 17 TH
TO 12 00 18 TH 48

OVER

163-701 ✓
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1430
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE
SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

17 date

Patrols operating vicinity
red beach stellar Cove.

at Old CP. in mountains approx
2 mi no of black beach.

no evening contact & will
contact 18 April 52

↓
you.

St. Thompson

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) R |
| No. 6 | DATE 17 May 43 | |
| TO | | |
| ADVANTAGE MUST BE IMMEDIATELY EXPLOITED BY YOU WITH MOST AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO LIQUIDATE ANY POSITIONS FROM WHICH FIRE WILL INTERFERE WITH PERSONNEL LANDINGS ON BLACK BEACH THE IMPORTANCE FOR PUSHING THE | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) R |
| No. 6 | DATE 17 May 43 | |
| TO | | |
| ENEMY AWAY FROM HOLTZ BAY WATER AREA IS EMPHASIZED BY PLANS TO REINFORCE YOU BY ONE INFANTRY BATTALION WHICH EXPECTED ARRIVING OFF HOLT TRUE BAY LATE AFTER-NOON MAY 18 ABILITY TO LAND THIS | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN No. | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) R |
| No. 6 | DATE 17 May 43 | |
| TO | | |
| BATTALION TO BLACK BEACH MUST BE ASSURED | | |
| <div style="border: 1px solid black; border-radius: 50%; padding: 10px; display: inline-block; margin: 10px;"> 1255 S.I.T. </div> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | TIME SIGNED | |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. 4 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 17 MAY 43

To CO 1ST AN 17 INF

TO CULIN ARE YOU RECEIVING FIRE FROM NORTHEAST ENTRANCE TO HOLZ MASSACRE BAY PASS IF SO QUANTITY AND TYPE OF FIRE AND LOCATIONS FROM WHICH RECEIVED.

OVER

G2 TDIV
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

L440
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. K4VVAYE DATE 17 MAY 43 PG

To CO REGT

REPORT PRIOR TO 1930W GRID COORDINATE LOCATION OF YOUR FRONT LINE AND FLANKS, ALSO AREA TO THE FRONT AND FLANKS CONTROLLED BY YOUR PATROLS. GIVE LOCATION BY 500 YD DISTANCE OF PRINCIPLE OF COMBAT ELEMENTS.

G2 TDIV (1753)
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1775
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. 8 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 17 MAY 43

To CO 1ST AN 17 INF

OUR TROOPS HAS BROKEN IN TO SUPP PASS AND MAY BE ABLE TO GO THROUGH. INDICATE THEY NOW 1000 YDS. NORTH OF THE SOUTH MOUTH OF THE PASS

G2 TDIV
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2032
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO. 9

HOW SENT

IPAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

17 MAR 50

To

CD 135 VIT

FOR CALL IN ANSWER TO MY
EXPLICIT ANSWER TO MY
1725 W CALLING FOR
AN EXPLICIT REPORT

GIRTDIL

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2238

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER.

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE _____

To: *SEA 22-1-56*

SEK VIK BIRT
SEK CALP

CO BT

Report on SS - W.M.S.
enemy

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED *2253*

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

DO NOT UNDERSTAND YOUR MESSAGE
UNCL BT49 C - 49FA IS
IN ACTION AT BEACH
C.O. OF 49FA WAS ON FILLER


OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

FROM LT. EDWARDS
A.T. PLAT. 3rd BN. HQ. CO.

TIME 1540

DATE 17 MAY 1943



Have contact and good where you placed me day before yesterday
5 man patrol working to their car. Lt O'Brien and 1600

17 May 1943

Beginning of NLF Journal

Materials collected by Msg Center 1st Bn Hq Co, 92nd Inf.

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. 1 | DATE 18 MAY | |
| To C.O. 32ND INF | | |
| CONTACT COL. CULIN FOR ORDERS | | |
| FOR ALASKAN SCOUTS, LT | | |
| TOMPKINS AND 16 MEN | | |
| ARE ON BEACH SCARLET. | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|---------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE 18 MAY 43 | |
| To CO 1ST BN 17 INF | | |
| COUNTER SIGN 1200 TODAY TO | | |
| 1200 MAY 19 IS VILLAGE SMITHY | | |
| DISSEMINATE REPEAT OR OUGHLY | | |
| G 2 17 INF | | 0655 |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER | | |

| | | |
|--|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. 1 | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE 18 MAY 43 | |
| To G-2-7 DIV | | |
| WE HAVE PATROLED | | |
| INLAND IN VALLEY EAST | | |
| ARM HOLTZ BAY AS | | |
| FAR AS (861-3512.8). | | |
| NO ENEMY RESISTANCE TO | | |
| THAT POINT | | |
| CULIN JT | | 1200 |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT RAD

621 V D B T MESSAGE 1
(CLASSIFICATION) (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. _____ DATE 18 MAY

To REGT CO

FOR COL CULLIN REPORT NAMES OF OFFICERS WHO SHOULD BE RECEIVED FOR CAUSE IF ANY, AND NAMES VACANCIES EXIST DUE TO CASUALTIES OR RELIEF FOR CAUSE LANDRUNA

(0401 JR)

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 171136

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

GPO 18-20188

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

MADE RECON OF STELLAR COVE

3 EXCEPTIONAL LANDING BEACHES

BUT SHOULD BE OUT-POSTED.

OTHER OUT POSTS SAME AS

YESTERDAYS MESSAGE. OBSERVED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

SINGLE ENEMY TRACKS BETWEEN

BEACH BLACK AND SCARLET. PREPARED

TO OUTPOST STELLAR COVE

FROM HERE. ADVISE

Ally Opa 21210

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 395 E.B. TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>2</u> | DATE | |
| TO | | |
| IN ENTERING THE VALLEY TO THE NORTH. IT WILL THEN ADVANCE, WITH LEFT ASTRIDE FISH HOOK RIDGE, SEIZE BUFFALO - FISH HOOK RIDGE, CONTINUE ATTACK TO NORTH SEIZING PLATEAU SOUTH OF ATTU VILLAGE, THEN ATTU VILLAGE. IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT NO | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE | |
| TO | | |
| ENEMY ESCAPES FROM ATTU VILLAGE PAST OUR RIGHT FLANK IN THE DIRECTION OF LAKE CANIRCA AND LAKE CONES, THE THIRD BN, 17TH INF WILL REMAIN IN PRESENT POSITION ON THE CHICHAGOF VALLEY FLOOR AND WILL NOT BE MOVED FURTHER | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| | | |
|--|----------------------|--|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE | |
| TO | | |
| FORWARD EXCEPT ON ORDER THIS HQ. | | |
| G-2 7TH DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | 1700 TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | LANDRUM SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THREE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

059

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

RAD.

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

NO

DATE

18 MAY 43

TO

CO 1 BN 17 INF

OUR TROOPS HAVE BROKEN
IN TO MASSCRE BAY HOLTZ
BAY PASS AND MAY BE
ABLE TO GO THROUGH. REPORT
THEY ARE NOW 1000 YDS NORTH
OF THE SOUTH MOUTH OF
THE PASS

G 2 7 DIV.
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2032
TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

18 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**

To **CO REGT**

COUNTERSIGN ONETWO ZERO NIENTEENTH MAY TO ONE TWO ZERO ZERO TWENTY MAY IS LITTLE SYMPATHY

G 22 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **0800** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27880-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. **4** HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**

To **CO REGT**

REQUEST LOCATION LT COL. LYNN'S WITH WDC/IE PRESENT, YOUR FORCE DIRECTI^{ON} HLM, PROCEED ACCENTUATE AS SOON AS PRACTICAL PER ORDER E.G. WDC ANY SCHEDULE FLIGHT PRY AUTHORIZED CASPO WILL ARRANGE NOTIFY THIS HQ IMMEDIATELY

G 2-701V OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **0835** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27880-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**

To **CO REGT**

FOR COL. CULIN NOTIFY MAJ A.V. HARTL OF HIS PROMOTION ON BATTLEFIELD TO GRADE OF LIEUT COL. REPORT NAMES OF OTHER OFFICERS WHO HAVE DEMONSTRATED OUTSTANDING QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP WHO YOU RECOMMEND FOR PROMOTION AND FOR WHOM

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **1050** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27880-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**

To **CO REGT**

VACANCIES EXIST ALSO NOTIFY FIRST LIENT WM DAVIS Co B SEVENTEEN AT ONCE OF HIS PROMOTION TO CAPT.

G-2 ~~7TH~~ **7TH DIV. (LANFOR)** **1050**
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-8780-1

⑨ THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

(CLASSIFICATION) **SECRET** (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) **FJ**

No. **3644** DATE **19 MAY 43**

To **REGT**

REPORT SITUATION IN PROGRESS

Ailey *110P* *Answered*

G-2 7 DIV **1245**
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

GPO 16-20158

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **14** MSG CEN NO. **5** HOW SENT **RAD**

4 **MESSAGE** (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION:)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**

To **CO REGT**

FOR CULIN CAPTURED MATERIALS WILL BE SAFELY GUARDED X TAKE AS NORMAL ES FOR CARE AND PRESERVAION USEING FULL ITEMS ISSUEING TO TROOPS AUTHORIZED ON YOUR ORDER

G-2 7 DIV **1330**
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-8780-1

12

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED 1600 MSG CEN No. HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)
(CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 19 MAY 43

To CO REGT.
CP MAY BE RETAINED IN PRESENT POSITION
UNLOADING WILL HAVE TO BE DONE HERE BUT ANY SUPPLIES DESIRED WILL BE SHIPPED THERE.

G2 7 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1430 TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER 13

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 19 MAY 43

To CO REGT

WITHOUT DELAY SEND REINFORCED RIFLE COMPANY TO TAKE OVER CoK 3d Bn 17th Inf 5th Div MISSION OF HEBREW AT HOLTZ BAY MASSACRE PASS. EXPECT

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1459 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-37580-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 19 MAY 43

To

TO RETURN COMPANY TO YOU DAY AFTER TOMORROW. LET ME KNOW HOW THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. THIS FOR COL CULIN

G-2 7TH DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1459 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER
* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-37580-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE
(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE 19 MAY 43

To CO. 52, INF (BY AIR GROUND)
PLANE WILL ARRIVE AT
1600

[Handwritten Signature]

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 6L10 TIME SIGNED _____

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

GPO 16-20185

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE
(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE 5/19/43

To G-2 - LF 7

Reference your message 1248
174 moving into position for
defense of Holly Bay Area.
Elements 32-30 moving out
to attack per Division
order.

[Handwritten Signature]

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 TIME SIGNED 15/15

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE
(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE 19 MAY 43

To G-2 Tth LF

Due to patrols going out for
long duration necessary we have
post up for next three days

[Handwritten Signature]

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER S-2 NLF TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 7/19/43
TO CG LF 7

I co 32nd Inf leaving shortly to relieve Helms & take over their mission per your order message of 1459.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

16
THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 19 MAY 43
TO CO 1ST BN 17 IN

COUNTER SIGN TWELVE HUNDRED PWT TWENTY MAY TO TWELVE HUNDRED 21 MAY IS FOLLOW THROUGH TWELVE HUNDRED 21 MAY TO TWELVE HUNDRED 22 MAY IS JOLLY FELLOW TWELVE HUNDRED 22 MAY TO 1200 23 MAY IS SMOOTH SAILING.

G 2 2 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1615 TIME SIGNED
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER (14) 16-8018

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 7/19/43
TO CG LF 7

32-3 patrol progressed across Snow-Ebit Ben Holly Bay along beach 300 yds & is proceeding up pass to ridge. No disposition as yet.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

①
TIME FILED _____ THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**
To **REGT. CO**

**BUT GENUINE OFFERS SHOULD
BE ACCEPTED AND
CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN
ENEMY WOUNDED**

G27DIV
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1620
TIME SIGNED

**AUTHORIZED TO BE
SENT IN CLEAR**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

A
TIME FILED _____ THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **19 MAY 43**
To **REGT CO.**

**IT IS DESIRED THAT ALL
PERSONNEL BE REMINDED
OF THE URGENT NEED FOR
PRISONERS TO BE QUESTIONED
CAPTURE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED
BY EVERY SECURITY MEANS
TO GUARD AGAINST TREACHERY**

G27DIV
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1620
TIME SIGNED

**AUTHORIZED TO BE
SENT IN CLEAR**

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 5/19/43

To G4-LF7

Estimate only 2 days C & K rations left for all troops. Request be kept at least 5 day ahead for 3500 troops. Necessary keep C & K rations on hand for troops out in front. Need 32-3 + 1st Hq Co. 32-1 kitchens. Need officers.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

Memphis. All LCM's out of ... if ... of ... Need 200 ... other ... of 32-3 ... 32-1 ... here.

5-4 NLT

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER *Roark*

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3006 DATE 11-24-43

To REGT CO

REPORT SITUATION AND PROGRESS

1st ...

627 DIV

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

14
THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 5/19/43
To C. G. LF7

4 Co 32-3 left 1640 relieve
Helms 32-3 patrol still
advancing no opposition. Artillery
fire placed on 15-30
located at 805.7-3510.9
Helms suffered 4 casualties
moving toward Shichang
Harbor & arty fire followed.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER NLF 1715
TIME SIGNED
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

15
THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 5/19/43
To C. G. LF7

reports at 1740 that
patrol near Mt Ridge
relieving the first but
still in contact with
to top. some smoke
planned below.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER NLF 1750
TIME SIGNED
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 5/19/43
To C. G. LF7

arty fire placed on enemy
at reported position & drop
them back. 32-3 patrol
still advancing. Sending
overlays on map showing
new positions.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER NLF 1842
TIME SIGNED
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

NAME FILED (20) THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 5/19/43
To G-4 LFT

Need immediate replacement
of 2 complete 81MM mortar
equipment & attachment with
repair tools & parts for
repair.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER G-4 LFT TIME SIGNED _____
AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

NAME FILED 31R THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT ITAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 19 MAY 43
To REGT. CO

REQUEST REPLY
IMMEDIATELY TO WHERE
ABOUTS GUNBOATS OF LT
COLONEL LYNNE - CONT

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER G27DIV TIME SIGNED 2155

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

2 27 54

MSG CEN NO.

SENT

RAO

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

To

MITHWOC OBSERVER

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

G-2-70W

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(Signature)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27800-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

19 May 43

To

G-2 TLF

Colonel Lyman Smith left by plane at 1600 19 May 43 in connection with earlier circuit received same date

File 170

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

S-1 NLF

TIME SIGNED

235-8

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(Signature)
WUSG Capt 5-1

19 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **954** MSG CEN NO. _____ HOV **NT** **RAO**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **20 MAY 43**

To **CO REGT HQ**

COUNTER SIGN 1200 NOON 20 MAY TO 1200 NOON 21 MAY IS FOLLOW THROUGH DISSEMINATE THOROUGHLY

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **G2-7014** TIME SIGNED **0830**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **[Signature]**

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1943 16-27280-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **[Signature]** MSG CEN NO. _____ HOV **NT**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **5/20/43**

To **E-4 LF7**

Items needed NLF
Mitchell Coys 32-3, 32-1 less C+D Co's
Cigarettes & Matches
2 LCM(3) tank lighters
Marine jeep 32-1
1000 Canteens 100 lbs
C. K. D+B ration 500 troops
Colman lantern

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **[Signature]** MSG CEN NO. _____ HOV **NT**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____


Personal supplies
1000 Canteens 32-1
BA 400 batteries
43
37
27
M. E. #13, 600 crew repairman man

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED **1535**


AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **[Signature]**

OVERLAY OF DEFENSE - See Para 1, 1st Bn 17 INF

DET. AT SCARLET BEACH
1 sqd. 81MM - 7 MEN - Co. D
1 sqd. RIFLEMEN - 10 - Co. A
AID MAN - 1
COM MENS - 3
OFFICER - 1



TERRAIN MAP
OF
ATTU ISLAND
SCALE 1/20,000



20 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 7 MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT AD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 21 MAY 43

To RGT. CO

COUNTERSIGN FROM 1200
NOON 21 MAY TO 1200
NOON 22 MAY IS JOLLY
FELLOW DISSEMINATE
THROUGH

G-27 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 0800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER (2)

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT AD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 21 May 43

To FOR CULIN

PUSH MISSION NOW ENGAGED IN AUTHORITY
GRANTED TO USE FORCE YOU BELIEVE REQUIRED THIS
DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REFER TO EITHER COWBOY
OR COWGIRL
SIGNED LASSIE

1329 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR (23) SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 45 MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT AD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)


No. DATE 21 MAY 43

To CO REGT HQ



CAPT BAGLEY ADC WILL REPORT THIS HQ FOR ORDERS ISSUED ON HIM

G-1-7 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 2350


AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER (1)



32
 32 PATROLS



← TAKEN AT FEMME BAY



21 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 10 MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT RAO

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 22 MAY 43 To CO REST HQ

PERSONAL WILL BE RETAINED UNTIL CAPTURED ENEMY STORES AND SKIPPONS ARE THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND WILL IF DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS MUST BE FOR THE COLLECTION AND STUDY OF CAPTURED EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL IS AN INTER-SENCE OPERATION OF SERVICE

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER (3)

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED (1) MSG CEN NO. HOW

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE May 22 1943 To All Organizations of NLF

A daily ammunition report as of 1200 each day will be sent to S-4 NLF at NLF Hqts. It will reach this Hqts by 1400 and will show expenditure of preceding 24 hrs and the amount on hands. It will cover all types of ammunition used by the organization

For S-4 NLF OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 1030

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR Capt C C Heather SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED (3) 453 MSG CEN NO. 2 HOW SENT RAO

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE To

arms fire & no large guns.

S-2 NLF OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED 1050

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 22 MAY 43

To CO REST HQ

CONT. AND SUPPLY LIMITS. UNIT
C.O.S WILL BE RESPONSIBLE THAT
TROOPS ARE NOT PERMITTED TO LOOT
CAPTURED MATERIAL AND BE REMINDED
THAT LANDING FORCE FIELD
COURTESY IS THE PERSONAL
APPROPRIATION OF DOCUMENTS
BY PERSONAL NOT ASSIGNED TO SHIGYATA

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 22 MAY 43

To CO REST HQ

COUNTER SIGN FROM 22 & MAY
22 TO 22 & MAY 23 IS SMOOTH
SAILING

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

May 21 '43

Subject: Supplies ~~to be~~
To: C.O. Northern Landing Force

1. The following supplies are now in C.M. supply dumps:

200 Towels bath
94 Bags Baracks
140 Blankets
200 Inocuum wool
125 Shirts wool
144 P. shoes service
150 mittens asbestos
400 P. leggings
120 tent shelter half.
1234 Cots canvas.

Rations:

1 1/3 Days "C"
3 Days "K"
1 1/3 Days "D"

2. Division G-4 has been contacted and request for following was made:

7 Days "B" rations
Tents + Poles
Kitchens and equipment
Medical supplies
BA-43 radios Batteries
Telephones
Clothing - socks, underwear, rain suits.
Ammunition

3. G-4 stated that every effort would be made to get supplies to this Hq. at once, but due to air raid alert and bad weather delay may be expected.

Frank L. Roark Jr
Major - Inf.
S-4.

Capt Link states that police of mountain area between Holtz Bay and Red Bluffs progressed well today

HLG

22 May 1943

BOL CLIN VARIOUS REPORTS INRIRICATE

MUCH LOOTING OF JAPANESE SUPPLIES

CAPTURED AT HOLT BAY X YOU WILL TAKE

ALL REASONBLE MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD

THIS PROPERTY C S

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 5 MSG CEN No. HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) ZL

No. LYLV JGV DATE 23 MAY

To REGT CO

REPORT YOUR ATTENTION WITHOUT DELAY & REPORTS DESIRED 0700-1200-1900 DAILY.

G27 DIV (OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER) 0850 (TIME SIGNED)

(9919 JR)

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER (D)

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 1 MSG CEN No. HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 23 MAY 43

To REGT. CO.

COUNTERSIGN FOR PERIOD 1200-23 MAY TO 1200-24 MAY IS SLY SLEUTH

G27 DIV (OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER) 0935 (TIME SIGNED)

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER (D)

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|---|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| | | URGENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>4</u> | DATE <u>5/23/43</u> | |
| To <u>R 2 - LF 7</u> | | |
| <p><i>Give us countermeasures for next four days from 1200 to - day out.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 NLF</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1042</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>[Signature]</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|---|--|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| | | URGENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. <u>3</u> | DATE <u>5/23/43</u> | |
| To <u>General Landrum</u> | | |
| <p><i>one LCAC tank lighter needed urgently. Need Kane for boat repair. Only 3 LCVP (P) operating.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>C. R. NLF</u> | | TIME SIGNED <u>1045</u> |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER <i>[Signature]</i> | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <i>[Signature]</i> |

| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
|--|--------------------------|---|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| | | |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION) | | |
| No. | DATE <u>May 23, 1943</u> | |
| To <u>S-1, NLF</u> | | |
| <p><i>Following named interpreters are joining you: George Hayashida, Fred Tanakatsubo, Shige Ito. the following enlisted men of G Btry 28 CA are assigned for their protection: Pvt. Hutchings, Pvt. Amin, Pvt. Dyet.</i></p> | | |
| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER <u>S-2 4 Div</u> | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER <u>Capt C. C. Prather</u> |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 3 MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 5/23/43

To E-2, LF7

Intelligence Patrol reports Enemy location 865.3-3511.1 + 865.7-3511.1. 32-3 located 865.0-3510.7. These approximate & conflict west, others reported 4th mi over hill to right 1/2 mile. Contact still established. Our arty + M 24 moved up 0930 mi started advance 0945. OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER ip small

TO BE CLEAR. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 11 MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 23 May 43

To Col. Culin, Comd. North Force

A meeting was held at 1100 today at which time I changed each Company Commander with proper discipline of his men in relation to enemy dumps.

I regret Yesterdays occurrence and will make every effort to prevent its repetition

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1202

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER North Lt. Col.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 8 MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 23 May 43

To W.O. Sandens.

The Personnel Clerks from my Companies are at RED BEACH.

I have instructed them to move over land and report to you for duty.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1250

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER North Lt. Col.

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **TRAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **23 MAY 43**

To **REGT. CO.**

THE FORCE SIGNAL OFFICER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROMPT DISSEMINATION OF WARNINGS OF HOSTILE AIR ACTIVITY THAT OFFICE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY FASTEST MEANS USING

C. G. 7 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **15-43** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **(6)**

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **TRAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **23 MAY 43**

To **REGT. CO.**

ANY MEANS AVAILABLE. MESSAGES PRECEDED BY WORD FLASH TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OTHERS

C. G. 7 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **15-43** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **(6)**

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE
(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. _____ DATE 23 MAY 43

To ALL UNITS

THE FORCE SIGNAL OFFICER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROMPT DISSEMINATION OF WARNING OF HOSTILE AIR ACTIVITY. THAT OFFICE WILL BE NOTIFIED BY FASTEST MEANS USING ANY MEANS AVAILABLE

MESSAGES PRECEDED BY WORD FLASH TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OTHERS

SIGNAL OFFICER
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1545
TIME SIGNED

LANDRUM
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

GPO 16-90158

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE May 23, 1943

To Unit Journal

Lt Col Delong + Col Jolley de-
parted for Messers Bay 1915
by US & Kane

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE May 23, 1943

To Unit Journal

Lt Col Delong + Col Jolley de-
parted for Messers Bay 1915
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OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

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|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE | |
| To | | |
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| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE | |
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| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

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|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY | | |
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE May 23, 1943 | |
| To 14 Field Hosp, 4, Colad, | | |
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| OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

You will send number of men indicated to My Center NHI immediately for receiving party.
 45 Reg 36 men
 2 Med 10 men
 15 men 2 Co
 Capt. J. H. [unclear]

16
THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE May 23, 1943

To: At Col. Peabody

We are asking you to furnish 5000 simulated funds and 5000 simulated stores to send to the 3rd Bn 32 Inf in First Delta. ~~As a result of report to you~~
~~for the~~
By order of Col. Peabody
Capt. C. Peabody

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

S-1, NLF
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE May 23, 1943

To: S-1, NLF

Following named interpreters are joining you: George Hayashida, Fred Tanakatsuba, Shigeo Ito. The following enlisted men of G Btry 28 CA are assigned for their protection: Pvt. Hutchings, Pvt. Amm, Pvt. Dyer.

S-1, NLF
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Capt. C. Peabody
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(4) One tank lighter needed. Urgent. Need Kane
for boat repair. Only three LCVP's operating.

23 May 43

1100

To Mr. Landrum

Tel to Col Hockel. Port C.S. - says 2
tank lighters, Kane or 1/4 ton B section,
or may be - tried yesterday but turned
back as it ^{is} rotten. Will send a barge
when available with LCM in
Cradle.

17⁰

At Canyon - no change in site. Hot
red BO's and rations

Jayce - poor visibility - no change - flat floor.
was pinned but got back out -

Amun eggs last 24

30 cal MG - 250 chert
60 X101 - 597 rds
81 MM (L) 139 rds
81 MM (H) 65 rds
75 MM (HE) - 338 rds
37 MM (HE) - 130 rds

low flat top hill.

double nose - rounded.

snow top - trenches on top -

1100. Withdraw from Ch Pass effort

Assess cost -

dep comm with Co B 4th -

1645 - Call from Gen. Landrum re
reported air attack - he had no info
on this - said our air was up - was
giving negative report as to our status
here

Bar. Holding wide front

COB possession high grade.

North - South

kept on knoll SW of mud Brake

most places to get from ones

3rd Bar

On (Barrel)

Cal 30 M1 - 38 cases (14)

Cal. 30 1903 - 4 cases

Cal 30 MG - (250 rd chest) 680 chest

Carbines - 1 case

* 60 MM - 882 rds

81 MM (L) - 355 rds

81 MM (H) - 230 rds

81 MM (S) - 396 rds

85 MM (HE) 22 rds

95 MM (S) - 237 rds

37 MM (HE) - 240 rds

• Gren (Fuz) - 22 cases

Gren (OFF) - 6 cases

Gren (AT) - 8 cases

5/23/43

1030

1. 20-35-15 groups Japs attacked ^{our plane} down off Hell left Chicago of Mass. Our arty. + ^{men} opened fire & pinned them to ground. Definite info of strength etc positions unknown.
2. Col. Ferguson reported flight 15 bombers ~~from~~ ~~the~~ ~~islands~~ ~~reached~~ ~~west~~ ~~of~~ Uluk. P-38's intercepted & shot down 5. We lost 1 plane rescued pilot & 1 missing.
3. Lt. Kretzer reports negative on patrols. Captured documents on way from 3rd Lt. Sgt. m.c.g.
4. Captured documents received. No information of value contained in captured documents.

23 May 1943

①

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 922 MSG CEN NO. 1 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 3/24/43

To CO, Det 17th Inf Scarlet Beach

Red Beach reported at 0115
direction N.W. elevation 30°
3 distinct white lights seen
at an estimated distance
of 5 miles. Did you note
this from your O.P. 0000, 43

8000
 24 MAY 43
 C. M.

S. J. N. F. 0920

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____
 SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER [Signature]

②

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION) _____

No. _____ DATE 24 MAY 43

To _____

NO LIGHTS OBSERVED

SCARLET BEACH OP

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1010
1110

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

GPO 10-20156

24-
arrived on 21st. Left at 1200

Lt. Col. Yates
Capt. Oliver
Langston
Sternman
Lt. Boyd
Shepard
Capt. Bennett
Lt. Swinick
Lt. Murray
Capt. Habits (Chap)
Lt. Grantham
Lt. Egan
Lt. Harrington

col. Farley & maj. Myers A.D.C.
arrived by boat from Massachus
Bay 1500

May 24/43

65088 / M.M.A. E. were dead

Large number of our casualties carried Carbene

24 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|------------|------------|----------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO | HOW SENT |
|------------|------------|----------|

MESSAGE
(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. _____ DATE 25 MAY 43

To _____

ALL UNITS COUNTER SIGN 1200
WT 25 MAY TO 1200 WT 26 MAY
IS SHALLOW LAKE

GN
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

0442
TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

*** 8-10640

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|------------|------------|----------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO | HOW SENT |
|------------|------------|----------|

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 25 MAY 43

To CO REGT HQ

COUNTER SIGN 1200 25 MAY TO
1200 26 MAY 43 IS SHALLOW
LAKE

62-7014
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1350
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|------------|------------|----------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO | HOW SENT |
|------------|------------|----------|

MESSAGE
(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. _____ DATE 25 MAY 43

To NIXE

COUNTER SIGN FOR 1200 WT 26
MAY TO 1200 WT 27 - MAY IS
THUNDER CLOUD DISSEMINATE
THOROUGHLY

GN
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2030
TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

*** 8-10640

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3

DATE 25 MAY 1943

To

JAP POSITION NOW AT (865.8 - 3511.1)
 OUR TROOPS NOW AT HILL LEFT OF
 CHICKAGO PASS. K+L+M Co. ARE ON
 THIS HILL; (865.6 - 3511). ONE OF
 OUR MORTARS BLEW UP 30 FEET
 FROM US. 1 MAN BUILT. HURT.
 I Co. To be IN RESERVE. Firing
 NOW INTENSE.

INT. SGT.
 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1645
 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Sgt. N.W. Olson
 SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. ①

DATE 25 MAY 43

To CO REGT

FOR COL CULLIN. ELEMENTS NORTH
 FORCE WILL ADVANCE RAPIDLY
 NORTHWARD ASTRIDE STREAM
 RUNNING NORTH IN VALLEY
 INCLOSED BY FISH HOOK RIDGE.
 PROTECT FLANK. SOUTH FORCE
 WILL ASSIST NORTH FORCE IN
 SEIZING FISH HOOK RIDGE AND

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

LT00
 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(V)

5-3

Itan Valley

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|----------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 時分 | 時分 | 日 | 日 | 月 | 月 | 著 | 者 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 著信發 | 著信發 | 3/23/73. | | | | | |

To all Unit Commanders Concerned

1. Elements NLF will advance rapidly northward astride stream running north in Valley enclosed by Fish Hook Ridge. Protect flanks.

2. SLF will assist NLF in seizing Fish Hook ridge & entering valley to the north. It will then advance with left astride Fish Hook Ridge, seize Buffalo - Fish Hook Ridge, continue attack to north seize plateau south of Attu Village, then Attu Village.

In order to insure that

| | | | | | | |
|--------|---|---|---|---|-----|---|
| 發 者 | 月 | 日 | 時 | 分 | 地信號 | 於 |
| 受 者 | 月 | 日 | 時 | 分 | 地信號 | |

no enemy escapes from
Atlix Village just our
right flank in direction
Lake Canica & Lake Cories.

(3) 17-3 will remain in present
position on Chicagof Valley
floor & will not be moved
further forward except
on order Sq. L.F.

General Landrum

1700

S-2

| 發 | 月 | 日 | 時 | 分 | 地 | 於 |
|---|-----------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 者 | 月 | 日 | 時 | 分 | 址 | |
| 受 | | | | | 信 | |
| Received from | S-2 LF 70 | | | | 信 | |
| given to unit 9 LF at once. | | | | | | |
| Jap. light signals. | | | | | | |
| • To have LMG & Heavy Weapons dispose in various positions. Remaining weapons await further orders. | | | | | | |
| — • To have each Pl. take position. | | | | | | |
| • • — To have LMG & Heavy Weapons commence firing. | | | | | | |
| • • To have rifles commence firing. | | | | | | |
| • • — To fire flares | | | | | | |
| — • • To report enemy situation | | | | | | |
| • • — Take offensive | | | | | | |
| Circular movement of light - Calls | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 發 | 月 | 日 | 時 | 分 | 發 | 於 |
| 者 | 月 | 日 | 時 | 分 | 地 | 信 |
| 者 | | | | | 者 | 信 |
| 受 | | | | | 發 | |

attention to Right flank Unit.

Vertical Mount. of light - calls attention to Right flank Unit.

Horizontal - Attention Mountain Guns.

-- Send out scouts.

... Charge with hand grenades.

.. -- .. Prepare for assault.

.. -- . Change one part ??

... -- . Start message.

25 May 1943

5/11/43

Landed Beach Scarlet

0530, took up approach

March formations and arrived

in rear of valley of the

Willy Boy 1530. Kation

and ammunition dropped

by plane 1600. Rested troops

for night. 7th Recon inns

one platoon reported $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles

behind me 2400.

5/12/43

approach march started

0400 and entered valley 0600

Remain in area and final

orders issued, attack jump

off 0800 - advanced down

valley under fog for 200

yards before enemy barbed

wire fence. About

10-12 MGs

at various intervals

fire fight at long range
We continued to advance
A.A. enemy fire was laid
~~down~~ ~~repair~~ ~~at~~ ~~all~~
~~day~~ ~~our~~ ~~advance~~ ~~was~~
stopped after 600 yds by
enemy fire where we dug
in to await arrival of
Recon. mortars. patrols
were active by both ourselves
and enemy. Fight went
on all night

5/13/43

Recon came in to
reinforce scout co. actively,
and we began advance
again holding our left
flank and driving hard
on right to secure high
ground vicinity of
Late that afternoon we did

take it but were driven
 out by enemy reinforcements
 moving arriving from
~~the direction of the objective~~
 average 30 Mms of light
 and heavy type with riflemen
 and snipers estimated to
 number 35-45. Enemy
 A.A. again supported this
 defense and their attack to
 drive out our troops from
 high ground objective
 vicinity of
 Lack of mortar ammunition
 and artillery support against
 enemy A.A. & M.G. was the
 cause of my attack failing
 our mortar and 50 Cal
 did knock out one A.A.
 each. Enemy made a
 strong attempt to break

our lines by night attack
but were repulsed. Fight
went on all night.

4/14
Enemy attempted to
force a breakthrough by
concentrating but failed.
No mortar ammunition or
arty support was available
and I held up attack on
the promise it would come.
Snipers active all day.
M.G. fire constant.

4/15

We straightened out
our lines but again failed
to take high ground on
my right flank. Patrol
activity and sniper work
undisturbed. Enemy with down

from my front about
0200 ^{4/16} I am not sure
yet about high ground
on my right

4/16.

Enemy withdrawn about
0200. We began attack
10.00 to reach beach of W.
Arm Holtz Bay. at 0600
2 snipers killed by M6 fire
during advance - only enemy
sighted

W. H. W. Loughly
Capt. Under
Composite R
Scout - Reserve Coy.

SECRET

Notes from 7th Scout Company

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
RESTRICTED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 1945

Beginning consolidated RLG 32 - NLF Journal.

Materials collected by Regimental Hqs Msg Center.

25 May - 2 June 1943

307-700-3

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
RESTRICTED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Sully & Desmet
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *19 July* 1945

150-9 Vol I

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No

HOW SORT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

NO

DATE 25 MAY 65

TO

ALL UNITS X COUNTER SIGN
1200 WT 25 MAY TO 1200 WT
26 MAY IS SHALLOW LAKE

GV

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

0444

TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

SECRET

25 May 1949

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 1155 MSG CEN NO. 1 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE May 26/43

To G-2 7LF

REQUEST COUNTERSIGN FROM TWELVE HUNDRED MAY 27/43 TO 1200 MAY 31/43. REASON FOR REQUEST SENDING PATROLS ON SECURITY MISSIONS

Asst Adj NLF OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 1150 TIME SIGNED

[Signature] AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER [Signature] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE May 26, 1943

To AO, NLF

Amn Ppt 3rd Bn 27th Div 26 May 43

| | |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| <u>M-1 cal 30</u> | <u>48 cases</u> |
| <u>1903</u> | <u>16 "</u> |
| <u>Cashmere</u> | <u>1 "</u> |
| <u>MG</u> | <u>352 cases</u> |
| <u>60MM</u> | <u>576 rds</u> |
| <u>81 MM (A)</u> | <u>492 "</u> |
| <u>81 MM (H)</u> | <u>291 " no more</u> |
| <u>81 MM (S)</u> | <u>234 " no more</u> |

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1230

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 5-26-43

To AO NLF Amn Ppt 1200-5-26-43 3 Bn 32

| | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|
| <u>45 cal</u> | <u>- 1 case</u> |
| <u>25 MM (HE)</u> | <u>- 415 rds</u> |
| <u>25 MM (S)</u> | <u>- 270 rds (no more)</u> |
| <u>37 HE</u> | <u>- 460 rds</u> |
| <u>37 AP</u> | <u>- 90 rds { no more</u> |
| <u>37 Cas</u> | <u>- 160 rds {</u> |
| <u>37 M-1</u> | <u>- 27 cases (25)</u> |
| <u>37 M-1</u> | <u>- 1 case</u> |
| <u>37 M-1</u> | <u>- 9 cases</u> |
| <u>37 M-1</u> | <u>- 1 case</u> |

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1230

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR Amn Ppt 3rd Bn 27th Div 26 May 43 SIGNATURE OF OFFICER [Signature] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED | MSG CEN NO. | HOW SENT |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE 5-26-43 | |
| To | S-4, NAF | |
| Returns rpt 3rd Br 3rd Inf 1200-5-26-43 | | |
| C - 26 cases | | |
| D - 24 " " | | |
| K - 16 " " | | |
| Great S-4 3rd Br 3rd Inf | | |
| Wt Leimbury OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | 1230 TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED 1625 | MSG CEN NO. A | HOW SENT RAD |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE 26-MAY 43 | |
| To | St. Marshall - Scout | |
| Patrol has left rd. which on way to Scout post. | | |
| You patrol should contact them. Help way. | | |
| VORD | | |
| Lt. Croner - Bol Rent 1625 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

| | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------|
| TIME FILED 1647 | MSG CEN NO. 0 | HOW SENT MSGR |
| MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) | | (CLASSIFICATION) |
| No. | DATE May 26, 1943 | |
| To | All Organizations, NAF | |
| Org. Commanders will pick up from their men all the canned-heat not absolutely necessary for use of their men on outposts. All canned-heat picked-up will be turned in to the NAF S-4 for use by front line troops. Turn in as soon as possible. | | |
| S-H NAF OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER | | 1130 TIME SIGNED |
| AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR | Capt. E. C. Frather, Inf SIGNATURE OF OFFICER | SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER |

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 1647 MSG CEN NO. 6 HOW SENT MSGP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE May 26, 1943

To All Organizations, NLF

Org. Commanders will pick up from their men all the canned-heat not absolutely necessary for use of their men on outposts. All canned-heat picked up will be turned in to the NLF S-H for use by front line troops. Turning in as soon as possible.

1130
TIME SIGNED

S-H NLF
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

Capt E C Prather, Inf
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 1640 MSG CEN NO. 5 HOW SENT RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE May 26, 1943

To 75 Sig Det.

Send 1 man to Hq Co 1st Bn 32 Inf kitchen for KP duty for remainder of day.

1635
TIME SIGNED

Hq NLF Commandant
Capt E C Prather, Inf
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 26 May 1943

To REGT. CO.

COUNTER SIGN FOR 1200
26 MAY TO 1200 27 MAY
IS THUNDER CLOUD.

2030
TIME SIGNED

G 37514
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

26 May 1949

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 0825 MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 6 DATE 27 MAY 43

To NLF

COUNTERSIGN 1200 27th TO
1200 28 FLYING COLORS
Handwritten signature
0835

MAGIC 2 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 0745 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

811

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

FILE 939 MSG CEN NO. L HOW SENT RUN

SPB V KANE

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 27 MAY 43

To LT J G HAWY, SAKANA WAY

RETURN TO LEOPOLD PAIR TO
BY DAY X ATTEMPT TO
CONTACT LEOPOLD THRU HAWY
SMAY V L G X SAKA X ATTU X
Handwritten circled note:
1857
27 MAY 43
VIA MOVIE REID

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
 TIME FILED **1226** MSG CEN. NO. **1226** HOW SENT **RUN**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **May 27**

To **St Yenni**

minutes two sets + other trailers down to west end of Black beach to handle 105^{MM} guns and ammo coming in from Red Beach as soon as possible.

(1214)
1958
105

Has show Party CO.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

Capt EC Prather

1214
 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

S-1 NLF

W. D. Sig. C.
 Form No. _____
 (Rev. April _____)

WAR DEPARTMENT
 SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY

LOCAL DELIVERY LIST

G-2 LF 7
C.O. RLG-17-ATTN S-2

27 May 58

Time dispatched

Time returned

Message Identification

SIGNATURE IN FULL

L2

L3

(Signature)
27 May 58
1390
(Signature)

27 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. 7 HOW SENT TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 28 MAY 43

To NLF

AWCT QICP FEMM LUAN
MURF JEGC JITP XUQS
NOSK MOFF JEGC JITP NKVK
NOSK SAKL TAVK XAHP BNGJ
JIMK SIXT CLQP MIHV

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 0800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 28 MAY 43

To NLF

COUNTER SIGN 1200 28 MAY
TO 1200 29 MAY THISTLE
FLOWER

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER G72 SIGNATURE [Signature] TIME SIGNED 0800

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

Hq NLF

May 28/43

To: CO 78th CA

Furnish Lt Toste
with 6 men
immediately at message
center tent

By order of Col. Palmer
Cawhlem
Capt. Inf-1
Executive

28 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO. *71*

HOUR *11* DATE *79*

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE *29 MAY 43*

To

COUNTERSIGN FOR LZOO BY MAIL

TO LZOO 30 MAY LOVELY

LILLIAN

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER *G.V.*

TIME SIGNED *2045*

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. **36V 670** DATE **29 MAY**

To **REGT C6**

REQUEST REPLY OUR

MSG. 1200

DISREGARD

MENT FOR MOVIE

G2 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **1249** TIME SIGNED

1249 TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. **L** HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **29 May 43**

To **USS Casco**

29 May 43

18LD

DP.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **1812** MSG CEN NO. **2** HOW SENT **MSGR**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. **1** DATE **29 May 1943**

To **All units, Holts Bay and S.F. ORLE**

COUNTERSIGN EFFECTIVE 1200

29 MAY to 1200 30 MAY

"LOVELY ZILLIAN" ESPECIALLY

IMPORTANT YOU MAKE COMPLETE

DESSIMINATION OF COUNTERSIGN

TONIGHT

29 MAY 43

1926

D.P.

S-2, South Force OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **1830** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER **Menor, Capt** SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

29 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **TP**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **30 MAY 43**

To **C.O., N.F.**

COUNTERSIGN 1200-30 MAY

To 1200 31 MAY THIRSTY MILLER

[Handwritten Signature]

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED **0845**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **G.V.**

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **0950** MSG CEN NO. **L** HOW SENT **MSG R**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. **4** DATE **30 MAY 1943**

To **ALL UNITS, NORTH FORCE**

COUNTERSIGN EFFECTIVE 1200 30 MAY TO 1200 31 MAY IS "THIRSTY MILLER". IMPORTANT ALL TROOPS YOUR UNIT BE INFORMED

30 May 43
[Handwritten Signature]

5-2, N.F. TIME SIGNED **0950**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **Manor, Capt**

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. **408 V SBR** DATE **30 MAY**

To **REGT CO**

To MOVIE BLUE DO YOU NEED ANY MORE TRAILERS AT YOUR CLEARING STATION

62-701V TIME SIGNED **1946**

L939
JR

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 1026 MSG CEN NO. N HOW SENT MJGR

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 30 May

To Lt. Goodall

Return Tractor to motor pool
as Fillmore is in
Hensley

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 1026

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Robert J. Goodall SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER 1st Lt

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 2008 MSG CEN NO. 9 HOW SENT RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 30 MAY 43

To EN. C.P. ATTENTION COL YEATS

STARTED BAKING
BREAD - REQUEST SHIP-
MENT OF YEAST. NONE
RECEIVED.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TRANS. Comdr. TIME SIGNED 2005

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Sgt. V.F. Pille

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 2009 MSG CEN NO. 3 HOW SENT TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 30 MAY 43

To ALL UNITS, NORTH FORCE

PATROLS OF 17th INF IN
VALLEY IN REAR OF WEST
ARM HOLTZ BAY WILL FIRE
WHITE FLARES IF ENEMY
SIGHTED. INFORM YOUR
TROOPS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER 3-2, NLG TIME SIGNED 2030

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER Major, Cpt

2133 THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY MSG CEN NO. 4 BLINKER

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE 30 MAY 72 To APA-6 (USS FILLMORE)

REQUEST INFORMATION IF SHIP WILL BE UNLOADED TONIGHT

30 MAY 72 2133 718

CAPT WHITCOMB 2133 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 408 V 53C (THE DIV) DATE 30 MAY To RPT. CO

PLEASE REPORT EVERY TWO HOURS BREAK THROUGH VICINITY LAKE CORIES BY 75 ENEMY HAS BEEN REPORTED. WHAT INFORMATION DO YOU

G 27 DIV OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER 4

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY TIME FILED MSG CEN NO. HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 408 V 53C DATE 30 MAY To RPT. CO

HAVE CONCERNING THIS MOVEMENT. INDICATE DEPTH OF YOUR POSITION AND LATERAL CONTACT WITH 1 CO NORTH FORCES

G 27 DIV 2305 AT 2245 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER 4

30 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 0752

MSG CEN NO. 1

HOW SENT RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE 31 MAY 43

TO ALL UNITS, NORTH FORCE

17-1 SENDING A TWO MAN PATROL INTO EAST VALLEY OF WEST ARM TODAY. NOTIFY YOUR UNIT

(Handwritten initials)

*D. J. Black
E. J.*

5-2, N.L.G.

0750
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Manor, Capt
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 0806

MSG CEN NO. 2

HOW SENT RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 2 DATE 31 MAY 1943

TO ALL UNITS, NORTH FORCE

COUNTERSIGN EFFECTIVE 0200 - 31 MAY TO 0200 - 1 JUNE IS "LIVELY LIZZY" DESSIMINATE COMPLETELY

*(Handwritten note in circle)
31 May 43
0940
EJZ*

5-2, N.L.G.

0835
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Manor, Capt
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 0812

MSG CEN NO. 3

HOW SENT RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 3 DATE 31 MAY 1943

TO ALL UNITS, N.L.F & USAT PRESIDENT FILLMORE

78th CA (AA) WILL TEST FIRE FOUR 40mm GUNS TWO ROUNDS EACH STARTING 1100 TODAY FROM RED BEACH.

(Handwritten initials)

*(Handwritten note in circle)
31 May 43
1010
EJZ*

5-2, N.L.G.
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

0837
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

Manor, Capt
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **31 MAY 43**

To **RGT. CO**

**TO UNITS HOLDING M209A
CONTINUE TO USE JE
EDITION OF HAG KEY
LIST.**

DSO 7514 **0900**
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **(2)**

* U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27000-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **May 31, 1943**

To **7 QM Rat Det.**

**Issue 78 CA 2/3 of K
ration for 30 men.**

For WLF CO

S-1 WLF **1045**
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **Capt ECP rather Sgt**

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 10 MSG CEN No. 7 HOW SENT LINEAR

MESSAGE
(CLASSIFICATION) (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. _____ DATE 31 MAY 43
 To USS FIL MORE (Mag Long)

SEND ALL 105 AMM. BLACK BEACH

31 MAY 43
 1320
 76

Col. Yeatts 1200

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

16-2018

W. D., Sig. C. Form No. 160 (Rev. April 1941) WAR DEPARTMENT
SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY

LOCAL DELIVERY LIST

| Time dispatched | Time returned | | | | |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|
| <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 30%;">Message Identification</th> <th style="width: 70%;">SIGNATURE IN FULL</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td style="height: 100px; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Mag. Cen. # 5</u> <u>was voided.</u> </td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | Message Identification | SIGNATURE IN FULL | <u>Mag. Cen. # 5</u> <u>was voided.</u> | | |
| Message Identification | SIGNATURE IN FULL | | | | |
| <u>Mag. Cen. # 5</u> <u>was voided.</u> | | | | | |

*** 16-21504

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 31 MAY 43
 To CO ALL UNITS

UNTILL FARTHER INSTRUCTION
ALL PERSONEL WILL BE
INSTRUCTED THAT IMPERSONEL
MAIL NO MENTION WILL BE
MADE OF GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATIONS AND NO INDICATION
THAT THE INDIVIDUAL OR UNIT
HAS BEEN IN OR NEAR ENEMY ACTION
MAGIC ALL

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT **TP**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **31 MAY 43**

TO **CG ALL UNITS**

X STRICT CONFINEMENT TO PERSONAL MATTERS WILL BE REQUIRED X UNIT CENSORS. SEE TRAINING CIRCULAR 15

o/p
2029

LANDRUM CG 1635

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **1817** MSG CEN No. **6** HOW SENT **BLINKER**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **31 MAY 43**

TO **MAJ LOVEJOY (w/ Capt. HIGGINS)**

ALL OFFICERS FROM THE BEACH WHO HAVE NOT AUTHORITY FROM LT. COL. YEATS TO BE ABOARD FILLMORE WILL REPORT ASHORE ON THE FIRST BOAT.

LT. COL. YEATS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED **1815**

MAJ BEARSS.

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

870 16-8018

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **1908** MSG CEN No. **8** HOW SENT **RUN**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **31 MAY 43**

TO **LT MURRAY**

PICK UP HEATER UNITS AND LT JORGENSEN AND SEVERAL E.M. FROM WHITE BEACH & TAKE THEM TO CHICKAGO HARBOR.

31 MAY 43
1954

Murray

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED **1936**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER **J.F. Boyd 1936**

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 4850

MSG CEN NO. 7

HOW SENT RUN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE May 31, 1943

TO 7th Scout Co

Send immediately
Send A-12 units to O M supply
dump to report to Lt Bishop
to assist in unloading
other trailers.

C. H. [Signature]
1906

S-1, WLF 31 MAY 43

1850
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

Sgt [Signature]
SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

[Signature]
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No. DATE May 31, 1943

TO Capt Whitcomb at Eng. Bay

Following msg relayed from 19th
by [Signature]:

"The tank lighter which just
landed in Challenger Harbor
needs batteries. Get word
to the Navy."

31 May 43
2153 - Returned
[Signature]

S-1, WLF

2145
TIME SIGNED

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

Capt [Signature]
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No.

DATE

May 31, 1943

To

Co A, 7 med

Copy on back

You will furnish 1 NCO and 10 privates as an unloading detail to report to the Regtable at West End of Alibon Beach. They will report at 250 2300 tonight.
Wm the NLF CO

S-1, NLF

2250

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

Capt W. C. Peuther, Jr.

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

GPO 16-60128

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

T.P.

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

31 MAY 43

To

ALL UNITS

COUNTERSIGN 1200 WT 31 MAY
TO 1200 JUNE IS LIVELY LIZZY

Recd G. F. MANN
Capt S-2
31 0830

MACIC 2

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2325

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

31 May 1943

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT **TP**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. **4** DATE **1-6-43**

TO **CO INF.**

COUNTER SIGN FOR 1200 WT

1 JUNE TO 1200 WT 2 JUNE 15

LEVEL PLAIN

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **G-2** TIME SIGNED **0800**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **1806** MSG CEN No. **L** HOW SENT **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **JUNE-11-1943**

TO **Black - Red & White.**

Counter sign for 1200 W.T.

1 June 10 1200 W.T. 2 June 15

LEVEL PLAIN.

1 June 43 1100 DD.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **CO INF.** TIME SIGNED **1856**

(Sgt) Pat [Signature] SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

GPO 16-20158

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **1138** MSG CEN No. **W** HOW SENT **TP**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **5/1/43**

TO **Tucroy Col. Erickson**

We have War Correspondant Mr. Handelman to be picked up by PBY. Acknowledge if & when it will be here to day.

1 JUNE 43 1136 DD.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED **1145**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER **[Signature]** SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN No.

HOW SENT

TP

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

NO

DATE

JUNE 43

TO

CO 32ND INF

REY WITH GEN BUCKNER

SHOULD LAND AT HOLTZ BAY

AT 1500 PILOT WILL PICK

UP MR HANDLEMAN

J. B. ...

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

LT 35

TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

1615

MSG CEN No.

3

HOW SENT

RAID

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE 1 JUNE 43

TO

MR. BOYLE - U.S.S. FILLMORE;

TAKE

ALL BATTERIES ABOARD

P.A. 16.9 - ~~READY TO HOIST~~

ABOARD FOR CHARGING.

163L
K.O.A.

Capt. C. A. WHITCOMB
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1615
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

S/SGT. PATTEN
SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

NO.

DATE

June 1 1943

TO:

C.A. 7 med

Send all your mess just intilly
supposed to the beach to help
rebuild the LCT as rapidly
as possible.

for the NLF CO.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1708

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGATURE OF OFFICER

SIGATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

S-1 NLF
Capt C. G. [Signature]

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

NO.

DATE

JUNE 43

TO:

CO ALL UNITS (JW) 1739

THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF
APPROACHING ENEMY AIRCRAFT
X UNIT COMMANDERS WILL
PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION
TO DISPERSION AND PROPER
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL

LANDRUM C. G.
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1715
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGATURE OF OFFICER

SIGATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

1 JUNE

To

CO REGT.

PROTECTION OF PERSONNEL

*cleared to all
units and
revised copy
returned to E.P.*

*1452
E.P.*

LODD

G2 7 DIV

1725

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(2)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27255-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

1 JUNE

To

CO REGT.

THERE IS A POSSIBILITY
OF APPROACHING ENEMY
AIRCRAFT UNIT COMM. WILL
PAY PARTICULAR ATT TO
DISPERSION AND PROPER

G2 7 DIV

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

(2)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1942 16-27255-1

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 16

MSG CEN NO. 4

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

1 JUNE 43

TO U.S.S. FILLMORE

RECEIVED (1) COPY - RADIO

OPR. KEPT COPY

1 JUNE 43

1230

DS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 18

MSG CEN NO. 5

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

6/1/43

TO Mr. Betty U.S.S. Fillmore

How long do you estimate it will take to complete unloading of ship with present facilities.

1874
K.O.B.

1830

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

MESSAGE

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

June 1, 1943

To

COA7 med

Have your men at the beach by 1845.

[Handwritten Signature]

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

190P THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN No. 6 HOW SENT PWN

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. DATE 1 JUNE 43

To: QM

Service Records

1 June 43
1915
Eggs

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

190P

TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

GPO 16-20158

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY
TIME FILED MSG CEN No. HOW SENT Rad

MESSAGE

(CLASSIFICATION)

(SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. Euse D. Boyle DATE 1 June 43

To: Capt. Whitcomb

verification of last message
present discharging facilities
should unload the U. S. S. Fillmore
by Sat. 5th - working from 6666-
2360

1 June 43
2610
Eggs

Mr. Betts
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

2660
TIME SIGNED

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

GPO 16-20158

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 7007 MSG CEN No. 8 HOW SENT Rad

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 6/1/43

To Mr Betz U.S.S. Willmore

OK on your suggestion for plan of unloading will only have 1 LCT though. Very sorry.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER (Signature) TIME SIGNED 2015

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT RLN

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE June 1, 1943

To Lt. Tote and Capt Sturman

Lt. Tote and Lt. Sebastian are to work under Capt. Hurt and relieve Lt. Yennie and Lt Killian on the beach unloading boats at 0100 tonight. Officers concerned will make their own arrangements for being awakened.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER for the NLF CO. TIME SIGNED 2035

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER Capt NLF Prather SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 2040 MSG CEN No. 7 HOW SENT RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 6/1/43

To Mr Betz U.S.S. Willmore

Two LCT's will work from mid-night on. Please arrange working crews aboard ship. Contact present L.C.T. Cmdr. Lt Carpenter & arrange to load all night. Adequate shore party arranged for Lt Schayre to report ashore immediately.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED 2040

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **RD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **1 JUNE 43**

To **CAPT WHITCOMB** JD
2145

STOP PRESENT WORKING DETAIL WORKING 0600-2PO 000 USING ALL MEN SUGGEST WE COMMENCE WORK AT 0600 AND CONTINUE SAME WORKING HOURS ARRANGE TO HAVE TWO LCT ALONGSIDE AT 0500 OR BEFORE WORK BETWEEN 0000 AND 0600 UNPRACTICAL

MR. BETZ OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER *[Signature]* SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

2145

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT **GR**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **1 JUNE 43**

To **LT [unclear]**

I have ordered the next LCT to land in the beach at a point opposite the [unclear] [unclear] the hill

MAJ. BEARSS OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED **7158**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER *[Signature]*

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED **YY** MSG CEN NO. **9** HOW SENT **GR**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **1 JUNE 43**

To **LT YENNY**

HAVE BOAT #9 TOWED OUT AND ANCHORED.

Received by [unclear]

CAPT. C.A. WHITCOMB OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED **2258**

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER *[Signature]*

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT **CP**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **1 June 43**

To **Hq 50th Engrs.**

Casual report:
 corporal Robert E. Mangano
 # 37433734 Schrapnel May 14
 PFC Nelson G. Morse # 29451470
 wounded in action May 7
 PFC. Charles P. Eley # 34244718
 weak heart left aboard
 U.S.S. Bell May 17

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

Art Joseph H. Link # 37225609
 broken collarbone left aboard
 U.S.S. Bell May 17
 Disposition of attached men
Art Charles F. Page # 34035542
 Co. "C", This man transferred
 to 13th Engrs. from 50th Engrs.
 returned to 50th Engrs Co "B"

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN No. _____ HOW SENT _____

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE _____

To _____

Art James D. Palmer
 # 35032040 Co. "E"

Art Lewis C. Meiffel
 Co. "M"

Signed on read.

Co. "B" 50th ENGRS.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER _____ TIME SIGNED _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ **1st SGT. HADLEY** SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT **AD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. Ens. C. J. Boyle DATE 1 JUNE 43
TO CDT. WHITCOMB

ESTIMATE WILL TAKE 7 DAYS
TO UNLOAD FILL MORE BY WORKING
FROM 0600 TO 2300 EACH DAY

WJW

MR. BETTS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

W. D., Sig. C.
Form No. 160
(Rev. April 1941)

WAR DEPARTMENT
SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY

LOCAL DELIVERY LIST

1 - white envelope

FROM: S/M-32 TO:

W. O. LOGAN
7TH. CAN.

Time dispatched

Time returned

Message Identification

SIGNATURE IN FULL

W. O. Logan
W/O 7A

1 June 1943

4759

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED: 4759 MSG CEN NO. 1 HOW SENT: AIR

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

No. _____ DATE: 2 JUNE '43

To: *Major Beavers*

Have a boat ready to take General Bukner to East Arm, at 0800. Pl 0752

g-y Beavers

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: _____ TIME SIGNED: _____

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: *Rossy Maj.*

484

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED: 484 MSG CEN NO. 2 HOW SENT: TPg Run

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. 1 DATE: 2 JUNE '43

To: ALL UNITS - NORTH FORCE

*COUNTERSIGN FOR 1200
2 JUNE TO 1200 - 3 JUNE
"ROLLING HILLS"
DESSIMINATE THOROUGHLY.*

3-2, N.L.G.

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: _____ TIME SIGNED: 484

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: *Major, Capt*

*2 JUNE '43
1055
LXB*

4936

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED: 4936 MSG CEN NO. 3 HOW SENT: RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE: 6/2

To: *Wtety US's Hillmore*

LCT 395 to come to beach immediately. Kindly acknowledge it is leaving

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER: _____ TIME SIGNED: _____

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR: _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER: _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER: _____

*4474
N.L.G.*

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

2 JUNE 43

To

ATTENTION ALL. ENSIGN BOYLE
 AND COL CULIN ARMY REGULATIONS
 PROHIBIT CREW OF LIGHTER FROM
 BOARDING FILLMORE. NOTIFIED
 LIGHTER CREW OF THIS REGULATION
 THEIR REPLY WAS GO FUCK YOURSELF
 AND UNLOAD YOUR OWN CARGO
 THE LIGHTER INVOLVED THEN PROCEEDED
 TO BEACH MR. BETTS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

1220
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

2 JUNE 43

To

URGENTLY NEED BOAT TO TAKE
 CHIEF ENGINEER AND TRANSPORT COMM
 TO BEACH ON BUSINESS. HOW SOON
 CAN YOU SEND THAT TRANSPORTATION

G.V.
 1344

2 June 43
 1440
 E.B.

PILMORE DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW

TP

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

2 JUNE 43

To

S-4 MAJ LOVEJOY

WHEN RATION BOAT LEAVES
FOR BROWN BEACH WOULD
LIKE A CASE OF LUBRICATING
OIL AND PATCHES

A. Hooley

Maj. SF

MANSION BLUE 4
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

4:35
TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 4 MSG CEN NO. 4 HOW SENT RAD

By telephone to Red Beach
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 2 JUNE 43

To ENGINE BOYLE

FILMORES OWN BOAT TAKING CHIEF ENGINEER AND TRANSPORT COM. ASHORE ON BUSINESS NOW. ENGINE BOIL IS VAGED TO RETURN TO FILMORE ON THIS BOAT FOR OFFICIAL COMFORANCE

*2 June 43
1510
EJG*

*G.V.
1457*

CHIEF OFFICER - FILMORE 001455
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED 4 MSG CEN NO. 4 HOW SENT RAD

By telephone to Red Beach
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE 2 JUNE 43

To ENGINE BOYLE

FILMORES OWN BOAT TAKING CHIEF ENGINEER AND TRANSPORT COM. ASHORE ON BUSINESS NOW. ENGINE BOIL IS VAGED TO RETURN TO FILMORE ON THIS BOAT FOR OFFICIAL COMFORANCE

*G.V.
1457*

CHIEF OFFICER - FILMORE 001455
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW SENT RAD

Relayed to Message 11
MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE JUNE 43

To TO SOPA MASAKER BAY

NO LAUNDRY EQUIPMENT ABOARD. PRESENT SUPPLY OF TOWELS AND BED LINEN COVERED INTIRELY FOR USE OF CASUALTYS, WILL BE EXHAUSTED IN EIGHT DAYS. CAN YOU ARRANGE TO LAUNDRY FOR CASUALTYS ONLY. WE HAVE LIMITED SUPPLY OF SOAP

*G.V.
1514*

*2 June 43
1457
EJG*

MASTER ELLARAK 021505
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR SIGNATURE OF OFFICER SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW **TP**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATED) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. **9** DATE **2 JUNE 43**

To **NLF**

**COUNTER SIGN FOR 1200
2 JUNE TO 1200 3 JUNE
ROLLING HILLS DISSEMI-
NATE THOROUGHLY**

2/1/43

G-2 7 OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **2006** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATED) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **2 JUNE 43**

To **APG 716 122045 BT**

**TO OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
HOSPITAL, (BLACK BEACH). ARE
YOU EQUIPPED TO TAKE X-RAYS?
AWAITING REPLY.**

**Yes I have G.V.
X-ray & plain scold
W.A. (Robert) 2L37**

TRANSIENT COMM. DB. OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **DB.** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED _____ MSG CEN NO. _____ HOW **RAD**

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATED) (CLASSIFICATION)

No. _____ DATE **2 JUNE 43**

To **MAJ BEERS**

**LPT WILL BE IN ABOUT 0030
FOR UNLOADING**

**GV
2142**

MAJ BEERS OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER **MAJ BEERS** TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR _____ SIGNATURE OF OFFICER _____ SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER _____

THESE SPACES FOR MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

TIME FILED

MSG CEN NO.

HOW SENT

RAD

MESSAGE (SUBMIT TO MESSAGE CENTER IN DUPLICATE)

(CLASSIFICATION)

No.

DATE

3 JUNE 43

To

MAJ. BEERS

LPT. WILL LEAVE FILMORE AT 0800. PLEASE HAVE UNLOADING DETAIL AT BEACH

**2145
GV**

BETTS

OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF SENDER

TIME SIGNED

AUTHORIZED TO BE SENT IN CLEAR

SIGNATURE OF OFFICER

SIGNATURE AND GRADE OF WRITER

W. D., Sig. C.
Form No. 160
(Rev. 11 1941)

WAR DEPARTMENT
SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY

LOCAL DELIVERY LIST

Time dispatched

Time returned

Message Identification

SIGNATURE IN FULL

**Msg. numbers 546
to U.S.S. Pillsbury
(Retained by Kodak)
Opv.**

2 June 1943

SECRET
MESSAGE CENTER LOG

STATION OPENED

MESSAGE CENTER LOG
HQ. CO., 32ND INF.

STATION CLOSED

TIME: 009L

DATE: 29 MAY 43

TIME: 7400

SECRET

MOHAWK - 2210
THRU
MAGIC
BEACHES
WITH ALL

| UNIT | RADIO | | TF | | TG | | NO. & CLASS : IPICA : TION | SENT TO | TIME FILED | HOW SENT | TIME CLEAR | SERIAL |
|--------------------|-------|-----|------|------|----|-----|----------------------------------|---------|------------|----------|------------|--------|
| | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | | | | | | |
| MAGIC | | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| MANSON BLUE | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MOVIE RED | | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| 36 RAD TOP | | | 009L | 0500 | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | Out | | | | | | | | |
| 6 | 009L | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NAS | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MANSON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MOVIE BLUE | | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| VIA MANSON | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7TH DIV | 009L | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| MOHAWK | | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 M.P. | | | 009L | | | | | | | | | |
| MOVIE GREEN | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| C.O. 174 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| THRU MANSON BLUE | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ALL BEACHES | 009L | | | | | | | | | | | |
| VIA 75316 | | | | | | | | | | | | |

U.S.S. 1734 RAD 1745 1520
1734 1600 1620 1720

STATION OPENED

MESSAGE CENTER LOG
HQ. CO., 32ND INF.

STATION CLOSED

TIME: 0001

DATE: 30 MAY 43

TIME: 2400

SECRET

| UNIT | RADIO | | TP | | TG | | :NO.& :CLASS :IFICA :TION | SENT TO | TIME FILED | HOW SENT | TIME DISP CHD | TIME CLEAR ED |
|---|-------|-----|------|-----|----|-----|------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | | | | | | |
| MAGIC 2 LINES | 0001 | | 0001 | | | | 1 | ALL UNITS | 0950 | MSGR | 0953 | |
| | | | | | | | 2 | LT. GOODALL | 1026 | MSGR | 1027 | 1030 |
| MANSTON BLUE | | | 0001 | | | | 3 | ALL UNITS | 2038 | TP | 2042 | 2105 |
| | | | | | | | 4 | APA-6 | 2132 | BLINK | 2134 | 2135 |
| MOVIE RED | | | 0001 | | | | 5 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | |
| 30 AMP TOP | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | |
| MOVIE BLUE VIA MANSTON | | | 0001 | | | | 9 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 0 | | | | | |
| MOHAWK | | | 0001 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | |
| 7TH M.P. | | | 0001 | | | | 3 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | |
| MOVIE GREEN THRU. MANSTON BLUE | | | 0001 | | | | 5 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 6 | | | | | |
| C.O. 17TH THRU. MANSTON BLUE | | | 0001 | | | | 7 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | |
| ALL BEACHES VIA. 75 th SIG. | 0001 | | | | | | 9 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 0 | | | | | |
| A-Co, 32 nd Para. manston Blue | | | 0001 | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 5 | | | | | |

STATION OPENED

MESSAGE CENTER LOG
HQ. CO., 32ND INF.

STATION CLOSED

TIME: 0001

DATE: 1 JUNE 43

TIME: ✓ 400

SECRET

| UNIT | RADIO | | TP | | TG | | NO. & CLASS IFICA TION | SENT TO | TIME FILED | HOW SENT | TIME DISP | TIME CLEAR |
|---|-------|-----|------|------|----|-----|---------------------------------|-----------|---------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|
| | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | | | | | | |
| MAGIC FINNIES | 0001 | | 0001 | | | | X | RVA BEACH | 1755 | RAD | 1830 | 1100 |
| | | | | | | | X | BRICKSON | 1132 | TP | 1133 | 1136 |
| | | | | | | | X | FILLMORE | 1615 | RAD | 1600 | 1631 |
| MANSON BLUE | | | 0001 | 1315 | | | X | FILLMORE | 1726 | RAD | 1728 | 1731 |
| | | | 0635 | 1029 | | | X | GM | 1700 | RUN | 1901 | 1915 |
| | | | 1730 | 1844 | | | X | BRICKSON | 1829 | RAD | 1830 | 1844 |
| MOVIE RED | | | 1734 | | | | X | BRICKSON | 1827 | RAD | 1828 | 1850 |
| | | | 0001 | | | | X | LY YENNIE | 1750 | RAD | 1730 | 1735 |
| | | | | | | | 10 | | | | | |
| MOVIE BLUE VIA-MANSON | | | 0001 | | | | 11 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 12 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 13 | | | | | |
| MOHAWK | | | 0001 | | | | 14 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 15 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 16 | | | | | |
| T.M.P. | | | 0001 | | | | 17 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 18 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 19 | | | | | |
| MOVIE GREEN THRU-MANSON BLUE | | | 0001 | | | | 20 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | |
| ALL BEACHES VIA 75 th SIG | | | 0001 | | | | 3 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 5 | | | | | |
| A Co. 32 nd THRU MANSON BLUE | | | 0001 | | | | 6 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | |
| MELON SHORT | | | 0001 | | | | 9 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 0 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | |
| MANSON- PERSONNEL | | | 1634 | | | | 2 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | 5 | | | | | | |

STATION OPENED

MESSAGE CENTER LOG
HQ: CO., 32ND INF.

STATION CLOSED

TIME: 000LDATE: 27 MAY 43TIME: 2400~~SECRET~~

| UNIT | RADIO | | TP | | TG | | NO. & CLASS : IPICA : TION | SENT TO | TIME FILED | HOW SENT | TIME DISP CHD | TIME CLEAR ED |
|--------------------|-------|-----|------|------|----|-----|---|---|--------------|------------|---------------|---------------|
| | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | | | | | | |
| MAGIC | | | 000L | | | | X 2 3 4 | 7 th SIG. 11 th SIG. | 0739 1016 | RUN RUN | 0942 1210 | 1057 7:00 |
| MANSION BLUE | | | 000L | 1706 | | | 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 | | | | | |
| MOVIE RED | | | 000L | | | | | | | | | |
| 36 ACP & OP | | | 000L | | | | | | | | | |
| NAVY LIAISON | 000L | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7TH DIV | 000L | | 000L | | | | | | | | | |
| MOHAWK | | | 000L | | | | | | | | | |
| 7 th MP | | | 1717 | | | | | | | | | |

x. could not be delivered and was returned

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE CENTER LOG

MANSION
UNIT

26 MAY 43
DATE

0800
TIME OPENED

2400
TIME CLOSED

| UNIT | RADIO | | TELEPHONE | | TELEGRAPH | | NR | IDENTIFICATION | VIA | TIME | TIME | TIME |
|-------------|-------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|----|----------------------|-----|-------|----------|-----------|
| | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | IN | OUT | | | | FILED | DISPATCH | DELIVERED |
| MAGIC | | | 0001 | | | | 1 | GD 745 | RAD | 1533 | | 1730 |
| | | | | | | | 2 | GD - SEED | | 1535 | | 1840 |
| | | | | | | | 3 | CO. REG. 11 - ATT 50 | | 1535 | | 1840 |
| MANSION 500 | | | | | | | 4 | W. STADT | RAD | 1618 | VAD | 1630 |
| | | | | | | | 5 | W. STADT | SW | 1611 | | 1647 |
| | | | | | | | 6 | GEN. DIST. | RIN | 1647 | 1731 | 1811 |
| | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 9 | | | | | |
| 36 MAY 43 | | | | | | | 10 | | | | | |
| 6 | | | | | | | 11 | | | | | |
| MAGIC | | | 0001 | | | | 12 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 13 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 14 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 15 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 16 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 17 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 18 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 19 | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | 20 | | | | | |

ALLIANCE REPORT
75 MINUTES AFTER 11:00 AM