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THE OPERATIONS OF CO. B, 179TH INFANTRY
(45TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE RHINE RIVER CROSSING
NORTH OF WORMS, GERMANY, 25-26 MARCH 1945
(Personal Experience of a Company Executive Officer)

Type of operation described: RIVER CROSSING

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ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO I

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(Personal possession of Author)

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THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY B, 179TH INFANTRY
(45TH INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE RHINE RIVER CROSSING
NORTH OF WORMS, GERMANY, 25-26 MARCH 1945
(CENTRAL EUROPE CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Company Executive Officer)

INTRODUCTION

This monograph covers the operation of Company B, 179th Infantry, 45th US Infantry Division, in the Rhine River Crossing at Worms, Germany, 25-26 March 1945, during the beginning of the final drive into the heart of Germany.

To really understand the long range planning in the events leading up to this action, it will be necessary to go back to the early phases of the Southern France Campaign. We shall then understand the background from which the operation itself was launched.

During the month of September, 1944, the US Seventh Army staged a successful drive up through Southern France by way of the Rhone River Valley. This drive joined the US Third Army and cut the German forces in half. (1) (See Map A - Point A)

From this junction, a consolidation of forces afforded a drive over the Rhine into the very heart of Germany. Realizing the formidable barrier of the Rhine River, it was evident that immediate preparation was necessary to be able to master this barrier when the opportunity arrived. For this purpose, two schools were established for Engineer training. These schools taught all the technical phases of engineering pertaining to river crossings. They were situated at Dole and Camp DeValbourne, opening for business on September 26. (See Map A - Point B) The 40th Engineer Regiment, which later supported the 45th Division's Rhine crossing, began their training at this time. (2)

About this same period, an extensive study was under way concerning the characteristics of the Rhine River. This study included the width at various points, depth and swiftness. The research which was conducted

(1) A-4 Part II Annex III, p. 1; A-9, p. 267-271; (2) A-1, p. 744

brought the Weir gates into the limelight. These gates were located at dams along the Rhine tributaries, as well as on the river itself. The opening of these gates in a sudden action, would cause a mighty flood downstream. This in turn could make a river crossing operation result in a catastrophe. The German and Swiss governments had entered into an agreement to control the operation of these "Weirs," as they were called. An attempt was made with the Swiss government to control the Weirs so that this obstacle would not be encountered. After a great deal of diplomatic negotiation, word was received that the Swiss government would grant the request. (3)

These early preplanning days covered a great many details and considerations. Many engineer studies were compiled from the problems at hand. By the end of October, the 7th Army had fully revised its plans. This not only included a maneuver scheme but also a compilation of the troop lists for the crossing. (4)

Advancements of the 7th Army were finally slowed down by heavy snows and the bitter cold of winter. (See Map B) In the 45th Division sector, sharp patrol clashes were frequent but no attack was possible. The freezing winds and sleet of January and February kept the men in their fox holes. The Germans had shifted most of their forces in the upper part of Alsace, and it looked as if they intended to fight from strong points, instead of an established defensive line. In the 179th Infantry's sector, reconnaissance patrols were not able to operate too far in front of their sector because of mines and strong road blocks. (5)

On February 17, the 179th Infantry Regiment was relieved by elements of the US 42nd Division and moved into a bivouac area north of Rambervillers. (6) (See Map A - Point C)

(3,4) A-1, p. 742; (5) A-5, p. 148; (6) A-3, p. 109

Company B was quartered in the village of Romont and had settled down for a rest. The morale was at an all time high, after so many long weeks in the line. Clean clothes were issued to the men as they stepped out of the portable bath units. "Home Alive in Forty Five" and "Paris In The Spring" was heard in every conversation. These rest days were suddenly cut short by a training program, which was put into effect two days later. Schedules were filling up the Company's daylight hours with range firing, map reading and company problems. Replacements soon began to arrive, bringing the Company up to approximately eighty per cent fighting strength.

A change in schedule suddenly directed all training to be centered around river crossing operations. Individual boat teams were tactically organized within the company. These teams went through regimental problems on the Moselle River and staged two full dress rehearsals. One during daylight and the other during the hours of darkness. Little did anyone dream that the last full dress rehearsal was to become a reality on the Rhine river. (7)

On March 12, the Division was again on its way into the battle. An assembly area was moved into near Sarreguemenes, where the Division became under the control of the US XV Corps. (8)

The offensive began with the XV Corps successfully penetrating Zweibrucken, on the 18th of March, and contacting elements of the US Third Army. (9)

New orders were received, directing the XV Corps to breach the Siegfried defenses, turning east in a final drive to the Rhine river. This was achieved by using the 45th and 3d US Divisions, supported by units of the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion and the US 6th Armored Division. Hard fighting raged, and slow progress was made against the enemy pill boxes. On the 20th of March, the line suddenly gave way with

(7) Personal knowledge; (8) A-5, p. 149; (9) A-2, p. 31

the Germans attempting a mass withdrawal. Taking full advantage of this, and by motorizing the Infantry units, the two divisions pushed to the Rhine river, arriving there on the 23d day of March. (10) (See Map C)

THE GENERAL SITUATION

The 45th Division was alerted to make preparations for the spearheading of the Rhine river crossing with the US Third Division in the XV Corps zone. The 40th Engineer group was also alerted to support this operation. Minute details began to take shape in the joint staff planning for the next three days of March 23, 24 and 25. (11)

At 2400 hours on the 24th of March, the XV Corps issued Field Order No. 23. This order assigned the 45th Division a crossing area north of Worms. It is interesting to note that no D-Day or H-Hour was mentioned at this time. The information that was distributed contained the mission and area, but nothing else. The mission was to cut the Gernsheim-Mannheim railroad line and to clean out the Wehrmacht in the Main River Valley. (12)

The river at this site, as reported by the Engineers, was one thousand feet wide and seventeen feet deep. The river bottom near the bank was firm with gentle slopes. (13)

This three day preparation by the Division found the 157th Infantry Regiment patrolling the west bank of the river. This Regiment had been selected to support the assault from reserve positions. The 179th and the 180th Infantry Regiments were making plans for the assault in the Division's zone of action. Battalions of the 179th Infantry were located in order at Eppelsheim, Hangenweisheim and Flomborn. (See Map D) All the ground work had been completed, with the troops waiting for the final orders to ^{cross} open the Rhine. (14)

Seventh Army published the order for D-Day and H-Hour in Operations

- (10) A-1, p. 726-730; (11) A-5, p. 157; (12) A-1, p. 745; (13) A-1, p. 747
(14) A-5, p. 158

Instructions No. 111. The Rhine River Crossing was scheduled for the 26th of March at 0230 hours. (15)

THE COMPANY SITUATION

Company B, 179th Infantry Regiment was located at Eppelsheim.

Plan not shown
(See Map D) Like the rest of the units in the Regiment, it was busy making final preparations for the crossing. Battalions selected for the Regimental Spearheading were the 1st and 2d, with the 2d Battalion on the left. A and B Companies were to lead the assault in the 1st Battalion zone of action. A Company to be on the left, B Company on the right and C Company in reserve.

Captain William J. Robertson, B Company Commander, ordered the writer, then Company Executive Officer, to organize the company into boat teams. This boat list was similar to the rehearsal list used on the Moselle River during March. A few changes had to be made, however, because of the casualties suffered at the Siegfried Line. Each platoon had become slightly depleted at Bliesbruck and Elieskastel. After the completion of these lists, they were sent to Battalion where actual boat numbers were assigned. A copy was returned to the Company and the Executive Officer notified the groups. Great pains were taken to orient each individual man, in order that there would be no misunderstanding concerning boat numbers. (16)

On March 25, Lt. Colonel Marion W. Crouse, 1st Battalion Commander, went to Regiment for the final receipt of orders. Major Gardner N. Williams, Regimental S-3, had published the final instructions and Colonel Preston J. Murphy, 179th Infantry Commander was ready to put his Battalions into action.

Lt. Colonel Crouse had called Captain Robertson and given him a verbal warning order before leaving for Regiment. These instructions

(15) A-1, p. 747; (16) Personal knowledge

revealed the Battalion and B Company crossing site. No time was lost by the Company Commander in making a reconnaissance of this area by liaison plane. The plane had been secured by the Battalion for this purpose.

By 1130 hours Captain Robertson returned to the Company Command post. A messenger was just arriving with maps and photos of the crossing area. He also had instructions for the Company Commander to be at Battalion by 1300 hours for the final order. These maps and photos were carefully studied by the Captain and the Executive officer during the next hour. Captain Robertson also gave a full detailed account of what he had found out concerning the crossing site during his reconnaissance that morning. The latest intelligence information was discussed and notations made on the maps. At 1245 hours the Company Commander left for the Battalion Command Post. (17)

While Captain Robertson was at Battalion receiving the final order, the Company Executive Officer held a conference with the Platoon Leaders. They were given maps, as well as completely oriented with ^{the} crossing area. Photo maps were studied in conjunction with the terrain analysis previously given by the Company Commander. (18)

In the Company zone of action, (See Map E) a canal separated a heavy patch of woods from the river bank. This created a small peninsula like projection, approximately two hundred yards wide. The canal separating this peninsula from the far bank of the river was about fifty feet wide. A small bridge, near the right edge of the woods, connected the two together. There was also a small stream flowing North East, parallel to the river, which emptied into the canal at the bridge. At this point, the canal made a ninety degree turn, cutting the woods in

(17, 18) Personal knowledge

half along the direction of advance. Previous reconnaissance revealed that the peninsula was about five feet above water level at the center. The bank on the far side of the Canal was also about the same height. Dug in positions could be seen on the photo, extending along this strip of land. What appeared to be secondary positions were in rear of these on the wooded side of the canal. By terrain deductions, it was obvious that the primary positions could easily cover all the river approaches. Secondary positions also were capable of covering the entire projection. Direction flow of the river was from right to left, or North East. The only heartening part of this terrain was the canal and stream which provided a good boundary extending in the direction of attack. This also created a possible barrier to any exposure of the company right flank. (19)

At 1415 hours Captain Robertson returned to the Company Command Post where he found the officers ready to receive the final order. (20)

THE COMPANY PLAN OF ATTACK

Company attack plans revealed that D-Day was March 26 and H-Hour 0230 hours. Company A would be on the left with the 180th Infantry Regiment on the right. There was to be a gap between our right flank and the 180th Infantry. Contact was to be established along Highway 44 by the 180th Infantry (See Map F) when they had captured Biblis. The Company mission involved the clearing of the peninsula, as well as the heavy woods on the far side of the Canal. The attack would then continue North East in the direction of Gross Rohrheim, assisting Company A in the capture of that town. When Gross Rohrheim was captured, the Company would be prepared to move on Battalion order.

2d Lt. Ralph Browning's 1st Platoon was to be on the left with the 2d Platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Joe Keating, on the right. The 3rd Platoon, commanded by 1st Lt. Robert Barnhart, would be in support

(19) A-6; Personal knowledge; (20) Personal knowledge

and follow in the second wave. Company Headquarters, the Weapons Platoon and D Company attachments would also be in the second wave. A special wire team had been attached to the Company by Battalion. This team would ride in the Executive Officer's Boat, laying a wire as the boat crossed the River. No medical litter team was available for the company on its initial isolated objective. However, arrangements had been made for a special Medical team to evacuate any wounded on call. Otherwise, this team would only operate in the main flow of traffic during the first six waves. After this an advance aid station would be available on the river bank, in the vicinity of A Company's landing site.

Radio silence was to be observed until H-Hour and no artillery would be fired unless called for after the operation had begun. A prearranged white phosphorous concentration would be fired by the Chemical Mortar Battalion, on Gross Rohrheim, at H plus 15. This was for the purpose of igniting the town, thus providing a direction beacon during the darkness. The only supporting fire for the crossing would be fired by reserve elements of the 157th Infantry Regiment. This was to be heavy machine gun overhead fire on the far banks while the first wave was on the river. An amber star cluster would be the signal for lifting this fire. Two of these amber star cluster rifle grenades were issued to each platoon in the first wave. Any platoon reaching the far bank would fire one of these grenades. Extras were only issued for precautionary measures. (21)

When the Company reached the far bank, the 2d Platoon had the mission of driving to, and securing the bridge. The 1st Platoon would go straight to the canal, fanning out to form a base of fire for the attack on the woods. It was felt that they could pin down any of the enemy occupying the secondary positions, while the rest of the

(21) Personal knowledge

Company crossed the bridge. The 3d Platoon would sweep the peninsula from left to right in a mopping up action, joining the 2d Platoon for the attack on the woods.

This attack would be coordinated with the 2d Platoon on the left and the 3d on the right. Company D attached machine guns, commanded by 2nd Lt. Delbert Easton, were to support the advance of the 2d Platoon. Just as soon as this attack got underway, the 1st Platoon would cross the bridge and follow behind the 2d Platoon.

Orders for the weapons platoon placed it under company control during the initial landing. As soon as practicable, the light machine section was to join the 1st Platoon. Mortars would be set up under the rocky bank protection to support the attack. Their mission was to fire on any targets of opportunity on the other side of the Canal. Company headquarters would set up a Command Post upon landing and assist in the evacuation of wounded as well as the handling of any prisoners captured.

(22)

Movement to the river would start at 2000 hours and be by motor. The entrucking point would be located near the Company Command Post. Company vehicles, after joining the column, would remain under Battalion control until further orders. This move was to proceed to the Eastern edge of Osthofen (See Map D) where guides would move each company on foot to the boat assembly area. This assembly area to be located in an orchard just South of Ibersheim. Engineer boat teams were to contact their corresponding groups in the company and guide them to the boats at H-20, hand carrying them to the water. The H-Hour signal would be overhead machine gun fire from the 157th Infantry Regiment. All 55 horsepower motors on the storm boats were to be started at that moment with the attack jumping off.

(22) Personal knowledge

Latest information indicated skeleton forces occupying the positions along the river bank. Plane observation stated that the bulk of the forces appeared to be located in the town of Gross Rohrheim. Each Platoon leader was instructed to carefully orient each of his men, so that everyone would know his exact job and where it was to be performed. In this way the company would be able to complete the mission in spite of severe casualties. Captain Robertson concluded the order by stating the he would be with the 2d Platoon. (23)

A few questions were asked by the Platoon Leaders at the close of the order. These brought out the fact that reserve troops were to follow the route of Company A. Company B would be alone on its mission until the Peninsula had been cleared and a bridgehead established on the mainland. For this reason there could be no alternate plan, outside of Platoon maneuver. (24)

With the conference ended, all officers returned to their respective platoons. The remaining hours of the afternoon were spent in carefully briefing each man. While this was being conducted, Captain Robertson and his Executive Officer visited the Platoons. Some men were found to be a little tense because of the approaching operation, but the morale as a whole was exceptionally good.. Company strength was approximately thirty five per cent below combat strength, although the past three day rest had increased the fighting efficiency of the men.

During mess, at 1800 hours, one K ration per man and one D ration was issued. The D ration was to be used only in case of emergency. After mess, last minute checks were made on ammunition, weapons and equipment. Most of the company managed to write a quick note home, which the mail clerk collected for later censorship and mailing. At 1945 hours the

(23) Personal knowledge; (24) A-6; Personal knowledge

movement to the entrucking point began, and in short order the convoy moved out. (25)

THE COMPANY ATTACK

Company B followed in rear of Company A as the Battalion motored toward Osthofen, along the Flomborn-Westhofen highway. (See Map D) Moonlight was obscured by over hanging clouds and a slight chill was present in the night air. German aircraft (Point A) became very active as the convoy was passing the outer edges of Westhofen. A cluster of illuminating flares, looking like a waterfall in a fireworks demonstration suddenly lit the area. Everyone took as much cover as possible, using the trees and houses along the road. We wondered if the Germans were trying to tell us that they knew we were coming. The droning engines of the planes died out with the light of the flares, allowing the convoy to continue on its way. Another group of flares (Point B) stopped the column just outside of Osthofen. Perceiving to be on the fringe of the illumination and hearing bombs drop in the distance, the column got underway again. No other disturbances were met from here to the end of the motor move. (26)

Guides met the Company on the eastern edge of Osthofen. Captain Robertson turned the company over to his Executive Officer who moved it to the boat assembly area (Point C) under the direction of the guide. Engineer boat teams were located near a dyke at the south end of the orchard. These teams were posted in numerical order, from left to right, making it an easy task to place the company groups at the proper stations. The Engineers had the area well prepared. Boat groups huddled together to keep warm and rest for the next two and a half hours. Everything was all set, thought the Executive Officer, as he joined his group under an apple tree. He checked his watch and found the time to be 2330 hours. (27)

(25) Personal knowledge; (26) A-6; Personal knowledge (27) Personal knowledge.

While this was taking place, Captain Robertson and the Platoon Leaders had gone to the edge of Rhein Durkheim. (Point D) Here a house was entered in order that lights could be used. The officers made a final review of the plans and all last minute questions were ironed out. Ending the meeting at 2400 hours, the officers returned to the company assembly area. (28)

The Captain joined the Executive Officer, where the two settled down for a short rest. During this resting period, two large German bombers flew overhead. They were so low that the exhaust flashes were plainly visible. No Units fired on them due to the secrecy of our mission. We certainly did not want to telegraph our positions this early in the game. It was not long before we heard anti-personnel bombs bursting in rear of us. It was evident that their target was not in our area, causing us to breathe a sigh of relief. (29)

0220 hours arrived in what seemed seconds instead of two hours. Messengers were sent out, alerting the men to start for the boats. While this was being done, a shot flashed out in the darkness. A rifle had accidentally been fired, wounding Private Murphy. His moaning and groaning made it seem like the whole German army would be alerted. We certainly hoped that this would not be the case and evacuated him at record speed. (30)

The 150 yards to the boats and the boat carry, the remaining 50 yards (See Map E) to the water, was made in short order. Engineer crews had been well rehearsed in this phase of their training. Boats were loaded and ready to go when the machine gun fire from the 157th Infantry burst forth. The 55 horsepower boat motors sounded like a million swarming beehives as the boats sped to the far bank.

(28) A-6; (29,30) A-8; Personal knowledge

Captain Robertson's boat reached the far bank ahead of the 1st Platoon and had to remain in the water until a flare was fired to lift the machine gun fire. Just as soon as Lt. Browning's boat hit the bank, Private Nelson fired an amber star cluster which immediately lifted the fire. Nelson then suffered a slight heart attack, becoming our first casualty. The darkness made it very difficult to control and reorganize his men, but Lt. Browning soon had his Platoon moving to its objective. Rifle fire began to pierce the darkness, however, surprise still held the upper hand. (31)

The 2d Platoon began to receive small bursts of fire as they landed on the bank. Lt. Keating with his radio operator lost contact with his men. He made an attempt to reorganize, but the darkness made control difficult. Knowing that the men all knew their objective, he set out for the bridge in hopes of organizing there. On the way small groups were picked up until he soon had his men assembled. One group came along and spoke out in German. Needless to say, they became the first prisoners for the company. The Platoon had almost reached the bridge when a machine gun cut loose from the other side. Lt. Keating fell into a small drainage ditch. As he crawled along this ditch he bumped into another German half frightened to death. This prisoner pointed out the approximate position of the machine gun, while Private Pratt fired three white phosphorous grenades into the position. No more fire was received from this area and the Platoon moved forward quickly securing the bridge. (32)

The third Platoon landed without any casualties, although they received some rifle and mortar fire during the landing. Lt. Barnhart lost no time in reorganizing his Platoon for the sweep of the peninsula. Germans were found sleeping in their holes and others surrendered as

(31) A-7; Personal knowledge; (32) A-6

their positions were overrun in the darkness. Contact was made with the second Platoon as they were engaging the machine gun on the far bank of the canal. Captain Robertson arrived just about this time with Lt. Easton, D. Company machine gun Platoon Leader. Lt. Barnhart asked Lt. Easton to take the prisoners back to the Executive Officer as he returned to bring up his machine gun section. He had left the section at the Company Command Post while he was contacting the 2d Platoon. Pfc. John Alotta acted as a rear guard for the Lieutenant as the group moved back. (33)

Company Headquarters and the Weapons Platoon had established a Command Post under the protection of some large rocks near the water. During the crossing the wire team had lost their equipment in the water. Their wire reel had suddenly stopped turning and was jerked overboard. This eliminated our wire communications with Battalion. When the boat was nearing the bank an automatic rifle opened fire. This fire was seen to come from the Pilot House of a sunken river boat. An explosion in the boat silenced their gun, allowing the landing to be safely made. It was later learned that Lt. Chamberlane from Company A was responsible for knocking out this gun crew, thus saving the day for the Headquarters group. His group had been put off on the peninsula by mistake.

Mortar fire began to fall around our Command Post and we were forced to move it to another location. The Executive Officer sent the Light Machine gun section to support the 1st Platoon while the Mortar Section set up positions to support the company attack on the mainland.

A fire fight broke out about twenty-five yards to the right flank of the mortar section. First Sergeant Jobe and three men from Company D went out to investigate. They found that Lt. Easton had been killed

(33) A-6

and Pfc. Alotta seriously wounded. The prisoners had taken cover near them but were still together. Lt. Easton had led the group back through an area that had not been swept. A German Officer and two German soldiers had ambushed them as they went by. It did not take the enraged D Company men long to clean out this ambush and return with the rest of the prisoners. The Weapons Platoon Aid Man took care of Alotta as the Executive Officer radioed to Battalion for the special medical boat team. A "roger" was received on many messages after that, but no medical boat arrived. A lost boat from the sixth wave was hailed as it passed close by and was used to evacuate Alotta as well as Lt. Easton's body. News came to us later that Alotta had died in the clearing station. (34)

Dawn was breaking as the 2d and 3d Platoons moved over the bridge and into the woods. One prisoner who was captured by the 3d Platoon stated that the rest of the company had pulled out. The 2d Platoon captured eight more prisoners in their zone. One German tried to get away and was killed. No other action occurred as the Company cleared the rest of the woods. (35)

Lt. Browning moved his platoon over the bridge near the 2d Platoon and Company Headquarters plus attachments followed closely behind. Captain Robertson led the company into Gross Rohrheim (See Map F) after its reorganization had taken place. Company A had already taken the town, capturing nearly four hundred prisoners. Most of them were caught sleeping in the basements of the buildings. Battalion Headquarters and C Company had suffered heavy casualties from a flak gun firing from the 2d Battalion's zone. The 2d Battalion was hardest hit by losing forty per cent of their boats during the crossing.

At 1200 hours the Company was ordered to cut the Reich Autobahn

(34) Personal knowledge; (35) A-6; A-8

three miles East of Gross Rohrheim. (See Map F) This was accomplished without any further opposition. The Rhine River had been spanned and the bridgehead was now secure. (36)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In reviewing the events of this operation, it is the opinion of the writer that the preplanning stages were excellent. Engineer units had been well trained and briefed in their duties. This was instrumental in moving the Infantry over the river with such efficiency.

The training program carried on by the Infantry units during their rest period, as well as the negotiation of the Weir Gates, had a great deal to do with the mission being a success.

Withholding artillery and mortar preparation usually fired prior to an attack was sound. Intelligence had revealed that only scattered positions were actually occupied. The bulk of the enemy forces were in mobile reserve at Gross Rohrheim. By not telegraphing the attack with artillery, the troops were able to move in on top of the enemy positions before being detected. If all these positions had been occupied, instead of the Germans sleeping in town, the crossing might have been a different story.

Careful plans were made for the evacuation of the wounded but somehow failed to work. Supervision was not at its best in this case. The special Medical Boat Team could have easily been oriented as to the Company position. Instead, it became lost in the general traffic behind Company A. If B Company's casualties had been heavy, serious consequence could have resulted.

Wire communications in this crossing would have enabled an easy explanation as to why the Medical team was not getting to our position. Explanations of this type are not feasible over a radio. The wire team

(36) Personal knowledge

failed because previous mistakes were not corrected. The same loss of equipment in the exact manner occurred while training on the Moselle river. The Communications Officer should have taken action to correct this weakness.

Special commendation should be given all units for the coordination and teamwork displayed. The speed in which the Engineers ferried the troops, as well as the completion of the mission was surprising. Confusion, usually found in night operations of this type, was negligible.

Company B lost one officer killed and one enlisted man wounded. The enlisted man later died of the wounds. One other slight casualty occurred but evacuation was not necessary.

The enemy's losses were one officer and four enlisted men killed plus twenty-two prisoners captured.

A Veteran Officer of many amphibious campaigns summed up the entire operation when he said, "It is gratifying to be a member of this organization."


LESSONS

1. Extensive training and preplanning for special missions pay dividends in combat.
2. Withholding pre-H-Hour concentrations in night operations, sometimes allows the attacker to move into enemy positions before being detected.
3. Special measures for the evacuation of the wounded must not only be planned but supervised to see that they are effectively carried out.
4. Reorganization, after a night river crossing is most difficult, even with well trained troops.
5. Surprise is definitely a potent weapon in combat.
6. Wire communication is an asset in river crossings. Measures should be taken for its effective use.


7. Withholding the D-Day and H-Hour time, when alerting a Unit to prepare for an operation, results in good security.


8. When each man of a unit is well oriented for a mission the problems of control are almost eliminated.


9. The use of guides during a night movement is invaluable.



Rhine







SHEIM

RHINE RIVER

B 179

A

B

N

MAP "E"

RHINE CAESARE

0 500 1000 YARDS
Scale