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OPERATIONS ON LUZON, 8 DECEMBER 1941 - 6 MAY 1942
(General Subject)

Type of operation described: THE DEFENSE OF A REMOTE
ISLAND POSSESSION AGAINST ATTACK BY A FULLY MOBILIZED,
POWERFUL AGGRESSOR NATION SITUATED NEAR THAT ISLAND

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1512

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OPERATIONS ON LUZON, 8 DECEMBER 1941 - 6 MAY 1942
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INTRODUCTION

At 0755 on the calm Sunday morning of 7 December 1941, a group of airplanes appeared over the Island of Oahu in the Territory of Hawaii flying at an altitude of about three thousand feet in the well known "echelon of echelons" formation which, at that time and place, was the commonly used formation of the United States Navy. Ostensibly, this group was the returning dawn patrol. Over Oahu, however, the lead plane slid off its right wing and entered into a dive bomb run. With no prior warning, and with no declaration of war, the staccato rattle of 7.7mm machine gun fire and the burst of aerial bombs engulfed that island fortress and its possessor, the United States, in a mortal conflict which was to last for four years. (1)

Over five thousand miles farther west in another more distant possession of the United States, the Philippine Islands, it was 0255 hours 8 December 1941. No knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor was known to the members of our armed forces in the Philippines at that moment; however, this knowledge was soon to become known to them for this attack had been launched as one of the primary steps in setting the stage for the invasion of the Philippines. Within an hour, news of the attack on Pearl Harbor had been broadcast over the radio and had been intercepted by a commercial radio station operator at Clark Field, Luzon. This news was immediately transmitted to General Douglas MacArthur, who, by 0330 hours, alerted the Department of the Philippines to the existence of a state of war. (2)

In order to more fully orient ourselves with the cause of the outbreak of hostilities with a nation which theretofore had been at peace with

(1) Eyewitness account of author; (2) A-11, p. 29; A-2, p. 54.

our own, and which then desired to "continue with sincerity to find a common formula for a peaceful solution in the Pacific", (3) according to a "Japanese government spokesman", (4) let us turn our eyes toward the prelude to the hostile act.

For over fifty years, Japan had attempted to conquer, annex, or incorporate adjacent countries and islands through war or as spoils of war. In many of these attempts, Japan's outright aggression was predicated upon a minor incident which offered an excuse for war. These small opportunities were vigorously pursued. In some of the acts, the United States, together with other nations, protested against Japanese aggression. Japan violently disliked this intercession, for she was determined to rule the Far East. (5)

"The Philippines, by virtue of their strategic location, completely dominate the eastern part of the South China Sea," (6) and "In addition to their military value the Philippine Islands possess natural resources of considerable value to Japan or any other empire-building nation." (7) In following her plan of conquest and rule, by 1941 Japan had maneuvered herself into the desirable strategic position of virtually having surrounded the Philippine Islands with Japanese dominated islands and territory on the mainland of Asia. From these locations Japan planned to attack the Philippines and to incorporate the entire archipelago into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (8)

THE STRATEGIC PLAN

"The general strategy of the attack on the Philippines was excellently conceived. It revolved around a series of four successive steps:

(3) A-10, p. 8; (4) Not made clear herein, but probably was Ambassador Kurusu, who was then in the US; A-10, p. 8; (5) A-2, pps. 1,2,3; (6) A-2, p. 46; (7) A-2, p. 46; (8) A-2, pps. 1,2,3; A-10, p. 123.

1. The destruction of American air power, the key operation of the entire campaign since it was both the means and, to a great extent, the end of the Japanese invasion.

2. The final complete isolation of the Philippine Islands by means of:

(a) The attack on Pearl Harbor and the capture of Guam and Wake Islands, the connecting links with Hawaii.

(b) The seizure of Davao on Mindanao, thus severing the sole line of communications from the Philippines to the outside world.

3. The capture of Luzon and the defeat of the principal body of American ground troops in the Far East.

4. The occupation of the rest of the Philippines and the mopping up of the surviving American Forces." (9)

Specifically, with respect to the foregoing outline of general strategy, the attack on Oahu was designed to immediately destroy the ships, airplanes, installations, and equipment of the military and naval forces on that island. Not only would this destruction deprive the United States of the material means of naval access to Japan; but, together with the destruction of the air and naval bases on Midway, Guam, and Wake and the eventual capture of these islands would also deprive our forces of the chain of stepping stones to the Far East. In addition, this action, if completed, would remove the American air and sea power from the left arm of Japan's great pincers movement. (10) Meanwhile, the enemy planned to extend the right arm of this pincers movement through the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, The Bismarcks, The Solomons, and eventually, to link up with her base, which, by that time would be firmly established on Mindanao. Thus, Luzon, the main garrison of the Philippine Islands, would be ringed by Japanese held territory. (11)

(9) A-2, pps. 52-53; (10) A-2, pps. 29-30; (11) A-3, p. 18.

THE DEFENDERS OF LUZON

On 8 December 1941 Luzon, the largest and most highly fortified island of the Philippines, was garrisoned by approximately 85,000 troops, largely Filipinos. The majority of the ground military units were newly inducted, inadequately trained divisions of the Philippine Army Reserve; however, there was one division of regulars, Philippine Army. In addition, the mobile ground forces contained two infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment of Philippine Scouts, who were well trained regular soldiers. The remainder of the troops were regular soldiers of the United States Army plus some recently activated National Guardsmen. This force was commanded by Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur. Disregarding the Philippine Coast Artillery Command on Corregidor, the Luzon Force was organized into three major commands:

1. The North Luzon Force

Commander: Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright

Units : 11th Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve
21st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve
31st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve
26th Cavalry Regiment, Philippine Scouts
Other minor units, Philippine Scouts

2. The South Luzon Force

Commander: Brigadier General M. Parker, Jr.

Units : 1st Infantry Division, Philippine Regular Army
41st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve
51st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve
Two regiments of Philippine Constabulary

3. United States Army Forces in the Far East (Reserve Troops)

Commander: Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur

Units : Philippine Division, Philippine Scouts and U.S. Army
71st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve

91st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Reserve

Two tank battalions

Other minor units (12)

"The initial mission assigned both forces were, first, to prevent a landing, and, second, if a landing could not be prevented, to attack and destroy the landing force." (13)

THE SOFTENING UP

In conformity with her strategic plan of the destruction of American air power, the enemy on 8-9 December 1941, conducted extensive bombing missions on Luzon to neutralize existing bases and aircraft. On the first day, the enemy destroyed the defenders' only operational radar set at Iba, most of the aircraft maintenance installations, and all but seven of the heavy bombers which were caught on the ground at Clark Field. (See Map A) Despite the fact that a state of war had been declared several hours prior to this time, some of these bombers were not placed in bunkers or behind revetments, consequently these planes were easily destroyed remunerative *assets* targets. (14) Operational protection of a fighter cover for the field could have prevented much of this damage. Fortunately, some of General Brereton's heavy bombers previously ^{had been} flown to Mindanao in order to remove them from striking range of enemy land based planes. General MacArthur ordered the removal of all bombers to Mindanao three times prior to this attack. Unfortunately, this order was not fully executed and only eighteen of the bombers were so disposed. This loss could have been avoided by strict, prompt, and full compliance with orders. (15) As a result of the air operations on 8-9 December, the enemy was able to gain air superiority

(12) A-2, pps. 52-53; (13) A-3, p. 18; (14) A-11, p. 33; A-2, pps. 55-56;
(15) A-11, p. 31.

by the destruction of most of the planes on Luzon. This advantage never left the hands of the enemy during the entire Luzon campaign. (16)

INITIAL LANDING OPERATIONS

Diversionsary landings were made by an enemy regiment at Aparri and by an enemy battalion at Vigan on 10 December. Another diversionsary landing of two reinforced enemy battalions followed at Legaspi on 12 December. (See Map A) The enemy intended that these landings should secure the flanks and draw the bulk of the defenders toward these three widely separated sites, thus dividing the defensive strength of Luzon. The enemy could then cut the line of communications of each of these forces by effecting the main landings inside the established flanks and nearer the center of the Luzon coastline, isolate each defending force, defeat that force in detail, and march on Manila to complete the final capture of the seat of government. However, General MacArthur had already evaluated the terrain of Luzon; consequently, he recognized the ruse and committed only light resistance against these diversionsary landings merely to slow their advance while he awaited the commitment of the Japanese main effort. Against the Legaspi landing, however, bombers were employed on 14 December for the last time before ^{their} withdrawal to Australia. Meanwhile, all three of the enemy diversionsary landing forces began pushing inland, each heading in the general direction of Manila. (17) (See Map A)

(See map B) By 14 December the Japanese push toward Manila gathered force. One regiment of the 11th Division was sent to San Fernando, La Union Province to stop this movement. This regiment was disposed to defend the San Fernando-Bauang-Damortis area, with only one battalion at San Fernando. On 16 December this force received orders to hold the enemy north of San Fernando. To accomplish (16) A-3, p. 49; (17) A-2, p. 58.

this mission the line was strengthened by some of the troops who had prepared other battle positions in the Bauang-Damortis area. (18) The enemy attacked the reinforced battalion at San Fernando in order to hold this battalion in position while other enemy troops prepared to land along the shore of Lingayen Gulf. (See Map B) The reinforced battalion of the 11th Division at San Fernando was driven from its position and withdrew to the mountains to become guerillas. The forward movement of the enemy was halted by one regiment of the 71st Division, recently released by General MacArthur from USAFFE reserve. This regiment moved forward to occupy the positions just vacated by the reinforced battalion of the 11th Division. (19) (See Map B)

COMMITMENTS IN FORCE

At dawn on 22 December the enemy made a landing in force consisting of one infantry division, two tank regiments, and additional artillery in the Lingayen Gulf area on beaches near Bauang, San Benito, and Agoo. (See Map B) This landing was the proving ground for the Japanese Army which had undergone extensive ship to shore landings and amphibious operations training along the China coast from Canton to the Indo-China border. This was a main invasion, occurring inside the flank which had been secured by the enemy landing at Vigan, which had been anticipated by General MacArthur. The regiment of the 71st Division which had moved up to oppose the landing at Vigan was now disposed to carry out its primary mission to prevent a landing. This mission was being adequately and capably executed at San Benito and Bauang; however, the landing at Agoo, south of the left (south) flank of the defending unit, began to force this regiment from its position. The Agoo landing had cut the line of retreat to the parent division of this regiment of the 71st Division. Consequently, this regiment was forced to withdraw to the mountains east of that position when attacked (18) A-2, p. 59; (19) A-2, p. 59 & 67; USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East).

from the north by the original landing at Vigan. (See Map B) This regiment took up guerilla activities after it was separated from the main body of defending forces. (20) By 0100 hours 23 December the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS), equipped with horses and armor, moved up to oppose the landing at Damortis with the mission "to hold until forced to retire and then conduct delaying action". (21)

By 0400 hours 23 December the enemy landed some tanks farther north and came to engage the 26th Cavalry Regiment (PS) with tanks and planes. Consequently, the 26th Cavalry was forced to withdraw to the highway just east of Damortis, whereupon this regiment became flank guard for the 71st Division which had moved up on line. (See Map B) The 11th and 21st Divisions, already along this line, extended their flanks to completely tie in all unit flanks. This flank security was short lived for the 26th Cavalry, as this regiment was withdrawn from the line to reorganize at Binanolan. The 91st Regiment of the 91st Division moved forward to replace the 26th Cavalry. (See Map B) (22) The 91st Regiment of the 91st Division had a strength of approximately 1600 men, 37 American officers, plus 5

Not substantiated by previous material third lieutenants, Philippine Army per company. The 91st Regiment arrived at Pozurrubio (See Map B) at about 2030 hours 22 December, whereafter, the decimated 26th Cavalry passed through the 91st leading dead men's horses. ^{BY WHOM? TO WHOM?} Orders ^{91st?} were disseminated at that time. Members of the regiment were informed that the regiment would be committed on the right (east) flank of the defending forces between the already established line and the mountains. Furthermore, this regiment was told to get a good night's sleep while they were still in comparative safety. The regimental commander informed the troops that three divisions already were engaging the enemy and that a half track was patrolling the road between the front lines and Pozurrubio, consequently, no alarm need be voiced if armored vehicles were heard on the road. The

(20) A-4, pps. 8,9,28,29; A-11, p. 37; A-2, pps. 59,67; (21) A-2, p. 59; (PS) is the official abbreviation for "Philippine Scouts"; (22) A-7, p. 5; A-8, p. 3; A-2, p. 60.

26th Cavalry, which also had armor, was in that vicinity. Furthermore the enemy was some twenty miles away. At about 2300 hours, members of the regiment were alarmed by the sound of armor on the road from the front lines to Pozurrubio. Several men identified the sound of a tank, not a half track, and opposed the enemy. Enemy armor first struck the 91st Division; cyclist troops followed; infantry constituted the third wave. The surprise, with few exceptions, was complete and effective. No anti-tank weapons were available with this regiment; however, the regiment had a battery of 75mm artillery in support. This artillery engaged the tanks inflicting only slight damage. The decimated 91st Regiment was forced to withdraw before the tank-cyclist-infantry team by 0500 hours 23 December with a remaining strength of approximately 420 men, a portion of the third lieutenants, Philippine Army, and 2 American officers. These few troops were immediately incorporated into the 92nd Regiment, 91st Division. (23)

This enemy attack affected not only the 91st but also the 71st Division. The enemy forced the entire line to withdraw to a position along a new defensive line through Aguilar, San Carlos, and Urdaneta. Whereupon the remainder of the 91st Division reverted to reserve. (24) (See Map B, Line A) During this action the enemy beachhead was enlarged by the addition of another landing south of Damortis. (25)

map C
While the North Luzon Force withdrew from the previous position and established a new line during the night of 23-24 December, the enemy staged another landing in force in Lamon Bay. This landing was effected on the morning of 24 December at Antimonan and Mauban, Taysbas Province. (See Map C) Clearly, this landing was to complete the encircling movement which the enemy had planned for the seizure of the seat of government of the Philippines, Manila. Again it was demonstrated that General MacArthur's estimate of the situation concerning the feint at Legaspi was correct. If General MacArthur had committed a large force against the Legaspi landing, the Lamon (23) Statement of 1st Lt. Robert L. Morris, member of the 91st Regiment, to author; (24) A-2, pps. 60,64; (25) A-2, Map 10.

Bay landing, by aggressively pushing forward, could cut off the line of retreat of the force opposing the Legaspi landing by proceeding directly across the narrowest part of the Batangas Peninsula. General MacArthur had ascertained that no large body of men was committed to oppose the Legaspi landing. By use of the Manila bus system, the light opposition to the Legaspi landing was withdrawn before the enemy could isolate this unit. (See Map A) While this withdrawal was in progress, the enemy was opposed by a company at Antimonan, a reinforced regiment west of Antimonan, and on 24-25 December, by a battalion in Mauban and west of Mauban. (26)

By 24 December the North Luzon force completely established the line Aguilar-Urdaneta. (See Map B, Line A) Due to the defeat of the 71st and 91st Divisions on the previous day, General Wainwright deemed that he should not hold his present line, but should fall back to a more secure defensive line behind the Agno River. (See Map D, Line B) Permission to make this move was sought of and granted by General MacArthur. (27) "Outnumbered and incompletely equipped, lacking air support, and utilizing troops but recently mobilized into regimental groups, General MacArthur was left no alternative but that of a delaying action." (28) Consequently, he ordered such action along five predetermined delaying positions which had heretofore been designated by him. (See Map D, Line A to E) One of these delaying positions had already been held and another was now being held. At the same time this delay would permit the withdrawal of General Parker's headquarters and the 41st Division from the Batangas Peninsula to garrison Bataan. (See Map C) In addition, the 31st Division and two regiments of the Philippine Division received orders to move to Bataan. (29) While these troops withdrew to Bataan, General MacArthur moved the USAFFE headquarters, the Philippine gold reserve, some of the civil leaders of the

(26) A-4, pps. 8,9; A-11, p. 39; A-2, pps. 60-61; (27) A-2, p. 60; (28) A-14, p. 10; (29) A-2, p. 61-62.

Philippines, including President Manuel Quezon, all possible food, and troop supplies to Bataan and to Corregidor. Meanwhile, command of the troops in the south of Luzon fell to Brigadier General Albert M. Jones who fought small actions to delay the enemy until all possible personnel and supplies had been evacuated to Bataan and Corregidor. (30)

On 25 December the North Luzon Force was defending the Agno River line. (See Map D, Line B) The North Luzon Force now faced a stronger enemy whose beachhead had been enlarged and whose diversionary landing at Aparri had now moved down the Cagayan valley ^{MAPA} and had linked up with the Lingayen landing. The defenders faced a determined enemy with at least five infantry divisions and one tank brigade on the line. Nevertheless, the defenders held the Agno River line. (30-a)

On 26 December, Corregidor was officially declared the USAFFE headquarters, and Manila was declared an open city; despite this fact the enemy bombed Manila that same day. (31) The troops south of Manila delayed the enemy along a north-south line through Tayabas and Lucena (See Map C) and the North Luzon Force still held the Agno River line. Later, on 26 December, the enemy attacked in the vicinity of Rosales (See Map D, Line B) and broke through the defense of the Agno River line. The 26th Cavalry covered the withdrawal until the defenders established a new defensive line through Paniqui, Guimba, and San Jose whereupon the 26th Cavalry retired from the line to reorganize. (See Map D, Line C) (32) Meanwhile the 1st and 51st Divisions engaged the enemy west of Mauban and at Lucena, respectively. Cavite Naval Base, which had already been heavily bombed by the enemy, was destroyed by the Americans before it could fall into the hands of the Japanese. (See Map C) The task of delaying the enemy on the Batangas Peninsula was aided by the support of a tank battalion, and lightened by the scarcity of enemy planes and artillery in that area. (33)

(30) A-11, p. 43; A-2, p. 62; (30-a) A-2, p. 62; (31) A-2, p. 63;
(32) A-2, p. 62; (33) A-11, p. 43; A-2, p. 63.

SECURING THE LINE OF WITHDRAWAL

On 27 December, the defensive line in the north was not attacked or harassed. The battle at this point reached a stalemate. This condition provoked much thought on the part of General Wainwright. That night General Wainwright withdrew his force to a line running through Tarlac and Cabanatuan (See Map D, Line D) because he had perceived the enemy's plan to advance along the two generally parallel roads running south from these two towns and to seize the Calumpit Bridge across the Pampanga River. (See Map E) This bridge was to be used by the forces south of Manila in their withdrawal to Bataan. General Wainwright saw immediately that the withdrawal of the forces opposing the Lamon Bay landing had to be expedited and the enemy had to be contained until the South Luzon Force was safely across the Calumpit Bridge. (34) To accomplish this mission of holding the enemy, the North Luzon Force resorted to all available means of delay. Much of the planning necessary to retard the forward movement of the enemy fell to the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Casey, Corps of Engineers, who had been transferred to Luzon in October 1941 subsequent to a specific request for him, by name, by General MacArthur. This particular officer was requested because he was familiar with Luzon as well as with both the civilian and military engineers of Luzon. In addition, this officer was a demolitions expert. General MacArthur ordered Colonel Casey to organize all the available miners and mining engineers who were familiar with explosives, and to impede the advance of the enemy by constructing hasty battle positions for the front line troops, and by destroying bridges and culverts behind the withdrawing friendly forces. This demolitions unit went into action aiding in every way possible with demolitions the rear guard action which was being fought by the 26th Cavalry, which was also supported by light artillery. (35) "Up north in several roads and trails leading

(34) A-2, p. 63; Correct spelling "Calumpit", not "Calumit", as in A-11; (Personal knowledge of author); (35) A-11, pps. 38-42.

southward down the wide central plain of Luzon, the 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, was fighting one of the bravest and most competent withdrawal battles in military history.* (36) Meanwhile, a regiment south of Manila delayed the enemy in a battle east of Tiaong, reorganized in Tiaong, fought another battle there the next day, and withdrew to a more secure position between Lake Taal and Laguna de Bay. (See Map C) Concurrently, on 29 December, Corregidor was bombed and strafed for the first time. In this air attack, the enemy suffered severe loss of planes from the defending five batteries of anti-aircraft artillery despite the fact that only one of these batteries was equipped with mechanical fuzed ammunition and the average expenditure of anti-aircraft ammunition per kill was 120 rounds. (37)

In the north, a general offensive was launched by the Japanese during 30 and 31 December. A double envelopment of the line was attempted: The two main efforts were directed toward Tarlac in the west and Cabanatuan in the east. (See Map D, Line D) The enemy's ground attack was supported by tanks; and the enemy dive bomber control of the air was virtually unopposed. The attack on Cabanatuan routed the 91st Division, but this division took another stand at Gapan. (See Map D) Gapan was captured on 31 December, and the new defensive line was established at Sibil Springs. The other main effort of the enemy gained only slight ground against the 21st Division at Tarlac. The defenders' attempt to reestablish the east flank of the line at Gapan was unsuccessful. Another attack directed toward Sibil Springs forced the defenders to drop back. Here this portion of the defending line hinged their west flank on the Candaba Swamp east of the Pampanga River. (See Map E) The short distance between the Candaba Swamp and the Pampanga River was defended. That portion of the line west of the Pampanga River held the terrain between Bamban and the north foothills of Mt. Arayat to which position this portion of the line withdrew after the

(36) A-11, p. 42; (37) A-2, Map 11.

attack at Tarlac. (See Map E, Line E) This was a modification of the fifth predetermined delaying position which General MacArthur had designated; however, upon consideration of the current situation, this position offered better terrain to defend than was available by holding the ground from Bamban toward Gapan. The line from Bamban toward Gapan did not offer the opportunity to tie in the flanks with natural terrain obstacles as did the modified position. (38) Holding the terrain between the swamp and the Pampanga River was an important task not only in keeping the enemy from enveloping the portion of the line east of the river by infiltrating through this area which was passable by foot as well as by vehicle on an unimproved road from Gapan to the town of Arayat; but also there was a structural steel bridge over the Pampanga River at the town of Arayat. (See Map E) The Arayat Bridge did not control the flow of traffic from Manila as did the Calumpit Bridge; however, possession of the Arayat Bridge offered the enemy a route of lateral communications which would enable him to envelop the portion of the line west of the Pampanga River. By seizing the Arayat Bridge, the enemy could seize the Calumpit Bridge by proceeding along improved roads through Arayat, Mexico, and San Fernando to the western approach of the Calumpit Bridge. (See Map E) By seizure of the Arayat Bridge and by speedy action the enemy could not only cut off all the defending troops east of the Pampanga River, but would be offered the opportunity to envelop the defenders on both sides of the river starting at the flanks next to the river. In addition, the enemy could also seize the Calumpit Bridge intact. The enemy's seizure of the Arayat Bridge did not occur because the planned destruction of the bridge was completed prior to seizure. (39)

(38) A-1, p. 11; A-2, p. 64; (39) Personal knowledge of the terrain at that location. To the author's knowledge, this is not mentioned in any text; however the author chose this shorter route from San Jose to Arayat in 1945. The Arayat Bridge was blown. According to the Filipinos on the east bank of the river, the destruction occurred to stop the advance of the enemy in 1941.

General Jones received notice that he was to take command of all the troops east of the Pampanga River, and to evacuate all of his troops across the Calumpit Bridge by 0600 hours 1 January 1942. General Jones' new command consisted of the 71st and 91st Divisions which held the enemy north of Baliuag plus one regiment of the 51st Division which guarded the east approach of the Calumpit Bridge from a position in the vicinity of Pleridel. (See Map E) General Jones had tank and artillery support. The 91st Division received orders from General Wainwright to withdraw. Through error, the 71st Division began to withdraw also. The Japanese occupied Baliuag. This withdrawal of the 71st Division was a dangerous move to all of the forces east of the Pampanga River since an enemy attack could cut the line of withdrawal to Bataan. The erroneous withdrawal of the 71st Division was discerned before the enemy took action; however, and, upon order, attacked to the north to retake Baliuag. (See Map E) This attack, though not successful in retaking the town, was such a hard blow to the Japanese that no further forward movement was made by the enemy until 0400 hours 1 January 1942. The delay was sufficient to allow the remaining troops from the south to pass across the Calumpit Bridge, thus allowing the Lemon Bay landing to occupy Manila. The defending troops on the east bank of the Pampanga River were withdrawn across the river immediately and the Calumpit Bridge was destroyed by "Casey's Dynamiters", using already emplaced charges, when the advance guard of the Japanese column was on the bridge. By the time the remains of the Calumpit Bridge was in the hands of the enemy, other factors bearing on the defense of Bataan had transpired. The remaining supplies which were not transferred to Corregidor and Bataan were destroyed. The submarines of the United States Navy and the surface fleet, less some of the PT boats were withdrawn toward Australia, thus removing the last method of evacuation of the defenders from Bataan.

to Australia. The South Luzon Force lost its identity upon passage of the Calumpit Bridge. The Japanese north and south units joined forces, thus uniting the elements of the 14th Japanese Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Homma. (40)

CLOSING THE GATE TO BATAAN

As soon as General Jones' troops had successfully withdrawn across the Pampanga river, General Wainwright selected the next delaying position along the line Guagua-Porac where the east flank of the line would be tied in to a swamp along the Guagua River. (See Map E) (41) Some of the troops that withdrew from the Bamban area reached the new delaying position by moving along the concrete highway 3 to Angeles and then to the small "barrio" (village) of Porac. Most of the troops from the Bamban area were forced by the slow progress of the advance troops along the Angeles-Porac road and by the desire to quickly occupy the new delaying position to move from Angeles along Highway 3 to San Fernando and from there southwest to Guagua. Concurrently, troops along the center of the former line tried to move along the same route from San Fernando to Guagua. (42) In order to complete this move with the least possible congestion in San Fernando and also to keep the enemy from interfering with the withdrawing column as it arrived at San Fernando, General Wainwright was forced to delay the enemy again on Highway 3 southeast of San Fernando. This delay was conducted successfully while the remainder of the line withdrew and established the selected delaying line to the north of the dirt road leading from Guagua to Porac. This position provided a route of lateral communications to the defending forces as well as deprived the enemy of the Guagua-Porac road which would have served the enemy as a route of lateral communications if the delaying position had been established farther south. (43) (See Map E)

(41) A-2, p. 66; Map 11; (42) Personal knowledge of author of those roads and towns, plus information contained in A-2, p. 66; (43) A-2, Map 11.

By 3 January the Guagua-Porac line was enveloped around the east flank. The defenders displaced to the rear in a three day delaying action with the 26th Cavalry covering the west flank of the movement. Concurrently, the North Luzon Force began moving into Bataan while the 26th Cavalry Regiment, the 31st Infantry Regiment, and the remainder of the 71st Division covered the withdrawal. The final delaying action of upper Luzon was fought at Layac where again the defending force was disposed between the enemy and the road, thus depriving the enemy of the use of the Orani-Olongapo road. (See Map E) Once again this excellent choice of a delaying position denied the enemy the use of a much needed route of lateral communications. At the same time this position blocked the enemy from entering Bataan without going across extremely rough terrain on the defenders' west flank or through a swamp on the east flank. The enemy conducted a coordinated attack on 5 January which was quickly repulsed by the rear guard at an estimated cost of seven hundred lives to the enemy. The rear guard was forced to withdraw, however, after exceptionally heavy artillery shelling on the afternoon of 6 January. (44)

Concurrent with the attack on the Guagua-Porac line on 3 January, the enemy conducted a five hour air mission on Corregidor and again that small island bastion was bombed on 4 January. (45)

THE INITIAL DEFENSE OF BATAAN

The withdrawal of the delaying force marked the end of the operations on upper Luzon as well as the end of the existence of the North Luzon Force, but the defense of Bataan was still ahead. This defense was set up to provide a main battle position across the broader part of the peninsula on a line north of Abucay and Mauban, a reserve battle position across the narrower part of Bataan between Orion and Bagac, and a service Command area (44) A-1, p. 11; A-11, p. 51; A-2, p. 66, Map 11; (45) A-1, p. 11.

which occupied the last seven miles on the tip of Bataan. The troops were organized into two corps. The western side of Bataan was held by I Corps which was commanded by General Wainwright. This corps consisted of the 1st Division (reinforced), which was disposed along the main battle position; the 31st Division, which guarded the western beaches of Bataan to prevent an amphibious landing; the 71st and 91st Divisions, now incorporated in the 91st Division, which, together with the 26th Cavalry constituted I Corps reserve. The eastern side of Bataan was more accessible to the enemy from the north due to less rugged terrain, a wider beach, and less limited road net. For these reasons it was considered probable that the enemy would throw the bulk of the attacking forces against the eastern side of Bataan. This major unit, II Corps, was commanded by General Parker and consisted of the 51st Division, the 41st Division, and the 57th Infantry Regiment on the line. The 11th Division guarded the eastern beaches against amphibious assault. The USAFFE reserve, which was being held close behind II Corps, consisted of the Philippine Division, less the 57th Infantry Regiment. When the troops occupied these positions on Bataan, an estimated two thousand troops had been separated from the main body of the defending forces and were conducting guerilla warfare in Luzon. (46) These guerillas were able to harass the enemy, destroy supply dumps, and kill many of the enemy soldiers. (47)

An account was taken of all existing personnel and rations on Bataan and Corregidor. Due in part to some 20,000 civilian refugees with the defending forces, there was found to be a critical shortage of food for the continued feeding of personnel at the normal rate. General MacArthur ordered the rations reduced by one-half and fed on a two meal per day schedule. The two meals received by the troops were breakfast and supper. (48)

In order to determine the exact main line of resistance, General Homma's

(46) A-2, Map 12, pps. 67,68,69; (47) Statements made to author by many Filipino ex-guerillas; (48) A-2, p. 67.

14th Army began reconnoitering the area by air. On 9 January, the enemy forces, replenished with fresh replacements, established contact with at least three divisions along the line. The defending forces were holding the line with three depleted divisions and one infantry regiment. The intelligence reports concerning the enemy indicated a forthcoming attack on 11 or 12 January. The enemy was sending false reports to Japan to cover the inability of the Japanese forces to take Luzon from the pitifully small and poorly equipped troop units which were tenaciously holding the island garrison. Furthermore, the enemy was expected to make an all-out attack to crush the defenders, since the planned schedule of conquest which the enemy had devised had not been met. Knowing these facts concerning the enemy, General MacArthur visited the front line units on 10 January and impressed the soldiers with the necessity in holding the present position. On this same day, the enemy attacked. The bulk of the attack was thrown against the 57th Infantry Regiment which held the extreme right of the line in the more open, level terrain. (See Map F) This enemy attack was quickly repulsed. A concentrated attack was thrown at this same point on 11 January. The enemy was badly beaten and repulsed, losing many men. These staggering losses, the worst the Japanese had yet encountered, did not stop the commitment of several attacks along the front of the 57th Infantry Regiment in the next four days. The artillery shelling during this period was particularly heavy on both sides. Observation posts were available in countless good locations in these mountains. Counter-battery fire was extremely effective. Friendly artillery fired into the Japanese positions all along the main line of resistance. The enemy artillery reciprocated. Friendly artillery won the duel, however, by neutralizing eleven enemy batteries and driving the enemy artillery from its selected positions. General MacArthur's general loss in manpower during this

engagement was low, despite the aggressive action of his forces and the remarkable losses inflicted upon the enemy in this action. Due to the great success of our troops at this time, General MacArthur might have achieved the retaking of the entire Island of Luzon if fresh American troops and plentiful supplies had been available. In this respect, the enemy enjoyed a distinct advantage. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other successively until certain of the extreme eastern portion of Bataan fell into the hands of each opposing force several times. As a result of this action, the first Congressional Medal of Honor of World War II was bestowed upon an officer of the United States Army. (49)

This officer's citation reads: "NININGER, ALEXANDER R., Jr.

Rank and Organization: Second Lieutenant, 57th Infantry, Philippine Scouts.

Place and Date: Near Abucay, Bataan, Philippine Islands, on 12 Jan. 1942.

Entered Service At: Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Birth: Gainesville, Georgia,
G. O. No: 9, 5 February, 1942.

Citation: For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action with the enemy near Abucay, Bataan, Philippine Islands, on 12 Jan. 1942. This officer, though assigned to another company, not then engaged in combat, voluntarily attached himself to Company K, same regiment, while that unit was being attacked by enemy forces superior in fire power. Enemy snipers in trees and fox holes had stopped a counterattack to regain part of position. In hand to hand fighting which followed, Lieutenant Nininger repeatedly forced his way to and into the hostile position. Though exposed to heavy enemy fire, he continued to attack with rifle and hand grenades and succeeded in destroying several enemy groups in fox holes and enemy snipers. Although wounded three times, he continued his attacks until he was killed after pushing alone far within the enemy position. When his body was found after recapture of the position, one enemy officer and two enemy soldiers lay dead around him." (50)

(49) A-11, pps. 52,53,54; A-1, p. 11; A-2, p. 69; Map 13; (50) A-15, p. 271.

Establishment of contact was not satisfactory along the center of the main line of resistance. This land was held by small detachments which acted as outposts. The very nature of the terrain prevented the establishment of satisfactory contact and communications, hence the holding of the same land with the normal number of men was virtually impossible. However, this same factor was considered by the defending forces in designating this particular portion of the main line of resistance as an improbable point of attack by the enemy. The enemy, who had long been schooled in jungle fighting, preferred the jungle fighting to the open terrain fighting. In this instance, the enemy was not willing to forego the opportunity to attack through the jungle, for in so doing, the enemy attack would be canalized down the beaches and the more level, less vegetated terrain where friendly artillery had already registered and held good observation. On 12 January it was shown that this preference on the part of the Japanese was not amiss when the enemy attacked the interior flank of the 51st Division. (See Map F) By 16 January the enemy broke through the 51st Division and breached the line between the 51st and the 41st Divisions. A rout ensued, but the retreat was covered by the interior regiment of the 51st Division. Concurrent with this action, the enemy artillery began occupying positions between Ternate and Naic on Batangas Peninsula in order to shell the fortress islands of Corregidor, El Fraile, Caballo, and Carabao in Manila Bay. (51) (See Map C)

By using his USAFFE reserve, and the 31st Division from I Corps to counterattack, General MacArthur was able to bring enough force to bear in II Corps zone to reestablish the main line of resistance on 17 January. As a result of the withdrawal of the 31st Division, I Corps had to redispense troops for beach guard duty. The thin line of I Corps could no longer stop the infiltration of the enemy. After several days of infiltration, (51) A-2, p. 69.

the enemy threatened envelopment to the entire I Corps. This situation, coupled with the effects of the gains made by the enemy in an attack on both Corps on 22 January, forced the entire line to withdraw, since this attack could not be stopped despite the commitment of all available reserves. (See Map F) The necessary retrograde movement began on the night of 23-24 January and was completed by the morning of 26 January. The enemy closely pushed this withdrawal and cut off the 1st Division. Small groups infiltrated from the 1st Division through the lines and through lightly held, rough terrain to rejoin the defenders. The majority of the 1st Division rejoined in this manner. Before they departed from their isolated positions, however, the soldiers destroyed their own heavier weapons and equipment, especially artillery, and kept this materiel from falling into the hands of the enemy. (52)

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The enemy was trained extensively in amphibious operations along the China coast and achieved remarkable success against the British in Malaya by the use of amphibious assaults. Eventually, the enemy launched some sea borne attacks against the defenders of Bataan. This eventuality had been anticipated by the beleaguered force commanders, however, and a beach guard was established. By amphibious invasion, the enemy desired to establish a beachhead behind the defending forces, and at the same time, to capture Mariveles, the natural harbor at the tip of Bataan which offered a good port for water travel to Corregidor. The enemy planned not only to cut off any movement of troops from Bataan, but to expand the beachhead and capture the defenders of Bataan. On 23 January, the enemy landed at Quinauan Point and Longaskawayan Point. (See Map G) The landing forces were contained on the small points by provisional units organized as

(52) A-2, pps. 70,71.

infantry until infantry units were placed against the landing forces. One Battalion of the 57th Infantry (PS) cleared the Longaskawayan Point of enemy by 29 January. The 45th Infantry (PS) cleared the Quinauan Point by 7 February. Three other attempts to land on small points were tried. Two landings were turned back by joint infantry-artillery-navy action. The third landing gained a foothold on Cenas Point, but was defeated by the 45th and 57th Regiments (PS) by 13 February. (53) (See Map G)

DEFENSE OF THE RESERVE BATTLE POSITION

The weary, hungry, medically neglected, survivors of the defense of Bataan, war wise and battle seasoned, established the incomplete former reserve battle position as the main position on 26 January. This line, between Bagac and Orion, offered the advantages of a shorter front for the ever-decreasing number of troops to defend as well as less rugged terrain, thus allowing the units all along the line to tie in the flanks of adjacent units. An additional asset was the excellent observation of the enemy positions gained through use of observation posts on Mt. Samat. The Bagac-Orion line lacked a good route of lateral communications. This factor had heretofore tempered the selection of a delaying position. Now, however, there was no choice. Troops were redistributed so that each corps would have a more even share of the survivors. The new main line of resistance in I Corps was held by the 1st, 11th, and 91st Divisions. The 26th Cavalry Regiment was in I Corps reserve. In II Corps, the line was held by the 21st, 31st, 41st and 51st Divisions; the reserve was drawn from the front line units and held in an area behind the center of the line. (See Map G) The beaches in both corps were defended by provisional units and troops drawn from front line units. The Philippine Division was designated by USAFFE as the general reserve, with the 45th Infantry Regiment (53) A-9, p. 42; A-2, p. 71,72.

behind I Corps to limit any possible penetration of the enemy. The 57th and 31st Regiments backed up II Corps in the vicinity of Limay. (54)

In the last few days of January, positive identifications were made of opposition by the 16th Japanese Infantry Division on the west and the 65th Japanese Infantry Division on the east. On 1 February General MacArthur chose not to reply to the absurd message sent to him by the famous Filipino ex-insurgent of the Philippine Insurrection, General Aguinaldo. This message enjoined General MacArthur to surrender his entire command. (55)

Only limited military operations transpired for the first few days of occupancy of the new position, although the defenders scored a victory on the Japanese in the Battle of the Pockets. One Japanese regiment followed closely behind the defenders when they occupied the present battle position. The enemy regiment breached the partially occupied position unnoticed. This enemy regiment was discovered in rear of the 1st Division on 27 January and was contained along the perimeter of the salient by all units in I Corps zone, including the general reserve. The defending units systematically cut off small pockets of enemy in limited counterattacks and reduced the pockets. By this action, the defenders restored the main line of resistance in about three weeks with only slight losses on the part of I Corps; the enemy suffered the loss of virtually all the regiment. This loss on the part of the enemy as well as the loss by the enemy of the amphibious forces which were annihilated in the Battle of the Points raised the morale of the defenders, despite the fact that by now these defenders knew that the Bataan garrison would not be relieved. This point had been clearly indicated by the President of the United States in a speech delivered in February. General MacArthur still firmly believed that the defenders of Bataan would get relief. The General had made this belief known to the troops as early as January. Even unto the end of his (54) A-2, pps. 70,71,72; Map 14; (55) A-1, p. 13.

stay on Corregidor, General MacArthur believed that his troops would never be captured. His final belief was that his own departure hinged on leading the relief back to Bataan. (56)

HUNGRY SOLDIERS

The food and medicine situation became critical at this time. "By mid-February a typical daily ration for one man consisted of four ounces of rice, three ounces of meat or fish, two ounces of canned milk, four ounces of sugar, two ounces of salt, and a share of the one can of fruit allotted to each fifty men for a week. An occasional submarine arrived at Corregidor with food, but more often the cargo consisted of much-needed drugs and ammunition." (57) The food situation was aided to some extent by foraging off the land. The troops increased their diet by eating items which they had never considered eating before they were so badly in need of food. The mules and horses of the 26th Cavalry were eaten, and so were the few carabao that could be found within the lines. Of course, carabao was a standard meat for the Filipinos, but to the Americans it was new. Additional meat was obtained in small amounts by catching some fish and by shooting monkeys and Iguana lizards. To these meats the soldiers added the more tasty fruits like avacados, guavas, mangoes, and papaya as well as the less tasty fruit, chico. Normal vegetables were replaced by banana flower buds from the tip of a banana stalk and by the camote, a rather stringy, pulpy vegetable which resembles a sweet potato. For green food, bamboo shoots were available. Occasionally cocoanuts were available. However, such food could not always be found on the land. The soldiers were generally extremely hungry and undernourished. (58) Due to the critical shortage of food, the rations were cut from the previous one-half standard to one-third on 9 March. (59)

(56) A-1, p. 16; A-11, pps. 60-65; A-2, Map 14; (57) A-2, p. 73; (58) Statement made to author by 1st Lt. Robert L. Moore, then a member of the 91st Division; (59) A-2, p. 74.

THE GENERAL DEPARTS

The morale of the enemy dropped in the last few days of February and the first few days of March due to the continued effective actions of the seasoned defending units, such as the Battle of the Pockets and the Battle of the Points. The enemy operations slowed down to token effort and demonstrated a defensive attitude. The enemy's morale was further demoralized by the sinking of three transports and some smaller vessels as well as the killing of many enemy personnel in Subic Bay near Olongapo ^{NAPE} by the remaining three or four fighter planes of the defending forces on 4 March. Consequently, the receipt of the news by the enemy of the departure of General MacArthur from Corregidor on 11 March, raised the enemy morale to a frenzy of zest. (60) In addition, the enemy taunted the Filipino people, as well as the Filipino soldiers, through radio broadcasts, in an attempt to incite the Filipinos against the Americans, that General MacArthur had "Deserted his command on the eve of its most decisive battle." (61) This news raised the morale of the enemy immeasurably. The enemy believed that the war was virtually over and that their next thrust would truly be the last thrust of the Philippine Campaign. The enemy ^{troops} did not know that General MacArthur departed from Corregidor, taking as escort the four remaining PT boats, as the result of a direct order promulgated by the President of the United States; and that command fell into the capable hands of General Wainwright. (62)

(60) A-1, p. 16; (61) A-4, p. 8; (62) A-2, p. 74.

THE BREAKTHROUGH ON BATAAN

The enemy morale build-up continued by the massing of artillery fires for a forthcoming attack. The incessant shelling and the added air activity, aided by the addition of 40 medium bombers and new troops to Luzon began to wear on the nerves of the defenders, since malnutrition and sickness took its toll at the same time. This build-up phase for attack continued through 27 March, as the enemy determined the next point of attack. The attack came on the morning of 28 March when an enemy regiment struck the weakened, starving, fever-ridden, twenty percent effective 41st Division, but was quickly repulsed. This attack was followed by another build-up phase of intensive artillery and air bombardment which lasted for four days. This preparation was intensified along the entire line, but especially in front of Mt. Samat, the critical terrain feature of the front line area. This apparent build-up for an attack lasted for seven hours on 3 April. The preparation was lifted from the front line positions and smashed the rear installations and units. Behind the lifted artillery fire, swarms of enemy infantry advanced on the 41st Division. Enemy planes entered into the attack by conducting strafing missions on the defending troops. The enemy struck the 41st Division and hurled this Division back to the reserve positions, but was unable to proceed beyond that point. The attack was resumed the next day after intensive artillery preparation, and the 41st Division line was breached. The enemy then began to roll up the flank of the 21st Division and to employ his four infantry divisions and one armored regiment, which were along the line of contact, to breach the entire line and capture the position. The enemy attack was resumed on 5 April and swept the 21st Division from its position. A counterattack by the 31st and 45th Regiments and one regiment of the 31st Division gained no force and was stopped almost immediately. Continued enemy attacks on 6 April pushed II Corps further back. I Corps failed to give way. On 7 April

II Corps again gave way under repeated enemy attacks and fell back to defend the Mamala River. Later that day II Corps again gave way and took up another stand behind the Alangan River. Meanwhile, I Corps received orders to withdraw to the south behind the Binuangan River. On 8 April II Corps was holding the Lamac River line with the 26th Cavalry, 57th Infantry, and the 31st Infantry. The 45th Infantry was still on the I Corps main line of resistance north of Mt. Mariveles. (See Map G) Partial evacuation of personnel from Bataan to Corregidor was accomplished during the night of 8-9 April by barges. Orders were issued to destroy ammunition and military equipment before 0600 hours 9 April. At 0600 hours 9 April surrender terms went forth to the enemy commander. (63)

PRISONERS OF WAR
(NO MAP)

Soon after Bataan fell, the enemy gathered the survivors into a group and began marching the tired, hungry, sick men, many of whom were wounded, to prison camps on Luzon. The route chosen for this marching column was the main road along the east side of Bataan. Atrocities were committed against the marching prisoners. These prisoners were inadequately fed, given little water, and little rest. (64) At one place along the route, one American soldier was hanged by the thumbs for obtaining a drink of water from beside the road, even though the enemy did not provide water to quench the thirst of this soldier. (65) The column spent one night along the march route in the vicinity of Guegua. During the night many of the captives in the "Death March" were too tired, hungry, and weary to go further. Many of these prisoners died during the night. In general, the dead were left by the roadside and were buried by the

(63) A-2, pps. 75-76; (64) Statements made to author at 24th Replacement Depot, Luzon in orientation lecture concerning "Death March"; (65) Statement made by that soldier in newsreels in 1945; newsreel observed by author.

Filipinos in the ditches and by the roadside. (66) In San Fernando, four or five of the captured defenders of Bataan were summarily shot. Their crime was cutting in on captives who had Japanese permission to get a drink from a well. Many of the captives could go no further from San Fernando, and at this time the enemy took compassion on the sick and wounded and hauled them to the concentration camp at Camp O'Donnel. The remainder of the column followed to Camp O'Donnel on foot. (67)

In addition to the estimated two thousand troops who had taken up guerilla warfare prior to the closing of the gate to Bataan, many others escaped the enemy in the collection of prisoners in Bataan or escaped from the "Death March". These troops engaged in guerilla warfare against the enemy, disrupted supply lines of the enemy as long as the operation continued or killed enemy soldiers individually or in small groups. These guerillas formed small bands of men and organized military units to disrupt supply lines and to harass the enemy. (68)

THE JAPANESE STRUGGLE FOR CORREGIDOR

The enemy artillery, which moved into position between Ternate and Naic on the Betangas Peninsula on 15 January fired more steadily on the main fortress island of Corregidor and its satellites, Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao as soon as Bataan fell. The fortresses in the entrance to Manila returned more accurate fire, however, and the enemy batteries withdrew to more secure, defiladed positions in the mountains near the former positions. (See Map C) After the new positions were occupied, the enemy delivered more accurate, heavier fires on the forts. Fire from the 240mm units placed on the tip of Bataan added to this bombardment as soon as

(66) Statements made to author at 24th Replacement Depot, Luzon in orientation lecture concerning "Death March". Graves were seen by the author before the bodies were exhumed; (67) Statement made to author by residents of San Fernando, confirmed by 1st Lt. Robert L. Morris, a captive; (68) Statement made to author by ex-guerillas.

the enemy brought the big guns down to the tip of Bataan. This fire was more devastating than the fire delivered by the same enemy artillery units on the defenders of Bataan. The 240mm units placed sufficient fire on Corregidor alone to score an average of one hit per second for long periods of time. The entire enemy artillery present in action concentrated on the small tadpole shaped island of Corregidor which is approximately four miles long and one half mile wide at its broadest point. (See Map H) The other three satellite islands near Corregidor were not large enough to form a major portion of the tail of the tadpole of Corregidor. The guns that could be moved by tractor on Corregidor were moved quite frequently to evade the incessant counterbattery fire that was laid down by the enemy. This method of evading the enemy artillery was effective. The friendly artillery fired only approximately twenty rounds from each new position and were then forced to move, because the enemy was able to establish a bracket on the gun's new position within the period of time required to fire twenty rounds. The destruction by the enemy of the gun positions on Corregidor was slow. Ordnance personnel worked day and night to repair the damage done and to keep the guns in operating condition. (69) Fortunately for supply purposes and for hospitalization, Malinta tunnel was available to the defenders of Corregidor. (See Map H) The air in the tunnel was foul, but the tunnel did offer security from the fragmentation of the artillery shells and from the bombs that fell on Corregidor in the daily bombing raids. (70)

Food was a critical consideration at this time. Several thousand of the defenders of Bataan, newly arrived on Corregidor, drew food from these supplies. Water became even more critical. This condition was anticipated and water was stored away in powder cans as a reserve supply. The enemy concentrated the artillery fire on the water system and did serious damage

(69) A-13, p. 12; A-9, p. 41; A-2, pps. 73,77,78; (70) A-13, p. 13; A-2, p. 78; A-1, p. 16.

to this system. The enemy also concentrated fire on the roads and the defending gun positions. Most of the defensive guns of Corregidor were located in open pits and were especially vulnerable to dive bombing and to shelling by enemy artillery. The main water supply for the small forts was on Corregidor and on Bataan. Water was transported to these forts by water barges. Consequently, during the siege of Corregidor, the smaller islands needed water worse than did Corregidor. Due to constant shelling and bombing, the water in the powder cans gathered dust, rock, and rubble. By the time Corregidor fell, the stored water was scarcely fit for animals, much less for men. Even this foul, brackish, brine constituted only a three day supply of water by the time Corregidor fell. (71)

Enemy shelling continued to increase daily, but well trained ordnance personnel kept the guns of the fortress islands returning fire in the first stages of the siege. Early in this artillery duel the north shore batteries of Corregidor were beaten out of their positions by the enemy artillery on the tip of Bataan. At this time the enemy resorted to balloon observation to adjust fire on the other batteries which were now defiladed from observation from Mt. Mariveles. (See Map G) Anti-aircraft fire was not effectively directed on the balloons, however, since height finders were seldom in operating condition. Even when these instruments functioned properly, the communications system was generally out. Telephone communications, on which the anti-aircraft guns relied, was destroyed again the following day. Enemy artillery harassed the defending anti-aircraft batteries daily, and enemy air strikes were conducted virtually constantly on Corregidor. (72)

The remaining members of the Ordnance Department on Corregidor became too few and too fatigued to maintain all the guns which received daily damage from enemy counterbattery fire. Some artillery positions on Corregidor were destroyed by the enemy fire, but the roving guns maintained good

(71) A-9, p. 43; A-13, p. 13; (72) A-9, pps. 41,42,45,46.

counterbattery fire. By 14 April, the open emplacements on Corregidor, Cabello and Carabao had been destroyed, or were delivering sporadic fire as a result of the enemy devastating counterbattery fire. Turreted guns on the battleship-like structure of El Fraile, which had a reinforced concrete deck, fired continuously. These gun turrets functioned effectively throughout the entire campaign and continued to fire up until a few minutes prior to the surrender without ever being disabled. Few men were lost on El Fraile despite the fact that in a single day the enemy hit the deck of this fort with over a thousand artillery rounds. The enemy chipped off more than fifteen feet of the deck of El Fraile during the entire siege.

On Corregidor, the roving batteries adopted a new technique of fire. Two or more batteries or two or more single guns in widely separated positions fired on the same enemy position by a coordinated system by use of which the defending artillery hoped to destroy the enemy without being taken under effective counterbattery fire. In this system one gun or one battery, depending on the situation, fired on a target until the usual twenty salvos were delivered. Then this gun would move in an attempt to evade the enemy counterbattery fire which was calculated to be delivered after twenty salvos of friendly artillery fire. During the move, the second friendly gun or battery took the same target under fire. By this system the firing guns would fire and move in coordination with each other. This system was not effective. The enemy had a larger number of guns with accurately adjusted data which covered a given part of Corregidor at all times. The counter measures of the enemy defeated the new technique of fire. (73)

(73) A-9, p. 45.

THE JAPANESE ASSAULT ON CORREGIDOR

On 1 May increased enemy artillery fire along the north side of the tail of the tadpole indicated that a landing would be attempted along that portion of Corregidor. This build-up for the landing continued for four days. On the fourth day, an estimated 16,000 artillery hits on Corregidor were fired by the enemy. On this day, General Wainwright refused an opportunity to surrender.

On 5 May the enemy increased the artillery fire in the build-up phase of the assault on Corregidor. Intense artillery fire was not limited to the proposed landing site of the enemy, but was delivered all over the entire island. A concentration of enemy boats, sighted at Cabacben on the tip of Betan by the defenders of Corregidor, were taken under fire by all available guns. About 2200 hours 5 May, in brilliant moonlight, the enemy approached Corregidor in twenty steel, motor driven assault boats. Each boat carried a tank as well as infantry with organic weapons, which included grenades, light mortars, and automatic weapons. The bombardment was so intense that the defenders did not hear the approaching landing party. The enemy was sighted eventually, and a fight ensued as the Japanese covered the last three hundred yards of water. All weapons were concentrated on stopping the enemy assault. By 0300, the enemy effected a landing but landed only three tanks of the original twenty. The enemy was pinned to the ground for the next seven hours. Meanwhile, early on the morning of 6 May another enemy landing party was beaten off by the defenders. This landing party turned back to Mariveles. (74) (See Map G and H)

(74) A-9, pps. 47,48.

THE SURRENDER

The enemy made only slight advances on Corregidor, all units, including the 4th Regiment, United States Marine Corps, the only Marine Corps regiment in the Philippines, rushed forward to take up position on the beaches along the north shore of the tail of the tadpole. At about 1300 hours 6 May a lull came in the shelling. Out of compassion for the sick and wounded and not wishing to have the lives of the remaining friendly troops taken unnecessarily, General Wainwright, with a party of American officers, left Malinta tunnel to be taken to General Homma to surrender the Island of Corregidor. By 1430 hours, the enemy blocked the west entrance to the Malinta tunnel. At this time Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Kalakuka, a fluent speaker of Russian, went out of the east end of Malinta tunnel under a flag of truce to find a Russian speaking enemy to stop the firing. A few minutes later, Colonel Kalakuka reentered Malinta tunnel with a Japanese major and a Japanese lieutenant. The major desired to negotiate terms of surrender with Brigadier General Charles C. Drake, the senior officer present, in the absence of General Wainwright and his party. The Japanese major wanted General Drake to completely empty Malinta tunnel of troops through the west entrance in ten minutes, despite the fact that other Japanese were firing on the west end of the tunnel. (See Map I) General Drake assured the enemy major, through Colonel Kalakuka and the enemy lieutenant, contact agent for the enemy major, that Malinta tunnel would be cleared of defending troops as soon as possible if the major would stop the firing. The enemy major agreed, so the survivors in the tunnel were squeezed back against the walls of Malinta tunnel to form a passageway for the enemy contact party to exit through the west entrance. The enemy major emerged from the tunnel and stopped the firing. Malinta tunnel was emptied through the west entrance by 1600 hours. The enemy soldiers systematically searched the survivors of Corregidor

and deprived the survivors of jewelry, watches, money, and other valuable small items. (75)

General Wainwright's trip to Cabcaben was a failure. General Homma stomped out of the meeting because General Wainwright did not desire to surrender the entire Philippine Archipelago, merely Luzon and the islands at the mouth of Manila Harbor. General Wainwright had no choice other than to return to Corregidor, which he did, only to find Malinta Hill in the hands of the enemy. In view of the situation, General Wainwright had no choice other than to locate the senior enemy officer on Corregidor and to complete the surrender (76) by giving to the senior enemy officer present a "formal recognition that Corregidor was in possession of the enemy". (77)

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In making a detailed study and analysis of the operations on Luzon from 8 December 1941 to 6 May 1942, it is believed that the quality of the delaying action fought on many occasions by the defending forces far surpassed the quality of the offensive action fought by the enemy. Since the general situation in the Far East indicated aggression on the part of Japan before the first strike on Clark Field, all the bombers at Clark Field should have been moved to Mindanao, out of range of enemy land based bombers, even before 8 December. Further, in view of the same set of circumstances, bunkers should have been constructed prior to hostilities, and the use thereof should have been stressed and practiced. Operational air cover should have been SOP for the Air Corps fields at that time. These last two points should have been rigorously enforced after the first warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

General MacArthur's analysis of the terrain of Luzon with respect to possible landing sites in the strategy of the capture of Luzon was a
(75) A-13, pps. 12,13,64; (76) A-13, p. 64; A-2, p. 81,82; (77) A-13, p. 64.

masterpiece, for the initial commitments of the Japanese as well as the main landings fitted General MacArthur's predetermined analysis perfectly.

Delaying positions that had a good route of lateral communications and delaying positions that tied in to natural terrain obstacles were well chosen by the various commanders who selected these positions whenever the selection of such a position was possible.

The rear guard actions of the 26th Cavalry were well fought battles that effectively delayed the enemy, especially when aided by the engineers who destroyed bridges and culverts as well as constructed hasty positions.

The unauthorized withdrawal of the 71st Division from Baliaug on 31 December could have resulted in the capture by the enemy of all defending forces east of the Calumpit Bridge.

Destruction of supplies that could not be evacuated as well as destruction of all facilities that would aid the enemy, including the dynamiting of Cavite, and the destruction of equipment which was abandoned, as accomplished by the 1st Division when cut off from their lines in Bataan, was an important duty that was thoroughly accomplished.

The removal by General MacArthur of the civil leaders of the Philippines from Manila to Corregidor was a well conceived move since this action insured that these leaders would not fall into the hands of the Japanese and be held as hostages and used by the enemy as a tool with which to bend the will of the Filipino people.

General MacArthur's appearance among the front line units on 10 January 1942 contributed greatly to the morale of the fighting men.

The failure of the units along the first main battle position on Bataan to tie in the flanks of the adjacent units was a mistake that should have been avoided, for this error gave the enemy a soft spot that was easily pierced.

The defeat of the amphibious operations against Bataan in the Battle of the Points by a relatively small number of men was well conducted since assaults against the enemy landings occurred before the landing parties could move inland.

The reduction of the salient by use of the Battle of the Pockets technique was effectively conducted and reduced the salient with little loss of life on the reducing force, but great loss of life on the part of the enemy.

The reflection of victory on morale was clearly demonstrated by both sides of the lines after the reduction of the salient by the Battle of the Pockets technique subsequent to the decisive defeat of the amphibious assaults in the Battle of the Points.

The enemy artillery-air build-up phase of the last few days of the operations on Bataan was effective, especially when the planes covered the infantry-tank teams as these teams followed behind the enemy artillery preparation to destroy the remaining troops.

The actions of guerillas in harassing the enemy were valuable to the defending forces.

Food, medicine and drugs were conserved and stock-piled as much as possible in these operations, additional medicine was brought in by submarine, and food was taken from natural growth sources; yet these were critical items and were insufficient for such operations.

The Japanese observation of Corregidor by balloon was an effective method of adjusting artillery fire. At the same time, the counterbattery fire against the anti-aircraft batteries as well as concurrent bombardment was an effective method of neutralizing the batteries of Corregidor.

Well trained ordnance personnel did an excellent job in the repair of materiel on Corregidor, Carabao, and Caballo in almost daily repair of guns that had been knocked out by the enemy. Trained repairmen to place guns

back in operating condition was an asset to the defenders.

Open pits were not good emplacements for artillery, but were a handicap since these gun pits were necessarily fixed and could not move about and develop deception as did the roving pieces and batteries. At the same time, the pits were subjected to heavy fire which eventually neutralized all these pits.

The turreted guns were especially suited to the siege type of fighting and were able to withstand a tremendous amount of shelling.

The communications system on Corregidor was inadequately protected on top of the ground. Deeply buried lines would not have been broken daily by the enemy shelling.

The water supply on Corregidor was not sufficiently secure. As water is one of the necessities of life, a safe, certain, protected method of supply and storage on Corregidor should have been provided.

LESSONS

1. Orders from a military superior must always be strictly, promptly, and fully executed.

2. The cavalry mission of a rear guard action is still a good cavalry mission and can be capably discharged by cavalry units.

3. Military units defending on the field of battle must always secure their flanks on natural terrain obstacles when such obstacles exist.

4. In military operations, a good route of lateral communications is a necessity. This factor must be considered by a commander before a position is selected.

5. A Commander must always critically analyze the terrain he holds and determine the best method of attacking this terrain. From this analysis, the commander will also be able to determine the countermeasures he must take in the event of an attack.

6. The destruction of bridges and culverts in front of an advancing enemy is an effective means of slowing the advance of that enemy.

7. Military units on the field of battle should withdraw only upon order, and should not take the authorized withdrawal of an adjacent unit as permission for the withdrawal of the entire line.

8. All supplies, installations, and facilities that will aid the enemy in any way must be destroyed before they can fall into the hands of that enemy, unless these items can be evacuated to maintain or comfort our own troops.

9. Civil leaders of a country should always be evacuated with the friendly or allied country's army to prevent these civil leaders from falling into the hands of the enemy, ^{being} held as hostage, and ^{being} used by the enemy to coerce the civil leader's people.

10. The presence of a high commander on the field of battle will impress the troops of that command.

#3 is sufficient? 11. The flanks of all units ~~must~~ always be tied in with adjacent units to prevent the enemy from making a penetration between the units.

12. Beach defense is an effective countermeasure for amphibious assault.

13. A salient in a line can be reduced with a ^{small} low loss of men by methodically cutting off a small segment of the salient in a limited attack and systematically reducing the segment.

14. Victory has a definite effect upon morale.

15. Infantry-tank teams, supported by artillery and air missions constitute an effective striking force.

16. Numerous, adequate observation posts can be located in mountainous terrain.

17. Fresh troops are essential in an extended campaign.

18. Adequate Class V supplies are essential in a campaign.

19. Sufficient food, medicine and drugs are a necessity in any campaign.

Too General 20. Aggressive action is effective.

21. Exploitation of a breakthrough can defeat defending forces.

22. Observation by air is an effective method of artillery adjustment.

23. Ordnance repairmen are a necessity in a campaign, especially in a siege phase.

24. Open pits for guns are not effective emplacements, and can be reduced by plunging fire and bombers.

25. Heavy guns used in defense of a fort must always be emplaced in completely enclosed turrets.

26. Communications systems must always be under ground, where possible, to protect the communication lines from enemy artillery and air bombardment.

guerillas covered but not machine gunned as. 27. Native guerillas from among the inhabitants of a country constitute effective harassing troops against an enemy.