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THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
FOURTH SECTION
COMMITTEE "H"
FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

ADVANCED COURSE
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OPERATIONS OF 3D BATTALION, 6TH INFANTRY (5TH DIVISION), IN THE
CROSSING OF THE MEUSE RIVER IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE
NOVEMBER 2D TO NOVEMBER 6TH, 1918

(Personal Experience of a Battalion Commander)

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Society of the Fifth Division

Official history of the Fifth Division, U.S.A., during the period of its organization and of its operations in the European World War, 1917-1919. Washington, D.C., Society of the Fifth Division, 1919.

More or less biased in favor of the 5th Division. General statements are accurate. The parts that apply to this monograph were taken from operations report of the 10th Brigade and are inaccurate as to details.

Monograph: 5th Division

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1921. (A collection of mimeographed documents.)

These documents are copies of official records and appear to be correct.

Palmer, Frederick

Our Greatest Battle (The Meuse-Argonne). New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1919. Pages 580-617.

A well written book from a civilian standpoint. Biased against the regular army and inaccurate in details.

American Battle Monuments Commission

Guide to the American Battlefields in Europe. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1927. Pages 127-130.

Very accurate, except front lines are marked as occupied, when they were only visited by patrols.

King, W. C.

King's Complete History of the World War. Springfield, Mass., History Associates, 1922. Page 472.

This book is very general and in some cases inaccurate.

Hartzell, A. E.

Meuse-Argonne Battle, September 26 - November 11, 1918.

The part that applies to this monograph is mixed up and inaccurate (Par. 4, page 35).

Army War College

Order of Battle of the United States
Land Forces in the World War.

Hodges, C. H., Major

Statement by Major C. H. Hodges,
2d Battalion, 6th Infantry, November
1918.

O'Neal, Marcus D., Captain

Statements by Captain Marcus D.
O'Neal, Company E, 6th Infantry,
November 1918.

French Military Maps:
Dun-Sur Meuse 1-20,000
Breheville 1-20,000
Verdun A and B 1-20,000

Operations report of 2d Battalion,
Sixth Infantry, November 1st to 7th
1918

Memorandum: Headquarters, Tenth
Infantry, November 15, 1918

Personal participation.

MARGINAL ABBREVIATIONS USED

Monograph

"Monograph: 5th Division"

Palmer

"Our Greatest Battle"

American Battle
Mon. Com.

"Guide to the American Battlefields in
Europe"

Major Hodges

Personal Experience

Personal Knowledge

Knowledge by the writer through partici-
pation.

INTRODUCTION

As the subject of this monograph is the operations of a single battalion of infantry for a definite period, it is necessary to identify the unit in order that the reader may have a more comprehensive understanding of the subject.

The 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry, a part of the 10th Brigade, 5th Division, U.S. Army, was composed of troops from all parts of the country. In the latter part of November 1917 the 5th Division was organized for immediate service overseas. Its units were individually equipped and trained, the 6th Infantry being stationed at Camp Forrest, Tennessee.

The latter part of March, embarkation orders were received and the regiment sailed from New York April 9, 1918. The 1st of May the Sixth, as part of the division, arrived in the Bar Sur-Aube Sector for further training. Early in June the division was sent to the Vosges Mountains to relieve the 21st French Division which was needed on the Marne.

ACTIVE OPERATIONS AND EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 22

The division remained in the Vosges during the summer and on August 17th, the 3d Battalion, 6th Infantry, carried out its first operation when it attacked and captured the town of Frappelle in the St. Die Sector. During the St. Mihiel Offensive the 3d Battalion led the assault wave for the 10th Brigade and succeeded in reaching the objectives assigned to it.

On October 14th the 3d Battalion in the Meuse-Argonne again led the assault for the 10th

Brigade. (1) This time they met with great difficulties

(1) Army War ?
College,
pp 81-89

and suffered heavy casualties. The strength on the morning of the 13th was 900 men and 32 officers, the battalion commanded by Major John W. Leonard, and each company by a captain. When it was relieved on the 17th there were two first and five second lieutenants and about 550 men. I had served as Bn-3 on Major Leonard's staff since June and had been with him in all the operations of the 3d Battalion. I was at his side on the night of October 16th when he was shot through the leg by a rifle bullet. I helped him apply first aid. He then informed me that I was in command of the battalion and left for the aid station and was evacuated. (2)

(2) Personal Knowledge

On October 26th the 5th Division relieved the 3d on the west bank of the Meuse. (3)

(3) Monograph, p 110

GENERAL SITUATION

The general situation on November 1st was very favorable to the Allies. On the extreme north the Belgian Army had cleared the Belgian Coast. The French and British were driving forward on a wide front. The Italians had been successful and Austria had sued for peace. On the 30th of October an armistice was signed with Turkey. Germany was fighting alone and the morale of the German Army and the German Nation was nearing the breaking point. (4)

(4) Palmer, pp 515,516

By November 1st they had been defeated along the entire front of the American Army and were withdrawing from the east bank of the Meuse. (5)

(5) Monograph, p 63

DIVISION, REGIMENTAL AND BATTALION POSITIONS

NOVEMBER 1ST

The 5th Division formed the right flank of the First American Army; the Nintieth Division was

(6) American
Battle Mon.
Com., p 127

not
not

on its left, and Fifteenth French Division on its right. The division line ran from (Bois de Babiemont-- Hill 261--Clery-le-Petit and turned south along the Meuse to Bois Cote de la Lamont/ where it joined the French. (6) The Sixth Infantry occupied the front line of the Tenth Brigade in the right sector of the division. The 2d Battalion was generally along a line covering the northern and eastern edge of Bois de la Lamont with outpost on Hill 227 and one platoon and two machine guns occupying Br^uilles. The 3d Battalion (less Company M) was in the northwestern part of Bois de Br^uilles in support. Company M was in the eastern part of Bois de Ru to maintain liaison between the 1st Battalion and the Fifteenth French Division. The 1st Battalion was in Bois de Sepsarges. Regimental Headquarters were 500 yards south of the 3d Battalion. (7)

(7) Personal
Knowledge

ORDERS AND PLAN FOR CROSSING THE MEUSE RIVER AND
CANAL

Late in the afternoon November 1st, I received Field Order No. 49, Headquarters Tenth Brigade, which stated in substance:

"Par. 2 (a) The Tenth Brigade will, in the event of the enemy's withdrawal, pursue.

"Par. 3 (a) The Brigade will advance with its regiments side by side, the Sixth Infantry on the right, the Eleventh Infantry on the left, each regiment in formation of column of battalions designated "A", "B", and "C" from front to rear.

"Par. 3 (c) The "B" battalions will commence crossing the river and canal as soon as the

"A" battalions move forward against their objectives and will follow "A" battalions at 500 yards.

"Par. 3 (j) Company "F", Seventh Engineers will construct foot bridges across the Meuse at point 14.5-85.8 and construct the foot bridge across the canal at point 15.0-86.0. Two companies of the Eleventh Infantry from "A" battalion will cover them during this work."

This order issued by General Paul B. Malone, went into details as to formations, artillery barrages, liaison, etc. (8)

(8) Monograph,
p 91

STRENGTH, PERSONNEL AND MORALE OF THE 3D BATTALION

At the time I received the order my battalion was comfortably quartered in the Bois de Brisselles, the kitchens had been brought up and we were having three good meals a day. New clothing and shoes had been issued, equipment replaced and companies reorganized. The strength of the battalion was six officers and 550 enlisted men. The morale of the men was high. The noncommissioned officers were experienced and reliable. Among the officers were 1st Lieutenant McGuire and 1st Lieutenant Grey, who had joined the battalion in the United States. 2d Lieutenants Grigsby, Tubbs, and Stapleton had joined on October 8, 1918. I had never been in command of a unit larger than a platoon. However, I had been with Major Leonard at Frappelle, St. Mihiel, and Romange. I was prepared to follow the 2d Battalion and do as directed.

Our regimental commander had not been active in pushing his battalions or assisting them in overcoming their difficulties. He was not ac-

(9) Opinion of
Writer

customed to hardships, valued his personal comfort and was content to pass on brigade orders and let events take their course. General Malone was aware of this and issued orders more or less direct to battalions. (9) During the time from November 2d to November 6th regimental headquarters did not influence the actions of the battalion in any way.

OPERATIONS OF THE 2D BATTALION, NOVEMBER 1-2D

The actions of the 2d Battalion on November 1st can be covered better by quoting the operations report taken from Major Hodges' personal file:

"Found the battalion intrenched along the position Bois de Brioules - cote 280 - Bois de la Lemmont with one (1) platoon and two (2) machine guns in advance at trench du Teton and one (1) platoon under an officer occupying BRIEULLES. Three (3) companies occupied the front line and one (1) company was held in support with two (2) platoons on hill 279 and two (2) platoons on Hill 283. The battalion connected up with the 5th Colonial Infantry (French) on the right and the 11th U.S. Infantry on the left.

During the night two (2) patrols under non-commissioned officers and a covering detachment under an officer were sent along the river bank to look for possible crossings and if possible to cross the canal beyond and gain contact with the enemy. (After the second patrol had returned without success the battalion commander with four (4) men moved out through BRIEULLES at 2:00 A.M. and proceeded along the river valley, in order to get a more comprehensive idea of the difficulties encountered by the patrols sent out earlier in the evening and the night before.) Enemy's outpost was found very alert. Flares were thrown up at frequent intervals from points near canal and, on two occasions, enemy machine guns opened fire, with short bursts, from points just east of canal. Flares lighted up stream bed so completely that patrols moved with great difficulty."

NOVEMBER 2D

3D BATTALION ORDERS AND RECONNAISSANCE

The 3d Battalion location remained unchanged. Officers of the battalion were called

together, the brigade order read and an assembly point fixed for the battalion.

The morning of November 2d I obtained a high-powered telescope and with Lieutenant McGuire and Lieutenant Grey went to a point along the western edge of Bois de la Lamont. We could see the Meuse Valley from ~~Briselles~~ to Vilones and the German defenses on the opposite bank. The valley here is about 1,000 yards wide and, with the exception of numerous shell holes, perfectly flat. It is cut by the river and the canal. The Bois de Chatillon is covered with small trees and undergrowth and was defended with two lines of trenches with concrete dugouts. *not shown*

ATTEMPTED CROSSING BY THE 2D BATTALION NOVEMBER 2-3D

The 2d Battalion received orders from the brigade at midnight November 2d to force a crossing. The engineers arrived at 3:00 AM and at 5:45 AM, November 3d, Company E and a detachment of engineers crossed the river but due to terrific artillery and machine gun fire were forced to take cover under the canal bank. This crossing was made in square 45, near (14.80-85.35). Throughout the day this company was unable to move. During the night of November 3d-4th Company G crossed the river and joined Company E. The remainder of the battalion with a platoon of machine guns and Stokes mortar platoon were assisting Companies E and G with fire, but the crossing was not effected. (10)

(10) Operations
Report, 2d
Bn, 6th Inf

OPERATIONS NOVEMBER 4TH

During the day, our artillery supporting the 2d Battalion shelled the east bank of the canal

*Not shown
on map*

and Bois de Chatillon with heavy concentrations and
at 6:00 PM the two companies that had crossed the
river November 3d got across the canal at point
(15.0-86.0) and took a position along the small draw

(11) Major Hodges

in square 56 (see Map No. 3). (11)

At 10:00 AM November 4th I received Field
Order No. 50.

"HEADQUARTERS TENTH INFANTRY BRIGADE,
American E.F. FRANCE, 4 November, 1918

S E C R E T

FIELD ORDER NO. 50

EXTRACT

1. Enemy is still in retreat covered by rear
guards. We succeeded last night in throwing two
foot bridges across the canal.

2. We will force a crossing tonight.

* * * * *

(b) The Hartman Bn. of the 6th Infantry
(less 1 company) carrying duckboards and rafts will
move under cover of darkness to a position along the
canal to the southwest of Bois de CHATILLON, and at
8:00 P.M. will cross the canal on rafts and duck-
boards covered by their own fire and will secure a
position on the east of the canal. The Bois de
CHATILLON will be mopped up tomorrow morning begin-
ning at 6:00 A.M.

(c) The Kiser Bn 6th Infantry, provided
with duckboards, will take up position along the
west bank of the canal covering the two foot bridges
and covered by its own fire, it will at 8:00 P.M.
force a crossing by the bridges and by means of
duckboards. It will then secure possession of Hills
228 and on the high ground to the south of LINY
dev't DUN.

(d) The Hodges Bn. will stand fast until
the Kiser Bn. has passed through, when it will man
the western bank of the canal and be prepared to
cross and assist the Kiser Bn. or Hartman Bn. to
accomplish their tasks.

If possible, improvised rafts will be made from
barrals or other available material to provide
bridges across the canal.

* * * * *

Paul B. Malone
Brigadier General, U.S.A.
Commanding."

To carry out this order my plan was to march to the river in column of twos, companies without distance twenty-five yards between sections and, when the river was reached, to cross by any means available, swimming if necessary, then move on to the canal and cross it. I had selected the point where Trench de la Corrins touched the canal (15.30-85.35) square 55 as the place where we wanted to cross the canal.

In reading paragraph 3 (b) of this order I was impressed with the fact that I was ordered to force a crossing of the Meuse River and canal unassisted at a new place where the enemy were entrenched and to attack at 6:00.0'clock the next morning. The entire 5th Division assisted by engineers and artillery, had been trying to get a patrol across for three days and had failed.

At 5:30 PM Companies I, K and L moved out of Bois de Bruelles around Hill 227, along the south edge of Bruelles, to a point where I had been informed that we could get material to assist us in crossing. ~~This material consisted of about fifty duckboards.~~ Then we moved in the same formation to a point in square 55 (15.20-85.20). The river here was eighty feet wide and ten feet deep. The ground was level except for numerous shell holes, and clear of trees and undergrowth. We had met with no interference other than harassing artillery fire that was more or less general over the entire area. About the

time we reached the river we were discovered and numerous shells began to fall. The companies were ordered to take cover where they were. A patrol was sent to the right and left with orders to find a more suitable crossing place.

I, with the sergeant major and two runners went back towards ~~Brigades~~ looking for material to use for a raft. We crossed the railroad and had proceeded about fifty yards when we heard a wagon coming toward us. It was driven by a French soldier and loaded with boats and bridge material. The Frenchman could not understand us. There was no time to lose, so we took charge, much against the Frenchman's will. The sergeant major drove and I led the way to the battalion. The men were eager to cross. It was a problem to keep them from collecting in groups and making artillery targets of themselves. The first boat was carried to the water, manned by twenty-five men and paddled to the east bank. This was continued; each boat load as it was ferried over moved to the canal bank under cover. Meanwhile the French soldier who was ~~experienced in building ponton bridges was construct-~~ing one here, assisted by our men.

Now shells began falling, the enemy had the exact range; the bridge was blown up with a direct hit; several men were wounded; the horses became unmanageable and had to be taken away. Men were crowded around ready to cross. Confusion was everywhere. All men except those working on the bridge were moved away from the river bank to take cover in shell holes. The bridge was started again a short distance down the river and completed. "K" and "L"

Companies marched over and went to the canal bank.

In the meantime about one hundred men had been ferried over and had carried a boat to the canal which was at this point five feet above the level of the valley. This group was lined up behind the canal bank ready to fire. The boat was placed in the canal, manned by twenty-five men, and crossed. When they reached the east bank they took a fan-shaped patrol formation and moved out in all directions. The canal bank on the east side at this point was level for thirty yards with an unimproved narrow road running along beside it. There were patches of undergrowth along the road. The bank rose abruptly for thirty feet and then gradually to the top of Hill 228.

The first group captured eleven Germans and a heavy machine gun within fifty yards of where we crossed. They were in a trench and evidently had been firing at the 2d Battalion. I crossed the canal in the first boat and as the rest of the battalion was ferried over, gave my orders. "I" Company moved south along the canal bank for 400 yards and then northeast to the trenches in ~~square 65 (16 20 85 20)~~. Company "L" moved up the trenches towards Cote 252. Company "K" was in the center along the top of the canal bank, and was to send a platoon south along the canal bank and a patrol north to locate the 2d Battalion. Company "I" in moving along the canal bank, was fired on by a machine gun, killing one man and wounding another. The gun was flanked and three enemy captured.

The crossing was completed and all companies were in position at 8:20 PM. At 10:00 PM the patrol on the left returned and reported that Company "G" was

about 1,000 yards north of our position. At 11:30 PM the C.O., Company "L", sent me ten enemy prisoners, saying that some of our men in looking for a place to keep warm found the prisoners sleeping in a dugout in our lines.

CONTINUED OPERATIONS, NOVEMBER 5TH

At 5:00 AM November 5th I received five prisoners from Company "K". These were captured in a dugout where our men had been sleeping on the outer part of the dugout and the Germans sleeping inside. Orders had been issued to attack at 6:00 AM and capture Bois de Chatillon with "I" Company on the right and "L" Company on the left, and "K" Company in support, following "I" Company at 200 yards. Each company had a strength of about 140 men and was divided into three platoons with two platoons in the first wave and one platoon in support. We were attacking over terrain covered with thick undergrowth. Our right flank was unprotected. Our left flank we believed would be protected by the attack of the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry. However I later found that while the 1st Battalion crossed the canal about 2:00 PM November 5th, they never attacked but took a position with the 2d Battalion near the canal bank and remained there until November 6th.

At 6:00 AM our attack started. I could see about twenty-five enemy running east in front of our men. We received some rifle and machine-gun fire from Hill 228, but due to the undergrowth it did not cause any casualties. By 7:00 o'clock we had advanced to the Liny devant Dun-Vilosnes road and were in complete possession of the Bois de Chatillon. Of the enemy troops that were driven out by our attack I saw one group of thirty men go towards Bois de Sartelle. Several small groups went

towards Hill 275 and Liny devant Dun.

Of course these groups were good machine gun targets, but we had no guns. The regimental commander had promised to send one company from the 14th Machine Gun Battalion. This company was commanded by a new 2d lieutenant. He decided it was better for him to stay with the kitchens and see to it that his men had something to eat. About fifteen men from this company joined us after the attack without guns or ammunition. They secured captured guns and were used on the right flank. Our losses during the attack were eight men killed and twenty-three wounded. The companies were reorganized and placed in three combat groups about 100 yards from the edge of the road, Company "I" on the right and Company "L" in the center and left, with Company "K" in reserve.

At 9:30 AM the enemy made a counterattack preceded by intense artillery fire. Small parties numbering from three to ten men filtered in between our combat groups. This resulted in continuous fighting. One method of the enemy was to slip by a combat group and open fire from the rear, usually with a light machine gun. Our men were engaged in ten separate actions of this nature. The artillery fire caused us heavy losses. Lieutenant Grey was wounded. Lieutenant McGuire was able to walk with difficulty due to a serious attack of hernia.

The 1st Battalion that had been ordered to Hill 228 could not be located. The trenches on our right were occupied by the enemy. Our medical officer and attendants were in Bruelles. The wounded walked back if they were able; otherwise they lay where they

fell. Runners sent to regimental headquarters failed to return.

At noon we were desperate; I marked a German map showing enemy positions and sent it direct to General Malone, Brigade Commander. At 12:30 PM our artillery placed an intense concentration on the positions I had marked. This caused the enemy to hastily withdraw from our front.

We were now holding the eastern edge of Bois de Chatillon with three combat groups on the left, center and right. The reserve (Company "K") had been used, one platoon in the center and one on the right. Twenty-seven men were killed and seventy-five wounded.

At 3:00 PM I received a message from Captain Kiser who was in command of the 1st Battalion to report to the regimental commander at Bruelles for orders. I went back to the canal and Lieutenant Colonel Hodges gave me the orders saying the 338th Infantry would pass through my position at 6:00 AM November 6th, and continue the attack and for me to send runners to meet them at Bruelles at 5:00 AM. The 2d Battalion (Hodges) and ~~the 1st Battalion (Kiser) were occupying the same po-~~ sition about 200 yards from the canal bank. Regimental Headquarters were in Bruelles. My battalion was to stay where it was until after the 338th Infantry had passed and would then go into division reserve.

Our kitchens were brought up the night of the 5th to the western edge of Bois de Chatillon. Wounded ^{not known} men were evacuated and our position was reorganized. At ~~6:00 AM November 6th the 338th Infantry passed through~~ our lines and continued the attack.

At this time I sent a patrol of fifteen men towards Vilosnes. They got in rear of the enemy and opened fire. The French on the west bank of the Meuse thus aided were able to cross the Meuse and the enemy was forced to surrender. This patrol captured 110 Germans and turned them over to the French.

RESUME'

This battalion from 6:00 PM November 4th to 3:00 PM November 6th forced a crossing of the Meuse River and canal, attacked and captured a position highly organized and defended by infantry, and penetrated the Bois de Chatillon for 2500 yards, without artillery fire. It repulsed a determined counterattack on the morning of November 5th, that if successful would have prevented the 5th Division from enlarging their bridgehead. It organized and defended for twenty-four hours a position 2,000 yards in front of any other troops.

LOSSES

Killed: 31 men

Wounded: 98 men and two officers

ENEMY CAPTURED

In Bois de Chatillon: 96

At Vilosnes: 110

MATERIAL CAPTURED

10 light cannon

6 minenwerfers

24 heavy machine guns

45 light machine guns

100 rifles

500,000 rounds of machine gun and rifle ammunition

COMMENTS FROM HIGHER COMMANDERS

Brigade Commander (General Malone).- The importance of the feats of this battalion in relation to the subsequent operations of the division and of the corps cannot be overestimated.

Corps Commander.- This operation was the beginning of the movement that turned the flank and caused the withdrawal of the German Army.

Commander-in-Chief.- The Fifth Division in crossing the Meuse River and establishing a bridgehead performed one of the most brilliant operations of the war.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

I have no adverse criticisms to make on the operations of the 3d Battalion. I expected to be ordered to attempt a crossing of the river and canal and when the order was received we were ready. We crossed the river and canal without delay. The formation on the east bank the night of November 4th-5th furnished protection and placed the companies in a position ready for attack.

The attack was made with dash and determination.

Not shown in map

The frontage held by the battalion on the eastern edge of Bois de Chatillon was over 1,000 yards. It was necessary to establish large combat groups to prevent straggling, and retain control of the men.

The repulse of the counterattack on the morning of the 5th, especially on the left flank, which was exposed to frontal and enfilade machine gun fire cannot be praised too highly. If our right flank (which was exposed for 2500 yards) had been attacked at this time the results would have been serious.

So far as I know there was no one in the

division who had any experience in river crossings. Higher commanders knew the width and depth of the streams and probably knew that wire had been placed in the canal to prevent swimming. It is unreasonable to think that a battalion could cross on duckboards; boats that were available should have been furnished. Regimental Headquarters could have assisted us in many ways but they apparently were not functioning on November 5th.

Our medical unit was 3,000 yards to the rear under the Regimental Surgeon. Telephone communication was not established until late in the afternoon November 5th. The 1st Battalion that was ordered by the 10th Brigade to attack on our left flank never moved after it crossed the canal. While my battalion was seriously engaged, the Regimental Commander knowing the shortage of officers in the battalion, ordered me to walk 3,000 yards to the rear to receive an order.

It is my opinion that Companies "E" and "G" could have crossed the canal on the night of November 3d-4th if they had made an effort to do so. They had boats and were protected by the canal bank from long-range fire. ~~The failure can only be accounted for by~~ lack of proper effort on the part of the leaders.

LESSONS

1. Infantry can advance under its own effort and capture and hold any terrain against defeated troops that it wishes.

2. Many privileges can be taken against the enemy when his morale is low.

3. Writing a good order does not guarantee results. The execution is the most important part.

4. Teamwork is essential.

5. Good reconnaissance can be made without going over the ground.

6. When you are in support have a plan of your own for you may become the leading unit.

7. River crossings are difficult operations. I recommend that more time be devoted to this subject in training schedules.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. The battalion (450 men) has reached the river (formation column of twos, twenty-five yards between sections) and find that it is impossible to cross. The enemy is shelling the area where ^{it} is halted. What action would you take as battalion commander?

ANSWER: Order the companies to take cover where they are. Send patrols up and down the river to find a more suitable crossing. Look for material that could be used to effect a crossing. (See page 9.)

2. The battalion has crossed the river and is now crossing the canal; it will attack at 6:00 AM tomorrow morning. What dispositions would you make for the night?

ANSWER: ~~The companies should be placed in their jump off~~ positions and so placed that the battalion will have protection on all sides. (See page 10.)

3. What patrols, if any, would you send out?

ANSWER: One patrol, to locate the 2d Battalion. (See page 10.)

4. The attack is successful. The battalion at 7:00 AM has reached the eastern edge of Bois de Chatillon. You have a front of 1,000 yards covered with undergrowth. Small groups of enemy can be seen to the front and flanks. Your reserve company is intact; the front line companies are disorganized. The battalion has no protection on either flank. You are not under fire. What would you do?

ANSWER: Reorganize the front line companies and place them in combat groups and hold the reserve company where it was. (See page 11.)

5. Fourteen men and a noncommissioned officer from the 14th Machine Gun Battalion reported to you at 8:00 AM. They had no guns or equipment. (You have captured machine guns.) How would you use them?

ANSWER: Arm the men with enemy machine guns and place them on the flanks of the battalion. (See page 12.)

