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OPERATIONS OF 2D BATTALION, 3D INFANTRY, 199TH LIGHT
INFANTRY BRIGADE, IN A PACIFICATION MISSION (OPERATION
FAIRFAX) JANUARY THROUGH OCTOBER 1967 IN GIA DINH
PROVINCE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. (PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF
A COMPANY COMMANDER/BATTALION STAFF OFFICER.)

Captain Paul F. Morgan

Advanced Course Class No 3-68

Roster No 115, Advisory Group No 18

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INTRODUCTION

The Saigon Government's control of the populace and its resources is perhaps the most critical and crucial aspect of the war; yet, the enigma of the Vietnam war lies in the inability of the Free World Forces, the Vietnamese, and, in the past, the French to ferret out and destroy the communist infrastructure which undermines all efforts towards a normal existence for the people of Vietnam.

The purpose of this monograph is to illustrate one method - one attempt - in the struggle to solve this riddle through pacification.

BACKGROUND

Although a succession of failures has existed within the pacification program since the days of the French, the American war effort did not grasp the basics of this problem until late 1965, when the direct role of US forces in pacification became the only foreseeable solution. At best, the realization that drastic measures were in order on the part of the South Vietnamese Government and the United States was the beginning of a long and tedious job.

The utilization of American combat units to provide security did not evolve until late in 1966 when Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge announced the change in policy. Because of previous slippages in the program, Gia Dinh Province and the Saigon area were targeted for increased emphasis on pacification and a large-scale commitment of US troops.

The 199th Light Infantry Brigade arrived in Vietnam in November 1966. After in-country processing, the Brigade assumed the Operation FAIRFAX mission with subordinate units relocating in Gia Dinh Province during the first week of January 1967.

THE EXISTING SITUATION

The city of Saigon and its surrounding area are of special importance to the Viet Cong. The seizure of Saigon was their plan in 1966 and 1967. The TET and post-TET pressure applied by the Viet Cong in 1968 is the culmination of these earlier plans. To further this end, the Viet Cong had established a well-organized, covert government to direct the activities in the Saigon region.

The area was designated as the Saigon-Gia Dinh Special Region and was subdivided into geographic/administrative divisions, not unlike the province, district, and village organization of the Republic of South

Vietnam. The basic differences were geographic. (See Appendix A)

This highly-skilled and well-developed shadow government was responsible for proselytism, training, and propaganda, as well as supporting the military activities logistically. These agencies were adjusted to the special features of the area, and, generally speaking, they used a greater degree of sophistication as compared to the techniques used in the rural areas of the country. The organization's techniques were based upon the population density of the city and its surrounding area, as opposed to the heavily-populated Chinese sections in the urban area.

Viet Cong military units faced different requirements and a different adversary in this region, one with well built-up police networks and communications. Mobile terrorist cells operated throughout the section, and underground units provided liaison, finance and communications. Within this general area, the Viet Cong were able to acquire and store supplies which were unavailable in other parts of the country, such as medicines, machines, and river craft.

At the edge of Saigon, abrupt changes exist. Busy streets become rice paddies, sidewalk hustlers are replaced by farmers, and the surrounding countryside is

as sparsely populated as Saigon is crowded. This urban/rural area offers the Viet Cong an ideal and lucrative base with unlimited possibilities for creating an all-out uprising, the ultimate aim of which is to seize the administration in Saigon and oust the present government.

Throughout 1966, reports concluded that efforts to maintain security within this section had failed dismally, and the capital was gravely threatened because the Viet Cong were creating a choke hold on the city and were managing to siphon off the supplies, men, and equipment necessary to carry on the war throughout Vietnam.

The most effective way of reaching and destroying the Viet Cong in this region was through the populace. However, in order to do this, it was first necessary to offer continual security - socially, politically, and economically - and to provide adequate military training, supplies and equipment to the local military and paramilitary forces so that, at a future date, they could effectively resume the role of restoring and maintaining their government.

This internal defense program would cover a lengthy period of time and would be combined with development operations. The end purpose of this internal defense program was to strengthen the local government so that

it could provide the populace with a viable society.

THE BRIGADE PLAN

Operation FAIRFAX was a military operation to counter the problems of pacification within Gia Dinh Province with a coordinated effort in support of the internal defense and internal developmental efforts of the provincial government. The operation was a multi-faceted approach which incorporated two phases: strike operations and defensive operations.

This tactical plan called for separate battalion strike and consolidation missions in the surrounding districts of the capital. The 4th Battalion, 12th Infantry, was assigned Thu Duc District; 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was given Binh Chanh District; and the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, had Nha Be District. (See Appendix B)

These districts were initially chosen because strike operations were necessary to find and destroy the overt guerrilla operations flourishing within them. A great deal of time was needed to lay the foundation for consolidation work in order to provide the much-needed security that would enable a more positive approach to pacification to take root.

To control this operation, the 199th Light Infantry Brigade established a Forward Command Post at Cat Lai on the Saigon River in the Thu Duc District. The Brigade divided its resources between its base camp at Long Binh and the forward area. By occupying a former French aerodrome which was already occupied by other US units, facilities were present to accommodate a large tactical operations center, a heliport, a dispensary, working space for each staff section, a very adequate communications center, a large Intelligence Coordination Center, and the necessity to establish security precautions was minimized. Also, Cat Lai was in a strategic location as all the battalion command posts were within 10 minutes flying time.

At Brigade rear, Long Binh, the support battalion and engineer company built an adequate logistics and administration facility, and then began the work of constructing permanent facilities for the Brigade which included two-story wooden barracks-type buildings for each battalion. No major problems existed in either logistics or administration due to the proximity of the Long Binh depot complex, excellent road networks, and good security.

THE BATTALION OPERATIONS

During early January 1967, the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry, relocated from Long Binh to the new command

post at Nha Be and relieved the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, 25th Infantry Division, of the Nha Be Operation FAIRFAX mission. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, had started strike operations in this area in late November 1966 and had partially cleared the district of guerrilla activity. (See Appendix C)

The Battalion Advance Party arrived and occupied the Shell Oil storage area, approximately 9 kilometers south of Saigon on the Nha Be River, and 3 kilometers north of the naval base on the Saigon shipping channel.

Nha Be District and the surrounding area, which became the battalion area of operation, consisted of 19 villages and 72 hamlets. The terrain was typical of the Mekong River Delta, vastly inundated and subject to extreme fluctuation of tidal currents, with vegetation consisting mainly of nippa palm, palm trees, and rice paddies. The area is divided by the Nha Be River (the main shipping channel between Saigon and the South China Sea) and the Can Giouc River, a major water route to Can Tho and the Mekong Delta.

The people are employed in diversified occupations. During a war-time boom, the oil industry (Shell, Esso, and Caltex) employs thousands of workers and supplies both the military and civilian needs for most of South Vietnam. The nearby shipbuilding industry also employs a large percentage of the Nha Be populace. The rest of

the Vietnamese are employed as rice farmers and fishermen.

As a result of previously-conducted strike operations, it was apparent that Viet Cong activity in Nha Be was becoming more clandestine. The ease with which these activities were conducted was due, in large part, to the migration of workers who were employed in the nearby industries, and the ability of the Viet Cong to mingle with the workers.

From outward appearances in early 1967, Nha Be was a peaceful, undisturbed area, subject to the usual terrorist activity which only affected a small part of the population. Underneath, the Viet Cong were manipulating the inhabitants by collecting large taxes, procuring needed supplies, and utilizing the civilian transportation for their own needs. Understandably, the Saigon government was distrusted by the people because it did not secure their villages against the Viet Cong, and a general apathy existed since all the programs in the past had failed to improve their condition.

NARRATION

The difficult job of finding and destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure required the dispersion of units. To accomplish this, each rifle company was given an area

of operation approximately 6 kilometers square. The command post for the company was placed in one of the villages within the area of operation from which all subsequent operations would be based. With the exception of the Company Executive Officer and the supply personnel, all other elements of the company were moved to the forward locations.

From these new bases, the companies began saturation operations based on intelligence from the former battalion's operations. Almost immediately, a system of daylight patrols and checkpoints was established, and a nightly series of mutually-supporting ambushes were undertaken, at first to provide security for the company bases, and later to intercept Viet Cong lines of communication. The small unit patrols, both squad and platoon-sized forces, were to establish an atmosphere of security for the villages in the area of operation and to daily clear the area of any guerrilla infiltration.

The ambushes further increased security measures. Each ambush was part of the battalion plan, each was mutually supporting, and each covered a part of the known enemy avenues of infiltration. These techniques were most significant in isolating the battalion area of operation from open Viet Cong activities.

After several weeks of clear and hold operations, search and destroy or strike operations were initiated to keep the enemy off balance and to hit him in his base areas. Those areas targeted for search and destroy missions were now being planned by the battalion in coordination with Nha Be District authorities.

As the companies began expanding their operations, the battalion constructed a permanent base within the confines of the industrial complex with the aim of minimizing base camp security requirements, and offering mutual protection to the vital oil storage areas. This battalion command post then became the permanent base for the operations that would follow during the next ten months.

It consisted of all Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company elements, except for a small number of logistics personnel who were left at Long Binh to provide a battalion rear. All administrative, intelligence, operational, logistical and civic actions were now coordinated from the forward command post.

The area provided by the Shell Oil Company was an ideally centralized location for operations of this type. It was on the main highway, near the most heavily populated areas. It was collocated with the district advisor's headquarters and consisted of several concrete

buildings suitable for extended operations. All elements of the battalion were able to disperse, yet maintain good security. One major disadvantage, however, was the poor helipad which was capable of handling only three UH-1 aircraft at a time.

An engineer squad was attached to the battalion, along with communications personnel, a quartermaster bath point, and a fire fighting team. Additionally, one battery of artillery from the 2d Battalion, 40th Artillery, was in direct support during the entire operation, and the battalion was occasionally augmented by two additional tubes of Vietnamese artillery which provided fire support.

After several weeks of establishing a firm basis for operations within the District and several coordination meetings, the plan for operational coordination between the battalion and the District authorities was formulated. The Area Security Coordination Center (ASCC) (see Appendix D) became the ad hoc group responsible for combining military and civic action activities among all elements of the pacification team. It was immediately established that this group had no command responsibility; rather, it was to provide coordination between the two key decision makers of the district: the US Commander and the Nha Be District Chief.

The District Advisor, District Aid of International Development representative, and the commander of the Army

of Vietnam unit currently operating and training with the battalion were normally present at the meetings. Staff officers from each headquarters presented material that enabled the commanders to plan and coordinate military and civil operations, direct support given to the Revolutionary Development Team and other cadre groups, and exploit the activities of the Combined Intelligence Center (CIC). The objectives of mutual cooperation and coordination at all levels became the primary concern of each weekly meeting.

THE STRIKE OPERATION

With limited search and destroy operations already underway, the ASCC concluded that more powerful and frequent strike operations were necessary to support consolidation efforts. For this reason, an all-out effort was maintained between the middle of January and the end of March 1967 to neutralize enemy base camps, supply facilities, and small guerrilla forces. The CIC collected and processed tactical intelligence to facilitate fast combat action. The area of operation was extended by mutual agreement with the 9th Infantry Division and local governments, so that unrelenting clearing operations of task force and battalion size units could take place. The combination of saturation

patrols, day and night operations, and search and destroy missions was utilized to locate, engage, and destroy all remnants of the local guerrilla forces. Psychological operations were conducted in support of these operations, not only in the contested areas, but also in the relatively pacified area of Nha Be, with emphasis placed upon persuading the Viet Cong to give up a losing cause, surrender, and rally to the Government of South Vietnam. Additionally, strike operations were followed up by short-term, high-impact civic action which was initiated not only by the 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry ("Old Guard") S-5, but also by the efforts of the district S-5, who now had the opportunity and means to carry out many necessary projects in the rural sections of the district.

Several of the techniques utilized during the initial stages of Operation FAIRFAX have already been cited. As part of the search and destroy mission, companies conducted sweep operations to rapidly inspect the objective, seize arms, ammunition, or other contraband before it could be hidden, detect booby traps, immobilize the population, and apprehend any suspected persons for further questioning. The most successful type of sweep operation occurred when two or more companies converged on an objective, effectively sealing the enemy routes of withdrawal. To organize this type of operation, a Command

Group maintained over-all control of the operation by directing subordinate units and maintaining contact with the battalion. Search teams were formed, which consisted of US Infantrymen and Vietnamese Combat Police. These police used sharpened iron poles to prod suspected caches of enemy contraband, and arrested suspicious persons before they could disappear. All detainees were immediately sent to the Command Group for interrogation and evacuation, while the balance of the team continued the search. Another standing operation procedure of these teams was the marking and reporting of all booby traps discovered by the naked eye, mine detectors, or scout dogs. The third team was the loudspeaker team, which was normally composed of South Vietnamese psyops soldiers who established rapid and positive control over the population.

In conjunction with sweep operations, a more detailed search or cordon operation was often conducted. Usually this operation was concurrent with a joint civic action, psyops, and MEDCAP appeal to the villagers. The aim of this operation was to blockade a target area (usually a hamlet), prevent movement to or from this hamlet, and conduct a detailed search with a separate force, preferably Vietnamese. The cordon and search was most effective when applied silently and under the cover of darkness. It frequently trapped draft evaders, deserters, and local

guerrilla forces who had spent the night in the hamlet. It should be noted that under certain circumstances, the ability to change the location or time of the cordon served to catch the Viet Cong unawares, and the resulting operations were normally successful. The cordon and search force varied from time to time, depending upon Vietnamese resources, as both ARVN Regular Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) and National Police were utilized. As these operations became more prevalent, the brigade formed a Cordon and Search Committee, consisting of several officers and NCO's who trained Vietnamese search forces in the tactics and techniques of cordon operations, established specific assignments, and briefed the search teams on characteristics of each hamlet operation.

Each house or hut received a methodical search. Walls and roofs were probed to detect hiding places, floors were probed, and water was poured on them to detect soft spots that might possibly hide weapons. Flagstones and ovens were searched as were family altars, bunkers, sleeping platforms and especially bagged rice. The outside area, particularly around trees, bushes, fish ponds, and grave sites were good hiding places that are normally not searched by Americans, but are known by the Vietnamese to be excellent cache locations.

Considerable emphasis was placed on returning the searched area to its original state of order, and company

commanders were personally tasked to insure that these matters were complied with in all cases where no evidence of enemy complicity was found. Several other considerations were discovered through experience. The cordon commander should assign and follow-up assigned tasks, and the senior member of a household should remain with his home during the search to discourage looting. After the search, the cordon commander should check with the village elders to insure that no complaints were registered.

By the end of March, sufficient indications concluded that the need to enter the Consolidation Phase was present. Three Revolutionary Development cadre were at work in the area of operation. Limited reports of Viet Cong activity were being received through all channels, and the general attitude of the villagers seemed to have improved. Unlike other American units, the "Old Guard" was now totally committed to the people of Nha Be. They lived in the villages with the people, assisted in the every-day work of the community, and provided security previously unknown to the people of this region.

CONSOLIDATION OPERATIONS

The clear and hold aspect of the pacification mission which neutralizes the Viet Cong infrastructure and provides lasting security for the inhabitants is the most important part of the mission. During this work, emphasis was shifted from offensive operations to advisory assistance,

local training for indigenous soldiers, and general defensive measures characterized primarily by extensive patrolling.

The long-range objective was to gradually break the ties with the Vietnamese after first equipping them and training them to carry on their own security and defense. The first task in this role was to improve the capabilities of the RF/PF assigned to the district. In order to do this, a system of integrating platoons of RF/PF with US companies was established. During this period, the local para-military forces participated in all the combat operations of the company, and the company provided the necessary skills and materials to improve the static village defenses.

Accurate records were necessary at district level to control the population. Under a screen of security, district officials conducted detailed census taking for all the hamlets, which included photographing entire families for record. During these procedures, civic action and psyops personnel propagandized the villages on the merits of this new program. The ASCC carefully monitored this stage of the operation and established a series of goals to be attained during the period of US support. The local forces should be able to deter guerrilla offensive action, deny Viet Cong entry into the district, and develop favorable conditions for continuing the pacification of the area.

After the initial training of the local military forces, a Mobile Advisory Team was developed by the battalion to continue advice and assistance in constructing field fortifications, barrier systems, adjustment of indirect fire, small unit operations with emphasis on night operations, ambushes, weapons employment, emergency medical care, and other areas related to the mission of the RF/PF.

This team consisted of two lieutenants and ten enlisted men who lived and worked with the RF/PF cadre for the remaining period of Operation FAIRFAX. In certain instances, modified Army Training Tests were given to the local units at the commencement of this program with gratifying results.

The success of the program with the regional forces was expanded upon by the joint missions being conducted with ARVN units in each battalion area. Because of the scope of the entire mission, the inclusion of additional troops was necessary. After joint operations with several Airborne and Marine units of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the 38th Ranger Battalion, consisting of four companies, was assigned to pacification work in Nha Be. In the beginning, many doubts existed as to the feasibility of long-term operations on this basis; however, under the tutorage of the ASCC, with the Ranger Battalion commander exercising an equal position with the

district and US battalion, an excellent relationship existed at all levels.

Here again, integration of forces was the byword of the operation. By locating these company units in close proximity to the already-present "Old Guard" units and combining forces for subsequent missions, an excellent method was established by which field training was conducted in airmobile, riverine, and ground combat techniques. This program was a two-way street, and much new knowledge of Viet Cong techniques was passed on by the combat-experienced soldiers of the Ranger unit. The training mission had now completed a circuit, with the required amount and diversification of pacification methods being covered.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The fulfillment of intelligence on this mission was complicated by the fact that detailed and accurate knowledge of the area and the enemy was required at battalion level. Because the area of operation of each battalion in the 199th Light Infantry Brigade contained a different enemy with somewhat different objectives, the S-2 section was implemented with an Interrogation Prisoner of War Team and counterintelligence specialists from the Brigade Military Intelligence Detachment. Further, to continue the joint operations concept,

officers and specialists from the Vietnamese Military Security Service, National Police, and ARVN interrogation teams were collocated with the battalion to form the CIC (see Appendix E). In concept, it was designed to take advantage of inputs from all possible intelligence agencies of the district. Every effort was made to obtain up-to-the-minute information, not only concerning tactical information, but also that information needed to penetrate the enemy infrastructure. Therefore, the success of this operation was based on immediate and professional interrogation, excellent document exploitation, and clandestine operations designed to infiltrate all facets of the enemy's shadow government.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological warfare operations were coordinated by the ASCC to insure that the populace understood that the benefits they were deriving from Operation FAIRFAX were the result of actions taken by the South Vietnamese Government. Every opportunity to include psychological operations in the plan was made by the Battalion S-5 and local Vietnamese Information Service officers. The program was divided into a tactical phase, with emphasis given to the enemy (Chieu Hoi Program, leaflet drops), and the phase designed to reach the local civilians by means of newspaper distribution, loudspeaker news, mobile TV receivers,

and themes enhancing the government's prestige in the eyes of the people.

CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

The almost inseparable mission of civic action was coordinated by the Civil Affairs Officers of the battalion. This important function insured that tactical operations could be conducted without adverse effects on the innocent civilian populace. Good community relations were maintained by the soldiers in the villages, and each unit had a civic action program to support the over-all district scheme, as well as provide adequate assistance to the local forces to maintain effective and recurring populace and resources control programs.

This latter task proved to be the most time-consuming and critical operation. Through the numerous agencies of the civil government, a steady program was initiated. It consisted of registration and identification of all Nha Be inhabitants; checkpoint inspections of individual documents, permits, and passes; the establishment and maintenance of realistic curfews; and the monitoring of goods and foodstuffs that could be used by the Viet Cong. The extent of control imposed on the populace changed as greater security was achieved; however, the checkpoint operations were maintained by necessity as a continuing measure throughout Operation FAIRFAX.

The S-5 coordinated programs in the areas of education, public works, agriculture, health, and sanitation. Transportation and security were afforded all school teachers in outlying areas. School equipment was obtained from CARE and distributed throughout the district. Several deep water wells were attempted, which drastically cut down on the villagers' expenses, who had to pay for imported water. Farmers in the district were provided with tool kits through the provisions of USAID, and, with this new security, land previously barren could now be farmed again. Each company provided MEDCAP facilities in their villages. The battalion surgeon and his staff conducted a medical treatment program in support of almost every operation. The roads and bridges were improved, as required, with the assistance of Brigade and Field Force engineer units which permitted farmers to send their goods to the Saigon markets more easily.

This coordinated effort, which was the culmination of the pacification program, afforded the people of Nha Be a degree of governmental security, free of Viet Cong influence, in which immeasurable progress was made. With forceful leadership and sufficient time, a great deal can be accomplished with this realistic approach to defeating insurgency in Vietnam.

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

In retrospect, the actions of Operation FAIRFAX seem to comply with current Army doctrine. During the period of early 1967, however, much trial and error accompanied our initial actions towards stabilization. Several factors are significant when viewing the operation from a distance.

Mainly, we were able to spend the necessary time and effort to institute sound programs based on trial and error (there was little or no practical experience available). Secondly, the organization of the Light Infantry Brigade is well suited to independent actions of this type. The modifications necessary to accomplish the mission, with few exceptions, were met by the brigade's own resources. Some of the notable exceptions were small boats, motors, and repair facilities which were needed to conduct operations in the marshy battalion area. These were usually borrowed from engineer units which had no need for them.

I believe a high priority should be given to units involved in pacification work for herein lies the ability to maintain understanding. Procuring capable, trustworthy interpreters proved difficult throughout the operation. It was necessary for the battalion to employ a minimum of eight qualified interpreters at one time, a figure never attainable under the existing situation.

Finally, the attachment of a Civic Action Company at brigade level would provide many of the specialists required to fully accomplish the pacification mission.

Many of the techniques and tactics employed were adopted from ones already in use by the Vietnamese. The increased mobility, firepower, and resources available, combined with determined efforts by the local government, made forward strides possible. As the US representatives, the need to show confidence in the abilities of the Vietnamese to overcome years of setbacks was apparent with each successful undertaking. At first, government officials were cautious and withdrawn, but when the attitude of the populace began to improve, they became more willing to cooperate and support the program.

Most of the recent doctrine on Vietnam pacification has been based upon feeder information provided by units such as the 199th Light Infantry Brigade working the early stages of this program. It is interesting to note that what is doctrine today was mere conjecture less than eighteen months ago. Also, it emphasizes the fact that, in the situation of Vietnam today, more and more techniques will evolve with the experience gained from new problems.

There is no yardstick, no set standards, which can measure the degree of accomplishment in this work. While

every type of criteria was weighted against success, only the ability of the Vietnamese to rectify the political, social, and economic imbalances which support the Viet Cong cause can truly signify the end of US military assistance.

Because of outside pressures, the brigade was relieved of this mission during November 1967 while doubts still existed as to its successful completion. The results have been all too clear for the brigade's withdrawal contributed markedly to the success of the communist TET offensive.

The realization that operations of this nature depend upon significant amounts of time and resources is the key to eliminating communist insurgency in South Vietnam.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. The pacification operation is a long-term, large-scope program which requires the total combat strength and resources of Infantry units.
2. Dispersion of forces, particularly among the people, is the most effective means of providing area security.
3. The training of Regular Armed Forces, paramilitary, and Irregular Forces can be an effective secondary mission for units involved in pacification.

4. Combat units in the performance of consolidation missions can provide sufficient forces to conduct strike operations in other areas for limited periods.

5. The Area Security Coordination Center will only be effective if the US units take a strong and active part in its organization and missions.

6. The key to effective counter guerrilla operations is timely intelligence. The Combined Intelligence Center is a good example of an effective intelligence-gathering agency at battalion level.

7. Continual troop leadership and motivation is necessary in the static atmosphere of pacification missions. All leaders must continually guard against complacency.

8. Company-size units can effectively utilize small craft in swamp and marshy terrain. Units assigned to this type of environment should have sufficient small boats and outboard motors available, and a means to repair these items as necessary.

9. During strike operations, the need exists to maintain constant pressure on the Viet Cong to prevent his ability to hide, reorganize, and resume offensive operations.

10. During consolidation operations, the need for contingency plans to support local forces and provide ready reaction teams is a necessary requirement.

11. Continuing effort is a most critical portion of civic action and psyops methods. To achieve this coordination through the ASCC and local Vietnamese officials is a daily necessity. All projects should be oriented so that the people can see how their own government is able to support their needs.

12. The cordon and search operation is best employed on good intelligence information and swift seals and detailed searches of the area using Vietnamese who are trained and briefed on the mission.

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