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Report date: 9 December 1965

Title: $\quad$ Battle of the la Drang, $1^{\text {st }}$ Battalion, $7^{\text {th }}$ Cavalry

Author: Department of the Army, Headquarters, $1^{\text {st }}$ Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Abstract: } & \text { After Action Report, Ia Drang Valley Operation, } 1^{\text {st }} \text { Battalion, } \\ & 7^{\text {th }} \text { Cavalry, 14-16 November } 1965\end{array}$

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# 9 December 1965 <br> SUBJECT: After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley Operation 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry $14-16$ Nover 7th Cavalry 14-16 November 1965 

TO: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
APO US Forces 96490

## I. GENERAL:

During this operation, I was the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry. On 23 November 1965, I was promoted and turned over the battalion to my successor.
II. BACKGROUND:
A. On 10 November the battalion moved from the base camp at An Khe, coordinates BR476476, by CV-2 to a forward airstrip and assembly area south of Pleiku, coordinates ZA198340. From there, all companies were shuttled the same day by UH-1D into a search and destroy operation in an area to the east of Plei Me, vicinity coordinates ZA2007 to ZA7606. We conducted saturation patrolling through the 12 th with light contact by only Company A. We also conducted a civic action program supplying medical aid and USOM food to Mentagnard village, population 200, conrdinates ZA237073. On the 12th, the Assistant Division Commander - A, during a visit to the battalion, indicated to the Brigade Commander that he had no objection to the latter sending a battalion into the IA DRANG Valley. This we took as an alert and begen a map study. On 13 November, the battalion was moved on brigade orders to a new area of operations south and southwest of Plei Me. Once again saturation patrolling was conducted out of company bases throughout the day with no contact. Company B was airlifted after 1500 hours into the Brigade CP area as security, and for an immediate reaction force under Brigade control. It closed into position by 1800 hours.
B. At approximately 1700 hours, the Brigade Commander and I visited the Company A CP south of Plei Me. During the visit, the Brigade Commander gave me orders to execute an assault by helicopter into the IA DRANG Valley, north of CHU PONG Mountain early the next morning with a mission of conducting search and destroy operations
through the 15th. The area of operations was pointed out on the map and he informed me that we would be supported from LZ FALCON, coordinates ZA023032, by two batteries of 105 mm howitzer artillery - one of which would be moved by air from, PLEI 让 early on the 14 th prior to our assault.
C. I returned to my CP near Plei Me; formulated a tentative plan; issued instructions to my staff; procured further details from 3 j Brigade Headquarters and the supporting helicopter unit; and issued a warning order to my unit commanders, staff, and supporting elements. By 2200 hours, 13 November, all preparations had been accomplished wich were possible without an actual air reconnaissance. Arrangements included an early morning airlift of Company B back to PLEI ME: directions to the commanders of $A$ and $C$ Companies to concentrate their elements at Eirst light in the largest pick-up zone(s) in their respective sectors; and plans for a first light air recon by all key commanders and staff officers. A time of 0830 hours was set for issuance at my CP of the operation order.
D. At this time, the "fighting" strength of my letterad companies as they went into the operation was as follows:

## NUMBER COMMITED TO OPERATION

## TOAE

|  | Officers | Men | Dezicers | Men |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Co A | 5 | 115 | 6 | 154 |
| COB | 5 | 114 | 6 | 164 |
| COC | 6 | 106 | 6 | 164 |
| COD | 4 | 76 | 5 | 118 |

The shortages were primarily due to malaria and ETS discharges. Each company also had 3 - 5 men at base camp at An Khe as guards, sick, administrative retention, and base camp area development workers. There were 8-10 men on $R$ and $R$ or about going back to prepare For $R$ and $R$.
III. OPERATIONS ON 14 NOVEMBER:
A. THE AIR RECON AND RESULTS:
(1) 14 November dawned bright and clear. Shortly after first light at 0630 hours, Company $B$ was returned to battalion contral at Plei Me and began making final preparations for its role as the assault company. The Chinooks which had carried B company back where commencing to move Battery A, lst Battalion, 21st Artillery to $I z$ FALCON as planned. The air recon party had assembled and after a
brieE orientation on the purpose oミ che recon，Elignt route，anc Lこams to look for，we took os三 in two UR－iD＇s escoreed by two gun ships． The flighe route is shown on the attached sketch（Tad A）．we made one south to north pass at ajout 4500 Eeet actual；Eiew north past Duc Co， coordinates YA845255，orbiこad Eive minutes，then Elew souta genezaliy over the same route and at the same altitude，and retumed $=0$ Plei he． The air recon party incluced the Eatealion Commander；Saj；Eattaiion Artillery Liaison Officer：Commancing OEEice＝，コattery A，Ist Baここaíor， 2lst Artillezy；Commanding OEEicez Z Company（Assaule Company）；Scou： Section Leader，Troop C，lst Squadron， $9 t i$ Cavaizy；and the Commandinj
 Special Forces，1st Special Eorees Group）．
（2）Durins the ait zecon，severai cpen a＝eas－ieze selecz－ ed by members of the recon party as possijie lancing zonas in anc anound
 we raceived a writeen Frag Criez Erom Brigacie which specizicaily jew Eined the area cioperations．The area is shown on the aここacieed ma＝ （Wai B）．I then receivec comments as to the La zo be used．Mn＝aミ possibilities Eell out oz this discussion－ZZ＇s TAMCO，K－ZAY，and


 that $X-R A Y$ and VANKE coule bcth p＝obably accommodate aizã
 my operation order based on tiat seiacticm．Concuraentig I dispaこctec the Cavalzy Scout Section Eor a low－leve：Eizet up the It DRAMG Va：ie： area to gain detailed infomation on $X-2 A y$ ，Vive terrain，and to look for signs oE enemy activiny．The Cavalä Sečion．
 was spotted with high stumps and would je di三ミicule to use as a land－
 co ten UH－1D＇s at one Eime．No signs of enemy activíy were detačac around X－RAY，and the Cavaly Section was not Eirad on curing ies low－ level recon．Several trails were picked up anc their locations were noted．The Cavalry Section also reported seeing commo wine on 2 tこail
 I made my decision to land Et $X-R A Y$ with TANGO and YANKEE as altemates to be used only on my order．I then iscued an orai operation order． Reduced to writing，it is attached at Tab C．Present to hear ohe order were all my Company Commanders；the battalion staff and special seaff； the lift Company Commander and his Liaison Officer to the battalicn， the Cavalry Scout Section Leader；CO，Battery A，lst Battalion，2lst Artillery；and the 3 d Brigade S－3．The Brigade Commander arrived dur－ irg the issuance of the order and was separately briefed shortly thereafter．It was then reported to me that the two artillery batteries were in position，and 1 set 2 time of 1030 hours for the assault land－ ing with the 20 minute tube artillery preparation to be timed to be
completed at h-Hour minus one ninute. The A and C Company Comandens wera then flown back to theif companies. The 3 Company Commander recumed to his unit on the Plei Me airstzip on a mechanical mule. The time was approximately 0915 hours. All hecessazy p=eparazions had eithez been completed or were nearing completion. No problems hac been raised.

## 3. THE ENITIAL ASSALL:

Due to last minute posizioning of the attillez pieces caused by air movement delays, the praparatozy firas did not besin until 1017 hours. I was in the lead aincraEt and had a zood view 0 these Eires. They were precisely where requized, and beautivan tined with the landing of lead elements of the assaula company. Finas were concentrated principally around the lancing zone, in the =nees and high grass, and on a Einger and in a draw leading down Enco ane high ground northwest $0 \equiv \mathrm{X}-\mathrm{RA} \mathrm{Y}$. The aevial aztiliezy came in on the
 expending halE their loads - then went into a neatiy ain croz on call. The li三: battaiion gun ships took up the fites and weze immediately ahead of the UH-1D's. As we came in Eor the assauiz iand ing all door gunners fized tnto the zrees and aizh grass. we innced anc =an from the landing zone into the trees Etinig ou: 4 - 15 's $E=$ likely enemy positions.
 and a Vietnamese national, sent down by zrigace, Ma. Nik - a Yonzanna=e
 Plei Me and over the LA DRAMG Valley were my $S-3$, Artillezy Liaison Ofzicez, and Liaison OEEicer Erom the helicopte= lizz company, and … Forward Air Controiler. I had placed them there duzing the assaui: Eor best execution of their duties, for a communications zelay, anc for an air OP. On the ground we received no enemy Eire and mace to contact upon landing. The terzain was flat and consisted of sc=ub trees up to 100 feet high; thick elephant grass vafing in height E=om one foot to five feet; and ant hills throughout the area 4 to $=13 \mathrm{z}$ fest high with thick brush and elepinant grass on and around them. Along the westem edge of the $L z$, the trees and grass were especially thick and extended off into the jungle on the foothills of the mountain. Photographs of the area are at Tabs $D$ and $E$. These photos were taken several days after the action ended hence the area is less foliated than on 14 November when we went in. The 16 UH-ID's returned to the Plei Me area to pick up the remainder of Company $B$ and a portion of the next company to be brought in - Company C. Thus began the process of shuttling the battalion into the area of operations. The time of the assault was precisely 1048 hours.
C. SECURING OF THE LANDING ZONE AND INITIAL CONTACT:
(1) In compliance with my instructions, the B Company

Commander secured the landing zone oy having cne o a ns platocn i＝Ec－ Ers dispatch his scuads into diEferent areas， 50 to joo meters ozミ the landing zone to reconnoiter，while he retained the balance oE Kiz company concealed in a clump of trees and high grass near the cañe： oE the $L Z$ area as an oEEensive striking force．Aた approximatei $\because: 120$ hours，one of the recon squads took a prisone：．I immediatei $\because=06$ my S－2 and the Vietnamese，Mr．Nik，and went to the location and ques－ tioned him．He was unazmed，dressed in diEEy khaki sniz＝anc z＝ousers mith a serial number on one of the shint epaulets，and cavaiod an eopr．f cantミen．He stated that he hac eaten only bananas Eov ミire days，and that there were three batalions on the mountain above us rinc \％シニこミE vEry much to kill Americans but hac been unajle to Einc them．吴e sこated that he was in the No：th Vietnamese Azoy．Tine 3 Compan：
 rineza the prisoner hac been taken（near the mounこann），and to こここここころ


 veck immediately for interrogation at the $B=i z a c \in C \equiv$ ．zy fnen，：．．． houzs，sufficient elements of Company $A$ had lanciec（uncpposei：＝ Ekie over the LZ securizy mission E＝om Company 3．Aiso eiameraz にま こie zeconnoitering plazoon of 3 Company had made contact wis
－scattered enemy riflemen neaz the mounsain．The 3 Company Comazader inas
 Enger Loading down towanis $X-$ Rivy anc to deveicy the sizeation．引
 \＃o move up into the same area on order when Company C bad az＝ived in

 ments oE Company $B$ began to engage in a Eine Eight oz moceza＝a in－ こersity．Shortiy afternards at approximately i330 hours，Comandizo CEEice＝，Company B reported that he was being attackes heavily $3 \because=2$
 of being surrounded and cut ofe Erom the rest oz the company $3 \because$ a numericaliy superior force．The Eine Eight became intense．Aiso
 B Company．B Company also received some rocke Eize．
（2）Shortly after the heavy Eire Eight began，the iast
platcon of A Company anc the Company Commander and laad elements of $C$ Compariy landed．The Comanding Officer，Company A was ordered do －move his company up on the left of $B$ Company；to establish physicel． contact with it；to protect the $B$ Company left flank；and to serd cne platoon up to $B$ Company to assist $B$ Company in getting to the B Company platoon which was in danger of being cut off．－The Commanc． ing Officer，Company $C$ was ordered to take up a biocking positaon ofí the landing zone to the south and southwest to prevent the Lz from being overrun from that direction and to give protection to A Company：s left Elank．I called the $S-3$ in the command chopper and told him co

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Cave my Eorvard Aiz Controllez oring in azz. strikes beginning on tre
Lower fringe of the mowntain Eoothills and wotk over the mounadin anc
enemy approaches to the LZ Eron the west and south in that p=ioこ:ご:
The same instauctions weze to be given to the ARA and to the a=こilleng
2rionity of fires were to go to Eize missions and requests E=0m
companies. When not Eiring in response to a specific request, Eines
were to be pourad in as cirected above. The Company Commande \(=\),
forward observers, the forward air controlle=, and the a=tilie=:
Liaison officer were ali having dizミicuizy getting cooriinatec as zo
the locations of the Eo=ward eiemerts of the companies. Theze iene
no well-defined terrain Eeatures to hel? and the scrib anc t=ees a: :
looked alike. The ait was heavy with smoke and dust. 3 Company had
more proolems than any other company since i= iad one piacoon sapa=-
ated Erom the rest of the company in the jungio, and could not prec:-
seiy pin point its location for puzposes ci ciose-in Eine suppoz.
The platoon was in a moving Ena-Eight aganes a force o
The Eact that this plazoon was Eo=nand o才 3 and A Companies delayed
delivezy of efzective 三izes in suppori czthese two companias.
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the south anc west, Eizes wete ?lacec wheze nae\% gave scme he:う
Ehese two companies - especially Company A.' I specizica: \(\because\) de inne
several draws loading com Erom the mountain, and wanted jizes piacee
on enemy mottar positions sighted or suspected cut to Bi mon worニar
zange. Two aiz stzikes weze also z=ought in on the vailey Eioc: \(=0\)
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En :eported by hignez headquarters the previous day. At this poina,
the most critical perioc of the aEtemocn besan.
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（3）The A Company Commande $\operatorname{sen}=$ up cripiatocn $=2$ Company as directed．This piazoon heaced out，became engaged，and ended up on the right $o$ E $B$ Company rathe than the lef．This uas confusing to both the A Company Comande anc myselz until late＝ in the aftemoon when the location of this platoon becane soraec out．The 3 Company Comander pushed out in an ezEore to reach his $x$ platoon which by that time hac jeen completeiy surrounded． 3 Company （－）plus the A Company platoon was able to get to within 75 meters of the cut－off platoon but could get no Eurther．The A Company piat－ oon made it closer than any other element．B Company was 5 aking mod． erate casualties．Concurrently as Company $A(-)$ was heading up to－ wards the left and reamost elements of B Company，it made heavy－ contact with a large force of at least one PAVN Company which was driving in and along a dry creek bed parallel to the western edge of the $1 Z$ ．These enemy were headed（directly towards the left rea＝ 0 I Company B．A very heavy fire fight immediately broke out．A Com－ pany was taking light casualties，and extracting a heavy toll from the enemy．Whe of the A Company platoons was in such a position that it was able to bring close－in Elanking fire on 50－70 PAVN as Eney ＇continued moving across their front，Many of them were killed，as when the lead few were dropped，the remainder kept coming right into

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the Eield oE fira. A Company tock two p=isonezs who we=e latez evac-
uaこさd こo 3rigade.
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（4）Just as the A Company Eire Eight broke out，Eng i三s＝ elements of $C$ Company and the lead elements of $D$ Company landed：is they landed，the helicopters took numerous hits but none were siot down． The C Company Commande＝directed his elements into position aiong side his other elements which had landed previously．Within Eive minuzas， a force of 175 － 200 enemy，headed for the $L Z$ ，ran heaclong into $C$ Company．C Company held them off killing numezous of them in the process as they continued trying to get to the lancing zone．One orisoner was taken anc evacuatec．The C Company action continuec Eo approximataly $1 / / 2$ hours until the enemy，disczganized and deciaazas，
 $0 \equiv$ his dead and woundee．
（3）Concuzzant with al1 o the above，as the ミins： elements of $D$ Company landed（with the last eiements 0 E Company） they immediately became engaged in the Eize Eizht neat A Company． One 0 E the $D$ Company Comander＇s radio operato $=$ was kil in the $: \therefore=$ Company Commanders helicopter be三ore he could dismount and the doc＝ gunner and one pilot were woundec．（I stopped the other aizhz un－：2＇s Erom landingly radio．The $D$ Company eiements consisted $c \equiv$ the counend group，part of the morzar platoon and the antz＝ank platocn．The－ Company Commander lec them towards the sound of the heavy Ezing in the A Company area．They made it to the stream－jed azea；immediaze． engaged $25-30$ PAVN headed down the steam－bed and Killed acse 0 E them．A Company elements killed the rest．Duting this Eight，the －Company Commander anc Mortar Platoon Leade＝were seriously wounded out continued to fire their EElles personally killing several zan．
 consciousness and came to．He tumed ove：the command 0 E the compar： to the Antitank Platoon Sergeant，a Staiz Sezgeant，ミーo．Disposi＝ions Of units at that time are shown at Tad $F$ ．The Commanding OEfice：，$\sigma$ Company made physical contact with this Sta三E Sergeant and with ay approval directed the $D$ Company elements to the left $0 \equiv C$ Company tying in tightly around the southeastern edge of the 12 ofis in the brush．
（6）By then we were taking numerous casualties through－ out the battalion，and it was apparent that we were fighting 500－600 enemy．These were only the ones we were in contact with and I figured others were headed our way．II requested the Brigade Commander to senc me another rifle company．He immediately approved this request．In fact I later learned that he had already alerted B Company，2d Battai－ ion，ith Cavalry and was assembling it at pick－up zones．
（i）During this Eire Eizã，She Cavalry Scour Section ias given specizic areas to zeccnnoitez．They concentrated on routes oz egress down the mountain to the noここえiwes and southivest，and also apo proaches from the north and northwest on the valley Floor．The Careiry reported results to me on my command net．At＝his time，approximaこe土y K00 hours，I decided that it was necessary to continue to inc rae $=\equiv$ minder of the tactical elements of the battalion consisting $o$ tie Es－ con platoon， 3 UHID loads o $C$ Company men，and the $d 0$ and liE Serseane of D Company t Although the eastern potion $c$ E the dancing zone was under enemy fire it had slacked oz considerably due to the $C$ and $D$ Company actions．These elements landed safely．I Fumed $C$ Company over $=0$ tie Company KO and directed him to dispose the teach platoon around the
 serve．The C Company Commander had previously，wink my approval，set ir
 Company Commander was directed to acid his me z＝a＝s to them and take

 Li defense tother＝east：．AII wert：quickly ina position．

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（1）The time was now approximate：$\because$ i sj nous and ane disposition of the opposing cores ias as short at Ta j 心．We ミニニミニ


 and they came off the mountain in lasso groups．They were vein camouflaged and took excellent advantage oE cover and conceaimere．The？ were good shots．They were armed wiz i numerous automatic weapons＝－0

 dropping dead．I ordered Companies A and 3 to evacuate their a＝ミuミiたi en
 coordinated attack supported by heavy p：eparaこc：zines to get back Ere surrounded platoon．Meanwhile Company $C$ mas continuing to hold of＝ie enemy to their front with the help o some magnizicanz arailismy arc close air support，The Battalion $S-2$ was wounded and late＝snot $\ddagger 9 E=2$ and killed during this enemy attack．The surrounded platoon $0=3$ Company stood off numerous PAVN efforts to overrun it．Carrying then＝ dead，their wounded，and their equipment the men of the platoon stab－ fished a small 25 meter wide perimeter on a slight rise of ground and redistributed their ammunition under heavy enemy fire．）
（2）［At approximately 1620 hours，the second at $e=\frac{k}{7}$ by Companies $A$ and $B$ to reach the surrounded platoon began 7 ［This arrack was preceded by artillery and ARA preparatory zines．Between the Erst and second attacks and despite heavy fires from artillery and ain：fie enemy had moved well up towards $A$ and $B$ Companies．Some were in trees．

None fell back. For friendly to advance, the enemy had to be killed. This was difficult because they were well-camouflaged and used all means of cover and concealment. Many had dug into small spider-holes, others were dug into the tops and sides of the ant-hills. By that time, Company A had lost all three rifle platoon leaders - one KIA and its artillery forward observer KIA. Four men had been shot and killed within six feet of the Company Commander, including his commo sergeant who was acting as a radio operator. Company $B$ echeloned sligntly ahead and to the right of Company A, progressed only 75-100 meters much of it paid for in close-in fighting. I had given A Company back his platoon which had been assisting 3 Company $\overrightarrow{\dot{j}}$ Nevertheless A Company could only progress about 150 meters. One platoon of $A$ Company advanced farther than the other two; became engaged with a greatly superior force; and was pinned down. Some of the enemy permitted the friendly to pass by them in the dense terrain and then opened up from concealed positions. White phosphorous artillery was brought in around the platoon and between the platoon and A Company ( ) to give support to an A Company move forward to get it. The buming phosphorous caused a temporary $1 u l l$ in the enemy firing and that plus the smoke, enabled the platoon and their dead and wounded to be reached and brought back. A 200-225 enemy force was still in the area figinting against Companies $A$ and $B$. $\bar{B} y 1740$ hours, $I$ decided that it was necessary to pull A and B Companies, under cover of heavy supporting fires, back to the fringe of the landing zone and set up a tight defensive perimeten for the night. We were still in good communications with the surrounded platoon and it was ringed with close-in artillery defensive fire. My intentions were to conduct another cooriinated attack during the night or early the next morning to reach it or to get them out during the night by infiltration. Both A and 3 Companies had numerous WIA and KIA to get out of the area of contact; reorgan. ization of the squads and platoons had to be accomplished; resupply of ammo and water had to be carried out; and all units of the battalion had to be tied in and disposed for the night. C Company had taken a heavy toll of the enemy throughout the afternoon. C Company had taken a few casualties but was in good shape and the enemy, although still in contact, had ceased his attacks on the company. Company $D$ had gone into position. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry was landed in two to four UH-1D loads at a time from 1705 to 1800 hours. As they landed I. built them into a reserve force prepared to counter-attack any penetration of $C$ Company or for commitment in the $A, B$ Company area of contact.] This was not necessary.
(3) The withdrawal of $A$ and $B$ Companies was conducted successfully. White phosphorous, fired by artillery, was again used to cover the withdrawal. The burning phosphorous seemed to disorganize the enemy more than $H E$ and the smoke greatly assisted us by its screening effects. (By 1900 hours, the organization of the perimeter was completed; units were tying in for the night and defensive artillery and mortar fires were being registered. I attached one platoon of

Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to C Company as C Company had a wider sector to defend. The recon platoon was placed in battalion reserve. 7 Dispositions were as shown at Tab
E. OTHER ACTIVITIES DURING THE AFTERNOON:
(1) While all of the above described actions were in progress, numerous other activities were going on. A major problem.was care and evacuation of the wounded. Early in the afternoon, the battalion surgeon, medical supplies and four aid station personnel were brought. in. They arrived around 1400 hours and under heavy fire treated the wounded in my CP area. I did not call in Med Evac helicopters too Erequently because most of the afternoon the landing zone was under fire. At about 1330 hours a small two-chopper open area was selected in the northeastem portion of X-RAY, as my supply and evacuation link to the rear. This we had to defend at all costs. This area is shown at Tab A. I requested the helicopter lift company commander to evacuate the wounded, bing in supplies, and set up a system whereby every helicopter coming to K -RAY with troops, with supplies, or for wounded would call me for landing instructions. This system worked very well; throughout the aztemoon and early evening, numerous UH-1D's were brought in - each from a specific direction at a prescribed altitude to land at a specizic place and go out on a prescribed heading. I have the highest admization, praise and respect for the outstanding professionalism and courage 0 킁 the UH-1D pilots and crews who ran a gauntlet of enemy fire time aEte: time to help us. They never refused to come in; they followed instructions beautifully; they were great. We in tum called them in when fire was the lightest and tried to have everything ready for each landing to keep them on the ground a minimum time. None were shot down and destroyed although most of them took hits. Two aircraft were brought in which did not get out. One received enemy fire in the engine and had to land in an open area just off the northern portion of the Lz ; the other clipped a few tree tops with the main rotor on landing in the LZ and had to be left. Crews of both aircraft were immediately lizted out by other helicopters. Both downed helicopters wera immediately secured by elements of Company $D$ without orders per battalion SOP they being the nearest troops. Both were slightly damaged only and were slung out two days later by $\mathrm{CH}-47$ Chinooks. During the three day battle, those were the only two downed helicopters. By 1350 hours, it had become apparent that we would need a night landing capability that I needed a pathfinder team to assist me on the ground. I called the A Company, 229 th lift company commander with a request for patho $\because$ finders and was gratified to learn that he had anticipated the requirement. They arrived shortly thereafter and with engineer demolitionists cleared the LZ into a fairly safe two-chopper landing area and set up lights to be turned on if necessary for night landings. Although under enemy observation and fire, it was less vulnerable than the southern portion of $X-R A Y$ where we were still cleaning out enemy riflemen.
(2) By dark, at 1915 hours, a resupply of ammo, rations, water and medical supplies had been brought in. Dexdrane, morphine, and bandages were the medical supplies most needed and water was at a premium. At approximately 1850 hours, I radioed by $\mathrm{S}-3$ and told him to prepare to come in as soon as possible using two UH-1D's and to bring in the artillery liaison officer, FAC, two radio operators and more water and small arms ammo. They landed at 2128 hours. The dust and smoke which hung like a horizontal curtain over the entire area delayed their arrival and made the landing very difficult but once again, the 229 th pilots performed with great courage and professionalism.
IV. ACTIVITIES DURING THE NIGHT OF 14 NOVEMBER:
A. By darkness, 1915 hours, we had evacuated all our wounded and collected our dead in my CP area. Ammo and water was being distriouted; the landing zone area was in the final stages of preparation for night landings; mortar and artillery fires were being registered close around the perimeter a small light proof working area had been constructed out of ponchos for the medics; and the chain of command had been reorganized. I talked with many of the men and could see that the morale was high. We knew we were facing a tough enemy out we also knew the enemy with a greatly superior force had failed to get through us that aftemoon. We were in excellent shape as we completed tying in our perimeter. The cutoff platoon of $B$ Company was in good morale and was holding its position.
[B. During the night the enemy made several light probes forward of $A$ and $B$ Company, and of C Company near where it tied in with A Company, Artillery harassing and interdiction fires were brought down on the lower fingers and draws of the mountain, around the southern and western edges of the perimeter; and up on the slopes where four or five electric lights were observed. 7 We received six or seven rounds of high explosive fire, either mortar or rockets.
C. The surrounded platoon of $B$ Company on a finger of the mourntain 300 meters northwest of the battalion perimeter was protected by ciose-in artillery fires all night. The enemy could be heard ail around the platoon. Artillery fire was brought in on these areas and the shouts and screams told of good results. The platoon began and ended the night with 8 KIA, 12 WIA and 7 men not wounded. It was disposed in two separate locarions within their small perimeter. The platoon leader, paton sergeant and weapons squad leader were among the KiA. The rsi who ended up on the radio was a Sergeant E-5 squad leader. He could not get to the ranking man (a Staff Sergeant rifle squad leader), since any move he made drew immediate enemy rifle fire. He was the compo and leadership link to his Company Commander. Throughout the night he adjusted close-in artillery fire on the enemy surrounding him as he heard them moving and talking. Three separate attacks were made during the night by the enemyeach in about 50 man strength. All were beaten off by small arms and
artillery fire. Several of the wounded men of the platoon continued to fight. The second attack, at approximately 0345 hours was preceded by bugle calls around the platoon and up on the mountain 200-400 meters above the platoon. I requested and received a TAC Air strike in the area above the platoon. It was conducted under Air Force flareship illumination. It was right on target and greatly assisted in breaking up the second attack on the surrounded platoon. This was the oniy illumination used all night since it exposed the men in the surrounded platoon as well as the foxholes in the open areas of the battalion perimeter. Also, there was a fairly bright moon from 2315 onwards. When day-light broke, numerous enemy dead were seen around the surrounded platoon. These were only the dead who could be seen by the men as they lay prone in their positions. Other bodies were possibly concealed by the high grass which dotted the area. During the night, the men of the platoon saw and heard the enemy dragging off many dead and wounded.
D. First light came at 0630 hours. I had tentatively decided on my plan of attack to reach the surrounded platoon while simultaneously securing the perimeter. I directed by $A, B$, and $C$ Company Commanders to meet me at the Cocomany CP to finalize the plan and to receive my orders since that was the best point of vantage. The time was approximately 0640 hours. I also directed each company to check around their positions carefully for infiltrators and snipers.

## V. ENEMY ATTACRS OF 15 NOVEMBER:

[A. At approximately 0650 hours the recon elements of the ist and 2d platoons of C Company (the two left platoons) which were searching and screening approximately $100-200$ meters forward of their positions began receiving rifle fire from their front and left Ezont.:They returned the fire and began pulling back to their defensive positions. At this tire, they were attacked by a force of 2 - 3 Companies. n wi The enemy was well-camouflaged; crouching low; and in some cases crawling on hands and knees. The recon parties from the two platoon positions right of the company $C P$ encountered no enemy but pulled back immediately to their defensive positions. An intense small arms fire fight broke out. The weight of the enemy attack was directed at the left portion of the $C$ Company sector. The recon parties of the 1 st and $2 d$ platoons began taking casualties including some KIA as they pulled back. Other men were hit trying to get to them. Some were recovered; however, by then - 0730 hours the enemy had moved almost to the perimeter foxholes despite taking severe losses from artillery, mortar, and close air. Savage close-range fighting went on for the next two hours in the $C$ Company sector - primarily in the left three platoon areas and forward of the Company CP. There was considerable hand-to-hand fighting. For example, the lst platoon leader was found later KIA and five dead PAVN around him in and near his CP foxhole. One man was found KIA with his thands at the throat of a dead PAVN. Numerous enemy bodies were found intermingled with the killed and wounded of C Company. At approximately 0715 hours, the enemy attacked the D Company sector near where the
mortars were emplaced This put the perimeter under attack Erom two directions. Artillery, Aerial Rocket Artillery, and TAC Air were calied in and their fires were accurate and extremely effective. ARA and TAC Air was also used to ring the perimeter with fires. Priority of all fires was given to C Company. The artillery FO with C Company was pinned down by rifle fire in the company $C P$ area. Hence the artillery was adjusted oy my artillery liaison officer from my CD. There was good observation.
(B. At approximately 0715 hours, the Commanding Officer, C Company requested reinforcements. I took a platoon from Company A (it being the closest to $C$ Company) and dispatched it for the Company $C P$ areal It came under fire while moving over the open ground, lost 2 KIA and WIA; but made it to the right center of the $C$ Company sector. At about 0745 hours, the A Company sector was attacked by what was later determined to be a small force. (We were now being attacked from three different directions with firing of equal intensity in all three areas. Grazing fire from enemy small arms and automatic weapons was criss-crossing the interior of the perimeter into the landing zone, battalion CP area and aid station. Twelve to fifteen HE explosions ci either enemy mortar or rocket fire occured in the perimeter. Severai men were wounded in and near the $C P$ by small ams fire. One was KIA. I alerted my reserve for probable commitment in the $C$ Company area or $D$ Company Sector - both of which contingencies we had planned for cie night before. I radioed the brigade commander, informed him oz che situation, and in view of the losses being sustained by $C$ Company and the heavy attack, I requested an additional reinforcing company. He had already alerted Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry the previous night and assembled it with helicopters ready for movement. Yy request was approved but $I$ did not bring the company in at that time due to heavy fire in the LZ. See Tab I for dispositions of opposing Eorces.
C. The heavy fire fight continued oniy in the $C$ and $D$ Company Sectors. At one time, approximately 0800 hours, the anti-tank platoon was heavily engaged and the $L Z$ was severely threatened. The mortarmen were firing both their mortars and their rifles and taking heavy small arms fire. One mortar was hit and put out of action by enemy fire. (I committed my reserve, the Recon Platoon, which moved into the left $\%$ comm:of the C Company sector; headed towards $D$ Company and cleaned it out. They joined up with the rest of $D$ Company and Erom then on throughout the rest of the attack, that portion of the perimeter was under control) This permitted me to take the risk of commencing to bring in A Company, 2 d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry. Although the LZ was under fire, it was reduced somewhat. I needed A Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry in, so that I could reinforce or possibly counterattack or block in or behind the C Company sector. I ordered the commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to pull one additional rifle platoon plus his command group aff his line; turn the sector over to his remaining platoon; assemble the Company (-) dispersed near my $C P$; and prepare, on order, to reinforce,
block, or counterattack in the C Company sector which was 125 meters to the east of the CP or second, in any other area.). By then, two officers of C Company had been killed and three wounded. However, the company commander although shot in the chest and back continued to function; help to control this company; and give me reports for nearly three hours. The men of C Company stood their ground. One man of Company D who wound up in the $C$ Company sector was the only soldier left covering 50 meters. He personally shot $10-15$ enemy with his $M-16$ rifle firing from the kneeling position. The company radio operator picked off 15 - 20 from the company CP foxhole. The company commander killed several before he was wounded. The enemy fire was so heavy that movement towards or within the sector resulted in more friendly casualties. It was during this action at 0755 hours that all platoon positions threw a colored smoke grenade on my order to define visually for TAC Air, ARA and artillery air observers the periphery of the perimeter. All fire support
was brought in extremely close, Some friendiy artillery fell inside the perimeter, and two cans of napalm were delivered in my CP area wounding two men and setting off some $M-16$ ammo. This we accepted as abnormal, but not unexpected due to the emergency need for unusually close-in fire support (50-100 meters). C Company, with attachments, fought the massive enemy force for over two hours. At approximataly 0910 hours, elements of A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry began landing.) I briefed the Commanding Officer, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry on the situation and saw to it that he was oriented by the Commanding Officer, B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalty on the sector he was to go into. I then ordered the Commanding Officer, Company 3 , 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to move with his command group arid the one platoon to the $C$ Company sector, assume control over the remainder of C Company and responsibility for the defense of the sector.) He moved out at 0941 hours. The remaining platoon of $B$ Company, 2d Battalion, Ith Cavalry followed shortly after when it was relieved on the perimeter by A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. When the 3 d platoon of $A$ Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry dismounted from the choppers, it headed towards the C Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry fire fight and assembled behind their left platoon. I attached it to $B$ Company, $2 d$ Battalion, 7 th Cavalry and it fought with that company throughout the next two days. By 1000 hours the enemy attack had been defeated.) $C$ Company had held. The enemy never penetrated through their position. (At approximately 1330 hours all companies on the perimeter screened out for 300 meters and policed the battlefield) Dead PAVN, PAVN body fragments, and PAVN weapons and equipment were littered in profusion around the edge and forward of the perimeter. Numerous body fragments were seen. There was massive evidence e.g. bloody trails, bandages, etc. of many other PAVN being dragged away from the area. Some of the enemy dead were found stacked behind anthills. Artillery and TAC Air was placed on all wooded areas nearby into which trails disappeared. Numerous enemy weapons were collected along with other armament. Two prisoners were taken and evacuated. Friendly dead and wounded were also collected. Some friendly were killed and wounded in this screening. (C Company, lst Battalion, 7 th Cavalry was then positioned as
the battalion reserve in the center of the perimeter and A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry was in position in the former 3 Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry sector?

## VI. THE RELIEF OF THE SURROUNDED 2ND PLATOON, COMPANY B. AND REDISPOSITION OF THE PERIMETER:

A. Date in the afternoon of 14 November, the brigade Commander had moved the $2 d$ Battalion, 5th Cavalry, into LZ Victor. At approximately 0800 hours it headed, on foot, for LZ X-RAY. See Tab J for routes used. At 1205 hours, it closed into $X$-RAY. The Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, Sth Cavalry and 1 coordinated on the disposition of forces. It was agreed that his $A$ and $B$ Companies which were south and west of $L Z X-R A Y$ on the lower slopes of the mountain headed northwest plus B Company, lst Battalion, $7 t h$ Cavalry would conduct a coordinated attack behind artillery, ARA, TAC Air preparation to relieve the surrounded platoon. The route of attack was as shown at $T a b K$. It was agreed that $I$ would assume ope: ational control of Company $B$, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry and be in overali control of all units at $L Z X-R A Y$ plus responsibility for its defense. B Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry moved forward of D Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry on the perimeter. All 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry mortars went into position and registered. D Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavjlry (minus the mortar platoon) was added to C Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalng in reserve. The attack by $A$ and $C$ Companies of the $2 d$ Battalion, 5-h Cavalry and B Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry under control of Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry jumped off at 1315 hours. There was little enemy resistance. B Company, lst Battalion, Tth Cavaly reached the surrounded platoon at 1510 hours. At the location there were 8 KIA, 12 WIA and 7 unwounded. The platoon still had ammo left and were in good morale. The wounded were evacuated and all units disposod 三nd dug in for the night. Dispositions were as shown at Tai L. Ammunition, water, and rations were brought in and distributed. The dead were $\equiv 11$ evacuated.
VII. ENEMY NIGHT ATTACK, 0400-0630 HOURS, 16 NOV:
A. At approximately 0100 hours, B Company, lst Battalion, 7 th Cavalry was probed by 5 enemy. Two were killed and the other three dispersed. The moon was up at 2320 hours and there were no clouds. (Fire discipline, as during the previous night, was excellent. Ali aiming stake lights on the mortars were extinguished, and no mortar fire was permitted, as during the previous night, without approval from me.) (All fires were coordinated by my Artillery Liaison Officer. Continuous, close-in $H$ and $I$ fires were conducted all around the perimeter. Some were placed on the mountainside, and firing in two areas resulted in a series of secondary explosions.
B. At approximately 0400 hours, the enemy began probing tne 3 Company, $2 d$ Battalion, 7 th Cavalry sector. At 0422 hours a force of 250 - 300 enemy attacked B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry in the lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry sector. The route of attack was from the southeastias shown at Tab M. Flareship illumination was called for and continuous until 0545 hours. The attack was beaten off by small azms and artillery fires. (At 0431 hours another attack by 200 enemy came in on B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Each time a flare would light up, the enemy would hit the ground or fall back into the cover and concealment offered by the high grass and trees. The artillery took a heavy toll.) There were four batteries firing. The PAVN could be seen dragging off numerous bodies. (By 0503 hours, the weight of his attack had shifted more to the southwest with approximately 100 enemy attacking. This was repulsed by 0535 hours) At 0550 hours, the flareship ran out of flares. Artillery illumination was then employed. The mortars oi both battalions had been firing HE since the attack jegan. Mortar illumination was then permitted. At 0627 hours, another attack came directly towards the $C$. At 0641 hours the enemy had been beaten off) and was dragging off bodies under fire. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry had performed magnificantly, and had suffered only 6 lightly wounded. During the attack, two separate resupply tuns of ammo were made by the Recon Platoon, Ist Battalion, 7th Cavalry under fire and one oy the XO and radio operators of 3 Company, $2 d$ Batzalion, 7 th Cavalry.
(C. At 0641 hours, orders were given for 211 men on the perimeter to spray the trees and the anthills and bushes forward and over thei: positions at 0655 hours for two minutes to kill infiltrators, snipers, ate. Immediately upon firing, a force of $30-50$ PAVN exposed themselves 150 meters forward of Company A, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry and began Eizing their weapons. Apparently the "mad minute" free spraying, prematurely triggered a possible enemy attack. $H E$ and VT artillery was brought in and the attack was beaten off in twenty minutes, The tactic of spray firing accounted for 6 PAVN dead. One hung from a tree forward of the left platoon of B Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry. Another dropped out of a tree immediately forward of the $B$ Company CP. One PAVN was killed about one hour later attempting to climo down a tree and escape. My company commanders reported to me that the men liked this spraying. In addition to killing enemy, apparently it affords a release of tension built up through the night, and clears any doubts as to enemy nearby. (At 0716 hours, a cautious and deliberate sweep was made by Company C, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the Recon platoon, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry throughout the interior and fringes of the 22. I ordered this conducted on hands and knees to search for friendly casualties and PAVN infiltrators in the high elephant grass. The trees were also searched. There were negative results.
D. At 0810 hours, all units on the perimeter were ordered to coordinate with their flank units, and prepare to move out on a search
and clear sweep 500 meters commencing on order. The movement began at 0955 hours, however, after moving 50-75 meters B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry came under fire. One platoon leader was seriously wounded. All movement was stopped. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry pulled back to the perimeter foxholes and close-in artillery and TAC Air was called in. We then moved back out; eliminated all resistance and policed the area. 27 more PAVN were killed on this sweep. Enemy dead were lying throughout the area. I saw massive evidence of dead and wounded evacuation -- blood, body fragments, bloody garments, etc. We also orought in three friendly KIA. Numerous enemy weapons were collected. Many were seen which had been fragmented by Eire.
E. At approximately 0930 hours, the first elements of the 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry (-) began arriving at X -RAY. They closed at approximately 1200 hours. At 1040 hours, the Brigade Commander ordered me to move the battalion; Company 3, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry; and the 3d Platoon, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry by UH-1D to FALCON LZ, then to Camp Holloway at Pleiku for two days of rest and reorganization. He ordered me to relieve my elements on line with elements of the 2 d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry. This i did. However, before moving B Company, 2d Battalion, ith Cavalry, I had them conduct one final lateral sweep across their front out to 150 meters. This was the scene of extremely heavy action and $I$ wanted the battlefield thoroughly policed. The extraction by UH-1D was completely successiful, and was covered throughout by artillery and TAC Air delivered around X -RAY, on the flight routes in and out, and on the slopes of the mountain. There was no enemy fire at any time during the extraction. The choppers were not brought in until aircraft loads were spotted on the LZ . Hence the UH-1Ds were only on the ground a few seconds. Concurrently with troop extraction, excess supplies, enemy weapons, casualty gear anc weapons, and casualties were evacuated. Enemy hand grenades, ammo, anti-tank weapons, etc were placed in a large hole and arrangements were made with CO, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry for demolition by his engineer teams. Many other enemy weapons had previously been destroyed elsewhere in the battle area. By 1456 hours all elements of the list Battalion, 7th Cavalry; B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 3d Platoon, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry had been extracted from X-RAY bound for LZ Falcon. By 1830 hours all elements had left L2 FALCON by air and closed into Camp Holloway, vicinity of Pleiku.
VIII. ENEMY, FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, CAPTURED:

EQUIPMENT
jA. ENEMY:
Killed, body count - 634 X
Killed, wounded (Est) - 1215
Captured, evacuated - 6
B. FRIENDLY (INCLUDES ATTACHED UNITS):

Killed - 79
Wounded - 121
Missing - None
C. CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT, EVACUATED:

Assault carbines w/bayonet - 54
Assault rifles, automatic - 57
Automatic Rifles - 17
Heavy Machine Guns - 4
Antitank Rocket Launchers - 5
Pistols - 2
81/82 mm Mortar Tubes - 2
Medics Kits - 6
D. ENEMY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED IN OBJECTIVE AREA:

Crew-served and individual weapons - 75-100 (approx) Antitank Rockets - 3 cases of 3 rounds each Hand Grenades - 300-400 (approx) Assorted small arms, AW ammunition - 5000-7000 rounds (est) Entrenching tools - 100-150 (small shovel type)
IX. COMMENT:
A. The following items concerning the enemy and genezal battlefield techniques are considered worthy of mention. Most represent nothing new and are listed for emphasis as being particularly applicade to the PAVN enemy.
B. FIRE SUPPORT:
$\checkmark(1)$ Fire support to be truly effective must be close-in: Against heavy attacks such as the ones we defended against, some enemy will get very close or even intermingled with friendly in the high grass. Bringing fires in promptly, "walking them in" extremely close helped us greatly. The commander cannot wait until he knows exactly where all his men are. If he does, in a heavy action, he will get more men killed by waiting than if he starts shooting immediately. Once the enemy gets as close as 25 meters out or intermingled then he has the friendly fighting on his terms, with those who have made it that close. Close fire support then can be used to cut off his follow-up units, and they will be there. (He is much more afraid of napalm and white phosphorous than HE.] He hits the dirt under HE fire. Under napalm and WP, he often gets up and runs around in distorder, and presents a better target for small arms, VT, and HE. The 250 pound frag bomb and the CBO's are very effective.

(2) When a unit gets into an objective area, as soon as possible after landing, artillery fires should be brought in. 7 This will maybe kill some PAVN nearby and certainly will cut down time on target when a fire mission on known enemy is called for.
(3) [Aerial rocket artillery is extremely effective especially if the pilots knew the exact location of friendly. It has a tremendous shock effect on the enemy.] The thing about ARA which makes it at times more effective than artillery is the fact that it does not have to be seen by ground observers to be adjusted. If the front lines or a friendly position is marked and can be recognized by the pilots, quick, accurate Eire support is the result.
(4) The LAW was effective against the anthills behind which the PAVN were hiding. Training on use of LAWS must be emphasized.
(5) If PAVN are encountered ciose-in during a Eriendy
, attack, the best solution to an attack may be to back up under artillery again, loading off with plenty of $M-79 \mathrm{~s}$ in the trees and grass and LAwS into the anthills.
(6) Whenever illumination was in the air many of the enemy ceased firing.
(7) Careful placement of 1 -79 men should be emphasized in order to give them the best possible fields of Eire. They must always be on the lookout for enemy in trees. It was found that the M-ig's were extremely effective against enemy in trees as well as troops in the open. $M-79^{\prime}$ 's must be fired into trees and the high grass even when no enemy are seen.
(8) In this operation all mortars were combined under a ( cnetral FDC. This was very satisfactory. The mortars were very effectfive. Mortar illumination firing was carefully controlled at battalion level. The mortar illumination round has a very high dud rate and it would take many rounds to provide a battalion perimeter illumination for one hour. Therefore it was used to fill the gap for illumination between the artillery and the flareship. The mortars alone could not have come close to providing the desired amount of illumination.
(9) Artillery, TAC Air, and ARA can be used at the same time without loss of aircraft or effectiveness. The ARA and TAC Air flow perpendicular to the artillery gun-target line in these cases where they simultaneously struck the same target areas. Other striking aircraft flew parallel to the gun-target line and beyond it. This called for close teamwork between the FAC and the artillery liaison officer. 1
(10) Artillery must be used against possible avenues of reinforcement as well as on the enemy in either an attack or a defense. Close-in continuous defensive $H$ and $I$ fires are a must in a defensive situation where the enemy is known to be present even if he is not attacking.
(11) Great emphasis should be placed on the ability oz all personnel down to and including fire team leaders to adjust artillery and mortar fire.
(12) Each platoon must carry many coiored smoke grenades and a panel for marking friendly lines and landing areas.
(13) The technique of having ail units on the perimeta: throw a colored smoke grenade on order greatly helped TAC Air and ARA to locate the perimeter.
C. MOVEMENT
(1) Movement must be cautiously aggressive. The enemy must be pinned down by fire. Small unit, squad sized Eire and movement must be conducted to perfection. This is extremely important. If not conducted correctly, men will get hit and the problem is then compounded when other men stop firing to try to recover casualties. Then they also get hit in many cases and soon, combat effectiveness of the squad, platoon, etc. is in danger of being lost. In this connection, when enemy contact has been made or is strongly suspected, recon jy fire or actual Eire and movement should be conducted to forestall the eremy firing first. This is particularly important for a unit moving up alongside a unit which is in contact and in a fire fight.
(2) Platoon and company fire and maneuver must be conducted to perfection. Flanks must be secure. Open flanks can be secured to a degree by fire support. Squads and platoons must be tied together as close as the situation permits. The tighter the better against the PAVN, as he will hole up in concealed firing positions, let friendly go by, then open up.
(3) Close-in artillery, ARA, and TAC Air front, rear, and both sides is a great help in moving through an area where there are known enemy. This normal but sometimes overlooked.
(4) When companies conduct sweep and clear operations together out of a perimeter, or ever a certain route, battalion must check on the company formations to be used to insure that the terrain will be adequately covered and the companies are properly coordinated , and fitted to the terrain and the enemy situation.

## FOROFFICTATMSENLY

D. TECHNIQUES:
(1) The technique of nolding a company (-) as an offensive striking force while recon elements of oné platoon check speci£ic areas out 50-100 meters from the landing zone worked out very well in this case. For one thing until the assault unit is actually on the ground and sees and feels the terrain and the environment, the commande: of the unit charged with LZ security does not finally know which areas he will check out in priority. Also and most important, the assembled company ( - ) enables the battalion commander to hit any emeny attack quickly with a controlled unit. In this operation we were also able to move quickly with Company $B$ to develop the contact made by one of its platoons as soon as Company A had sufficient force to take ove= the LZ security mission. In retrospect, the fact that Company 3 was in a posture for a fast move off the landing zone undoubtedly gave us the jump on the PAVN. Had not 3 Company surprised them with thei= aggressive move up the finger, we might well have been fighting the PAVN from the fringes of the $L Z$ with our backs on it -- and the enemy in turn would have had good fields of fire on the incoming helicopters carrying the last elements of $A$ Company and $a l l$ of $C$ and $D$ Companies. I feel that the fact that we had first B Company, then A Company, of the landing zone moving against the PAVN, then C Company in a good biocking position took the initiative away from nim. From then on, Eo= three days and two nights, he was reacting to our presence.
(2) At night, units must form tight perimeters, use Claymore mines, trip flares and dig in. The use of outposts and listening posts depends largely on the terrain and the enemy situation. In this operation, it would have been suicidal as the cover and concealment afforded the enemy too many opportunities to take the outguards by stealth. CamouElaged foxholes with cleared fields of fire are recommended. Normal, but sometimes hard to execute under fire.
(3) In a perimeter defense, it is necessary to check the front with small recon parties at first light and periodically through the day for 100-200 meters to clear out infiltrators, police the batilefield, and to insure that the enemy is not massing for an attack. This action should be preceded by having all troops on the perimeter spray the trees, grass, and anthills to their front and overhead at a specified time for two-three minutes. When the recon elements screen to the front, it should be preceded by artillery and recon by fire, Air Cav Scouts overhead can assist by observation. Units should move as in the attack with fire and movement. All men must give the enemy the capability of being to the front and overhead as infiltrators, snipers, or massing for an attack.
(4) The battalion command group must carry a 292 antenna in on the assault and set it up as soon as possible. D Company, my
alternate $C P$, carried one in on the assault -- set it up, and it was invaluable.

## E. SUPPLY, SUPPORT, SERVICES:

(1) The minimum amount of gear should be carried into an assault. This should be one meal, a poncho, two canteens oミwater, salt tablets, and plenty of ammunition.
(2) Casualties are a critical problem. When Eire is pinning down individuals, one casualty will cost one or two more men attempting to get to him. Heavy cover fire must be employed to $=$ y and cover the attempt to recover the wounded men and get him out oz the danger area. Leaders at all levels in contact under fire must act cautionsly in getting casualties out. I lost many leaders killed and wounded while recovering casualties. Wounded must be puiled back $=0$ some type of covered position and then treated. Troops must not get so concerned with casualties that they forget the enemy and theit mission. Attempting to carry a man out requires up to Eour men as bearers rinich can hurt a unit at a critical time.
(3) Evacuation of casualties Erom the areas of contact in this action was a provlem. TO\&e litter bearers would have jeen a big help. As it tumed out, Eighting strength had to be used to carry out a wounded man (3-4 men required) or to assist many walkina wounded. (one man at least required in many cases).
(4) When a man is wounded or killed, his weapon and some of his equipment get separated Erom him in many cases. An S-i zenこesentative - officer or NCO with assistants, must be present at least in the battalion forward aid station and at the collecting company at Forward Support. Some of our equipment was evacuated with men all the way to Qui Nhon. Also we had many M-16's shot up and had to have replacements in the area. Therefore we kept a lot of weapons in the battle area for re-issue. When we were pulled out we brought 211 excess weapons and equipment with us. Many enemy weapons wich were captured and sent out with friendly KIA and WIA were never seen again. The unit commander fighting the battle in the oojective area loses control of equipment, friendly and enemy, once it leaves the forward area by helicopter. A more effective "backstop" system must be set up to catch this gear and control it when it arrives at various unloading points in the rear.
(5) Rations are no problem. Few men eat much when in a heavy action; however, water is extremely critical. It must be present in quantitity particularly when there is no stream source available.

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(6) The pathfinder team was tremendous. Until they could get in around 1630 hours, 14 November, all incoming aircraft had to be
guided in and out by the battalion commander on the battalion command net. A pathfinder team should go into every battalion-sized assault.
(7) It took time to reload M-16 magazines one round at a time. In the heavy action we encountered, this took excessive time at critical periods. It was particularly critical during the enemy night attack. Also it was difficult to keep track of empty magazines in a heavy fire fight. The solution may be an expendable, plastic type magazine which is resupplied to the rifleman fully loaded in a bandoleer as was the old M-I clip of eight rouncs. Also, the present M-1is ammo pouch makes crawling on the stomach difficult.
(8) The individual soldier must become at least as good as the PAVN in camouflage tachniques and use of terrain and foliage to cover and conceal his movements. This must be emphasized.

## F. THE PAVN ENEMY:

(I) He appeared to be well-trained. He was aggressive. He was equipped with a preponderance of automatic weapons and plenty oz ammunition. He carried 3 - 5 Chinese potato masher hand grenades. He carried a softball-sized wad of cooked rice, most of them carried a bed roll consisting of a piece of waterproof plastic and a hammock. His weapons were well maintained.
(2) He was an expert at camourlage and used every bi= of cover and concealment to perfection. With only small arms, mortars, and antitank weapons he obviously sought to close with us in strength quickly-iefore we could discover him - possibly to render our fire support less effective and certainly to overwhelm us and force us to Eight on his terms. Without much overhead Eire support, he probably has to fall back on expert camouflage techniques, attacks in mass, infiltrators, and stay-behind killer parties.
(3) He was a deadly shot. In caring For my men who had been killed and wounded, I was struck by the great number who had been shot in the head and upper part of the body -- particularly in the head. He definitely aimed for the leaders -- the men who were shouting, pointing, talking on radios. He also aimed for the men carrying radios. He also appeared to concentrate on men wearing insignia of rank -- particulariy non-commissioned officer with stripes on their arms. In this war, I question if it is necessary, possibly even foolish, or inviting fire, for non-commissioned officers to wear insignia of their grade -or any enlisted man for that matter. Within the small units, all men know their leaders. In base camp the leaders should wear their insignia. On operations against the enemy, they should wear clean-sleeve fatigues.
(4) When attacking, the PAVN units confronting us used mass assault tactics preceded in some cases by light mortar and antitank rocket fire. The latter I believe is often mistaken for mortar Eire. He also used encircling maneuvers with 50-75 men groups. He employed his machine guns extremely well and thoroughly understood the value of grazing fire. At night, he infiltrated small numbers up to the friendly positions. These enemy set up on top of grassy anthilis, in trees, and good close-in firing positions. He was expert at probing our defensive perimeter at night and went to great efforts to tey to Eorce Eriendly into firing.
(5) When met by heavy ground fire or by mortar, artillery, TAC Air, or ARA he became less organized. However, he did nct guit. Napalm and white phosphorous he definitely did not like.
(6) He appeared to have no radios. The leaders controlled their men by shouting. Bugles were used during the night of 14 - 15 November on the mountain above the battalion perimeter. Also, at aight on the mountain they used signal lights.
(7) He fought to the death. When wounded, he continued fighting with his small arms and grenades. Be appeared fanatical when wounded and had to be approached with extreme care. Yany Eziendy were shot by wounded pavN.
(8) He also appeared fanatical in his extreme efiorts $=0$ recover bodies of his dead and wounded and thei= equipment. Fe neve: stopped his efforts in this regard and used the night, the high grass, the anthills and other concealment to maximum advantage to serve his purpose. We found many of his dead with ropes lied around the ankies and a short, running end free. I saw two of my dead with similar ropes tied around their ankles.
(9) Some of my men who met him face to face have stated that some PAVN appeared to be "hopped up". They based this conclusion in part on their observation that when shot, they kept moving several more steps firing before dropping. In these cases, it is possible that the high velocity $M-16$ bullet passed cleanly through these enemy without any immediate stopping effect. Also some men stated that they saw a few enemy keep their weapons at sling arms although under fire. One non-commissioned officer stated that one group of 30 or so enemy continued moving across the front of his squad although it was jeing cut to pieces by close-in flanking fire.
(10) A favorite tactic of the PAVN enemy we faced seemed to be an aggressive small-unit encircling maneuver. Another was a rapid assault by $6-10$ PAVN on 2 or 3 friendly.
(11) We found some of our KIA "dog tags" and wallets on the bodies of dead PAVN.

## 

VIII. Out of all the above, the principal points that $I$ would like to emphasize are:
A. We must make imaginative and constant use of our tremendous fire support advantage to kill the PAVN enemy before he gets so close that we must fight him on his terms. This includes heavy use of the $M-79$ and even hand grenades to hold him out so that artillery, TAC Air, and ARA can work on him.
B. We must take time and every opportunity to train our men, and especially our replacements, to perfection in small-unit fire and movement and fire and maneuver. If we do not to this, men will be killed who would not otherwise be killed.
C. The commander on the battlefield must continually anticipate what the future may bring or could bring and take steps to influence tie future before it comes about. This applies to the enemy; to fire support; supply of ammo, water, and medical supplies before the requirement arises; to friendly reaction to possiole enemy action; and to all other mattars having a bearing on a particular situation. Also, periodicaliy throughout a battle, the commander must mentally detach himself from the action and objectively think .- what is not being done which should be done to influence the situation, and what is being done which should not be going on.

/s/ H Moore<br>/ $/$ / HAROLD G. MOORE<br>Colonel, Infantry

VIII．Out of ali the ajove，the principal points tiat $I$ would like to emphasize are：

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B．We must＝ake＝ime and evezy opportunity zo taain ouz men，and especially our feplacements，to perfečion in small－unit Eza and movement and fire and maneuver．IE we do not tc $=$ nis，men in： be killed who would not othe：wise be killed．

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 こuに a batile，the comanaer must mentaliy decach himseiz z＝ow the acticn and objectively think－．what is not deing done rinich snowid je cine to influence the situation，and what is being done whinct sholid not je zonne on．

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/s/ \because Yoc=e
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TU: Commanding Officer
3d Brigede
1st Cevalry Division (inirmbilo)
$\therefore P O$ US Foroes 96490

## I. GMNLins

During this operetion, I wes the Comnanding Officer of the 1st Bettalion, 7th Cavalry. Un 23 ifovember 1965, I was irum ted and turned over the battalion to my successcr.

## II. BGCKGRUOND:

5. Un 10 liovember the battalion noved from the bese catay at. an kho, coordinates ER476476, by (VV-2 to a forward airstrip and assembly aroa south of Lleiku, coordinates 46198340 . Frum there, all compenies wore shuttlocl the sare day by UH-11 into a search and cestruy operation In an area to the east of Ploi Mio, vioinity coordinates 242007 to 2.7606 . We ounduotec seturation patrililing through the 12th with light contact by only Crmpany A. We also cuncucted a civio acticn progrenim applying medicel aid and USOM fuoi to dicntagnarc village, yopulation 200, oocrdinat as W237073. On the 12th, the wssistant Division Comiliander - L, during a visit to the battalion, indicated to the brigado Comander that he had no cbjection to the latter sending a bettalion into the I. DRLJG Vailey. This we took aa an alert and began a map study. On 13 November, the battalion was moved on brieade ordere to a new axoa of operations south and southwost of Plei Nie. Unce again saturation patrulling wes cuncuctod out of onmpany beses throughout the day with no oontact. Company B. Was airliftec efter 1500 hours into the Erigede C 2 area as seourity, and for en immedite reaction foroe under Brigede oontrul. It closed intc position by 1800 hours.
B. At approxinately 1700 hours, the Brigracle Conmander and I visited the Compeny is de gouth of lelei Vie. During the visit, the Brigede Commander geve mo orders to exocute an asseult by helioopter into the IL DRuivG Valley, north of CEU HUNG Nountain early the next morning with e misaion of conclucting search and deatroy operaticns through the 15th. The area of operations was lointed out on the map and ho informod me that we would be supported frun LL HuLCuN, coordinates Lu023032, by two battorles of 105 m howitzer artillery ane of which would be moved by air from HLUI Hed early on the 14 th prior tic our esseult.
C. I returnod to my OP noer Plei liei formulated a tentative plan issued instruotions to my staffy procured further detaila from 3ch inigece Hoadquarters and the aupporting helloopter unit; and lesued a warnines order to ny unit commanders, ataff, and supporting olemente: By 2200 hours, 13 fiovomber, all proparations had been zocomilished which were possible without an actual air reounnalasanoe. drrancemente inoludeden ourly morning eirlifi of Cumpany B back to PLiAI Nif direotions to the comenders of a end C Comicnieg to conoontrate their elements at
finst 11 ght in the largest pick-up tone(s) in their rospoctive sotors; end plens for a first licht air raoon by all koy comenders and staff officers. A tine of 0830 hours was set for lisawnce at hy Cr of the operation order.
D. $s$ t this time, the "fighting" otrength of wy lettered companies as thoy went into the oporation was ere follows:
 TO8TH
Ufficers Ven Offcers Men

| CO | 5 | 115 | 6 | 164 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| COB | 5 | 114 | 6 | 164 |
| COC | 6 | 106 | 6 | 164 |
| COD | 4 | 76 | 5 | 118 |




(1) 14 liovember dawed bxtht and clear. Shortly after first light at 0630 hours, Compeny B wes faturned to battalion control
 ceisult company: The Citnooke whioh bec canrtec B Company back wore ocmancirg to move Battery dig 1et feittallen, 21st urtillery to 4 ThiCON plannel. we alx reocn party hat assambled and aftor a brief orientation on the warpose of the reoun, filight route, and items

 south vo north pese at ebout 4500 reot ootum, flow north past Duo Co.






 Special Frorces, 1st speotal Horoes Gxovi).
(2) During the eir rocon, eovoral opon apaes wero solootod by lembers of the racon party es posedble lencing zanos in and around tho IA Didut Vallay. Upon raturn from the rooun at about 0815 hours,
 finged the erom of oparations. The anea st bhown on the attachod map (Tab E) I then reoolved omiments as to the IL to be used. Three





 ry operation order beise on thet eoleothon. Conouruentiy I dispatohod

 torreifond to lowk on alens of onery notivity. Tho Caveilry sootion

was spotted with high stumps and would be difficult to use as a landIng zone. The Cavalry Section confirmed thet $4 x$ X-RN could take oight to ten UH-1D's at one time. Ho eighe of onemy botivity were detected around $X-\mathrm{kH}_{\mathrm{M}}$, and the Cavaly Soction wae not fired on during its lowlevel recon. Severat trails were picked upe end their locations were noted. The Cavalry Section eliso reported seeing commo wire on a trail north of X-haY which led east and wost. No twails led through Lis X-RaY.
 to be used only on my order. It then iagued an orel operation order. Heduced to writing, it is atteched at Lab C. Hresent to hear the order were all my Company Comanders; the battallon etaff and apecial staff: the lift Company Commander and bis wiaison Offloer to the battailon, the Cavalry Seaut Section Laader; OU, Battary A, 1et Battalion, 21a't Artillery; ane the 3nd Briggde $8-3$. Whe Infigede Comander arrived cur-. ing the lesumpo of the order end was separately brtefed shortiy thereafter. It was then raporited to me that the two artillery battories were in postion, and 2 sot $a$ thie of 1030 houses for the assault landing with the 20 minute tube ertilleiry preatration to be timed to be completed at H-Hour ithus onominute. The a and Company Compnders wero then flown back to thesercompenies. The 1 Company Commander returnod to his unit of the सhat we atretirip on meohentoel mule. The timo wes appoximetoly 0915 hours. Ll noceasamy properetions had either bean oompleted or were neamigeompletron. No problem had
been raised.

## B. TH: IMTM能 SSGOM:

Due to last minute positioning of the arillery pioces caused by air movoment delayd, the proparatory fires did not begin until 1017 hours. I was in tho load aircraft and had good view of these fires. They were precisely where requined, and beautifully tired with the landing of lead olamente of the asedith company. Fires wero concontreted privelpaliy erourd tho landine zone, in the trees and high grases ent on a finger and the draw loading down from the high enetur forthwest of h-huy. The eerial ertillery cerie in on the hools of the tube extiliery firos end worked over tho area for 30 seoonds
 on oall. Tho 14 betebelion gun ships took up tho fires and woro


















 takon doveral eays enter the notion ended hence tho arca is lose
 to the Plei lio erea to pade the remainder of Company and a port-
 procose of phutting the betfelton inte the aroe of operations. The tine of tho asault wes proolsely 1048 hours.
O. AG

Commander seoured the lancling zone by having one of his platuon leadorg dispatch his squads into differont areas, 50 to 100 meters off the landing zone to reconolter, while he retained the balanoe of his oompany concoaled in a clump of trees and high grass near the conter of the Jik area as en offensive striking force. it approximately 1120 hours, one of the recon aquads took a priencr. i inmediately took my S-2 and the Vietnamese, Nr. Wik, ane wont to the location and ques.. tioned him. He was unarmed, dressed in dirty khaki shirt end trousers with a sorial number on one of tho shirt opaulots, and carriod an ompty cantoon. Ho stated that he had eaten only benenas for five deys, ard that there were three bettaijons on the nountain above us who wanted very much to kill Amerteans but had boen unablo to find them. Ho stated that he was in tho Horth Viethamese army. The 1 Company Comundes was dracted to intensify his roconnemsanco in the aroa whare the priboner had been taken (nowe tho mountain), and to jrepere to asoune the Company misaion of searching the lower portion of the mountain aroe with omphasis on the finger and drew to the northwest. ly ooruand choper was called in end the prisonex was teken back immediately for interrogation the the Brigade CP. By then, 1210 hours, sufficiont elaments of Compeny ha had landed (unopposod) to teke cover the Li seourity misefon from Company B. iso olemente of tho roconnoitering platoon of is Company had made contect with soattered onemy rifloman noar tho mountain. Tho b Company Comrander was ordored t- assume tho Compeny sewrching miswiong to movo up the finger leading down towards X-BAI; anci to deviolop the aituetion. B Company moved out, and I diroctod the commindor of tompeny to proparo to rave up into tha same aroa on ordor whon Compeny o had arrivod in X-KiS in sufficient strength to tako over L\% securdty. tht thet ting. 1230 hours wo were taking no fire in the Lk, dround 1245 hours, leed elem monts of Compeny b bogan to ongege in a fire fight of modorato intensity. Shortly afterwords at approximately 1330 hours; Conimanding Officor, Company $B$ roportud that ho was boing attecked heevily by at least two ocmpanies of enory and that his right ylatoontan in denger of boing surroundec did out off from the nest of tho compeny by a
 few rounds of 60 and 81 dm morter firo kogen falling in the wh and on ECompany. B Company alao rocolved somo rocket fixe.
(2) Shortly after tho hacvy flre fight bogen, tho last platoon of $A$ Compery and tho Gompany Comander and bate olomenta of 0 Cmpany landoct Tho Commending Untioen, Company it was ordered to nove his oompay up on the loft of Company; to establiah physiocil contad whith ity to protact tha B Company loft flernk; and to sond
 $\pm$ Company platoon whoh was in dinger of boing out off. The Comiending Officer, Compent was ardond tc trak up $\varepsilon$ blucking position of $f$ the 1 naling zono to tho Bouth fing pouthost to provont the Li from being ovemrun from thit direothom, enicl to Bivo protoction to a Cumany's loft flank. I oellod the $4-3$ in the command ohoppon end told him to
 lower fringe of the mentima foothinia and work over the mountain and onemy approgoheg to the L\% from the wost and south in that priority. The seme thetruction wo givon to the ind and to the artillery. priority of flues wore to to fingolimion and requests from companies. Whon not fteme in nownen to a spocific raquost, fires were to be poured tin asirectod abvo. The Company Cormenders, forward observors, the forward sir ecritroller, and the artillery Liaison officor were all heving difficulty getting ooordinated a to the locations of the fcrwerd elononts of the companies. Ihore were no wall-deftnod torrian feature to holp and the acrub and trees all lookod alike. The ain was heavy with sincke end duat. B Cimpany had more problume than any other oompeny alinco it hed ono plation aoparated fron tho rost of the oompeny lin the junglo, and oculd not procisoly pin pint its lootion for purpueos of olosern fire support. The phatoon was in a moving firu-fight oganct a foreo of 75-100 onomy: The act that this plation was forward of 3 and a Compaijos doldyod
delivery of offeotive firos in support of thesu two ocmpenies. fowever, using the technique of "walki.g" fires down the mountain from the south and wost, fires were placed whero thoy give somo help to theso two cumanios - espocially. Company i. I spucifically dofined sovaral draws laading duwn from the mountein, and wented fires placed on enoiny murtar positions aightod or suspoctod out to 81 mm nortar range. Two air strikas were also brought in on the valley flucr to the northwest on and noar tho location of tho auspocted enemy battalion reported by higher headquartars the provious day. t.t this point, tho most oritical pariod of the aftornoon bogen.
(3) The A Company Commander sent up onepletoon to B. Company as directed. This platoon headed out, bacomo ongaged, and ondod up on the right of BCompany rather than tho loft. This was O. nfusing to both the i. C mpany Comander and nysalf until letor in the afterncon when the locetion of this platuon beosme scrted out. The b Company Gomincler lushod out in an effort to reach his platcon which by that tiku had boon oomplately surrounded. b Company (-) plus the ac Company plation was ablo to got to wathin 75 moters of the cut-ciff platoon but could get no furthor. The acomany platcon mado it cluser than any other eloment. BCompany was takingmoderato sasualtios. Concurrontly as Company $4(-)$ was hoaing up towards the loft and rearmost elomonts of $\mathcal{B}$ Cimpany, it mede hoavy contact with a large forco of at least one PaVil Company which was driving in and along a dry oreok bed parailel to the wostorn odgo of tho Lí. These onomy wero hoadod diroctly towards tho left rear of Corupainy b. is very hoavy firo fight inmodiatoly broko out. A Company was taking light casurltios, and oxtracting a hoavy toll from the onemy. Uno of tios . Company platouns was in such ev prosition thet it wea ablo to bring clusu-in flenking fire on 50-70 pavN as they oontinuod wiving acruse thoir frust. Meny of tinom wore killed, as whon the lacd fow were droppod, the romainder kept oomirg right into tho field of fire. A Cumpeny took two prasuners who wore leter eveuatad to Brigado.
(4) Just as tho A Company fire fight broko out, tho last olowents of 0 Cumpany and the loarl olements of D Company landod. as they lancied, tho holiooptors twok numorcus hits but none were ahot down. Tho C Company Comunder directod his olonents into position along side his othor olomonts whioh had landod groviously, within fivo minutos, a forco of $175-200$ onomy, honded for the LL, ran hoadiong into $C$ Company. C Company hota thom off, kjlling numorous of thom in the process as they ocntinuod triving to got to the landing zono. une priscnor wes takon and ovacuatod. Tho Company action cuntinued for approxibiately 1t hours until the onomy, disorganized and decinated, pullod off undor hoavy friondly artillory and air fires, cragging many of his dond and woundod.
(5) Concurront with all of the above, as the first elemonts of $D$ Ocmpeny lanciod (with the last olononts of C Compeny), they frmodiattaly bocame ongaged in the fire fight noar 4 Company. Une of the Compary Cominancers akido operatore was KI. In the lift Compary Curimaders fellooptor bofone he ouqd dismunt and the diour gunner and one pilot wore whande. I etoppod the other olght Uir-1)'s from landing by radio. The $W$ Compeny olements cansisted of the ccmand group, part of tho mortar plation and the antitamk platcon. The $D$ Company Commander lod thom toward the sound of tho hoavy firing in the 4 Company aroa. They made it to the atresmbod oreaj imodiately ongagod $25-301 \mathrm{diN}$ horded down the streammod and killod moat of thom. 4 Company oloments killod tho rost. During this fight, the Di Uompany Comandor and Vortar Piatuen Lesder wero seriously woundod but oontinuod to fire thoir rifles personally killing aevoral Pd. $\mathrm{V}_{\mathrm{L}}$. diftor the anomy were etopped, tho $D$ Cumpany Comiandor altorntoly lost oonsciousnoss and came to. Hie turnod ovor the corimand of the company to tho dntitank Plention Sorgoant, a Staff Sargoant, b-6. Digpositions of unite st that timo aro shewn at $1 n b \mathrm{~F}$. Tho Comanding Ufifoor, 0 Company mace phatioal oontact with this Staif Sorgocht and with wy approvel dirootod tho $D$ Compeny oloments to the left uf $C C_{C m p a n y}$
tying in tightly axolid the southoastern odge of the $\mathrm{H} / \mathrm{H}$ off in the brush.
(6) By thon we.were taking numerous casualties throughout the battalion, and it was apparent that we were fighting 500-600 onomy . These woro only the onos wo were in contact with and I figurod others were hoaded our way. i roquestod tho irigede Comander to sond mo another rifle oompany, he immadatoly approvod this roquost. In fact I lister locurnod that ho had alroady alertod b Company, $2 d$ battalion, 7 th Cavalry and weis assombling it at piok-up zonos.
(7) Lhring this fire fight, the Gavalry Soout section wels givon spocifio aroes to roconnoiter. 'lhoy ooncentroted on routes of Egrese down the mountain to the northwest and southwest, and also approanes from the north and northwest on the velley floor. the Cavelry reported rosults to mo on ry cormund not. st this time, approximately 1500 hours, I decided that it was nocossary to continue to land the remainder of the tactical olonents of the battalion oonsisting of the reoon platoon, 3 Uilid loads of C Company men, and the $X O$ and lat Sorseant of 1 Compeny, ulthough the oastorn portion of the landing zone was under eneriy fire it had slacked off considorably due to the $u$ and $D$ Vompany actions. lhege elorionts landed afely. I turned y Comp ny ovor to tio Company XU and direotod hin to dispeso the rocon platoon around the north and eest fringe of the Li for Li socurity and as battalion reservo. Tho $C$ Company Comandor had proviously, with uy approvel, sot up all riflo company mortars on the oastorn fringe of the Lik. The $\psi$ Company Comander was diroctod to add his mortars to them and take over thoir control fron a contral FiDC. Erincipel diroction of fire wea toward a and b Companios. The mortarmon also had the mission of dh defonse to thoir onst. $4 l$ went quickly into position.

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(1) Tho tino was now spproxinately 1545 hours and the disposition of tho opposing forous was as shown at tab $k$. ithe first attompt by Companios and $\dot{b}$ to rorich the cut-off platoon had beon stopjod by approxinatoly 300 oneriy. wo woro taking modereto oadualtios espooinliy among laadors anc redionan. thoeo enomy were aggreesiva and. they ocille off the mountain in largo groups. They were wall-canouflaged. and took excollent adventage of cover and concealment. Ihey were good shots. Thoy wore amod with mumerous autoriatio woapons ond small "potatomikshor" grenados. ivon aftor being hit soveral times in tho chost, unny oontinued firing and woving for oovoral wore steps before dropping doadi. 1 orderod Companion i and to ovacuato their cesuritioag withdrow undor covering flris out of olose oontacts and prepared for a coordinetod attaok supportod by hoavy proparatory fires to got back the surrounded platoon. iveanwlillo Company $C$ was continuing to hold off the oneray to thair front with the holp of some magnificent artillory and closo air support. The battalion S-2 was wounded end later shot again and killed during this onory attack. Tho surrounded platoon of $B$ Compeny stood off numorous pivis offorts to ovormun it. Corrying their doad, thoir woundod, and thoir oquipnent the mon of tho platoon ostablishor: a srall 25 moter wide perinotor on a slight rise of ground and rediatributori their anmunition undor hoavy enony fire.
(2) it approximately 1620 hours, tho socond attack by Compenios is and $B$ to reech tho surroundad platoon bogen. This attiok. was procodod by artillery and lik proparatory firos. botwoen tho firet and socond attaoks and despito heavy firos from artillory and elr, tho enoly had moved well up towarcls a and B Lompenios. Sono wome in troes. None fell beck. For friendly to advanoe, the onoriy had to bo kitloce. This was difticult becauso they wero woll-onwouflagod and usod ghl monns of cover anc conoenlment. lman hail dug into suall mpdoneholog, othors wore dug into the tope aurl sides of tho ant-hillis. dy theit tino, Company a had lost eill throo riflo platoon losidore - ono har end its ertililary forward observer hI. Four mon had boon hot end khhou within six foot of tho Company Coniandor, including his oommodengeaint who was acting as a radlo operctor, vonpany booholoned sleghtty dhoad enc to tho right of Company in, progrosgod only $75-100$ metore
nuoh of it patd for in oloso-in fighting. I had givon $a$ Company baok his platoon which had beon assisting B Coupany. Novortheless acompany could only progross about 150 notors. Gno plation of a Corapany advanood farthor than tile other two; booknis ongagoa with a greatly suporior force; and wers pinned down. Wota of the onouly permittod the friondy to pass by them in tho donso torrain and then opancd up from concoaled positions. White phosphosous artillery was brought in around the platoon and betwoon the platoon and 4 Company (-) to give aupport to an Corapany move forward to got it. Tho burning phosphorous oaused a towiporary lall in the onery firing and that plus the sroko, ohnblod the platoon and their doad and wounded to be reechod and brought back. $4200-225$ onemy forco was still in the area fight ing ageinst Companios is and B. Bir 1740 houre, I docided thet it was necossary to pull A and b Companies, undor cover of henvy supporting. firos, bnok to the fringe of the lending zone and sot up a tight defonsive porineter for the night. We wero ettill in good oormunientions with the surrounded plation and it wed ringed with close-in artillory defonsive fire. lyy intentions wore to oonduot another coordinated fittack during the night or ourly the noxt morntig to reach it or to got then out during the night by infiltration. Both and $b$ Companios hed numerous WIa and KL. to get out of the aros of contaot; reorganization of the squade ancl platoons had to be accomplishod; rosuphy of aniso and water had to be carried out; and all units of the battalion hail to be tied in and disposed for tho night. O Company had takon a hecvy toll of the oneury throughout the afternoon. C Coupany had takon a fow cosualtios but was in good ohspo and tho onouy, although still in ountwot, had coesed his attroks on the company, Company $D$ had gone into fosition. BCompony, $2 d$ Battalion, 7 th Cavalxy was lendod in two to four Uh~1D loads at a time from 1705 to 1800 hours. as thoy lanitod I built thon into a reservo foroo prepared to counter-attack any penetration of C Company or for oorinititiont in the $A, B$ Company ares of contact. This was not nocessary.
(3) The withdrewal of and b companios was ounduotod sucoessfully; White phosphorous, fired by artillory, wai again usod to ocver the withdrawel. The burning phosphorous seonod to disorganize
 ing offeote. Hy 1900 hours, the organization of tho porimetor was completed, unite wore tying in for the nfget ond defondivo artillery and wortar firas wore boling registored. I attadhod one platoon of Conpeny B, 2a Battaiony th Cevaliry to OOmpiny a 0 Company had a widor soctor to defent. The rooon plation wat phood in battelion resorve. Disposition were es shown at tert it.

## 

(1) While all of tho abuve desoribed aotions wore in progross, numenous othor activities wero going on. an nijor problom was oare and oveouation of tho wounded. uerly in tho afternoon, the battalion ourgen, modteal gupplies find four aid station parsonnel were brought, in. Thoy arrivod arounit 1400 hours and under hoavy fire trented the wounded in ry of nrea. I did net odill in wed wad holicoptors tou frequontly bocause wost of the aftarnoon the landing zone was under fíro. at about 1330 hours a mail two-dopper opon area was solooted in tho northoestorn portion of X-Ray, as ray wupply and oveouation Ink to the rear. This wo had to defend at all ooster. This aree is shown at Tab it. 1 requestod the holicoptor lift company oomander to ovaouato tho wounded, bring in supplios, and set up a syetatn whoroby qvory holiooptor octilng to $X$-liny with troops, with supplies, of for wounded would oall no for landing instruotions. This aystom worked vary wel1; throughout the afternoon and oarly ovening', nuworous UFi-1D's wero brought in - oach froti a apecifito dirootion at a prosoribod altitido to land at a apooific place and go out on a prosoribed hoading. I have the highest adruiration, praiso anci ruspoct for the outstanding professionalisf and courage of tho tion pillots and crews who ran a geuntlet of onexy fyre time ofton time to hole us. They never refused to oonc in; thoy fillowod dnetriuotfons boavitifully; they woro groat. Wo in turn callod them in whon
fire was tha lighteat and triod to have everything roady for each landing to koop them on the ground a nifnimum time. Wiono wore shot down and destroyed although most of them took hits. I'w aircraft were brought in which did not get out. Une receivod enery fire in the ongine and had to lend in an opon oroe just off the northorn portion of tho tiz: tho other olippod a fow treo tops with the miain rutor on landing in the LiL anc had tu bo luft. Crows of both airoreft woro immoditoly liftod out by other holicoptors. Both downod holicoptors wore inmodiatoly securod by alomonts of Company $D$ without orders par battalion SUP thoy boing tho nearost troops. Both wore slightly damagod only and woro slung out two days later by CH-47 Chinooks. During the throe dey battle, those woro tho only two downed holiooptors. biy 1530 hours, It had bocomo epperent thet wo would nood a night landing capability that I needod a pathfindor toam to assist no on tho ground. I callod the a Company, 229 th lift oorapany oommandor with a requost for pathfindors and was gratifiod to loarn that ho hac anticipatod tho roquiroment. Thay arrivod ahortly thereaftor shd with onginoer demolitionists oloerod the Liz into a feirly safo two-chuppor lending area and sot up lights to be turned on if necossary fur night landings. withough undor onow obsorvation and firo, it wes loss vulnorable then the southern portion if $\bar{x}-14 \mathrm{y}$ whoro wo woro still cloaning out onomy riflemen.
(2) By dark, at 1915 hours, a rosupply of ama, rations, water and modical suppliea hed been brought in. Doxdrene, morphino, anci bandages were the medioal supplios most noeded and wator was at a preniun. Lt elpproximetoly 1850 hours, 1 radiood my is 3 and told him to propero to cone in as scon es possible using twu UH-1.j's and to bring in the artiliory liefisch officor, NLC, two radio cperators and nore water and small arlis awing. ithoy lendod at 2128 hours. Tho diost
 doluvod thoir arrival and mado tho landing vory difficult but once agnin, the 229th pilots porformed with groat ourage and professionalism.

## 

A. By darknoss, 1915 hours, we hed evacuated all our woundod and colloctod cur doed in ry CP erca. An and wator was boing distributod; the landing zone area wes in the final stagoe of iroparation for night landings; mistax and artillery fires were boing rogistored closo around tho piorimator; a braill light proof working aroe had beon ocnstructod out of fonohos for the werlios; and the chein of ourinand had boen roorgenizod. I telkod with nany of the then and coulrl soo that the morelo was high. We knew wo wero facing a tough onemy but we elac know the onoriy with a grontly superfor force hed failed to get through us that efferncon. We wore in exoollont shope as wo completer tying d.n our perinetor. Tho cut-off platoon of BCompany was in good murale and was holding its pxisition.
B. During the night the eneriy made sevoral light probes furwerd of and $b$ Compeny, and of $C$ Uciapany near whore it tiod in with i. Company, untillory horessing unc interdiotion firos woro brousht duwn on tho lowor fingers end arews of the mountein, around the southorn and western odges of the perineter; and up on the slopes where four or fivo oleotrio lifghts woro ubserved. Wo rooeived six ur sovon rounds of high exilusive fire, oither tertar or rookets.
C. The surrounded platoon of $b$ Company on a finger of the mountain 300 noters northwost of the battelion porincter was prutootod by close-in artillory fires all night. Tho onory oculd be hourd all around the platuon. artillery fire was brought in on theos orens and tho ghouts and soroaris told of good rosults. Tho phatoon bogen and onder the night with $8 \mathrm{KIL}, 12 \mathrm{Wla}$ and 7 wen not wounced. It wels alsposed in two oparate locations within their statil porimotor. The platuon leador, plation sorgeant and weapons squad lender wore axicng the KI. Tho ach who onded. up on the radic wis as Sorgeant $4-5$ squad loader. Ho could not got to the ranking man (e istat'f sergoant rifle squad loador), sinoe any move ho
made drew inmodiato onory riflo firo. He was the come and leadorship link to his Company Cchuidncior. Throughout tho night he adjusted close-in artilloiy fire on the onomy surrounding him as ho hoard theri noving and talking. Throe separate attack were mado during the night by the omayonch in about 50 man strength. 411 wore bontion off by small arns and artillory fire. Soverel of the wounded men of the platoon oontinuod to fight. The second attaok, at apuroximitely 0345 hours was preoeded by bugle calls arounc the plation and up on the mountain 200-400 meters above the platoon. I roquested and roooivod a lisd wir strike in the aroa abovo the platoon. It was conduoted undor wir Forco flareship illumination. It was right on target and groatiy assisted in broaking up tho socund attack on the sumroundod platoon. This was the only illumination usod all night sinoo it exposed the mon in the surrounded plation as well aid the foxholes in the opon arens of the beitialion porinoter. iliso, thore was a fairly bright moon from 2315 onwards. Whon dny-light broke, numorous onomy deed ware soon around the surrcundod platoon. Those were only the decd who oculd be soon by the mon as thoy lay prone in thair positions. Uthor bodios were possibly oonoonled by the high grass whioh dotted the area. During the night, the non of tho plation saw enil hoard the onony dragging off many doad and woundod.
D. First light ocme at 0630 hours. I hat tontativoly decided on my plan of attaok to roaid the surirounded platoon while simaltaneousiy socuring the porinetor, I directed ry $u, B$, and $C$ company Cormandera to moet mo at the 0 Company $O P$ to finalizo the plan and to rooeivo ny orciors sinoo that was tho bost point of vantage. Tho timo was approxinatoly 0640 hours. I also dircotoci onoh oompany to ohook arcund thair pusitions cerefully for infiltretore and snipers.

## 

a. at ayproximately 0650 hours the roon olemonte of the 1 st and 2 a platouns of Cumpany (tho two loft fintoons) which were soarohing and moreoning approximatoly $100-200$ poters forwand of thoir poaitions bogen rocaiving rifle firo from thoir front and laft fronto They returnad the firo gind bagan pulling back to thoir dofonsivo positions. 山t this tile, they were attackod by a foroo of $2-3$ Cumanios. The onomy was well-oonouflagect orouohing lowl and in gomo casos orawling on hands and knoes. Tho rooon partlos from the two platown positions right of tho oompny CP onowuntereck no onomy but pulled book imodiatoly to their dofoneive pesitions., aly thtonso small aras fire fight broke out. Tho waicht of tho eneny atteok was dirooted at the loft portion of tho $C$ Company soctor. The rooon partios of tho 1 st and ed plationa bogen teking cesueities inoluding some kit as thoy pullod back. Uther men were hit trying to get to thoti. Somio wero rocoverad; howevor, by thon - O730 hours the enomy had mover almost to the porimetor foxholas doaple taking evvere losaes from artillory, nortar, and cioge air. Sevego olosa-range fighting went an for the next two houra in the $C$ Company seotor - primarily in tha loft throo platuon areas anit forwerd of tio Company CR. Thoro was consaderable handutcunand fighting. irir oxamplo, the 184 platoon londer was found Lator $x L_{4}$ with fivo doad PiVN around him in and nokic him dy foxhola. Ono sian was found ki: with his hende at the throat of a doad diVN, Tumerous onemy bodies were found intorringled with tho kshea and wonded of Oompany at elppoximatoly 0715 hours, the onory attacked the D Uompany eator near whore tho morturs were ampaced. Thi put the permotw undor attrok from two
 callod in and their fires were aocurate midextrenely offectivo. what and Tac wir was also used to ring the jerimetor with fires. lriority of all fires was given to C Company. Tho artillery Fu with C Company was pinned duwn by rifle fire in tho company cir aroa hence tho artillory was adjusted by $x y$ artillery liajson uffioor from tiy lif. Thoro was good observation.
being the closost tu C Cormany) and dispatchod it fcr the C Company CP aroe. It came undor fire while moving over the open ground, lost 2 hIi and $W I_{d,}$ but mode it to the right contor of the $C$ Company sector. Let about 0745 hours, the aCompeny soctor was attacked by what was leter detormined to be a small foroe. We werre now boing attecked fron three difforont direotions with firling of oqual intonsity in all throo aroas. Grazing fire from onomy shall amis and autciuntio woapons was criss-orussing the intorior of the perimotor into the lending zone, battailon GP arca and aid atation. Twolvo tu fiftoon Ha oxplusions of oithor anemy morter or rookot fire oocured in the perimetor. Several man wore woundod in and noar tho $G P$ by ariall arms firo. Une was bil. I alorted ry roserve for probeble commitmont in the 0 Oompany area or D Company Soctor - buth of wisioh contingencios we had planned for the nieht befure. I radivod the brigade ocmmander, informed hin of tho situation, and in viow of tho losses boing austainod by C Company and tho hoavy atteck, I requestor an adritionel roinforoing ocmpeny. no had alrocidy alerted Compeny $A$, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry the previous night and assemblod it with holicopters roady for movemont. piy request was appreved but i did not briag tho comiany in at that tico due tu heavy firc in the $\mathrm{L} / \mathrm{H}$. Doo Tab I for dispositiong of opposing furoog.
C. The hoewy fire fight continued only in the $C$ and 1 Company sootors. at cno tise, approxiwitely 0800 hours, the untimtank platoon was hoevily ongagod and the the was aevoroly throatoned. Tino mortarnen werv firing both thoir mortars and thair rifles ani triking hoivy amall aras firo. Uno murtar was hit and pat out of aotion by oneay fire. I conilittod ny resorve, the hooon 3 latcon, whioh movod into the left of tho C Company sootor; hasuded towarda 1 Company and clounod it out. Thoy joinod up with tho rest of $D$ Company and from then on throughout the rost of the atteck, thet porticon of the pardmetore weo under ocntrol. Ihis perraitted me to take the risk of ocmanaing to bring in ac Compeny, Dd Dettolion, 7th Cavelry. Lithough the lik was under fire, it was roduoorl aowewheit. I needed as Crapany, $2 d$ Eettinion, 7 th Cavalry in, so that I ouuld roinforce or possibly counterattack or block in or behind the C Company seotor I ordered the omanncior, b Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Gavalry to pull one additional riflo platon plus his oonman group uff his lines turn the sootor over to. his romaining plations aseomble the Company ( - ) disporsod noar my Cy; and propere, on order, to roinforoo, block, or oounterattaok in the $C$ Oompany beotor whioh was 125 motors to tho oest of the GP or sooond, in any othor anco. By then, two wfficers of 0 Company har boon killod and thrue woundod. bowovor, tho compeny oormencler sithongh shot in tho ohost and besck oontinuod to funotion; holp to oontrol his ocimpanys and gitvo ne reports for noarly tinroo hours. The mon of C Company stcod thetr eround. Lne man of Company $D$ who wound up in tho C Company soctor was the only suldier loft cuverinis 50 motors. Ho persingily shot $10-15$ eneny with his $\mathrm{H}=16$ riflo firing from the kneoling positiun. The oompany radio oporator piokod off $15-20$ frus tho oumpany CP foxhcio. The company ocimandor killed severin before he was wounded. Tho onemy fire was so heavy that noverient towards or within tho aootor rasultad in more friondy oasualtios. it wes during tide aotion at 0755 hours that all platoon pesitions threw a oulored smoke grenade on my order to dofino viawaly for pot adr, wing and artillory ain obabreme the periphery of tho pardrotor. all fire suppurt was bruught in oxtromely olome. ©omo fintondy artillory foll insido tho porimotor, and two onh of hemplimero dolivorod in my G area
 abnorinl, but not unoxpooted duro to tho oramenoy nood for unusually oluso-in firo apport (50-100 metare. Company, with attachments, fought tho massive onomy foroe for ovor two hourd. at approximately
 landing, 1 briofed tho Oomanding Uffioer, is Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Gavalry on tho situation and gaw t. it that ho was urientod by the Commading uffioor, BCupany, 2d battmlion, 7th Cevelry on tho sootor ho was to go into. I thon ordored the Comanding Offioor, Cumpany B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to move with his oomman group and tho ond platoon to tho Company seotur, assum ountrol uvor the romedndor gi 0 Company an? roaponsibility for tho dofonse of the gootor. to ropyd. out at 0941 hours. cinc romaining platoun of $B$ Company, $2 d$ Bettatughtion

7th Cavcluy followod shortiy nftor when it was relioved on the porinotur by a Company, $2 d$ Battalicn, 7 th Cavalry whon tho 3 ra platuan of is Company, 2 Battalion, 7 th $\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{n}} \mathrm{V}$ lry dismuunted from tho choppors, it hoadoc towards the 0 Coripny, 1st battalion, 7 th Covalry fire fight and assombled behina their loft platoon. I attachod it to $\bar{B}$ Compnny, $2 d$ Bettelion, 7th Caviluy anct it fought with thet compiny throughout the noxt twi, daye. By 1000 houras the onomy attaok hein boen dofoated. $C$ Company har hold. Tho ondiy nevor ponotratad thruagh thoir position. At onpreximetoly 1330 hours all ompanies on tho perimetor screcnod
 fragmente, and pat woapons and oquipmont woro littorod in profus ion rround the odgend forwere of tho porimetor. ivumerse begy fragnonte wero soen. There was massive ovidanoe ag bloody tinaile; bandages, ato. of nany othor bulu boing dregked away from the anca. Surno of the onomy doad wore found wtakod bohlind anthilis. artillory and dac wir was plnood on all woded aroas nemby into whol trails disamoarod. Ifunorous onomy woapons woro collootod gilong with othor armainent. I'wo prisunors woro tnkan and ovecunter. Friondly doad and wounded wore also collooted. Skitie friendly woro klaled and woundod in this scroening. U Ocmpany, $10 t$ bettalion, 7 th Cevelyy was thon jositionod as the battedion roserrbo in tho contor uf the portmetor and is Company, 2a Batcalion, 7th Covalry was in poaition in the formor b Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Civalry socter.

##  FHDTSTUSTIUY OF THE EVRTHGIGK:

d. Leto in tho aftornoon of 14 Novenher, the Erigado Combander had mived tho 2ri Battalinen, 5th Cavalry, into Wiotor it numamimaly
 at 1205 hours, it olosod into $\mathrm{X}-\mathrm{K}, \mathrm{S}$. Tho Ccamancling Ufficor, 2 d Battolion, 5th Covalry and I coordinatod on the disposition of forcos. It was agrood that his di and is Companies which woro south and wost of Li/ X-Kiy on tho lowor slopos of tho mountain hoedod northwost plus is Cupany, 1 st Brattelion, 7 th cavilry would ocnduct a ooordinatod attack bohind antillory, dizi, ThC win properition the nalfove the surrounded watoon. The route of atteck was as whem the He It was ciereed that I would assumo oporationni ocmatrop of OMmany 3, ed Battalich, 5 th Cavily and bo in ovorall






 Conmanding ufficer, Zd Battalion, Sth Gevily jurapod off at 1315 hours.
 roachod tho gurrouncod platoon at 1510 hours, at tha looation thore wore



 oweduviced

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 in a acfios of scondary explodswn.
B. Lut aproxinktely 0400 hours, tha onory bogan probing the BCompany, 20 bettalion, 7th Cevi lry soctor, wit 0422 hours a foroo of 250-300 enomy ettackor i' Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry in tho 1 st jattalion, 7 th Cavalry soctor, tho ruto of attack wes from the suuthoast as shown at Tably. wharoship 1llunination was callud for and cuntinuous until 0545 hours. Tho attack was boaton off by mall arms and artillery firos. Lt 0431 hours another attack by 200 onemy oame in on B Company, $2 d$ Battelion, 7 th Caviley. Bach time a flare woula light up, the enery would hit the ground or fall back into tho cover and conconlunt offorod by the high grass and troes. Tho artillery took a heavy toll. There were four batteries firing. The P.WN could be seen aragging off numersus bodies. By 0503 hours, the weight of his att ok heid shiftod more to tho southwost with approximetely 100 enomy attacking. This was repulsed by 0535 hours, Lt 0550 hours, the fleroship ran out
 both battaliuns hed beon firing His ainoe the attaok began. Hortar illuruineition wes then permittod. Lit 0627 hours, another attack onnie directly towards the CP. at 0641 hourg the enoray had boon boaten off end was drageing off bodios under fira: Company, 2d Bettalion, 7 th $C_{A} v a l r y$ had porfcrmed nagnifioentay, and had suffered only 6 lightly woundoc. During the atteok, two sopencte resupply runs of anso were mado by the Recun Platoon, 1st Datteifon, 7 th Cavalry under fire and one by tho do and radic operators of 0 Oompeny, $2 i$ Battalion, 7 th Cavalry.
C. at 0641 hours, orciers were given fur all men on the perimeter to sprey tho troos and the anthills and bushes furward end ovor their positions at 0655 hours for two minutes to kill infiltresturs, snipers, eto. Immaiiately upon firing, a forco of $30-50$ Pivivexposed themelves 150 motors forward of Company in, 2A Fattion, 7th Cavelry and boecn firtreg thojer worpons. Apparently the "mad minuto" froo spraying, premeturely triggarol a poosiblo enomy attaok. His and artillory was brought in and the attrick was berten off in twenty minutes. The tactic of sprey firing acocun fed for $6 \mathrm{~S}_{\mathrm{a}} \mathrm{Vl}$ deed. Uno hung frim a tree forward of the loft platoun of $B$ Company, 2d Eattalion, 7 th Cgralry. L Lnother droppod out of a treo impodiately forward of the $B$ Compeny CP. Uno Hivii was killod about ono hour lator attompting to climb down a tree and osoapo. Ny cumany ocmandors roportod to mo that the men likod this spraying. In adi.ition to killing oneray, apprarently it affords a roleeso of tonsion built up through the night, and cleare any doubts as to encry noarby. at 0716 hours; a cautious end dolibarato swoop wes medo by Company C, 1 st Battalion, 7 th Cavalry and the Rocon platoon, 1 et Battalion, 7 th $C_{a}$ valry throughout the interior and frinpes of the 4 . I orderod this conduotod on hands and knoos to soarch fur friondly casualties and HiVN infiltratore in the high olophant grass. The troos wore also searched. there were nogativo rosults.
D. Lit 0810 hours, ali units on the porineter were orderod to coordinato with thoir flumk unter and jpopare to movo out on a soarch and clear wooj 500 notors oomidenong on urdon. Tho novonant began at 0955 hours, howover, afton noving 50-75 metors Wompan, 2d battalion, 7 th Covalry oame under flre: Une pletoon leader was soriously wcunded. 4ll ravonent was etopped. BOcrangy, 2a Battalion, 7 th Orvelry pulled back to the perimetor foxholom ento olowerin ortillery and lico air was callod in. Wo thon movod baok outs elfinemod all rosistanco end policod
 ing throughout the aroa. I saw thasedve evidanoo of doad and wounded evacuation -- blood, body fragrienta, bloody germonta, otc. Wo siso brought in throo friendly kI. Numercus onemy weapons wero colloctod. lieny were soen which had boon fragwontorl by firo.
E. It approximetely 0930 hours, the first elanonts of tho 2 Battalion, 7 th Cavalry ( - ) bogan arriving at X-RAY. They closed. at aiproximately 1200 hours. ut 1040 hours, the Brietado Comiander irdored mo to move the battalion; Comany 5 , 2d Batalion, 7 th Cavalry; and the
 thon to Camp Holloway at Ploiku for two days of rost and roorganiantion.

He ordered me to relie, my elements on line with eleme of the $2 d$ Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, This I did. However before moving B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, I had them conduct one find lateral sweep across their front out to 150 meters. This waid the soene of extremely heavy action and I wanted the battlefield thoroughly polioed. The extraotion by UH-1D was completely auccessful, and was covered throughout by artililery and ThO Air delivered around $X$-Ray, on the flight routes in and out, and on the slopes of the mountain. There was no enemy fire at any time during the extraction. The choppers were not brought in until aircraft loeds were spotted on the IZ. Hence the UH-1Ds were only on the ground a few seconds. Conourrently with troop extraction, excess supplies, enemy weapons, casualty geax and weapons, and qasualties wore evecuated. Enomy hand grenades, ammo, anti-tank woapons, etc were placed in a large hole and arrangements were made with CO, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry for demolition by his engineur teams. Many other enemy weapons hed previously been destroyed elsewhere in the battlo axea. By 1456 hours all elements of the 1 st Battalion, 7 th Cavalry; B Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry and the 3d Platoon, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry had been extractod from X-RAY bound for LZ Falcon. By. 1830 hours all elements had left IL FALCON by air and closed into Camp Holloway, vicinity ofgPleiku.
VIII. IMNEMY, FRTHNDLY CASUALTIES, CAPTURED:

## FQULPMENT

A. ENEEM:

Killed, body count - 634
Killed, wounded (Est) - 1215
Captured, evacuated - 6
B. FRTHNDIY (INCLIDES ATTACEMD UNITS):

Killed - 79
Wounded - 121
Missing - None
C. CAPYURED IENEMY EQUIPMENS, TVACUATPD:

Assault carbines w/beyonet - 54
Assault rifles, automatic - 57
Automatic Rifles - 17
Heavy Machino Guns - 4
Antitank Rocket Launohers - 5
Pistols - 2
81/82 mm Mortar Tubes -2
Medics Kits - 6
D. ENGMY EQUIPMENT DISSTR YED IH OBJECIJVE AREA:

Crew-served and individual weapons - 75-100 (approx)
Antitank Rockets - 3 oases of 3 rounds each
Hand Grenades - 300~400 (approx)
Assorted small aims, AW ammunition - 5000-7000 rounds (est)
Entrenohing tools - 100-150 (small shovel type)
IX. COMMENP:
A. The following items conoerning the onomy and goneral battlefield techniques are considered worthy of mention. Most represent nothing new and are listed for emphasis as being perticulariy applicable to the PAVN enomy.
B. FITE SUFPORT:
(1) Fire support to be truly effective must be close-in.

Legaingt heary attacks such as the ones we defonded against, sume enemy will get very eloso or even intemingled with friendly in the high grease. bringing firos in promptly, "welking them in" extrenely close holpod us eroatly. The comander onnnot wait until ho knows exactly where all his men are. If he coos, in a hoavy aotion, he will get more men killed by waiting than if ho sterts shooting inmodiatoly. Unoe the enemy gets as oluge as 25 meters wut or intermingled then he has tho friendly fighting on his torme, with thuse who have maie it thit close. Oloso fire support thon onn bo used to out off his follow-up units, and they will bo thore $n_{0}$ le much more afreid of najalm end white phosphcrus than $k w$. no hits tho dirt undor Hit fire. Undar napalm and Wipy ho ofton gets upenc runs around in diaordor, and prosonta a botior texegot for surall smas, VT, and He. The 250 pound fras bumb and the CBl's ene vory effootive.
(2) Whon e unit gota into en objoctivo aren, as soon as possible aftor lending, artillomy fires should be brought in. This will raybe kill ocme Pave noarby and oertainly will out down tíne on target when a fire mission on known oneny is callod for.
(3) aorial ruokot artillory is extronoly offoctivo espoolelly if tho pilote know tho exnot location of frionaly. It hes a trowondeus shock offuct on the eneay. The thines ebout siris which makes it at times moro offoctive then artiliory is the feot thet it dues not heivo tu bo soon by ground obsorvors to bo adjusted. if tho frent lines or a friendy position $\pm$ markod anc can bo recrignized by the pilcts, quick, accurete fire support is the rosult.
(4) Tho Lut wes offoutivo eginst tho anthitis bohind which the Pivir woso hidine. Praining on uso of dikis must be omphesizod.
 attack, tho bost sulution to en attack mey bo to back ui undor artillory
 Ageing, losidng off with plenty of H-79s in tho troes cind gress and buw intw tho anthills.
(6) Whonevor illumint,tion wats in tho air many of the aremy ceasol firing.
(7) Caroful placoment of $15-79$ mon should bo emphasizea in ordse to givo thom tho bowt possiblo fiales of fire. Thoy must elways bo on tho luokout for onory in trous. It was found that tho $\mathrm{k}-79^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ wero oxtromely offoctive mgingt onody in troos as well es troops in tho opan. $M-79^{\prime} g$ must be firod into troes and the high greas oven when no onotity aru suon.
(8) In this oporation all mortars woro ocmbined undor a contral FIC. Thia was vory getisfotcry. Tho mortang wono vary offootivo. Mortar illumintion firing was orofully oontrollod at battaition lovel. The murtar illuminticn round has a woxy high ad pato mid $1 t$ would tako many runds to provido a battalling porimoten plumination for cha hour. Therofto it wis urod te fill the gex for tilundmetion botwoon tho emthlory and tho flaroshep. Wo mortars alono oould not


 flow porponctoular to the gethenoty gth-targot lino in theoo oases
 airoraft fiow perellol to the gun-tergot lino and boyond it. This cillod for close toniwurk botwoan the We kid tho ertillary 1icisun officer.
(10) urtillory aust bo usod aficinst pasiblo avonuos of roinfurcomont as woll as on the onoly in oithor an ettack ur a dofongo. Oloso-In oontinucus dofonsivo mance Ifis are a mist in a dofonsive
gituation where the ongy iv known to be prosent oven fif ho is not attecking.
(11) Great emphas is ehoulat bo placed on the ability of all personnol down to and inoluding fine tom loedons thedust artillory and mortar fire.
(12) $\mathbb{B}_{\text {fot }}$ platoon mute cany many olonad smoka gronedos and a panol for maxting friendly lines and lentire acode.
(13) The fochnique of heving all unitis on the porimeter throw o colored tmoke gronade on order croatly holped ThC Air and ara to locato the pentmoter.

## c. Dovinian

(1) Movement must be onxtiously egeresgive, The enomy mast bo pinnod down by firo. Smail unit; squad sized firo and rove-ment-must be ocmetuoted to panfotion. This is oxtromely impowent. If not oonducted ootrootily, mon will gat hit and the problem is thon oompounded what ther men top fing to try to rocovar oaftitios. Then thoy biso get hit in many oason and soch; ocmbat effoctiveness of the squady pletoon, efo, is In dangen of boing lost. In this conneotion, when eneriy contact has bian meder is atringly alupootod, recon by fire or actual fire and moverent ghould bo ouduotad to forestall the enory
 side a unit which is in oontact and in a fire fight.
(2) Plation and compeny firo and maneuver must bo non-



 friendly go by, then operi up.
(3) Close-in artillory, ARA, and ThC Air froit, ruan, snd both aides is a great help in moving through an aroa where there are known onory. Thif is hormal but wometines overlooked.
(4). When empantes conduct aweop and cloer operevitions toothem out of a porimoter, or ower a cortain routo, battalion must Qheok on tho ompeny formatitue to bo wed to insuro that the tocradn
 and fititod to the torrain and the onemy situation.

## D. TMCENTGURS:

(1) The toquature now (-) an afohsive
 out $50-100$ getay





 to move quickly with oumbint tove the owitact made by one






 oorrying the last olenente of a Compary the all of end Compantes.

I feol that the faot thet we had first $B$ Company, then 4 dompany, off the ladding zone moving againat the DivN, then C Company in a good blook. ing position took the initiative away from him. From thon on, for three days and two nighte, he was roecting to our presence.
(2) At nieght, units must form tight perimeters, uso Claymors minos, trip flares and dig in. The use of outposts and listening posts dopends largely on the terrain and the onery situation. In this operation, it would heve been suipidal as the cover and ouncoelmant afforded the enery too many opportunities to take the outguards by atoalth. Caxioum flagod foxholes with olearod fields of fire are roocumended. Nornal, but somotivios hard to execute under fire.
(3) In a perimeter defonse, it is neoessany to ohook the front with small rooon parties at first light and periodically thro ugh the day for $100-200$ mators to cloar out infiltrators, polioo the battlefield, and to insure that the onomy is not massing for an attacli. This aotion should be prooeded by having all troops on the perimotn: spray the troes, erass, and anthills to their front and overhead at ci socritiod time for two-throo minutes. When the recon olements screcrito the front, it should be preoedod by artillexy and recon by fire.. ats Cav Soouts overhead oan assist by obsorvation. Unite should nove as in the attaok with fire and movement. dill men must give thr onemy the oavability of being to the front and ovorhoad as infiltratons: aniipers, or massing for an attrock.
(4) The bettailion oommand group must oarry a 292 antenna in on the assault and sot it up as soon as possible. D Company, my alternete. CP, oarried one in on the assault -m set it up, and it was invalusblo.

## E. SUPPLI, SUPRORT, SERVICES:

(1) The minimum amount of gear should be carrigit into an assault. This should be one meal, a poncho, two canteans of water, salt tablots, and plonty of ammunition.
(2) Casualtios are a oritioal problom, Whon fire is pinning down individuals, one onsualty will cost one or two more mon attompting to get to him. Heavy oover fire must bo orployed to tzy. and ouvor the attompt to reoover the wounded nen and get his out of the dencor anes. Leaders at gil levele in contaot undex fins minst not.
 woundod while xoaovaring cisualtios. Woundoc mast be puiljed kock to some type of oovered poeition end then treated. Troops nust not get so conoerind with oasualtiae that they fonget the onemy and thoir misaion: attompting to oarry a man out requires up to four mon as bearers which can hurt a unit at a oritioal timo.
(3) Evacuation of oasualties from the areas of contact in this eotion was a problem. TUBE litter bearers would have boon a big help. As it turned out, flegting strongeth had to be usod to carry out e wounded man ( $3-4$ men requiréd) or to assist many walking wornded. (one man at least required in many cases).
(4) Whan a man is wounded or killed, his weapon and some. of his oquipment get soparated from him in many oasos. An S-4 reprosentattyo - officer or NOU with assistanta, must be present at least in the battalion forward aid station and at the collooting oompany at Forwerd Support, Some of our oquipment was evacuated with man all the way to wid Nhon. Also wo had many M-16's shot up and hed to havo roplacoments in the area. Thorefure we kopt a lot of weapons in the battlo aroc for re-issue. When we were pulled out we brought all exoess weapons and equipment with us. Many eheny weapons which were oaptured and sont out with friendly $\mathrm{KI}_{4}$ and WIA wore nover sein
agein. The unit commander fighting the battio in the objective axea loseg control of oquipmont, firiondy ond mery, ono it lobvoe the forward area by heldooptor. A more effoctive "becketop" sfatem must bo sot up to oatch this gear and oontrol it when it arivas at various unloading pointe in tho roar.
(5) Rations ane no problom. How man oat much when in a heavy action howaver, water le extremaly oritical. It must bo prasent in quantity partioulariy when therg is no stroan souroo pakilablo.
(6) The gethrindou toam wes tromandousw. Until they owuld get in around 1630 hours, 14 Horember, all inoomint alroseft hed to we guided in and out by the battailon oommader on the battelion comand net. pethifincex teat should go into evory betalloh-atrad assault.
(7) It tuok timo to reluad H-16 mageminom one round at a time. In the heavy eotion we onoountered, thle took exceestre time at oxdthal porlode It was partioulamy optuteal auting the wey ndeht attack. 4180 it wes diffault to keop traok of ompty magenthem in a heary fire fight. The oolution mey be an oxpendabla, plestic iypo magazino whioh if reskpplifato the rifleman fully luaded win iandoleor
 pouch makee arewling on the stomach diffioult.
(8) Tha tridptidian golator must boome at lead as good as the PAVN in oamozituge toohntaven and use of tornain and foliago


## Fi. THH PAVN RNEMK:

 Se wea oquppe wthe pepomierenoo of eutcmatic weapona one nothy of


 tie weapons Were wollmintained.
(6) Ho wee an oxpert et omionathge and ueac evomy bit of








 shot in the hoad and upgore pent of the body wometrulemiy in tha haod. Ho cofintely almod for the leadere - the men who were shouting, pointing, telking on radios. Ho also almod for the men omyring radias. Ho also oppoarod to oonoentrato on man wearlig inolemia of rank -- pertioularly non-ocmmisgioned offloer with atripas on their arms. In this war, I question if it te necoesony, possibly oven foollsh, or inviting fire, for non-commisitoned offioers to wear insimia of thoir grade -or any onlistod man for that mattor. Within tho small unito, all mon know, their laaders. In base oamp tho leadors ahould woar thoir insignie. On operations against the enomy, thoy should woar olean-sloevo fritiguta.
(4) Whan attackeng, the puvv undty confronting us used mass asaault tactios procoded in acme oases by 11 at mortar and antitenk rooket fire. The latter I bolieve is often miateken for mortor fire. He also used onoircling manouvers with 50-75 mon groups: He employed his machine guns extremely woll and thorouphly understood the value of grazing fire. At afght, he infiltrated amall numbers up to
the friendly positions. These enemy aet up on top of grassy anthills, in troes, and good close-in firing positions. He was oxpert at probing our defensive perimeter at night and went to groat offorts to try to foroo friondly into firing.
(5) When mot by heavy ground fire or by mortar, artillery, TAC Lix, or ARA he bocome less organized. Howover, he did not quit. Nepalm and white phosphorous he definitely did not like.
(6) He appeared to have no radios. The leaders controlled their men by shouting. Bugles were used during the night of 14-15 November on the mountain above the battalion perimeter. silso, at night on the mountein they used signel lights.
(7) $H_{e}$ fought to the death. When wounded, he continued fighting with his small arms and grenados. He appoared fanctios? when wounded and had to be approached with extreme care. Many fricnlly were shot by wounded PhVN.
(8) Ho also appoared fanatioal in his extrene afforts to recover budies of his doad and wounded and thetr equipment. Io naver stoppod his offorts in this regard and used the night, the higil gises, the anthills and other oonoealment to maximum advantage to eerve his purpose. We found many of his dead with ropes tied around the eankles and a short, running ond free. I saw two of my dead with atmilar ropos tied around their ankles.
(9) Some of my men who met him faee to face hov's stated that some PAVN appreared to be "hoppad up". They besod thie onnoluetion in part on their observatian that whan enot, they kopt moving eleveral more atepe firing before droppings In these cases, it is prasibls that the high velocity $\mathrm{M}-16$ bullet passed oleanly through tiessa onemy Without any inmediate stopping effeot. Also some nen stated that ihey sew a fow onemy keop their weapons at sling arms although under fice. One non-comnisaioned officor stated that one group of 30 or so eneray ountinued moving across the front of his squad although it wes being cut to ploces by olose-in flanking fire.
(10) A favorite tactio of the PAVN enery wo facod seomed to be an agereseivo small-unit oncircling maneuver. Anothor was a rapid assault by $6-10$ PaVN on 2 or 3 friendly.
(11) We found some of our KIi "dog tags" and wallets on the bodios of dead PivNs.
VIII. Out of all the above, the prinoipal points that I would like . tu emphasize are:
A. We must make imaginative and constant use of our tremondous fire support advantage to kill the $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{A}} \mathrm{VN}$ enemy before ho gets ao olose that we must fight him on his torms. This inoludes heavy use of the Mi-79 and even hand grenedes to hold him out so that artillery, TAC hir, and did oan work on him.
B. We must take time and every opportunity to train our men, and ospocially our replaoomente, to porfection in smail-unit fire and movement and firo and manouver. If wo do not do this, men will be killod who would not otherwiso be killed.
C. The oommander on the battlefield mast ountinualiy antioipato what the future may bring or could bring and take eteps to influenoe the future before it comes about. This applies to the onemy; to fire support; supply of emmo, water, and medical supplies before the requirement eriese;
to friendy reaction to possible enamy action; and to all other matters heving a bearing on a particular situation. Also, periodically throughout a battle, the comiander must mentaily detach himself from the action and objeotively think --what is not being done whioh should be done to influence the situation, and what is being done which should not be going on.


HaRULD G. NOONA
Colonel, Infantry



Written transoript of Oral Operations Order issued by Lieutenant Colonel Harold G. Moore; Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Tth Cavalry, 140845 Noveraber 1965.

1. SITUATION:
A. Enemy
(1) Possible Battalion Vioinity YA 903032.
(2) Yossible enemy on Chu Pons Mountain YA 935010.
(3) Possible secret base vioinity YA 960020.
B. Zrd Brigade contimes present mission of search and destroy Geluth dind West of Pleiku, PLel Me with $2 / 7$ Cavalry South of Flai Me and $2 / 5$ Cavalry West of Plei Me.
2. Mission: 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry oonducts Aix assault operations In area LIME (Ia Drang Valley) to search for and destroy the enemy. Operations will be concentrated on stream beds, river beds, and wonded high ground to a medrum hotight. of 500 meters.
3. EXECJTION:
A. Concept of Operation:
(1) Maneuver: The battalion will enter the area of operations by oompany elements shuttling from theix present looations using 16 UHiD helifonpters landine at Landing Zone Xuliay. Altoriate Landing Znnes are TANGO and YANKEE to be used only on oxder. Compeny B will land first and seoure tho Landing Zone. The Landing Zone will be sooured using the teohnique of sendine out roonnnaissanoo elements from ono platoon and rotainine the company ( - ) assembled as a striking force. Company $A$, Company C, and Company D will follow on order. Company. B and Company $A$ on order will asasmblo in attrok formation off the North and Northwest portion of the landing zone prepared to onmmenoe a onordinated searching movement to the East and Northeast on order with Company $\Lambda$ on the right (Bast). Company C initially Battalion reserve and Lending Zone security on orclor. Prepare to move West and Northwest to searoh lower portion of mountain area vicinity X-RAY.
(2) FIre Supports There will be an 8 minute diversionary axtiliery preparation vioinity Landing Zone YaNKHE and NuNGO, followac by a 20 minute tube artillery preparation thotntty the primary Landing Zone XmAY with omphasis on surcoundine terrain and the finger and draw Northwost of X-RAY:

The tube eartillery will be fnllowed by 30 seonnds of Aerlal Rocicet Axtillery follnwed by 30 seconds of sunship prem paration fust prior to touohdown of the assault company. All mortars under Company $D$ mortar platoon enntrol. Fogition area to be slooted after landins. Priority of fires initially to Company $B$ then to Company $\Lambda$ when move off the IZ to Bast begins.
B. Company $A$ :
C. Company B;
D. Company C:
E. Company Dz
F. Headquartors Companys Move to Landing Zone on order utilizing $2 \mathrm{CH}-47^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$.
G. Conrdinating Instructions:
(1) Bach rifle oompeny be proparod to essume mission of any other rifle company on ordor.
(2) "C" lift frequency will be uagd for move.
(3) All rifle oompanies take ne mortar and maximum amunition.
(4) N1l monrtars will be brought in as internal UHil loads and plaood under Company II control.
4. ATMTMNTRATTON AND LCGISTICS:
A. No mules will be taken into objeotive aroa until olearon to do go by the Battalion Commander.
B. Forward Sumply print will be at Landing Zone Faloon zA 022032.
C.: Equipment left at Plel Mo will be plaoed inside the Speoial fomees Camp propareA for atr move to Londing Zone Faloon or X-RAY on order.
5. COMMND AND STGNAL:
A. Bettailon Commenter dinttady wt thesanult onmpany
B. Battalion Forwart Comani Bosf Landing Zone Xaray at Battalion Commandor's Iocation:
C. Bettelion Rear Command Pnst: Leesont Inoation inftially. Landing Zone Falonn on order:

$$
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& \text { MOORE } \\
& \text { Lt CO2Onol }
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S-3

through the 15th. The area of operations was pointed out on the map and he informed me that we would be supported from LZ FALCON, coordinates ZAO23032, by two batteries of 105 mm howitzer artillery - one of which would be moved by air from PLEI ME early on the 14 th prior to our assault.
C. I returned to my CP near Plei Me; formulated a tentative plan; issued instructions to my staff; procured further details from 3d Brigade Headquarters and the supporting helicopter unit; and issued a warning order to my unit commanders, staff, and supporting elements. By 2200 hours, 13 November, all preparations had been accomplished which were possible without an actual air reconnaissance. Arrangements included an early morning airlift of Company B back to PLEI ME: directions to the commanders of $A$ and $C$ Companies to concentrate their elements at first light in the largest pick-up zone(s) in their respective sectors; and plans for a first light air recon by all key commanders and staff officers. A time of 0830 hours was set for issuance at my CP of the operation order.
D. At this time, the "fighting" strength of my lettered companies as they went into the operation was as follows:

NUMBER COMMITED TO OPERATION
officers, Men $\quad$ Officers $\quad$ Men
Co A
5

5

6

4

115
114
106
76

TOSE

brief orientation on the purpose of the recon, flight route, and items to look for, we took off in two UH-1D's escorted by two gun ships. The flight route is shown on the attached sketch (Tab A). We made one south to north pass at about 4500 feet actual; flew north past Duc Co, coordinates YA845255, orbited five minutes, then flew south generally over the same route and at the same altitude, and returned to Plei Me. The air recon party included the Battalion Commander; S-3; Battalion Artillery Liaison Officer; Commanding Officer, Battery A, lst Battalion, 21st Artillery; Commanding Officer B Company (Assault Company); Scout Section Leader, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry; and the Commanding Officer, Company A, 229 th Assault Helicopter Battalion (Avn Com, 7th
Special Forces, lst Special Forces Group).
(2) During the air recon, several open areas were selected by members of the recon party as possible landing zones in and around the IA DRANG Valley. Upon return from the recon at about 0815 hourg, we recerved $x$ wataner Tony bitu: from brigade whicit specifically defined the area of operations. The area is shown on the attached map (Tab B). I then received comments as to the $L Z$ to be used. Three possibilities fell out of this discussion - LZ's TANGO, X-RAY, and YANKEE (See Tab B). TANGO was discarded as the primary LZ for being to tight, e.g. a "well" - type LZ with tall trees around it, and for being to small - capacity of three to four UH-1D's. It was agreed that $X$-RAY and YANKEE could both probably accommodate eight UH-1D's at one landing. I tentatively decided on LZ X-RAY and prepared to issue my operation order based on that selection. Concurrently I dispatched the Cavalry Scout Section for a low-level flight up the IA DRANG Valley area to gain detailed information on X-RAY, YANKEE, the surrounding terrain, and to look for signs of enemy activity. The Cavalry Section returned in approximately 40 minutes with the information that YANKEE was spotted with high stumps and would be difficult to use as a landing zone. The Cavalry Section confirmed that LZ X-RAY could take eight to ten UH-1D's at one time. No signs of enemy activity were detected around X -RAY, and the Cavalry Section was not fired on during its lowlevel recon. Several trails were picked up and their locations were noted. The Cavalry Section also reported seeing commo wire on a trail north of X-RAY which led east and west. No trails led through LZ X-RAY. I made my decision to land at X-RAY with TANGO and YANKEE as alternates to be used only on my order. I then issued an oral operation order. Reduced to writing, it is attached at Tab C. Present to hear the order were all my Company Commanders; the battalion staff and special staff; the lift Company Commander and his Liaison Officer to the battalion, the Cavalry Scout Section Leader; CO, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery; and the 3d Brigade S-3. The Brigade Commander arrived during the issuance of the order and was separately briefed shortly thereafter. It was then reported to me that the two artillery batteries were in position, and 1 set a time of 1030 hours for the assault landing with the 20 minute tube artillery preparation to be timed to be
completed at H-Hour minus one minute. The A and C Company Commanders were then flown back to their companies. The B Company Commander returned to his unit on the Plei Me airstrip on a mechanical mule. The time was approximately 0915 hours. All necessary preparations had either been completed or were nearing completion. No problems had. been raised.

## B. THE INITIAL ASSAULT:

Due to last minute positioning of the artillery pieces caused by air movement delays, the preparatory fires did not begin until 1017 hours. I was in the lead aircraft and had a good view of these fires. They were precisely where required, and beautifully timed with the landing of lead elements of the assault company. Fires were concentrated principally around the landing zone, in the trees and high grass, and on a finger and in a draw leading down from the high ground northwest of X-RAY. The aerial artillery came in on the heels of the tube artillery fires and worked over the area for 30 seconds expending half their loads - then went into a nearby air orbit on call. The lift battalion gun ships took up the fires and were immediately ahead of the UH-1D's. As we came in for the assault landing all door gunners fired into the trees and high grass. We landed and ran from the landing zone into the trees firing our M-16's at likely enemy positions. My command group consisted of myself, the Battalion Sergeant Major, the Battalion S-2, my two radio operators, and a Vietnamese national, sent down by Brigade, Mr. Nik - a Montagnard who could speak good English. In my command chopper orbitting between Plei Me and over the IA dRANG Valley were my S-3, Artillery Liaison Officer, and Liaison Officer from the helicopter lift company, and my Forward Air Controller. I had placed them there during the assault for best execution of their duties, for a communications relay, and for an air OP. On the ground we received no enemy fire and made no contact upon landing. The terrain was flat and consisted of scrub trees up to 100 feet high; thick elephant grass varying in height from one foot to five feet; and ant hills throughout the area up to eight feet high with thick brush and elephant grass on and around them. Along the western edge of the $L Z$, the trees and grass were especiaily thick and extended off into the jungle on the foothills of the mountain. Photographs of the area are at Tabs $D$ and E. These photos were taken several days after the action ended hence the area is less foliated than on 14 November when we went in. The 16 UH-1D's returned to the Plei Me area to pick up the remainder of Company $B$ and a portion of the next company to be brought in - Company C. Thus began the process of shutting the battalion into the area of operations. The time of the assault was precisely 1048 hours.

## C. SECURING OF THE LANDING ZONE AND INITIAL CONTACT:

(1) In compliance with my instructions, the B Company 4

Commander secured the landing zone by having one of his platoon leaders dispatch his squads into different areas, 50 to 100 meters off the landing zone to reconnoiter, while he retained the balance of his company concealed in a clump of trees and high grass near the center of the LZ area as an offensive striking force. At approximately 1120 hours, one of the recon squads took a prisoner. I immediately took my S-2 and the Vietnamese, Mr. Nik, and went to the location and questioned him. He was unarmed, dressed in dirty khaki shirt and trousers with a serial number on one of the shirt epaulets, and carried an empty canteen. He stated that he had eaten only bananas for five days, and that there were three battalions on the mountain above us who wanted very much to kill Americans but had been unable to find them. He stated that he was in the North Vietnamese Army. The B Company Commander was directed to intensify his reconnaissance in the area where the prisoner had been taken (near the mountain), and to prepare to assume the C Company mission of searching the lower portion of the mountain area with emphasis on the finger and draw to the northwest. My command chopper was called in and the prisoner was taken back immediately for interrogation at the Brigade CP. By then, 1210 hours, sufficient elements of Company A had landed (unopposed) to take over the LZ security mission from Company B. Also elements of the reconnoitering platoon of $B$ Company had made contact with scattered enemy riflemen near the mountain. The B Company Commander was ordered to assume the C Company searching mission; to move up the finger loading down towards $X$-RAY; and to develop the situation. B Company moved out, and I directed the commander of A Company to prepare to move up into the same area on order when Company $C$ had arrived in X-RAY in sufficient strength to take over LZ security. At that time, 1230 hours we were taking no fire in the LZ. Around 1245 hours, lead elements of Company B began to engage in a fire fight of moderate intensity. Shortly afterwards at approximately 1330 hours, Commanding Officer, Company B reported that he was being attacked heavily by at least two companies of enemy and that his right platoon was in danger of being surrounded and cut off from the rest of the company by a numerically superior force. The fire fight became intense. Also a few rounds of 60 and 81 mm mortar fire began falling in the LZ and on B Company. B Company also received some rocket fire.
(2) Shortly after the heavy fire fight began, the last platoon of A Company and the Company Commander and lead elements of C Compariy landed. The Commanding Officer, Company A was ordered to move his company up on the left of B Company; to establish physical. contact with it; to protect the $B$ Company left flank; and to send one plation up to B Company to assist B Company in getting to the $B$ Company platoon which was in danger of being cut off. The Commanding Officer, Company C was ordered to take up a blocking position off the landing zone to the south and southwest to prevent the LZ from being overrun from that direction, and to give protection to A Company's left flank. I called the S-3 in the command chopper and told him to
have my Forward Air Controller bring in air strikes beginning on the lower fringe of the mountain foothills and work over the mountain and enemy approaches to the LZ from the west and south in that priority. The same instructions were to be given to the ARA and to the artillery. Priority of fires were to go to fire missions and requests from companies. When not firing in response to a specific request, fires were to be poured in as directed above. The Company Commanders, forward observers, the forward air controller, and the artillery Liaison officer were all having difficulty getting coordinated as to the locations of the forward elements of the companies. There were no well-defined terrain features to help and the scrub and trees all looked alike. The air was heavy with smoke and dust. B Company had more problems than any other company since it had one platoon separated from the rest of the company in the jungle, and could not precisely pin point its location for purposes of close-in fire support. The plation was in a moving fire-fight against a force of 75-100 enemy. The fact that this platoon was forward of B.and A Companies delayed delivery of effective fires in support of these two companies. However, using the technique of "walking" fires down the mountain from the south and west, fires were placed where they gave some help to these two companies - especially Company A. I specifically defined several draws loading down from the mountain, and wanted fires placed on enemy mortar positions sighted or suspected out to 81 mm mortar range. Two air strikes were also brought in on the valley floor to the northwest on and near the location of the suspected enemy battalion reported by higher headquarters the previous day. At this point, the most critical period of the afternoon began.
(3) The A Company Commander sent up oneplatoon to B Company as directed. This plation headed out, became engaged, and ended up on the right of $B$ Company rather than the left.. X This was confusing to both the A Company Commander and myself until later in the afternoon when the location of this platoon became sorted out. The B Company Commander pushed out in an effort to reach his platoon which by that time had been completely surrounded. B Company (-) plus the A Company platoon was able to get to within 75 meters of the cut-off plation but could get no further. The A Company platoon made it closer than any other element. B Company was taking moderate casuaities. Concurrently as Company $A(-)$ was heading up towards the left and rearmost elements of $B$ Company, it made heavy contact with a large force of at least one PAVN Company which was driving in and along a dry creek bed parallel to the western edge of the LZ. These enemy were headed directly towards the left rear of Company B. A very heavy fire fight immediately broke out. A Company was taking light casualties, and extracting a heavy toll from the enemy. One of the A Company platoons was in such a position that it was able to bring close-in flanking fire on $50-70$ PAVN as they continued moving across their front. Many of them were killed, as when the lead few were dropped, the remainder kept coming right into
the field of fire. A Company took two prisoners who were later evacuated to Brigade.
(4) Just as the A Company fire fight broke out, the last elements of $C$ Company and the lead elements of $D$ Company landed. As they landed, the helicopters took numerous hits but none were shot down. The C Company Commander directed his elements into position along side his other elements which had landed previously. Within five minutes, a force of 175-200 enemy, headed for the LZ, ran headiong into $C$ Company. $C$ Company held them off, killing numerous of them in the process as they continued trying to get to the landing zone. One prisoner was taken and evacuated. The C Company action continued for approximately 1 1/2 hours until the enemy, disorganized.and decimated, pulled off under heavy friendly artillery and air fires, dragging many of his dead and wounded.
(5) Concurrent with all of the above, as the first elements of D Company landed (with the last elements of C Company), they immediately became engaged in the fire fight near A Company. One of the D Company Commander's radio operators was KIA in the lift Company Commanders helicopter before he could dismount and the door gunner and one pilot were wounded. I stopped the other eight UH-1D's from landing by radio. The D Company elements consisted of the command group, part of the mortar platoon and the antitank platoon. The D Company Commander led them towards the sound of the heavy firing in the A Company area. They made it to the stream-bed area; immediately engaged 25-30 PAVN headed down the stream-bed and killed most of them. A Company elements killed the rest. During this fight, the D Company Commander and Mortar Platoon Leader were seriously wounded but continued to fire their rifles personally killing several PAVN. After the enemy were stopped, the D Company Commander alternately lost consciousnessi and came to. He turned over the command of the company to the Antitank Platoon Sergeant, Staff Sergeant, E-6. Dispositions of units at that time are shown at Tab F. The Commanding Officer, C Company made physical contact with this Staff Sergeant and with my approval directed the $D$ Company elements to the left of C Company tying in tightly around the southeastern edge of the LZ off in the brush.
(6). By then we were taking numerous casualties throughout the battalion, and it was apparent that we were fighting 500-600 enemy. These were only the ones we were in contact with and I figured others were headed our way. I requested the Brigade Commander to send me another rifle company, He immediately approved this request. In fact I later learned that he had already alerted B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalty and was assembling it at pick-up zones.
(7) During this fire fight, the Cavalry Scout Section was given specific areas to reconnoiter. They concentrated on routes of egress down the mountain to the northwest and southwest, and also approaches from the north and northwest on the valley floor. The Cavalry reported results to me on my command net. At this time, approximately 1500 hours, I decided that it was necessary to continue to land the remainder of the tactical elements of the battalion consisting of the.recon platoon, 3 UHID loads of C Company men, and the XO and 1st Sergeant of $D$ Company. Although the eastern portion of the landing zone was under enemy fire it had slacked off considerably due to the $C$ and $D$ Company actions. These elements landed safely. I turned D Company over to the Company XO and directed him to dispose the recon platoon around the north and east fringe of the LZ for LZ security and as battalion reserve. The C Company Commander had previously, with my approval, set up all rifle company mortars on the eastern fringe of the LZ . The $D$ Company Commander was directed to add his mortars to them and take over their control from a central FDC. Principal direction of fire was toward $A$ and $B$ Companies. The mortarmen also had the mission of LZ defense to their east. All went quickly into position.

## D. THE 2ND ATTACK TO REACH THE SURROUNDED 2D PLATOON COMPANY B:

(1) The time was now approximately 1545 hours and the disposition of the opposing forces was as shown at Tab G. The first attempt by Companies A and B to reach the cut-off platoon had been stopped by approximately 300 enemy. We were taking moderate casualties especially among leaders and radiomen. These enemy were aggressive and they came off the mountain in large groups. They were wellcamouflaged and took excellent advantage of cover and concealment. They were good shots. They were armed with numerous automatic weapons and small "potato-masher" grenades. Even after being hit several times in the chest, many continued firing and moving for several more steps before dropping dead. I ordered Companies $A$ and $B$ to evacuate their casualties; withdrew under covering fires out of close contact; and prepared for a coordinated attack supported by heavy preparatory fires to get back the surrounded platoon. K Meanwhile Company $C$ was continuing to hold off the $^{\text {che }}$ enemy to their front with the help of some magnificant artillery and close air support. The Battalion $\mathrm{S}-2$ was wounded and later shot again and killed during this enemy attack. The surrounded platoon of B Company stood off numerous PAVN efforts to overrun it. Carrying their dead, their wounded, and their equipment the men of the platoon established a small 25 meter wide perimeter on a slight rise of ground and redistributed their ammunition under heavy enemy fire.
(2) At approximately 1620 hours, the second attack by Companies A and B to reach the surrounded platoon began. This attack was preceded by artillery and ARA preparatory fires. Between the first and second attacks and despite heavy fires from artillery and air, the enemy had moved well up towards $A$ and $B$ Companies. Some were in trees.

None fell back. For friendly to advance, the enemy had to be killed. This was difficult because they were welld camouflaged and used all means of cover and concealment. Many had dug into small spider-holes, others were dug into the tops and sides of the ant-hills. By that time, Company A had lost all three rifle platoon leaders - one KIA and itsartillery forward observer KIA: Four men had been shot and killed within six feet of the Company Commander, including his commo sergeant who was acting as a radio operator. Company B echeloned slightly ahead and to the right of Company A, progressed only 75-100 meters much of it paid for in close-in fighting. I had given A Company back his platoon which had been assisting B Company. Nevertheless A Company could only progress about 150 meters. One platoon of $A$ Company advanced farther than the other two; became engaged with a greatly superior force; and was pinned down. Some of the enemy permitted the friendly to pass by them in the dense terrain and then opened up from concealed positions. $X$ White phosphorous artillery was brought in around the platoon and between the platoon and A Company (-) to give support to an A Company move forward to get it. The burning phosphorous caused a temporary $1 u l l$ in the enemy firing and that plus the smoke, enabled the platoon and their dead and wounded to be reached and brought back. A 200-225 enemy force was still in the area fighting against Companies $A$ and B. By 1740 hours, I decided that it was necessary to pull A and B Companies, under cover of heavy supporting fires, back to the fringe of the landing zone and set up a tight defensive perimeter for the night. We were still in good communications with the surrounded platoon and it was ringed with close-in artillery defensive fire. My intentions were to conduct another coordinated attack during the night or early the next morning to reach it or to get them out during the night by infiltration. Both $A$ and $B$ Companies had numerous WIA and KIA to get out of the area of contact; reorganization of the squads and platoons had to be accomplished; resupply of ammo and water had to be carried out; and all units of the battalion had to be tied in and disposed for the night. $C$ Company had taken a heavy toll of the enemy throughout the afternoon. C Company had taken a few casualties but was in good shape and the enemy, although still in contact, had ceased his attacks on the company. Company $D$ had gone into position. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry was landed in two to four UH-1D loads at a time from 1705 to 1800 hours. As they landed I built them into a reserve force prepared to counter-attack any penetration of Company or for commitment in the $A, B$ Company area of contact. This was not necessary.
(3) The withdrawal of $A$ and $B$ Companies was conducted successfully. White phosphorous, fired by artillery, was again used to cover the withdrawal. The burning phosphorous seemed to disorganize the enemy more than $H E$ and the smoke greatly assisted us by its screening effects. By 1900 hours; the organization of the perimeter was completed; units were tying in for the night and defensive artillery and mortar firesiwere being registered. I attached one platoon of

Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to C Company as Company had a wider sector to defend. The recon platoon was placed in battalion reserve. Dispositions were as shown at Tab A.

## E. OTHER ACTIVITIES DURING THE AFTERNOON:

(1) While all of the above described actions were in progress, numerous other activities were going on. A major problem was $\mathcal{K}$ care and evacuation of the wounded. Early in the afternoon, the battalion surgeon, medical supplies and four aid station personnel were brought. in. They arrived around 1400 hours and under heavy fire treated the wounded in my CP area. I did not call in Med Evac helicopters too frequently because most of the afternoon the landing zone was under fire. At about 1330 hours a small two-chopper open area was selected in the northeastern portion of $X-R A Y$, as my supply and evacuation link to the rear. This we had to defend at all costs. This area is shown at Tab A. I requested the helicopter lift company commander to evacuate the wounded, bring in supplies, and set up a system whereby every helicopter coming to $X$-RAY $\nless 0$ with troops, with supplies, or for wounded would call me for landing instructions. This system worked very well; throughout the afternoon and early evening, numerous UH-1D's were brought in - each from a specific direction at a prescribed altitude to land at a specific place and go out on a prescribed heading. / I have the highest admiration, praise and respect for the outstanding professionalism and courage of the UH-1D pilots and crews who ran a gauntlet of enemy fire time after time to help us. They never refused to come in; they followed instructions beautifully; they were great. We in turn called them in when fire was the lightest and tried to have everything ready for each landing to keep them on the ground a minimum time. None were shot down and destroyed although most of them took hits. Two aircraft were brought in which did not get out. One received enemy fire in the engine and had to land in an open area just off the northern portion of the LZ ; the other clipped a few tree tops with the main rotor on landing in the LZ and had to be left. Crews of both aircraft were immediately lifted out by other helicopters. Both downed helicopters were immediately secured by elements of Company D without orders per battalion SOP they being the nearest troops. Both were slightly damaged only and were slung out two days later by CH-47 Chinooks. During the three day battle, those were the only two downed helicopters. By 1350 hours, it had become apparent that we would need a night landing capability that I needed a pathfinder team to assist me on the ground. I called the A Company, 229 th lift company commander with a request for pathfinders and was gratified to learn that he had anticipated the requirement. They arrived shortly thereafter and with engineer demolitionists cleared the LZ into a fairly safe two-chopper landing area and set up lights to be turned on if necessary for night landings. Although under enemy observation and fire, it was less vulnerable than the southern portion of $X-R A Y$ where we were still cleaning out enemy riflemen.
(2) By dark, at 1915 hours, a resupply of ammo, rations, water and medical supplies had been brought in. Dextrand, morphine, and bandages were the medical supplies most needed and water was at a premium. At approximately 1850 hours, I radioed by $\mathrm{S}-3$ and told him to prepare to come in as soon as possible using two UH-1D's and to. bring in the artillery liaison officer, FAC, two radio operators and more water and small arms ammo. They landed at 2128 hours. The dust and smoke which hung like a horizontal curtain over the entire area delayed their arrival and made the landing very difficult but once again, the 229 th pilots performed with great courage and professionalism.

## IV. ACTIVITIES DURING THE NIGHT OF 14 NOVEMBER:

A. By darkness, 1915 hours, we had evacuated all our wounded and collected our dead in my CP area. Ammo and water was being dis-. tributed; the landing zone area was in the final stages of preparation for night landings; mortar and artillery fires were being registered close around the perimeter; a small light proof working area had been constructed out of ponchos for the medics; and the chain of command had been reorganized. I talked with many of the men and could see that the morale was high. We knew we were facing a tough enemy but we also knew the enemy with a greatly superior force had failed to get through us that afternoon. We were in excellent shape as we completed tying in our perimeter. The cut-off platoon of B Company was in good morale and was holding its position.
B. During the night the enemy made several light probes forward of $A$ and $B$ Company, and of C Company near where it tied in with A Company, Artillery harassing and interdiction fires were brought down on the lower fingers and draws of the mountain, around the southern and western edges of the perimeter; and up on the slopes where four or five electric lights were observed. We received six or seven rounds of high explosive fire, either mortar or rockets.
C. The surrounded platoon of $B$ Company on a finger of the mountain 300 meters northwest of the battalion perimeter was protected by close-in artillery fires all night. The enemy could be heard all around the platoon. Artillery fire was brought in on these areas and the shouts and sereams told of good results. The platoon began and ended the night with 8 KIA, 12 WIA and 7 men not wounded. It was disposed in two separate locations within their small perimeter. The platoon leader, plation sergeant and weapons squad leader were among the KIA. The man who ended up on the radio was a Sergeant E-5 squad leader. He could not get to the ranking man (a Staff Sergeant rifle squad leader), since any move he made drew immediate enemy rifle fire. He was the commo and leadership link to his Company Commander. Throughout the night he adjusted close-in artillery fire on the enemy surrounding him as he heard them moving and talking. Three separate attacks were made during the night by the enemyeach in about 50 man strength. All were beaten off by small arms and
artillery fire. Several of the wounded men of the platoon continued to fight. The second attack, at approximately 0345 hours was preceded by bugle calls around the platoon and up on the mountain 200-400 meters above the platoon. I requested and received a TAC Air strike in the area above the platoon. Ittwas conducted under Air Force flareship illumination. It was right on target and greatly assisted in breaking up the second attack on the surrounded platoon. This was the only illumination used all night since it exposed the men in the surrounded platoon as well as the foxholes in the open areas of the battalion perimeter. Also, there was a fairly bright moon from 2315 onwards. When day-light broke, numerous enemy dead were seen around the surrounded platoon. These were only the dead who could be seen by the men as they lay prone in their positions. Other bodies were possibly concealed by the high grass which dotted the area. During the night, the men of the platoon saw and heard the enemy dragging off many dead and wounded.
D. First light came at 0630 hours. I had tentatively decided on my plan of attack to reach the surrounded platoon while simultaneously securing the perimeter. I directed by $A, B$, and C Company Commanders to meet me at the CoCpmpany CP to finalize the plan and to receive my orders since that was the best point of vantage. The time was approximately 0640 hours. I also directed each company to check around their positions carefully for infiltrators and snipers.

## V. ENEMY ATTACKS OF 15 NOVEMBER:

A. At approximately 0650 hours the recon elements of the 'lst and 2d platoons of C Company (the two left platoons) which were searching and screening approximately 100-200 meters forward of their positions began receiving rifle fire from their front and left front. They returned the fire and began pulling back to their defensive positions. At this time, they were attacked by a force of 2 - 3 Companies. The enemy was well-camouflaged; crouching low; and in some cases crawling on hands and knees. The recon parties from the two plation positions right of the company CP encountered no enemy but pulled back immediately to their defensive positions. An intense small arms fire fight broke out. The weight of the enemy attack was directed at the left portion of the C Company sector. The recon parties of the 1 st and 2 d platoons began taking casualties including some KIA as they pulled back. Other men were hit trying to get to them. Some were recovered; however, by then - 0730 hours the enemy had moved almost to the perimeter foxholes despite taking severe losses from artillery, mortar, and close air. Savage close-range fighting went on for the next two hours in the $C$ Company sector - primarily in the left three platoon areas and forward of the Company CP. There was considerable hand-to-hand fighting. For example, the lst platoon leader was found later KIA and five dead PAVN around him in and near his CP foxhole. One man was found KIA with his hands at the chroat of a dead PAVN. Numerous enemy bodies were found intermingled with the killed and wounded of C Company. At approximately 07.15 hours, the enemy attacked the $D$ Company sector near where the
mortars were emplaced. This put the perimeter under attack from two directions. Artillery, Aerial Rocket Artillery, and TAC Air were called in and their fires were accurate and extremely effective. ARA and TAC Air was also used to ring the perimeter with fires. Priority of all fires was given to C Company. The artillery FO with C Company was pinned down by rifle fire in the company CP area. Hence the artillery was adjusted by my artillery liaison officer from my CP. There was good observation.
B. At approximately 0715 hours, the Commanding Officer, C Company requested reinforcements. I took a platoon from Company A (it deing the closest to $C$ Company) and dispatched it for the $C$ Company CP area. It came under fire while moving over the open ground, lost 2 KIA and WIA, but made it to the right center of the $C$ Company sector. At about 0745 hours, the A Company sector was attacked by what was later determined to be a small force. We were now being attacked from three different directions with firing of equal intensity in all three areas. Grazing fire from enemy small arms and automatic weapons was criss-crossing the interior of the perimeter into the landing zone, battalion CP area and aid station. Twelve to fifteen $H E$ explosions of either enemy mortar or rocket fire occured in the perimeter. Several men were wounded in and near the CP by small arms fire. One was KIA. I alerted my reserve for probable commitment in the C Company area or D Company Sector - both of which contingencies we had planned for the night before. I radioed the brigade commander, informed him of the situation, and in view of the losses being sustained by C Company and the heavy attack, I requested an additional reinforcing company. He had already alerted Company A, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry the previous night and assembled it with helicopters ready for movement. My request was approved but. I did not bring the company in at that time due to heavy fire in the LZ. See Tab I for dispositions of opposing forces.
C. The heavy fire fight continued only in the C and D Company Sectors. At one time, approximately 0800 hours, the anti-tank platoon was heavily engaged and the LZ was severely threatened. The mortarmen were firing both their mortars and their rifles and taking heavy small arms fire. One mortar was hit and put out of action by enemy fire. I committed my reserve, the Recon Platoon, which moved into the left of the C Company sector; headed towards D Company and cleaned it out. They joined up with the rest of $D$ Company and from then on throughout the rest of the attack, that portion of the perimeter was under control. This permitted me to take the risk of commencing to bring in A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Although the LZ was under fire, it was reduced somewhat. I needed A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry in, so that I could reinforce or possibly counterattack or block in or behind the C Company sector. I ordered the commander, B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry to pull one additional rifle platoon plus his command group off his line; turn the sector over to his remaining platoon; assemble the Company ( - ) dispersed near my CP; and prepare, on order, to reinforce,
block, or counterattack in the C Company sector which was 125 meters to the east of the CP or second, in any other area. By then, two officers of C Company had been killed and three wounded. However, the company commander although shot in the chest and back continued to function; help to control hiss company; and give me reports for nearly three hours. The men of C Company stood their ground. One man of Company D who wound up in the C Company sector was the only soldier left covering 50 meters. He personally shot 10 - 15 enemy with his M-16 rifle firing from the kneeling position. The company radio operator picked off 15-20 from the company CP foxhole. The company commander killed several before he was wounded. The enemy fire was so heavy that movement towards or within the sector resulted in more friendly casualties. It was during this action at 0755 hours that all platoon positions threw a colored smoke grenade on my order to define visually for TAC Air, ARA and artillery air observers the periphery of the perimeter. All fire support was brought in extremely close. Some friendly artillery fell inside the perimeter, and two cans of napalm were delivered in my CP area wounding two men and setting off some M-16 ammo. This we accepted as abnormal, but not unexpected due to the emergency need for unusually close-in fire support (50-100 meters). C Company, with attachments, fought the massive enemy force for over two hours. At approximately 0910 hours, elements of A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry began landing. I briefed the Commanding Officer, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry on the situation and saw to it that he was oriented by the Commanding Officer, B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry on the sector he was to go into. I then ordered the Commanding Officer, Company B, 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry to move with his command group and the one platoon to the C Company sector, assume control over the remainder of C Company and responsibility for the defense of the sector. He moved out at 0941 hours. The remaining platoon of $B$ Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry followed shortly after when it was relieved on the perimeter by A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. When the 3d platoon of A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry dismounted from the choppers, it headed towards the C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry fire fight and assembled behind their left platoon. I attached it to B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and it fought with that company throughout the next two days. By 1000 hours the enemy attack had been defeated. C Company had held. The enemy never penetrated through their position. At approximately 1330 hours all companies on the perimeter screened out for 300 meters and policed the battlefield. Dead PAVN, PAVN body fragments, and PAVN weapons and equipment were littered in profusion around the edge and forward of the perimeter. Numerous body fragments were seen. There was massive evidence e.g. bloody trails, bandages, etc. of many other PAVN being dragged away from the area. Some of the enemy dead were found stacked behind anthills. Artillery and TAC Air was placed on all wooded areas nearby into which trails disappeared. Numerous enemy weapons were collected along with other armament. Two prisoners were taken and evacuated. Friendly dead and wounded were also collected. Some friendly were killed and wounded in this ocreening, $C$ Company, 1st Battalion, 7 th Cavalry was then positioned as
the battalion reserve in the center of the perimeter and A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry was in position in the former B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry sector.

## VI. THE RELIEF OF THE SURROUNDED 2ND PLATOON, COMPANY B, AND REDISPOSITION OF THE PERIMETER:

A. Date in the afternoon of 14 November, the brigade Commander had moved the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, into LZ Victor. At approximately 0800 hours it headed, on foot, for LZ X-RAY. See Tab J for routes used. At 1205 hours, it closed into X-RAY. The Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry and 1 coordinated on the disposition of forces. It was agreed that his A and B Companies which were south and west of LZ X-RAY on the lower slopes of the mountain headed northwest plus B Company, 1st Battalion, 7 th Cavalry would conduct a coordinated attack behind artillery, ARA, TAC Air preparation to relieve the surrounded platoon. The route of attack was as shown at Tab $K$. It was agreed that $I$ would assume operational control of Company B, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry and be in overall control of all units at LZ X-RAY plus responsibility for its defense. B Company, 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry moved forward of D Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry on the perimeter. All 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry mortars went into position and registered. D Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry (minus the mortar platoon) was added to C Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry in reserve. The attack by $A$ and $C$ Companies of the $2 d$ Battalion, 5th Cavalry and B Company, 1st Battalion; 7th Cavalry under control of Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, Sth Cavalry jumped off at 1315 hours. There was little enemy resistance. B Company, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry reached the surrounded plation at 1510 hours. At the location there were 8 KIA, 12 WIA and 7 unwounded. The platoon still had ammo left and were in good morale. The wounded were evacuated and all units disposed and dug in for the night. Dispositions were as shown at Tab L. Ammunition, water, and rations were brought in and distributed. .The dead were all evacuated.
VII. ENEMY NIGHT ATTACK, $0400-0630$ HOURS; 16 NOV:
A. At approximately 0100 hours, B Company, 1st Battalion, 7 th Cavalry was probed by 5 enemy. Two were killed and the other three dispersed. The moon was up at 2320 hours and there were no clouds. Fire discipline, as during the previous night, was excellent. All aiming stake lights on the mortars were extinguished, and no mortar fire was permitted, as during the previous night, without approval from me. All fires were coordinated by my Artillery Liaison Officer. Continuous, close-in $H$ and $I$ fires were conducted all around the perimeter. Some were placed on the mountainside, and firing in two areas resulted in a series of secondary explosions.
B. At approximately 0400 hours, the enemy began probing the B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry sector. At 0422 hours a force of 250-300 enemy attacked B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry in the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry sector. The route of attack was from the southeast as shown at Tab M. Flareship illumination was called for and continuous until 0545 hours. The attack was beaten off by small arms and artillery fires. At 0431 hours another attack by 200 enemy came in on B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalyy. Each time a flare would light up, the enemy would hit the ground or fall back into the cover and concealment offered by the high grass and trees. The artillery took a heavy toll. There were four batteries firing. The PAVN could be seen dragging off numerous bodies. By 0503 hours, the weight of his attack had shifted more to the southwest with approximately 100 enemy attacking. This was repulsed by 0535 hours. At 0550 hours, the flareship ran out of flares. Artillery illumination was then employed. The mortars of both battalions had been firing HE since the attack began. Mortar illumination was then permitted. At 0627 hours, another attack came directly towards the CP. At 0641 hours the enemy had been beaten off and was dragging off bodies under fire. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry had performed magnificantly, and had suffered only 6 lightly wounded. During the attack, two separate resupply runs of ammo were made by the Recon Platoon, lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry under fire and one by the-XO and radio operators of B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry.
C. At 0641 hours, orders were given for all men on the perimeter to spray the trees and the anthills and bushes forward and over their positions at 0655 hours for two minutes to kill infiltrators, snipers, etc. Immediately upon firing, a force of $30-50$ PAVN exposed themselves 150 meters forward of Company A, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and began firing their weapons. Apparently the "mad minute" free spraying, prematurely triggered a possible enemy attack. HE and VT artillery was brought in and the attack was beaten off in twenty minutes. The tactic of spray firing accounted for 6 PAVN dead. One hung from a tree forward of the left platoon of B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Another dropped out of a tree immediately forward of the B Company CP. One PAVN was killed about one hour later attempting to climb down a tree and escape. My company commanders reported to me that the men liked this spraying. In addition to killing enemy, apparently it affords a release of tension built up through the night, and clears any doubts as to enemy nearby. At 0716 hours, a cautious and deliberate sweep was made by Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the Recon platoon, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry throughout the interior and fringes of the LZ. I ordered this conducted on hands and knees to search for friendly casualties and PAVN infiltrators in the high elephant grass. The trees were also searched. There were negative results.
D. At 0810 hours, all units on the perimeter were ordered to coordinate with their flank units; and prepare to move out on a search
and ciear sweep 500 meters commencing on order. The movement began at 0955 hours, however, after moving 50-75 meters B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry came under fire. One platoon leader was seriously wounded. All moyement was stopped. B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry pulled $\cdot$ badketotthe perniter foxhos and $c$ called in. We ind called in. We then moved back out; eliminated all resistance and policed the area. 27 more PAVN were killed on this sweep. Enemy dead were lying throughout the area. I saw massive evidence of dead and wounded evacuation -- blood, body fragments, bloody garments, etc. We also brought in three friendly KIA. Numerous enemy weapons were collected. Many were seen which had been fragmented by fire.
E. At approximately 0930 hours, the first elements of the 2d Battalion, 7 th Cavalry $(-)$ began arriving at X-RAY. They closed at approximately 1200 hours. At 1040 hours, the Brigade Commander ordered me to move the battalion; Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry; and the 3d Platoon, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry by UH-1D to FALCON LZ, then to Camp Holloway at Pleiku for two days of rest and reorganization. He ordered me to relieve my elements on line with elements of the 2 d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry. This I did. However, before moving B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, I had them conduct one final lateral sweep across their front out to 150 meters. This was the scene of extremely heavy action and I wanted the battlefield thoroughly policed. The extraction by UH-1D was completely successful, and was covered throughout by artillery and TAC Air delivered around X-RAY, on the flight routes in and out, and on the slopes of the mountain. There was no enemy fire at any time during the extraction. The choppers were not brought in until aircraft loads were spotted on the LZ. Hence the UH-1Ds were only on the ground a few seconds. Concurrently with troop extraction, excess supplies, enemy weapons, casualty gear and weapons, and casualties were evacuated. Enemy hand grenades, ammo, anti-tank weapons, etc were placed in a large hole and arrangements were made with CO, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry for demolition by his engineer teams. Many other enemy weapons had previously been destroyed elsewhere in the battle area. By 1456 hours all elements of the lst Battalion, 7th Cavalry; B Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry and the 3d Platoon, A Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry had been extracted from X-RAY bound for LZ Falcon. By 1830 hours all elements had left L2 FALCON by air and closed into Camp Holloway, vicinity of Pleiku.
VIII. ENEMY, FRIENDLY CASUALTIES, CAPTURED:

## EQUIPMENT

A. ENEMY:

Killed, body count - 634
Killed, wounded (Est) - 1215
Captured evacuated - 6
B. FRIENDLY (INCLUDES ATTACHED UNITS):

Killed - 79
Wounded - 121
Missing - None
C. CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT, EVACUATED:

Assault carbines w/bayonet - 54
Assault rifles, automatic - 57
Automatic Rifles - 17
Heavy Machine Guns - 4
Antitank Rocket Launchers - 5
Pistols - 2
$81 / 82 \mathrm{~mm}$ Mortar Tubes - 2
Medics Kits - 6
D. ENEMY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED IN OBJECTIVE AREA:

Crew-served and individual weapons - 75-100 (approx) Antitank Rockets - 3 cases of 3 rounds each Hand Grenades - 300-400 (approx) Assorted small arms, AW ammunition - 5000-7000 rounds (est) Entrenching tools - 100-150 (small shovel type)
IX. COMMENT:
A. The following items concerning the enemy and general battlefield techniques are considered worthy of mention. Most represent nothing new and are listed for emphasis as being particularly applicable to the PAVN enemy.
B. FIRE SUPPORT:
(1) Fire support to be truly effective must be close-in. Against heavy attacks such as the ones we defended against, some enemy will get very close or even intermingled with friendly in the high grass. Bringing fires in promptly, "walking them in" extremely close helped us greatly. The commander cannot wait until he knows exactly where all his men are. If he does, in a heavy action, he will get more men killed by waiting than if he starts shooting immediately. Once the enemy gets as close as 25 meters out or intermingled then he has the friendly fighting on his terms, with those who have made it that close. Close fire support then can be used to cut off his follow-up units, and they will be there. He is much more afraid of napalm and white phosphorous than HE. He hits the dirt under HE fire. Under napalm and WP, he often gets up and runs around in disorder, and presents a'better target for small arms, VX, and $H E$. The 250 pound frag bomb and the $C B Q^{\prime} s$ are very effective.
(2) When a unit gets into an objective area, as soon as possible after landing, artillery fires should be brought in. This will maybe kill some PAVN nearby and certainly will cut down time on target when a fire mission on known enemy is called for.
(3) Aerial rocket artillery is extremely effective especially if the pilots knew the exact location of friendly. It has a tremendous shock effect on the enemy. The thing about ARA which makes it at times more effective than artillery is the fact that it does not have to be seen by ground observers to be adjusted. If the front lines or a friendly position is marked and can be recognized by the pilots, quick, accurate fire support is the result.
(4) The LAW was effective against the anthills behind which the PAVN were hiding. Training on use of LAWS must be emphasized.
(5) If PAVN are encountered close-in during a friendly attack, the best solution to an attack may be to back up under artillery and ARA, let the artillery and ARA work the area over and then start again, loading off with plenty of M-79s in the trees and grass and LAWS into the anthills.
(6) Whenever illumination was in the air many of the enemy ceased firing.
(7) Careful placement of $\mathrm{M}-79$ men should be emphasized in order to give them the best possible fields of fire. They must always be on the lookout for enemy in trees. It was found that the M-79's were extremely effective against enemy in trees as well as troops in the open. $M$-79's must be fired into trees and the high grass even when no enemy are seen.
(8) In this operation all mortars were combined under a cnetral FDC. This was very satisfactory. The mortars were very effective. Mortar illumination firing was carefully controlled at battalion level. The mortar illumination round has a very high dud rate and it would take many rounds to provide a battalion perimeter illumination for one hour. Therefore it was used to fill the gap for illumination between the artillery and the flareship. The mortars alone could not have come close to providing the desired amount of illumination.
(9) Artillery, TAC Air, and ARA can be used at the same time without loss of aircraft or effectiveness. The ARA and TAC Air flow perpendicular to the artillery gun-target line in these cases where they simultaneously struck the same target areas. Other striking aircraft flew parallel to the gun-target line and beyond it. This called for close teamwork between the FAC and the artillery liaison officer.
(10) Artillery must be used against possible avenues of reinforcement as well as on the enemy in either an attack or a defense. Close-in continuous defensive $H$ and $I$ fires are a must in a defensive situation where the enemy is known to be present even if he is not attacking.
(11) Great emphasis should be placed on the ability of all personnel down to and including fire team leaders to adjust artillery and mortar fire.
(12) Each platoon must carry many colored smoke grenades and a panel for marking friendly lines and landing areas.
(13) The technique of having all units on the perimeter throw a colored smoke grenade on order greatly helped TAC Air and ARA to locate the perimeter.
c. MOVEMENT
(1) Movement must be cautiously aggressive. The enemy must be pinned down by fire. Stmall unit, squad sized fire and movement must be conducted to perfection. This is extremely important. If not conducted correctly, men will get hit and the problem is then compounded when other men stop firing to try to recover casualties. Then they also get hit in many cases and soon, combat effectiveness of the squad, platoon, etc. is in danger of being lost. In this connection, when enemy contact has been made or is strongly suspected, recon by fire or actual fire and movement should be conducted to forestall the enemy firing first. This is particularly important for a unit moving up alongside a unit which is in contact and in a fire fight.
$\rightarrow$ (2) Platoon and company fire and maneuver must be conducted to perfection. Flanks must be secure. Open flanks can be secured to a degree by fire support. Squads and platoons must be tied together as close as the situation permits. The tighter the better against the PAVN, as he will hole up in concealed firing positions, let friendly go by, then open up.
(3) Close-in artillery, ARA, and TAC Air front, rear, and both sides is a great help in moving through an area where there are known enemy. This normal but sometimes overlooked.
(4) When companies conduct sweep and clear operations together out of a perimeter, or ever a certain route, battalion must check on the company formations to be used to insure that the terrain will be adequately covered and the companies are properiy coordinated and fitted to the terrain and the enemy situation.
D. TECHNIQUES:
(1) The technique of holding a company (-) as an offensive striking force while recon elements of one platoon check specific areas out 50-100 meters from the landing zone worked out very well in this case. For one thing until the assault unit is actually on the ground and sees and feels the terrain and the environment, the commander of the unit charged with LZ security does not finally know which areas he will check out in priority. Also and most important, the assembled company ( - ) enables the battalion commander to hit any emeny attack quickly with a controlled unit. In this operation we were also able to move quickly with Company B to develop the contact made by one of its platoons as soon as Company A had sufficient force to take over the LZ security mission. In retrospect, the fact that Company $B$ was in a posture for a fast move off the landing zone undoubtedly gave us the jump on the PAVN. Had not B Company surprised them with their aggressive move up the finger, we might well have been fighting the PAVN from the fringes of the LZ with our backs on it -. and the enemy in turn would have had good fields of fire on the incoming helicopters carrying the last elements of $A$ Company and all of $C$ and $D$ Companies. I feel that the fact that we had first B Company, then A Company, off the landing zone moving against the PAVN, then C Company in a good blocking position took the initiative away from him. From then on, for three days and two nights; he was reacting to our presence.
(2) At night, units must form tight perimeters, use Claymore mines, trip flares and dig in. The use of outposts and listening posts depends largely on the terrain and the enemy situation. In this operation, it would have been suicidal as the cover and concealment afforded the enemy too many opportunities to take the outguards by stealth. Camouflaged foxholes with cleared fields of fire are recommended. Normal, but sometimes hard to execute under fire.
(3) In a perimeter defense, it is necessary to check the front with small recon parties at first light and periodically through the day for 100-200 meters to clear out infiltrators, police the battlefield, and to insure that the enemy is not massing for an attack. This action should be preceded by having all troops on the perimeter spray the trees, grass, and anthills to their front and overhead at a specified

- time for two-three minutes. When the recon elements screen to the front, it should be preceded by artillery and recon by fire, Air Cav Scouts overhead can assist by observation. Units should move as in the attack with fire and movement. All men must give the enemy the capability of being to the front and overhead as infiltrators, snipers, or massing for an attack.
(4) The batcalion command group must carry a 292 antenna in on the assault and set it up as soon as possible. D Company, my
alternace $C P_{0}$ carried one in on the assault so set it up and ผ\&s invalusble.
E. SUPPLY, SUPPORT, SERVICES:
(1) The minimum amount of gear should be carried an assaulc. This should be one meal, a poncho, two canteens of wa salt tablets, and plenty of ammunition.
(2) Casualties are a critical problem. When fire is pinning down individuals, one casualty will cost one or two more men attempting to get to him. Heavy cover fire must be employed to try and cover the attempt to recover the wounded men and get him out of the danger area. Leaders at all levels in contact under fire must act cautionsly in getting casualties out. I lost many leaders killed and wounded while recovering casualties. Wounded must be pulled back to some type of covered position and then treated. Troops must not get so concerned with casualties that they forget the enemy and their mission. Attempting to carry a man out requires up to four men as bearers which can hurt a unit at a critical time.
(3) Evacuation of casualties from the areas of contact in this action was a problem. TO\&E litter bearers would have been a big help. As it turned out, fighting strength had to be used to carry out a wounded man ( $3-4$ men required) or to assist many walking wounded. (one man at least required in many cases).
(4) When a man is wounded or killed, his weapon and some of his equipment get separated from him in many cases. An S-4 representative - officer or NCO with assistants, must be present at least in the battalion forward aid station and at the collecting company at Forward Support. Some of our equipment was evacuated with men all the way to Qui Nhon. Also we had many M-16's shot up and had to have replacements in the area. Therefore we kept a lot of weapons in the battle area for re-issue. When we were pulled out we brought all excess weapons and equipment with us. Many enemy weapons which were captured and sent out with friendly KIA and WIA were never seen again. The unit commander fighting the battle in the objective area loses control of equipment, friendly and enemy, once it leaves the forward area by helicopter. A more effective "backstop" system must be set up to catch this gear and control it when it arrives at various unloading points in the rear.
(5) Rations are no problem. Few men eat much when in a heavy action; however, water is extremely critical. It must be present in quantitity particularly when there is no stream source available.
(6) The pathfinder team was tremendous.. Until they could get in around 1630 hours, 14 November, all incoming aircraft had to be
guided $\mathfrak{B C}$ and by the battalion commander on the battalion command net. A parbinder team should go into every battalion-sized assault.
(7) It took time to reload M-16 magazones one sound at a time. In the-heavy action we encountered, this, took excessive time at critical periods. It was particularly critical doring the enemy night attack. Also it was difficult to keep track off empey magazines in a heavy fire fight. The solution may be an expendable, plastic type magazine which is resupplied to the riffleman fully foaded in a bandoleer as was the old $\mathrm{M}-1$ clip of eight rounds. Also, the present $M-14$ ammo pouch makes crawling on the stomach difficult.
(8) The individual soldier must become at least as good as the PAVN in camouflage techniques and use of terrain and foliage to cover and conceal his movements. This must be emphasized.


## F. THE PAVN ENEMY:

(1) He appeared to be well-trainéd. He was aggressive. He was equipped with a preponderance of automatic weapons and plenty of ammunition. He carried 3-5 Chinese potato masher hand grenades. He carried a softball-sized wad of cooked rice, most of them carried a bed roll consisting of a piece of waterproof plastic and a hammock. His weapons were well maintained.
(2) He was an expert at camouflage and used every bit of cover and concealment to perfection. With only small arms, mortars, and antitank weapons he obviously sought to close with us in strength quickly-before we could discover him - possibly to render our fire support less effective and certainly to overwhelm us and force us to fight on his terms. Without much overhead fire support, he probably has to fall back on expert camouflage techniques, attacks in mass, infiltrators, and stay-behind killer parties.
(3) He was a deadly shot. In caring for my men who had been killed and wounded, I was struck by the great number who had been shot in the head and upper part of the body -- particularly in the head. He definitely aimed for the leaders -- the men who were shouting, pointing, talking on radios. He also aimed for the men carrying radios. He also appeared to concentrate on men wearing insignia of rank -- particularly non-commissioned officer with stripes on their arms. In this war, I question if it is necessary, possibly even foolish, or inviting fire, for non-commissioned officers to wear insignia of their grade -or any enlisted man for that matrer. Within the small units, all men know their leaders. In base camp the leaders should wear their insignia. On operations against the enemy, they should wear clean-sleeve fatigues.
(4) When attacking, the PAVN units confronting us used mass assault tactics preceded in some cases by light mortar and antitank rocket fire. The latter I believe is often mistaken for mortar fire. He also used encircling maneuvers with 50-75 men groups. He employed his machine guns extremely well and thoroughly understood the value of grazing fire. At night, he infiltrated small numbers up to the friendly positions. These enemy set up on top of grassy anthills, in trees, and good close-in firing positions. He was expert at probing our defensive perimeter at night and went to great efforts to try to force friendly into firing.
(5) When met by heavy ground fire or by mortar, artillexy, TAC Air, or ARA he became less organized. However, he did not quit. Napalm and white phosphorous he definitely did not like.
(6) He appeared to have no radios. The leaders controlled their men by shouting. Bugles were used during the night of $14-15$ November on the mountain above the battalion perimeter. Also, at night on the mountain they used signal lights.
(7) He fought to the death. When wounded, he continued fighting with his small arms and grenades. He appeared fanatical when wounded and had to be approached with extreme care. Many friendly were shot by wounded PAVN.
(8) He also appeared fanatical in his extreme efforts to recover bodies of his dead and wounded and their equipment. He never stopped his efforts in this regard and used the night, the high grass, the anthills and other concealment to maximum advantage to serve his purpose. We found many of his dead with ropes tied around the ankles and a short, running end free. I saw two of my dead with similar ropes tied around their ankles.
(9) Some of my men who met him face to face have stated that some PAVN appeared to be "hopped up". They based this conclusion in part on their observation that when shot, they kept moving several more steps firing before dropping. In these cases, it is possible that the high velocity $\mathrm{M}-16$ bullet passed cleanly through these enemy without any immediate stopping effect. Also some men stated that they saw a few enemy keep their weapons at sling arms although under fire. One non-commissioned officer stated that one group of 30 or so enemy continued moving across the front of his squad although it was being cut to pieces by close-in flanking fire.
(10) A favorite tactic of the PAVN enemy we faced seemed to be an aggressive small-unit encircling maneuver. Another was a rapid assault by 6-10 PAVN on 2 or 3 friendly.
(11) We found some of our KIA "dog cags" and wallets on the bodies of dead PAVN.
VIII. Out of all the above, the principal points that I would like to emphasize are:
A. We must make imaginative and constant use of our tremendous fire support advantage to kill the PAVN enemy before he gets so close that we must fight him on his terms. This includes heavy use of the M-79 and even hand grenades to hold him out so that artillery, TAC Air, and ARA can work on him.
$V_{\text {and }}$ B. We must take time and every opportunity to train our men, and especially our replacements, to perfection in small-unit fire and movement and fire and maneuver. If we do not to this, men will be killed who would not otherwise be killed.
$V$
c. The commander on the battlefield must continually anticipate what the future may bring or could bring and take steps to influence the future before it comes about. This applies to the enemy; to fire support; supply of ammo, water, and medical supplies before the requirement arises; to friendly reaction to possible enemy action; and to all other matters having a bearing on a particular situation. $\bar{A} 1$ so, periodically throughout a battle, the commander must mentally detach himself from the action and objectively think -- what is not being done which should be done to influence the situation, and what is being done which should not be going on.
/s/H Moore
/t/ HAROLD G. MOORE
Colone 1, Infantry

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