


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# ACTION ON ATTU



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A SUMMARY OF INFORMATION OF  
 THE ENEMY OBTAINED DURING  
 THE OPERATIONS OF THE [REDACTED]  
 FORCE ON ATTU AGAINST THE  
 JAPANESE OCCUPATION FORCE  
 BEGINNING 11 MAY 1943

## KNOW YOUR ENEMY

G-2 ALASKA DEFENSE COMMAND ADVANCE COMMAND POST 30 JULY 1943

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# FIGHTING ON ATTU

In this compilation of information of the enemy gained from the ATTU offensive operation an effort has been made to assemble data which can be of use to all echelons of any command participating in future military operations in the North Pacific Theater. This work is designed to present enemy information which can be of value to smaller units as well as commands and staffs of the larger organizations. Although it is not expected that any particular item herein should be accepted as "standard Japanese practice" the study of all enemy practices, tactics, reactions, weapons, installations on ATTU will aid the American soldier in an understanding of a general enemy pattern likely to exist in any northern area.

*W J Verbeck*  
 W. J. VERBECK,  
 Lt. Col., G.S.C.,  
 Assistant, A C of S, G-2.

Date 17 May 48

Classification cancelled or changed to [REDACTED]

By authority of Letter Hq AGF, 380.01/411 (DG ( GNGBI dated 23 Dec 46, Subject "Downgrading", and Comdt TIS

*H. S. Wilbur* #6

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# ATTU

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THE DEFENSE AND  
THE DEFENDERS--

Comments By  
SIMON BOLIVAR BUCKNER, JR.  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army  
Commanding, Alaska Defense Command

(The following comments on the Japanese and their defense of Attu Island were made by General Buckner following a personal study, on Attu, during the action. - - - Editor's note)

WHAT THE JAPS EXPECTED----- The Japs evidently expected us to land in the harbors of Attu near their main post. These harbors were well defended with dug-in foxholes and machine gun positions so well hidden that it was almost impossible to see them at a distance of only a few yards. One of their beaches was mined by two rows of contact mines; each mine consisted of a can of TNT about the size of a dinner plate and about two inches thick; the mines were buried just under the surface of the sand and were discharged when about 30 pounds pressure was placed upon a projection on the upper side of each mine. Japanese artillery was of the dual purpose type; ranges were calculated carefully so that air bursts could be placed above ridges overlooking the main Japanese installations.

PATTERN FOR DEFENSE---- In the passes approaching their positions from the rear the Japanese had prepared numerous foxholes and positions for light machine guns; all these positions were well supplied with ammunition and rations. These positions were well up on the hillsides and in general behind spurs so as not to offer a target for artillery fire. While the positions were well selected individually, they were not coordinated with each other, nor were they prepared for a final protective line of defense. Neither were they well protected from attack from higher up on the mountains. The Japs evidently expected us to advance up the valleys and seemed surprised that our troops took to the mountains so readily.

JAPS DON'T LIKE FIRE! In many of their prepared defensive positions the enemy had a few foxholes on military crests but their main positions were on reverse slopes. They were well supplied with grenades and the so-called "knee mortars." Their light machine guns were used very skillfully in delaying actions and they had several lines of foxholes on the hillsides; these foxholes were used as alternate positions and were occupied in accordance with the height of the clouds on the mountains. The Japs preferred to occupy positions just at the lower edge of the clouds.

[REDACTED]

**CAMOUFLAGE SUPERIOR--** The Jap on Attu proved himself a master of camouflage and concealed himself admirably in the grass. During a fight, however, and especially when he is under fire, the enemy is inclined to do a great deal of running around within his positions; this motion quickly discloses his dispositions. It is easy to hide in this treeless country if one does not move, but any movement by daylight is conspicuous.

**INFILTRATION AS USUAL----** As usual, the Japs used infiltration tactics on Attu. Small enemy groups passed through our lines, preyed on our communications and attacked our command posts. A favorite enemy scheme was to locate the evacuation lines serving our wounded and to shoot our litter bearers. In many cases a Jap would locate a wounded American, lie in wait until our collecting parties arrived, and then shoot the latter. The Japs also broke into one collecting station and bayoneted wounded.

**THE UNEXPECTED UPSETS JAPS---** Among the weaknesses displayed by the Japs on Attu were (1) a failure to coordinate their fires in defense and (2) their inability to adapt themselves promptly to a changing situation. The enemy were greatly disconcerted by movements which did not conform to their plan of defense. They were so well dug in that artillery fire bursting impact did not disturb them, although air bursts above their positions frequently ran them out. The Japs did not like our coordinated artillery fire nor do they like our attacks with the bayonet. When under fire from small arms they stay down in their holes and are easily approached. When attacking small groups of fox-holes, our troops were able to keep the Japs down by fire from rifles and the Browning Automatic Rifle while some of our men approached and dropped grenades into their holes. This was our favorite mop-up method. When about to be run out of a position, the Japs seemed to feel it necessary to counterattack. These counterattacks were not well coordinated and were welcomed by our troops, who were able, then, to shoot down the enemy in great numbers. These Jap counterattacks were of a suicidal character and were pressed home regardless of losses until practically all of the counterattacking troops were exterminated.

**JAP IS TOUGH OPPONENT----** On the other hand, the Jap on Attu proved himself a tough fighter, with great physical endurance and fortitude. He is not afraid to die. His infiltration patrols are perfectly willing to be killed if they can do an appreciable amount of damage before being shot. The Japs have no thought of surrender, and, when cornered, frequently will commit suicide with grenades. When defeated, they feel in duty bound to die. Their seriously wounded who cannot be evacuated either commit suicide or are killed by their own doctors. The seriously wounded Jap, however, frequently will hold onto a couple of grenades and throw these at anyone approaching him.

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THE JAP IS  
VULNERABLE

The enemy is vulnerable, however, as his Attu dispositions and tactics; he is vulnerable to the tactics that have been standard to the American Army as long as there has been an American Army; he is vulnerable to the aggressive spirit of the American soldier; he is vulnerable to superior American weapons. The enemy may believe that, in such terrain, he can hold up the advance of an entire battalion with three men and a light machine gun. In fact, however, he is critically vulnerable to intelligence action by officers and men who understand the necessity for immediate maneuver against small parties of the enemy seeking to hold them up. It was obvious that the enemy cannot hold against officers and non-commissioned officers who refuse to be pinned down by enemy fire for as much as five minutes, who are thoroughly acquainted with the principles of fire and movement, and who take to the high terrain to eliminate points of enemy resistance one by one. It was obvious that small patrols easily disposed of machine gun positions on reverse slopes behind mountain spurs, while any tendency to lie down and call for artillery support would have resulted only in tremendous wastage of artillery fire in attempting to seek out targets which, in fact, were inaccessible to artillery fire.

LEADERSHIP  
IMPORTANT-

The enemy proved unable to resist constant pressure and competent maneuver of small combat groups, led by tenacious, aggressive and resourceful officers and non-commissioned officers. It was obvious that our soldiers, if properly led, will outfight the Japs as a group. Too much emphasis, however, cannot be placed upon the importance of aggressive and resolute leadership down to and including the squad.

It was apparent that the enemy sought to tempt us into committing too many troops to the front line initially, in the hope of exhausting everybody and leaving no fresh troops to relieve those who became tired out. Further, the enemy sought to use his classic pattern of fire in our rear in an effort to disconcert our troops, forcing them to lose rest and sleep, and, of course, to lose their battle efficiency.

It was apparent that the enemy was particularly vulnerable to attack by units of our infantry which pushed forward vigorously while the enemy was held down by artillery fire. Those of our units profited most which learned soonest to advance closely behind their own artillery supporting fire.

The Attu action likewise indicated that standard Japanese infiltration tactics can be offset by a system of "anti-termite" patrols organized behind our lines, protecting our artillery, command posts and supply lines. Wherever troops know that these friendly patrols are behind them, fire in their rear will mean to them simply that our patrols are exterminating the infiltrating Japs. This feeling was well expressed by General Bedford Forrest when one of his staff officers approached him in great excitement and said, "General, the enemy is in our rear." Forrest calmly replied: "If they are in our'n, we must be in ther'n."

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- ANTI-JAP TACTICS- In general, the Japanese method of fighting, as demonstrated on Attu, can be combatted successfully by the following:
1. Careful staff training and decentralization of details.
  2. Organization in depth so as to keep fresh troops constantly pressing the enemy to the utmost.
  3. The training of all units in the prompt and aggressive maneuver of small combat groups.
  4. Careful coordination between movement and supporting fire.
  5. An adequate relay and relief organization for the movement of supplies by hand.
  6. A system of "anti-termite" patrols in rear areas.
  7. The use of small patrols to infiltrate into the enemy's positions to keep him awake all night and give him no rest.
  8. The hardening of the individual soldier so that he can climb mountains, undergo severe exertion and still be in condition to fight.
  9. The prompt relief of any officer or non-commissioned officer who lacks aggressiveness.
  10. A thorough system of security detachments so as to give ample warning against hostile counterattacks and flanking movements.
  11. Taking advantage of darkness and flanking to maneuver around and through hostile prepared positions.

OUR TACTICS ARE SOUND--- On the whole, our basic tactics are sound and nothing of a relatively novel nature has developed in the Attu action. Our troubles probably will be minor and few if we follow out the sound doctrines which we have always been taught. Where these have been carried out with resolute determination, our troops have shown themselves to be more than the equal of the Jap, who, in spite of his tough fighting qualities, has many weaknesses of which we can take advantage.

Well-disciplined troops will not tend to turn aside from the action to plunder Jap possessions, nor will they straggle and root into enemy possessions as the result of a desire for trophies.

Well-trained and well-disciplined boat crews will exercise the utmost care of their boats, which may be wrecked beyond repair if the crews should leave them to plunder.

In the Attu action, the Japs were not well shod and suffered from sore feet more than we did; this suffering being avoidable through use of proper footgear, extra insoles, plenty of socks, and elementary foot hygiene.

The Japs kept themselves warm in Attu weather by putting on several suits of underwear; this apparently was better than burdening themselves with bulky outer clothing.

"KNEE MORTAR" IS USEFUL----- The Jap "knee-mortar" or heavy grenade thrower was found very useful by our troops due to its lightness and the effectiveness of its fire. All of these weapons that were captured were used immediately by our troops. The Jap machine guns



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had a sound and rate of fire which made them easily distinguishable from ours.

IDENTIFY      The Japs prevented casualties due to accidental shooting upon  
PATROLS-      their own patrols by use of a small flag for identification  
                 purposes. Such a flag could be carried in the pocket and  
save both confusion and casualties due to fire by friendly troops.

SUMMING UP--The enemy is vulnerable to our standard tactics and aggressive leadership. He is easily ousted by leaders who refuse to be pinned down, and who will send tenacious and aggressive patrols to go over forbidding terrain to flush him out of his holes. His tactics of infiltration and of identification of friendly troops can be used against him and in our behalf, respectively. We can win, and quickly, where nothing turns us aside from our purpose to seek out the enemy relentlessly, and to destroy him.

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# THE GENERAL SPEAKS

"The Japanese soldier can be whipped.

"He is a tough, active and tricky fighter, but he is no super-soldier.

"He is subject to fear, to confusion and to thoughtless acts of desperation. He can, however, be counted on to fight to the last. It will be sometime before we find Japanese surrendering in large numbers as did the German and Italian troops in Tunisia.

"Know his characteristics; his weaknesses and his strong points. Match those characteristics with those you possess, and then proceed to develop yourself so that you are his superior in any phase of fighting.

"It can be done.

"It was done at ATTU.

"It will be done by you."

E. M. LANDRUM  
Major General, U. S. Army

(General LANDRUM, commanding the ATTU Force, gives this message of inspiration and counsel to succeeding American forces as the forward to the following summary of Japanese tactics on ATTU).

# TACTICS

HOW THE ENEMY  
FOUGHT ON ATTU

FACTS OUST OLD FANCIES WHEN AMERICAN TROOPS CLOSED WITH THE ENEMY and destroyed him on Attu, they destroyed something else. They destroyed the myth that the Jap was a super-man, and that he had super-weapons of any sort.

MET ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE, the Jap proved himself a brave and determined opponent. His weapons were good, but not good enough. His tactics often were good, sometimes too good, but in achieving excellence in certain areas the enemy committed the fatal blunder of failing to learn and use the A, B, Cs of our tactics; the Jap failed to know his enemy. The Jap got there fustest, all right, but he didn't have the most-est men, or the bestest weapons, or the smartest leadership. But he used what he had with a determination as heroic as it was useless, and in that use he taught us exactly what to expect of him; he showed us his tools and tactics and techniques.


"AS A MAN THINKETH--" THE JAP PROVED the Biblical adage, "As a man thinketh, so is he." The Jap's action sprang from his thought. When his thought was wrong, his action was wrong, and he died. In the Jap's psychology, then, are some of the reasons for his swift and costly defeat. Inflexible of mind, the enemy was completely thrown off his balance and out of time by anything unforeseen and either (1) took no responsive action, (2) took obviously wrong action, or (3) took a correct action at a time far too late to be effective.

Japanese weaknesses included complete lack of air support (the torpedo planes from Paramushiro having confined their ineffective attacks to Naval vessels), together with a pronounced inferiority in artillery. Notable, too, was the complete lack of any artificial obstacles, such as barbed wire and the abattis, beach mines on beaches used for our landings, effective use of land mines known to have been stocked and improperly used, or mining of harbors and waters used by our vessels.

Japanese strengths included traditional patterns: the use of deception and surprise, aggressive night activity, infiltration, determined and aggressive patrol action, cutting of communication and supply lines, creation of confusion far to the rear, theft of our munitions and materiel, extreme boldness in planning and execution of attacks, destruction of our stores and equipment, contempt for our forces and weapons, and complete disregard of casualties in the attainment of objectives.

JAPANESE USE OF TERRAIN-- UNIFORMLY, ON ATTU, the enemy organized high ground which ordinarily (1) commanded the flanks and rear of inward-pushing forces with plunging fire, (2) was extremely to moderately inaccessible (3) was largely secure from our Naval fire and aerial strafing, and (4) offered extreme difficulty for observation and target location from the valley floors.

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ENEMY PLATOON POSITION LOCATED ON THE WESTERN RIDGE BOUNDING MASSACRE VALLEY. COMMAND POST SHOWN IS LOCATED AT 866.4-3504.3 SHEET NO 12 OF 17, 29<sup>TH</sup> ENGINEER MAP OF ATTU 1943.

LARGE LAKE IN MASSACRE VALLEY

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Uniformly, the enemy "played the terrain" for all possible advantage to gain (in ordinary) the maximum effect from each rifle and automatic weapon. Positions frequently were located high in side gullies. Trenches and/or tunnels frequently connected fox holes, rifle bays and automatic weapons positions, so that a single rifleman or automatic weapons man might have several fields of fire and several positions, permitting the defender to take up a new position when or before an occupied position became untenable, and deceiving and perplexing the attacker with respect to the strength of the defense.

Precipitous and rocky canyon walls proved no deterrent to enemy selection of positions which might bring substantial forces under fire; in fact, difficulty of access to these positions by attacking troops appeared to have been regarded as an advantage. This demonstrated the Japanese eagerness to use terrain features presumably regarded by us as insuperable or impracticable.

High positions commanding the flanks and rear of inward-pushing forces predominated; foxholes, trenches and bays commanding such forces often outnumbered by more than ten to one the positions set up for Jap frontal defense. For example, extraordinary completeness and multiple coverage by machine gun fire marked installations at Holtz Bay, where scores of positions well up on the forward flanks of both coves criss-crossed every inch and every hollow of both beaches.

**PLUNGING FIRE  
JAP'S CHOICE--**      The net result of enemy terrain use was that our troops frequently were pinned down by plunging fire from unseen sources which were located and silenced only with great difficulty.

It was notable that the enemy sought maximum fields of fire, and therefore selected high ground and ridges which provided excellent opportunity for long range fire. The net result was that the Japanese did not have (for rifles or machine guns) the grazing fire which we regard so highly; instead their fire was steep and plunging, and the projectiles generally imbedded themselves in tundra and mud.

In some cases enemy emplacement of machine guns on Attu was good so far as mutual support was concerned; other machine guns were located singly. At times a gun was covered by another gun, generally from 200 to 500 yards away. This sometimes made reduction of enemy machine guns difficult, as all guns in an area had to be taken at once or those not taken might force our withdrawal from the gun or guns taken. Often, knee mortars were located near the machine gun positions, and, in at least one position, the support was strengthened by the addition of a rapid fire cannon, which twice forced the withdrawal of our troops under fire after they had twice taken the machine gun position.

**MACHINE GUNS  
REGISTERED--**      Enemy machine guns, in general, were good in their siting. Elaborate range cards were prepared. Apparently many of the guns had been registered carefully on terrain features before our troops came ashore, and had been laid on specific

[REDACTED]

ground areas with planned patterns of mutually supporting criss-cross fire. In many cases, every hollow in a particular sector of a valley floor could be searched out by one or more enemy machine guns on one side or the other of the valley. Small range and deflection stakes often were found in front of enemy positions, permitting the opening of fire in conditions of either good or bad visibility. The Jap could open fire on either sight or sound, and usually could be expected to be on his intended target in both range and deflection with his first burst.

**FIRE "DOWN THE ALLEY"**      However, one notable fact was reported by many officers: in many cases the Japanese machine guns fired only in narrow, limited alleys, and neither traversed nor searched. Areas in which Jap machine gun fire could be seen falling at any given time, therefore, could be expected to be under fire again and again, and should, therefore, be avoided. Lt. Col. Hartl, commanding a battalion at the north reported, for example, that he had stood unhurt for sometime within 40 feet of a stream of enemy machine gun fire and had seen an officer hurt in attempting to cross the area between bursts; this incident occurred on the east side of West Arm, Holtz Bay.

**MISTAKES OF THE ENEMY--**      In the mindset or psychology of the Japanese, probably, lies the explanation for the obvious mistakes he made in selection, organization and use of his automatic weapons positions.

First and foremost error, perhaps, was the enemy's apparent belief that there was only one channel along which the American attack could come, and that he (the Japanese) had determined that channel infallibly. Therefore, he failed to provide adequate close-in protection for his machine guns, and failed completely to organize his automatic weapons installations for all-around defense. Covered routes of approach usually could be found which would allow patrols or small units to work around the flanks or to the rear of the enemy machine gun positions and destroy them; once we got well to his flank or above him, the enemy was a sitting duck and could be knocked out with rifle fire or hand grenades.

Second, the enemy had no concept of tying in their machine guns to a main line of resistance and of laying on final interdiction or protective fires. The Japanese machine gunner always shot at targets. He either saw you or heard you before he fired.

Third, the enemy usually opened fire too soon. His heavy machine gun often was equipped with a telescopic sight for use in long range firing, up to 2500 yards. He consistently opened fire at ranges in excess of 1000 yards. Despite the excellence of enemy camouflage, and despite the use of smokeless powder, such early opening of fire gave an index to enemy positions. Only once was the enemy reported to have held his heavy machine gun fire until our forces were within 300 yards, and then enemy fire appeared high, his gunners apparently having failed to

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change their sight settings or to shift from the telescopic sight to the open sight used for normal ranges. At such extreme ranges the enemy cone of fire was too dispersed to be effective against individuals. However, the fire did have a considerable harassing effect, it being difficult to keep our troops moving ahead when they were receiving such fire from their flanks, even though the fire was not producing many casualties.

Fourth, the enemy usually fired too short a burst. In general, he would fire three or four rounds. Despite accurate registration, the extreme ranges resulted in a cone of dispersion that caused only few casualties and these, in most cases, were non-fatal.

**INDIVIDUAL MARKSMANSHIP**      **EXPERIENCE IN OTHER THEATRES** was repeated in Attu with respect to snipers. The enemy used many. He endeavored to post and infiltrate these men in the rear of and on the flank of American troops. Their fine, to judge from the consolidated experience of many officers and men, was exceedingly mixed. Some appeared to be extraordinarily accurate or usually lucky. These rare individuals would pick out men who obviously were commanding officers, who carried distinctive insignia or equipment, who gave signals or commands, who had carbines or pistols instead of M-1 rifles, who carried map cases, and who received reports and salutes from others. This pattern of concentrating sniper fire on commanders was observed as soon as American forces set foot on Attu. The enemy snipers also concentrated their fire on litter bearers.

**AVERAGE JAP POOR SHOT--**      **RUN-OF-THE-MILL JAPANESE MARKSMANSHIP**, however, was about as poor as could be. Part of this, perhaps, is due to inadequate training in marksmanship, in galleries, with ammunition not at all of combat character. Part of it may be due to eyesight somewhat below American standards. Part of it may be due to the fact that the rifles have poor sights, according to U. S. standards, with no adjustment for drift or windage. Whatever the causes, the marksmanship was poor, very poor, individual riflemen often having been reported as having fired repeatedly from ranges as low as 200 yards without scoring any sort of hits. One officer reported having been under fire from high ground less than 100 yards distant, and being unhit. Another reported having been fired at from less than 50 yards, albeit through a thin film of drifting smoke, with no hits despite the fact that he walked around slowly and erect. Colonel L. V. Castner, AC of S, G-2, ADC, reported that a sniper under a pile of dead Japanese bodies fired at him with a rifle at a range of not over 250 yards, and that at least eight shots were fired without effect.

Despite the fact that Japanese sniper fire, in the main, was not dangerous, it proved harassing. Green men (who have not had live ammunition fired over them during the last stages of training) are prone to dive for cover every time a lone bullet whiffles over them, and leaders of troops had to act aggressively to keep the men from hitting the ground and staying there before an attack was stopped by really superior fire power. The Japanese sniper fire, too, when encountered, required that aggressive patrol action be taken to ferret out the snipers, hidden (as they

[REDACTED]

were) under perfect camouflage and armed with rifles giving little or no flash and no smoke.

On Attu, our troops rapidly became inured to enemy rifle fire. One officer, continuously active in exposed positions along the front, reported that Japanese marksmanship was notoriously bad in a cross wind. He made it a habit to walk erect when under enemy fire. He advised that it was safe to stop in sight and range of enemy riflemen during a heavy cross wind, if one leaned against the wind; he urged, however, that one move rapidly during periods when the wind was not blowing. (This is not recommended as standard procedure; it is a yardstick of marksmanship of the enemy as reported by an officer whose quest for information of the enemy took him close to their positions).

Several officers reported that they drew little or no fire on very active sectors when they rose from their foxholes and walked, singly and slowly, to their objectives. When they broke and ran, however, bullets spattered all about them, they reported.

Any bunching up of personnel was likely to draw enemy fire, both artillery and small arms. Aimed enemy rifle fire produced casualties only when men grouped together within range of the enemy, or rested in areas not defiladed from enemy fire.

POOR WITH      Despite the fact that the Japanese Army places a mystical  
BAYONET--      importance upon the use of cold steel, despite the fact that  
                 bayonet training takes a high place in Japanese military  
education, and despite the fact that bayonet dummies in Holtz Bay indicated  
that actual practice had been conducted in bayonet exercises on Attu, the  
performance of individual Japanese with the bayonet on Attu was successful  
in only in the most despicable and unsoldierly situation.

That situation developed on the morning of the final breakthrough from Chichagof Corridor, when Japanese soldiers reportedly bayoneted helpless wounded soldiers, an unarmed chaplain, and sleeping and unarmed medical personnel prisoned in their sleeping bags and pup tents.

When it came to man-to-man combat with the bayonet, the Japanese proved to be a sorry spectacle. It is probable that the Japs feared our generally larger stature and presumably greater physical strength.

Captain Leo W. Bagley, FA, reported observing one bayonet charge only in the course of the Attu action. That attack, made against a BAR position by four enemy infantrymen, was unsuccessful.

Major J. Grant Lemmon, Inf, commanding an American unit during part of the Attu action, reported that "in most instances the Japanese would have retreated from a position by the time our advancing infantry had reached it" and that, "when the enemy did remain in their position, they would stay in their holes until shot or bayoneted."



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NIGHT ACTION Night action, another greatly emphasized Japanese military pattern, proved to be honored in the breach rather than in the observance by the Japanese on Attu. True, the enemy did attempt to infiltrate snipers into our positions during the hours of darkness, and to move about within our positions snipers already there, but generally, the enemy's night actions were unsuccessful. Night activities, of course, included enemy ammunition and food supply, evacuation of casualties and digging of trenches and other defenses. The enemy period of most energetic maneuver was in the twilight before the dawn, exactly the "stand-to" hour of World War I when activity was usually anticipated. The Attu action, however, indicated the great value of aggressive night patrols to the force using them, and showed that our troops are every bit as good as the Jap in this phase of combat. Our units, as large as a company, successfully engaged in night operations during the Attu action.


When attacked at night, the Japanese fired their rifles and machine guns, thus disclosing their position and allowing our troops to infiltrate to where bayonets could be used.

MASTERS OF TERRAIN--- Once again, on Attu, the Japanese proved themselves masters of the most difficult terrain. New foundation was found here for the familiar remark that the Japs make highways of swamps and ridges and terrain features regarded by their enemies as almost impassable. On Attu the enemy had emplaced machine guns, mortars and even small field pieces on ridges which our riflemen had great difficulty in traversing. Cliff-scaling equipment and rope appeared to be standard gear for their squads, and were found repeatedly on the persons of enemy soldiers after their final breakthrough. Glacier skis, short and broad, were found in large numbers. Zigzag paths and steps cut into precipitous hillsides led up to the enemy's well-stocked aeries of death in the cloud-swathed heights.


The terrain, therefore, may have helped to shape the apparent Japanese concept of defense, which seemed to consist of scattered and isolated small strong points very loosely tied together with supporting fires.

COUNTER-ATTACKS Sharply conflicting testimony comes from observers with respect to the enemy's defensive tactics. Some observers insist that the Attu action was replete with bold counter-offensive thrusts in conformity with the Japanese tactical doctrine of the superiority of the offensive, and the Japanese pattern of using offensive action to obtain delay to cover withdrawals. Other observers, likewise present in the heat of action, reported as their experience that the Japanese on Attu were not prone to counter-attack to restore a position, and that they appeared to reserve the counter-attack, generally, as a tactic of desperation and a last-ditch resort. It is probable that counter-attack patterns were dictated by immediate exigencies, and that counter-attacks were made only when the enemy still infested an area in strength, and when aggressive and competent officer and non-commissioned officer leaders were still alive and with the troops. Obviously, too, the specific importance


# M/G EMPLACEMENT & TWO MAN RIFLE CAVES



• PERSPECTIVE • M/G EMPLACEMENT & 2 MAN RIFLE CAVES



SECTION THRU M/G EMPLACEMENT.




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
20' APPROX.

16' APPROX.

• PLAN • M/G EMPLACEMENT



SECTION THRU RIFLE CAVE



MAT FLOOR

• PLAN • RIFLE CAVE

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of a particular strong point relative to the overall problem had a definite bearing on the decision of the enemy to counter-attack.


**ATTACK UP HILLSIDES** TRUE TO PATTERNS reported from other theatres, the enemy chose to fight on high ground and on dominating ridge lines rather than in corridors and valleys. Repeatedly, the enemy would defend from just beyond the ridge line, dropping over the reverse slope to a line just past the military crest, where they would wait for American troops to be silhouetted as targets against the skyline, whereupon the enemy would open fire with every available weapon, including his heavy grenade throwers. A ridge was not securely in our possession, therefore, with the taking of the ridge line; the slope beneath had to be taken to a point including the military crest. A number of enemy counter-attacks reportedly were launched from a line well below the military crest and on slopes so steep that the enemy was forced to creep along on all fours, himself presenting an excellent target in the reversed situation.

**MUCH MATERIEL LEFT INTACT--** Apparently, the enemy counter-attacked when he had the means and the leadership, the counter-attack, swift and aggressive, being standard Japanese doctrine. Bred to believe in victory, the enemy probably never conceded that he would not regain every inch he yielded to us. That probability provides one logical explanation for the fact that the enemy did not destroy his stores in retreat, and that he expected to recapture them in due course. One other possible explanation is that, where the enemy was decimated in retreat, he had neither time nor manpower to destroy, hide, spoil or remove his ammunition, food, guns, tents, tools, clothing, sake, medicine and other necessaries. At any rate, generous stores of serviceable munitions were found by our advancing troops. In some cases machine guns were captured with partially full strips still in the weapons. These guns might have been turned against the retreating enemy, and his own bullets and grenades used against him. However, our soldiers generally proved conditioned to the sound of the enemy weapons, and a member of our forces could expect to draw fire to himself when he manned an enemy weapon (this happened to Captain Leo W. Bagley when he turned a captured machine gun on the enemy).

**VERSATILE AA ARTILLERY---** While enemy AA artillery was sited to do its antiaircraft job well, it usually was sited, too, to have additional utility against approaching Naval and shipping targets. The positioning of the 75mm Model 88 guns in Chichagof Harbor and Holtz Bay was such that deadly fire might have been concentrated on any landing barges or other approaching craft. A third utility, too, was served ingeniously by the guns; they fired against our advancing infantry. Whenever our forces crossed ridge lines visible to these AA guns, the enemy would open highly effective fire with both impact and air bursts. In general, the enemy appeared to strive for HE air bursts only a few yards over the heads of our troops. The resulting fragmentation produced many casualties, while the concussion from the burst likewise beat the men physically, the effect being as though one had been picked up bodily and thrown down again until battered and bruised all over.

# DEMOLITION TUBE TYPE 99-1939

筒壞破式九九  
BANGALORE TORPEDO




## ASSEMBLY

- ① CLOSING PLUG
- ② END OF TUBE TO RECEIVE FUZE
- ③ CLOSING PLUG
- ④ FUZE PROTECTOR CAP
- ⑤ FUZE
- ⑤a THREADS
- ⑤b COTTER PIN & CORD
- ⑤c PULL ROPE
- ⑤d BLASTING CAPS (DETONATORS)

## OPERATION

REMOVE FUZE PROTECTOR CAP FROM FUZE. UNSCREW CLOSING PLUG ①. SCREW FUZE INTO ② WITH THREADS ⑤a. TO DETONATE PULL ⑤c. APPROXIMATELY FIVE SECONDS AFTER PULLING ⑤b BEFORE H.E. DETONATION.



"1 SET DEMOLITION TUBE TYPE 99"

[REDACTED]

True to his behavior pattern with respect to small arms fire, the Jap didn't fire unless he saw (or heard) a target. Our men, therefore, were comparatively secure on the reverse slopes of the same ridges. The tendency of the enemy to use his AA guns for such attack on troops crossing high ridges, and using those guns in direct fire only, results in sparing an attacking force that keeps under cover, while it inflicts heavy losses on exposed forces unless the guns have been knocked out first. The enemy AA guns, however, were deeply and solidly revetted, and usually had to sustain a direct hit before they were even slightly damaged. Further, the Japs were observed to range on the crests of the ridges surrounding Chichagof Harbor while visibility was good, deriving firing data. Later, when our troops were attempting to traverse such exposed and critical areas under cover of darkness or fog, they were fired upon.

ARTILLERY      While the enemy had no true field artillery, and employed  
ACCURATE-      only a few 70mm battalion howitzers, model 92, and 75mm  
                 model 41 mountain guns (Regimental guns), the guns appeared  
to have been employed effectively and accurately.

Captain Leo W. Bagley, FA, observer, reported that two of the 75mm mountain guns were examined in the Holtz Bay area and at least one more probably was on the island, first in the Massacre-Holtz Pass and later in the Massacre-Saranna-Chichagof Pass.

On two occasions, Captain Bagley reports, he observed fire from the Massacre gun, continuing:

"In both instances, a single gun employing direct laying was used, firing HE with contact fuse. The accuracy on both problems was excellent. Casualties on the first occasion were avoided when the shell was heard coming and all personnel hit the dirt. Succeeding shells also were heard in time to get on the ground before the burst came. This practice, combined with movement to cover between rounds, was successful in avoiding casualties.

"The second problem was fired on the rear kitchen area where the first round struck squarely in the group of assembled men, killing five and seriously wounding ten. Again, the first round was heard coming and a warning was sounded, but the warning was unheeded. Men were wounded by the succeeding rounds because they tried to run to foxholes instead of dropping to the ground immediately. Even greater casualties would have been suffered had the Jap increased his range 100 yards, for men congregated on a ridge to watch the show."

For protection against this Japanese gun, Captain Bagley continued, "men must be taught:

"a. To listen to the front at all times; even enemy AT shells can be heard in time to get down.

"b. Not to attempt to run to a hole but to hit the dirt right now; artillery shell fragments spray upward and even if the shell hits within feet of you it won't hit you if you're on the ground.

~~SECRET~~

"c. To avoid bunching up anywhere in range of the enemy artillery; the enemy won't waste shells on a single soldier, but men who assemble in groups often will find that they are gathered together where and when the enemy has artillery and observation."

Captain Frederick G. Bull, FA, observer and Assistant, AC of S, G-2, ADC, reports that four of the 75mm model 41 mountain (regimental) guns were found, but that emplacements with ammunition for the weapon were located at a number of points about the island.

The gun apparently, was man-handled with ease, its overall weight being only about 1200 pounds, according to TM 30-480. Ramps were provided to let the gun down into excellently prepared positions, some of which had planked roofs and sod cover which gave both concealment and protection.

**GRENAD  
THROWER** AN IMPROVED MODEL of the heavy grenade thrower, type 89, was used effectively against our troops. This weapon, crude as it appeared to be, still could be amazingly accurate in the hands of trained grenadiers, as was demonstrated both by the enemy in the field and by our own ordnance tests after the battle.

The grenade thrower, notoriously poor in the hands of some grenadiers, was dangerously effective in the hands of others, and proved a weapon of high tactical utility. It could be transported with ease to any point that a man could reach, its ammunition supply was elementary in its simplicity, the sound and flash were relatively minor, and its accuracy in the rifled models was a factor worthy of note. It required a minimum of man power for operation. One man could maintain a fire rate of 10 rounds per minute; two men could double that rate. In fact, one ported and un-rifled model of the grenade thrower was found in which the mechanism had been simplified and the design arranged so that the supporting column and base-plate telescoped inside the tube. The entire weapon, then could be transported as a tube less than 12 inches long and not much over 2 inches in diameter. One man, then, could carry this type of grenade thrower and a small stock of ammunition, re-supplying himself from the many stockages scattered over the entire heart area of Attu.

It was believed that, in many instances, the grenadier would take position above the level of fog and overcast that usually overlaid the valleys along which our troops pressed forward, and that well-hidden observers below the fog line directed accurate fire from positions far above them. In at least one case a field telephone was found in such location as to suggest that it had been used for such grenade fire control. A number of officers reported very accurate grenade fire. In one instance, fire fell exactly on the margin of a snow-field along which our men advancing up into the dense cloud cover to attack snow-covered ridge positions of the enemy on Point Able, at the junction of Sarana and Massacre Valleys.

The effect of the grenade thrower's missiles was variable. As was true even for our heaviest Naval fire, explosive missiles landing in the snow, mud, water or soft, spongy tundra had their range of shard damage

definitely restricted. There remained, however, severe concussion effect when a blast came close at hand. In the case of the heavy grenade thrower, with its 50mm (two-inch diameter) and its normal 5-yard effective radius of burst, the men soon became contemptuous of it in the tundra. One sergeant said: "I was flipped like a pancake three times this morning, but it never hurt me." The casualty effect of the knee mortar missile was far higher on rocky faces of precipitous mountain slopes.

The range of the grenade thrower with the model 89 shell was believed to be a maximum of 650 meters (about 700 yards), with its most accurate range about half that distance.

JAPS USED WEAPONS-- The overall defect of the Japanese artillery on Attu was the same fault they have exhibited elsewhere and everywhere, that is, there wasn't enough of it. The main criticism of the Japanese infantry mortars on Attu was that the highly touted "knee mortar" or grenade thrower wasn't good enough for the job. The next criticism was that there was little massing and coordination of available fire power. The overwhelming fact remains that the enemy gave superlative application to the principle of supporting his infantry as far forward as he possibly had opportunity with every heavy weapon he could find. The principle is right. It is ours. When we failed to practice what we preach relative to the close support of forward elements by heavy weapons, we paid heavily. On the contrary, when we practiced the time-tested doctrine, we won ground rapidly and relatively cheaply.

For example, action of May 22nd proved the validity of the Infantry School doctrine on the close support of forward elements by heavy weapons. On May 22nd, heavy weapons companies of three battalions were massed in support of the attack on the Sarana-Chichagof nose and on the Chichagof Valley floor by Lake Cories. Our casualties were very light. The position was carried in the initial assault in each case, with Japs running out of their positions in complete disorder, unable to take the concentration of fire from our heavy weapons.

WHAT ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS? From the moment our forces set foot on Attu, there was no evidence that the enemy was exercising tactical control or securing tactical intelligence by radio, nor was there any evidence of the existence or use by the enemy on Attu of radio sets of our Walkie-Talkie type. Instead, he appeared to rely chiefly on telephone communications and on runners. The enemy field telephones were good, but somewhat heavy, and permitted him code (buzzer) transmission as well as voice, while the exceedingly light weight of his single field wire and wire reel permitted him to run lines rapidly or in and over terrain with a higher intrinsic security against interruption by us.

The enemy placed strong emphasis on the disruption of our communications. Our soldiers could traverse wide areas known to be infested by enemy snipers, without receiving a single shot. Let a single soldier, stop, however, and appear to be repairing a break in a telephone line, and enemy snipers' bullets would begin to whine all around him.

[REDACTED]

In the final all-out enemy attack, bayonets severed our wires in certain areas at an average interval of 20 feet, and communications rearward were disrupted seriously and for some time. In some cases, enemy bayonets scraped the insulation from off our wires, grounding circuits. In one case, a Japanese soldier was killed, linemen finding his body stiff, both hands clutching our wire; the wire was between the dead man's tightly gritted teeth, and the insulation had been stripped off cleanly for six inches or more, shorting the circuit.

ENEMY SEEKS            Raiding parties, infiltrating groups and counterattacking  
AMERICAN ARMS        units always sought American M-1 rifles, mortars, and  
                         machine guns, with ammunition. Grenades also were taken.  
Uniformly, the raiders took our rations and ate them, and rifled haversacks, musettes, rucksacks, and personal belongings generally. They took pains to destroy as much property as possible, shooting holes low down in cooking utensils and in water, oil, and gasoline containers and tanks. They smashed one tractor magneto and sent the tractor hurtling down a steep hill. They exploded grenades to disable another tractor used to lift litter patients up about a quarter mile of steep grade opposite Cold Mountain.

No proof whatever has been found for the battlefield story that the Jap used high pitched bird call whistles to give signals, particularly prior to the all-out pre-dawn bayonet attack in Chichagof Valley, in which a number of our men were killed in their tents and sleeping bags. (There were many birds on Attu; and these supposed signal whistles undoubtedly were the true bird calls which have been heard daily on Attu at places far from both Japs and the battlefield).

Thorough night reconnaissance apparently had been made of all units attacked in the final all-out Japanese counter-attack. One of our battalions, which had continuously kept 50 per cent of its men alert at all times through each night, was not included in the counter-attack.

Terrifying yells and high pitched screams accompanied the pre-dawn attack by the Japanese. The enemy fought with fanatical fury, according to men involved in the attack. The action of the enemy, particularly, was said to resemble the fury of the Moro amok. It was obvious that the attack was made by extremely desperate, completely frustrated and highly excited men. Interrogation of medical officers and other competent observers reveals that there was no warrant whatever for the battlefield rumor that the Japs had been stimulated with sake, cocaine or marijuana cigarettes.

After enemy officers were killed in the final all-out Japanese attack, there were occasions when desperately pressed enemy soldiers, in imminent danger of death or capture, and beyond hope of inflicting further damage upon us, committed suicide. They steadfastly refused to surrender. Instead, in specific instances, the Japs would take grenades, arm them, strike them on their helmets, and blow their own bodies to bits. It was clearly and repeatedly pointed out that such suicides came when the Japs were helpless, when they were in mortal fear



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

of imminent death, and when their group was almost completely casualties and sure to be killed by our troops if they did not so suicide. Under no conditions can we expect such suicides to take place unless we put the enemy in such a desperate situation.

Even the enemy wounded could not be trusted and would not surrender. For example, two tents of wounded Japanese were found in Chichagof Valley near the beach. Our men reportedly entered, asking them to surrender and seeking to give them medical aid. They were met by flung grenades. Between answering American grenades and the Japanese grenades, the tents caught fire and burned down, some 65 Japanese being burned to death therein.

**WILL FIGHT TO DEATH--** This willingness of the enemy to fight to the death was manifested even in the cleanup period following the battle. Even when all hope was gone, the enemy was dangerous. In the thick of the battle, every pile of wounded and dead had to be examined for men feigning death, and waiting only the opportunity to snipe or throw grenades at some of our personnel, including hospital personnel seeking to give assistance. After the battle the enemy showed the same willingness to die rather than be captured, and the same intention to do all possible harm before death.

It is significant that enemy suicides occurred only when officer leadership had been destroyed. It is significant, too, that a singularly high mystical patriotic fervor appeared to have been evoked in the Japanese soldiery. The intensity of this patriotic sentiment appeared to have been so great as to banish all thought of surrender. Single of purpose, the enemy appeared to be ready to die, hoping for immortality, their thoughts fixed on the YASUKUNI Shrine, the Nipponese Valhalla. Single of purpose, the enemy apparently was determined to do or die.

**DESTROY PAPERS-** Many important papers were destroyed by the enemy. Some of these might have been of inestimable value in saving many American lives in future operations. Reports state that the enemy was observed to have been burning papers (presumably documents) for four days in Chichagof Harbor area before the final breakthrough. Despite the obvious desirability of seeking speedy contact with the enemy and maintain heavy pressure on him continuously thereafter, the enemy had time to dispose of the great files of records and the great stack of documents which certainly must have been in his Attu headquarters. Likewise, he destroyed radio tubes, smashed receiving sets, hid or broke up transmitters, damaged generators and made efforts to destroy or dispose of his radio direction finding equipment. The enemy met no barrier of fire or diverting action which could keep such valuable materials and records intact for us. Further losses occurred through the souvenir hunting and destructive activities of our own troops.

ENEMY PLANTED Singularly, the enemy planted few obstacles, if any.  
 FEW OBSTACLES No barbed wire entanglements were found at any point.  
 No water or beach areas were wired. Nowhere was our progress impeded by the use of the abattis, by hedgehogs, concertinas, entanglements, our double apron fence, or by any other device which might presumably have been employed to hold up our forces under the full heat of concentrated enemy fire. Neither was there anywhere any tank trap or tank obstacle. There was one small section of mined beach, but this was not a beach that was used in any of our landings. There were stockpiles of land mines and, on the Chichagof Valley side of the lip of Sarana Pass, a few dozen of the land mines had been put out; these mines were poorly concealed, the outlines of their holes being clear and in geometrical pattern; nobody was hurt by these mines and they were swiftly removed with no injury to anyone. Although the Japs had anticipated our attack for months, although they had had ample time to bring in wire and/or other barrier materials, and although they might have constructed barriers with material existent on Attu, no obstructions were erected.



NO BRIDGES OR ROADS-- On the negative side, however, the enemy accomplished the equivalent of constructing barriers. The probability is that the enemy regarded us as roadbound. Therefore, he built no roads and no bridges usable by our vehicles. Such trails as were constructed by the enemy would not even have served our jeeps. Our effort to push a tractor over a Jap trail resulted in the tractor's going into the gully before it even had a good start into the canyon and up the trail. The enemy's narrow paths and trails permitted him to move munitions and supplies by manpower and by his two-wheeled carts. Meantime, we obviously were without roads for our wheeled vehicles. Because the narrow-treaded Jap tractors bogged down hopelessly in the tundra, they probably presumed that we, too, would be without tractor transport.

It is probable, then, that the enemy concluded that he needed no mines for protection against our armored and power vehicles. The terrain was enemy enough, and would pin our transport to the beaches, easy targets for his fire.

Two 20mm guns were found on Massacre Beach; these might have done great damage to our landing effort. One battery of enemy light artillery, covering the beach, could have endangered our landing seriously. The enemy obviously clearly anticipated our landing on Massacre beach and he obviously had ample time to organize a beach defense there. His failure to defend at the beach and his decision, instead, to defend in the valley proper, has occasioned much speculation. Lacking any written record of what was in the mind of the defending commander, the logic of his defense plan must be found written in the pattern of the foxholes and emplacements that scar the face of Attu.

Here, on the basis of that evidence, is one possible reconstruction of the commander's plan:

The commander was persuaded that we would attack in overwhelming numbers. Our Naval artillery would first plow the northern

[REDACTED]

headlands and beaches with a terrific bombardment. To counter the succeeding landing effort, the dual purpose guns on the north side of the island must be given maximum protection. This was done, and the guns were secure against everything except direct hits. These dual purpose guns were so concentrated and so sited that no landing boat could be expected to reach shore while one gun remained to fire, with a crew to man it and ammunition on hand. The commander of Attu probably envisioned a costly landing attempt, with the remaining Americans reorganizing and seeking an easy access route of the south. With Sarana bottlenecked by a lake, Massacre would be the Americans' logical choice. It was logical to presume that no wheeled vehicle and no artillery could leave the beach. With standard Attu weather, fog and overcast would press far down the precipitous mountain slopes that box in Massacre Corridor, fog and overcast would hide the higher enemy positions while the lower positions would be obscured by perfect camouflage.

This, then, was the stage setting for the drama of defeat apparently planned for us by the Japanese commander on Attu. It involved daring and deception. It might have been another Singapore in the sense that a Jap Force defeated a large force of their enemy, thanks to shrewd terrain use.

TECHNICAL MANUAL      Reference to paragraph 142, Technical Manual 30-480,  
REVEALS ANSWERS-      will indicate the characteristics of Jap tactics as  
                                 they throw light on the probable enemy plan for the  
Attu battle. Our aerial photography, at best, would show no entrenchments, no artillery, no AA guns and no major defensive works of any sort on the south side of the backbone ridge of Attu. Only an occasional tent and a few foxholes and trails would indicate that Massacre and Sarana Valleys were outposted thinly. That, presumably, would tempt the Americans into a back-door assault on Holtz Bay and Chichagof. The few scattered soldiers who fled the beach at Massacre on our approach may have been a planned decoy to start our march up Massacre Valley. Against that march, probably, the enemy intended to use only enough frontal resistance to ensure the building up of a powerful American force. When that force should have been pocketed solidly in Massacre Valley, all the flanking machine guns and mortars would open fire, grenades and rifle fire would plunge down upon us, and the artillery at the head of Massacre-Sarana Valley would complete the job. We would be pinned to the ground and destroyed in detail by vastly inferior forces, completely hidden and with complete command of the terrain. Our own artillery, held on the beach, would be helpless to reach the inward-facing enemy positions, and any attempt to fire would sacrifice our own troops. Our aircraft would be denied access to the canyon by overcast, and could not be expected to locate or destroy the Japs even in CAVU conditions. This was to be a modern Japanese version of Cannae, with a weak and yielding center luring the Americans into a trap of deadly fire power. The flanks, most probably, were to continue completely hidden until the moment they were called into action with fatal surprise.

Meantime, just to meet the possibility that American Naval fire and air bombardment might knock out the dual purpose batteries on the north side, and in the event that a beach landing actually was

[REDACTED]

possible, the enemy had prepared almost innumerable positions flanking the beach and facing inward and to the rear. In Holtz Bay, behind the most inviting landing beaches, the Jap apparently had prepared four successive lines of resistance, with a final defensive line at the valley head. There, too, the logic of prepared positions indicated a probable intention of sucking into a trap as many troops as could not be destroyed in the water or on the beach, and bringing all-round fire to bear upon them from positions unseen from the air and protected from Naval bombardment.

That would have been Cannae up-to-date. It would have used the enemy's favorite tactic of deception. It would have caused the Americans to accomplish their own envelopment. It would have had some of the characteristics of the meeting engagement, so highly favored by the enemy. The plan met some slight success initially where our troops failed to initiate promptly fire and movement tactics and outflank or failed to get above the Jap resistance. The plan was frustrated completely where we did the unexpected, and where our troops employed fire and movement, seized and retained the initiative, and employed energetic combat leadership and the prompt occupation of dominating terrain features.

SUMMING UP:

The enemy is tough, but we are tougher.

The enemy's tactics are good, but our tactics will lick him if we'll stick to our time-and-battle-tested doctrines.

The enemy's weapons are good, but not as good as ours, and our weapons will defeat him if we use them aggressively and in close support of our infantry.

The enemy will fight to the death.

The enemy is wily and deceitful, but is thrown completely off balance if we discover his plan and take action he does not expect.

The enemy's individual marksmanship is bad. We can outshoot him, man for man, rifle for rifle.

# WEAPONS

WHAT THE JAP  
USED ON ATTU-  
HOW HE USED IT

The Jap on Attu was well-armed.

His small arms were good and abundant, with ammunition in excellent quality and ample quantity, properly and adequately dispersed.

His AA artillery was good, in siting, in protective emplacement, and in rate, range and character of fire.

The following weapons were found in varying quantity:

Revolver.

Pistol, automatic (GI and private purchase).

Two handed sword (an imitation of an ancient Japanese Samurai sword).

Hand grenade (model 97, time fuse).

Grenade discharger (knee mortar), 50mm, model 89 and model 10. Model 89 grenades for grenade discharger.

Pyrotechnic grenades for above.

Smoke grenades for above.

Rifle, Arisaka, pattern 38, M 1905, 6.5mm.

Rifle, M 1919, 7.7mm.

Bayonet.

Rifles, British Enfield (a few only).

Light machine gun, 6.5mm, type 96.

Light machine gun, 7.7mm, type 99.

Heavy machine gun, 7.7mm, type 92.

Machine gun, British Vickers, .303 calibre type.

Machine gun, Lewis type, aircraft, 7.7mm (1 only).

Boys (British) anti-tank rifles, .56 calibre (2 only).

Mines, combination anti-tank and anti-personnel, pressure detonated.

Mines, magnetic anti-tank (also useful as high power demolition and anti-personnel grenades).

Bangalore torpedoes (steel case).

Mortar, barrage, 70mm, for general area bombardment, discharging parachute-borne cylinders filled with tetryl, booby trap type.

Antiaircraft Gun, 20mm, Oerlikon type, used as dual purpose artillery; HE and AP ammunition for 20mm gun.

Gun, 25mm, not found, but quantities of ammunition indicate that such materiel may have been on Attu, may have been expected, may have been on vessel sunk or turned back en route, or that the ammunition was intended for Kiska and unloaded at Attu through necessity or in error.

Gun, infantry rapid-fire, model 94, 37mm, with AP and HE ammunition.

Ammunition, 47mm, AP.

Howitzer, infantry battalion, model 92, 70mm, with HE ammunition.

Gun, 75mm mountain, model 41 (1908), infantry regimental gun, with HE and AP projectiles.

Gun, 75mm antiaircraft, model 88, with mobile mount, with HE projectiles.

Enemy officers on Attu commonly carried either the pattern 26 (1893) Smith and Wesson Type 9mm calibre revolver or a Mauser or Luger type automatic pistol of about 8mm calibre. The revolver used a lead bullet while the pistol used a cupro-nickel jacketed slug, following our own practice. Pistols and revolvers were found in about equal numbers. One very small automatic pistol, estimated to be about 5mm or .2 calibre, was found; this apparently was private property and not GI.


**SAMURAI SWORD--** None of the standard cavalry sabers were found on Attu. However, officers generally were equipped with the two-handed Samurai sword, usually of excellent steel and superior workmanship, with highly ornamental hilt. This sword had a thick, narrow, long curved blade, almost razor sharp. Some of those captured on Attu apparently were made by hand and showed the characteristic light longitudinal lines resulting from the hand-hammering of the steel into paper thin sheets and folding them to form a blade. This weapon, the enemy officer's dearest possession, was reported on a number of occasions to have been wielded in daring suicide charges by small groups of madly yelling enemy soldiers.

**GRENADES DANGEROUS** Large quantities of Jap hand grenades were captured in the Attu operation. These were described on the shipping containers as model 97, but were, in general, identical in appearance with the model 91 hand grenade described on page 103, Technical Manual 30-480. The grenades found on Attu had an additional safety feature, which was not found on the earlier grenades. This consisted in a small, fairly loosely set screw under the cap; on removing from the packing case the screw had to be turned through about 180° before the grenade could be armed.

The grenades came in bulky paper packages enclosed in wooden chests; the package and the shining black bole of the grenade made them easily distinguishable against the tundra. The grenades weighed about a pound each, were about two inches in diameter, stood about four inches in overall height, and contained a bursting charge of two ounces of TNT. The base section was of serrated, waffle-like cast iron.

The safety pin of the grenade was attached by a cord wrapped around a protecting cap. To operate the grenade, the cord was slipped off, the safety pin was withdrawn, and the head of the ignition tube was struck sharply against the helmet or a rock. Striking the grenade on the helmet left the right arm in perfect position to start a throw without delay. The fuse had a delayed action of 4 to 5 seconds. American soldiers and officers who threw the grenade merely after pulling the safety pin (as they would with our own) sometimes found the enemy picking

# HAND GRENADE, FRAGMENTATION TYPE 97 (1937)




## ASSEMBLY

- ① SERRATED BODY.
- ② FUZE.
- ③ FUZE COVER.
- ④ COTTER PIN.
- ⑤ SCREW TOP FIRING PIN.
- ⑥ BREATHER HOLE.

## OPERATION

- a. SCREW DOWN FIRING PIN.
- b. PULL COTTER PIN.
- c. HIT FUZE SHARPLY ON HELMET OR OTHER HARD SURFACE.
- d. THROW. APPROXIMATELY FOUR TO FIVE SECOND DELAY UNTIL DETONATION.



PACKING CASE

up the grenades and striking them and throwing them back with telling effect.

A sharp blow, ordinarily, is required to set the fuse burning in train. Many grenades were tested by our troops without successful ignition and explosion; it is believed that the failures were due to failure to discover the screw safety feature under the cap and/or to fail to strike the head sharply enough.

Particularly in the Holtz Bay area, quantities of the grenades were found scattered about with safety pins withdrawn; it is believed that the enemy planned these as booby traps which might be set off by the feet of our troops.

Ordnance officers reported that the fragmentation effect of the model 97 grenade was slight, and that the fuse tube and cap were likely to be the only parts to be found with serious fragmentation hazard. The rest of the grenade, they reported, was likely to be reduced to powder by the intense blast. The most telling evidence of the terrific explosive power of the grenade was revealed to our troops when they found the bodies of enemy soldiers who had died by their own grenades; many bodies were found with the viscera almost completely blown away, and only the spinal column, the back half of the ribs and possibly the tough muscular structure of the heart still remaining of the trunks of men exposed to the grenade blast at close range.

No stick or potato masher type grenades were reported found on Attu. No gas grenades were reported found.

**HEAVY GRENADE  
THROWER COMMON** The enemy weapon which excited most attention on Attu, perhaps, was the heavy grenade thrower, Model 89, often miscalled "knee mortar." This was a rifled weapon with a 10-inch barrel, highly portable, and quite accurate in the hands of a trained and expert grenadier. Our own ordnance personnel have since developed surprising accuracy with the weapon.

The characteristics of the weapon are exactly as reported on pages 101 and 102, Technical Manual 30-480. One improvement over previously described models was noted: a small levelling device was attached at the right side of the breech, permitting a constant angle of fire. A line engraved (and filled with enamel) provided a line of sight for aiming. The range was varied by turning a knurled knob at the right of and below the tube; this raised or lowered the firing mechanism, varying the duration of time and the distance through which the propelling charge acted on the projectile, and also increasing the size of the combustion chamber.

This improved model of grenade thrower (sometimes called Model 10) had a projectile with a broad copper expansion-rotating band. Small openings from the propellant charge permit the expanding gas to drive the copper well into the eight grooves of the rifling, thereby effectively sealing compression and limiting blowby past the projectile.



[REDACTED]

While the grenade thrower was calibrated up to 650 meters (700 yards) for the Model 89 shell, the range for the smoke grenade and signal pyrotechnics was not over 200 yards.

A second grenade thrower with the same general structural characteristics was found on Attu. This was not rifled, and the range was controlled by a variable port opening in the base. It appeared to be calibrated up to 220 yards. The one advantage of this discharger was its compactness and lightness, the base and shaft telescoping within the tube.

The grenade thrower was used effectively against the enemy by our troops. It proved to be the most easily portable weapon of its kind in the rugged Attu terrain, and the weapon and a generous supply of ammunition could be carried by one man. There were 12 grenade throwers seen, but indications are that they were more numerous. 2nd Lt William E. Winterstein, Ordnance Intelligence, reported that souvenir hunting, apparently reduced the number of these weapons available for training, reissue to troops and analytical study. Lt. Winterstein found this weapon very popular with all of our troop commanders who were questioned about its tactical use. There were not enough weapons captured to supply the demand, and indications were that many units desired similar weapons of our own issue.

The ammunition for the heavy grenade thrower was of the instantaneous impact fuse type only, and no 7-second delay timed fuse ammunition was reported. The heavy grenades come packed 20 per box in natural wood boxes while the accompanying fuses are packed 100 per box in flat wood boxes which are painted black. (Almost all Jap fuses, except 25mm, come in flat black wooden boxes.)

JAPANESE RIFLES GOOD

Jap rifles found on Attu were generally only good in design and workmanship. In general, they were new and in good condition. The inherent accuracy of the weapons were good, the sighting equipment was poor, and the Jap marksmanship bad.

A number of M 1905 Mauser type Arisaka rifles were found. These were the rifles referred to somewhat slightly by newspaper correspondents in the Southwest Pacific and in the Philippines as being not much more than a child's toy. Attu experience indicated that the .256 calibre nickel-steel bullet, at its high velocity, probably was as accurate as the 7.7mm bullet now apparently rapidly replacing it. The new size slug, only one-fifth larger in diameter, weighs about 50 per cent more. Reports state that the 6.5 does about equally serious damage when it hits some vital point, but that the slender, high velocity slug can cause flesh wounds with relatively less tissue destruction, shock and hemorrhage.

The rifle most commonly found on Attu was the 7.7mm M1919 (about .303 calibre), taking five cartridges in a clip. The bolt had been modified and the stock shortened to fit the Japanese physique. This

weapon has a considerable striking power. A stock of new 7.7s was found in original packages in the ordnance warehouse in West Arm, Holtz Bay, but no 6.5s were found; this probably indicated the intention of the enemy to replace the old 6.5 with 7.7s. Small numbers of carbines, both of the cavalry and 7.7mm type, were found, as were also a few British Enfield (.30 calibre) rifles, possibly captured at Hong Kong or Singapore.

Enemy rifles had a light steel wire support which was hinged to the rifle at the lower band. This unfolded to serve as a rest, presumably, to stabilize the piece in firing, but practically appeared to be of no use whatever, and apparently had been lost or removed from many of the rifles.

The sighting arrangements of enemy rifles were generally crude and inherently tending to inaccurate fire. There was no automatic correction for drift. There was no correction for windage. Both windage and drift corrections had to be applied by guess. There was, however, a novel arrangement of "leading leaves" by which the rifles could easily take a predetermined lead on airplanes flying within range.

Ammunition for the 6.5mm rifle and 6.5mm light machine gun were packed in wedge-shaped cardboard containers containing 3 clips each, the clips being spaced by cardboard separators. This ammunition was packed 1440 rounds per case. Ammunition for the 7.7mm rifle and light machine gun came packed similarly but 1380 rounds per case. The 7.7 ammunition was not interchangeable with the strip ammunition used in the heavy machine guns, and could not be used in our M 1903 or M1 rifles or machine guns.

Enemy small arms ammunition, not being sealed in tin cans like ours, suffers from exposure to moisture. Cartridges from cases left in the open were found to have been covered with moisture. This did not seem to impair the functioning of the cartridges, although the brass cases were discolored and slight rust was found on the steel spring of the clip. The high quality laquer used in seating the primer and ball apparently prevents any moisture from leaking into the cartridge case. In a test, a clip of five 7.7mm cartridges was submerged in water; after 72 hours the cartridges were taken from the water and fired without any ill effects due to submergence being noted on the firing qualities of the cartridges. The smokeless qualities of the Jap power were superior and no visible signs of smoke were noted. The powder also was almost completely flashless.

All of the enemy shoulder weapons, including the light machine gun, were equipped to take the dagger-bayonet, about 18 inches in length. Great emphasis is placed by the enemy upon the spiritual and physical superiority of the aggressive, and upon the use of cold steel. This bayonet has a peculiar outward-facing hook. This hook is known to be used in stacking arms, but some sources insist that it is used in a special bayonet technique. This technique seeks to hook the rifle and/or bayonet of the adversary, preventing the latter's use of his weapon and then, with a thrust and twist sequence, wrenching the adversary's rifle

from his hands. The adversary's rifle, presumably, drops to the ground, leaving the Jap with bayonet in hand to deal with his disarmed enemy. Two soldiers on Attu were reported to have been so disarmed, but definitive proof is needed.

**JAP LIGHT MACHINE GUN**      The only light enemy machine guns found on Attu were the 6.5mm, type 96, and one of almost identical construction except for the 7.7mm bore. The 7.7mm size (called Type 99) appeared to be more generally in use than the 6.5mm type. This gun appears to be patterned generally after the French Hotchkiss light machine gun, and to incorporate several features of the British Bren. (A complete description is found on page 95, TM 30-480). This gun is air-cooled, gas-operated, and fed from a magazine which clips on top of the breech and resembles an arc (about one-eighth) of a circle. This gun, in one or the other caliber, was believed to have been used in the Attu operation on the basis of at least one gun per squad, probably substantially more. The gun, weighing less than 20 pounds, proved light and easy to manhandle over the precipitous mountain terrain. It had a carrying handle mid-barrel, plus a shoulder sling attached to the butt stock and to the gas-cylinder bracket; these features permitted the gun to be fired from the hip and may have given rise to the rumor that the Jap had a "Tommy" gun. The gun also could be fitted with a bayonet, but the attachment for the bayonet was substantially below the muzzle; this positioning and the weight of the weapon reduced the possible effective use of this gun in bayonet fighting to about nil. The gun frequently was found with a flash hider. The gun's light attached bipod mount gave this gun a low silhouette. The bipod, however, had no adjustment for height. The gun was found equipped with both telescopic and open sights. While the magazines held about 30 rounds each, our soldiers reported that the gun commonly was fired in bursts of four, sometimes three, rounds. Ammunition was fed into the clip-loader magazine hopper by hand.


Some reports, still unverified, stated that the enemy had a few guns of the Nambu, gas-operated, air-cooled, hopper-fed type. The reports stated that this gun differed from the type 96 and type 99 in that it almost invariably was fired from the prone position. This gun, too, was reported to have a low silhouette, which, with the use of a flash-hider and the almost flashless and smokeless powder used by the enemy, made it extremely difficult to pick up visually on the high ground on which it usually was emplaced.

Lewis (aircraft) type drum-fed machine guns and Bren type guns, both of .303 calibre, were reported found in very small quantity. Ammunition drums for the Lewis type guns were found in the Holtz Bay area, where enemy planes had been destroyed some months prior to the operation. One belt-fed, water-cooled, British Vickers type .303 machine gun also was found.

Second in numbers only to the types 99 and 96 guns, and believed to have been in use on the basis of at least one gun per platoon, were the Model 92 heavy machine guns, described on page 98, TM 30-480. This was a strip-fed, air-cooled, gas-operated modified Hotchkiss, with


# LIGHT MACHINE GUN TYPE 96 (1936)

CALIBER 303 (7.7MM.)  
GAS OPERATED  
EFFECTIVE RANGE  
PROBABLY ABOUT 500YDS.



FULL AUTOMATIC. CAN BE FIRED  
SINGLE SHOT ONLY BY FANNING  
THE TRIGGER.

THIS WEAPON IS ALSO MADE  
WITH 6.5MM. (256 CALIBER)  
BARREL AND SUITABLE  
MAGAZINE.



██████████

rugged fixed mount, generous angles of elevation and depression, and 360 degrees of traverse. Large quantities of ammunition for this gun were found, well dispersed to points of tactical utility. The ammunition was found both in chests and carried by gunners. Thirty rounds of .303 ammunition (not interchangeable with that used for the light model 99 MG) would be fastened in a brass strip, every sixth round being a tracer. The clips are packed in chests containing 600 rounds each. Despite its weight (over 60 pounds) the heavy machine gun could be man-handled into all sorts of terrain, the air-cooling making for simplicity and ease of transport. No case was reported in which the gun was overheated; this supports the comment of Military Intelligence Service Information Bulletin No. 16, page 65, stating that "the gun can fire 3,000 to 3,500 rounds continuously before becoming overheated."

Two only British Boys anti-tank rifles, .56 calibre, were reported captured; these may have been captured at Singapore or Hong-Kong.

ENEMY LIKES                      Unconsciously, the Jap paid high tribute to our M-1  
OUR M-1 RIFLE                    rifle. Repeated reports indicate that, in their final  
   desperate charges, the Japs showed no fear of our car-  
bines, but dropped to earth when they saw and heard our M-1 rifles in  
action. The Japs, raiding our areas, stole M-1 rifles from in front of  
hospital relay station tents and elsewhere whenever possible.

Two types of enemy mines were found on Attu. A few were found installed on one Holtz Bay beach, but, for the most part, they were found in quantity and unused, dispersed from the junction of Massacre and Chichagof Valleys down to the shores of Holtz Bay.

ENEMY USES                      The most common type of mine was circular, flat, brown or  
LAND MINES                      brown-grey in color, and about 6½ inches in diameter. This  
   type of mine was believed to contain four blocks of TNT or  
tetryl-type explosive. This mine looked like a pair of pie plates put to-  
gether, convex sides out. This mine had a brass fuse cap in the top cen-  
ter; this fuse cap had to be removed, a safety collar taken out, and the  
fuse cap returned before the mine was armed. A weight of 35 pounds or  
more on the fuse cap would break a shear pin and set the fuse going.  
While TM 30-480 reports that the shear pin "is so strong that a light  
sedan can be driven over the mine field without detonating any mine".  
However, the mines may be, and were, used against personnel, and direct  
pressure of one man's foot can set off the mine. The advanced medical  
relay station at the foot of the tractor-stretcher lift at the head of  
Sarana and Chichagof valleys reported one sergeant mortally wounded and  
with one leg left hanging by shreds of flesh only, when the sergeant  
stepped on a mine of this type. Several reports said that these mines  
were left about Jap quarters as booby traps.

# TANK MINE - TYPE 93 (1933)




## 雷地車戰式三九

### ASSEMBLY


- ① UPPER MINE COVER.
- ② LOWER MINE COVER (1 & 2 SCREW TOGETHER.)
- ③ CARRYING RINGS & ROPE.
- ④ THREADS TO RECEIVE SAFETY CAP
- ⑤ SAFETY WASHER.
- ⑥ FUZE, WITH FUZE SAFETY CAP REMOVED.
- ⑦ FUZE SAFETY CAP.
- ⑧ CRUSHER CAP.

### OPERATION

- a. UNSCREW CRUSHER CAP.
- b. REMOVE SAFETY WASHER.
- c. UNSCREW FUZE SAFETY CAP
- d. REPLACE CRUSHER CAP.
- e. MINE WILL NOW FUNCTION UNDER ABOUT 35 LBS. PRESSURE



TYPE 93 (1933) TANK MINE  
20 PER BOX, IRON MADE.



PACKING CASE

MAGNETIC  
TANK MINE

One of the most interesting new munitions found on Attu was the Model 99 Magnetic Mine, obviously designed for use against tanks or any steel or iron object, but additionally extremely powerful and effective as an anti-personnel grenade, particularly effective in enclosures.

The Mine consists of eight blocks of tetryl type explosive. These fit together to form a circular unit about 5 inches in diameter and about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches in thickness. These are sewn into a neat OD cloth bag around the edge of which are four high saturation cobalt alloy magnets, each about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  X  $7/8$  X  $1\frac{1}{4}$  inches in size. In a test, a single magnet suspended the entire weight of mine and fuse ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  lbs) from a vertical surface, two magnets held the weight against substantial jarring, while all four magnets held the mine against the metal surface with a strong grip that obviously would take vigorous shock to dislodge. The block construction of the explosive charge, plus the flexible cloth envelope, permits the mine to conform to irregular contours, such as the side or belly of a tank or over a stud or bolt.

A push or pressure-type fuse comes with each mine, and is enclosed in a tin container encased with the mine in an OD cloth cover about 2 X 6 X 7 inches in size. This fuse is inserted in a hole in the side of the mine, and the actuating mechanism projects about two inches.

To operate the mine, the fuse is inserted in the explosive, a small safety cotter pin is withdrawn from the fuse shank, and the outer sleeve is pushed down sharply. This releases the striker and discharges the primer. Immediately a small breather hole in the side of the fuse will start "spitting" flame and smoke from the black powder delay pellet. Ignition will be marked by a small sharp crack such as a .22 caliber primer makes, followed by a very slight hissing sound from the burning delay pellet. There is nothing that can be done to stop the action now, and explosion ensues within 6 or 7 seconds.

Enemy sources rate this mine very high, according to an effect extending 3 meters in depth and over a radius of 8 meters.

The principal use of this mine is against tanks, armored cars and for the demolition of metal objects, such as steel landing boats, tractors, etc. However, it is very readily convertible into a personnel mine and as a booby trap. By placing the mine on edge in a shallow hole, with board or brush over the fuse shank, it can be set off by slight pressure from a passing footfall or a vehicle.

Easily and simply usable by our own troops, this mine can be recognized by the fact that it comes packed 20 in a rope-handled box 23 X 15 X 17 inches in size. This box, in turn, contains ten smaller boxes, 6 X 8 X 15 inches. Each smaller box contains two mines in OD cloth containers.

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# ARMOR PENETRATION MINE TYPE 99 (1933)


## 九九式破石甲爆雷

### MAGNETIC MINE

#### ASSEMBLY

1. CLOTH COVER
2. FUZE
3. COTTER PIN & STRING
4. MAGNETS
5. CLOTH MAGNET HOLDER
6. SEALING PLUG
7. FUZE CONTAINER
8. MINE CARRIER

*Dotted lines indicate shape of blocks of explosives*




#### OPERATION


- a. PULL COTTER PIN
- b. PRESS FUZE IN
- c. THROW AGAINST METAL TARGET. FUZE DELAYED ABOUT 5 SECONDS.

*Type 99 armor penetrating mine*

LEGEND  
PREF. 12 FT. FULL DELAYED ABOUT 5 SECONDS.



20 each



PACKING CASE

*Full load. Approximately 44 kilograms*



██████████

BANGALORE TORPEDOES For the first time on any front (it is believed) Bangalore torpedoes of steel, designated as Type 99 Demolition Tubes, were found. Hitherto bamboo tubes had been used to contain the explosive.

BOOBY TRAP PROJECTOR Early in the Attu operation, reports came in from the Holtz Bay area that the enemy had sown booby traps. These were explosive cylinders of steel, about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  inches long by 1 inch in diameter. They were attached to rice paper parachutes. Two cases were reported of men seriously injured, one when he picked up one of the cylinders and the other when he swung the chute around his head in an effort to toss it into the air.


The mystery was partly cleared up with the finding of a crude new mortar, called a barrage mortar, for bombardment of areas. The mortar consisted of a tube about 70mm in diameter and 4 ft in length, screwed into a base plate and bolted to a wooden block 10 X 8 X 12 inches in size. A steel rod about 18 inches in length projected downward from the opposite face of the wood block. Elevation and depression were achieved by changing the angle at which the rod was pegged into the ground. No range control device of any sort was noted.

The ammunition, packed 10 rounds in a box, consisted of cylindrical shells, about a foot in length, painted black and covered with a nose-cap of rounded wood. The propelling charge was contained in the base, with no increments to add. The shell, when fired, burst in midair, releasing six of the parachute-borne steel tubes mentioned above. The tubes were loaded with nitro-starch and were detonated by means of a very sensitive pull-ignitor string fuse. The effective range of the mortar, its probable tactical value and other data are being checked at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Troops should be warned not to touch any such parachutes or containers, as those found on Attu were highly dangerous. Identical munitions, tested at Fort Ord, were so water-soaked that they proved harmless.

OERLIKON TYPE 20MM AA GUNS- A relatively large number of 20mm Oerlikon type dual purpose (AA and surface targets) guns were found on Attu. These guns closely resembled the Swiss weapon but were made at the Osaka Arsenal. They held clips of 20 rounds each, and the typical ammunition used was one round of AP with tracer to one round of HE. Generous stores of ammunition for this weapon were scattered over the island. A number of extra barrels were found, badly split or with portions of the muzzle blown off, indicating that the ammunition was not bore-safe. The ammunition was notable in that it has an exceptionally large propellant case. This case was nearly twice the diameter of that used in our own 20mm ammunition, and probably had from two to three times as much propellant powder as our 20mm ammunition.

Ammunition for a 25mm gun was found, in quantity, on the beach of the West Arm of Holtz Bay. The anchor stamped on the base of the shell case indicated that the ammunition was for a naval gun. No gun to fit the ammunition was found, however. This may indicate (a) that the

# JAP "BARRAGE MORTAR"



[REDACTED]

ammunition was intended for naval units still to have come, (b) that such materiel was planned for installation on Attu and had not arrived, or (c) that the ammunition actually was intended for Kiska, but was unloaded on Attu when it became impossible for the carrying ship to reach the ultimate destination.

Much ammunition was captured which apparently was intended for the 37mm Japanese Infantry rapid-fire gun, model 94. One observer reported at least one of these guns in the saddle at the Massacre-Sarana Valley juncture, opposing our forces driving up the Massacre Valley. The ammunition had unusually long cartridge cases in proportion to the shell proper, and its use was marked by a clear, very sharp report, a high muzzle velocity and a flat trajectory. This tallies with the TM 30-480 description, which ascribes to it "an exceptionally loud sharp report, a strong muzzle blast, and little smoke during fire." Both AP and HE ammunition were used.

**JAP HOWITZER  
MOVED EASILY** One of the Jap weapons most readily maneuverable in the difficult terrain of Attu was the Infantry battalion howitzer, model 92. Several of these weapons were captured, one being in condition for proof firing. The steep angles of departure of this weapon made it highly desirable for operation from defiladed reverse slopes, while its sharply steeper angles of fall made it excellent for seeking out adjacent terrain compartments in the deep canyons of Attu. Its light weight (420 lbs for mounted howitzer and caisson) made it possible to manhandle the gun over streams, across tundra, up forbidding gradients. The 70mm ammunition was semi-fixed and used variable propelling charges, and many powder increments were captured, enclosed in their circular envelopes of oiled blue paper. Large stocks of fuses were captured; these fuses were interchangeable and usable in the ammunition for the 75mm regimental gun.

At least three of the 75mm mountain guns, model 41 (1908) (regimental gun), were found. One observer reported that two guns he examined were not the standard model 41, in that they had sliding (Krupp type) breech blocks instead of the interrupted screw swinging block type reported standard for these guns. The enemy removed the breech blocks from two of the weapons before vacating his positions. Two demountable shafts were provided, the shafts mortising to the outside of the trails for horse draft.

All ammunition for the 75mm mountain gun was of the contact fuse type, and both armor piercing and HE ammunition were found, the latter being in substantially larger quantities. Some of the ammunition was equipped with tracer. The ammunition all was of the fixed type, with an exceptionally large projectile and an unusually short propellant case. The ammunition came in 2-round and 4-round cases. The fuses came packed with the shells in the 2-round cases, but packed separately---in distinctive black, flat wood fuse boxes---for shells in the 4-round cases.



20 MM DUAL PURPOSE GUN

A number of these guns were found on ATTU. Also found were many extra barrels, badly split or with parts of the muzzle blown off, indicating that the ammunition was not boresafe. Clips held 20 rounds, usually alternating HE, AP and tracer. Personnel dugouts often were closely attached.



75 MM AA GUN, MODEL 88

Fourteen of these guns were found on ATTU. Name plates said "7 cm" but the bores measured 75 mm. HE projectiles were used, with 30-second fuse train. Emplacements were 18 to 20 ft inside diameter and 5 ft deep, with ammunition storages and personnel dugouts immediately adjoining.

ANTI-AIRCRAFT  
ARTILLERY----

Enemy AA artillery on Attu was good in siting, in protective emplacement, and in rate, range and character of fire. It inflicted battle damage on our planes many times. All were of the 75mm M 88 (1928) mobile mount type. Eleven guns were noted in the Holtz Bay area, 6 in the West Arm and 5 in the East Arm, while an additional battery was emplaced in Chichagof Harbor. All were of the sliding breechblock type, used HE shell exclusively, and had a continuous pull firing mechanism.

Although the altitude and lead scale plates on the sides of these guns described them at 7cm, the projectile and bore of the tube measured 75mm. The tube measured 10.2 ft in length. The model 90 AA pointed shell with HE bursting charge was used, and came packed without fuse in boxes of two and four rounds. A 30-second combination time fuse, model 89, was used, giving point detonation as well as time effect. The fuses were packed separately in distinctive black flat wood boxes, 24 to the box. Apparently ammunition was shipped with propelling charge, booster and fuse in separate units. About 200 ft back of the AA position in the West Arm was an ammunition loading room where shells were found in the process of assembly to the shell case by means of a hand operated machine. Some of the projectiles had not only a copper bourrellet (reducing wear on the lands) but also had a double copper rotating band, indicating that the enemy apparently had an ample supply of copper. No steel cartridge cases were noted.

In no case did the enemy AA artillery appear to have on-carriage fire control equipment to synchronize the traverse or elevation of one gun with others, as in our own director system.

The enemy AA guns, in traveling position, were mounted on two rubber-tired wheels and were so well balanced as to be moved easily by one man in effecting connection with a prime mover. The wheels were taken off and five spider legs were unfolded when the gun was put in the firing position.

A new three meter base stereoscopic height and range finder was found complete in its case behind the gun position on the first high dune in from the beach on the West Arm of Holtz Bay; this apparently was in excellent working order and entirely undamaged in the Japanese retreat. Another range-finder, of about two-meter base, was found in damaged condition at the site of the anti-aircraft battery on the first dune above the Chichagof Harbor beach.

Several pairs of 10-cm anti-aircraft binoculars were captured at the AA installations.

All AA guns had night lighting devices and a buzzer system operating from storage cells.

No enemy bombs were found.

SUMMING UP:

The Jap on Attu was well-armed. He had good small arms,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

in ample quantity. He was heavily armed with automatic weapons of highly portable, highly practical design, well fitted to the problem. His grenade discharger was an excellent weapon, well used. His artillery ranged from good to excellent for the purposes it served; as always, the fault was that there wasn't enough of it and the larger calibers were lacking entirely. The Jap was lavish in the use of materials which are scarcity items with us. Enemy use of mines was poor and unimaginative, but his mines were good to excellent.

It was obvious that the Jap intended to protect and support his infantry. Therefore, he got the weapons that would do just that and pushed them up where they could be most useful.

# HEALTH

## HOW JAPANESE SOLDIERS ON ATTU FARED IN GARRISON AND DURING THE BATTLE

"TAKE NO CHANCES" THE RED CROSS shone against its white field on the medical pouch of the Japanese hospital corps non-com. He was dead. His body lay near the saddle between Sarana and Massacre Valleys, at the high water mark of desperate Japanese counter attack, almost within reach of the American artillery which the enemy had been told to sieze and turn upon us. He obviously had been in the enemy wave that had swept across and around our Chichagof Corridor positions in the darkness before that Aleutian dawn, then on across the head of Sarana Valley.

The Red Cross on the medical pouch was not the symbol of healing and non-combatant care in this instance, however. Other weapons lay about on the steel-pocked tundra, but none of these could be fixed definitely as having been in the hands of the dead medico in that last mad break-through. However, the pouch with the Red Cross insignia told its own story: the pouch was stripped of bandages and antiseptics and morphine, the pouch was jammed with the small, black, serrated iron cylinders of Type 91 hand grenades, each loaded with 2 ounces of TNT. There was no one to testify that the Jap hospital non-com had thrown grenades, but the medical pouch was strapped to his body, the pouch was open, and he had been killed in the course of an effort to take our positions.

Below, in the blood-reddened marshes of the upper Sarana Valley, lay a Japanese medical officer, killed in the breakthrough attempt. Around him, too, and within reach, were weapons and grenades. He bore none of his healing drugs or gear.

Behind them, in a dressing station barabara on the trail between Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor, were the bodies of 18 dead patients, assertedly slain by the enemy doctors to prevent their capture, dead or alive. In his little office at the rear lay the body of a young Japanese doctor who had died there instead of joining the last mad drive. The doctor's face was covered by a knit helmet, his body was composed neatly on the floor, and a pistol bullet neatly let into the base of his skull had set a period to his last job.

These three instances probably could be multiplied many times. They were observed by one officer. They are believed to be representative. The conclusion that must be drawn is this, that, no matter what orders ostensibly governed the conduct of Japanese medical personnel, they were armed, they were competent in the use of arms, and, in emergency, they joined the combatant troops and actually were combatant.

In general, the enemy practice on ATTU appeared to be for the medical personnel to go armed lightly, the enlisted men carrying bayonets and the officers carrying pistols. In only one case (the one mentioned) was a soldier or officer reported as wearing a Red Cross or other identifying insignia, presumably because the Red Cross could

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be seen clearly at a distance and (parallel to the apparent Japanese practice) would provide a desirable target for our fire.

WOUNDED GET            American wounded, helpless and disarmed, could expect  
COUP DE GRACE        no consideration from the enemy in the battle of Attu.  
No fine distinctions deterred the enemy. Repeated testimony indicates that the enemy considered our collecting stations a particularly desirable target for attack. Not only were our dressing stations lightly protected, if at all, but they usually had a stack of fine American arms, taken from casualties cleared to points rearward. And, in our dressing stations, no resistance was to be expected from wounded soldiers, hospital personnel, or from any chaplain who chanced to stay with the threatened casualties. Bayonets stabbed through pup tents to kill unarmed medical personnel, trapped in their sleeping bags. Bullets sieved through the pyramidal tents of medical relay stations. Repeated testimony indicates that the enemy singled out stretcher bearers for his fire, and even waited for stretcher bearers to come to pick up casualties. Enemy wounded, too, met mercy with treachery; from Chichagof Harbor there comes the report that grenade blasts met American hospital personnel who sought to enter two Japanese hospital tents to give aid to some 65 enemy wounded. This parallels the story from North Africa, to the effect that medical orderlies who sought to treat German casualties lost their arms by booby traps.

The overall conclusion is that the Japanese, on Attu, regarded their own medical men as combatants, and that they expected that we, too, would use our medical personnel as fighting men. The conclusion stands that the Japanese, on Attu, gave no mercy to our wounded, and that they could not conceive that any mercy (much less, competent medical care) would be given to Japanese wounded by us. The conclusion further stands that we dare not take any chances in our dealings with Japanese wounded or with Japanese medical personnel, but must take precautionary measures always in dealing with either enemy group.

DISEASES            The possibility of infection of our men by some Oriental  
ON ATTU            disease (or even by some less exotic ailment) becomes a  
                      matter of concern with the occupation of Attu by American  
troops.

Prior to the battle, there apparently were no lice on Attu in quantity sufficient to be a problem. After the battle began the lice appeared, probably due to enemy relaxation of sanitary discipline. The lice were destroyed by boiling clothing. There continues a possible hazard in infestations of enemy clothing, blankets or installations, with the hazard of lice-borne diseases being added to the discomfort of the itchy vermin. Enemy shelters in Holtz Bay have been found clean and uninfested, and have been used by our troops without any resultant infestation.

Typhus, apparently, was a major preoccupation with the enemy, and special precautions were taken when symptoms suggested the possibility of the disease. One source indicates that there had been an



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outbreak of paratyphoid on the island, and the stock of gastrointestinal medications, especially aberry powder, suggests that symptoms of this kind may have been common. Measles apparently were unknown. It is believed that one case of mumps occurred, the victim having been sent back to Japan. An outbreak of dysentery was known to have occurred, after which water and messkits were boiled and creosote administered (as also for paratyphoid). While the enemy is known to have water purifying tablets, none are known to have been on Attu. Two water purifying units were captured, but these had been broken or partly dismantled, and apparently were not used. Prior to general activity along Attu ridges, the snow water could have been expected to be pure.

No cases of nervous disease were believed to have been noted and evacuated, but one man, called "aeroplane crazy", was believed to have been regarded as a mental case.

Nearly all of the enemy on Attu suffered from fungus infections of the feet; these foot infections were treated with alcohol and salicylic acid. Prior to the American attack there were no known cases of frost-bitten feet, but several cases were known to have existed after the start of the battle. Cases of snow blindness also were reported, although snow goggles of black cloth mesh were issued to enemy troops to reduce glare hazards.

**TUBERCULOSIS** Many of the Japanese troops apparently suffered from  
**COMMON-----** tuberculosis, and it is believed that from 25 to 30 of  
the enemy per month, on the average, were sent back to  
Japan from Attu because of pneumonia, chest ailments and stomach troubles,  
especially dysentery.

Japanese soldiers on Attu, in general, appeared to have kept their hair trimmed neatly at all times, and to have kept their beards well trimmed, although this appeared to have been a matter for control by battalion commanders.

Because of the absence of women on Attu, inspections for venereal disease obviously were unnecessary there. The Japanese Army usually has a monthly checkup, plus frequent talks on venereal disease, the speaker being a medical officer or the company commander. One source indicated that treatment with neocarsphenamine was given over a two months' period. In the Japanese Army the venereal case suffers no loss of pay, no court martial.

**PERSONAL** All Japanese troops are taught first aid. Each enemy  
**EQUIPMENT** soldier on Attu carried a first aid packet somewhat similar  
to those carried by our troops. TERABORU powder (the formula for this is unknown to us, but it apparently is intended to serve the same functions as our sulfa drugs) was put on open wounds, and troops were issued another powder to take inwardly when wounded. Two paper envelopes of American-made sulfa powders were found beside a cluster of dead Japanese artillerymen, while a similar envelope was reported found in the pocket of a dead Japanese; the probability is that these had been

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taken from American casualties or looted from American stores, rather than issued by the Japanese. Little or no use was made of sulfa-drugs by the enemy, and no such drugs were found in captured medical stores.

**STANDARDS OF CLEANLINESS** Almost every enemy installation of even one or two tents had its bath-house, usually (by American standards) surprisingly close to the kitchen, latrine and food storage. These bath-houses, generally, were beside running streams, and consisted of a small shelter with a wooden washing platform; below and beside this platform was a small fireplace burning coal or charcoal, over which water was heated in a 55-gallon oil drum. The fire apparently provided heat for both the water and the enclosure. In permanent camps, the bath-house usually had running water troughed through the buildings. Wash stands were provided and small oval wooden bath tubs with built-in coal or charcoal fire units were supplied. In the earlier period on Attu, all soldiers were permitted to take a hot bath daily, but beginning in March, when the non-arrival of ships made it necessary to ration fuel, enlisted men were restricted to one hot bath in three days, with officers bathing daily.

All enemy troops used latrines of the open pit type, the quality of construction providing an index to the relative permanence and importance of the camp. Latrine buildings were installed in permanent camps such as in the CP area at Holtz Bay. Generally, latrines were protected by blankets, old canvas or matting stretched over a frame of wood. The latrines sometimes were very close to running streams. In some underground barracks situations adjoining adjoining AA and dual purpose artillery installations, the latrine also was underground and immediately adjoining sleeping quarters and kitchen; this permitted AA crews to live underground continuously despite severe raiding, strafing and bombardment.

**THE ENEMY USED LATRINES** In general, enemy latrines were cruder than American latrines, dirtier, and much closer to living quarters. In some places, there was evidence of the use of some sterilizing and deodorizing material, probably lime or chloride of lime. It was notable, however, that there was "sanitary discipline" among the enemy troops; toilet tissue was standard issue and enemy latrines were used except outside the hideouts and caves of wounded and diseased fugitives on Cape Khlebnikof, where uncovered stools were found in paths and at entrances to shelters, giving direct evidence of dysentery or other serious digestive disturbances. In contrast with enemy sanitary discipline, the advance of our own troops was marked clearly by uncovered stools found everywhere, in the open, in boats, in enemy tents and quarters, and even in the little water-courses from which our men drew water for drinking, cooking and washing. Latest information is that the enemy did NOT attempt to cover his stools when he was on patrol duty. Since so much of the ATTU action was along the ridges, it is likely that ALL of the watershed is polluted, and that enemy and friendly troops alike (in heat of battle) sought the protected beds of the steep, snow-fed mountain streams for defecation.

In general, however, our men, in contrast to the enemy, showed a standard disregard for hygienic or esthetic considerations during the progress of the battle, even when their particular area may not have been under fire.

**VITAMINS POPULAR** Enemy use of vitamin pills appeared to have been universal, with a compressed yeast (Vitamin B) tablet being issued to troops in bottles of 150, with one tablet taken orally at each meal. High reliance apparently was placed on vitamin therapy, particularly in the expectation that high resistance to all sorts of disease would be built up by this enriched vitamin intake. Six ounce bottles labelled "WAKAMOTO", a yeast concentrate, were found everywhere. A Vitamin "B" concentrate syrup (liquor Oryzanin), bottled in 6-oz bottles, also was used. Several cases of oral multi-vitamin capsules and hypodermic ampoules of Vitamin A-B-C preparations were found.

Generous storages of drugs, bandages, sterilized dressings and all other basic hospital needs were found, adequate for six months ordinary needs for a garrison of 2,000 and for a month's battle needs of the same size garrison, it was estimated.

**IODINE MAIN ANTISEPTIC** Tincture of iodine was the chief antiseptic used by enemy doctors. It was found in large bottles, in small kit bottles, and in 1/8-inch sealed glass gauze wrapped swab tubes. Iodoform gauze dressings also were seen. Bichloride of mercury often was used as a germicide. Some mercurochrome tablets also were seen.

Complete medical equipment, however, was not found in any of the enemy installations on Attu, according to Edward J. Jackemy, Major, MC, medical inspector. It is probable that the retreating enemy carried away the equipment needed most urgently, and destroyed or hid much of the rest.

Japanese medical instruments were comparable to ours and, reportedly, were used in at least one case to complement our equipment. The enemy instruments were of interest chiefly because of the very compact packing of individual pieces into small, well designed boxes of metal or wood. Sets for blood typing, urinalysis, dentistry, surgery, and ear, nose and throat were included in assemblies found. The enemy had small sterilizers similar to our field sterilizers. One large pressure type sterilizer was found in a cave first aid station. Syringes of all types were found packed in metal or wooden boxes. Clinical thermometers were marked in the centigrade scale. A few Thomas splints and many board and wire ladder splints were found.

At each field installation comparable to our battalion aid stations there were found two or three medical chests. These were of wood, heavily reinforced by leather or canvas, of about 4 cubic feet capacity, and marked with the Red Cross and organizational markings. These chests contained dressings and drugs; in every case they were almost empty.

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**MEDICAL KITS FOR FIELD USE** Medical officers and noncommissioned officers were equipped with reinforced canvas (or leather) kits about 9 x 10 x 5 inches in size; these were carried by a shoulder strap and marked with a large red cross sewed on a white cloth background. The contents were varied but usually included instrument sets, antiseptics (mostly iodine), dressings (both medicated and non-medicated), bandages, drugs (both oral and hypodermic), and syringes and needles in metal cases.

Medical enlisted men's kits were made of leather or canvas and were slightly smaller than the officers kits. These contained bandage, dressings and iodine swabs. Many small dressing packets were found; these were wrapped in linen or olive drab cotton cloth and may have been used as first aid packets by troops or medical personnel.

**FEW LITTERS FOR WOUNDED** Only two canvas litters of manufactured type were found; these were comparable to our old type wood litter. However, the enemy improvised many litters from blankets and boards; these were sometimes seen in the field.

Buildings, tents or dugouts were used to provide battle treatment facilities. New barabara buildings with at least 16 x 30 ft of usable interior space were found in four defense areas. It was estimated that about 25 patients could be hospitalized temporarily in one of these buildings. Locations generally were in deep canyons with excellent defilade, in addition to which the buildings were well dug in, revetted and camouflaged. One such barabara, on the Chichagof Valley side of the pass leading to East Arm, Holtz Bay, contained a considerable store of surgical instruments, probably salvaged by enemy medical personnel in their retreat from the main hospital.

The hospital on Attu had accommodations for 40 men (prior to our attack) with a staff of 8 doctors. Each battalion on Attu had five doctors in addition to the hospital staff. Normally, since there were no dispensaries, ailing soldiers were treated in their own barracks.

During the battle, large round field tents were used as aid stations or hospitals. These tents, likewise, were usually well defiladed, well dug in and well camouflaged. One source estimated that each tent could accommodate 20 patients; however, two tents were found in Chichagof Harbor with nearly 35 battle casualties in each. About 10 such tents were noted.

Throughout his stay on Attu, the enemy used caves as hospital wards. This apparently was particularly true of a large natural cave, overlooking the East Arm, Holtz Bay, in which several tents had been set up and which had an estimated capacity of about 75 patients. A pressure type sterilizer and folding operating table were found in this cave.

In the Command Post area near the airport in East Arm, Holtz Bay, one building about 18 x 60 ft apparently had been prepared

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for use as a hospital and possibly, prior to its capture, had been used for barracks exclusively. One source states that the pre-attack patients were in process of being transferred to this new hospital area, but that the intensity of the bombings made the completion of the move impracticable. There were no known electrical facilities in the hospital, and X-ray equipment reportedly was lost en route when the transport bringing it was sunk. Books on X-ray technique and new X-ray films were found in several Holtz Bay areas. Partly burned X-ray films and other medical supplies were found in West Arm, Holtz Bay. There was no evidence of the existence on Attu of X-ray electrical equipment or developing facilities, although these may have been planned.

**MEDICINES, TECHNIQUES** While major operations were performed by the enemy on Attu, it was obvious that his medical service was inferior to ours on most counts. For example, the treatment of battle wounds was simple, and usually was confined to painting with iodine and the application of a dressing. Fracture cases were treated with Thomas or Lange splints.

Plasma apparently was entirely unknown to enemy enlisted medical personnel, no campaign for blood collection was known to have been conducted in Japan, and no evidence existed on Attu of extensive use of plasma. However, one small 30 cc vial of dried plasma was observed. No transfusions were given.

**ONLY LOCAL ANESTHETICS** Major operations on Attu were performed with local anesthetics, the island garrison's situation reflecting Japan's shortage of ether and chloroform. Some spinal anesthesia was reported. Apparently the use of pentothal sodium or any type of intravenous anesthetic was not known, and no anesthetic of this kind was furnished. Considerable use was made of morphine, camphor and morphine, in particular, being given in case of dysentery. Enemy medical personnel frequently carried hypodermic needles with camphor and morphine. In case of a severe wound, the camphor was given to stop the bleeding and the morphine to reduce the pain. No morphine addicts were found among enemy troops, according to information gathered by Colonel R. E. Bitner, assistant surgeon, ADC. One cocaine addict was believed to have been on the island.

**NO DENTIST ON ATTU---** There was no enemy dentist on Attu, but extraordinary emphasis appeared to have been placed on dental hygiene. Hundreds of comfort kits were found; each kit contained a new toothbrush and tooth powder, in addition to a skimpy towel, a fundoshi (loincloth) and other trifles. Teeth of dead Japanese, generally, appeared to be clean and well kept, with few visible cavities and relatively few missing teeth. Despite the characteristic splay and "buck tooth" pattern so frequently found among the enemy, it appeared that much high grade dental work had been done, particularly in the way of gold inlays and reinforcements.

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WERE JAPS "HOPPED UP"? American soldiers who saw the intense fury of the Japs in their last futile breakthrough wondered whether they had been given some stimulant drug. While it is true that enemy drugs for hypodermic use indicate a predominance of stimulants, there is no evidence that the enemy had been abnormally stimulated by the use of cocaine, benzedrine, marijuana (hasheesh) cigarettes or other stimulants prior to the breakthrough. There was even more positively no evidence of use of alcohol in any form at that time. Use of cigarettes, other than tobacco, apparently was unknown, and cigarettes reportedly were not to be had after February, because our aerial and Naval patrols had intercepted supply shipping.

SURPRISING JAP CUSTOM A shocking and unique pattern greeted American soldiers who descended into the gully to the enemy dressing station located in a tent at the head of the Sarana Valley. Here were found 17 arms, severed swiftly from the bodies of dead Japanese. Not one of the arms appeared to have been in need of amputation. All obviously had been removed after death. First thought, for many, was that some one of the enemy had gone insane and had begun butchery of his own dead. However, most of the arms had small white cotton name markers wrapped about the wrist; this suggested that some ancient Japanese custom was being served, and that an effort was being made to send to the Nipponese homeland some of the ashes of Japanese who had died for the Emperor in far Attu.

LOW PHYSICAL STANDARDS--- While the Japs on Attu looked sturdy and healthy, information gathered by Colonel Bitner indicated that the Japanese Army, generally, drops the level of physical capacity for conscripts far below that for our inductees. Jap soldiers all get a physical examination on entering the Army. Those who have poor hearing or who have lost limbs are rejected. Poor eyesight is no barrier to conscription, and loss of one eye and poor vision in the other are not considered to be disqualifying even for the infantry. No dental defects are acknowledged to be causes for rejection. Epilepsy is a cause for rejection. Chest pathology is a cause for rejection; every man has a small X-ray made of his chest at the time of his conscription, with a larger X-ray in case there is any sign of trouble. Inductees with hernia are accepted and the hernia is repaired.

The Japanese soldier reportedly is immunized against typhoid with two injections of vaccine. No shot was given against typhus. There is no immunization against cholera except for troops going to China. One immunizing dose each is given against tetanus and dysentery. Another tetanus shot is believed to have been given those who were wounded.

(No protection, apparently, had been achieved against malaria. . . . some of the large pools in the Holtz-Massacre Pass had been oiled by the Japs, this being of interest since some of the Attu garrison reputedly took part in the Burma campaign and undoubtedly were infected with malaria).

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SUMMARIZING:

The Jap regarded his medical men as combatants, armed them, and treated ours exactly as though they were combatants, killing unarmed medical men, chaplains, and patients.

The Jap was reasonably clean. His latrines in permanent installations were poorer than ours; his sanitary discipline in battle appeared better than ours.

The Jap had plenty of doctors, hospitals and medicines. However, he had no plasma, no transfusion, no general anesthetics, and generally appeared to provide much poorer protection for his men than ours received.

The Jap inoculated against tetanus, dysentery and typhoid. He had lice and he feared typhus. He took measures of the sort that would control malaria and some of his men were believed to have been infected with malaria.

The Jap took men with hernia, one eye, poor eyesight, bad teeth and other defects. But the run of the mill Jap was a very tough customer, solid and muscular, healthy, and able to withstand cold, fatigue, hunger and exposure. The quick, clean healing of many of the Jap's battle wounds are an index to his toughness.

And, finally, the Jap who was wounded wasn't knocked out. He could play dead and shoot or throw grenades after you passed by, and literally hundreds of wounded Japs took part with deadly effect in the last all-out drive.

# UNIFORMS

## AND PERSONAL EQUIPMENT OF ALEUTIAN JAPS

JAP CLOTHING WELL ADAPTED TO FAR NORTH THE JAPS ON ATTU WERE WELL EQUIPPED to meet the cold and wet of the Aleutians. The Nipponese flair for planning for the ultimate detail showed generally good results. It is probable that our clothing and equipment, type for type, is better than that of the enemy. That was not the question. The Jap had what he needed, where and when it was needed, and in ample quantity. The Jap was trained in its use. The Americans who sleep in Attu tundra could say, perhaps, that the enemy's clothing kept him warm, shooting and on the job.

THE JAP HAD AN ADVANTAGE in equipment and training in its use, perhaps. He had clothing and equipment tested in ten years of action on the bitterly-cold Manchukuoan front. Many of the Japs on Attu came from cold and storm-lashed parts of Nippon. All of them had been seasoned by an Aleutian winter. They were inured to the climate and accustomed to the equipment, definite advantages over troops fresh from desert heat.

JAP SOLDIER HAD CHOICE- EXAMINATION OF ENEMY DEAD indicates that the Japs were well equipped, but that no hard and fast orders held for uniform on Attu. There, where a wide range of elevations and an incredibly fickle climate bring a daily succession of weather changes, the Jap soldier appeared to wear the particular clothing which he felt would protect him in the problem posed, and which happened to be available and dry. In this respect, the Jap was much like the United States soldier in the Aleutians.

JAPANESE OFFICERS on Attu wore clothing only slightly different from that worn by enlisted men. The cut of the clothes was the same, although the tailoring was obviously better and the material usually superior. The officers often could be distinguished by their wearing of the two-handed Samurai sword, their most prized possession. However, Sergeant Majors and some Sergeants are similarly armed. In a few cases they were found wearing smart riding boots; the boots, however, appear to have been regarded as impractical, and a number of pairs were found discarded beside paths in the Holtz Bay hinterland during the battle. Some officers were found wearing a leather-backed pack instead of the standard pack.

TYPICAL UNIFORM Following is the typical uniform worn by the Japanese soldier on Attu, as observed on enemy dead:

- 1 fundoshi, or loin-cloth.
- 1 1000-stitch good-luck belt (not issue).
- 1 pr cotton socks.
- 1 pr wool-silk socks.
- 1 pr service shoes or rubber boots.
- 1 suit cotton underwear.



- 1 suit knit wool underwear (sometimes two suits).
- 1 shirt.
- 1 wool coat.
- 1 wool breeches or slacks.
- 1 pr puttees, wraparound, or leggings.
- 1 pr mittens.
- 1 headgear, either the fur hat alone, the helmet alone, or the forage cap and steel helmet.
- 1 overcoat, usually of water repellent duck and similar to our mackinaw, or a hooded OD light melton.

In general, the Japanese soldier on Attu carried with him only what he could wear or carry in his pack. Packs found, ready for use, included extra shoes, a shelter half with poles and pins, felt leggings, a bag of rice, a bag of tea, a tin of canned heat, emergency ration (fish cake, sugar cake and pressed oatmeal cakes), extra socks, a thin and sleezy towel, soap, tooth powder, first aid dressing, spare fundoshi, and a blanket and wool overcoat, the latter rolled and in horseshoe shape.

JAPANESE UNDERWEAR      Three types of underwear were reported by Robert D. Orr, 1st Lt, QMC, Quartermaster Observer on Attu throughout the action and thereafter. Orr remarks:

"There are basically three types of underwear, heavy white cotton, flannel lined cotton, and wool-silk knit of the greyish purple color. All enemy underwear had long arms and legs. From Japanese manuals and from observation of the dead, at least two types of underwear appeared to have been worn together in cold climates, with cotton worn next the skin. This is significant, in that the Japanese apparently used the layer principle as protection against increasing cold. The cotton undershirts are coat style, while the wool-silk shirt is a slipover with three buttons down the front. There appeared to be no sizing for the drawers, fit being secured by overlapping and tying drawstrings. It is believed that the heavy wool-silk knit underwear was a new item of issue, the flannel-lined cotton suits formerly having been the only heavy underwear supplied.

"A very limited number of heavy white wool knit drawers and undershirts were found, the material closely resembling that found in athletic letter sweaters in the United States.

"A few suits of silk knit underwear were found; these probably belonged to officers.

"No issue sweater ever was found. It would appear that the Japanese simply use their wool underwear for that purpose, wearing an extra wool undershirt if more warmth is desired. No muffler of any kind ever was seen."

Lt Orr reported that the only type of shirt he found was a coat-style collarless cotton shirt, generally greenish OD in shade. Captain Leo W. Bagley, FA, reported finding an OD shirt whose design and material resembled ours.

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Brass identification tags (ninshikihyo) also were usually worn in battle. Only one tag was worn. Many men likewise carried their personal seal or "han" of bone, jade or some composition; these "hans" did not mention the unit to which a man belonged, but only a character representing his name.

Many of the dead Japanese were found to be wearing about their waists and under their uniforms the "sennimbari" or "belt of 1,000 stitches," which presumably confers upon the wearer good fortune, valor, and immunity from the enemy's attacks.

**SOCKS HAVE NO HEELS--** Japanese socks were peculiar in that they were woven without heels, much in the manner of the "spiral sock" currently in vogue among home knitters in the United States. This solves the sizing problem simply. Our troops did not like the Jap socks, complaining that they were tight over the heel and bunched up over the instep. The enemy, apparently, found no such objection, and apparently rotated the sock around the foot, thereby equalizing the wear.

Two types of sock were found: a comparatively light white cotton sock and a medium heavy wool-silk knit sock of the same grey purple color found in the toque. All socks were of calf length. One or two pairs of heavy knee length white wool socks with heels also were noted; these probably were not issue but were private property.

**VARIETY OF FOOTWEAR--** Three main types of footwear were found: (1) a service shoe of leather, (2) a furlined canvas and leather shoe with a rubber sole, and (3) a knee length rubber boot which was worn directly over the sock.

The service shoe obviously was made for service, not for smartness. The flesh side of the leather would be turned outward as often as inward. Some of the shoes appeared to have been made of pig-skin.

Probably the commonest and most universally used footgear was the rubber boot. This boot, found in great quantities, had a heavily treaded sole and appeared to be a good article of issue for the Aleutians. However, many of the boots were found bearing patches similar to the patches used on automobile inner tubes. On close examination, the boots appeared to have been made of rubber that was improperly cured, inferior or reclaimed. Previously issued boots, it was learned, had been of better quality, while this consignment leaked considerably, the boots were cold, hard to dry out, and were accompanied with considerable suffering from fungus infections of the foot.

**NO INSOLES FOR RUBBER BOOTS--** Insoles apparently were not worn with the boots. However, dried tundra grass apparently was used as insulation. During the battle, many wearers of the rubber boots reportedly suffered from frostbite and other foot troubles, including "immersion foot," such as our own troops experienced so widely.

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A cloth boot lining, apparently intended to protect the feet against cold, reportedly helped very little.

The Japs had no overshoes. The rubber boot and the service shoe were most widely worn. Not many of the dead wore the fur lined shoe, which, though warm, became quite wet and uncomfortable in Aleutian terrain. Our men, wearing the fur lined shoe, also disliked them. The treaded rubber sole, however, appeared to be an excellent feature. The fur lining was difficult to dry out and probably would be subject to hoar frost in climates colder than that of Attu.

The enemy also had stocks of extra soles and heels, both leather and rubber, as well as extra hobnails, which were widely used by our troops.

**ENEMY SENDS  
WRONG SUPPLIES** A few plain rubber and canvas tennis sneakers were found, as well as abundant stocks of "tabi," or rubber-soled canvas footwear with the great toe separated from the rest. While this footgear was popular on Guadalcanal, on patrol and in jungle warfare, it appeared to be wholly unsatisfactory and disused here (the Japs, too, not being incapable of sending the wrong sort of supplies to an unfamiliar land).

Lavish in their use of rubber, the Japs had stocks of hip length rubber boots for special work, plus shoulder height waders of light, medium and heavy rubber, and all of excellent material and workmanship.

Stocks also included a few high top felt boots using the same type sole as that found on the fur lined shoe; these boots were for officers and NCOs.

A good grade of felt insole was used by the Japs. One pair of fibre insoles also was found.

**JAP MITTENS  
POPULAR WITH  
U. S. SOLDIERS** The item of enemy clothing most sought after by our troops on Attu, probably, was the heavy wool mitten lined (in the earlier issue) with rabbit fur or with a fabricated fleece made by drawing wool yarn through fabric to form a surface much like chenille. This mitten had a trigger finger. A white cotton glove, made to fit either hand, often was worn beneath the heavy mitten. A third type of hand covering was a wool-silk glove of the greyish purple knit material already described; this was designed to fit either hand.

Our troops found the heavy woolen mittens warm. The mitts were fastened together by a cord which was carried over the neck, and which prevented the loss of the mittens in a blizzard, in darkness, or in the heat of action. The mittens were salvaged by American troops as substitutes for our own woolen gloves, which went to pieces quickly in field service, and which sopped up icy water or wet snow on contact. No

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protection equivalent to that provided by the Jap heavy mitten apparently had been contemplated in supplying our troops.

The Japs also had heavy rubber, elbow length gloves, apparently for work in salt water or by divers.

OLIVE DRAB WOOL PUTTEES of the spiral type were the most common leg covering on Attu. The puttees always were worn, with felt leggings sometimes worn over the puttees for extra warmth. Some fur trimmed leggings also were reported as having been found; commonly articles trimmed with genuine fur were worn by officers and NCOs.

JAP UNIFORMS OF TWO TYPES      The enemy had two types of uniforms on Attu: one was of light cotton duck and the other of wool. Check on the enemy dead indicated that the cotton uniform almost never was worn, although the trousers occasionally might be worn over wool trousers to repel rain and to break the wind.

Both woolen and cotton uniforms consisted of short coat and breeches only. In evidence were both the stand-up collar coat and the new model lay-down collar, the latter reportedly having been adopted for field duty about 1940. Fit, generally, was only passable. Some of the new type wool blouses apparently were manufactured early in 1943 and were of good material and workmanship. The older type cotton duck uniforms were lined with corduroy, with a light padding (probably cotton) in the newer ones.

MACKINAW COAT POPULAR      Several types of outer garments were found in enemy dumps and on enemy dead. The most popular coat appeared to be a mackinaw type. Earlier models of this coat apparently used real fur and fleece, for the most part. The newer coats of this model used a manufactured fleece, somewhat resembling alpaca pile, and with a cotton pile being substituted for natural fleece. This coat had no hood, but had one novel feature; detachable sleeves, buttoning on between shoulder and elbow. Since elbows and cuffs generally are the first parts of a coat to wear out, this construction apparently has practical value. As Lt Orr reports, this, too, may help in the problem of sizing garments. Since the chief objection to the coat is its weight and bulk, it is possible that more freedom of movement was secured in combat by removal of the sleeves.

The enemy also had large quantities of another type of coat, a fur or hairlined garment, longer than the mackinaw type. It, too, had button-on sleeves, and it is possible that sleeves of this coat were interchangeable with the coat described above. This coat had no hood but usually had a turn-up collar, lined with fur. The coat was heavier than the mackinaw type and appeared too cumbersome for combat. Both coats had an outer covering of light weight cotton duck, in light olive drab color resembling that of our GI field jacket. The duck apparently is water repellent, but apparently was not chemically treated to secure that quality.

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A third type of overcoat was a long wool (probably medium melton) overcoat of dark OD, closely resembling our own GI coat except that it had a practical button-on hood. An overcoat of similar design but superior workmanship was found in an issue warehouse; this coat had braid on the sleeves and probably was intended for officers' wear.

FOR ALEUTIAN RAINSTORMS--- The chief item of rainwear was a light gabardine duck coat of below-knee length, equipped with a button-on hood which covered the helmet. The garment is OD in color, and apparently water repellent only, and, reportedly, unsatisfactory both as a wind-breaker and as protection against rainstorms.

The enemy had no raincoats or rainsuits comparable to the U. S. Army issue. However, he did have a heavy black rubber jacket with detachable hood. It probably was completely waterproof, but was heavy, hot, and too cumbersome for combat; it illustrates the enemy's lavish use of crude rubber.

One of the most practical garments found was a long oiled silk raincoat, found on the Holtz Bay side in quantity, lying on the ground as though cast aside and practically invisible until our men came upon them. This raincoat has three features, (1) a detachable snap-on hood, (2) a built-in "hump" to cover the pack, protecting it from both rain and observation, and (3) a mottled green and brown pattern of high camouflage utility. Like the gabardine raincoat, this one came below the knee; like the gabardine, it was of such ample cut that a man kneeling, squatting or sitting would have complete protection from the weather plus a color that blended with his surroundings. This coat probably was intended for use by snipers and men on outpost or patrol duty.

One or two light cotton duck capes, with hoods, were noted.

JAPANESE HEADGEAR All enemy troops on Attu were equipped with a steel helmet, painted OD, and bearing the Army star insignia in the front center. The helmet was somewhat smaller than ours and, apparently, made of unalloyed or poorly alloyed steel which did not possess the toughness, ductility and resistance to shock possessed by our helmets. Enemy helmets often were found with neat holes cracked out of the metal, apparently punctured by our .30 calibre bullets. Sometimes sections of metal were broken away, revealing a granular, hard, rough metal structure beneath. Sometimes helmets appeared to have been split completely in two by our fire or grenades, broken as neatly as a boiled egg. There were noted a few helmet nets, for camouflage.

The typical peaked field cap of the Japanese soldier was found in quantity, as was also a warm winter cap with flaps and a fold-down section to cover the head, helmet-wise, and, usually protecting the lower part of the face, also. The cap was lined with real fur or manufactured fleece.

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There were also found wool-silk knit toques or knit helmets of grey-purple color, which could be worn under the helmet.

**SLEEPING EQUIPMENT** The enemy had no sleeping bags on Attu, and apparently had none anywhere. One prisoner, told to get into a sleeping bag, displayed considerable fear, apparently believing that he was about to be put into a straight jacket. Prisoners, generally, were delighted with them after once using them.

The enemy used a cotton filled sleeping pad about 3 X 5 ft in size when sleeping in barracks or tents. It appeared not to have been part of field equipment, although it was well dispersed on Attu, even to tents at some distance from the main camp.

The enemy generally used stout, close-woven blankets, of a dusty greenish OD color. These blankets probably were all wool, and possibly used some type of wool not commonly in use in this country. One blanket only was carried ashore in landings or carried into combat by the enemy, but, on Attu, after the landing, seven more blankets were issued to each man. The blankets were lavishly used, some (apparently salvage) even having been used on the roofs of barabaras.

Generally, our troops used the enemy blankets when they were available, reporting them quite warm although somewhat smaller than our own.

The Jap shelter half was a light weight duck tarpaulin about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  ft square. It sometimes was laced (not buttoned) to another and, like our own, pitched to form a pup tent which was opened at both ends. With the shelter half were included a rope and neatly varnished pegs and sectional pole. The tent obviously provided less shelter than does our own. Reportedly, the enemy sometimes assembled the shelter halves of 28 men to make a crude, fairly large tent, which, however, provided shelter for only about 20 men. In general, it appeared that Jap soldiers simply took shelter in foxholes, covering themselves with their own shelter halves. Reportedly, the enemy commonly wrapped themselves in the shelter halves. This obviously would give good protection, particularly if the shelter were a niche or cave cut into a steep, lee hillside.

**INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT-** For field mess gear the enemy used a deep aluminum container, slightly oval or kidney shaped to conform to the human figure, and with one or two traylike dishes nested beneath the cover. The mess can was painted olive drab on the outside and was fitted snugly in a heat-retaining container. It was believed that the Jap soldier could carry a day's rations in his mess kit alone, and that it was the custom, during combat, to prepare overnight at least two meals to be eaten the following day. Frequently rice or rice balls were found in the mess cans.

The Jap canteen was made of aluminum, also painted OD, and, likewise, fitted with a fur lined carrier, apparently used alike to keep

drinks hot or to prevent liquids from freezing. Usually this cover was not found. The canteen held about one pint, and was round in side view and oval in cross section.

With the field pack, there was usually a can of canned heat, obviously for heating food and drinks in the field. This was uniformly in demand among our own troops, and was hailed by them as substantially better than our own Sterno, lighting more easily, burning with a flame that was stable and not easily blown out, with a flame that encircled the container being heated, and relighting readily if all the heat was not consumed in the first using.

Leather was the favored material, apparently, for the construction of enemy field equipment. Leather was lavishly used for cases, except that no new leather equipment was found. New equipment generally was made of a synthetic "ersatz" material resembling leather belting and probably embodying some rubber. Very little cotton webbing was used for belts, cases or pouches.

Almost without exception, the Jap soldier carried a gas mask. This mask was somewhat smaller and lighter than our own, with a smaller canister, a lighter facepiece, tube and satchel, but with generous use of new, live rubber. Apparently poison gas was greatly feared by the enemy. Enemy soldiers were found dead, wearing gas masks or with gas masks opened, in areas where our white phosphorus smoke shell had been dropped in Navy bombardments. This screening smoke, apparently, was what the Tokyo radio shortwave broadcasts called poison gas in their news reports and news commentaries.

SUMMARIZING:

Jap equipment on Attu was good, ample, and was available at need to troops trained in its use. Piece for piece, it was not equal of comparable American equipment. The important thing was that the Jap had the equipment, whereas the American soldier sometimes had it in his barracks bag, on the beach or in the hold of the ship. The Jap was indoctrinated in the use of his equipment and acted on the principle that poor equipment, promptly and properly used, is better than superlative equipment in the warehouse or misused.

# ATTU VETERANS SAY

"THERE IS AN OLD ADAGE that knowledge gained through experience is the best teacher." ----- So says Theodore B. Tufte, Captain, CAC, Intelligence Officer at a post which cared for a number of Attu casualties. Captain Tufte and his office personnel interviewed every casualty at their station to secure their points of view as to their impression of the Japanese soldier and for any suggestions which might help our troops going into the combat zone.

The compendium---prepared to impress American fighting men that the Jap is stubborn, crafty and is endowed with remarkable endurance--is presented herewith, with conclusions compiled by Captain Tufte's office.

----- Editor.

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1st Sgt PAUL B. THOMPSON, Infantry:

"Upon landing on the island of Attu, without resistance on the part of our enemy, I built up a fast carefree attitude which was my greatest personal fault. I attempted moves with small groups of men that should have had more thought and weight. The Japs move fast, so you have to keep the thought in your mind at all times, 'what would I do if I received fire at this point?'

"They (the Japs) like to fight in small groups and will attempt to halt a group many times their strength.

"I don't believe they are good marksmen. Many times they would pick you as a target and if you hit the ground and rolled three or four yards to the right or left you could get out of their field of fire, (they would continue for a few rounds firing in a path). The Jap mortar is by far, in my mind, their best weapon. Though I think they lack good firing methods, however, these weapons are not to be fooled with.

"I find our men have a habit of firing at targets they are not sure of; the results, therefore, are mortar and machine gun fire in their direction and a lost position.

"Our equipment and weapons are far above that of the Japs. A good clear mind with careful planning will always beat them."

Private JAMES R. NEWTON, Infantry:

"The soldier that a Jap looks for is the one wearing insignia or the one that gives the hand signals.

"The Jap is hard to see but once you get him in the open he's licked. He sure doesn't like hand to hand combat.



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"The Japanese guns are not as good as ours. Their helmets are not much, they will not face a 30 cal. A Marine once said, 'you can tell when the Japs are close by the odor they carry', it is hard to explain but they do have a funny odor if the wind is coming from them."

Pvt lcl FINIS M. QUICK, Infantry, Machine Gunner:

"The Jap soldier was pretty smart in the way he used the fog. When the fog raised he took his range on my platoon and fired one long and one short. All of this was in the morning. There was no movement made from this firing so in the afternoon he opened up right in the middle of us with his mortars. The effects of the mortar fire was cut down by soft ground as the shell buried itself before explosion, so fragments weren't as great as they should have been.

"It might be well to forget a few safety notes in training mortarmen and set the mortar up in and on any kind of ground. In other words terrain where the base plate won't hardly set itself.

"My most lasting impression was made by our medical men in the way they went in unarmed and the work they did in getting the wounded out."

Pvt lcl GEORGE W. PETER, Infantry:

"My impression of a Jap is that he is a very poor shot with a rifle or machine gun but watch out for their "knee" mortar. They really use it a lot against personnel. If the men keep plenty of interval there won't be so much danger. That, I believe, was one of our faults, we didn't have enough room for the amount of men we had on line when we tried to assault a hill and we lost too many men to finish our mission."

Pvt lcl KENNETH R. BATES, Infantry, Rifleman:

"Our mission was to capture the landing strip on Attu. My mission was to get as many of the enemy as possible. We pulled a boner by getting in the valley, we were caught in machine gun cross fire.

"Seems to me the Japs are poor shots with machine gun and rifle, but excellent with mortar fire. The Japs would work in pairs and change positions quite often. They would even use shell holes from our artillery to machine gun us.

"What weapons they had were light yet very good.

"The Japs on Attu used camouflage expertly. They were darned hard to see. To me, the Japs are fast, tricky and cruel. Their uniform looked like jute sack cloth and was of a yellowish-green color. They were dressed much the same as our men except for the color of their uniforms.

"When going into combat in Arctic weather use four or more pairs of heavy socks and two sets of woolen underwear. You can get frost-bitten easily. Be sure to keep the mud out of the front and rear sights of your Garand rifle; mud impairs your aiming and accuracy."

Pvt lcl LOUIS N. BARIOLA, Infantry, Ammunition carrier:

"I don't think much of the Jap soldier; he is a very good sniper, he is hard to see and very tricky, but he is a very poor rifle shot as far as I could tell.

"They are good shots with their mortars and they have plenty of them, however, they didn't prove very effective. I don't know the reason for this, it may be that it's too small or the ground was too soft and the shells would bury themselves in the ground too deep and shoot up with very little sideways trajectory.

"If I had to do this over again I would make sure that I had my rain pants and coat on, you never know when you have to hit the ground and fast; you have no time to pick a dry spot."

Pvt lcl A. G. WIMSATT, Infantry, Assistant Light Machine Gunner:

"Stay out of the snow, stay where there is plenty of coloring to match your clothing.

"Make sure you know the password and don't forget it. Every time you go out be sure it hasn't been changed.

"Make sure you shoot the right fellows and not your own men.

"Don't run from one place to another without first picking your place and cover. The Japs are poor shots with a rifle but pretty good with MG and mortar. Keep your shovel handy at all times as there are times when you will need it badly."

Pvt lcl D. S. PRESCOTT, Infantry, Messenger:

"The Japs have clothes about like ours and they also have white clothing for where there is snow.

"There is one thing that I want to stress and that is for every soldier to take good care of his intrenching tool because it saved many of the mens' lives. I won't have to say much about hitting the ground and staying close to it because they will do that anyway when under fire."

Sgt NYE R. BUTLER, Infantry, Squad Leader:

"Our boat was one of the first wave of boats to hit the beach. We were very much surprised to find no opposition at the beach. I organized my squad and began moving toward Temnac Bay, our company objective. I moved out rapidly to clear the beach for the troops following. We first received fire from a Jap MG from 700 or 800 yards away. It was too far away to excite us much although we did take cover. Our company soon took up the approach march and began our march to our objective. My squad was the right flank squad so I sent my two scouts out to my right for flank protection. After we had hiked a while I looked out to my right to check on my scouts. I saw two men walking along in the same direction as our advance. My scouts didn't know who they were and after checking my squad I found they weren't my men. I told my No. 1 scout to fire on them, the first shot didn't move them any faster but the next started them off on a

run. If they had taken off in the opposite direction they could have gotten away but they tried to cross over the valley in front of our company and failed, it was a rather hot spot and we got them. Our advance was uninterrupted except for some dummy installations which were nothing more than the top layer of earth turned over to make our aerial photos confusing.

"We arrived at Temnac Bay at about midnight. We soon found out the Japs weren't very well disciplined about lights or smoking at night. With the help they gave us with their lights we didn't have to wait until daylight to start our mission. The few Japs that weren't killed in tents by hand grenades that night were finished off the next morning. We then returned to Massacre Valley and joined the rest of our Bn. We launched an attack soon after we joined our Bn. I didn't finish the attack.

"Our mens' morale was very good. The Japs seemed to be very poor shots. Their knee mortar seemed to be their best weapon so don't concentrate too many troops in a small area."

Private JOHN BODNOVICH, Infantry, Rifleman:

"Being that I was hit the first day but hung around for two more days, I can't say I had seen much action. What I did learn though is; while advancing always have a spot picked out where you will hit the ground next. Most of our casualties were due to lack of taking cover while advancing. The Japs are the best snipers and are always around where you least expect them. Watch out for trenches with dummies in them; they had us fooled a couple of times. Their mortars are very accurate."

Pvt 1cl GEORGE E. WARREN, Infantry, Machine Gunner:

"I was under fire for four days; I had to dig into a slit trench first of all to keep from being observed and being shot at. Cover was not hard to find. My impression of the Japanese soldier is that they haven't got the guts the American men have. One thing to be careful of is hidden explosives.

"My clothing consisted of woolen ODS and water repellents, we had leather boots but would rather have rubber bottom shoe pacs.

"The thing that impressed me the most was the accuracy of the enemy's mortar fire; they couldn't see us but they seemed to know exactly where we were.

"The enemy was dug in very well.

"In hand to hand fighting the Japanese soldier gives up very easily."

Pvt 1cl WALTER R. MORD, Infantry, BAR:

"What I learned about the Japanese armed forces is that they like to do all their close fighting at night after dark, in the daytime they like to hide so no one can see them. In my opinion they are not very brave fighters."

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Corp PHILIP E. SCHACHT, Infantry, Instrument Corp:

"I was in a heavy weapons platoon (HMG) and due to the lack of manpower I was required to be an ammunition carrier. The mission of my platoon, support of Rifle Company, was very well executed, our men gave an excellent account of themselves and held up very well under fire. I believe that is what impressed me the most, our men seemed to be bothered more by the damp and cold than the fire being placed on them.

"Due to the fact that the closest I got to any Japanese troops was about 700 yards I am unable to give much of an impression of them. They did an excellent job of fortifying and camouflaging their trenches, fox holes and other emplacements and their sniping was quite accurate.

"There was a decided lack of coordination and maybe cooperation between some units of our own troops. Due to this fact our men were shooting at each other at various times during the battle. This might have been caused by the extreme ruggedness of the terrain and the heavy fire being placed on us which prohibited the different units from establishing contact with each other - consequently each thought the other was the enemy."

Private DALLAS MARTIN, Infantry:

"The greatest mistake made was that practically everyone took to the valley. We all know our enemy was fortified on the sides of the hills where they could fire into the valleys. The important thing is to stay separated and stay as low as possible and in making your rushes make them fast and short and never lay where you fall, always roll over two or more times and always have the next landing place picked out before you get up."

Private THOMAS A. SKELLEY, Infantry, Lineman:

"My individual mission was to help lay the second Bn OP line when we landed in the third wave. There were six of us linemen in that wave, two of us in the Bn commanders boat and four in another boat. The six of us had three DR4 of wire and three telephones, two would roll out their wire and the next two would splice theirs on it, sure was tough going but we managed to keep connections back at all times.

"What impressed me most was a machine gun nest up on the mountain that we had a hard time getting. He was giving us much trouble and had the boys cut off between the front lines and the beach. They tried to get him with naval fire and artillery and the day I got hit he was still there, every time they shot a few shots he would answer with his machine gun, seemingly just to let them know that he was still there. A colonel came around the night after I had got hit and said that they got him that day. I sure would like to go up on that mountain and see just what kind of a place he had up there."

S/Sgt WILMER R. OFARRELI, Platoon Sgt, Infantry:

"The incident which impressed me most was the operation as a whole. 'We were winning. That in my estimation is a morale builder 'A-1'.

"Speaking of morale, which we all know is an important item, has a tendency to drop very low prior to entering the combat zone. Due to this fact, men keep guessing as to what our next move will be, especially between Sailors and Soldiers. Surely I do not have to say how fast one's imaginations or thoughts can change into 'that is what I heard' or 'he told me it happened'. It becomes rather official when they add, 'this comes from a reliable source.' I recommend that each individual be kept abreast of the situation at all times so he will know what is true and what is not. When an individual is ignorant of what is being planned for his near future, he starts to guessing. That is the basis for rumors. I noticed men having more confidence in their superior officers and there were less rumors and the morale went sky high when we were given plans for the operation. That is the only time that our men thought we were being given an even chance with the enemy. He was convinced he could win because he knew everything there was to know about it, consequently the individual stopped guessing, he knew the facts. There were not many rumors thereafter.

"Orders for the operation were made to conform with our study of the terrain features, and the weather conditions on the island. Some of our troops were allowed to leave the ship and make the landing without wearing the Alaskan rain suit. Some of them were wearing wristlets instead of gloves, results 'frostbitten hands' and exposure due to wet clothing. Some had frostbitten feet because they thought one heavy wool pair of socks was enough. I wore four pair of socks, three light wool and one heavy wool. When shoes were issued I called for a size so I could sail, not walk. My feet were never damp, the two outer socks absorbed what dampness there was inside my shoes. Although I was practically standing in water most of the time, my feet never got cold. I tied the legs of my rain trousers with legging strings just below the tops of my boots; that prevented water from coming in at the top. By fastening my sleeve snaps on my rain jacket, I prevented water and mud from coming inside my sleeves when hitting the mud and water.

"We were well trained and all had the fighting spirit. Our mission gave us an enemy to fight. All seemed to be ready and willing.

"After landing our men had a tendency to bunch up, wanting to talk about the nice landing; what a hell of a messed up affair it really was. As a result, it took commanders too long to reorganize their units so they could continue the attack.

"When we contacted the enemy almost all the troops in our task force were in the center of Massacre valley because it was easier going. At that time, I think the men respected the thing called cover which they had been taught so much about. We were pinned down by MG, mortar and artillery fire until dark. Our company commander then assigned each platoon an area for our company defensive position for the night contemplating attacking at daylight. That first night each platoon had to put out six outposts consisting of two men each 50 yards out in front of our platoon defensive area. One officer had to stay awake at the Company CP. Our

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platoon leader got the better part of that. Our squad leader took charge of our squads outpost. My platoon guide and I took turns staying up, watching platoon area and checking outguards. That way there was no rest or sleep for anybody. Our platoon leader was shot the next day.

"The next night I only had three outposts consisting of two men in a hole together, one hour on and two off. The three squad leaders took turns taking charge of the outguards. This eliminated all this running around and challenging thus giving away our position to enemy patrols. We were contemplating another attack next morning so it kept me busy practically all night getting ammunition, reorganizing my platoon. During that day we had lost a squad leader and had to replace him with a corporal.

"There were mountains to our front and to our flanks. We were occupying the floor of Massacre valley and the mountains were loaded with snipers, machine gunners, mortars and artillery were in the rear of the mountains to our front. We were getting fire from every direction but from the rear."

Corp ENCARNACION DeLAO, Infantry, Grenadier in Rifle Platoon:

"The Japs love BAR men. I think corporals should have a shovel instead of an axe, I know because I felt like an orphan for a couple of days."

Corp LEROY C. LIST, Infantry, Radio Operator:

"The Jap mortar was very effective and they were able to get observation from the outlying ridges. Machine guns were a big source of trouble insomuch as they seemed well supplied with them. From my own observation I would say their marksmanship was poor with light weapons.

"Fog was both an aid and a hindrance to our troops, they could advance under cover of it, while Japs laid along lower edges of the fog and were able to get both plunging and grazing fire on us.

"Radio communications were excellent; Jap interference was almost nil. Whip antennas on radios were almost a dead giveaway to positions of CPs and OPs. COs insist on using voice and saying much in the clear. Wire went out several times, put out by mortars and by our own tractors and moving vehicles. Movement of vehicles was difficult due to soft ground and rough terrain.

"The Japs were very well dug in. Connecting trenches and piles of sod apparently were used for aiming posts. Sod also was turned over in spots just wide enough to leave the impression that emplacements were intended; these could be observed from the air.

"Aircraft were unable to be of much assistance on account of fog, they had to fly slow and Jap machine guns could open on them readily.

"Most impressive was the cooperation between Army and Navy in handling the sick and wounded.

"In conclusion, the Jap is a pretty good soldier, poor marksman, excellent with the mortar, their smokeless powder (hiding gun flashes) a constant source of danger to us."

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Corp BRUCE MACDONALD, Infantry, Rifleman:

"In my brief encounter with the Japanese soldier I found that the enemy rifleman seemed to be very careless in maneuvering with a squad (noisy and they tend to bunch), also the rifleman is a poor shot and they show very poor judgement. The mortar fire and machine gun fire is extremely accurate."

Private CHARLES C. RUNYON, Infantry, Rifleman:

"The Japanese soldier is sneaky and tricky. They shot a soldier of Company "F", let him make his way 100 yards off our front line, then shot him again enough to break him down so he couldn't go any further, and so we would go after him and they could machine-gun us. I guess they saw that we wouldn't go after him until the fog came in again so they machine-gunned him and killed him.

"Something that might help the soldier going into combat zone: when digging a fox hole never stand up, lay on one side and dig a while, then on the other, because when you are standing up you make a nice target for a Jap. Another thing, if you are lying down and a mortar shell lands close it won't hurt you so much. I was one that stood up to dig fox holes -- I'm in the hospital with a concussion -- had I listened to what they told me in my training I might be there still, helping get rid of them Japs.

"Take a tip -- it's better to lay down to dig then it is to get knocked down! I was a good shot but not a good soldier because a good soldier takes every advantage; I've learned my lesson now."

Pvt 1cl CHARLES T. THATCH, Infantry OP:

"I was one of the fortunate ones, suffering only from exposure and frost bite. The first day wasn't so bad as our clothes were dry. The platoon which I was with was on a special mission and for three days suffered much from the rain, cold and a high wind.

"The Japs were clothed somewhat more warmly than we were and wore rubber boots. They seemed to have plenty of weapons, ammunition and rations. They were well dug in, also very hard to see in spite of very little vegetation on the island. Some of the trenches and fox holes had evidence of being dug for a period of time because of the fact that the grass had grown up around the fox holes. Being dug in up in the mountains made it very hard to get them out of their fox holes. This is where our artillery played a very big part.

"Japs and their weapons: The Japs are good soldiers but are not good riflemen although their snipers are very good at a range of 400 or 500 yards or even closer. The Japs don't seem to aim their machine guns but just move them slowly from one side to another, sometimes firing in the fog when they couldn't even see us. The Japs are good with their mortars; they proved this by following up our front lines.

"When we landed our troops carried only two days' rations. We carried a BDS and three army chocolate ration bars. The "K" rations are good but the candy isn't good when you are hungry.

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"The M1 is the best rifle the individual soldier can have, in my opinion, also our hand grenades are much more effective than the Japs.

"The incident that impressed me was that two Japs knowing approximately where our front lines were located, got within a short distance of it after dark. These Japs started talking to each other and walking back to their lines. Our troops, not being able to see them, started following them; a few minutes later realizing the voices weren't getting any closer our troops returned to our line. A half an hour later Japanese machine guns opened up."

Sgt CHARLES M. STRONG, Infantry, Rifle Platoon:

"The Japanese are very tricky and their use of cover and concealment of the individual soldier is perfect. There is nothing wrong with the Japs eye sight or his ability to shoot. The Japs are easily confused, even when we pretend to throw a hand grenade they will scatter in all directions and are easily shot by our own troops. They are not equal to our soldiers in hand to hand combat, they would rather stay off at a distance of 400 to 500 yards with the advantage in their favor.

"One thing that impressed me was their accuracy with the "knee" mortar, it will outshoot our 60mm mortar by about 200 yards. They can place a shell on a machine gun in two rounds so if a machine gunner moves from position to position he will live longer."

Private LEONARD HOFFMAN, Infantry, Rifleman:

"A machine gun got me. Their snipers aren't so very good. The Medics were swell, they did a job it's hard to describe, and they worked for 27 hours at a stretch."

Private JOHN F. CAMPBELL, Infantry, Rifleman:

"Hot chow got up to us the third night; they all didn't get it, but some of them did. I believe the machine gun was the Japs most effective weapon."

Pvt HAROLD E. STULL, Infantry, Rifleman:

"The Japanese snipers are not too good. Their mortar fire just made us draw back down in little ditches.

"The Jap 40mm mortar shell makes a hole about three feet across except that its effect is softened by the softness of the ground.

"That damned fog -- we couldn't see our targets.

"They seemed to have a .25 cal. machine gun, something like our BAR, even had a bayonet on it.

"There was plenty of fresh water and it wouldn't have done the Japs any good to try to poison it -- the streams were running too fast.



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"After being wounded I took by sulfa tablets, washing them down with water."

Private TONY LORENZO, Infantry, Rifleman:

"The Medics did a great job. They came up at night, but they were carrying men both day and night. They had to go unarmed."

Private WILLIAM E. CHAMBERS, Infantry, Ammunition bearer:

"I saw one Jap Captain close, he had on a long black wool coat.

"Their fire would cut the weeds around me. There weren't any sizable bushes or any trees for cover.

"I got hit while carrying up some BAR ammunition. I took my belt off and wound it around some ammunition and was going to throw it forward when the shrapnel got me.

"A Lieutenant sat out in the open, directing artillery; the Jap snipers fired away at him for an hour. I told him he'd better get down, but he said, 'Aw, catfish.'

"Of an 8-man Jap outpost, 2 Japs ran away after 6 had been laid low with grenades. One was still kicking when the Americans came up, one of our men busted his carbine over the Jap's head.

"Artillery gives the Jap mortars a fit. We had heavier mortars but the Japs knew the area and had the ranges figured.

"I tell you the worst fault I saw; it was mortars set up too close to our own men. These mortars draw fire."

FAULTS OF THE JAPANESE SOLDIER:

Showed very poor "night discipline", exposing lighted cigarettes, and used tracer ammunition thus giving away their positions.

AVERAGE JAPANESE SOLDIERS:

Were poor marksmen. Several cases were cited where the leaders fell into our traps because of our knowledge of their pass word.

The Jap is inferior in hand to hand fighting. The Jap did not destroy documents and diaries which were priceless to our forces.

JAPANESE STRONG POINTS:

Used excellent camouflage. Very efficient in installing "dummy" installations. He possesses extreme fortitude and stamina. He apparently does not fear death and will fight with the odds against him. He uses the 40mm "knee mortar" with remarkable accuracy and efficiency.

ERRORS MADE BY OUR TROOPS

Did not carry out instructions as to the amount of clothing to be worn. Took chances and were too "cocky". After being subjected to fire for several days did not hug the ground, pick a spot and move fast enough.

Did not check radios before landing with the result that one radio did not work and communication was not established.

In many cases fired at targets they were not sure of thus giving away our positions.

Some of our men did not learn the pass word and due to weather conditions and impossible visual identification were killed by mistake.

#### OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OF OUR MEN

Each man knew his job and did his best to accomplish his mission.

Due to excellent training, scout patrols, riflemen, and artillerymen worked together and kept in contact with each other.

Kept a high state of morale, were eager and anxious to accomplish their missions.

Due to conditioning were in excellent shape to brave the adverse weather conditions and difficult terrain.

Medical personnel were outstanding in carrying out their duties. They treated and evacuated the men in the roughest terrain working night and day and were constantly under fire.

The officers were praised for their leadership, at all times leading the advances and staying at the front line. (Result: many officers were killed, as the Japs identified them by their mussette bags and insignia. BAR men and machine gunners were also chosen targets).

A report by Colonel Hiram S. Yellen, Medical Corps, was very gratifying. Quoting Colonel Yellen: "The condition of the wounds upon arrival at this station was indicative of very excellent first aid care as there were very few infections even though many of them were still open wounds. The use of sulfanilamide or sulfathiazole powders or crystals on open wounds was evidently largely responsible for the lack of infection. We feel that no prolonged attempt should be made to remove bullets, shell fragments, or other foreign bodies in the immediate combat zone, but that all wounds be dusted with sulfanilamide or sulfathiazole powder or crystals, sterile dressing applied, and the patient evacuated to a more stable area such as our present relation to Attu, or the communication zone before the removal of these foreign bodies is attempted."

# CAMOUFLAGE

ENEMY DECEPTION  
AND HOW IT WORKED  
IN ATTU OPERATION

"THE JAPANESE appreciate the importance of secrecy and deception. No maneuver is ever attempted without including in the plan some device to deceive the enemy and conceal the true intention of the commander."

Thus runs the text of Technical Manual 30-480, the Handbook of Japanese Military Forces (page 277). The operation on Attu ran true to type. Consistently, the enemy sought to hide his actual installations and sought to make us believe that he had strength where no strength existed.

Chief effort went into camouflage.

Enemy camouflage, in general, was superior.

In general, local materials were used, improvised and/or secured at the point of use. This saved the labor and time of transport. This also resulted in a desirable uniformity of texture and color, since it is obvious that no studio-made fabric can imitate grass, for example, as closely as grass plucked from same area can duplicate it.

With exceptions, enemy camouflage discipline appeared to be excellent. Apparently, however, the camouflage plan had been conceived by higher authority, and the necessity for camouflage discipline had not been made second nature in the Attu troops. Apparently camouflage discipline deteriorated in direct proportion to the distance of a unit or outpost from the command post. Relaxations from camouflage discipline were particularly to be noted in the heat of action; for example, when the enemy occupied positions hastily under pressure of our flanking troops from Beach Scarlet, our forces found enemy paths marked clearly in the snow, the paths almost invariably providing a guide to the location of enemy installations.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING-- In general, however, troops showed a high degree of individual training and proficiency in camouflage. The individual Jap soldier's hillside position was likely to be shielded by branches of dwarf pussy willow, across whose gnarled and irregular frame were draped moss and tufts of grass which almost completely hid the opening, but gave the enemy within an excellent view of everything outside. The enemy's flashless and smokelless ammunition helped to keep these positions concealed, even when he fired.

Likewise, covered positions were found with only a narrow slit for observation and fire. This slit commonly was masked by tufts of grass. Outlines and shadows were broken up by tufts of grass threaded into loosely twisted ropes made of Attu grass or of rice straw. Straw matting, likewise, covered openings or excavations, and blended in well

with the bleaching grass of the higher tundra. These protective means were used generally on all man-made structures, while the principles of limiting shadows and of reducing silhouette elevations to the absolute minimum were applied generally.

**BLEND WITH SURROUNDINGS** The olive drab uniforms of the enemy, obviously, blended into the tundra cover very well. There were white snow parkas (and, some reports say, wraparound white snow pants also) for wear above the snow line. Wherever possible, the enemy avoided travel across snow faces, in our sight, when they were clad in clothing other than white. When the enemy moved across the dryer, paler grass of the hillsides, they often held up strips of matting, running behind these at a crouch. The color of the matting was sufficiently close to that of the dry grass to make difficult the sighting of our weapons on these men.

Individual enemy riflemen and observers were supplied with hooded camouflage capes made of light and rain-repellent tan-colored paper. The capes were about 6 X 9 ft in size, and were tied with tie strings. Behind and under these paper capes, dry, warm, and sheltered from wind and rain, riflemen and observers could sit for a day at a time, indistinguishable from the tundra.

**CAMOUFLAGE NETS USED** Many individual camouflage nets were found on Attu. These nets were made of several colors of netting, with wisps of similarly dyed raffia tied into the string meshes of each section.

Individual nets frequently were laced together, sometimes covering entire conical tents. Very high revetments were built around the tents in many instances, the nets falling in a gentle angle from the peak of the tent to the revetment wall. In some cases nets were not used, concealment being gained from the similarity in color between the tent fabric and the sod. The practice of locating tents in the bottom of deep and precipitous ravines provided an additional safeguard for the tentage, since the tents were so deep that the chance of observation and photography was greatly reduced, while it was rare that direct sunlight could give telltale shadows.

It was standard practice to cut cooking and storage chambers, latrines and the inevitable bath-houses into the sides of hills or banks, making the structures blend into the surrounding scene by covers of grass, matting, willow branches and/or turf.

Office buildings, barracks, officers' quarters, radio installations and hospitals in the more developed centers generally were of the barabara type, with only the roof above ground level. The roofs of the barabara buildings were of low peak angle, the shallow pitch giving minimal shadows and relief under study of stereoscopic photo pairs. Further, the roofs were covered with sod which was carried over each gable in a continuous carpet of green. These sods also helped to shed the rain

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and to give limited protection from fragments of shells bursting nearby, and from rifle or machine gun fire near the maximum range. Glass windows inserted near the gables as skylights were strewn loosely with grass to prevent daytime detection, while blackout curtains flipped into place at night.

Further, when sodded areas were cut over to provide roof coverings for barabaras, the denuded areas were roughly rectangular and located at some little distance from the buildings protected. It was thought probably that such cuts were made deliberately, in the belief that the contrasting color would befuddle our fast-flying pursuit pilots and rarely could be picked up by our high flying photo planes. The denuding of the areas might have been due to a wish on the part of the Attu commander to create counter-camouflage which might delude our forces into believing that actually non-existent building units were dimly pictured on aerial photographs.

Similar deceptive techniques were reported in the outlining of entire trench systems, where only the surface sod was removed, revealing the dark earth. This, presumably, was intended to be interpreted on our aerial photographs as completed intrenchments, and to suggest to us a defense plan entirely different from that which the enemy had set up in fact.

Islands at the entrance to Chichagof Harbor contained complete dummy emplacements, with elaborately constructed dummy guns of wood (also found elsewhere) and dummy personnel which were literally "straw men" made by stuffing salvage uniforms with dry grass. These emplacements and deceptive installations succeeded in calling forth from us a special troop mission, as well as aerial reconnaissance sorties. Similar straw men, possibly planted in an effort to draw fire or to inhibit our move against temporarily occupied enemy positions, were found in enemy outpost areas at the head of Sarana Valley.

#### SUMMARIZING:

Then, enemy camouflage on Attu was very good, in general. That which was obvious was likely to be fake. That which was not well hidden was either accomplished in haste or without close central supervision. The closest scrutiny must be given all areas where nothing obvious appears, or where only slight hints of the presence of man may be seen; in such places, danger is at its peak.

# SMOKE

JAP HAD PLENTY  
OF SMOKE, BUT  
DIDN'T USE IT-

THE JAP ON ATTU had plenty of smoke. He was ready to use it in battle, but he made little or no use of it.

On Kiska, by contrast, the Jap has used smoke.

Reasons for the enemy's failure to use available smoke on Attu remain pure conjecture. These might be:

1. The enemy had no personnel adequately trained in the offensive and defensive uses of smoke.
2. The enemy disliked smoke and had small regard for its military utility (he feared our smoke shell, apparently did not recognize its nature, donned gas masks when our incendiary smoke shell was fired, and radioed to Japan--as Radio Tokyo broadcasts indicated--that we were using poison gas).
3. Jap minor installations had excellent concealment and needed no smoke.
4. The persistent Attu fog masked most of the enemy positions along the dominating ridges during the daylight hours, while darkness concealed action there at night.
5. The Jap was saving his smoke for a tactical emergency, but may not have had time, opportunity, personnel or smoke still in hand when the emergency arrived.

Three types of smoke candle were found on Attu.

Two were type 94 smoke candles (one small, one large) and the third was the type 99 self-propelled smoke candle. It is probable that there also were smoke grenades for the 50mm type 89 heavy grenade discharger.

The large type 94 smoke candle was made of steel, six inches in diameter and 18 inches tall, painted grey-green, and weighing about 40 pounds. It had a bail like a bucket. A quick match ignitor of the scratch type was contained under a screw cap at the top. About 19.7 kilograms of material were included. The mixture is believed to be of the Berger type, consisting mainly of carbon tetrachloride, zinc dust and zinc oxide.

Soldiers were warned to handle the pot gently and to place it, in transit, at such points of minimum shock and movement as over the axle of a car or deep in the hold of a ship. Because of erupting, flaming mixture, soldiers were advised not to come within two meters of a burning smoke pot, or to place it near anything inflammable. The eruption hole is to be placed to windward. If the pot does not burn, it can be placed with its eruption hole opposite the eruption hole of a burning pot, and ignition will usually follow. If the pot fails to burn or to burn well at the beginning, care should be taken because of the danger of explosion, and one should not come within 10 meters until it is burned out.

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The small type 94 candle, found in quantity, is painted dull grey, is about 2.1 inches in diameter and 7.25 inches long, weighing two pounds, 3-3/4 ounces, and with about 1.87 pounds of the mixture described above. A well-protected scratch type ignitor was included with each candle.

The type 99 self propelled smoke candle is, in effect, a rocket without a stick, and is launched by sticking an attached spike into the ground at the intended angle of departure. The lower cap is removed and a circular scratchboard is used to ignite a matchhead carefully protected in a slot which is found under the cap. (The matchhead is further protected by a pledget of cotton, which is intended for use in the ears of the person firing, to protect against injury due to excessive blast). The propelling charge shoots the inner container a distance of up to 300 meters, the smoke mixture being ignited in flight or on landing of the projectile, after an interval of 4 to 7 seconds. This candle is olive drab in color, has a steel wire spike assembly on its side, weights two pounds 14 1/2 ounces, and is 2 inches in diameter and 8 inches long. The smoke produced by this candle apparently is non-toxic, bluish grey in color and moderately dense. It has a slight menthol odor. The residue from the burning was a yellowish powder.

Many pyrotechnic signal flares of the conventional type were found on Attu, as was also a double barreled Very pistol, the latter possibly part of the equipment of one of the wrecked enemy planes.

A number of aircraft spotting flares were noted. These were of the self-igniting calcium phosphide type. The flares had the general appearance of lightweight aerial bombs and were painted a battleship grey. They came in two sizes, one 2.8 inches in diameter and 11.75 inches overall length, and the other 4.25 inches diameter and 21.5 inches long overall. The walls were of light tinned steel. The smaller type consisted of five sections of light tinned steel plate, while six sections were used in the larger size. These sections overlapped and were soldered lightly together. Tear strips of white metal were soldered to the flare, and covered two holes in the body thereof; one strip ran longitudinally over the nose of the flare while the other encircled the cap. These flares were operated by tearing off the tear strips and throwing the flare overboard; when it fell in the sea, and water entered the holes, the calcium carbide was converted into acetylene gas, while the water contacting the calcium phosphide produces a flame which ignited the gas.

There were also found on Attu some aircraft sea spotting markers for daytime use. These were 13 inches long, 3 inches in diameter and resembled an ordinary finned bomb. They were of a bright aluminum color. The marker apparently was dropped by hand, the impact with the water breaking the container and spreading a large quantity of aluminum powder to float on the surface of the sea. There is no fuse or explosive charge in this marker. It could be used to mark the position of a submarine sighting or raft-borne survivors, could be used to determine wind velocity and drift.

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It is significant that no poison gas shell, poison gas in cylinders, or poison gas in any projectile or projector form were found on Attu.

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# RATIONS

PLENTY OF GOOD,  
VARIED FOOD IN  
ATTU JAP CAMPS

THE JAPS ON ATTU had plenty of good food.

As the hungry little fish-eaters from Nippon fell back over the jagged ridges of Attu, they left behind them large, well-protected and widely dispersed stores of varied foods, in quantity and type and quality designed to provide a dietary far above that of the average Japanese.

In sight of plenty, the enemy was going hungry. For two months, since early in March, the Japs had been on half rations because American air and Naval blockade had kept supply ships away. Hunger and food were beginning to be major preoccupations of the beleaguered garrison, despite the fact that they all seemed strong and well-nourished. In particular, the enemy was suffering a shortage of rice, although rice was the food found in greatest abundance by the Americans; it is obvious that rice was the backbone of the diet, and when the rice ration was cut drastically, as it was during the final days of the battle, the enemy would feel the lack of food bulk as much as the lack of available food energy.

Apparently the Japanese were going through a period of experiment with respect to the way in which supplies were sent to the Aleutians. Part of the rice stores, for example, were encased in matting containers and stout fabric bags about five feet long and one foot in diameter. The bulk of the rice stores, however, appeared to have been shipped in stout fabric bags, each of which was encased in two heavy tubular bags of rubberized fabric. Tightly tied, these units appeared to be waterproof and weatherproof, and probably could be thrown overboard from a ship, to float ashore in safety in any ordinary sea and on any fairly smooth beach.

Scores of these bags were found on Attu with additional foodstuffs packed in the rice. With the rice, for example, would be dried squid, canned salmon and crabmeat, dried seaweed, seasonings, soy bean sauce and other foodstuffs. It is probable that the rice bags were opened on Attu and these additional foodstuffs inserted before the bags were sent to outposts. The bags usually weighed about 80 pounds (estimated), and constituted a generous load for a single soldier.

The rice was a partially polished white type. Barley, oats and similar supplies also were supplied in similar stout fabric sacks.

(It is noteworthy that paper and cardboard never were used for packaging of Japanese foodstuffs, thereby eliminating much of the spoilage problem experienced with U. S. supplies. Apparently no packages were so large or so heavy that they could not be handled by one man, or, in difficult situations, by two men. Further, the packing material has immediate utility. The sacking was found being used for camouflage, as door curtains for showers, latrines, dugouts, kitchens and storages,

as floor covering, as protection for supplies, and as a means of carrying coal, dirt and other materials. The rubberized fabric bags were used by our men as improvised boots for work in water more than knee deep, and apparently were useful in all places where a waterproof paulin was indicated.)

DEHYDRATED FOODS USED      Dried foods were found in abundance on Attu. These usually were soldered into airtight tins, which, in turn, were packed in wooden cases. Dried potato chips, squash chips, onions, kelp and mushrooms were common. The dried potatoes had to be cooked before use as they had been sliced thin and dried in the raw state; it was noteworthy that the potatoes retained the outer skin, simplifying the task of preparation and retaining the minerals and vitamins. Dried squid also were found; these were cooked with rice, and the rice-squid combination often was found jammed into the mess kits of dead Jap soldiers.

Dried flounders and dried salmon also were found, but not packed in airtight tins. Quantities of canned tuna fish, cod livers and salmon (both Japanese and foreign pack) were found. Small fish--possibly smelt, minnows or some small salt water fish--also were found packed in oil in wooden pails.

Canned beef also was found in limited quantity. In general, the Attu dietary, from the American point of view, was seriously deficient in meats, cheese, eggs, breakfast meats and dairy products generally.

CANNED FRUIT, VEGETABLES---      Canned peas, pickled carrots, mixed vegetables, spinach, pickled radishes and rinkan roots were found, as were also a small amount of canned pineapple and large stores of tangerines. The tangerines, a Japanese delicacy, were particularly popular with our forward-pressing troops. Every permanent type enemy installation had quantities of empty tangerine cans lying about. The fruit was packed in a sweet syrup, and much resembled the commercial product sold in the United States, except, as noted by Captain Leo W. Bagley, FA, observer, for a slight rum flavor in the military product. About 1500 48-can cases were reported stocked at Holtz Bay. The only other tinned goods noted were a few cans of condensed milk, labeled in English and assertedly prepared for the Canned Milk Association of Japan.

Pickled plums, sea cucumbers in curry powder, pickled radishes and shoyu sauce were found packed in wooden pails.

Fresh onions, potatoes, carrots and rutabagas were found in open slatted boxes.

Tea, soy beans, pre-cooked rice balls, oats, barley, soy bean flour, wheat flour and an unidentified brown bean were found in abundance. Some candy was found, and a relatively small amount of sugar. Outside a deserted kitchen in East Arm, Holtz Bay, was found a stone

mill, hand-operated, in which peas apparently were reduced to a paste for soups and other culinary uses; our advancing troops apparently had driven away the enemy KP's in the middle of the preparation of a meal. Oatmeal cookies, hardtack, a good biscuit containing caraway seeds and a small, very light cake with a popcorny flavor were found in quantity, some of these being eaten with relish by our troops.

One enemy unit kept a few pigs and chickens. Some fishing was done locally. Apparently no attempt had been made to grow vegetables on Attu, and, on the basis of Japanese development, there is no reason to believe that vegetables can be grown in the warm, lee spots of Attu valleys.

**COMBAT RATIONS** Two types of combat rations were found, particularly in exposed frontal positions. One kind contained about 8 ounces of hard biscuit, a dozen small pieces of rock candy, tea and rice. This type was found in every soldier's pack. It was usual, too, to find a sock full of rice in the soldier's pack. The other type of combat ration contained seven small pressed wheat or oatmeal cakes, some dried plums, some dried fish powder cured in saké and four cubes of sugar. The cakes were strongly salted, and met with mixed reactions; some of our soldiers enjoyed them, while the enemy soldiers were understood to have found them tasteless and hard to down. The prepared combat rations were neatly packed, with an outer covering of moisture proof paper.

Enemy tea, in general, was of a coarse, black leaf variety and was packed in the same type of rubberized bag as that which contained the rice. In quarters, many individuals had paper bags containing a finer tea for their personal use.

Aside from the tea, the only beverage appeared to have been **SAKE**. Quantities of empty sake bottles were found, these being chiefly imperial quarts, packed in cases of 12 bottles each. It is believed that the sake was a matter of regular issue, and that each soldier was issued the drink at the rate of about a quart a week. One observer reported seeing some red wine in blue, straw-covered bottles, while several reported small stockages of Johnnie Walker whiskey. Half-pint bottles of cheap Japanese whiskey were found in a number of barabara quarters.

**VITAMIN TABLETS** Vitamin tablets were found in great quantity, particularly Vitamin "B". These were believed to have been issued in bottles of 150, with each soldier supposedly taking one tablet at each meal. One medical observer reported that these tablets were merely dried compressed yeast.

One package of ten issue cigarettes reportedly was given each man daily. Other brands reportedly were available at a canteen. It is of interest to note that the enemy was avidly eager to get our American cigarettes; enemy dead often had on their persons entire cartons of cigarettes seized from our dumps and tents, while some reports declare that enemy soldiers were smoking American cigarettes, in some instances,

during their counter-attacks.

NO MESSHALLS      It was noteworthy that the enemy had no messhalls on  
FOR ENEMY---      Attu, and that food was carried in pails from the kit-  
                     chens to the tents, barabararas or caves used as living  
                     quarters, and dispensed there. Dishes were commonly found in these  
                     living quarters. One mess sergeant's notice, posted, was translated; it  
                     stated that the men would not crowd and would leave the area as soon as  
                     they got food, indicating that chow line troubles are found in the Jap  
                     Army, too.

Kitchens usually were small and generally supplied one company or, in outposts or special installations, a smaller number of men. Nearly all living quarters had food storages, pantries and kitchens very close by, and, also, rather close to the latrine. Cooking apparently was handled by a roster similar to our KP method, with a group of soldiers cooking under the mess sergeant's supervision for about a month at a time.

SUMMARIZING:

The Japs on Attu had plenty of food, varied, balanced, well dispersed and well cared for. Their diet was above the level reported for Japan generally, and suggests that the legend of the frugal dietary and Spartan food regimen of the Jap soldier is merely a legend.

# SALVAGE

WANTON WASTE  
DESTROYED MUCH  
ENEMY EQUIPMENT

JOE PRIVATE HAD A SWELL SOUVENIR---he had a huge pair of Jap antiaircraft spotting binoculars. Joe ditched them, planning to pick them up when he left Attu front lines.

The glasses were safely cached, too safely.

For want of glasses that would have found a Jap sniper, a GI died.

For want of glasses that would have searched out a Jap machine gun, our 37s couldn't clean out a strong point that held up our advance.

\* \* \* \* \*

Jack GI grenaded a Jap outpost. As his squad moved forward, Jack jammed deep into his parka pocket a battle flag, some notebooks and some Jap sketches. Tundra mud and foxhole water didn't improve them.

Days later, at a first aid station, the sketches were taken from Jack's pocket and examined by G-2 personnel. The sketches proved to be battle orders, new the day Jack got them, and precisely indicating the enemy's strength, plans and positions. They pointed out the exact location of the strong points that had held up Jack's squad, and the mountain gun whose shell had nicked him.

\* \* \* \* \*

These are old stories, true in basic pattern, and new again in every battle. Enemy information which might have saved American lives is withheld innocently, but our men are just as dead as if the enemy had withheld the information. Enemy equipment in our hands is held out of a battle it might help to win. The moral of the old stories is this:

"EVERYTHING HAS A VALUE IN MODERN WARFARE.

"NOTHING SHOULD BE WASTED OR IGNORED.

"NOTHING SHOULD BE WILFULLY DESTROYED UNLESS IT IS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF FALLING INTO ENEMY HANDS."

Death taught that moral on Attu.

It isn't new to the Japs. The Japs and Nazis both place great stress on capture of our equipment. On Attu, the Jap was swift to use our materiel and to turn it against us. The Jap ate our rations and smoked our cigarettes. The Jap captured our M-1 rifles and our BARs (if and when he could). The Japs firmly intended to take our artillery

[REDACTED]

in their last breakthrough, intending to turn our guns against us and against our shipping.

BOTH GERMANY AND JAPAN OFTEN HAVE CLAIMED THAT THE EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THEIR SALVAGE ACTIVITIES HAS BEEN ONE OF THE MAIN FACTORS IN PAST SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNS.

Perhaps we pressed the Jap too hard on Attu. Or perhaps he wasn't trained properly. He retreated under our fire, abandoning great stores of ammunition and many weapons. The Jap wasted nothing. He siezed anything of value that he could take from us. But he failed to destroy Jap property about to fall into our hands.

Maybe the Jap was so sure that he'd win on Attu that he didn't learn what to do when he was losing.

We turned the Jap's abandoned weapons on him. We blew him up with his own grenades. Every time he left stores he gave us something, deprived himself, spared our bearers a long tote across the tundra and gave his own carriers another hard job.

HERE'S LOOT      The Jap repeatedly left his barabaras in condition for our  
ENEMY LEFT-      immediate occupancy. His tents, too could have been used  
                         by us with only a little policing. Around his quarters  
the Jap left large stocks of good clothing, rubber boots, blankets, canned tangerines, canned vegetables, canned and dried fish, rice, dried potatoes, tea, paper, bandages and other usable materials.

Repeatedly our troops ruined foodstuffs, burned or damaged tents, reduced barabaras to a shambles, and slashed through bales and boxes with bayonets. They worked for the Jap by accomplishing the destruction he had failed to complete.

HERE'S WHAT      Attu proved that we must preserve enemy equipment, des-  
IS NECESSARY      troying it only if it is about to fall into his hands.  
                         His food is useful. His tents and buildings can shelter  
us. His coal can keep us warm. His gasoline can drive our vehicles. In our hands, his weapons can help defeat him. His maps, his notebooks, his orders can direct our troops to the points where he can be hit hardest.

On Attu, men apparently removed nameplates from vehicles, picked up optical gear, letters, orders, records and tactically important sketches and maps. Where there was no loot of interest for the souvenir hunter, quarters and material were sometimes left in utter disorder and valuable information was destroyed.

Attu demonstrated that lives can be saved and the battle shortened by preserving information of the enemy and getting it immediately to the G-2.

██████████

Attu demonstrated that enemy materiel can be used against him in the current battle.

But, equally important, the gun captured today can help win a battle tomorrow. Our experts must see every new design for enemy weapons. Thus, we can determine the kind of a position the enemy may occupy, and what it takes to get him out. We can use the enemy's own new designs, inventions and technical advances against the enemy. We can design new counter-weapons. And, what's more, the materials the enemy uses may indicate his strategic shortages, and exactly where to hit him to shut off his supply and end the war.

SUMMING UP:

Enemy materiel should be destroyed when the enemy has it, and preserved when it is in our hands.

Enemy papers may save our lives, enemy weapons may be used to destroy him.

That souvenir in the rucksack may reveal a tiny fact that can win a big battle.

GOOD ADVICE: ON DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED PROPERTY.

ARTICLE OF WAR 80.

"DEALING IN CAPTURED OR ABANDONED PROPERTY--Any person subject to military law who buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or to any other person directly or indirectly connected with himself, or who fails whenever such property comes into his possession or custody or within his control to give notice thereof to the proper authority and to turn over such property to the proper authority without delay, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine or imprisonment, or by such other punishment as a courtmartial, military commission, or other military tribunal may adjudge, or by any or all of said penalties."

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JAPANESE TRIANGULAR DIVISION - TENTATIVE TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

The following are notes on Organization of the Japanese Triangular Division agreed on by the committee of Japanese Army which met June 21 to 24, 1943, at the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.:

PROVISIONAL TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

	<u>Officers and W.O.</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Notes #</u>
Divisional headquarters	20	100	120	9
Infantry group headquarters	3	10	13	1
Tankette unit			150	2
3 Infantry regiments	387	9654	10041	3
Reconnaissance regiment			450	4
Field artillery unit	110	2612	2722	
Engineer unit			750	5
Signal unit	8	307	315	
Transport unit			1000	
			3900	6
Medical unit	15	300	315	7
4 Field Hospitals	72	400	472	
Water purification unit	2	98	100	
Veterinary detachment	4	46	50	
Ordnance detachment	3	47	50	
Other				8
Total: if transport unit is horse drawn			<u>19448</u>	10
Total: if transport unit is motorized			<u>16548</u>	6
Average			18048	10

Notes:

1. Infantry group headquarters

Infantry Commanding General	1
Adjutants (Major and Captain)	2
Clerks	3
Gas (non-commissioned officer)	1
Observers	4
Runners	<u>2</u>
Total	13

2. The Tankette unit, attached to the Infantry group, consists of 17 to 20 Ishikawajima tankettes. This unit has been identified in 10 divisions only.

3. Infantry regiment --See Inclosure A.

4. In some divisions there is a cavalry regiment in place of the



[REDACTED]

reconnaissance regiment. The figure for the strength of the reconnaissance regiment has been taken from the Australian estimate.

5. Engineer unit consists of a headquarters of 50, three companies of 200 officers and men each and a materiel section of 100, totaling 750.

6. The transport unit varies from 3900 (fully horse-drawn transport unit) to 1000 (fully motorized transport unit). These estimates are consistent with the assumption that a division requires 200 tons a day.

7. Medical unit -- See Inclosure E.

8. Tank companies are a part of three divisions. Each tank company comprises about 17 light and medium tanks.

9. In the field all headquarters will be at considerably greater strength than that shown in these tables of organization. This increase is accounted for by the attachment of runners, signal and transport personnel and escort platoons to the headquarters concerned. As it is not believed that these personnel are part of the headquarters organization they have been shown with their unit of origin, i.e., runners in infantry squads, signal personnel with regimental and divisional signal units and transport personnel with the transport regiment (except in the case of the artillery unit). Escort platoons at regimental and higher headquarters are believed to be formed from within the infantry companies.

10. For the purpose of rough estimates, a round figure of 18000 Tables of Organization strength for an average triangular division is suggested.

Up to the present, the operational strength of divisions met in the field has been in the neighborhood of 15000. Various tentative reasons for the discrepancy between this 15000 figure and Tables of Organization (War Establishment) strength have been advanced. Definite evidence is lacking and information on the subject is requested.

Inclosure A -- Infantry Regiment

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Regimental headquarters	11	49	60	1
No. 1 battalion	36	924	960	2
No. 2 battalion	36	924	960	
No. 3 battalion	36	924	960	
Regimental signal company	3	153	156	3
Regimental anti-tank company	4	117	121	4
Regimental gun company	3	127	130	5
Total	129	3218	3347	

Notes:

1. Regimental headquarters -- no detailed data as to duties was accepted by the committee.

2. Battalion organization -- See Inclosure B.

3. Regimental signal company.

	<u>O</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>E.M.</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Pistols</u>	<u>Rifles</u>	<u>W/T</u>	<u>R/T</u>
Headquarters	1	9	14	24	6	10	14		
No. 1 Platoon (2 line sections)	1	2	32	35	7	3	32		
No. 2 Platoon - 2 sects. R/T* sets		2	30	32	6	2	30		10
8 sects. W/T* sets	1	8	56	65	11	9	56	8	
Total	3	21	132	156	30	24	132	8	10

\*R/T sets are radio telephone, W/T sets wireless telegraph.

4. Regimental anti-tank company

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Headquarters	1	11	12
b. 6 gun sections	3	81	84
c. 3 ammunition sections		25	25
Total	4	117	121

5. Regimental gun company

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Headquarters	1	23	24
b. 2 Platoons	2	70	72
c. Ammunition section		34	34
Total	3	127	130

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Inclosure B -- Infantry Battalion

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Notes</u>
Battalion headquarters	5	57	62	1
No. 1 company	6	172	178	2
No. 2 company	6	172	178	
No. 3 company	6	172	178	
No. 4 company	6	172	178	
Heavy machine gun company	6	130	136	3
Battalion gun company	<u>1</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	36	924	960	

Notes:

1. Battalion headquarters

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>NCO</u>	<u>E.M.</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Command section				
Battalion C.O. (lt. col or major)	1			1
Adjutant (Captain or Lieutenant)	1			1
Intendance	1	1		2
Medical	1	3	2	6
Veterinary	1	1	2	4
Clerks (2 sgt-majors 2 sgts.)		4		4
Ordnance NCO (also gas)		1		1
Orderlies, runners (1 corporal, 1 private)		1	1	2
Observers			2	2
A/A squad	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Part Total	5	12	10	27
b. Baggage section				<u>35</u>
Total				62

2. Infantry company -- See Inclosure C

3. Heavy machine gun company

	<u>Officers and W.O.</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
a. Organization			
Company headquarters	1	12	13
No. 1 platoon	1	21	22
No. 2 platoon	1	21	22
No. 3 platoon	1	21	22
No. 4 platoon	1	21	22
Ammunition section	<u>1*</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>35</u>
Total	6	130	136

CONFIDENTIAL

Each platoon has two sections. Each section has one heavy machine gun, giving 8 to the company.

\* Leader of ammunition section is a warrant officer.

b. Heavy machine gun company headquarters

	Officers	NCO	E.M.	Total	Pist.	Rifles
Company commander	1			1	1	
Section leader (sgt.-major)		1		1	1	
Ordnance NCO		1		1	1	
Supply NCO		1		1	1	
Buglers (privates)			2	2		2
Medical (privates)			4	4		
Orders (sgt., private)		1	1	2		2
Horse holder			1	1		1
<b>Total</b>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>

4. Battalion gun unit (70mm howitzer)

a. Organization

	Officers and W.O.	Men	Total	How.
Headquarters	1	10	11	
No. 1 section		14	14	1
No. 2 section		14	14	1
Ammunition section		11	11	
<b>Total</b>	<u>1</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>2</u>

b. Battalion gun unit headquarters

	Officers and W.O.	Men	Total	Pistols	Rifles
Commanding officer	1		1	1	
Squad leader (sgt. Maj.)		1	1	1	
Orders (sgt.)		1	1	1	
Range		3	3	1	2
Communications		2	2		
Medical		2	2		
Horse holders		1	1		1
<b>Total</b>	<u>1</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>

c. Battalion gun section

Each section has one leader, 10 canoneers and 3 drivers, a total of 14.

d. Battalion ammunition section

The ammunition section has one leader and 10 men, a total of 11.

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Inclosure C -- Infantry Company

	Officers and W.O.	Men	Total	Pistols	Rifles	Gren.	Notes
Company headquarters	3*	10	13	7	2	4	1
No. 1 platoon	1	54	55	11	43	86	2
No. 2 platoon	1	54	55	11	43	86	
No. 3 platoon	<u>1</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>86</u>	
Total	6	172	178	40	131	262	

\* Two officers and one warrant officer.

Notes:

1. Infantry company headquarters

	Officers and W.O.	NCO	E.M.	Total	Pistols	Rifles
Commanding Officer	1			1	1	
Adjutant	1			1	1	
Warrant officer	1			1	1	
Orders (sgt., corporal)		2		2	1	1
Weapons (NCO)		1		1	1	
Supply (NCO, private)		1	1	2	1	1
Liaison (NCO)		1		1	1	
Medical		<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>		
Total	3	6	4	13	7	2

(One of the above NCO or men is also in charge of gas).

2. Infantry platoon

a. Platoon headquarters, consisting of Lieutenant, sergeant and private. The officer and NCO are armed with pistols, the private with a rifle.

b. Three rifle squads of 14 men each, totaling 42.

c. One grenade discharger squad of 10 men.

d. This gives a total platoon strength of 55 officers and men.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Inclosure D -- Infantry Squad

1. Rifle squad

	<u>Corporals</u>	<u>Lance corp.</u>	<u>Privates</u>	<u>Pistols</u>	<u>Rifles</u>
Leader	1				1
Assistant leader		1			1
Light machine gun			1	1	
Ammunition carriers			2	1	1
Riflemen			<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>

Squad strength 14. In actual operations the size of the rifle squad is smaller than above indicated and the size of the company, battalion and regimental headquarters larger. It is assumed that men are drawn from the squads to serve in the various headquarters.

2. Grenade discharger squad

	<u>Corporals</u>	<u>Privates</u>	<u>Pistols</u>	<u>Rifles</u>
Leader	1			1
Grenade discharger gunners		3	3	
Ammunition carriers		<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
Total	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>

Squad strength 10. Grenade discharger squads having 4 grenade dischargers (13 men) also have been reported. This is not believed to be normal. If present, the strength of the regiment will be increased by 108 men.

Inclosure E -- Medical

The attached medical personnel in a type battalion seems to consist of one medical officer or NCO and two enlisted men per company. These are supplemented if necessary by enlisted men of the combat troops for litter bearers.

The next link in the evacuation seems to be what is variously called: Medical Unit, Casualty Clearing Station and Divisional Bearer Section. The information on the strength and exact composition of this unit is not obtainable. It seems, however, to be split into three parts: a headquarters capable of setting up a dressing station, a litter bearer section for hand litter carry, and an ambulance section for motor evacuation to the next rearward element, the Field Hospital. The Medical Unit appears to be what was previously called the Medical Regiment, but no evidence has been produced to show that Medical Regiments as such exist. Strengths given vary from 50 to 650.

The Field Hospital is capable of caring for 400 patients and has about 18 officers, according to quite definite evidence available. There are apparently four per division, though possibly only two in some cases. Each is headed by a major, who is assisted by 12 medical officers, one pharmacist, one dentist, three sanitary officers and probably 100 enlisted men. In addition, there are attached as needed about 30 to 40 men (probably one officer) with either truck or animal transport to aid in evacuation.

Other units definitely known to appear within the division are the Water Purification Unit, with a probable strength of about 100, and a Sanitary Unit, strength and composition unknown.

The divisional surgeon (lt. Col or Major) is on the divisional commander's staff.

MEDICAL ORGANIZATION FOR DIVISIONS IN THE FIELD

Comparison between U. S. and Japanese Organization

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Japanese</u>
Battalion Aid Station	Officers and Men with Company
Coll: { Company {	Litter Company ) Aid Station ) Ambulance Company )
(Litter Bearer Section (Collecting Station Section (Motor Ambulance Section	Medical Unit
2 Clearing Stations (12 officers and 116 men)	4 Field Hospitals (72 officers and 400 men)

Estimated number of medical personnel in Japanese Triangular Division in the Field

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>
Divisional headquarters	1	1	2
Infantry group headquarters			
Tankette unit	2	10	12
3 infantry regiments	18	108	126
Reconnaissance regiment	2	13	15
Field artillery unit	2	19	21
Engineer unit	2	11	13
Signal unit		3	3
Transport unit	2	10	12
Medical unit	15	300	315
4 field hospitals	72	400	472
Water purification unit	2	98	100
Veterinary detachment	4	46	50
Ordnance detachment		3	3
Total	<u>122</u>	<u>1022</u>	<u>1144</u>



# DESIGN FOR DEFENSE

The story of the Japanese occupation and defense of ATTU, by  
Lt. Col. R. G. Fergusson, GSC, G-2, Landing Force.

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## BACKGROUND FOR OCCUPATION

The offensive move of the Japanese in June, 1942, in the North and Central Pacific was frustrated at Midway Island and in the area of Dutch Harbor. The unexpected aerial strength in the Alaska Defense Command sent the Japs reeling back along the Aleutian Chain to the Rat and Near Islands. Part of the Jap troops landed on Kiska Island on June 7; the rest of the transports unloaded at Attu on the 8th. The Attu garrison immediately prepared positions, chiefly in the Holtz-Chichagof area, with beach positions in Sarana and Massacre Bays. Outposts also were located at Scarlet Beach (Austin Cove) and in Steller Cove.

In September, 1942, most of the enemy's Attu Force was shifted to Kiska, leaving only a comparatively small group as a house-keeping unit. However, the Japs did not intend to abandon the Near Islands, but were planning to occupy Shemya and Agattu in addition to Attu. An Independent Infantry Battalion under Lt. Col Yonigawa was staged at Paramushiru in company with the 303rd Independent Infantry Battalion under Major Watanabe. In October this expedition sailed for the Near Islands, the Yonigawa Battalion landing at Holtz Bay, while the Watanabe Battalion with its attached troops and Landing Strip Construction Crew was turned back from Shemya because of the suspected presence of U. S. Naval Units, and was forced back to Paramushiro.

On November 4, 1942, the 24th Independent AA Company, the 302nd Independent Engineers and an Amphibious Engineer Platoon landed on Attu. These units were followed on November 12 by the 35th Independent AA Company and the 6th Mountain Artillery Unit. Then, in January, 1943, the Watanabe Battalion returned, this time on warships, including the cruiser "KISO", and took up the defense of Chichagof Harbor.

Additions were made to this force until in early May the following units formed the garrison of approximately 2400 men under Colonel Yasuyo Yamasaki:

- Yonigawa Independent Infantry Battalion.
- 303rd Independent Infantry Battalion.
- Antiaircraft Battalion (4 companies under Major AOTO).
- Engineer Unit (1 company plus 2 independent platoons).
- 6th Mountain Gun Company.
- Anchorage Unit, Naval Reconnaissance Unit, Airfield Construction Unit, Field Hospital and Field Post Office.

MAIN STRENGTH  
IN HOLTZ BAY

On May 11, the date of the landing of the U. S. Forces, the Japs were dispersed so as to put the main strength in the Holtz Bay area. The defense plan was to deny the use of the Chichagof and Holtz Bay area to the U. S. forces by strong positions against frontal attack and by holding the vital Massacre-Holtz Pass and the Massacre-Sarana Pass. The 303rd Battalion was charged with the defense of the Chichagof and Massacre area and was disposed as follows: in the Massacre-Sarana Pass and on the ridge between the Massacre and Sarana valleys was the 2nd Company under Lt. Honna, supported by the 4th Company under Lt. Goto. The Massacre Holtz Pass was held by the 1st Company under Captain Hayashi, in excellently prepared positions. One platoon of the 1st Company was in the Massacre Valley to act as a delaying force. Also, in that area, was the Amphibious Engineer Platoon, which was constructing trenches and trails and was prepared to unload the Jap ships expected about the 19th with reinforcements.

The Japs knew that a U. S. force was in the area but did not expect an attack until late in May, so the landing was a surprise, the biggest surprise being the landing made at Red Beach, on the flank of Holtz Bay. In the Massacre area, the defense was conducted according to plan, the U. S. troops being stopped completely in front of the Massacre-Holtz Pass and subjected to harassing fire from the Sarana Pass and Massacre-Sarana Ridge. In the Holtz Sector the enemy managed to occupy the strategic high ground overlooking West Arm (Holtz) Beach before the arrival of the U. S. battalion.

WITHDRAWAL  
IS ORDERED

In the first four days the Japs held firmly in the Holtz-Massacre Pass, but steady pressure on the Holtz Bay sector from the left flank, both from the Red Beach force and the Provisional Battalion that had landed at Scarlet Beach (Austin Cove), was making that area untenable. The Japs were forced down into the West Arm, across the ridge, and then East Arm (Holtz Bay) was threatened.

On May 15, Colonel Yamasaki issued a withdrawal order that caused an orderly retreat into the Chichagof Harbor area. Leaving only rear guard forces to hold in East Arm and cover the movement. On 16 May, as a result of steady pounding from the artillery and determined assault by U. S. forces, the 1st Company of the 303rd evacuated the Holtz-Massacre Pass into the Cold Mountain area and prepared to assist the 2nd Company in holding the Sarana Pass.

On May 18, the U. S. Forces began the assault on the Sarana Pass, which, by the next day, had cleared the high ground northwest of the pass but was stopped by the Jap force under Lt. Honna at Point "A" on the tip of the Massacre-Sarana Ridge. Here Honna's unit occupied a strong position that covered the steep slope leading down from the ridge. The first assault was thrown back with losses, and American weapons were captured, including a mortar with 13 rounds of ammunition. These rounds were promptly fired back into Massacre Valley and produced casualties, though the fire was unaimed.

[REDACTED]

Point "A" was finally wrested from Lt Honna, who died with his unit in its defense on 21 May. This opened the Sarana Pass, and then the U. S. battalions moved through with Chichagof Harbor as the objective. The high ridge on the left of the Chichagof Valley was promptly climbed and steady pressure forced the Japs back. However, the strongly held Sarana Nose, the junction of Sarana and Chichagof Valleys, presented a problem. Here Lt. Goto with his 4th Company, 303rd Battalion, with remnants of the 2nd company, defied the crossing of the Sarana Valley floor. In plain sight of his position an infantry company was assembling for what appeared to be a suicide advance. Suddenly, at 0640 on 22 May the combined fire of all artillery batteries, infantry cannon, heavy weapons and anti-tank units in the area descended on Sarana Nose. At 0700 the doughboys crossed the valley with few casualties and routed or killed Goto's forces, thus opening up the Sarana Valley.

FISHHOOK RIDGE      Attention now shifted to the ridge on the north side of  
IN SPOTLIGHT      Chichagof Valley, where Yonegawa's Battalion and supporting units were holding the ridge and the Chichagof-Holtz Pass. Bitter fighting forced the Nips back until they stopped the advance at the Fishhook ridge. On 24 May at 1000 two U. S. battalions assaulted the Fishhook, supported by air attack and artillery barrage. Some initial success was made, but the forces were thrown back to their original position. The attack was not renewed until the next day because of the difficulty in moving ammunition and supplies up to the forces on the ridge. On 25 May, the attack was renewed along the line until, on 28 May, the Japs had been forced back to a line through Lake Cories and the Fishhook Ridge had been taken from the Japs. The U. S. forces now prepared for the downhill assault on the Chichagof Harbor defenses.

It was obvious that Yamasaki's position was hopeless, and the U. S. Force commander prepared a demand for the surrender of the Japanese garrison. This message was dropped on the beach at Chichagof from a PBY at 2100 on 28 May. Colonel Yamasaki's force was faced with the prospect of a last ditch stand on the beach, a complete surrender or a violent counter attack. He chose the latter.

His plan was to assemble his remaining forces, approximately 1000 men, and hit the U. S. line between Lake Cories and Fishhook Ridge with the artillery position across the Sarana Pass as his objective. Then he hoped to stream down to the Massacre Beach, thus causing maximum damage to the American force. Colonel Yamasaki on the 28th issued the following order (paraphrase) to his forces:

CHICHAGOF HARBOR  
ORDER OF SECOND SECTOR UNIT

1-By the combined attack of the enemy land, sea and air units the Battalions on the front line have been defeated. However, our morale is excellent and we are holding in some important points. We will attack and annihilate the United States Forces.

2-The Watanabe Battalion will hold in their present position and cover the assembling forces, then will be prepared to attack

[REDACTED]

on the left in the direction of the Sarana-Massacre Pass,

3-The Yonegawa Battalion will form on the right of Lake Cories and will advance on the right in the direction of Sarana Pass.

4-The Aota Battalion (AA) will cease the defense of the sea frontier and will advance in the center in the direction of Sarana Pass.

(Following paragraphs are devoted to small units, including, for example, the following):

8-Lt Tsuroka (Navy) will command the attached Naval personnel and will advance as third reserve in the rear of headquarters.

9-The cryptographic and wireless section will destroy all documents and will act under the command of the adjutant.

10-The Field Hospital, after direct assistance to the patients, will advance as a part of the reserve under command of the adjutant.

11-The time for attack will be announced later. All units will send liaison officers to headquarters prior to 2200.

12-I, in the advance for the attack, will be in the center rear of the front line.

YONUJO YAMASAKI  
Colonel, Infantry,  
Commanding.

At 0330 on 29 May, the Japs hit and overran the front line units at the head of Lake Cories. They streamed up the Chichagof Valley, overrunning two command posts and medical installations until they hit the U. S. force reserve position in the Massacre-Sarana Pass. A direct attack was made with only a slight attempt to bypass the strong position. Their fanatical charges were repulsed again and again until the remaining Jap forces consisted of scattered groups in the area at the junction of the Sarana and Chichagof Valleys. By the evening of 29 May the majority of the Japanese force had been annihilated. Colonel Yamasaki was killed, sword in hand, at the base of the Sarana Pass.

Organized resistance was now over and the next few days consisted only in mopping up operations, and the United States Forces firmly held Attu Island.

# JAP PAPERS

TURN THEM IN  
RIGHT NOW  
AND SAVE LIVES

The importance of prompt action in turning into proper channels all captured documents can hardly be overestimated. The information secured will usually be of immediate use, either to identify and thus aid in gauging the strength of opposing units or to actually locate Jap gun and automatic weapons positions.

Early in the action in the Massacre Valley, a platoon under a Lt Paulson, while covering the ridge overlooking Sarana Bay, surprised and routed a Jap platoon. From the body of the Jap officer commanding the unit, Lt Paulson took a map and order which gave the detailed plan for the defense of Chichagof Harbor. These documents were promptly turned in to Force Headquarters.

From another source a map was turned in which gave the position of a 75mm gun on the Sarana Nose, the junction of Sarana and Chichagof Valleys. No fire had been received from this position, but the artillery opened up on the location and, as found later, the Jap gun was destroyed without ever having fired a shot.

In the Holtz Bay sector the actual order directing the evacuation of that area and the general plans for the location of the evacuating unit in Chichagof Harbor were found and turned in before the assault on that area began.

However, in a few cases documents were submitted too late to be of anything but historical value. It should be realized that the Jap habit of recording all his orders and plans and then carrying them on his person can be used as a weapon against him.

----Lt. Col. R. G. Fergusson, G-2, Landing Force

# PRISONERS

BRING 'EM BACK ALIVE  
AND YOU'LL SAVE GOOD  
AMERICAN LIVES-----

----by Lt. Col R. G. Fergusson, G-2, Landing Force.

The Jap prisoner is of tremendous value to the Force Headquarters. He has never been told not to talk in event of capture, because the possibility of capture is never considered by the enemy. As a result, this well disciplined Jap soldier obeys orders and answers any questions that we direct at him. He is very proud of the knowledge he has and is, actually, eager to give out this information despite the fact that it will be, obviously, against the best interests of his own people.

The third prisoner on Attu, on being asked for the location of a particular AA gun in Chichagof Harbor, pointed out the place on a map and gave the location as "200 meters from the church." Immediately a phone call to the artillery and to the Naval Support Unit brought howitzer and gun fire on that location. This same eager Jap pointed out the location of the Japanese headquarters, and in a few minutes this location was being shelled heavily from a patrolling destroyer outside Chichagof Harbor.

Truly such an eager source of information should be an object of determined effort for capture.

The wounded Jap in the foxhole wants only one thing--death. The Japanese Army wants him to be killed to prevent him from being questioned; therefore, it is logical that every effort be made to save his life so that he can save many American lives by "talking". The rules of Land Warfare dictate that enemy wounded shall be cared for properly and that prisoners will be taken. Moreover, disregarding humanitarian motives, every officer and soldier should realize the great importance of taking prisoners and this object should be considered in all tactical moves.

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
# SURRENDER PASSES

## "WILLING CAPTIVES" BEAR TICKETS TO NEW LIFE AND ANOTHER CHANCE-----

At least 25 per cent of the prisoners taken by us during the Attu operation had been influenced by "surrender passes" and "security passes" dropped on the enemy by United States planes. That is the estimate of qualified observers. More than 25 per cent of the prisoners admitted that one or another of these passes first put the idea of surrender in their heads. Those so influenced, perhaps, might be called "willing captives."

There is no record of Japanese on Attu having attempted to use these passes as bait to lure United States troops into the open or into an ambush, but the possible misuse of such passes remains a hazard to which every soldier always must be alert.

The passes were written in both English and Japanese. This is a sample of the security pass-----



The "security pass" bore instructions to enemy personnel wishing to surrender, directing them to approach U. S. lines singly, to keep their hands well above their heads, to wave the pass as identification, and to obey quickly any orders given by gestures.



The passes, which were signed by the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, promised the Japanese soldier that if he surrendered he would be treated courteously, and that the treatment given him would be in accord with the provisions of the Geneva Convention for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, to which the United States is a signatory nation. This part of the document was an implied contract, which United States troops capturing Japanese must respect as both a personal and a national obligation of honor. Respect for the provisions of the treaty did not mean, however, that prisoners were to be molly-coddled.

Here is a sample of the Surrender Pass-----

單獨に投降せよ！ 怪しげな行動を慎しめ！

<p><b>Surrender Pass</b></p> <p>The bearer is surrendering. He is to be treated courteously and escorted to the rear.</p> <p>COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE U. S. FORCES</p>	<p>戦線通過査證</p> <p>本票所持ノ者ハ自發投降者ナリ。</p> <p>丁重ニ同人ヲ取扱ヒ、後方ニ護送スベシ。</p> <p>米國軍司令官</p>
---	---

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

米軍陣地へ此の票を示せ！

The surrender pass urged Japanese troops to surrender, but to surrender alone. It also instructed them to display the pass prominently when approaching American lines during either the day or night, and promised them that the United States Army and its soldiers would treat them well.

The general warning is given whenever the surrender pass is used that the mere fact that a Japanese soldier displays one of the two passes shown herewith does not mean that he is above suspicion and that his captor can safely trust the Jap or be off his guard. Nor, on the other hand, does the mere fact that a Japanese soldier does not have or does not display the surrender or security pass mean that he does not wish to surrender. It is possible to lose many things during battle, and a Japanese soldier wishing to surrender might quite conceivably have lost the "security pass" he was holding for a rainy day.

# HOUSING

ATTU JAPS  
LIVED IN  
COMFORT--

COMFORT WAS THE KEYNOTE of Jap housing provisions on Attu.

Like the Aleuts before them, the Japs learned to dig for their housing, thereby achieving a maximum of comfort, warmth, concealment and cover with a minimum use of building materials.

Four types of housing were general in Jap-occupied areas on Attu: (1) octagonal tents, (2) long barabara type barracks, (3) dugouts and small houses similar to dugouts, and (4) holes and caves made as livable as possible.

**JAP TENTAGE** The Japanese octagonal tent is excellent. It is lighter, warmer, roomier and generally more comfortable than ours. Its double walls apparently give much better protection from the wind than our tent gives; the double walls, too, apparently permit the use of dim lights at night without danger of violation of blackout discipline. It has a stand-up door with a vestibule type entrance that appears to be highly desirable in storms, and which provides limited emergency storage space. The Jap tent can be heated by a smaller stove and with less fuel than is ours. It is packed in light, compact, complete units. It is the envy of all American troops who see it, and who themselves use a tent which has been changed but little over many decades.

The Japanese tent had an inside diameter of about 24 feet. It was the same height as our pyramidal tent, although both tents use a 12 foot 9 inch center pole. The side walls are about two feet high and are supported by short poles. The tent is twelve-sided, but gives the appearance of being round. The tent is suspended from the supporting pole by 12 chains connected to a pierced plate. The tie-down ropes run over pulleys attached to the tent rim. A flap is provided in each side, probably to give light and ventilation. At the entrance flap, the wall rises to nearly five feet, and two poles support the entrance.

**DOUBLE WALLS-** The basic and outer fabric of the tent is of a closely woven khaki colored duck, considerably lighter in weight than that used in our tents. Suspended within the basic tent is a second tent of closely woven strong, white cotton, which is held in place by tapes. This gives from six to eight inches of dead air space between the tent and the tent liner, eliminating drafts, providing a second shelter against moisture, and conserving the heat. In the tropics, a mosquito netting liner takes the place of the white cotton liner; some of the netting type liner were found on Attu, also. The top of the tent was covered with a half-spherical ventilator cover resembling a baby-pram top and operated by pull-cords from within. There is no noisy metal hood.

Usually the tent was pitched in the following manner:

A trench about 18 inches deep was dug from the intended entrance to the intended location of the center pole. A circular hole of the same depth and about 7 or 8 feet in diameter, was dug around the center pole, the hole providing a site for the stove and access to the sleeping and living space in the rear of the tent. A tarpaulin then was placed over the earthen shelf left as the result of the completion of the excavation. Sometimes, instead, a wood floor was made of new lumber, dunnage or scrap lumber, in place of the paulin. Straw mats were scattered on the paulin, and, on the mats (or the wood floor) were placed a large number of blankets. The entrance trench and the space around the stove and center pole ordinarily were floored with straw mats. The Japanese soldier, coming out of storm or mud, would take off his shoes in the depressed trough area, and could walk about with dry feet on the warmer, higher floor, which always was set above the stove level.

**EXCELLENT PACKING--** 1st Lt Robert D. Orr, QMC observer, commented that the Jap tent and component parts are packed in a very sensible manner, especially for overseas combat operations. Lt Orr continues: "Each unit, the tent proper, the liners and tarpaulin, the poles, the stove and the pins are packed in separate heavy duck bags with handles, each of which can easily be carried by one or two men. The pin unit (both metal tipped wooden and iron tent peg sets having been found) contains a small sledge hammer broken down, two candle holders, and the manual on how to pitch the tent, in addition to the correct number of pins. This method of packaging eliminates the problem our Army experiences where all the various components of tent and stove always are scattered and always are hard to gather together for issue."

Like our own tent, the Japanese tent was put to severe tests by williwaws and Aleutian windstorms, whose gusts (reported this year in this western area) have exceeded 110 miles per hour. The light tough duck of the Jap tent often was ripped where, when and as exposed to storms just as was the heavier fabric of our own pyramidal tents.

**EFFICIENT STOVES USED** Two types of Japanese stove were found. Both types burned coal or charcoal, and both were of sturdy construction and designed to fit the particular needs for which they were issued. One was a drum stove, 20 to 22 inches in diameter and 24 inches high, with a 6-inch opening in the center of the top for the stovepipe. Around the stovepipe was ample space for individual messkit cookery, retaining rivets having been placed around the extreme margin, presumably to keep messkits from sliding off and possibly also to aid in the drying of equipment. This stove also had a grate. The Japs apparently did not regard this stove as being as good as our own Wheeling type. The second type of enemy stove, frequently found installed in barabaras, was of cast iron, about two feet high, 18 inches deep and 14 inches wide, and was equipped with a good grate and front fire door. These stoves could be broken down for economical space use in shipment. These stoves, too, had space on top for cooking utensils.

[REDACTED]

The Japs used nut coal of good quality, packed in stout matting bags that resembled pillows with handles at each end. These bags handled more easily and withstood rough handling better than did our own burlap coal sacks. Additionally, the emptied bags could be and were used for camouflage purposes.

Although these stoves provided facilities for individual cooking for every tent, hut and barabara, Jap community cooking was not done in the living quarters. Instead, large iron kettles were set up just outside the tents, in separate cook shelters or tents. These kettles were set up on mortared stones, with a short chimney and over a coal fire, and appeared to be capable of cooking food in quantity faster than did our gasoline range, model 1937, according to Captain Leo W. Bagley, FA, observer.

**JAP STOVEPIPE READY FOR USE** Japanese stove pipe was made of iron, and was stout, well constructed, and apparently somewhat heavier in gauge than our own. While our own pipe is shipped semi-fabricated and requires some mechanical processes to prepare it for use, the Japanese pipe accomplished the conservation of shipping space while retaining the advantage of being ready for instant use. This was accomplished by nesting the pipe sections; pipes were slightly tapered and were numbered, the higher sections reducing slightly in diameter. A good damper was installed about 3 feet above the stove. The pipe, however, did not appear to stick far enough above the tent, for the top of the tent and hood often were blackened and had holes burnt in the fabric, despite the use of wire grid spark arrester at the outer end of the last section of pipe.


**DEEP REVETTING HAS HIGH VALUE** The excellent and deep revetting of the Japanese tents provided (1) increased protection from violent Aleutian windstorms, (2) increased ease of smooth and shadowless camouflage, and (3) increased physical protection against our bombing, shelling and strafing. Similar deep revetting was standard for Jap shelters generally, and the uniform eagerness of the Jap to dig deeply for cover was remarked generally by Americans on Attu.

Economy of labor was notable in the preparation of enemy housing arrangements. Uniformly, the same earth which was removed to provide working cubage of the barabaras or tents was used, likewise, to provide physical protection.

**BARABARA BUILDINGS** As materials became available, the Japs on Attu provided permanent housing, usually of a modified Aleut barabara type, for barracks, offices, hospital wards and warehouses. While strangers to the Aleutians might regard such semi-underground structures as dismal and "make do" substitutes for above-ground housing, it appears that the buildings were a highly ingenious and flexible adaptation to local needs. They provided a maximum of shelter, warmth and convenience with the use of minimum material and shipping space, at the same time that they offered maximum concealment and protection.

# TRIANGULAR TYPE BARRACKS

- ① SKYLIGHT
- ② DIRT & SOD
- ③ WATERPROOF PAPER
- ④ SHEATHING
- ⑤ RAFTERS
- ⑥ RAFTER BASE
- ⑦ BED PANELS
- ⑧ DRAINAGE DITCH



Barabara structures generally were located on sloping sidehills, with the long dimensions parallel to the contours of the hills. All excavation was by hand. A typical cross section was 18 feet in width at the level of the bunks and 20 feet in width at the ground level at the end of the rafters. Lengths were variable, one small barracks room being 20 ft square, while other barracks buildings having been measured up to 88 ft in length.

Rafters apparently came from Japan in pairs, bolted together and .2 X .6 X 12 ft in size. (The Japs apparently apply the metric system to the foot, and express lumber dimensions in tenths and hundreds and feet.) Tenons at the ends of the rafters were fitted into mortises in sills usually set along the tops of the prepared excavation at ground level. Boards of light and sturdy Manchurian larch covered the rafters and formed the gable roof. Over the roof, then, was laid tar paper and, occasionally, salvage blankets, sometimes sheet metal, and always, earth and neatly trimmed and fitted sod. Water from the roof was carried away by small ditches outside the excavation limits.

The roof apparently was completed first. Next came the side walls, about three feet high, and sloping inward from the base of the rafters like the walls of a corn crib. Then came the horizontal floor or bunk deck, extending about 7 ft from each wall and leaving a 4 or 5 ft walkway down the middle of the building some 20 inches below the bunk decks. Space below the bunk deck was available for storage. Light and ventilation were provided by glass windows, 2 ft square, at 10 ft intervals. These windows were hinged to the roof and held open by short sticks. Doorways usually were centered at the ends and were 3.3 X 5.7 ft in size. Coal burning stoves identical with those used in the tents heated these barabaras. Light was commonly supplied by candles, makeshift electric wiring being found in a few scattered instances.

The low slope of the roofs, with the use of local sod, made the camouflage of the barabaras nearly perfect. Captain John G. Rakowsky, CE, reports that the sod was cut in chunks about 2 ft square and 6 to 10 inches thick. The material was laid on the roof in an irregular pattern, being thickened near the gable to form a smooth curve. Chinks were filled with dirt and weeds and carefully smoothed or raked. At the eaves, the covering was carried to the natural ground at the edges of the excavation. Intercepting ditches were carefully covered with sod and smoothed down. Nettings of ropes covered with twigs, grass and weeds formed canopies over the doors and building ends. Dry grass or a few loose sods were left on top of the roof to be placed over the windows.

Some of the Jap dwellings had no standard dimensions or design. They were, generally, wooden huts dug into the ground. They appear to have been used for living quarters, kitchens or storehouses. They often had skylights, windows, stoves and other appointments.

Many of the Japs seemed to have lived at least part of the time in what can be described best as holes. These often were buttressed by timbers. This type of shelter was found adjoining OPs and machine gun nests, and probably was developed as an expedient when it appeared that

[REDACTED]

we planned an attack on Attu.

SUMMARISING:

Jap housing on Attu was comfortable, though crowded. Tentage was excellent. Housing was warm, well camouflaged, used a minimum of materials and labor, and was well adapted to the terrain, but always was substantially below American standards of space and facilities.

# ORDER OF BATTLE

## THE STRENGTH OF JAPANESE FORCES DEFENDING THE ISLAND OF ATTU-----

Study of documents captured on Attu now make it possible to give an approximate estimate of the units on the island prior to the recent operations. Operational reports now place the total number of Japanese killed at 2,350, and it appears probable that these troops were components of the following units:

<u>Arm</u>	<u>Formation</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Army Register Appointment</u>
Hq		40	Col YAMASAKI Yasuyo	CO 130 Inf Regt 8/40
Inf	1 & 3 Cos Inf Unit N Chishima Fortress	200	Lt. Col. YONEGAWA Hiroshi	CO Inf Unit N Chishima For- tress 8/41
	303 Ind Inf Bn	660	Maj WATANABE Tokuji	Bn Comdr 105 Inf Regt 8/41
Arty	33 Ind AA Bn	540	Maj AOTO Nobu (?)	Adj 33 Div 5/41
	1 Bty 6 Mtn Arty Unit	110	Lt ENDO	
Engr	One Co 302 Ind Engr Unit	179	Capt ONO Kinzo	Atchd Reinf Unit 57 Engr Regt 8/41
	One Co 6 Ship- ping Engr	270	Capt KOBAYASHI Tokuo	Co Comdr 26 Ind Engr Co 7/41
Med	One Sec Fd Hosp	183		
Misc	Airfield Con- struction De- tachment	21		
	Pt NAGAMINE Anchorage	60	Lt INOMATA (Naval)	
	One Machine- Cannon Co	136		
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2359</u>		



[REDACTED]

JAP STRIP ON ATTU APPEARS TO BE USELESS FOR AMERICAN OPERATIONS

AT TERRIBLE COST, Japan learned at Midway and in the Coral Sea that it is suicide to bring sea forces within reach of land-based planes.

Therefore, Japan resolved to use that fact against us.

Flying fields were planned for Attu and for KISKA.

Using hand-tools and manpower only, at both bases, the sweating Nips sought to carve out air bases that would challenge our supremacy in northern skies.

The U. S. forces that captured Attu found a bomb-battered strip about 3000 X 300 feet, about half completed. No enemy plane ever had landed there. It is probable that no plane ever will land there. Bad in siting, spotty in workmanship, the enemy landing strip apparently is worthless.

ENGINEERS      Lt. Col. C. H. Whitesell, Jr., CE, who carefully checked the  
SAY THIS-      terrain and the project, comments as follows:

'The East Arm of Holtz Bay is a valley about 6000 X 750 feet in dimension. This valley is a prolongation of the bay, and a runway in the middle of the valley, therefore, would give an approach over the water; the middle of the valley is the logical place for the strip.

'Because the Japs built their runway by hand, they were forced to place it against the east side of the valley so as to use material from a large sand dune, and from borrow pits in the valley wall. Locating the runway in this position precluded its use as any more than a fighter strip...The approach to this runway from the bay was obstructed, and it was necessary to make a slight change of course after entering the East Arm and before approaching the runway.

'The north end of the runway was on a sand base and about 30 ft above sea level. Construction on this end was good, but toward the south end there was no sand available and fill was taken from the valley wall. This fill could have been made of available gravel mixed with hardpan. The Jap made no effort to keep this good material clean, but dumped mud and muskeg into the fill indiscriminately....

'The interesting feature of the construction was the precise detail in some parts, particularly the lining up of ditches and the careful sloping of sidehill cuts, compared with the carelessness and poor construction in other parts. This precision in some parts was a waste of time.

'The valley floor is of gravel and would form a perfect base for a runway, by diverting the meandering stream into a single straight

[REDACTED]

channel (which would eliminate the need for drainage beneath the runway). The time involved for building a 5000 foot runway in this location with our modern equipment is about one twentieth of that involved for building a 3000 foot fighter strip with hand labor in the location chosen by the Japs.'

Captain Rakowsky estimated that all of the work the Japs accomplished in months, by hand, could have been done by an American aviation company in four or five days, using its ordinary equipment.

The Japs filled all gullies except for a stream crossing the runway at an angle; this was covered with a raftered wooden tunnel with a 4-foot base and a maximum width of 11 ft. A fine drainage ditch was dug through the tundra to the gravel subsoil on the southeast side of the runway. Many laterals fed into both sides of the ditch, apparently to ensure good drainage to provide good hardstands for planes.

CARS ON      Tramways on the runway were of 2-foot gauge, about 15-pound  
RUNWAY      rail, fastened with single spikes. Tracks were rough, crooked,  
             wavy and irregular. Man cars used on the runway had flat plat-  
forms on which were set truncated wooden pyramids into which the fill was  
shoveled. The floor of each car was 4 X 6 ft, and the wooden frame was  
1.8 ft high, with a top 3.5 X 5.5 ft in size. The car would be trundled  
to the point of unloading, and the wooden frame lifted by hand to release  
the earth.

Three damaged trucks were seen on the runway. These appeared to be Japanese copies of 1½ ton GMC trucks, with right hand steer, and drive on rear dual tires. One truck had its duals encased in steel drums about 24 inches wide, these apparently being intended for light rolling of the airfield. Several large caterpillar tractors also were found on the runway, as well as many rubber tired carts. Two or three gasoline-powered rollers also were found on the runway.

SUMMARIZING: The Jap airport was poorly planned, improperly laid out, and represented a great deal of unnecessary manual labor. The work done by Japs in months could be done by us in four or five days. If we build a flying field in Holtz Bay, the Jap site probably will be useless, but we can easily build a field 5000 ft long instead of the 3000 ft field planned by the enemy.

D I S T R I B U T I O N


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G-2, ADC, Rear CP	2	S-2, ANNETTE ILF	1
CG, ADV CP ADC	2	S-2, ATKA	1
C/S, ADV CP ADC	2	S-2, BETHEL	1
G-3, ADV CP ADC	2	S-2, CORDOVA	1
G-4, ADV CP ADC	1	S-2, CAMP EARLE	20
AG ADV CP ADC	1	S-2, FORT GLENN	2
AO, ADV CP ADC	1	S-2, FORT GREELY	2
SIG O, ADV CP ADC	1	S-2, JUNEAU	1
TRANS O, ADV CP ADC	1	G-2, ATF-9	250
SURGEON, ADV CP ADC	1	S-2, LADD FIELD	1
DECOM, ADC	1	S-2, McGRATH	1
G-1, ADC	1	S-2, FORT MEARS	2
DC of S, ADC	1	S-2, FORT MORROW	1
CWO, ADC	1	S-2, NAKNEK	1
QM, ADC	1	S-2, NOME	1
ORD O, ADC	1	S-2, FORT RANDALL	2
ENGR O, ADC	1	S-2, FORT RAY	2
FO, ADC	1	S-2, FORT RAYMOND	1
IG, ADC	1	S-2, FORT RICHARDSON	2
JA, ADC	1	S-2, ST PAUL	1
COMNORPACFOR	2	S-2, SHEMA	2
C/S JOINT STAFF	2	S-2, VALDEZ	1
OIC, AIC, NORPACFOR	20	S-2, WHITTIER	1
COMALSEC	2	S-2, YAKUTAT LF	1
GEN LANDRUM	2		
FORCE ORD O, ADAK	20		
A-2, 11TH AF	10		
42ND CA BRIGADE	1		

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


ANTI-AIRCRAFT DIRECTOR GROUP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



7.7 MM HEAVY MACHINE GUN



7.7 MM RIFLE

6.5 MM RIFLE

6.5 MM CARBINE

CONFIDENTIAL



JAPANESE WINTER CLOTHING WITH  
BOOTS, OVERCOATS & WINTER CAPS

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




7.7 MM LIGHT MACHINE GUN




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



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|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Crusher Cap                    | 8. Firing Pin         |
| 2. Washer                         | 9. Adapter Ring       |
| 3. Safety Ring                    | 10. Primer            |
| 4. Washer                         | 11. Primer Receiver   |
| 5. Safety Cap                     | 12. Booster Detonator |
| 6. Upper Fuze Body &<br>Shear Pin | 13. Lower Fuze Body   |
| 7. Tension Spring                 | 14. Booster           |
|                                   | 15. Bursting Charge   |



ARMOR PENETRATION (MAGNETIC) MINE







### 50 MM GRENADE DISCHARGER

AMMUNITION WITH & WITHOUT SEPARATE FUZE SCREWED IN. TO PUT FUZE IN REMOVE PLUG FROM NOSE OF PROJECTILE. KNURLED KNOB JUST BELOW BREECH ADJUSTS RANGE. RANGE SHOWN IN METERS ON LEFT SLOT IN HANDLE, USING UPPER PART OF TRIGGER BASE AS INDICATOR.




JAPANESE WINTER UNIFORM  
(GARRISON BLOUSE & LIGHT CAP)



WINTER CAP, OVERCOAT  
AND BOOTS






DATE DUE

OCT 7 1949	08 FEB 1998
MAR 10 1950	
MAR 24 1950	30 NOV 1993
29 DEC 1955 4 Jan	04 JUN 2001
30 JAN 1957	28 NOV 2002
DEC 20 1958	02 JAN 2003
21 APR 1989	
26 DEC 1999	
<del>02 MAR 1990</del>	
15 Mar IOAC-1-90	
18 APR 1991	
04 MAR 1992	
20 APR 1992	
22 OCT 1992	
25 NOV 1992	
10 5 JAN 1993	
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17 OCT 1993	
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