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Report date: 1 July to 21 August, 1945

Title: After Action Report Final Phase of Luzon Campaign

Author: 6th Infantry Division

Abstract: The following after-action report covers the operations of the 6th Infantry Division in the Cagayan Valley of Luzon from 1 July to 21 August 1945 during which period the Division was part of the XIV Corps operating under Eighth Army. Includes sketches of maps.

Number of pages: 43 p.

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Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release

AFTER ACTION REPORT
6TH DIVISION
FINAL PHASE LUZON CAMPAIGN

6TH INFANTRY
DIVISION



AFTER ACTION REPORT
FINAL PHASE OF LUZON CAMPAIGN
1 JULY TO 21 AUGUST, 1945



Hq 6th Inf Div, 6-20-44

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HEADQUARTERS 6TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 6

22 August 1945

The following after-action report covers the operations of the 6th Infantry Division in the CAGAYAN VALLEY of LUZON from 1 July to 21 August 1945 during which period the Division was part of the XIV Corps operating under Eighth Army. This report is a continuation of a previously submitted report covering the action of the Division prior to 1 July 1945 when Sixth Army directed the operations on LUZON.

At the time of the cessation of hostilities with Japan on 15 August 1945, this Division was probably the most heavily engaged Division in the U. S. Army. All three Infantry Regiments were committed. When hostilities ended, the 1st Infantry advancing east from BANAUE had made junction with Filipino forces near MAYOYAO and were mopping-up a hard-won ridge over-looking HAPAO on the northern approach to HUNGDUAN. The 20th Infantry had turned the western anchor of the formidable Jap position on MT PULOY (4,500 ft. elevation) which had withstood attack from its frontal approaches and were within sight of the Jap communication center of KIANGKIANG to the south of HUNGDUAN. The 63d Infantry pushing south from KIANGAN had captured ANTIPOLO, a large food area, which was sorely needed by the beleaguered Japs. The Division Artillery had an unusually large number of remunerative targets upon which to bring their gun-power to bear. The Division Engineers had accomplished a major engineering feat in opening New Highway 4 clear to BANAUE. The 6th Medical Battalion and all divisional service units had performed magnificently to overcome the problems of the most difficult supply and evacuation difficulties the Division had ever faced. Certainly on 15 August 1945 the situation of General Yamashita, Supreme Commander in the PHILIPPINES, completely cut-off in the rugged mountains of the IFUGAO PROVINCE, could be considered hopeless.

The final chapter of the long and savagely fought campaign of LUZON has been written. Since 9 January 1945 when the assault landing was made in LINGAYEN GULF, elements of the Division have been actively committed in combat. It is believed that this record of 219 days continuous action is unsurpassed in the Pacific War. The action has been bloody and our losses severe. It is to our immortal dead, rather than to us the living, that we owe our success in arms.

C. E. Hurdie

C. E. HURDIS
Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

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INTRODUCTION

At 0001⁰⁰, 1 July 1945, the XIV Corps took over operations in NORTHERN LUZON from the I Corps and at the same time, tactical responsibility for LUZON passed from Sixth Army to Eighth Army. This date found the leading elements of the 63d Infantry attacking northwest along Old and New Highways 4, in the vicinity of HUCAB, after an advance from the LAMUT RIVER which had begun on 13 June. The 1st Infantry was in the process of moving to the area north of the LAMUT RIVER, as elements of the Regiment were relieved in the SALINAS-PINGKIAN-KAYAPA area by elements of the 32d Infantry Division. At the same time the 20th Infantry had begun its movement east from BAGABAG to relieve elements of the 37th Infantry Division along Highway 5 between the MAGAT RIVER crossing and ILAGAN. (See Fig. 1).

The primary mission assigned the Division by XIV Corps was to continue the attack to the northwest to seize KIANGAN, and to prepare for further advance on Corps order to seize HUNGDUAN and BANAUE. Other missions were to secure the CAGAYAN VALLEY and the uninterrupted use of Highway 5 in the Division zone, to seize JONES and to reconnoiter the DIBULUAN and DABUBU RIVER VALLEYS, and to reconnoiter east from ILAGAN towards PALANAN BAY, destroying any enemy encountered.

Combat units attached to the Division at this time included:

BUENA VISTA Regiment (PA)
2d Provisional Battalion, 3d PANGASINAN Regiment (G)
2d Provisional Battalion, 2d PANGASINAN Regiment (G)

Battery "B", 465th Field Artillery Battalion (8" How)
Battery "A", 161st AAA Battalion (90mm)
2d Platoon, Battery "B", 209th AAA (AW) Battalion
(M-51's on Half-Tracks)
Provisional Platoon, Battery "A", 209th AAA (AW)
Battalion (M-51's on Half-Tracks)
Company "B", 85th Chemical Mortar Battalion
Company "D", 754th Tank Battalion
26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon




FIG. 1
 ORIENTATION MAP AND
 BOUNDARIES 1 JULY, 1945

1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 YDS

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Chapter I

THE CAPTURE OF KIANGAN

1. Estimate of the Situation, 1 July:

The total strength of enemy troops concentrated in the BOKOD - KIANGAN - BONTOC area was estimated at 12,000 to 15,000, including 2,000 naval personnel, and 2,000 civilians and laborers. Approximately 2,500 were believed to be army combat troops, and the rest miscellaneous army line of communication units.

In the advance from PAYAWAN to HUCAB, the 63d Infantry had been in contact with three provisional infantry battalions, had overrun their main positions, and reduced the units to remnant status. Noticeably absent up to that time was contact with 105th Division Combat units, believed to be in the vicinity of KIANGAN. This suggested that these troops were still in reserve, possibly to man a defense line reported by air observers to be about 2,000 yards north of KIANGAN.

It was anticipated that the advance toward KIANGAN would be extremely difficult. To secure the road necessitated the crossing and traversing of deep rocky gorges, and scaling precipitous mountain heights by troops who could be supplied only by hand carry. All along the road, the enemy had destroyed bridges, carried out other demolitions, planted mines and dug tank traps. In addition were obstacles caused by landslides and by friendly air attacks. The maximum effort of the 6th Engineer Combat Battalion would be needed to open the road. Additional Corps engineers were urgently needed to support the advance as it went higher into the mountains.

The enemy was in a position to defend from successive ridges along Highway 4, and well situated to counter our thrusts at his strongpoints. Flank attacks on the supply route were probable, as were suicidal infiltrations to harass supply lines and areas farther to the rear along Highway 4.

2. The Battle for LANE'S RIDGE, 1 to 8 July: (See Fig. 2 and sketch)

Operations along Highway 4 on 1 July were limited by landslides and heavy rains to reconnaissance and security patrols, forward and to the flanks of leading elements of the 63d Infantry. A few enemy stragglers were encountered. A landslide on New Highway 4, 500 yards north of BOLOG, it was estimated by the Engineers, would take three days to clear. A temporary dry weather by-pass around this for 1/4 ton trucks and tractors was made impassable by the end of the day by heavy rains.

The following day a reconnaissance in force by a reinforced platoon of the 1st Battalion, 63d Infantry, encountered an estimated 50 riflemen and 4 MG's about 900 yards northeast of HUCAB on New Highway 4. At the same time the 2d Battalion, 63d Infantry, advanced 700 yards along Old Highway 4, overrunning a small delaying position, but later being held up by an unknown number of Japs with automatic weapons, defending from a ridge astride the highway. The finding of 29 dead Japs during the day testified to the effectiveness of our artillery and air strikes, while 20 rounds of enemy 47mm or 75mm which landed in the 63d zone caused no damage.

On 3 July, elements of Company "G", 63d Infantry, pushed up Old Highway 4, killing 16 enemy and capturing a LMG, to a point 2,500 yards northwest of HUCAB, where stiff resistance developed along high ground later named "LANE'S RIDGE". A defensive position including 5 caves was cleaned out, at a cost to the enemy of 45 lives. MG fire from adjacent enemy positions forced the leading platoon to withdraw for the night.


Company "G" continued the attack next morning, following an air strike, and set the stage for the four day battle of LANE'S RIDGE, which later proved to be the Jap's final position guarding the approaches to KIANGAN. Company "G" secured a position 400 yards south of the ridge, preparatory to an attack on 5 July. This attack was launched at 0800, following an air bombardment and artillery and mortar preparations. Company "F", in the assault, advanced only 200 yards, meeting determined resistance from rifles and an estimated 5 MG's. The Company held the ground gained while enemy positions were pounded by artillery fire, and other elements of the battalion hacked their way through heavy bamboo thickets and underbrush, seeking flanking routes of approach. Tanks could not be brought forward to support the attack, because of a large bomb crater blocking the road at the junction of the Jap cut-off and Old Highway 4.

On 6 July, a reinforced platoon of Company "G" sought to envelop the enemy's west flank, cutting their way through dense bamboo and up precipitous ridges only to be stopped by 6 MG's and numerous riflemen covering the western approaches to the Jap strongpoint. The platoon pulled back while artillery concentrations were laid on the enemy emplacements. An attempt by Company "F" to make a flanking approach to the east was blocked by deep gorges.

In an all-out effort on 7 July, following napalm and demolition bomb air strikes and preparations by all available supporting weapons, the 2d Battalion, 63d Infantry, assaulted and took the forward slope of LANE'S RIDGE. Continuing northwest toward KIANGAN,



Fig. 2
 63rd INFANTRY OPERATIONS
 1-12 JULY



SCALE: 1:32,500

leading elements uncovered another strong defensive position on the reverse slope of the ridge. This position was later found to consist of 55 mutually supporting emplacements, including 13 pillboxes and 22 caves, with enemy riflemen and machine gunners well dug in. The position selected could only be assaulted frontally, as the flanks were protected by almost impenetrable undergrowth and deep ravines.

These emplacements were overrun late on the afternoon of 8 July, in a determined attack following a heavy artillery and mortar preparation, and under cover of a smoke screen and strafing fires of Quad 50's. A total of 51 dead Japs were counted, and 12 additional Nips were killed when an unknown number of them made an unsuccessful counterattack about 2230, raising the total Japs destroyed in the LANE'S RIDGE fight to over 150.

From the overall excellence of this defensive position, the enemy's good physical condition, and his aggressiveness, it was believed that, as had been anticipated, the 63d had met trained troops of the 105th Division.

In the meantime, the 3d Battalion, 63d Infantry, had pushed "K" Company forward on 5 July to secure the rear of the 2d Battalion along Old Highway 4. In conjunction with the 2d Battalion's 7 July attack, a reinforced platoon from Company "L" advanced along New Highway 4 to a point 2,300 yards north of HUCAB, and then moved west in a wide envelopment of LANE'S RIDGE. High ground about midway between the two highways was secured with nil opposition. At 0800 on 8 July, the 3d Battalion attacked northwest along the high ground west of New Highway 4, with their object the commanding ground 3,000 yards north of HUCAB.

3. KIANGAN Falls: (See Fig. 2)

The 1st and 3d Battalions, 63d Infantry continued the drive on KIANGAN on 10 July. From LANE'S RIDGE, Old Highway 4 turns west, while New Highway 4 runs north to the IBULAO RIVER. The 1st Battalion, passing through Company "F", by the end of the day had advanced 2,000 yards to a point about 4,300 yards short of KIANGAN. Scattered enemy fire, tank traps, landmines and numerous landslides delayed the advance. Another 2,000 yards was gained next day by Company "B", supported by four tanks and a Quad 50. 12 July saw the capture of KIANGAN. Company "C" moved through Company "B" and effected a junction with elements of Company "K", advancing from the IBULAO RIVER. Together the two companies took what was left of the town.





Fig. 2
 63rd INFANTRY OPERATIONS
 1-12 JULY



SCALE: 1:32,500

The 3d Battalion's part in the seizure of KIANGAN involved four days of active fighting along the New Highway. By 9 July elements were over-looking the IBULAO RIVER, 1,000 yards south of the old bridge site, after breaking through a series of enemy delaying positions and road blocks, flanked by steep slopes and bamboo-choked ravines. On 10 July, two companies engaged in an afternoon firefight with an unknown number of Japs about 200 yards from the river crossing. Company "L", continuing the advance on 12 July, reached the IBULAO RIVER crossing and then leaving New Highway 4, pushed north and west along the road to KIANGAN. At 1200, at a point along the road about 2,500 yards from the river, Company "L", 63d Infantry, made junction with Company "A", leading company of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, which had assembled near LANE'S RIDGE the day before, and then had moved out again along Old Highway 4 on 12 July. On the same day, Company "K", 63d Infantry, striking out across country from the IBULAO RIVER reached KIANGAN against slight opposition and secured the town jointly with Company "C", 63d Infantry. (See Fig. 2)

4. Activities of Other Units, 1 to 12 July:

During the first few days of July, the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, and later the 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry had been disposed along Highway 4 to the rear of the 63d Infantry, guarding lines of communications with the aid of Filipino guerrilla units. On 3 July a 1st Infantry patrol discovered a strong though small Jap position some 3,500 yards southwest of PAYAWAN. This took Company "F", 1st Infantry, several days to overcome with the aid of artillery and air support. About 60 Japs were killed or found dead. While mopping up was taking place in this locality, patrols were being sent to the north and west along the LAMUT RIVER to protect the left (west) flank of the Division.

The 14th Infantry Regiment (PA) (-two Battalions) operated in the DUIT-HALIAP area, south of KIANGAN and west of BOLOG, where they reported the movements and dispositions of Jap remnants living off the land in this area. This regiment was attached to the 63d Infantry on 11 July.

On 10 July, the 1st Infantry was given the mission of passing through the 63d Infantry to seize and secure a bridgehead north of the IBULAO RIVER. By 12 July, leading elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, had moved to the old crossing of the IBULAO RIVER on Highway 4 and had relieved elements of the 63d Infantry in that vicinity.

The Division artillery and attached Corps artillery furnished excellent support to assaulting units despite poor roads,

difficult weather conditions and inadequate position areas. The fires of the 8" howitzers were particularly effective in closing cave positions on IANE'S RIDGE. The 90mm AAA Battery proved valuable in placing harassing fires on KIANGAN and interdicting roads in that area.

More than 450 sorties were flown during the 12 day period. In addition to tons of HE, 100,000 gallons of Napalm were dropped. For four days of the period, bad weather prevented all air activity including the use of the L-5 controller plane. Principal close support targets were IANE'S RIDGE, KIANGAN, and the enemy position 3,500 yards southwest of PAYAWAN. Targets north of the IBULAO RIVER were also hit.

Tanks and Quad 50's mounted on half-tracks were of great assistance in the reduction of the IANE'S RIDGE position. A short distance beyond this point, however, they passed out of the picture, as all efforts to get these vehicles forward resulted only in getting them hopelessly bogged down.

5. The 63d Infantry Mops up Around KIANGAN: (See Fig. 3)

During the period 12 to 24 July, operations of the 63d Infantry were limited to local actions to search out and destroy enemy remnants in the KIANGAN area, as determined enemy groups continued to resist to the west and south of the town. The problem of supply and evacuation for troops in the forward areas became increasingly serious as continuing heavy rains and high winds hampered engineer operations to open supply roads.

On 14 July, supply vehicles moving on Old Highway 4 could get within 4,000 yards of KIANGAN and could reach the IBULAO RIVER. By 16 July, however, bad weather made Old Highway 4 impassable, and for the next five days, over 100 vehicles including a tank platoon and a Quad 50 platoon, were marooned between the Jap cut-off and the junction of Old Highway 4 with the KIANGAN-IBULAO RIVER road. Adverse weather also prevented supply by air. New Highway 4 was blocked in four places by large rock slides and demolitions between the Jap cut-off and the IBULAO RIVER. Evacuation and supply was accomplished by combined vehicle haul and hand carry. The 6th Engineer Battalion worked 24 hours a day to clear Old Highway 4 which could be used to supply both KIANGAN and IBULAO RIVER troops. By 20 July, Old Highway 4 was open again to light traffic under dry weather conditions only, and all marooned vehicles had been extricated. Clearing this road involved the removal of mines, filling tank traps, clearing landslides, installing culverts, and corduroying rice paddy mud holes. The 6th Engineers were also busy

on New Highway 4 from the IBULAO RIVER north. By 16 July a foot bridge had been completed over the river, and on 18 July, an improvised jeep bridge was open to traffic. This bridge, later reinforced to take $1\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks, was built on top of captured Jap trucks anchored in the swift, boulder-strewn mountain river. New Highway 4 north of the river was opened to GURUG on 25 July. In the meantime, Corps Engineers had taken over responsibility for New Highway 4 as far as the river on 16 July, and on 18 July had begun work on the first large slide north of the Jap cut-off.

During the period, the 63d Infantry and attached guerrilla troops patrolled extensively in all directions from KIANGAN, with profitable results. On 13 July, 69 Japs were killed, and 131 found dead in the area. By 15 July, Company "K" had seized LONSA to the west of KIANGAN against light opposition. Strong enemy opposition, however, was met by Company "C", attacking cave positions on the high ground 500 yards to the southwest of KIANGAN, which were reduced on 15 July. The same day, a patrol from Company "A", advancing to the south on PAIAO, ran into two machine guns and an estimated squad of riflemen 3500 yards south of KIANGAN. Mopping-up in the KIANGAN-LONSA area on 16 July netted 37 Japs killed and 85 found dead from recent artillery and mortar fire. Fifteen of the Japs were killed by Ifugao scouts. 63d Infantry patrols made contact the same day with elements of the 14th Infantry (PA) in the vicinity of PAIAO. This Filipino unit, disposed in the PAIAO-DUIT-HALLAP area, had suffered numerous casualties in scattered contacts throughout the area, and badly needed supplies of all kinds. Operations in this sector were very difficult, as the only connecting trail from KIANGAN went up over a high mountain and crossed four wide streams which were impassable after rains. Active patrolling by the 63d Infantry continued in the KIANGAN sector until 21 July, when the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, relieved 63d Infantry elements in the area. This 20th Infantry Battalion, however, remained under the control of the 63d Infantry until the 20th Infantry assumed responsibility for the zone on 24 July.

In the advance on and seizure of KIANGAN, the 63d Infantry, during the period 13 June to 21 July, killed, or found dead, 2,383 Japs and took 119 PW's. The Regiment, during the same period, lost 48 dead and 195 wounded and injured.

Chapter II

OPERATIONS ALONG HIGHWAY 5 IN THE CAGAYAN VALLEY

1. The 20th Infantry is Committed in The Cagayan Valley (See Fig. 1)

On 1 July 1945, the 20th Infantry initiated relief of elements of the 37th Infantry Division disposed along Highway 5 between the MAGAT RIVER and ILAGAN (See Fig. 1). By 5 July, the Regiment with the 3d Platoon, 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop attached, had completed the relief. The 3d Battalion covered the northern part of the zone in the ILAGAN area, the 2d Battalion was disposed in the CABATUAN-CAUAYAN area, and the 1st Battalion, with the 2d Battalion, 2d PANGASINAN Regiment (G) attached, was responsible for the ORIOUNG PASS-SANTIAGO-JONES sector.

In the 20th Infantry zone, there were two areas to which the enemy was known to have withdrawn with some organized forces. One of these was along the trail running east from MAGUILLAN towards PALANAN BAY. Guerrillas reported that small groups of Japs were living in barrios located along this trail. About 800 were reported in the PALANAN BAY area. The second area was to the south of JONES, where it was estimated that approximately 1000 Japs, poorly equipped and in poor health, were trying to live off the land. In the upper CAGAYAN VALLEY, enemy small-scale harassing attacks on Highway 5 from SANTIAGO to ILAGAN, and contacts with isolated Jap groups attempting to rejoin their main forces in either the CARABALLO or SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS, could be expected.

2. Operations of 20th Infantry, 1 to 24 July:

The 20th Infantry remained in this zone until 23 July. During this period, the 1st Battalion (and later the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop) secured JONES, reconnoited to the south up the DIBULUAN and DABUBU RIVER, and patrolled extensively in their sector, but only scattered contacts were made and no organized resistance was encountered.

The 2d Battalion also made scattered contacts during the period, the majority of which were groups of Japs, who had escaped from the CAGAYAN VALLEY and were attempting to withdraw along the trail west of SANTA CRUZ to join other Jap forces in MAYOYAO and BANAUE.

The heaviest action during the period occurred in that



part of the 3d Battalion sector east of MAGUILLAN. From MAGUILLAN to the east runs the only trail traversing the SIERRA MADRE MOUNTAINS to the east coast of LUZON. This trail is passable to weasels and SPM's only as far as SAN MARIANO, and then only in dry weather. From SAN MARIANO, the trail crosses the PINACUAN DE ILAGAN RIVER which is impassable for vehicles and too swift for weasels. Beyond the river, the trail is very poor and passable only to foot troops. The country is heavily wooded and hilly as far as AMBUBU, about half way between SAN MARIANO and PALANAN BAY. From AMBUBU, the trail runs through the deepest jungles of LUZON and crosses mountains up to 4,000 feet elevation. Near the coast, the trail descends to PALANAN TOWN about 8,000 yards up the PALANAN RIVER from PALANAN BAY.

Company "I", 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry secured SAN MARIANO on 5 July, and then crossing the PINACUAN DE ILAGAN RIVER on 6 July, pushed on for 2,200 yards where enemy rifle fire was received. Company "K" secured the trail between MAGUILLAN and SAN MARIANO. By 14 July, Company "L" had joined Company "I" which had pushed 5,000 yards east of SAN MARIANO and was in contact with an estimated 100 Japs, dug in and supported by mortars and heavy machine guns. On 15 July, Company "I" and two Platoons, Company "I", overran this position and secured DIBULUAN, killing 12 Japs enroute. SPM fire from positions in SAN MARIANO was very effective in supporting the attack. Abandoned Jap pill-boxes were found in the area and considerable Jap food supplies and ammunition were destroyed. The next day, another Jap strong-point was met about 200 yards east of DIBULUAN. Heavy weather brought operations to a practical standstill for the next five days. However, elements of the 3d Battalion did succeed in reaching AMBUBU, about 10,000 yards west of DIBULUAN, on 18 July. The trail from SAN MARIANO to DIBULUAN was now so slippery that even lightly-loaded carriers took two days for the trip. From DIBULUAN to AMBUBU was another three days march which only foot troops without packs could negotiate.

3. The 20th Infantry is Relieved:

In the meantime, the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop had relieved the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, in its zone on 16 July. The 1st Battalion moved to BAGABAG in Division Reserve on 17 July, and on 21 July passed to the control of the 63d Infantry, and relieved the 1st Battalion of that regiment in the KLANGAN area.

On 22 July, pursuant to XIV Corps orders, the Division zone was changed to exclude the sector then held by the 20th Infantry and 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, the MAGAT RIVER becoming the east boundary of the Division. Relief of 6th Infantry

Division elements in this sector by elements of the 32d and 37th Infantry Divisions was initiated on 22 July, and was completed on 24 July. The remainder of the 20th Infantry and the 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop moved to assembly areas north of the LAMUT RIVER, where the 20th Infantry made preparations to relieve the 63d Infantry in the KLANGAN area. The 2d Battalion, 2d PANGASINAN Regiment (G) remained attached to the 20th Infantry and moved to the BOLOG-KLANGAN area on 26 July where it helped to secure lines of communication.

During the period, 1 July to 23 July, the 20th Infantry killed 382 Japs and took 207 PW's while their own losses were two dead and 15 wounded.



Chapter III

OBJECTIVE BANAUE

1. Estimate of the Situation, 12 July:

It had been anticipated that KIANGAN itself would be taken easily, since it had been estimated as early as 1 July, that at least a partial withdrawal from the KIANGAN area was taking place. PW and civilian reports indicated further that the enemy was not withdrawing to the north along Highway 4 towards BANAUE, but was retreating to the northwest towards the rice terraced mountains around HUNGDUAN. At this time, it was believed that the 14th Area Army headquarters of General YAMASHITA, Supreme Commander of the Philippines, was in the vicinity of HUNGDUAN, and that remnants of the 105th Japanese Division would be used to block the southern approaches to this position. From 3,000 to 4,000 troops were thought to be disposed between PACDAN and HUNGDUAN.

To the south of KIANGAN, it was estimated that there might be as many as 1,000 Japs in the ANTIPOLO-AMDUNTOG area, consisting primarily of remnants of the Geki Force (2d Armored Division). These troops were thought to be scattered throughout the area in small groups where they could forage off the land. Little trouble in eliminating these pockets was expected.

In the BANAUE area, it was estimated that elements of the 103d Japanese Division, about 2,000 strong, moving south from BONTOG, might either defend BANAUE or withdraw further to the south and west in the direction of HAPAO to protect the northern approaches to HUNGDUAN.

Jap troops in the MAYOYAO-BUNHIAN-NATONIN area, estimated at between 1,000 and 2,000 in number, were believed to be remnants of service, air and naval units, organized into provisional infantry units, which had escaped from the LOWER CAGAYAN VALLEY.

2. The 1st Infantry Captures BANAUE: (See Fig. 3)

On the afternoon of 12 July, Company "A" of the 1st Infantry relieved elements of the 63d Infantry near the destroyed IBULAO RIVER bridge. Crossing the river despite high and dangerously swift water, the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, by 15 July had secured a bridgehead on the far side against only scattered resistance. (See Fig. 3). Troops were supplied initially by hand-carry across a foot bridge completed on 16 July. At this





FIG. 3
OPERATIONS 12-20 JULY



tine, the Division received orders to seize BANAUE and destroy any enemy encountered in the BANAUE-MAYOYAO area.

Slight resistance was met 3,000 yards northwest of LAGAVE on 16 July by a combat patrol consisting of a platoon of Company "A" and a platoon of Company "G" of the 14th Regiment (PA). The patrol withdrew and artillery was laid down and dispersed the group, after which the patrol proceeded and entered GUROG at noon on 17 July. Thirteen Japs were killed 500 yards south of GUROG by Company "C".

Logistically, roads and bridges were the prime considerations. It was clear that the advance to the north would depend on the ability to open a road and to keep the IBULAO RIVER bridged. Engineers had decided that it was not feasible to keep Old Highway 4 open during the rainy season and had, therefore, put the main engineer effort on New Highway 4. This road was blocked at four places between the Jap cut-off and the IBULAO RIVER, where stretches of the road bed from 100 to 287 feet in length had been completely blown away from the rocky sides of the mountain. The only practical method of supply and evacuation was by combined jeep and hand carry, with jeeps being slung on cables around these impassable points. North of the river it was found that Highway 4 was no more than a cart trail which had not been used for years, and which was blocked by landslides and overgrowth.

On 18 July against scattered small arms fire, the 1st Battalion advanced to a point 1,500 yards northwest of GUROG, killing four Japs enroute. Strong combat and reconnaissance patrols on high ground to the east and west of the Highway made no contacts. The 3d Battalion moved in behind the 1st Battalion to protect the supply road.

The next day another 4,000 yards were gained up the Highway by Company "B" of the 1st Infantry without contact. On 20 July, the Company met 30 to 50 Japs 1,800 yards west of BANAUE. The Japs lost one man before fleeing to the hills north of BANAUE. One Filipino carrier was killed and two wounded in this skirmish, which preceded the entry into BANAUE on the afternoon of 20 July. Patrols to the north on Highway 4 towards POLIS PASS and to the east of BANAUE towards DUC LIGAN were immediately sent out.

3. Artillery Support.

As the advance of the Division progressed beyond KIANGAN and the IBULAO RIVER, the problem of artillery support became increasingly difficult. To haul artillery pieces, particularly 155mm How's and ammunition over mountain trails which were hardly passable for light vehicles, was no mean feat. To maintain communications with forward observers in this mountainous country, it often was necessary to establish two or three relay stations. Position areas were scarce, and those that could be occupied were entirely inadequate.

The 1st Field Artillery Battalion during the period was in position near HUCAB on a small spur running east from New Highway 4 just north of the Jap cut-off. The 53d Field Artillery Battalion occupied an unusual position atop a ridge just south of the Jap cut-off and between Old and New Highways 4, which was 3000 feet in elevation and could only be reached in dry weather. The 80th Field Artillery Battalion (Med) was in position near PAYAWAN FARM. On 18 July, Battery "C", 80th Field Artillery Battalion, displaced to positions near the 1st Field Artillery Battalion. On 16 July, Battery "C", 1st Field Artillery Battalion, attempting to displace forward, was marooned on Old Highway 4 and went into position along the road, until it was finally able to reach its original destination on the west side of the IBULAO RIVER crossing on 20 July. Battery "B", 465th Field Artillery Battalion (8" How), remained in position south of PAYAWAN, until 22 July when one platoon displaced forward to PAYAWAN FARM (south of BOLOG) on 22 July. Battery "A", 161st AAA Bn (90mm), displaced from positions near the 8" Howitzer Battery to the vicinity of HUCAB, near the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, on 14 July. From this position, the 90mm battery could effectively shell KIANGKIANG and HUNGDUAN.

CHAPTER IV

FINAL OPERATIONS IN NORTHERN LUZON

1. The Division Zone is Extended:

On 9 July, orders from XIV Corps changed the boundary between the Division and the force to its north, Philippine Guerrilla forces, NORTHERN LUZON. The Division was now responsible for the entire MAYOYAO - BUNHIAN - SANTA CRUZ area, lying between the ALIMIT and MAGAT RIVERS. (See Fig. 1). This Corps order also directed that the 11th Infantry (-1st and 2d Battalions) (PA), with the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (PA) attached, move south from their present locations in the lower CAGAYAN VALLEY in the 37th Infantry Division zone, passing to control of the 6th Infantry Division upon entering the zone of the latter. This Filipino force on 10 July, was given the mission of seizing BUNHIAN, prepared to advance to the west and secure MAYOYAO on Division order.

Initially the CP, 11th Infantry, moved south to MARSAT GRANDE (See Fig. 1), where a 10 day supply dump was established at the river. Two battalions were then ordered to converge on and secure UBAO, the Provisional Battalion, 11th Infantry advancing west along the trail from MARSAT GRANDE, while the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, advanced from the direction of SANTA CRUZ. By 20 July, the Provisional Battalion, 11th Infantry, had secured UBAO and pushing on to the northwest, ran into resistance about 4,000 yards southeast of BUNHIAN. On 25 July, the Provisional Battalion secured BUNHIAN against slight opposition, and the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, reached UBAO, killing over 100 Japs enroute. On 26 July, the CP, 11th Infantry, opened at BUNHIAN. Troops at BUNHIAN had to be supplied by hand-carry from MARSAT GRANDE, about 25 miles away. This supply line was protected by elements of the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, disposed along the trail.

In the meantime, the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, after a long march to the south over rugged and slippery mountain trails and across swollen, swift running rivers, secured NATONIN on 24 July, making only scattered contacts on the way. By 26 July, leading elements of the 3d Battalion had joined the Provisional Battalion, 11th Infantry, near BUNHIAN.

On 20 July, the 11th Infantry was given the mission of seizing MAYOYAO. The advance from BUNHIAN was begun on 26 July

by the Provisional Battalion, 11th Infantry, which by 28 July, was heavily engaged with a strong Jap force holding the high ground north and east of MAYOYAO.

2. 1st Infantry Operations in the BANAUE sector, 20 July to 15 August: (See Fig. 4).

On 20 July, the 1st Infantry was ordered to advance to the east from BANAUE, secure DUCLIGAN, and make junction with the 11th Infantry which was ordered to secure MAYOYAO and push on to the west towards DUCLIGAN. This same day, the 1st Infantry was also ordered to make junction with PGF troops at POLIS PASS to the north of BANAUE along Highway 4. Patrols from the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, made contact with elements of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (Filipino) at POLIS PASS on 22 July, and on 23 July, Company "C" of the latter Battalion joined the 1st Infantry at BANAUE. In the meantime, the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, with the 3d Battalion, 1st Pangasinan Regiment (Filipino), attached, moved forward to the BANAUE area, and relieved the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, which returned to an assembly area north of the LAMUT RIVER on 23 July.

By Corps order on 24 July, the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, passed to the control of the Division. This battalion (less Company "C") was ordered to advance south from POLIS PASS along the SAPAO RIVER and make junction with elements of the 1st Infantry pushing west from Highway 4. On the same day, the 1st Infantry was given the mission of seizing and securing HAPAO. Company "K", 1st Infantry, with Company "C", 11th Infantry attached, departed BANAUE on 25 July and on 27 July met the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, in the vicinity of GOHANG. 22 Japs were killed during the advance of the two columns. At this point, Company "C" reverted to battalion control and the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, was attached to the 1st Infantry. During this period, the 2d Battalion, 3d Pangasinan Regiment was brought forward to BANAUE. This unit was later to prove valuable in furnishing carrying parties to troops fighting west of Highway 4, as civilian carriers were scarce.

Supply difficulties continued throughout the Division zone and air drops became the chief method of supply in the BANAUE and MAYOYAO sectors. Engineers continued their battle against time to clear and maintain the roads leading to all fronts. General weather conditions grew worse and landslides increased. With the roads reported clear, convoys heading for the front with much needed medical supplies, ammunition and rations would suddenly find themselves cut off by new slides.

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



FIG. 4
1ST INFANTRY OPERATIONS
21 JULY - 15 AUG
SCALE-1:95,250

Old Highway 4 north of the Jap cut-off remained impassable most of the time. For brief intervals during dry weather, it was open, and then only to light traffic. Supply and evacuation of troops in the KIANGAN area was, therefore, largely accomplished by combined hand-carry and motor transport means. For the 4,000 troops in the KIANGAN area (not counting civilian laborers), this presented no easy problem. Some air drops were successfully made in this area, but priority on air supply had to go to the BANAUE sector which was inaccessible to vehicles. As a result, supply difficulties and heavy rains greatly hindered operations west of KIANGAN.

Troops in the IBULAO - LAGAWA - GUROG area, numbering about 2,000, exclusive of civilian laborers, were largely supplied by combined vehicle and hand-carry over New Highway 4. Corps Engineers hoped to have New Highway 4 open for traffic up to the last and most difficult rock slide south of the IBULAO RIVER by 28 July. This would greatly ease the supply and evacuation situation in both the LAGAWA and KIANGAN areas, as hand-carry would only be necessary for a distance of 100 yards. Supplies could then be hauled by vehicle up New Highway 4 to this point, hand-carried around the rock slide, and then taken by vehicle to truck heads at GUROG and KIANGAN.

Supply of troops in the BANAUE area was largely by air drop. Evacuation became a serious problem, as it involved a hand-carry of more than 15,000 yards from BANAUE. For troops fighting to the east and west of BANAUE, the hand-carry was even longer. At this time there were about 1,500 troops in the area, exclusive of civilian laborers. This number was expected to rise in the near future to about 3,500 when troops from the MAYOYAO sector arrived. North of the IBULAO RIVER, vehicles could go on New Highway 4 only as far as GUROG. From this point to a point 6,000 yards south of BANAUE, there were nine earth and rock slides on New Highway 4 for the engineers to clear.

During the period from 27-30 July, substantial gains rewarded both efforts of the 1st Infantry. While the push towards HAPAO was stubbornly resisted yard by yard by well organized Jap positions located on key high ground stretching from GOHANG to HAPAO, a strong combat patrol advancing towards MAYOYAO made good progress, securing DUCLIGAN on 28 July with nil enemy contact. By late afternoon on 31 July, the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, had reached a position 1,000 yards east of HAPAO and were attempting to dislodge a strong force of Japs dug in on the ridge running to the northeast. These Jap troops appeared to be well-armed and well-trained Infantry with machine-gun and mortar support.

During the first two days of August the enemy launched a series of determined all-out counterattacks against 3d Battalion positions in the HAPAO sector. These attacks came from the north, west and southwest, and were supported by automatic weapons and mortars. The attacks were broken up each time with well directed small arms and artillery fire, and a total of 235 dead Japs were counted. On 3 August, Companies "I" and "K", 1st Infantry, secured positions on the high ground 900 yards east of HAPAO and immediately dispatched strong patrols to probe the ground between this position and the town. As a result of patrol action in this sector, 34 Japs were killed, and it was learned that large groups of Japs were moving northwest up into the mountains.

On 2 August, the 1st Infantry was given the mission of securing TULAIID to the northeast of DUCLIGAN and exerting pressure on MAYOYAO from the west to assist in the capture of this town. By 4 August the 2d Battalion had relieved the 3d Battalion in the BANAUE - DUCLIGAN area, allowing the latter to concentrate in the HAPAO area.

On 5 August a strong combat patrol composed of one rifle platoon and one weapons platoon of Company "G", 1st Infantry, and Headquarters and Company "K", 3d Provisional Battalion, 1st Pangasinan Regiment departed DUCLIGAN. This force secured TULAIID on 6 August and then made contact with a Jap roadblock about 3000 yards southwest of MAYOYAO, where the 11th Infantry was engaged with a strong enemy force 1000 yards northeast of town.

1st Infantry offensive action during the period 6-8 August consisted mainly of patrol activity in the HAPAO - BANIKI sector. Company "F" of the 2d Battalion was committed at this time north of BANIKI to protect the supply line to the 3d Battalion. Fanatical enemy counterattacks and desperate efforts to disrupt communications and supply lines occurred throughout this sector. All were repulsed and heavy losses were dealt the enemy with a minimum of loss to friendly forces.

In an effort to shorten ever-lengthening supply lines, reconnaissance patrols from the 1st Battalion, which had now moved up again into the LAGAVE area, were dispatched west from Highway 4 to seek a new trail to elements of the 3d Battalion engaged with the enemy in the HAPAO area. These efforts proved fruitless and the reports were all the same: "Entire terrain extremely rough and covered with dense vegetation. A practical route of supply and evacuation simply does not exist in this area."

On 8 August, Company "K", with elements of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA), attacked north from their position 900 yards east of HAPAO, and gained 1000 yards against small-arms fire. This opposition came from a strong, well-organized enemy defensive position. By 10 August, the attack had reached a point 1800 yards northeast of HAPAO along the ridge which dominates the HAPAO-BANAUE trail.

By this time, troops of the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, fighting in the HAPAO area, had been reduced to a total strength of about 500 men as the result of battle losses and high non-battle casualty rate from sickness brought on by a high fly population and the inaccessibility of potable water. It was a four hour round trip for a man to descend from these ridge positions to water and climb back on his hands and knees with two canteens of water. The evacuation of casualties was by a long, difficult and hazardous hand-carry. Relief of these two battalions in the HAPAO area was, therefore, initiated on 11 August by the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry. This relief was accomplished on 13 August, and by 14 August, the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry (PA) had closed into BANAUE. Heavy rains limited the operations of the 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, to local patrols to continue the development of the enemy positions west and northwest of BANIKI. At 1720, 15 August, pursuant to instructions from XIV Corps, all offensive operations in the Division zone ceased.

3. The Battle for MAYOYAO: (See Fig. 4).

On 26 July, elements of the 11th Infantry (PA), with the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (PA), attached, advanced west from BUNHIAN to within 1,000 yards of MAYOYAO, encountering little opposition. At this point the situation quickly developed into what proved to be a fierce battle for control of the commanding terrain northeast of MAYOYAO. The enemy, estimated to be 800-1000 in strength, and supported by machine guns and mortars, was strongly entrenched in a series of rock caves and dug-in emplacements on a high ridge northeast of and overlooking MAYOYAO. This strong-point commanded the several trails leading into MAYOYAO and had to be taken.

The reduction of MAYOYAO was to be a tough job. Artillery support could not be furnished and air support was unpredictable because of the frequency of unfavorable weather. Overland supply was abandoned and all supplies were thereafter by air drop. Evacuation, however, had to continue by an extremely difficult hand-carry to MARSAT GRANDE, forty miles away.

By 1 August after heavy fighting, the 11th Infantry (PA)

gained a foothold on the enemy position. Although the situation was definitely improved, the position of the leading elements was still dominated by the enemy. A strong counterattack was launched by the Japs that night, causing numerous friendly casualties, but no ground was given up. During the period 2-7 August, continuous pressure was maintained on the Jap positions still firmly embedded in rock caves and entrenchments on the highest point of the ridge, about 5000 feet in elevation. By this time losses had been so severe that the Provisional Battalion, 11th Infantry, was disbanded in order to furnish replacements to the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

On 7 August the last Jap was pushed off the once seemingly impregnable ridge, and the approaches to MAYOYAO were secured. All intelligence reports indicated that the Japs in the MAYOYAO sector were evacuating in small groups both to the north toward NATONIN and the SIFFU RIVER VALLEY, and to the south toward ALIMIT. On 8 August the 11th Infantry entered MAYOYAO. In the meantime, orders had been issued directing that the 11th Infantry assemble in BANAUE and that the 1st Infantry take over the MAYOYAO sector. Leaving two companies in town, the 11th Infantry pushed on to the west and made junction with Company "G", 1st Infantry, near TULAID on 9 August.

On 12 August, Company "G", 1st Infantry (reinforced), completed the relief of remaining Filipino troops in MAYOYAO, while Company "E", 1st Infantry (reinforced), took over responsibility for the DUCLIGAN area. By 13 August, the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, were assembled in BANAUE, where they were to be rehabilitated for future commitment in the direction of HUNGDUAN.

The 11th Infantry (reinforced) in the MAYOYAO operations killed over 350 Japs and captured a large and well-stocked rice area. Their own losses were over 50 killed and 200 wounded.

4. 20th Infantry Operations in the KIANGAN-MT PULOY Sector, 24 July - 15 August: (See Fig. 5).

The 20th Infantry, having relieved the 63d Infantry in the KIANGAN area on 24 July, was assigned the mission of attacking to the west and northwest to seize KIANGKIANG, and of destroying by-passed enemy groups to the south of KIANGAN. By 26 July, the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, had advanced along the trail from KIANGAN to within 400 yards of PACDAN, where it met serious opposition from a steep, heavily wooded razor-back ridge southwest of PACDAN. (See Sketch of PACDAN position).

On 27 July, Company "B" succeeded in gaining a precarious



JAP. POSITIONS OVERLOOKING PACDAN
Sketched from vic. LONSA

foothold on a portion of this objective ridge, but was unable to advance over the crest due to murderous fire from the reverse slope and adjacent spurs and found their position untenable. The objective ridge was reported to be defended by at least 100 Japs utilizing well camouflaged inter-connecting spider holes, with the reverse slope thickly studded with deeply dug, reinforced caves.

The next two days were utilized in regrouping forces in preparation for the next attack. On 29 July, following an air strike, elements of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, supported by elements of the 1st Battalion, BUENA VISTA Regiment, attacked the stubbornly defended ridge and, by the close of the day Company "A" had taken the left (south) part of the objective. From this advantageous position they gave close support to the attack of the 1st Battalion, BUENA VISTA Regiment, enabling it to secure the right (north) portion of the objective after a fierce fire fight. The enemy immediately launched a counterattack, which proved futile and cost them ten killed.

It was found that the enemy had transformed this ridge line and reverse slope into a veritable fortress, bristling with automatic weapons, organized in depth and excellently camouflaged against air and ground observation. On the crest of the ridge, the enemy had constructed numerous caves which were connected by tunnels. Spider holes were also dug on the military crest and the reverse slope. Many of these holes had underground connecting tunnels. The extremely precipitous approaches to the top of the ridge made it difficult to assault. Some idea of how difficult is shown by the fact that it took two hours for troops to scale the almost vertical slopes.

In the process of softening up this objective, Division Artillery (reinforced) fired over 4,000 rounds, ranging from 90mm to 8-inch, 4.2-inch mortars fired over 4,000 rounds of HE and WP, and 81mm mortars fired more than 8,000 rounds. In two air strikes nine tons of HE and 26,000 gallons of Napalm were dropped. In spite of this heavy concentration of supporting fires, the Jap fought stubbornly, tenaciously and skillfully to hold his position until the final assault succeeded.

Following up the action, the 1st Battalion went on to secure the town of PACDAN against slight opposition on 31 July. Twenty-two Japs were killed or found dead enroute and an additional 53 dead were counted in the town. PACDAN had been extensively prepared for defense by the enemy with fortified building and reinforced dugouts.

On 1 and 2 August, the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry,

mopped up in PACDAN, finding many dead Japs from artillery fire and air strikes, and pushed reconnaissance up the trail to the northwest towards MT PULOY. This formidable hill mass, 4 to 5,000 feet in elevation, rises precipitously to form a huge, heavily wooded, semi-circular rock wall around the bowl-shaped rice terraces of PACDAN. The top of this ridge was over two miles long. To turn its flanks required a long march through trail-less jungles and over even more precipitous country. The main trail to KIANG-KIANG runs northwest and north from PACDAN, winding up long and steep switch-backs to the summit of MT PULOY. Turning sharply to the west, the trail then descends the almost vertical reverse slopes of MT PULOY and runs to the northwest towards KIANGKIANG. Although still rugged and mountainous, the terrain to the northwest of MT PULOY slopes downward into the KIANGKIANG-HUNGDUAN valley. The MT PULOY barrier forms a natural obstacle and was the most logical position from which to defend the southern approaches to KIANGKIANG.

Captured maps later indicated that a Jap battalion was disposed in depth from MT PULOY to KIANGKIANG, with a reinforced company dug in on the mountain itself. At least three 75mm guns and two 47mm guns were believed to be supporting this defensive position.

Company "B", 20th Infantry, attacking up the mountain trail on 3 August, met heavy resistance from artillery, mortars and machine guns. Progress was slow and enemy opposition was bitter. Not until 6 August did Company "B" finally reach a position roughly 500 yards airline from the crest of MT PULOY, but about 1,300 yards measured along the trail. From here on was the steepest part of the trail. Heavy rains and dense fogs hampered the advance during this period, and enemy artillery harassed friendly positions nightly. In the meantime, Company "A" protected the rear and Company "C" the left (southwest) flank of Company "B".

From 7 to 10 August, Company "B", 20th Infantry, tried to find a way to knock out the resistance atop MT PULOY without success. The enemy covered the trail from commanding positions which could not be outflanked. It was now apparent that a frontal assault to take the crest would be extremely costly. During the same period, Company "C" probed along the trail leading southwest from PACDAN, encountering slight resistance, until relieved by elements of the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, on 9 August. In the meantime, Company "A", 20th Infantry, attacking north from PACDAN on 7 August, finally gained the top of a narrow, knife-edge ridge to the southeast of MT PULOY on 9 August. Attempts to attack to the northwest from this position were stopped by heavy fire and adverse terrain precluded any maneuver by friendly troops. The

enemy, during the period, was aggressive and made several small night counterattacks.

At this time, Ifugao scouts reported the existence of a new trail, leading over the southwestern part of MT PULOY, which had been developed by natives in the area to avoid Jap units disposed along the main trail. The 20th Infantry, therefore, ordered the 2d Battalion to reconnoiter this route with the view of attacking in this direction and by-passing the main Jap position, while the 1st Battalion contained the enemy to their front.

On 10 August, Companies "E" and "F", 20th Infantry, consolidated positions gained about 1,200 yards west of PACDAN against scattered opposition. On 11 August, Company "G" passed through this position and by 13 August, with the aid of the Provisional Battalion, BUENA VISTA Regiment, had gained 1,000 yards to the north towards the crest of MT PULOY. The Jap was now reacting to the maneuver and placed 75mm fire on Company "G's" position and made small night infiltrations. One 75mm gun was finally spotted by a cub plane on the reverse slope of MT PULOY, but was found to be in such a location that artillery fire could not reach it. On 14 and 15 August, elements of the Buena Vista Regiment attacked to within 200 yards of the crest, only to be driven back by heavy Jap fire. On 15 August, offensive operations ceased.

5. Operations in the PALAO-ANTIPOLO Area, 24 July-15 August:
(See Fig. 5).

To the south of KIANGAN, the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, was given the mission on 24 July to secure the DUIT-HALIAP area, and then advance in the direction of ANTIPOLO, destroying any hostile forces encountered. The 2d Battalion and Company "L", 14th Infantry (PA), which had been carrying on guerrilla warfare against the Japs in this area for the past three months, were attached to the 20th Infantry. PALAO was secured on 26 July by Company "F", 20th Infantry and on 27 July, Company "E", 20th Infantry occupied DUIT, killing 54 Japs in scattered contacts throughout the area.

For the next few days, 20th Infantry patrols searched out the area to the southwest, Company "F" working in the area southwest of PALAO and north of AMDUNTOG, while Company "E" operated in the HALIAP area. Only small Jap groups, which avoided combat and were quickly dispersed by artillery fire, were contacted. It was believed that the largest Jap groups were in the ANTIPOLO area, where it was estimated that about 600 Japs, mainly remnants of the GEKI FORCE, were trying to live off the land. In the meantime, elements of the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, attacking to the southwest from PALAO, on 30 July secured a hill about 800 yards northeast of AMDUNTOG, killing over 50 Japs in the advance.

In the three day period, 1-3 August, Company "F", 20th Infantry, with elements of the 14th Infantry killed or found dead from artillery fire, over 130 Japs in the AMDUNTOG-CACCAJA area. Company "G", which had joined Company "E" at DUIT on 31 July, advanced to the south and southwest and on 3 August seized the high ground 2,500 yards northeast of ANTIPOLO. The next day, the advance of this company to the southwest progressed another 1,000 yards.

At this time, in order to allow the 20th Infantry to make its maximum effort against MT PULOY, the 63d Infantry was ordered to relieve the 20th Infantry in the ANTIPOLO sector and continue operations there. On 5-6 August, slippery mountain trails and swollen rivers resulting from heavy rains, restricted patrol movements in the area and delayed the relief, which was not completed until 7 August.

Advancing through heavy undergrowth and up to their waists in water-filled rice paddies, elements of the 2d Battalion, 63d Infantry, on 8 August advanced south along the high ground which had been taken over from Company "G", 20th Infantry. By 11 August, the Battalion, assisted by Company "H" and Combat Company, 14th Infantry, had secured the objective, the high ground 1,500 yards southeast of and overlooking ANTIPOLO. Only slight resistance was met during the advance. From 11 August to 15 August, when offensive operations were terminated, elements of the 63d Infantry patrolled the ANTIPOLO area. No organized resistance was encountered, but only small, poorly-armed, and disorganized Jap groups, which usually withdrew without making contact, were observed. It was apparent that the Jap in this area had had enough.

Later, after the 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry had taken over responsibility for the KIANGAN area, the Commanding Officer of that battalion carried on surrender negotiations for three days, 18-20 August, with Jap officers in the vicinity of AMDUNTOG. These negotiations all fell through, as the Japs failed to carry out instructions agreed upon. These failures were probably brought on by the disorganized state of the enemy.

6. Artillery Support (20 July - 15 August).

Despite poor road conditions, bad weather, and supply difficulties, the Division Artillery (reinforced) kept artillery units well forward and were able to support effectively the advance of the Division. Battery "B", 80th Field Artillery Battalion (medium) displaced to the IBULAO RIVER near the position of Battery "C", 1st Field Artillery Battalion on 26 July. By 27 July a platoon from each of these batteries were in position on Highway 4 near GÜROG from which they could support the 1st Infantry in the

HAPAO sector. These guns had to fire from positions on the trail, barely wide enough for a jeep, since there were no other position areas in this mountainous country. By 2 August, the remainder of the 80th Field Artillery Battalion had closed into the IBULAO RIVER position. On 4 August, engineer work on Highway 4 had progressed to the point where all of Battery "C", 1st Field Artillery was able to displace to a position 4,000 yards north of GUROG.

In the meantime, the 51st Field Artillery had moved from an assembly north of the LAMUT RIVER to positions in KIANGAN, closing there on 1 August. From here, effective support could be given the 20th Infantry in its advance on KIANGKIANG. The 53d Field Artillery Battalion was brought out of the line and returned to the Division camp area north of the LAMUT RIVER for a well-earned rest. The 1st Field Artillery Battalion (-Battery "C") which up to the time had been firing from positions near HUCAB, displaced to KIANGAN, closing there on 10 August.

During the period the Division Artillery lost the Corps 90mm battery (Battery "A", 161st AAA Battalion) which departed the Division zone on 4 August. Battery "B", 465th Field Artillery Battalion (8" howitzer), however, remained and continued to give the Division excellent support. This battery displaced forward from its position near PAYAWAN FARM and closed into a position area near the 1st Field Artillery Battalion on 4 August.

Artillery support was a primary factor in getting the Infantry forward in the MOUNTAIN PROVINCE fighting. Air support was not always available, as weather condition frequently caused the cancellation of strikes. Infantry attacking over rugged, mountainous, wild terrain where only foot trails existed, could not always get adequate support from its own weapons, chemical mortars, and tanks. Artillery, therefore, was the only real support that could be depended upon, rain or shine, night or day.

7. Engineer Operations.

As rains became longer in duration and more intense, engineer work became increasingly difficult. Repeated landslides and mud-holes developed without warning, and bridges, culverts, and sometimes the road-bed itself, were continually being washed out. The IBULAO RIVER Jap-truck bridge was twice washed out during the period 6-11 August, and the foot bridge was completely washed down the river. The LAMUT RIVER bridge was also knocked out at intervals, as well as smaller bridges along Highway 4 to the north.

The major engineer feat was the opening of New Highway 4 clear to the IBULAO RIVER by the 27th Engineer Construction Battalion

(XIV Corps). This marvel of field engineering was completed on 11 August in extraordinarily good time, considering the difficulties experienced. A Bailey bridge over the IBULAO RIVER was completed by Corps Engineers on 16 August. In the meantime, the 6th Engineer Battalion working on Highway 4 north of GUROG made considerably better progress than originally anticipated, and by 10 August had opened the road clear to BANAUE. With the opening of New Highway 4 to the IBULAO RIVER, Old Highway 4, which had steadily deteriorated, was abandoned and used only for tractors and dozers.

During the period, more and more difficulty was experienced in keeping open the road from the IBULAO RIVER crossing to KIANGAN. This road in places passed through rice paddies which, when wet, were bottomless. By constant work, corduroying, and filling with rock, engineers were able to keep the road passable to vehicles, with the help of tractors at the worst spots.

The Engineers played a vital part in the mountain fighting in the IFUGAO PROVINCE. The advance of the Division high into this rugged rice terrace country was made possible only by the prodigious labor of the Engineers.

8. Medical Support.

The work of the 6th Medical Battalion was no less difficult than that of the Engineers. Long litter carries over extremely rough terrain and precarious mountain roads were but routine daily problems. Particularly valuable in caring for emergency casualties were the 24th and 55th Portable Surgical Hospitals. The 55th Portable Surgical Hospital packed overland into an area near the IBULAO RIVER crossing well before the opening of New Highway 4, and the 24th Portable Surgical Hospital packed up Highway 4 into BANAUE shortly after the 1st Infantry took the town.

9. The Division Comes Out of the Line.

With the cessation of offensive operations on 15 August, the Division immediately put into effect plans which it had made to receive the surrender of General Yamashita, Supreme Commander of the PHILIPPINES, and what was left of his XIV Area Army. Pamphlets giving surrender instructions were dropped and broadcasts from L-5 planes were made. Although some negotiations were carried on with Japanese local commanders south of KIANGAN, up until the time the Division was relieved, there were no overtures made by General Yamashita. Apparently the haughty "Tiger of Malaya" was awaiting either further instructions from Tokio, or the announcement that formal surrender terms had been signed.

However, on 19 August, an American P-38 pilot, who had been forced to bail out over MT PULOY on 8 August, when his plane caught fire, and had been captured by the enemy, was returned to the 1st Infantry lines near HAPAO by a Japanese escort. Although the Japs had not told this American officer that the war was over, he had suspected as much, since while he was held captive at the main enemy headquarters (presumably General Yamashita's), the treatment accorded him by the Japs suddenly took a decided turn for the better on the morning of 15 August. The officer reported to Division Headquarters with a letter, dated 16 August, addressed to the "Commander of the American Forces" from the "Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army". Although the signature was illegible, it was believed to have been signed by General Yamashita himself. The letter had little to say other than that the American officer had refused to divulge any information, had conducted himself admirably, and since he was of no further value, was being returned to the American forces. On 21 August, just before the Division was relieved, this officer was flown in an L-5 over the area southwest of HUNGDUAN and positively located the main enemy headquarters where he had been held captive. That this was General Yamashita's headquarters was later confirmed, when communications between General Yamashita himself and the 32d Infantry Division were established on 25 August after a Cub plane flying over the area had dropped a message to him the day before. Cub pilots also observed at this time that large groups of Jap soldiers were assembling in the general vicinity of the headquarters, apparently in preparation for an actual surrender.

On 16 August the Division was alerted for movement to Japan as part of the American Army of Occupation. XIV Corps issued orders on 18 August for the relief of the Division by elements of the 32d Infantry Division and the Division began its movement out of the mountains.

The 1st Infantry was ordered to assemble in the Division camp area north of the LAMUT RIVER, except for one Battalion (-one Company) which was to remain at the IBULAO RIVER crossing until relieved. The 11th Infantry (2d Battalion), with the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 1st Pangasinan Regiment, and 2d Battalion, 3d Pangasinan Regiment attached, was ordered to assemble at BANAUE awaiting further instructions. The 20th Infantry was ordered to assemble in the Division camp area, except for one company to remain at KIANGAN until relieved. The 14th Infantry (-1st Battalion and 3d Battalion (-Company "L") and BUENA VISTA Regiment were ordered to assemble in KIANGAN, while the 2d Battalion, 2d Pangasinan Regiment and Company "I", 3d Pangasinan Regiment, which had been securing Highway 4, were ordered to remain in place, awaiting further instructions. Company "A", 6th Engineer Battalion, elements of the 6th Medical Battalion, and the 24th Portable Surgical Hospital were ordered to remain in the LAGAWE-KIANGAN area until all 6th Infantry Division troops had been relieved.

At 1800, 21 August, the 3d Battalion, 128th Infantry of the 32d Infantry Division completed the relief of 6th Infantry Division elements in the forward areas and all Filipino units passed to the control of the 32d Infantry Division. By 24 August all troops of the Division had closed into their assembly areas. The Division was finally out of the hills.

During the campaign in the CAGAYAN VALLEY, the Division killed 7,702 Japs, took 925 PW's, and captured or destroyed over 800 enemy vehicles, tons of ammunition, and large amounts of food, medical, signal, and ordnance supplies. Battle casualties of the Division were 99 dead and 432 wounded and injured.

SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

1. Operational:

a. Beating the Jap At His Own Game:

In the campaign fought along Highway 4, where increasingly rugged, wild and densely vegetated terrain was met as the advance progressed, it was again pointedly brought out that one of the best ways to defeat the Jap is to push through his position, and once in behind him, to keep moving forward, keeping him off balance, and never giving him a chance to recover. These are favorite Jap tactics, but turned against him, they work even better. When our troops get in behind him, the Jap becomes confused and does stupid things in his efforts to recoup the situation. From the LAMUT RIVER to KIANGAN, Highway 4 runs for 20 miles, every foot of which is ideal ambush country. To keep pushing forward rapidly in such terrain, despite Jap infiltrations and harassing raids on our supply lines, was a risk, but it shortened the campaign many weeks and saved many casualties. Had our troops stopped to secure the flanks of the road in this jungle-mountain country, the Jap would have had time to get set for our successive attacks. As it turned out, the Jap was knocked off balance, and was able to make only two major stands during this drive, one near PAYAWAN FARM and the other at LANE'S RIDGE. It is true that during the earlier part of the advance, our losses from repeated Jap ambushes and raids on our supply trains, day and night, were greater than our losses in the attack. Nevertheless, these losses were justified. Lives were saved by vigorously pushing up the road and avoiding costly attacks against Jap groups on our flanks. These by-passed groups of Japs had only a limited time to harass our lines of communication, as they could not supply themselves, and were forced to withdraw sooner or later. The very fact that these tactics shortened the campaign saved additional lives.

b. Artillery and Air Preparations in Depth:

In this campaign our advance was tied to the one existing mountain road, Highway 4, because of the extreme difficulty of cross-country movement. By the same token, the Jap defense was also tied to the road. These conditions made the employment of artillery and air in depth particularly effective, as succeeding objectives, for days ahead, could be readily selected and all possible defensive localities in the area could be constantly pounded, day and night. This had an accumulative

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effect that grew in intensity as the advance progressed deeper into the enemy's position. It immobilized him, disrupted his supply, evacuation, and communications, destroyed his defensive positions, caused him constant casualties, harassed his reserves, gave him no rest, and lowered his morale to the breaking point. Against these tactics, the Jap had no defense. To escape this relentless punishment, he had to either die, or withdraw far to the rear. The hundreds of Japs found dead from artillery, air bombing, strafing and Napalm strikes along Highway 4 during the advance, attested to the deadly effectiveness of these tactics. Many PW's testified as to the devastating effect constant shelling and air strikes had on the nerves and morale of their troops, not only in the front lines, but also all along their lines of communications and in their rear areas. Many, who could not stand the punishment any longer, committed suicide, ran to the rear, or made suicidal banzai attacks against our troops to end their suffering.

c. Tactics Used Against Jap Delaying Positions:

The terrain encountered by our troops shortly after the crossing of the LAMUT RIVER was a combination of very steep rugged hills, deep river gorges and densely forested jungle terrain with many bamboo thickets.

Difficulty of cross-country movement combined with limited visibility made the delaying tactics of the Japs extremely effective. These delaying positions were usually found along narrow trails at a sharp bend. Consisting of several MGs supported by a few riflemen, these positions had to be flanked, as any frontal assault along such a narrow trail would be very costly.

Flanking movements around such delaying positions, where the terrain would permit, were usually successful because of the lack of depth in each of the Jap positions. The direct fire and crushing power of tanks and Quad 50's in half-tracks, where they could be used, quickly reduced many Jap delaying positions.

Where the Jap position was a strong point, it was usually located so that its flanks were secured by natural barriers made by cliffs or deep and thickly covered draws. This necessitated the massing of all artillery and supporting weapons to keep the Jap in his reverse slope defenses, while the Infantry could advance, under covering fire, to the ridge and engage the enemy with small arms, bazookas, and grenades.

d. Air Support:

Because of fog and low-hanging clouds prevalent in the early morning hours, close-support air strikes preceding an attack were frequently delayed or cancelled. The resulting delay in the time of attack sometimes gave the attacking forces insufficient time to consolidate their gains and plan defenses properly prior to dark. Several sharp Jap counterattacks at dusk were partially successful for this reason.

A Philippine Army unit engaged with a strong Jap force in positions along a high ridge used close air support to the maximum advantage. Friendly artillery was out of supporting distance of this action. During one air strike it was noticed that the Japs pulled out of their ridge positions and occupied caves on the slopes while the strike was in progress. The following day, after the strike was completed, several planes continued to make dummy runs on the Jap held ridge. The enemy thinking the strike still in progress, stayed in his caves and allowed the Philippine Army units to take the hill and occupy the Jap positions without a single casualty.

e. War Dogs:

The Scout Dog Platoons were very effective in close terrain, because the dogs frequently pointed out Jap defenses and ambushes while they were still invisible to the Infantry.

f. Communications:

Forward units in places accessible only with great difficulty and where radio communication was lacking were frequently contacted by an observer in a cub plane equipped with an SCR 300 netted with the ground commander's radio.

g. Self-propelled Quad 50's:

Quadruple 50 cal AAA MG's, mounted on half-tracks, were successfully used in spraying bamboo-filled draws believed to contain Jap delaying parties and ambush groups. This fire eliminated the necessity for a tedious, time consuming search and thereby increased the speed of the advance. The half-tracks were used in several instances to evacuate casualties along the roads which were subject to Jap ambushes.

h. Convoying Trains:

M-8 Scout cars and the half-tracks of the AAA were



used to convoy supply trains to and from forward units. Their presence undoubtedly accounted for the safe passage of many convoys and assisted in destroying Jap ambush parties when attacks were made on convoys. The elimination of such ambushes, however, was not complete until Infantry and Guerrilla patrols and outposts had pushed out several thousand yards from the road and scoured the country for possible hiding places of Jap raiding parties.

i. Artillery:

TOT fires of several artillery battalions at irregular intervals were again used to great advantage. The effectiveness of the VT fuse was further attested by many PW reports.

90mm AAA guns, controlled and directed by the Division Artillery, were used extensively in placing harassing and interdiction fires on Jap bivouacs in rear areas and on critical points along the narrow trails.

Photo strips were used extensively, particularly in the later and more stabilized phases of the campaign. At times the strips provided inadequate coverage, apparently because a regular pattern of photographic flights had been impossible. Strips were not always issued in sufficient copies. 1/50,000 maps, while good for the plains, were distorted in both direction and distance for the mountains.

Many command, reconnaissance, liaison, and supply missions were flown by Division Artillery Cubs for all units of the Division. There is an urgent need for the organic assignment of two (2) L-5 aircraft to Division Headquarters and one (1) to each Infantry Regiment, these planes to operate under the technical control of the Division Artillery Air Section.

2. Propaganda Warfare:

During the course of the campaign (July 1 to August 21) in the CARABALLO MOUNTAINS, two methods of nullifying the enemy's combat efficiency proved to be particularly effective. The first was a 7 hour armistice on July 24, devised to allow enemy elements to surrender in comparative safety. The other was to employ PW's to reenter enemy lines voluntarily and encourage demoralized groups to surrender.

The armistice on July 24 was fully publicized beforehand by propaganda leaflets and broadcasts from a Public Address system mounted in an L-5. Although individual surrenders during

the period were negligible, the truce evidently produced these pronounced effects: (1) Our strict compliance with the terms helped to dispel the enemy's preconceived conception of our insincerity and deceit, (2) The seven hours of inactivity provided time for the Japs to consider and evaluate their plight, and (3) A moral advantage was gained by offering a chance to surrender because it implies that the enemy's state is hopeless and that the truce is a generous gift from a superior to an inferior force. The reluctance to surrender on the day of the truce can be attributed to the following conditions: special precautions were taken by enemy outposts to insure that none could approach the American lines; many elements were stranded in remote areas and had no knowledge of the location of American lines; and the disgrace of surrendering deterred such an ostensible action during the specified period. However, this unusual occurrence must have disturbed the stereotyped Japanese mind and further depressed the enemy's morale.

The technique of using PW's to encourage their comrades and compatriots to surrender was again tried during the campaign. After the care and attention afforded these PW's, they were enthusiastic about locating other enemy elements and revealing the unexpected kindness of our treatment. Formosans were employed for missions because they had not been so extensively indoctrinated with the ignominy of surrender and were therefore willing to face their comrades after having done so. However, this procedure is limited by certain conditions. It could hardly be expected that PW's could proceed through organized enemy positions and return unmolested with any sizeable group, and ample protection from any retributions on the part of civilians had to be insured. During August, when PW's contacted enemy groups west of SANTA CRUZ, NUEVA VIZCAYA, several Jap groups, mostly Formosan, the largest of which totaled 65, returned with the PW's and surrendered to our troops.

3. Supply and Evacuation:

a. Supply by Air:

Early in July the main effort of the Division was being made in the mountainous terrain west of the CAGAYAN VALLEY, where only one usable supply route, Highway 4, and mountain trails passable only to foot troops and in a few instances to pack animals, existed. It soon became apparent that the Division would have to resort to air supply of combat troops. All combat units were instructed to select the best available air drop areas within their zones of action as they advanced.

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During the first part of July, the 14th Infantry Regiment, a Philippine Army unit, operating near DUIT, south of KIANGAN, came under control of the Division. This unit, with a strength of 1500, was isolated from all roads, and on 5 July the first air drop asked for by the Division in the campaign was requested. Later, both 20th Infantry and 63d Infantry troops, were committed in this area and air drops continued until friendly troops were withdrawn from the sector at the end of the campaign. Air drops in the DUIT area were not always successful, owing to inexperienced Philippine Army troops' selecting air drop areas too close to the front lines, and on a few occasions the enemy benefited as much from air drops as the Filipinos did.

In KIANGAN, air drops were used to supply 2000 to 3500 troops for over two weeks. Air drops in KIANGAN were very successful, as supplies dropped outside the drop area could be recovered.

At BANAUE, air drops of ammunition and rations for a strength of 1900 troops commenced on 22 July. By 4 August, the strength in the BANAUE sector had increased to 4000, necessitating the use of pack horses and carrying parties to supplement the limited amounts of supplies that could be dropped, because of drop commitments in other areas. Air drop at BANAUE was discontinued on 10 August when Highway 4 was opened to jeep traffic. During August, a force of 400, sent from BANAUE to DUCRIGAN by the 1st Infantry, and another 1st Infantry task force of 1500 at HAPAO, were also partly supplied by air.

On 25 July the 11th Infantry Regiment (PA) (reinf) under the control of the 6th Division, was committed near BUNHLAN, where no road net existed and supplies had to be hand-carried from MARSAT GRANDE, located 25 miles to the east. By 28 July this unit was heavily engaged 1000 yards from MAYOYAO, and could no longer bring forward sufficient supplies from MARSAT GRANDE, now 40 miles away. Air supply was initiated 27 July and continued every three days until 9 August, at which time the 11th Infantry moved to BANAUE.

During the period 3 July to 15 August a total of 53 airdrops were made to supply troops whose strength reached 7000 at the peak of air drop supply during the last week of July and the first week of August. Part of the losses was caused by damage to containers.

Total tonnage of supplies air dropped and recovered during the period 6 July to 14 August were as follows:

	<u>Tons</u> <u>Requested</u>	<u>Tons</u> <u>Received</u>	<u>Tons</u> <u>Lost</u>	<u>% of</u> <u>Loss</u>
Rations	506	374	132	26.1%
Ammunition	213	157	56	26.3%
Signal Supplies	11	8	3	27.2%
Medical Supplies	2	1.5	.5	25.0%
Totals	<u>732</u>	<u>540.5</u>	<u>191.5</u>	<u>26.17%*</u>

* Average Loss,

Air drop areas should be carefully selected and located well in rear of front lines to insure full recovery of supplies dropped. Markings of drop areas should be changed frequently to insure that the enemy will not be able to set up an air drop area within his own lines and receive the air drops through the use of U. S. markings. The use of varied colored smokes to mark drop areas proved to be very successful and does away with the need for changing panel markings frequently.

b. Hand Carriers and Pack Animals,

In the area west of KIANGAN, a total of two battalions were operating in rough, densely wooded terrain, precluding the use of air drops. Civilian carriers were used in large numbers with excellent results. During the initial phases of operations in KIANGAN, supplies were air dropped in a central location and hand-carried to the front line units. Later, as roads became passable to KIANGAN, supplies were hauled in by truck to the hand-carry starting point.

A peak total of 4000 troops were deployed in the BANAUE sector, which required the use of civilian carriers to haul supplies into the area to supplement those dropped by air. A total of 500 carriers were employed to haul supplies 15 miles from GUROG to BANAUE, a two day trip due to the terrain, and a trip in which only half of the carriers could carry supplies, while the other half rested.

Carriers had been used prior to this time in the LUZON Campaign with only fair degree of success, because civilians were reluctant to work in areas where enemy snipers were found, but in the CAGAYAN VALLEY civilians would not quit under fire. This fact probably accounts for the great success the Division had in the employment of civilian carriers in the latter part of the campaign.



The Division found that owing to the large number of troops in the BANAU and KIANGAN area, the combined use of carriers available and air drops could not adequately supply the troops committed, and that other methods of supply had to be used to supplement those already in use. Pack horses filled this need. By 3 August the Division Civil Affairs Section had procured 98 horses and had turned over 68 of them to the 1st Infantry and 30 to the 20th Infantry. Heavy pack saddles were available in large quantities, but only 35 light wooden saddles, suitable for small Filipino ponies, were obtained. Cargo pack boards were found to be an excellent substitute for pack saddles. In addition to hiring the horses, the Civil Affairs Section hired one civilian to take care of each horse. Pack teams consisting of 17-20 horses, were organized and an experienced soldier packmaster was placed in charge.

The success of the Division in employing pack trains indicates that plans for mountain operations should provide for an ample supply of pack horses.

c. Evacuation.

Evacuation was one of the most serious problems faced by the Division. When troops first reached the IBULAO RIVER-KIANGAN area, all evacuation from forward positions was by a long, difficult hand carry over precipitous mountain trails. Air evacuation by L-5's, landing on the road just north of the IBULAO RIVER, was not feasible, since a safe airstrip could not be constructed in this rough terrain.

Litter bearers faced longer and more difficult carries, as the troops advanced deeper into the mountains, trails became less distinct, and rains increased in intensity and duration. One of the most difficult carries was that from the ANTIPOLLO position to KIANGAN. The route, although only about 8 miles long, traveled over the top of a 3000 foot mountain, passed through rice paddy areas three to four feet under water, and crossed four large streams which were unfordable during rains. The trip normally required two days for a man walking in dry weather. In rainy weather, the trip often took four days. Casualties were often hand-carried, not by enlisted medical personnel, (this back breaking job would kill a white man), but by Ifugao natives. These brown, naked men, sixteen or more to a litter, carried casualties out with great difficulty, but more swiftly than could be done by American soldiers. Where trails became narrow ledges on the mountain side, natives carried the litters on their heads with one man at each end. A single misstep would have sent the casualty hurtling down hundreds of feet to the floor of the canyon. However, our casualties were evacuated without a single loss. One severe

"puncture wound of the chest" case was carried 8 miles from the vicinity of ANTIPOLO to KIANGAN by the litter bearers of a Collecting Company and civilians. The trip required 28 men and eight hours of gruelling labor. When the hospital was reached the casualty was barely able to murmur, "Thank God and the Medics, we made it."

In the inaccessible areas in which the Division found itself operating, portable surgical hospitals were packed into the mountains and proved their weight in gold. Their presence in mountain fighting is a must, if seriously wounded men are to be given a chance to live.

d. The Employment of Weasels.

On 3 July, 12 Weasels were received by the Division, 5 each of which were issued to the 1st Infantry and 63d Infantry, and 2 to the 6th Signal Company.

Weasels were used to haul supplies and lay wire on soft slippery roads, but in spite of cautious employment and driving, at the end of one week of operation, more than half of the weasels were deadlined because of broken parts and worn out track suspension systems. In some places, weasels were immobilized by mud so thick that the tracks lost all traction. Because of their inherent mechanical weaknesses, the use in the future of weasels in mountainous terrain is not recommended.

e. Enemy Equipment Salvage.

Throughout the whole campaign, large quantities of captured supplies presented a problem, because the Division had only one section of a Quartermaster Salvage Platoon attached. It was necessary to set aside quartermaster transportation and personnel to collect and evacuate captured equipment and supplies to rear collecting points. Because of the small size of the provisional salvage group, much of the captured supplies could not be evacuated, but had to be destroyed to prevent recapture, souveniring and looting. Unit commanders are not able to carry on and supervise salvage operations simultaneously with tactical operations. This work should be done by qualified teams attached to a Division for an entire operation.

5. Personnel Matters.

a. Casualties.

Battle casualties during the period (1 July to 15 August) averaged slightly over 8 per day; non-battle casualties were comparatively light. Living conditions in the upper

CAGAYAN VALLEY and in the mountains of IFUGAO PROVINCE were far from desirable. However, by continued careful supervision and strict enforcement of sanitary measures, illness was held to a minimum except in one isolated instance.

b. The Readjustment Program and Morale.

The initiation of the Readjustment Program consumed considerable time and planning throughout the period. In June, 8 officers and 105 enlisted men were relieved from assignment with the Division; in July, 6 officers and 200 enlisted men; in August, 5 officers and 940 enlisted men, and later in August, 600 additional enlisted men. This relieved from assignment with the Division all enlisted personnel with Adjusted Rating Scores of 85 or higher.

The morale of personnel of the Division was uniformly excellent throughout the period. Initially, there was considerable question and some dissatisfaction among the men concerning the Readjustment Program. As further information was disseminated and all personnel came to realize all the problems involved, the general outlook concerning the Readjustment Program became more favorable.

c. Labor

Because of poor condition of roads and the distance involved, it was necessary throughout July and the first part of August to secure large numbers of native carriers to furnish supplies of rations and ammunition to the front line units. From 1500 to 2000 of these laborers were secured through the Division Civil Affairs Office, daily. When the use of carriers was insufficient, Civil Affairs secured horses which were organized into pack trains. To secure this number of animals, it was necessary to comb the entire area. Local civil officials assisted materially in the procurement of labor and pack carriers.

6. Medical

a. Water Supply:

As in previous operations, water was drawn from wells sunk near the banks of streams and not from the streams themselves. Although the engineers located water points as close to forward troops as possible, hand carry of water was often necessary. Troops were frequently forced to resort to the use of boiling and halazone tablets to purify water from springs or streams. The restricted amount of water precluded

adequate sterilization of mess-kits in some instances.

b. Insect Control:

Mosquitoes of the *Anopheles minimus* variety were found to be breeding in large numbers along the banks of nearly all the streams in areas occupied by American troops. Whenever feasible the banks of streams within two miles of bivouacs were sprayed weekly with 5% DDT in oil.

Flies were present in indescribable numbers. Control measures afforded by adequate field sanitation, burial of the numerous enemy dead, use of fly traps and DDT, and destruction of breeding places quickly reduced the fly population in fully occupied territory. In forward areas, however, the full effects of swarms of flies were seen in the health of troops.

c. Communicable Diseases:

The problem of supply and evacuation in the HAPAO area produced an excessive number of diarrhea cases in one battalion. There were several contributory factors. Widely dispersed troops depended on air drops and pack trains for food and water. Food containers dropped by air frequently burst, exposing the food to contamination. Water was sufficient in many instances only for drinking and cooking, and not for adequate sterilization. Flies were thick. Enemy action prevented the burial of numerous enemy dead in the close proximity of our troops. A Filipino battalion, whose sanitation standards were poor, were fighting alongside the American battalion. Diarrhea and dysentery rapidly increased in number to 178 in the one American battalion in two weeks. This outbreak brought out forcibly how difficult it is to eliminate diarrhea in a forward area during combat, once it has become thoroughly infected.

Many cases of fever of undetermined origin were admitted to Division hospitals, the greater part of the 138 cases of malaria admitted between 1 July and 15 August being from troops in active combat. One causative factor was the failure of troops in combat to take the required suppressive dose of two atabrine tablets per day. One successful method used by several units in combat, was to administer 4 tablets daily, to make up for the periods of close contact when it was not always possible to get atabrine to all men.

7. Engineer.

a. Landslides:

The engineer problem of opening and maintaining



Highway 4 was complicated by excessive landslides. These were usually cleared in the normal manner by dozing the debris over the side of the road and by restoring original grade and drainage. However, in numerous cases the roadbed itself had slipped away from the mountain side. In such cases, it was necessary to blast out foundations, crib up revetments, and fill in a new roadbed. To speed up the operations, it was found that considerable time was saved, except in solid rock, by construction of low cribs, 2 or 3 feet outside the previous road bed, and 4 or 5 feet below. An initial low narrow fill was pushed across, enabling light vehicles to cross the dip immediately. The expedient was subsequently developed by a strong retaining wall and filling to the former level, without interrupting necessary traffic.

b. Maintenance of Old Highway 4:

A heavy drain on the strength of the 6th Engineer Combat Battalion was the maintenance of Old Highway 4, a narrow, one-way, hand-constructed road which had been abandoned several years previously. The road had been surfaced with hand placed stone and was capable of carrying six ton loads. Division traffic resulted in quick deterioration of the road. It was found that hand labor to place rock and corduroy in the worst places was the only satisfactory method of maintenance. Trucks were limited to half-capacity loads. A continuous pick and shovel ditching gang was necessary to counteract the innumerable springs that bubbled along and in the road bed. Much of the time, two companies and 200 civilian laborers were thrown into the fight to keep Old Highway open, and even then it was out 60% of the time.

c. Bridges:

In the rugged mountainous area of operations, bridging the numerous rivers and gorges was made doubly difficult by fluctuating flow of water, steep banks, and inaccessible by-passes. Intermittent rains transformed dry washes into raging torrents within an hour. In order to keep a line of supply open behind the advance of infantry troops, bridges were improvised from materials at hand. A destroyed bridge to the rear provided a valuable supply of 12" standard steel I beams, 16 feet long, and 18" steel box girders, 30 feet long. Use of these members resulted in a 50% saving of time, labor, and lumber. In one case, these long box girders, used as stringers over a deep gorge, made possible a 35 ton bridge, saved 2,000 board feet of lumber, and allowed supplies to get to the advancing infantry 24 hours before expectation. These

salvaged steel members expedited work in five similar crossings which would otherwise have been delayed until standard timbers could be brought up from supply depots far to the rear. At the IBULAO RIVER, the engineers devised a unique solution. The river was approximately 300 feet wide and 3 to 4 feet deep, the current was swift, and the river bed strewn with boulders that made fording treacherous. The area was scouted for abandoned Jap trucks, which were dragged into the river to serve as bents, across which 6 by 12 timbers were laid for a treadway. Bulldozers maneuvered the vehicles into position and then heaped rocks and boulders around them as anchors. High water occasionally rose over the bridge for four or five hours, but repair crews easily replaced damaged sections in short time. This 8 ton bridge carried the bulk of the supplies to an Infantry Regiment plus 3500 Philippine Army troops for several weeks, until a Bailey bridge could be brought forward and constructed at this critical point.

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FINIS

The LUZON Campaign was over. For 219 successive days, from 9 January to 15 August 1945, troops of the Division had been in combat. Landing in the assault at LINGAYEN GULF, the 63d Infantry (Corps Reserve) saw heavy fighting in the capture of ROSARIO, while the rest of the Division pushed inland, and fought the battle of the CABARUAN HILLS and took MUNOZ where the largest concentration of Jap armor encountered in the Pacific War was liquidated. After seizing SAN JOSE, the gateway to the CAGAYAN VALLEY, the Division advanced to BALER BAY and DINGALAN BAY on the east coast of LUZON. Moving swiftly down the CENTRAL VALLEY, the 1st Infantry in a rapid advance retook the major part of the peninsula of BATAAN, while the rest of the Division launched the first assault against the heavily fortified SHIMBU LINE east of MANILA. Here were fought some of the most savage engagements of the Pacific War. When the Division left this area, the center of the SHIMBU LINE had been shattered, and its right anchor greatly weakened. After mopping up in BATAAN and ZAMBALES Province, the Division moved to the north up Highway 5 and relieved the 37th Infantry Division in the ARITAO-BAGABAG area. After seizing SALINAS-PINGKIAN and KIYAPA in rapid succession, the Division launched the drive up Highway 4 which wound up the LUZON Campaign.

In this campaign, the Division killed 20,480 Japs and took 1,369 PW's. Friendly losses were heavy, battle casualties totalling 854 dead, 7 missing, and 3,228 wounded and injured. Troops attached to the Division during the campaign suffered an additional 62 dead and 288 wounded and injured. The losses of the three Infantry Regiments of the Division were a little over 93% of the Division total. Battle casualties by regiment were as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>IIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>DOW</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1st Infantry	212	660	258	4	46	1,160
20th Infantry	205	719	296	2	46	1,268
63d Infantry	<u>246</u>	<u>890</u>	<u>197</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>1,390</u>
<u>Totals</u>	663	2,269	731	7	148	3,818

The fighting was over. Once again in an assembly area, the Division looked forward to an active part in the Occupation of Japan, and immediately began an intensive rehabilitation program.



