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Author: 7th Infantry Division

Abstract: The following is the introduction by MG A.V. Arnold: This is a report on the part played by the 7th Infantry Division in the Leyte Operation.

In the following pages are described the planning and execution, the successes and mistakes and finally the price which was paid.

In preparing a factual report, we are prone to describe each operation in terms of battalions and batteries, yards gained or prisoners taken. To do so ignores the vital factor of morale. Perhaps morale is not susceptible to measurement in mathematical terms but is very adequately evidenced by the splendid courage of our Soldiers which played a major part in every success.

To judge how well the 7th Division carried out its mission in the Leyte Campaign will require a perspective which only time can supply. Nevertheless, there are many valuable lessons which can best be derived by an analysis of recent experiences, while they are still fresh. These lessons have been included in this report in order that advantage may be taken of them in coming operations.

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Operation report - King II

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
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OPERATION REPORT

7th INFANTRY DIVISION

KING II



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
FIELD ORDER NO. 7
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INTRODUCTION


INTRODUCTION

This is a report of the part played by the 7th Infantry Division in the Leyte Operation.

In the following pages are described the planning and execution, the successes and mistakes, and finally the price which was paid.



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To judge how well the 7th Division carried out its mission in the Leyte Campaign will require a perspective which only time can supply. Nevertheless, there are many valuable lessons which can best be derived by an analysis of recent experiences, while they are still fresh. These lessons have been included in this report in order that advantage may be taken of them in coming operations.



A. V. ARNOLD
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding

NARRATIVE



APPROACH SKETCH
LEYTE ISLAND
 LOOKING NORTHWEST
 DULAG - BURAUEN
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
 FRONT LINES AS OF 2400 EACH DAY

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REPRODUCED BY
 PROV. ENGR. TOP. MAP DET.
 XXIV CORPS. W.D. NO. 190

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 G-3 SECTION

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In early August 1944, the 7th Infantry Division was assigned the mission of assaulting and capturing Yap Island as a part of the Stalemate II Operation. During the period 15 August to 11 September 1944, plans and training were directed to this end. Supplies and loading, particularly in the matter of transportation were planned for operations on a very small land mass with short supply routes. Combat training conducted on the Island of Oahu, T.H. emphasized tactics in tropical mountain terrain, cane fields, and swamp areas, and the establishment of a beachhead in assault amphibious landing. Combat problems ranging in size from squad to regimental combat team, and extending over periods of from one to three days, were laid out and units rotated through combat courses in order that all personnel would benefit by training in all types of terrain involved. Particular stress was laid on the development of tank-infantry team tactics in order that the maximum advantage might be gained from the coordinated activity of these arms. The utilization of an amphibian tank battalion as an integral part of Division Artillery was envisaged to provide immediate overhead fire support to assault infantry during the period from Jig Hour to the landing and registration of organic Division Artillery Units. To this end, the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, assisted by Division Artillery instructors underwent a course of intensive training in conduct of indirect firing and the massing of fire, controlled by Artillery Forward Observers. Division Artillery radio and wire nets were so modified as to make this activity possible.

Supply by air drop to isolated infantry units was practiced in the rugged mountainous terrain of Kaena Point. Replacements who had not experienced operations at either Attu or Kwajalein were given special training at the Waianae Amphibious Training Center. All personnel of the Division completed an intensive course of training at the POA Unit Jungle Training Center.

A full dress practice landing was made on Beaches of the Island of Maui, T.H. The transfer of troops from APA's to LST's and thence to landing craft was conducted in accordance with plans developed and coordinated by the 7th Infantry Division and CINCPAC staff representatives. An assault beachhead was established against opposition by simulated enemy forces, radio-controlled by umpire teams. Assault elements of the Division, spearheaded by amphibian tanks, seized beaches laid to the scale of the proposed target, established themselves ashore in tactical dispositions, and pushed rapidly inland. Naval gunfire and air support were in accordance with the plan for the operation, except that ammunition was not fired.

The Division was mounted in Oahu by the Commanding General, Central Pacific Base Command. Palletization of selected supplies was undertaken in order to improve the ease and efficiency of handling. Approximately 4,000 sleds, averaging forty per cent of all supplies were loaded. Palletizing was accomplished by Division and attached Engineer Troops at Fort Kamehameha, T.H. under the supervision of the

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Division Engineer. A unique feature was the assembly line designed and used, capable of an output of up to 200 sled loads per eight hours. Preparation of all supplies and equipment had to be accomplished in the final two weeks prior to ship loading.

A special cargo regulating section of 6 officers and 12 enlisted men, including supply service representatives under the supervision of G-4, directed the movement of all Division cargo to the piers. 14,000 tons of general cargo were moved to the piers in a period of 12 days by three different methods. Bulk supplies were hauled by truck and rail direct from base depots. Organizational equipment was moved by truck and rail from unit staging areas direct to the piers. Palletized cargo was hauled by truck, ferry, and rail from the assembly yard at Fort Kamehameha.

IST's commenced loading 17 August, and transports 22 August 1944. By 27 August, a total of 31,000 tons of cargo was loaded on the 12 APA's, 3 AKA's, 23 IST's, 2 LSD's, 1 LSV, and 1 LSM which had been allotted to this Division. Division and unit TQM personnel, 56 officers and 102 enlisted men, supervised the loading. Embarked troops furnished ships' working parties. After all cargo had been loaded, personnel were moved to piers by rail from Schofield Barracks, and by motor from other staging areas. The embarkation of over 21,000 troops was completed in a period of three days, the majority of it by lighters to ships anchored in the stream.

On 12 September 1944, IST Unit (TU 33.3.5) cleared Pearl Harbor T.H. and TransGroup Able cleared on 15 September 1944.

On 15 September, the 7th Infantry Division was notified that Stalemate II had been cancelled.

The voyage to Eniwetok was completed without incident. TU 33.3.5 and TG 33.3 arrived on 25 September. While at Eniwetok, the Division received Tentative Field Order #3, Headquarters XXIV Corps, dated 24 September 1944 for the King II Operation. At Eniwetok, unit commander's conferences were conducted and tentative verbal field orders issued.

TU 33.3.5 sailed from Eniwetok on 26 September and TG 33.3 sailed on 28 September. The voyage to Seeadler Harbor, Island of Manus, Admiralty Islands, was not marked by any unusual occurrence. En route, a tentative Division Field Order for the King II Operation was prepared, based on Tentative Field Order #3, Headquarters XXIV Corps.

TU 33.3.5 and TG 33.3 arrived at Seeadler Harbor on 3 October.

At Manus, King II, Field Order #3, XXIV Corps, dated 28 September 1944 was received, and King II, Field Order #9, Headquarters 7th Infantry Division was published and distributed to the units. Numerous unit commander's conferences were conducted to discuss revisions of the original tactical and logistical plans that had to be adopted as a

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result of the change of target.

Initial transfer of assault troops from APA's to LST's was completed at Seeadler Harbor. Other than effecting this transfer at the forward staging area, landing plans remained as rehearsed at Maui, T.H.

TU 33.3.5 sailed from Seeadler Harbor on 11 October 1944, and TG 33.3 sailed on 14 October 1944.

During the period 18 October through 20 October, Army and Navy air strikes and surface bombardment were conducted against the Island of Leyte by the Fifth Air Force, the Third Fleet and Fire Support Groups.

A Day, the day of assault, was 20 October 1944, and J Hour 1000. ← ?

At 0330, Attack Group Able entered Leyte Gulf and by 0700, TU 33.3.5 and TG 33.3 had arrived in the transport area. Naval preparation in support of the landing was conducted on schedule.

The initial mission of the 7th Infantry Division reinforced was to land on Beaches Yellow I, Yellow II, Violet I, and Violet II, between the Calbasag and Daguitan Rivers, advancing rapidly inland along the axis of the Dulag-Burauen Road, seizing hostile airdromes in its zone of action, securing the Burauen-Dagami Road, and protecting the Corps left (south) flank.

Assault BLT's were landed as follows: Beach Yellow I, 184-1, Beach Yellow II, 184-3, Beach Violet I, 32-3, Beach Violet II, 32-2.

Elements of the Japanese 16th Infantry Division occupying the Division zone of action were disposed as follows: The 3rd Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, supported by the 4th and 5th Batteries, 22nd Field Artillery Regiment, manned the Dulag Beach defenses. The 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment occupied heavily fortified beach defenses at Rizal, while the Anti-tank and Regimental Gun Companies were in position to support both battalions in their respective sectors. Regimental Headquarters, 20th Infantry Regiment had been established in Dulag just prior to A Day, and the 3rd Battalion, 33rd Infantry Regiment moved into position on the left flank of the 3rd Battalion 20th Infantry Regiment in the Dulag beach defense area. At Buri, the 7th Independent Tank Company was located. This unit was full strength, but equipped with obsolete tanks, some of which were operational at the time of the landing. In addition, the 54th Airfield Construction Unit and the 114th Airfield Construction Unit were located at the Dulag and Buri airfields respectively, operating under the 34th Air Sector Command. A transport Unit, Engineers, and the 4th Field Hospital, 16th Infantry Division were also in the general area. Prior to A Day, all units within the zone of action had orders to "annihilate the enemy at the beaches".

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The first wave, consisting of amtracs of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion hit the beach at 1003. A few tank obstacles were encountered on Beach Yellow I, but opposition was slight. Landing of the first fourteen waves was completed with very minor variations from schedule and against light, sporadic opposition from mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire. Waves 2, 3, and 4, consisted of assault infantry in amtracs. Wave 5 consisted of medium tanks in LCM's. Waves 6 through 9 consisted of infantry, command personnel, and engineers in amtracs. Waves 10 through 14 consisted of LCV's and LCM's carrying tanks, bulldozers, shore party and medical personnel. One platoon of the 91st Chemical Weapons Company was landed in the 8th wave to support each assault infantry regiment.

As a result of the heavy air and naval preparation, and successful subsequent landing operations, the enemy force in the Dulag area began an organized withdrawal from their beach positions, leaving suicide units to protect the withdrawal.

By 1016, the 776th Amtrac Battalion had penetrated 200 yards inland and gone into position to support the infantry attack with overhead fire. Fire of the amtracs was conducted by field artillery forward observers.

184-3 advanced steadily against sporadic rifle fire in the town of Dulag, reaching Highway #1 by 1320. 184-1 encountered only scattered enemy riflemen and reached Highway #1 by 1300. 32-2 and 32-3 advanced against moderate opposition, and by 1043, had penetrated 200 yards inland. Continuing the advance against considerable small arms, anti-tank, and machine gun fire, they had pushed an additional 300 yards by 1400.

At approximately 1300, 184-2 landed and moved into an assembly area on the left flank. By 1530, 184-1 and 184-3 were in contact, reporting no enemy in the interval between Beaches Yellow I and Yellow II. By 1410, 184-3 had pushed 350 yards beyond Highway #1.

At approximately 1500, 17-3 landed on Beach Yellow I and pushed west and south, seizing the Dao Bridge over the Daguitan River. Opposition was light, and by 2100, 17-3 had established a bridgehead south of the river, maintaining contact with the 184th Infantry on its right.

Route of withdrawal of the Japanese forces - the 3rd Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, Regimental Headquarters, and air and ground service units was along the Dulag-Burauen Road. Coincident with this move, and after fighting a very determined delaying action, the 3rd Battalion, 33rd Infantry (on left flank facing toward sea) gradually withdrew inland. This unit defended tenaciously from pillboxes and trench systems and during the night of A Day lost five tanks in their area, expending the main strength of the 7th Independent Tank Company. Regimental Anti-tank and Gun Companies and the two Artillery Batteries were overrun and destroyed at the beach.

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By 2021, the Division Artillery Command Post, and all field artillery battalions were ashore. In conjunction with the 776th Amtank Battalion, registration was completed.

The 7th Medical Battalion, 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, and elements of the 502nd AAA Gun Battalion, 866th AAA AW Battalion, 230th Searchlight Battalion, and 727th Signal Air Warning Company had all established positions ashore by 2200.

At approximately 1610, 32-2 gained contact with the 96th Division.

By 1656, 184-1 had advanced to a point 300 yards west of the east end of the Dulag Airfield.

By approximately 1700, all elements of the 184th and 32nd Infantry were ashore, and had established final lines for the night.

In the course of A Day, a firm beachhead was secured and major units were established ashore to continue the attack on A plus 1.

At 0800, on A plus 1, the attack was resumed by the 184th Infantry, with 184-1 on the left and 184-3 on the right, and by the 32nd Infantry, with 32-3 on the left and 32-2 on the right. The 184th Infantry advanced rapidly against light resistance and by 0900 had completed seizure of the Dulag Airfield. It then continued the advance against sporadic rifle, and machine gun fire. The 32nd Infantry advanced against moderate opposition from small arms, machine guns, anti-tank fire and from artillery in position in the Catmon Hills. It experienced considerable difficulty in traversing numerous swampy areas and thick underbrush. In several instances, units were forced to move around impassable areas.

By 0940, the Assistant Division Commander was ashore and the forward echelon of the Division Command Post established near Beach Violet I. At 1300, when the Division Commander and his party landed, the 184th Infantry, meeting very little resistance had advanced 1500 yards west of Dulag Airfield and a gap was being created between the 184th and 32nd. Consequently, at 1530, the 184th Infantry was ordered to discontinue its advance temporarily. The advance of the 32nd Infantry was pushed forward with the support of medium tanks. Enemy resistance diminished, and by 1800, the 32nd Infantry had established lines nearly abreast 184. Field artillery battalions, together with units of the 767th Tank Battalion, and the 776th Amtank Battalion continued in general support of the advance.

As a result of the day's operations, all elements of the Division had been landed with their equipment and assault supplies. The 184th Infantry advanced its front lines approximately 3200 yards, and the 32nd Infantry, attacking on the right over difficult terrain and covered fortifications, gained approximately 2900 yards. These advances secured the Dulag Airfield.

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The speed of advance on the following day was controlled by the progress of the 32nd Infantry on the right, which encountered moderate resistance from small arms and machine gun fire. It was impeded somewhat by the difficult nature of the terrain consisting mainly of swampland and dense undergrowth. Effective air strikes during the day reduced strong points to the front of both the 184th and 32nd Infantry Regiments, and by 1800, both units had gained approximately 2800 yards. By 1800, the 17th Infantry, less 17-3 which continued on its mission of protecting the Division left flank, had moved into assembly in the vicinity of the Dulag Airfield. All batteries of the 502nd AAA Gun Battalion were in position, firing field artillery missions during the day, and delivering harassing ground fires at night.

During this period, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, withdrew from Rizal, assembled at La Paz and then moved to the vicinity of Burauen to effect junction with the remaining elements of the 20th Infantry Regiment.

On A plus 3, the advance west was resumed at 0830, with the 184th Infantry, less 184-2, on the left, the 17th Infantry, less 17-3, 184-2 attached, in the center, and the 32nd Infantry, less 32-2, on the right. The 17th Infantry, preceded by the 767th Tank Battalion, which spearheaded the attack, advanced astride the Dulag-Burauen Road on a frontage of 400 yards with its organic battalions abreast in the assault, and 184-2 in reserve. The 32nd Infantry, less 32-2, continued its advance echeloned to the right rear of the 17th Infantry. The 184th Infantry, less 184-2, advanced echeloned to the left rear of the 17th. Only sporadic resistance was encountered, and by 1330, the San Pablo Airfield was reported cleared. By 1715, the 767th Tank Battalion had reached the west side of Burauen with little opposition. Terrain difficulties contributed largely to the inability of infantry to maintain pace with the rapid tank advance along the road. During the day, Julita, Tangnan, San Pablo, and San Pablo Airfield were occupied, and the tank units which overran Burauen, disorganized hostile forces in that area. By 1830, all units had assumed night defensive positions.

On A plus 4, at 0830, the attack west was resumed with the three regiments employing the same formation as on the preceding day. Resistance was light, and by 1200, the Burauen Airfield was captured, and the town of Burauen occupied.

The Division Command Post displaced to the vicinity of San Pablo.

At 1205, the 767th Tank Battalion pushing north on the Burauen-Dagami Road encountered a mine field a short distance north of Burauen. Four tanks were knocked out and the advance was delayed until this mine field was eliminated by artillery fire.

At 1500, the 17th Infantry drove north astride the Burauen-Dagami Road on a frontage of 800 yards. By 1600, it had reached a point midway between Burauen and Guinarona where it established a night perimeter.

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At 1515, 32-1 was held up by approximately twenty well-manned, strongly constructed field fortifications with overhead cover, in the area of the Buri Airfield. These were manned by two companies of the 2nd Battalion, 20th Infantry, elements of the 3rd Battalion, 33rd Infantry, 114th Airfield Construction Unit, stragglers from the 54th Airfield Construction Unit, and 16th Division Engineers. The combined enemy force totalled approximately 1000 men who made a fanatical last-stand defense. The airfield was heavily mined with 100 pound aerial bombs buried nose up in the runway and scattered throughout the dispersal area. Some bombs were electrically fused and detonated by Japs hidden in foxholes a short distance away.

At 1700, 32-1 repulsed a strong counterattack, and consolidated positions to establish a defense for the night.

During A plus 4, the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop reconnoitered south and southwest to within 600 yards of La Paz, encountering only occasional Jap snipers and one enemy patrol.

As a result of the day's operations, the town of Burauen was occupied and the Division front advanced up to 5,000 yards.

As our forces moved into Burauen, remnants of the Japanese 2nd and 3rd Battalions and Regimental Headquarters, 20th Infantry Regiment, retreated west, thence northwest through the foothills to the vicinity of Hitomnog, (west of Dagami). By this time, a new Regimental Commander had taken over the 20th Infantry Regiment. In its rapid moves from Dulag and Burauen, possibly moving temporarily to La Paz at some time during our attack west, the control of the regiment was shattered. Later, apparently near Hitomnog, the remnants of the 20th Infantry were reformed.

The 17th Infantry on A plus 5, conducted vigorous reconnaissance in force with tanks and infantry as far north as Ginogusan, while awaiting the forward movement of the 32nd Infantry.

After holding its positions under active enemy sniper fire during the night, at 0800, the 32nd Infantry, with 32-2 on the left, and 32-3 on the right, launched their attack on the Buri airstrip, but heavily fortified strongpoints, and determined enemy resistance limited their gains to approximately 800 yards.

Meanwhile, the 184th Infantry, from positions on the southern approaches to Burauen, made distant reconnaissance to the south with patrols of platoon strength, encountering and engaging scattered enemy groups.

At approximately 2020, enemy aviation bombed ordnance and engineer dumps just inland of Beach Violet I, causing extensive fires and considerable loss of ammunition.

At 0800, on the morning of A plus 6, the Division resumed the attack. The 32nd Infantry, attacking north and west on Buri Airfield

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continued to meet heavy resistance consisting of foxholes in high grass concealed by thick brush, and mutually supporting machine gun pillboxes interlaced with extensive trench systems. A limited "banzai" attack was repulsed with heavy losses, and our lines remained intact.

The 17th Infantry, plus one company of medium tanks, attacked north along the axis of the Burauen-Dagami Road at 0800, 17-1 on the left, and 17-2 on the right, while 184-2 in Division reserve, remained in position near the town of Paitan. By 1300, tanks had overrun Ginogusan and by 1400, infantry had commenced clearing the barrio. Resistance centered about individual groups of approximately 25 riflemen under stilted houses. Many were in spider holes, and many were buried when tanks crashed through the structures. Enemy casualties were heavy, and by 1800, the barrio had been secured and a regimental perimeter defense established around the outskirts. The 184th Infantry, less 184-2, remained in position in the vicinity of Burauen. One company, reinforced by a platoon of light tanks patrolled southeast to Santa Ana reporting no enemy.

At 0800, on A plus 7, the 32nd Infantry continued its attack against the Buri Airfield with 32-2 on the left and 32-1 on the right. By 1125, remaining resistance had been overrun, and the airfield secured. It is believed that except for a small covering force, the enemy was forced to withdraw during the night as a result of heavy casualties from the combined infantry-tank-artillery assault. The airfield had been carefully mined with 100 pound air bombs, buried nose up with detonating mechanism one inch above or below ground. Standard land mines were also utilized. By 1430, 32-2 had assumed defense of Buri Airfield, 32-1 assumed defense of Burauen Airfield, and 32-2 assembled for rehabilitation in the vicinity of Burauen.

The 17th Infantry, preceded by one platoon of medium tanks continued the attack north astride the Burauen-Dagami Road at 0700, with battalions in column at 500 yard distances. After the repair of two bridges, the regiment advanced rapidly against moderate resistance and secured the road to a point 1300 yards south of Dagami, establishing a perimeter defense at the point of greatest advance.

The 184th Infantry patrolled south, west, and east from Burauen on a radius of approximately 7000 yards. Patrols in force, with light tanks and infantry, reached San Jose, San Andres, Santa Ana, Caridad and Pusod, reporting no enemy. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop patrolled south to Abuyog without encountering hostile forces.

At 0700 on A plus 8, 17-2 attacked north astride the Burauen-Dagami Road with 17-1 protecting the left flank and 17-3 following at a distance of 500 yards. The bridge just north of Ginogusan, temporarily repaired on the previous day had been washed out during the night, and tanks were initially unable to support the attack.

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After slight forward progress, heavy resistance caused full deployment of the regiment, and intense fighting continued throughout the day. The main enemy attempt to halt the advance on Dagami from the south was made by the 2nd Battalion, 33rd Infantry Regiment. This battalion had successfully withdrawn from the Dulag beach area, and had had the necessary time to firmly establish well organized positions in depth approximately 1000 yards south of Dagami. This unit was believed almost intact and under organized command. In addition, elements of the 16th Engineer Regiment, and scattered elements of the 9th and 20th Infantry Regiments were committed in the Battle of Dagami. Total enemy involved in the delaying action from Burauen to Dagami was about 2500, of which about 500 later withdrew in orderly fashion from Dagami. Enemy defenses consisted of interlocking bands of machine gun fire from mutually supporting pillboxes of coconut logs and sand reinforced. These pillboxes were very effectively camouflaged. Enemy positions were on rising ground and could be approached only across open rice paddies. Men advancing across these paddies were often immersed in mud and water to their waists.

Of the company of medium tanks attached to the 17th Infantry, one platoon succeeded in crossing the first bridge between Ginogusan and Guinarona. Three of these tanks were knocked out by enemy action and the remaining two, were shortly out of ammunition.

A successful flanking movement to the right, supported by M-8's rolled up the enemy east flank and broke through pillboxes in this sector. Extension of the left flank to the west and south eventually located the enemy's right flank. By 1545, the 17th Infantry had destroyed over 15 pillboxes. As darkness fell, 17-2, and the committed elements of 17-1 were able to push some 300 yards beyond the enemy strong point, and the regiment closed into perimeter defense for the night.

The 32nd Infantry, with the exception of 32-3, which was prepared to reinforce the 17th Infantry, remained in positions held during the previous day.

At 1700, the 184th Infantry dispatched a reconnaissance patrol in force, consisting of one infantry company and a platoon of light tanks to La Paz, securing the barrio. During the day, 184-1, less one company, and 184-3 departed for Santa Ana, and arrived just prior to darkness, followed shortly by regimental headquarters which established the CP at Santa Ana.

As a result of this day's operations, a formidable hostile defensive position guarding the approach to Dagami had been reduced and elements of the 184th Infantry had been displaced for further operations in the Santa Ana-La Paz area.

At 0800, on A plus 9, the 17th Infantry, preceded by an artillery barrage resumed its advance on Dagami. Resistance was initially light and by 1130, the 17th Infantry had advanced 1000

yards from its line of departure. In continuing the advance, several strong pockets of resistance were encountered, notably in the Dagami Cemetery, where individual Japs had concealed themselves in vaults and graves, requiring flame throwers and vicious hand-to-hand fighting before the area could be cleared. By 1655, the 17th Infantry had pushed to the center of Dagami. By 1800, 17-3 was briskly engaged by an enemy counterattack which was broken, and repulsed with the aid of field artillery.

184-3 displaced from Santa Ana to La Paz, and 32-2, preceded by the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop displaced to Abuyog for the purpose of destroying hostile forces occupying the area between the Abuyog-Baybay Road and the Marabang River.

As a result of the day's operations, Dagami was seized, and hostile resistance within the Corps beachhead was broken.

The initial mission of the 7th Infantry Division, reinforced, having been accomplished, the operation entered its second phase. During this phase, the Division mission was to secure Abuyog, destroying all hostile forces south of the Daguitan River from the mountain range east to the sea; to advance west to seize and occupy Baybay securing Highway #1 from Abuyog to Baybay; and to conduct patrolling south and west of Abuyog, north, west, and east of Dagami, and north and south of Baybay. It was further ordered to protect the Corps left flank, to continue mopping up hostile forces within its zone of action, and to be prepared for extensive operations in the southern portion of Leyte on the east and west coast.

To the 184th Infantry was assigned the mission of securing La Paz, and conducting extensive combat patrolling to destroy all enemy forces in the area bounded on the north by the Daguitan River, on the west by the mountain range, on the east by the sea, and on the south by a line running east-west through Abuyog. Later it was directed to maintain one battalion in Abuyog, and to conduct aggressive patrolling in its assigned zones destroying all hostile forces encountered.

The 32nd Infantry was ordered to maintain one battalion in the vicinity of Guinarona to continue mopping east and west of the Bureau Dagami road, to maintain one reinforced battalion at Abuyog, and was further directed to move one reinforced battalion by water to Panaon Island, there to relieve the 21st Infantry, and maintain control of Panaon Strait.

On A plus 12, 17-1 resumed reconnaissance in force 1800 yards west of Dagami to clear the enemy from positions in that area. Terrain consisted of a series of rice paddies traversed by a single lane unimproved road. By late afternoon, this battalion had driven to the foothills where well-concealed enemy, strongly entrenched and in considerable force were encountered. Machine gun fire from the hills pinned the battalion effectively in the paddies, preventing either forward or retrograde movement.

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32-3 from positions immediately south of Guinarona, resumed operations against a force uncovered by patrol action of the previous day. Artillery fire caused withdrawal of enemy forces. The advance was again resumed and it became apparent that the enemy, taking full advantage of dense undergrowth was conducting a fluid delaying action, abandoning prepared positions to allow 32-3 to advance, and then placing intense fire on both flanks.

On the following morning, after utilizing the fire of two battalions of organic artillery, and three batteries of 155mm Corps Artillery during the night, 17-1 resumed operations. Vigorous and distant patrol action failed to divulge enemy flanks, and patrols received heavy machine gun and mortar fire. At 1400, 17-1 was relieved by elements of the 96th Division, and then withdrew to a bivouac area about one quarter of a mile south of Dagami.

Meanwhile, at 0800, 32-3 resumed operations west of Guinarona, thrusting 700 yards beyond its most forward position of the previous day.

32-2 pushed Company G, reinforced to Baybay where it closed at 2200.

The 184th Infantry continued patrol action in its zone, encountering only scattered individual Japs in an exhausted condition.

For the next two days, the units continued patrolling with only minor hostile contacts.

On A plus 15, the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop reconnoitered the west coast from one mile north of Caridad to 45 miles south of Baybay.

On A plus 17, 184-2 displaced from Santa Ana, reaching Abuyog at 1300. A detachment remained at Abuyog and the main body moved into bivouac near the concrete ford. The day following, the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop completed a patrol 75 miles south of Baybay with no enemy contact.

On A plus 19, weather grew increasingly stormy with rain and wind approaching typhoon velocity. This continued through A plus 20, causing extreme deterioration of roads, uprooting trees, and destroying buildings over a wide area, and disrupting supply and wire communications. Flash floods which followed the typhoon washed out bridges on the main supply route between Dulag and Abuyog and caused the miring of considerable heavy materiel.

On A plus 21, the CP, 32nd Infantry, 32-2 less one company, and 32-3 less two companies consolidated positions at Baybay, with Company G occupying positions nine miles north on the coast. Two enemy destroyers passed approximately 800 yards off Baybay with no resulting action.

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On A plus 22, the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop patrolling north of Baybay, contacted the 96th Division Reconnaissance Troop at Damulaan, while 32-2 remained at Baybay, displacing Company G to Caridad.

On A plus 23, 32-2, less one company, remained in defense of the Baybay area, sending patrols northeast to the foothills. Company G displaced south to San Augustine. Company I, which had patrolled from Union to Sogod Bay, and then west to Bató, returned to Baybay at 1800.

During the day, 17-3 moved to a position west of Guinarona where it relieved 381-2 of the 96th Infantry Division and made contact with the enemy. On the following morning at 0800, 17-3 attacked northeast encountering determined enemy resistance. The engagement against enemy occupying well-concealed positions in heavily overgrown and mountainous terrain, was continued throughout the day. Throughout A plus 25, 26, and 27, the attack was continued, driving the enemy west, and reducing a series of strongly held positions dug in and concealed on the crests of precipitous ridges. On the morning of A plus 28, it was determined that all survivors of the enemy force in this area had fled west into the hills.

While this action was going on, 32-2 and Battery B, 49th Field Artillery Battalion, on A plus 26 pushed north from Baybay, and by evening, closed on Damulaan. On A plus 28, 32-2 improved defensive positions just south of the Palanas River, extending inland from the beach approximately 600 yards. The battalion right flank was screened by guerilla elements. The enemy occupied lines on the high ground across the river, approximately 400 yards to the north. Patrols were pushed northeast.

During the next six days, units of the Division continued patrolling in their zones of action, reporting only minor enemy contacts. The 32nd Infantry on the west coast continued the improvement of positions south of the Palanas River, and pushed vigorous patrols to the right (east) flank. On A plus 31, upon relief by elements of the 11th Airborne Division, 184-2 moved from Abuyog to Baybay, and on A plus 32, 32-3 moved north in support of 32-2, taking up positions in the Damulaan area on the following day. At this time, the 32nd Infantry was supported by the entire 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and Battery B, 11th 155mm Gun Battalion, USMC. Upon occupation of position by 155mm guns, Japanese installations in Ormoc were shelled. The regimental MSR from Baybay to Damulaan was vulnerable to attack from the Camotes Sea. Sustained heavy rains made all troop movement exceedingly difficult.

At this time, The Japanese 26th Infantry Division under command of Lieutenant General Yamagata, was assembled in the vicinity of Ormoc. His general plan of action was as follows:

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The 13th Infantry Regiment (Provisional) had the mission of holding the Palanas River Line, while the remainder of the Division moved east across the mountains to attack airfields in the Burauen area in coordination with airborne units. The Provisional 13th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Saito, was composed of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Independent Infantry Regiment, 1st and 2nd Battalions, 13th Independent Infantry Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, with the 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, 22d Independent Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, and elements of the 11th Field Artillery Regiment in support.

At the time that Colonel Saito moved his regiment to the Palanas River Line, Lieutenant General Suzuki moved with the forward echelon of the 35th Army Headquarters into the Talisayan River Valley.

At approximately 2115 of A plus 34, the 32nd Infantry, less 32-1 (at Panaon), received an attack on its right flank from superior enemy forces. In refusing the flank, lines in this area were displaced slightly to the south and west. In addition to the assaulting enemy forces, an estimated reinforced company occupied the western slopes of Hill 918. A counterattack was launched by Companies E and L to secure more favorable ground. 32-3 received heavy mortar and artillery fire of calibers up to 150mm.

During the morning of A plus 35, 184-1, which had been relieved by the 188th Infantry, arrived in Baybay and began a move north by foot. On this same morning, two companies of 32-3 advanced 2500 yards east of Damulaan where they discovered an enemy force of unknown size, and killed 45 of them. Enemy air activity made it impossible to employ cub planes for observation. At 2200, 32-2 received artillery fire, followed by an attack on the battalion right flank by an estimated 500 Japs. Company I was moved forward to reinforce this flank, and a heavy fire fight continued until approximately 2315. During this fight, supporting artillery of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion was taken under fire by enemy artillery, and attack by infiltrators with small arms and demolitions. The lines of 32-2 remained intact.

On A plus 36, the 7th Infantry Division, less the 17th Infantry, (minus one battalion), was ordered to displace to the west coast in preparation for an attack north on Ormoc. The 32nd Infantry, less one battalion, was ordered to prevent any hostile movement south from Damulaan, and to conduct active patrolling north and east to determine enemy strength and dispositions. The 184th Infantry, upon relief by elements of the 11th Airborne Division, was to displace to the West Coast, and assemble the regiment at Caridad in preparation for the attack north.

During the course of A plus 36, enemy action against 32-2 was limited to strong night attacks on the center and right flank.

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These attacks were repulsed with heavy enemy losses. 32-3 held its lines, and the CP, 32nd Infantry displaced to Caridad. 184-1 moved into position at Caridad in reserve, and 184-2 continued in defense of Baybay. The CP, 184th Infantry, and 184-3, less one company, displaced to Baybay.

On A plus 37, 17-2 moved to Baybay, relieved 184-2, and assumed defense of the Baybay area. 184-2, less one company, moved from Baybay to Caridad. 32-2 maintained its lines to the north and east of Damulaan. At 2100, this battalion received a strong enemy attack, and 184-1 was attached to the 32nd Infantry to reinforce this position in preparation for counterattack.

Throughout the following day, 32-2, and 32-3, with 184-1 attached, held their lines south of the Palanas River and east of Damulaan. At 2150, enemy mortar and artillery fire commenced falling in the front lines, and at 2200, an undetermined number of enemy attacked the 32nd Infantry lines. Supporting artillery laid down a normal barrage, and enemy activity ceased. Company A, 184th Infantry made a limited attack north at approximately 0400 to further improve our positions, and by 1600 had overrun 13 enemy machine gun positions.

On A plus 39, 184-3 reached Baybay, and 17-3, having been relieved by elements of the 306th Infantry of the 77th Infantry Division, began preparations for a move from Guinarona to Baybay.

On A plus 41, 17-1 reached Baybay, and on A plus 42 it moved to St. Augustine, where it moved into reserve. 17-2 was relieved at Baybay by 305-2 of the 77th Infantry Division, and moved to a reserve position at Caridad.

At 2200, 184-1 and 184-2 attacked to the northeast, gaining high ground overlooking enemy positions in the Palanas River Valley. After consolidating positions, these battalions on the following day, continued probing hostile lines and meeting strong resistance. Patrols attempted to find weak spots in the enemy line, and numerous enemy positions were taken under effective artillery fire.

Throughout A plus 44, the 17th Infantry continued consolidation of the regiment. 32-1, having been relieved, commenced movement by LCM's and LCVP's from Panaon Island to Caridad. 32-2, less one company, assumed the defense of Baybay, relieving 305-2 of the 77th Infantry Division.

The 184th Infantry continued occupation of the front lines, with 32-3 in position extending to the SE of the lines of the 184th Infantry. 184-2 more nearly facing the enemy's positions on Hill 918, patrolled actively on the hill's north slope, receiving intense machine gun fire from effectively concealed positions.

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A provisional company of amphibian tracked vehicles, consisting of elements of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, and the 718th Amphibian Tractor Battalion, which had moved by water around the southern end of Leyte, maintained beach defenses at Tinagan and Lagolago. The Division Command Post closed on the east coast and opened at Baybay at 2000.

On A plus 45, the 17th Infantry engaged in consolidation of the regiment and movement of troops to forward positions. 17-1 moved into attack assembly area 600 yards east of Damulaan. 17-2 moved to a similar position 200 yards east of 17-1. Elements of 17-3 arrived at Caridad via Navy Craft and moved by foot and motor to Tinagan.

The 32nd Infantry continued consolidation of the regiment, with 32-3 continuing to hold front-line positions. 32-1, less elements of Headquarters Company, moved from Panaon Island to Caridad, arriving at 0130. 32-2, less one company at St. Augustine, remained in defense of Baybay.

The 184th Infantry prepared for the attack by probing enemy positions to its front. A reconnaissance to the south edge of Balogo revealed a considerable number of enemy, occupying prepared machine gun positions under shacks.

The Division Command Post closed at Baybay, and opened at Caridad.

At this time, the Division mission was to attack north, eliminating enemy forces to its front and sweeping high ground to the northeast. Upon execution of an amphibious assault by the 77th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Florian and Deposito, the 7th Infantry Division was ordered to continue its drive north, establishing contact with the 77th Infantry Division, and destroying all hostile forces within its zone of responsibility.

On A plus 46, the Division, with the 17th Infantry on the right, and the 184th Infantry on the left, attacked at 0800 to secure Hill 918, and the Palanas River Line. Moderate opposition was encountered on the right, and by evening, the 17th Infantry had secured the ridge west of Hill 918. The 184th Infantry advanced against light small arms fire and one limited hostile counter-attack to secure a line extending from the beach 300 yards south of Balogo east to high ground southeast of the Palanas River. One company of the 32nd Infantry was disposed to hold the gap existing between the 17th and 184th Infantry. The reserve battalion of the 184th Infantry crossed the Palanas River during the day, and attacked northwest against enemy positions on Hill 380. By mid-afternoon, the first ridge of this hill had been secured.

32-1, Headquarters and C Companies, closed on Caridad, and by 2330, the battalion had consolidated near that barrio. The

battalion, less one company, moved to the vicinity of Tinagan, prepared to displace in support of the attack, or to repel hostile envelopment of the Division right flank.

In coordination with the infantry attack, amtanks of the Provisional Amphibian Company moved by water to Balogo where at 0700, they landed in assault on enemy machine gun positions. After eliminating these hostile installations, and shelling enemy concentration areas inland, the amtanks again moved by water to a point shortly south of Albuera. Here they made a diversionary demonstration off-shore, and returned to Balogo where they again landed and shelled enemy positions. At 0930, the amtanks returned to the bivouac area.

Following an uneventful night, the Division advance was resumed at 0800 of A plus 47, with the 184th Infantry and 17th Infantry on line, and the 32nd Infantry in Division Reserve. The 17th Infantry advance met unrelenting pressure on the left, but forced a crossing of the Palanas River by 1430. The regimental right, assaulting Hill 918, was initially unopposed by other than extremely rugged terrain, but was forced to overrun a number of enemy pillboxes before Hill 918 could be secured. This was accomplished by 1230. Pausing only for reorganization, troops which had secured Hill 918 struck northwest to the Palanas River. At the river crossing, heavy resistance was encountered, and the 17th Infantry right flank was consolidated for the night at this point.

On the Division left, the 184th Infantry initially advanced to an east-west line through Balogo where at 1155, the regimental right flank was hit by a sharp coordinated counterattack supported by intense mortar, machine gun, and light artillery fire. Calling on support from artillery and chemical mortars, the 184th Infantry repulsed this threat, continued the advance, and by 1530 had reached the high ground south of the Talisayan River. During the day, all enemy forces were swept from Hill 380.

At 0700 on A plus 48, the U.S. 77th Infantry Division made an amphibious landing just south of Deposito with the mission of driving north to seize Ormoc. Initial opposition was very light, and by the close of the period, a strong beachhead had been established extending approximately 1500 yards inland and north to a point several hundred yards beyond Ipil.

The 7th Division drive north was continued. The 17th Infantry advancing over extremely rugged terrain features encountered determined resistance from concealed mortars and numerous automatic weapons in sound tactical dispositions. This resistance was later augmented by a vigorous counterattack, which the regiment repulsed with heavy enemy losses. At the close of the period, the lines of the 17th Infantry were slightly echeloned to the right rear.

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On the left, the 184th Infantry moved forward slowly throughout the day, encountering persistent light artillery fire. When night preparations were complete, the regimental left rested on the Tabgas River and the right tied in with the 17th Infantry.

The following day's assault carried all elements of the attacking forces across the Tabgas River, drove enemy forces from the southwest slopes of Hill 606, and secured the Tabgas River Valley. During the advance, the 17th Infantry on the right, was opposed by well-coordinated pockets of resistance, cleverly concealed in the rugged terrain. Captured enemy arms included six machine guns and several mortars. The drive of the 184th Infantry against Hill 606 was heavily opposed by strongly dug in enemy forces in commanding positions. During the day, the Provisional Amphibian Company raided Albuera, and supported the Division attack with flanking fire. While engaged in this activity, the amtanks were taken under fire by machine guns, mortars, and light artillery.

On A plus 50, the 17th Infantry seized the high ground north of the Sibugay Creek, while the 184th Infantry, supported by a platoon of light tanks, seized the town of Albuera, and advanced 600 yards beyond, meeting strong resistance from rifle, automatic weapons, and artillery fire. Three 75mm guns, British Army Model 1917, were captured. Patrol contact was gained with elements of the 11th Airborne Division at Lubi.

Continuing the attack for the sixth consecutive day on A plus 51, the drive north was sustained and by 1530, the 184th Infantry on the Division left, advanced under light small arms and artillery fire to reach a point 800 yards north of the Talisayan River. The attack of the 17th Infantry on the right met continued enemy resistance reinforced by bombing and artillery fire. The regiment moved forward slowly and seized the last high ridge 500 yards south of the Talisayan River. The 17th Infantry was now taken under 47mm fire, a prelude to heavy shelling through the remainder of the day. One battalion moved east into the foothills to envelop enemy artillery positions on the following day. In the course of the day's advance, a large number of enemy artillery pieces, and machine guns were captured together with considerable stores of diverse enemy supplies in the town of Binoljo.

By 1700, this date, Ormoc had been taken and secured by the 77th Infantry Division.

On A plus 52, the Division resumed the attack with the 184th Infantry on the left, and the 17th Infantry on the right. Dawn patrols from front-line companies reported the enemy to be withdrawing. Pursuit of the main enemy forces was considerably

retarded by small hostile delaying elements and by rugged terrain. The 17th Infantry on the right was forced to traverse a series of steep ridges 400 to 500 feet high, with an airline distance between crests of approximately 300 yards. By 1230, the Regimental left had crossed the Talisayan River against light resistance, while the enveloping battalion on the right overran seven enemy artillery pieces, and drove forward across the river. By 1800, the 17th Infantry had secured the high ground north of the Talisayan River. Many enemy positions were reduced and a total of 12 artillery pieces captured.

The 184th Infantry on the left, overcame light resistance to capture Siguinon, and when secured for the night, the regimental line ran from Binoljo on the left to a point approximately 300 yards north of the barrio of Talisayan. 184-2, moving rapidly north along the coast, cut through and passed enemy positions to reach Ipil by 1020. Here contact was made with elements of the 77th Infantry Division, and 184-2 assumed security of the Ipil area, passing to operational control of the 77th Infantry Division.

The very extended Division MSR, stretching over poor roads from Abuyog to Baybay, and north to the front lines was creating a definite problem. Facilities for supply by water were still extremely limited.

During A plus 53, the drive north was continued. Progress of the 17th Infantry was extremely rapid with the enemy withdrawing before its advance. The 32nd Infantry, relieved of its reserve mission, displaced for front-line relief of the 17th. 32-3 completed the relief of 17-2 by 1700, and the latter reverted to Division reserve, prepared to defend the Division right. 17-1 was relieved of its regimental reserve mission by 32-1, and moved by foot to Albuera, and thence by motor to Baybay, assuming responsibility for the security of that area. 32-2 moved by LCM and LCVP to Albuera. From here it proceeded by foot to positions behind and on the right flank from enemy forces reported moving west from the mountains.

By 1100, the 184th Infantry had secured that portion of the Panilahan River within its zone of action. Shortly thereafter, 184-3 was ordered to displace to Ipil, where it passed to the operation control of the 77th Infantry Division.

Although the mission of Colonel Saito, holding the Palanas River Line and Hill 918, had been to defend against our attack from the south, his repeated night attacks against our lines so seriously depleted the Japanese forces that he was unable to defend effectively. As Saito's right flank was first turned, then completely rolled up, and his escape route cut by amphibious landings to his rear, he was forced to retreat eastward into the mountains near the upper reaches of the Talisayan River, where he again came under the control of Lieutenant General Yamagata

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whose attack east had failed.

Due to confirmed observations of large forces threatening the Division right flank, the attack north was temporarily suspended, and the Division on A plus 54, spearheaded by the 32nd Infantry, wheeled east, to destroy enemy forces in the Bintoan-Libas-Capatgan area, and to join forces with the 511th Parachute Infantry driving west through the mountains. On the avenues of approach between the Talisayan and Panilahan Rivers, the 32nd Infantry met very heavy resistance from high ridges. Automatic weapons fire temporarily immobilized the leading battalion. Rifle and mortar fire were heavy. Covered and concealed enemy positions on ridge crests were not subject to observation. Artillery fire was called for, and by nightfall the battalion position was made tenable.

Late in the day, Headquarters 184th Infantry, with elements of regimental special troops was ordered to proceed north to Ormoc, where it joined 184-3. 184-3 and 184-2 reverted to regimental control. On request of the Commanding General, 77th Infantry Division, 184-1 was moved north and by 1800 was also at Ormoc. 184-2 at Ipil engaged an estimated 70 enemy east of the town. The remnants of this force withdrew to the hills.

On A plus 55, the 32nd Infantry drove east into the mountains up high ground, from which intense fire had been received during the previous day. Movement of 32-1 on the left was severely retarded by the steepness of the grade estimated to average 45%. In a number of instances, grenades were rolled downhill on the assaulting troops. Enemy rifle fire was accurate and the percentage of machine guns, the heaviest yet encountered. At 1300, a coordinated attack employing mortars, and artillery was initially repulsed, but following continued softening up by mortars, cannon company, and artillery fires, the objective was taken. In defense of this commanding terrain feature, it is estimated that the enemy employed three reinforced rifle companies. From this position, excellent observation of enemy held areas was possible, and effective artillery time fire was laid down. Under cover of this artillery fire, the battalion advanced to seize still more advantageous positions and by darkness, the enemy held only a small portion of the ridge.

32-3 on the right attacked the high ridge south of the Talisayan River and adjacent to the objective of 32-1. Movement up this ridge was retarded by steep grades and moderate enemy resistance, but by 1100, 32-3 had gained high ground to the right of the enemy. Late in the day, one company occupied the valley between 32-1 and 32-3 to prevent enemy movement west.

At 0700 on the following morning, the 32nd Infantry advanced along separate, but mutually supporting ridges. In contrast to the previous day's operations, resistance diminished

and by 1100, both ridges had been secured. The regiment immediately reorganized and continued east into a bowl-like terrain feature, where by 1530, the remaining scattered hostile forces had been destroyed. 32-2 then crossed the Talisayan River and moved east in a drive to destroy the enemy in the Capatgan area and to contact the 511th Parachute Infantry, of the 11th Airborne Division.

On A plus 57, positions were consolidated and strong patrols thrown out to locate hostile forces.

On A plus 58, at 0800, 32-2, after an artillery preparation, resumed the attack, and secured high ground several hundred yards to its front. In continuation of the attack, the battalion ran into almost impassable terrain; high, heavily wooded ridges, separated by gorges several hundred feet deep. The enemy in small groups, well hidden by dense foliage, occupied commanding positions overlooking the gorges, and with rifle and machine gun fire forced our troops to use the most difficult avenues of approach. At 1800, 32-2 dug in, fixing and containing the enemy in this area.

On the following morning, the drive was resumed towards Capatgan and Anas. This attack continued to be hindered by the extremely rugged terrain which gave very limited approach to the enemy, dug in among caves and boulders in commanding positions.

Meanwhile, the regiment, less 32-2, having been assigned the mission of destroying all hostile forces in their zone of action as far north as the Ormoc-Patag Line, reconnoitered for suitable routes of advance north. By 1430, two companies had reached the Panilahan River, and against light resistance, a crossing was effected. The remainder of the force then joined the leading elements and by dusk, all were in perimeter defense 400 yards north of the River.

At 0800, on A plus 60, 32-1 and 32-3 jumped off and pushed the attack north, inflicting severe casualties on the enemy. The attack rolled forward, and by 1800, the front lines were 300 yards short of the trail which extends from Ipil to Boroc.

At 0800, 32-2 attacked an enemy force occupying a commanding peak to the east, placing small arms, machine gun fire, field artillery and cannon company fire on the position. All approaches to this peak were up steep, rugged, slopes and across areas of open rock face. At the same time, reconnaissance was pushed to locate a route by which the enemy strongpoint might be by-passed to the south. This activity was continued through A plus 62.

Meanwhile, on A plus 61, 32-1 and 32-3 jumped off at 0830, following dawn patrols. Assault on the primary objective, a canefield in which strong enemy forces with supporting weapons

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were entrenched and concealed, was preceded by a bombing and strafing attack, and supported by light tanks. By 1100, the troops had advanced 500 yards, but stiff resistance continued throughout the day.

During the day, the 184th Infantry reverted to Division control.

On A plus 62, the 184th Infantry continued to hold and defend the Linao-Ormoc-Camp Downes Line, pushing a reconnaissance in force to the town of Dolores, driving the enemy from that vicinity, and destroying a large quantity of enemy ammunition.

At 0800, 32-1 and 32-3 jumped off, immediately destroying a pocket of enemy and capturing shortly thereafter, six 75mm guns. The advance continued rapidly against light resistance, and the Ormoc-Patag Line was gained by mid-morning. Again the attack was resumed, and by 1530, the Ormoc-Canale Trail had been gained.

On A plus 63, 32-2 driving forward from positions previously held, seized the commanding ground to its front, concluding a vicious engagement. The ridge was honey-combed with deep caves on the reverse slope into which the enemy had withdrawn under artillery fire. Hostile forces had held out bitterly, even the seriously wounded taking part in the last stand. Shortly after the enemy strongpoint was eliminated, elements of the 187th Paraglider Infantry, which had passed through lines of the 511th Parachute Regiment of the 11th Airborne Division, crossed the Leyte Watershed establishing firm contact with the 7th Infantry Division.

The 32nd Infantry, less 2nd Battalion, 184-3 attached, assumed responsibility for the Linao-Ormoc-Camp Downes area, relieving the 184th Infantry.

The 184th Infantry, less 184-3, was assigned the mission of driving on Valencia east of Highway #2, and destroying all enemy encountered. This sweep continued through A plus 65, overrunning all enemy resistance, and securing the final Division objective. As of A plus 65, the Division was

At 2400, 25 December 1944, the XXIV Corps, including the 7th Infantry Division, passed to control of Eighth Army, and initiated the mopping-up phase of King II. December 26, 1944, was A plus 67. On this date, the Division was disposed as follows: The 17th Infantry from Baybay to Ipil securing the MSR, the 32nd Infantry in position defending the Ormoc perimeter, and the 184th Infantry in separate battalion perimeters on a line running east northeast from Valencia for approximately 4,000 yards.

During the first 66 days of combat, the Division had

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driven from Dulag to Burauch, Burauch to Dagami, moved south to Abuyog, west to Baybay, and finally drove north to Valencia. It fought as a Division over 37 miles, moved over 105 miles, covered in reconnaissance 1,857 square miles, lost 470 officers and men killed in action, 1,801 officers and men wounded in action, took 93 prisoners of war, and killed 10,167 of the enemy.

Division operations during the mopping up period were based on the ruined town of Ormoc, lying on the west coast of Leyte at the head of Ormoc Bay. From this port, the Ormoc Corridor, a swampy and roughly cultivated valley, extends north northeast toward Carigara Bay. It is bordered on the east by rugged heavily overgrown mountains of the main Leyte Watershed, and on the west by a lower, parallel mountain chain which extends north to Rabin Point and south to the tip of Leyte Peninsula. The Division MSR from Ormoc to Baybay followed the shore line closely and traversed a narrow coastal plain.

On December 26th, remnants of the Japanese 26th Division, still under the personal command of Lieutenant General Yamagata, having failed in their attack upon Burauch, had retreated westward through the mountains and were in the process of reassembling in the vicinity of Hill 4101, approximately 12,000 yards east of Ormoc. The 13th Independent Infantry Regiment, (provisional), commanded by Colonel Saito, after being forced from the Palanas River Line with extremely heavy casualties, had retreated northward into the mountains. This unit was badly depleted in strength and considerably scattered. Remnants of the 16th Division, including the Headquarters, with General Makino, the Commanding General, were reliably reported to have joined the 26th Division in this retreat.

Combined enemy forces assembling in the Hill 4101 area, numbered three to four thousand, and included elements of the following units: Headquarters 26th Division, 2nd Battalion, 11th Independent Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 13th Independent Infantry Regiment (provisional), 26th Engineer Regiment, 26th Medical Unit plus field hospital, 3rd Battalion, 77th Infantry Regiment, Gigo Unit (4th Air Army Demolition Unit), 21st Independent Mortar Battalion, 11th Independent Field Artillery Regiment, 65th Independent Engineer Regiment, Headquarters 16th Division, 9th Company, 3rd Battalion, 33rd Independent Infantry Regiment, other 16th Division elements, and the Kurisu Group, consisting of sick and wounded.

At the same time, Japanese units which had been scattered by landings at Ipil, and the advance of American troops through Ormoc to Valencia, were being assembled in the vicinity of Canale. This effort was being directed by Colonel Imabori, Commanding Officer of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment. The force of

approximately 2,000 which Colonel Imabori succeeded in assembling and reorganizing, became known as the Imabori Unit, and was composed of remnants of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, less 2nd Battalion, the Moida Battalion, (provisional battalion, 16th Division), the 2nd Battalion, 77th Infantry Regiment, the 4th Raiding Regiment, the 26th Transport Regiment, the 21st Shipping Engineers, the 7th Battery, 2nd Shipping AA Regiment, the 2nd Mobile Medical Unit, and the 26th Engineer Regiment.

During this phase of the King II Operation, it was necessary for the 7th Division to maintain defense of its area, to patrol actively throughout its zone of responsibility, finding and destroying scattered enemy groups, and attacking the two main hostile concentrations. Throughout the period, the Division operated an average of 30 patrols daily, in addition to major troop movements. At no time, did the enemy maintain an organized main line of resistance, and for the most part, sought to avoid combat. The period was characterized by small engagements, which in conjunction with disease and starvation, reduced enemy forces day by day. A high percentage of patrols were accompanied by artillery forward observation parties, and maximum use was made of supporting arms.

Initially, the 184th Infantry moved southeast from east of Valencia against forces under Colonel Imabori near Canale. On A plus 67, the 1st Battalion displaced to the vicinity of Dolores, and the 3rd to the vicinity of Soong. At these points, patrol bases were established. The 2nd Battalion established its CP at Cabulihan.

Reconnaissance and combat patrols made early contact with outlying enemy groups. On A plus 69, an assembled group of 45 Japs near Canale was taken under surprise artillery fire and decimated.

On A plus 70, the 17th Infantry initiated patrolling in force to locate enemy in the vicinity of Hill 4101. One company, reinforced, moved on Boroc and Magasue, laying long-range mortar and artillery fire on observed enemy positions. This company established a night perimeter in the hills. One reinforced company of the 184th Infantry moved west on the Valencia-Palompon Road to join forces with the 77th Infantry Division at Palompon. Near Biliboy, one reinforced company of the 32nd Infantry engaged and largely decimated approximately 50 of the enemy.

During A plus 71, patrolling in force by the 17th Infantry in the Kancosia-Magocdoc-Mahiloam area eliminated several small groups of Japanese. An amphibious force, composed of one infantry company, reinforced, one platoon of the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, one platoon of the 91st Chemical Weapons Company, six antracks and nine amtanks, was dispatched for a

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three day reconnaissance of the Leyte Peninsula. This force established a base at Merida, and patrols reconnoitered Libas, Lalunasang, Lundag, and Calinangan Point without making enemy contact. Two companies of the 32nd Infantry delivered a coordinated attack against an estimated 75 enemy armed with small arms, mortars and machine guns in the vicinity of Biliboy. Approximately 40 of the Japanese were killed, and the remainder withdrew to the northeast. Two companies of the 184th Infantry patrolling east, contacted an estimated Japanese Company in well dug-in positions. In the ensuing fire fight, 80 of the enemy were killed, and the remainder withdrew.

The company moving west to Palompon effected a juncture with 77th Division troops without having made enemy contact.

On A plus 72, patrols of the 17th Infantry pushed north, northeast, and east in an effort to locate routes of approach to Mahiloan. Scattered enemy groups were contacted and annihilated. On Leyte Peninsula, patrols moved overland via Mount Lundag and Hunan to join LVT's at Matlan. At Quoit, a new defensive position was established, and foot patrols worked around the Bay to Duljugan and Sacay Points. No enemy were contacted. A reinforced company of the 32nd Infantry, and one platoon of light tanks, drove northeast up the Ormoc-Canale Trail to a point 1100 yards south of Dunghol #2. Here contact was made with approximately 30 enemy. Driving forward against stubborn resistance from increasing hostile forces, the company pushed to within 400 yards of Dunghol, and in the course of its advance, overran five light machine guns, one heavy machine gun, and one knee mortar. Numerous storage installations of food and ammunition were destroyed, and 63 Japanese killed. At approximately 1600, hostile forces in this area broke contact. The 184th Infantry, less 184-1 and 184-3, displaced to the vicinity of Dolores in preparation for a coordinated attack to the southeast in conjunction with the 32nd Infantry.

During A plus 73, two companies of the 17th Infantry pushed northeast to the Magocdoc-Mahiloan area, eliminating small groups of enemy in dug-in positions. Reconnaissance of the Leyte Peninsula was completed, and the patrolling force returned to Albucera. Elements of the 32nd Infantry, continuing pressure on the enemy west of Dunghol #2, met an estimated Japanese Company, armed with light machine guns, knee mortars and rifles. The attack was pressed in conjunction with elements of 184-2, and approximately 67 of the enemy were killed and several machine guns destroyed. 32-3 dispatched an amphibious reconnaissance force to Puerto Bello, covering Calunasan, and Capisanan by foot, and the swampy area west of Ormoc by LVT. The 184th Infantry, less 184-3, located and engaged hostile forces of undetermined strength in the area southeast of Dolores.

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During A plus 74, 17-3 pressed the attack of two companies against enemy forces in the area between Punta Blanca and Mahiloam. A hostile reinforced company with fire power augmented by heavy mortars and numerous machine guns was strongly entrenched on three finger-like ridges and effectively concealed by 12 foot grass. The attack was pushed along these ridges. In the ensuing action, several light machine guns were overrun, and approximately 65 enemy killed. By 1800, the companies had effected a juncture on high ground, and established a mutually supporting perimeter prepared to resume the advance. The 184th Infantry pushed one patrol of company strength toward Lake Danao, and a second patrolled the vicinity of Taluan. The company at Palompon moved by water transportation to Ormoc, and thence by foot and motor to Dolores. 184-2, with two companies abreast, attacked south-east toward Biliboy. Throughout the day, it received sporadic mortar and machine gun fire and killed 20 of the enemy.

On A plus 75, 17-3 continued offensive action in the vicinity of Mahiloam with three companies engaged. Near the town, approximately 100 well armed Japs, in deeply entrenched defensive positions, were fixed and taken under fire by artillery, M-8's and 4.2" mortars. By late afternoon, hostile forces had been cleared from high ground in the Mahiloam area. 184-2 continued its attack on hostile forces at Biliboy. Fire was received from enemy small arms, machine guns, mortars, and 75mm artillery, but by 1600, 81 of the Japanese had been killed and the remainder driven from the town.

On A plus 76, 17-2 combed the upper valley of the Panilahon River in search of enemy forces reported in that area. Only scattered enemy groups were encountered and taken under fire. 17-3 continued its attack generally east, clearing the enemy from finger ridges, and laying artillery fire on other enemy groups observed still farther east. The 32nd Infantry displaced a provisional platoon to Guinobatan at the southern tip of Leyte Peninsula in defense of Battery A, 531st Field Artillery Battalion, (155mm Gun) which was emplaced at this point. The 184th Infantry continued vigorous action against enemy in the Canale area, with two battalions attacking northeast astride the Ormoc-Canale Trail. 184-2 from the vicinity of Biliboy advanced steadily on Canale, meeting stiff resistance from approximately 500 well equipped enemy, who employed all types of infantry weapons. 184-3 met much lighter opposition. By nightfall, 184-2 had driven the enemy from Canale, while 184-3 had advanced to a point 800 yards to the west. In the course of this day's action, the 184th Infantry and supporting artillery killed 171 Japanese.

During A plus 77, combat patrols of the 17th Infantry continued to push northeast, meeting scattered light resistance. Reinforced patrols, with attached artillery observers, killed an estimated 68 Japs. Patrols of the 32nd Infantry covered Dunghol, Patag, Malunod, Mandaag, and Jalubon with minor enemy

contacts. 184-2 on the left, and 184-3 on the right, continued their advance astride the Ormoc-Canale Trail, against resistance, and by 1400, held a line from Paglocsoon to Tinago. 184-1 remained in the vicinity of Dolores patrolling actively to the west and north.

Following the capture of Canale, Colonel Inabori's force was ordered to a position in the mountains on the Western Peninsula. In moving, Inabori's troops were systematically divided into small groups, which proceeded individually, moving only at night, and hiding during the day. The movement of these small groups was governed by the terrain, and the disposition of American Troops.

During A plus 78, the 17th Infantry maintained pressure on enemy in the eastern mountains. Patrols visited Libas, Balogo, Cantotoc, and Hill 606, engaging scattered groups, and placing observed artillery fire on draws and gullies to the east. The 1st Battalion, 307th Infantry, 77th Infantry Division came under control of the 7th Infantry Division, and was attached to the 32nd Infantry. Patrols to Tambuco, and northeast of Patag eliminated minor enemy groups. Patrols of the 184th Infantry ranged widely from Dolores and Canale attempting to find and fix major enemy forces, but encountered only disorganized groups. Strongest resistance was met in the rugged terrain near Cabadyangan.

On A plus 79, the 17th Infantry sent two companies plus strong combat patrols northeast into the mountains. Artillery observers accompanying patrols, fired on enemy groups killing approximately 50. These companies pushed to Kancosia and Magocdoc with minor enemy contacts. 307-1 relieved 32-3 in the Ormoc Perimeter, and 32-3 displaced and established a base camp near Punta Blanca. One company, reinforced, encountered an estimated Japanese Company in a bamboo thicket four hundred yards north of the Ormoc-Liloan Road. This force was taken under fire, but succeeded in disengaging and withdrawing to the northwest. The 184th Infantry, less 184-3, moved to the vicinity of Siguinon preparatory to attacking northeast. 184-3 less one company, swept southwest from Canale to Biliboy, eliminating enemy stragglers. One company patrolled the Canale-Lake Danao Trail.

During A plus 80, one reinforced platoon of the 32nd Infantry contacted an estimated 50 to 60 enemy in the vicinity of Liloan. These were taken under fire, but effected a withdrawal. The 184th Infantry, less 184-3, from its new position between the Panilahan and Talisayan Rivers conducted limited patrolling northeast to a line running between Pahagan and Libas. This temporary limiting line was established to permit freedom of cub spotted artillery fire. 184-3, less one company, patrolled

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for 2,000 yards from Biliboy, eliminating minor enemy groups. Patrol of the Canale-Lake Danao Trail by one company was continued. During the night, harassing artillery fire was laid on Ponson Island.

On A plus 81, four provisional port companies totalling 825 men, drawn from combat troops of the Division, left for the east coast.

1500 yards south of Bao, a company of the 32nd Infantry received intense automatic weapons fire from well-concealed enemy positions. The hostile group held its ground tenaciously during the day, but withdrew under cover of darkness. 307-1 patrolled to Liloan, Soong, and north 500 yards to Masin, encountering an estimated 100 of the enemy. Small arms, mortar and artillery fire killed 38 Japanese, and the remainder effected a withdrawal. The 184th Infantry observed numerous enemy groups in the sector between Libas and Maagonoc. One patrol of 184-1 reached the summit of Hill 4101, established an OP, and conducted effective artillery fire on scattered groups of Japs. 184-2 sent three patrols to the headwaters of the Panilahan River, and killed 45 Japs between Binabuyan and Pahagan. 184-3 patrolled to the vicinity of London and established a new base camp on the Canale- Lake Danao Trail.

During A plus 82, a reinforced company of the 17th Infantry discovered a large enemy concentration on a plateau located in a deep gorge, approximately 2500 yards east of Punta Blanca. Heavy artillery concentrations were placed on the area, killing at least 100 Japs. A strong patrol descended into the gorge, but was unable to reach the plateau. The 32nd Infantry maintained one battalion in the vicinity of Punta Blanca. Three reinforced companies were sent from the Ormoc perimeter to destroy enemy forces located in the Liloan, Soong, Masin, Bao, and Catmon areas. Near Bao, an estimated 150 Japs were contacted. After losing five killed, this enemy group retreated hastily toward Masin, where it ran into a Company of 307-1 already engaged with a group of 40 Japs. Artillery and mortar fire was placed on the larger group, killing 40. The remainder became completely disorganized and scattered. Patrols of the 184th Infantry eliminated scattered groups of stragglers, and the OP established on Hill 4101 placed artillery and machine gun fire on several groups of enemy moving north.

On A plus 83, patrols of the 17th Infantry covered Hill 606 via the Tabgas River, the Calingatnan River, Candonaya via the Sibugay River, and Kang Cainto. The patrol pushing toward enemy concentrations previously located east of Punta Blanca eliminated outlying enemy groups, but was delayed by extremely heavy rain forests. 32-1, less one company, was relieved by 184-1, and displaced to the vicinity of Liloan. One company,

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reinforced, patrolled the Soong-Masin area, encountering and annihilating a group of enemy in a bamboo thicket. One platoon of 307-1 moved by DUKW to Puerto Bello, and thence to Binuhay, Binoban, Ipil, Biasong, and returned, crossing the swampy area west of Ormoc, without enemy contact. 184-2 dispatched three patrols to the upper branches of the Panilahan River. 184-3 initiated action to re-group its forces. One company patrolled the Lake Danao area extensively, and a second company patrolled the area west of Lake Danao.

On A plus 84, General Yamagata's 26th Division Headquarters and units assembled under his command in the hills east of Punta Blanca, began moving northwest through the mountains toward Lake Danao, their ultimate goal being the west coast of Leyte Peninsula and eventual evacuation from the island.

On this day, four combat patrols of the 17th Infantry covered the area Palanas, Bacan, Tabgas, Calingatnan and Sibugay Rivers, encountering few of the enemy. One company searched the headwaters of the Panilahan River penetrating to a point approximately 1500 yards north of Pahagan where it bivouaced for the night. Patrols operating farther south made no enemy contact. The 184th Infantry, less 184-3, with 307-1 attached, assumed responsibility for the defense of Ormoc. 184-3 commenced assembly of its forces in the vicinity of Ipil for an assault on the Camotes Islands, to be known as the Sweet Potato Operation. The 32nd Infantry, relieved of defense of Ormoc, commenced displacement of troops to the north, northeast and northwest to continue mopping up operations in the northern portion of the Division zone of responsibility. 32-1 from positions previously held in the vicinity of Liloan, sent two companies reinforced, sweeping on a 2,000 yard front to Masin. Small enemy groups up to 30 men were eliminated, and by 1600, a perimeter defense had been established at Masin. One company advancing on Bao, engaged many enemy groups en route, and by 1600 had established a perimeter blocking the Pagsangahan River Ford. 32-2 displaced to the vicinity of Dolores outposting the trail to Lake Danao and Buena Vista. 32-3 outposted Biliboy and Canale. At 1930, a hostile force of from 150 to 200, employing rifles, machine guns, and knee mortars, made a strong night attack against the perimeter of Company A near Masin. Brought up sharply against concertina wire of the final protective line, the enemy was taken under fire, disorganized, and driven back. After reorganizing their forces, and evacuating some dead and wounded, the enemy bypassed Company A and drove southwest. Approaching defenses of Company B, the Jap force was further decimated by effective artillery fire, and remnants withdrew west.

On A plus 85, the 17th Infantry pushed combat patrols as far as 4,000 yards up the Panilahan River from Pahagan. 32-1, patrolling in the Tabugnapoc, Picoy, Colisao, Masin area, killed 97 enemy in numerous small engagements. 32-2 in extensive patrol

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action covering the area from Cabulihan on Highway #2 to Hibunawan, Dolores, Cablinan, Macalpe, and Lake Danao encountered only 3 enemy. Patrols of 32-3 operating from Dunghol made minor enemy contacts near Lake Danao. 184-3 remained in the vicinity of Ipil in preparation for the Sweet Potato Operation.

On A plus 86, the 17th Infantry continued its effort to locate and fix the Japanese 26th Division CP. Effective artillery fire was placed on an estimated 100 Japs moving north in column, and one company pushed through a lightly held enemy position. Heavy, low-hanging clouds greatly impeded operations in the mountain areas. Patrols of the 32nd Infantry, sweeping north, northwest, and northeast of Ormoc, eliminated 58 scattered Japs. a provisional amphibian company, composed of elements of the 776th Amtank Battalion, and the 718th and 536th Amtrack Battalions, completed assembly of vehicles near Ipil in preparation for the Sweet Potato Operation.

During A plus 87, the Special Task Force, composed of 184-3, heavily reinforced, sailed from Ipil at 0010, with the mission of seizing the Camotes Islands. This force was embarked on LVT's, LCM's, and LCVP's. Screened by PT boats, and covered by P-40's of the Fifth AAF, the movement to the objective was completed without incident, and an unopposed landing on Ponson Island was effected at 0745. Advancing rapidly from the beach at Kawit, Company L drove northeast along the west coast to Dapdap, and Company K pushed on the east coast to Montserrat. Both companies immediately commenced intensive patrolling. Company I, waterborne in amtracks and supported by amtanks, landed at a point approximately 1500 yards southwest of Pilar and advanced northeast to that barrio. No resistance was encountered during the day.

The 17th Infantry continued its efforts to locate the Japanese 26th Division CP. Patrols of the 32nd Infantry encountered small enemy groups moving west across the Ormoc Corridor, and concealed among the western foothills. An additional provisional port company consisting of 100 officers and men drawn from Division Artillery departed for the east coast.

On A plus 88, the Special Task Force completed the seizure of Ponson Island, and a strafing attack was made on Poro. It was evident that Japanese forces had evacuated Ponson, after systematically massacring most of the civilian populace.

By A plus 89, the last of Colonel Imabori's remaining troops had completed their move west across the Ormoc Corridor and assembled in a defensive position on the slopes of Mount Naguang. Of the original 2,000 Japanese in the Canale area, only 1,116 managed to reach Mount Naguang. These figures are drawn from Colonel Imabori's official reports. Meanwhile,

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General Yamagata's unit moving north from Hill 4101 had reached the southern end of Lake Danao. Persistent American attacks, coupled with starvation and disease, had reduced this group by approximately 1,650. Yamagata's force now totalled approximately 2,000 starving and poorly equipped troops.

During A plus 89, the Special Task Force completed plans for the invasion of Poro. The 32nd Infantry continued aggressive patrolling in its zone of responsibility, in a determined effort to find and destroy hostile remnants, and to locate and block enemy escape routes north in the vicinity of Lake Danao. 17-2 driving east with two companies, overran a trail block strongly held by approximately 75 Japs. One company annihilated an additional group of 55.

On A plus 90, the Special Task Force initiated the second phase in the seizure of the Camotes by landing on Poro Island at 0830. Driving ashore with two companies in the vicinity of Tudela, the Force established a 1500 yard beachhead by 1100, and swung west, seizing the barrio of Poro. At 1950, an enemy plane bombed and strafed the Tudela area.

The 32nd Infantry found little evidence of Jap activity except near Lake Danao. Here patrols engaged 80 Japs defending the trail at the south end of the lake, and killed 46. Guerillas killed 13 out of 50 Japs found searching for food. Elements of the 17th Infantry, driving east along the northeast slope of Hill 4101 killed 27 Japs and counted 414 previously unreported dead.

At 0730, on A plus 91, the Special Task Force CP on Poro Island was bombed and strafed by one enemy plane. Patrolling was continued, and 15 Japs were observed and taken under fire on the high ground northeast of Poro town.

On Leyte Island, minor enemy contacts were made, but in the vicinity of Hill 4101, operations were handicapped by slippery trails, heavy rain, and limited visibility.

During A plus 92, elements of the Special Task Force patrolled to San Francisco on Pacijan Island, and returning, left one platoon to secure the causeway. Patrols to Kang Unit, Tagis, and Mount Three Peak failed to contact enemy.

On Leyte Island, the 184th and 32nd Infantry regiments found only stragglers. In the vicinity of Hill 4101, elements of 17-2 reached the location of the 26th Division CP, but found the area deserted. One company, disposed astride the main trail north, engaged and decimated two groups of enemy. Approximately 200 dead were found on the trail. Death was attributed to starvation and disease.

On A plus 93, General Yamagata commenced his movement west from Lake Danao toward Mount Naguang. His route and method of movement was similar to that employed by Colonel Imabori, and progress equally hampered by the activity of American Forces.

In the Camotes, the Special Task Force extended its reconnaissance to Pacijan without enemy contact. On Poro, Japanese were encountered on Hill 854.

In the vicinity of Lake Danao, elements of the 17th Infantry killed 45 Japs and counted 300 dead scattered along the trails.

During A plus 94, the Special Task Force continued operations on the rugged terrain between Poro and Tudela. Northeast of Poro Town, the Japanese held commanding defenses, situated on high ground and providing mutually supporting strong points. Six combat patrols supported by mortar fire probed these defenses during the day.

On Leyte Island, only minor enemy elements were contacted.

On A plus 95, troops on Poro Island continued to engage enemy disposed on the high ground between Poro Town and Tudela. Company L drove northeast up the slopes of Hill 854, engaging a force of undetermined size, while a reinforced platoon of Company K engaged a small force slightly to the west. A patrol to Esperanza made no enemy contact. Artillery silenced hostile field guns and mortars which fired on the Battalion CP.

During A plus 96, enemy resistance on Poro grew increasingly stubborn. Company I made an envelopment to the west of enemy held positions on Hill 854, while Company L held on the south. Company I encountered heavy small arms and some artillery fire. Both companies closed in but could not dislodge the enemy.

On Leyte Island, there was indication of increased enemy activity west of Ormoc. A patrol of 307-1 engaged one enemy group estimated at from 75 to 100. 32-2 displaced to the Pag-sangahan River and two companies were disposed at Bao and Liloan to prevent enemy from crossing the river at these points. Companies L and M of the 17th Infantry departed by LSM for the east coast. 17-3 (minus) was relieved of defense of Baybay and displaced to the vicinity of Damulaan.

Following a friendly air strike on Poro Island at 0830, of A plus 97, Company L resumed its attack to the north, assaulting the south slopes of Hill 854, while a platoon of Company I patrolled the northeast slopes in an effort to locate covered routes of approach to the enemy position. Intense small arms fire from concealed spider holes held up the advance, and as

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darkness fell, positions were consolidated on favorable ground, Company K patrolled to Alta Vista, and having made no contact bivouaced for the night in preparation for a coordinated attack on Hill 854.

Companies C and E of the 184th Infantry, relieved of their position in the Ormoc perimeter by Company I, 17th Infantry, moved by foot and motor to Soong where a base camp was established. The 32nd Infantry in continued efforts to prevent mobilization of enemy forces west of the Pagsangahan River, moved elements of 32-3, the Regimental CP and Special Units, to the vicinity of Tambuco Road Junction. Along the river, trail blocks and out posts were established.

On A plus 98, the Special Task Force continued operations against firmly entrenched enemy on Hill 854. Following preparation by am tanks and artillery, Company K drove southwest in the face of heavy fire from rifles, automatic weapons and light artillery. Advancing slowly against stubborn resistance, and closely supported by 4.2" mortars, the company gained approximately 700 yards. Independent platoons of Company I reconnoitered both flanks of the enemy position, while Company I held the southwest base of Hill 854.

On Leyte Island, many scattered enemy groups were engaged in sharp encounters west of Highway #2, and other groups eliminated attempting to cross the road.

During A plus 99, the attack against Hill 854 was pressed. Company K resumed the advance southwest, and by 1500, following intensive shelling by 4.2" mortars and am tanks, had gained 500 yards against determined enemy concealed in recessed spider holes on commanding heights. Late in the afternoon, the advance was stopped by intense and accurate fire from rifles, machine guns, and two light artillery pieces. Company I held the southern slopes of the hill. On Pacijan Island, guerilla forces combed as far as Union without enemy contact.

On Leyte, numerous scattered enemy groups were encountered along Highway #2. At least 154 enemy were killed and 16 POW's taken. 17-3 Battalion Headquarters, and Cannon Company embarked on LSM's for movement to the east coast for rehabilitation.

On A plus 100, the Special Task Force continued operations in the extremely rugged terrain of Hill 854. The center of enemy resistance having been fixed in an area approximately 1800 yards long and 900 yards wide, heavy artillery laid harassing fires throughout the night. At dawn, 75mm time fire from battery-fired am tanks, and WP shells from 4.2" mortars paved the way for ground troops. Company K resumed its advance southwest down the slopes of Hill 854, while Company I, less two platoons, drove northeast up the same slope. Independent platoons of Company I,

by aggressive patrol action and harassing fires successfully contained the enemy flanks. By 1700, the enemy pocket had been further compressed by approximately 800 yards, and the hostile force had suffered severe punishment.

During A plus 101, Company K continued to advance southwest against small arms and machine gun fire from strong enemy defensive positions. In the course of the advance, one 37mm gun, one 57 mm gun, and a light machine gun were captured. At 1430, a small enemy counterattacking force was decimated, and as a result of the day's action, the enemy pocket was reduced by approximately 600 yards. On Pacijan Island, patrols reached Esperanza without enemy contact, completing seizure of the Island. Security of Pacijan was turned over to Guerilla Forces.

On A plus 102, Company L of the Special Task Force, contained the southwest end of the enemy pocket, while Companies K and I resumed the attack southwest against stiff resistance. Considerable progress was made, and fighting continued into the hours of darkness.

On this date, the 900 remaining members of General Yamagata's force reached the Japanese assembly area at Mount Naguang. Consequently, the total estimated strength of the entire remnants of the 26th and 16 Division then assembled on the west coast of Leyte was not more than 2,000 poorly equipped, ill-fed troops.


During A plus 103, at 0315, on Poro Island, 39 Japs attacked the Battalion CP at the bridgehead of the Poro-Pacijan Causeway. In a determined effort to break through, this force hit the perimeter in five different places, but the defenses held. At the same time, another group armed with satchel charges attempted to destroy a platoon of amtanks in the near vicinity. In this encounter, 18 Japs were killed and one of the amtanks slightly damaged. From positions held the previous night, Companies I and K resumed the advance southwest at 0800, and by 1100 had joined Company L which was driving northeast. During this advance no resistance was encountered, but 254 previously unreported bodies were found. For the remainder of the period, patrols failed to make any further contact. By 1800, the battalion was closed in defensive positions near Poro Town, and the Camotes Islands were declared secure.

From A plus 104 to A plus 113, advance elements of the Division displaced to rehabilitation areas on the east coast of Leyte. On A plus 107, the Special Task Force returned from Poro Island, and integral units reverted to organizational control. On A plus 113, defense of the 7th Division zone of responsibility was turned over to the Americal Division.

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During the mopping up phase of King II, the Division killed 6,382 Japs, and took 1146 POW's. During this period, the Division lost a total of 91 officers and men killed in action, and 316 officers and men wounded in action. Two large enemy concentrations were attacked, pushed out of strongholds in the eastern mountains, and forced to withdraw disastrously to the west. An area of approximately 300 square miles was rigorously patrolled and the Camotes Islands seized and secured.

During the entire King II Operation, from 20 October 1944 to 10 February 1945, the 7th Infantry Division fought as a Division over 37 miles, moved over 105 miles, and covered in reconnaissance 1,950 square miles, or 68.8% of Leyte, including Panaon Island and the Camotes Islands. A total of 16,559 Japs were killed and 233 taken prisoner. 582 officers and men of the Division were killed in action, and 2,102 officers and men wounded in action. The Division suffered a total of 2,684 battle casualties, or 18.85% of total strength; 6,684 non-battle casualties, recurrent, or 43.9% of total strength. A total of 9,368 casualties, or 64% of total strength, were suffered from all causes during the 110 day period of combat, and 1,689 officers and men were evacuated.



APPROACH SKETCH
LEYTE ISLAND
 (LOOKING NORTHEAST)
 ORMOC CORRIDOR
7TH INFANTRY DIVISION
 FRONT LINES AS OF 2400 EACH DAY

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Loddy
 G-3 SECTION

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

TERRAIN

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The beaches of Leyte provided relatively few problems for an amphibious assault. Calm waters in Leyte Gulf, the absence of reefs or coral heads, and a favorable under-water gradient permitted the smooth and unhindered landing of personnel and equipment. Directly inland from the beaches however, the low-lying valley floor was dotted with heavily overgrown swamp areas which formed serious obstacles to troop movements. In addition, much of the Leyte Valley was cultivated with flooded rice paddies, traversed by narrow unimproved roads. This terrain condition necessarily canalized the movement of heavy equipment at many points, and impeded the advance of troops, particularly in the Buri area, and on either side of the Burauen-Dagami Road. Occasional cane fields and bamboo thickets provided effective concealment for enemy forces. Roads themselves were too elementary in construction to support sustained military traffic. With the commencement of heavy rains, these roads rapidly deteriorated to the point of impassability.

The precipitous mountain range which runs north and south and separates the eastern and western coastal areas of Leyte, formed a natural barrier to all but lightly equipped infantry troops. These mountains were characterized by inter-lacing, knife-like spurs and ridges, heavily over-grown with tropical foliage and cut by deep ravines.

Numerous rivers fed by nearby mountain sources meandered through the lowlands, and on the east coast terminated in flood plains. With the advent of the monsoons, all watercourses were subject to flash floods which washed out many of the locally constructed bridges. On the east coast, streams were bordered by swampy areas which made fording impossible in most cases. On the west coast, a gravelly soil provided more natural fording points, although these were in many cases affected by the rise and fall of tides.

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RECONNAISSANCE

Prior to the landing of United States Forces, terrain information of Leyte Island was very limited, and existing maps lacked completeness and accuracy. A check of ground distances ashore as compared with map distances revealed inaccuracies of up to fifty per cent, and stream courses were not as depicted. This condition gave added urgency to immediate and extensive terrain reconnaissance.

The stepped up schedule of the King II Operation did not permit complete photographic coverage of the target. However, photos taken of initial objective areas did provide sufficient information for photo interpreters to make an accurate study of enemy beach defenses. As operations progressed inland, the time delay necessitated by development, delivery, interpretation and distribution of aerial photos limited their value greatly. Good photos taken sufficiently in advance would have saved many days of infantry patrolling. Even at the completion of the operation, patrols were still back tracking and searching their way among the many ravines and forested ridges so poorly shown on existing maps. As enemy forces were driven westward into mountainous and heavily forested areas, aerial photographs, although providing valuable terrain information, revealed only the largest enemy installations. Effective Japanese camouflage contributed to this difficulty. It is not necessary that complete strips of photos be given wide distribution. It is more important that photos of critical areas and of areas which are poorly mapped be printed in sufficient copies that the small unit on the ground will have a photo guide to the terrain. It is believed that further coordination could be effected to accomplish aerial photography with the planned requirements of the ground forces more in mind.

Aerial visual reconnaissance was provided relatively early in the operation, and was used throughout in spot reconnaissance of localized areas. For this type of mission, the Artillery Liaison Plane proved the most effective type of aircraft. Considerable stress must be laid on training pilots and observers in concentrating on the information desired and the necessity for accurate reports. On the other hand, G-2's and S-2's must keep pilots and observers informed of the tactical situation, and specifically request those items of information currently needed.

The ground reconnaissance plan for Division intelligence units was mainly concerned with long-range reconnaissance on the flanks and in areas in which enemy contact had not yet been gained. On Leyte, this Division operated on the south flank of the Army - a flank particularly exposed because the initial direction of attack envisaged a direct movement westward with a following movement to the north. No combat elements were

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diverted toward the south except for local security of the beachhead.

The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop completely mechanized, with 10 M-8 Armored Cars, 9 M-29C Weasels and Jeeps, was assigned the mission of long-range reconnaissance to the south and southwest, below the Daguitan River. Whenever possible, the Troop operated with armored cars well forward. However, the condition of roads and bridges, and dense vegetation made most patrols dependent on the weasel and the jeep. Primarily, these vehicles were used to provide transportation and a mobile base of fire for foot patrols. This permitted coverage of a wide area, and by providing heavy fire-power, effectively screened the left flank from Jap reconnaissance activity. Bold thrusts to the south and southwest determined that the Abuyog Sector was clear, and in conjunction with patrols of the left-flank infantry regiment, ascertained when enemy forces evacuated the vital La Paz area. Mechanized movement across the mountains to Baybay, and reconnaissance north and south of that point, early determined the limits of Japanese activity on the West Coast.

After the Corps beachhead had been secured, continuous combat patrolling by all units was necessary to fix enemy positions. The value of information secured by patrols increased progressively as patrol leaders realized the importance of reporting fully not only information of the enemy, but also details of terrain, correct place locations, distance and data regarding roads, trails, and bridges. Such reports are necessary in order that higher echelons may provide corrected maps giving more detailed and complete information. In order to forestall duplication of effort, these data must be furnished units which will subsequently operate in an area which has already been patrolled.

It has been found that confusion is avoided and communication facilitated by daily assignment within the Division of block patrol numbers to regiments. Regiments initially furnish the size, type, destination, and route of each patrol together with its assigned number. Thenceforth, the patrols are referred to by number in all messages and reports.

A special aspect of the Leyte Operation was the presence and use of organized guerilla units. Guerilla troops had been trained and equipped for raiding missions, reconnaissance, patrolling, and maintaining surveillance on enemy groups through various civilian sources of information. Although Guerilla Headquarters restricted their activities to assigned sectors, this did not decrease their value to United States Forces. The use of guerillas on combat patrols, except as guides, was not effective or even desirable. They were far more useful in locating the enemy, interviewing natives, and guiding the American Forces which would actually engage the Japs in combat.

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Despite their shortcomings, which included inadequate training, loose organization, and political jealousies, the assistance provided by guerillas on Leyte added considerably to the rapid completion of the campaign.

The principal uses of water-borne reconnaissance were to convey foot patrols from point to point, and to facilitate surveillance of enemy activity in large and otherwise inaccessible areas. LVT's were used to transport combat patrols to points along the west side of Ormoc Bay. Reconnaissance patrols, operating from Panaon Island used both LCVP's and native craft in maintaining the security of Panaon Straits and southern Leyte. The 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop utilized native craft in search of coast-wise areas and river courses. Native craft were also used by the CIC Detachment in dispatching guerillas to the Cuatro and Camotes Islands where enemy activity was observed and reported upon.

The following
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poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original**.

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INTELLIGENCE

In the King II Operation, standard methods of obtaining combat intelligence were employed throughout. The troops themselves maintained a continuous flow of useful information through the normal command channels allowing each S-2 to consolidate all available intelligence for his commander. Specialized intelligence personnel were free to perform their proper functions in operation of distant reconnaissance patrols, maintenance of OP's, search for documents, accompanying infantry patrols when special sketches or reports were desired, and assistance of language personnel. Artillery aerial and forward observers were extremely valuable sources of enemy information, which was simultaneously reported to higher headquarters and supported infantry units through artillery battalion S-2's and liaison officers. The specialized experience of artillery observers proved of great value in continuous confirmation and correction of other intelligence reports.

The presence on Leyte Island of a large and almost completely friendly native population was a significant factor in intelligence operations. Within the first few days of the campaign, it became apparent that reports from both organized guerilla groups, and from civilians must be treated with considerable reserve. Natural eagerness to please the Americans, limited military knowledge, and a certain degree of language barrier resulted in conflicting and inaccurate reports. It was early found that the best method of interrogating civilians was through other Filipinos already proven reliable. Each infantry unit was accompanied by several of these reliable civilians, who were utilized successfully as interrogators throughout the operation. Estimates of enemy strength were the most inaccurate of civilian reports, and reports given by guerilla officers were often grossly exaggerated. Many of the natives selected to assist our troops were chosen by the Division CIC Detachment. In some cases, CIC sent specially selected natives behind the enemy lines in order to gain specific information or to contact local leaders or guerillas. Also, reports of the CIC concerning the political animosities of guerillas assisted intelligence officers in the evaluation of information. During the entire operation, the CIC supplied G-2 with a great quantity of useful and accurate tactical information.

In the first days of an amphibious assault, there is a great need for obtaining confirmation of previously gained photo intelligence and for so developing a picture of the enemy situation that there will be no delay in continuing the attack beyond the established beachheads. The volume of operational radio traffic necessary to control this phase requires that a

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separate Intelligence Radio Net, including the three regimental S-2's, the Reconnaissance Troop and G-2, be temporarily established.

Prior to the landing, photo-intelligence, aerial reconnaissance and guerilla reports fixed major enemy installations, troop dispositions, and the order of battle with considerable accuracy. For the first week, the principal information to be obtained from captured documents was the identity of small units, and the location of more distant outposts. From prisoners information was secured regarding the location of pillboxes and guns, the strength of artillery, command post positions, and plans for counterattack.

After the capture of Dagami, and until the end of the operation, the importance of information obtained from documents and prisoners increased greatly. With the landing of enemy reinforcements on the west coast, it became necessary to augment aerial and guerilla intelligence reports with specific data obtainable only from prisoners or captured documents. From these it was possible to determine the number of enemy landed, the type and quality of his equipment, and hostile plans for defense and attack. While there were a few occasions on which the enemy made an effort to destroy documents, dog-tags, and other marks of identification which were subject to capture, it was generally found that the usual Jap failure to take security measures gave us most of the material needed.

Early prisoner interrogation by Nisei Language men with the Regiments and Division enabled commanders to act rapidly on current information. It was found however, that a Language Team of 1 officer and 10 enlisted men is entirely inadequate for a Division. There should be sufficient interpreters that each battalion commander may have the benefit of immediate interrogation of prisoners and rough translation of important documents.

In the interrogation of prisoners, G-2 informed the Language Officer of information desired. Interrogators were given free rein to adopt whatever approach they thought necessary in questioning the individual prisoner. This system is far more effective than use of the Nisei as mere interpreters of questions placed by an intelligence officer. The difference between Oriental and Occidental backgrounds and thought processes often confuses the prisoner when questioned in the latter manner. In addition, the humiliation of the never-surrender Jap, his physical condition, and the circumstances of his capture are all barriers which can be broken down only through tactful and understanding interrogation by a member of his own race.

The preliminary security of the King II Operation was guaranteed by the change of target after embarkation. Steps

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taken to prevent leakage of information at way-points were normal with one exception. Since elements of the force were embarked on many different ships, responsibility for security after embarkation was placed upon troop commanders of ships, rather than upon subordinate headquarters in the normal chain of command.

Censorship regulations were effectively disseminated by the publication prior to embarkation of a memorandum containing specific provisions to be followed during each phase of the campaign. It is felt that Theater Censors could further simplify censorship regulations by additional study of the security requirements of each campaign.

The presence of many civilians behind our lines presented a serious security problem. While the bulk of these civilians were friendly, some few remained pro-Japanese, and many innocently gave valuable information to the enemy when moving back and forth between the lines. Every effort was made to prevent this movement, but the great number of civilians, and the large area involved made truly effective control impossible.

The CIC Detachment worked tirelessly at the enormous task of sorting out suspect civilians, gaining tactical information from natives and guerillas, and maintaining port security on the entire west and south coast of Leyte.

Although the Detachment had been increased by SOWESPAC for the King II Operation, its strength was still insufficient for the problems at hand. The major CIC task of contacting guerilla leaders, and keeping G-2 informed of probable reliability of individuals, would have been eliminated by the attachment to the Division of Guerilla Liaison Officers prior to the landing. Had the Division been dealing with a large enemy civilian group, the strength of the CIC Detachment would have been totally inadequate. Sufficient CIC personnel should be available in higher echelons to relieve Division CIC personnel of responsibility for areas which the Division has cleared.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

During the King II Operation, this Division enjoyed unusual success in capturing combatant officers and men of the Japanese Army. In effecting these captures, propaganda and surrender leaflets locally prepared by Nisei of the Language Team were of the utmost value. Considerable propaganda material was furnished to the Division prior to landing. Of this material, surrender passes proved useful, but accompanying literature did not fit the situation. In most cases, the text ridiculed the Japanese Air, Naval, and Ground efforts and was accompanied by caricatures of Japanese soldiers. It is apparent that this type of propaganda would not be relished by the Japanese, and would only serve to insult and spur them to greater resistance. Captured diaries and prisoners' statements have emphasized this fact.

Surrender requests which were dropped consisted of mimeographed statements which took into consideration the tactical situation at that particular time. These were prepared by a Nisei of the Division Interpreter Team who had an excellent knowledge of enemy psychology. His statements were sympathetic in mood, and directed to both officers and men, yet considered the different mental attitudes of these two groups. Pamphlets were dropped by cub planes and scattered by patrols. In all cases, they placed in areas selected by S-2's and G-2, often being dropped on a pin-pointed group of the enemy.

Occasion did not arise for the effective use of loud-speakers. Terrain permitted withdrawal and dispersion of the enemy and there were few instances when battle-weary groups of Japanese became cornered in caves and shelters.

In the future, surrender propaganda should be prepared either by Nisei or with the collaboration of Nisei. Very few Caucasians have the necessary insight into oriental thought processes to produce effective leaflets. In writing propaganda leaflets, a thorough understanding of Japanese psychology is necessary. The writer must understand the background and indoctrination of the Japanese soldier, and how he is most likely to react under certain circumstances. Intimate familiarity with the language is necessary because the Japanese are sensitive to composition, especially that pertaining to honorifics. Existing propaganda leaflets have a tendency to address them in a somewhat juvenile manner. Leaflets must put the situation to the Japanese on a man-to-man basis. Reaction to stock propaganda is indicated by a captured document in which the statement appears: "The enemy is dropping numerous propaganda leaflets. They seem to ridicule our military establishment, and we must do everything to show them how we can fight".

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Propaganda leaflets have essentially a triple purpose. Their aims are to capture enemy military or civilian personnel as a means of gaining military information, to undermine morale in order to cause dissension and disunity within enemy lines, and to facilitate the mopping up campaign by persuading the enemy to come in to us, relieving our troops of the costly and time-consuming task of hunting down individual survivors in inaccessible positions.

Some POW's have pointed out especially effective items within the message which should be emphasized. Some have asked that points be deleted. The net result is improvement in the eyes of POW's with whose point of view we are most concerned. Most of them say that locally prepared propaganda has had a marked effect within their units, requiring officers to issue orders that leaflets may not be picked up. One well-educated prisoner who had held responsible positions in Japanese civil life stated: "The contents of the propaganda leaflet gave me a new meaning in life, therefore I came out."

The following order of presentation in situation or appeal propaganda has been found effective:

1. Address to the enemy officers and men stressing our respect for their bravery in the face of tremendous hardships.
2. A brief outline of the situation confronting them in their immediate front, and the situation as a whole. Stress the futility of further resistance, and the desire of our forces to stop useless slaughter.
3. The purpose of living through the war is the most important item to stress. Dare them to live through this war, to work for the reconstruction of Japan. Tell them that it is the most patriotic gesture to their Emperor, and that death is but an escape. Clarify our treatment of POW's to counteract the horror stories with which they have been indoctrinated. Tell them that when the United Nations win the war, they will be returned home to Japan and that the outcome of the war will deter their people from heaping disgrace upon them.
4. Sympathy and understanding of their situation must be written sincerely, and appeals should be made to officers to pardon their men if they come out. The fact that we will provide them with good food, clothing and medical attention should be made clear. Point out that Americans may be "devils" in combat, but otherwise are sportsmanlike in character.
5. Conditions of surrender should be written tactfully. The word "surrender" should be avoided if possible.

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In the composition of surrender leaflets, it is well to bear in mind that Japanese Troops are forewarned about propaganda and are indoctrinated never to surrender. To break through this shell, each message must be composed flawlessly, so that Japanese officers can find nothing to use against us, while enlisted men cannot deny its logic.

JAPANESE OPERATIONS

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No new methods of enemy attack were encountered in the King II Operation. In general, the Japs have tried two main types of attack. One type, very similar to our own, utilized a base of fire with supporting weapons, registered artillery and mortar preparation, and infantry fire and movement. Usually, the preparatory fire was absent and many such organized attacks were conducted without artillery or heavy mortar support. In either case, these attacks failed due principally to the terrific fire power of our infantry and artillery.

Captured orders indicated that many of the enemy attacks had been well conceived, but often insufficient troops were available at the time of attack. Continual harassing by artillery and air resulted in dispersion of Jap reserves and interruption of his communications. In most cases, his well planned schemes failed to come off. Documents repeatedly indicate that a unit failed to receive its orders, or that another unit could not reach the appointed place on time, or that artillery had created high casualties in equipment and men. On the other hand, there are indications that some Jap Commanders failed to realize the force necessary to stage an attack against American fire power.

The other general type of attack was the localized charge, in which the enemy attempted, by sheer weight, to penetrate our defenses. Some such charges were evidently the organized attempts of small units to accomplish their missions; others were the fanatical rushes of yelling men. The latter were generally executed when the enemy was in a desperate situation. Again our fire power all but annihilated the enemy.

The enemy made many attempts at infiltration, which he considers a tactic of either attack or defense. The objectives were artillery pieces, planes, supply dumps, CP's, and other key installations. In one enemy regiment, each company was required to have in operation at all times two or more groups of from 6 to 8 men whose mission it was to make such infiltrations, using satchel charges and grenades. In one case only was such an infiltration successful, when a 105mm howitzer was satchel-charged by two Japs while covered by a rifle-firing diversionary group. In another case, paratroopers who had succeeded in getting through our perimeter whistled and sang while booby-trapping two of our cub planes. The same ruse failed to work when they attempted to pass back through the lines. Except for these two examples, all attempts at infiltration were partially or entirely disrupted by tight night perimeters.

The usual tenacious Jap defense was encountered on Leyte. The enemy dug in well and used the maximum number of automatic weapons available. However, fields of fire were usually sacrificed for cover and concealment - a factor which made hostile

positions extremely difficult to locate. This was offset by the fact that automatic weapons did not cover all sections of the protective lines. The Japanese did not register artillery and mortars in front of their positions, nor did they mass the fires of these weapons. They built successive lines of defense, and dug alternate positions; they covered their automatic weapons with riflemen and so placed machine guns that they covered one another. But when attacked from an unexpected quarter, these defenses often crumbled in short order.

Many local counterattacks were made, but these were usually so poorly executed that the attacking force was quickly destroyed or dispersed. Since the terrain permitted withdrawal, there was no necessity for last-ditch suicidal stands, but the enemy did occasionally reinforce an untenable position until all of the defenders had been killed.

Use of mines and demolitions was poor, with minefields hastily and obviously laid.

There were no new enemy weapons encountered during the operation, though many types of Japanese, American, and British weapons (captured during the campaigns of 1941-1942) were available. The enemy was well equipped with artillery of calibers up to and including 150mm. However, Japanese gunnery and tactical technique again proved remarkably undeveloped and ineffective. Guns were used singly, in pairs, and only in rare instances as batteries. Gun positions were well constructed, but often so selected as to allow limited fields of fire. The Japanese exhibited a marked preference for direct laying. Elaborate fire control instruments and computing devices were captured, but there were few indications from delivery of fire that they were used. Fires were not massed. Only one instance is recorded of an actual adjustment being made and followed by a concentration of fire. Although the enemy held terrain more favorable for observation than that occupied by friendly artillery, this advantage was not utilized. POW's indicated that only rarely was the forward observer equipped with communications.

Most Jap weapons are inferior to our own. However, it was poor employment rather than poor design which was partly responsible for our low casualty rate.

Initially, enemy reserve stores of ammunition and other supplies were large for the original Leyte Garrison. However, the Japanese did not have sufficient reserves to supply or re-supply the new divisions which were thrown into this campaign. Thus it was necessary for these elements to bring with them all supplies possible. Navy and Air attacks against Jap shipping completely disrupted this supply plan, and only a limited quantity of supplies could be brought ashore. In many cases, artillery pieces or the larger infantry weapons could not be landed.

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The Japanese had relied upon a poorly developed road net and a small amount of transportation for the movement of supplies. Their vehicles were for the most part two-wheel drive trucks of American manufacture, totally incapable of movement through muddy and shell-torn terrain. In the mountainous areas, animals could not have been used satisfactorily even had a sufficient number been available. An effort was made to cache all types of supply at convenient points along routes of advance and withdrawal, but the amount in these dumps was entirely inadequate.

The enemy was almost entirely dependent upon hand-carried supply during most of the operation, but the force which was employed was entirely too large for successful use of this method.

As the Japs withdrew, supplies which had been moved forward could not be taken with them, and consequently our route of advance was littered with Jap equipment, ammunition, and food.

The systematic destruction of dumps by our artillery and air insured complete failure of the Japanese supply system. However, it is doubtful if they could have supplied their troops successfully even without this continual harassment. It is not believed that the Japanese system or equipment would have been equal to the task.

Just as the enemy were not able to move supplies forward, so were they unable to evacuate their personnel and equipment to the rear. The Japanese made every effort to evacuate their wounded, and during the early part of the campaign were relatively successful. Later on, they were forced to abandon both wounded and sick, and left entire hospitals with hundreds of patients to fend for themselves. While as yet there is little supporting evidence from documents, it is doubtful that any real system of evacuation was ever put into effect. Evacuation centers and large hospitals were improvised, but these were feeble efforts. Whenever possible, the dead were buried in hastily prepared graves.


Lack of prior planning and inadequate equipment doomed the Japanese evacuation attempts to failure. It is possible that the high command intended to gamble everything on a successful advance. It is more probable that the entire system of supply and evacuation was inadequate, and would have been so despite disastrous losses to both shipping and dumps.

The Japanese again demonstrated great care and ingenuity in concealment and the use of camouflage, utilizing protection afforded by terrain and vegetation to the utmost. They soon realized that to move when under observation by an Artillery Cub revealed a position and drew artillery fire, and orders were issued that Cubs were not to be fired upon for fear of artillery retaliation. Consequently, it was often extremely difficult for aerial observers to spot enemy troops. No new enemy technique

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of camouflage or concealment has been noted during this operation.

Most of the Jap units appeared to be well trained. The 1st and 26th Division were rated among the best in the Japanese Army. However, their erratic tactics and unpredictable actions often made it difficult to determine whether poor training or stupidity was responsible for many of their actions. Marksmanship was generally inferior to our own, though these troops boasted many better shots than the Naval Garrison units encountered on Pacific atolls. There were indications that the enemy had been trained in various techniques, such as the use of artillery, yet in most cases he failed to utilize either equipment or training in battle. His boasted ability with the bayonet has yet to be proven. In the latter phases of the operation, some enemy were encountered with very little training, and little desire to stand and fight our troops. Initially, the physical endurance and morale of the enemy was excellent. But as his attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties, and he was forced to withdraw leaving many of his weapons and supplies behind, a large number became weak from hunger and exposure. Consequently, his morale, in most cases, became low, and individual soldiers were increasingly susceptible to propaganda. Many cases of voluntary surrender are recorded; soldiers deserted the officers who were still trying to hold together and make effective the remnants of organized units. It is believed that this attitude is far more typical of the average Japanese soldier than is the fanatical bushido encountered in small island warfare. On a small island, no other attitude is possible. However, this does not mean that the great majority of Japanese soldiers will not fight to the bitter end, regardless of hunger, casualties, and loss of supplies. There were very few cases where officers were not fanatically devoted to their mission - and as long as any officers remain alive, the remnants of a Jap force are capable of determined action.



ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

• MAP •

20 OCT. 44 - 5 FEB 45

Showing schematic dispositions and identifications of major units.

PREPARED BY OAC of S., G-2 7th INF. DIV.

Total enemy killed - 16,494;
Prisoners 223

The following
image(s) may be of
poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original**.

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TACTICS

During the initial and closing stages of the operation, the Division in most cases attacked with two regiments abreast, and one in reserve. During the greater part of the operation, the tactical situation dictated numerous independent actions of subordinate units. Ordinarily, these independent actions, although requiring coordination and control by Division, did not constitute a concerted tactical Division effort. Among the subordinate units, the most frequently used formation was two units in the attacking echelon, and one in reserve. The attack in column was also adopted when operating in a narrow zone of action or in those cases where the location of hostile positions was indefinite.

Experience of Division Artillery units indicates that in most cases the use of a Diamond or "W" formation by firing batteries is most effective in facilitating all-around fire, and in providing local security. Battalion CP's were normally centrally located between the firing batteries.

The relief of front-line units during the King II Operation was not particularly difficult since enemy pressure at no time was sufficient to interfere with the mechanics of the execution.

During the early stages of the operation, many attacks were made with battalions in column, and it was normal for the leading element to be relieved daily.

The most common method employed for relief was the passage of lines, in which the relieving unit would move up in rear of the unit being relieved just prior to dusk. The following morning the passage of lines would be executed with the unit relieved supporting the advance from its position.

Night operations were limited to the perimeter defense. Use of new type concertina wire, trip flares, and the 60mm mortar illuminating shell, in conjunction with supporting automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery fire completely thwarted Jap Banzai night attacks. In three attacks on successive nights against two battalions, the enemy, although possessing overwhelming superiority was thrown back with extreme losses, some units being decimated. Since it was always possible to reach ground favorable for a jump-off on the following day, major night offensives were not undertaken by our forces. Night attacks would have been relatively unprofitable. Extremely dense undergrowth would have made the coordination of night attacks extremely difficult and greatly limited the use of artillery and other supporting weapons. Surprise would not have been obtained, since at the close of each day's operations, close contact had been established between the opposing forces. Nowhere has it been more clearly demonstrated that the coordinated attack of American Forces by daylight can consistently overcome the best organized Japanese opposition.

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The close night perimeter is an effective counter measure to night infiltration and assault, and the consistently ineffective Jap artillery and air activity does not constitute a threat to this type of position.

Local security of the attacking echelon was obtained by the employment of security patrols to the front, flanks, and rear. In the attack, contact patrols were maintained between adjacent units, and strong patrols operated on exposed flanks.

Security of forward areas was provided by Division reserve combat elements supplemented by service troops of the assault units. These defenses were normally coordinated under Division supervision, and responsibility for the entire area delegated to an officer of field grade.

Rear echelon establishments and CP's provided their own perimeter defenses, maintaining 50% alert during the hours of darkness. Locations of organic service units and CP's whenever possible were selected so that front-line troops automatically covered the main routes of approach into the installations. The problem of security for rear echelon establishments was increased by the activity of enemy termite patrols in areas occupied by service units. A Provisional Headquarters, provided with radio and wire communications, and organized for the express purpose of defending the MSR, coordinated the defenses of service units. Interior guards, road blocks, bridge guards, and outposts along trails leading into the rear area and the MSR were established, and night motor patrols maintained. As a further measure, the Amtank 75mm Howitzers were registered in on the flanks of rear areas at likely avenues of approach.

Defense of landing beaches was accomplished by the Engineer Shore Party Group supported by amtanks and amtracks organized for beach defense under Division Control. The Commander of the 1140th Engineer Group was designated as the responsible officer to coordinate defense missions of all units occupying the beach area.

The flat marshy terrain and poor visibility encountered during initial stages of the operation, permitted very limited employment of automatic weapons for overhead fires and firing through gaps. Therefore, the usual practice was to place the light machine guns and automatic weapons well up in the front lines and the heavy machine guns to cover the flanks. On the western side of the Island during the later stages of the operation, terrain permitted the normal employment of heavy machine guns. Weapons were emplaced on high ground from which positions flanking and overhead fires could be delivered and the flanks protected against envelopment. The light machine guns and automatic rifles moved forward with the assault echelons prepared to furnish supporting fires on targets at close range. During daylight hours

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when the attack was stopped for reorganization, or other reasons, normal OP's were established, and automatic weapons emplaced.

Supporting artillery closely followed by assault troops was used extensively. The effectiveness of this fire enabled attacking infantry to seize many well-organized, heavily manned, and excellently disposed hostile defensive positions with light casualties. In the defense, the careful registration of artillery fires in close proximity to front lines was extremely effective in repulsing and decimating attacking enemy forces. Harassing missions fired against distant targets, disrupted enemy communications and observation, prevented construction of additional defensive positions in depth, and disorganized the movement of reserves.

During the initial stages of the operation, naval aircraft on call were readily available and communication through the JASCO AGL Teams was excellent. However, the terrain so limited observation by ground troops that extensive use of close support air-strikes was difficult. In the few instances when close support missions were flown, accuracy was superior and results excellent, particularly in bombing and rocket strikes against log pillboxes. Numerous air strikes were made against hostile rear area installations, and although it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of damage inflicted, it is reasonably certain that enemy communications were disrupted, and many artillery and supply installations destroyed. As personnel of this Division were trained primarily in the coordination of Naval air strikes, a change to Army Air Force methods caused some difficulty. This was aggravated by the unusual number of high-priority missions which the air force was called upon to fly and which limited the availability of support aircraft. However, all Army Air Force missions that were flown gave superior results.

On the one occasion that terrain permitted, tanks were employed in battalion strength to spearhead the infantry attack. For the greater part of the operation, tanks were canalized by terrain difficulties. At these times, it was found most advantageous to attach tanks to an infantry unit normally on a basis of one company to a regiment, leaving tanks in assembly area close to the front to be brought forward for a specific mission. On the completion of each mission, they returned to the assembly area. There were two main types of mission upon which tanks were employed: first, the reduction of enemy pillboxes; and second, flushing out bamboo thickets. In the latter case, infantry advanced with the tanks in order that mutual protection might be obtained.

During the landing phase, naval gunfire again demonstrated its extreme effectiveness in neutralizing all hostile beach defense emplacements and rear area installations. Once our own supporting artillery had landed, naval gunfire was employed mainly to place heavy concentrations and harassing fires on known enemy installations in rear areas.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF WEAPONS

Employment of weapons on Leyte Island has demonstrated the peculiar effectiveness of some for use against the Japanese in this climate and terrain, and has also emphasized certain weaknesses. Basic United States Army Weapons have continued to prove themselves entirely satisfactory, and in every case, markedly superior to those parallel weapons with which Japanese Forces are armed. The relative effectiveness of mechanically adequate Japanese weapons was considerably diminished by the manner of their employment. In many cases this was evidenced by limited tactical flexibility and in the case of field artillery, by a basic deficiency in the science of gunnery.

In consideration of American weapons, certain salient features have been noted. The .30 caliber carbine has proved entirely satisfactory with the exception that bluing on both weapon and magazine continues to be markedly inferior.

BAR's proved to be particularly valuable when employed two to the squad. The increased fire power which they provided was especially effective in night defense.

Among grenades, the fragmentation type was most favored by our troops, with the offensive and phosphorus next in order.

During this operation, the 60mm Mortar with T18E6 tube and M2 base plate, bipod, and sight, were employed. This weapons has not proved as efficient as the M2 Mortar, since it is less accurate.

The 81mm Mortar continues to retain high estimation as a close-supporting infantry weapon. An ammunition ratio of 80-10-10 for light, heavy, and smoke is desirable in this area.

The tactical situation required use of the bazooka in relatively few instances. The weapon however, was effective in knocking out several light tanks and in attacking coconut log pillboxes.

The 37mm Gun was used only occasionally, since there were few hostile armored vehicles, and because extreme difficulty was experienced in manhandling it into positions from which effective fire could be placed on enemy machine guns and pillboxes. On the relatively few occasions when the 37mm Gun could be employed for the latter purpose, its extreme accuracy gave excellent results.

Use of the flame thrower M2-2 was limited by lack of suitable targets. As an incendiary weapon against bamboo thickets and shacks in which hostile groups were concealed, it was highly effective. A high mortality rate of this article was sustained even with its limited use. The general construction is too fragile

to withstand normal combat conditions. Flame thrower packing boxes are not serviceable after repeated wettings under field conditions. Flame thrower tanks were of little value. The tanks being old models, presented a maintenance problem, and frequent mechanical failures of the flame thrower itself made employment extremely limited.

The Chemical Mortar, 4.2", is an effective accompanying weapon when attached to assault infantry elements. It is adversely affected however, by certain mechanical deficiencies. Elevating screws bend, and recoil and counter-recoil springs lose elasticity when the mortar is fired at maximum or near-maximum range. The base plates are too small and the base of the standard is too short, which results in burying of the mortar and tilting of the base plate during long-range firing.

The caliber .50 Machine Gun continued to be a highly effective weapon against ground targets, and in the experience of this Division on Leyte, was the only weapon which proved itself against low-flying aircraft.

The M-8, Self-Propelled Howitzer, due to its superior mobility, proved to be the most effective close-support infantry weapon in the reduction of pillboxes.

Medium tanks were the most effective of all weapons in reducing enemy pillboxes. In many instances, medium tanks were successful in destroying covered emplacements which had withstood intensive artillery concentrations. The major weaknesses demonstrated were marked lack of mobility in swampy terrain, and a tendency to throw tracks when moving onto soft shoulders.

The mobility of light tanks proved superior to that of mediums. However, their light armament is not adequate to effect reduction of coconut log pillboxes - a mission which accompanying tanks are frequently called upon to perform.

Demolitions were not used extensively by this Division on Leyte Island. However, patrols found them of considerable value in the destruction of enemy ammunition captured in inaccessible locations, and not possible to salvage due to tactical exigencies. On several occasions, field artillery units employed demolitions in cutting down trees in rapid clearance of fields of fire. Primacord and half pound block charges of TNT were very effective for this purpose.

All organic field artillery battalions of the 7th Infantry Division were equipped with the 105mm howitzer. A minimum of mechanical difficulty was experienced with this weapon, and the speed, accuracy and effectiveness of its fire was of inestimable value during all phases of the operation. Despite numerous trials, WP

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smoke proved unsuitable for burning buildings, cane, or bamboo in this climate. Against personnel however, it was highly effective. During the attack on Dagami, WP fire drove enemy from covered emplacements into standing type open foxholes where the fire of time shell inflicted extremely high casualties. Prisoners stated that artillery is the most feared and deadly weapon of the American Army.

Although the 105mm Howitzer is in itself a superior weapon, a definite need for the 155mm Howitzer, M-1, does exist within the Division for general support missions. The general support battalion of the Division was armed with 105mm howitzers instead of 155mm howitzers because the original plan called for an operation involving the crossing of a coral barrier reef where the 105mm howitzer, DUKW-borne, would have been easier to land and supply with ammunition. The character of the beach on Leyte was such that 155mm howitzers could have been landed easily in LCM's. There were many occasions when the greater range and striking power of 155mm howitzers could have been used to great advantage.

90mm AAA Guns, when not engaged in anti-aircraft fire, were employed and registered by artillery cub planes against distant ground targets. The extreme accuracy of this weapon and its ability to deliver an intense volume of fire gave excellent results.

155mm Gun Batteries of the United States Marine Corps were attached to the 7th Infantry Division during early phases of the operation, and delivered extremely effective fires against enemy installations in the Dagami area. They were later replaced by a 155mm Gun Battalion of Army Artillery.

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AIR SUPPORT

Air support during the King II Operation was provided by aircraft of the United States Navy, and Allied Army Air Forces. During initial stages of the operation, the following missions were successfully executed by aircraft of the Naval Air Arm:

The fast Carrier Groups as directed by the Commander Third Fleet made air strikes against the objective area on A minus 3, A minus 2, A minus 1, and A Day. On A Day, the Commander Support Aircraft, Central Philippines, through the Attack Force Commander Support Aircraft, coordinated these strikes with local air group strikes and naval gunfire. The A Day strike against Leyte was completed by 0900.

Carrier Based night fighters were over the objective area beginning on A minus 3 and continued through A plus 5 when they ceased to be available.

Commander Task Group 77.4 furnished CVE based aircraft and air spotters for operation in support of the assault. Aircraft assigned this mission were controlled by Commander Task Group 79.

Naval Gunfire spotting was conducted by VO-VCS aircraft from fire support ships.

At Manus Island, 3 Division air observers drawn from infantry regiments joined the Naval Air Arm under the Commander Support Aircraft and sailed on three separate carriers. These observers were briefed with naval air personnel. Beginning at dawn on A Day, and continuing through A plus 4, Division observers maintained continuous observation during daylight hours, reporting friendly and enemy front-line positions, enemy activity, and pertinent terrain information. This intelligence was of great value. On A plus 5, the Support Aircraft Carriers were engaged with the Japanese Fleet, and Division Air Observers ceased to be available. This naval engagement also marked the end of naval air support for ground forces.

Each infantry battalion and higher echelon, as well as the artillery command, was furnished an air liaison party, suitably trained and equipped to keep the Commander Support Aircraft informed of profitable targets in their respective areas. The Air Liaison Party coordinated the artillery and air effort with Division Artillery. It was habitually able to inform the Commander Support Aircraft what targets were under fire, and when ordered by competent authority, was able to check artillery fire to permit air attack. Each liaison party carried suitable panels for supplementing radio direction of aircraft to designated targets. These panels were removed immediately upon completion of each strike.

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Following the withdrawal of naval aircraft, air support for the Sixth Army was provided by the Fifth AAF. Within the Division, strikes were arranged and coordinated by the Liaison Officer, Fifth AAF, present at the Division Command Post.

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NAVAL GUNFIRE

Throughout the period of Naval Gunfire Support, the 7th Division Naval Gunfire Officer worked directly under the Commanding General, 7th Division Artillery, to whom responsibility for all artillery fires, including Naval Gunfire, was delegated, and in close liaison with CTG 79.1, who acceded to his recommendations and suggestions in all instances.

Commencing on A minus 3 and continuing until A Day, the Bombardment and Fire Support Group directed neutralization fires against heavy guns and gun emplacements, blockhouses, pillboxes, strong points, troop concentrations, beach defenses and beach obstacles, and ammunition and fuel dumps. At dawn on A Day, the Bombardment and Fire Support Group conducted bombardment of the landing beaches, Catmon Hill, and flank strong points. When the leading wave was 800 yards from the beach, large caliber fire was shifted 3,000 yards inland. Five inch fire was shifted to the flanks along the beach upon arrival of the leading wave at the line of fire. A J plus 20 minutes, covering fires inland were raised an additional 1,000 yards. Eighteen LCI gunboats preceding the leading wave, commenced firing rockets when about 2,000 yards from the beach. Naval gunfire provided such effective support that landing of assault infantry was accomplished under a minimum of hostile fire.

Night harassing fires were delivered on the night of A Day and A plus 1, upon the request of the 7th Infantry Division, on all cross-roads within and on the left flank of the Division zone of responsibility. All requests for scheduled illumination missions with star shells were screened through the Division Naval Gunfire Officer. Additional illumination required due to enemy counterattacks was obtained by direct request between the battalion naval liaison officer and supporting ship.

Four fire support ships were made available to the 7th Infantry Division for call fires. Each of the four assault infantry battalions was assigned a Fire Support Ship for direct support, and fire of these ships was controlled directly by the Shore Fire Control Parties under the supervision of the Battalion Naval Liaison Officer.

Each spotter with his battalion Naval Liaison Officer and Fire Support Ship was assigned a separate radio frequency. However, no close support naval gunfire was requested by the assault infantry. This was occasioned by the fact that the first wave of assault infantry was preceded by 56 amphibian tanks which landed and moved to a point inland from which a field of fire was obtainable in close support of the infantry. Amphibian Tank Fire was directed by field artillery forward observers landed in assault waves. A platoon of 4.2" chemical mortars accompanied each assault infantry

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regiment, landing in the eighth wave, and immediately occupying positions from which close-support fire was delivered. In addition, on A Day, all four battalions of the 7th Division Artillery were landed, moved into position, registered, and supporting missions were fired. The flat trajectory of naval gunfire, coupled with limited observation, made it impracticable for use in close support of assault infantry when more suitable fire support was available. The zone of action of the 7th Infantry Division was flat, level terrain, heavily overgrown with dense vegetation which prevented observation in excess of 200 yards.

Although this Division did not require any close support by naval gunfire, this does not mean that in future operations close-support by naval gunfire should be eliminated.

A few deep support fires were called for by assault infantry. Other requests for Naval Gunfire were initiated by the Commanding General, 7th Division Artillery. A schedule of harassing and deep support fires for the following day, was prepared each evening by the Division Naval Gunfire Officer. These fires were placed on known enemy strong points, and road intersections.

Due principally to flat terrain with heavy jungle vegetation, the SCR 536 Radio functioned ineffectively, and the Radar Beacon Mark I, Model I, failed to function.

The Gunfire Control channel was used by Fire Support Ships for administrative traffic, which clogged this channel and prohibited its use for fire missions. It is felt that Fire Support Ships' common frequency should be restricted solely to tactical matters.

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LIAISON

During the planning phase of the King II Operation, liaison officers representing CINCPAC, XXIV Corps, the Seventh AAF, and attached AAA commands, worked in close conjunction with Division Staff personnel. These officers acted in an advisory capacity in preparation of plans which were incorporated into the Division field order. CINCPAC Liaison Officers assisted in coordination of plans for boating, transfer of assault troops to IST's, and landing of assault troops at the target. The XXIV Corps Liaison Officer assisted in operational planning by the respective headquarters. The Seventh AAF Liaison Officer served primarily in an advisory capacity in preparation of the Air Support Plan. The AAA Liaison Officer worked closely with G-3 and Division Artillery in planning for the employment of Anti-Aircraft Artillery against both air and ground targets.

Prior to embarkation, Division Artillery Liaison Officers were exchanged between the 7th and 96th Division, to assist in perfecting arrangements for inter-divisional reinforcing fires. The 75th Joint Assault Signal Company, including air-ground liaison teams, naval liaison teams, and shore fire control parties was also attached to the Division.

At Manus, a liaison officer of the Fifth AAF joined the Division for the purpose of arranging air-support missions to be flown by land-based aircraft of the Fifth AAF.

Upon initiation of operations ashore, normal liaison was established between Division Artillery and organic infantry units. At such times as the tactical situation indicated, unit liaison officers were exchanged between adjoining elements of the 7th and 96th Divisions. This was especially valuable in the Buraen-Dagami area when battalions engaged in closely coordinated local attack, and in effecting the relief of front-line units.

A liaison officer of the 767th Tank Battalion remained at Division Headquarters from the time of landing until the Corps Beachhead Line was secured, providing radio communication and assisting in the arrangement of tank missions.

During all active phases of the operation, liaison officers were exchanged with XXIV Corps.

When the Division attacked north from the Palanas River Line, a Liaison Officer was received from the 11th Airborne Division. This officer remained with the Division until A plus 65 when firm contact was established with the 11th Airborne Division.

When the 77th Division made its amphibious landing at Deposito and drove north toward Ormoc and Valencia, Divisional liaison officers were exchanged.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Signal Communications during the King II Operation were normal with the exception that the following four nets were established:

A Division Voice Command Net, employing SCR 508, 509, and 510 Radios. This net included the Division Commander, Assistant Division Commander, Division Command Post, Division Rear Command Post, and the three organic infantry regiments. Division Artillery maintained a listening watch on the Division Voice Command Net.

A Division Artillery Voice Control Net employing SCR 508 608, and 609 radios. This net included Headquarters Division Artillery, and the four organic field artillery battalions. A listening watch was maintained by the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion, the 767th Tank Battalion, and the 91st Chemical Weapons Company. The 502nd AAA Gun Battalion, and the 866th AAA AW Battalion were tied in with the normal Division Artillery Command Net.

A G-2 Reporting Net employing SCR 508 and 510 Radios. This net included the 7th Division Command Post, the three organic infantry regiments, and the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop. Infantry regimental sets in this net were operated by I & R Platoon personnel. This net was of value during the amphibious phase, but proved dispensable when communications were established ashore.

A G-4 Net employing SCR 508 and 509 Radios. It included the Division TQM, the Control Vessel, the supply DUKW Company (480th Amphibian Truck Company), the two assault infantry regiments, and later, the G-4 ashore. The net was used to control the unloading of assault shipping.

To facilitate the transmission of G-2 and G-4 radio traffic on the planned nets, a brief course in radio procedure was held for staff sections during the training period.

Ship to Shore Communications were handled by both the Navy and the Army. All Army tactical radio channels were operated by Army personnel using Navy radio equipment afloat, or Army equipment installed on the decks of ships. As the various headquarters debarked, ship stations in Army nets closed, except for the Division Headquarters stationed on the Flag Ship. This station was taken over by the ship's Marines and operated as a rear echelon radio, thus enabling the Admiral to have direct communications with the Division.

The Administrative Ship-to-shore channels were provided by the 75th JASCO on the shore and by the Navy afloat. This net-

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work was adequate, but little used by the Army since the G-4 Supply Radio Net duplicated Naval Channels in part. The G-4 channel was faster since it involved less relaying of traffic.

Air-ground communication during the landing phase was controlled by the Naval Support Aircraft Command. The 75th JASCO provided the air liaison teams for each infantry battalion and regimental headquarters. These teams funneled all information on possible air targets to the Support Air Commander who filtered the information and assigned targets. This system worked satisfactorily. It is believed however, that assigned targets could have been pin-pointed more quickly and accurately had the battalion or regimental teams been permitted direct contact with the attacking planes through their VHF radio.

When the Fifth AAF became active and replaced Naval Air, the Air Force Officer assigned to the Division Staff provided air liaison. He had radio equipment to establish direct contact with the Fifth AAF and with planes in flight. This is an excellent manner of directing Air Support for the Division, provided the liaison officer personally directs the air strikes.

The problem of communications on Leyte Island was largely conditioned by terrain, weather, and the great distances over which it became necessary for Division elements to function. The reduction of T/E vehicles by fifty per cent imposed by shipping limitations and original planning for operations over a small land mass, was an additional contributing factor to the problem of Division signal communication. Extremely poor road conditions, and the heavy volume of both wheeled and track-laying traffic made it necessary to lay lines off roads and overhead in nearly all cases. Wire suspended by normal field wire ties developed an excessive number of shorts, crosses, and grounds at the tie. This was due to poor insulation of wire, excessive moisture in the tree, and the strain created by wind, moving both trees and wire. Wire suspended by the marline or basket tie caused less operational interruptions as it had no direct contact with trees and there was sufficient slack to relieve strains created by movement of the wire. Initial construction with the basket weave tie is slow, but is compensated by circuits remaining usable a greater percentage of the time.

The problems faced by wire construction teams were greatly increased by heavy tropical undergrowth, swamps, and flooded rice paddy areas. As the operation progressed, some trunk lines between echelons were over thirty miles long. Distances such as these and extreme wet weather conditions combined to make Wire W-110 less than satisfactory. A distinct need was felt for Spiral Four Cable. As a result of these conditions, the volume of traffic handled by radio became disproportionately large as compared with

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that transmitted by wire, taxing message center to the utmost of its capacity. During the period from 20 October to 26 December 1944, message center handled 21,024 messages, or an average of 309 per day. Of this number, 19,000 were clear text or shackle cipher, and 2,024 were in code. The average time for encoding and decoding during the operation was 29 minutes. Had coding of all messages been required, operations would have been delayed materially.

The great number of heavy construction vehicles operating at maximum speeds in improvement of roads and construction of air-fields, increased the tendency toward carelessness on the part of drivers, and caused frequent extensive breaks in wire lines. Misuse of wire by civilians and soldiers for personal and domestic purposes created a serious unnecessary difficulty for trouble shooters of the wire construction platoon. In several instances, infiltrating enemy succeeded in tapping and booby-trapping wire lines. High tropical winds reaching typhoon proportions uprooted trees and destroyed buildings over a wide area. The number of available wire construction personnel to handle these diverse problems was inadequate.

The Cargo Carrier M-29C is not rugged enough to withstand the constant rough usage of wire construction. Equipment and wire for a Division Wire Team cannot be carried in sufficient quantity in this vehicle. Two weeks after the opening of hostilities, all M-29C Wire Vehicles were wrecked beyond repair because of the overload. No vehicle smaller than a 3/4 Ton 4x4 truck proved adequate for wire laying. As a mount for vehicular radios however, the M-29C proved of outstanding value. The vehicle has a 12 volt ignition system, permits adequate waterproofing of equipment, and can be readily blacked out for night operation of radio sets. It can cover terrain inaccessible to a 1/4 Ton 4x4 Truck and can carry the necessary equipment for a three man radio team. This the 1/4 Ton 4x4 Truck can do only with the aid of a trailer.

Among radios employed in this operation, little difficulty was encountered except with the SCR 300 when that set was used to provide Cannon Company Communication. The distant transmission required by Cannon Company is beyond the range of this set. Experience proved that the effective range of radio sets using whip antennas was reduced approximately fifty per cent. Whip antennas were discarded in favor of long wire antennas, cut to frequency, which materially increased the working range. Adjusting antennas for rapidly changing frequencies is not feasible unless special equipment such as a Tape Measure Antenna is provided.

Linemen are vulnerable when climbing poles or trees and need a weapon which can be operated with one hand. The carbine or M-1 rifle must be slung while the man is above ground. This

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makes the weapon inaccessible, as often only one hand of the lineman is free. The pistol, automatic, caliber .45 in a shoulder holster would be available for instant use under any condition.

Interference from enemy radio transmitters was noted on many occasions. This resulted from deliberate jamming and the fact that in many instances frequencies employed by the Japanese were very close to our own.

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SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

In the initial landing phase, supply of the assault troops was effected by pre-loaded DUKW ferries from specially stocked cargo LST's standing in close to shore. The use of such a "Drug-store Delivery" system enabled supply and evacuation to be carried on without interruption while the personnel and equipment necessary for the establishment of normal Shore Party operations were being landed.

Shore Party operations were carried out by a three battalion Engineer Group attached to the Division. In cooperation with the Navy, complete beach area layouts were prepared and a detailed unloading schedule developed in advance. All except three cargo LST's were beached and unloaded immediately. APA's and AKA's were then unloaded by small landing craft in daylight and by larger boats and pontoon barges at night. Pontoon causeways launched from LST's were utilized to facilitate discharge of trucks and heavy equipment from these ships. By taking advantage of the time made available by the initial use of the DUKW-LST supply system to land and organize, the Shore Party was able to undertake operations at Jig plus 4 hours and to start issuing supplies to assault troops two hours later.

Cargo discharge from the LST-DUKW system was selective, based on the needs of the assault troops ashore. Subsequently, cargo was unloaded rapidly without respect to selection in order to meet the sailing deadline imposed by CTF 33.1. By 1700 of A plus 1, 10 APA's were completely unloaded (approximately 8,000 tons of total cargo) and these ships departed Leyte Gulf. All AKA's and LST's were unloaded by A plus 5. A total of 31,000 tons of cargo was discharged during this period. Of this, 14,000 tons were general cargo, the remainder vehicles. Inasmuch as the principles of combat loading had been followed, representative amounts of all types of supplies were automatically discharged throughout the unloading period.

Cargo was rapidly moved directly across the landing beaches to initial beach dumps dispersed within the first 500 yards inland. In general, all types of supplies were distributed approximately equally among each of the three contiguous beaches. Vehicles were driven under their own power either to temporary unit assembly areas or directly to their organizations inland.

Regimental dumps were initially established within the beach zone, but were quickly moved forward on A plus one. Thereafter, on A plus 2, forward Division DP's were set up for Class I, III, and V supplies approximately five miles inland along the MSR. These were subsequently progressively advanced as the troops moved forward. Because of the rapid unloading rate, only a limited amount of supplies was hauled direct from boats to these inland DP's.

Losses by pilfering were moderate to large. Military police protection in the beach dumps was inadequate in view of the presence of a large civilian refugee population in the Dulag dump areas. It is suggested that all civilians be prevented from entering military dump areas and that Civil Affairs Personnel be landed at the earliest possible opportunity in order to control the population.

Damage by enemy activity was limited to a single bombing raid on A plus 5 in which one bomb and the resulting fire destroyed an ammunition dump, 12 $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, and over 80 per cent of the armament and automotive spare parts initially carried by the Division. Dispersion within the beach zone and prompt action on the part of Shore Party personnel to control the fire prevented further serious losses.

Some Class II Quartermaster supplies were damaged as a result of inadequate waterproof packing. Additional losses to individual clothing and equipment were sustained because of mildew and water soakage of duffle bags.

Unloading facilities were adequate. Efficiency could have been improved by increasing the number of wheeled vehicles in the Shore Party to one hundred per cent of T/E, by providing more gravity roller conveyors for use in the dumps, and by adding 2 cranes per Shore Party Battalion.

The Palletization of approximately 40 per cent of supplies had the following favorable results:

The speed and efficiency of unloading both from ship's holds into landing craft as well as from boats at the beach was increased, since the number of cargo lifts and the amount of personnel required to handle cargo were reduced.

It was possible to move cargo directly into beach dumps and later into inland dumps without re-handling.

The prompt and orderly establishment of dumps was greatly facilitated. Supplies were delivered neatly packaged, waterproofed, and on dunnage.

Pilferage and damage losses were minimized. It is felt that palletization should be limited to an average of 50 per cent of all supplies in order to utilize assault shipping space efficiently and to provide flexibility in unloading.

Because of the nature of the campaign, the greatly extended supply lines, the extensive zone of Division supply responsibility, the heavy rainfall, the extremely rough and almost impassable terrain, and the limited road network, it was necessary to utilize ten different methods of transportation to keep front-line troops

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supplied in this operation. Transportation by cargo carrier, M-29C, by DUKW, by amphibious tractor, by Caterpillar tractor and Athey Trailer, by native canoe, by military and naval landing craft (LCVP, LCM, LCT, LSM, and LST), by water-buffalo train, and by hand-carry were used, depending upon the need. In several instances, air drop from Artillery Liaison planes and from large transports (C47) was resorted to. At one time during the advance northward along the west coast of Leyte, it was necessary for the Division to handle some supplies as many as eight different times in moving them from Dulag to the front-line troops. Cargo was ferried by LCT, LVT, DUKW, and LCVP from Dulag to Abuyog, thence transferred to cargo trucks and hauled by road to Baybay, where a second transfer was made to LCM's and/or DUKW's, and the cargo ferried to points along the coast as far north as Albueria and Ormoc. All of this eighty mile supply movement was coordinated and controlled by the Division G-4 Section.

As a result of shipping space limitations, and the logistical plan requirement for loading a 20-day level of replenishment supplies, it was necessary to restrict the number of general purpose vehicles embarked to an average of 40 per cent of the authorized T/E allowance. Fortunately, the full allowance of Quartermaster Company cargo trucks was loaded. Nevertheless, the reduced amount of transportation so crippled the cargo hauling capacity of the Division as to render the continuous supply and movement of the troops exceedingly difficult.

It was therefore necessary to operate all vehicles continuously and with only very brief periods for maintenance work. The activities of unit motor sections and Division Ordnance personnel were so effective, however, that an average of less than 15 per cent of general purpose vehicles was deadlined daily for repairs. Operating conditions were extremely poor since heavy rains made roads nearly impassable, while the lack of bridges necessitated a great deal of stream-fording.

Division cargo vehicles were pooled and dispatched by the transportation officer under a schedule of priorities established by G-4. Only a limited number of vehicles were made available from service command and other headquarters transportation pools.

In support of troops operating in mountainous and jungle areas, infantry regiments hired as many as 250 Filipino workers for hand-carrying parties. Insufficient military personnel were available for the task, especially after depletion of ranks by casualties. Hand carry parties covered distances of from two to five miles. Standard issue cargo packboards proved eminently successful for use in these operations.

The "D" or chocolate ration was not palatable in a tropical climate. The "K" ration was found suitable for consumption during the first few days of the amphibious assault because of the ease

with which it is carried and prepared. The special assault or candy ration, furnished by QM, USAFPOA, is ideally suited for landing troops in the initial period, when, because of excitement, and lack of time or means to prepare food elaborately, most personnel find that the food and sustaining value of candy is adequate for their needs. Thereafter, as troops are actively engaged with the enemy or patrolling in less accessible terrain, the "C" ration is desirable. The new "C" ration was exceedingly popular because of its accessory component and greater menu variety. When cooking facilities become available, the 10-in-1 ration is preferred. It contains sufficient variety of food and accessories to compare favorably with straight "B" rations. Its principal advantage is its ease in carrying, issuing, and preparation. The manner of packaging is far superior to the bulky, hard-to-handle, 134-component "B" ration; nevertheless, it is felt that for campaigns of 30 days or more the ration program should include at least one-third ordinary "B" rations. These should be used to feed rear area troops or combat troops temporarily resting, and the 10-in-1 and emergency "C" and "K" rations should be reserved for tactical troops whose cooking facilities are limited.

The list of individual clothing and equipment authorized for the King II Operation contained 16 different articles in excess of T/E allowances. For the most part, these as well as the currently authorized articles were found desirable, although some troops noticed that the combat pack was made excessively heavy by the addition of certain "comfort" items.

The following major articles of T/E clothing and equipment were found to be particularly desirable in this area: waterproof clothing bag, waterproof weapons covers, trench knife, and HBT uniform. T/E 21 is basically sound as a guide in equipping troops for combat in this area.

Of the special articles, the following are believed particularly well suited for use in this area: extra oil thong and case, 3-pocket grenade carrier, machete 18", jungle medical kit, combat boot in lieu of service shoe, poncho in lieu of raincoat, wool-knit shirt, jungle pack, waterproof food bags, the new poplin combat uniform, and 2nd canteen with cover.

It is felt that the following special articles should be eliminated as of insufficient value to be carried in this area: sun glasses, sunburn cream, black gymnasium shoes for patrols, flannel shirt, mosquito gloves, camouflage face paint, waterproof match box, and heat tablets with collapsible stoves.

Evacuation of casualties during the King II Operation was accomplished principally by $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton ambulances. Over swampy terrain, however, the cargo carrier, M-29C was utilized where the $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton ambulance could not be used. In the foothills on the west coast,

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evacuation was by hand carry over distances up to two miles. Because of the rough roads in this area, collecting stations were evacuated by DUKW to Clearing Stations, whereas the evacuation from Clearing Stations to Field Hospitals was effected by LCM. In the early stages of the advance north of Baybay, evacuation beyond the Division Clearing Station was supervised and carried out by Division Medical personnel using 3/4 ton ambulances borrowed for this purpose. Evacuation from field hospitals to station hospitals was accomplished by 3/4 ton field ambulance, by LSM and LCI, and by air transport (C-47).

Over marshy terrain, the M-29C was the most effective means of evacuation. On roads, the 3/4 Ton field ambulance was found most efficient. One-quarter ton ambulances are too rough over a long haul, and because of their narrow wheel base and low carriage, are prone to have difficulty negotiating deeply rutted roads. Wherever water parallels the evacuation route, boat transportation is extremely satisfactory.

TABLE I

CARGO SUMMARY--KING II OPERATION--7TH INFANTRY DIVISION

<u>Item</u>	<u>Day's Supply</u>	<u>Sq Ft</u>	<u>Cu Ft</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Initial issue, rations	3 days		3,445	58
Initial issue, ammo	1 U/F		14,656	329
Ammo, Grenades, Chm smoke	4 U/F		1,482	33
Ammo, Grenades, HE	4 U/F		6,338	86
Ammo, high explosives	4 U/F		134,879	3,546
Ammo, pyrotechnics	4 U/F		1,598	23
Ammo, small arms	4 U/F		36,620	1,160
Ammo, shells, HC or WP	4 U/F		9,784	320
CWS, class II & IV	20 days		8,189	93
Engineer Explosives	20 days		12,243	207
Class II & IV	20 days		35,327	405
Water, 5-gal cans	2.5 days		35,454	751
Water, 55-gal drum	2.5 days		27,255	464
Medical, Class II & IV	30 days		2,583	38
Ordnance, Class II & IV	20 days		15,119	201
Motor Parts	20 days		2,318	15
Rations, C,D,K, 10-in-1	27 days		131,848	1,743
QM, Class II & IV	20 days		61,198	719
Class III Lubes & Greases	20 days		11,948	202
Diesel, 5's	20 days		3,507	61
Diesel, 55's			11,975	229
Gas, 5's	20 days		56,747	901
Gas, 55's			123,544	2,286
Signal, Class II & IV	20 days		16,842	346
 TOTAL SUPPLIES			 767,896	 14,183
 Organizational Equipment			 415,712	 1,821
Vehicles (2,207 vehicles)		277,227	2,080,608	15,010
 GRAND TOTAL		 277,227	 3,264,216	 31,014

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DEFICIENCIES IN EQUIPMENT

During the course of the King II Operation, certain deficiencies in equipment other than weapons, were noted. The most outstanding of these may be summarized as follows:

ENGINEER. D-6 Tractors issued to the Engineer Battalion did not stand up under operating conditions encountered. All three tractors were deadlined for long periods; in all cases, the breakdown was caused by mechanical failure, and not by faulty operation or by improper maintenance.

The lack of gravel loading equipment necessitated the use of tractors and gravel loading ramps, thereby tying up dozers which could have been used to better advantage elsewhere. In some cases rock had to be loaded by hand.

The quantities of hand tools provided were not adequate. On more than one occasion, men were idle because hammers, sledges, saws, peavies, and shovels were not available.

The lack of heavy flatbed trailers was keenly felt in the later stages of the operation. In order to move tractors from one area to another, it was necessary to "walk" them under their own power over many miles of rough roads. This caused unnecessary wear on the equipment, wear which could have been prevented with the use of flatbed trailers.

Even though the T/E allowance was increased 25 per cent, water supply equipment was not adequate. A total of seven units were in operation at one time, which required borrowing two complete units from other Engineer Units. The number of canvas tanks issued as replacements for T/E equipment proved to be sufficient only for a sixty day period. At the last of the operation, it was impossible to establish more than four water points, because of a lack of tanks and hose. The truck-mounted mobile water unit proved satisfactory, except that parts of one portable unit had to be used in conjunction with the mobile unit.

With few exceptions, the amounts of engineer supplies procured by the Division were sufficient for the first twenty days of operation, as originally intended. After that time, the resupply of Engineer materials was practically non-existent. This was particularly true of hand tools and construction items, such as nails and drift pins. Fortunately, some round steel stock was captured, from which drift pins were hand-made in the Engineer Battalion blacksmith shop. This was accomplished just in time to prevent the cessation of bridge construction completely, for lack of drift pins.

Larger quantities of barbed wire and sand bags should have been provided; the available stock was depleted by the end

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of the first two weeks. Some of this material was lost to enemy action in the bombing and fire on A plus 5 day. If this had not occurred, original quantities of fortification materials might have been sufficient for the first twenty days as planned.

Approximately 125,000 board feet of heavy bridge timber was brought for this operation. With the tremendous amount of bridge repair and construction to be done, this supply lasted about 14 days. Resupply of decking, stringers, and treadway was almost non-existent, and the repair of existing bridges thereby became increasingly difficult. Without the portable sawmill, set up and operated by the Engineer Battalion, further bridge construction would have been impossible.

Only one portable steel bridge of the "Bailey" type was provided for the exclusive use of the Division. In one instance, lack of Bailey bridge necessitated the use of ponton trestle equipment over a stream subject to flash floods. Almost 180 feet of this ponton trestle equipment was lost in one of these flash floods. The use of Bailey bridge would have prevented this loss entirely.

In most cases, the Division cannot expect assistance from higher echelons in maintenance and construction of roads, and bridges in the Division zone of operations. During the King II Operation, the 13th Engineer Battalion built, reinforced, or rebuilt more than 65 bridges. It constructed 26 miles of road, of which $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles were along the front lines. At one time, the battalion was responsible for the maintenance, construction, and repair of roads and bridges over a 42 mile stretch. This battalion also constructed and put into operation four cub air-fields, removed or neutralized five enemy mine fields, salvaged a local ferry and put it into operation over a 250 foot stream. A portable sawmill was procured, and placed in operation to produce 5,000 board feet of lumber a day. In addition, a portable pile-driving rig was constructed from salvaged materials and employed in the construction of a 420 foot two way pile bridge, the lumber for which was produced by the sawmill. The necessity for undertaking and completing similar projects can normally be expected in operations of this kind. During King II, the organic engineer battalion required not only all equipment which had been specially authorized, but full T/E allowance of dump trucks and other engineer battalion vehicles. Experience gained during the operation indicates very strongly that to accomplish its mission, the Division organic engineer battalion must have considerably more equipment than is now authorized by T/E.

QUARTERMASTER: Amphibious operations require huge quantities of fuel and lubricants in fifty-three gallon drums. All drums were handled many times between the time they were

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unloaded and the time the fuel was consumed. On rare occasions, it was possible to obtain a crane equipped with barrel chimes for the loading and unloading of these drums, but in the majority of cases, it was necessary to manhandle the four hundred pound drums. It is felt that the man-handling of fuel drums is a definite waste of service personnel, and could be obviated by the assignment of one or two cranes with barrel chimes to the Quartermaster Company. The four motor-driven fuel dispensers which accompanied the Division proved to be invaluable in establishing and operating fuel DP's.

Seventeen 1-ton trailers, pre-loaded with priority supplies and equipment were taken on this operation by the Quartermaster Company. After landing, the trailers were parked, because they could not be utilized in moving supplies from the ships to the dumps. It was later attempted to use the trailers for hauling cargo, but the muddy and impassable condition of roads made it impossible to use them. One ton trailers proved to be of little value, and are not desired for use in any operation unless a hard-surfaced all-weather road net prevails on the anticipated target.

The footwear problem was a complex one throughout the King II Operation. The service shoe, with which the entire Division was equipped proved to be entirely inadequate for wear in the wet, muddy terrain encountered. Furthermore, constant soaking of shoes, with little opportunity to completely dry them, caused shoes to wear excessively, and to disintegrate rapidly. This condition rapidly led to a shortage of footwear as the normal replacement factor could not meet increased losses. It is felt that the shoe-pac, with which this Division was equipped in the Aleutians, would be a much more satisfactory item for use in swampy, tropical climate and terrain. The new type combat shoe was made available to infantry and reconnaissance troop soldiers shortly before the end of the operation, but it has not as yet been determined whether it is satisfactory.

Replacement stocks of socks were available in insufficient quantities. As in the case of shoes, constant immersion of socks in water rapidly rotted them and decreased their potential life. It is felt that if socks, light-wool, were substituted for the normal allowance of socks, cotton, tan, and if the maintenance factor were increased to provide a minimum replacement of two pairs of socks per man per month, the critical nature of the replacement of socks in combat would be somewhat relieved.

ORDNANCE: Effective maintenance is dependent upon the regular flow of replacement parts. Materiel lost to enemy action in the bombing and fire of A plus 5, seriously hampered repairs by destroying many of the parts carried by the Ordnance Company as a combat load. Had the accident not occurred, far better service might have been rendered. The lack of parts in higher echelons presented the biggest maintenance problem, and much equipment spent excessive time in deadline because of it.

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Cannibalization of combat losses was effected throughout the operation, but this source was soon exhausted, resulting in idle mechanic hours.

Evacuation of work to 4th and 5th echelons of repair was hampered by road conditions and the distance of shops from the Division Ordnance Area. Had parts and assemblies been available, little work need have been sent to the rear.

New vehicular equipment needing the most care and maintenance was the M-29C Amphibious Cargo Carrier (Weasel). In view of the delicate mechanisms on this piece of equipment, and the performance expected of it, constant preventative maintenance procedures must be observed. Extreme care in operation, plus continuous first echelon maintenance will greatly reduce third echelon repair of this vehicle.

Very few instances arose in which assembly breakdowns could be attributed to poor design. However, it was found that the truck, 2½ ton rear axle assembly split type (GM2162380) broke down under heavy strains more readily than the rear axle assembly, banjo type.

Tracks for the M-29C have failed to hold up for the job expected of them. The tracks, being linked with rubber cables, have a tendency to stretch beyond the point where suspension adjustment is effective. This usually results in a lost track and damage to drive sprockets. No effective modification has as yet been devised. Average track life was 450 to 500 miles.

Ammunition performed satisfactorily with the following exception:

Shell, H.E., M56, w/PDF M53, 81mm Mortar. Due to terrain, this type mortar shell, having a fuse with a .15 second delay was not as effective against personnel as Shell, H.E. M43A1 w/PDF M52 with an instantaneous fuse. The shell would bury in the ground and had very little fragmentation effect.

Critical item shortages after A plus 60 were Shell, Illuminating, 60mm Mortar; Shell, H.E. M43A1, 81mm Mortar (light); Flare, trip, Para., M48; Flare, Trip, M49; Signal Ground, White Star Para. M17A1; Shell, W.P., 75mm Howitzer; Shell, W.P., 105mm Howitzer; and Shell, W.P. 155mm Howitzer.

The following notes on ordnance resupply are believed important. Engine assemblies were received less clutch throw-out bearings so that unless the old bearing was available from existing stocks, the engine was of little value. Brake parts and electrical parts had an unusually high mortality rate. A higher than average stock would be in order on such parts in this theater.

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MEDICAL: Evacuation of some casualties during the King II operation was effected from marshy areas and rice paddies. The 1/4 Ton ambulance is limited in its ability to negotiate this type of terrain. Collecting Companies found that under marsh conditions, the Cargo Carrier, M-29C was a more suitable vehicle. No weasels were assigned to medical units, but infantry regiments cooperated in furnishing these vehicles when special evacuation problems dictated. In operation in mud, and in marsh areas, the weasel would be a valuable adjunct to the mechanical conveyances of collecting companies and battalion medical sections.

If the 1/4 ton ambulance is to be used on future operations, one deficiency exists which should be corrected. The frame of the top of the ambulance is too close to the upper-most litter. This makes it difficult to load the upper litter rack and is uncomfortable for the casualty. The deficiency was remedied in the field by welding on a 6" section of pipe to the top frame thereby allowing the top to be raised.

The amount of tentage carried by the Clearing Company was insufficient to house all of the patients who were necessarily held during the intervals between evacuations. The T/E allowance for squad tents is 18; and it is felt that this should be increased. When the platoons of the Clearing Company operate separately, two kitchens utilize two of these squad tents; two more are used for admissions, two for major surgeries; two for minor surgeries, and two for pre-operative treatment. This leaves only 8 squad tents available for wards with a capacity of 144 beds. In this operation, the Clearing Company on occasion had a census of 201.

SIGNAL: The chain of supply was critical as the lack of transportation and the distance to the base dump was excessive. In order to keep supply and repair facilities available to front-line troops, it was necessary to move the Division Signal Dump and Repair Section a distance of over 50 miles from the base dump. At times the MSR was blocked by impassable road conditions. Full T/E transportation would be extremely desirable and supply would be facilitated were the base dump closer to the Division.

Maintenance wire supplied at the target was found to have defective insulation. This can be avoided if supply agencies take care that wire is at no time overheated.

The SCR 500 Radio was found to be less satisfactory than the SCR 600 for the special purpose nets, as it is less rugged and has a shorter range. The SCR 300 Radio is not a satisfactory substitute for the SCR 509 in the M-8 self-propelled howitzer as its range is not adequate for Cannon Company requirements. The SCR 536 Tank-Infantry Radio does not have sufficient range and should be replaced by the SCR 300 as prescribed in the new T/E.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Prior to departure from the Hawaiian Islands, A Naval Civil Affairs Unit was attached to the Division to revert to Corps control after the landing phase of the operation had been completed. This Naval Detachment consisted of three line officers, one a Japanese Interpreter, one Medical Officer, one Supply Officer, and ten enlisted men. A plan for the operation of Civil Affairs functions was developed and supplies for relief, medical attention, and shelter of refugees were procured. As plans were formulated for the Stalemate II Operation, the number of civilian refugees was not expected to total more than three or four thousand in the Division sector. On 15 September 1944, the day of departure from the Hawaiian Islands, information was released that the target had been changed to Leyte, Philippine Islands. A new civil affairs plan was prepared and published. It was anticipated that the supplies and equipment which had been procured for the Stalemate Operation would be highly inadequate for the new target, in view of the large population, but no method of procuring additional supplies was available.

The NCAU Unit disembarked at 0700, (J plus 21 hours) 21 October 1944. Upon arrival at Beach Yellow II, it made a quick survey of the civilian area that had been allocated prior to landing. The site was found to be a swamp, and permission was obtained from Division to relocate the civilian camp within the town of Dulag.

Approximately 1,000 civilians were found on Beach Yellow II, and another 500 on Beach Yellow I. These people were immediately moved to the civilian camp. Within 8 hours, their number had increased to approximately 3,000. As the civilian site had undergone a 3 day naval bombardment, and was badly littered with shell holes and debris, laborers were immediately procured and employed to clear the area. The officers and men of NCAU were assigned specific duties consisting of water and food procurement and distribution, and the orderly control of the population. In this, they were assisted by Military Police assigned to civil affairs. Emergency medical care was furnished by 7th Division Medical officers and enlisted men. Hospital cases were cared for by a nearby Army Field Hospital. Large numbers of minor wounds, injuries, and tropical ulcers were treated. By A plus 2, at least 100 cases had been referred to Army hospitals. A survey revealed at least 15 civilian dead lying unattended. The Filipino people showed little interest in the identification and disposal of their dead, and burial was made in the Filipino Cemetery by NCAU.

Due to infiltration from outlying districts, reportedly due to Japanese pressure, the civilian population had grown to approximately 30,000 by A plus 3. On this day, between the hours

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of 1300 and 2300, the entire civilian populace was moved to Beach Yellow I, a distance of about 2 miles. This migration proved to be very difficult, and succeeded only when supplies of food and water were moved to Beach Yellow I, and the people so informed. By the morning of A plus 4, the civilian population had reached its maximum, estimated to be 45,000, this representing the greater portion of the inhabitants of some 56 communities. Army "C" and "K" rations were distributed up to and including A plus 4. Following this date, fish, rice, and meat were issued. Originally, food distribution was made to individuals, but with the increase of population, and organization of barrios, it was found advisable to distribute supplies through barrio leaders. This plan worked satisfactorily and was continued until a general store was established.

Filipinos were found to be exceptionally cooperative. On A plus 1, local political and labor leaders were contacted, and thereafter remained permanently as advisors and assistants. Their help was found to be invaluable. Labor was procured in the following manner: A Labor Office was established for Civilian Personnel; Army units needing labor, furnished this office with a request for the number needed; labor leaders were contacted, and told to have available on the following day the number requested. Transportation to the site of work was furnished by the requesting agency. A list of laborer's time and the amount due having been certified by a commissioned officer, it was presented to the NCAU Finance Office, and payment made to the officer, who in turn paid labor. All laborers were classified and utilized according to their various skills. One hundred and eight nurses, nurses' helpers, four doctors, and two dentists, were secured and made available for duty in dispensaries and hospitals. Wages were paid according to the Commonwealth Government scales. On A plus 5, a maximum of 5,000 laborers were available. The average however, was approximately 1500 per day. The labor supply was adequate at all times.

Army medical personnel continued to assist NCAU medical officers with treatments until A plus 6, the two units treating up to 2,000 patients daily. On A plus 5, and thereafter, as soon as barrios were declared secure, civilians were organized into barrio groups and returned home. Transportation was furnished where necessary. On A plus 7, the civilian camp population had been reduced to approximately 15,000.

On A plus 5, in order to relieve congestion on Beach Yellow I, a secondary civilian relief center was established at Julita. This center was operated entirely by Division personnel, who cared for approximately 3,000 persons.

Following displacement of the Division Command Post to San Pablo, civilians were hired through municipal authorities. It was found that the most efficient method of employment was

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to arrange each group for work under the same foreman, the foreman being designated by the local mayor, and the laborers residents of the community.

On 26 October 1944, A Philippines Civil Affairs Unit was assigned to the Division. This unit, PCAU #7, consisted of approximately 11 officers and 30 enlisted men, and undertook to supplement the activities of the NCAU. On 5 November 1944, NCAU reverted to Corps control.

During the move west to Baybay and north to Ormoc, Engineers used a great deal of civilian labor on roads and bridges. This labor was paid by the hiring agencies with funds procured from PCAU if the latter was available, and otherwise from the Division Finance Office. No difficulties in the procurement and handling of labor were encountered.

In the Baybay area, the civilian population and municipal authorities were found to be most cooperative and intelligent. Any requests for buildings, for housing troops, or warehouses were graciously complied with. The local light and ice plants were placed in operation by arrangement with the owner for the use of troops in the area. It was determined that the saving of signal and ordnance generators, as well as fuel, fully justified operation of these utilities.

A typical problem encountered was the finding of a certain number of venereally infected prostitutes. At Baybay, this was handled by the civilian hospitals, detaining and treating the prostitutes during such time as the danger of infecting others with the venereal disease continued. Explanation by local physicians of the effects of the untreated disease was arranged, with the result that detention became voluntary on the part of the prostitutes.

As soon as the average soldier arrives in a community, he desires to obtain souvenirs, and will pay the first price asked, or will outbid other soldiers for goods. Bolo blades increased in price from two pesos to ten pesos. Bolos increased from five pesos to twenty-five pesos. Other items increased in like proportion, the result being that the civilians' incentive to till crops, to work on government projects, and to continue their own economic life was lost. It is believed that on the Island of Leyte, the economic structure has been so disrupted, that hard times will follow upon departure of any substantial number of troops. Another untoward result of bartering is the tendency on the part of soldiers to trade articles of Government issue.

It is obvious that civil affairs control personnel provided for service within the Division zone of responsibility during the

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King II Operation were numerically inadequate to meet and control the problems presented. Upwards of 100,000 civilian refugees were present within the 7th Division lines during initial phases of the operation. The five officers and ten enlisted men available from the Naval Civil Affairs Unit could only begin to handle the innumerable problems presented. It was necessary that administrative and medical facilities be greatly supplemented by personnel of the 7th Division, a diversion of skilled personnel, which the Division could ill afford during the period of combat. At no time during the King II Operation were duly constituted civil affairs personnel in the Division zone of responsibility nearly adequate to handle problems of providing food for refugees, billeting and re-location of homeless thousands, the immediate necessities of medical service, organization and administration of civilian labor, and the re-establishment of social order. A combat Division engaged in active operations should not be called upon to deal with problems of this type and magnitude. It is imperative that in future operations a sufficient number of highly trained and adequately equipped civil affairs personnel, of unquestioned efficiency and proven ability be provided to secure immediate and continuing control of civilian elements.

Observation over a period of several months and discussion with many civilians leads to the inevitable conclusion that the actions and attitude of the Japanese have resulted in a genuine and intense hatred on the part of the Filipino populace. The attitude of civilians toward Americans has been extremely cordial, and efforts of civil affairs personnel have maintained relations on a most amicable basis.

The following
image(s) may be of
poor quality due to
the poor quality of
the **original**.

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PERSONNEL

Upon receipt of orders announcing the Division's participation in the Stalemate II Operation, steps were immediately taken to procure additional personnel to bring the Division up to authorized T/O strength. Since an overstrength of $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ had been authorized to replace absentees on the date of departure, 465 filler replacements were attached unassigned to the Division. Immediately prior to departure, those fillers not utilized were returned to the replacement Depot, and all units assigned and attached left the staging area at full T/O strength.

Embarkation plans and tactical groupings were prepared by G-1 in coordination with G-3 and G-4. In preparing these plans, personnel were assigned to ships in accord with the tactical groupings, taking into consideration the equipment loaded aboard each ship, and the necessary personnel to maintain and operate it. This plan facilitated the smooth embarkation of troops and enabled units to function efficiently on the long voyage. It was also designed to provide necessary unloading details, and to facilitate assembly of troops after debarkation from many different ships.

Movement of troops from unit areas and embarkation was executed in close coordination with G-4.

All general prisoners who were deemed capable of combat functions were restored to duty after examination by the Division Psychiatrist and upon review of their cases by the Division J.A.

Aboard ship, recreational facilities were made available by Special Service Officers. In coordination with Division G-3 and the Task Force Commander, all troops were taken ashore both at Eniwetok and Manus for exercise and recreation. Officer personnel were extended the privileges of the Naval Officer's Club at Manus. During the operation, opportunities for troop recreation and rehabilitation were extremely limited, since the great majority of the troops were continuously engaged with the enemy. In the later stages of the operation, several regimental rest camps were established. At these camps, limited recreational facilities were provided. American Red Cross Field Directors working with each regimental combat team and at hospital installations, provided invaluable assistance.

Religious services of all denominations were observed regularly both aboard ship and throughout combat operations.

Delay in the receipt of incoming and the forwarding of outgoing mail was a major source of complaint during the operation.

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A great portion of Christmas package mail which eventually did reach the Division was water-damaged. It is generally recognized that the receipt or non-receipt of mail has as great an influence on morale as any other individual factor.

Despite the addition of 26 officers and 779 enlisted replacements, the Division was operating during the later phases of the operation with front-line companies whose strength averaged less than 3 officers and 100 enlisted men. Although replacements were requisitioned on a basis of branch requirement, personnel received by the Division in November were untrained in infantry tactics and the use of infantry weapons. The majority of these replacements were of basic branches other than infantry, and all were in poor physical condition. Most of the men were turned over to the Division without individual arms.

The method of returning hospitalized personnel to units from medical installations both on and away from Leyte Island, was a source of considerable difficulty during early stages of the operation.

Although 108 recommendations for combat promotions were submitted by the Division during the month of November and the early part of December 1944, no combat promotions had been received by personnel of the Division by 25 December 1944. It is felt that every effort must be exercised to have promotion channels cleared to permit early recognition for meritorious service in combat. The prompt servicing of combat promotions is of importance not only to morale, but also to the tactical efficiency of units engaged in combat and suffering combat casualties.

The Division had authority to award only the Bronze Star Medal and the Purple Heart. Although many recommendations for higher awards had been forwarded during October and November very few had been approved by 25 December 1944. In order that meritorious services in combat be immediately recognized, a simplified board of officers for the screening and processing of recommendations for awards should be appointed from among those officers whose duties during combat permits this activity. Efforts should be made to expedite the processing of higher awards.

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Initially, the Division interred its dead in the Dulag Army Cemetery, but thereafter, in operations on the west coast, dead were interred in the 7th Division Cemetery located at Baybay. During the operation, the Graves Registration Platoon originally attached to the Division operated under four different headquarters, each with a different SOP on graves registration procedure. Separation of the Platoon from the Division on these different occasions, disrupted the orderly recording of graves registration data. Assurance of rehabilitation with the Division at the end of an operation is an important mental factor for personnel involved in this type of duty. It is felt that the Graves Registration Platoon should be made an organic attachment to the reinforced Division.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. The organic Division Engineer Battalion be provided with sufficient transportation and heavy equipment to repair and construct bridges, and to build and improve roads over an extended MSR.
2. Replacements be immediately available on call by Divisions and furnished on a basis of branch requirement as requisitioned, well trained, armed, and in excellent physical condition.
3. A sufficient number of highly trained, and adequately equipped civil affairs personnel be provided to secure immediate and continuing control of civilian elements.
4. For campaigns of thirty days or more, the ration program include at least one-third ordinary "B" Rations for rear area troops and combat troops temporarily resting, while ten-in-one, emergency "C" and "K" Rations are reserved for tactical troops whose cooking facilities are limited.
5. When at all possible, full T/E allowance of Division general purpose vehicles be authorized.
6. Theater Censors further simplify censorship regulations by additional study of the security requirements of each campaign.

ROSTER OF OFFICERS

Commanding General.....Major General A.V.Arnold
Assistant Commanding General.....Brig. General J.L.Ready
Artillery Commanding General.....Brig. General L.J.Stewart
Chief of Staff.....Colonel Burton L. Lucas
AC of S, G-1.....Lieut.Col. J. H. Keller
(12 Sept - 24 Oct. 44)
Acting AC of S, G-1.....Captain Jack L. Oliver (to 25 Jan)
AC of S, G-2.....Lieut. Col. Robert G. Fergusson
(12 Sept - 16 Jan 45)
AC of S, G-2.....Major Jackson C. Gillis
(16 January 45.....)
AC of S, G-3.....Lieut.Col. Charles G. Fredericks
AC of S, G-4.....Lieut.Col. H.S.Dillingham
(12 Sept - 27 Dec 44)
AC of S, G-4.....Major Alfred G. Fry
(27 December.....)
Division Engineer.....Lieut.Col. George M.Cookson
Ordnance Officer.....Lieut.Col. John H. Moller
Signal Officer.....Lieut.Col. M. C. Raney
Chemical Warfare Officer (Actg)..Major Gordon A. Cain
Quartermaster.....Lieut.Col. Ward R. Nyhus
(12 Sept - 6 Dec 44)
Quartermaster.....Major J. K. Kane
(6 Dec.....)
Surgeon.....Lieut.Col. R. J. Kamish
Headquarters Commandant.....Lieut. Col. R. K. Hutson
Judge Advocate.....Lieut.Col. J. K. Blanche
Chaplain.....Lieut.Col. Edwin L. Kirtley
Finance Officer.....Lieut.Col. E.W.Taylor
Adjutant General.....Lieut.Col. A.A.Watson
CO, 17th Infantry.....Colonel Francis T. Pachler
Executive, 17th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. E.P.Smith
CO, 1st Bn, 17th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. Albert V. Hartl
CO, 2nd Bn, 17th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. W. B. Moore
CO, 3rd Bn, 17th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. Lee Wallace
CO, 32nd Infantry.....Colonel Marc J. Logie
(12 Sept - 24 October)
CO, 32nd Infantry.....Lieut.Col. John M. Finn
CO, 1st Bn, 32nd Infantry.....Lt.Col. Leigh H. Mathias
(12 Sept - 24 October)
CO, 1st Bn, 32nd Infantry.....Major Robert C. Foulston
CO, 2nd Bn, 32nd Infantry.....Lieut.Col. Glenn A. Nelson
(12 Sept - 10 December)
CO, 2nd Bn, 32nd Infantry.....Major R.E.Goodfellow
CO, 3rd Bn, 32nd Infantry.....Lieut.Col. Charles A. Whitcomb

CO, 184th Infantry.....Colonel C.D.O'Sullivan
(12 Sept. 44 - 4 Jan 45)

CO, 184th Infantry.....Lieut. Col. Roy A. Green

CO, 1st Bn, 184th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. Daniel C. Maybury

CO, 2nd Bn, 184th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. Delbert L. Bjork

CO, 3rd Bn, 184th Infantry.....Lieut.Col. W.P. Walker

Executive, Division Artillery.....Colonel Robert H. Booth

CO, 31st F.A. Battalion.....Lieut.Col. Stanley Sawicki

CO, 48th F.A. Battalion.....Major Jack D. Beck
(12 Sept - 28 October)

CO, 48th F.A. Battalion.....Major Clement B. Harts

CO, 49th F.A. Battalion.....Lieut.Col. F.B.Harrison

CO, 57th F.A. Battalion.....Lieut.Col. D.F.Slaughter

CO, 7th Medical Battalion.....Lieut.Col. Byron B. Cochrane

CO, 767th Tank Battalion.....Lieut.Col. H.R.Edmondson
(12 Sept - 25 Oct)

CO, 767th Tank Battalion.....Major L. P.Daniels

CO, 776th Amph. Tank Battalion.....Lieut.Col. O'Neill K. Kane

CO, 536th Amph. Trac Battalion.....Lieut.Col. R.B.Smith

CO, 718th Amph. Trac Battalion.....Lieut.Col. J.L.Behrns

CO, 7th Quartermaster Company.....Captain C.A.Lauenstein

CO, 7th Signal Company.....Captain F.S.Kelly

CO, 707th Ordnance Company.....Captain R.A.Fuller

CO, 7th Cav.Recon. Troop.....Captain Paul B. Gritta

CO, 91st Chemical Company.....Captain E. F. Them

Operations Report - prepared by.....Captain O.M.Doerflinger, G-3
assisted by.....CWO E.A.Blumenthal

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CO 707th Ord (LM) Co	1
CO 767th Tank Bn	2
CO 776th Amph Tank Bn	2
CO 1140th Engr (C) Gp	1
CO 50th Engr (C) Bn	1
CO 104th Engr (C) Bn	1
CO 110th Engr (C) Bn	1
CO 536th Amph Tractor Bn	1
CO 718th Amph Tractor Bn	1
CO 480th Amph Truck Co	1
CO 472nd Amph Truck Co	1
CO 75th JASCO	1
CO 502nd AAA Gun Bn	1
CO 866th AAA (AW) Bn	1
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