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OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

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25 March 1945.

SUBJECT: Supplemental Operation Report, XXIV Corps - Battle of Leyte, Philippine Islands - for period 26 December 1944 to 10 February 1945, inclusive.

- TO :
- Commandant, Army and Navy Staff College, New War Department Building, Washington, D. C. (21st & Virginia Avenue).
  - Commandant, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.
  - Commandant, Navy War College, Newport, R. I.
  - Commanding General, Third Amphibious Corps, c/o Fleet Marine Force, c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.
  - Commandant, Marine Corps School, c/o Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

The inclosed copy of Supplemental Operation Report, XXIV Corps - Battle of Leyte, Philippine Islands - for period 26 December 1944 to 10 February 1945, inclusive, is forwarded for your information and file.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

*L. Duenweg*  
L. DUENWEG,  
Lt. Col., AGD,  
Ass't Adjutant General.

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Subject report.  
(copy No. 17).

Date 1/31/47

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# OPERATION REPORT

# XXIV CORPS



26 December 1944 - 10 February 1945



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S E C R E T

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. This report covers the operations of the XXIV Corps on LEYTE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS from 26 December 1944 to 10 February 1945. During this period the Corps was attached to and operated under Eighth Army (Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger).

2. The earlier phases of the operation are described in "Operation Report, XXIV Corps - LEYTE, 20 October 1944 to 25 December 1944". This report has been previously submitted through the Commanding General, Sixth Army (Lieutenant General Walter Krueger), under whose command the Corps served during this period. The lessons learned in the campaign, with appropriate recommendations, are included in the above report and for that reason are not included here.

3. The zones of action of the Corps and the divisions and the locations of major elements on 26 December are shown on the map on page 2. These dispositions resulted from the earlier activities of the Corps, which for the purpose of background are summarized briefly below.

a. The Sixth Army, with the X Corps (Major General F. C. Sibert) and the XXIV Corps abreast, the XXIV Corps on the left (south), made the initial assault landing on the east coast of LEYTE on 20 October 1944 (Inclosure No. 1 - Map of LEYTE, 1 to 250,000).

b. The XXIV Corps (Major General John R. Hodge) landed on the east coast of LEYTE between CATMON HILL (61-35) and MARABANG RIVER (63-24) with the 96th Infantry Division (Major General J. L. Bradley) on the right (north) and the 7th Infantry Division (Major General A. V. Arnold) on the left. The Corps completed the seizure of its assigned beachhead on schedule on 30 October. Following this two additional divisions were assigned the Corps (11th Airborne under Major General J. M. Swing and 77th Infantry under Major General A. D. Bruce), and the Corps shifted a large part of its strength to the west coast of LEYTE. The 7th Division attacked north from BAYBAY (85-93) 5 December. The 77th Division made an amphibious assault landing near ORMOC (12-33) 7 December and attacked north. The 11th Airborne and 96th Infantry Divisions which remained on the east coast attacked west through the mountains. By 26 December our forces had reached positions shown on the map on page 2.

NOTE: All coordinates used in this report refer to Map of LEYTE, 1 to 250,000 (Inclosure No. 1).





PART TWO

BRIEF NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

4. On 26 December, the Corps was involved in the final phase of the LEYTE campaign as briefly outlined in Part One. The plan for continuing the operation included the following features:

a. The immediate opening of the PALOMPON (85-33)-LIBUNGAO (06-51) road. This mission was retained by the 77th Division.

b. Destroying remnants of Jap units in the mountains. All divisions were involved in this operation - the 7th and 77th Divisions blocking the western exits of the mountain passes while the 96th Infantry Division and 11th Airborne Division pushed aggressively through the mountains from their eastern side.

c. Continuous and aggressive action covering the entire Corps area of responsibility, to hunt down and destroy all remaining hostile forces.

d. Maintaining security of principal roads, bridges and installations in the Corps area of responsibility.

e. Expansion of activities to take over security of all of LEYTE and SAMAR ISLANDS in early January.

5. Between 26-31 December, the 77th Infantry Division completed its coordinated attack to secure the PALOMPON-LIBUNGAO road. The reinforced battalion of the 305th Infantry which was located at PALOMPON attacked northeast along the road toward the mountain pass overlooking the west coast. Simultaneously the remainder of the 305th Infantry attacked west from MATAGOB (98-45). Extremely stubborn resistance was encountered along this road where it wound through the pass. The Japs defending this road consisted of the 5th Regiment of the 8th Jap Division, reinforced by stragglers from several other units. Well dug-in along high ground commanding the road and supported by artillery and heavy mortars, these Japs clung tenaciously to their positions until on the 31st of December when our forces advancing both from the east and west broke all organized enemy resistance along the road, secured the pass, and made juncture on the western slopes of the mountains. Although organized resistance along the PALOMPON-MATAGOB road was broken, only protected convoys were able to make the trip with safety for several days due to constant sniping and numerous ambushes established by the Japs in the favorable terrain of the mountain pass. At this time the 77th Division expanded its zone of action northward in relieving elements of the X Corps and elements of the 305th Infantry proceeded by water up the coast to VILLABA (86-58). This town was secured with little resistance and a strong defense established around



it from which strong patrols probed the mountains to the north, east and south. Enemy activity in this area initially consisted of patrols and small harassing attacks against our patrols and against our perimeter. A second regiment of the division operated in the vicinity of VALENCIA (08-45), intercepting groups of Japs driven into that area by the activities of the 7th Division, and groups attempting to escape to the west coast. The other regiment of the 77th Division remained in the northern central part of the division zone, cooperating with X Corps units in destruction of hostile forces caught between the two corps. On 5 January 1945 it expanded its area northward to relieve the X Corps west of the main range. The division assumed responsibility for all of LEYTE east of the mountains and north of the line VALENCIA-PALOMPON (both inclusive)

6. On 26 December, the 11th Airborne Division was engaged in mopping up "last ditch" Japs located in almost completely inaccessible positions on the southern slopes of MT. MAJUNAG (MANUNAG) (38-33). One regiment of the division - the 511th Parachute Infantry - had already forced its way through the mountains to the west coast tying in with elements of the 7th Division and completing the isolation of an enemy force protecting the eastern end of an unfinished supply trail the Japs had apparently intended to push across the mountains. The remainder of the 11th Airborne Division had this enemy isolated force practically surrounded. This force, which occupied deep "spider holes" and mutually supporting pillboxes located on knife-edged ridges was only destroyed after much hand-to-hand fighting. The 11th Airborne Division was relieved from its area by elements of the 96th Division on 29 December and withdrawn to eastern beaches to rehabilitate for operations elsewhere.

7. On the east side of LEYTE the 96th Division with its CP near GUINARONA (46-35) was disposed in a wide arc centering generally on the area west of DAGAMI (47-40). Patrols from the division constantly probed through the mountains, driving the remaining scattered enemy groups to the west with heavy losses. These patrols ranged far from their bases and several of them crossed the mountains into the 7th and 77th Division areas. The division completed relief of all elements of the 11th Airborne Division by the end of December and on 5 January 1945 expanded north and relieved X Corps units of all tactical responsibility east of the mountains, with the exception of a staging area along the PINAMOPOAN (08-68)-CARIGARA (21-68)-JARO (33-55) road. At this time two infantry battalions were sent to SAMAR ISLAND (north of LEYTE) to relieve X Corps units there.

8. The 7th Division had taken over areas from the 77th as the latter drove north and on 26 December was responsible for the security of the entire west coastal area south of the line PALOMPON-VALENCIA (both exclusive). This area contained thousands of Jap stragglers searching for food or attempting to join the group assembling in the hills east of ORMOC or trying to get to the west coast. 7th Division combat patrols - as many as forty (40) a day - combed the west coastal plain and probed the mountains constantly, hunting down and destroying enemy groups. In addition to wandering bands of enemy throughout the area, patrols eventually located two large and well-protected concentrations of enemy remnants east of ORMOC in extremely difficult

mountain terrain. One of these, 3,000-4,000 strong was in the MT MAAGONOC (23-33) area under Lieutenant General Yamagata and the other 1,500-2,000 in strength was in the MT ABUNUG (22-36) area under Colonel Imabore. Prisoners of war indicated that although these troops were tired, hungry and dispirited, they were planning to attack the ORMOC area. Under pressure of our troops and artillery fire this plan was abandoned and the concentrations withdrew northward, later breaking up into bands of 20 to 200 and attempting to withdraw westward across Highway 2 to reach the west coast. By the end of January few Japs were left east of Highway 2 and thousands had been killed by the 7th and 77th Divisions during their westward withdrawal. Starvation and disease also took heavy toll.

9. During this period the withdrawing Japs showed little aggressive spirit, but fought desperately when cornered. Our patrols, ambushes and artillery fire, catching the retreating bands in the open ORMOC VALLEY, were able to cause great destruction with comparatively few friendly casualties. Combat patrols with accompanying artillery observers and supporting Cub airplanes proved most effective in results. Due to the Jap dispersal and his refusal to make a stand it was usually impossible to make effective coordinated attacks in any strength. Accurately adjusted artillery fire using time fuzes was particularly effective in the open.

10. In the meantime, on 15 January, 1945 the battalion of the 305th Infantry (77th Division) which had landed at VILLABA was subjected to an all-day, coordinated infantry-artillery attack from Japs apparently assembled from those left in the west peninsula. The Japs participating were in good condition and were well trained. Presumably they had not been hurt in combat on LEYTE prior to this time. Our troops drove off this attack, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. Subsequent patrolling by the VILLABA battalion located a strong enemy force in the mountains southeast of VILLABA. The 77th Division using the mass of the division destroyed this Jap pocket during the period 27 January-3 February by a coordinated converging attack from three directions. The division was relieved of tactical responsibility by elements of the Americal Division (X Corps) on 5 February and moved to an assembly area on the east coast.

11. Repeated native reports of Jap atrocities against civilians in the CAMOTES ISLANDS (just west of LEYTE) had been received in December. On 15 January the 7th Division sent a task force composed of a reinforced battalion, 184th Infantry in LVTs and LCMs to PONSON ISLAND, the easternmost of the CAMOTES. The landing was unopposed and the island was occupied without resistance. Reported Jap atrocities against Filipinos were confirmed and evidence and photos were obtained. The Japs had evacuated the island some time before, probably as a result of our 155mm gunfire which had been placed on the island for over a month. Two days later this battalion made an amphibious assault on PORO ISLAND where fanatically resisting Japs located in excellent positions near the town of PORO on the southern end of the island were encountered and eventually annihilated. Patrols were sent over the causeway to comb PACIJAN ISLAND but no hostile forces were encountered on that island. The islands were secure and the task force turned them over to guerrilla troops on 31 January and returned to LEYTE.

S E C R E T

12. By 12 February, all elements of the Corps on the west coast except small elements of antiaircraft had been relieved by the Americal Division operating under X Corps and by night 13 February had closed in staging areas on the east coast of LEYTE. Relief of units on eastern LEYTE and on SAMAR was made progressively, and all elements finally moved into staging areas by 15 February.

13. Throughout all operations on the western half of LEYTE, wholehearted cooperation by the PT boats provided invaluable support to elements of the XXIV Corps. Operating primarily at night, boats of the PT squadrons located at ORMOC sortied continuously to the east coast of CEBU and north along the western coast of LEYTE. Many Jap barges, at least two (2) sizeable freighters and several schooners, many of which were loaded with Jap troops or equipment, were sunk by PT boats. During these attacks PT boat crews were often fired upon by shore batteries of light caliber or by weapons carried in the Jap vessels. While casualties were frequently suffered by these crews, their eagerness to close with the enemy and furnish aid to our ground operations was outstanding throughout their support of the XXIV Corps.

14. Major General J. L. Bradley of the 96th Division was in temporary command of the Corps 14-25 January 1945, during the absence of the Corps Commander for a planning conference in connection with a new operation.

15. Enemy air was a constant annoyance during most of the period of this report but was never used in a sufficiently concentrated effort to interfere seriously with our activities. An attack on ORMOC just after daylight on 3 January 1945 was the most damaging single raid, resulting in 96 casualties from cluster antipersonnel bombs less than half of whom were evacuated.

16. a. Counted Jap casualties during the period 26 December through 10 February were:

<u>Killed</u>	<u>Found Dead from Dis-</u> <u>ease and Starvation</u>	<u>PWs</u>	<u>Total</u>
13,221	950	236	14,407

Estimated Japs remaining on island - 3,000.

b. Our own battle casualties for the same period were:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
180	577	6	763

S E C R E T


PART THREE

COMMENTS

17. Detailed comments and lessons learned are made in the Report of Operations for the period ending 25 December and will not be repeated. With the capture of PALOMPON on 25 December, it was properly announced that organized resistance on LEYTE ISLAND had ended. The total number of enemy individuals left on LEYTE exceeded a full division strength but with two exceptions there was no indication of control or organized effort although there is strong evidence that most elements were in contact with a higher headquarters. Constant pressure and aggressive patrolling by our elements frustrated any chance of reassembly for aggressive action and eventually reduced the remnants to a condition in which they were of no consequence except for the harassment of native communities.

18. During this phase, troops of the infantry divisions gained rich experience and much knowledge of patrolling, particularly in the field of combat patrolling. Greatest possible use was made of artillery and its great effectiveness in mopping up operations was universally evident. Forward observers habitually accompanied all combat patrols and it is believed the Japs killed by artillery fire greatly exceeded those killed by infantry action. Artillery fire was all observed fire placed on known targets, and was fired in short dense concentrations. Considerable timed fire was used and was especially effective on enemy in the open. Armored vehicles used in small groups for infantry support proved highly effective against enemy pockets wherever the terrain allowed their use.

19. The most outstanding thing in the entire campaign has been the bravery, the stability and the durability of the American soldier and junior officer and their ability to "take it" without complaint. No praise of their performance can be too high.

  
JOHN R. HODGE  
Major General, United States Army  
Commanding

APPENDIX A

PERSONNEL AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. Personnel.

a. Casualties suffered during the period 26 December 1944 - 10 February 1945 were as follows:

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	<u>KIA</u>			<u>WIA</u>			<u>IIA</u>			<u>MIA</u>			<u>DOW</u>		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Corps Trs	3		8			47			1						1
7th Div	3		60	11		215	1		17			4	2		11
77th Div	3	1	77	10		243			87			2			4
96th Div			7	3		28			1			4			10
11th A/B Div	2		16	10		10			8						3
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>34</b>		<b>543</b>	<b>1</b>		<b>114</b>			<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>		<b>29</b>

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

	<u>SICK</u>			<u>DEATHS</u>			<u>OTHER CAUSES</u>		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Corps Trs	76	6	2517			11	3		322
7th Div	155		3476			1	11		326
77th Div	110	2	2159			19			
96th Div	81	1	2293			3			5
11th A/B Div	No Report								
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10445</b>			<b>34</b>	<b>14</b>		<b>653</b>

S E C R E T

b. Grand total of casualties suffered during the entire campaign (20 October 1944 - 10 February 1945) were as follows:

BATTLE CASUALTIES

	<u>KIA</u>			<u>WIA</u>			<u>IIA</u>			<u>MIA</u>			<u>DOW</u>		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Corps Trs	8		65	17	2	311	2		31						7
7th Div	45		472	139	1	1960	5		74		1	5			62
77th Div	22	1	408	101	1	1451	3		167	1	3	1	1		66
96th Div	24		357	67		1085	1		36	2		5			83
11th A/B	17		117	23		299	3		27	1		11			34
Separate*			29	8	1	176	1		16	1		16	1		5
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1448</b>	<b>355</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5282</b>	<b>15</b>		<b>351</b>	<b>5</b>		<b>31</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>157</b>

NON-BATTLE CASUALTIES

	<u>SICK</u>			<u>DEATHS</u>			<u>OTHER CAUSES</u>		
	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM	O	WO	EM
Corps Trs	125	10	4877	1		14	4		365
7th Div	245	3	5795			4	11		326
77th Div	143	2	2832			20			
96th Div	179	1	3658	1		9	4		33
11th A/B Div	No Report								
Separate*	34	4	1083			2	2		119
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>726</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18245</b>	<b>2</b>		<b>49</b>	<b>21</b>		<b>843</b>

\* Organizations listed separately were reattached to Corps on or about 10 February 1945. Their final reports are submitted separately and are not included in Corps totals.

c. Replacements were received on 31 January 1945 and were assigned as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
7th Division	8	498
77th Division	9	572
96th Division	7	324
Hq XXIV Corps		78
Corps Troops	<u>1</u>	<u>25</u>
 TOTALS	 25	 1497

d. Burials in Corps cemeteries during the period 26 December 1944 - 10 February 1945 totaled 516. These added to previous burials give the following grand total:

	<u>BAYBAY</u>	<u>IPIL</u>	<u>CAMP DOWNES</u>	<u>VALENCIA</u>	<u>SAN JOSE</u>	<u>DULAG</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Army	314	119	127	276	459	625	1920
Navy	1		1		15	16	33
Marines					3	5	8
Unknown	12	1			18	62	96
 TOTALS	 327	 120	 128	 276	 495	 708	 2057*

\* Includes some burials from units not under control of XXIV Corps.

## 2. Civil Affairs.


a. On 26 December, Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU) Numbers 14, 15, 17, 26 and 27 took over responsibility for civil affairs in the areas indicated on the map on page 11. These PCAUs relieved Numbers 4, 7, and 8 which had been with the Corps for some time but were relieved from their duties on LEYTE in order to make them available for duty on LUZON. Although the change in units resulted in some unavoidable confusion, the generally excellent service performed by the PCAUs was continued.

b. At this time, civil conditions on the east side of the island had become stable. On the west coast, however, thousands of civilians had been driven from their homes by our advance. The town of ORMOC - the largest in the area - and numerous smaller barrios had been destroyed. In addition, an estimated 2,000 natives of the CAMOTES ISLANDS had left their homes due to the atrocities committed by the Japs and were living along the beaches north of BAYBAY. The shortage of food and medical supplies had resulted in seriously hazardous health conditions throughout the west coastal plain, with the exception of the BAYBAY area which had been restored to a reasonably normal condition.

c. The PCAUs operated directly under the Corps Commander with the mission of assisting the division commanders charged with tactical control of the particular area concerned. PCAU supplies of food, medicine, clothing and sundries were brought to the west coast as rapidly as space in the convoys could be made available. An organized effort to reap the unharvested rice crop produced an appreciable addition to the imported food supplies.

d. Resettlement of natives in their homes was accomplished as rapidly as tactical conditions permitted. In this





connection the IPIL-ORMOC area was made off limits to native settlement in order to avoid interference with the supply installations. Ample native labor was available and was freely used on roads and in the service installations.

e. Relocation centers were established at DEPOSITO (17-27), BINOLJO (19-25), SIGUINON (20-25) and ALBUERA (23-23) for the civilians of IPIL (16-29) and ORMOC. Some ORMOC inhabitants were also relocated at VALENCIA. There was a group of 4,000 civilians who were released from Jap custody at HOT SPRING (16-46) early in January. Overall population of these relocation centers reached a total of 35,000. Food supply was critical, although all families admitted having stored provisions hidden away. As the tactical situation permitted, individuals were permitted to return for these supplies.

f. During this period, evidence of Jap atrocity appeared in increasing frequency. Civilians who had been shot or ruthlessly bayoneted were found every day. On PONSON ISLAND over 300 people had been brutally murdered when American troops arrived there.

g. Most serious problems encountered during the period were supply and government. The former was solved by shipping from 50 to 100 tons, mostly food, with each of the five resupply convoys from DULAG (63-27) to IPIL. Local government continued to be hampered by the failure of the Commonwealth Government to appoint or confirm local officials. It was found that the Filipino returned to his former habits and way of life very quickly, but he refused to respect officials who had only the backing of the military authorities. Had the Commonwealth Government been quick to appoint officials, local government could have started much sooner.

APPENDIX BLOGISTICS1. General.

a. The Port of DULAG and its associated service installations was being operated by Sub-Base K on 26 December. Inclosure No. 1, Organization indicates the service units which were assigned or attached to the XXIV Corps at the time of the landing (20 October) and which at the time of this report were under the operational control of Sub-Base K. This was the base installation responsible for support of the Corps.

b. The Corps had, on 29 November, established an unloading point at ABUYOG (see map, page 14). This installation (later known as the ABUYOG Port and Dump Area) was established to speed up unloading of Corps resupply and rear echelon shipping (which was far behind schedule due to limited port facilities) and to provide a supplementary stock of supplies available for shipment to west coast units. It continued functioning throughout the period of this report.

c. The logistic support of west coast units was a Corps responsibility throughout the operations. A port had been established at IPIL (see map, page 14) early in December and by the 26th a corresponding dump area was in operation at ORMOC. At this time, the 7th Division was responsible for coordination of all west coast logistic activities which were involved in the support of some 32,000 troops located west of the mountains.

2. Transportation.

a. Water transportation from the east coast to IPIL was provided by Task Force 78.3 (7th Fleet) which sent a convoy of LSMs and LCIs to the west coast every three (3) days. These convoys normally carried 500-600 tons of supplies.

b. Trucks supplemented the available water transportation by hauls over the narrow and mountainous MSR. During the period immediately following 26 December, an average of about 100 trucks daily arrived on the west coast.


c. Company B, 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment operated under control of the Corps on the west coast. This company equipped chiefly with LCMs and LCV(P)s moved personnel, supplies, equipment and casualties between points on the west coast and were used to maintain units located in areas inaccessible by road. In addition, the rocket and flak boats of the company were frequently called upon for supporting fires. This unit was indispensable in the 77th Division operations in the PALOMPON-VILLABA area and in the 7th Division's assault on the CAMOTES.

3. Supply.

a. By 26 December stocks on the west coast had been built up to a general level of 5-10 days of supply of all

# ROAD MAP OF LEYTE

STATUTE MILES  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



## LEGEND

- 2 LANE ALL WEATHER
- 1 LANE ALL WEATHER
- 1 LANE SEASONAL

NOTE:  
Italicized numbers indicate distance in miles between asterisks

classes. This level was maintained throughout the remainder of the operation.

b. The general plan of supply was as follows:

- (1) The Corps coordinated the utilization of the space available on the LSM convoys.
- (2) The divisions and separate units utilized all available motor transportation to supplement tonnage allotted on the convoys.
- (3) Supplies were, in general, pooled in the IPIL-ORMOC dumps and allocated to units in accordance with the requirements of the situation.

4. Medical Support (Map, page 16).

a. Status of medical support on western LEYTE as of 26 December 1944:

- (1) 36th Field Hospital was in operation at ORMOC.
- (2) 644th Collecting Company with one (1) platoon of the 556th Ambulance Company attached was operating from ORMOC, with responsibility of evacuating 7th and 77th Division Clearing Stations and moving patients from hospitals to beach or VALENCIA airfield for further evacuation. The station platoon operated a strip side holding station at VALENCIA airstrip.
- (3) 69th Field Hospital, less one (1) platoon, was in process of moving to VALENCIA from BAYBAY.
- (4) One (1) platoon of the 69th Field Hospital was in operation at BAYBAY.
- (5) 645th Collecting Company with one (1) platoon of the 556th Ambulance Company attached was operating from BAYBAY with responsibility for land evacuation to east coast LEYTE.
- (6) Air Transport Command, on call, was evacuating patients from VALENCIA airstrip.
- (7) 1st Section, 1st Platoon, 589th Quartermaster Laundry Company was operating in ORMOC.

b. Hospitalization.

- (1) The 36th Field Hospital operated at full capacity in ORMOC. 3 January 1945, at 0645, a Jap plane dropped several anti-personnel bombs in and around the 36th Field Hospital. Twenty (20) enlisted men of the hospital were wounded, of which two (2) died. Sixteen (16) patients of the hospital received minor wounds. The

# ROAD MAP OF LEYTE

STATUTE MILES  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

TO WHITE BEACH  
FOR AIR EVAC

TO EAST  
COAST

## LEGEND

- 2 LANE ALL WEATHER
- 1 LANE ALL WEATHER
- 1 LANE SEASONAL

NOTE:  
Italicized numbers indicate  
distance in miles between asterisks

- CORPS EVAC ROUTES AMB
- XX CORPS EVAC ROUTES LCM-LCVP
- OO ARMY WATER EVAC

**CORPS MEDICAL  
INSTALLATIONS & EVACUATION  
ROUTES**

69 F HOSP (-PLAT)  
25 DEC-5 FEB

36 F HOSP  
20 DEC-3 JAN  
644 COLL CO  
17 DEC  
20 SEC 556 AMB  
17 DEC-1 FEB

HQ 71 BN  
5 DEC TO DATE  
394 CLR CO (-PLAT)  
5 DEC TO DATE

645 COLL CO  
5 DEC-12 FEB  
IST SEC 556 AMB  
17 NOV-6 JAN

36 F HOSP  
7 DEC-18 DEC

69 F HOSP (-PLAT)  
5 DEC-24 DEC  
IST PLAT 69 F HOSP  
8 DEC-12 FEB

644 COLL CO  
14 NOV-15 DEC

644 COLL CO  
10 NOV-14 NOV

645 COLL CO  
29 OCT-18 NOV

644 COLL CO  
23 OCT-10 NOV

IST PLAT 69  
24 OCT  
69 F HOSP  
23 OCT-3 DEC  
76 STA HOSP  
OPENED 24 OCT  
165 STA HOSP  
OPENED 24 OCT  
394 CLR CO  
24 OCT-5 DEC  
556 AMB CO  
22 OCT TO DATE  
HQ 71ST MED BN  
23 OCT-5 DEC  
645 COLL CO  
23 OCT-29 OCT

645 COLL CO  
18 NOV-28 NOV  
DET 645 COLL CO  
28 NOV-12 DEC  
IST PLAT 394 CLR CO  
12 DEC-6 FEB  
DET 69 F HOSP  
17 NOV-28 NOV

S E C R E T

36th Field Hospital, less two(2) platoons, closed at ORMOC on 4 January 1945 and opened at VALENCIA 5 January 1945. The remainder of the hospital was shuttled to VALENCIA, the move being completed 8 January 1945. The 36th Field Hospital, less two (2) platoons, closed at VALENCIA on 25 January and one (1) platoon closed each three (3) days thereafter. The hospital equipment and personnel were moved to eastern LEYTE by LSMs, three (3) days after closing.

- (2) The 69th Field Hospital, less one (1) platoon, opened station at VALENCIA on 27 December 1944. One (1) platoon, 69th Field Hospital remained at BAYBAY. 69th Field Hospital, less one (1) platoon, closed station at VALENCIA on 5 February 1945, the second platoon on 8 February 1945. Equipment was transported to eastern LEYTE by LSM. The platoon of 69th Field Hospital at BAYBAY closed station on 11 February 1945. The supplies, equipment and personnel were moved to eastern LEYTE by truck.

c. Evacuation.

- (1) Beginning 28 December 1944, LCIs arrived each three (3) days at ORMOC. On each occasion, all patients that required more than fourteen (14) days hospitalization, were evacuated. Eighth Army supplied Medical Department personnel on the LCIs until 2 February 1945. Thereafter the medical units returning to eastern LEYTE furnished the necessary Medical Department personnel. A total of 1,734 casualties (457 litter and 1,277 ambulant cases) were evacuated by water. During the period, when the hospitals became overloaded, the casualties were evacuated to BAYBAY by LCMs and LCV(P)s and then to the DULAG hospitals by ambulance to ABUYOG.
- (2) Weather permitting, the Air Corps evacuated by C-47s such litter cases as could not be moved by water, and emergency ambulatory patients. Air evacuation was discontinued 1 February 1945. A total of 643 (394 litter and 249 ambulant cases) were evacuated by air during the period.

d. Supplies - Medical supplies were adequate during this phase of the operation. Supply point was set up in ORMOC. Supplies were transported to western LEYTE by truck, LSM and LCI. Whole blood and biologicals were delivered by Cub plane as needed. One (1) 150 cu. ft. mechanical reefer was delivered to each field hospital on 27 December 1944.



S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

18 MAR 1945  
10 11 12  
13 14 15  
16 17 18  
19 20 21  
22 23 24  
25 26 27  
28 29 30  
31


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25 26 27  
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31






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**LEGEND**  
 ○ Cities and Villages  
 — Roads (First and Second Class)  
 — Roads (Third Class)  
 - - - Trails  
 ~~~~~ Streams



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**LEGEND**  
 ○ Cities and Villages  
 — Roads (First and Second Class)  
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 - - - Trails  
 ~~~~~ Streams



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