

D 769.3 TWENTY-SIXTH INFANTRY DIVISION  
26th BRIEF DIARY, 8 Nov - 12 Dec 1944  
.A 2 LORRAINE CAMPAIGN/ by Interviewee  
dU from 26th Inf Div et al 1945

*Paris*

26TH INFANTRY DIVISION BRIEF DIARY

*See 1st  
9 Nov 1944  
13 Dec  
1944*

8 Nov 1944: Captured MOYENVIC AND VIC sur SEILLE. The 326th Inf attacked 0700 following a thirty(30) minute artillery preparation. Cleared BEZANNGE le PETITE and MONCOURT.

SEILLE River Bridge

9 Nov 1944: At 0900 hours Task Force A crossed at MOYENVIC And attacked in the direction of MORVILLE and HAMPONT. Cleared MORVILLE under heavy artillery fire, advanced to the high ground northeast of HAMPONT. 104th Inf cleared two-thirds of CHATEAU SALINS.

10 Nov 1944: The 101st and 104th Inf Regts continued the attack against medium resistance. CHATEAU SALINS was captured. 4th Armored Division passed through.

11 Nov 1944: Counterattack by 11th Panzer Division on the 1st Bn 104th Inf at RODALBE broken by artillery and direct fire from attached AA Battalion. HALBOUDANGE WOODS, OB ECK, and high ground east of HAMPONT secured. 3d Battalion 326th Infantry and 3d Battalion 101st Infantry began clearing KOECKING WOODS. 101st Infantry, plus Task Force B, plus 3d Battalion 326th Infantry (attached) protected division right flank and mopped up vicinity of Hill 310.

12 Nov 1944: 104th Infantry, with CC<sup>+</sup>, advanced slowly to the north east against heavy resistance. At 1500 hours, 3d Battalion 104th Infantry received violent counterattack of infantry supported by tanks. 326th Infantry cleared KOECKING FOREST, met resistance vic BERANGE FARM.

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26TH INF DIVISION  
LOREAIN CAMPAIGN  
8 Nov - 12 Dec 1944

Fairly comprehensive material on winter fighting against strong defenses in hilly, wooded country. Consists mostly of battalion interviews, which systematically trace daily operations down to companies. A good deal of detail of various small-unit combats in woods and villages.

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19 Nov 1944: 328th Infantry attacked 0700 hours preceded by a thirty minute artillery preparation on DIEUZE. Met heavy resistance. Secured KERPRICH - GUEBESTROFF line. 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments continued attack against heavy resistance but failed to take BOURGALSTROFF and BENESTROFF.

20 Nov 1944: 328th Infantry supported by 51st AIB and 761st Tank Battalion, attacked DIEUZE, seized the town without opposition, secured the high ground north of DIEUZE. 101st Infantry broke through to TORCHVILLE and LOHR. 104th Infantry cleared BENESTROFF and MAREMONT and advanced to MONTDIDIER.

21 Nov 1944: 104th Infantry seized MONTDIDIER and positions overlooking ALBESTROFF. The 328th Infantry (motorized) moved to NEBING for an attack on MUNSTER and HONSKIRCH. Advance of 101st Infantry on INSVILLER was impeded by flooded condition of RODE River.

22 Nov 1944: 104th Infantry advanced slowly against heavy resistance secured high ground southeast of ALBESTROFF. The 101st Infantry began clearance of FENETRANGE WOODS north of SAAR Canal. 328th Infantry reached MUNSTER.

23 Nov 1944: Division makes slow progress in entire zone. 104th Infantry clears ALBESTROFF.

24 Nov 1944: Division readjusts positions and constructs bridges for supply routes.

25 Nov 1944: 101st Infantry clears BOIS de BONNE FONTAINE. Clears VIBERSVILLIER against heavy resistance. Secures high ground overlooking ALTWILLER. 328th Infantry secures high ground vic HONSKIRCH. 104th Inf pinched out by 328th and elements of the 35th Infantry Division.

Was held abreast farm by fire from pillbox emplacements and heavy automatic weapons fire. The 101st Infantry attacked unsuccessfully against ST MIDARD. Received heavy concentration of direct artillery fire from the southeast. 2d Cavalry moved up to HILL 310 and relieved the 101st Infantry.

13 Nov 1944: Division attack slowing down.

3d Battalion, 104th Infantry, on north flank of division counter-attacked by heavy infantry and armor attack. 328th Infantry meeting heavy resistance in KOECKING WOODS.

14 Nov 1944: Division attacked with little progress. 104th Inf holding the line on CONTHIL - LIDREZING road. 101st Infantry in reserve. 328th Infantry attacking, three battalions abreast, making progress in the KOECKING WOODS.

15 Nov 1944: 104th Infantry holding positions. 328th Infantry broke defensive positions along lateral road through KOECKING FOREST. 101st Infantry, with assistance of 2d Cavalry, put patrols into MARSAL and HARAUCOURT.

16 Nov 1944: 104th Infantry holding positions. 328th Infantry completed clearance of KOECKING WOODS. 2d Cavalry occupied without opposition JUVELIZE, LEZAY, LEY, BLANCOGLISE, HILL 257 (Q2118).

17 Nov 1944: 26th Infantry Division regrouped, took positions on MLR prepared to attack the GUEBLING - BENESTROFF line. The 2d Cavalry cleared MULCEY and HAUT de la CROIX.

18 Nov 1944: 26th Infantry Division attacked 0800 hours preceded by thirty minute counter-battery fire and thirty minute artillery preparation. 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments advanced against heavy resistance but penetrated enemy MLR.

- 26 Nov 1944: Positions reorganized for attack against permanent entrenchments and fortifications extending across division zone from HONSKIRCH to ALTWEILLER. 101st Infantry patrolling south flank on SAAR Canal.
- 27 Nov 1944: 101st Infantry secured ALTWEILLER. GCompany 328th Infantry broke defenses of HONSKIRCH.
- 28 Nov 1944: Division advanced without resistance. 104th Infantry occupied GUEBLANGE, VENTZVILLER, STEINBACH.
- 29 Nov 1944: 101st Infantry occupied BISSERT. 101st Infantry relieved by 328th Infantry. Moved to WOLFKIRCHEN in preparation to launching attack in conjunction with 4th Armored Division to seize SAARE-UNION. 328th Infantry and 104th Infantry defended and patrolled.
- 30 Nov 1944: Division made plans and reconnaissance for attack on SAARE-UNION.
- 1 Dec 1944: 101st Infantry attacking south of SAARE-UNION. I Company entered the town but withdrew for night security. 104th Infantry moved to WOLFKIRCHEN to support 101st Infantry. 328th Infantry held its positions.
- 2 Dec 1944: 1st Battalion 101st Infantry, supported by a battalion of the 104th Infantry cleared and occupied SAARE-UNION. 101st Infantry cut the escape routes from SAARE-UNION to the east.
- 3 Dec 1944: 26th Infantry Div outposting SAARE-UNION, Received counter attack at SAARE-UNION.
- 4 Dec 1944: 101st Infantry moved to OERMINGEN behind the 45th Armored Division. 328th Infantry secured north flank of division above SAARE-UNION.
- 5 Dec 1944: 328th and 104th Infantry Regiments passed through the

the 101st Infantry to positions for an assault on Maginot fort at WITTRING and ACHEN.

5 and 6 Dec 1944: Preparations for attack on Maginot line.

7 Dec 1944: Artillery preparation, air attack, and patrolling against Maginot forts.

8 Dec 1944: 104th Infantry seized four Maginot forts at ACHEN.

328th Infantry unsuccessfully attacked Maginot forts at WITTRING. (4th Armored Division on right flank relieved by 12th Armored Division).

9 Dec 1944: 328th Infantry completed capture of WITTRING forts. Division advanced to GROS REDERCHING and vic of BOIS BRUCKEN. 328th Infantry received counterattack from BOIS BRUCKEN. 101st Infantry, relieved by one Regiment of the 87th Infantry Division, began movement to METZ.

10-11 Dec 1944: 104th and 328th Infantry Regiments attacked to clear the BOIS BRUCKEN. 346th Infantry, 87th Infantry Division, relieved 104th Infantry during evening.

12 Dec 1944: 328th Infantry attacking with 346th Infantry for German border. 1st Battalion 328th Inf met heavy resistance but crossed border. 347th Infantry relieved 328th Infantry that evening. 26th Infantry Division began movement to METZ.

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APO 303 U. S. ARMY

17 January 1945

#### LORRAINE CAMPAIGN

26th Infantry Division  
(5 October 1944 to 13 December 1944)

The first elements of the 26th Infantry Div arrived at HOEVILLE ( ) on 5 October 1944. Main elements moved from VALOGNES ( ) by way of FONTAINBLEAU ( ) and arrived in the vicinity of HOEVILLE on 10 October. (See map.) On 12 October, the Division officially took over command of the sector which was then held by the 4th Armored Div. At that time, the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments were with the Division.

The month of October was spent in defensive warfare. Lines were straightened and units in the line were relieved by new units of the Division. On 15 October, the 328th Infantry Regt was relieved from attachment to the 80th Infantry Div and moved to BEZANGE LA GRANDE ( ) where it was placed under command of the 26th Infantry Div. patrolling by the 42nd Cavalry Sq on 20 October beyond the Divi-



sion's Main Line of Resistance resulted in local night gains of 2000 yards on the Division's south flank.

On 22 October the 104th and 101st Infantry Regts attacked and seized high ground between BEZANGE ( ) and MONCOURT (V1913). There was a change of sectors between the 104th and 328th Regts on 24 October. The remainder of the month was spent in relieving and relocating troops on the main Line of Resistance.

The first seven days of November were occupied with defensive action similar to that of October. Additional training was carried on, including special work with flame throwers.

On 8 November at 0600 the 26th Infantry Div participated in the large Allied offensive begun in that month. Preceded by artillery preparations of Division and Corps Artillery, the 104th Infantry Regt advanced rapidly toward VIC SUR SEILLE (V1120). The 101st attacked toward MOYENVIC (V1320), and the 328th jumped off at 0720 and cleared BEZANGE LA PETITE (V1715) and MONCOURT (V1913).

The 2nd Cavalry Gp protected the right flank of the Division and the 26th Reconnaissance Tp screened the left flank and maintained contact with the 35th Infantry Div.

On the first day of the drive, one of the outstanding actions of the campaign took place. This was the capture of MOYENVIC and Hill 310 ( ). Capt John O. Dickerson, S-3, related that 2nd Bn 101st Infantry Regt jumped off at 0800 after a tremendous artillery preparation, and advanced across open ground. The companies were in column, G, E, F, and H, heading north toward MOYENVIC. The estimated enemy holding

the town was of battalion strength. Enemy fire consisted of small arms, mortars, and six 75-mm's.

The town was enveloped at first. Co G moved directly into the town from the south, after which Co F moved around to the left (west) and swam the SEILLE River; Co E moved around the town to the right (east), with some of the elements using a foot bridge which had not been blown and the remainder of the company crossing in the river.

Before the town was cleared (at 082130) Co E on the right and Co F on the left attacked Hill 310 ( ). This hill was the southwest extension of a long ridge which was held by the Germans. Hill 310 was taken at 090930, but the enemy still held <sup>high</sup> ground to the northeast which extended into the FORET DE BRIDE ET DE KOECKING.

On 10 November, the 101st and 104th Infantry Regts continued the attack and met only medium resistance during the clearing of CHATEAU SALINS (V0925). On the 12th the 101st Infantry Regt secured ST. MEDARD (V1924). On the 16th BLANCHE-EGLISE (V2222), JUVELEIZE (V2018), LEZEY (V1817) and LEY (V2015) were secured. On the 17th HAUT DE LA CROIX ( ) and MULCEY (V2123) were taken.

On the 18th the formation was: 101st Infantry Regt on the left, 104th on the right, and the 328th in reserve. On the 19th the 328th secured KERPRICH (V2325), GUENWATROFF (V2425), and GUEBESTROFF (V2526). On the 20th the 101st and the 3rd Bn of the 328th seized TORCHEVILLE (V3534) and 81 prisoners by a night attack. On the following day the 104th seized MONTDIDIER (V3237) and the 328th advanced on MUNSTER (V3935).

On the 26th the Division took up a defensive position temporarily, from HONSKIRCH (V4338) to ALTWILLER (V4437), and on the next day the 101st occupied the latter town while Co. G of the 328th took the former.

On the 28th the 101st occupied BOIS LE FREIWALD: the 104th took GUEBLANGE ( ), DENTZVILLER ( ), AND KIRVILLER (V4439). On the 29th the 101st took BISSERT ( ). On the 30th of November, the final plans for the attack on SARRE UNION ( ) by the 101st were made.

On 1 December at 0900, the 26th Infantry Div attacked northeast to seize SARRE UNION. Heavy tanks, artillery, and mortar fire were used. At dusk, elements of the 3rd Bn of the 101st entered the town, but were forced to withdraw to the high ground to the south. On the 2nd, the 104th on the left and the 101st on the right took RIMSDORE ( ) and SAARWERDEN ( ). On the 4th SARRE UNION was cleared.

On 5 December, the 101st and 104th seized OERMINGEN ( ), VOELLERINGEN ( ), SCHOPPERTEN ( ), KESPASTEL ( ), and HERBITZHEIM ( ). The Division's gains on this day were greater than for any other single day's operations since the LORRAINE CAMPAIGN had begun.

On 6 December, the MAGINTO line of forts was reached and WITTRING ( ), and KAIHAUSEN ( ) were entered; The 101st was in the vicinity of OERMINGEN. On the 7th the 101st took ETTING ( ), and the 328th took SCHLOSSWALD and MUHLENWALD woods. On the 8th ACHEN ( ) and forts in the MAGINOT LINE were seized by the 104th after a thirty minute artillery preparation, and strafing by the 405th and 362nd Fighter Bomber Groups. The 328th was then at LE GRAND BOIS.

On the 10th the 101st moved to METZ ( ); the 328th cleared BOIS DE BLIES. BRUCHEN ( ) was not cleared due to heavy tank and infantry fire. On the 11th, the 104th was relieved by the 346th of the 87th Infantry Div. On the 13th, the 87th assumed command of the 26th Div's zone.

Note No 1. Outstanding smaller unit actions were at MOYENVIC, GUEB\* LING, SARRE UNION, and the river crossings of the SARRE River. Principle units involved were the 2nd Bn 101st, 3rd Bn 101st, and 3rd Bn 104th. (For the MOYENVIC story see Capt John O. Dickerson, S-3, 2nd Bn 101st.)

Note No. 2. Phases of the 26th Infantry Division's action in the LORRAINE CAMPAIGN were:

12 Oct - Command change and training.

22-23 Oct - Attack launched with limited objective to straighten lines.

8 Nov - Big attack and continued push.

15 Nov - 4th Armored Div units which had been attached to and jumped off behind the 26th, went back to their Division and, at DIEUZE (V 2524), took up a zone of the right flank of the 26th Infantry Div.

26-30 Nov Preparation for the SARRE UNION attack.

1 Dec - Jump off for SARRE UNION.

5 Dec - Greatest "single day advance."

Sources - Capt James C. Popham, Asst G-3; Capt John O. Dickerson, Asst G-3.

Interviewer - 1st Lt Wm. J. Dunkerley.

Date of Interview - 11 January 1945.

Map Reference - GSGS 4416-1:100,000.

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UNIT: 26th Infantry Division

PERIOD: 8 Nov - 12 Dec 1944

ACTION: LORRAINE Campaign

SOURCE: Major William R Porter, Asst G-3

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: PRACHATICE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 14 June 1945

MAPS: 1/100,000, Central Europe, Sheet Saarbrücken

INTERVIEWER: Lt Monroe Ludden

INTERVIEW made with maps and records.

NOTE: The Division After Action Reports for the period of the Lorraine Campaign are very brief and sketchy. Due to the time that was elapsed since the action, it was difficult to find people who had been in the campaign or remembered the action or the command problems in any detail, and those contacted became confused in trying to pin down the action. The interviews following in this volume must be examined carefully against the division records.

NOTE: The action of the 26th Inf Div during the campaign was closely tied in with the 4th Armd Div. The 4th Armd Div had two separate periods of commitment, through and ahead of, the 26th Inf Div. It can be presumed that coordination between the two units was an important part of the action, but at this late date the details of the coordination were not clear either in the minds of the infantry of the 4th Armd Div when they were later contacted. Generally, the two units had high respect for each other, but in the reports made little reference to the other unit.

During the September battles for CHATEAU SALINS the 4th Armd Div had worked into this area as far as DIEUZE, after a heavy tank to tank duel with the 11th Pz Div, the 4th had withdrawn back to lines anchored in the BEZANGE woods and extending to the southeast to the RHINE canal in the vicinity of LAGARDE (245105).

The 26th Inf Div took over these lines from the 4th Armd Div on 5 October. This was ~~the~~ first battle commitment for the 26th Div and it took up positions similar to the ones held by the Divisions in World War I when during the last period of the War it made an assault on the Von Hindenberg Line defending DIEUZE.

During the static period before the attack the 26th Div gave battle inoculation to all its units by rotating them in the defense line. A number of limited objective attacks were made to improve the positions held along the plateau overlooking the SEILLE River basin. ~~the~~



command through the 35th Inf Div as soon as the initial defense crust had been broken. Due to the ragged terrain in the zone of advance, detailed planning was left to be solved by each subordinate unit on the spot. Maneuvering was to be done in terms of small units working on separate terrain features within the general zones of action.

On the 5-6th Nov, the wire and mine field defenses along the MLR were picked up. On the 7th the division regrouped. The 104th Inf took positions on the left flank facing SALLONNES (2209) and VIC SUR SEILLE (1121). The 101st Inf was in the vicinity of "five points" (the road junction at (1212)) facing MOYENVIC and HILL 310. The 328th Inf was on the right flank in the vicinity of MONCOURT (1914) and BEZANGE LE PETITE. Attachments to the division were 761st Tk Bn (colored), 602 TD Bn, 945th FA Bn, 255th FA Bn, 243d FA Bn, 165th Engr C Bn.

The initial plans were for the <sup>328</sup>104th Inf to make a feint at H-hour minus 1 at MONCOURT and BEZANGE LE PETITE. This was the logical and shortest distance to DIEUZE and a feint there could be easily camouflaged to look like the main effort. The 101st Inf was to seize a crossing of the SEILLE River at MOYENVIC and secure HILL 310 in a rapid marching fire attack. The 104th Inf was to cross the SEILLE River at VIC SUR SEILLE and move up on the right of CHATEAU SALINS in positions to work on the KOECKING ridge from the north. The 104th Inf was making the main effort.

Two armored task forces were composed to assist the 104th Inf. TF "A" composed of A and C Cos 761st Tk Bn, one-half platoon engineers, C Co 691st TD Bn, and K Co of the 101st Inf were to strike from VIC SUR SEILLE to MORVAL. TF "B" composed of one platoon 761st Tk Bn, B and D Cos 691st TD Bn and one-half platoon of engineers were to

be kept as a reserve maneuvering element. The engineers were equipped with several footbridges to make rapid crossings of the SEILLE River.

The attack jumped off at 0800 on the morning of the 8th preceded by one hour of Corps artillery preparation followed by approximately one hour of division artillery preparation. The feint of the 328th Inf at MONCOURT met heavy resistance and cost considerable casualties, but according to Major Porter, threw the enemy off balance. The 101st Inf quickly seized MOYENVIC and passed the attack on HILL 310 but were pinned down on the reverse slope of the hill and tied up for the next two days in an attempt to maneuver around the hill to the left. The principal factors of the opposition were artillery batteries at MARSAL and HARAUCOURT. The 104th seized crossings at VIC SUR SEILLE early in the day and moved up to high ground positions overlooking CHATEAU SALINS before dark. TF "A" was committed on the road from VIC SUR SEILLE from MORVILLE (129249), but (due to faulty maneuvering) were badly chewed up and made a disappointing advance. The enemy had been taken by surprise in the CHATEAU SALINS area but not on HILL 310 or to the south. The 2d Cav Gp was unable to make any advance during the day. That evening it was decided that the 101st and the 104th would continue the attack and the 328th Inf would be brought up for commitment on the division center as soon as the zone opened. No reserves were kept for the division.

The SEILLE River at VIC SUR SEILLE was improved for navigation with concrete embankments. The bridge had been blown, but in spite of the swollen river there was only a 25 foot gap in the bridge. A bridge was emplaced there during the first day's action and was used as the main communication route for the 26th Division.

UNIT: 101st Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division

PERIOD: 8 November to 12 December 1944

ACTION: LORRAINE CAMPAIGN

SOURCES: Capt Thomas J. Ryan, Regimental S-3 (Then Asst S-3)  
Capt William M. Howle, S-2  
Major A. J. McWade, CO, 2d Bn (formerly Regimental S-3)  
Major E. C. Brown, S-3, 101st FA Bn (in direct support of 101st Inf Regt)

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: HOR FLAIN, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 17 June 1945

MAPS: Scale, 1/50,000 Eastern France, Sheets 35/14, 35/15, 36/14, 36/15, 37/13, and 37/14.

INTERVIEWER: 2d Lt Monroe Ludden

NOTE: This interview was first conducted with Captain Ryan and Captain Howle at the regimental CP with maps and the regimental After Action Report. Capt Ryan gave the majority of the information in a rather hesitant manner and depended greatly on the After Action Report for his information. Major McWade was later contacted at the 2d Bn CP, without records, and from him considerable more detail was forthcoming. Many additional points of information in respect to terrain features and critical elements of the action were obtained from Major Brown of the 101st FA Bn and several liaison officers and forward observers who had operated with the regiment during the action.

The command of the regiment during this operation:

Colonel Walter Scott, CO (now C/S of the division)  
Lt Col Lawrence Kirk, 1st Bn  
Lt Col Bernard Lyons, 2d Bn (now at Div Hq)  
Lt Col James M. Peale, Jr, 3d Bn

Only Col Peale could be contacted for material on battalion action (see interview, 3d Bn, inclosed in this volume).

In the action to be reviewed, the 101st Inf Regt was in its first combat operation. On 9 Oct the regiment had relieved elements of the 4th Armd Div in the vicinity of ARRACOURT (1214). In this area the 4th Armd Div had fought the severe tank battles of the latter part of September.

When the regiment went into the line, the front had been stabilized on a line running from (104181) on the edge of the FORET DE BEAUVILLE LA GRANDE to the southeast to HILL 265 (170150) (see map). These positions were generally on an undulating

an enemy FA Bn at RECOURT FARM (171195). He also showed the dispositions of enemy Corps Artillery in the vicinity of JUVELIZE (201186) and MARSAI (173218). He was able to give the dispositions of enemy troops in the woods south of DIEUE.

The 101st Inf had been planning its attack for approximately a week before the jump off. It laid on a fire plan for the artillery preparation, covering the known targets to its front. The prime consideration of the attack was a speedy crossing of the SEILLE River and the seizure of HILL 310. This entailed a movement of approximately 6,000 yards from its present front line positions.

The regiment was disposed with the 1st Bn on the high ground just west of ZANREY (1517), the 2d Bn on the edge of the FORST DE BEZANGE LA GRANDE, and the 3d Bn in retired positions at (1216). The plan of attack called for the 2d Bn to make the main effort through MOYELVIC to HILL 310.

The day before the jump off, Gen Eddy, the Corps Commander, visited the CP of the 101st Inf Regt and emphasized that the entire Corps action depended on the seizure of HILL 310. The Corps was to pivot to the northeast on this position, leaving the low ground and lake region south of DIEUE to be occupied after a flanking maneuver on the north.

H-Hour for the attack was set at 0600 8 Nov. The artillery preparation for the attack started at 0400, with all units of the division and Corps artillery firing counterbattery and destructive fires for one hour. As H-Hour approached, the division artillery, under its own control, worked on the close-in targets.

During the night the 2d Bn inched out from its positions in the woods until it was 1,000 yards from the road junction south of MOYELVIC. The battalion was covered by its own H Co on the right in the ST PLAMONT woods, and M Co on its left at the edge of the BEZANGE woods. Just before dawn the 101st FA Bn (in direct support) laid heavy concentrations on HILL 310 and rolled a barrage back through MOYELVIC to the forward positions of the 2d Bn until it was lifted by the 3d Bn commander.

company before beginning the climb, but once in the wooded area all men pushed forward as fast as they could without regard for organization. Most of the company officers became casualties on the hill. One of the platoon sergeants from E Co, with a BAR man, reached the house on top of HILL 310. From that position he could see the enemy positions further down the ridge. He maintained his position for three hours in spite of intense fire, but was then captured by an enemy patrol which came up on his right rear. The sergeant was evacuated through enemy positions on the east side of the ridge to HARAUCOURT, but shortly after was able to escape, make his way back to friendly lines, and report what he had seen.

G Co, which had remained in MOYENVIC, was committed on the hill at about 1100. The CC was hit on the bridge just outside of the town. G Co could not relieve the situation of E and F Cos and remained in position to the rear of E and F Cos.

The 3d Bn (-K Co, which had been assigned to IFV, an armored task force which was to go through MOYENVIC to MORVILLE (125255) ) had moved up before the jump off to the BEZANGE woods. At 1200 8 Nov the 3d Bn moved down the road into MOYENVIC. It was then committed piece-meal to relieve the condition of the 2d Bn. I Co moved up to the left of the hill and took positions on the left rear of Co F. I Co came under fire but maintained its maneuverability. I Co attempted to move on the right rear of E Co to the right of HILL 310 but was immediately pinned down as soon as it showed on the lip of ground facing HARAUCOURT. During the day, the 1st Bn was relieved at JUVRECHART by the 2d Cav Gp and was moved to MOYENVIC. The plan was to commit it on the west side of HILL 310. The regimental CP moved to MOYENVIC.

For the next three days the problem of the regiment was to find some means of maneuvering onto the ridge line behind HILL 310. This ridge line dominated HILL 310 by fire and observation. Enemy artillery fire from HARAUCOURT and MORVILLE prevented any movement on the forward or eastern slope of the ridge. The enemy fired during this period, Major McNamee estimated, 3600 artillery rounds a day into the

positions at SALIVAL. The 1st Bn made no advances during the day. Any movement of the battalion immediately drew small arms fire and heavy and accurate concentrations of mortar fire from the forward slope of HILL 310.

The attack to take place the afternoon of the 10th was directed at the tip of the high ground dominating the ridge line at (158232). In the first attempt that morning the 1st Bn had little success. The battalion drew back and a second coordinated attack was planned for 101610. This time C Co in a marching fire attack following closely behind the artillery barrage secured this tip of high ground. A and B Cos swung to the left during this attack and began to work on the wooded area. Immediately after C Co captured the hill position at (235145) on the west slope of the ridge (101715), the enemy counterattacked with mortars and artillery followed by approximately a company of infantry. C Co beat off the counterattack with small arms fire but was badly mauled. The company dug in for the night on the ridge while under tremendous enemy artillery fire.

From this tip of high ground it was possible to observe the enemy positions east of the ridge to DIEUZE. Artillery observers working from this position were able to lay accurate fire on MARSAL, HARAUCOURT, and ST MEDARD. Infantry weapons were set up to cover the crest of the ridge to the north by fire. The seizure of this position by C Co is the critical point of the initial action of the 101st Inf in the LORRAINE campaign.

On the 11th A and B Cos in spite of well defended enemy dug-in positions cleared the woods west of the ridge and the 3d Bn, recovering K Co, moved up the road from SALIVAL to the northeast. These mopping-up actions were heavily fought against pocketed enemy resistance but they remained exclusively mopping-up actions after the ridge line succeeded in diminishing greatly the enemy fire from the east flank. The 3d Bn, with the support of tanks, finally reached the road junction at (161256) and doubled back along the ridge line. During this time, the 2d Bn maintained its

positions on HILL 310, and the 1st Bn took up positions on the crest of the ridge. All three battalions had lost heavily during this action, but the 2d was in the worst condition.

During this action the 104th Inf had moved up on the right flank to the woods northeast of MORVILLE. On the 11th and 12th the 328th Inf, which at the beginning of the operation had been on the right flank of the 101st Inf, was relieved there by the 2d Cav Gp and moved in between the 101st and the 104th Inf Regts. The 328th was committed from MORVILLE (128246) with the mission of clearing the KOECKING forest. The 3d Bn, 101st Inf, which had already begun this mission, was attached to the 328th Inf and used on the north side of the road through KOECKING woods (see interview, 3d Bn, 101st Inf). The 328th Inf began their attack on the 11th.

As the 328th Infantry and the 3d Bn, 101st Inf, moved through the woods, the 1st Bn, 101st Inf, extended to the east to guard the southern flank of the KOECKING woods. On the 12th, C Co attempted to attack from the point of woods at (172252) on HRAUSCOURT, but as the company showed on the edge of the woods, it drew a tremendous volley of artillery from the southeast. The fire continued for three hours causing many casualties to the company. C Co gave up the attack and remained in position on the edge of the woods.

At 121620, the 101st Inf CP was set up at WUISSE (250385) behind the lines of the 328th Inf, and the 3d Bn reverted to its control. While at WUISSE, the regiment got in houses. The town was relatively free from enemy artillery fire. There the regiment rehabilitated its troops and absorbed reinforcements (759 EM and 16 officers). During this time the 328th Inf pushed out to the eastern edge of KOECKING woods, but met heavy opposition and made slow progress. CCA, 4th Armd Div, and the 104th Inf had been stopped on the north by heavy opposition from the 11th Pz Div. On the night of the 13th-14th, the 3d Bn which was guarding the assembly area at WUISSE, had a small counterattack from the rear by enemy units which were withdrawing from the pocket on the northwest. This counterattack was easily beaten off.

On the morning of the 17th the 101st Inf moved to the eastern edge of the KOECKING FOREST to attack through the 328th Inf against the strongly held enemy positions guarding the escape route from DIEUZE in the vicinity of GUEHLING and BOURGALSTROFF. (NOTE: At this time attachments to the 101st were: A Co 101st Inf, B Co 761st Tz Bn, D Co 602d TD Bn, and A Btry 390th AAA Bn.)

The eastern edge of the KOECKING woods was on high ground which fell away rapidly to the DORDIAL CREEK and a railroad embankment paralleling the creek on the near side. Opposite the creek was a series of high ground positions abreast of GUEHLING and BOURGALSTROFF. Prior to the attack of the 101st Inf, GCB of the 4th Armd Div had made an attack in this area which had drawn in additional enemy troops from the DIEUZE area. The 4th Armd Div had been stopped in this area after a heavy engagement with tanks and artillery of the 11th Pz Div. The 4th Armd Div was withdrawn on the 14th and 15th, leaving the enemy two days to improve his positions. The positions themselves covered the enemy escape routes from DIEUZE which was still being strongly held.

At 170800 the 101st Inf attacked, with the 3d Bn moving to the northeast for HILL 273 (272315), and the 2d Bn on the right attacking on the right of the main road directly on GUEHLING. The attack was preceded by a heavy artillery preparation. The 104th Inf was making a coordinated attack on HENESTROF (285342) and MARMONT (302326) on the left. The principal factor in the attack was that the enemy had perfect observation from the high ground positions, HILL 372, the two slide piles at the quarry, and the two high ground positions flanking GUEHLING. Smoke was maintained for six hours on these positions by the 101st FA Bn during the attack.

On the left the 3d Bn attacked through heavy fire to the railroad embankment, but here was stopped by grazing fire along the embankment itself. After additional artillery was laid on the quarry just behind the embankment, I Co was able to maneuver across the railroad track north of the quarry and get a foothold in the



edge of the BERESTROFF woods where it was in contact with the 104th Inf. This attack was hampered by the large number of fresh reinforcements in the battalion.

On the right, the 2d Bn had greater success in crossing the railroad embankment and wading the DORIAL creek (0857). E Co took the high ground north of GUEBLING and F Co skirted GUEBLING to the south and kept moving well ahead. Due to the enveloping move to the north by the 3d Bn there was a gap between the 2d and 3d Bns. Up to this time the attack was going well.

At 131025 it was learned that F Co had reached positions south of BERESTROFF (290302). F Co had found a gap in the enemy lines and had been able to pass through without receiving frontal fire. However, they were subjected to a cross-fire from automatic weapons and 20mm dual purpose AA guns in the patch of the woods at (261290) and from the reverse slope of HILL 273. F Co was, at the time, commanded by a replacement officer in his first engagement. F Co went out of contact and nothing was heard from them for several hours. (About noon an artillery air observer reported that he saw approximately 100 Americans being marched back by the Germans. It was presumed, by Major McWade, that F Co had been pinned down by the cross-fire and then captured by three enemy tanks cutting in on their rear since these enemy tanks were seen in the area at the same time.)

At 1100 hours the 1st Bn was committed behind the 3d Bn and attempted to flank HILL 273. They reached the edge of the BERESTROFF woods but were stopped by fire directed from HILL 286 and HILL 234. At this time it was decided to hold up any further attacks of the 101st Inf until the 104th Inf had taken the high ground positions to the north around BERESTROFF. (NOTE: During the day the 3d Bn captured an enemy fire plan showing complete defenses in the area.)

At 1400 hours the same day, tanks and tank destroyers (attached units) came up to support the continuation of the attack of the 2d Bn. - and C Cos jumped off for BERESTROFF to rescue, if possible, F Co. An artillery preparation of ten minutes was

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laid on but it only succeeded in raising larger amounts of enemy artillery, particularly from the left flank. Three enemy tanks (previously knocked out by the 4th Arm Div) had been dug in at the bend of the road between GUEBLING and BOURGALSTOFF (272299). These tanks were firing automatic weapons down the road directly into GUEBLING. E and F Cos succeeded in reaching BOURGALSTOFF by flanking the dug-in tank positions on the north, but could not get into the town itself. (In this attack the CO of the 2d Bn, Lt Col Lyons, was wounded, 18 Nov).

The division planned a coordinated attack for the morning of the 19th with the 328th Inf on the right attacking for DIEUZE, the 101st Inf in the center continuing its attack on BOURGALSTOFF and the 104th Inf on the north on MARLONT.

The attack of the 101st Inf jumped off with the 1st Bn on the right to pass through the 2d Bn and the 3d Bn working in conjunction with the 104th Inf at MARLONT. In this attack, the 1st Bn pulled back its A Co to put a TOT concentration on two enemy tanks covering the road at GUEBLING. The attack was unable to get past the LD. The 3d Bn got to MARLONT but was stopped at that point after receiving very severe casualties.

On the 20th, the attack was continued. But during the night the enemy had withdrawn. The 1st Bn, without meeting any serious enemy opposition, went through BASSING (315302), GUINDELING (315345), to LOER. The 3d Bn passed through MARLONT, NEHLING, and in a forced night march reached TORCHEVILLE (135350) where they captured approximately 70 enemy troops. This breakthrough was apparently due to the fact that the 328th Inf in attacking DIEUZE had forced the final withdrawal from the town. The enemy withdrew from the positions on the escape routes to form a new defense line guarding SARR-UNION.

The next day, the 21st, the plan for the 1st Bn to continue the attack and the 328th Inf to pass through the 101st. The 1st Bn, then under control of the 328th, attacked from LOER but found the creek between LOER and HUSWILLER flooded and the

The 1st Bn led off through the woods, meeting a heavy but spotty defense which had been elaborately prepared but poorly defended due to the flooding of many of the dug-in positions. The 2d Bn cleared the northern edge of the woods from the lateral road to the northeast. The 3d Bn skirted the open ground north of the woods to VIVIERSVILLER. The 1st Bn dropped back in reserve.

At 242015 the 2d Bn, which by that time was leading the regiment on the south part of the woods, made contact with the enemy defending the chateau of BORNESFONTAINE (458345). (NOTE: For details of this attack see 2d Bn interview). The result of the attack was that E Co got into the chateau but had a platoon pinched off and captured there by an enemy counterattack and G Co working to the north of the chateau, through a heavy wooded and well defended area, became disorganized. It was apparent that the chateau was the strongpoint of enemy resistance. The 2d Bn withdrew to reorganize that night and K Co was attached to the 2d Bn to help support the attack.

The 2d Bn's attack the next morning was delayed temporarily while K Co came up to support positions, but the enemy had pulled out and during the day the 2d Bn completed clearing the wooded area.

At this time the 4th Armd Div had begun its sweep across the SAAR River at FENETRANGE and were forcing the enemy to withdraw to a close-in defense of SAARF-UNION. Part of the 3d Bn, on the 22th, had met trouble on the north portion of the woods opposite ALTWEILLER. There, the attack bogged down until the 326th Infantry, by taking HONSKIRCH, succeeded in knocking the enemy out of ALTWEILLER. The 1st Bn moved into the town of ALTWEILLER and the 2d Bn cleared the FENETRANGE forest up to the SAAR canal. This job was completed on the night of the 27th. That night a combat patrol of SS troops succeeded in gaining an entrance to ALTWEILLER, captured six men and destroyed a gun of the TD platoon outposting the town and succeeded in upsetting the 1st Bn's defense set-up. The patrol was driven out without any other damage.

\* \* \* \*

The 101st Inf remained in these positions from the 27th to the 30th, at which time they again received a number of reinforcements. During this time the 4th Armd Div had fought their way within striking distance of SAAR UNION on the south. In order to close-in on the city the 101st Inf was attached to the 4th Armd Div and by 300615 had moved to the vicinity of EUBACH (542338) with plans to move into the city along the right bank of the SAAR River while the 4th Armd Div encircled the city on the east. Initially, the 3d Bn took positions overlooking SAAR WERDEN, and the 2d Bn took positions on HILL 331 (535355) facing to the northeast.

On the jump off the 1st Bn passed through the 2d Bn to reached positions on the southern edge of the BANHOLE WOODS where it was pinned down by machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire which was directed from the hill position 315 (555375) to the northeast. In this attack the 1st Bn lost its battalion commander. The 3d Bn started its attack by getting patrols into SAAR WERDEN by 1014 hours and found it unoccupied, and continued to move on the city just right of the railroad tracks. By 1015 on the first, B Co, had pressed out from the BANHOLE WOODS toward the city, but 1,000 yards from the town were stopped by machine gun and AA fire from the barracks and hospital at (526376). The 2d Bn moved to follow up B Co into the town but also was pinned down by that fire. At 1400 hours this attack of the 1st and 2d Bns had bogged down.

At this time I Co had taken positions on approximately the 37 grid line, 1000 yards short of the town on the south. A coordinated attack was planned for a final closing in on the city which began at approximately 1500 hours. The attack jumped off after an artillery preparation at 1521 hours, with A and C Cos making the main effort on the southeast and I Co on the south. A and C Cos had little success. I Co however got into the town by 1635 hours and succeeded in moving all the way through the town to the eastern edge before dark. K Co followed I Co into the town

and was sent against the high ground positions on the northwest edge of the town under the command of a sergeant. K Co was pinned down by dug-in automatic weapons positions. In the town itself, I Co captured some light machine guns, one 88mm piece, and only two prisoners.

Since I Co was in the town alone it was decided just before dark to pull them south for security that night. The next morning the 3d Bn was to clear the town itself and secure the high ground positions to the northeast. The 1st and 2d Bns changed the direction of attack to the northeast to cut the main escape route from SAARFÜHRUNG to DOLFESSEL.

The next day I Co led the 3d Bn back into SAARFÜHRUNG with the support of a tank and TD platoon, and took positions on the east edge of the town. K Co again cleared to the north part of the town, and L Co went in to aid I Co. Late in the afternoon the enemy counterattacked I Co with about ten tanks and a company and one-half of infantry. This counterattack recaptured about one-half the town, but was broken by artillery fire and driven out. By this time the 4th Armd Div had broken the defenses around DOLFESSEL and forced a withdrawal from the defense positions east of SAARFÜHRUNG. The 1st and 2d Bns jumped off at 020700 aided the 4th Armd in this action on the left and moved up to the SCHLOSSHOF FLE (552390) against diminished resistance. The 1st Bn then went to OERLINGEN and the 2d Bn peeled off to the southeast of the town and secured the high ground there. In these positions, the regiment was pinched out by the 104th and 328th Inf Regts.

\* \* \* \*

The 26th Inf Div continued the attack to the northeast with the 328th and 104th Inf Regts. On 8 Dec, the 1st Bn of the 101st Inf Regt displaced forward to support positions at BYTLING, and to outpost to the northeast on the flank of the 104th Inf. Before any elements of the regiment were committed, the 101st Inf was relieved by elements of the 87th Inf Div on the 10 Dec. The 101st withdrew to the rear areas.

Page

UNIT: 2d Battalion, 101st Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division

PERIOD: 8 November - 12 December 1944

ACTION: Lorraine Campaign

SOURCES: Major A. J. McWade, now Battalion Commander (during campaign, Regimental S-3)  
1st Lt S. D. Hunter, Battalion Adjutant (during campaign, Communications Officer) (only officer left after the campaign)  
Captain D. M. Anderson, Battalion Surgeon

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: LHENICE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 20 June 1945

MAPS: Scale 1/50,000, Eastern France, 35/14; 35/15; 36/14; 37/13

INTERVIEWER: Lt Monroe Ludden

NOTE: This interview was conducted with maps but no records. Major McWade told the story of the 2d Battalion as he knew it from the regimental picture and his story was supplemented by the two officers noted. In the course of the interview Major McWade added considerable detail of the regimental picture which could not be obtained at the regiment itself. The ~~regimental~~ commander at the beginning of this action, Lt Col Bernard A. Lyons, was wounded at JUBLING. The ~~regiment~~ was taken over by the executive officer, Major D. E. Stetson. Colonel Lyons has now returned to the 26th Division with an assignment at Division Headquarters, but he could not be contacted. Considering the importance of the 2d Battalion action in the initial assault on HILL 310, Colonel Lyons should be contacted for additional material.

#### HILL 310

When the 101st Infantry relieved the 4th Armored Division in the JUVRECOURT area 8 October the 2d Battalion took up positions in the forward edge of the BEZANGE woods with outposts concentrated around road junction 272 ("five points") and extending out on the lip of high ground pointing towards MOYENVIC. These positions did not change during the month of stationary activity.

The 2d Battalion was designated to make the main effort of the regiment against MOYENVIC and HILL 310 in the attack the morning of the 8th <sup>NW</sup>. Before the attack the 2d Battalion was completely familiar with the terrain and the enemy positions to its front. The battalion planned to attack

with a column of companies down the road to MOYENVIC with H and M Companies giving fire support on either flank of the road. The reason for attacking in column of companies was to make the quickest possible run of the SEILLE River basin and attack HILL 310, 4,000 yards away, by surprise. The night before the attack the battalion inched up from the lip of the high ground <sup>within</sup> to striking distance of MOYENVIC itself.

After the artillery preparation was lifted (0630) the battalion attacked along the road with G Company leading off followed by E and F Companies. G Company took on the first opposition, machine gun emplacement at the road junction 206, while E Company fanned out to by-pass MOYENVIC on the right and F Company on the left. E Company, in a double time march reached the SEILLE River 500 yards east of MOYENVIC and attempted to make a crossing by wading and swimming the river. Several men were swept down the river by the swift and swollen current. Only one man succeeded in getting across. E Company then changed its plan of attack and moved directly for the still intact bridge across the SEILLE north-east of MOYENVIC, a distance of about 200 yards from the positions then held on the river. The bridge was reached without serious opposition. The leading elements of the company seized and overcame the two guards stationed to set off the charges on the bridge, and the bridge was secured intact. During this maneuver the company had some casualties, mainly from the enemy artillery and mortar fire coming in from the east. About the time E Company seized the bridge, six 75mm howitzers opened up on the company at the bridge site from HILL 310, causing the company to disperse.

In the meantime F Company had fanned to the left of MOYENVIC and by skirting the edge of the town, had reached positions along the river. The Company was unable to make a crossing by wading. It called for

engineer support with a footbridge, as had been previously planned and prepared for in case the MOYENVIC bridge was not seized intact. G Company by this time had easily overcome resistance on the southern edge of MOYENVIC and moved into the town, catching most of the enemy there by surprise before they could recover from the artillery barrage. The taking of MOYENVIC made it possible to bring up the bridging material without difficulty. The bridge was emplaced for G Company before 0830.

There were still enemy positions on the right and left rear of MOYENVIC. The battalion left these to be dealt with by the 3d Battalion which was to follow. The battalion immediately launched its attack on HILL 310 in an effort to seize this critical high ground before the enemy could react in force. About 0830 E Company took off from the road junction northeast of the town. The company moved at double time in the marching fire up the hill through a lightly wooded area toward the crest of HILL 310. At the same time F Company crossed the river by footbridge and attacked on the left rear of E Company.

For this attack both companies were stripped of <sup>even</sup> clothing and equipment for the fastest possible movement. There were no heavy weapons carried in the assault. E and F Companies became intermingled, and both companies raced to reach the hill crest.

The enemy opposed the attack with the battery of 76mm on top of the hill, machine gun positions firing a cross fire on the slope, mortars from behind HILL 310, from the left rear of MOYENVIC, and from MARSAL, and with artillery from the east.

E and F Companies' attack slowed down in the woods as the men sought cover from the enemy fire. A few groups of both companies did reach the far edge of the woods just short of the hill crest. One of the platoon



sergeants of E Company, with a BAR man, worked over the open ground to the hill crest and took up positions there in a house overlooking the ridge to the northeast. He was able to maintain this position for approximately three hours before an enemy patrol worked up on his right rear and took him prisoner. Both E and F Companies were completely pinned down in the wooded area about 500 yards short of the hill crest.

The attack bogged down at 0900 just two hours after the jump off. Colonel Lyons then ordered G Company, which had remained in MOYENVIC, up the hill to support E and F Companies. As G Company crossed the bridge and moved by the road junction they received heavy artillery fire. The CO of G Company became a casualty. G Company, under command of its executive officer, moved up to intermingle with the men of E Company (see map positions), but were also pinned down by enemy fire.

By noon the regimental command group and the 3d Battalion (minus K Company) had moved into MOYENVIC. The 3d Battalion cleared an enemy mortar position out of the woods west of MOYENVIC. Early in the afternoon Colonel Scott, the regimental commander, committed the 3d Battalion to flank the positions held by the 2d Battalion and to work around either flank of HILL 310. I Company, attacking on the right through the positions of E and G Companies, got to the lip of the ridge overlooking HARAU-COURT, but was pinned down by frontal and flanking fire. I Company on the left moved around F Company but drew heavy small arms fire from SALIVAL and ST LIVIER as soon as it exposed itself on the open ground west of HILL 310. This was the extent of the maneuvering on the 8th of November. During the night it rained.

For the next two days, while the casualties mounted the 2d Battalion held on to the positions gained the first day. During this time I Com-

batteries in the vicinity of ST MEDARD and the woods southwest of DIEUZE.

During this time the 2d Battalion was reorganized. It received approximately 250 replacements. The battalion surgeon stated that from the 12th to 14th the battalion evacuated a large number of trench foot and exposure cases resulting from the period of exposure on HILL 310. (The battalion had attacked HILL 310 without galoshes or field jackets and carried only one day's rations. During the 3-day period during which it was pinned down there had been constant rain which turned to snow on the 11th.)

NOTE: During this period the 1st Battalion, 101st Infantry, extended along the south edge of the KOECKING WOODS to cover the flank of the 328th Infantry. On division order, C Company attempted an attack on ST MEDARD but met heavy enemy artillery on the edge of the woods above the town.

Colonel Scott, the regimental commander of the 101st Infantry recommended to the division commander that there was no need to make this attack on ST MEDARD in light of the flanking maneuver which the 26th Infantry and the 4th Armored Divisions were then making through the KOECKING WOODS. The division commander then requested from Corps, and Corps from the Army Commander, a change of orders relieving the 101st from this mission until DIEUZE was outflanked and the enemy withdrawn. This request was granted.

The 2d Cavalry Group relieved the 101st Infantry on the 15th.

The 2d Battalion along with the 1st Battalion of the 101st was then assembled in the vicinity of WUISSE (205285) and remained there until the 328th Infantry had cleared to the far edge of the KOECKING WOODS. The 101st was then given the mission of attacking through the 328th on GEUBLING and BOURALSTROFF. In this attack the 2d Battalion was on the right flank of the regiment.

### GUEBLING

The 2d Battalion positions prior to the attack was on high ground (255295) overlooking the DORDEL CREEK and the town of GUEBLING. On the left of the battalion was a corkscrew road, in open terrain, leading down from the high ground. CCA of the 4th Armored Division had attacked in this area two days prior to the attack of the 101st Infantry. The effect of this attack was to draw in heavy enemy defenses in the area. The enemy had placed high velocity guns so that they could fire point-blank on the corkscrew road. Several enemy tanks, which had been knocked out by the 4th Armored Division's attack, had been stationed along the road at (278299) as armored pillboxes. Major McWade stated that the regiment knew from captured documents that the left flank of one enemy unit was in the patch of woods at (281290) and that the right flank of another unit was in BOURGALSTROFF.

On the morning of the 18th the battalion jumped off, after an intense artillery preparation, with E Company on the left and F Company on the right. The 2d Battalion attack was made well to the right of the corkscrew road in order to avoid the direct fire on the road. In a rapid assault, F Company crossed the railroad embankment and the DORDEL CREEK, but were held up on the high ground just South of GUEBLING. F Company (being led by a replacement officer) moved to the right of this high ground and, without maintaining contact, pressed on in the direction of BOURGALSTROFF. Just what happened to F Company was never learned. Three enemy tanks were seen maneuvering South of BOURGALSTROFF, and some time later an aerial observer saw about 100 American troops marching back to the German rear under guard.

BOURGALSTROFF proved to be the strong point in the enemy's defen-

ses on the battalion front. At the bend in the road at (277299) the dug-in enemy tanks were laying a heavy volume of fire on GOEBLING. The bridge across the DORDIAL CREEK (a bridge which had been constructed by the 4th Armored Division in its attack) was destroyed. Engineers were brought up to replace the bridge, losing several vehicles as they came down the corkscrew road, but the bridge site was under constant enemy fire. Working under this fire, the Engineers completed the bridge at 1400 hours and tanks and TD's, and ammunition, were sent up to support E Company. At 1700 hours, E and G Companies attacked, with the support of the tanks and TD's to recover, if possible, what was left of F Company. The TD's knocked out the three tanks dug-in at the bend of the road, and E and G Companies reached the western edge of BOURGALSTROFF soon after dusk. That night the 2d Battalion made a perimeter defense on the western outskirts of BOURGALSTROFF. The battalion occupied one end of the town with the Germans in the other.

In this attack the 2d Battalion had been heavily hit, first by the capture of F Company and by enemy artillery fire. During the day, Lt Col Lyons was wounded in GUEBLING as he crossed the main street covered by fire from the dug-in enemy tanks.

That night the 1st Battalion came up behind the 2d Battalion and the next day continued the attack to BOURGALSTROFF. The 1st Battalion, with the support of the 2d Battalion, fought a heavy battle during the day to clear the town. Considerable confusion was caused primarily by the flanking fire from both the right and left rear. Towards dark the left side of the line of the 101st Infantry began moving and there were signs of an enemy withdrawal. During the 2d night, the 1st and 2d Battalions got an "awful pasting of artillery and the next morning there

was not an enemy in the place", said Major McWade. When the enemy line broke, the 1st Battalion stepped out in a column road march to LOHR (365325), and the 2d Battalion peeled off to the right of BEDESTROFF and down to DOMNON (330294).

During this attack the 3d Battalion of the 101st Infantry, working on the left and in conjunction with the 104th Infantry, had cleared the last enemy position on this delaying line at MARIMONT. When this position had been cleared, the 3d Battalion took off for TORCHEVILLE (350348). Major McWade attributed this breakthrough to a gap in the enemy lines. The 104th Infantry and the 35th Infantry Division ~~was~~ still meeting heavy resistance North of this gap. While the 2d Battalion was in the vicinity of DOMNON and BASSING, TF JACQUES, (4th Armored Division) came through BASSING in an attempt to reach MUNSTER (390355). This move of the 4th Armored Division had been made without prior permission from the 26th Infantry Division. The appearance of the 4th Armored Division in this area caused a traffic jam in the vicinity of GUINZLING, and the 26th Infantry Division ordered the TF to move south out of the area.

The 2d Battalion moved up to LOHR to support the 1st Battalion's attack at INSVILLER. The battalion's main job there was to give assistance in building the bridge across the RODE CREEK between LOHR and INSVILLER, which was done under the supervision of the 2d Battalion S-4, Lt CLASSEN. The bridge was improvised from rough lumber, furniture and other odds and ends, but was suitable for the 1st Battalion to pass on to INSVILLER. The 1st Battalion went beyond INSVILLER to clear the BOIS de HAMMESBIEL, and the plan was for the 2d Battalion to pass through the 1st Battalion to finish clearing the woods to the SAAR CANAL, while the 3d Battalion moved on MUNSTER and eliminated the artillery which was raking

the left flank of the 1st and 2d Battalions.

The next morning the 2d Battalion passed through the 1st Battalion but ran into heavy opposition in the woods along the lateral road. The entire wooded area of the BOIS de BONNE FONTAINE had been prepared with dug-in positions and zig-zag trenches. Along the lateral road were bands of concertina wire every 100 yards with mines attached. Many of the enemy defenses had been made ineffective by wet weather which flooded out the trenches. The enemy apparently did not have enough men to man the positions. The principal defensive weapons in the area were 20mm dual purpose AA guns.

The 2d Battalion attacked, with E Company on the right, to clear the area between the SAAR CANAL and the parallel road to the North. G Company on the left was to clear the woods from the road to the Northern edge. F Company was still practically non-existent, but a few reinforcements were available. Major McWade said that this was a hell of an area to clear with such a small number of men. After piercing the crusted defenses along the road, the battalion started out through the woods meeting small pockets of resistance. The advance continued steadily, and by the second day (23 November) E Company neared the Chateau de BONNE FONTAINE, and G Company was at the road junction #264 (442338). G Company had been meeting the heaviest resistance, particularly in securing this road junction, and had been considerably disorganized in passing through the woods. E Company was out of contact with the battalion.

The picture of what happened to E Company in its attack on the Chateau, Major McWade could not give. The Chateau was a nest of enemy resistance. Apparently E Company attacked with one platoon well in the lead. This platoon was able to get into the Chateau, along with the

Company CO. Before defenses could be established around the Chateau, the enemy pulled a flanking counterattack which cut off the platoon and cut into the other elements of the company. The platoon in the Chateau tried to hold off the enemy with small arms but were finally captured (about 30 men). The CO of E Company, Lt G. P. Pennington was taken prisoner but shortly after was able to escape and return back to the battalion lines.

At this time K Company was attached to the battalion to help in clearing the woods to the East. G Company shifted to the south. G Company was to flank the Chateau de BONNE FONTAINE on the North. K Company was assigned on the Northern edge of the woods and given the mission of clearing to the high ground 282 (448356). F Company was brought up the road to the rear of the lake at (450345).

The next day G Company got into position North of the Chateau and F and E Companies were able to re-enter the Chateau. K Company reached its objective on Hill 282 but were counterattacked by a company of SS men supported by SP's moving down the road from ALTWILLER. K Company had first run into the enemy SP guns on HILL 262 at about 50 yards range. The company was maneuvering to knock them out when the counterattack hit, preceeded by artillery at 1600 hours. Enemy troops made a fanatical attack with fixed bayonets. The enemy overran K Company and the fighting degenerated into a hand to hand combat to a depth of about 200 yards. During this attack Captain MUNSING, the CO of K Company, was a casualty. K Company was driven back into the woods with approximately fifty casualties, but the enemy did not exploit the situation. K Company reorganized that night at (440345) with about half strength.

At this time the 1st Battalion, 101st Infantry, was brought up to

RIMSDORF road and overlooking SAARE-UNION at 1500 yards distance. The woods was raked heavily by the enemy fire from three sides.

The situation was relieved to a certain extent when TF CHURCHHILL, 4th Armored Division, got into RIMSDORF (554369) and threatened to press out to the North. K and L Companies then came up to the Northwest edge of the BANNHOLTZ WOODS in preparation for its attack on SAARE-UNION. (See later notes on SAARE-UNION Battle).

The plan was for the 1st Battalion to attack northeast with the SCHLOSSHOFF FARM (551390) as its objective while the 2d Battalion swung to the right around REMSDORF and attacked the SCHLOSSHOFF FARM from the southeast. The 3d Battalion was to clear SAARE-UNION.

When this attack jumped off the 1st Battalion could make no progress due to strong enemy defensive positions in the ISENBOHL WOODS (550376) and the ALTENBURG WOODS (545382). At this time TF CHURCHHILL made its attack to the North of RIMSDORF, outflanking the ISENBOHL WOODS, and C Company following up behind TF CHURCHHILL was able to clear out the woods from the rear.

When this position was broken both the 1st and 2d Battalions were able to work through the ALTENBURG WOODS and take positions astride the SAARE-UNION - DOMFESSEL road. Shortly after the 2d Battalion advanced on to high ground positions at (543390) overlooking SAARE-UNION from the northeast. These were the positions held by the 2d Battalion at the end of the SAARE-UNION battle. The 101st Infantry then went into division reserve, and before it was committed in the final division attack on the Maginot forts northeast of DOMFESSEL, the regiment was withdrawn to rear areas.



Major McWade's account of the SAARE-UNION Battle

In the attack on SAARE-UNION the right flank of the 101st Infantry was working with the 4th Armored Division and the critical objectives were taken by the 4th Armored Division. The 2d and 3d Battalions met heavy resistance and had medium casualties, but the big story of SAARE-UNION is with the 3d Battalion. As the 101st Infantry jumped-off, the 3d Battalion moved under cover of a ridge line, which concealed it from the principal enemy positions East and Northeast of SAARE-UNION, was able to get to the outskirts of SAARE-UNION without serious opposition. The 3d Battalion was advancing in a column of companies, with I, K, and L, and intended to stay on the road and along the railroad leading directly to the town. According to Major McWade, I and K Companies advanced as planned but for some reason L Company stayed on the main road which carried it off to the right and brought it under fire of enemy positions in the factory and barracks area (528376) south of SAARE-UNION. L Company was hit heavily by this fire and pinned down. I Company, in the meantime, had come to the edge of the town without meeting resistance and the Battalion S-3 gave permission to I Company to go into the town and see what they could find. The town was practically deserted. I Company captured four machine guns and thirty-six enemy before enemy fire could be brought to bear. I Company went through the town and then for security reasons pulled back to the southern outskirts because it was felt that the company could not hold down the town itself. The next morning, 2 December, the entire battalion went into the town using the same route I Company had found the night before. This time the enemy had managed a tentative defense and there was some street fighting against machine gun positions set to rake the streets. The barracks area south of the town

had been completely alerted by this time and was a "hot bed" of resistance, throwing fire both at the town and on the 2d and 3d Battalions to the southeast. The town itself was cleared about noon. I Company secured positions on the northeast side of town along a road which was flanked by a few houses and orchards. L Company was outposting towards the factory area and one element was on the north. K Company was on the northwest.

Apparently, as the battalion moved in the town, the enemy had between eight and ten tanks in well camouflaged positions in the orchard east of the town. During the afternoon the enemy counterattacked after a preliminary fire of mortars and artillery. Four of the tanks drove into the town from the east and four from the northeast, followed by approximately a company and one-half of infantry. This counterattack overran and captured five of the battalion anti-tank guns which were stationed near the graveyard northeast of the town. The tanks drove into the town itself and, taking positions at street intersections, laid grazing fire on the streets particularly in the area which I Company was holding. A line of fire completely cut off the building containing the I Company Command Group. Under this protective fire the enemy infantry moved through the town to engage the 2d Battalion troops who had defended themselves in houses. The enemy counterattack was apparently very well handled and completely organized. The enemy tank commander was seen directing the movement of the tanks from his command tank turret.

The enemy counterattack succeeded in reoccupying, or clearing by fire, most of the northern part of the town. The forward artillery observer with I Company (Lt Clark, 101st FA Battalion) succeeded in radioing back word of the counterattack, and giving directions for fire. The

101st FA Battalion replied with 380 rounds in ten minutes, using a four battalion organization (its own three batteries and one battery of six guns from the Regimental Cannon Company under its control). Lt CLARK, surrounded by enemy tanks, called for fire on his own position and continued to give fire directions even when he had taken cover in the basement of the building. Just before the artillery fire came in, the I. Company Command Group spotted the enemy tank commander, and one of the men laid a single shot through the tank commander's berret. The artillery fire broke the counterattack and caused the tanks to withdraw. Two of the tanks were knocked out by artillery fire. The tanks stayed in the orchards on the edge of the town and continued to lay harassing fire on the edge of the town until their position was threatened by the advance of the 4th Armored Division and the 2d and 3d Battalions along the SAARE-UNION - DOMRESSEL road. These tanks succeeded in making their escape to the northeast.

NOTE: At the present time there is practically no one left in the 2d Battalion who was in the SAARE-UNION battle. To get a better picture of this action Lt Col Peale should be reached and Lt Howard M. Clark, who is still with the 101st FA Battalion.

*Paris*

UNIT: 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division

PERIOD: 8 November - 12 December 1944

ACTION: Lorraine Campaign

SOURCE: Lt Col James Nixon Peale, Jr., 020684, Battalion CO  
Capt John Dennis, Battalion S-3

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: 19 June 1945, ZELNAVA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MAPS: Scale, 1/50,000, Eastern FRANCE, Sheets Nos 35/14; 35/15; 36/14;  
37/13; 37/14

INTERVIEWER: Lt Monroe Ludden

NOTE: This interview was conducted with reference to maps and to a sketch diary kept by Colonel Peale. He was not always sure of the exact dates and times, but appeared to have a very clear conception of the action of his battalion. Colonel Peale called in several of his officers and NCOs to give spot stories included with this report. (Interviews by Lt Howard). Colonel Peale is a young West Point officer with a very firm grasp of the importance of the battalion action.

The 3d Battalion first moved into the Lorraine area on 6 October 1944. It relieved the 53d Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division, on the high ground positions near JUVRECOURT (1460). This was the first combat commitment of the battalion. The 53d Armored Infantry Battalion was questioned very carefully on the enemy situation. The 53d Armored Infantry Battalion recommended that troops be kept out of the woods ST PIAMONT as enemy artillery was zeroed on that position and giving it periodic concentration.

I Company took up positions on HILL 279 (148162); K Company was stationed just south of the ST PIAMONT woods; and L Company on HILL 273 (142169). M Company was kept to the rear of JUVRECOURT.

During the relief the battalion got its first taste of enemy fire. Each company was accurately shelled as it moved into position.

NOTE: At that time there were still civilians in JUVRECOURT who were, possibly, directing the enemy fire. This was never proved, however. The civilians were evacuated a few days later.

The enemy fire was coming from batteries at JUVÆELIÆZE and HARAUCOURT (170228). On this line the closest positions to the enemy were on HILL 273, where the enemy had mortar positions and outposts on the forward slope while L Company dug in on the reverse slope.

There was a constant exchange of fire across the lines for the next month, but the lines remained stable. The 3d Battalion had a few combat casualties and due to wet and cold weather a few cases of exposure. Patrols were sent out, mostly without success, but one patrol did manage to gather information of enemy positions in ZANERY.

Just prior to D-Day (8 November) the regiment began detailed planning for the attack and readjusted its positions. The 1st Battalion sideslipped to the left and relieved the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was brought back to reserve positions behind "Five Points", the road junction at (121179). The night preceding the attack the 2d Battalion inched up its positions toward MOYENVIC and the 3d Battalion took up positions on the north edge of the BEZANGE woods. The plan called for the 2d Battalion to make the initial assault towards HILL 310. The 3d Battalion was to give fire support with its M Company and be prepared to follow up on the 2d Battalion as soon as needed.

The 2d Battalion attack began at 0700. At this time M Company had a platoon of heavy machine guns at (109181) and the mortar of the company stationed behind the ST PIAMONT woods. During the attack the heavy weapons company fired on MOYENVIC at long range on terrain targets which could barely be seen for the mist. As the attack progressed, M Company was ordered to move up towards MOYENVIC. In moving up, the company commander of M Company became confused on directions. He moved from the edge of the

woods towards VIC-SUR-SEILLE and was ambushed by enemy machine gun fire in the area (120200) which had not yet been cleared. The M Company CO was killed and a few of his men wounded.

At 1100 (approximately) the regimental commander called for the 2d Battalion. It moved in a column of companies to MOYENVIC and there received instructions to relieve the 2d Battalion which had been pinned down and disorganized on the reverse slope of HILL 310. MOYENVIC was under heavy artillery fire as was the bridge and road junction northeast of the town. L Company was first committed with the intent of flanking the hill to the east. I Company was to take reserve positions on the hill just above the NEUF FARM (144216).

During this time MOYENVIC was being mortared from unknown enemy positions west of the town. One man from M Company came into MOYENVIC and said that he could lead the way to the enemy positions. Captain E. R. Radzwich, CO of I Company, gathered a few men to search out the position. (The Battalion Commander's intention was that all of I Company would do the job). The patrol moved to the woods west (130203) of MOYENVIC, met enemy fire which it returned and caused the surrender of a platoon of enemy with approximately ten 81mm mortars.

L Company had no success on HILL 310. It moved up on the right of E Company but as soon as it showed on the skyline on the lip of the ridge at (156223) it was subjected to intense enemy fire from HARAUCOURT and HILL 310. L Company drew back. I Company moved to its positions on the hill but were hit by a cross fire of automatic weapons from SALIVAL (141232) and HILL 310. Colonel Peale stated that the principal damage was coming from machine gun positions in a church at (150228). Both companies were ordered to hold their positions for the night.

About 1800 a 20-minute artillery concentration from HARAUCOURT and MARSAL fell on MOYENVIC and the forward positions of the 2d and 3d Battalions. Colonel Peale stated that this was the most intense artillery fire the battalion has ever met.

The 3d Battalion though, minus K Company (which was with TF "A" - see note appended), was the only maneuvering force available on HILL 310. The next morning the attack was to be resumed with L Company to go through E Company directly to the crest of HILL 310. I Company, with the support of a platoon of tanks from the 761st Tank Battalion, was to attack the enemy positions at SALIVAL Farm. L Company got to the edge of the woods just short of the hill crest, but was pinned down by machine gun fire at close range from the hill crest itself and by mortar fire just to the rear of the hill. After several hours of being pinned down Captain Donahue, CO of L Company, reported his situation and Colonel Peale ordered him to disengage and follow I Company to SALIVAL Farm.

I Company's attack jumped off with the tank platoon giving fire support. The tanks (a negro tank outfit) would not move up as I Company attacked. I Company made a marching fire assault from the southeast keeping under the protection of a lip of HILL 310. I Company overran the opposition at SALIVAL but there was difficulty when the supporting tank platoon did not lift its fire on the positions after I Company reached it. The tanks, following up the attack were stalled in the flooded stream just short of SALIVAL. In this attack I Company received fire on the flanks from the woods on the right and met grazing fire from strong enemy positions in the edge of the woods to the north (see map). I Company pushed on from SALIVAL, attacked this wooded area to the north and succeeded in getting a foothold before dark.

NOTE: During this attack TF "A" moved from MOYENVIC along the road west of SALIVAL toward MORVILLE. All units mentioning this task force give the impression that it did not accomplish anything, but met heavy fire and had high casualties. It appears however that this task force must have assisted I Company, and turned the left flank of the 101st Infantry, which eventually resulted in the taking of HILL 310. (See small unit interview, K Company, by Lt Howard).

By this time the enemy defenses of HILL 310 were well spotted. He had strong automatic weapons positions on the forward slope of the hill and on the hill crest. He had two (some reports say six) 75mm infantry howitzers on the ridge crest itself commanding its entire length. There were a number of mortar positions behind the tip of high ground at (158232). It was later found that these mortars were dug into 20-foot pits. The enemy artillery was all to the east of the hill positions. The 3d Battalion which was on the west of the ridge was getting practically no artillery fire but were meeting intensive machine gun and small arms fire from infantry positions on the wooded slopes.

During the 9th, L Company was sent to SALIVAL. The plan was for the battalion to attack with I Company on the left and L Company on the right up the ravine to the northeast.

On the morning of the 10th, I Company resumed its attack on enemy positions in the woods to the north. It was intended first to send the tanks up the ravine to the northeast to blanket the woods with flanking fire. The 500 yards from northeast of SALIVAL there was a tank trap extending across the ravine and anchored at both sides in heavy wooded areas. It was then planned to send the tanks cross-country directly at the corner of the woods with the infantry to follow. This attack jumped off as planned but the tanks moved out too quickly and got well ahead of the infantry. Then because they were exposed, the tanks withdrew to SALIVAL. Another attack was made which was better coordinated. This time one



platoon of I Company plus a weapons platoon got into the woods and after engaging in a hand to hand fight were able to clear an area about 300 yards deep and 200 yards wide.

At this time Colonel Peale committed his battle patrol to maintain contact with units on the left of the 3d Battalion.

(NOTE: In the 101st Regiment each battalion has a battle patrol composed of one officer and five enlisted men who have volunteered for commando missions.)

The 3d Battalion patrol (Lt Howard A. Balm) worked up in the CHEZEL woods (2524) and encountered a group of fifty Germans maneuvering to make a counterattack on SALIVAL. The patrol took them under a surprise fire at 50 to 100 yards range and dispersed the enemy unit. The patrol withdrew back 50 yards expecting the enemy to regroup for a second engagement. In a short time the enemy did make a second attack. The patrol stopped this by fire from entrenched positions. The enemy group was driven off for good.

During the afternoon of the 10th, L Company was sent off to the left of I Company with the mission of clearing the ravine to the point of open ground at (158245). In moving up L Company circled through the wooded area on the left of the ravine (see map) and reached positions behind the tank trap just short of the point of open ground. (During this attack Captain Donahue taught his men the use of marching fire in clearing a wooded area.) When L Company reached the above position it encountered enemy machine guns set up to fire directly down the ravine. This fire held up the company.

By this time I Company had swung around to the left in the woods and began to push east on the point of the ravine. Under Colonel Peale's direction both companies pressed forward along enemy positions at the

point of open ground. It was L Company that finally overcame the enemy machine gun positions at this point and cleared the road for further movement.

The two companies then formed in a column of twos on the road with L Company leading and moved out to the Northeast with the road junction at (161255) as the objective. Every 50 yards or so there was an exchange of fire with snipers along the road. Each time two or three men were casualties. Lt Col Peale decided that this kind of movement was too costly, and L and I Companies procured positions with a perimeter defense in the middle of the woods at grid line 25.

Colonel Peale said that it was difficult to describe the extreme hardship of this day's action. It was raining; the woods were extremely heavy and spotted by groves of heavy pine which the enemy often used for defense positions. The area was much too large for one battalion's operations and both right and left flanks were exposed. During the night it was possible to get supplies to the battalion. (That day the 1st Battalion began to work on the woods to the right.) Several enemy patrols were encountered. These were suspected to be enemy units trying to withdraw from cut off positions.

By the night of the 10th the 104th Infantry had reached positions northeast of MORVILLE. TF "A" which had been working with the 104th was dissolved. K Company reverted to the 3d Battalion during the night, but it had been reduced to approximately 50% strength during its action with TF "A".

It was planned to resume the attack on the morning of the 11th with two companies moving abreast on the right and left of the road toward the enemy strong point at the road junction. This attack was made without artillery or mortar preparation. The 3d Battalion, tired and cold,

made a desperate attack to get out of the woods. With a heavy volume of marching fire, they succeeded in overcoming all opposition. The woods were cleared and a few enemy automatic weapons positions were overrun at the road junction before noon. At this point an enemy battalion CP was taken with approximately 100 PWs.

NOTE: During the attack several enemy 50mm mortars which had been captured in the previous day's actions were used very effectively on the enemy strong point at the road junction. Colonel Peale mentioned that the only way to control this attack in the dense wood and rain was by judging the noise made by both friendly and enemy fire. Practically all the ammunition the battalion carried (each man with at least four bandoleers) was used up during the attack.)

The battalion secured positions at the road junction and sent its supporting tank platoon guarded by a combat patrol down the crest of the ridge to the south. By this time the 1st Battalion had seized positions on the ridge from the west and the 3d Battalion patrol met little opposition except from artillery fire.

The division regrouped during the 11-12th of November. The 104th had reached positions near HAMPONT (151269). The 328th was moved up to be committed between the 101st and the 104th Infantry Regiments. On the 12th the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, was given orders to push to the northeast from its positions at the road junction while the 1st and the 2d Battalions, which had been badly mauled in their fight on HILL 310 were to extend out along the southern edge of the KOECKING Forest. On the morning of the 12th Colonel Peale held up the battalion's attack until he could make a reconnaissance of enemy positions to his front. Captain Dennis, the Battalion S-3, went out with three light tanks (761st Tank Battalion) and located an enemy strong point of machine guns and AT weapons at (162258) in the open ground in front of the road junction. During this reconnaissance Dennis' tank was hit by AT fire but he was able to get back to give his report of the positions.

About 1000 hours the battalion attacked with L Company on the left, I Company on the right, with the road leading into the KOECKING woods as the axis of the attack. This attack was preceded by artillery raking the wooded area and the strong point on open ground to the left. I Company pushed forward along the road with tank support, but two tanks were knocked out by AT fire (probably two enemy tanks) at the road junction at (168295). The enemy anti-tank weapons were overrun by I Company's marching fire and I Company reached positions along the road at (173259).

L Company made its attack on the strong point preceded by an artillery barrage (firing white phosphorus and high explosive) which was lifted by radio as the company approached the strong point. The company followed immediately with marching fire, overrunning the enemy positions before the Germans could get their heads up, and according to Colonel Peale, bayoneted most of the enemy while they were still in their foxholes. There were a few PWs taken.

In this attack both companies were led by their company commanders personally and both companies raced to see how far they could get. Towards the end of the attack PWs were picked up and interrogated on the spot by Lt Freedman, the battalion S-2. The PWs indicated that the road and wooded area to the front of the battalion was heavily mined. It was also learned from a map taken with the PWs that there was a reserve battalion of enemy on the tip of woods at (179252). Enemy howitzer positions at certain points along the main road through the KOECKING forest to the east were indicated on this map.

Colonel Peale stated that it would have been possible for the battalion to advance farther that day but concern for a possible counter-attack by the reserve enemy battalion on his right flank and lack of

knowledge of what was on his left caused him to hold up at the positions indicated. During the day the 3d Battalion 101st Infantry had been attached to the 328th Infantry and Colonel Peale's decision to hold up was agreed to by Colonel Jacobs, CO of the 328th. Colonel Peale added that the battalion did not want to stop at these positions as it had learned by this time that any halt meant that the enemy would register in artillery very quickly. The battalion got a shelling that night, but received only two small counterattacks from a twenty-man patrol which were beaten off by rifle fire.

During the night the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, on its right flank and the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, prepared to continue the attack on the left of the road through the KOECKING forest.

NOTE: During that day C Company of the 101st, in the extending along the KOECKING woods, had attempted to attack from the tip of the woods at (172252) on enemy positions remaining in ST MEDAND. As soon as it began its move C Company was subjected to three hours intense artillery fire which killed the company commander and caused heavy casualties to the company. At this point Colonel Jacobs of the 328th Infantry took over supervision of C Company and reorganized its positions.)

The next day the 3d Battalion, moving generally to the northeast, cleared 2000 yards of wooded area without serious opposition. At the end of the day's advance some opposition was met at the edge of the woods at (191273) from thirty enemy dug in along a stream bed. These were quickly overcome by assault fire. The battalion moved up to WUISSE (205285) and held in there for the night. The battalion was able to rest and dry their clothes in houses that night during which three inches of snow fell.

The next morning several of the men lit fires to warm their "K" rations in the woods north of WUISSE. The smoke of the fires apparently drew enemy artillery fire. Several casualties were received from a

short but heavy concentration.

NOTE: At this point in the interview Colonel Peale described the enemy defenses in the KOECKING Woods. For the entire length of 15,000 yards the woods was prepared for an elaborate defense with foxholes, zig-zag trenches and dugouts. The main defenses were in front of the main CONTHIL - DIEUZE road. However most of these positions were found unoccupied. The enemy were able to make only a spotty but stubborn defense. Along the main road were wire, mines, and strong points. A few tanks were encountered along the road. The main enemy defenses in the woods were overcome by a right flank maneuver on the part of the 2d Battalion 328th Infantry (reference: Interview, 328th Infantry, enclosed in this volume).

On the morning of the 14th the 3d Battalion attacked to the lateral road northeast of WUISSE. I Company leading out with HILL 296 (215296) as objective. Enemy units which had been dislodged by the movement of CCA, 4th Armored Division were still active on the north on the 3d Battalion front. One enemy unit set up machine gun positions along the edge of the woods northeast of WUISSE. Lt Krug, forward observer from the 263d FA Battalion, called for the preparatory artillery fire on this enemy gun position but a mistake was made of one grid square in the laying which caused the fire to fall short on the 3d Battalion. A few casualties were caused but there was no serious damage.

I Company opened on the enemy position with their machine guns and small arms and after a short fire fight accounted for "quite a few" Germans dead or captured. L Company went along the edge of the woods to the objective with K Company following. I Company was to be the maneuvering elements on the right flank. L Company met organized enemy positions on the hill but in a marching fire attack captured the position. After the hill was seized, L Company continued east to the road where it encountered two 75mm SP guns on the main road set to fire to the north. These SP guns were knocked out by bazooka fire, small arms and rifle grenades. Fifty PW's were taken and there were a good many enemy dead. L and K Companies received approximately thirty casualties during the

attack.

I Company, working up to the road junction (237), took up positions. Just as the company had began operating their 284 radio, it received a tremendous artillery concentration from the right flank. The Company moved away from the road junction 200 yards to the edge of the woods on the north but in doing this walked under a muzzle of an enemy SP gun parked in the woods. The company engaged the SP with machine gun and rifle fire. Two of the Germans immediately came out to surrender but the rest of the crew decided to fight. I Company had no bazooka or rifle grenades. The SP withdrew to the north passing in front of the positions of K and L Companies. As it passed, Pvt O. J. Cusic lobed a hand grenade in the top of the SP. The grenade set off the ammunition and destroyed the SP. During the engagement the enemy SP had not returned fire. The other two SP weapons which had been knocked out by I Company blocked the road.

While the battalion remained in these positions, there was considerable enemy artillery fire falling in the general area but it all fell long or short of the position held by the battalion. When the resistance was broken L Company took up positions in ARLANGE Farm (223284) where they fired in support of the 328th Infantry into the KOECKING woods. At this time the 3d Battalion reverted to the control of the 101st Infantry.

Note: During the day (13 November) the battalion received their first replacements (approximately 200). Colonel Peale stated that in subsequent actions these men who were mainly ASTP and Regular Army men turned out very well, but they were lacking in certain necessary training such as extended order drill and hand signals controlling it and the use of the secondary weapons such as the BAR, mortar, etc.

The battalion remained in positions in the vicinity of WUISSE for several days, absorbing its replacements and rehabilitating its troops, during which time the 328th Infantry cleared to the eastern edge of the

KOECKING woods and CCA, 4th Armored Division, after its unsuccessful attack on GUEBLING, was withdrawn on Corps order. The 101st Infantry was given the mission of cracking the enemy defense line at GUEBLING. On the evening of the 17th-18th of November the 1st Battalion moved to positions above KUTZELING Farm (255312) in preparation for the attack. (Refer to interview, 101st Infantry and CCA, 4th Armored Division).

The enemy had a strong front line position on a railroad embankment along the DORDAL creek. This line position was supported by high ground 500 yards to its rear from which artillery and mortar fire could be directed. Colonel Peale gave some details of the enemy defenses. At the railroad embankment, ties had been taken from the railroad track and machine guns dug in to fire directly up and down the track itself. Another machine gun position was in a culvert through the embankment aimed to fire blind, with the aid of an observer who directed the fire. The critical strong point in front of the 3d Battalion was a granite quarry at (268320) with two large slag piles dominating the railroad embankment. The 101st Infantry planned to attack with two battalions abreast, coordinated with the attack of the 101st Infantry on the left. The objective of the 3d Battalion was HILL 273. On the morning of the 18th under cover of darkness before the artillery preparation, the battalion inched up to the railroad embankment, with the minimum loss of surprise. After the artillery preparation, I and K Companies attempted to secure the embankment itself. By this time the enemy were completely alerted. Every man who tried to cross the embankment came under intense flanking machine gun fire grazing the track and frontal fire from the enemy positions on HILL 273, and from two large slag piles at a quarry (269320).

In this attack I Company was on the right and L Company on the left.



K Company was in reserve. The battalion had its OP on the edge of the woods above KURTZLING Farm and M Company gave fire support with one platoon of machine guns on the edge of the woods and its mortar platoon back in the woods.

Both L and I Companies found it impossible to get across the embankment as planned. The forward artillery observer with I Company became separated from his radio and the only artillery support I Company could get was from the radio operator, a private, who directed the artillery fire well but not accurately. About 0700, L Company managed to cross the tracks and get up on the reverse slope of HILL 273. There it received a heavy volume of machine gun fire from the front and the left flank. Captain Donahue, Company CO, was killed and every officer of the company were casualties. The company lost an estimated thirty men at this time. Lt Clark, the forward observer of the 101st FA Battalion, and a platoon sergeant took over the company.

Soon after 0700, I Company got a few men across the track but were unable to advance against the enemy positions in the quarry. At 0815, K Company was committed with the mission of cleaning out the quarry with the help of I Company's fire. At about 1030 I Company managed to adjust a heavy concentration of time fire on the quarry itself and began to side-slip to the left of the quarry.

By waiting until I Company got to flanking positions north of the quarry, K Company was able to drive on to the slag piles with assault fire taking prisoner three officers and ninety-five men with a large number of enemy killed. With this strong point eliminated, I Company was able to work along the edge of the woods to the north but in doing so came under direct and intense flanking fire from the enemy positions in front of L Company on HILL 273. They pushed on in spite of this fire and

reached positions in the BOIS de CORDES (2B2321 - see map).

At 15 00 it became possible to get artillery fire from the 180th FA Battalion on HILL 273 in front of L Company. This fire diminished the enemy volume of fire, but there still remained three machine guns laying a cross fire on L Company's position. Just at dark L Company decided on a desperate attack. It worked up the hill with assault fire and attacked machine gun positions with bazookas and grenades. Most of the enemy were killed; six PW's were taken. Colonel Peale stated that the credit for this attack should go mainly to T/Sgt Sam A. Longbottom, who was actually leading the company. L and K Companies then moved up to positions held by I Company and during the night set up a perimeter defense in the positions noted. At this time Captain Gerald Wilson took charge of L Company.

The coordinated attack of the 104th and 101st on the 18th had broken the enemy defense line in the GUEBLING - BENESTROFF area. On the night of 18-19, orders came down to the 3d Battalion by way of its Executive Officer to continue the attack at 0700 the next morning with successive objectives, the BOIS D'MARIMONT, the FORET de MORLING and TORCHEVILLE (3535). The battalion had no idea what to expect in their next move as it had been able to make only a limited reconnaissance from its present positions. During the night enemy vehicles were heard moving both in the BOIS CORDES and BOIS de MARIMONT. Attempts were made to establish contact with the 2d Battalion on the south but this was unsuccessful.

At dawn the next morning as the attack jumped off, the battalion received heavy artillery fire on the edge of the CORDES woods from positions to the northeast. I and K Companies moved off abreast with marching fire the 800 yards to the BOIS de MARIMONT while getting artillery

fire from the north flank. As the leading elements entered the woods five enemy tanks were located on HILL 289 to the north. Captain Jackson got an effective artillery concentration on these tanks and drove them off the hill. It was supposed that these tanks were carrying a forward artillery observer who directed the artillery fire on the battalion.

As I and K Companies pressed into the MARIMONT woods they received an intense fire of 120mm mortars and 150mm artillery fire which Colonel Peale said was the most intensive fire that he had witnessed against the battalion. This fire was greatly diminished in accuracy after the enemy tanks were driven out, but still continued. The enemy fire had come from MARIMONT.

NOTE: This action was extremely confused and the enemy artillery kept units disorganized. Colonel Peale seemed to be sure of the sequence of events, but not of positions. He felt that the two hardest days for the battalion during the Lorraine Campaign were these, the 18th and 19th.

This artillery barrage had hit Companies I and K very hard, and completely wiped out the light machine guns of both companies. The 2d Platoon of M Company was completely wiped out. The battalion strength was reduced to about 200 effectives.

After this concentration Colonel Peale committed L Company to cover the southern edge of the woods. At this time the 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry, was moving up on the left but there was no contact between the battalions. I and K Companies were badly disorganized. The 81mm Platoon of M Company was used to evacuate the wounded by handcarry back to the BOIS CORDES, and the survivors of the barrage were assembled along the road in the center of the woods. The scout platoon was used to guard the rear of these elements along the edge of the woods. About this time a second shelling came in, hitting the woods and wiping out practically the entire scout platoon. A patrol of volunteers was sent up to the high

ground in the center of the woods to reconnoiter that position and look for the 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry. Before the patrol got well off, several enemy tanks were discovered along the road in the center of the woods. At this time a squadron of P-47's came over on a requested mission to attack MARIMONT. The P-47's spotted these tanks. They bombed and strafed, driving out the enemy tanks, but caused several casualties to the 3d. Battalion. It was still only 1100 in the morning.

About noon, during a pause in the action, Colonel Peale personally reorganized his battalion. It was formed along the road and out in the woods to the southern tip. By this time most of the enemy in the woods had withdrew to positions in MARIMONT. Colonel Peale decided that the only way he could get beyond the woods was to attack the southern edge of MARIMONT to clear a route to the MORLING woods. The strength of the battalion at that time was equal to one good sized company with a few supporting heavy weapons.

L Company attacked to clear the high ground in the BOIS D'MARIMONT. Captain Wilson took the company up the hill with assault fire where he met the 2d Battalion of the 104th Infantry (the 2d Battalion did considerable screaming because its positions were shot up). L Company passed through the 2d Battalion, 104th, and went down the hill toward the Chateau (302323) at MARIMONT, receiving some automatic weapons, rifle, and mortar fire from the town as it moved in. Reaching the edge of the town L Company spotted a Mk VI tank in the chateau on the right of the main road and decided to withhold its attack since the company had no bazookas or AT grenades. The company began getting heavy tank fire from the woods east of MARIMONT (310326). The artillery liaison officer succeeded in laying artillery fire on these tank positions and diminished the fire. The company then

secured positions for the night.

That night at 2100 the enemy opened up with every kind of weapon that he had. Fire was tremendous in volume but mostly inaccurate and caused no serious damage. It was presumed that the enemy was pulling out and getting rid of its artillery load before it moved.

During the evening Colonel Peale returned to the regiment and received orders to continue the attack the next morning. He learned that the 104th Infantry was going through NEBLING to ALBESTROFF. During the evening the 3d Battalion moved across the road into the woods east of MARIMONT and in that position received 100 replacements. (At that time there were nine men in L Company and 10 in K Company. Each of these companies were assigned twenty-five men and the rest of the replacements distributed to M and I Companies, which were kept as the main striking force.) The next day I and K Companies patrolled through the MORLING woods with I Company on the right and K Company on the left. They met no resistance, but working through the woods was slow. Reaching the railroad at (327330) at dusk and finding there was no way to get vehicles across, the battalion planned to outpost there for the night. However, Colonel Scott, Regimental Commander, insisted that the battalion continue the attack to TORCHEVILLE. In accordance with these instructions the battalion took off that evening in the dark and in a drizzling rain. All vehicles were left behind. I Company led off the attack through the woods, meeting no opposition but finding several abatis on the road. The battalion, travelling in a chained file, worked out from the edge of the woods towards TORCHEVILLE. Near the edge of the town the lead patrol picked up two German guards. They were interrogated on the spot, and told there were eighteen men in TORCHEVILLE and approximately fifty men on the high ground on either side of the town. Lt Maunford, CO of K

Company, took the two PWs into the town, had them point out where the enemy were stationed and took the eighteen prisoners without any resistance.

L Company led by Sgt Longbottom and Sgt Murphy moved to the hill south of the town, but decided it was too dark to search out the enemy positions. At first light L Company moved over the hill and after a brief fire fight completely overran the enemy positions. Approximately fifty PWs were taken there. The rest of the battalion had moved in the town during the night. They kept several wounded prisoners under guard in the town that night. The next morning an enemy tank got into the town from the north. The men prepared to defend themselves in the basements of buildings, during which the PW's escaped. The tank crew talked with one of the wounded PW's and then turned and withdrew from the town. The battalion expected a counterattack to break any moment, and prepared hastily for it. For some reason the counterattack never came off.

NOTE: The German lieutenant who had command of the position in TORCHEVILLE said that he had moved in late that afternoon expecting to be followed by reinforcements. He had had no time to organize his positions before dark. This officer also gave information on mines placed in the road between GUINZELING and TORCHEVILLE. Before word of this could be got back to the rear, reconnaissance parties from the regimental cannon company moved on to the road and two peeps were blown.

The battalion got artillery and mortar fire in TORCHEVILLE but received no counterattack. At the time the 104th Infantry on the north was having trouble around ALBESTROFF and the 2d Battalion of the 101st moving out from the LOHR to INSVILLER. The 1st Battalion stayed in TORCHEVILLE until the 21st and then went to INSVILLER in regimental reserve.

The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 101st Infantry continued the attack in BOIS de BONNEFONTAINE while the 3d Battalion was in reserve. On the 23d, the 3d Battalion was given orders to skirt the Northern edge of the woods to capture VIEBESVILLER (4235). In this attack the 3d Battalion

was to pass through the 2d Battalion starting from the point of woods (4133), I Company moved North down the ravine, L Company circled to the left of the town and K Company was held in reserve behind I Company. The 3d Battalion got into the town without a fight and found the enemy had withdrawn.

About 1700 hours, I Company continued on to the high ground (4236) Northeast of the town but met machine gun and 20mm AA fire from a hastily improvised strongpoint. This fire caused six casualties before Lt CLARK, the forward observer, could get artillery on the strongpoint under which I Company withdrew to the reverse slope of the high ground. That evening the 3d Battalion made contact with the 2d Battalion of the 101st Infantry in the corner of the woods at (435349). The bridge at VIBERVILLE had been secured intact, and in order to guard it the 3d Battalion placed L Company north of the bridge in the vicinity of ST ELIZABETH FARM (415366).

The next day the 2d Battalion ran into trouble at the Chateau de BONNEFONTAINE and K Company was attached to it and ordered to attack along the edge of the BONNEFONTAINE woods to the Northeast with the objective, HILL 282 and the road south of ALTWEILLER. K Company made its attack during the afternoon and reached its objective just before dark after taking an enemy strongpoint on the edge of the woods by assault fire.

Almost immediately after K Company had moved into its objective it received a counterattack by a company of fanatical troops from the north. The counterattack was supported by heavy 20mm AA fire and mortar fire. K Company was caught before its lines were firm. Its positions were overrun, after a hand to hand battle, and the remainder of the company

was driven back about 200 yards. It was estimated that 50 to 60% of the company were either killed or captured in this counterattack. That night K Company was brought back to VIBERSVILLER with the effective strength of about one good platoon. (Refer to interview, 2d Battalion, 101st Infantry).

While the 3d Battalion was in reserve the 1st and 2d Battalions cleared out the BOIS de BONNEFONTAINE to the SAAR Canal. The 101st Regiment was held for several days in division reserve. On the 1st of December the regiment was committed east of the SAAR River to support the 4th Armored Division's attack on SAARE-UNION. The 1st Battalion moved through BURBACH (542336) and took up positions relieving an element of the 4th Armored Division in the GEISEBUSCH WOODS and on the high ground, HILLS 317 and 323, overlooking the SAAR River and SAREEWERDEN to the West. The 1st Battalion of the 101st Infantry was on the right of the 3d Battalion in the GRANDBOIS. The mission of the 3d Battalion was to attack along the river road to SAAR-UNION and to seize Hill 254 (525392) North of the city. The 1st and 2d Battalions were to go through the BANNHOLTZ WOODS and attack SAAR-UNION from the Southeast.

At this time the line companies of the 3d Battalion had about fifty (50) men each. During the day, K Company cleared to the Southwest corner of the GIESBACH WOODS and Col Peale took his battalion command group to Hill 331 to establish and OP for the attack. L Company also took up positions on Hill 331. From this position it was possible to observe SAAR-UNION and especially the hospital and barracks area south of the town. The OP at Hill 331 at this time had an enemy tank sniping at it from about 600 yards to the North, and was receiving high velocity fire from the Northeast from tanks which could be seen on the main road East from SAAR-UNION.



During the day I and K Companies moved up through SARREWADERN and continued to the outskirts of SAAR-UNION along the railroad embankment without meeting resistance.

Due to the terrain, I Company reached the outskirts of the town without realizing that they were near it. Late in the afternoon, I and K Companies were sent into the city in order to explore the opposition there. They met no resistance so I Company continued through to the Eastern edge of the town, while K Company veered off to the left to seize a foot hold on Hill 254 which was the battalion objective. As K Company came out of the town they met heavy machine gun fire from Hill 254. This fire pinned down the company and caused fifteen (15) casualties. What was left of K Company withdrew back into the town after dark. After dark, C Co withdrew back to the outskirts south of the city for security reasons. During the night, I Company was moved across country to SARREWADERN to be in position to enter the town with I Company the next morning.

NOTE: This is the account as given by Col Peale. For further details, some of them conflicting, see interviews: K Company by Lt Howard, and interview 2d Bn, 101st Inf by Lt Ludden.

The morning of the 2d December, the battalion reentered the city in a column of companies, with I Company leading followed by L Company and the fifteen remaining men of K Company. This time the battalion was opposed by machine guns along the railroad tracks in the outskirts of the town and several anti-tank guns in the SAAR-UNION station. The battalion was supported by a platoon of tank destroyers which took these enemy positions under fire and an artillery TOT was placed on the town. At 1000 hours the battalion moved up in single file using the railroad embankment as cover to its right, and the leading elements of the battalion reached the town without casualties. A Company again pushed

through the town receiving machine gun fire from the Northeast and some inaccurate mortar and anti-tank fire. It took up its former positions on the eastern edge of the town.

Colonel PEALE was not satisfied with the clearance of the town so he used L Company to patrol the streets and then to take up positions covering both the right and left flank of I Company. The fifteen men from K Company were ordered to set up a road block on the road leading from the town to the Northwest. K Company positions drew fire from machine guns and mortars from Hill 254 which caused several additional casualties, and it was necessary to lay smoke on Hill 254 in order to withdraw K Company back into the town. During the afternoon, L Company made an attack on the barracks area South of the town. By attacking the barracks from the rear, L Company succeeded in dislodging the enemy defending there and in taking most of them prisoners. By evening of the 2d, L Company was also able to clear the area to the river on the West which included the railroad yards and a few enemy positions which were still holding out. That evening the town was outposted with I Company on the Northeast, L Company to the left of I Company, a platoon of tank destroyers on the high ground South of the town, and the Battalion AT platoon northeast of the town. During the night the 3d Battalion (K Company alone) of the 104th Infantry came into the town to reinforce the outposts.

The battalion still had the mission of taking Hill 254 North of the town. The next morning an artillery barrage was laid on the hill at 0930 hours. About the same time I Company reported that the enemy on the hill were forming for a counterattack, using the road to the East of Hill 254. Artillery was laid on the enemy concentration but the enemy by that time had advanced to the edge of the city, overrunning the anti-tank platoon of the 3d Battalion which was blocking this road.

The enemy counterattack was supported by about ten tanks and 60 infantrymen. It infiltrated into the positions of I Company and were able to capture the I Company Headquarters and most of the anti-tank platoon. The enemy tanks moved systematically through the town, laying a heavy cross-fire on the streets while the enemy infantry moved from house to house, taking on the men who were defending in houses in small groups.

The enemy counterattack was beaten off primarily by the action of Lt Clark (the forward observer from the 101st FA Bn with I Company). He called for artillery fire on his own positions which were surrounded by the enemy tanks. This fire was heavy enough to cause the withdrawal of the enemy infantry, and the tanks became disorganized when the Commanding Officer of I Company shot the enemy tank commander who exposed himself in the turret of his command tank. By evening, I Company was able to push back to its positions and I Company pushed up to occupy the road on the left of I Company. At this time the division ordered the 3d Battalion of the 104th Infantry to complete the clearance and outposting of SAAR-UNION and gave the mission of taking Hill 254 to another battalion of the 104th Infantry. At the same time a company of tanks from the 4th Armored Division came into SAAR-UNION to reinforce the 104th Infantry. The enemy tanks used in this counterattack first withdrew to the orchards East of the town and then waited until dark and withdrew to the North without being cut off.

At this time the 1st Battalion went into Regimental reserve and before it was committed again, the 101st Infantry was relieved and moved back to rear areas.

*Povis*

UNIT: I COMPANY, 101 INF REGT, 26 INF DIV

PERIOD: 30 NOV - 4 DEC 44

ACTION: SAAR-UNION

SOURCE: LT. WALTER A. YOUNG, PLAT LDR, 3D BN, 101 INF REGT  
CAPT. GABRIEL A. IVAN, CO M Co, 101 INF REGT

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: SALNAU, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 18 JUNE 1945

INTERVIEWER: 2d LT. CHARLES KING HOWARD

MAP: 1/50,000 SAAR-UNION, SHEET NO. 36-14, GSGS 4471

During this period Lt Young was a T/Sgt, 3d Plat., I Co., 101 Inf Regt. He was awarded the DSC for his part in the action and later received a battle field commission during the ARDENNES on 19 Jan 45. Capt Ivan was a 1st Lt, serving as EX O, I Co., 101 Inf Regt.

No notes were referred to during interview. Lt Young's memory was not entirely reliable nor was he informed regarding units beyond his immediate concern. Capt Ivan was not present for the entire interview but, during the time in which it was a combined interview, amplified the information of Lt Young and furnished the information on the 1st plat and wpns Plat.

On 1 December the 3d Bn, 101st Inf, was in the vicinity of PISTORF (5133). I Co was on the left flank of the Bn, which was working its way north along the east side of the SAAR RIVER to attack SARRE-UNION (5238). Preceded by two M-8 armored cars from a cavalry unit, I Co moved north along the PISTORF - SAAR-UNION ROAD to seize SARREWERDEN (5236), which is located less than 2000 yards south of SAARE-UNION. The enemy had pulled out of SARREWERDEN and were shelling it heavily when I Co moved through the town. The bridge at (521362) had been blown and mechanized cavalry units, observed on the west side of the river, would not be able to cross the SAAR until the bridge was replaced. During the afternoon enemy 88 and 120 mortar fire landed constantly on the north side of the town. By 1500 I Co was 500 yards north of SAAREWERDEN in the vicinity of the road and rail crossing

at (522366), where a gate-keeper's house was located. This house served as the Company observation post, providing excellent observation over the open ground toward SAAR-UNION and to the northeast across HIGHWAY 61.

I Co attempted to push on in a column of platoons along the SAAREWERDEN ROAD which sloped gradually down to a tree lined creek running southeast across the Bn front. The bridge (526372) had been blown at the creek. Across the stream the road continued on to join HIGHWAY 61 at (527374), a point some 1000 yards from the I Co OP at the switch-house. From the RJ the HIGHWAY runs into SAARE-UNION, a distance of 700 yards, past a factory located on the east side of the road. German barracks had been constructed just south of town also on the east side of the road. The Highway served as a boundary between I and K Companies. The day was cold and clear and I Co could observe K Co on the northwest side of the BANNHOLTZ WOODS, across the highway, and in the open ground ahead of the woods receiving heavy artillery fire, as they moved forward.

In moving toward the creek (526372) I Co drew artillery fire but was able to observe enemy troops on the south side of town and a tank firing from the factory (526376). Artillery was also coming from VILLENEUVE (5137) across the SAAR RIVER, although the Company had been told that this town was in friendly hands. The Company was then ordered to pull back, probably to the vicinity of the CP, as the 3d Plat was given the mission of withdrawing into defilade along a trail running almost due east from SAAREWERDEN to Highway 61 to form a line of skirmishers, establish contact with K Co, and advance again on the attack. About 1600 six men were sent from the 3d Plat to contact K

Co and the Plat advanced, keeping the main highway on its right. As the Plat. drew up opposite the OP (522366), artillery fire checked its further advance across the open ground.

The 3d Platoon Sgt was then informed that the Company would resume the attack at 1900, when it would be dark, and that his plat could press the attack along the axis of the SARREWERDEN ROAD toward the RJ (527374) and enter town on the west side of the Highway. I Co was in reserve, dug in around SARREWERDEN and did not participate in this action. An attempt was again to be made to contact A Co in order to coordinate the attack. At 1900 another contact patrol was sent across the Highway to the east to contact K Co, leaving two squads of about 7-8 men to press the 3d Plat attack. At the same time the Weapons Plat and 1st Plat, under Lt Ivan, were to advance from the OP north along the west side of the railroad that parallels the SAAR RIVER and enter SAAR-UNION from across the railroad tracks. The Wpns Plat was to support the I Co attack and would be positioned by Lt Ivan according to the situation.

At 1900 the I Co Commander ordered his units to attack without delay, as he had received word from the Bn that A Co was already in town. The men in I Co were aware of the fact that there were enemy tanks in SAARE-UNION and therefore believed that K Co must be facing a stiff fight within the town. The 3d Plat moved out with the Plat Sgt leading the two reduced squads, while the Co Comdr followed behind with an Forward Observer with an SCR 300. It was dark by now but the moon had come up. The Plat scrambled across the creek on the left of the blown bridge (526372) over the debris which was only partly submerged. The creek was about six feet wide and three to four feet deep. With the aid of the moonlight a light tank cavalry outfit was

seen across the river. The Plat advanced over the now vision open ground guiding left (west) of the SARREWERDEN ROAD and of the RJ (527374), still watching for K Co on its right flank. Since jumping-off the night had been extremely quiet and there had been no small arms fire heard. The Plat advanced about 500 yards being careful to guide well left of the factory (526376) where an enemy tank was still believed to be located. At this point a hedgerow was penetrated and two Germans completely surprised, were captured from their foxholes. An enemy AT position was then spotted directly ahead. The position was occupied by Germans but the advance of the Plat was not observed until it was within 3-4 yards of the enemy. The Germans immediately took off to the rear toward town and the AT gun and a MG were captured. The fleeing troops alerted a MG section, for almost at once two heavy MGs and some rifles opened up about 75-100 yards ahead of the 3d Plat.

No word had been received from K Co and the I Co squads now believed themselves to be out alone and were of course without MG support. Artillery began to land on the slope to the south in the vicinity of the creek. At this time one German suddenly sprang up from behind the AT position and ran over the BAR man, who quickly knocked him down. The German began to shout giving away the Plat locations and it was necessary to take summary action. About this time the CO and FO went to the rear, as their radio was out, to tell the Bn Comdr that the 3d Plat was meeting stiff resistance and that no contact had been made with K Co. \* The Germans now began to advance on the 3d Plat positions and the captured MG was readied to help counter the attack. The platoon held its fire, watching the Germans' shadowy figures come toward them in what

\*Compare interviews - 2d Bn, 101 Inf (Bn S-3) and 3d Bn, 101 Inf (Bn CO) - for other interpretations of the activities of K and I Cos during period 1-3 Dec.

was now a dark night except for the moonlight, which aided the defenders. At 60 yards the enemy fire was suddenly returned with was believed to be decisive effect. The fire fight then continued for some time without the 3d Plat giving any ground. A thermite grenade was received, which had been sent forward by the Co Comdr, and also word that the plat was to pull back and break off the fight. T/Sgt (now Lt) Young had his men fall back while he blew the AT gun with the grenade. The resulting explosion drew an increased volume of artillery fire but it fortunately continued to fall well to the rear of the 3d Plat. The plat now completed its withdrawal without having lost any men during the entire time.

In the meantime the other units of I Co, under Lt Ivan, had also made contact with the enemy. At 1900 the Wpns and 1st Plat had jumped off as planned, moving along the embankment on the west side of the railroad tracks. On this route into SA R-UNION the men observed two German guard details walking south along a road which runs on the east side of the tracks. The Germans did not see them and the patrol continued. Lt Ivan let the two platoons throught the canter of town without being observed, when suddenly heavy firing broke <sup>out</sup> to their rear. All the men immediately took cover, but then it was realized that the fire was not being directed at them but was coming from south of town.

Lt Ivan assumed that his route had by-passed an enemy defensive position which the 3d Plat must have run into.

The squads were reorganized and then went northwest to the edge of town. A German officer stepped out of a CP and was quickly shot. Soon after the patrol was challenged by two guards who let the men come up close before halting them. The two guards were quietly



taken prisoner. A Sgt, Henry H Hoffman, spoke German and in German threatened the guards with death if they did not reveal the location of the rest of the guard. The intimidated Germans then led the two squads to the guard-house, where 16 Germans were collected. All of these men were sleeping at the time except one man. The Sgt of the German guard, who was among the captives, was very insolent and told his captors that they would be his prisoners before they ever left town. He said that there were 2 Inf Bns in town and an AA flak regt was on the hills north of town. Lt Ivan's men moved back into town with their prisoners, where they waited an hour expecting to make momentary contact with other friendly units. After waiting this time, a patrol was sent to the east through the town to try to contact the 3d Platoon and K Co, which was supposed to be in town. The force under Lt Ivan was reluctant to pull back, as it meant giving up ground, while other forces might still be in the town. No contact was made with other friendly units. Finally it was decided to pull back, and the force returned across the tracks, collecting two more prisoners. Across the tracks, still in the town area, Lt Ivan left his men, and with two guards took the 20 PWs back along the west side of the railroad embankment. He was anxious to determine whether his force should be withdrawn from town or whether it was to remain in town. In the rear, probably in the vicinity of the I Co OP, he met the Bn Comdr who approved his withdrawing. Lt Ivan then had his men drawn back about 400 yards to the railroad station (524376) south of town and almost due west from the factory (526376) on Highway 51. The platoons dug in for the night in an arc around the station and I Co also came up and dug in.

It was by now the conviction of I Co, stated as a fact by the officers interviewed, that K Co had been so seriously hit by artillery fire during the afternoon and had received so many casualties that it had been unable to advance into SAARE-UNION. K Co, according to these sources, had less than one platoon left "as a result of the shelling during the early afternoon".

I Co was ordered to attack the following morning, so at 1000 on 2 December the Company moved north along the railroad tracks, following the route taken the night before by Lt Ivan's platoons. M Co set up positions which enabled them to neutralize an enemy machine-gun nest near the factory at RJ (527374). L Co was also to attack SAARE-UNION, and it may be presumed that L Co moved north along Highway 61, for I Co reports (to this interview) that L Co only held the German barracks south of town during the night of 2-3 December. I Co planned to attack the town from deployed positions along the railroad track once they reached a point opposite to and just east of the town. Highway 61 runs through SAARE-UNION on the east side of town parallel to the railroad and about 100 yards west of the tracks. The attack would thus be made through the town to the northeast with the 1st and 2d platoons, whose personnel numbered altogether about one platoon, being combined as the 1st platoon with the mission to clear the north half of the town. The 3d platoon would at the same time be responsible for the south half of the town.

Moving across the tracks the 1st plat drew fire from a German machine gun and could see a German tank back in the town. Three men were killed in this platoon in the vicinity of the main street corner (524380). By this time the 3d plat was also along the highway but were

being subjected to small arms fire and could not get across the road. It was about 1200 and the Bn Comdr, seeing that the men were getting panicky under the fire which they were drawing, stepped out onto the street and fired a full clip from the M-1 which he was carrying at a suspected enemy position. This action steadied the men and shortly after 1 squad from the 1st plat, got across the road, using WP grenades. This squad set about clearing the north sector of the town which went on throughout the afternoon in a series of small arms fights. The 3d plat also finally got across the road and during the late afternoon cleared its area without much trouble. It was becoming apparent from the decreased resistance that most of the Germans had pulled out of town. T/Sgt Young had the 3d plat clear the buildings in their sector room by room and also found himself giving constant instruction to the replacements which had been added to the plat recently. For these men this was their first experience in town fighting. In moving through their sector of town, the 1st Plat moved to the left of the church which forms a "block not indicated on the map" (the town was divided on the basis of a map study) and missed a German tank located near the church.

At night the Company reorganized on the inner of the two arc-like streets which are on the eastern side of town. In the process they came very close to firing on each other in reestablishing contact between the two platoons. The CP for I Co was set up in a big hotel in the town. During the evening Sgt Henry Hoffman discovered the enemy tank in the churchyard. While observing the tank he was jumped by two Germans. He succeeded in killing one of them and wounding the other,

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before leaving to report the location of the tank. The officers of I Co knew that the remnants of K Co had moved through the northwest side of town during the day and had been pinned down. I Co was holding the enemy barracks just south of the town. Late the night of 2-3 December I Co, 104th Inf, came into the town and took up positions on the north side of town, covering that flank for I Co.

The morning of 3 December started quietly. A good house for the CP had been located just east of town on the road to DOMFESSEL (5739) slightly beyond the line of riflemen which now had positions on the edge of town facing east. A TD was located just to the left of the CR (528384) and several AT guns were also in position covering this area. The CP was therefore moved out to the newly chosen location (530384) and directly across the road in a clearing south of the road. At least one liason plane was in the air during this time and the OPs were alert. About 0900 the OPs reported that 5 enemy tanks were attacking from the east, moving out of cover and carefully camouflaged positions in which they had been located. Their <sup>PRior</sup> movement forward had not been detected either by the OPs ~~or the OPs~~ or the liason planes. This counter-attack was supported by infantry. The CP was soon isolated, cutting off one officer who happened to be going by to check the OPs when the tanks came in sight. The I Co Ex O, Lt Ivans; was in the town at the time with the Bn Comdr. The CO of I Co was in the CP when the tanks were seen coming. He shouted to the staff, "Lets go, follow me!" and ran out firing a weapon at the oncoming tanks. Apparently they failed to react to his order, for the Supply Sgt, the 1st Sgt and two runners were captured when the Germans entered the CP. One Sgt, Walter Gilpin, went down into the cellar and when the Germans attempted to enter the cellar from the first floor, he fired one round

knocking a "burp-gun" out of a German's hands. He was not bothered further and was "liberated" the following day.

The enemy infantry infiltrated into the town during the day and for I Co, it was a day of individual actions as they attempted to keep their positions well forward on the east side of town. The FO from the 101 FA Bn, Lt Howard Clark, and his radio operator installed themselves in a house on the eastern edge of the town and adjusted close in 105mm fire all day. This deterred the enemy tanks which were handled with excellent defensive skill, taking extreme advantage of defilade and obstacles so that bazooka fire on them was almost impossible. The enemy tanks were fortunately using armor piercing shells which went through the houses without setting them on fire. There were some enemy tanks in the town all day. At dusk the tanks started to converge behind the I Co lines, so the Company withdrew to the center of the town around the churchyard. Lt Clark remained in his observation post and adjusted artillery on the recently abandoned I Co positions. It was believed at Bn that he was firing on his own men but his authority to get fire at once on order had been established during the day and 280 rounds fell on the small area which I Co had just left. Fire was then lifted and the infantry moved back to their former positions finding that resistance had been broken. The Germans did not attack again that night and I Co felt that Lt Clark was chiefly to be credited for the fact that the Company was still holding the town. During the day the Bn Comdr had attempted to get tank and anti-tank support for I Co into the town from units located on the southwest side of town. Their presence would have helped deter the enemy tanks, if it had been known to the enemy, but this possible support never materialized. The most impulsive shot of the day was fired by a Sgt Bowman, who was fired.

on from an unexpected quarter by an enemy machine-gunner. Bowman wheeled, remarking, "I think that son of a bitch tried to kill me" and killed the gunner with one round.

On 4 December a unit of the 104th Inf Rgt moved into town again mopping it up and finding a number of Germans who had infiltrated into town during the counter-attack. Five enemy tanks were observed pulling out to the north along the highway running west of the GRAND BOIS (5440) but friendly tanks did not engage them. During the night of 3-4 December enemy tanks were constantly heard but could not be located. It was later believed that they were covering the evacuation of the dead and wounded from the artillery barrage. On the 4th I Co was relieved by the 104th Inf and withdrew from the town.



PETITE, and Hill 253 and outpost this area. This mission was carried out with not too much difficulty.

On 11 November the 328th Regiment was relieved by the 2d Cavalry and was trucked into ARRACOURT (115145) and moved by foot into VIC-sur-SEILLE (115205). The 1st Battalion moved into the line along a front approaching the west edge of the KOECKING FOREST. The Regimental CP was set up at SALIVAL (142233). The 3d Battalion 101st Regiment, which was attached to the 328th for this operation, was deployed along the (169261) line.

On the morning of the 12th of November a dawn attack started with the 3d Battalion, 101st Regiment, on the left. The 2d Battalion, 328th Regiment, was abreast of the 3d Battalion to the right, and the 1st Battalion was held in reserve for the Regiment. The 3d Battalion of the 328th was attached to the 101st Regiment during this period and was screening above MOYENVIC (137206). As the attack jumped off the enemy opened fire from three directions on the two attacking battalions. The small arms and automatic fire from the enemy was intense and observed artillery was coming in. On the 13th, the two battalions were still attacking through the forest. During the period from the 11th through the 13th, the Regiment had very little flank protection, and the battalions were formed into perimeter defenses for self-protection. Lt Col JAMES C. MOTT took over command of the Regiment on the 13th of November.

On the morning of the 14th, the 1st Battalion passed through the 3d Battalion of the 101st Regiment, at which time the 3d Battalion reverted to the 101st Regiment's control. The 3d Battalion of the 328th Regiment was then relieved from the 101st and moved to the vicinity of WUISSE (204287) in Regimental reserve.

When the 2d Battalion started its attack on the 14th, it was checked by intense machine gun fire. Here, according to the interviewee, a very





104th Regiment then moved into the LA GRANDE FOREST taking over the position of the 1st Battalion 328th and 101st Engineers. This action resulted in a swap of areas by the 104th and the 328th. This action was completed on 26 October. On 27 October the 3d Battalion was committed to clear the woods at MONCOURT (193138), but when they encountered stiff enemy opposition they were forced to withdraw to their old positions to prevent unnecessary casualties. The period from 27 October to 7 November was spent in a little last minute training and preparation for the big attack on 8 November. Each battalion spent a given amount of time in reserve where the men took showers and clean clothes were issued.

At 0700 on 8 November when the jump-off started the 2d Battalion was on the right, the 1st Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion was held in reserve (see sketch). The attack was supported by one battery (Charlie Battery) of the 263d FA Battalion and the regiment's own cannon company. Company C of the 761st Tank Battalion was to attack with the regiment. The only objective given was a division objective which was to take BENESTROFF (265343). The 328th Regiment was to first take BEZANGE la PETITE (175152) and MONCOURT, and hold so as to act as a spring-board for the 2d Cavalry to take LEY <sup>(205155)</sup> and LEEZEY <sup>(197176)</sup>, screening the right flank, and to contact elements of Seventh Army.

The 2d Battalion attacked direct into MONCOURT, and the fighting was very difficult. Casualties for the battalion were high as the enemy had well fortified positions <sup>for 35' + Artillery with excellent fields of</sup> of fire covering the approach to MONCOURT. The enemy's use of small arms and automatic weapons was on a small scale; however, a great deal of sniper fire was encountered during the advance into MONCOURT. Sixty-seven PWs were taken during the capture and occupation of MONCOURT. The 1st Battalion had the mission of taking BEZANGE la

PARROY Sheet No. 35/15

Scale: 1/50,000



Sketch: Showing positions of 328<sup>th</sup> Inf Regt. on  
8 Nov. AM Also objectives for the 328<sup>th</sup> Regt. for that  
day. (8 Nov. 1944)

*Pami*

UNIT: 328th Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division "YD" *in combat from 8 Nov 44 to 12 Dec 44*

PERIOD: 8 November - 12 December 1944

ACTION: LORRAINE CAMPAIGN

SOURCE: Major PAUL S. CARRIER, S-3

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: VLOCHOVO - BREZI, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 16 June 45

MAPS: 1/50,000, CHATEAU-SALINS Sheet No. 35/14. PARROY Sheet No. 35/15.  
NOMENY Sheet No. 34/14. SAARE-UNION Sheet No. 36/14. SARREBOURG  
INTERVIEWER: 2d Lt CARL W. ELVINGTON (Sheet No. 36/15.  
(1/100,000 SAARBRUCKEN Sheet  
(No. 5/1.

A personal unit History was used for dates and location of towns.

The LORRAINE CAMPAIGN was D-Day for the "YD" Division, and the 328th Regiment first got the feel of the line on the 8th of October when they relieved the 319th Infantry Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division. The 1st Battalion was deployed in line along a front in the vicinity of PORT-sur-SEILLE (847351); the 2d Battalion was deployed along a line in the vicinity of BENICOURT (863332). The 3d Battalion, less Companies I and M, were held in reserve. This action by the 328th Regiment was just a holding action to allow the 319th Infantry to flank around to NOMENY (895335). The enemy was not encountered during this holding action except by small units and patrols. Company I suffered the first casualty at 0100 on 8<sup>th</sup> October. On the 13th of October the 328th was relieved by the 317th Regiment of the 80th Infantry Division and rejoined the 26th Infantry Division on the 14th of October, at which time they took up positions along the North side of the LA GRANDE FOREST. The regiment remained in this area until 24 October. The 101st Engineers relieved the 2d Battalion leaving the 1st Battalion still on line. The 2d Battalion and also the 3d Battalion, (which was pulled out of reserve), moved to within the vicinity of BECHICOURT (153139) relieving the 104th Regiment, 26th Division. The

The 3d Bn returned to EULHAUSEN on 8 Nov, and from there moved into ETTING. Companies I and K attacked ACHEN, above which a series of forts were emplaced. B Co, 761st Tk Bn, was attached to the battalion, and put 76.2mm fire on the pillboxes. The infantry then moved in with white phosphorous grenades and took the boxes.

On 9 ~~Nov~~<sup>Dec</sup> the battalion received orders to attack the woods and high ground north of ACHEN. This attack was made in a column of companies, and some resistance was encountered in the woods. But artillery fire was moving ahead of the advance, and the battalion pushed to the north edge of the woods. The 328th Inf was moving on the left and trying to take the towns of WEISVILLER and WOEFFLING. The 1st Bn, 104th Inf, had come up on the immediate left of the 3d Bn to take the high ground northeast of ACHEN. The direction of attack was now swinging northeast. Machine gun fire was coming down the main road that led from ACHEN to SINGLING, and there was intense enemy activity all through the area. A great many enemy tanks were to be seen moving over the hills to the east. P-47s were giving effective support with their air strikes, using Napalm bombs on pillboxes, and fragmentation bombs in the woods. The weather had turned fine, and tank fights were taking place. The 4th Armd Div was active around SINGLING and BINING, and the 12th Armd Div had appeared to relieve the 4th Armored. Attrition on the infantry units was very heavy. The 3d Bn was down to a combat strength of 135 men, and the 1st Bn was in even worse shape, with something like 100 men available to fight.

The morning of 11 November, the 3d Bn received a respite when the 3d Bn, 346th Inf of the completely fresh and untried 87th Div relieved them on line, and the entire 26th Div initiated a movement to METZ for rest and recuperation.

the road that led north. The east-west road north of KULHAUSEN was cut.

Companies L and I were to seize WEIDESHEIM. L Co sent patrols into the woods east of WEIDESHEIM, who found Germans in the woods. In an effort to get positions east and northeast of the town, the two companies attacked down the sloping ground, but as they came out of the woods were completely stopped by heavy small arms, MG, artillery and mortar fire coming from the town.

On 7 Nov orders came to take WEIDESHEIM, if necessary using the full battalion. L Co attacked and was stopped again. "I" Co was ordered to move due west 2,000 yards to HUTTING, then due north to WEIDESHEIM. This company met shelling while proceeding through HUTTING, and as it reached a road junction at the edge of WEIDESHEIM received heavy mortar fire. The 328th was moving up on the left at this time. Neither I Co from the south, nor L Co from the northeast could get into the town. K Co, which was still in KULHAUSEN, was ordered to come northeast, following the creek bank in to the town. K Co came across an open field, crossed the field, and got right into the town, Capt LeBoeuf, K Co CO, sent a message to Col Dellert that he was in the town and proceeding to clean it. An artillery barrage on the town was stopped just in time.

Capt LeBoeuf later explained: "It was getting dark, and I don't like to fight in towns after dark. So we took the shortest way in."

It was at this time that the battalion began to run into the defenses of the MAGINOT LINE. Little actual use was made of these defenses however, the Germans using them more as terrain features than fortifications. And the easy penetration of them came as somewhat of a surprise to the battalion.

artillery was zeroed in and the attacks didn't get anywhere. Enemy MGs were emplaced on a hill north of SARRE UNION, and from a distance of approximately 2,000 yards, were able to fire down the main cross streets of the town. The town was cleared at 041315 December, but it was necessary to keep patrols roving through the streets, since occasional snipers still held out.

On 5 December the order came for the 3d Bn to take KESKASTEL to the northwest. At the same time the 1st and 2d Bns were attacking towards OERMINGEN. While on the road the 3d Bn was ordered not to go into KESKASTEL but to get to OERMINGEN instead. The shortest route to OERMINGEN was through the BOIS MEYERWEIS, but it was not known whether the odds had been cleaned or not. It had begun raining again, and it was decided to use the road through the woods. The march was slow and cautious, but the battalion walked right to the outskirts of OERMINGEN without meeting any trouble. There the mission was received to capture the high ground northwest of OERMINGEN. Two companies started towards this commanding ground about one hour before dark, when another order came to abandon the last order that had been given, and to instead swing east into OERMINGEN. The 2d Bn had gone through the south of the town, and without stopping to clean the remainder, had gone on to take the high ground to the east. The 3d Bn swung in and cleaned the north portion of OERMINGEN during the night of 5 December.

On 6 December the battalion moved out in a column of companies with a heavy patrol leading (1 platoon), and K Company as the lead company, towards KULHAUSEN. Heavy artillery fire was received along the route of march. KULHAUSEN was taken by noon, and more artillery was received in the town. The road leading west to HUTTING was secured, as was

an attack on SARRE-UNION, and the 3d Bn, 101 Inf had gotten into the northeast edge of the town. The Germans still held the balance of the town and were holed up in buildings. The mission of the 3d Bn, 104th Inf was to assist the other battalion in securing the town, by coming up into it from the south. Heavy combat patrols from I and L Companies were first sent to secure two roads, one leading northwest out of SARRE-UNION, the other leading northeast. This was to prevent a counter-attack by the enemy. Once SARRE-UNION was secured, the high ground north of the town was to be taken. Co E was attached to the battalion for the operation. The 3d Bn got into the west portion of SARRE-UNION, and there met an enemy counter-attack made with infantry and tanks. Attached TDS were in SARRE-UNION, and fired at the German tanks every time they might stick their nose past a building.

On 4 December the decision was made to clean the town building for building: the Germans still held two thirds of the buildings and contact had not been established with the 3d Bn, 101 In on the eastern edge. There were five main streets, and it was decided to put two tanks and a platoon of infantry up each street, and have them work through each building until it was certain no enemy remained in SARRE-UNION. Companies E, K, and part of L, did most of the work in this cleaning job. Co I was blocking the road leading northwest, and the remaining portion of L Co was on the road that ran northeast. A tank company (Co A, 37th Tk Bn) from the 4th Armd Div was used to assist the infantry. The tanks would advance one house at a time, and cover the infantry, four to six men, as they entered each house in turn. Each room and the cellar and attic were searched to make sure no enemy remained in the house.

A counter-attack did materialize down the roads, but the

MONTIIDIÉ and after attacking up the most commanding ridge in the area, got into the town at noon. Elements of the 35th Division were trying to take RENING and meeting opposition. On 22 November the objective was ALBESTROFF, and HILL 275, the high ground which commanded it. The plan was to take this high ground with the 3d Bn, and to have the 1st Bn by pass ALBESTROFF and get the high ground to the east. By taking this high ground it was felt that the town itself would fall.

The 3d Bn ran into every type of fire the enemy had to offer, including a first experience with nebelwerfers, and perhaps the main reason for this was the fact the troops were again moving out beyond the 35th Division and were getting the enemy's concentrated fire. The 1st Bn sent C Co through ALBESTROFF. This company was immediately counter-attacked and driven back. More men were thrown into ALBESTROFF during the night, and at that point communications from the 1st Bn ceased. The 3d Bn was not on the objective by nightfall.

By morning (23 Nov) Capt Leon D Gladding, CO of the 1st Bn had succeeded in getting his men out of ALBESTROFF. The next day the 2d Bn came through and took the objective. The 328th Inf came up and began cleaning the ALBESTROFF WOODS.

The 104th Inf consolidated their positions and remained in the ALBESTROFF area until 1 Dec, when the regiment was motorized and moved to the vicinity of WOLFKIRCHEN south of SARRE-UNION.

(NOTE: Up to this point during the interview Lt Col Dellert was giving a regimental picture, rather than concentrating on the 3d Bn. On Nov 24th Col Dellert (then major) took command of the 3d Bn, when Lt Col Hugh G Donaldson was wounded. From this point on his story concerns the 3d Bn.)

The 3d Bn, on 2 Dec moved through the woods east of WOLFSKIRCHEN to the woods east of PISDORF. The 101st Inf was engaged in



By 18 November the lines had advanced, with the 3d Bn in the vicinity of ST SUZANNE Farm southeast of RODALBE, and the 2d Bn around DORDAL Farm and patrolling aggressively along the woods BOIS DE BEHESTROFF. These advances had occurred mainly because of the aggressiveness of the troops, who could not be held back, and took any opportunity to seize more ground.

The orders given to the regiment on 18 November were to take the road and rail hub of BENESTROFF. It was necessary to take the woods first. These woods were filled with S-Mines, booby traps, teller mines, and hand grenades strapped to trees. There were only two approaches: along the railroad leading into BENESTROFF, and the unimproved road that ran through DORDAL Farm. There was no way in which to get tanks and vehicles into BENESTROFF. The enemy was defending the line with an estimated ten companies.

The 3d Bn, which had received replacements by this time, got into BENESTROFF with comparative ease, capturing the town at 191710 November, but the 2d Bn ran into an extremely tough fight before gaining the high ground south of the town. (The 2d Bn action is detailed in another interview.) The 101st Infantry and the armor were having a hard fight in GUEBLING on the right. On 20 November the 3d Bn got the high ground north of BENESTROFF and out the main road that led north from DIEUZE. The physical resistance had broken early, although aerial photos of the area had indicated the enemy would hold. Railroad bridges all were blown, though, and many road blocks with mines were encountered. This same day the 3d Bn took VAHL LES BENESTROFF, and the 2d Bn succeeded in capturing MARIEMONT.

On 21 November, Companies I and L were sent to take

had been able to infiltrate through the enemy encirclement and get back to CONTHIL, while the remainder took up positions in cellars. An eye witness of the action, who later escaped, saw civilians come up to the tanks and guide them to the buildings which the Americans occupied. The tanks then fired a number of rounds into the cellars of the buildings, causing very heavy casualties. Many of the Americans were captured, but some managed to hide out in the town while the Germans occupied it and were found when the 104th drove back into the town many days later. These were very few, some ten or fifteen, who proved resourceful enough to evade capture..

The armor was blocking the roads for as far back as fifteen miles. The almost continuous rain made such a morass of mud that the 4th Armored Div tanks were unable to maneuver. Although they were very aggressive the weather had them licked, and it was not the sort of action or terrain in which the tanks could be used to advantage.

One small action in which the tanks did prove valuable was in the taking of HILL 330 (Q238311). Here the 2d Bn coordinated beautifully with the armored infantry battalion to seize the high ground (Lt Col Dellert thought this Bn might have been the 53d AIB, but was not certain.)

The situation remained fairly stagnant for the next few days while the 35th Inf Div came up on the left. The latter were having a fight at MORHANGE to the northwest. The 328th Inf (26th Inf Div) was getting all kinds of hell in the woods on the right.

The disposition of the 104th Inf during this phase: the much cut up 3d Bn in the woods between CONTHIL and RODALBE, the 2d Bn in the vicinity of LIDRIZING on the high ground, the 1st Bn in reserve.

into CONTAL, getting only slight resistance there. The 2d Bn met much heavier resistance against their attack. A report was received at the regimental OP the afternoon of the 12th that the 3d Bn had gotten into RODALBE. The character of the fighting up to this point had been such that the report was hard to believe. The enemy, it was true, was fighting a delaying action, but the resistance had been very stiff with each terrain feature utilized to its maximum advantage. It was feared that the 3d Bn had gone out on a limb, with the 2d Bn far behind on the right, and elements of the 35th Division on the left also behind. A patrol sent into RODALBE that night confirmed the presence of the 3d Bn in the town. The battalion was ordered back, but by that time the enemy had begun his counterattack. The counter-attack began about 1600, 12 November, with infantry and tanks converging on the town from all sides. Some of the 4th Armored Division's tanks were coiled in a field rather near to RODALBE, but were too bogged down to get moving and offer some relief.

K, L, and M Companies were in RODALBE, and I Co was sent to reinforce them, but could not get in, since by this time the enemy had the town surrounded with tanks.

The 3d Bn was out of radio contact with the artillery at this point, and the artillery could not advance because direct counter battery fire was being received at that time.

(NOTE : There appeared to be some question about whether or not the artillery could have offered some help, and this was true also of the tanks in the vicinity. Reasons given for failure to come to the aid of the besieged battalion are put in for what they are worth.....)

During the night the Germans came into the town with tanks. Some reports said three tanks were sighted in the streets, and other reports gave the number as seven. By this time some of the men of the 3d Bn

The next morning (9 Nov) the 3d Bn took MORVILLE LES VIC, with the 1st Bn advancing on the right, and the 2d Bn on the left. The 2d Bn took CHATEAU SALINS, and the 1st Bn met some trouble going through the woods east of MORVILLE LES VIC. The front line the next morning was on the edge of the Woods 1,000 yards south of HAMPONT.

On 10 November the 3d Bn attacked for HAMPONT. In the vicinity now was Task Force Hunter of the 4th Armored Division. The task force was unable to get moving because of the extremely muddy roads, and was held up particularly by a large shell crater in the road running through the BOIS DE LA GELINE.

K Co took HAMPONT during the day and L Co took the hill on the left flank. A very heavy shelling was received in HAMPONT, which included calibres up to 150mm; 300 and 400 rounds were counted in each concentration. HAMPONT was a supply center for the enemy and contained a large ammunition dump. This ammunition dump was exploded by the enemy fire and more casualties were caused among men of the 3d Bn by exploding ammunition than by the shell fire. A counter-attack was received the morning of 11 November by infantry elements of the 11th Panzer Division in something like company strength. The Cannon Co was set up on a forward slope and was able to lay accurate observed fire on the attackers, practically slaughtering them.

K Co went on to take OBRECK, while elements of the 1st Bn pushed on into the woods north of OBRECK. The plan at this time was for the 3d Bn to take CONTHIL and RODALBE, and for the 2d Bn to take CHATEAUVOUE. The 1st Bn was held in the woods.

On 12 November the 3d Bn advanced rapidly with K and L Cos

#### MORVILLE LES VIC.

About half the troops of the 1st and 2d Bns were across the river when the enemy began to zero in with their mortars and artillery on the crossing site. The enemy, when the attack began, held the commanding ground, but it was felt certain, however, that the greater part of the MG and mortar positions had been picked up and neutralized with artillery. This proved to be the case when the first infantry elements crossed, but the enemy was soon able to reorganize his defenses. Lt Col Howard C Dellart (at the time of the campaign a major, and regimental S-3) felt that the reason the enemy was able to bring fire to bear on the crossing site during the darkness of the early morning hours was because the enemy Forward Observer had not been gotten. It was necessary for the troops to traverse three thousand yards of open ground. The terrain eloped gradually down to the river, and then rose up again to the next hill. This flat ground was the scene of many casualties to the regiment.

The 3d Bn, which was committed two hours after the other two battalions, was hit hard. HILL 300, which provided some of the best observation for the enemy, was out of zone, and smoke shells were placed upon it with 155 shells to blind it. The 35th Inf Div was on the left of the regiment and was going to the left of CHATEAU SALINS. The left boundary of the 104th Inf thus ran roughly from the western edge of the FORET DE BEZANGE LA GRANDE through CHAMBREY and CHATEAU SALINS. The initial objective of MORVILLE LES VIC was not obtained during the first days advance by the 3d Bn. They did get up on the high ground just southwest of the village, with the farthest point of advance the main road that ran southeast from CHATEAU SALINS to MOYENVIC.

*Paris*

UNIT: 3d Bn, 104th Inf (26th Inf Div)

ACTION: The LORRAINE Campaign

PERIOD: 8 Nov - 10 Dec 1945

SOURCE: Lt Col Howard C Dellert, CO, 3d Bn

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: KRUMAU, Czechoslovakia, 16 June 1945

INTERVIEWER: Lt Hollis Alpert

MAPS: Central Europe: 1:100,000 - Saarbrücken sheet. Eastern France: 1:50,000 Sarreguemines, Sarre-Union, Chateau Salins, Nomeny, Nancy, Parroy.

INTERVIEW conducted with some aid from unit records. This interview does not give a full account of the 3d Bn action. Col Dellert was S-3 of the 104th Inf during approximately half the campaign, and the earlier portion of the interview gives more of a regimental than a battalion picture. Since over seven months had elapsed between the action and the time of interview certain details will be found to be vague and sketchy. A use of records will probably fill in some of these details.

The 104th Inf (26th Inf Div) attacked from the FORET DE BEZANGE LA GRANDE at 0600, 8 Nov 1944, after an hour long artillery preparation. The direction of the attack was northeast, with the main effort of the 26th Division being made by the 104th Inf, and the objective set as the road and rail hub of BENESTROFF. Prior to the jump-off a platoon was sent to the SEILLE River, over which all crossings had been blown by the enemy, and a footbridge put in while it was still dark. A railroad bridge at (U095218) was blown but it was possible to walk troops across. The initial stage of the operation had the 2d Bn crossing the SEILLE to take OHAMBREY and the high ground northwest of VIC SUR SEILLE, and on its right, the 1st Bn was to cross the river west of VIC SUR SEILLE and seize the high ground north of the town. The 3d Bn was to go through the other two battalions and take the initial objective of

not come until an hour later. At 1030 E and G Companies moved out and attacked Ft Aachen (Northeast); it was captured by 1300 with surprising ease. The enemy had used the fort to emplace machine guns, and had made no use of the French artillery mounts. Ft Singling (West) was taken at 1500. The forts had been manned only by skeleton crews, with machine guns, and few casualties were incurred by the 2d Battalion in capturing them. About 100 PW's were taken.

On 9 December the battalion received orders to gain the high ground east and northeast of Gros Rederching. The 1st Battalion was on the left, and a column of the 12th Armored Division on the right, with the 26th Recon Troop screening the immediate right flank. At 1600 after heavy tank resistance the 2d Battalion was on the approaches to the town, and was ordered to close for the night.

E Company moved out at 0800 the next morning, with F Company following. The 1st Battalion moving up on the left met tank fire, but with the support of TD's the 2d Battalion got into Gros Rederching and found no resistance in the town.

At 030, 11 December word was received that the 2d Battalion was to be relieved on line at 0400 by the 2d Battalion, 346th Infantry (87th Infantry Division). The relief went slowly and it was not until the daylight hours had come that the 2d Battalion was able to pull back into Aachen. Late that night the order came to move to Metz for a period of rest and rehabilitation - a period that was later to be interrupted by the battle of the Ardennes.

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Oermingen, and the big fight "was for the largest and best cellars for billeting and CP purposes..."

About 1520 of this day (5 December) elements of the 4th Armored Division were reported in Kalhausen, three kilometers northeast of Oermingen, and reports of the enemy showed them to be withdrawing confusedly from the weight of the attack.

By the end of the day F and G Companies had moved east of Oermingen. Civilians in the town brought information that eight enemy tanks accompanied by infantry had withdrawn towards Aachen.

The attack continued at 0730, 6 December. The battalion advanced, but met small arms and artillery fire from Kalhausen. It took until noon to clear the town. Meanwhile the 4th Armored Division was fighting in Singling and Etting, while the 1st Battalion was fighting in the woods above Kalhausen, Le Grand Bois. A number of turret type forts had been observed in these woods.

The 2d Battalion was to follow the 4th Armored Division into Etting, but at 1400 this order was changed, and the battalion ordered to by-pass Etting and to attack for the high ground overlooking Aachen. E and G Companies were outside Etting receiving direct 88mm artillery fire from a fort of the Maginot Line on Hill 336 (585502). At 1600 a flight of P-47's came in on this hill and succeeded in putting a stop to the fire. Orders then came for the 2d Battalion to contain the town of Etting. The attack to take the town began at 0600, 7 December. G Company was to take the town itself, E Company was to take the high ground to the east and northeast, and F Company was to move behind E Company to the same positions. A combat patrol was to be sent in Aachen. Tanks of the 761st Tank Battalion were to be in support.

The attack went off as scheduled and at 1100 G and elements of H Company were in Etting. The enemy could be seen withdrawing into Aachen. Patrols were sent to Ft Aachen (Northeast) and Ft Singling (West), and these patrols discovered enemy tanks in Aachen. Air support had been scheduled to hit Aachen at 0900, but due to the cloudy weather did



Union, and the main effort was now being directed towards that town. The 4th Armored Division had made a limited breakthrough, and the alert of the 104th Infantry was for the purpose of their joining in an assault on Saare-Union.

On 1 December the 2d Battalion was placed on a half-hour alert; at 1200 the 26th Reconnaissance Troop relieved the battalion on the line, and the companies moved by foot to Insming and there entrucked and moved to an assembly area in the woods east of Wolfskirchen.

Late that night the orders came to attack the morning of 2 December for Saare-Union. The 3d Battalion led in this attack, and the 2d Battalion closed in north and northeast of Pisdorf. On 3 December the 2d Battalion was still behind the 3d Battalion, and elements of the 101st Infantry, who were meeting heavy tank opposition from the Saare-Union vicinity. E Company this day was ordered into Saare-Union to hold the southwest edge of the town. F and G Companies moved up to Sarrewerden and were east of the town by 1530. At 2140, E Company and the machine gun platoon of H Company were attached to the 3d Battalion for mopping up of Saare-Union. The 1st Battalion was northwest of the town.

The next morning the attack continued northeast. A combat patrol of platoon strength led, with Company F following. The general mission was to take a series of limited objectives (defined simply as goose eggs on the map) with Oermingen as the final one of the series. The 1st Battalion was attacking on the left. By 0815 the first objective on the edge of a woods had been attained but contact had not yet occurred with the 1st Battalion. The contact was made at 0830. At noon the 2d Battalion was still in the woods south of Oermingen, and again it rained. The roads in the zone were mined, and engineers followed close behind the lead infantry elements, clearing the roads as the advance proceeded. There was no resistance, nor was any artillery fire met.

At 1500 regiment ordered the battalion to consolidate on the eastern edge of the woods and to send patrols in Oermingen. The entire division seemed to have converged on

on the edge of the woods west of Albestroff.

This was Thanksgiving Day. The 1st Battalion had gotten into Albestroff and had been pushed back out. The 1st Battalion had been on the left of the 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion was told to hold on the edge of the woods and to make contact with the units on their left and right. It was comparatively quiet.

Men were relieved from the line a squad at a time and sent to a defiladed spot 500 yards or so to the rear where hot turkey dinners in Marmite cans (insulated food containers) were served to them. The kitchen had been brought up practically to the line for the occasion.

The next day the 2d Battalion was ordered to take Albestroff. G Company pushed in, ran into mines and booby traps, but met no other resistance. Two of the tanks attached to the battalion were disabled by mines. G Company secured the entrances and exists to Albestroff, while the other companies outposted it. The troops were billeted in Albestroff and things were relatively quiet during the 25th and 26th of November. The men rested, trained, and contact was maintained with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 328th Infantry on the right. Civilians, who had been hiding in the cellars of the town, came out and walked the streets once more. A Red Cross wagon came up and fed the men the usual doughnuts and coffee.

By evening of 27 November the 320th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) had positions in the vicinity of Gueblange and Hazembourg. Advance elements of the battalion proceeded to Kappelkingen to initiate a relief of the 1st Battalion, 320th Infantry. On 28 November the battalion took over the positions at Gueblange and Schweix, but made no contact with the enemy. The Germans had withdrawn across the Saar River. The battalion remained in this comparatively quiet zone for the next two days, receiving only spasmodic artillery fire. On 30 November the 2d Battalion was alerted to move to an undisclosed assembly area, but no movement took place that day.

Crossings of the Saar River had been forced further to the south, below Saare-

Infantry. The high ground was obtained by the storming of the objective by Lt Spiegelberg's platoon, in which attack many casualties were covered. It was a slow, steady slugging match up the hill, and casualties were heavy on the enemy as well.

F and G Companies, on the left and right respectively of E Company, had some hard fighting up the hill, meeting fire from emplaced machine guns and mortars, and the direct 88mm fire of enemy tanks. The enemy was trying desperately to hold the ground, and even after the ground was captured by the 2d Battalion, threw in a number of counter-attacks of platoon and company size. Tanks from the Negro tank battalion supported the infantry against these attacks, all of which came in the afternoon. The night was spent by the battalion on the high ground. While there, a lot of activity in the town of Nebing, to the northeast, was observed. The enemy was withdrawing, and had many vehicles concentrated in the town. Heavy artillery was thrown into them, and some of the vehicles were destroyed, and casualties were observed.

The morning of 20 November the 2d Battalion moved into the town of Marimont against moderate resistance: sniper fire, and some 88mm fire. Road blocks and anti-personnel mines were encountered during this advance. The town was taken, and the battalion remained in it throughout the day. F Company occupied Marimont, and E and G Companies moved northeast towards Nebing, digging in in woods southeast of Nebing, with G Company on the right and E Company on the left. Throughout the night patrols attempted to determine whether or not Nebing was held by the enemy. None were encountered, so the following morning at 0700 E and G continued into Nebing, found the town empty of German troops, and went on to occupy the high northeast of the town.

The battalion went into regimental reserve for the next two days, remaining in the vicinity of Nebing.

On 21 November the mission came to go into Albestroff. E and G Companies moved to the edge of the town and found themselves unable to advance further because of heavy tank fire, direct 88mm and small arms fire. The two companies consolidated positions

just beyond the tracks. The battalion had moved rapidly and their flanks became exposed. The whole attack became pinned down at the railroad, including the assault of the 1st Battalion on the left and the 329th Infantry on the right.

F Company, in a brave assault, attempted to storm across the railroad, and in so doing suffered heavily. Finally, it was the aggressiveness of one squad of that company that did much to decide the issue. This squad stormed the machine gun position preventing their advance, and succeeded in silencing the guns and penetrating the enemy line. Twenty-five of the enemy were killed, and an equal number taken prisoner. F Company exploited this breakthrough and crossed the railroad into the woods on the eastern side. The whole battalion got through this break, and as a result, the enemy on the left and right withdrew to new positions, enabling the adjacent elements to advance also. The battalion remained in the Bois de Benestroff (forest) that night, with F and G Companies on the line and E Company 200 yards to their rear, in support.

The rain poured down steadily during the night, and throughout the night mortar and artillery fire came in. Patrols operated actively, and reported having seen or heard at least three German tanks. Help from friendly armor was negligible, again because of the muddy morass.

On 19 November the attack continued at 0700. E Company moved through F and G Companies, while the latter companies maintained their line.

Hill 334 was the ground that commanded the terrain for what seemed like many miles. That knob provided observation over the entire division front, and it was the key of the division objective. E Company was to take this ground. G and F Companies awaited further orders.

E Company had not advanced far when machine gun fire hit them, and pinned the company down. A platoon of E Company, commanded by 1st Lt Spiegelberg, was receiving heavy automatic fire from woods to the southeast - Bois de Marimont. It was the understanding of the 2d Battalion that these woods were to have been cleared by the 329th

fighting men in them. The 3d Battalion had been all but cut off when it shot out on a limb to Rodalbe on 12 November, and the strong and successful counter-attack received forced the remnants of the battalion back to Conthil. The initial objective, the road and rail hub of Benestroff, still remained to be taken, but it was almost within sight now.

The 2d Battalion remained on the defensive for the next few days, and still it rained, and the roads still dissolved in mud. Not only tanks, but all other vehicles were mired down in mud. It was all but impossible to move anything on wheels or tracks. The Germans were active, pounding away at the battalion positions. Most frequently it was mortar fire that was received, and more casualties were suffered. The men hated this period more than when they moved forward. As long as they moved forward it seemed that less fire was brought to bear on them; by cracking the crust of resistance the chances of getting shot at lessened. The first replacements since the attack had started came in. They brought the battalion up to about two-thirds of its normal strength. Many of these fresh, unexperienced men lost their lives within a day or two of their arrival at the line. "All through this," Captain Carnevale stated, "I think we were taking a worse beating than the Jerries. They fought a delaying action, all the way. When things got too tough they could withdraw to their next defense line. And when we sat for awhile, they pounded us."

On 18 November the 104th Infantry renewed its attack for the objective of Benestroff, and this was expanded to include the high ground commanding Marimont-les-Benestroff, which became an objective for the 2d Battalion. An hour-long artillery preparation began at 0700. F Company jumped off from the vicinity of Dordal Farm at 0800, eastward toward the north-south railroad line about 1,000 yards away; E and G Companies followed in column. Resistance did not develop until the embankment of the railroad was approached, and at that point machine guns emplaced all along the railroad began firing. Other machine guns were emplaced at a very large quarry (Carriere de Gypse)

casualties had been suffered while entering the village and medical personnel were sent for. A medical jeep was sent in about 1900, a security patrol riding with them. On the outskirts, as they approached, machine guns fired on them, and they were unable to get in to administer aid that night.

Throughout the night the enemy tried to infiltrate into the American positions, and the following morning six dead Germans were discovered at one door step with grenades still in their hands. But by morning the Germans had withdrawn to the edge of the village. The battalion CP was moved into Chateau Voue, and the battalion remained in the village during the day for a number of reasons: the enemy strength in the area was a battalion or more; the 328th Infantry was supposed to be clearing the woods on the right but had not come up yet; and elements of the 4th Armored Division were supposed to pass through the 2d Battalion that day. Machine gun and 88mm fire was coming in from the woods, and an artillery battalion which had come up behind the 2d Battalion was able to lay direct fire on some of the enemy positions.

The armor did come through this day (12 November) and got up to Lidrequin, about 5 kilometers northeast of Chateau Voue. The battalion staff came in contact with Col Creighton Abrams, who was commanding the armored outfit which passed through (either a combat command or a tank battalion - the source was not certain), and found him fully as aggressive as he was reputed to be. But again it was mud which limited and blunted his attack.

On 13 November, E and G Companies moved out to get the high ground east of Lidrezing, the armor having withdrawn because of lack of mobility. F Company, which had remained in reserve at Chateau Voue, was sent out on a side mission under the battalion Executive officer to take Wuisse, two kilometers east of Chateau Voue. Once these objectives had been attained the battalion was halted, and reorganization took place. Companies were now down to a strength of fifty men, and the 1st Battalion on the left had straggled up in even worse shape, with companies containing from eight to fifteen

snow as the night wore on. As the cold increased, the rain froze on the men's clothing.

The next morning, at 0900, F and G attacked from the woods with tank support (1 platoon, 761st Tank Battalion - Negro) with the objective of capturing Chateau Salins. G Company led and was soon stopped by a number of well emplaced machine gun nests. The men worked up and knocked out some of the guns with grenades, and the tanks silenced others. About 1530 G Company was in Chateau Salins, with F Company following, and was meeting heavy sniper fire, and drawing automatic fire from machine guns emplaced in buildings. The machine guns were neutralized and seventy-five prisoners taken out of houses. E Company moved into the town and secured the southern outskirts. The night was spent by the battalion in Chateau Salins.

In the morning the division recon troop came in to hold the town and the 2d Battalion was withdrawn. The companies then moved up into a woods southwest of Hampont, five kilometers northeast of Chateau Salins, and went into assembly for the night. The morning of 11 November the battalion continued the attack, this time with the mission of taking Obreck, about 1500 yards beyond Hampont. E and F Companies moved out abreast about 0700, by-passed Hampont to the east and got into Obreck about noon. Infantry resistance did not materialize in Obreck, but mortar and 88mm fire was thrown in to the town, and casualties were suffered. The ranks of the battalion were appreciably thinned by this time, and no replacements had been received. The men were showing a great deal of aggressiveness, in spite of the heavy, accurate fire they received and the cold, soggy weather.

The battalion was ordered to take Chateau Voue, two kilometers northeast of Obreck, and E Company was given this mission, with F Company to follow, and G Company in reserve. Heavy machine gun fire was encountered on the edge of the village, but the positions were overcome and the village entered about 1500. By the time the center of the village was got to, Chateau Voue was found to be well defended. It was getting dark by now, and it was decided for E and F Companies to hold their half of the village. More

large scale assault. They knew they were part of the Yankee Division which had fought well in World War I, and oddly, their first big battle was to take place over ground that had been fought over by that earlier division in 1918.

Companies E and G were on the line, and they were to by-pass Sallongnes and capture the wooded high ground to the northeast. At 0600 the infantry began to slip across the bridge, the men of E Company in the lead. There was no opposition at first, for the artillery concentration had disorganized the defensive line facing them. But evidently an enemy forward observer remained at his post and was able to observe the crossing. For while men were still crossing the foot bridge, mortar and 83mm artillery shells began to fall in the immediate area of the bridge. E Company suffered casualties, went too far to the left in the darkness, and went into Sallongnes, where machine guns and mortars opened up on them. After the company had passed by, some by-passed enemy machine guns opened up, isolating E Company from G Company which had followed.

F Company was then crossed at a point to the right of the other two companies, (the other crossing point used by the 104th Infantry was the destroyed railroad bridge over which foot elements were still able to get across) and was able to by-pass Sallongnes and get to the high ground against very little resistance. The CO of Company E contacted the 3d Battalion CO by radio and informed him of his plight, and was told to withdraw from the town after dark had fallen. But E Company was involved in a fire fight in the village all through the day, and it was not possible to get medical aid to them because of the machine guns barring the way. During the course of the day the company succeeded in silencing the guns and withdrew after dark, carrying their casualties with them. G Company was also withdrawn, and the two companies were ordered to swing around to the right and come up with F Company on the hill. When this was accomplished, G Company joined F Company on the line, and E Company was placed in support. The first night after the jump-off was spent on this high ground to the northeast of Sallongnes, and the troops suffered extreme discomfort from the rain which turned into



*Paris*

UNIT: 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry, 26th Infantry Division.

ACTION: The Lorraine Campaign.

PERIOD: 8 November - 11 December 1944.

SOURCE: Captain Harry M. Carnevale, S-1, 2d Battalion  
S/Sgt Frank J. Norton, Operations Sgt.

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: Krenze, Czechoslovakia, 17 June 1945.

INTERVIEWER: 1st Lt Hollis C. Alpert

MAPS: Eastern France: 1/50,000 Sarreguemines, Bitche, Saare-Union, Chateau Salins, Parroy sheets.

NOTE: Interview conducted for the most part without unit records. The latter phases were covered by Sgt Norton, and he referred to the journal he kept of the operation.

When the jump-off for the 26th Infantry Division came on November 8, 1944, the 2d Battalion, 104th Infantry was in the woods Bezanze La Grande, with the 1st Battalion of the same regiment on its right, and elements of the 35th Infantry Division on the left. The time of the attack was scheduled for 0600, and an artillery preparation was to start one-half hour before that time, and to continue as a rolling barrage for one-half hour after the start of the infantry assault. Captain Harry M. Carnevale, Battalion S-1, at 0400 took an engineer platoon down to the Seille River, and a foot bridge was constructed over the river. This bridge was put in to the west of a demolished railroad bridge over the same river just south of the village of Sallionnes.

The attack was made in darkness and rain and mud. And it was rain and mud that characterized the whole Lorraine Campaign for the men who fought through it. The 2d Battalion had been engaged in the vicinity for a full month before the large scale attack began, making small scale forays which had as their objective the straightening of the line and the obtaining of high terrain features which would command the ground to the front. Many of the men of the battalion had already experienced their battle indoctrination, but it was as a relatively untried unit that they made their first

the fighting, three plat sgts and the EX O as casualties, and the Co Comdr had been killed early in the operation.

The infantry now moved out of town to occupy the ground to the north, where the 1st and 4th Plats. of K Co joined them, together with the tanks which had been with this group. However both the infantry and the tanks were ordered to pull back into town, which they did, outposting the town for the night. The units spent a quiet night in the town and the following morning K Co rejoined the 3d Bn, 101st Inf in BOIS de CELINE in the vicinity of (158245).\*

\* It is the Interviewer's belief that the principal utility of the above account lies in the information regarding the Inf Plats in MORVILLE during 9 December. That the town was not cleared until the middle of the afternoon is established, but further details regarding the attached armor are desirable and both the projected plan for the 1st and Wpns Plats and their actual opns are open to question.

of the town while the rest followed the leading tank down the main road through the town. Two-thirds of the way through the little town a bazooka, located somewhere on the north side of the town with observation on the road, suddenly fired a round, knocking out the lead tank. At the same time an enemy machine gun opened up from the same direction wounding a plat sgt. The damaged tank effectively blocked the road and it was considered impractical to attempt to drag the tank out of the road until the enemy AT weapon had been neutralized. It was impossible to locate the MG or the "bazooka" from the vicinity of the damaged tank as the enemy MG controlled the area around the tank.

A patrol was sent to the eastern side of town to detect the MG but met small arms fire. Two BARs were then dispatched to the west side of the town to fire into the area of the suspected location of the MG. They were to fire across the damaged tank, engaging the enemy's automatic weapon, while the other patrol maneuvered to locate the gun and destroy it. The Squad Leader located the machine gun. A rifle grenade then accounted for two Germans manning the position and two more immediately surrendered. Snipers were by this time being pinned down by the patrol's fire and four more men soon gave themselves up. An additional four Germans were driven out into the main street where they were picked off by riflemen located along the street. During the course of this activity both the MG and the AT weapon were neutralized and it was now possible to pull the tank off the road and continue through town.

The town was cleared about 1500. 24 Germans were captured during the day in the town so that the total number of prisoners taken was about 29. The platoons of K Co had lost five enlisted men killed in

of MORVILLE. Observation of MORVILLE and of the road over which the column was now moving was excellent from the HAUTE de CHAUMONT north west of MORVILLE. In moving north of MOYENVIC, Co K had noticed the 104th Inf on their left in the vicinity of VIC-SUR-SEILLE (1121) and had seen units of the 101st Inf moving across country on the right of their route in the region of the COTE ST JEAN (1522).

The 1st and wpns plats had already peeled off to the right to move toward their designated areas and the tanks went into partial defilade along the road in the vicinity of CR 273 as planned. The tanks opened fire from a range of 500-600 yards on the buildings and hedgerows on the south side of MORVILLE. The tanks then moved across the open ground with the infantry dismounted in close support. The infantry had already begun to return the small arms fire which they were receiving. At the CR the C Co Comdr, Capt. Long, was killed by fragments of a shell which landed nearby as he was conferring with the Tk Co Comdr. The tank officer was not hit, as he was protected by his tank. The attacking force moved across the open ground and along the road into MORVILLE Drawing artillery, mortar and small arms fire. The 400 yards from the LD to the hedgerow were quickly covered and here the infantry picked up 15 Germans who offered no resistance. The tanks had now moved ahead of the men of K Co, blasting a way through a read block encountered on the road at (127246). As the attack moved into town the enemy artillery range could not be shortened due to the presence of German troops holding the town. It therefore now fell behind the attackers. It was later estimated that the town was being held by about 60 infantrymen with one MG and a bazooka.

Part of the attacking infantry now moved up along the west side

MISSION OF THE TF: As understood by Lt Tierney, the mission of the task force was to seize or neutralize MORVILLE-les-VIC (1224) by an attack from the south and then to swing northwest to aid in the reduction of CHATEAU-SALINS (0925). The advance on MORVILLE was to be made from the southwest through MOYENVIC (1320), which was to be taken by the infantry before the task force moved across the SEILLE RIVER. Co K was to ride the tanks, sticking with them as far forward as possible, in order to supply direct support. The platoons of K Co were to be utilized in this manner: As the tanks moved up the MOYENVIC - CHATEAU-SALINS ROAD, the 1st Plat and the Wpns Plat, with tank support, would move off the road in the vicinity of SALIVAL (1423), going north along the western edge of the BOIS de la GELINE (136247) to occupy the high ground east of MORVILLE. The mortars were to be set up for protection against a counter-attack and were to fire on the northwest side of the town. This force would form a base of fire during the advance of the other units and would serve to help isolate MORVILLE from the northeast by interdicting the MORVILLE-HAMPONT ROAD by fire. The 2d and 3d Plats would continue on with the majority of the tanks, who were to deploy along both sides of CR 273 (124241), using the main highway as an ID for a direct assault on the town of MORVILLE from the southwest.

ATTACK ON MORVILLE: MOYENVIC fell on 8 November and a sizeable bridgehead was established across the SEILLE RIVER during the day. At 0700 on 9 November the TF moved through ARRACOURT (1114) and along the direct route to MOYENVIC, crossing the SEILLE RIVER without incident. About 1030 the TF had passed through MOYENVIC and was on the road moving north toward MORVILLE. As the column drew up on the high ground in the vicinity of (130234), artillery started coming in from the north

UNIT: Co K, 101st Infantry Regiment - TF "A"

PERIOD: 8-10 November 1944

ACTION: LORRAINE CAMPAIGN

SOURCE: Lt Edmund T Tierney, Platoon Leader, 3d Platoon, Company K, 101st Infantry Regiment.

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: SALNAU, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 18 June, 1945.

INTERVIEWER: 2d Lt Charles King Howard

MAPS:	1:50,000	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SHEET NUMBER</u>	<u>GSGS NO</u>
		CHATEAU-SALINS	35-14	4471
		PARROY	35-15	4471

This interview was made without reference to any notes or formal records of the period. It was made to determine the actions of TF A and especially of Co K, 101st Inf, a unit of the TF, in the MORVILLE (1224) area during its commitment.

FORMATION OF TF A: On 6 November Co K was informed that it was to be detached from the 101st Inf Regt and made a part of TF A. The Company was at this time commanded by Capt. Charles F. Long. It was being held in Bn reserve in the vicinity of JUVRECOURT (1316) from which it moved on this day to the rear to a bivouac area (098123) on the west side of the BOIS du BENAMMON. Here it was joined by other units of the task force, which was to be composed of the following units:

Cos A and C, 761 Tk Bn (Negro)  
1 Co, 602 TD Bn  
2 Sqds Engrs  
Co K, 101 Inf Regt

It is likely that the above armored units were under strength as Tierney recalled that there were about 21 tanks in the column, including a maintenance tank. He made no separate mention of TDs at any time, so it may be presumed that they are included in the above figure.

\* Composition of TF supplied by G-3 as part of 26 Inf Div interview.

heroic action took place when Tank Destroyers were brought up to dislodge and destroy the enemy machine gun emplacements. On the morning of the 15th of November, the 1st Battalion moved through the 2d Battalion and continued its advance clearing the remainder of the woods and outposting them along the edge to the East and Southeast. The 2d Battalion took up outpost positions to the South overlooking DIEUZE (255242). The 3d Battalion cleared the woods to the North and outposted in that section. The three battalions remained in this sector holding and sending out patrols for the next four days. On the 19th, the 3d Battalion pulled out and attacked South with DIEUZE as their objective, taking GUENESTROFF (243257) and GUEBESTROFF (254263) in the first day's fighting, and on the 20th of November the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion of the 4th Armored Division was attached to attack with the 3d Battalion in its assault against DIEUZE. The 25th Cavalry was also used

in the attack, coming in from the west. When the attack in full force hit the objective of DIEUZE, it was discovered that the main enemy force had pulled out and a very small group of the enemy remained to defend DIEUZE; they were overcome very easily. The 51st Arm'd Inf Bn and the 25th Cav. remained in DIEUZE, while the 3d Bn continued its attack forward into VERGAVILLE (272269), and by nightfall ended their advance in BIDESTROFF (305282). This attack encountered very light opposition all along, and no opposition at all in entering BIDESTROFF. This light opposition was due to the fact that the 101st Regiment was far out front on the left flank, and the enemy was withdrawing in front of the 3d Bn, 328th Inf. On the morning of the 21st of November, the 1st and 2d Bns entrucked and moved into MOLRING (329323). The 1st Bn moved into position in the vicinity of LOER (365325) and the 2d Bn took up positions in the area of TORCHEVILLE (352348). The 3d Bn, which entrucked later in the morning on the 21st of November, moved into GUINZELING (346315) and went into regimental reserve. This operation was a process of relieving the 101st Inf Regt. At 1000 hours on the 22d of Nov, the 2d Bn attacked through the woods into MUNSTER (392355). Enemy opposition was light in the woods as only small arms was occasionally encountered. However, all the bridges had been blown approaching MUNSTER, and once the 2d Bn left the woods, automatic weapons and artillery was encountered which caused the advance to be more difficult and resulted in many casualties. The battalion commander, Lt Col Byers, was wounded in the fight for MUNSTER, and Major Madbowen took over command of the battalion. The 1st Bn moved into INSVILLER (385324), which was a very important place at this time because here was located a group of dams which, if blown, would have flooded the entire division area. Strangely as it may seem, the dams were all prepared with demolitions to be blown but the enemy had withdrawn leaving them unprotected. This action was believed to have been so because of the fact the enemy had a large number of troops and equipment also in the area to be flooded, which had not been withdrawn. The 1st Bn believed the bridges to be out so they



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US ARMY

pulled back into LOER during the night to prevent the enemy from cutting them off, as the battalion was stuck out front where support would be very difficult in case the enemy were to attack. The 2d Bn pulled out of MUNSTER on 23 Nov, leaving one company in the town, and two companies pulled around through the forest, and attacked GIVRYCOURT (402362) from the west. The area around GUINZELING, TORCHEVILLE, MUNSTER, was loaded with mines, roadblocks, and booby traps. All the bridges were blown, and this made the advance slow and costly. On the 24th, a holding action for one day took place while bridges were prepared and the company left in MUNSTER came into GIVRYCOURT. The 3d Bn moved into VITTERSEURG (407394) without any opposition on 25 Nov. One Company (B Co) of the 1st, made an attack on HONSKIRCH (429382) which was a very well fortified town. Anti-tank ditches were in the valley between HONSKIRCH and VITTERSEURG, and minefields covered with automatic fire, covered all approaches. When the attack started, B Co was supported by 11 tanks from the 761st Tk Bn, but the lead tank hit a mine and was knocked out. Enemy direct fire caused the tanks to become disorganized and B Co continued the attack alone. After suffering severe casualties, the company was forced to withdraw under darkness. On the 26th, the 1st Bn was ordered to attack HONSKIRCH again from the west, assisted by fire from the 2d Bn and 3d Bn. The 1st Bn advanced to the edge of the town but were pinned down so effectively by enemy fire that smoke was used to allow the battalion to withdraw again. After their withdrawal, they went into reserve at TORCHEVILLE. On the 27th, Co G of the 2d Bn sent a patrol into HONSKIRCH without meeting any opposition. The 3d Bn moved forward into the forest northwest of VITTERSEURG, encountering very light resistance. On 28 Nov the 1st Bn moved out of reserve through the 2d Bn and took KIRVILLER (448396) and HINSINGEN (455395) with practically no opposition. The 2d Bn then went into reserve at TORCHEVILLE where the men had showers and a period of rehabilitation. While there doughnut trucks came up. The 3d Bn remained in VITTERSEURG for their rehabilitation as the line was very quiet. They

then moved into BISSERT (478384). The 2d Bn moved into HARSCHIRCHEN (491374) on the 29th. By the 1st of December, all three battalions were somewhat on line along the SARRE River, with the 1st Bn at HINSINGEN, the 2d Bn at HARSCHIRCHEN, and the 3d Bn at BISSERT. The 328th Regt held along this line while the 101st Regt and 104th Regt attacked SARRE UNION (527381). The 2d Bn faked an attack on SCHOFFERTEN (498387) on 4 Dec, while the 104th attacked SARRE UNION. The 3d Bn went into BUSCHENHOFF (538361) to act as reserve for the 104th Regt while the 1st remained in position. On 5 Dec, the 2d Bn moved through a small passage in SARRE UNION to allow it to pass through SCHOFFERTEN and KESKASTEL (493414) and Co E went into SARRALEE (435448). The 1st Bn had also started into SARRALEE but were pulled out and attached to the 4th Arm'd Div to assist in the attack on BIRNIG (647487). The 3d Bn followed the 2d Bn into KESKASTEL and went north to within 3 kilometers of HERBITZHEIM (525466) during the night of 5 Dec. On the 6th, the 2d and 3d Bns were to move to STROKHOF FLE (544459) and assemble. The 104th Regt had taken HALLAUBEN (574471) and ETTING (594482) on the 6th. On 7 Dec, the 2d Bn cleared HUTTING and outposted it while the 3d Bn moved into WEIDESHEIM WOODS to the right of the town, and in doing so they received enemy fire from WEIDESHEIM (539489). On the 8th of Dec, the 2d Bn advanced on WEIDESHEIM and drove the enemy out. The 1st Bn returned to the 328th Regt from the 4th Arm'd Div and went into regimental reserve. At 0320 9 Dec, Co A, 3d Bn 328th Inf Regt, made an attack on the WITTRING forts (536508). They learned it could only be taken by the use of demolitions, so they withdrew and moved back up again with 500 lbs of dynamite and blew the fort. Here, after the enemy was driven out, was discovered an underground factory producing products for the jet-propelled planes the enemy was using against us. The 2d Bn pulled through ACHEN (596494), which the 104th Regt had taken on the 8th of Dec, and attacked WOELFING (591508), while the 3d Bn continued its advance into WEISVILLER. The advance on WEISVILLER (584537) was assisted by the 35th Div who just took ZETTING (562535). The 1st Battalion now moved into WITTRING, still in regimental reserve.

On 10 Dec the attack started with the objective to cross the German border, as the regiment knew they were going to be pulled out of the line and they wanted to get into Germany first. The 2d Bn was on the right and the 3d Bn on the left. The 320th Inf Regt, 35th Inf Div, was on the left, and the 346th Inf Regt, 87th Inf Div, which was attached to the 26th Inf Div, was right of the 2d Bn. After a hard day's fighting with the enemy putting up very stiff resistance, the attack got as far as the edge of the BRUCHEN Forest along a road at the west edge. On the 11th, the attack started off again with the 1st Bn moving through the 3d Bn on the left, and the 3d Bn sent Co I to attack between the two battalions. Again the enemy was fighting with all its might to prevent the Americans from going into Germany, but Co A, 1st Bn, commanded by Lt Clark E. Reynolds, drove into Germany, this being the first company of the 26th Div to set foot in Germany. The next morning at 0950, the 12th of Dec, the regiment was relieved by the 347th Inf Regt, 87th Inf Div, and were marched by the woods into the vicinity of HUTTING (554474) where they entrucked for METZ.

*Panic*

UNIT: 1st Bn, 328th Inf Regt, 26th Inf Div

PERIOD: 8 Nov - 12 Dec 1944

ACTION: LORRAINE Campaign

SOURCE: Lt Col Noel A. Meyard, Bn Commander  
Capt Elbert L. Ryan, Bn S-3

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: ZIEBY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 17 June 1945

MAPS: Scale, 1/50,000 Chateau Salins No 35/14; Parroy No 35/5;  
Sarreguion No 36/14; Sarreguion No 36/15; 1/100,000 Saarbrücken  
No 5/1

INTERVIEWER: 2d Lt Carl W. Elvington

INTERVIEW was conducted with maps and special records prepared by Lt  
R. Thomas Marshal, a medical officer during this action.

On the morning of the attack, 8 November 1944, the weather was  
clear and cold. Lt Col Noel L. Meyard assembled his company com-  
manders and issued his first and last written attack order for the  
campaign. The company commanders were each flown over the area they  
were to attack and knew of the enemy position and gun emplacements.  
Patrols had helped in the securing of enemy information, and sketches  
of the enemy positions had been made from forward foxholes. The batta-  
lion objectives were BEZANGE LA PETITE (175152) and HILL 253 (179145).

At 0700 the attack jumped off with A Co, commanded by Capt James  
G. Royds, on the left with the mission of securing BEZANGE LA PETITE;  
B Co, commanded by Capt Elbert R. Ryan, was on the right with the  
mission of securing and holding HILL 253. C Co was held in reserve.  
Before the attack was launched, the Cannon Co had been firing on HILL  
253, and mortar fire had been directed on the known gun emplacements

during the night and up until the American forces massed their fire. A Co moved into BEZANGE LA PETITE very fast and on through to the outskirts of the village. A platoon of C Co was committed here to clear out the town as A Co passed through, rapidly pursuing the withdrawing enemy. Co B encountered stiff opposition in its approach to HILL 253, but the enemy were quickly overcome and the objective taken. That night the 1st Bn was relieved and moved back into ARRACOURT (115145) and the 2d Cav took over their positions.

During the period from the 9th until the morning of the 14th, the battalion was moving behind the line on foot working into position for the attack on the morning of 14 Nov, which found the battalion on the west edge of the KOECKING FOREST. When the attack jumped off, B Co was on the right and C Co on the left. In this attack the battalion was fighting three enemies - Jerry, cold, and Trench foot. Trench foot was causing a great many casualties during this period. The weather was cold and rainy with visibility poor.

The battalion had the mission of clearing the woods as far as HILL 324 (241286) and outposting the woods to the south overlooking DIEUZE (253243). As the two companies began their attack through the forest, they encountered very stiff opposition from the enemy who was throwing observed artillery, 88s, and machine gun fire at the Americans. As the battalion reached the vicinity of BERANGE FME (197-268) it was stopped completely by machine gun fire. This was the first experience the battalion had had with 88s, and also with fighting in woods.

On the morning of the 15th, Co A was ordered up, with TDS attached, to knock out the enemy machine gun emplacement. The attack continued

from here with A and B Cos leading and C Co in direct support. Very light enemy opposition was encountered during the remainder of the clearing through 824, where the battalion outposted to the south and held until it was pulled out and entrucked for BASSING (315304). From BASSING it moved by foot into LOHR (365325), on 22 Nov, to relieve the 1st Bn 101st Inf Regt. Co A was sent into INSVILLER (385324) and found the enemy had blown all the bridges approaching the village, and had attached demolitions to several dams which, if blown, would have flooded the entire division area. Co C was then sent forward into INSVILLER to augment the force already there. But both A and C Cos were recalled during the night because the engineers were unable to prepare the bridges to their rear, and it was feared they may get cut off.

On the 23d the battalion moved into regimental reserve and started moving toward HONSKIRCH (429382) through MUNSTER (392355) and VITTEBSBOURG (407394). The battalion was in the woods west of MUNSTER on the 25th of Nov and had their belated Thanksgiving dinner there.

On the 26th, Co B assisted by eleven tanks from the 761st Tk Bn, started its attack on HONSKIRCH. Just as the attack was beginning to move along, the regimental commander gave orders for the attacking force to stop and pull back into their old positions because artillery was being fired into the town of HONSKIRCH. This caused many to wonder, because of the fact the artillery had been called to assist in the attack. After the artillery ceased its fire on HONSKIRCH, the attack was ordered to start again. By this time the enemy had gotten out of their dug-in positions and were ready to meet the attack. The tanks were attacking along the road from

VITTEBSBOURG, as this was their only avenue of approach; a marsh was on each side of the road which prevented the tanks from leaving it. After the attack had progressed only a short distance, the lead tank struck a mine and was disabled completely. At this same time the enemy opened fire with anti-tank guns and knocked out two of the tanks in the rear of the column; as the other tanks were unable to move they were abandoned by their crews. However, this did not keep the doughboys of Co B from pushing on forward. By nightfall they were as far forward as the outskirts of the city where the enemy had row after row of double apron wire. Unable to get any support from the rear, Co B was forced to withdraw under the cover of darkness that night as they had suffered many casualties during the tough fighting that day.

On the morning of 27 Nov at 0700 hours, the battalion launched another attack on HONSKIRCH from the west with Co C on the right and Co A on the left. During the night of the 26th, artillery and mortar fire had been directed upon the defenses of HONSKIRCH and a very intense artillery barrage was being fired as the two companies attacked. However, the effect of the artillery and mortar on the enemy was not too great, as the battalion encountered 88s, 20mm, small arms, machine guns, and self-propelled guns as they advanced to the outskirts of the city. The enemy fire became so effective that it was necessary to call for smoke to allow the two attacking companies of the 1st Bn to withdraw. The 1st Bn was then relieved by the 2d Bn and they moved into TORCHEVILLE (352348) for rehabilitation and a few days rest. Here the men took showers, and clean clothes were issued.

The 1st Bn moved back into the line on 1 Dec and were outposting HINSINGER (455395), a holding action with some patrol activity. Casualties were caused during the patrolling action. This outposting and patrolling continued for the 1st Bn until 6 Dec when they were attached to the 4th Armd Div and trucked into SCHMITTVILLER (595452), where they were ordered to attack in front of the armor into BINING (647487). A company of light tanks were to accompany the battalion in its advance. The battalion attacked in a column of companies: C, B, and A in that order. Very light opposition was encountered in the attack on BINING. However, after the battalion had got into the town, the enemy opened up with a terrific barrage of mortar and artillery fire. (It was believed by the S-3, Capt Elbert L. Ryan that the enemy had more ammunition than they could carry with them in their withdrawal, so they fired it on the 1st Bn after they entered BINING.) This caused many casualties among the battalion. The 1st Bn rejoined their regiment on 8 Dec when they were trucked into FORT WITTRING (569508) and moved to WOELFLING (591541) as regimental reserve. On the 11th of Dec it was learned that the regiment was going to be pulled out of this sector, and the German border was in sight. When the attack started the three battalions were all in the line, and to cross the German border was the desire of every man. The enemy opposition was very great, however, and Co A of the 1st Bn was the only company to get on German soil. The battalion was relieved that night in place by the 347th Regt, 87th Inf Div, and marched by the woods to the vicinity of HUTTING (554474) where they entrucked for METZ, FRANCE.



*Done*

UNIT: 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry Regiment, 26th Infantry Division.

PERIOD: 8 November - 12 December 1944.

ACTION: Lorraine Campaign.

SOURCES: Major Paul S. Carrier, Regimental S-3, CO G Company until 15 November 1944.  
Major E. Gardner Goldsmith, Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry.  
On 15 November assumed command of G Company.

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEWS: VALCHOVO-BREZI & DUB, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 18-19 June 1945.

MAPS: 1/50,000	TITLE	SECRET NO.	GSGS
	Chateau-Salins	35-14	4471
	Parroy	35-15	4471
	Sarreguimines	36-13	4471
	Saare-Union	36-14	4471

INTERVIEWER: Lts Ludden (first period) and Howard (second period).

NOTE: Major Carrier was the 2d Battalion S-3 during this operation but due to the severe casualties in the Bois de Koecking took up temporary command positions as company and battalion commander at various times. He is apparently the only surviving officer in the 2d Battalion, in which he served as CO G Company until 15 November. His report on the 2d Battalion action was given from maps and checked against the regiment records. He told the story mainly as a personal account rather than as a battalion story, but did his best to keep the tone of the story objective. The first period of the action was given to Lt Ludden and in a different session the final period was covered by Lt Howard.

When the 26th Division relieved the 4th Armored Division south of the Seille River in the middle of October, considerable adjustment and shifts in regimental sectors occurred within the 26th Division prior to November 8th when the offensive was renewed in this area. On 26 October the 328th Infantry took up its final positions, relieving the 104th Infantry on the right flank of the Division zone. The 101st Infantry was on the left of the 328th Infantry on a static line extending from (168156), a point some 800 yards northwest of Bezange-la-Petite (1715), to the Bezange woods. The 328th Infantry line ran from northeast of Bezange-la-Petite generally south along the 17th grid line until it reached the vicinity of the woods west of Moncourt (1913) where it turned east to include the western half of the woods. Then it again ran south about 1,000 yards where contact was established with the 2d Cavalry Group, on the right flank of

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the Third Army. The 44th Infantry Division was on the left flank of Seventh Army south of the Saar-Rhine Canal and the 2d Cavalry group maintained contact between the 26th and 44th Infantry Divisions.

The positions of the 2d Battalion were southwest of Moncourt (192139) around a small patch of woods of which F Company held one side and the enemy held the other. G Company was to the north of F Company in defilade positions against enemy fire from Hill 253 and E Company was to the right rear of F Company. The 1st Battalion was on the left of G Company, and the 3d Battalion was in reserve.

In the period prior to the jump off the battalion traded small arms fire with the enemy outposts to their front and considerable enemy artillery fell in the woods southwest of Moncourt. The positions held by the 2d Battalion of the 328th Infantry in the Moncourt woods received the heaviest concentrations of artillery. This fire forced the 2d Battalion to draw back out of the woods several times.

The division plan for the attack on 8 November called for the 328th Infantry to make a feint before H-Hour on Bezange la Petite and Moncourt, while the 101st Infantry made the main effort on Hill 310. It was understood that after the feint the 328th Infantry would be relieved by the 2d Cavalry Group, and the 328th Infantry would be committed in the Chateau Salins area.

Shortly before the jump off the Army Commander visited the positions of the 328th. He emphasized that Chateau Salins was the key to the Saar River basin.

The day before the attack, F Company made a limited objective attack against dug-in enemy infantry positions to clear half of the woods southwest of Moncourt as the line of departure for the feint attack at H-hour.

The artillery preparation for the main effort was to be four hours long. For the feint attack the artillery preparation was to be  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hours starting at H-hour minus 1. (Apparently H-hour minus 1 was 0700. This would mean that the feint attack jumped off as it was growing light). One platoon C Company, 761st Tank Battalion, was to

support the 2d Battalion 328th Infantry. The tanks were late in starting to join the 328th Infantry and never got into position for the attack. They laid fire on the 1st Battalion assembly area near Recincourt. (It was stated that during the day, when C Company 761st was committed, it lost communications and traded fire among its own units. The company was reported to have shot up one of its own tanks at this time. (See interview with 1st Battalion 328th Infantry)).

The enemy had a spot defense with strong points (dug-in tank) at Hill 279, Hill 253, and the high ground to the east of Moncourt. The attack jumped off with G Company on the left to clear Hill 279 and enter Moncourt. F Company on the right was to clear the remainder of the woods southeast of Moncourt then pass through G Company and seize the high ground east of the town.

G Company, with close artillery support, and mortar and machine gun fire from H Company, seized Hill 279 and the road junction with little resistance. The company moved in a column of platoons to Moncourt while H Company, with positions on high ground, gave overhead fire support with a heavy blanket of fire on Moncourt. The enemy was found to have outposted Moncourt with dug in automatic weapons positions. G Company deployed short of the town and attempted to enter with assault fire. At this point Major Carrier's story became unclear. Apparently the 3d Platoon of G Company lost directions on the left, swung around the town, and came under the fire of enemy positions south of the town. Before the platoon could be withdrawn there were only three men of the platoon left. It probably had heavy casualties but many were captured. The rest of G Company made a marching fire attack on Moncourt. The enemy outpost positions were overrun and six to eight men captured. G Company went into the town alone.

F Company had been delayed in clearing out the remainder of the woods southwest of Moncourt by a tenacious enemy defense of his positions in the dense woods. He was finally dislodged about 1000 and withdrew to the northeast. At this time a platoon of E Company was committed with F Company.

F Company joined with G Company at the edge of Moncourt at 1100 and together the companies pushed through the town. The principal opposition was about fifteen enemy with automatic weapons in the orchard south of the town (it was supposed that this enemy group had caused the capture of the platoon of G Company). The town was secured about 1130 and at the time there were twenty-eight men left in G Company, and F Company due to their losses in clearing the woods, was low in strength. The enemy laid heavy concentrations of artillery on Moncourt. 88 fire raked the town from positions on the reverse slope of the ridge to the east. During the afternoon, F and G Companies tried to maneuver against these positions. Envelopment was prevented because the slopes of the ridge were bare and covered by enemy automatic fire from the north and south flanks. A direct assault was attempted but the men were exposed to withering fire as soon as they reached the crest of the ridge. Communications to the rear were hampered by enemy harassing fire.

At 1600 the 2d Battalion got orders to withdraw from the town and returned to the edge of the woods to the southeast. Major Carrier stated that thirty men of the battalion stayed in the town until they were relieved by the 2d Cavalry Group.

Asked about the support on the right flank by the 44th Infantry Division, Major Carrier said that he understood that the 44th Division was to jump off on 8 November with the 26th Infantry Division. However, the 44th Division did not attack until three days later, but during the 8-9th, the 44th Division Artillery threw fire to the front of the 328th Infantry.

The 2d Battalion was withdrawn through Coincourt to Arracourt (120145) closing there the morning of the 9th. The morning of the 10th the battalion moved to Vic-sur-Seille, but was held up there by the traffic of the 4th Armored Division. At 1600 the battalion began moving to the edge of Vic-sur-Seille where it detrucked and marched by foot to Morville (128246). At Morville the battalion received reinforcements.

At 1700 on the 10th the battalion received orders to move out the next morning

on the left rear of the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, to aid in clearing the woods (Bois de la Celine) south of Hampont (1526). However, the enemy had withdrawn from this area before the battalion moved out and the 2d Battalion was directed on the 11th to relieve the 3d Battalion 101st in the heavily defended area south of the main road through Bois de Koecking. The 3d Battalion of the 101st was given the lighter mission of clearing the part of the woods north of the main road. The 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, was attached to the 328th Infantry for control.

That night Lt Col Bayers, the 2d Battalion commander, was evacuated for illness and Major Robert Senatus, Executive officer, took over the battalion.

The Bois de Koecking covered a ridgeline extending 10,000 yards to the northeast. The road through the woods kept to the crest of the ridge. The ground fell away rapidly on either side. The woods was largely beech which at this time of the year were still covered with leaves. Throughout the woods were small copse of dense fir, many of which the enemy used for automatic weapons positions. The forest had been prepared with trenches for a successive delaying action throughout the woods.

The morning of the 12th the 2d Battalion moved out abreast of the 3d Battalion 101st Infantry, with F Company on the left, G Company on the right and E Company in reserve, making a "T" formation for the attack. (The 3d Battalion 101st Infantry mentioned a concentration of approximately a battalion of enemy in the tip of woods at (180252) which they said was taken care of by the 2d Battalion 328th Infantry. The 328th Infantry did not mention any action at this point).)

The 2d Battalion advanced apparently with little difficulty until they reached the clearing in the woods at (205265). At this point they were subjected to a sudden and heavy barrage of mortar fire which caused a number of casualties to the battalion, killed Major (Senatus), acting Battalion Commander, and wounded Colonel Jacobs, the regimental commander. Captain Freedman, Battalion S-3, took over the battalion. Captain Carrier was then made Battalion S-3.

The battalion moved another 500 yards from this position and made a perimeter defense for the night. By this time communications with regiment and with the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, (which had been held up on the right rear) were difficult. The battalion was largely operating under its own control.

(NOTE: During the delaying action in the Koecking woods the enemy made use of a trick encountered in Normandy fighting. Observers concealed in the patches of fir were left behind with wire communications to their artillery and mortar batteries. This accounted for the sudden and accurate barrage of mortar and artillery fire which was laid on the 2d Battalion, 328th Infantry. The 2d Battalion caught on to the trick and made a special search to cut the wires.)

During the night of 12-13th the battalion positions were harassed by enemy artillery from the south and east. The men had no blankets. About three inches of snow fell. About 0600 the next morning Major Medbourn, CO of the 3d Battalion, came up to take command. The battalion received some replacements.

At this time the 2d Battalion 328th Infantry had contact with the 1st Battalion 101st Infantry, which had come up to outpost the south flank of the woods.

While the 2d Battalion was in this area, F Company moved to the edge of the woods to make an attack on the enemy positions at St Medard from (178251). At the edge of the woods F Company came under heavy artillery fire from the southeast. The company had heavy casualties, including all the company officers. From that time the enemy artillery raked the southern edge of the Koecking woods and made positions there practically untenable.

On the 13th the 2d Battalion continued its advance reaching a position just short of the road junction at (213269). There it came on well prepared enemy delaying positions (crescent shaped trenches, dug outs, AT & AW fire) guarding the lateral road through the woods. F Company, on the left of the line attempted to turn the flank of the position. The strong point of which is referred to above was concentrated at the road junction itself. In the attack F Company took heavy losses but was unsuccessful. In the meantime the 3d Battalion of the 101st came up on the north flank. Due to the

broadening of the woods there was a gap between the 3d Battalion 101st and 2d Battalion 328th. During the afternoon the 1st Battalion, 328th, was brought in to fill the gap. The 2d Battalion secured positions for the night short of the enemy delaying positions.

The 14th of November was an important day in the history of the 2d Battalion. Early in the morning, Colonel Byers came back to take over command of the battalion. Captain Freedman was made executive officer. The attack jumped off with G Company passing through F Company on the left and E Company (Lt Swift, commanding) on the right. The 1st Battalion was to make a coordinated attack on the left of the road (Chemin des Hafeurs). G Company was to be the guiding company of the 2d Battalion, and see that it kept its flank on the main road.

As the battalion moved out, automatic weapons opened up on the left flank which wounded G Company's lieutenant and his acting 1st/Sgt. The automatic weapons position was overrun and the battalion continued to move. At the road junction G Company lost direction and moved along the southern road to the southeast. The advance continued in this direction, still receiving flanking fire, until it reached the road junction at (217268) which indicated the loss of direction. Colonel Bayors with the command group came up to rectify the matter but was pinned down by an automatic weapons position at close range for approximately an hour and a half.

During this time the battalion continued the attack southeast across the road which intersects at road junction (217268) where they met another enemy position. There was a sharp fire fight during which G Company received considerable casualties before the position was knocked out. At this time Captain Swift of E Company and Captain Carrier were commanding the movement of the battalion and sent out reconnaissance to see how they could get back to positions on the right of the main road.

It was decided to give the battalion a complete left flank movement which brought it back to the main road at the 22 grid line (see map). This made a pocket of enemy behind the battalion. At first this was not known. A runner was sent back to get

contact with the battalion command group but no word was received from him. A second runner was sent out and returned immediately saying that there were Germans in the woods to the rear. A patrol was formed to work backwards and word was passed to H Company to work up on the rear of the pocket. After a short fire fight an enemy battalion staff, totalling forty-seven men, were captured from this pocket. During the fire fight in the pocket the battalion received ten casualties.

The battalion command group had been pinned down by fire from the enemy position to the left of the road junction (213269) which had not yet been cleared by the 1st Battalion. Major Carrier said that the 1st Battalion attacked with C Company on its right but C Company had lost direction and by-passed this position. A Company was brought up to assault this enemy position but was unsuccessful after Captain Royce, the A Company commander, was killed. Eventually the 2d battalion command group was able to withdraw and Colonel Byers went back to get a platoon of tanks from the 761st Tank Battalion, brought them up along the road, and knocked out the enemy position, at the road junction. Still the battalion command group was out of contact with companies of the battalion.

During the afternoon the 1st Battalion came up along the road to the left, abreast of the 2d, and together the 1st and 2d Battalions advanced to the objective of the day across the lateral road through the woods. Action was completed at 1700.

Captain Carrier made his way back to the battalion command group and was told by Colonel Byers to take command of the troops of the battalion for the night.

On the 15th the 2d Battalion held up in its positions. Communications were established to the rear and the wounded of the battle of the 14th were evacuated. At this same time a large number of cases of trench foot and exposure turned up since this was the first letdown in four days continuous attacking and movement since the jump off. The battalion had about 500 non-battle casualties which were evacuated at this time and replacements were brought up. At this time F Company received an entire new officer



staff. On the 15th the 1st Battalion 328th Infantry continued the attack to clear the rest of the Koecking woods. During the day the negro tank outfit, 761st Tank Battalion, came up the lateral road, turned south, and in doing so laid fire on the positions where the 2d Battalion was assembled. The 3d Battalion of the 328th was committed with the 1st Battalion to work through the rest of the woods. This action continued until the 18th, and on the 19th the 3d Battalion swung back to positions southeast of the 2d Battalion assembly area to attack along with the 51st Armored Infantry Battalion, 4th Armored Division, to Dieuze. The 2d Battalion from its positions assisted this attack by fire but was not committed.

The 3d Battalion, 328th Infantry, entered Dieuze (2524) on November 20th, while the 2d Battalion maintained its positions north in the woods. On the following morning the 2d Battalion entrucked and moved out of the Koecking woods toward Torcheville (3534), several miles to the northeast. The intervening area had been cleared by the 101st and 104th Infantry Regiments. The 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, had taken Torcheville, where the 2d Battalion 328th Infantry relieved it as part of a battalion-by-battalion relief of the 101st Infantry by the 328th. The 1st Battalion moved into position at Lohr (3632). The 3d, in regimental reserve, was located in the vicinity of the regimental CP at Guinzeling (3431).

The objective for the 2d Battalion for 22 November was Munster (3935), located about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles to the east on the other side of the intervening Albestroff Forest. The attack order required clearing only that part of the woods east and south of Torcheville, after which the battalion would move directly on Munster. A platoon of tanks, was to support the attack, moving along the Torcheville - Munster road, which runs almost due east through the forest. The attack jumped off at 0900 with G Company on the left of the road, E Company on the right and F Company moving in reserve. The Weapons Company was parcelled out to the rifle companies. The initial advance to the woods was made in a column of files, keeping in defilade. The morning was cold, damp

and misty. The men proceeded through the woods without incident and reorganized on the far side for the movement on Munster. The tanks continued along the road and their firing secured a direct hit on the church steeple in town. The platoons were dispersed in a line of skirmishers. Just before E Company got into town, it was pinned down by small arms fire from about twenty men, but G Company soon had a squad in Munster that quickly rounded up the civilians. F Company followed G Company and the town was cleared. This action removed the pressure on Company G which now moved into the town. 20mm and 80mm shells were now being fired directly into town from the woods to the north and from the higher ground to the northeast in the area around Givreccourt (4036). Considerable fire also started coming in. A perimeter defense was set up, the battalion CP established in town, and the battalion remained here for the rest of the day and the night of 22-23 November. The opposition to G Company had come from a partial flank position on their left across a stream which runs north of Munster, and on breaking off the fire the enemy had retired to the woods north of the town. Both small arms and artillery fire increased in intensity during the afternoon. The bridges around the town had been blown, cutting the main route from Munster to Givreccourt (4036), which was the battalion's objective for the next day. The small arms fire coming from the tip of the Albestroff forest which ran down just north of town indicated that the enemy might elect to make a stand in this part of the woods to prevent its use in a movement northeast to Givreccourt.

Under mortar and artillery fire Engineers went to work repairing the bridge (393357) to open the road to Givreccourt on the morning of the 23d. Meanwhile F and G Companies moved back along the northwest road toward Albestroff (3537) before daylight and followed the 3d Battalion across the bridge at (373365) to enter the northern section of the Albestroff Forest. The plan was for the 3d Battalion to clear the northern half of this part of the woods while the 2d Battalion took care of the section immediately north of Munster. The 2d Battalion was then to move down on Givreccourt from

the northwest. Rocket fire was received as the battalion moved across the Rose Creek but the woods in the 2d Battalion zone was cleared at the cost of few casualties. F Company then moved out of the forest to outpost the high ground northwest of Givrecourt while G Company entered the town. Enemy infantry resistance continued slight. The Engineers had gotten their bridge in and E Company came up during the day along the road from Munster to enter Givrecourt also.

At 1900 a patrol was sent from G Company to reconnoiter Honskirch (4238), which was on high ground to the northeast on the far side of a stream. The patrol reached the vicinity of the town about 2100 and discovered that the town was protected by heavy wire emplacements. These were laid in box sections running back several deep. German outposts were seen silhouetted against the skyline. A continuous line of entrenchments was observed running around the town along the ridge. When it was seen that the town was being strongly held the patrol ceased attempting to penetrate the box barriers and returned. This information was reported about 2400 and passed on to higher headquarters.

The 24th was spent consolidating positions and planning for the attack on Honskirch. During the day it was learned that the 1st Battalion was to move through the 2d Battalion to make the attack on Honskirch, while the 3d Battalion would move against Vittersbourg (4039), northwest of Honskirch. The 25th found the 1st Battalion attacking Honskirch where the defenses of the town and its commanding location resulted in heavy casualties to the battalion without its being able to enter the town. Meanwhile the 3d Battalion had entered Vittersbourg without much opposition. The next day the 1st Battalion resumed its attack against heavy resistance. Their fire was supported by the 2d Battalion. Armor was used during the attack but enemy fire protected their minefields and it was not possible to clear the minefields which were holding up the tanks. On the afternoon of the 26th (this date repeated as morning 27 November in 328th Infantry Regiment's interview) the 2d Battalion replaced the 1st Battalion and a platoon from G Company moved into Honskirch, which was found by then to be unoccupied. G Company

and a platoon from F Company then entered and outposted the town.

The 2d Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion on 28 November and moved back to Torcheville (3534). The resistance west of the Saar River had collapsed by now and on the following day the 2d Battalion moved east to occupy Harskirchen (4937). At this time the 3d Battalion was on its left at Bissert (4738) and the 1st Battalion was at Einsingen (4539). These positions were maintained during the 101st Infantry attack on Saare-Union which took place in the first days of December. Prior to the attack on Saare-Union a force from the 2d Battalion guarded the approach from Villeneuve (5137) to Harskirchen.

At 0100 December 5th the 2d Battalion moved south to cross the Saar at Sarrewerden (5236), then north through Saare-Union, where G Company cut the Schopperton - Saare-Union road. In the daylight F Company moved along the railroad tracks and entered Schopperton (4938) while G Company moved up on its left flank. F & G Companies then moved north through the woods above the town and by 1500 G Company was in Keskastel (4941) followed by the rest of the battalion. The 1st Battalion had been moving north on the west side of the Saar during this time and E Company went on to Sarrable (4844) to find part of the 1st Battalion also in the area.

The following day the 2d Battalion moved with the regiment to the vicinity of Oermingen (5544) and crossed the Eichel River. The 104th Infantry was moving ahead clearing Kalhausen (5747), Etting (5948) and was in the vicinity of the Grand Bois (5748). The 2d Battalion reached Kalhausen by dark and on the 7th moved west toward the Eichel River to clear Etting (5547). E Company moved then to take Weidesheim (5649) while the 3d Battalion worked on its right flank clearing the Grand Bois. On December 8th, while the 104th Infantry was taking Achen (5949), the 2d Battalion cleared Weidesheim. December 9th the 2d Battalion moved by foot through Achen, Wiesviller (5753) to Woelfing (5954).

December 10th the 2d Battalion attacked northeast into the Elies-Brucken Forest

with the 3d Battalion on its left. Here both Battalions ran into heavy opposition, meeting both enemy tank and infantry fire. The fighting went on in the woods all day but late in the afternoon the 2d Battalion was forced to pull back southwest of the forest. The next day at noon, E & F Companies resumed the attack pushing back into the woods.

The 2d Battalion was relieved at 1900 by elements of the 87th Division, who took over, finishing the clearing of the woods. It was remarked by the 2d Battalion that it was an unfortunate spot to initiate the 87th into battle, especially as they appeared to be short essential equipment, including radios, bazookas, and BARs. The 2d Battalion gave them an SCR 300 and some bazookas and withdrew from the sector. The battalion of the 87th Division was not recalled, but this was part of the relief of the 328th Infantry by the 347th Infantry, 87th Division, which was completed by 12 December.

*Paris*

UNIT: 3D BN, 328 INF REGT, 26 DIV

PERIOD: 8 NOVEMBER - 12 December 1944

ACTION: LORRAINE CAMPAIGN

SOURCE: CAPT. KINGDON W SWAYNE, 3d Bn S-3

PLACE AND DATE OF INTERVIEW: DUB, CZECHOSLOVAKIA - 17 JUNE 1945

INTERVIEWER: 2d LT CHARLES KING HOWARD

MAPS: 1:50,000

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>SHEET NO</u>	<u>GS GS</u>
CHATEAU-SALINS	35-14	4471
PARROY	35-15	4471
SARREGUEMINES	36-13	4471
SAAHE-UNION	36-14	4471
HITCHE	37-13	4471

Capt Swayne was with the 3d Bn for the period of this campaign. He appeared to have a good grasp of the Bn's action and referred to a unit history during the interview. Observations regarding adjacent units and the general situation as it appeared to Capt Swayne have been fully set forth as it is believed they are of value, when taken with other interviews, in clarifying the picture of the 26th Div. During this campaign the 3d Bn was frequently in reserve.

PERIOD PRIOR TO 8 NOVEMBER: - The 3d Bn, 328th Inf Regt, moved on October 13th from its positions in the PONT-A-MOUSSON (7735) area by motor to the vicinity of ARRACOURT (1114). The Bn was to relieve the 166 Engr C Bn the following day in the HEZANGE LA GRANDE Forest, occupying a sector running along the eastern edge of the forest from the SEILLE RIVER southeast to the road at (090191). The 3d Bn moved into its positions the 15th of October and found them to be an improvement over those which they had recently left. This shift was a part of the relief of the 4th Armd Div by the 26th Inf Div.

The Bn's initial combat experience had started October 5th around PONT-A-MOUSSON, where the Regt was attached to the 80th Div. Here it held static positions while the 80th Div attacked to expand its MOSELLE RIVER bridgehead. This period was without particular incident, except for the continuous rains, which the Bn was to endure for the coming two months. Artillery fire was received and the first casualties were the result of a direct hit on an MG emplacement. Dugouts scraped out by "bulldozers" provided shelter. The nights were very dark and men got lost trying to locate their own

positions.

In the new positions on the edge of the BEZANGE Forest the men could move fairly freely without fear of enemy observation from across the SEILLE RIVER. Germans were observed at VIC-SUR-SEILLE (112 1') and enemy patrols crossed the SEILLE at night but were unable to penetrate the forest. The flat open ground between the forest and the river prevented any movement during the day. The Bn remained in position in the BEZANGE WOODS until October 20th, when it was relieved by the 2d Bn, 328th Inf.

The 3d Bn was now placed in division reserve and alerted to assist the 104th Inf in attacking BEZANGE-la-PETITE (1715) and MONCOURT (1913). The Bn was not used for this purpose and on October 24th it was attached to the 104th Inf and relieved the 1st Bn, 104th, in their positions in the vicinity of MONCOURT. The positions were located in the woods (1813) southwest of the town. They ran along the northeast edge of the woods to the nose of forest which protrudes at (184137), then southeast across the road at (185134) to the edge of the woods in that locality. This front was so small that positions were tenable for only two companies on an extremely confined front which thus ran about half way through the woods. A third company was kept in reserve immediately southwest of the forest. The Bn CP was located in a "pothole" at (172132) which was 15 feet deep, about 20 feet across and 40 feet long. The CP tent was placed in this depression and the command installations were dug into the side of the bank. When the 3d Bn moved in, the woods offered good concealment but the leaves started falling from the trees exposing the locations to the enemy even as far back as the CP. The enemy controlled the highest ground in the vicinity in the BOIS de la CROIX (2112). From a corner (211124) of this woods a German CP had commanding observation. German artillery was located during this period east of the BOIS de la CROIX but was not used to shell the 3d Bn positions systematically except in case of unusual activity. Mortar fire fell in the area fairly regularly. An enemy artillery observer's map which was captured later showed how completely the Bn area was

covered from the CP in the CROIX woods. Several paths were dug at least 5 feet deep and 20 to 30 feet long from the CP in order to mask the entrance of personnel.

The 3d Bn remained in the MONCOURT WOODS from October 24th to November 5th. During this time more than one man mysteriously disappeared without leaving any clue as to his fate. An I Co Sgt named Snesby was summoned from the front lines one evening to the CP a half hour before dark. He started back through the woods and was never seen again. The following day the woods were scoured carefully without success. Another Sgt disappeared after visiting a contact point in much the same fashion. It was barely possible that the Germans were slipping through the lines but that they could return thru this congested area with prisoners seemed unlikely. The woods and high ground in the area was tunnelled to a considerable degree. Several of these openings were closed up by the infantry after inspection.

In the line one platoon from the right flank company maintained positions on the right side of the road which cuts through the woods at (185134). Visual contact and fire controlled the open area south of the woods during the day. At night patrols maintained contact with the 2d Cav Gp on the right flank of the Division.

It was soon realized that the German positions in the eastern half of the woods were heavily fortified. Tremendous dug-outs of heavy log construction and earth-covered strong-points were noted. Two of these straddled the RJ at (187135), being located just west of the RJ. Another was located south of the RJ in the woods and a fourth was in the corner (211124) of the CROIX woods. Until the Germans had been driven out of the western half of the MONCOURT Woods by the limited attack of the 104th Inf about October 22d, they had controlled the entire patch of woods and it was evident that they knew every inch of the ground and all the trails through the area. It was believed that their positions were improved World War I locations. Most of the 3d Bn positions were between two lines of fortifications. The right flank Co CP was in an old World War I concrete and log pillbox. Generally the men dug two-man foxholes and covered the tops with logs and earth to guard against tree-bursts. The better ones had two



~~and~~ two openings one of which was utilized as a firing aperture. One of the fox-holes was covered with the turret of a wrecked tank, which may have caused the Germans some anxiety. The enemy positions were located in many places as close as 75 to 100 yards from the 3d Bn's fox-holes.

Due to the proximity of the Germans and their knowledge of the terrain, it was necessary to cut new trails for supply and communication to avoid the mortar fire which fell on the established routes. During the entire time that the 3d Bn was in these woods, they expected to attack in an attempt to clear the remainder of the forest, but were never ordered to do so. At night the Germans would sneak up to the infantry positions and throw grenades and do a great deal of small arms firing, so the usual system of remaining quiet and sitting at night was abandoned for a system of firing and "raising hell" to discourage the enemy. Despite the knowledge that digging attracted mortar fire during the day, the digging was done during this time. Late in the period a section of heavy MGs was set up in the rear of the woods to place "interdictory" fire on the town of MONCOURT, which was termed "strictly a map problem", for observation was out of the question. It was beginning to be suspected that the enemy were occupying their positions lightly during the day and were only manning them in force at night, when they would do their best to annoy the 3d Bn. Enemy patrol scares at the Bn CP occurred practically every night. \*

On November 5th the 3d Bn was relieved by the 2d Bn, 328th Inf, and withdrawn as Division reserve to the vicinity of (153122). It did not participate in the initial

\* The details regarding the 3d Bn's occupation of the MONCOURT WOODS AND the situation which it encountered there has been set forth to explain the difficulties which successive bns met in these woods for a period of almost a month. The losses which the 3d Bn suffered here are perhaps the explanation for the fact that the Bn was placed in reserve during a considerable part of the offensive which started 8 November. The tactical importance of the Tank Co which was to assist in breaking the stalemate in this sector on 8 Nov is also pointed up, it is believed, and the failure of the tanks to get in position on 8 Nov may account for the confused and inconclusive results which were obtained that day.

attack of November 8th but knew that the 1st and 2d Bns of the 328th Inf had the objectives of BEZANGE-la-PETITE (1715) and MONCOURT (1913). The objectives were taken with heavy casualties in the case of the latter objective. The 2d Cav Gp was never "sprung" as the ground was too soggy and the vehicles were "sitting duck" targets when moving along the two roads which led from the initial objectives to LEZEY (1817) and LEY (2015). The Cavalry therefore held up and screened in front of BEZANGE-la-PETITE and MONCOURT.

On November 9th the developing Division situation resulted in the right flank of the Division, now held by the 101st Inf, becoming very extended due to the north-east progress of the 101st. On the evening of November 8th the 328th Inf's line Bns had been relieved by the 2d Cav Gp. On the 9th the 3d Bn was therefore moved up to relieve a Bn of the 101st and screen the right flank of the Division. The front line at this time ran, for the Bn, along a 5000 yard front from MOYENVIC (1320) southeast along the trail extending from the RJ at (143197) across the FOSSE and SAULOY streams to the RJ at (153181). From here the line continued in the same general direction just east of XANREY (149171) toward BEZANGE-la-PETITE where contact was made with the 2d Cav Gp. The 3d Bn CP was established at JUVRECOURT (1316) during this time. About November 12th the sector from RJ 206 (139199) south was turned over to the cavalry, spreading them "very thin" and the 3d Bn was assembled in Division reserve north of VIC-SUR-SEUILLE (1121) in the vicinity of (115227).

November 14th the 3d Bn, still in reserve, moved to the vicinity of HAMPONT (1526) where the Division CP was located. During this time the men always dug slit trenches and were ready to move on short notice. 15 trucks were standing by in the event that it was decided to commit the Bn.

The following day the 3d Bn was returned to the 328th Inf. Due to a confusion in orders the Regiment expected the 3d Bn to take positions in the center section of the KOECHING Woods but the Division orders were to organize positions <sup>in</sup> the

~~...of the ... Division Orders were to ...~~  
~~...the northeast of WUISSE preparatory to attacking through the northern~~  
~~part of the KOECKING WOODS. Early in the morning of Nov 15th request for artillery~~  
~~preparation on the woods east of WUISSE was made. The supporting FA Bn demanded a~~  
~~guarantee that there were no friendly troops in this area before firing the mission.~~  
~~This was not given and the troops moved ahead without artillery support to find that~~  
~~an Engr Co of the 4th Armd Div had been sitting in these woods for two days. The~~  
~~3d Bn moved into the woods at 0900 and by the end of the day had walked through the~~  
~~sector of the woods known as the BOIS de KERFERCHÉ to the eastern limit of the forest.~~  
~~One company took up positions around the KUTZELING FARMS (255312). The 3d Bn line~~  
~~ran along the northeast edge of the forest as far south as the main road which comes~~  
~~out of the forest at (253300). The 1st and 2d Bns of the 328th were still west of~~  
~~these positions in the southern part of the woods.~~

The next day a reinforced combat patrol was moved southeast to occupy the  
regimental objective in the southeastern edge of the KOECKING FOREST. The 3d Bn was  
now on a line extending from the KUTZELING FARMS south to (258286). No opposition  
was encountered this day and the 3d Bn met the 1st Bn at RJ (245291).

On November 17th the 101st Inf passed through the 3d Bn positions in preparation  
for attacking BOURGALTROFF (2830) and GUELHILING (2729) and the 3d Bn was relieved  
from its line mission. On the 18th at 1200 the Bn was informed that it was to take  
DIEUZE (2524) on order by 1600. At this time the Bn was in an assembly area in the  
northeast part of the woods. A postponement was effected until the following day.  
The plans devised called for a dawn attack from an LD along the southern edge of the  
BOIS de GUENESTROFF (2327). The initial objective for K Co was BURBESTROFF (2526), for  
I Co GUENESTROFF (2425). Artillery preparation was laid on the ridge running from  
VERGAVILLE (2727) southeast toward DIEUZE. It was planned that after K Co took its  
objective that it would climb the ridge, after crossing the stream which runs south  
of BURBESTROFF, and assault DIEUZE from the east following the sloping ridge down

to the town. Mortars and MGs of the 1st Bn and mortars from the 2d Bn were attached for support.

The attacking companies moved out at dawn on the 19th, crossing the open ground to their initial objectives without difficulty. K Co entered GUEBESTROFF without firing a shot. I Co did not encounter any difficulty either, but soon K Co discovered that the bridge at (256260), south of the town, had been blown. I Co also moved into KERPRICH-les-DIEUZE (2325), a town just southwest of GUEBESTROFF. These towns were under control by 0800. I Co was now ordered to hold up while K Co scaled the ridge to the south and then the two companies would make a coordinated attack on DIEUZE.

K Co started moving out of GUEBESTROFF to cross the wide but shallow stream south of the town. At this time machine guns and depressed 37mm flak guns opened up along the ridge from the house at (260257), to positions just west of VERGAVILLE. Particularly intense fire was coming from the RJ at (260257), which was the intersection of the GUEBESTROFF Road with the one running from VERGAVILLE to DIEUZE. Part of a platoon of the 761st (Negro) Tk Bn was with K Co at this time, but since the bridge was out below GUEBESTROFF they would be unable to support the attack should it move across the stream. Difficulty was encountered in getting the tankers to maintain their positions and support from that source was abandoned. Smoke was called for from the artillery to cover the ridge but either because of communication trouble or its unavailability this protection was not forthcoming. K Co was meanwhile suffering a number of casualties without succeeding in crossing the stream. Heavy mortar fire was coming in and both the K Co radio and the FO's radio went out, putting the communication burden on foot messengers. The ground in this area was extremely soft and muddy. The land is low and the several streams in the area had been flooded due to the continuous rains. Ploughed fields outside the town made the walking even more difficult. From their commanding ground the enemy were able to pin down K Co throughout the day. Even the messengers were sniped at by mortars which tracked them across the muddy ground.

About 1600 the Bn Cdr, Lt Col Tillson, received word that the 51st Armd Inf Bn was attached to the 3d Bn and was prepared to support the attack on DIEUZE that day. It was also learned that the 51st was with its vehicles in the vicinity of WUISSE, which meant that it would be dark before they could move up to attack positions. It was then planned to resume the attack the following day with this additional support. Another factor also entered the picture, making it desirable to postpone further attack for the day. The little stream south of GUEBESTROFF WAS getting wider throughout the day. It appeared that it was being backed by a daming operation in the vicinity of DIEUZE, thus making it almost impossible to cross the stream as K Co had originally planned.

Elaborate plans were made for attacking DIEUZE the following day. The tanks and I Co were to move south both along the KERPRICH -- DIEUZE Road and along the open ground just east of this road. The dismounted 51st Armd Inf Bn was to move on the west of this road, keeping its left flank along the road. I Co was to replace K Co, which was put in reserve, and was to work directly toward the factory section of DIEUZE on the northeast side of town, without attempting to scale the ridge first. Fire power was to be used to a maximum by all weapons. Interdictory fire was placed on the town all night by the artillery and a heavy preparation was laid down just prior to the jump-off. All units started off on the 20th with tanks and infantry engaging in a marching fire demonstration. The town was entered without difficulty as the Germans had evacuated it during the night.

The 25th Cav Sq, 4th Armd Div moved into DIEUZE along the MULCEY -- DIEUZE road preparatory to leading the 4th Armd Div movement northeast along the DIEUZE -- MITTERSHEIM Road. A major traffic problem soon developed as all the main bridges had been blown in DIEUZE. The 3d Bn discovered a bridge at (254244) which had not been blown and which freed the armor to move toward VERGAVILLE. Although the bridges in the center of town were out, the 3d Bn discovered another bridge intact at (258243). This bridge was set for demolition and the charges were removed. The

The 25th Cav Sq was able to move out of DIEUZE during the day but the main elements of the 4th Armd Div did not move through the town toward MITTERSHEIM until the following day.

Early in the afternoon of the 20th the 3d Bn withdrew from DIEUZE and extended the division's flanks by occupying the towns of GUEBESTROFF (2526), VERGAVILLE (2727), and REDESTROFF (2930). K Co took the last two named towns without opposition, rounding up a half-dozen stragglers in each town. This further indicated that the enemy's stand on the GUEHLING (2829) - VERGAVILLE - DIEUZE line had been broken and that the enemy was probably withdrawing to the SARRE River. The 20th was distinguished by the fact that no rain fell during most of the day, although in the late afternoon a heavy downpour began.

The average company strength in the 3d Bn was now about 130 - 135 men with a few replacements coming up about this time. A number of replacements had been received for the losses sustained in the MONCOURT WOODS where each Co had lost about 30 men and several officers. One particular round in the MONCOURT Woods had accounted for a Platoon Leader, an FO, an Engr Officer and a Regt AT Co officer. One officer's grave was later discovered in the section of the woods held by the Germans.

At 0800 on November 21st the 3d Bn moved by motor and foot to GUINZELING (3431), where the CP for the 101st Inf was located. It was planned that the 328th Inf would move through the 101st Inf and occupy the towns of TORCHEVILLE (3534) and LOHR (3632), already taken by the 101st Inf. The 3d Bn was to be in Regt reserve. The next day the 3d Bn moved to TORCHEVILLE where its CP was established while the troops took up positions in the KIEWALD which was in the southwestern part of the ALBESTROFF Forest. On the 23d of November the 3d Bn moved north with the mission of clearing the northern half of the ALBESTROFF Forest - ie MUEHLWALD - while the 2d Bn took care of the sector of the forest south of a line running northeast from (374367). I and K Cos moved into the woods using the ALBESTROFF - MUNSTER Road west of the blown bridge at (373365) as an LD. No Germans were met in the woods which was systematically

cleared.

At this time the 26th Div boundary was close to the left flank of the 3d Bn and the 104th Inf was being pinched out by the 35th Div. Not much was known of the enemy situation north and west of the 3d Bn but from the Bn's standpoint it was necessary to know whether the 35th Div planned to take HELMBURG (3539) and INSMING (3740), as these towns and the roads east through them were needed by the 26th Div for movement further east. A PFC Herman L Vaden was made the Bn's Ln NCO and dispatched on this mission. He made the difficult trip to locate a unit of the 35th Div and contacted a Regt CO with whom he exchanged "big pictures" and effected a coordination between the movements of the units. Soon after Vaden was made a S/Sgt.

During the night of the 23d a combat patrol was sent to VITTEBSBOURG (4139), a town northeast from the ALBESTROFF Forest on the far side of another forest called Le SPITZWALD. The patrol returned with the report that the town was occupied by the enemy but that the SPITZWALD was clear and also the patch of woods lying directly north of this forest. Since INSMING was by now known to be cleared, it was decided to send 5 tanks from the 761 Tk Bn and 3 assault guns with L Co along the INSMING-VITTEBSBOURG Road while I and K Cos would attack northeast across country through the spit of woods north of the SPITZWALD. The two forces were to move on VITTEBSBOURG in a tightly coordinated operation. The operation started after daylight on the 24th and the attackers moved into VITTEBSBOURG about 0930 to find that the Germans had evacuated the town a half-hour before, withdrawing toward HONSKIRCH (4338). On the outskirts of VITTEBSBOURG a road block of logs with a crater blown in front of it held up the tanks. The Bn's 4 came up at this time with a 2 1/2 ton truck with a winch on it. With the aid of the winch the road block was dumped into the crater and the road was opened.

After occupying the town artillery came in with an intensity unusual in the Bn's experience. This shelling continued until HONSKIRCH fell two days later. During the day the tanks moved south along the road with part of the 1st Bn in what turned

Fort WITTRING and Fort GRAND BOIS, against which the 3d Bn was to move on Dec 8th. On the morning of the 8th, I and L Cos moved northeast through the woods, while K Co swung to the west to enter the neck of woods running northwest toward the town of WITTRING (5757) and the SARRE River. The GRAND BOIS is situated on a piece of sharply rising ground with the forest forming a "V" pointing northeast. Well up into the forest on the right, or northeast side of this "V", Fort GRAND BOIS was located, while Fort WITTRING was in the left triangle on lower ground and may have been located either in the forest or in the open ground in the vicinity of (5780)\*.

As the companies moved through the woods scattered opposition and some MG fire of a delaying nature was encountered. I Co was pulled back in reserve as the forces split ~~split~~ to move separately toward the forts, with K Co moving against Fort WITTRING and L Co continuing on up the hill toward Fort GRAND BOIS. Quite a number of Germans were killed during this advance and a few were captured. Actually fewer Germans were being encountered during this period than had been met by the previous day's patrols. Before noon L Co was able to see its objective, a large fort facing east with its rear wall, against which the attack was moving, rising some 35 feet above the ground. Two revolving cupolas for MGs could be seen on the top of the fort. At least 6 firing slits and a large steel door big enough for a truck to drive through were observed. The Fort was surrounded with an amazing tangle of wire. Ten complete double-apron wire entanglements ran around the Fort and residue wire appeared to have been dumped in between the apron barriers. There was no road to be seen leading up to the building. The men of L Co were both startled and somewhat scared when they looked at this building and its protection.

\* The SARREQUELINES Map (1:50000) was not available for this part of the interview, so accurate locations cannot be given. It was established that the 2 Forts were mutually supporting. A Defense Overprint would be valuable in pinpointing the action described above. A sketch was made from memory by Lt Col Tillson, 3d Bn Comdr. who described in detail the action of K Co against Fort WITTRING. Capt Swayne with the Cos attacking Fort GRAND BOIS and described their action and corroborated the details furnished by the Bn Comdr.



During the afternoon L Co set about attempting to find a way through the wire. Small arms fire was laid on the apertures without much effect. The fire would be returned just as soon as any slackening was noted by the enemy. The woods had a heavy undergrowth in this area and it was possible to get within 200 yards of the Fort without crawling. Movement closer than that was practically prohibitive, as the wire was covered by MGs firing from the fort. A TD was snaked up the hill and put into a firing position about 500 yards from the Fort. The 76mm AP shells bounced off the fort and cupola, which the gunner could see, without doing any damage other than chipping the building. The attacking force then pulled back and waited for dark. After a reconnaissance, the night was spent trying to cut a path through the wire. Bangalore torpedoes were not available and it was light before the work had been completed, so it was necessary to pull back under cover in the early morning of December 9th.

K Co had meanwhile also been busy. A morning air strike of 4 planes with oil bombs had missed both forts by a considerable distance and the morning of December 8th was spent probing through the forest toward Fort WITTING. While still in the woods the men came upon a factory town where workers were apparently employed in an underground factory which was discovered dug into the side of the hill. It was believed that the factory produced fluid for jet-propelled planes. In the early afternoon the troops moved through these buildings which were not defended by the enemy. Several outpost pillboxes were taken with German troops asleep inside of them. More than once during this operation the poor quality of the German soldiers guarding these installations was remarked. Their apparent belief in the impregnability of the forts made them feel that security outside the forts was unnecessary. By 1500 K Co was in position to observe Fort WITTING, which was seen to be a large fort surrounded on three sides by the factory dwellings. The fort was located on a huge mound about 20 feet high and was typically constructed with revolving cupolas and firing slits.

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The TD which had been sent up the hill against Fort GRAND BOIS was now utilized from its position on the high ground to the east to fire directly on Fort WITTLING. This produced counter fire from a 20mm gun in the WITTLING Fort but served no other useful purpose, except to engage this gun. Patrols worked around the fort while small arms fire was laid on the apertures of the Fort to engage the enemy's attention. During the afternoon an enlisted man, Sgt Uker, climbed up on the mound of the fort to within two feet of a large door, which was located between a corner steel firing turret and the flak gun position, and attempted to hurl a grenade against the door. He threw the grenade and then was seen to fall, hit by MG fire. Most of the Co was located in the factory buildings, some of which were about 125 yards from the Fort. The FO with K Co called for artillery fire during the afternoon and 155mm shells dropped on the fortification without effect. Another TD was brought up and fired 10 point-blank rounds at a MG position in one of the turrets which only succeeded in chipping the ball turret. Patrols during the afternoon drew constant MG and flak fire but finally determined on the likeliest place to approach and blow the building. Just after this report had been made to the Bn Comdr, who was present with K Co, a Division order was received to blow the Fort.

A squad of Engrs and another of K Co men was made up for the assault effort, which was to be made during the night. S/Sgt Anthony F Pisano, who had already been on three patrols during the day, including the final one mentioned above, was put in charge of the operation. At 0130 on December 9th, the assault group moved up to the fort with 400 lbs of German dynamite which had been taken from a nearby bridge. This was placed against the door of the Fort and exploded without blowing the door. The only result was to draw vigorous fire from the Grand Bois Fort. At 0400 the patrol returned and secured about 200 lbs of Composition 2C which was carried back to the fort. During this second attempt the patrol was not subjected to fire of any kind, but whether this was because the enemy figured that a second attempt would not be made is not known. Shortly after 0530 a terrific explosion was heard. No orders were given

then to enter the Fort for it was evident that the position had been neutralized. S/Sgt Pisano later received the Silver Star for his work during these operations, and it was the Bn Comdr's conviction after the night's work that the success of the undertaking was due to the teamwork of the assault force. The training methods of taking a fortified position with artillery, tanks, flame-throwers had turned out to be of little value, while BAR and small arms fire to keep the position buttoned up, prior reconnaissance, and then "guts and dynamite" had turned the trick.

At daylight K Co picked up a German messenger with orders for the men in the forts to withdraw to the ELIESBRUCK Forest. He had apparently already delivered his message to Fort GRAND BOIS and was on his way to Fort WITTING when captured. From the cessation of activity around FORT GRAND BOIS early that morning, it was estimated that this fort was evacuated about 0500.

Since no fire was being drawn from either fort, K and L Cos skirted these positions during the morning of December 9th and the 3d Bn reorganized on the road north of the GRAND BOIS Forest. Both forts were entered later in the day by other elements of the regiment. In WITTING 22 Germans were found "splattered against the walls" as well as the K Co Sgt who had hurled the grenade against the door of the Fort the previous afternoon.

There were no Germans in the town of WITTING (5750) so the 3d Bn made an approach march along the road toward WIESVILLER (5353) during which they drew a smattering of small arms fire. The town of WIESVILLER was entered where six stragglers were picked up and one Italian who claimed to have been impressed into the German Army. He assisted the guard in marching the prisoners to the rear and enforced discipline with a big stick which he applied whenever the marching did not suit him. With the assistance of the 2d Bn the occupation of WOLFFLING (5954) was also completed without incident.

Northeast of WOLFFLING open ground extends for less than two miles up to the ELIESBRUCKEN Forest. The 3d Bn moved over this open area during the afternoon.

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the afternoon. Just before entering the forest two M4 IVs opened up on the battalion and MGs also started firing. At this time 4 TDs and 3 tanks which were supporting the 2d Bn, which was moving forward with the 3d Bn, came up and the enemy broke off and withdrew into the forest. The Germans now began to shell both WIESVILLER and WOELFLING heavily, and it was believed that the German artillery had been displacing and getting into position during the 328th Inf movement through these towns. At the end of the day the 3d Bn and the 2d Bn took up positions outposting the two towns, with the 3d Bn on the left. Both Bns were making preparations for attacking through the forest the following morning.

The two-battalion attack jumped off on the morning of the 10th across the open ground which was subject to enemy tank fire. The 2d Bn was to make the main effort as the high ground extended into the forest from WOELFLING just south of the road running to the edge of the woods at (604549). The terrain in the vicinity of the woods dominated both towns. A part of one company of the 2d Bn got up to the woods but friendly tank support would not move up due to the enemy fire. However a tank duel developed at about a 1000 yard range and one, and possibly more, enemy tanks was destroyed. A house and railroad station located in the edge of the forest at (602552) were also riddled. These buildings along the railroad track appeared to be the center of German activity. No successful penetration of the ELIES-BRUCKEN Forest was made during the day but on the 11th the attack was resumed.

The Germans had already pulled back out of the forest to the high ground in the woods to the north, which was located on the German border. This patch of woods is located less than a 1000 yards west of OBERGAILBACH (6257) on ground which rises steeply from a little stream on the northeast side of the ELIES-BRUCKEN Forest. The 2d Bn moved through the ELIES-BRUCKEN and reestablished contact with the enemy in their positions in the forest west of OBERGAILBACH. In the afternoon an I Co patrol worked its way up the hill toward the enemy positions and penetrated German soil for

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the first time about 1515, thus giving the 3d Bn the privilege of claiming to have led the Division into Germany.

On December 12th the 328th Inf attacked with 3 Bns abreast in an attempt to establish a foothold in Germany and to seize the high ground and forest west of OBERGAILBACH. The front was too narrow for the battalions to work and so each Bn furnished a company for the push. I Co, moving along the bare ridge on the right of A Co, was caught by artillery and tank fire and lost almost an entire platoon. Meanwhile A Co moved forward sufficiently to claim an established position inside the border. During the early hours of the evening the 3d Bn sent litter-bearers forward to recover the wounded. Riflemen were sent along for protection. After dark the guards reported back that the litter-team had "wandered off" and they were positive that these men had been captured. About 2300 the litter-team turned up, being assisted by three Germans whom they had talked into surrendering.

Before daylight on December 13th the 3d Bn was relieved by elements of the 87th Div and withdrew from the lines.

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