

**Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Libraries  
MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library  
Fort Benning, Georgia**

**Report date:** undated

**Title:** Notes on G-3 Conference with COL Temple G. Holland, a Regimental Commander, 37<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, recently returned from SWP.

**Organization:** United States Army

**Abstract:** Extract INF 11-II from SWP includes brief information on the use of the following: mortars, flame thrower, bazooka, rifle grenade, 37mm, anti-pill box weapon, personal equipment, jungle suit, tommy gun, communications, assault on pill boxes, jungle tactics, and night operations.

**Number of pages:** 5 p.

**Notes:** From the MCoE HQ Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. Documents collection. Call #: D730 .U3 #10.

**Classification:** Unclassified; Approved for public release

D 730

Notes on G-3 conference with Coll

U 3

Holland

10

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~


Notes on G-3 Conference with Col. Holland, a regimental commander, 37th Inf Div., recently returned from IAP

S.P

Undated

Inf 11-II

Extract:



6. Mortars.

81 mm mortars with heavy shell is the sweetest weapon in the jungle. 81's were adjusted by using smoke shells to within 50 yards of troops. 60 mm mortar not used much, probably due to lack of proper training of company commanders and troops. This was caused by lack of training ammunition in training previous to entering combat.

7. Flame Thrower.

Only tactical use made of flame thrower was to locate flanking movements when sent out 500-600 yards. These flanking detachments would shoot a jet into the air and duck to avoid the inevitable reply by Jap mortar fire. This to verify position of flanking detachment to unit commander. Main objections to flame thrower are as follows: Only good for 10 seconds operation, too cumbersome and heavy to take forward under terrain conditions involved, difficult to get anyone to carry it ahead of the CP out of sight of an officer.

11. Bazooka.

Bazooka was not taken into action since no ammunition was provided for it.

12. Rifle Grenade.

Little success was obtained from use of rifle grenade in the jungle.

14. 37 mm.

Observer's regiment had 37 mm canister but never used it. It is generally impossible to pull 37 through the jungle.

~~SECRET~~

15. Anti-Hill Box weapon.

Weapon is needed which is light enough to be transportable in jungle and which can exert a strong explosive effect on point target at 150 yard range. The bazooka, the new 4.5" rocket, or a light knock-down 37 mm might be the answer.

16. Personal Equipment.

The American soldier has too much equipment. Observer's unit stripped down to 1 raincoat, 1 spoon, ammunition, rations, and water. U.S. Soldier will throw other equipment away in first stages of action, loading up with ammunition and rations. After a while he will turn up loaded down with Jap souvenirs and very little ammunition, rations or other equipment.

17. Jungle Suit.

The camouflaged jungle suit is a remarkably effective garment, both in respect to service ability and camouflage. A two piece or a drop set garment probably would be better.

\* \* \* \* \*

19. Tommy Gun. This weapon is valuable in jungle warfare. Should be retained at the rate of one per squad and one per platoon, being handled in each case by the unit leader.

20. Communications.


Communications were not a problem and in general were good. The wire had to be re-layed at least once a day since all lines were always cut by the Japs every night.

Division kept wire pushed to regiment.

Wire-laying parties had to be protected by an escort. Ordinary chain of events was for concealed Jap sniper who was almost always waiting to get one man of the party with his first shot, and then party set about to eliminate the sniper.

Communications personnel in the regiment are sufficient but armed escort must be provided from elsewhere.

\* \* \* \* \*



Notes on G-5 Conference with  
Col. Holland, a regimental  
commander, 37th Inf Div.,  
recently returned from S.M.P.

Undated  
(Dec. 1944)

Inf 11-IV

Extract:

3. Assault of Pill Boxes.

Pill boxes were knocked out principally by artillery and mortar  
fire. Some were taken by close in work with grenades but this procedure  
is too expensive in men killed since pill boxes are mutually supporting.

15. Jungle Tactics.

At dusk, assault units should drop back 50-60 yards from most  
advanced position. Japs will lie down mortars on this area.

The answer to the Jap defense is to blast him out with artillery  
and mortar and go in while he's groggy and mop up the position.


Japs organize the crest of hills about the same as we do; they  
use mutually supporting strong points organized on hills.

Used 24 hour light and scattered artillery fire to prevent the  
Japs sleeping. Observer's regiment used this device successfully and Japs  
captured in final assault were in pretty bad shape.

To combat Jap night patrols and night infiltration parties, at  
about 3 P.M. observer's regiment would start forming up a clover leaf, each  
of the legs being formed by one of the three provisional battalions  
organized for the purpose. Each battalion was organized for all-around de-  
fence with perimeters touching. Regimental CP was in center. As an SOP  
control measure, battalion commanders were required to make personal contact  
where perimeters touched. In case of night attack only men on the perimeters  
fired. Four-man foxholes were used, two men observing and two men sleeping  
or resting. In this type of defense selected men can be allowed to fire with-  
in the perimeter of position. They can fire easily from fox holes because  
fire would be delivered normally at a Jap near lip of fox hole and,  
consequently, upward.

In the jungle triangular formations in all echelons should be  
used at all times. In the advance triangularly disposed units can fight  
to the flanks pretty quickly. Units should break up into small columns  
in advance through the jungle, and keep off existing trails. Units which  
moved forward in one column invariably got strung out and got into trouble.

By authority of [unclear] dated 23 [unclear]



*[Handwritten signatures and scribbles]*  
#9  
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

Notes on G-5 Conference  
with Col. Holland, a  
regimental commander, 37th  
Inf Div., recently returned  
from SWP.

SWP

Undated

Inf 11-V

Extract:

\* \* \* \* \*

9. Night Operations. American troops in jungle do not operate at night. Observer does not believe that we can bring our troops to the state of combat efficiency necessary for successful night operations against the Japs.

\* \* \* \* \*

RESTRICTED  
UNCLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
DECLASSIFIED  
BY TAG PER  
9 D 112  
80 MAR 1948  
SECRET

#108  
~~RESTRICTED~~

*sch*

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Notes on G-3 Conference  
with Col. Holland, a  
regimental commander, 57th  
Inf Div., recently returned  
from SWP

SWP


Unrated

Inf 11-1

Extracts:

4. Cannon Company--Carrying Company.

The observer was offered a cannon company for his regiment but considered it useless in the jungle, requested a carrying company instead. He used his band, AF company and parts of his service company as carrying company. For this carrying task high-quality troops, courageously led, are required.



#111

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~