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Abstract: U.S. Army 7th Armored Division After Action Report, 5-16 April

1945, in Ruhr Pocket. Includes G-2 notes.

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
Classification: Unclassified; Approved for public release

AFTER ACTION REPORT.

7th Armored Div

5 - 16 April 45

RUHR POCKET



Upon learning that the Seventh Armored Division was to be committed in operations against the RUHR pocket, a pocket formed by the junction of the First and Ninth Armies at FADEREDEN, interest was shifted whole-


of energetic activity by the encircled enemy forces had been on the east side of the packet, where several formations, including the 130th Fz. Lehr Div., 116th Fz Div., and supporting infantry divisions had been gathered for an attempted breakout where the encircling forces were weakest. Fatimates, more or less concurrent with the division's employment, put the German forces at about 150,000. The enemy supply situation was expected to be relatively good, particularly in the line of munitions and vehicles, for the packet centered on the great MUHR industrial district which had long sustained the German war effort. Food supplies were unknown but as much of MESTPHALIA was under cultivation, for the military at least, it was believed to be fairly good.


The division closed in the new assembly area in the HALLENBERG(6280) - MEDEBACH(6889) region on 4 April and began preparations to attack northwest

PREPARATION in the corps some. Two plateons of A/87th Cev Pen Sq FOR ATTACK

News., were detached from Combat Commands "R" and "R" respectively and attached to Division Trains at \$8\$\$. The 400th and 440th Arm'D FA Battalions were released from Combat Command "R" at 133\$ when that command closed into the assembly area, and returned to the control of Division Artillery.

C. & 1/F/87th Cav Ren Eq Wees., was returned to Squadron control from Combat






ommand WER at \$8\$\$. Division Trains was given added protection by the attachment of D/203rd AAA Bn at 15\$\$\frac{1}{2}\$. Combat Command WER was reinforced by the attachment of 3/325th Inf Regt., at \$15\$\$\frac{1}{2}\$.

Field Order No. 10 was issued the night of 4 Abril. In ceneral, the First U.S. Army was to attack without delay with its YVIII and

III Corps to clear the area held by the termans south of the RUHR RIVER in the First Army some. The III Corps was to attack to the northwest on 5 April to clear the LARME RIVER on the south and the FIME RIVER on the north. The 9th Infartry Division was to have the wight or northern flank, the 99th Infantry Division on the left on southern sector and the Seventh Armored Division to attack in the center; destroying all enemy encountered. The attack was divided into several phases for the Seventh Armored Division. It was to open its attack on 5 april (-CCMA") with 3/395th Inf. Degt., 99th Inf. Div., attached to Combat Command "P". Combat Command "P" was to seize the general are in the vicinity of MINERALLEY (4384), Germany. After this had taken blade. Combat Command "P" would take the left of the sector and Combat Command """ the right, pushing on to our next objective, the secenal area morth of the CALTEY RIVER. The big plan of attack was to liquidate the Parre tooket of Germans contained in this area through the linkup of the First and Ninth Armies in the vicinity of PADERRORN.

when the division was committed to action on 5 April to the west of the little mountain town of OBERKITCHEN(A685), it was against a litter and determined enemy. After conject with the enemy had been established at \$645, solid contact was maintained throughout the day. Tight advances were



SIMMARY made and by the end or the period, Combat Command "B" had 5 APRIL occupied ALMERT(AASA) and had advanced on to the village of WIMMAUSEN (4384) and 1500 meters beyond on its southern flank, The day's action was characterized by a series of local counterattacks designed to deny us the favorable terrain that had been gained by difficult fighting. The enemy efforts were made primarily with infantry troops supported by a great mass of anti-armor weapons. An unusual feature was the enemy's constant use of his RUHR defense anti-aircraft weapons on ground troops. Almost all strong points were defended by these flak guns which were primary factors in delaying our advance. The use of these guns was very effective since they were invariably placed to deliver fire on our troops while the support armor was held up by road blocks.

At first light of day on 5 April, Combet Commend "B" steaked west through elements of the 9th Infantry Division with two infantry bettalions abresst. The 3rd bettalion of the 395th Inf. Regt., was on the right and

ATTACKS
and C/814th TD Bn., supported the attack. The objective was SCMALLENBERG(3883)
and the surrounding road net.

The 3rd Bn., of the 395th Inf Regt., crossed the LD at \$53\$ and advanced rapidly to a point east of WINKHAUSEN(4284) where they met strong resistance

3ED BN. OF at \$645. Hard fighting brought the bettalion to within a 395TH RECT.

few hundred yards of the town by the time darkness fell, when they dug in under heavy artillery and mortar fire.

After jumping off at \$650, the 48th Arm'd Inf. Bn., took ALMERT(4484) in the face of direct fire from assault guns by 1960. The attack was continued west through the woods on the High ground north of ALMERT. WINKHAUSEN was by-ALMERT TAKEN

passed to the south and the high ground (£184) north of GRAFSCHAFT resched in spite of direct fire from esseult guns, morters, sutematic wespons and small arms. B/A8th Arm'd Inf Bn., in a flanking movement, moved into position south of GRAFSCHAFT.

At 1745, the Germans launched the first of a series of counterettacks, using one tank and about 20 infantrymen and advancing from the north on

THE ENEXY WINKHAUSEN. This attack was repulsed without loss.

OUNTERATIACKS

One hour later about 75 enemy with strong artillery and morter support counterattacked the elements of the 45th Arm'd Inf Sm., from the west and forced them to withdraw about 400 yards to another defensive position. At 193 about a company of infantry, attempting to take the high ground to the mortheast of WINKHAUSEN, were caught by our artillery and at least two thirds destroyed.

The 36th Arm'd Inf Bn., and B/814th TD Bn(- 1 plat) was attached

ATTACHMENTS to Combat Command "B" from Combat Command "R" at 1366,
and occupied defensive positions in the vicinity of OBERKIBCHEN(4484) after
relieving 2/47th Inf Regt., at 1666.

During 5 Arril, Combat Command "A" remained attached to the 9th Inf Division. Combat Command "R", in division reserve, moved to a new assembly area in the vicinity of NEW ASTENBERG closing in at 1636. As for Division

CCMAN Artillery, in support of the days operations, the 43/th had DIVARTI been placed in direct support of Combat Command "R"; the 440th in general support, prepared to support Combat Command "" when committed; the 400th in direct support of the 3rd Bn., of the 395th Inf. Regt; and the 489th was attached to and supporting Combat Command "A" to the north on their detached mission.



On 6 April saw a continuation of the flerce resistance that had been put up against the Seventh on the previous day. Combat Command "B" was


SUMMARY Strengthened by the attachment of the 87th Gav. Ron. Sq. 6-APRIL Mecs., (-B), at \$755 and continued to attack to seize WINKHAUSEN,
GRAFSCHAFT, NEDER SURPE(4366) and GLIEDORF(4085). Patrols in HOLTHAUSEN were vigorously counterattacked and forced to withdraw after undergoing the first coordinated artillery fire that forces of the division had experienced in some time. The identification of numerous spearate units fighting as infantry, pointed to the fact that the enemy was using anything in uniform as infantry at a point nearest its existing location. At the end of the day, the division's forces were on high ground to the west and northwest of SCHMALLEMBERG (3884) in position to attack that town.

The outflanked town of GRAFSCHAFT was subjected to a terrific artillery TOT and taken by the 48th Armid Inf Bn early on 6 April. Re-

GRAFSCHAFT sistence, in the form of small arms and machine gun fire, TAKES was moderate. From GRAFSCHAFT, troops of the 48th, supported by tanks from the 31st Tank Bn., pushed on to the northwest and eventually reached a position on high ground to the west of MEDER SURPE(4386).

The 38th Armid Inf Bn., was relieved of the defense of the OBERKIRCHEN region by the 87th Cav Rom Sq Mecs., (-B). At first light on 6 April, the

HEDER SORPE 36th jumped off following an artillery preparation on SECURED
HEDER SORPE and by \$650 had secured the town. A strong patrol of infantry
was sent into HOLTHAUSEN to the merthwest, but before supporting tanks could
be brought up to the town, a coordinated enemy counterattack of infantry supported by at least two Tiger tanks, the Secured it to withdraw to HEDER SORPE.



The attack on WINKHAUSEN By 3/395th Inf Regt., continued on 6 April after an artillery TOT on the town. The fighting was bitter and not until


AND CLIEDORF continued on to attack GLIEDORF (4085). K. Co., passing through the 38th A.m. d Inf Bn., to enter the town at 1966, followed by I Co., which had been forced to detour from the southern route by strong resistance.

Combat Command "A", on 6 April, remained attached to the 9th Infantry Division. Combat Command "R" remained in Division reserve and moved forward CC"A" to a new area in the vicinity of OBTRKIRCHEN(4585). Three tanks CC"R" of D/40th Tank Bn., were placed on a special mission(under 9th Inf control) guarding buildings in HALLENBERG containing captured signal equipment, and two other tanks from D/40th Tank Bn., were put on a similar mission guarding a building in the same city containing V-2 bomb parts.

Fanatical defense of every inch of the ground was again in order for 7 April. The day opened with two determined and quite sizeable counter-

SUMMARY attacks on GI IEDORF both of which were repulsed with the T-APRIL
enemy forces drawing northwards towards FREDEBURG. Combat Command was
made a bitterly contested entry into HOLTHAUSEN and Combat Command was
took SCHMALLENBERG(3884), the largest town in the area, against moderate
to heavy resistance. Once inside the town, the troops were aced with the
dual problem of combatting florce resistance and poor observation caused
by the make of buildings burning from our own artillery and air preparations. The blinding smoke concealed many weapons which continued to deliver a heavy volume of fire and the 48th Arm'd Inf. Bn., was obliged to clear
the town house by house

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The 48th Arm'd Inf Bn., supported by B/Slet Tank Bn., under Combat Compand "B", maneuvered into position to attack SCHMALLENBERG from the

SCHWALLENBERG east and southeast on 7 April. C/48th made a wide envelopment through the woods to a position south of the town while A/48th moved through the woods and stopped east of the town to soordinate its attack with "C" Company. The two companies gumped off at 1116 after two battalions of artillery had hit the town with a ten minute preparation. C/48th entering the town from the south was met with small arms and machine gum fire from the south. A/48th met withering small arms, antitank and self propelled gum fire as it entered the town from the east. Just prior to their entry, four P-47's had bombed and strafed SCHMALIEN BERG but it was still found necessary to fight from block to block to clear the town. The Germans finally gave up after the combined assault of artillery, tanks and infantry at 1956 and 360 PW's were taken. The 87th Cav Ron Sq Mecs., occupied SCHMALLENBERG during the night 7-8 April, relieving the 48th Arm'd Inf Bn., who pushed on to secure the high ground about 1,000 yards northwest of the town.

Early in the morning of 7 April 3/395th received two counterattacks against their position in GLIsDORF. The first at #315 consisting of an

COUNTERATTACKS undetermined number of infantry supported by one REPULSED tank, was repulsed without dosing any ground. At \$\infty\$500, another counterattack was filunched on GLEIDORF from the north with five tanks and an estimated 250 infantrymen. By \$715, the attack had been repelled with four enemy tanks damaged and 108 prisoners taken. Heavy resistance provented attempts of 3/395th to gain the high ground to the northwest of GLEIDORF

-19-



until 1700, at which time the 3rd Bn., had moved 500 yards northwest to the high ground and by 1900 had cleared the woods directly northeast of the town. C/31st Tank Bn., superted the operation.

A/87th Cav Ron Sq Mecz., was attached to Combat Command " " at 1000.

At 1200, the Co bat Command became operational when it assumed responsibility

CC"R" BLOWLS for the right flank of the division. The plan was for OFLEATI WAL

TF ORIFITA, commanded by Lt. Col. MARCUS N. GRIFFIN, to seize and secure modefination. The attack developed at 1230 when C/38th attack northwest to secure the commanding terrain in the vicinit of 4386 and envelop modefinate which 3/3eth launched its frontal attack at 1420 from positions near man. R 3-MMs. "C" Company made comparatively slow progress due to the nature of the terrain and a line of dug-in enemy infantry. "3" received a heavy concentration of artillery and northr fire but progressed favorably. By mightfall, the two forces had joined enside the town and had been reinforced by 1//40th Tank ms., and 1/8/81ath Tan. A/38th was now ordered to pass through midfly the and secure the town of middle 238). This attack was resisted principally by small arms fire and the town was taken at /145 on 8 April.

Division as of \$624\$6(-5/17th and A/814th which were to be employed only

on order of the CG, To Corps, and reverted to control of the 7th Armored Division at the time of their release. Compat Co. and "A" moved from their positions in the vicinity of to the an assembly area in

made and the



the vicinity of HOHELEYE (5085), where they were placed in division reserve. At 1299, the 489th Arm'd FA Bn., and A/203rd AAA Bn., were released from attachment to Combat Command A" and attached to Division Artillery. They were placed in general support as was the 809th FA Bn., (155 H) which was attached to the Seventh Armored Division at 1599.

A continued defense was encountered on 8 Arril, though not to quite the same marked degree as in the past. Combat Command "B" was able to admine to seize the towns of OBRINGHAUSEN (3886) and ABBINGHOF (3887) against moderate resistance in the form of small arms and machine gum fire. Combat Command "R"

SUBMARY 8 APRIL entered the town of FREDERORG(4088) and, encountering fanatically minded troops, was obliged to clear the town in house to house fighting that was still in progress when the day ended. A good many Volksturmers were found fighting in the towns in the area; they were not bitterenders.

Situated in a valley, the town of FREDEBURG constituted the next block in the road north. It was dominated by high ground to the northeast, and it was to secure this that A \pm C/36th Arm'd Inf Bn., under CombatCommand "R",

FIGHTING IN launched an attack at \$85685 April. The progress was slow in the face of stubborn enemy resistance in the form of machine gun, small arms and mortar fire but by lills the high ground overlooking FREDEBURG was taken. "A" and "C" companies then regrouped and prepared to seize the town in conjunction with "B" company and A/40th lank Bn., FREDEB. RG had been hit the day before from the air, and a heavy artillery preparation preceded the

7TH ARMORED DIVISION

AFTER ACTION REPORT



APRIL, 1945

PROBLEM OF THE ADJUST OF THE

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HTADQUARTERS 7TH ARMORED DIVISION APO 257 U.S. ARMY

SUBJECT: After Action Peport, 7th Armored Division, Period 1-30 April, 1945.

: Adjutant General, Washington, 25, D.C. (Thru Channels).

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

The first three days of Arril found the Seventh Armored Division, under III Corps, First U. S. Army, centered about the town of FRANKENAU, Germany, guarding the EDEF SEE DAM and the bridges over the RDEE RIVER. It had come to a temporary halt one hundred and forty-eight miles from its starting point after spearheading the advance of the First U. S. Army in their breskout from the RFMAGEN bridgehead. At 1530 on 1 April, the Ninth U. S. Army and the First U. S. Army linked forces at LIPSTAT, thus completely encircling the vital RUHR industrial district. It was expected that the encircled forces would attempt to open an escape gap and First Army G-2 called the MEDERACH-WINTER WRG area, one of the two most likely breakout points. At 1700 on 2 April, Combet Command "A" was attached to the VII Corps for employment in the vicinity of MEDEBACH to counter this threat. The Seventh Armored Division moved on 4 April to a new ascembly area in the vicinity of HALLENUURG-SACHSENEERG-FURSTENBERG. The III Corps was to attack to the northwest to clear the area bounded by the LEDY SIVER on the south and the RUHR EIVER on the north. The Seventh Armored was to attack in the center between the 9th Infantry and the 99th Infantry Divisions destroying all enemy encountered. Liquidation of the PUPP nocket was the final objective. Between 5 April and 16 April, despite mountainous terrain. which greatly favored the Germans, the Seventh Armored drove to the heart of his defenses. The part of the mocket they were to reduce, cassed to exist at \$845 on 16 April. 37,476 prisoners were taken and processed in the drive which ended in a mass surrender of the Cerman L III Panzer Corps.

3-4-448-7-7

The commanding generals and their staffs of the LUXYI Corps, the LIII Penzer Corps, 9th Panzer Division, 116th Penzer Division, 180th Infantry Division and the 190th Infantry Division were made prisoner in the last four days. Over 24,000 Allied prisoners of wer were liberated. The amount of enemy meterial captured or destroyed would have equipped six to eight divisions. At 1249 on 17 April, the Seventh Armored was detached from III Corps and attached to V Corps. The division now moved from WESTPHALIA to a new assembly area in BRUNSSICK near the town of GOTTINGEN. When it had completely closed in on 18 April, it moved into SHAEF reserve. At 1200 on 22 April, the Seventh was released from attachment to V Corps, remaining in SHAEF reserve but reverting to First U. S. Army control. From 18 April to 28 April, extensive maintenance of equipment and rehabilitation of personnel was carried out. At 1200 on 25 April, the Seventh was attached to the WVIII Airborne Corps, operating under the Pritish 2nd Army. On 29 April the division started to move to a new assembly area in the wicinity of CMIE, Germany and prepared for future operations to the north in the corps some. The next move would take it east of the TIBT in a dash to the Baltic and a linkup with the Russians on the Clat plains of Worklingurg. The situation was rapidly moving towards a smaghing cli-BSX.



The EDER SEE DAM, the dam with the largest water capacity in Europe, after its capture by the Seventh Armored Division.



BREATHING SPELL AT EDER SEE

The first three days of April found the Seventh Armored Division centered about the town of FRANKEMAU in the province of KUR-HESSE, GERMANY.

In the five days just previous (26 March - 30 March), the feventh had spearheaded the advance of the U.S. First Army in their break-out from the Remagen Bridgehead. After overnunning the northern half of NAS AU and a large part of KUR-HESSE, it had seized the EDER SEE DAM and bridge over the EDER RIVER and had come to a temporary halt one hundred and forty-eight miles from the starting point. Here the division went into an assembly area in the immediate vicinity of the dam, maintaining defensive positions and enforcing civilian control measures in its assigned zone.

The Seventh Armored Division was under III Corps, 1st United States Army. The order of battle was:

PROBER OF BATTLE

MALI TALL TALL

17th mank Battalion
23rd Arm'd Inf. Bn.
489th Arm'd TA Bn.
A/Pl4th TD Pn.
B/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn.
1/A/203rd AAA Bn.

DIVISION ASTULERY A(-)/203rd AAA Bn.

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

31st Tank Battalion 48th Arm'd Inf. Bn. 434th Arm'd FA Bn. C/814th TD Bn. A/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn. 1/8/203rd AAA Bn.

DIVISION TRAINS
129th Ord M. Bn.
77th Med.Bn.Armid.
AA6th QM Tr Tr Co.
3067th QM Tr Co.
A/07th Cav Ren Sq Mecs
D/203rd AAA Bn.

COMBAT COMMAND "R"

40th Tank Bat alion
38th Arm'd Inf. Rn.
440th Arm'd FA Rn.
400th Arm'd FA Rn.
C/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn.
B/814th TD Sn.
B(-) & 2/C/203rd AAA En.
DIVISION TROOPS
33rd Arm'd Engr. En.
87th Cav Ron Sq Mecs.(-)
203rd AAA Rn (-)
814th TD En (4)



The units stached to the division were the 203rd AAA Bn., 814th TD Bn., 400th Arm'd FA Bn., 446th QM Tr Tr Co., and the 3967th QM Tr Co.

While during this period no line was held by the enemy in the Seventh's sector, the division troops still contacted many small groups of Germans.

First Some of these groups voluntarily surrendered while others fired a few shots before being taken and evacuated to our FW case. All these prisoners were strapplers, strays, or furlouched men. One known war oriminal was captured 1 April. At AFFOLDERN near the TREE SEE, the Fazis had a small concentration camp (400 men) for foreign workers who tried to escape from Germany. It was the scene of the usual beatings, sordid living conditions and semi-starvation diet and was min by one PICFAND WINTELL, a member of both the TS and Gestapo. Nith the arrival of the Americans, Herr MATZEL heatily lost his uniform and attenuted to flee in civilian clothes. He was picked up by one of his former charges and brought to the CIC head-counters. Here, MATZEL, a man of about fifty-ith greying hair and a cold smeeting face wept bitterly when he was separated from his wife.

on 2 Anril, Fraulein MARTHA KICIS, a mousey little secretary formerly in the school department of the city of AACHEN, voluntarily gave the in-

AACHEN
OFFICIALS formation that a number of that city's employees including herself were living in MINIMPEN, GENERALY. She gave a lead to her included authorizing the MINIMPEN, upon being questioned, told the following story: In Sentember, 1944, all the city offices of MACHEN moved to MINIMPENALLY. Then, as the Americans approached CLOCAE, they again moved, this time to four villages, CULLECHAUSE, ALLI , CHLICZ and L. I HAME.



The postal department and city archives went to F ANKERAT. This ghost overnment was supposed to finction till the city records were straightened out and all evacuees cared for. At noon on 30 March, the Americans were in FRANCIAN and the newest government-in-exile quietly ceased to function. The Seventh C.I.'. told all its members to stay put till ther could be evacuated back to AACHEN and sealed all of its records.

Combat Command "A" had been placed on a three hour elect as of 312265.

Warch for attachment to the VII Corps and employment in the general REPRINCIP-

ATTACHMENTS
1 - 2 APPIL

to the VII Comps as of 1725 hours and at the same time, Combat Command MAN

was placed on a two hour alert for attachment to VII Comps. CombatCommand MAN

had been further attached to the 104th Infantry Division and, moving to join

them via TIMESHAUSEN(8176) and GEISMAR(7976), closed in in an assembly area

mean MARBERACH(8789). B/87 had been attached to Command MAN at MAN on

the second. The day before two platoons of A/87 had been attached to Combat


Command MAN and Combat Command MAN respectively from Division Trains.

st 16/10 on 3 April, the Seventh Armored Division was relieved of responsibility for the security of the EDTR SEE DAM and the bridges over the EDER

14th CAV. TAKES RIVER by the 14th Cavalry Group (-18 Sq). C and 1/F/87 OVER 7th SECTOR
were attached to CC "R" at \$8\$\$. 998th Engineer Treadway B=fige Company

(-1 plat) was attached to the division at 15\$\$\$. The 300th Engineer(C) Battalion was placed in direct support of the Seventh.


At \$324\$\$\text{f}\$ the awaited operations instructions were issued. The Seventh Armored Division was to move on 4 April from its present assembly area to the west in the vicinity of HALLENBURG(6250), CACHENBERG(7381) FURSTERBERG(7686)





and MERENACH (APPR). They were to be prepared to operate recommendations or Division order, into the southern half of the RHPR pocket.





3 APRIL - 7 APRIL

Combat Command "A" had been placed on a three hour alert as of 32205

March 45 for attachment to VII Corps and employment in the general MEDERACH-


SUMMARY HALLENBERG area. At 1530 on 1 April, the 2nd Armored Division of the Ninth United States Army and the 3rd Armored Division of the First United States Army linked forces at LLPESTADT just northwest of PADERTORN.

They had thus completely encircled the RUHR, dealt Germany's industrial effort a staggering blow, and trapped an undetermined number of Germans. It was to be expected that the encircled forces would attempt to omen an escape map and the lst Army C-2 called the LLEPSTADT-PADERFORN area and the MEDEPACH-WINTERRERG area, the two most likely breakout points. PW information seemed to indicate that not only did the Cermans intend to breakout of the pocket but also that the area west of MEDEPACH was to be the scene of their attempt. At 1700 on 2 Arril Combat Command "A" was attached to the VII Corps and in turn to the 104th Infantry Division. Enemy forces identified in this area were elements of the 30th Enzer-lehr, 3rd Panzer Grenadier and the 176th Infantry Division, Volksgrenadier.

Combat Command "A" was organized in three task forces, Task Force
WEMPLE, under Lt. Col. JOHN P. WEMPLE, CO of the 17th Tk Bn.; Task Force

TASK FORCE SHEA, commanded by Lt. Col. ROBERT L. RHEA, CO of the 23rd COMPOSITIO:

Armid Inf. Bn.; and Task Force DAILEY commanded by Major THOMAS ".DAILEY, Executive Officer of the 17th Tk. Bn. Their composition was as follows:





TF TEMPLE 17th Tk Bn (less 2 Cos (M) and D/17 less 1 plat) B/23rd Arm'd Inf. Bn. 1/A/814th TD Bn.

TF RHEA 23rd Arm'd Inf. On. (less 2 Cos) C/17th Tk Bn. 1/D/17th Tk Bn. 1/A/814th TD 3n. 1/R/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn. 1/7/33rd Arm'd Engr. Bn.

TF DAILEY B/17th Tk Bn. C/23rd Arm dInf. Bn. D/17th Tk Bn.(less 2 plats) A/814th D Bn. (less 2 plats) 1/B/3rd Arm'd Engr. Bn.

At 2000 on 2 April, Combat Command "A" began a movement from the vicinity of ELLERSHAUSEN to an assembly area in the vicinity of MEDERACH(6789),

GERMANY. The column moved very slowly because of rain and poor MO VEMENT visibility. The darkness of the night, almost continuous down-TEDEPACH pour, and intermittent artillery fire made the selection of positions in the new assembly area a difficult job but by 0.545 on 3 April, the entire command had closed and relief of the 1st Bn. of the 415th Infanty was effected. Germans had made an unsuccessful counterattack on this battalien the day previous.

with operations instructions issued by the commanding In accordance officer of Combat Command "A", Colonel ANDREW J. ADAMS, Combat Command "A" was

to attack in conjunction with the 415th Inf. Hegt. at \$936 ATTACK ON GLINDFELD on 3 April to seize and secure GLINDFELD(6590) and R.J. 6589, and establish a security screen. TF WEMPLE and TF RHEA were given the mission of accomplishing these objectives, while TF DAILEY was to move to MEDERACH and establish closein security in that area. The 489th Armid FA Bn., attached to Combat Command "A" was displaced forward to fire preparatory fires on the objectives and to afford other fires on call. The attack was to be made with infantry mounted on In spite of a heavy ground hase at first light on 3 April, there were tanks. eather by 1930, the time for the attack. The good prospects for fam

-6-



attack started as planned and while the assault platoons received a few rounds of small arms fire from a heavily wooded hill on their right flank as they across the open alightly rising terrain towards GIITTUTED, 1 Km distant, the fire ceased as the tanks reached the edge of the woods and eight enemy riflemen surrendered. The wooded hill had been seized and secured by 1\$17 and the tanks were firing on enemy infantry in GLINDFELD. The right platoon moved around to the right of the hill, entered the town at 1\$4\$, and by 11\$\$, GLINDFELD had been cleared. One German officer and twenty-seven FW were taken prisoner.

TF DATERY was now assigned the task of taking the town of KUSTELRERG (6192) in commetion with the 3rd Pattalion of the 145th Infantry Regiment.

THE SAILEY moved to carry out this mission at 1745 on 3

TAKEN

April but direct fire from AT guns, tanks, and SP guns was encountered,

he was unable to move his tanks into the town until after dark. KUSTEI BERG

was finally entered and secured at 1936.

Operations Instructions were issued at 2200 on 3 April siving TF GRAPLE the mission of moving their positions at MEDERACH to KUSTELBERG to occupy

OPERATIONS and defend the north section of the town. They were to INSTRUCTIONS block all entrances to the area, destroy all direct fire weapons capable of firing into the area, and prepare to continue the advance to the northwest. TF DAILEY was given a like mission, occurying and defending the south section of KUSTELBERG. TF RHEA was to secure MEDEBACH, MEDELON(6586) and to maintain contact with elements of the 60th Infantry Regiment. At 2400 3 April, Combat Command MAP was detached from the 104th Infantry Division and attached to the 9th Infantry Division.

-7-

4 April wes the most critical day of this entire operation for Combat Command "A". The original plan was for TF WEMPLE, upon reaching KUSTKLPERG,

SUMM ARY to attack and secure Hill 693, one kilemeter west of town and then seize GRONERACH(5893), two kilometers to the west of that. TF RHEA was to pass through KUSTELBERG and take HIIDFELD(5894), about 3 kilometers northwest. TF DAILEY was to remain in KUSTELBERG prepared to assist either of the other two. However, the sector essigned TF WEMPLE lay flat and open between high hills. The German artillery observers had perfect observation of all our movements and took full advantage. TF MEMPLE encountered heavy anti-tank. morter, and artillery fire and were forced to reorganize a short distance beyord KUNTELEGRG. It had become apparent that the final attack on CRONFRACH would have to wait on TF RHEA's seizure of HILDFELD and the high ridge to the north. Once this was accomplished, a coordinated attack was launched by both task forces and the defense of GRONZBACH collapsed. A division order of the 176th Infantry Division captured on the next day revealed the Germans had an important defense line running between the two towns and that newly reinforced German forces were attacking us at the same time the Combat Command "A" attack was launched.

fire on KUSTELBERG and the area just to the west. The sky was overcast with

INITIAL ATTACK occasional rain and snow flurries. The terrain was ON GRONEBACH open except for a short distance over a wooded hill and while the ground was soft it could be crossed. The assault force was composed of two platoons of tanks abreast and a platoon of infantry following each tank platoon in their half-tracks. The assault tank platoon on the left had one of its tanks

knocked out by an enemy SP gun at #920 but this in turn was destroyed by another tank in the platoon a few seconds later. The infantry platoon following the tanks became somewhat disorganized because of the heavy artillery, mortar and SP fire but the tanks went on into the wooded area Filling several enemy infantrymen. As the tanks reached the open area on the other side, two more were knocked out by an enemy SP gun which was in turn knocked out by the remaining tank in that platoon. The other platoon, meanwhile, had been unable to flank Hill 693 on the right because of an unexpectedly steep bank and had been pulled back behind the left platoon. It was now decided to reorganize TF TEMPLE and to wait for TF RHEA to take HILDER D.


By 1210 TF RHEA had taken the town of HIIDFRID and was ordered to assist
TF WEVPIR in taking GRONETACH by moving a task force down on the town's back-

door from the north. TF WE PLE was to move in from the east ATTACK ON GROWERACH and south. At 1600 all plans had been completed and the coordinated attack was made. By 11620 the twin forces were on the objective and after firing a few rounds of small arms, the forces holding the town gave up quickly. At 1700 COONEDACH was completely cleared and the task forces ready to move on to new objectives. TF DATLEY, meanwhile, had followed TF RHEA through HILDFELD and had attacked northwest, seizing MINDERSEELD at 1945 against heavy artillery, anti-tank and mortar fire.

Operations Instructions for the next day were issued at $\emptyset4215\%$ April. Combat Command "A" reinforced by the 1st Bettalion, 47th Infantry Esciment

OPERATIONS
INSTRUCTIONS
5 - APRIL (5499), ASSI CHARGER (5401), and POUCHEAUSEN (5803). TF

PHEA was to take MIENER DECLARGED and ASSINGUALISEN and be prepared to continue



to ELLERINGHAUSEN(5603). TF WEMPLE was to initially follow TF RHEA north to WIEMERINGHAUSEN and then turn southwest to RHUNSKAPPEL. TF Dailey was to make a reconnaissance of routes north to BEUCHHAUSEN and be prepared to either assist TF RHEA or attack REUCHHAUSEN on Combat Command orders.

Attacking northwest from NIEDERSWELD towards WIEMERI GSHAUSEN, at \$866

TF RHEA was met with heavy AT fire and a road block in the vicinity of 5597

WIEMERINGHAUSEN defended by both SP and S/A fire. The enemy employed

ASSINGHAUSEN eight SP guns to bolster his defenses here. After clearing out the resistance, the task force advanced to within 200 yards southeast
of WIEMERI GSHAUSEN where it encountered heavy 20mm fire. It was not until

1315 that the objective was taken and consolidated. Continuing northwards,

TF RHEA, pushed on to ASSINGHAUSEN which was taken by 1567 against moderate
enemy resistance.

By 1730, TF WEMPLE was in position on the high ground west of WIEMERINGSHAUSEN to attack south and seize BRUNSKAPPEL. The terrain was such

DRUNKAPPEL that the tanks could attack due south across country over the creat of the hill and into within about 600 yards of the town. Then, it was necessary for the tanks to go west and enter the town on the main north - south road; the vehicles could not go down the steep grade and directly into town. The road was the only approach. The tanks were to attack, two platoons abreast with the infantry advancing dismounted. The wemple moved out in the assault at 1800 and as soon as it reached the creat of the hill, it drew heavy AT and tank fire from the town. One of the tanks on the right flank was knocked out and the rest pulled back in defilade position and fired at possible gun positions in the town. Meanwhile artillery fire

infantry from the 47th Infantry was attached to the task force to assist with the attack. The original infantry was reorganized, the attached inwish the attack. The original infantry was reorganized, the attached inwish fantry was in place by 2645, and at that time the finalmessult on the town was launched. An intensive artillery shelling with white phosphorus set several buildings on fire while, under cover of darkness, our infantry closed in on the town from the north and east. Some small a ms and a tomatic measure fire was received as the troops entered but the resistance was soon overcome and by 2226, it was possible for the infantry to lead the tanks into the town to consolidate the position a destablish blocks.


As it was a black moonless night when ERGUNCKAP To was entered, it was not until morning that all the snipers were eliminated. The tanks and SP guns that had held up the troops initially, escaped by the south as the infantry was entering the northern fringe of houses.

On 6 April, TF DATIEY, to which was attached "C"Company of the 27th Infantry Regirent and one platoon of HDH Troop of the 87th Cav. Ren. So. Macs., continued the sitack from ELLITTECHAUSER, moving out at \$89.5. A

6 APRIL heavily defended road block at 5506 was reduced at \$635.

At \$6936 OI SPERC was attacked and seized with only small resistance encountered. At 1366, RIGGE was taken in the face of moderate antillery and mortar fire and considerable small arms fire. At 1766, ACTEDID(5108) fell where resistance in the form of basooks men sitting in trees had been overcome. TF 'EMPLE moved out from BRUNCKA-PEL at \$996, set up a road block at 5302 to counter a threat of armor from the west, and secured ACCINGUALSEN.

TF 'HEA moved out from WILLMERINGHAUSEN at \$816, followed TF BAH EY through



OLSBERG(5307) and BIGGE(5107) and during such at BIGGE, attacked and secured HELMERINGHAUSEN(5105) at 1330.

Combet Command "A" remained on a defensive status in the zone
HELMTRINGHAUSEN - ANTFELD - OLSBERG and ASSINGHAUSEN until relieved

1

TO 7TH the 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment at DETURNS TO 7TH draws April. On the previous night at 1936 Combat Command "A" had been relieved of its attachment to the 9th Infantry Division. A/814th TD Bn. was attached to the 47th Inf. Regt. in the vicinity of OLSBERG and B/17th Tk Bn. was attached to the same organization in the vicinity of ANTFELD at \$750 on 7 April. The rest of Combat Command "A" moved on order of the 7th Armored Division to a new assembly area in the vicinity of WINTERHERG(5689), LANGEWISE(5185) and HOHELEYE(5083).

A commendation for the "battle efficiency of Combat Command "A"!
Was received a short time after it returned to the Seventh Armored Di-

OMMENDATION vision in a letter sent from Major General LOUIS


FROM 9TH INFANTRY
DIVISION A. CRAIG, CG of the 9th Inf. Div, to Major General

eral ROBERT W. HASBROUCK, CB of the Seventh Armored Division. The following is an extract from the letter:

"This unit, under its commander, Col. ADAMS, lent their fullest energetic support to the quick completion of a mission that would have taken much longer without its assistance. At no time, in the experience of the undersigned, has there been a more satisfactory association of armored units with the infantry of the 9th Division. The mobility and aggressiveness of the 7th Armored Division Combat Command were outstanding.
"The assistance is greatly appreciated, the combat effectiveness of this unit is highly respected, and you personally are worthy of high commendation for the development of the experience and training demonstrated."



German refugees living in cave at FREDEBURG. Part of a group of 3,000 Germans who spent five days and six nights in cave prior to entry of town. The town was taken by the 7th Armored Division on 8 April.



attack, but the enemy continued a tenacious defense. A ter bitter house to house fighting, portions of the town were still in enemy hands at 213¢ when operations were suspended for the night. 20mm flak gum fire had been r ceived from the high ground to the northwest of the town and this high ground and the parts of the town still in enemy hands were subjected to TOT's by one artillery during the night. The remainder of FREDEBURG was cleared on the morning of 9 April with little further opposition.


Shortly after the entry of the 58th Armored Infantry Battalion into FREDEBURG, Lt. Col. JOHN E. BULAND, Division Surgeon, went forward to investi-

CAVE AT FREDERUNG
FREDERUNG
FREDERUNG
FREDERUNG for five days and six nights. Three thousand citizens of FREDERUNG
had ried to this cove in hills above their town to escape the air and artillery bombardment as the Americans approached. Col. BOIAND walked through
a narrow gate and found five large caverns, terraced and filled with staw.

In the thick darness, pushed back here and there by an occasional, inadequate
candle, he found these people sitting side by each on the floor, packed so
tightly it was almost impossible for them to either walk or move. The stale
smell was sickening. He chased the momen and babies out only to have a small
artillery liaison plane fly overhead at precisely that moment when they emerged into the scalight after nearly a week's confinement. They took one look
and fled back in mortal terror.

3/395th Inf Regt., moved out at \$745 to secure the high ground to the morthwest of GLEIDORF and shortly afternoon had cleared the area. From the

OPERATIONS





position it supported by fire Combat Command "R": a sault on FREDEBURGand the attack on OBRIEGHAUSEN by B/48th Armd. Inf. Bn. OBRIEGHAUSEN was taken by B/48th against negligible opposition, after an artillery TOT had been placed on the town. The 48th Armd Inf Bn was placed in combat command reserve at 1400. The 23rd Armd Inf Bn had been attached to Combat Command "B" from Combat Command "A" at 1200 and 5/895th Inf Regt. transferred to attachment to Combat Command "R" at 2000. The 87th Cav Ron Sq Mecs(-B) was attached to Combat Command "B" at 1899 and "B" Troop later attached at 1845.

Combat Command "B" organised three task forces and continued operations. By 1500 the following task forces were formed in their res areas:

CC"B" 's Task Forces

TE	BE	Ł	TY	•

A/31st Tk Bn(-) Mortar Platoon/Slat Tk Bn Ren Plat/Slat Tk Bn B/23rd Armd Inf Bn 1/C/814th TD Bn 2/A/ 33rd Armd Engr Bn

TY EALL BUSCH

B/Slat Th Bn S Assualt Guns/Slat Tk Bn S Assault Guns/Slat Tk Bn C/3lat Tk Bn C/25rd Arad Inf Bn 1/C/814th TD Bn 1/A/83rd Armd Engr Bn

TP RHBA

Hq & Hq Co/23rd Armd Inf Bn(-) A 23rd Armd Inf Bn 1/C/814th Tk Bn 3/A/35rd Armd Eng Bn


TF Beaty attacked EBBINGHOF at 1839, and by 1930 the town and high ground 1,000 yards to the west had been taken and the task force consolidated for the night. TF ERLENBUSCH and TF RHEA moved into new assembly areas.

Combat Command "A" (-B/17th Tk Bn) and A/814th TD Bn) remained in division reserve to be employed only on order of the Commanding General, III Corps.

CC"A" The Division Artillery organized for combat as follows: AND

"DIV ARTY434th Armd FA Bn in direct support of Combat Command "B",





440th Armd FA Bm im direct support of Combat Command "R", 400th Armd FA Bm in direct support 3/395th Imf Regt., and 489th Armd FA Bm and 800th FA Bm (168H) were in general support.

On 9 April, the enemy's actions were more varied than on the previous days. Combat Command "R" after completing the eccupation of FREDEBURG was able to move westward to occupy the village of HEMINGHAUSEN and reach MAILAR (3690), strongly defended by infantry supported by tanks and self-propelled weapons. Progress in this sector was slowed by a smoke screen that the enemy

BURNARY Laid in the valley down which our forces were operating, blotting out everything till noon. The enemy defenses in the OBER BERNDORF (3687) - ARPE (3388) -KOBHENRODE (3089) areas were not well organised and Combat Command "B" occupied this area without too much effort.

Perhaps the defense of this sector did not seem too profitable to the enemy as his position had already been compromised by the advances of friendly troops operating to our south. At this end of the day the division had established a general cost-west line from MAHAR to KOBHENRODE.

Task Force Wolf (Combat Command WR") considing of B/40th Tk Bn, 1 squad 2/C/83rd Armd Engr. Bn and 2/B/814th TD En, was organized in the evening of

TP WOLFE /8 April and ordered to pass through FREDEBERG on 9 April.

The task force moved out at first light on 9 April and moving through

FREDEBERG, piebed up B/S8th Armd Inf Bn. The infantrymen mounted the tanks

and the force proceeded towards HEMINGHAUSEN (3789). Progress was slow, in
peded by road blocks and a smoke-screen. In the first two hours, five un
defended road blocks, consisting of felled trees, rubble, destroyed vehicles



and mines were encountered. The enemy filled the valley that contained the route of advance with a thick smoke screen that reduced visibility to zero, further delaying the attack. Active resistance increased in intensity in the afternoon and by nightfall TF WOLFE had reached MAILAR (3690) and was opposed by infantry, tanks and SP fire.

Meanwhile TF GRIFFIN (38th Armd Inf Bn(-B), A/40th Tk Bn, 1/C/83rd Armd Engr Bn, and B/814th TD Bn(-)) advanced at 1616 along axis FREDERERG (4088)

OTHER - EBBINCHOF (3887) - BERGHAUSEN (3688) - NEDERBERNDORF (3489)

OPERATIONS - MENKHAUSEN (\$591). This force also encountered a series of undefended road blocks similiar to those encountered by TF WOLFE. The attack of this column continued slowly in the face of small arms, machine gum, and mortar fire until resching BERGRAUSEN where poor roads brought it to a standard till. The engineers repaired the roads, and the attack was pushed forward in the face of increasing resistance. By the end of the day, the task force occupied positions on the southern edge of MENEHAUSEN. Task Force BROWN (40th Tk Bn(-A,B,1/D) and 1 sq/c/S3rd Armd Engr Bn) moved through FREDEBERG to the vicinity of EBBINGHOF as combat command reserve. Here I/S/395th Inf Regt. was attached to the task force. At 1815, the task force was committed to relieve pressure on TF WOLFS at HAILAR. TF BECOMM preceded along the route BERGHAUSEN - OBER BERNDORF - MEDER BERNDORF and northeast toward HAILAR. The remainder of S/395th Inf Regt. cleared the woods southwest of MAILAR and outposted HEMING-HAUSEN.

At first light on 9 April, a coordinated attack by TF ERLENBUSCH from the south and TF BEATY from the southeast was launched on the town of BERGHAUSEN and by \$945 the town had fallen. Task Force Rhea moved from GLEIDORF to capture




CC"B" ADVANCES FELBECKE (\$485) against light resistance at \$945, and continued north and west to capture a string of small villages.

OBER BERNDORF (\$587) was taken against moderate resistance and ARPE (5388) was cleared after a brief stubborn defense. The villages of OBER LANDENBECK (\$190) and HENNINGHAUSEN (\$688) were taken against light opposition. At KOBBEHRODE (3089) resistance stiffened, but the town was cleared of enemy before dark with over 200 prisoners taken and a quantity of equipment captured or destroyed. Here the task force consolidated for the night. In the meantime, TF BRATY moved from BERGHAUSEN to OBER BERNDORF and from here attacked KUKELHEIM where little resistance was met. TF ERLENBUSCH moved from BERGHAUSEN to FELBECKE at 1100 and took SELKENTROP (3486) at 1405 with little epposition. The task force pushed on through WENTROP, BRACHT and LECEMARTE to take SCHWARTNECK during the night 9-10 April, and by 166366, the town was secured. The 484th and 489th Armd F A Bas and 1/A and 1/B/203rd AAA Bn were attached to Combat Command "B" at 18gg.

Combat Command "A" returned to the full control of the 7th Armored Division at \$945 on the 9th and the command moved forward to the vicinity of GLEIDORF. A/814th T D Bn reverted to Combat Command "A" C C "A" control at #866.

Again on 10 April the enemy elected to continue his defense from a series of iselated positions based in depth along the available roads.

Most of the positions had ample support from tanks and from SUMMARY 10 April self-propelled guns, which acted in a purely defensive role and not agressively at all. The predominance of AA weapons was more marked than ever, supporting virtually every defensive position that the enemy





ohose to occupy. For the first time in the current operations all three combat commands were in action simultaneously. During the day an advance of eight thousand yards was made and numerous small towns captured in the some. Enemy artillery, which had been rather light for the past few days, came into more prominence, though it was still not a definate or organised program.

The division's main thrust to the northwest was made by Combat Command "R".

Task Forces BROWN and WOLFE moved out in a small pincers movement. TF BROWN


C C "R" following a route MAILAR - HEDER BERNDORF - MENEHAUSEN (3391)-

ATTACK GRIMINGHAUSEN (3592) - LOCHTROP (3393) to meet TF WOLFE(who

CONTINUES had proceeded along the axis MAILAR - DORLAR) at FRIELING-

HAUSEN (3594). A heavy fog was the greatest delaying factor, and active enemy resistance was scattered and light. At FRIELINGHAUSEN the two task forces were consolidated under Lt. Col. BROWN, and the attack to the north continued. After a TOT on BREMKE (3595) by the corpe artillery, that town was cleared without serious opposition. TF BROWN then preceded to secure the bridge ever the WETNE RIVER (3297) and outposted the surrounding road net for the night. At the same time that TF BROWN and WOLFE were attacking. TF GRIFFIN advanced along the route HENGSBECK (3291) - BREMSCHEID (3094) - ESLOHE (3095). Light resistance was encountered until reaching BREMSCHEID. Here the enemy defended the town with small arms, machine guns, and mortars. TF GRIFFIN advanced after a heavy concentration of marching fire and overcame the resistance. The same technique was employed at ESLOHE and only light opposition was offered. 3/595th Inf Regt supported the attack of TF GRIFFIN by clearing the woods to the northwest of BREMSCHEID.

After leaving SCHWARTMECK early on the morning of 10 April, TF ERLENBUSCH went into action again at noon, sending out patrols towards OBER MARPE (2789).



At 1516, the task force advanced on the town in force and by 1435 had cleared

C C "B" it of resistance. Continuing, TP ERLEMBUSCH swung northwest to GAINS

GROUND take DORMECKE (2691) and the high ground 1000 yards to the

northwest by 2000. IF CHAPPUIS also went into eperation at moon, attacking morth from KOBBENRODE to take BOCKHEIM at 1320. Proceeding west toward MEDER HARPE (2891) strong armor, artillery, and infantry opposition was encountered and a vigorous fight ensued. Four Mark IV tanks and an Samm SP gum were destroyed and many prisoners were taken when the town was secured at 2000. The task force them moved on to HUCKELEDIM (2792) which was taken with little resistance and outposted for the night. If BRATY was held in reserve and followed the other task forces, prepared to pass through either on combat command order.

The 23rd Armd inf in was resttached to Combat Command "A" at \$9\$\$en 10

April and three task forces, composed as follows, were formed:

C C "A" GOES INTO ACTION

TF RHSA

23rd Armd Inf Fn (-2 cos) C/17th Tk Bn (-1 plat) 1/D/17th Tk Bn. 1/A/814th T D Bn 1/B/53rd Armd Eng Bn

Tr itme La

17th Tk En (-4 cos, 1 lt & l med plat)
1/23rd Armd Inf Bn
1/A/814th T D Bn
1/B/55rd Armd Ang En

TF DAILEY

A/17th Tk Bn
D/17th Tk Bn (-3 plat)
1/25rd Armd Inf Bn
A/814th TD Bn (-2 plat,
Ron Plat)
1/B/53rd Armd Eng En

Gombat Command "A" moved from GLEIDOHF to the vicinity of ARPL, closing at \$936. At 1666, IF RHEA jumped off from EOBBEHRODE, attacking north to seize ISINGHAM (5092) at 1816. The task force continued north to contact elements of Combat Command "R" in BREMSCHIID at 1836, and returned to secure an outpost ISINGHAM. IF DAILEY formed near SCHHARTHECKE and moved through OBER MARFE to attack OBER VALBERT (2688). That town was captured at 2116 and the IF pushed north to clear SCHONDFELT by 2236.

37



The enemy followed the same general pattern of operations on 11 April, using road blocks, mines to a limited degree, strong points of infantry backed up by armor to delay our advance. Aerial observation reported much

SUMARY apparently simless milling about in rear enemy areas, pointing up the confusion being experienced by troops that had not been able to escape from the pocket. Combat Command "A" and the 87th Ron Sq (Mecs) were given missions of cleaning out several bypassed enemy strongpoints that our forces would need to pass through. The 7th continued its attack to the west and northwest against moderate enemy resistance. It cleared the towns of MEDER SALWEY (2795), OBER SALWEY (2595), SCHLIPRUTHEN (2493), SIEPERTING (2996), and GREWENSTEIN (2701). By the end of the period the division had grouped in their respective assembly areas preparatory to a further attack to the west.

The task forces of Combat Command "R" continued to attack northeast on 11

April. TF GRIFFIN proceeded to take SIEPERTING (2996) and MATHMECKE (3099)

GREVENSTEIN

TAKEN

(2701) where the attack was held up by 20mm flack gun fire.

one platoon of A/40 Tk Bn with the task force deployed, and went about a thousand yards in the direction of the guns, firing until the flak fire ceased. The town was then entered and outposted.

Meanwhile TF WOLFE moved rapidly north and occupied WENTHOLTHAUSEE (3199) at 9718 without opposition, arriving there simultaneously with other friendly troops moving in from the north. TF BROWE moved from defensive positions near

ASSEMBLES

WENTHOLTHAUSEN. The Combat command regrouped in the assembly area preparatory to continuing the attack. The 440th and 400th Armd F A Bus





were attached to Combat Command "R" at 1299.

At \$735 on the morning of the 11th, TF CHAPPUIS continued to attack to the northwest and captured MEDER SALWEY (2795) at 1556. TF BEATY moved from

CONTINUES
ATTACK

at 1166, and turned west toward OBER SALMEY (2595). Here strong defensive positions were dug in around the town. After a coordinated attack by dive benders, artillery, tanks, TD's, and infantry, the town fell at 1466.

SCHLIPRUTHEN (3495) was the next objective and was caught in a pincers movement by TF BEATY from the east and TF ERLENBUSCH from the west. Dive bombers and artillery hit the town, and as the task forces converged, the burgomeister came out and surrendered it. TF ERLENBUSCH secured the town for the night. TF BEATY returned to OBER SALMEY and consolidated for the night while TF CHAPPUIS remained in NEDER SALMEY. The 489th Armd F A Bn was detached from Combat Command "B" at 1266.

In preparation for further operations, Combat Command "A" moved from the

ARPE region to an assembly area around ESLOHE closing there at 1615. The 489th

C C "A"

Armd F A Bn, detached from Combat Command "E", was attached to

Sombat Command "A" at 1200. I company of 3/395th Inf Regt was

attached to the combat command and further attached to TF RHEA at 1500.

On the afternoon of 11 April, operations instructions were received. The III Corps was to continue to attack west and northwest to destroy or capture the

OPERATIONS


THE TRUCTIONS


Div in the center, and the 99th Inf Div on the north, 7th Armo

The was to attack on division order to seize the first objective— the area south

of LAKE SORPE STAUBECKEN. Combat Commands "A" and "R" were to advance abreast on

the north (right) and south (left) flanks respectively. The jump-off was sohe-





duled for early morning of 12 April,

The early morning of 12 April, division moved through elements of the 5th Infantry Division to the immediate merth and then attacked west towards their first
objective. By the close of the period, after an advance of 15 miles, Combat

SURGIARY
Command "A" was fighting in the term of BALVE (0908) and Combat
12 APRIL
Command "R" had pushed forward through AFFELM (1097), BLIMTROP


(0899), EUMTROP (0890), and MEUMHRADE (0898). This advance was made against
light to moderate resistance. By turning west in the sector, the tanks were


able to reach out to roads and countryside that permitted limited operations off the main axis, and consequently enveloping the enemy's road-bound defenses, a speedy advance was marked up. A huge toll of prisoners was taken including most of the staff of the LXXXI Corps against which the Seventh had been operating. Communications seemed to have completely broken down as far as the enemy was concerned for this Corps was out of touch with even the general situation on their own front.

The 7th Armored Division was to be made with two combat commands abreast; Combat Command "A" on the right or north, and Combat Command "R" on the left or south, with Combat Command "B" in reserve. Combat Command "A" was given

C C "A" a specific route of attack and this attack was to be made with LOOSE task forces in column, TP RHEA with one company of the 595th Inf

Regt leading, followed by the 489th Armd F A Rm, TF WEMPLE and TF DAILEY. The infantry was to ride on tanks and each task force was to shorten their column as much as possible by taking only essential vehicles. TF RHEA attacked and captured SELSHEDE at \$750 and them, in rapid succession and against very light resistance seized RECKLINGHAUSEN (2501), SIEDFELD (1801), AMECKE (1400), and RJ (1111). At 1850, the TF commanders attended a meeting with the





the axis LARGENHOLTHAUSEN (1001), BALVE (0804), VOLKLINGHAUSEN (1007) with TF DAILEY in support. TF RHEA was to attack morth and take MELLEN (1204), MELESCHEDE (1406), and MEVEL (1206). By 2166, TF RHEA's mission was accomplished against negligible resistance. TF NEMPLE moved out in the assault on LARGENHOLTHAUSEN at 1666 and as soon as the lead tank reached the town, the infantry dissounted and entered on foot. At 1816 the town was cleared and the leading elements were pushing north towards BALVE. The terrain was getting increasingly difficult and the tanks could not deploy and advance, the only avenue of approach being down the road. An enemy tank held up the column for some little time but by 2266, both tanks and infantry had entered BALVE.

Combat Command "R" moved out on 12 April initially in one column--- along the axis GREVENSTEIN (2801), ALTERHELFELD (2602), LINNEP (2801), ENDORF (2199),

STOCKUM (1710), ALIEHOORF (1898), ALTEMAFFELM (0997). Order of BREAKS

LOOSE

parch for the attack was TF GRIFFIM, B/400th Armd F A Bn, TF

BUTLER, 400th Armd F A Bn (-B), TF WOLFE, 440th Armd F A Bn, TF BROWN. The

attack progressed rapidly at first against only light resistance. However, in

the vicinity of 2201 TF GRIFFIM was absolutely blocked by impassable roads and

considerable difficulty extricating his force. Hearing of these difficulties

by radio, Col FRANCIS P. TOMPKIES, CO of Combat Command "R" put the 400th Armd

F A Bn in firing position, sent out a recommaissance in force over a new route

and directed TF WOLFE to bypass TF GRIFFIM in the vicinity of LIMMEP (2501),

then move south to RJ (2400) and from there west to ENDORF (2199). In the

beginning some opposition was encountered over this new route but nonetheless

the advance continued encouragingly. At STOCKUM the first encay error was






encountered, and again between ALLENDORF and AFFELM. IF WOLFE was heavily engaged until 1725 when the opposition was reduced. At this point TF WOLFE broke loose and moved rapidly, shooting as it went, through ALTENAFFELE (0997), AFFELN (0997), KUNTROP (0899), and NEULINRADE (0398). The success of this operation was brought about by the surprise and shock of the fast moving, often firing, tank columns. During the current days operation Combat Command "R" seized sixteen towns and villages; destroyed five Tiger tanks, twenty motor transports, five artillery pieces, two personnel carriers, an unrecorded number of horse-drawn vehicles; and captured eight officers and 2822 enlisted men.

Among the prisoners taken on 12 April was the staff of the IXXXI Corps (minus CG, C/S, G-S, and Senior Aide). They apparently had been victims of a

EXIT

hoax as not more than one man was involved in their capture. He had said his entire command was behind him but the Germans related CORPS that the command was not seen until they had travelled several kilometers. All were at a total loss to explain why fighting continued for there was little ammunition left, few supplies, and the existing stocks of fuel were fast being used up by troops eager to escape an early capture or death. In the field of Order of Battle, the total failure of their communications had left them with only the hasiest knowledge of the disposition of their own and the epposing forces. However all the staff members were well abreast of the everall situation. The Corps Staff Interpreter stated that his source was the BBC, which he believed in implicitly and whose information he passed on to his fellow staff members. When asked what effect psychological warfare would have on treeps in the pocket





(with a view to hastening essection of fighting), two staff members stated that it would probably be only of local value, for at least ninety percent of the troops in the pocket knew the situation and were waiting for the eppertunity to get out under the eye of the few remaining fanaties so they could surrender. Of conditions inside Germany, the Judge Advocate sagely put it, "All is kaput."

When asked for eandid epinion of U. S. divisions that had faced the Corps at one time or another, the G-2 effered the following: five best divisions

on the Western Front---let Inf Div. 9th Inf Div. British THE SEVENTH Guards Armd Div, 2nd Armd Div, and 7th Armd Div. The ENEMY EYES Assistant G-2 who was asked point blank what he thought of the 7th Armd Division from an intelligence point of view (evaluation of the unit as a fighting force), stated that it was among the best, if not the best ever faced on the Western Front. He justified the statement by saying that the changes in direction and deception in the size of the force being employed had wrought havos with plans laid. ("We were saught, weren't we?"). The Corps had had available to it only one source of information on the 7th Armored Division during the current eperations, that of a single PW from the 25rd Armd Inf Bn. The soldier was identified by his patch, and the battalion identification had come from a slip of paper in his pocket. He had given only name, rank, and serial number. The G-2 was highly complimentary of the security consciousness that had been displayed by this soldier, as well as other American troops. He did remark however that they unwittingly effer much information by wearing their division patches and by carrying letters or a copy of Stars and Stripes,





The LXXXI Corps went to bed after their interrogation, voicing the hope that the remainder of the staff would turn up in the cage during the night, for they

THE GENERAL always had breakfast together." As per expectations at apCAME FOR
BREAKFAST proximately \$73\$ on 13 April, a negotiation was effected
between the remaining staff members and an outpost of the 87th Cav. Ron. Sq.
(Meos). From a woodland hideout streamed a convoy of Opels, Mercedes, and
Volkswagons bearing General der Infanterie KOCHLING (three stars), his Chief of
Staff, Artillery Commander, G-3, Senior Aide, and a galaxy of orderlies and
drivers. The General and his key staff members were accorded a hasty evacuation

The Seventh Armored Division continued attacking on 13 April to the northwest over difficult terrain and against moderate resistance; capturing some small towns

SUMMARY and gaining up to 7000 yards. Combat Command "A" made most of the 15 APRIL

to higher headquarters.

effort on this day while Combat Command "R" cleared the roads in their area and repulsed a counterattack of tanks and infantry in the vicinity of the high ground southwest of NEUENRADE (0398). Over 6000 prisoners were processed during the period of which most were taken in a thorough screening of the area to the rear that had been passed through so rapidly on the previous day. Broadcast appeals had some success in the bypassed areas. It was estimated that over 1000 prisoners were gathered from wooded areas when broadcasts were directed at them and surrender terms offered.

At \$83\$, the 3rd Bn of the 395th Inf Regt and TF CHAPPUIS were attached to Combat Command "A". TF WEMPLE attacked north at first light but soon found

CC "A" themselves hopelessly canalised with a stroam on one side,
steep cliffs on the other and a very effective road block consisting of a
blown underpass barring their way. Tank-dozers, retraivers, and engineers
started clearing the road block while the infantry continued forward on foot and

seized VOLERINGHAUSEN. By 1539, the road block was cleared and the tanks, passing through VOLKRINGHAUSEN, pushed north. Again they were canalized between the cliffs and the stream with an additional obstacle this time in the form of a railroad grade. Attempts to move the tanks forward resulted in their being pinned down by enemy tank fire and at the end of the period, the results were limited to minor local gains and the attack was continuing. If RHEA attacked from HOVEL (1308) to the southwest with the mission of capturing BECKUM (1107). Enemy resistance in BECKUM was moderate and consisted of a few tanks, one or two SP guns, machine guns, and small arms fire. It was captured at 1337 and one plateon of infantry and a plateon of tanks continued west to help TF WEMPLE get through the road block which had been holding up its advance. At 1200, an attack to the northwest was launched by TF CHAPPUIS, TF DAILEY, and the 3rd Ba of the 395 Inf Regt. TF CHAPPUIS jumped off from HOVEL at 1200, contacted slements of the 10th Inf and cleared the woods to their east by 183%. Considerable opposition was met 600 yards east of DISBORN (1010) at 1890 but by the end of the period TF CHAPPUIS had captured that town. TF DAILLY attacked from BALVE northwest over difficult terrain, supporting the attack of 3/365 lnf kegt on DEILINGHOFEN (0509).

Combat Command "R" remained in division reserve, following Combat Command "A".

Combat Command "R" remained in defensive positions in the vicinity of Neteurone

CC THE (0398). KUNTROF (0609) and GARBLCK (0702). TF WOLFE was directed AND CC TRE to send recommissance in force southwest in the vicinity of MERDONL (0296). This recommissance met stiff resistance that eventually developed into a counterattack from the high ground north of WERDONL. The enemy employed medium artillery, mortar, and small arms fire and at least 2 heavy tanks in direct fire. TF WOLFE called for heavy concentrations of artillery and

by this method contained the counterattack. Meanwhile, Before the artillery could be brought down, TF WOLFE withdrow to its original defensive position near NEUEURODE, where it remained for the balance of the period.

The attack to the north and west continued on 14 April with Combat Command "A" making the main effort to capture the airfield (0401) east of HEMER (0310) and the town. By 1400 the landing field had been taken intact with much valuable

self were temporarily called off to negotiate terms for declaring the town an open city because of the presence of 24000 allied FW's just outside the town. The terms of the CG of the German division opposing the attack were refused and at 2030 Combat Command "A" resumed the attack on HEMER. By this time, the RUHR Pooket was definately split in two parts and knowledge of this was widespread among the Germans apposing our advance. The prisoner take for the day was somewhat in excess of 4500.

. Combat Command "A" resuming the previous days attack at \$615, continued to the north and west. TF WEMPLE captured the village of HUSTADT at \$812,

HONNETHAL at 1914, and BROCKHAUSER (0709) at 1199 with little or no opposition encountered. The next important objective was the town of HEMER. Operations against the town itself were temporarily suspended at 1299 while the CO of TF DAILEY, Major THOMAS DAILEY, Executive Officer, 17th Tank Battalion, was taken behind enemy lines in an attempt to negotiate a peaceful entry of our troops into HEMER. The Germans wished to declare it an open city because of the presence of slightly ever 25000 allied prisoners in a prison camp just outside the town. However, the German General's terms were unsatisfactory and at 1939, the attack was resumed. Meanwhile Combat Command "A" had moved up into position from which moved entry could be effected if necessary.



This operation in the words of the 17th Tk Bn After Action Report was "most picturesque we have ever participated in or observed. The terrain was excellent for the tanks and they moved in at about 15 mph. The formation was perfect and the enemy artillery fire and air-bursts were sufficient to make it more than a dry run, in fact many of the rounds were very close misses and it is surprising that we suffered no casualties? At 1450 TF RHEA had seized the landing field intact where, contrary to usual procedure, the AA Guns were not manned. TF WEMPLE held control of the woods on the high ground southwest of HEMER, TF DAILEY had moved south of the town, and TF DANUBE (3/395) had attacked, seized and secured SUDWIG (0389) under moderate artillory and AT fire at 1250. These positions were consolidated and tanks and TD's deployed so that they could fire into the town. At 2030 TF DANUBE attacked and secured HEMER with TF RELA, T. WEMPLE, and TF DAILEY prepared to support with direct fire across their front if they needed it. 3/395 Inf Regt returned to the control of the 395th RET in place at HEMER at 2236.

At 16%, the tank company commander and the battalion 8-2 of the 17th Tk Bn who were in the assault wave of TF WEMPLE, walked to the large PN enclosure that

SURRENDER

OF

PRISON CAMP

were met by a German officer bearing a note stating that there

were 25000 allied prisoners of war in the enclosure whom the officials were ready

to surrender to our forces. The tank CO and S-2 were taken to the Camp Commandant

where they learned that Major THOMAS DAILEY, CO of TF DAILEY and at that time

negotiating for the surrender of HEMER, had already been there and instructed the

Germans to keep control of the PW's until some of our forces could take over. He

foresew the impossible situation if all these half-starved prisoners were turned

loose on the countryside. However, as most of the guards had already disposed of

their weapons and the prisoners were beginning to clip the barbed wire and slip out in twos and threes, it was necessary for TF WEMPLE to send two plateons of infantry and one plateon of light tanks to keep them in the cage.

A breakdown of prisoners in this camp by nationality was as follows:

BREAKDOWN AND LIVING CONDITIONS

19,411 Russians
2,755 French
548 Belgians
190 Italians
140 Polish
107 Jugoslavs
99 Americans
30 Raumanians
14 Greeks
4 Czecks
4 British
23,302 Total

The living conditions were atrocious. The hospital had 9000 patients, with typhus, pneumonis, spotted fever, T B, and dysentery raging unchecked throughout the camp. There were an average of 100 to 150 deaths a day and bodies were lying around unburied. The prisoners clothes were in rags, body lice were everywhere, and the sanitary facilities were both filthy and woefully inadequate. The foed situation was however probably the worst. There had been no food whatsoever for the four lays proceeding the American arrival and before that the prisoners had been living on barley soup (one bowl per Russian per day and two bowls per other nationalities per day) and one loaf of bread for every ten men. The Russians who had been there the longest were all suffering from malnutrition. The Americans, most of whom had been captured only a short time before, were in comparatively good condition.

At 1966, a kitchen was operating and what available food supplies there were, were being distributed. It was necessary at first to fire with small arms and a

light tank over the heads of the prisoners to break up semi_rioting groups in the chow line. They were hard to control because we were handicapped by a lack of people who spoke Russian. However, a propaganda tank


operated by 12th ArmyGroup and attached to TF TEMPLE was brought into action and after the situation was explained, the trouble quieted down. On the following morning, 15 April, as the division boundaries were shifted and the camp now fell the 90th Division's sector, Corps relieved the Seventh Armored Division of this responsibility. TF WEWFIE turned it over to the 395th Inf Regt. at 151015 April.

Combat Command "B" remained in Division reserve with TF CHAPTUIS reattached as of 1300. Combat Command "R" continued to maintain defensive

CCMBM positions in KUNTROP, NEUENRODE, and GARRECK until re
8
CCMBM lieved of this responsibility by the 395th Infantry Regiment of the 99th Infantry Division at 0900.

The main preoccupation of the CIG in the RUHR Pocket was deserters in civilian clothes. They apprehended some two thousand of these, most of whom C.I.C. acknowledged after a brief questioning that they were sold-ACTIVITIES iers. The majority had pieces of paper saying that they were discharged and permitted to travel home. Apparently, in an effort to get soldiers through our lines, centers had been set up where Cerman officers were issuing and signing discharge certificates to any German soldier on fort worker wearing a uniform. Made by typewrite; these certificates lacked official stamps, destroyed by "enemy" action. Another symptom showing the sick-core of the Nasi machine came to light on 14 April when two agents of the CIC were called to investigate a shooting in a civilian house in BROCKENHAUSEN.

Upon investigation they found FRAU JULIA WILKE, FRAU SOENNECKEN and CHETA WILKE shot and lying on a bed in their home. GERTA WILKE was still alive




and was evacuated. Conclusive evidence (the pistol in GERTA's hand)
pointed to the fact she had shot the other two and then tried to take
her own life. FRAU JULIA WILKE was the local leader NSDAP Frauenschaft
and FRAULEIN GERTA was the head EDM, NSDAP.

On 15 April, the division continued the attack to the west advancing approximately 8,000 yards against stubborn resistance from dug-in infantry supported by SP guns, 88°s, 20mm and 40mm direct fire guns. The

SUMMARY main effort of the day was made by Combat Command was a 15-APRIL which jumped off at \$955 from MENDEN. It attacked along two routes with a task force on each route and a third force trailing behind to attack the flank of any resistance that presented itself. Most of the units contacted were AA units that had been committed to a final defense of the roads leading to the heart of the pocket. Gun crews were ambitious and fired vigorously on our forces, but when their ammunition was expended, they surrendered readily to the nearest troops without offering further resistance. There apparently was no attempt on their part to disable the weapons when they were abandoned.

At \$73\$ 15 April, TF BROWN moved out to the north with orders to pass through units of the 5th Infantry Division at MENDEN (0316). Then, it was to attack to the west along the northern route, seizing and holding the high ground northeast of the LENNE RIVER. At \$99\$, the TF BROWN forces launched their attack from MENDEN with TF SWEAT leading. Advancing along the axis HALINGEN(9918) - RJ (9516), he ran into major opposition while trying to move from GRULAND(9617) to the road junction. Here the enemy





took full advantage of natural defensive features and the road was under direct fire from well camouflaged 20mm flak guns and 88mm Every movement of our infantry brought down enemy artillery and, in spite of counter-battery and direct tank fire on gun positions, it was impossible to push forward. TF WOLFE (who had been following in column) was directed to proceed wis route HOLINCEN(0018)-RERTINGLOH(9016)-KALTHOF (9614) and envelop the enemy flank. This task force moved rapidly, overruning resistance in the form of anti-tank and flak gun fire, and went into position in the area cast of KALTHOF. TF MOLFE was now ordered to take KALTHOF in an effort to relieve the continuing pressure on TE SMEAT. TF WOLFE with infantry of B/38th Arm'd Inf Bn. mounted on tanks of B/40th Tank Bn. moved rabidly into the town after it had been softened by the artillery. The tanks went in shooting and KALTHOF surrendered without serious resistance. TF WOLFE quickly reorganised and, with infantry mounted on tanks, attacked the road junction simultaneously with TF SWEAT. Both forces held up here for the evening and formed a tank-infantry strongpoint in the area by outposting the roads and covering the probable routes of attack. In this squeese play, mimerous guns of all calibres and two Mark VI tanks were destroyed, enemy positions overrun, and about 240 prisoners taken.

TF GRIFFIN was assigned the southern route out of MENDEN and launched its attack from there along the axis MENDEN-SHMMDRN(9913) at \$956. TF CRIFFIN

TF CRIFFIN was halted by heavy opposition in the form of artillery and direct fire from anti-aircraft weapons raking the column. Manualle, TF NOLFE's envelopment, which had been primerily intended to help out TF S MAT,



was proving of great material assistance to TF GRIFFIN. SUMMERN was cleared by 2000 and TF GRIFFIN moved on to KALTHOF to seize and secure REFFI INGSEN.

The organisation of the antillery was changed considerably on 15 April. The 474th Arm'd FA Bn. was attached to Combat Command "B" as

ARTHLERY
attached to Combat Command MPH; the 489th Arm'd FA Bn. was placed in
general support as of 151300. All artillery battalions displaced forward
as the troops advanced. The night of 15 April, the artillery made every
effort to hit potential assembly or billeting areas of the enemy as hard
as possible. Considerable Corps Artillery was called for and given.
Several American officers, PW's, reported that this fire was very accurate and the most plentiful they had ever witnessed. Later reports
showed that the night's firing completely disrupted the enemy communications and thoroughly shook the already low morale of the German troops.

TF WEMPLE and TF PHEA of Combat Command "A" remained in place and TF WEMPLE was relieved of the responsibility for the PW camp with the

CCMAM 23,000 allied prisoners at 1015 by the 395th Inf. Regt. TF

CCMBM DAILEY withdrew from HEMER and consolidated positions at

DEILINGHOFFEN(0509) at 1015. Combat Command MBM with the addition of

TF BEATY attached during the day stayed in division reserve, following behind Combat Command MBM

Combat Command "P" continued the attack at first light on 16 April with two task forces abreast. At \$630, the attack was halted when one of the task forces initiated proceedings for the surrender of enemy troops.

It foreshedowed the end of the enemy forces in the part of the pocket

SUMMARY where the Seventh had been operating. A negotiated sur16 - APRIL
render was effected between Colonel JOHN I. HYAN, JR., Chief of Staff
of the Seventh, representing the Commanding General, and Major General
FRITZ PAYEFLEIN, CG of the LIII Corps, who surrendered all the forces
under control of his Corps. At 1230 plans were completed for the surrender of the enemy troops and the remainder of the day was spent in the
collection and evacuation of prisoners. A final count of the number of
prisoners taken was 20,300. By the end of the period, Combat Command HPH
had escupied all of its objectives along the LENNE RIVER and had established road blocks where necessary.

Colonel FRANCIS P. TOMPKINS, CO of Combat Command "R", directed that an aggressive attack be resumed at first light on 16 April, with

SU-MENDER TES BROWN and CRIFFIN abrenat. At \$660, the attack NECCTIATIONS was abruptly interrupted when a German Captain, C-2 of the 116th

Panzer Division, came out of the woods and presented himself to leading elements of TE CRIEBIN. He indicated that he desired to negotiate the survender of enemy troops. It. Col. CRIFFIN immediately reported this incident to Col. TOMPKINS who wanted to know exactly who the Captain representated. He said he r presented the CC of the 116th Panzer Division. We was fold to return to his CP and return with someone who had sufficient authority to negotiate a surrender. Col. TWPKINS reported this conversation to Major Gereral ROBERT W. HAS FOUCK, CC of the Comenth, who immediately sent Col. J HN I. RYAN, JR., his chief of staff to he die the negotiations. Shortly after Col. RYAN a rrived on the scene, the German contain returned with



Ceneral VON WALDENBERG, CG of the 116th Penzer, we said that he was speaking not only for his own division but had been empowered to speak for Major General FRITZ BAYERLEIN, CG of the 53rd German Corps. He was told that we were not interested in any piecemeal surrender of certain units and so he volunteered to take Col. RYAN back to Corps headquarters where terms for the Corps surrender might be discussed.

Accompanied by Captain WILLIAM C. ARTHUR, Aide toGeneral HASBROUCK, and a group of MP*s, Col. RYAN went with General WON WALDENBERG to the headquarters of the LIII Corps. There General

BAYERLEIN announced he was speaking for the SURBENDER OF entire Corps which included in addition to the 116th Panzer, the 180th Infantry Division, the 190th Infantry Division and the remnants of the 9th Panser Division. Col. RYAN, as the representative of General HASBROUCK, laid down the surrender terms. All troops would be assembled in the designated areas; all arms would be stacked; no material would be destroyed; armed guards would be placed over material until relieved by American troops. Fifteen minutes were given the Germans to make a decision and if st the end of that time they felt the need of further persussion. Col. RYAN pointed out that planes were available to the Seventh and no time would be lost in calling them in to bomb the area. In less than three mimutes. the Germans





SS Lt. Col. HEINZ GUDERIAN, a divisional G-3, and son of Col.Gen. GUDERIAN, after his capture by the Seventh Armored Division.



announced their decision: the surrender terms were screpted.

The size of this mess surrender can be better appreciated by looking at the total figures of prisoners taken. For the period 152400 to 162400, the Seventh processed 20,303 German prisoners of war. Known

BOX SCORE units that surrendered intact to the division are:

116th Penzer Division, 180th Infantry Division, 190th Infantry Division and remnants of the 9th Penzer Division. A number of other AA, Engineer, Artillery, TD, replacement training, and service formations located in the Corps area turned themselves in. There were four General officers, all with field commands, Major General PRITZ MAYERIFIN, CG, LIII Corps;


Major General HAMMER, CG, 190th Infantry Division; Brigadier General WON WALDENBURG, CG, 180th Infantry Division and Brigadier General WON WALDENBURG, CG, 116th Panzer Division. In addition, the CO of the remains of the 9th Penzer Division, Colonel ZOLLEN KOPF, was included in the take. A brief recapitulation of prisoners of war taken by the division to date follows:

Frisoners taken prior to crossing of RHINE R. 9,085
Taken between RHINE R. and EDRR SEE DAM. 13,071
Taken from the RUHR Pocket. 34,476
Military personnel in overrun hespitals
(not evacuated) - 1,313
Grand total to date(16 April 45) - 160,945

The following are conservative estimates on items of military entipment that were delivered to Division pay deges following the mass surrender on 16 April:


MATERIEL

Motor vehicles (all types)-----



There was no flow of weaklings in the toll of prisoners being processed efter the mass surrender, but a cross section of Germany's existing military machine. There were stiff, quiet Prussien officers; over-

FINAL MARCH age GAF men, strong, young Grenadiers; crippled Landsers, arrogant panzer troopers, paunchy reservists, recently inducted teenagers, monocle-wearing aristocrats and foreign nationals. Many of the units moving to the cages marched as if in review before the FUERPER, others slouched and straggled as if they had been hold in a vise for months and then suddenly released. German officers barked orders and the soldiers obeyed as they have always done. There was a conspicuous absence of remorse; it was not uncommon to see a group gathered around an accordionist singing lilting German songs. English-speaking prisoners offered their services; other soldiers bent every effort to answer the beck and call of their conquerors. The most prevalent question was "Mill'I remain in Germany?"; the most prevalent thought: "How soon will I get home?" In compliance with the surrender terms, German troops began to pour from all directions toward the four appointed collecting points at noon on 16 April. The flow of prisoners continued uninterruptedly until the next morning. Collecting points were established in TF BROWN's area, TF GRIFFIN's area, and the 87th Cav Ron Sq (Mecz) area. From such collecting points they were evacuated to division and beyond by their own greatly varied transportation and whatever vehicles were available from the Seventh . At 1200 on 17 April, the Seventh Armored Division was re-




lieved of responsibility for the sector including acceptance and evecustion of prisoners.

In an Order of the Day dated 19 April from Major General ROPERT W. HASBROUCK to the officers and men of the Seventh Armored Division, their

ORDER OF part in the collapse of the RUHR Pocket is outlined in the THE DAY following extract:

The "---mission was to chop up the pocket you helped to create. Despite mountainous terrain which greatly favored the enemy, you drove to the heart of his defenses. That part of the Pocket you were to reduce ceased to exist at \$845 on 16 April. ----good hunting."



After the hard fighting of the first few weeks in April, the Seventh Armored Division moved from the RUHR pocket and the mountainous country of CUMMARY southern MESTPHALIA to an essembly area near COTTINGEN(5328) and the open rolling fermland of RRUNGWICK. From 18 April to 28 April, extensive maintenance of equipment and rehabilitation of personnel was carried out. A training directive to cover a seven day period was issued on 21 April. It dealt with calibration of wearons, Information and Education subjects, training for vehicular crews, employment of supporting weapons as a team, military courtesy, instruction in Military Government, and tactical walks. Local security was established and civilian control measures were enforced in the division zone. At 1200, the Seventh was detached from III Corps and attached to V Corps. Then it had completely closed in the new area on 18 April, it was placed in SHAEF reserve. At 1200 on 22 April, the division was released from attachment to V Corps, remaining in SHAEF reserve but

On 16 April, Combat Command MAW moved from the vicinity of BROCKHAUSEN (0709) to an assembly area near COTTINGEN. C/87th Ren Sq(Mecs) was attached at \$750 and the 489th Arm'd FA Bn. at 2300. Combat Command MBW moved from MENDRN (0516) to GOTTINGEN with B/87th attached at 1500. On 17 April, Combat Command MBW was relieved in its sector along the RUHR and LANNE RIVERS at 1200 by the 5th Infentry Division and began to move to the division assembly area. By 18 April, all elements of the Seventh were closed in the new assembly area. The 434th, 440th 480th Amild Running April area. The 434th, 440th 480th Amild Running April area.

reverting to First U. S. Army control.

16-25 APRIL area. The 434th, 440th, 489th Arm'd FA Bns and A & B/203rd AAA Bn. all reverted to Division Artillery control. All elements of the 87th



Cav Pen So (Macz), the Flith TD Rn. and the 33rd Arm'd Engr. 3n. returned to control of division troops. On 20 April the 446th QM Tr Tr Go. and the 3967th QM Trk Co. were released to First U. 1. Army control.



A NEW CORPS: A NEW ARMY

At 1200 on 25 April the division was attached to the XVIII Corps (Airborne) for future operations in the area to the east and north of HAMBURG, Germany. Billeting details left for the new area on 280900.

SUMMARY At \$660 on the morning of 29 April, the Sevneth Armored 22-30 APRIL
Division began to move from COTTINGEN out through the farmland of BRUNSWICK and onto the flat factory-dotted clain at the eastern tip of the RUHR.
Passing through bombed-out BEWASWICK, they continued north into the secubpine sandy fields, and toy-like villages, reminiscent of southeast EDIJAND, of the LUNESERGER heath-country until they reached their assembly area in the general vicinity of CELLE(5950). On the last day of April, all elements of the division less the 446th QM Tr Tr Co. and Rear Echelon Augmented had reached the new destination.

The Seventh Armored Division was now working under the 21st Army Croup, British 2nd Army, American YVIII Airborne Corps. Other divisions in the Corps

NOW PLANS were the American 82nd Airborne and 8th Infantry Divisions and the British 6th Airborne Division. The XVIII Corps was to secure crossings of the MIBR on the right flank of the British 2nd Army. Moving cenerally north and east it was to both cut the north German pocket in two by slicing through to the Baltic and to effect a linkup with the Russians somewhere on the flat MTCKLENBURG Plain. The end was clearly in sight.





FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

JOHN T. RYAN, JR., Colonel G. S. C. Chief of Steff

G-2 Notes

As the month began, there was no appreciable difference from the conditions that existed at the end of March. There was still a watch being maintained to the West, where the pocketed enemy was believed most capable of intervention - through the manifestation of a breakout of the pocket that had been created during the preceding menth. Other than a continued screening of persons in the area, there were few incidents of military importance to the troops of the Division. By-passed enemy individuals and small groups continued to come inte the open to surrender to our forces, and occasionally, a more ambitious enemy soldier, in bidding fair to escape his predicament would fire Tupon members of the Division. Such was easily brought to an end, with the numbers of persons being processed by the Division PW cage diminishing daily. To the 5th of April, at which time contact was reestablished with an organized enemy, a total of 1,515 prisoners were taken by troops of the Division, most of which were stragglers or convalescents taken in the area as the time permitted by the static mission allowed a more or less thorough screening of the entire area being eccupied.

Upon learning that the Division was to be committed in operations against the formed pecket, so-called MUHR pecket, interest was shifted wheleheartedly to what the pecket contained and what the basic efforts of the forces within the enclosure had been up to the time of the Divisions committment. The scene of the greatest amount of energetic activity by the encircled enemy forces had been on the East side of the pecket, where several formations, including the 150 Pz Lehr Div, 116 Pz Div, and supporting Inf divisions had been gathered for an attempted breakest where the encircling forces were weakest. It was unknown just how many forces were contained in the pecket; concervative estimates had ranged earlier from 50,000 to 80,000. Inter estimates, more or less concurrent with the Division's employment, had been beested to roughly 150,000 enemy troops. It was known that there were in the pecket many fermidable, or once-fermidable, enemy divisions. The supply situation

was expected to be relatively good, particularly in the line of munitions and vehicles, for the pocket was centered more or less on the industrial Ruhr district, where many of the materiels of war had been produced for the military machine of Germany through this struggle.

Feed supplies were unknown, but were believed to be fairly good, for it was also within the confines of the pocket that many commercial agricultural products were known to have been produced.

When the Division was committed to action on 5 April to the West of the little mountain town of OBERKIRCHEN, it was against a bitter and determined enemy that operations were immediately directed. It might well be said that the enemy was not everly strong in numbers, but every avenue of approach into enemy territory available to the Division was of a camalized mature, and a serious development of the terrain by the enemy had been effected or was effected upon the approach of Division treeps. Every inch of ground was contested by various elements of the 130 Pz Lehr Division. After contact with the enemy had been established bz 0645 on the morning of the 5th, solid contact was maintained throughout the day. Slight advances were made against the enemy, and by the end of the period, we eccupied the town of ALMERT and favorable terrain to the West of it, and other troops had advanced to the villages of WINKHAUSEN, while ferces had by-passed this village to the South and had advanced to a point some 1500 meters beyond. The action of the day was characterized by an almost non-ending series of local counterattacks that were designed to demy us the favorable points of terrain that had been gained in the difficult fighting.

The enemy efforts had been made primarily with infantry treeps with an everwhelming weight of anti-armor weapons, all directed at our forces that made their way sown the marrow mountain reads. Artillery and mertar support was available and was used by the enemy to harass our rear areas and to support the counterattacks that were launched against forward positions. Some armor was encountered during the operations of the day, but as the operations of armor were as hampered for the

enemy as they were for our ewn forces, it was baically disposed in a supporting role for the troops that were encountered on the ground.

Only 33 prisoners were taken in the forward areas during 5 April. An additional 27 were taken in the rear areas, from stragglers and convalescents and deserters - making the total for the day 60, the lightest day for prisoner tell experienced since the Division had crossed the Rhine River. Basically, the identifications made in forward areas placed the opposing elements as the 338 Inf Div and 130 Ps Lehr Div. Straggler identifications confirmed that the 176 Inf Div was also present within the near vicility, and was a formation that was to be reckoned with in future operations. The predominance of AA fire from many weapons in defensive positions maintained by the enemy laid reason to the fact that it was supposed that AA defenses of the Ruhr industrial district would be used extensively in ground roles as seen as tactical situations dictated such. (NOTE: News from adjacent formations confirmed the ever-increasing use of AA as ground weapons, and, as well, bore out that resistance to pressure being exerted against the eastern perimeter of the pocket was universally fierce.)

forces, that were supported by armor in the form of at least two Tigor tanks. The two forces converged on the village from the morthwest and the west, and were supported by the first coordinated artillery fire that had been experienced for some time by forces of the division. Farther to the west, our forces were able to gain entrance to the town of GLEIDORF, and were able to maintain their held on that town despite heavy fire from both mortars and artillery. Much anti-tank fire had been experienced by our troops in reaching the town, much of it coming from tanks themselves and from self-propelled artillery pieces.

Identifications made during the period from 288 prisoners pointed to a possible relief of the 130 Pz Lehr Division, which was believed to be pretty badly shattered and to be in the process of moving generally to the northward, possibly for the purpose of augmenting forces that were still attempting to escape the pecket in the vicinity of PADERBORN, where the 116 Pz Div was known to be. Basically, the identifications were made from the 338 Inf Div, which was felt/have come into the area . for the singular purpose of sealing off our attempts to break into the mentral perties of the pecket. What support it had was unknown at the time, but it was definitely felt that it had more than ample armor at its disposal, possibly some remaining elements of the 130 Pz Lehr Div or from separate formations that had come into the area. The appearance of numerous separate units fighting as infantry pointed to the fact that the enemy's use of anything that was in uniform for infantry committment at a point mearest its existing lecation.

Fanatic defense of every inch of the ground was again the order for 7 April, after launching the day's events with counterattacks against our positions in GLEIDORF. The first counterattack was launched at 0315, with an undetermined number of infantry and at least one tank. This effort was repulsed, with the forces withdrawing to the northward towards FREDEBURG. At 0500, a determined counterattack from the same direction (the morth) was launched on GIRIDORF, with a participating force of some 300 infantry and at least 5 tanks. The efforts were 69

repulsed by our forces the town by 0735, with a cleast 4 of the tanks damaged, and over a hundred prisoners taken. The remaining tanks withdrew towards FREDEBURG, and the infantry withdrew to the wooded area to the high ground to the west of GLEIDORF.

Our treeps in the vicinity of HOIRHAUSEN, who had been subjected to artillery and mertar fire during the preceding might, encountered dug-in infantry armed with panser fauste and small arms both/the north of the town and in the town itself. It was not until 1900, and after a bitterly centested entry, that our forces controlled the town.

SCHMALLENBERG, the largest town in the area, which was attacked by our forces during the day, effered resistance that varied from mederate to heavy. Forces that attempted to enter the town from the south were subjected to small arms and machine gund fire from positions south of the town, and even more on the southern outskirts of the town once it was entered . Barooka fire was glse encountered in the southern outskirts of the town, and artillery was played on the town from the morthwest and west - most of it from self-propelled pieces. Elements of the Division that attempted to enter the town from the east met withering small arms fire and fire from anti-tank weapons and self-propelaed pieces within the town. Once inside the twun, forces were faced with the dual problem of combatting fanatic resistance and poor observation that was caused by the buildings burning from our own artillery and air proparations. The blinding smoke concealed many enemy weapons that continued to deliver heavy volumes of fire on our ferces that were obliged to clear the town house by house. The town was cleared of enemy by 1900, yielding over 300 prisoners.

The only substantial identifications made during the day were of the 338 Infantry Division, which seemed to have taken ever the entire defensive sector against which we were pitting our efforts. The counterattacks made on GLEIDORF during the earlier part of the day had been made by one regiment of the division with the support of a GHQ Heavy Tank Battalion, and the defense of the city of SCHMALLENBERG was made.

by enother regiment of the division, with augmentation from a number of small and separate units that were contered around the town.

A total of 472 prisoners were taken during the period, exclusive of a number of prisoners that were left in the hespitals in SCHMALLEGERG.

A continued defense was encountered on & April, though not to duite the same marked degree as in the past. Our ferces in the south spent a relatively quiet night, and were able to advance to soize the towns of Christmann and Relindhof against moderate resistance characterized primarily by small arms and machine gun fire. Forces that moved to the wooded area to the west and northwest of GLEIDORF met same small arms fire in reaching the woods, but little resistance was offered during the day to the ferces operating in the woods. Same tank and self-propelled gun fire was received by these ferces, mostly from the commanding terrain to the southwest.

Our ferces that advanced to the west from HOLTHAUSEN met some fire from isolated groups of enemy, and encountered several lightly defended positions, primarily astride the roads that led into FREDEBURG. Some effort had been made by the enemy to effect road blooks along the route of advance. Outposts for the defense of FREDEBURG were also encountered, and as forces entered the town of FREDEBURG, they encountered a fanatically dinded group of enemy troops. House by house fighting was necessary, and was still in progress at the end of the day's operations.

were still most persistently of 757 and 759 Regiments of the 338 Inf Div, though some rather substantial identification was made of 901 Pz Gren-adier Regiment of the 130 Pz Lehr Division, indicating that the entire division had not been pulled from the present conflict. In addition, additional odd units without particular attributes except that they seemed to be under the control of the 338 Inf Div were encountered during the period. A good many Velksturmers were found fighting in the towns of the area; their inclinations towards fighting were not strong.

On 9 April, the enemy's actions were more varied than during

previous days. His defineste the west of FREDEBUT were as well organized as his usual preceding pattern, and consisted primarily of physical blocks on routes of advance that were well defended. Our forces in this sector, after completing the occupation of FREDEBURG, were able to move westward to occupy the villages of HEIMINGHAUSEN and MALLAR, both of which were defended by small forces of infantry supported by tanks and self-propelhed weapons. The most disturbing factor in this sector was a smoke screen that the enemy laid in the valley down which our forces operated, reducing observation to an absolute minimum until about midday.

The enemy's defenses in the Obr BERNDORF-ARPE-KOBBENRODE areas were not as well erganized as during the past few days, and our theops were able to occupy these three points, as well as intervening points without too much difficulty, having to everrum numerous AA weapons positions, however, in the process. The town of MENKHAUSEM, between the two focal routes of operations, was particularly well defended, and were not entirely overcome by our troops at the end of the day's operations.

The enemy's defenses during the day, it might well be said, were characterized by his usual defense of key terrain features with all weapons available. Though the defense was not as bitter in the extreme seuth sector, it might well be charged to the fact that defense of this rea would not have been too prefitable to the enemy, as the positions ecoupied by our troops had, to a large extent, been compremised by actions of friendly troops operating to our south.

All of the combat elements of the 338 Inf Div were identified during the day's eperations, as were the 901 and 902 Pz Grenadier Regts of the 130 Pz Lehr Div, plus an assortment of odd unist that were becoming more and more prevalent. A total of 847 priseners were taken during the period - the largest bag to date in the Division's actions against the pocket; in this number, however, were 500 who were everrun in the five hospitals in FREDEBURG.

Again on 10 April the enemy elected to continue his defenses by a series of isolated positions, not necessarily connected, and primarily

ample support from tanks and from self-propelled guns, which acted purely in a defensive role and not aggressively at all. Several isolated hasty minefields were encountered during the psriod, as were road blocks and demolitions. The predeminance of AA weapons was more marked than during previous periods; they were encountered in ground roles in support of virtually every defensive position that the enemy chose to occupy.

In the morth sector, BREMSCHEID was heavily defended, and it was early after a brisk fight against small arms and machine guns that our forces were able to occupy the town. The town of DORLAR was the only populated point that our forces had entered to date in this operation that was not defended. Less than a kilemeter from Mark, however, along the route of advance, the reestablishment of a defensive band was noted, what with encountering a system of road blocks backed up by minefields.

In other sectors, our forces were able to occupy the villages of MENKHAUSEN, GRIMMINGHAUSEN, and LOCHTRAP against fire from all arms, and the populated points of Ndr MARPE, KUKELHEIM, DORMECKE, and Obr MARPE were cleared after slight but fanatic resistance from small groups of infantrymen supported by some armor and AA weapons.

Inemy artillery, which had been rather light for the past few days, tame more into preminence, though not on a definite or organized program. The greater part of the fire was played on the southernmost front and consisted primarlily of fire from self-propelled weapons, although there was a little 150mm fire recorded.

In addition to 10055 prisoners that were taken during the period, there were 13 pieces of armer destroyed, and numerous weapons, including 2 six inch field pieces, 3 - 88mm guns, 4 - 40mm AA guns, and 11 - 20mm AA guns. In addition, nearly fifty assorted motor vehicles were destroyed.

For the first time in this fight, elements of the 3 Panzer Grenadier Division were identified in the enemy's ranks. Both the 8 and 29 Panzer Grenadier Regiments were identified, along with most of the elements of the 538 Inf Div and some elements of the 130 Pz Lehr Div, plus an even ,

more impressive lot of smaller units. The most predominant of these "extras" were the AA Battalions, of which there were at least eight identified during the period. Also, there were several artillery formations identified during the period, the personnel having been employed in infantry roles, as there were few pieces left and little ammunition for those that were still in firing condition. Several tank units were also identified through the crew members that were taken prisoner.

The enemy followed the same general pattern of operations on April lith, using road blocks, mines to a limited degree, strong points of infantry supported with armor to a limited degree to delay our advance. The reappearance of AA weapons in ground role was a little more in prominence than during previous days, as the Division penetrated deeper into the area wherein so many of the weapons had been used for defense against air attacks. Artillery fire was somewhat lighter than during previous periods, confirming to a certain degree the lack of artillery support for the hasty organizations that were opposing our advance, and further shortage of ammunition, or rather, lack of transportation to forward positions from possibly existing supply installations to rear of the present front lines.

Aerial observation continued to show a great deal of movement in the rear areas, pointing more conclusively to the confusion being experienced by the troops that had not been able to escape from the pocket. Prisoners also reported some movement, primarily of armored formations, those that were more or less out of contact in the forward areas. The reason was unknown. Perhaps the enemy was hopeful that he could concentrate his armor for further efforts at breaking out of the pocket, or that he was of the opinion that a concentration in the rear areas would offer him a force that he could use as a mobile reserve to possibly press against the major efforts being pressed against him.

During the period, the first experience during this operation of a town being surrendered by a non-military person was undergone by forces entering SCHLIPRUTHERN, where the burgomaster met forward elements and

accepted proferred terms of surrender, which included a military garrison present in the village.

904 prisoners of war were taken during the period, and among were identified elements of the 338 Infantry Division, 130 Peaser Lear Division, 3 Panzer Grenation Division, 176 Infantry Division, 116 Panzer Division, 476 Infantry Division, and any number of separate units GMA formations, AA units, Home Guard Battalions, and several miscellapeous Air Corps Service units.

Captured and destroyed during the period were 38 motor transpersa-8 AA guns (20mm & 40mm), 1 - 150mm Artillery piece, 3 - 75mm Self-propelled guns, and 6 tanks. In addition 2 - 88mm anti-tank guns were captured intact.

On April 12th, the Division was finally able to use the terrain that was encountered to break completely through the system of defenses that had been attempted, and a speedy advance was marked up. The enemy was badly erganised, and advances were made without serious difficulty. A terrific toll of prisoners was taken, including most of the staff of the LXXXI Gerps, which had been controlling the sector in which the Division had been operating. It appeared that communications had completely broken down as far as the enemy was concerned, for this headquarters and (ethers were completely out of touch with one another, and it had been impossible for them to keep abreast of the situation on their own fronts er en adjacent enes.

For the first time during the operation, the terrain encountered was other than completely a hindrance to the Division's operations. By turning west in the sector, the troops were able to reach out to reads and countryside that permitted limited operations off the main axis, and with this in mind, it was possible to get around the enemy's primary defenses and neutralize them without the resulting less of speed of advance that had been experienced thus far in the operation. The Division was able to reach into the rear areas of the enemy's forces, and was able to effect a great deal of material damage to the troops on the ground, both in personnel and in equipment. The amount of equipment 75 that was destroyed and overrun was so enormous that an estimate was not even to be attempted.

It was strange to note that while one force of the Division was able to record all of the aforementioned advances, it was impossible initially for another force to gain anything like the same speed due to the fact that it was operating in country in which most routes were canalized and even the feeblest efforts of the enemy were sufficient to delay the forces to an immeasurable degree. While the defenses that the enemy had were not defended as in the past, the mere presence of road blocks and the like were enough to slow down the advances, for there were few detouring routes that were available for use by the attacking forces.

It was estimated that during the period, over 4,000 prisoners were taken. In this lot were prisoners from all of the formations that had been previously contacted, plus a miscellany of odd units that were more or less employed without mission and without adequate supplies. There was some armor contacted during the period, but most of the prisoners from the armored units were fighting as infantry, if fighting at all, when captured.

In spite of the striking success that the Division enjoyed during the period, it was felt that the general scheme of the enemy's tactics had not been abandoned, and it was expected that more contact with terrain defenses and defense along roads would be encountered during future operations against the pocket. It was not at this time believed that the enemy was broken, but that he had suffered a temporary setback because he had not been prepared for an attack in the direction or the speed with which it had been launched. It was felt that a continued defense of critical features would be encountered, even though it might be of token nature, and by troops that were not of the opinion that their position was unimportant in the shole scheme of defense. The quality of the prisoners pointed to this fact rather conclusively; it did not appear that the general morale of the enemy had been at all broken.

The operations on April 13th bore out suppositions to a great extent. The nature of the terrain again afforded the enemy an excellent opportunitz to implementing his defensive measures from critical features. The roads cut through narrow mountain passes, and were difficult for armored units to use except in narrow columns. The enemy followed his past example, and deployed his anti-armor defenses astride the roads in depth, permitting him to delay our advances to a great extent. Artillery fire was heavy on occasions, and even led one to believe that the enemy had recuperated in realms of displacement of artillery pieces and in supply of ammunition for them. Direct fire from anti-tank weapons was also much heavier.

There was even one display of aggression during the period, when in an otherwise calm sector to the south of the Division's area a small force of infantry with limited armored support counterattacked our forces in an attempt to regain some features of ground that commanded a portion of that sector. The counterattack was launched in the vicinity of NEUNRADE, with the enemy forces moving to the north. It was contained without difficulty; our forces mexingain were able to inflict rather heavy personnel casualties and knocked out one Mark V tank that was supporting the attack.

Most of the strong points encountered during the period by advancing forces offered resistance in direct proportion to the amount of pressure exerted upon it. After some delay had been caused the attacking forces, and after artillery had been brought to bear on the points, the troops manning the position surrendered. However, their missions were fairly satisfactorily carried out, for the delay was a marked one when the combination of all of the delays caused by all of the points were considered on an overall basis.

Over 6000 prisoners were processed during the period, which would, if taken at face value, cause one to wonder why progress had been as slow as it had been. The truth of the matter was that most of the prisoners were taken in the screening of the areas to the rear that

had been passed through to rapidly on the day before, and the will to fight was at a low ebb when these forces saw the power that was being pushed through the area which they had been defending. Among the prisoners was the remainder of the staff of the LXXXI Corps, including the Commander, General der Infantrie KOCHLING. These remains of the staff had been separated only a short while from those captured on the day before and submitted to surrender to a patrol operating in the inactive sectors towards the rear. Also surrendering in the rear was the Transport Battalion of the 3 Panser Grenadier Division, which had been in hiding in a wooded area when our forces pushed through the day before. They offered no fight and surrendered with all of the equipment of the battalion, which included a large number of vehicles.

Some success was attained during the period in broadcast appeals in the bypassed areas. It was estimated that over 1,000 prisoners were gathered from the wooded areas when broadcasts were directed to them and surrender terms offered. Most of them so taken were more afraid of what would happen to them if they surrendered than if they had to be rooted out.

It is not as pronounced as it had been the day before. True, the terrain did not afford him the opportunity to employ defensive taetics as satisfactorily as he had in the past, but even those defenses established were not held in the same spirit as they had been in the past. Armor was contacted generally along all routes, though not in particular excess at any one point. It appeared that the enemy was attempting to get

further action.

It was by this time that the Ruhr pocket had been definitely out in two parts, and the knowledge of this fact became more or less widely known to the forces that were opposing our advances. The prisoner take for the day was something in excess of 4,500; the exact count was difficult to determine because of the great numbers that were still on the roads marching back to the prisoner of war enclosures during the latter hours of the period.

An Allied prisoner camp was liberated during the period in the near vicinity of HEMER, in which there were over 27,000 Allied prisoners of many nationalities. This was the greatest camp to date that had been overrun by our forces; the conditions at the camp were beyond the imagination of most of the men participating in the liberation.

The enemy came back into his own as far as defenses were conserned on April 15th. Contact was made early in the period. Most of the units contacted were AA units that had been committed to a final defense of the routes of entrance into the remainder of the pocket. Fire was heavy from the AA weapons that were emplaced along the routes, and there was a succession of strong points that was being continually run into by our advancing forces. There was only one action that was out of the ordinary for the enemy. Gun crews were ambitious and fired vigorously on our forces, but when their ammunition was expended in many cases, they surrendered readily to the nearest troops without offering further resistance. There apparently was no attempt on the part of the gun crews to disable the weapons when they were abandoned.

There were only 176 prisoners taken during the period; almost a direct ratio to the intensity of the fighting encountered. The only material taken during the period was destroyed, and included 14 pieces of anti-tank and AA artillery that had been used on our forces.

April 16th saw the end to the enemy forces in that portion of the

make pocket where the Division was operating. This end was accomplished tanky in the period when a negotiated surrender was effected between our advance froces and a representative of the LIM Gorps, who submitted to surrender all of the forces under control of that Gorps, the number of which was originally estimated at something like 5000. It took the remainder of April 16th and all day April 17th for all of the units to report to the collecting points that had been established by the Division, and it was found that the German commander's estimate was either very far wrong, or there were a let of units that had not been affected by the surrender that come to the collecting points of their own volition.

//final count of the number of prisoners reporting was 20, 300!

Included in the surrendering forces were the 190 Infantry Division, 180 Infantry Division, 116 Panser Division, and what was left of the 9 Panser Division. Also, there were numerous smaller units of regimental, battalion, and separate units size. The exact tell was impossible to obtain.

In addition to the personnel surrendered, there were thousands of vehicles of all descriptions that were surrendered. The toll Merepresented all of the organisational transportation of all of the formations that surrendered. There were also many weapons and armored vehicles that were either destroyed prior to capture or were surrendered along with the remainder of the unit. The surrendere represented the total elimination from this war of all of the organisations that were turned ever to the Division by Major General Frity Bayerlein, the commander of the LIII Corps, speaking originally through Brigadier General Von Waldenberg, commander of the 116 Panser Division.

Besides the above listed general officers, Major General Hammer, commanding the 190 Infantry Division, and Brigadier General Klosterkemper, commander of the 180 Infantry Division surrendered - all with their complete staffs. It was the largest bag of prisoners recorded for the division for any like period since landing on the shores of France!

A conservative estimate of theamount of material surrendered to the Division was arrived at only after a few days. The estimate, which

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was undoubtedly less than half actually marked off from combat strengths of German organizations, amounted to 850 vehicles, 100 motorcycles, 200 bicycles, 200 horses, and over a 100 horse-drawn vehicles. These figures are not intended to include that material that was left behind by units when they marched to the prisener eages.

There was no contact made by the Division for the remainder of the month of Apri, and all that happened was really an anti-climax to the mass surrender on the 16th. In all of the areas being occupied by troops of the Division, there were prisoners being picked up, particularly when the Division moved from the Ruhr area to the near environs of Gottingen, and remained there awaiting assignment of further mission.

During this period when the Division was not in contact with organised forces of the enemy, from 16 April to the end of the month, 783 stragglers and hospital dischargees and the like were taken prisoner, bringing the Division total to date to 61, 728.

As the menth ended, attention of the Division had been focused on the area well to the north that was being occupied - to the north of the Elbe River east of Hamburg, and north therefrom to the Baltic Sea coast line. With this area of interest now an assigned factor, the enemy forces, the terrain, and the indications of past action were being closely watched as the month came to an end. With the enemy forces surrendering in ever increasing numbers and more and more German territory being occupied from the East by the rapidly advancing Russian forces and from the West by all the Allies, a watchful eye was being kept on the entire situation as a whole. There appeared to be reason for the optimism that was becoming apparent.