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AAR # 90

AFTER ACTION REPORT

CC "R"

5TH ARMORED DIVISION

Aug 44 thru April 45

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AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

(1 August 1944 -- 31 August 1944)

HQ RES COMD 5TH ARMD DIV
APO 255

CCR was formally activated as the 3rd Combat Command of the 5th Armored Division in July 1944, VCGG. Upon its arrival in NORMANDY, CCR went into an assembly area in the vicinity of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE. With the other major commands of the Division, CCR departed from its initial assembly area, in preparation for active operations against the Germans, on 1 August 1944. CCR began movement about 2200.

The line-up as CCR began operations was: Combat Command, Colonel Glen H. Anderson, Inf, 08632; Lt. Colonel Kenneth P. Gilson, Inf, 0359160, Acting S-3 Air; Lt. Colonel William H. Allen, Inf, 0223875, Unassigned; Major Alfred H. Johnson, Cav, 0266524, S-3; Major Alonzo R. Pierce, Inf, 0374814, S-4; Captain Richard F. Wilkins, Inf, 0416201, S-2; Lt. Yewell M. Farmer, Cav, 01011043, Liaison Officer; Major Raymond T. Mc Farlin, MC, 0317687, Combat Surgeon.

Unit Commanders included: Lt. Colonel Howard E. Boyer, Inf, 0218680, Commanding Officer, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion; Lt. Colonel William A. Hamberg, Inf, 0292156, Commanding Officer, 10th Tank Battalion; Lt. Colonel James N. Mc Neer, FA, 0223703, Commanding Officer, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; Captain Charles Perlman, CE, 01101162, Commanding Officer, C Company, 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion; Captain Fred C. Hopper, Jr., Inf, 01010215, Commanding Officer, CCR Trains.

Before leaving the assembly area at ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE, Colonel Anderson had worked out a formation based on the married tank-infantry operations, practiced in England, in which "A" and "C" Companies of the 10th Tank Battalion habitually operated with "A" and "C" Companies of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion under the control of the CO of the 10th. "B" Company of the 10th habitually operated with "B" Company of the Infantry under the control of the CO of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion. With the addition of the Headquarters Company of the Tank Battalion, the former combination was commonly spoken of as the 10th; with the addition of the Headquarters Company of the Infantry Battalion, the latter combination was commonly spoken of as the 47th.

Upon leaving its initial assembly area, CCR moved into a temporary bivouac area vicinity LESSAY, marching via ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE, and PONT L'ABBE. CCR reached the LESSAY area approximately 0500, 2 August 1944. About noon, 2nd August 1944 Colonel Anderson was summoned to the Division Command Post where he received orders to march with the rest of the Division on FOUGERES. CCR began moving at 1400, but owing to the road congestion in the vicinity of PERIERS, movement of the Combat Command was blocked until nearly 2000 hours. Between 2400 August 2nd and 0200, 3rd August, CCR was ordered off the road into temporary bivouac in order to clear the roads for movement of elements of VII Corps. CCR was then southeast of GAVRAY in the immediate vicinity of LE MESNIL VILLEMAN. The march was resumed at 1100 and by 2000, CCR was closed in bivouac in the immediate vicinity of MARCILLY. As CCR was leaving the road at least 13 German 109 MESSERSCHMIDTS pursued by four American P51s strafed the column. This was the first contact of CCR with German air since the arrival of the command in France. Three of the 13 planes were shot down.

The 5th Armored Division, having been given the mission of blocking an anticipated German counterattack from Mortain toward Avranches, on August 5th CCR again moved southward to the vicinity of St. Martin de Landelle, where it remained that night.

On the morning of August 6th at 0600, CCR marched on CHATEAU GONTIER by way of ST. JAMES, ARGOUGES, FOUGERES, VITRE. At 1200, the combat command halted northwest of ARGENTRE behind CCA which was engaging a small German rearguard at CRAON. The command bivouaced for the night at ARGENTRE and resumed the march the following day.

Lt. Colonel KENNETH P. GILSON was assigned as CCR executive Officer, and Lt. Colonel WILLIAM H. ALLEN was assigned as S-3 Air on the afternoon of 6 August.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

DECLASSIFYING COMMITTEE 13 Aug 1946

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CCR, with the rest of the Division, had now been given the mission of marching on LE MANS. The night of 7 August, CCR minus one married platoon of "A" companies and the assault guns of Headquarters Company, 10th Tank Battalion, bivouaced vicinity of ST. BRICE northwest of SABLE. The married platoon of "A" Companies, supported by the assault guns of the 10th Tank Battalion, engaged an unidentified force of German infantry, supported by Panther tanks, at CHEMERE, vicinity ST. DENIS D'ANCON. The Germans were attempting to maneuver into position to attack our column from the south flank when engaged just at dusk by our flank guard. The Germans in the engagement which was fought until past 0000, 8 August lost one Panther Tank and 8 killed. Six prisoners of war were taken but unit identification of these is lacking in the records. CCR suffered no casualties.

At 0600, 8 August 1944, CCR resumed the march on LE MANS, marching by way of BOUESSAY, ASNIERES, TASSE, NOYEN, ST. JEAN DU BOIS, LA SUZE, FILLE, SPAY, MULSANNE. The forward elements of CCR bypassed some resistance at FILLE, which the 47th Echelon encountered about 1600. German resistance consisted of 3 or 4 machine guns and a few snipers, all of which were quickly reduced. Late in the afternoon of 8 August CCR moved into a defensive position in the vicinity of ST. GERVAIS and LAIGNE with the mission of blocking off German re-enforcements moving from the south towards LE MANS. CCR remained in this position the following day and although approximately 40 prisoners of war were taken, they were stragglers from various units. The only important identification was reconnaissance elements from the Panzer Division "Das Reich".

Late in the afternoon of 9 August, CCR was ordered to march northward from LE MANS to seize five crossings of the ORNE RIVER east of BALLON and in the vicinity of MAROLLES. "C" company and Reconnaissance Platoon, 628 Tank Destroyer Battalion with Captain HAL A. BURGESS, JR., FA, 01168583, commanding, was attached to CCR for this operation. The order of march was 10th Tank married, Tank Destroyers, 47th Infantry married, 95th Field Artillery, Trains.

By 2000 our forward elements had reached BEUFAY and knocked out a road block of a small number of German infantry. "D" company, 10th Tank Battalion, engaged in a fire fight with a platoon of German infantry and knocked out one halftrack. No prisoners were taken, however. The 10th Tank Echelon of "A" and "C" companies married meanwhile, had pushed on and seized two crossings of the ORNE, "A" Company having seized a crossing in the vicinity of PERAY and "C" Company a crossing vicinity of MAROLLES. The command post of CCR at this time was immediately south of COURCEMENT. The 47th Echelon was bivouaced in the vicinity of BEAUFAY and the 95th Field Artillery was also in the vicinity of BEAUFAY. At 0200 10 August, CCR Command post moved northward to ST. AIGNAN where it operated during the day's operations of the 10th.

About 0400, 10 August, the CCR Liaison Officer, Lt. FARMER, arrived from the Division Command Post with instructions to push on to the north with ~~CCR~~ as the objective. Battalion commanders were assembled and orders issued but the day's events soon changed all plans.

At 0700 on 10 August a German company of tanks supported by a battery of 88mm guns, a company of infantry, and probably a battery of light artillery counterattacked the bridgehead force of married "C" companies. The tanks and 88mm guns moved into positions dominating the ground occupied by the "C" company combination during the night after our force had crossed the ORNE. The maneuverability of the married "C"'s was hampered by the ORNE to their rear and dominating terrain to their front. No prisoners were taken in the engagement which lasted for 2 1/2 hours and no identifications were made, as the Germans removed all identifications from their dead; and the two Ak IV tanks destroyed in the action burned before markings on them could be identified.

Judging from the promptness with which the Germans counterattacked, their information as to our location, and certainly the nature of the terrain, must have been very good. Undoubtedly the engagement fought at COURCEMENT just at dusk the evening before had alerted the Germans in this area.

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The civilians gave forces information as to how early the Germans had withdrawn ahead of us on the evening of 9 August. The civilian information acquired by "C" Company commanders also indicated that sounds of movements heard north of the ORNE during the night of 9 and 10 August were sounds of further retreat by the Germans. The first light of dawn which revealed the Germans in position and ready to counter-attack proved this information, of course, incorrect.

The plan of meeting the counterattack was to engage the German force south of MAPOULES with the married "C" companies already in position north of the ORNE; to support the "C" companies with a platoon of TDs from "C" Company 628 TD Battalion and the 15th Field Artillery, and Tactical Air Support. The married "A" companies were in position at REAY and in possession of that crossing. They were in position to block German reinforcements from the west and northwest. The 47th Echelon was in Combat Command Reserve. When ordered northward to locations nearer the battlefield, however, that echelon experienced difficulty in moving northward, as German resistance consisting of infantry, anti-tank guns, and mortars in the vicinity of LESIERES west of COURCEMENT, which had been by-passed by the column the night before, attacked the west flank of the reserve element. About the same time this was happening, German artillery began calling in the immediate vicinity of the CCR Command Post at ST. AIGNAN and German infantry attempted to infiltrate into the area of the command post from the west. Aggressive action by the reserve echelon (47th) and counterbattery fire by the 25th FA forestalled both of these minor attacks.

Two German dispositions had to be taken into account by the Combat Commander. An unknown number of German Mark IV and Mark V tanks was reported at 1000 in the vicinity of CHAMPAISSANT - ST. GUSME DE VAIR. Also reconnaissance reports from the evening of 9 August indicated a considerable German force at BOUTETABLE and in the FORET DE BOUTETABLE. Tactical Air Support was available to the Combat Commander after 0800 and was effective in breaking up the German counterattack, destroying two German tanks and forcing the rest to withdraw. The threat of air attack, in addition to the excellent tactical position of the "A" companies, prohibited an effective attack by the German tank force east of CHAMPAISSANT and this force was not committed by the Germans. The Combat Commander ordered one tactical air mission employed against the FORET DE BOUTETABLE and no threat of importance developed from the southeast.

By 1000 hours the situation was well under control. "B" Companies relieved "C" Companies married and pushed on toward MAPOULES and were also securing possession of the crossing immediately west thereof. "A" Companies were engaged in seizing the crossing in the vicinity of NAUVAY. Artillery support after 0930 was also good but prior to that time had not been effective because observation planes were approximately 60 miles to rear due to misunderstanding of responsibility for movement of planes; and the time consumed in getting forward observers forward to their respective companies owing to failure of the Artillery Liaison Officer.

Casualties suffered included Captain JOHN M. CRAFTS, Company Commander "C" company, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, killed early in the action. Total casualties of CCR were:

By 1700 CCB had come up behind CCR with the leading elements of the former somewhere in the vicinity of COURCEMENT and by 1600, CCB had begun to relieve CCR in occupation of the 5 crossings of the ORNE. At 2000, CCR Command Post moved to a new location in the vicinity of JAUSE and plans were made and orders issued for movement to the north the following day.

CCR had now been given the mission of marching on SEES in two columns. The march began at 0700. The western axis of advance on which the 47th Echelon marched was via AUBSNES, CHAMPAISSANT, ST. VINCENT, ST. REMY, MAMERS, AILLIERES, LOUZES, CHASSE. The eastern axis on which the 10th Echelon marched was via ST. PIERRE, ORIGNY, LE ROUX, SURE, CONTILLY, VIDAY, LE MESLE. The columns pushed northward steadily throughout the morning against strong German rearguard actions. German rearguards consisted generally of a platoon of infantry supported by a section or platoon of MK IV tanks. The terrain was rolling, wooded country with good observation up to 5 and 6 miles.

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On each flank of CCR's 1 of advance was a major obsta The heavily fortified FORET DE PERSEIGNE was on the west flank and the equally heavily fortified FORET DE BELLEME on the east flank.

The FORET DE PERSEIGNE had been the headquarters of the 81st PANZER CORPS until the night before our push northward from ST. COSME. PWs captured throughout the morning and early afternoon were from the Corps Signal Battalion and had been sent out to cut communications in the face of our advance. Prisoners with similar missions belonged to the 432nd, and to the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 897th Infantry Regiment of the 352nd Division.

About 1500, the Combat Commander received orders from Division to combine his two columns into one column so that CCA could side slip to the east on what had been our western route. By 1800 the two columns had joined at LE MESLE and the 10th Echelon waited in place for the 47th Echelon to precede it in the order of march.

The movement of CCR northward against stiff rearguard action of the Germans had been marked by close and effective air support by Tactical Air Support. Several German columns moving northward on routes paralleling our route of advance were observed, bombed, and strafed by P47's giving our column air support. At 1457 the Air Corps bombed German tanks 5 miles west of ALENCON. An unknown number were knocked out. At 1745 a column of tanks and hostile vehicles north east of ALENCON and another column headed northeast from LE MESLE were bombed. According to Air Corps tally and CCR tally, by combined air ground action CCR destroyed on its march northward 29 Mark IV tanks and 1 Panther tank and 60 other vehicles.

By 1800, it was apparent that we had contacted the southern flank of a German Division attempting to withdraw to the East. Though identifications were not available at the time, from identifications acquired later it is estimated that this was probably the 253rd Infantry Division. Mobile counterattacking forces were apparently drawn from the 12th SS Panzer Division, Hitler Jugend.

But the heaviest engagement of the day's operations was fought at sundown at ESSAI. The 47th Echelon of CCR had pushed on from LE MESNIL toward SEES about 1800. At 1900 they reported contacting infantry, anti-tank guns, and tanks at ESSAI. From reports of tanks moving southward from NEAUFHE it was evident that the Germans were determined to delay us at ESSAI as long as possible. The artillery promptly went into position and two air support missions were flown at dusk. The 47th Echelon attacked immediately following the air attack and the tank and infantry attack proceeded well after dark. The attack was successful and resulted in getting the leading elements of 47 well out of the woods. The Germans suffered such heavy losses in vehicles and personnel as a result of this battle that during the night they withdrew. The total number of prisoners for the day's operation was 135. It was estimated that German losses in personnel were at least 300. Our losses were:

The significant facts of the day's operations were the close and immediate and effective air support; the surprise affected upon the Germans as evidenced by the fact that the 81st Panzer Corps Headquarters moved from its location in the FORET DE PERSEIGNE only the night before we reached it; the by-passing of two heavily fortified areas by our columns without damage to ourselves; and finally the use of an Armored Infantry Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon supported by a platoon of light tanks as a reconnaissance agency for an armored column.

In regard to the latter, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 47th Battalion preceded the western column throughout the day's operations. Not until late in the afternoon was it given the support of the light tanks in platoon strength. It had had, however, the close fire support of the leading platoon of the married "B" companies throughout the day. Although this employment of an infantry reconnaissance platoon is not recommended against an enemy defending in organized and prepared positions, during the operations on 11 August this employment proved successful. The only casualty suffered by the platoon was one man killed.

CCR's drive to the north was resumed at 0700 on the 12th with the combat command marching in one column. As CCR was getting under way the Division Commander arrived to congratulate Colonel ANDERSON on the remarkable progress of the combat command

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during the previous day's operations. At 0800 orders were received to halt in place. Immediately the message was given to the Commanding General and he ordered us to disregard the order and to continue the march.

The column by-passed SEES by marching on secondary roads to the east of town, and did not contact the Germans until the forward elements bumped into a German rearguard northeast of SEES at 1100. The rearguard was composed of a platoon of tanks apparently with no other support. The engagement was short, and although no tanks were lost on either side the Germans hastily withdrew northward. Pushing steadily on against moderate resistance, CCR by 1600 had its first echelon, the married Bakers, in NONANT LE PIN.

Stragglers captured along the way were identified from the 10th Panzer Grenadier Regt, 9th Panzer Division, 84th Corps, the 17th SS Panzer Division and 3rd Parachute Division. A prisoner captured early in the afternoon from the 12th Panzer stated that his outfit was in the vicinity of GACE and that GACE was well fortified with mines and Anti-tank guns, some of which were 88s.

At NONANT LE PIN the CCR column divided into two echelons. The 47th ECHELON marched on RJ GC 16, GC 14, and N24; the 10th ECHELON marched on GACE. In the vicinity of LA CORBETTE, North of NONANT LE PIN, the 10th Tank Battalion, about 1700, encountered a German mine field, the first contact of the campaign by CCR with German mines. Engineers from "C" Company, 22 Engineers, cleared the mine field promptly, however, and by 2100 the 10th Tank Bn had established a road block at the junction of N24 and GC14 south of GACE. This was accomplished against heavy resistance, the Germans having both anti-tank guns and artillery in position southeast of GACE.

The 47th Battalion meanwhile had advanced to the RJ immediately southeast of LE PIN AU HARAS where it established road blocks to block traffic moving south and east. Immediately after dark a German column moving south from EXMES without reconnaissance bumped into one of these road blocks and was totally annihilated.

The complete confusion existing among the Germans and the depth to which we had penetrated in the German rear areas can be measured from the identifications secured from prisoners of war and documents. German units identified included:

- Reconnaissance Company, 81st Corps.
- 6th Battery, 441 AA Battalion.
- 9th Co, 156th Panzer Grenadier Regt, 116th Panzer Grenadier Division.
- 1st Battery, 13200 AA Battalion.
- Observation Battery, 102nd Artillery Regiment, SS Division "Das Reich".
- 564th Transportation Battalion.
- Trains, 10th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 9th Panzer Division.
- Headquarters, 1st Battalion and 2nd Medical Company, SS Leibstandarte "Adolf Hitler".
- 32nd Medical Company, 3rd Parachute Division.
- Headquarters Company, 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, SS Division Hitler Jugend.
- 1st Labor Battalion (Russian).

Early on the morning of August 13th, the 47th with its married Bakers moved into position at the Road Junction GC 16, GC 14, and N24, effectively blocking, with the support of Tank Destroyers, that intersection of highways. The 10th Tank Battalion in the interim was fighting a strenuous battle south of GACE. To secure possession of that road junction originally, the battalion had to combat four 88mm anti-tank guns protected by infantry. The Germans, having sized up the situation south of GACE during the night, counter-attacked at noon. The counter-attack was preceded by continuous and heavy artillery concentrations. The artillery was believed to be a battalion of 105mm from the 102nd Artillery Regiment. The infantry attacked following the artillery preparation but were thrown back repeatedly. By 1500, however, the artillery fire had become so heavy that the commanding officer 10th Tank Battalion came to the Command Post CCR, then located at the crossroads southeast of LE PIN AU HARAS to acquaint the combat commander personally with the situation. He stated that infantry re-enforcements were necessary if he was to continue to hold the road block south of GACE. Colonel ANDERSON at this point was ordered to the Division CP for in-

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structions. During his absence, about 1000 Hamburg radiced that he could not continue to hold his ground. At this time the position of the 10th Tank was further complicated by a flank attack by infantry supported by a section of self propelled guns approaching from the southeast on highway GC 4. At this juncture, Colonel ANDERSON, who was by now returning from Division Headquarters, radiced that re-enforcements were arriving, that the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion was already moving northward, having been detached from GCB and attached to CCR to relieve the situation.

The situation was now overhauled and 10th Tank Battalion ordered to withdraw to the crossroads at LA CASTELLE and to block the road leading to the east toward LE MERLEAULT from NONANT. One company of the 15th Infantry was ordered to CROISILLES to block the roads there. The remainder of the 15th Infantry Battalion was put in reserve.

It was later determined that the German outfit counter-attacking the 10th Tank Battalion was probably the 25th Panzer Grenadier Regiment whose headquarters was at GACE. Apparently several replacements and stragglers were in the ranks of this Regiment for prisoners taken were identified from the 116 Panzer Grenadier Regt, 156th Pz Gren Regt, 60th Pz Gren Regt.

The 47th echelon was experiencing the German Nebelwerfer for the first time, at least six nebalwerfer shells having landed in its position. Prisoners later were taken from the Nebelwerfer Battalion, 8th Brigade, SS Panzer Division "Deutschland". Prisoners were also taken from the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and it was estimated that elements of this division were being used by the Germans as a mobile reserve. This mobile reserve, however, was never committed by them probably because our role at that time was purely defensive and the Germans were not sufficiently organized to launch an attack on a scale that would compel us to withdraw. The variety of units identified at this time as outlined in the S-2 Journal serves to illustrate again the confusion existing in the German ranks.

On the 14th of August the situation was relatively quiet. The general action of the Germans was an attempt on their part to infiltrate tanks, which had been trapped by our rapid advance, northward to rejoin their units. The result was that the Air Corps had a field day and day's tally for the 14th August showed that by combined air-ground action 25 tanks were destroyed. Early in the afternoon the reconnaissance of the 116th Panzer attempted to patrol our positions on our left flank. The reconnaissance patrols approached our positions from the vicinity of LE BOURG ST. LEONARDS. Six prisoners were taken and the remainder of the patrol which initially made contact without positions was destroyed.

On the morning of the 15th August orders were received by the Combat Commander from the Division Commander that the 353rd Regt of the 90th Infantry Division would relieve us in place; that we were to assemble and march on DREUX. The relief was not completed until 1500 in the afternoon. With "C" Troop of the 85th Cavalry under the command of Captain JOHN R. VANE, 01010690; and Company "B" and Reconnaissance platoon of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion both attached; and with the 47th Armored Field Artillery Battalion giving direct support, CCR began its march on DREUX at 1700. CCR was assigned the northern route which was an exposed flank. Information from Division G-2 indicated that MOULINS LA MACHE AND LAIGLE were German strong points and, as our mission was to get to DREUX as quickly as possible, it was decided by the Combat Commander to by-pass these places. CCR marched in two columns with the 47th Infantry Echelon, CCR Headquarters, 47th Field Artillery, 2 platoons of "C" troop, 1 platoon tank destroyers in the south column. The 10th Tank Battalion Echelon, 95th Field Artillery, one platoon "C" troop and 2 platoons of tank destroyers were in north column. The South column made very rapid progress marching by way of GAPREE, ST. GERMAIN, LE PLANTIS, ST. GERMAIN DE MARTIGNY, ST. CUEN SOLIGNY, FORET DE LA TRAPPE, ST. MARTIN D'APRES. By 0300, 16 August the south column had passed ST MARTIN D'AERES and cleared the road into temporary service areas for refueling. The northern column was marching by way of NEUVILLEY, COURTOMER, TELLIERES, ST AGNAN. About 2000 in the vicinity of TELLIERES the column was fired upon by hostile artillery and a delay of several hours resulted. The 10th Tank echelon did not, therefore, reach the servicing area east of ST. MARTIN D'APRES until after 0900

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The southern column meanwhile had pushed on at daybreak and by 1100 Colonel BOYER's 47th column was passing through BREZOUS and had made contact with the Germans. By noon the forward elements of the columns had reached the outskirts of DREUX and a platoon of light tanks which had been the advance guard drew fire from a battery of 88mm Anti-tank guns dug in along the western approaches to the city. One light tank was knocked out, and Lt. O'CONNOR, platoon commander, was killed. Colonel BOYER immediately deployed his married "B" companies and his artillery in preparation for the battle. Reconnaissance of the German position disclosed that the Germans were entrenched with artillery and anti-tank support and the general support of a few tanks. The German forces were apparently composed of elements of the 10th Panzer Grenadier Regt, 9th Panzer Division, and 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Panzer Division. As the 47th Echelon was deploying for battle the German Artillery, which had excellent observation from the DREUX heights opened counter battery fire on our artillery forcing it to displace several hundred yards to the rear. The fire fight began shortly thereafter.

Meanwhile, information had been received that the second column of CCR after completing its servicing at ST. MARTIN D'APRES and continuing its march, had encountered strong resistance in the vicinity of CRULAI. A platoon of Mk V tanks supported by a company of infantry and four heavy mortars attacked the left flank of the artillery column knocking out one M7 howitzer, one halftrack, and two smaller vehicles. The artillery fired direct fire at the attacking tanks, destroying probably one Mk IV and two Mk Vs forcing the Germans to retire. This engagement delayed the arrival of Colonel HAMBURG's column at DREUX until 1600. By that time the Combat Commander had been ordered to withdraw from contact with the Germans and had been informed that CCB had originally been given the mission of seizing the city. CCR was given the mission of blocking re-enforcements moving toward DREUX from the north.

Reconnaissance of the area north of DREUX and the crossings of the AVRE RIVER began in the late afternoon. It was determined that approximately two companies of infantry were occupying the area. It was not determined whether the infantry was supported by tanks or artillery. Darkness had settled by the time reconnaissance was completed and the combat commander decided that it was not wise to move northward until the following morning. At 0700 17 August 1944 Colonel BOYER's echelon began moving northward and by 0900 had encountered German infantry supported by machine gun and mortar fire, north of DREUX in the vicinity of MUZY. Although the EURE was an obstacle protecting our right flank, the Germans had excellent observation from the high ground on the east bank into our advancing columns.

Colonel HAMBURG's echelon was moving parallel to Colonel BOYER's (47th married). The mission of Colonel BOYER was to seize the crossings of the AVRE at MUZY and MOTEL and the crossings of the EURE at MONTREUL. Colonel HAMBURG's (10th married) mission was to seize the crossings of the AVRE west of MUZY exclusive of GERMAIN sur AVRE.

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Both columns encountered much the same opposition. A Few Mk IV tanks not exceeding one company were encountered which refused to fight it out. The German forces opposing us were composed of elements from the 1st Company of the Fortification IG Battalion, 901st Panzer Grenadier Regt, the Defense company of the Panzer Lehr Division, and the 38th Machine Gun Battalion. In MOTEL the forward elements of Colonel BOYER's column contacted and captured prisoners from the 17th GAF Division. It was learned from the prisoners that the 17th had been ordered from HOLLAND to stop our drive toward the SEINE. Both the 33rd and 34th Regiments of the 17th GAF Division plus the Anti-Tank Battalion were identified.

Colonel HAMBERG's column experienced little difficulty in pushing to the AVRE but it was later decided to hold only the crossing at BOURG L'ABBE. Colonel BOYER's column on orders of the combat commander undertook to enter both MUZY and MOTEL about 1700 but was forced back by heavy artillery fire and anti tank fire. Later it was determined that the Anti tank battalion of the 17th GAF Division was in position along the north bank of the AVRE opposite us.

The day's operations ended with CCR firmly in control of all territory north of DREUX to the AVRE and westward from the EURE to the Railroad. "C" troop of the 85th Cavalry had been given the mission of screening the left flank, which it accomplished. Tally for the day was 12 prisoners, one Mk IV, 3 Mk Vs, 1 Selfpropelled gun, and 3 75mm Anti tank guns destroyed. Air support was used to good advantage in attacking German Tank assembly areas in which German tanks were so well camouflaged as hay stacks and bushes that the air support had to follow tank tracks until they stopped and then bomb whatever was there. Results were excellent.

The following day, 18 August, was comparatively quiet. Information from "C" troop of the Cavalry, however, indicated considerable activity on our left flank in the vicinity of NONANCOURT. An unknown number of tanks was reported in that vicinity. The married "C" company combination was kept in combat command reserve to counter this threat. The major activity of the day was an infantry counterattack by the Germans which departed from MUZY. It was quickly broken up by the assault guns and machine guns of the 47th Infantry.

On 19 August, CCR was relieved in its position north of DREUX by a combat command of the 7th Armored Division. CCR had been given the mission on the afternoon of 16 August of moving northward to ANET on the east side of the EURE where it was to protect the left rear flank of the Corps. At 0840 as the column was passing through DREUX eight German fighters appeared overhead but were promptly chased out of the sky by friendly air cover. At least one ME was shot down by friendly AA. Little resistance was encountered on the march to ANET and by 1330 CCR was in position as ordered. German air reconnaissance was active, however, and watched us coming in.

ANET was the strongpoint of the German defenses in this area, the 5th, 6th, and 7th companies of the 47th Infantry being in that area. The mission of the 5th company was to take the woods east of town, while the 6th Company was to take and hold ANET with the 7th company protecting it from the South. This plan was foiled by our arrival.

A prisoner of war captured from the 17th GAF Division on our movement north stated that his division was moving into the sector ST. GERMAIN on the west to Highway 143 on the east. It was also learned that the 2nd Battalion of the 26th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the SS Panzer Division "Hitler Jugend" was located in the vicinity of DAMVILLE.

By 1610 patrols of CCR had contacted the Germans at ANET and determined that there were one Mark IV tank and 12 vehicles at ANET; that 13 supply trucks of the American 79th Infantry Division had been trapped in the woods west of ANENT by the Germans. These were immediately rescued.

CCR enjoyed the advantage of terrain in this situation, as it occupied the high ground immediately west of the town and this terrain dominated the surrounding country. The Germans conscious of our terrain advantage and apparently assigned the mission of seizing that ground, attacked on the morning of the 20th with 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 17th GAF Division, supported by at least one battalion of the

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Divisional artillery. The attack came across the EURE between ANET and IVRY but was stopped with heavy losses to the Germans before it had even gained momentum. The 47th echelon of CCR immediately retaliated by attacking German infantry dug in at IVRY.

By 1200 on the 20th all activity had quieted and at 1600 CCR was again being relieved in its positions by elements of the 7th Armored Division. Late in the afternoon CCR moved to an assembly area south of GRAVENT closing in the area by 2100.

Throughout the day on 21 August CCR was in Division reserve on alert for movement towards PACY SUR EURE to protect the left rear flank of the Division. The combat command, however, was not committed.

At 0300 on 22 August CCR received information from the Division G-2 that there were 18 tanks and an unknown amount of infantry in the FORET DE PACEY. At 0900 the Combat Commander departed for the Division command post to receive instructions on the employment of CCR in clearing the FORET DE PACEY. At 1300 CCR moved out and marched on LA HEUNIERE which it reached at 1600. The attack began at 1615 but no contact was made and by 1745 it had been determined that the FORET DE PACEY was completely clear of enemy.

On the 22nd, Lt Col. GILSON was assigned as Commanding Officer 15th Armored Infantry Battalion and Lt Colonel GLENN G. DICKENSON, Cav, 0197385 was assigned as Executive Officer, CCR.

On the morning of 23 August, CCR was ordered to move to the vicinity of ST. COLOMBE to protect the left flank of the Division. And by 1700 CCR had reached its assembly area without making contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance quickly determined that AUTHOUILLET and AUTHEUIL were clear. The mission of CCR in this operation was to protect the rear of the Division against an attack by German artillery and tanks reported moving north from vicinity of GRAVINGNY towards LOUVIVIERS from which the Germans were escaping across the SEINE.

At 0800 24 August Colonel ANDERSON left the Combat Command post for the Division Command Post where he received orders to move his combat command to an assembly area south east of MANTES GASSICOURT where CCR, under Corps control, would be a mobile reserve to back up the Cavalry Group then in contact with the Germans east of the MAULDRE.

"D" Troop 95th Cavalry under the command of Captain LEONARD S CARLSON, 01011717, was attached to CCR for this operation. "B" Company 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion remained attached. Other than this, CCR's composition remained as usual.

The combat command with the 10th Tank Echelon in the lead began moving at 1300. Marching in one column it moved by way of HOULBEC, LA HEUNIERE, DOUAINS, CRAVENET, BREVAL, GOUSSONVILLE. At that time, considerable confusion in orders resulted.

Orders from Division that CCR would go into an assembly area southeast of MANTES GASSICOURT as Corps mobile reserve had not been rescinded. Corps, however, had issued orders directly to Colonel ANDERSON through the Commanding Officer of the 106th Cavalry Group, Colonel WILSON, that CCR was to cross the MAULDRE and attack to the north clearing all enemy from the pocket south of the SEINE RIVER west of POISSY. Colonel ANDERSON immediately informed General OLIVER of the situation by special dispatch and issued orders to his command to move into an assembly area west of BEYNES in preparation for crossing the MAULDRE.

Colonel ANDERSON and his S-3 then went to the command post of the 106th Cavalry for a conference with Colonel WILSON, Group commander. It was learned that the 106th Group was screening the west bank of the MAULDRE from the SEINE to BEYNES. It was also determined that a few German tanks had been seen in the area but that the attitude of the Germans on the east side of the river had not been ~~at all~~ aggressive.

In the meantime a radiogram had ordered Colonel BOYER and the Train Commander to change their route of march at COURGENT and move their commands directly into an assembly area southeast of MARCO. This was done. After returning to his command post Colonel ANDERSON ordered the 10th Tank Battalion and the artillery to march on BEYNES. It was 2200, however, before all of CCR had closed into the area.

The terrain on the east of the MAULDRE beyond BEYNES dominated the surrounding area, with observation under favorable conditions up to 12 miles. German OPs had apparently spotted our column coming in, for about 2400 harassing 88mm fire began

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falling in the assembly area. Although it was estimated that over a hundred rounds of 88mm armor piercing shells were fired by the Germans into the assembly area not one round caused any casualties to CCR in personnel or vehicles. Interdictory artillery fire fell in BEYNES throughout the night again without damage to ourselves.

"D" Troop with elements of the 106th Cavalry Group began reconnaissance of THIVERVAL, DAVRON, CRESPIERES at dawn, 25 August. One small German mine field was located and promptly removed. By FORET DE ALLUEIS east of CRESPIERES. Later it was learned that a battalion of infantry, numbering about 500 thought to be the 3rd Storm Battalion, a hastily organized battalion of administrative personnel from PARIS, which had no heavy weapons, and whose troops were untrained and with extremely low moral, was occupying the forest. In an attack by the 47th Echelon against this position which began at 1400, it was estimated that 20% casualties were inflicted upon the Germans. Our casualties were:

By 1700 CCR was no longer in contact with the Germans as it apparently had cleared the area of whatever German cannon fodder remained there. The commander moved into a bivouac area east of ECQUEVILLY for the night after having achieved a tally for the day of: 30 prisoners of war; 4 105mm howitzers and four 88mm guns all of which had been abandoned, captured, 40 bicycles, and one transport plane in good condition, captured.

August 26th was again a day of conflicting orders. Originally the plan had been to move westward through AUBERGENVILLE and EPONE to the original assembly area southeast of MANTES GASSICOURT. "D" Troop was reconnoitering the route of march and the combat command was on the march when orders were received at noon from the Division Commander to halt in place and prepare to establish a bridgehead with the infantry from CCR across the SEINE in the vicinity of MEULAN the following day.

Immediately the combat commander ordered a special task force from Colonel ROYER's echelon to move to LES MUREAUX and seize the southern approaches to the crossing there. The task force had barely reached LES MUREAUX when the order to make preparations for establishing a bridgehead was rescinded.

CCR, therefore, remained in the area of LES MUREAUX - VERNOUILLET-POISSY outposting the southern bank of the SEINE until the morning of August 30th. Although the Combat Command did remain in this one position during the five day period, it was not inactive. By tank artillery, and mortar fire it continually harrassed German positions and movements on the opposite side of the river. The 47th Infantry married outposted the river from LES MUREAUX TO VERNOUILLET and the 10th Tank married outposted the river from there to POISSY inclusive. The harrassing fire of CCR across the river proved to be very helpful to the Infantry Divisions of the Corps, who were then expanding their bridgehead across the SEINE.

From Monsier BONNET and Madame HOC, two French Agents who had operated with CCR since 16 August; from LIL reports; from observation; and through tapping the telephone line in LES MUREAUX connected to a circuit in MEULAN, CCR during this period acquired a vast amount of information on what the Germans across the river were doing. Detailed reports of this intelligence are to be found in the S-2 Journal of CCR for the period.

When the task force from "B" Company, 47th Infantry entered LES MUREAUX on the afternoon of 28 August, the task force commander Captain FRANK G. PASQUALINO, O450627, discovered that the Germans had evacuated the city so hurriedly - so rapid that CCR's advance across the MAULDEL been - that they had abandoned several German planes on a dispersion field. Moreover, in a nearby warehouse, the Germans abandoned 36 MESSERSCHMIDT motors, 35 propellers, 40 20mm guns (German), at least 100 German machine guns, and thousands of dollars worth of spare parts, compasses, and electric bomb sights for German planes.

One German airplane-airplane factory containing Messerschmidt observation planes Messerschmidt tools and parts and repairs facilities for ME 109's was also abandoned

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by the Germans. The active defense established along the south bank of the SCINE prevented the Germans from returning to destroy the valuable military property. This was the largest amount of German equipment CCR had captured at that time.

On the afternoon of 29 August 1944, the Division Commander issued orders for movement of the Division through PARIS and thence northward to the FORET DE COMPIEGNE.

CCR began moving at 0900, 30 August and passed through the French Capitol at 1100, clearing the city at 1330. As the Combat Command was following CCB on the western axis of advance for the Division, it did not make contact with the Germans throughout the day. AT 2230 CCR moved into a servicing area north of LA CHAPELLE.

At 0200, 31 August, the Combat Commander received instructions from the Division Commander by radio to march on the central axis of advance. The Combat Command began moving at 0700 and, as ordered, sideslipped to the east, marching on the FORET DE COMPIEGNE by way of PLAILLY, BARON, AND BETHISY.

Shortly before 1215, the forward elements of CCR, which at this time were from the 10th Tank Battalion, had contacted the Germans. This took place immediately south of BETHISY. The German force had originally consisted of the 1st Battalion, 6th SICHELING REGIMENT supported by the 10th Battery of the 1143 Artillery Battalion, 105mm Howitzer, tractor drawn. The Air Corps however had spotted the battery the previous day and knocked out three of their guns. On the approach of our column, the crews abandoned the remaining two Howitzers, and the five Howitzers with prime movers were captured by our forces.

By 1435 our leading elements had entered BETHISY, although German artillery fire was still falling in the vicinity. At this point the Combat Commander divided his Command into two columns. Colonel HAMBURG's Command was ordered to enter the FORET DE COMPIEGNE by way of BETHISY and ORNOUY. Colonel BOYER's column was ordered to enter the forrest by way of GILCOURT. Although it was 1700 when the columns were prepared to start through the forrest, and though the heavily wooded terrain was decidedly unfavorable for armor, the columns nevertheless pushed on. By 2000, both columns had advanced only two and a half to three miles against determined resistance from infantry later identified as the 104th Infantry 47th Infantry Division, and the 512th Schnelle Battalion, supported by anti-tank guns and artillery. With the coming of dusk, CCR halted, put out its outposts, and serviced for the coming day's operations. Total prisoners for the day, 70; an estimated 150 German casualties inflicted; five 105mm Howitzers with prime movers abandoned; three anti-tank guns and eight trucks destroyed was the day's tally.

The significant fact of the day's operations was that the only artillery support given to CCR was one Battery of 155mm guns from the 987 Field Artillery. It had inadequate communications to function with an Armored Combat Command. The 98th Field Artillery was giving direct support to CCB and was not with CCR.

The 196th Artillery Truck drawn was assigned direct support of CCR late in the day. Principally due to inadequate communications it was late getting into firing position. No artillery fire support was available from about 1500 until dark. At dark the 196th went into action and the artillery was registered after dark by flash and sound of most effective concentrations were placed in the German AT defense along the S edge of COMPIEGNE FOREST in part of Colonel BOYER's (47 married) command. Night patrols into the German position found utter confusion and heavy casualties.

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The following is review of the supply and evacuation of CCR during the month of August. Upon the arrival in France the service elements of the 10th Tank Battalion and the 47th Infantry Battalion were pooled and called CCR Trains. Later an Ordnance Detachment, C Company 22nd Engineers Battalion and C Company 75th Medical Battalion were added. These trains traveled at the rear of the combat command along the route of advance when feasible. Trains included all Class I III and V of the CC minus the basic load of ammunition carried on the individual and on the vehicle. Vehicle and individual loads of ammunition were prescribed by Army. There were no extra gasoline cans carried on the armored vehicles but there were on the general purpose vehicles. (1 ton CR-1 can, 3/4 ton CR-2 cans, 2 1/2 ton truck 10-cans)

CLASS I

On each vehicle or person there were emergency rations for three days. Generally 1 K, 1 C, 1D, resupply of either C, K, or 10 in 1 rations was accomplished daily when possible. If this couldn't be done one of the vehicular rations was to be consumed and on arrival of the ration truck a like number of rations consumed would be replaced. In the tank and infantry battalions a 2 1/2 ton truck was sufficient for rations if the ration dumps were within thirty miles or so.

CLASS II

Class II was planned in the following manner. Units of the Combat Command submitted requisitions twice a month to Division Class II located in the vicinity of I and III. Requisitions were filled and bulk hauled on ration trucks, if the load was not too great, or on gas trucks if it were.

CLASS III

Gasoline resupply was accomplished by the task force S-4's of the CC calling on the S-4 of the CC their requirements. CC in turn contacted trains and gasoline was brought forward to a central point where it was picked up by the task force liaison officers and delivered to the task force. When refueling was accomplished trucks were returned by the same channels reversed.

CLASS V

When a task force expended any portion of its basic load it was reported by daily report to the CC S-4. CC S-4 contacted trains where by normal supply channels expenditure was replaced that day. If urgent the expenditure was processed in the same manner but much faster. If the situation prevented the Ammunition trains from going forward in general purpose vehicles the armored infantry company present sent to the CC S-4 sufficient trucks to haul the required amounts forward to the area of engagement. The task force being made up of tank and infantry companies of two different battalions it was necessary that in the trains when an order for ammunitions was received competent personnel from each ammunition section be present to fill that part of the order that pertained to them.

MAINTENANCE

In the trains of the CC the maintenance platoons of the battalions plus the ordnance detachment were always marched and bivouaced together. By doing this the company maintenance sections could always find their particular battalion section and in turn the battalion section always knew automatically where the parts sections of the ordnance detachments were. This done away with much unnecessary running about the countryside. When necessary on the march recovery equipment, for the task force minus the trains, was dispatched to reinforce the company maintenance section. Evacuation by ordnance back up company was to have relieved the CC maintenance of deadlined and destroyed vehicles that they could not handle.

EVACUATION OF THE DEAD AND WOUNDED

Wounded were evacuated by the attached medical detachment through the medical company in CC trains then to the hospital prescribed in the division field order. Dead were evacuated to the graves registration point on ration and gasoline trucks. Graves registration was generally located near the Class I and III supply points. Evacuation of PW to the CC trains and from there to division on empty gas and ration trucks returning for loads. This plan worked up until the flow of prisoners became so great that they couldn't be handled. If time allowed prisoners were shuttled, if not loads were dumped and the necessary trucks made available to clear the c-ge.

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For the first 15 days of the month of August the following is a brief day by day log of the CC. The remainder of the month 16-31 is a summary of some of the difficulties encountered.

- 29 July Landed on continent and into bivouac awaiting remainder of command.
- 30 July Supply of I II and III started, some difficulty in locating dumps.
- 31 July Paring to TO/E readying for operations.
- 1 August Plan of CCR supply and resupply put into operation. Some difficulty caused by not having worked in this manner before.
- 2 August Routine supply except that all III units were T/E supplied. PW evacuated and PW evacuation trucks are now in effect.
- 3 August Routine supply with minor exceptions. Vehicles being worked on by maintenance sections removing damages caused by short sea voyage.
- 4 August Supply reports of the first day of operation poor. Cause attributed to not having worked together before and the fact that this headquarters did not have sufficient equipment to function as a CC headquarters. Being the third CC in the division and not having the T/E of the other CCs and doing the same job quite justifies the difficulty.
- 5 August Gasoline consumption runs about as follows:
 - Medium tanks $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the gallon
 - Light tanks 1 mile to the gallon
 Equipment is practically new.
- 6-8 August Routine supply
- 9 August Routine supply. PW evacuation found to be most difficult due to the numbers involved, gas and ration trucks unable to evacuate fast enough.
- 10 August Gasoline resupply is getting to the point where distances involved cramp organic transportation.
- 11 August Entered first combat with the German. Ammunition basic load found to be sound for this fracas. (see history) System of resupply worked with some exceptions. Establishment of small intermediary dumps of critical items near CP of CC (1000 yards) proved very valuable. Machine gun and 75mm gun ammunition used in very great quantities. Morphine syrettes proved of more value when carried in vehicle 1st aid kit or on person. Medical detachment should have a hot drink available at all times during engagement. Blanket supply found to be inadequate. Men evacuated from vehicles knocked out by the enemy usually lost all their belongings and personal equipment by fire. Included in the trains at this time a small supply 8-10% of toilet articles. T/E individual equipment, blankets, and arms. Class I emergency of 100 rations, 10-1, C, or K carried also.
- 12 August Resupply of gasoline revised somewhat. Found better results if a truck or so of gas, 1000-3000 gallons, accompanies each married company. This makes refueling a faster process and does away with resupply after dark. Resupply after dark over a large area is not advisable due to the distances and terrain that have to be covered. Lost one truck and trailer by machine gun fire passing back and forth through the outposts at night with gasoline.
- 13-31 August Supply during this time was according to plan except that at times during the month the dumps were located 120 miles in the rear of our service elements. We had nothing to haul Class I, II, III, and V, evacuate our wounded and casualties except organic transportation augmented by twelve two and one half ton trucks. There were days when CC made marches of 100 miles and had to resupply over 240 miles round trip. The trains personnel worked twenty four hours a day alternating driving and sleeping on the road. The class III dumps many times during the latter period were out of gasoline. We began experiencing a critical shortage of gasoline. The CC at time was completely immobilized in place. Began to notice the amounts of fuel used is increasing somewhat. Tanks were beginning to use considerable more than any other vehicle. Consumption rates at the close of the month, medium tanks three gallons to the mile, light tanks one and one quarter gallons to the mile. Isolated cases of medium tanks using five gallons to the mile were encountered. No new engines available for replacement, spark plugs helped somewhat but quantities available not sufficient.

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Summary of salient failures and hardships, revisions during the month of August.

1. The plan devised by the combat command was generally sound when Corps and Army kept the dumps within reasonable distances generally 35 miles.
2. Class I during the month of August, CC ate absolutely nothing but C, K, 10-1 ration. If the rations are rotated throughout the command the meals are good but if not they become monotonous. This had a direct effect on the fighting shae of the command.
3. Class II plan failed entirely as there never was established until the last week of the month a dump that could even begin to fill a requisition. Men who were burned out of there vehicles had to borrow from other men and salvage from enemy vehicles sufficient clothes to carry on.
4. Class III plan was sound and worked effectively until the distances became more and more extreme. A CC cannot with its organic transportation resupply at the rate of 75-100 operational miles a day over a distance of 240 miles. To be really effective and run militarily sound the Corps and Army dumps must be within 35 miles of operations. Many times the gas trains would arrive and cans would contain kerosene, a limited amount, water and etc. Diesel fuel for attached tank destroyer units was a very critical item and no provision had been made to handle diesel fuel in the trains. Plan had to be modified so that a percentage of the transport could be made available for this purpose. If the attached unit arrived with sufficient transport all well and good but generally they did not and immediate steps had to be taken for supply.
5. During the month of August the CC received but a mere pittance of the cleaning and preserving materials needed for the maintenance of the weapons. Shortages were overcome by the use of enemy uniforms for rags and motor oil for preservative.
6. The CC had no means available for the evacuation of captured material usually personnel had to come foward to get it. If this could not be done the material was destroyed or left for the rear elements if there was no danger of the enemy closing on them again and manning.

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: AUTH: Ltr Hq 5AD 19 Nov 44 :
: INIT: *mw* :
: DATE: 21 November 1944 :

HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND R
5TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 255, U. S. ARMY

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY 1-30 SEPTEMBER 1944

THE BATTLE OF COMPIEGNE FOREST
31 August to midnight 1-2 Sept.

CCR spent the night of 31 August, 1 September in the southern edge of the Forêt de Compiègne.

Troops:

Headquarters Detachment, CCR, 5th Armored Division
Commanding Officer: Colonel Glen H. Anderson.

10th Tank Battalion (married Formation).
Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. William A Hamburg
Headquarters Company 10
A Co 10 married to A Co 47
C Co 10 married to C Co 47
1 Platoon D Co 10.

47th Armored Infantry Battalion (Married Formation).
Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. Howard E. Boyer
Headquarters Company 47
B Co 47 married to B Co 10
1 Platoon D Co 10

C Troop 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
Commanding Officer: Captain John R. Vane

C Co 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion
Commanding Officer: Captain Charles Perlman

CCR Trains
Commanding Officer: Captain Fred C. Hopper
Service Co 10
Service Co 47
Detachment C Co 127 Ord Mt Bn
C Co 75th Armored Med Bn (Det)
1 Platoon D Co 10

Artillery:

196th Field Artillery Battalion (Attached)
(105 mm Howitzers, Truck Drawn)

one Battery 987th Field Artillery Battalion (Attached)
(155 mm Guns, Armored, Self Propelled)

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

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BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 13 Aug 1945

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During the night the battery of 155 SP guns mysteriously vanished. CCR after sending out a search party to locate same, was told that this battery had been withdrawn to Division Artillery Control.

CCR CP was set up at OUROY, FRANCE for the night 31 August to 1 September. North of OUROY and GILCOURT, the southern edge of the forest was heavily defended. Units identified included 1st Battalion 864th Regiment; 348th Division; 2nd Battalion, 111th Parachute Regiment; 104th Grenadier Regiment, 147th Division. In addition to remnants of these regiments, it was estimated that CCR was in contact with the entire 512 SCHNELLE Battalion. During the night several German tanks sneaked into OUROY in an attempt to withdraw to the north through the FORET DE COMPIEGNE. A dismounted bagooaka patrol from Headquarters CCR was sent out to destroy the tanks, but premature shooting of a submachine gun caused the enemy force to bolt to the north towards the 10th Tank Battalion bivouac. The 10th Tank Battalion was notified and it opened fire on the fleeing German column. The enemy tanks escaped as did most of the personnel, but they abandoned two towed 88 mm AT guns, 4 trucks, 2 anti-aircraft SP guns, and two Volkswagens.

At 010140B September the C.O. of CCR was notified that during the night a combat team of the 28th Infantry Division would pass through CCR with the mission of moving through the FORET DE COMPIEGNE. The S-3 of Combat Team 109 made contact with the C.O. CCR that night. Combat Team 109 assembled in the area north of OUROY, but south of the 10th Tank Battalion, prepared to move forward at dawn.

At dawn CCR sent dismounted reconnaissance out to determine any local changes that might have occurred during the night and guard against a possible ambush of the armored column in passing through the woods.

Combat Team 109 moved out at daylight, but made slow progress on foot. At 011115B CCR began advancing and by mutual arrangements with the C.O. of the 109th Infantry, the leading battalion of Combat Team 109 was carried "piggy back" in and on vehicles of the 10th Tank Battalion. Traffic congestion became a problem in spite of good highways through the forest. It required constant attention to keep the roads clear enough to permit the artillery to bypass.

Arrangements between Colonel Anderson and the C.O. of Combat Team 109 permitted leapfrogging the towed artillery battalions (one with each command) by battalion instead of leapfrogging individual batteries. This speeded up the rate of advance tremendously and the head of the column was never without artillery support.

The advance into the forest was made on two roads. (See route map) The two roads converged however, so the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, which had been following the easternmost road fell into column following the 10th Tank Battalion.

By 011140B CCR Reconnaissance had reached 477012. German artillery was reported to be going into position south of CHOLSY. Consequently, CCR asked for air support.

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The air mission which followed was unable to locate the reported artillery and was placed, in part, on a large defended road block, which had been reached by C Troop, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Whether it was caused by lack of panels, thick foliage, or too close proximity to target area is not known, but the air strafed our own forward elements as well as the enemy road block, wounding 3 men and immobilizing 1 armored car and 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck. An interesting incident in the FORET DE COMPIEGNE was the capture by the married A companies (10-47th) and the tank destroyer company of the combat team 110 of 50 or more civilian designed sedans—almost all Ford V-8's. Most of the vehicles had the doors removed and a bicycle rack constructed on the rear. They belonged to the 512th SCHNELLE Battalion which had abandoned them in the forest—presumably because of the effectiveness of our air attacks on road traffic.

The C.O. of CCR was instructed to cross the ALSNE RIVER in the vicinity of CHOISY. A reconnaissance of the bridges indicated that all suitable bridges had been blown and that the north bank of the ALSNE RIVER was defended. A request was made for either 100 feet of Bailey Bridge or 350 feet of treadway bridge.

At 011630B CCR CP was located at 478034.

Before the bridging materials requested could be sent forward, the C.O. of CCR was notified that the combat team of the 28th Division would take over and build a bridge at CHOISY. CCR would follow CCB across the OLSE RIVER at COMPIEGNE on a bridge being constructed by CCB engineers.

Contact was made at this time with combat team 112 which had attacked COMPIEGNE the night before. Arrangements were made to permit combat team 109 to pass through CCR to the ALSNE RIVER. Colonel Anderson agreed to support Combat Team 109 as long as possible (until the time CCR was scheduled to move to COMPIEGNE to cross the river there) by tank direct fire and artillery fire from the south side of the ALSNE RIVER. Some supporting tanks were in position and available to Combat Team 109, but these were not needed and were not called upon.

At 012310B CCR began crossing the M-2 Treadway Bridge at COMPIEGNE to the north bank of the OLSE RIVER, and the battle of the COMPIEGNE FOREST was over.

Some observations made and lessons learned were:

1. Towed 105 mm artillery can support a fast moving armored column.
2. The married tank-infantry team as employed by the 5th Armored Division is extremely effective—especially so in close country.
3. 155 mm S.P. artillery is not suited to the role of close support of armored columns—largely because of communications difficulties.
4. A Combat Command of an armored division can carry forward "piggy back" the dismounted elements of two infantry battalions and still keep the forward elements of armor ready for instant use. By not loading the armored advance guard, the accompanying infantry is not unduly exposed to hostile fire. This procedure results in the highest morale for the accompanying infantry since they arrive at their destination in much less time and in much better condition to fight. It is also extremely comforting to the armored combat command to know that supporting infantry in goodly numbers are ever present to assist in case serious resistance is encountered over an extended front.

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THE ADVANCE FROM COMPIEGNE TO VALENCIENNES 2 SEPTEMBER 1944

At 020003B the forward elements of CCB advancing on highway N32 on NOYON were halted by resistance. Not having sufficient space to remain on the road and still clear the bridge at COMPIEGNE, CCR was ordered to close and bivouac beside the road. This was done and by 0320, the end of CCR Trains, bringing up the rear, had cleared the bridge.

While in bivouac during the night 1-2 September, 5 buzz bombs were observed overhead headed southwest.

CCR moved out at 021000B behind Division Troops advancing on NOYON-HAM-ST QUENTIN-LE CATELET-CARNIERES-HASPRES-VALENCIENNES. Head of CCR reached the SOMME river at HAM at 1420. A part of CCB cut into the column from the west. Division notified CCR to give CCB road priority. CCR did so, and the bridge across the SOMME river was not clear of CCB column until 021535B. At 021810B CCR halted in the vicinity of 783640 to refuel. After refueling, CCR continued to advance after dark until 2300 when Division ordered the C. O. of CCR to bivouac. Bivouac was made with the C.P. at VILLERS EN GAUCHIES. No contact was made with the enemy on 2 September, and there were no losses.

At 031037B the C.O. CCR received orders to "Protect left flank of Division from RAISMES (980076) to NAVES (850880)."

Colonel Anderson ordered his forces disposed so as to execute this mission. Half way through this deployment, CCR received orders to the effect that the previous orders had been too emphatic. All that was desired was for CCR to be alert to a left flank threat and to be prepared to move to counterattack same if it developed. CCR was regrouped northwest of SOLESMES in keeping with the new orders.

During the afternoon of 3 September, many alarming civilian reports came in to the effect that the Germans were shooting up all towns nearby. Finally Division ordered C.O. CCR to attack enemy force of 250 men and 3 tanks in the vicinity of 090198. These orders were received at 1240. The mission was assigned to the 10th Tank Battalion who employed the married C Companies for the job. By 031615B, C Companies had reached the assigned area, but no sign of any German activity could be found. C Companies returned just before dark. At this time, word was received that the neighboring town of THIANZ was being ravished by 3000 returning Germans. Monsieur Rene Bonnet a French civilian agent with CCR was dispatched with a tommy-gun to clear up the situation. No Germans were found in the town by this one-man patrol.

C.P. CCR was located at N928970 the night 3-4 September.

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**THE FORCED MARCH FROM VALENCIENNES AREA TO CHARLEVILLE-MEZIERES ON THE MEUSE
4 September 1944**

At 032040B a warning order was received that, "Division moves at 040700 to the southeast. Orders will be issued tonight." CCR troops were alerted for movement the following morning at 0700. At 040020B orders were received. CCR led the division on the march to the southeast. Originally CCR was scheduled to assemble in the area LOGNY-BOGNY, but enroute to this assembly area, General Oliver, the Division Commander, met Colonel Anderson and instructed him to move directly into CHARLEVILLE, MEZIERES and build a bridge across the MEUSE RIVER.

The route followed to MEZIERES is as indicated on the attached map viz: SOLEMES--LE CATEAU--GUIZE--VERVINE--HERSON--MON--IDEE--TOURNES--CHARLEVILLE--MEZIERES. This was a march of 96 miles. It was made with insufficient gasoline. There was not enough gasoline to refuel the entire command, so a policy was followed of allowing vehicles to drop out for lack of fuel, and then rejoin the column when fueled individually. By 1025 the head of the column had reached BEAURAIN; by 1125 the head was at LE PONT DE PIERRE; at 1520 the head was at CLIRON; at 1540 the forward elements had reached CHARLEVILLE. There, contact was established with a task force of C Troop of the 24th Cavalry, Reinforced by 1 Company of Infantry, which had reached MEZIERES on 3 September 1944. The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion had been given the mission of direct support of CCR while the command was still south of VALENCIENNES, before the march had started. Due to the shortage of gasoline, the 95th was unable to march with the rest of the command. It joined later. The 196th Field Artillery Battalion(105 mm Howitzers, truck drawn) did move with CCR, however. This concluded the forced march from VALENCIENNES to CHARLEVILLE, a distance of 96 miles completed in 8 hours and 10 minutes, with rationed and insufficient gasoline.

**FORGING A RIVER CROSSING AND BRIDGING OPERATIONS OF THE MEUSE RIVER AT
CHARLEVILLE-MEZIERES 4-5 SEPTEMBER 1944**

All six bridges across the MEUSE river had been blown by the Germans. The 24th Cavalry Reinforced had some elements across a branch of the river and set up in an old fortress at MEZIERES.

Reconnaissance was started immediately for a crossing site. A bridge was started at WARCQ at 1730. Before much work had been done however, it was discovered that the maps available were in error and that the bridge as planned would get CCR across only half of the river. The MEUSE river at MEZIERES had the design shown on the attached map.

A reconnaissance in advance of building the bridge had been made and had determined that Canal No. 1 had a substantial bridge capable of carrying Division loads. This bridge had not been blown. The Canal No 2. was not indicated on the available map. After the bridge at WARCQ had been started

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it was discovered that this canal existed—in fact most of the river flowed through it. And all bridges had been blown. Strong German forces were on the high ground immediately to the east of Canal No 2. This high ground was the rear of the MAGINOT LINE. The defending German forces consisted of the 1st Battalion, CT HOLZEN, strength about 200 men, armed with machine guns, and rifles and equipped with 6 or 7 armored cars. It had been organized from remnants of the 2nd PZ Division. It was supported by one battery of light artillery, probably 105 mm. Its mission was to defend east of the MEUSE and to prevent our crossing. Its morale was low and it had received no supplies for two (2) days.

Due to terrain, however, it was possible for the Germans, despite the quality of the troops, to defend stubbornly. The bank on the east side was a steep cliff with permanent fortifications built on the cliff sides and underground passageways in the top of the hill. The cliff completely dominated the western bank and from the top of the hills on the east bank, the Germans had observation to the northwest, west, and Southwest for 10 to 12 miles. From this point they were able to observe our column approaching MEZIERES from TOURNES on the afternoon of 4 September 1944.

There were some elements besides terrain affecting the situation. One was the situation at SEDAN where CCA was also crossing the MEUSE. The pressure exerted there by CCA occupied the German infantry and anti-tank batteries known to be in that vicinity. The other element was the number and composition of mobile reserves available to the Germans which might be capable of counter-attacking our bridgehead before we had crossed our armor to the east bank and occupied the high ground north of LE THEUX.

MI brought information from civilians that fifty German tanks between ST LAURENT and GRENELLE were heading north at 1700. That there was a battalion of Germans at NOUZONVILLE and another battalion between there and NEUFMANIL, that there was a company of Germans in GESFONSART and at least 3 anti-tank guns at NOUZONVILLE. Granting that the Germans were in some force at the places listed, with the exception of the tanks, no German force was sufficiently mobile to move southward and attack us before we occupied the high ground. In regard to the tank force, there was no other evidence to support the report of such a large force of German tanks.

On the ridge line of the high ground overlooking MEZIERES from the German side was a German military school. The buildings were made of concrete. The position was later discovered to be a model defensive set-up. Each foxhole was provided with a range card of the entire visible terrain. In addition to this prepared position, this ground was the back side of the MAGINOT LINE. The area contained many concrete entrances and exits to a network of underground tunnels. All this was discovered during and after the attack.

At 042120 the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, less A Company, attacked across the river at MEZIERES to secure a bridgehead. B and C Companies made the initial crossing. By 042220, B Company of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion had reached the high ground east of CHARLEVILLE and was preparing to attack east to remove small arms and machine gun fire from the bridge site.

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Following the attack, construction was started on the bridge. However, during the night the enemy employing self propelled AA pieces of 20 mm size, counterattacked the bridge site which cost C Company of the 22nd Engineer Battalion some casualties and equipment including one bulldozer. The infantry renewed its attacks at dawn with increased vigor, and B and C Companies of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion secured the bridgehead.

At 050918, the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to CCR. One company of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion to be committed on Division order only. At 051005, the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to CCR. The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion joined CCR shortly after the bridge was completed. The 196th Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm truck drawn) was still attached to CCR and assisted in the river crossing.

At about 0900 Company A of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion crossed the river at MOHON by ferry after B and C Companies had cleared the bridge site. The 10th Tank Battalion was ordered to employ A Company of the 47th to sieze the heights dominating the bridge site in a ferrying operation early on 5 September. As a result of reluctance on the part of A Company of the 47th the ferrying operation was not made until B and C Companies had taken fire off of the bridge site by moving to the southeast. Work on the bridge proceeded rapidly and it was completed at 1350. By 051807B the 10th Tank and the 47th Armored Infantry had crossed the bridge, and had remarried, and had pushed the attack to the designated bridgehead line where they took up defensive positions on the high ground east of MEZIERES. The 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion was at MEZIERES. The shortage of gasoline limited the advance at the time to the bridgehead line. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was also in need of rest after fighting all night long. The CCR CP was located at 842337.

The night of 5 September 1944, Colonel Anderson assigned the C.O. of the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion the mission of establishing a line southeast of MEZIERES so as to cut all roads leading into MEZIERES from the east or south-east. The C.O. of the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion was alerted to the possibility of German vehicles attempting to flee to the north through his position. No great amount of action was experienced the night of 5-6 September by the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, and it moved out in CCR's column the next morning.

Casualties for this operation were surprising small, numbering only three men killed and approximately 25 wounded. The reason for such light casualties is believed to be that the main attack was made at night, and in an extremely aggressive manner.

During the day of 5 September, General Oliver visited Colonel Anderson and gave CCR the mission of attacking SEDAN from the rear so as to secure a bridgehead across the MEUSE RIVER at that point to enable CBA to build a bridge. Colonel Anderson, after a careful terrain study decided to attack SEDAN from the east with the 47th married. The axis of advance was to be VIVDOR 9030, VRLIGNE 9230, ST MENGES 9530, GIVONNE 0288, SEDAN.

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The 10th Tank Battalion, married, and CCR Trains were held back on the bridgehead site and were only to move south on SEDAN on order. This provided protection to the left rear and still held open the option of using the northern route or the southern route to the east in the direction of ARLON. The C.O. CCR was given the option of using any or all routes to the east in the direction of ARLON.

The main body moved out at 0600. The reconnaissance echelon made first contact at a road block at 955305 which was strongly defended. The main body reached the road block at 1015. The situation was too close to employ the supporting air arm. This particular road block took several hours to overcome. The terrain was quite mountainous and by-passing was almost impossible. Wet weather and the poor condition of the chevrons on tank tracks prevented tanks from climbing to the high ground to the east which dominated the route of advance. Several more such blocks were encountered during this day. Every town had many wagons and other vehicles run into the center of the road so as to block traffic. Road blocks were formed by felling large roadside trees across the road with an explosive charge. Trees required sawing or otherwise cutting into smaller pieces and then removing. All roadblocks were defended to a greater or a lesser degree and consequently progress was rather slow.

An interesting though brief engagement took place in ILLY on this march. Most of the day was cloudy and rainy, but as the head of the column reached ILLY fifteen or twenty German vehicles were sighted. Air support became available at the same instant. A flight of P-47's attacked simultaneously with the 47th. The entire 47th force was committed. In the brief engagement, all of the German vehicles were destroyed or captured as were all but a handful of the German soldiers. This beautiful air support was often within a few hundred yards of our own vehicles. Air was also used on retreating Bosche in a pocket near FLOING.

Reconnaissance reached SEDAN at 1607, after passing through an undefended roadblock at GIVONNE. Upon reaching GIVONNE, the advance guard was informed that a German headquarters unit had escaped to the northeast just 15 minutes prior to their arrival. The direct support air was given the mission of following and destroying this headquarters. In 10 minutes a report was received that they had destroyed 15 out of 17 vehicles and requested another target. Subsequent reports from SEDAN showed this enemy group to have been the 8th Corps Headquarters Company, which had been at SEDAN regrouping elements of the German army. The citizens of SEDAN were celebrating our arrival when the reconnaissance entered town. The Stars and Stripes was slightly in error in reporting SEDAN liberated seven days before it was cleared by CCR.

Prisoners for the day totalled seventy (70) and were captured from the 4th observation Artillery Battalion which was fighting as infantry in the vicinity of ILLY; and from the 8th Corps Headquarters Company.

When CCR reached SEDAN, CCA had already started its bridge at BAZELLES (996225). Meanwhile, the 47th married, with the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion went into a position on the high ground overlooking SEDAN from the rear, and the 10th Tank Battalion bivouaced in the vicinity of GIVONNE. Although German artillery fire fell in the 10th Tank Battalion assembly area during the night of 6-7 September inflicting several casualties, and in spite of the shortage of gasoline, the liberation of SEDAN was completed with insignificant losses, largely as a result of the maneuver of attack from the rear.

While enroute to SEDAN the 196th Field Artillery Battalion was released from CCR to revert to army control for the purpose of hauling gasoline. Shortly after reaching SEDAN, the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion was released

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from CCR to revert to CCB. Both of these releases were accomplished as ordered.

THE PURSUIT INTO THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG

At 070100 September 1944, the following message was received by the C.O. of CCR: "You will halt your Combat Command in place. 28th Infantry Division will attack through you in both CCA and CCB zones early morning 7 September to secure a line running roughly from 2625 to 2014. Clear all roads for use of 28th Div. Clear area of rcn elms prior to 0700 September 7 so as to not hamper 28th Div. Exert every effort to prepare your commands for continuation of the attack through 28th Div on orders from their Hq. More details later." Immediate emphasis was placed on maintenance and resupply of all classes. A liaison officer with radio was sent to the 109th Infantry Regiment. Personnel were rested. At 1415 orders were changed telling CCR to remain in place all that day. The liaison officer from 5th Armored Division arrived to tell Colonel Anderson that he was to offer his reconnaissance troop to the C.O. of the 109th Infantry Regiment, if same was needed. Troop was offered, accepted, and dispatched.

During the night CCR received orders to follow Combat Team 109, prepared to attack through them on order. CCR moved out of the SEDAN area at 1520. The 10th Tank Battalion, married, led. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, married, remained in the vicinity of SEDAN and was to follow the 10th Tank Battalion by long bounds on orders.

At 1650 CCR was forced to halt behind the infantry combat team in the vicinity of FLORENVILLE. The C.O. of the 47th was ordered to bring up his force to the vicinity of FLORENVILLE and to bivouac with the rest of CCR. CCR bivouaced around the C.P. at 273237.

At 1930 the CCR liaison officer with Combat Team 110 reported seeing many German vehicles leaving FLORENVILLE. He gained additional information about the fleeing troops from ground elements in close contact with the enemy rear guards. Contact was made with the CP of the 28th Division nearby to work out a cooperative plan of attack. Colonel Anderson took the forward section of the CCR Command group to a position affording good radio communications possibilities, and proceeded to employ the air party attached to CCR. This was accomplished by obtaining targets through the liaison officer of CCR with Combat Team 110. These targets were relayed back for directions to the air support. Within a period of one half hour fifty vehicles had been knocked out. Numerous horse drawn supply wagons, guns, and caissons along the main route to ARLON were also destroyed.

At 090700 Reconnaissance, which had reverted to CCR control, passed through the 28th Division and proceeded on route to MERSCH, LUXEMBOURG. Information from artillery liaison plane indicated that the road leading west from VANCE 5021 was so cluttered with burned out German vehicles and horse drawn equipment that to use it would require considerable engineering work to clear the road. This condition was a result of CCR air missions on the day previous in conjunction with air support of Combat Team 110 of the 28th Division. Colonel Anderson therefore decided to by-pass VANCE and to travel to MERSCH by route HABAY LA NEUVE 4927--LOTTERT 5525--METZERT 5926--OBER-ALLEN 6327--USELDANGE 7331--MERSCH. This route was also selected with a view of by-passing

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ARLON since French agents had reported German resistance at ARLON had the use of a very high church steeple for observation. It was hoped that the selected route would be defiladed from this OP.

Upon reaching HABAY LA NEUVE contact was made with tank forces of the 28th Division which were attacking HABAY from the west. This force had been held up since daylight by an enemy force estimated to be one company reinforced with anti-tank guns. A Companies, married, of the 10th Tank Battalion were committed at once and the defenders were quickly put to rout. One M-4 medium tank received anti-tank gun hits on three sides in this engagement. All hits penetrated the tank, but none of its occupants was injured, and the tank did not burn.

Direct air support was used north and east of HABAY LA NEUVE and along the route of march to the east. The entire march was made over roads which had been cratered and on which the bridges had been blown and road blocks installed. A few enemy anti-tank mines were encountered in conjunction with the road blocks. Craters were by-passed and engineers with bulldozers filled them for the rear elements of the column.

C Company of the 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion assisted by the Pioneer Platoon of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion prepared the railway bridge at MERSCH for vehicular traffic and at 1335 forward elements began to cross the river. In the meantime, the 10th Tank Battalion had discovered a ford at MOESDORF 8331 and had made its crossing there. The German force defending the crossings was composed of the 503rd Mobile Battalion from CT VON FRITSCHEN whose total strength did not exceed 400, supported by a platoon of 81 mm mortars, two platoons of heavy machine guns, and an unknown number of anti-tank guns, but probably not more than four.

While CCR was enroute to MERSCH Colonel Anderson received instructions that instead of halting at MERSCH as originally planned that he was to continue to the SIEGFRIED LINE at ECHTERNACH. At 1350 Colonel Anderson received new orders through a visit of the G-3 to the effect that CCR would change direction as soon as the ALLZETTE RIVER at MERSCH had been crossed and would proceed north to secure an assembly area for the division immediately south of DIEKIRCH, LUXEMBOURG.

By turning to the north, CCR seemed to get on the south flank of a German infantry unit defending the ALLZETTE RIVER from its eastern bank. At this time CCR had no VHF workable for the control of air, however, air support was asked for and obtained through the division G-3 Air. Air missions attacked enemy elements in the vicinity of CRUCHTEN 8434, SCHRONDWILER 8635, NOMMERN 8733, immediately preceding CCR's movement into this area. The 10th Tank Battalion attacking with this air support succeeded in destroying or capturing approximately 70 vehicles. 32 pieces of German artillery were also destroyed or abandoned by the enemy at 8439. Forty(40) prisoners were taken during the day. CCR bivouaced the night of 10-11 September in the assigned area with the CP at 862335.

The CP of CCR moved 11 September to BRUCHERHOF, 895386, and the 10th Tank Battalion, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, and the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion grouped around it. The headquarters of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion continued to work with and to augment the slender staff of CCR, as it had been doing since its attachment to CCR at MEZIERES.

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During the period 11 September and 12 September OP's were set up on the German border where the SIEGFRIED LINE could be observed. C Company, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was ordered to send patrols across the OUR river into the SIEGFRIED LINE in an attempt to determine the extent to which the pillboxes were manned and supplied with weapons. No patrols were ever sent, and the company commander was relieved. On 13 September, on orders from the Division Commander, a reconnaissance by fire was conducted against the SIEGFRIED LINE in the vicinity of WALLENDORF, GERMANY. The town of AMELDINGEN, GERMANY was set on fire, but no return fire was received from the pillboxes.

THE PENETRATION OF THE SIEGFRIED LINE AND THE INVASION OF GERMANY 14-19 SEPT 44.

Colonel Anderson received orders late in the evening of 13 September 1944 that CCR would attack the Siegfried Line in the Vicinity of WALLENDORF, GERMANY as early as possible on 14 September 1944. Colonel Anderson visited the Division CP to obtain details and was not able to return to the Combat Command CP until after midnight 13-14 September. At that time it was necessary to make plans for the attack to take place the following day. Such a short time was available that a preparation of fires was not possible in as great detail as might have been desirable.

The terrain in that area was decidedly not suitable for armor. The OUR and SAUER RIVERS come together at WALLENDORF. Though both are fordable, the banks on each side are steep and precipitous, much like the HUDSON PALISADES. From the heights on the western bank of the OUR we had excellent observation of Germany and fortifications in the SIEGFRIED LINE. And conversely from the heights on the east side of the river, the Germans had good observation of our positions and movements.

When orders were issued for CCR to attack the SIEGFRIED LINE, we had this information: Not all the bunkers and pillboxes were occupied. Where they were occupied the crews were not full strength. There were no heavy calibre anti-tank guns emplaced in any of the fortifications. In some cases the Germans did not even have machine guns with which to defend the bunkers. Prisoners had stated that on the 1st of September, the water had not been pumped out of the fortifications; and that within the past two weeks civilians and soldiers had been busy digging anti-tank ditches. During the 3 days in which reconnaissance of CCR had been in observation of the line our OP's had seen German infantry coming into the area to man pillboxes which had not been previously manned.

Assault teams were hastily organized employing riflemen, bazooka teams, pole and satchel charge carriers and flame throwers. A fire plan was hastily worked out employing elements of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 10th Tank Battalion, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 400th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and one battery of the 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (155 mm guns SP).

The combat command was divorced for the operation. At 1300 the forward elements of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion approached the river in the vicinity of WALLENDORF. These elements received only small arms and machine gun fire. At this time it became apparent that WALLENDORF was not a regular village, in as much as artillery fire had small effect upon its for-like houses.

At about 1000 on 14 September, the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry Regiment was attached to CCR and was assembled in the vicinity of MORSTROFF,

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LUXEMBOURG 9141, to await further orders.

At 1340 tanks from B Company of the 10th Tank Battalion crossed the OUR RIVER and moved into the village with the forward elements of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion. It is interesting to note that the first units into Germany were a platoon of medium tanks from B Company of the 10th platoon leader, 2nd Lt Rollins, and an armored infantry platoon from B Company of the 47th, platoon leader, 2nd Lt. Lewis.

Continued resistance from the fortified houses in the village required that the flame throwers be employed for the reduction of the town of WALLENDORF.

Behind WALLENDORF is a ridge running from northwest to southeast. The roads leading to the top of this ridge are only two in number. The Germans had constructed a very strong road block on the northernmost of these roads, but the other was unblocked. The plan originally called for an infantry attack, but when no anti-tank defenses developed, the plan was changed and tanks led off with the infantry following in half-tracks so as to avoid the small arms and machine gun fire from the houses and pillboxes. The tanks and infantry, riding half-track personnel carriers, were able to ascend the sheer face of the ridge by using the one unobstructed road. At the top of this road was a bazooka team intended to prevent armor from climbing the hill. A tank knocked out at that point would undoubtedly have delayed the operation for several hours, since then the road would no longer have been useable by our armor. Fortunately, a lucky hit from a burst of machine gun fire detonated the bazooka rocket which had been readied for firing. All members of the enemy bazooka team were killed or seriously wounded in the ensuing blast.

Before the tanks and infantry had finished mopping up WALLENDORF and before the high ground behind the village had been siezed, the weather closed down and visibility was almost zero. Observation for artillery became almost completely impossible.

By 1515 A Company of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion had begun crossing to the eastern bank of the OUR RIVER to the right of B Company. Tank Destroyers were sent across shortly thereafter and a block was established to the north and south of WALLENDORF to prevent an armored counterattack. These blocks each consisted of one Tank Destroyer platoon. No counterattack came at this time. The 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry was committed shortly after the 47th (reinforced with all of B Company 10th Tank Battalion) had reached the high ground to the east of WALLENDORF. The mission of the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry was 1) to send one company to the northwest from WALLENDORF to a distance of 1 kilometer to roll up the GERMAN flank; 2) to employ one company in the village until it had been completely mopped up; and 3) to send one company to the right flank to roll up the south flank of the German line. This company was to proceed as far as the road junction at 977433. Upon completion of these missions, a report was to be rendered. One platoon of infantry was to remain with each tank destroyer platoon providing flank security.

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Reports from the 47th indicated that the valley between WALLENDORF and BIESDORF was even more precipitous than the one along the OUR RIVER. In short, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion with Companies A and B of the 10th Tank Battalion plus 1 platoon of D Company of the 10th Tank Battalion were on the high ground, but could find no way to get down so as to continue the attack. Therefore the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry was ordered to make an attack to sieze BIESDORF. The attack was started, but due to the lessened visibility and darkness BIESDORF was not taken that night. One company almost managed to capture the town, but contrary to the orders issued by the Battalion Commanding Officer, the company withdrew from its hard earned position. The commanding officer of that company was relieved the following morning.

From prisoners captured in the first day's operations on the 14th, it was determined that CT HEUTELBECK and the 759th Homeguard Battalion were manning the forward line of the SIEGFRIED defenses. Total prisoners for the day were 69.

The night of the 14-15 September found the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry, A and B Companies, and 1 platoon of D company of the 10th Tank Battalion, and C Company of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion inside of Germany. CoCompany of the 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion was partly inside Germany, as it built a bridge and a ford over the OUR RIVER at WALLENDORF.

Reconnaissance was made during the evening and night of 14 September in an attempt to find some route leading down so that an armored attack could be continued. A route was finally discovered leading through NIEDERSGEGEN. A plan was made which called for the 47th, married, to take hill 407, which was deemed to be the critical terrain of the area. The 10th Tank Battalion was to push straight ahead, axis of advance CRUCHTEN--HOMBERDINGER--FRIELINGEN--MUSBAUM--STOCKEM--WETTENGEN--MESSERICH--MASHOLDER--BITBURG.

The 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry Regiment was to attack on the right flank of the Combat Command to clear the dense woods on that flank. This plan was put into execution early 15 September. By dark, the 47th was on hill 407, the 10th Tank was at STOCKEM, and CCR headquarters was with the 47th on hill 407. The 1st Battalion of the 112th was still trying to take BIESDORF.

Mobile reserves of the Germans were encountered early on the morning of the 15th. At 0800 an under strength company of MK IV tanks from the 901st Panzer Grenadier Regiment supported by a smaller force of infantry counter-attacked our column in the vicinity of NIEDERSGEGEN. The Germans lost 3 tanks and 6 half-tracks in the first few minutes of the engagement and promptly withdrew. The battle was fought on each side of a small stream in an L shaped narrow valley. Terrain was to the disadvantage of both sides, but our observation was better than the Germans, and what is more important, so also were our gunners.

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The 400th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was on the high ground in the vicinity of 948441. The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion had started to move across the OUR RIVER during the afternoon of 15 September, to displace forward to the vicinity of HOMERDINGEN. Upon reaching the ford at NIEDERSGEGEN the 95th column was fired upon from the north flank. The Germans were blocking the ford at NIEDERSGEGEN with machine guns and mortar fire. This was a serious threat because it effectively interrupted traffic on our main supply route and prohibited the early displacement of our artillery forward. The threat was the more serious because the situation at BIESDORF was not clear and the only alternative route of communications went through it.

When Colonel Anderson learned of the sticky situation at NIEDERSGEGEN he sent a married tank and infantry platoon back to the ford with instructions to remain there until all of the artillery and the CCR trains had cleared the ford. Enroute to execute this mission the tank platoon leader encountered one echelon of trains which had managed to find a way forward without using the ford. This gave the tank-infantry platoon leader the impression that the ford was clear. Therefore the tank-infantry platoon went into bivouac for the night. The overall result was that the ford was not cleared of enemy that night and neither the 95th nor the 400th field artillery battalions were able to displace forward until late afternoon 16 September.

The troops in contact with the enemy were at the limit of artillery support. This required that the advance of CCR be limited the day of the 16th while the enemy was forced out of the NIEDERSGEGEN area. The 95th and 400th Field Artillery Battalions did not get into firing position until approximately 1700 of the 16 September 1944. By this time the fog had closed in so that observation was almost zero.

The afternoon of the 16th C Companies, married, made an attack and siezed the high ground just east of WETTLINGEN. They were relieved in this position by the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry, which was to continue the attack the next morning to the east to secure a "bridgehead" on the BITBURG plateau. The terrain here was so precipitous that "Bridgehead" is actually the most descriptive word.

By late afternoon of the 16th it was clear that the Germans were moving in mobile reserves to counter-attack. Prisoners were identified from the 901st and 902nd Regiments of the Panzer Lehr Division. Increased artillery fire at times in battery concentrations, indicated that the enemy was also moving up his artillery.

During the night of 16-17 September the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry received a strong counterattack by a company of infantry reinforced with a platoon of MK IV tanks and a battalion of light artillery. Their outposts were overrun and many casualties were suffered. The battalion was forced to fall back, but did remain east of WETTLINGEN. For the remainder of the night the Germans placed heavy artillery fire on this battalion and it suffered still more casualties.

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General Oliver visited Colonel Anderson on 17 September and gave orders to withdraw the 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry if it was necessary. He also instructed Colonel Anderson that his mission had been changed from one of capturing BITBURG to one of holding the ground CCR then held.

Early 17 September D Company of the 10th Tank Battalion was attacked by four Mark IV tanks. These tanks opened fire at extreme range and D Company lost two light tanks as a result. C Company of the 10th was ordered to counterattack and did so, destroying all four German tanks. A Company of the 10th had maneuvered in the meantime to a position in the rear of the German tank formation and succeeded in destroying five more tanks and a 20 mm SP gun. Some remnants of the enemy escaped to BETTINGEN and were heavily bombarded by our artillery and air, but the results of this bombardment are unknown.

At dawn on the 17th, the Germans also launched an attack against the 112th Infantry, 1st Battalion, which occupied the high ground east of WETTLINGEN at the time. The attack was made by approximately 1 battalion of infantry, supported by a company of tanks, reinforced by a battalion of artillery. Though the exact position of the German artillery were not located, the general locations of the enemy batteries at the time were known to be northeast of WETTLINGEN, south of DOCKENDORF, and southeast of FERSCHWELER. The attack compelled the infantry of the 112th to relinquish the high ground at WETTLINGEN and withdraw to the shelter of the buildings in STOCKEM, though the enemy paid with heavy losses.

Strong and effective enemy artillery fire was received all though the 17th of September by all units of CCR.

On the 18th of September, indications pointed to a shift of German troops from the WETTLINGEN area to the OLSDORF-METTENDORF area. An artillery forward observer reported columns of tanks and infantry moving from BETTINGEN to OLSDORF to NIEHL at 1230. Reconnaissance of D Troop, 85th Cavalry reported at 1655, a German infantry unit moving southeast towards ENZEN from METTENDORF. And at the same time another artillery forward observer reported a German artillery battery going into position at OLSDORF. A prisoner stated that a battery of artillery was located west of NIEHL and that there was a task force of battalion strength of infantry, tanks and artillery in the vicinity of LAHR. At 2100 an unknown number of German tanks came into METTENDORF from the north and were chased out by our artillery. Finally prisoners were identified from the 125th Infantry Regiment; CT Thieme; 78th Infantry Regiment, and the 17th Anti-tank Battalion of the 17th GAF Division, all of which were new identifications on our front. It became clear that the Germans had assembled mobile reserves and artillery on a scale sufficient to undertake to push us out of the SIEGFRIED LINE and that the counter-attack initially would come from the north.

The evening of 17 September, CCR was informed by Division that B Company of the 81st Tank Battalion married to B of the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion was now in the vicinity of NIEDERSGEGGEN and was in reserve. The company commander visited the CCR CP but there were so many strings tied to this unit before it could be used that no use was ever made of it. At no time did this company ever have more than two married platoons available and usually

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there was only one. The force which remained was doing full time duty in protecting the 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Division support of CCB).

The day of the 18th of September was relatively quiet. The 1st Battalion of the 112th Infantry was pulled back to the vicinity of HOMMERSDINGEN. Flash and sound facilities were requested of division, but none was forthcoming. On the 18th CCR was told that the 2nd Battalion of the 112th Infantry was to relieve the 1st Battalion, but the 2nd Battalion was unable to come forward on the 18th, and was scheduled to arrive on the 19th.

The night of the 18th of September was unique in that almost no artillery fire was received by our troops. Our artillery, on the contrary fired a great deal all night. In spite of this lull in enemy artillery the commanding officer of CCR repeated his request for sound and flash facilities, but again as on previous days he was denied them.

Shortly after daylight on 19 September, the German artillery opened up with the most vigorous fire yet received by CCR. The CCR command post and trains were heavily hit as were all other units of the command. At 0700 hours 19 September, tanks were reported approaching the left flank of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, married, on hill 407. At this time German artillery in battery concentrations began falling on the forward slope of Hill 407. Progressively the concentrations began falling on the forward slope shifting towards the top of the hill and finally to the reverse slope until the entire position of the 47th had been covered with artillery. Visibility was very poor as a result of fog. One platoon was moved to the left flank to take positions behind the crest of hill 426/3. By 0800 hours visibility improved and a force of 15 tanks and a number of personnel carriers was sighted. Heavy frontal and flanking fire from all guns was brought to bear on the enemy force which broke, scattered, and attempted to withdraw, and their withdrawal was disordered. Our artillery, adjusted by liaison plane, shelled the retreating Germans heavily.

After the battle Captain Frank Pool, the commanding officer of B Company of the Tank Battalion inspected the destroyed vehicles which consisted of 4 Mark V tanks, 6 Mark IV's, and 2 half-tracks. There were several more vehicles of undetermined type burning in the distance.

This was the first of a series of attacks made by the Germans on the 19th. Following this first attack pressure was strongly felt from OLSDORF and BETTINGEN, then from WETTLINGEN, then from SCHANKWEILER and ENZEN and lastly from NBSBAUM.

Late in the afternoon of 19 September the chief of staff of the 5th Armored Division arrived at the CCR command post by liaison aircraft. He brought instructions to the commander of CCR to withdraw to a more easily defended position closer to WALLENDORF. Orders were issued and troops set in motion. Before the withdrawal to new positions had been completed radio orders arrived telling Colonel Anderson that he was to withdraw entirely from Germany and to go into an assembly area south of DIEKIRCH, LUXEMBOURG. This withdrawal was executed quite successfully under cover of darkness with few casualties. CCR headquarters closed in the new assembly area at 200400 September.

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The remainder of the 20th was spent in much needed rest. At 202130A September, the commanding officer of CCR received instructions to move a tank company to positions along the road from 963420 to 957485 to prevent movement of the enemy along the river. This mission was accomplished with A Company of the 10th Tank Battalion.

On 21 September the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was ordered back into Germany—dismounted—to reinforce CCB. The evening of 21 September, Colonel Anderson was given orders to cover the withdrawal of CCB from Germany.

CCB withdrew the night of 21-22 September and CCR took over the defense of the western side of the OUR RIVER employing the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 112th Infantry and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 10th Tank Battalion, both married. Some air was available on 22 September. It was used on bombing-strafting missions on enemy personnel and vehicles between WALLENDORF and BIESDORF.

On the 23rd of September no great amount of activity on our side, and no enemy activity was noted. He placed artillery fire on all observable activity on our side of the river. Visibility in general was very poor. On 24 September the same situation prevailed. On 25 September CCB relieved CCR of its mission and CCR moved to a rest area at DIEKIRCH, LUXEMBOURG. Extensive rest, relaxation, and maintenance was the activity for the remainder of the month of September.

For the Commanding Officer:



R. M. WALLACE
Maj., Inf.,
Ex.O.

4 Inclosures:

- Operations Maps and Overlays
- S-2 Journal
- S-3 Journal and supplement
- S-4 Journal

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AUTH: Ltr 5AD
17 Oct 44
INIT:
DATE: 11 Dec 44

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY

OCTOBER 1 - OCTOBER 31 44.

COMBAT COMMAND "R".

On the 1st of October 1944, CCR was in DIEKIRCH, DUCHY of LUXEMBOURG, undergoing a period of rehabilitation following the campaign into Germany from WALLENDORF. Troops at that time consisted of the following:

Hq Det CCR, 5th Armd Div
Commanding Officer, Colonel Glen H. Anderson, 08632
Executive Officer, Major Rufus M. Wallace, 0362293
S-2, Captain Richard F. Wilkins, 0416201
S-3, Major Gregg L. McKee, 023811
S-4, Captain John D. Webber Jr., 01011954
S-3 Air, Lt Col Allen, William H., 0223875
Comm O, 2d Lt Rupert E. Park, 01643947
Surgeon, Major Raymond T. McFarlin, 0317687

47th Armd Inf Bn (married)
Commanding Officer, Lt Col. Howard E. Boyer, 0218680
Hq & Hq Co/47
B/Co/47 & B Co/10
Sv Co/47

10th Tk Bn (married)
Commanding Officer, Lt Col Wm A. Hamburg, 0292156
Hq & Hq Co/10
A/47 & A/10
C/47 & C/10
Sv Co/10
D/10

C Co/22d Armd Engr Bn
Commanding Officer, Captain Charles Perlman, 01101162

CCR Trains
Commanding Officer, Captain Fred Hopper, 01010215
C/75 Armd Med Bn
Det C/127 Ord Mt Bn.

On 3 October 1944 CCR was moved to the vicinity of MODERSCHIED (911997) BELGIUM. The command closed in the new area at 031540A October 1944.

The 95th Armd FA Bn was placed in direct support of CCR for this move. 95 marched with CCR to the same general area.

The CO CCR was notified on 5 October 1944 that CCR's probable mission would be to support or work in conjunction with the 4th Infantry Division.

At 061530A October 1944, D Co, 10th Tk Bn was attached to the 4th Inf Div by 5th Armd Div orders.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
RESTRICTED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 13 Aug 1945

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During the period 6 to 11 October no contact with the enemy was made by Combat Command "R".

At 1230A on 11 October 1944, Colonel Anderson returned to the CP from the 5th Armored Division Headquarters with instructions to move his command at once to KALTERHERBERG, GERMANY; to occupy concealed positions and to be prepared to repel any counterattack on KALTERHERBERG from the northeast, east or southeast. C Troop/85th Cav Rcn Sqdn and A Co 628 TD Bn were attached to CCR at once.

CCR moved at 1500 (less its trains) and closed in assembly areas south of KALTERHERBERG at 061800A.

Liaison was established at once with the 102d Cav Gp who were in occupation of the KALTERHERBERG area. KALTERHERBERG was the north flank of the V Corps and concern for flank protection was the cause for CCR being moved into this area.

The following morning (12 October) CCR headquarters moved into the town of KALTERHERBERG. Contact was established with the 1st Bn, 110 Inf who were in HOFEN. Plans were made to support them in the event of attack. These plans were 4 in number.

Plan A was in the event the enemy attacked with armor and or infantry to seize the KALTERHERBERG plateau.

Plan B was in the event CCR was called on to support the 1st Bn, 110 Inf (HOFEN) by fire.

Plan C was in the event CCR was required to occupy the HOFEN-ALZEN plateau in conjunction with the 1/110 Infantry, either before, during, or after a German attack on this position.

Plan D was in the event CCR was to counter-attack HOFEN-ALZEN to retake it after a successful counter-attack by the Germans against the 1st Bn 110 Inf.

All commanders, down to and including platoon leaders were sent onto the ground to study the terrain in anticipation of being called upon to execute any of the plans.

Engineer reconnaissance on the roads leading from KALTERHERBERG to HOFEN indicated considerable difficulty for an armored move so C 22 engaged in work to continuously improve access and possible supply routes. Liaison was established with the 24th Cav Rcn Sqdn located on the north of the V Corps sector. The 24th had headquarters in MONSCHAU.

On 13 October D 310 was released to CCR from 4th Division and was moved to the vicinity of KALTERHERBERG. C/85 was detached and returned to 5th Armored Division control.

From 13 October to 21 October, CCR continued to make reconnaissance of the HOFEN position, improve roads, and to develop plans. Considerable training was conducted in tank indirect fire and in infantry defensive positions. Some enemy artillery fire fell into KALTERHERBERG, so CCR CP moved to KUCHELSCHIED BELGIUM 4000 yards away.

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On 21 October 1944, the Commanding Officer of CCR received instructions that CCR (47th Armd Inf Bn) would relieve 1st Bn/110 Inf in HOFEN on Division order on 23 October. The 85th Cav Rcn Sqdn to "Come under control" of CCR at the same time."

On 22 October, the Commanding Officer of CCR was instructed to commence relief at once so as to have it completed prior to 230600A October 1944.

The 95th Armd FA Bn reverted to control of 5th Armd Div Arty. A/628 TD Bn reverted to 5th Armd Div Arty control to reinforce fires of the 95th. 85 Cav Rcn Sqdn attached to CCR effective 230600. By 222235A October the 47th Armd Inf Bn reported closed in new positions at HOFEN. No serious contact with the enemy was experienced that night. Moderate artillery fire fell at HOFEN, but ground action was limited to patrolling.

The 47th continued to occupy HOFEN - ALZEN for the remainder of October. The defense was characterized by the defensive artillery fires. Every possible avenue of approach was covered by a prepared concentration. Squad leaders had knowledge of which numbered concentration to call for in event of attack. The defensive position was extremely large for one battalion—4800 yards frontage. During this period nights were extremely dark, but contact was maintained by telephone. There were in excess of 70 phones on the position.

Extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were put out. Maintenance was difficult. The Germans each night drove cattle through the fields to detonate the mines.

All available automatic weapons were emplaced and readied for supporting fires. Fire from these weapons was rare, however, due to our desire to avoid disclosing the machine gun positions.

An extensive counter-battery OP system was set up. All gun flashes, sounds and flare activity was reported by azimuth on coordinated time through a special FA Bn, forward switchboard in HOFEN. The OPs were 27 in number with the result that night direct fire by the enemy employing SP guns and other weapons was costly to him.

The 95th Armd FA Bn was reinforced during this operation by the 400th Armd FA Bn, A Co 628 TD Bn and always by one or another of the medium tank companies of the 10th Tk Bn in rotation. The 10th Tk Bn assault guns were also employed.

During the time CCR defended HOFEN/ALZEN elements of the 115 AA Gp fired at ground targets ahead of our positions. 40mm Bofors and M-16 multiple mount 50 cal machine guns were employed with positive effective results. Large fires were started in ROHREN nad INGENBROICH daily by these weapons. These AA Elms were commanded by Captain Orndorff, 115 AA Gp.

ENEMY ACTIVITY

During the entire period "buzz" bomb activity was considerable. As great a number as 30 passed over Elms of the Command during a single day. None landed close enough to cause any casualties whatsoever.

CCR was in contact with the enemy from 22 October to 1 November 1944. During this time, the 47th Armd Inf Bn, dismounted, supported by Division Artillery, occupied a defensive sector on the high ground at HOFEN, GERMANY.

The German forces opposing the 47th consisted of the 1st Battalion, 1056th Regiment, 89th Infantry Division, supported by a number of individual artillery pieces, and possibly one battery of 150mm howitzers or 122mm Russian guns. The Germans

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Germans were not at all aggressive and were content to dig in and improve their positions. They did on occasion send out small patrols, but these were quickly chased back into their own lines of annihilated by our artillery fire.

German mortar fire was active, as was hostile artillery, intermittently throughout the 10 days that the 47th occupied the position. Through observation from 25 and more observations posts and studios plotting of flash readings CCR in conjunction with Division Artillery was able to locate several German gun positions, and Division Artillery fired counter-battery on these targets.

The terrain occupied by our infantry was a long narrow ridge extending from MUNSCHAU to ALZEN. The villages of HOFFEN and ALZEN both were situated on the topographical crest of this ridge and our positions were on the eastern and southeastern edges of the villages. From our positions on this ridge we had excellent observation toward DUGENROICH, EICHERSCHEID, ROHREN, and finally the HIGH ground southeast of ALZEN.

Conversely the Germans from their observation posts at each of these places had excellent observation of us and our movements.

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During the same period a large portion of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company 3d Armored Group was integrated with Headquarters CCR to form a provisional Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CCR. Staff officers after the arrival of 3d Armored Groups officers were as follows:

Commanding Officer	Colonel Glen H. Anderson 08632
Executive Officer	Major Rufus H. Wallace 0362293
S-2	Captain Richard F. Wilkins 0416201
S-3	Major Gregg L. McKee 023811
Asst S-3	Captain Robert E. Williams 0411189
S-3 Air	Lt Col William H. Allen 0223875
Asst S-3 Air & S-3	Captain Robert E. Williams 0411189
Asst S-3	Major Ray S. Treadwell 0389764
Com. Officers:	
Wire:	2d Lt Rupert E. Park 01643947
Radio:	1st Lt George G. Phillips 01015357
Liaison Section:	Captain Joseph G. Fowler 0414149
	1st Lt Leon C. Edenburn 01010878
	2d Lt Raymond H. Godsey 01297024
S-4	Captain John D. Webber Jr., 01011954
Surgeon	Major Raymond T. McFarlin 0317687 M.C.
Motor	W.O. Clayton G. Retzer W2120308
Hq Co Commander	Captain Francis B. Freeman 01011883
Maint Officer	1st Lt Allen R. Nye 0466023

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HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND "R" 5TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 255, U. S. ARMY

*OP 19
etc*

24 December 1944

new case

SUBJECT: Report After Action Against Enemy.

TO: Commanding General, 5th Armored Division.

Submitted herewith is Report After Action Against Enemy for CCR
for the month of November, 1944.

Glen H Anderson

ANDERSON
Col., Inf.,
Commanding

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Encl:

- Encl #1 Report After Action Against The Enemy (5 copies).
- Encl #2 S-2, S-3 Air, & S-4 Journals.
- Encl #3 S-2 Journal Supplement
- Encl #4 S-3 Journal
- Encl #5 S-3 Journal Supplement, 1-7 November
- Encl #6 S-3 Journal Supplement, 8-14 November
- Encl #7 S-3 Journal Supplement, 15-18 November
- Encl #8 S-3 Journal Supplement, 19-20 November
- Encl #9 S-3 Journal Supplement, 21-26 November
- Encl #10 S-3 Journal Supplement, 27-30 November
- Encl #11 S-3 Journal Supplement, 4th Inf Div.
- Encl #12 S-3 Journal Supplement, VII Corps
- Encl #13 S-3 Journal Supplement, VII Corps Periodic Reports & Sit Reps.

Donald Cameron 13 Aug

1945

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AUTHORITY
: Ltr.

**HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND "B" 5th ARMORED DIVISION
REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST THE ENEMY
November 1 - November 30, 1944**

On the 1st of November, CCR was engaged in turning over the defense of the HUFEN - ALZEN area to CCB, 5th Armored Division.

TROOPS

HQ AND HQ CO, CCR

Commanding officer
Executive officer
S-2
S-3
Asst S-3
S-3 Air
Asst S-3 & S-3 Air
S-4
Surgeon
Communications Officers:
Radio
wire
Liaison Section

Hq Co Commander
Maintenance Officer
Motor Transport

Colonel GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632
Major RUFUS M WALLACE, 0362293
Captain RICHARD R WILKINS, 0416201
Major GREGG L McKEE, 023811
Major RAY S. TREADWELL, 0389764
Lt Col WILLIAM H ALLEN, 0223875
Captain ROBERT E WILLIAMS, 0411189
Captain JOHN D WEBBER Jr., 01011954
Major RAYMOND T. MC FARLIN.

1st Lt GEORGE B. PHILLIPS, 01015357
2d Lt RUPERT E. PARK, 01643947

Captain Joseph G. FOWLER, 0414149
1st Lt LEON C. EDENBURN, 01010678
2d Lt RAYMOND W GODSEY, 01297024
Captain FRANCIS B. FREEMAN, 01011883
1st Lt ALLEN R NYE, 0466023
W.20. JG. CLAYTON G. RETZER, W2120308

C Co/22 Armd Engr Bn
Company Commander

Captain FERLMAN

10th Tank Bn. (Married formation,
Commanding Officer

Lt Col WILLIAM A HAMBURG

Hq Co/10
A Co/10 & A Co/47
C Co/10 & C Co/47
D Co/10 (less one platoon)

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married formation,
Commanding Officer

Lt Col HOWARD E BUYER.

Hq Co/47
B/Co/47 & B Co/10
1 platoon D Co/10

89th Cav Ren Sqdn

Hq & Hq & Sv Troop
A, B, C, D, & E Troops
F Co

CCR Trains
Commanding Officer

Captain FRED C. HOPPER

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Because of activity caused by the turnover, an increase in the amount of enemy artillery was noted. The turnover, however, was completed by 1700A. The 85th Cavalry Rcn Sqdn was at this time released from attachment to CCR and attached to CGB.

After being relieved, CCR moved to an area in the vicinity of **FAYMONVILLE (K8601), BELGIUM**. Troops remained the same with the exception of the 85th detached. Having settled in bivouac, the units began training programs.

November 2nd information was received that the 28th Inf Div was to make an attack the next day on the north flank of the V Corps sector. This operation was of interest to CCR as CGA was standing by for possible commitment in that area.

November 3rd General Oliver, Commanding General of the 5th Armored Division visited the CP to discuss possible future operations in conjunction with activities to the north. The general also notified this headquarters that CCR was in ARMY reserve.

The 4th and 5th of November, CCR continued training. Hq and Hq Company CCR, taking advantage of the rest period, devoted some time each day acquainting the new members of CCR Hq and Hq Co with the organization and operation of the 5th Armored Division and CCR.

November 6th at 1150A Colonel Anderson was requested by the C/S, 5th Armored Division to report to Division CP to make a route reconnaissance and a reconnaissance for possible employment in the **VUSSENACK** area. CCR staff was alerted and commanding officers of the 10th and 47th were called to the CP to participate in the reconnaissance. At 2015 that evening, the command was put on a four hour alert. Later, Colonel Anderson and reconnaissance party returned with information that CCR might be employed in the **VUSSENACK** area in the event the 28th Division ran into trouble. This particular situation, however, did not develop.

7 and 8 November, CCR remained in bivouac in the vicinity of **FAYMONVILLE**. Interest was maintained in the developments to the north.

091715 November, CCR was attached to VII Corps for possible later employment with the 4th Infantry Division. Liaison was established with Corps and Division on the 10th of November and the command was alerted to move to a vicinity southwest of **AACHEN**, movement to take place on the morning of the 11th.

CCR CP closed at **FAYMONVILLE 110900A** November and opened at **WALHORN (8132), BELGIUM, 111400A**.

TROOPS

Hq & Hq Co, CCR

0/22 ARMED Engr Bn
0/628 TD Bn SF
47th Arm'd Inf Bn (Married)
Hq & Hq Co/47
B/47 & B/10

10th Tk Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10 & A/47
C/10 & C/47
D/10

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95th Armd FA Bn
Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, C, & Sv Btrys
Medical detachment
C/387 AA An BN Sr attached.

CCR Trains
Sv Co/10
Sv Co/47
C Co/75th Armd Med Bn
Det C Co/127th Urd Mt Bn.

"C" Troop, 85th Cavalry Rcn Sqdn was attached to CCR, 12th November.

During the period 11 November to 24 November, the command remained in the vicinity of WALHORN preparing for coming operations. Liaison was maintained with VII Corps and the 4th Infantry Division.

On the 19th of November, CCR reverted to V Corps control and was attached to the 8th Infantry Division. The 8th had recently relieved the 28th Infantry Division in the HURTGEN - VOSSKNACK area.

The next day the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion with C/387 AA AN Bn Sr attached moved to the vicinity of K9934 to reinforce the fire of the 56th Field Artillery Battalion. The 95th would revert to direct support of CR upon commitment of CCR.

THE ATTACK ON HURTGEN AND KLEINHAU

The enemy and the terrain in the HURTGEN - KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG - BERGSTALN Area:

Elements of the 275th and 89th German Infantry Divisions were holding the line. They were supported by the 116th Panzer Division as a mobile reserve, but this division was being withdrawn when CCR began its operations. Specifically the following battalions and regiments were in the German sector: the 253d Engr Bn; the 600th Engr Bn; the 275th Fusilier Bn; the 2d Bn of the 1055th Regt; and the 1st and 2nd Bns 60th Panzer Grenadier Regt.

Normally, this imposing array of order of battle would have indicated that at least eleven battalions, with more than adequate support from the divisional artillery, 275th and 89th Divisions, were defending the sector where CCR was to make its attack. Actually, however, the listing of the German order of battle is a listing of nominal units. Information from prisoners indicated that all battalions were less than a third of strength. It was estimated that approximately a regiment in strength opposed CCR in the German lines. Mortar and artillery support, however, was effective, adequate and damaging to us. At least three battalions, two light and one medium were supporting the German infantry in our zone of advance. It is difficult to estimate the number of mortar batteries—81 and 120 mm that were in the German sector, but twelve would be a conservative estimate.

Heavy mortar and artillery fire was not anymore of an obstacle than the innumerable anti-tank mines, and anti-personnel mines and the terrain. First, the mines: the two German engineer battalions, owing to a relatively stable situation over a period of weeks had had an opportunity to lay large numbers of S8HU mines in the HURTGEN forest and MALTZ mines along the roads and in the open fields. In many cases, the fields were not defended by fire, the number of mines in itself being a major obstacle.

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The terrain in the HURTCEN - KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG - BERGSTEIN area was emphatically not suited for tank action. Open terrain was limited in the area and surrounded entirely by woods and wooded draws which permitted German infantry and snipers to stalk our tanks during darkness and afforded concealed positions for anti-tank weapons during daylight.

The ground had been cultivated within the previous growing season and owing to continual and heavy rainfall was too soft to insure good support for tank maneuver. The roads were originally narrow and third rate, with the exception of the main GERMETER - HURTCEN - KLEINHAU highway, and once they had been subjected to the stresses of the battle field, proved difficult and awkward routes over which to move armored vehicles.

The key terrain features of the area were, first Hill 401, northeast of HURTCEN; secondly, Hill 401 northeast of KLEINHAU; thirdly, the hill immediately east of BERGSTEIN; fourthly, the wooded valley between VOSSENACK and HURTCEN and the wooded area east of KLEINHAU and north of BRANDENBERG. The observation available to the Germans from the first three terrain features and the ease of defending the last two with a minimum of troops made more difficult the task of seizing and occupying the towns; which consistently bad weather, sodden ground, and countless mines had already made difficult.

TROOPS

Hq & Hq Co, CCR

C/22 Armd Engr Bn (Less Armd Plat,
C/85 Cav Rcn Sqdn

10th Tk Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/10

A/10 & A/47

C/10 & C/47

D/10

1 Platoon, C/628 TD Bn SP

95th Armd FA Bn

Hq & Hq Btry

A, B, C, & Sv Btrys

Medical detachment

C/387 AA Aw Bn SP (-)

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/47

B/47 & B/10

Armd Plat, C/22

C/628 TD Bn SP (Less 1 Plat)

Flail Tank

One M-16 multiple Mt AA,

C/387 AA Aw Bn Sr.

CCR Trains

Sv/10

Sv/47

Sv/95

C/75 Armd Med Bn

Det C/127 Ord Maint Bn

THE PLAN

The 121st Infantry was to clear the woods southwest of HURTCEN to the LD designated as the edge of woods at FO335. The 4th Infantry Division on the left was to mop up the woods northeast of HURTCEN and continue the attack on GRUSHAU FO538. On our right the 28th Infantry and the 13th Infantry were to hold defensive positions in the VOSSENACK area and in the woods between that town and HURTCEN. Air support would be available, weather permitting.

CCR attached to the 8th Infantry Division was to attack, seize and hold HURTCEN and KLEINHAU until relieved by elements of the 8th Division.

The command, less trains, planned to move to assembly area in ROTGEN K9228 on the 23rd of November and attack the following morning at 0730A.

The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, married, plus attachments, was to march on order from assembly area in ROTGEN to an attack position west of the LD. Crossing the LD at 0730A, the

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the LD. Crossing the LD at 0730A, 47 was to attack, seize and hold HURTGREN until relieved by the 13th infantry. The armored platoon of C/22, C/628 TD Bn less two platoons, and the flail tank were to be released to the 10th Tk Bn upon completion of the attack.

10th Tk Bn, married, plus attachments, was to march, following the 47th, from assembly area in ROTGEN to the attack position and attack on order to seize and hold high ground (Obj No 1) to protect right flank of CCR and seize and hold KLEINHAU (Obj No 2). 10th would turn over objectives to the 121st Infantry upon its arrival and would withdraw on order after being relieved.

C/22 Armored Engineer Battalion would move to assembly area, mark route & march from ROTGEN forward to facilitate night movement and would be prepared to support attacks of the 47th and 10th by mine location and removal.

C/85 Cav Rcn Sqdn was to move to assembly area in ROTGEN and provide road guides from ROTGEN forward.

95th Armd FA Bn plus attachments was to provide direct support to CCR.

THE ATTACK - HURTGREN

Due to dense mine fields and heavy artillery and mortar fire, the woods to the northwest and southwest of HURTGREN were not mopped up by the 4th and 8th Divisions as was ordered. Consequently, CCR's attack was postponed.

At 1230A, 24 November, the Commanding General of the 8th Infantry Division called by telephone informing Colonel ANDERSON that the show looked ready. Immediately plans were put into effect and the Command (less trains) moved to the assembly area in ROTGEN. Movement was completed before dark, 24 November.

Slight change in plans was initiated in attachment of C/22 Armd Engr Bn. The Armd Plat was detached from the 47th and attached to the 10th. One platoon (unarmored) was then attached to the 47th to work dismounted.


During the night and morning, 24 and 25 November, the 47th moved from the assembly area to the attack position, B/47 dismounting from half tracks at 2400. The 10th followed the 47th, leaving at 0900A.

At 0315A S-3, 121st Infantry informed this headquarters that there was a knocked out tank on the route of approach just short of the LD but that it was being removed. It will be found later that this one item was the cause of much confusion and delay in the operation.

The 47th Armd Inf Bn, married formation, attacked north through the 121st Inf at 0720A, 25 November (Obj HURTGREN). B/47 which had advanced to the LD, awaited the arrival of the tanks, B/10.

The Company Commander B/10 reported his tank column had been held up by a large crater in the road just short of the LD. C.O., CCR was aware of the crater at the time, but had received a report from the 8th Inf Div that a treadway bridge had been constructed spanning the breach.

platoon leader, 2nd platoon, B/10, leading the tank column and knowing nothing of the crater had come upon it unexpectedly. Directing his tank to the side of the road, he had attempted a crossing, but his tank had bogged halting the entire tank column.



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The Company Commander, B/10 immediately summed up the situation and began operations to bridge the span as there was no other way of getting the tanks through. Bridge, trucks were brought up and the bridge was constructed. The operation was very difficult however as it was accomplished under heavy mortar, artillery and small arms fire.

At approximately 1000A, the tanks were able to cross the bridge, but were unable to break out of the woods, because of dense AT mine fields.

CCR was at once regrouped giving the 47th its own A, B, and C Companies and B/10.

Another attack was made at 1630A employing principally infantry. This attack made little headway, because of numerous enemy mines, booby traps and mortar and artillery fire. The element of surprise had been lost.

During both attacks the 95th Armd FA Bn furnished direct support to CCR. C/22 Armd Engr Bn less attachments to battalions assisted C/85 Cav Rcn Sqdn in marking the route to the attack position. The Engineer Platoon with the 47th attacked with the 47th. Engineer casualties were high.

Before daylight, 26 November, the 47th was withdrawn from the attack position, and reassembled in HURTGEN. B/10 and elements of C/628 TD Bn S. attached to 47 reverted to the 10th Tk Bn.

The 10th was not committed during the attack, but having followed the 47th along the route of attack had to move off the roads to positions in the woods. This was done the morning of the 26th.

Our losses during the attack were high, casualties amounting to approximately 150 of which many were squad and platoon leaders and tank commanders. Three of our tanks were disabled, two by mines and one stuck in a crater.

The reason for the failure to take HURTGEN was the premature employment of CCR. A L of D had not been secured at the North edge of the woods. The single road available as an exit had not been cleared of mines, and the large crater which blocked the road had not been bridged as was reported. The infantry of the 8th Division was not up to the road bend at the edge of the woods as reported. As a result CCR was caught on a cratered mined road along which the Bosche snipers sniped tank commanders, with no other route of egress available. This necessitated bridging operations in plain view of HURTGEN and under intensive artillery and mortar fire. Smoke was used continually to conceal this bridging operation but over two hours elapsed before the first tank could pass over the treadway. All element of surprise was lost. The first tank over the treadway hit a mine in the road and further blocked the road. An AT gun was zeroed on the single road and further blocked egress. Had the crater been bridged at the time it was reported bridged or had the road been swept of mines as it was reported, there was still present the element of success. Further operation was by infantry trying to get through schu mine fields and booby trapped woods to get an exit from the woods. Efforts were not successful on this day.

26, 27 and 28 November CCR was engaged in regrouping and planning operations against KLEINHAU. During this period CCR worked in conjunction with 8th Div Engrs clearing roads and mine fields and filling craters. 27 November 47th Armd Inf Bn (Unmarried) moved from ROTGEN to vicinity K983309 and remarried with the 10th Tk Bn. The 10th (married) then moved to the attack position and remained on alert status prepared to attack through HURTGEN to seize KLEINHAU.

THE ATTACK ON KLEINHAU

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Hq & Hq Co, CCR
 C/85 Cav Rcn Sqdn
 1 platoon C/22 Armd Engr Bn
 1 platoon C/628 TD Bn SF

95th Armd FA Bn
 Hq & Hq Btry
 A, B, C, & Sv Btry's
 Medical detachment
 C/387 AA AW Bn SP (Attached)

10th Tk Bn (married)
 Hq & Hq Co/10
 A/10 & A/47
 C/10 & C/47
 D/10
 Armd Plat C/22
 2 platoons C/628
 Fleil Tank

CCR Trains
 Sv/10
 Sv/47
 Sv/95
 C/15 Armd Med Bn
 Det C/127 Ord Maint Bn

47th Armd Inf Bn (married)
 Hq & Hq Co/47
 B/47 & B/10
 1 Plat C/22

THE PLAN

On the 28th of November enemy in KLEINHAU were reported as 3 companies of infantry, 70 men each and 3 SF guns.

The 121st infantry holding HURTGEN was to clear the road through HURTGEN as far north as RJ 052368. Friendly troops, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf and Co C/709th Tk Bn in the woods west of KLEINHAU, were instructed not to fire into KLEINHAU except on call. The 10th would be able to call them directly by radio.

The 4th Inf Div was to attack GROSSHAU at the same time as our attack. Unless fired on by high velocity weapons from the direction, the 10th was not to fire on GROSSHAU.

The 10th Tk Bn was to leave the attack position and move through HURTGEN with the head of the column near the draw (FO49364) at first light, not later than 0730A, 29 November. 10 was to attack KLEINHAU, clear it out and take hill 401 (FO57376).

1st Bn, 13th Inf would follow under 8th Div control and quickly take over the defense of KLEINHAU and hill 401.

95th Armored FA Bn would be in direct support of CCR, 47th Armd Inf Bn to stand by in reserve.

THE ATTACK - KLEINHAU

During the morning 29 November, the 10th Tk Bn had trouble getting the road cleared through HURTGEN. The road was finally reported clear and the 10th moved out at 0638A. Upon going through HURTGEN at 0715A the head of the column was stopped by a crater with a tank parked beside it. The tank was removed and the column moved out, the head reaching the northeast edge of HURTGEN at 0756A. It was just getting light enough for the tanks to fire effectively.

At 0806A the attack began to move, forward elements taking up firing positions just short of the cross roads southwest of KLEINHAU. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was pinning the doughs so they were having trouble staying with the tanks.

At 0858A our artillery was lifted from KLEINHAU and the 2nd platoon, C/10 moved into town. The 1st platoon, C/10 was ready to flank the town from the

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west, but was having difficulty keeping its doughs with the tanks. The 3rd platoon, C/10 was forming a base of fire from a position near the crossroads southwest of KLEINHAU. At 0908A, 2nd platoon, C/10 reported being on its objective. Information was received that the 4th Inf Div was not attacking KLEINHAU until 1100A. As our tanks were receiving heavy direct fire from that direction, a clearance was obtained and an artillery concentration was put on the town. Some of the enemy fire ceased.

At 1001A two platoons of tanks, C/10 were in KLEINHAU, but no friendly doughs. This was bad as there were many enemy doughs in town and therefore much danger from bazookas. About ten minutes later, however, our doughs reached the south edge of town and began clearing out the buildings. A/10 was also moving up and at 1058A had one platoon of infantry in town.

A report received at 1100 indicated that the 3rd and 9th Panzer Regts were moving south toward GROSSHAU. AT mines and TD's were brought up. At 1118A the company commander of C/10 reported hearing enemy tanks moving into town. Two platoons of TD's were well forward to take care of the situation.

By 1245A, A/10 was on the north edge of town and C/10 was working through the town from the south toward the north, still having trouble working the doughs as enemy artillery was heavy.

At 1327A the weather cleared and friendly aircraft were overhead. The mere presence of the planes caused a noticeable decrease in enemy artillery, enabling our doughs to proceed more effectively with house to house operations.

The remainder of the afternoon and evening 29 November were spent in mopping up. White phosphorous and fragmentation grenades were used to flush the Germans from cellars.

At 1730A, A/10 (married) was in the north edge of town and south to about FO52370. C/10 (married) was in position from that point south to the southern edge of town. 2 platoons of TD's were in town, the other back in reserve. The 10th was ready to be relieved by the 13th Infantry. The 13th was slow in coming up, but the relief was successfully completed during darkness 29-30 November, except that the 13th sent no troops to occupy our road block positions near Hill 401 located at FO5453770 and at FO5753760.

The question of a rallying position had been decided earlier in the day. It was the plan of the C. O. of CCR to rally in the woods toward ROTGE. This plan was refused by the CG V Corps and the 10th was forced to rally just west of KLEINHAU where it sat in an open field most of the 30th under intense concentrations of enemy artillery and mortar fire. In the afternoon of the 30th of November, CCR, now in the woods just west of KLEINHAU, reorganized and resupplied the 10th. On the 30th of November the Germans brought up eight SF guns which fired on our troops from the edge of the woods just east of GROSSHAU. The 95th Armored FA Bn immediately laid down a concentration on the enemy guns, and knocked out a probable three and put the others to flight. Air was requested in order to get the guns while on the run, but was refused by the 8th Inf Div as the enemy was in the 4th Division sector.

During the attack it was found that the attitude of the German defense was exceedingly stubborn, but it was not aggressive. The enemy was reluctant to relinquish any ground and at one point the fact that during the initial phase of CCR's attack no indications of a withdrawal were seen and a captured field order of the 31st Machine Gun Battalion for the defense of KLEINHAU gave as the mission "To hold KLEINHAU at all costs." Once he had been forced to surrender ground, however, he did not counterattack in order to retake it, contrary to his usual custom. The enemy employed at least 3 SF guns in the defense of KLEINHAU, but used them in purely a defensive role and not as a

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mobile counter-attacking instrument.

During CCR's operations in the HURTCEN - KLEINHAU area, then, the epitome of the German's defense was stubborn refusal to give ground in terrain which he was able to hold over an extended period with a limited number of troops owing, first, to his clever use of obstacles and secondly, to very heavy artillery and mortar support.

Enemy prisoners captured during the KLEINHAU attack were 1 officer and 54 enlisted men.

CCR lost approximately 60 men, one tank destroyer gun, 13 half-tracks, most of which were recovered, and 8 tanks, two by AT guns and 6 by mines.

The next operation planned for CCR was to seize and hold BRANDENBERG on order of the Commanding General of the 8th Infantry Division.

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REPORT AFTER ACTION FOR COMBAT COMMAND "R"
5TH ARMORED DIVISION
DECEMBER 1944

TRCOPS

Hq & Hq Co, CCR

C. O. COLONEL GLEN H. ANDERSON, 080632
X. O. MAJOR RUFUS M. WALLACE, 0362293
S-2 MAJOR RICHARD R. WILKINS, 041201
S-3 MAJOR GREGG L. MC KEE, 023811
Asst. S-3 MAJOR RAY S. TREADWELL, 0389764
S-3 Air CAPTAIN ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, 0411189
S-4 CAPTAIN JOHN D. WEBBER JR., 01011954

Liaison Section:

CAPTAIN JOSEPH G. FOWLER, 0411149
1ST LT. LEON C. EDENBURN, 01010878
2ND LT. RAYMOND N. GODSEY, 01297024

Communication Section:

Radio 1ST LT. GEORGE G. PHILLIPS, 01015357
Wire 1ST LT. RUPERT E. PARK, 01043947
Surgeon MAJOR RAYMOND T. MC FARLIN, 0317687
Chaplains: CAPTAIN WILLIAM H. KLAUSTERMEYER, 0410695
CAPTAIN WILLIAM W. POEPPERLING, 0522820
Hq Co C.O. CAPTAIN FRANCIS B. FREEMAN, 01011883
Maint Officer 1ST LT. ALLEN R. NYE, 0436023
Motor Trans WOJG CLAYTON G. RETZER, W2120300

C/628 TD Bn SP

C. O. CAPTAIN ROBERT C. JONES, 01822013

C/85 Cav Rcn Sqdn

C. O. 1ST LT. GEORGE W. BAZQUEZ, 01012910

C/22 Armd Engr Bn

C. O. 1ST LT. THOMAS G. ARNOLD, 01100860

10th Tank Bn (Married)

C. O. LT. COL. WILLIAM A. HAMBURG, 0292156
Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10 & A/47
C/10 & C/47
D/10

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)

C. O. LT. COL. HOWARD E. BOYER, 0218680
Hq & Hq Co/47
B/10 & B/47

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:

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BY AUTHORITY OF THE ASSISTANT GENERAL

RECLASSIFYING COMMITTEE 13 Aug 1960

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95th Armd FA Bn

C. O. Lt Col JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703
Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, & C Btries
Sv Btry
C/387 AA AV Bn SP (Attached)

CCR Trains

C. O. Captain FRED HOPPER, 01010215
Sv/10
Sv/47
Det C/127 Ord Maint Bn (Det Comdr 1st Lt WILLIAM J MC BRIDE, 0466017)
C/75th Armd Med Bn (Co C.O. Captain NOEL F BARTONE, 0356625)

On 1 December 1944, CCR was in the midst of the HURTGEN - KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG - BERGSTEIN operation, the command attached to the 8th Infantry Division, V Corps. In the V Corps sector VOSSELACK (FO433), HURTGEN (FO436) and KLEINHAU (FO537) had been taken. GROSSHAU (FO538) in the VII Corps sector had been taken by the 4th Infantry Division. These four towns constituted approximately the front lines in the immediate sector.

Both the 10th Tank Battalion and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion plus attachments (C/22nd Armored Engineer Battalion, C/85 Cavalry Rcn Sqdn and C/628 TD Bn) had shortly previous to the 1st of December been committed and were at the time reorganizing and resupplying, rallying positions located as follows: 10th Tank Battalion (Married less D/10) in the edge of the woods west of KLEINHAU, approximately FO438; 47th Armored Infantry Battalion (Married plus D/10) in the woods between HURTGEN and ROTGEN vicinity K9931. CCR Hq and Hq Co remained at K997345 and the 95th Armored FA Bn vic K995335.

The command remained in these locations on the 1st of December with the exception of D/10 which joined the 10th during the night of the 1st.

THE ATTACK ON BRANDENBERG

TROOPS

HQ & HQ Co CCR

C/85
C/22 less Armd Plat.

10th Tk Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10 & A/47
C/10 & C/47
D/10
C/628
Armd Plat C/22

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47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/47
B/47 & B/10

95th Armd FA Bn

Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, & C Btries
Sv Btry
C/387 AA AW Bn SP attached

CCR Trains

Sv/10
Sv/47
Det C/127 Ord Maint Bn
C/75th Armd Med Bn.

THE PLAN

BRANDENBERG was defended by the following enemy units:

Elements 1055th and 1056th Regts, 89th Div
2nd and 3d Companies, 189th Engr Battalion (both used as infantry)
189th Anti-tank Battalion (Total amount, ten 75 mm anti-tank guns
towed. Only one section of two guns was committed from this
battalion in the defense of BRANDENBERG)
Elements of 2nd Company, 983d Regt.

These units were supported by the 189th Arty Regt, the Divisional Artillery of the 89th Division; at least two batteries of 120 mm mortars and at least one battalion of dual purpose AA and AT guns.

BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN were each situated on a narrow ridge running northwest to southeast. The ridge, barren on the crest, was covered with woods along the slopes. On the southwestern slope small creeks ran into the TIEFEN river which in turn joined the ROER river between BERGSTEIN and NIDEGGEN. The creeks on the northeastern slope flow into the REINE river which itself flows into the OBERMAUBACH equalizing basin. The dominating terrain was, first a knob of a hill 410 meters high 600 due east of BERGSTEIN, and secondarily, a small hill mass 400 meters in height on the east side of the ROER and northwest of NIDEGGEN. The only road along the ridge was a second class, unpaved road running from KLEINHAU through BRANDENBERG to BERGSTEIN.

Elements of the 8th Infantry Division were reported as having troops along the KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG road SE to a point approximately F056358. The front line at this point ran perpendicularly across the road, 500 yards NE then straight north. In the other direction the line ran SW of the road about 500 yards, then south to the NW end of VOSSENACK. Two companies of the 8th Infantry Division were reported as being in the woods west of BRANDENBERG at F059341.

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CCR was to attack, crossing the IP F056358 at 0730A 2 December, and to seize and hold BRANDENBERG. The 10th Tank Battalion (Married) plus attachments was to attack SE on the main KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG road crossing the IP at 0730A. The 47th Aard Infantry Battalion (Married) would be prepared to move on thirty minutes' notice from its assembly area by the route through GERMETER and HURTGEN to assist the 10th Tank Battalion in the capture of BRANDENBERG or to assist in the defense of the town after its capture. The 95th Armored FA Bn reinforced by the 56th FA Bn and 1 Bn of 155 mm guns would be in direct support of CCR on call by concentration number.

Since neither the NE flank nor the SE flank had been seized by the 8th Inf Div, the 10th was instructed to use D/10 as protection on the flanks after passage of A companies married. Because of the complicated maneuver, troops were to be supplied with last minute information as to the exact location of friendly troops.

THE ATTACK

The 10th Tank Battalion attacked on the morning of the 2nd of December. At 0740A, the C. O. of 10th Tank Bn reported that it was still too dark to shoot. The commanding officer of CCR instructed him to get his forward elements up and lag behind with other elements until it was light enough to shoot.

Engineers had swept the main road between KLEINHAU and BRANDENBERG SE to grid line 35. The southern route from HURTGEN to BRANDENBERG had not been cleared of mines because of small arms fire from the woods. Last minute reports from CCR Liaison Officer with the 121st Infantry indicated that infantry elements were astride the KLEINHAU - BRANDENBERG road at the line of departure.

The attack did not progress during the morning. The Germans had the road covered with AT guns located in KOLME SCHOEID and BRANDENBERG and in other positions which could not be located, because of excellent camouflage coupled with the fact that the enemy would fire only when our tanks started moving. When our tanks attempted to deploy in order to avoid being canalized on the road and thus running into direct AT fire, they encountered dense AT mine fields extending from F055352 to F061354 on either side of the road to the woods. Enemy automatic weapons and bazookas were located in the draw just SW of the road at F055352. Much small arms and machine gun fire was also coming from the edge of the woods east of the road from F066353 and F066347.

In addition to small arms, tanks and artillery, CCR employed close air support during the morning in an attempt to neutralize enemy AT guns and other weapons. The air corps officer attached to CCR directed the planes from his position in the 10th Tk Bn Executive Officer's tank, in which was installed a VHF radio for direct communication. Because of poor weather, only two separate flights were able to work during the morning, the first contacting the 10th's ground station at 0835A and the second at 0942A, shortly after the first flight had departed for base. The second flight departed for base at 1020A and shortly

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thereafter the weather closed in, ending air activity for the day. While the planes were up, however, they effectively bombed and strafed targets in BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN and in the surrounding woods.

By 1245A the situation had become inactive, pending reorganization of A/10 and development of a plan to lift the minefield already encountered. A/10 which had lost four tanks by mines and AT guns had turned over gains to D/10 ~~which had lost four tanks by mines and AT guns had turned over gains to D/10~~ and had returned to the assembly area to reorganize and repair communications, since many radio antennae had been shot off.

On the afternoon of the 2nd, the commanding officer of GCR decided, with the approval of the commanding general of the 8th Inf Div, to hold what had been taken, reinforced with infantry, and to clear a path in the mine field during the night and resume the attack on BRANDENBERG early the next morning. A Co was to form a base of fire from the vicinity of FO60354 and C Co was to make the attack into BRANDENBERG. The commanding general of the 8th Inf Div advised Colonel Anderson that the wooded draw SW of the road at FO55345 would be cleared during the afternoon, 2nd December.

At 021645 December, the commanding general, 8th Inf Div ordered the commanding officer of GCR to move the married company of the 47th Armd Inf Bn to the crossroads south of GERMETER and west of VOSSERACK at FO21328 to be readily available to assist in repelling a counterattack on VOSSERACK. The 47th moved to GERMETER during the night.

D/10 held the position across the road at FO58355 during the night, while C/22 Armd Engr Bn cleared a path through the mine field west of the road. The enemy was active with small arms and bazooka fire. 250 wooden box mines removed by the engineers and several PW's were taken by the 10th. Patrols sent out that night reported many Germans in the surrounding woods.

At 0800A, 3rd of December, the attack began moving. A smoke screen put out by the Germans slowed down progress slightly. At 0912, however the base of fire at FO60354 was in position, our planes were bombing and strafing BRANDENBERG, and the married company was ready to move into town. Just as the air attack stopped the tanks and infantry moved in. The commanding officer, 10th Tank Battalion reported "mission accomplished" at 1115A.

The 28th Infantry had not as yet taken its objectives so the 8th Division called on GCR for use of the 47th to help. The 47th was attached to the 28th Infantry at noon on the 3rd.

The 121st Infantry also had not taken its objectives. D/10 was used to assist the 121st in clearing up objective "A", NW of BRANDENBERG in the vicinity of FO55349 which was to the right rear of our troops in BRANDENBERG. Objective "A" was cleared out and D/10 reported 140 PW's taken in that area.

At about 1430, the 10th Tank Battalion was attacked by enemy planes, three of which were shot down. The enemy air attack was not effective.

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Disposition of forces of the 10th at 1550 was as follows: 5 TD's and 140 infantrymen were in BRANDENBERG; 6 tanks and 80 infantrymen were in position near RJ 058359 about half way between BRANDENBERG and KLEINHAU on the main road to defend to the east; D/10 was being used to defend and patrol the MSR between BRANDENBERG and KLEINHAU; 4 tanks and 2 TD's were knocked out at RJ 058354 and were to be evacuated during the coming night.

The next morning, 4th December, the 47th attacked under control of the 28th Infantry in the VOSSENACK area. There were many mines to the front and it was planned to use the flail tank to clear a path. The flail tank was with the 10th at the time, however, and had engine trouble during the night and was unable to reach the 47th's area in time for the attack in the morning. When it did arrive about noon, the flail was used in clearing the mine field until it hit a mine and was disabled.

During the day the married company of the 47th cleared out a fire trench NE of VOSSENACK at FO50335 after which the 47th was relieved from control of the 28th.

The 10th Tank Battalion held its position in BRANDENBERG receiving heavy artillery fire.

THE ATTACK ON BERGSTEIN

TROOPS

Hq & Hq Co CCR

C/22 less Armd Plat
1 Plat C/85

10th Tk Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10 & A/47
C/10 & C/47
D/10
C/85 less one Plat
C/628 TD less one Plat
Armd Plat, C/22

47th Armd Inf Bn

Hq & Hq Co/47
B/10 & B/47
1 Plat C/628 TD.

95th Armd FA Bn

Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, C, & Sv Btries
C/387 AA AW Bn SP

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CCR Trains

Sv/10

Sv/47

Det C/127 Ord Maint Bn

C/75 Armd Med Bn

THE PLAN

On the 4th of December, the commanding officer of CCR was told to prepare plans to seize BERGSTEIN as soon as possible and after taking the town to defend it against attack from the east, south, or west. To do this, Colonel Anderson maintained that he must have, 1st air support, and 2nd, the 47th as well as the 10th. The commanding general of the 8th Infantry Division informed Colonel Anderson that the 47th would rejoin CCR and that the attack on BERGSTEIN would be postponed until the flanks were secure, meaning no enemy in the draw south of HURTGEN and friendly forces in occupation of the woods just NE of BRANDENBERG (Objective "B").

BERGSTEIN was defended by the 2nd Bn, 900th Regt, with a strength of approximately 400 men. It was estimated that the amount of artillery supporting the defense of BERGSTEIN was equal to that supporting the defense of BRANDENBERG. In addition, the Germans were defending BERGSTEIN with 5 self-propelled guns, the balance of the 189th AT Battalion not committed at BRANDENBERG, and two infantry 75 mm howitzers.

The 10th was to be prepared, after 050800A, to attack on order to seize and hold the north and northeast parts of BERGSTEIN and also the high ground at FO88338 just east of the town if the situation permitted. 10 would organize the defense of the zone it takes with emphasis being placed on road blocks and AT defenses on all roads leading into town from the north and east. D/10 with C/85 less one platoon would be employed to protect the rear, BRANDENBERG, and to keep the MSR (BERGSTEIN - BRANDENBERG road) open. 10 would establish and maintain contact with the 121st Infantry on the northeastern flank.

The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion would be prepared, after 050800A, to move on order from GERMETER to an assembly area Vic FO55362 south of KLEINHAU. The 47th would be prepared, after arrival in the assembly area, to attack on order on the west and following the 10th Tk Bn to seize and hold the southwestern and southern parts of town, and to prepare the sector for defence with emphasis being placed on AT defenses on roads leading into the town from the south and west. After committment, the 47th would establish and maintain contact with the 3rd Bn of the 28th Infantry on the west flank.

C/22 less the Armored Platoon would remain under direct control of CCR and be prepared to assist the advance of 10 and 47 and assist in preparing BERGSTEIN for defense through construction of field fortifications, laying mine fields and obstacles and/or occupying a defensive sector.

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The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion would be in direct support of CCR and would prepare plans for defensive fires for the defense of BERGSTEIN.

The 3rd Bn, 26th Infantry was to attack to the east on division order to close the gap between its positions, which were at the time along the edge of the woods between F0734 and F0633, and our forces at BERGSTEIN. The 121st Infantry was to protect our left flank north of BERGSTEIN.

CCR was to have direct air support, ~~the~~ planes being controlled by the attached air corps officer from 5/10's tank as before.

THE ATTACK

Due to bad weather, the attack was not made during the morning of the 5th. The weather began to break about noon, however, and our planes were up. The attack was scheduled to move out at 1400.

At 1400 the forward elements of the 10th proceeded as planned. In spite of overcast and confusion caused by the 8th Infantry Division Air Support party in trying to divert the planes, air-ground coordination in this phase was excellent. The air corps officer, knowing the location of the troops, directed the planes to targets close to the front of the advancing tank-infantry teams, strafing and bombing with excellent results. Between flights the P-47s were requested to "stick around" even though they had used their bombs, as this factor helped considerably in decreasing enemy artillery activity. It was found that the pilots were eager to do this when told what a remarkable effect it had on the enemy. The planes worked until 1600 in the afternoon, bombing enemy artillery positions and AT locations when not engaged in close support. The air support party, 8th Infantry Division continually interfered and at 1550 when our troops were in BERGSTEIN, tried to bomb the town. The Air Corps officer with the 10th called them off in time, however.

At 1430 elements of the 10th were moving into BERGSTEIN from the north. The 47th had moved to the assembly area south of KLEINHAU at 1400 and was now ordered to proceed to the attack on the southern part of the town. At 1500, C/10 (Married) was well into the town and was mopping up. A/10 (Married) was coming in very well organized, and the B Companies were moving up. The south end was cleaned up at 1720 by the 47th. The reserve platoon, C/85, was dispatched to the 10th and two platoons C/85 were put out ahead before dark as outposts. The two reserve platoons, C/22 were sent to BRANDENBERG to take up defensive positions in the buildings there in case of a counterattack on that town.

During the day, enemy mortar fire and artillery were heavy; the 95th's forward observer with "B" companies was killed, the forward observer's tank with A Companies was knocked out and the C Companies' forward observer's tank was disabled. The latter still had communication, however, and was remaining in position during the night. Realizing the necessity of having forward observers out in the morning in case of a counter attack, Colonel Anderson immediately requested replacements from the 8th Infantry Division. Particular stress was laid on the importance of obtaining at least one F.O. tank. The commanding general of 8th Division assured Colonel Anderson that one would be supplied before morning: When the replacement observers arrived, they had to use the disabled tanks for communications until replacement tanks were brought up two days later.

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At 1820 that evening, the commanding general of the 8th Infantry Division informed Colonel Anderson that the infantry would not get up on CCR's north flank that night, but that the gap would be covered by artillery fire. One company of the 8th Division, however, was in BERGSTEIN and was at the disposal of CCR to cover the south flank, which had not as yet been taken by the 8th Div. The commanding general of the 8th Infantry Division also attached a company of TD's less one platoon to CCR for use in helping defend BERGSTEIN. These TD's moved up during the night 5-6 December, and were put under direct control of CCR TD officer, the company commander, C/628.

Casualties had been heavy during the day especially in infantry personnel. Vehicular losses were as follows: Hq/10--4 assault guns; A Companies (Married) 1 tank and 1 half-track; B Companies (Married)--2 tanks and 1 half-track; C Companies (Married)--3 tanks; C/628-- 1 TD. Strengths of the various elements of the command were as follows: A/10--5 tanks, 3 officers, 23 EM; A/47 (vehicles unknown) 3 officers, 35 EM; B/10--8 tanks, 3 officers and 43 EM; B/47-- (vehicles unknown) 3 officers, 80 EM; C/10--8 tanks, 2 officers, 42 EM; C/47--1 officer, 37 EM; C/628 6 TD's, 3 officers, 48 EM; C/22--about two full platoons.

Troops of CCR holding defensive positions in BERGSTEIN repulsed heavy German counter-attacks all day on the 6th of December. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire were also encountered. Losses during the day were great for both sides, elements of CCR repulsing all counter-attacks staged. The weather was bad all day, but our planes managed to get out late in the afternoon at 1800. Even then, the overcast was low and the planes, encountering much flak over the target area, requested counter-flak fire. CCR artillery fired counter-flak concentrations and the planes were able to effectively bomb and strafe. It was learned later from front line doughs that this action broke up an enemy counter-attack coming at BERGSTEIN from the southeast. By the time the enemy had re-organized his troops for another counter-attack it had become dark.

Other enemy counter-attacks during the day were repulsed by the few remaining tanks, TD's and doughs (reinforced by engineer and recon personnel) and by a large amount of defensive fire from the 95th Armored F.A. Bn. The battalion fired approximately 2500 rounds during the day.

At 0700, 6th of December, the initial German counter-attack was made by the 1st Battalion, 960th Regiment which had come from the SCHMIDT area during the night to make the attack. In addition to very heavy artillery support, the German infantry battalion was given the support of a platoon of s lp-propelled guns. By 1030, however, the initial counter-attack had been repulsed and our positions restored. In this battle, 6 enemy tanks and 5 AT guns were knocked out. At least one company of the attacking German battalion was also destroyed except for ten men, according to information later obtained from P's.

At 1400 the Germans launched a second attack from the north against our positions. The attack was made by the 189th Field Replacement Battalion and was quickly broken up by our supporting artillery.

By the end of the day CCR's strength was considerably depleted. A Companies had 3 tanks operational and 30 doughs; B Companies had 4 tanks, and 20 doughs; C Companies had about 20 doughs (number of tanks unknown); and C/628th had only one TD left.

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At 2000, the evening of the 6th, information was received that the 2nd Ranger Battalion, attached to the 8th Infantry Division, would pass through positions held by CCR and occupy the high ground surrounding BERGSTEIN. This was to take place early the next morning. Ranger forward observers were to relay messages by radio through the 95th's forward observers. CCR was to support the attack of the Rangers by fire and send an officer guide to meet a recon officer from the Ranger Bn that night. The 1st Inf was also to attack in the morning to seize and hold the high ground at F081344.

During the attack in the morning, 7th December, the 8th Infantry Division lost contact with the Rangers so CCR furnished communications for them through artillery channels. At 0905 the Rangers reported "mission completed" but that they were receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire. The Rangers, however, held their positions during the day and night and also the next day, repulsing several strong German counterattacks. Late in the afternoon, 7 December, the Germans with a Battalion of combat engineers, unit identity unknown, twice counterattacked the BERGSTEIN area unsuccessfully.

Elements of CCR remained in BERGSTEIN on the 8th of December, receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire. The strength of the command had been cut down to only a few tanks and doughs. Although there had not been much difficulty in taking the town, defending and holding it once it had been taken was extremely difficult due to the heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Because of the static situation forced on elements of CCR, loss of tanks and other vehicles from enemy artillery was great.

During the night and morning 8th-9th December, CCR, less the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, was relieved from its positions in the BRANDENBERG - BERGSTEIN area and returned to WALSORN, BELGIUM for reorganization. As many of the knocked out vehicles as possible were retrieved during the next few days, many were bogged in the mud and beyond repair.

In none of the attacks between WURTGEN and BERGSTEIN was CCR able to deploy its armor in order to make a strong attack. This was due chiefly to limited terrain, mud and dense AT mine fields. Because of this limited area for maneuver and the single avenue for approach, the Germans with heavy artillery support, extensive use of AT and AP mines, and a limited number of troops were able to make the taking of BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN extremely expensive for CCR in both men and material.

Having taken a position elements of CCR were forced to remain in a static position instead of being relieved by infantry and pulling back into a rallying position. Tanks thus remaining in a static position are extremely vulnerable to enemy artillery as demonstrated by the high casualties sustained by CCR at BRANDENBERG & BERGSTEIN.

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REORGANIZATION AT WALSORN, BELGIUM

Troops

Hq & Hq Co, CCR - (WALSORN, K8132)
C/628 - (RADOTROTH, K7831)
C/85 - (NW of WALSORN, K800324)
C/22 - (W of KETTEMIS, K7928)

10th Tank Bn - (NE of WALSORN, K8233)
Hq & Hq Co/10 (NE of WALSORN, K8233)
A, B, C, & D Cos/10 (NE of WALSORN, K8233)

47th Armd Inf Bn - (LONTZENBUSCH, K7733)
Hq & Hq Co/47 (LONTZENBUSCH, K7733)
A, B, & C Co/47 (LONTZENBUSCH, K7733)

CCR Trains

Sv/10 - (ASTENET, K8034)
Sv/47 - (ASTENET, K8034)
C/127 - (ASTENET, K8034)
C/75 - (KETTEMIS, K805285)

CCR less the 95th Armd F.A. Bn remained in the vicinity of WALSORN, (K8132) BELGIUM from the 9th to the 15th of December. The command was put in V Corps reserve on the 9th, remaining in this status during the period. The 95th remained in the MURIGLEN area at K996335 attached to the 6th Inf Div and furnished supporting fires for the 56th F.A. Bn.

During the period 9 - 15 December, CCR received replacements in vehicles and personnel. Ranges were established in the area and new personnel fired small arms and tank weapons and were given other types of instruction. CCR ordnance was engaged in the repair and maintenance of vehicles during the rest period. As many passes as possible were given to the fighting elements to Paris and to the V Corps recreation center at EUPEN.

THE DEFENSE OF ROTGEN, GERMANY

Troops

Hq & Hq Co, CCR

C/628
C/85
C/22

10th Tk Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10 & A/47
C/10 & C/47
D/10

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/47
B/10 & B/47

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95th Armd F.A. Bn

Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, C, & Sv Btry
C/387

CCR Trains

Sv/10
Sv/47
C/127
C/75

On the 15th of December CCR was put on a 2 hour alert by V Corps for commitment in the MONSCHAU (K9418) area SE of ROTGEN. The plan was that, pending developments, CCR was to attack IMGENBROICH (K9620) or EICHERSCHEID (K9921) or both. This was in the 78th Inf Div sector but CCR was to remain under V Corps control. The line in this sector ran between the towns of SIMMERATH (K9924) and KESTERNICH (K0024) back to the SW and then South to MONSCHAU.

On the 16th of December the command moved from WALHORN to attack as planned. CCR C.P. was to operate from the vicinity of LAMMERSDORF (K9727). While CCR was enroute to the attack positions, the plan was changed and the command less D/10th was stopped at ROTGEN. D/10th was attached to the 2nd Ranger Bn whose mission was to take over SIMMERATH while elements of the 78th Inf Div attacked KESTERNICH. D/10 was dispatched to the Rangers on the night of the 16th.

During the night information was received that the Germans were making a large scale attack to the south near the V and VIII Corps boundary. Much enemy activity was reported all along the front. Enemy air activity was also great and early in the morning of the 17th, paratroops were reported at various points in the V Corps sector.

At 0500, 17th December, V Corps alerted CCR for movement at a moment's notice and called for one company of armored infantry at once for the defense of Corps headquarters. Immediately A/47 was moved and the remainder of the command, less the 95th Armd F.A. Bn who was in firing position, was alerted.

On the 17th several German paratroops were captured by elements of CCR in the vicinity of ROTGEN. By interrogation it was learned that their objective was to cut the main MONSCHAU - EUPEN road. In this case their plane had been shot down and they had been forced to jump. Later it was learned that the entire airborne operation had failed because of bad weather and a lack of training. The paratroops became widely scattered. The main effort of the German offensive was more successful however and reports from several sources indicated that enemy spearheads had broken through American defenses at a number of points to the South.

Afternoon of the 17th, CCR was assigned the mission of defending ROTGEN.

Troops

Hq & Hq Co, CCR

C/628 less one plat.
C/22 less two platoons.

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Hq & Hq Co, CCR (Cont'd.)

One plat, C/85

10th Tank Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/10th
C/10th & C/47th
3rd Bn/121st Inf attached
C/85 less 1 plat.
Armd plat, C/22

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/47th
B/10th & B/47th
One plat, C/22
One plat, C/628

95th Armd F.A. Bn

Hq & Hq Btry.
A, B, & C Btries.
Sv Btry
C/387 AA AW Bn SP

102nd Cav Gp, Meer (Reinf)

102nd Cav Rcn Sqdn
Troop A, 38th Cav Rcn Sqdn (Plus
one plat, Co C, 893d TD Bn)
62nd Armd BA. Bn.

CCR Trains

Sv/10th
Sv/47th
Det C/127
C/75

A/10 had joined A/47, both being attached to the 47th RCT in the MOH-SCHAU area. The 102nd Cav Gp and the 3rd Bn, 121st Inf were attached to CCR.

The 102nd Cav Gp had maintained defensive positions in this area for some time. These defenses were not altered, other elements of CCR being put into strength to the line, form a secondary defense line and to provide a mobile reserve.

One married platoon, B/47, and one platoon of TD's was given the mission of defending PAUSTENBACH hill (K975252). The engineer platoon attached to the 47th was used to lay mines and prepare other defensive positions on the hill. The remainder of the 47th was put in mobile reserve in the vicinity of ROTGEN.

The 10th Tank Bn took up defensive positions within a zone south and southwest of ROTGEN. The 3rd Bn of the 121st Inf and C/85 less one platoon were used for this purpose. C Companies (married) were kept in mobile reserve. Elements of the 10th initiated reconnaissance of LAIBERSDORF, PAUSTENBACH, BICKERATH and SIMMERATH with a view of possible employment in these areas. C/628th also reconnoitered these areas for firing positions.

The 95th Armd F.A. Bn prepared defensive fires for the defense of PAUSTENBACH, LAIBERSDORF and ROTGEN.

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In preparing defensive positions maximum use was made of mines, wire booby traps and trip flares. Extreme vigilance was exercised against enemy paratroops.

Afternoon of the 18th OGR was attached to the 78th Inf Div. The Corps boundary had been moved and the 78th was now attached to VII Corps. The 102nd Cav Gp and the 3rd Bn, 121st Inf were detached from OGR and on the 19th of Dec the 78th Inf Div put the command in Div reserve for immediate commitment to repel a German attack in the division sector and to act as civilian control in ROTGEN. Elements of OGR now in defensive positions were pulled back to ROTGEN and the command began operations to prepare defensive position around ROTGEN by laying mines, putting up wire, digging trenches, constructing obstacles and reconnoitering for other possible defensive positions. Patrols and check points were also established in ROTGEN for the purpose of picking up civilians not authorized to be on the streets.

During the entire period (Defense of ROTGEN) OGR was not involved in any major engagements with the enemy.

THE DEFENSE OF EUPEN

Afternoon of the 21st of December, OGR was again attached to V Corps. The command moved to the vicinity of EUPEN that afternoon and was given the mission of defending EUPEN.

Troops

Hq & Hq Co, OGR

C/85
Co Hq, C/628

10th Tank Bn (Married) less A Cos.

Hq & Hq Co/10
One platoon, C/628

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)

Hq & Hq Co/47
B/10 & B/47
One platoon, D/10
One platoon, C/628

Reserve:

D/10 less one platoon
C/22
One platoon, C/628
Rcn platoon, C/628

95th Armd F.A. Bn

Hq & Hq Btry.
A, B, & C Btries.
Sv Btry.

OGR Trains

Sv/10
Sv/47
C/127
C/75

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Defensive positions were immediately established to the north, south and east of EUPEN. Generally the 47th Armd Inf Bn was responsible for the area south and southeast of EUPEN, the 10th Tk Bn the area north and northeast and the Reserve the area northwest, south and southwest. CCR C.P. was located in EUPEN.

The 47th's sector included the road south of EUPEN to BELLE-CROIX (K804162). One platoon, D/10 was placed at CR 811175 and one platoon, C/85 at CR 804162 to patrol the road between the two points. A bridge guard consisting of one squad of infantry of B/47 was placed on the bridge between the two cross roads at K810170. Two married platoons of B Companies went into position at K796205. The bridge at K809209 was prepared for demolitions with the A.T. platoon of B/47 covering the approaches. The 47th also placed two married platoons of B Companies on the road SE of EUPEN at K819249.

The 10th's sector included the road south out of EUPEN to CR 838257. Road blocks were constructed on roads running to the east and northeast of EUPEN. These road blocks were defended by from 2 tanks and 2 squads of infantry to 3 tanks and 3 squads of infantry.

The Reserve established positions in the vicinity of KETTEMIS (K805290). Two groups, each with a strength of one platoon of engineers and one platoon of light tanks, defended positions just SE of KETTEMIS at K812295 and K800299.

The 95th Armd F.A. Bn drew up plans for defensive fires.

In addition, TD's of C/628 were placed in positions by the units to which attached, several more bridges were prepared for demolitions, mines were laid and several abatis were constructed. These obstacles constituted the outer defenses of the defense plan and were coordinated with the defensive fires of the 95th. The entire area was also patrolled by the 10th, 47th and C/85th.

On the 23rd of December C/628 was detached from CCR. C/628 rejoined its battalion and moved with the battalion to a new area. One platoon, C/85 was attached to the 47th, the rest of the rcn company remaining under CCR control.

24 December, the 5th Armd Div arrived in the vicinity of EUPEN. CCR rejoined the division at this time but remained under V Corps control as far as the defense of EUPEN was concerned, continuing to maintain defensive positions that had been established. A/10 rejoined CCR on the 25th, A/47 remaining with the 47th RCT in the MONSCHAU area.

The 5th Armd Div was alerted and remained on an alert status between the 24th of December and end of the month for possible commitment in several areas along the First Army front. CCR initiated reconnaissance of roads and bivouac areas in the area NE of AACHEN during the period.

So ended the month of December and the year of 1944.

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Glen H. Anderson

GLEN H. ANDERSON
Colonel Infantry
Commanding

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19 Oct 44 :

REPORT AFTER ACTION FOR COMBAT COMMAND "R"
5TH ARMORED DIVISION
JANUARY 1945

TROOPS
Normal Formation

Hq & Hq Co., CC"R"

C. O.
X. O.
S-2
S-3
Asst. S-3
S-3 Air
S-4
Surgeon
S. S. O.
I. P. W.
C. A. C.
C. I. C.
Maint O.
W.O. Motor Transp.
Hq Co. Comdr.
Com. O.
Chaplains:
Catholic
Protestant
Liaison O's.:

COLONEL GLEN H. ANDERSON, 080632.
MAJOR RUFUS M. WALLACE, 0362293.
MAJOR RICHARD R. WILKINS, 041201.
MAJOR GREGG L. MC KEE, 023811.
MAJOR RAY S. TREADWELL, 0389764.
CAPTAIN ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, 0411189.
CAPTAIN JOHN D. WEBBER JR., 01011954.
MAJOR RAYMOND T. MC FARLIN, 0317687.
CAPTAIN BORIS B. BAMBALOFF, 01010621.
1ST LT. JOACHIM OHRINGER, 01169678.
1ST LT. DANIEL A. GRUNDMANN, 0331129.
2ND LT. JOHN W. BROOKENS, 01999838.
1ST LT. ALLEN R. NYE, 0466023.
W.O.J.G. CLAYTON G. RETZER, W2120308.
CAPTAIN FRANCIS B. FREEMAN, 01011883.
1ST LT. GEORGE G. PHILLIPS, 01015357.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM W. POEPPERLING, 0522828.
CAPTAIN WILLIAM H. KLAUSTERMEYER, 0410695.

CAPTAIN JOSEPH G. FOWLER, 0414149.
1ST LT. LEON C. EDENBURN, 01010878.
2ND LT. RAYMOND N. GODSEY, 01297024.

C/22 Armd Engr Bn
C. O.

1ST LT. THOMAS G. ARNOLD, 01100860.

C/85 Cav Rcn Sqdn
C. O.

1ST LT. GEORGE W. BASQUEZ, 01012910.

10th Tank Bn
C. O.

LT. COL. WILLIAM A. HAMBERG, 0292156.

47th Armd Inf Bn
C. O.

LT. COL. HOWARD E. BOYER, 0218680.

95th Armd FA Bn
C. O.

LT. COL. JAMES W. MC NEER, 0223703.

CLASSIFICATION

CCR Troops

CFO

CAPTAIN FRED HOPPER, 01010215.

BY AUTHORITY OF THE AD JUDGE GENERAL

DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 13 Aug 1945

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C/628 T. D. Bn SP
C. O. CAPTAIN ROBERT C. JONES, 01822013

From the 1st through the 24th of January 1945, CCR maintained its defenses around EUPEN, BELGIUM.

-TROOPS-

Hq & Hq Co., CC^R^ - EUPEN
C/85 Cav RCH Sqdn less one platoon.

10th Tank Bn (Married) - NE of EUPEN
Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10
C/10 & C/47

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married) - SE of EUPEN
Hq & Hq Co/47
B/10 & B/47
One Plat., C/85
One Plat., D/10

RESERVE - KETTENIS
D/10 less one Plat.
C/22

95th Armd FA Bn - KETTENIS
Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, C, & Sv. Btrys
C/387 AA AW SP

CCR Trains - ASTENET
Sv/10
Sv/47
C/75
Det C/127

During the period CCR remained under direct control of V Corps as far as the defense of EUPEN was concerned. Otherwise the Command was under control of the 5th Armored Division, which was in V Corps reserve on a four hour alert to be committed only upon approval of the commanding general of the First U. S. Army.

While in this static condition, CCR conducted several experiments and participated in range firing and tactical exercises. Attached are summaries of experiments conducted on: "Operatio of the Flail Tank;" "Effect of American Anti-Tank Mine M-1 on Mark V, Panth Tank Track;" and "Anti-Personnel Schu Mine Exploding Tests, Employing the M-29 Cargo Carrier (Weasle) with Schu Mine Detonating Apparatus Attached."

Experiments were also conducted on the German Panzerfaust and the U. S. Bazooka as to their effects against spaced-armor. It was found that three to four inches between spaced armor was satisfactory to protect the German Mark V Tank against the U. S. Bazooka. The Panzerfaust on the other hand penetrated armor spaced four inches and made a hole two inches in diameter in the turret of the German tank, the armor of which was two inches thick. Other tests were conducted on cold weather operations, tests being made on the effect of sand on icy roads and of grousers in snow.

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On the range, 37mm, 75mm, 76mm, and 105mm tank guns, mortars, bazookas, rifle grenades and small arms were fired by elements of the command.

The 10th Tank Bn and the 47th Armd Infantry Battalion conducted tactical exercises during the period.

A/47 rejoined CCR on the 21st of January and was put under control of the 10th Tank Battalion.

On the 24th of January, CCR was relieved from its mission of defending EUPEN. At this time C Troop of the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved from attachment to CCR and returned to squadron control.

The Command moved to the vicinity of WALHORN, BELGIUM on the 27th of January.

TROOPS

Hq & Hq Co., CCR - WALHORN
C/22 - (K825318)

10th Tank Bn (Married) - EYNATTEN
Hq & Hq Co/10 - EYNATTEN
A/10 & A/47 - (K800300)
C/10 & C/47 - EYNATTEN
B/10 - EYNATTEN

47th Armd Inf Bn (Married) - LONTZEN
Hq & Hq Co 47 - LONTZEN
B/10 & B/47 - LONTZEN

95th Armd FA Bn - HAUSET
Hq & Hq Btry- HAUSET
A, B, & C Btrys - HAUSET
Sv Btry - LONTZEN
C/387 - HAUSET

CCR Troops - LONTZEN
Sv/10 - LONTZEN
Sv/47 * LONTZEN
Det C/127 - LONTZEN
C/75 - ASTENET

On the 29th of January, the 5th Armored Division was attached to the XVI Corps, Ninth U. S. Army for possible future operations in the Ninth Army Sector.


CCR remained in the vicinity of WALHORN, BELGIUM up to and including the 31st of January 1945. Nonengagements with the enemy were experienced by CCR during the month.

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
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Glen H. Anderson

GLEN H. ANDERSON
Col., Inf.,
Comdg.



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REPORT AUTHORITY ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

MARCH 1945

HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND "R"
5th Armored Division
APO 255 U. S. Army

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DATE: [REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND THE 5TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 255, U. S. ARMY

30 April 1945

**REPORT AFTER ACTION ADMINISTRATION
MARCH 1945**

A. CAMPAIGN: Battle of Germany.

B. LOSSES IN ACTION:

1. Personnel:	Officers	Other	Total
Platoon	0	0	0
C/628	1	0	1
C/65	1	0	1
C/67	1	0	1
C/75	1	0	1
C/72	1	0	1
10th Tank BN	6	0	6
47th Armored Inf BN	2	0	2
	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>

2. Vehicles:

2	M41	Medium Tanks w/76mm gun
2	M4	Medium Tanks w/75mm gun
2	M3C	Arm veh
3	M3	Half-tracks
5		Trucks

C. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE AND LOSSES:

210,000	rnd	30 Cal. MG
25,176	rnd	30 Cal. ball rifle
12,000	rnd	30 Cal. AP rifle
6,850	rnd	30 Cal. carbine
17,630	rnd	90 Cal. 10
4,900	rnd	16 Cal.
890		Grenades (frag)
137		Grenades (MP)
8		Grenades (AT)
20		Cartons (M-3)
95		Boxcar (M-7)
38		Adapter grenades
20	rnd	rocket, launch
269	rnd	60mm HE
60	rnd	60mm WP
88	rnd	81mm HE
1	rnd	81mm WP
12	rnd	57mm HE
16	rnd	57mm AP
36	rnd	57mm HE
9	rnd	57mm AP
416	rnd	75mm HE
1,621	rnd	75mm HE 14.6 Super

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21

RESTRICTED

805 rds 76mm HE 1-100 upgr
 66 rds 75mm WP
 92 rds 76mm HE
 28 rds 76mm AP
 20 rds 90mm HE
 70 rds 105mm WP
 105 rds 105mm HE

D. COMMANDERS:

Bn & Bn Co CO's

C. O. Colonel GLEN H. ALDENBORN, 08632.
 L. O. Major RUFUS M. WALLACE, 0362293.
 S-2 Major RICHARD R. WILKINS, 0136208.
 S-3 Major GREGG L. MC KEE, 023011.
 Asst S-3 Major RAY S. TREADWELL, 0309764.
 S-3 Air Captain ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, 0111189.
 S-4 Captain JOHN D. WEFNER JR., 0101192.
 Surgeon Major RAYMOND T. MC FARLIN, 0327687.
 S. S. O. Captain BORIS B. BAMBALOFF, 0101062.
 I. P. W. 2nd Lt. ERNEST R. HOBBS, 0101934.
 G. A. C. Captain DANIEL A. GRUNDMAN, 0331129.
 C. I. C. 2nd Lt. JOSE W. BROOKS, 0199988.
 Comm O 1st Lt. GEORGE O. PHILLIPS, 01015357.
 Chaplains:
 Catholic Captain WILLIAM W. KOEPPFELING, 0522886.
 Protestant Captain WILLIAM H. KLAUSTERSCHER, 0110695.
 Liaison O's:
 1st Lt. LEON C. EYENBERG, 0101078.
 1st Lt. RICHARD G. BEVINS, 0101205.
 Bn Co Comdr Captain FRANCIS B. FUSHEE, 0101183.
 Hq. Co O 1st Lt. ALLEN R. HILL, 0166023.
 W.O. Motor Tr. W.O. J.G. CLAYTON G. REYZER, W-212088.

C/22nd Asnd Engr Bn

C. O. 1st Lt. THOMAS G. ARNOLD, 01100860.

C/85 Cav Hqs Sqdn

C. O. Captain GEORGE W. BARDJEW, 01012910.

10th Tank Bn

C. O. Lt. Col. WILLIAM A. HANBERG, 0292156.

107th Asnd Inf Bn

C. O. Lt. Col. HERFORD E. DUYER, 0218680.

97th Asnd FA Bn

C. O. Lt. Col. JAMES W. MC HERR, 0223703.

CCR Train

C. O. Captain FRED HOPFER, 01010215.

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22

O/CSS B) In SF

C. C. Captain ROBERT W. JONES, 01822013.

Changes in the above during the month of March were as follows:

- 6 March - Capt. CHARLES PERIMAN, 01101162 returned to duty as C.O. 1/31 Regts.
- 8 March - Colonel THOMAS W. HANF, 011015, INF., was added to the staff of OCE HQ.
- 8 March - Capt. DORRIS G. COOPER, 01203029 became OCE Training commander replacing Capt. FRED W. WATKINS, 01010215.
- 18 March - Major HERB L. DE WIT, 023011 was transferred to 9th U. S. Army, tactical air corps. At this time Major RAY W. ... became OCE S-3.
- 22 March - 1st Lt. ROBERT G. ... was assigned to OCE HQ as Liaison officer.
- 31 March - Major ... was wounded and evacuated. Col. ... took over duties of executive officer.


B. ATTACHMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS - See narrative account.

F. MOVEMENTS, BOUNDARIES, AND COMMAND POSTS - See overlays and narrative account.

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93
- 88

CLOSED - 010645 A MAR
CLEARED - 031215 A MAR



HQ CCR-5TH Δ
OPERATIONS 1-3 MAR 45
NO CONTACT W/ENEMY

MAPS: GSGS 4416
SHEETS: R-1 & Q-1
SCALE: 1/100,000

ERKELENZ

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07

CLEARED - 010300 A MAR

HOTTORF
R 15

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LINNICH RESTRICTED

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RESTRICTED

93
-15

Hq CCR - 5TH Δ
ROUTE OF MARCH OF
CCR TO ATTACK
POSITION - 3 MAR 45

BRIDGE
REPAIRED

MAPS: GSGS 4416
SHEETS: R-1 & Q-1
SCALE: 1/100,000



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07 25

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30

HQ CCR- 5TH Δ
OPERATIONS 3-5 MAR 45

MAPS: GSGS 4416
SHEET: Q-1
SCALE: 1/100,000

RHEINBERG

ORSOY

54
x
84

XVI
x x
XIII

HOMBERG

MORS

3 MAR \Rightarrow
4 MAR \Rightarrow
5 MAR \Rightarrow

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RESTRICTED

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
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R H E

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R.



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(Letter, Report Aft. Action Against Enemy - March 1, 1945, HQ, 1st, 5th A.H., Cont'd.)

At 1630 (1646) scattered sniper fire was quickly neutralized. The attached B Companies continued along the main road in the direction of HERS. As the leading tanks advanced at a speed of about 10 miles an hour, they knocked out two German trucks and a Mark IV tank along the route.

At 1830 on the 3d of March forward elements of GCR reached the road intersection at 21172 just west of HERS. At this point the leading tank of B/1st was knocked out by a German 88mm anti-tank gun. An anti-tank ditch intersected the road on either side of the disabled tank. Captain MOORE commanding the B Companies withdrew his force a few hundred yards and established a road block. Then he attempted to continue his advance to the north along a secondary road. It was almost dark and more enemy resistance was met to the north so defensive positions were set up.

Colonel AMER (C), exploring the possibilities of a night attack, sent C/35 out to probe to the north. Enemy resistance was met on every route and it appeared that the Germans had a defensive position established generally along the HERS - UFFERT - REPLEN - HENNINGER road. In view of this fact and also because of unfavorable conditions of darkness and rain, the attack was scheduled for first light in the morning.

During the night the 47th received scattered small arms fire from the front and left flank. The town of HENNINGERFELD (1917) occupied by elements of the 47th contained an estimated 25 German soldiers who had taken cover in the basements. The 47th swept up the town during the night taking 14 prisoners and killing 11 Germans.

The attack was resumed as scheduled early in the morning of the 4th. The 47th remained in place and A Companies (marked) of the 1st Tank Bn passed through the 47th on the road leading north out of HENNINGERFELD.

At 0940A leading elements reached the small town of SAID RUFF (21296) where they met heavy enemy resistance consisting of small arms, bazookas and artillery fire. Several enemy tanks were reported to be in the area. It took approximately an hour to clean up the town of SAID RUFF after which A Companies continued the advance in the direction of REPLEN.

The heavy artillery fire was believed to be coming from a battery of 150mm guns firing from REPLEN. As A Companies approached the town the enemy artillery fire ceased - it is believed that the guns were now in the process of being displaced.

Up to this time A Companies had had considerable infantry losses but small tank losses. One Mark IV assault gun had been destroyed and many prisoners had been taken. It was actually a matter of hours to have fighting all the way.

At 1225A, C Companies (marked) began moving up on the right flank of A Companies which had reached REPLEN and were fighting in the town. By dark C Companies had reached the cross roads at 23529 and had penetrated as far as the crossroad at 23227 which reported a strong force of enemy IF weapons and infantry to the north and northwest of that point. C Companies were receiving high velocity fire from the woods in the vicinity of 24000 and 100mm mortar and artillery fire from the east. C Companies set up road blocks and dug in for the night.

At this time A Companies had cleaned up REPLEN but were receiving high velocity and artillery fire. A Companies set up road blocks and dug in for the night.

- 6 -

RESTRICTED

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(Letter, Report after action against enemy - 10th March 1945)

During the night 4 - 5 March plans were initiated and carried out for the next day's operation. (100) would be to go on and continuing push down the river up to the north on the Corps boundary to other regiments being advanced by friendly units coming up from the west. Contact had been made with friendly units on the south bank. Colonel (100) decided to commit his entire command in the operation. A Company 3rd Battalion and Company (100) and (100) were attached to (100) on the 4th.

Groups

1st Group

C/10
C/22 (-)
1 platoon, C/10

2nd Group

A/10 & C/10
C/10 & C/10
C/10 & C/10
1 platoon, C/10
1 platoon, C/10

3rd Group

B/10 & C/10
A/10 & C/10
C/10 & C/10
1 platoon, C/10
1 platoon, C/10
C/10 less 2 platoons

4th Group

B/10 & C/10
A/10 & C/10
C/10 & C/10
C/10 & C/10
C/10 & C/10

5th Group

C/10
C/10
C/10
1 platoon, C/10
1 platoon, C/10


According to plan, on the morning of the 5th the married A and B Companies 10th Tr Bn advanced north to the Corps boundary where they set up defensive positions to the north and northwest. Following on the tail of U Companies to the cross roads at 22/233 the married B Companies organized by Capt. (100) followed by A/10th and A/10th made a rapid march to (100) a distance of six miles and covered in 15 minutes. Firing as they rolled, the married tank-infantry team knocked out German vehicles along the road. A German column attempting to cross the river at (100) was intercepted and many trucks containing weapons and supplies were knocked out or captured intact. Four SP guns were knocked out in the town and 230 prisoners were taken. Also ten light mortars were captured. Much of this equipment was evacuated by (100) during the night and the next day.

Advance elements of (100) (married B Companies), reached the (100) at 10:00 5th of March 1945. The report "Jacket 1010" was sent by radio to the GOC (100) General, 9th Army Div.


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Hq OOR - 5 Δ
DEFENSE & CIVILIAN
CONTROL AREA
9 MAR TO 31 MAR 45



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

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MUNSTER



DORTMUND EMS

Hq. CCR-5th Δ

OPERATIONS 31 MAR 45

MAPS: GSGS 4416

SHEET: P-2

SCALE: 1/100,000

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(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - March 1945, D. AR, 7th A.D., cont'd.)

1 Plat C/628
1 Plat D/10

10th Tank Bn (married)

Hq & Hq Co/10
A/10 & A/17
C/10 & C/17
1 Plat C/628
D/10 less 2 platoons

25th Arm FA Bn

Hq & Hq Btry
A, B, and C Btries
Sv Btry
C/387 AA M Bn Sp
1 Plat C/628

OCR Troops

Sv/10
Sv/17
C/75
Det C/127
1 Plat D/10

Order of March - C/85, 17th (married), Hq & Hq Co OCR, C/628 (-), 10th (married), 25th and OCR Troops. Route of March - ST TOWNS, MOUNTAIN, ANDERSON, HILKES, SUTTON, LIND, WEST, HILLS, SUTTON, DANFIELD, HALL, BROWN, LINDSEY, ST ADOLF
Hence to assembly areas.

After the Command had crossed the HILKES it was learned that MOUNTAIN and the assembly area southeast of MOUNTAIN had not been cleared and that British and American troops in that sector had no intentions or orders to attack. Colonel ANDERSON immediately assembled his command in the vicinity of DULLEN (6960) where contact was made with the Commanding General, 17th Airborne Division. It was then found that the 17th Airborne Division and elements of the British Guards Brigade were holding the line HETPULM (7470) to APPELHUSEN (7866).

It was also discovered that during the morning, OCR's billeting parties consisting of 24 people had gone through APPELHUSEN on the main road leading to MOUNTAIN. Forward British elements had not halted them and they had been fired on by enemy machine guns and rifles. During a hasty withdrawal of the 24 people Major WALLACE, OCR Executive Officer was wounded by MG fire. He was later evacuated. One of the enlisted men was also wounded.

Upon reaching DULLEN Colonel ANDERSON ordered C/85 to reconnoiter the APPELHUSEN - SUTTON (6362) and the HILKES (7163) - SUTTON road. The command regrouped and the 17th prepared to attack.

The 17th was on the DULLEN - SUTTON road at 1330A when the report was received that elements of the 83d Inf Div were in SUTTON.

While attempting to reconnoiter the APPELHUSEN - SUTTON road C/85 became pinned down by enemy fire in the vicinity of 8540. This was at 1400. One married platoon from the 10th Tank Bn which was still in the vicinity of DULLEN was immediately dispatched by way of APPELHUSEN to assist C/85. The small enemy force was cleaned up and both roads, APPELHUSEN - SUTTON and DULLEN - SUTTON were clear.

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[REDACTED]
(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - March 1945, Hq COB, 5th A.D., cont'd.)

N. N.TE:

During the period 1 March - 31 March Hq & Hq Co 3rd Armored Group was attached to Hq COB, 5th Armored Division and as such this report for the period will cover the report of Hq & Hq Co 3rd Armored Group as Hq Co 3rd Armored Group served as Hq Co COB.

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: **RESTRICTED** :
: AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL :
: 19 Oct. 44 :

**REPORT AFTER ACTION FOR COMBAT COMMAND "R"
5TH ARMORED DIVISION
FEBRUARY 1945**

NORMAL TROOPS IN COMBAT COMMAND "R"

Hq & Hq Co., CC"R"

C. O.
I. O.
S-2
S-3
Asst., S-3
S-3 Air
S-4
Surgeon
S. S. O.
I. P. W.
C. A. C.
C. I. C.
Com. O.
Chaplains:

Catholic
Protestant
Liaison O's:

Hq. Co. Comdr.
Maint. O.
W.O. Motor Transp.

COLONEL GLEN H. ANDERSON, 08632.
MAJOR RUFUS M. WALLACE, 0362293.
MAJOR RICHARD R. WILKINS, 0416201.
MAJOR GREGG L. MC KEE, 023811.
MAJOR RAY S. TREADWELL, 0389764.
CAPTAIN ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, 0411189.
CAPTAIN JOHN D. WEBBER JR., 01011954.
MAJOR RAYMOND T. MC FARLIN, 0317687.
CAPTAIN BORIS B. BAMBALOFF, 01010621.
2ND LT. ENNO R. HOBBLING, 01019342.
CAPTAIN DANIEL A. GRUNDMANN, 0331129.
2ND LT. JOHN W. BROOKENS, 01999838.
1ST LT. GEORGE G. PHILLIPS, 01015357.

CAPTAIN WILLIAM W. FOEPPERLING, 0522828.
CAPTAIN WILLIAM H. KLAUSTERMEYER, 0410695.

1ST LT. LEON C. EDENBURN, 01010878.
1ST LT. RICHARD G. REEVES, 01012425.
CAPTAIN FRANCIS B. FREEMAN, 01011883.
1ST LT. ALLEN R. NYE, 0466023.
W.O.J.G. CLAYTON G. RETZER, 02120308.

G/22 Armd Engr Bn
C. O.

1ST LT. THOMAS G. ARNOLD, 01100860.

G/85 Cav Ren Sqdn
C. O.

CAPTAIN GEORGE W. CASQUEZ, 01012910.

10th Tank Bn
C. O.

LT. COL. WILLIAM A. HALBERG, 0292156.

47th Armd Inf Bn
C. O.

LT. COL. HOWARD E. BOYER, 0218680.

1945
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO
RESTRICTED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE 13 Aug 1945

RESTRICTED

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95th Armd FA Bn
C. O.

LT. COL. JAMES A. MC NEEL, 0223703.

CC"R" Trains
C. O.

CAPTAIN FRED HOPPER, 01010215.

C/628 TD Bn Sp
C. O.

CAPTAIN ROBERT H. JONES, 01822013.

-o-

SUMMARY

During the month of February 1945, CC"R" had no contact with the enemy, and spent its time training, resting, planning and preparing for future operations. From the 10th to the 24th of the month considerable road repairs and maintenance was done on roads from GELLENKIRCHEN to WAUWACH and PALEMBERG, GERMANY.

At all times during the month of February CC"R" was under 5th Armored Division control. On the first of February, the 5th Armored Division was attached to the XVI Corps, and on the 2nd it was transferred to the XIII Corps, 9th U. S. Army to which it was attached for the remainder of the month. The 95th Armd Field Artillery Battalion was under Division Artillery control on the first of February, and remained under Division Artillery control throughout the month, except for the 4, 5, and 6th during the move from BELGIUM to HOLLAND at which time it was attached to CC"R".

TROOPS AS OF 010001 FEBRUARY 1945

<u>Hq & Hq Co/CC"R"</u> C/22	WALHORN, BELGIUM (R-825318)
<u>10th Tank Bn (Married)</u> Hq & Hq Co/10 A/10 & A/47 C/10 & C/47 D/10	EYNATTEN, BELGIUM EYNATTEN, BELGIUM (R800300) EYNATTEN, BELGIUM EYNATTEN, BELGIUM
<u>47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)</u> Hq & Hq Co/47 B/10 & B/47	LONTZEN, BELGIUM LONTZEN, BELGIUM LONTZEN, BELGIUM
<u>CC"R" Trains</u> Sv/10 Sv/47 Det C/127 C/75	LONTZEN, BELGIUM LONTZEN, BELGIUM LONTZEN, BELGIUM ASTHEIMT, BELGIUM

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During the first five days of February CC"R" remained in the vicinity of WALHORN, BELGIUM training and preparing for future operations. On the fourth of February orders were received for the movement of the Combat Command to the vicinity of HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND. On the fifth an advance party composed of elements of the CP staff, wire crew, and GAC left WALHORN to set up an advance CP and to make billeting arrangements.

In preparation for the move greatest secrecy was maintained. All markings were covered on vehicles, and all divisional patches were removed from clothing. Radio silence was maintained and new telephone call signs were used, and all personnel were instructed to use the utmost care to preserve secrecy and not to identify their units.

The CP closed at WALHORN, BELGIUM and opened at HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND at 1600A February 6, 1945. The Command was completely closed in its new location at 070030A February 1945.

TROOPS AS OF 070800A FEBRUARY 1945

<u>Hq & Hq Co/CC"R"</u> C/22	HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND
<u>10th Tank Bn (Married)</u> Hq & Hq Co/10 A/10 & A/47 C/10 & C/47 D/10	HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND HEERLERHEIDE, HOLLAND
<u>47th Armd Inf Bn (Married)</u> Hq & Hq Co/47 B/10 & B/47	TRIEBEEK, HOLLAND TRIEBEEK, HOLLAND TRIEBEEK, HOLLAND
<u>CC"R" Trains</u> Sv/10 Sv/47 C/75 Det C/127	ROBROEK, HOLLAND ROBROEK, HOLLAND NIEUW - BLINDE, HOLLAND NIEUW - BLINDE, HOLLAND ROBROEK, HOLLAND

From the seventh until the 24th of February, the units of CC"R" engaged in training programs which included gas mask drill, range firing, familiarization with British tanks, lectures on sex hygiene, and films on non-fraternization. Rest and recreation were also provided during this period. During the same period plans and preparations were made for future operations.

On the tenth of February extensive road maintenance was begun by CC"R". The road from GELLENKIRCHEN to WAUBACH, GERMANY was the road given highest priority and accordingly the most work was done on it. A rubble foundation was given to approximately two miles of the road and holes were filled, shoulders repaired, and drainage improved. The roads from PALENBERG to GELLENKIRCHEN, and from PALENBERG to WAUBACH, GROENSTRAAT, and UBACH, GERMANY were also repaired. Potholes were filled with rubble and a smooth surface laid. Washboard conditions were smoothed out, large holes and ruts filled, and drainage improved. The shoulders were resurfaced and repaired. On the 23 and 24th of February stock piles of rubble were placed at intervals along the road to help later maintenance as well as continuing general maintenance.

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On the 24th of February final preparations for moving forward were made and a billeting party was sent to PALENBERG, GERMANY. The CP closed in HERRLEBEIDE, HOLLAND on the 25th of February at 1330A and opened at PALENBERG, GERMANY at 1420. The tail cleared HERRLEBEIDE at 1550. During the next day preparations were made to cross the ROER RIVER. At 0315 on the 27th the CP closed at PALENBERG and operated enroute until 0700A when it arrived in bivouac in the vicinity of HOTTORF, (FO22675), GERMANY.

CC"R" crossed the ROER RIVER in the zone of the 102nd Infantry Division, using the treadway bridge at LINNICH. The bridge was strafed during the crossing but no damage resulted.

C/628 TD Bn was attached to CC"R" and joined CC"R" in bivouac in the vicinity of HOTTORF, GERMANY at 0815A February 1945.

On the 28th and last day of February CC"R" was ordered to remain in place, but plans were made for moving further. One troop of British flail tanks of Squadron C, 52nd Brigade, 79th Division were attached to the Command on this date. During the time CC"R" remained in the vicinity of Hottorf the Command maintained liaison with CCA, and was responsible for protecting that portion of the XIII Corps right flank which was behind CCA.

The end of the month found CC"R" with morale high, and with all of the units ready and anxious to assume the attack to the Rhine.



GLEN H. ANDERSON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

RESTRICTED

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HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND "R"
5th Armored Division
APO 255 U. S. Army

:
:Auth: [redacted] 5th AD:
:Init: *Raw* :
:Date: 18 May 1945 :

18 May 1945

SUBJECT: Report After Action for Combat Command "R", April 1945.

TO : Commanding General, 5th Armored Division, APO 255, U. S. Army.

1. Submitted herewith is the Report After Action for April 1945 for this command in five copies with supporting documents.

For the Commanding Officer:

Robert C. Wakefield
ROBERT C. WAKEFIELD
Lt. Col., Infantry
Actg Ex. O.

Inclosures: 14.

1. CCR History 5th Armored Division April 1945
2. CCR History 5th Armored Division (dupl's. 2, 3, 4, 5,) April 1945
3. S-2 Journal April 1945
4. S-2 Journal Supplement April 1945
5. S-2 Journal Supplement, Msg file (1) April 1945
6. S-2 Journal Supplement, Msg file (2) April 1945
7. S-2 Journal Supplement, Msg file (3) April 1945
8. S-3 Journal April 1945
9. S-3 Journal Supplement, Disposition Overlays, F.O.'s April 1945
10. S-3 Journal Supplement, Overlays, Ln O's reports, April 1945
11. S-3 Journal Supplement, G-3 Periodic Reports April 1945
12. S-3 Journal Supplement, G-3 Periodic Reports April 1945
13. S-3 Journal Supplement, Msg file April 1945
14. S-4 Journal April 1945

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16 May 45

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HEADQUARTERS 1st CABT G. M. AND "B"
 5th Armored Division
 APO 255 U. S. Army

Month: _____
 Initials: _____
 Date: _____

16 May 1945

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY
 APRIL 1945

A. CAMPAIGN: Battle of Germany

B. LOSSES IN ACTION:

1. Personnel:	Officers	EM	Total
OCB, Hq & Hq Co	1	0	1
10th Tank Bn (Married)	3	47	50
47th Armored Inf Bn (married)	4	7	11
95th Armored PA Bn	0	4	4
C/22	0	10	10
C/82	2	1	3
C/85	0	6	6
C/127	0	0	0
C/75	0	2	2
	<u>10</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>87</u>

2. Vehiculars:

4	M4	Medium Tanks w/75mm gun
4	M4A1	Medium Tanks w/76mm gun
1		Tank Dozer
1	87mm	Tow Gun
4		Half-tracks
3	2 1/2-ton	Trucks
4	1/2-ton	Trucks
1		Air Compressor truck

C. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

196480	rd	30 MG	108	rd	81mm Mort. HE.
32315	"	50 cal	12050	"	Carbine
37895	"	30 Rifle (B)	255	"	#115
471	"	105 M-48	3957	"	#108
61	"	105 HE	2	"	#114
2	"	105 Red Smk	172	"	#109
270	"	105 HE	210	"	#118
534	"	76 HE	125	"	Frag. Grenades
6	"	76 Smk.	35	"	WP Grenades
319	"	75 HE	14	"	INC. Grenades
16	"	75 WP	18	"	60 HE
111	"	57 HE	8800	"	45 Cal.
10	"	57 WP	34	"	37 AP
26	"	75 AP	14	"	75 How. HE
37	"	76 AP	11	"	90 AP
145	"	87 HE	14	"	90 HE

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - April 1945, 1st CCR, 8th AF, Cont'd)

D. COMMANDERS:

C.O.	Colonel GLEN W. ANDERSON, 06832
X.O.	Colonel THOMAS J. HOANE, 011815
S-2	Major JOHN W. MCKINIS, 0418201
S-3	Major RAY E. THROBELL, 0839764
S-3 Air	Captain ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, 0411189
S44	Captain JOHN W. WEBER JR., 01011954
Surgeon	Major RAYMOND T. MC PALLIN, 0817687
S.S.C.	Captain FRED S. BALBALOTT, 0110621
I.P.W.	2nd Lt. WYNO R. HOPPING, 01019542
C.A.C.	Captain DANIEL A. G. GUNMANN, 0331129
C.I.C.	2nd Lt. JOHN T. BROOKHUIS, 0199638
Commo O	1st Lt. GEORGE G. PHILLIPS, 0105357
<u>Chaplains:</u>	
Catholic	Captain WILLIAM J. ROSE, 0022525
Protestant	Captain WILLIAM E. KLA STERNBERG, 0410095
<u>Liaison O's:</u>	
	1st Lt. L. G. C. GUNBURN, 0101078
	1st Lt. ROBERT G. LINDSEY, 0-1513899
	1st Lt. RICHARD C. RAYNES, 01012420
Hq Co Comdr	Captain FRANCIS I. FREEMAN, 01011850
Maint. O	1st Lt. ADAM S. NYE, 0468025
MO Mtr Tr.	MSG CLAYTON G. METZER, W-2120303

C/22nd Armored Rgr Bn

C. O. Captain CHARLES W. ELMAN, 0-1011162

C/88 Cav Ren Sqdn

C. O. Captain GEORGE W. BASQUEZ, 01012910

10th Tank Battalion

C.O. Lt Col WILLIAM A. WAMBERG, 0292156

47th Armored Inf Bn

C. O. Lt Col HOWARD E. BOYER, 0218680

95th Armored PA Bn

C. O. Lt Col JAMES F. MC NEER, 0223703

CCR TRAINS

C. O. Captain DOUGLAS C. CORNER, 01283029

C/75th Armored Medical Bn

C. O. Captain NOEL F. BARTONE, 0356625

C/628 TD Bn AF

C. O. Captain ROBERT E. JONES, 01822018

[REDACTED]

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - April 1945, Hq CGR, 5th AD, Cont'd)

Changes in the above during the month of April were as follows:

28 April 1945 - 1st Lt. RICHARD G. REEVES, O1C12425 returned from CGP to 10th Tank Battalion.

E. ATTACHMENTS AND ASSIGNMENTS - See narrative account

F. MOVEMENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND COMPANY POSTS - See overlays and narrative account.

[REDACTED]

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - April 1945, Hq OGR, 5th A.F., cont'd)

NARRATIVE ACCOUNT:

6. On the 31st of March 1945 OGR had marched from bivouac in the vicinity of St. DENIS (1405) Germany on the west side of the Rhine to an assembly area just southwest of MUNSTER. The assembly area had not been cleared so it was necessary for the command to fight its way in.

The next problem confronting OGR was to establish a bridgehead and build a bridge over the DORTMUND-EMS Canal. Attempts had been made a few days prior to the 31st to capture one of the bridges intact. All attempts had failed as the bridges had either been previously blown or were blown as patrols approached.

Orders were issued to the 10th Tank Battalion to secure a bridgehead at 871634. This was accomplished by 0400, 1 April, without opposition.

At 0400 Captain CHARLES PERLMAN, the Commanding Officer of Company "C" 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion, was issued orders to construct a bridge at that site. Captain PERLMAN stated that the bridge would be ready by 1000 in the morning. The bridge was completed and reconnaissance had crossed by 0800. In four hours the bridge had been completed, a most amazing piece of work.

The command proceeded in one column, the 10th Tank Battalion leading followed by Troop "C" of the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, (the 10th Tank Battalion had a battery of the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion as lead battery), OGR Headquarters, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion minus the lead battery, and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion.

The column moved from the bridge site to VEHRE (A8761). Bad roads were encountered in the area A9061 and A9361. They were so bad the tail of the column had to be re-routed. When the head of the column got to the vicinity of B050345 the column mired into the mud. At that time Colonel ANDERSON contacted elements of the 44th Cavalry Squadron in SENDENHORST (B0660), who stated that the town had been cleared and that the roads in the area were in excellent condition. Colonel ANDERSON told Lt Colonel HAMBURG to turn the column and get it into SENDENHORST. The primary objective at this time was to secure another crossing over the EMS CANAL in the vicinity of B0670.

At SENDENHORST, Colonel ANDERSON instructed Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM A. HAMBURG of the 10th Tank Battalion to lead off on the main road with one married company to EVERSINKEL (B0769). The rest of the command was ordered to follow.

The married "A" companies led off and reached the town in twenty minutes. The companies met resistance at EVERSINKEL and captured an SS officer. The officer stated that his mission was to put up resistance as best he could and then notify the Germans by telephone when the Americans had entered the town. He had accomplished his mission. Hereafter a patrol was always sent to the telephone exchange as soon as leading elements reached a town. In EVERSINKEL all the switchboards were in operating order with the drops waving and lights flickering.

From EVERSWITHE the column moved east picking up prisoners along the way but encountering no resistance. At FROCVVHNDST (B1669) leading elements picked up another German officer whose job had been to call WARNDORF (B1773). The telephone wires had been cut by machine gun fire and he had been unable to do so. He stated that there were some 38 troops and two tanks in WARNDORF.

At this time, 1700 hours, 1 April, Colonel ANDERSON made the decision that he would by-pass WARNDORF. Colonel HAMBERS took off to the southeast to WESTKIRCHEN (B2165). At WESTKIRCHEN elements of the XVI Corps Cavalry were contacted. They were keeping contact with CGR and the 2d Armored Division. Approximately 200 yards of the road from WARNDORF to WESTKIRCHEN was a maze of defenses, road blocks, etc., for the most part unmanned.

At WESTKIRCHEN the column turned north to BEELEN (B2570). Here enemy vehicles were encountered. Approximately forty-five of them were destroyed. When the column reached BEELEN road blocks were set out on the main WARNDORF-GUTERSLOE (B4400) road. At this point a number of German vehicles were knocked out. Combat Command "B" was flushing them out from the vicinity of MUMSTER (A9375) and CGR was catching them.

When leading elements arrived in BEELEN they again had trouble with the telephone lines. Germans were invariably talking on the telephone to the next town. They knew our position all of the time.

Colonel ANDERSON decided to capture a passage over the EMS CANAL at GREFFEN (B279746) and the 10th Tank Battalion was given the mission of getting the bridge intact. If they were not successful in this they were to capture a bridgehead so that a bridge could be built. At that time 98 feet of bridging equipment was on hand.

At about 1930 or 1945 1 April, the 10th Tank Battalion reported that they had run into fire at the site of the bridge and had killed a few Krauts and discovered that the bridge had been blown.

Colonel ANDERSON issued orders sending the 85th Reconnaissance Squadron to reconnoiter crossing sites on the east and west of the crossing at GREFFEN (B2875). He issued orders to the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion to be prepared to reconnoiter the crossing on the EMS CANAL as far west as 1000 yards east of WARNDORF.

The reconnaissance reported at 2030 that both the bridges at B2574 and B3073 were intact. They further reported that the bridge at B2574 would take the division lead and that the bridge at B3073 with reinforcing would take the division lead.

Colonel ANDERSON issued orders at this time, 2030, for the 10th Tank Battalion to secure a bridgehead at both bridges so that either bridge could be used. Tanks were to be crossed over the bridges to make sure they would hold. By 2300 that night it had been found that the bridge at B257744 would take a medium tank easily.

The command had traveled some 150 miles in two days and had been fighting a lot of the time. The Colonel decided to allow the men some rest and to cross the canal at 0830 the following days. Order of march: C Troop, 85th

Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 10th Tank Battalion, CCR Headquarters, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion.

CCR trains had been unable to get across the DORTMUND-EMS CANAL the previous day because of traffic of the other division units. The command proceeded without the trains on the 2d of April.

As the column turned east into BREFFEN a road block was set up at the cross roads at 265756 with the mission of giving protection to the west until the column had cleared. The road block was first established by "C" Companies then by "B" Companies sent up from the rear to take over.

The primary reason for establishing the road block was because CCB was coming up on the left rear of CCR and German equipment and personnel had been flushed to the east into the command's positions on previous occasions. To prevent danger of having CCB fire on the column, Colonel ANDERSON had previously sent messages directly to CCB informing them of the route CCR was to take. At about 1200 reports were received that elements of CCB were firing on the road block. One half-track was knocked out, one 57mm AT gun badly damaged and one man was wounded.

During the course of operations on 2 April, CCR fought through fifteen road blocks, thirteen of which were defended by infantry and/or anti-tank guns. The command lost five tanks that day.

The first road block to cause real trouble was at HANSEWINKEL (B3374). This road block consisted of one SS officer and four enlisted men. They hazooked the leading tank and destroyed it, killing one man and wounding four others. All the Germans were killed. The next road block was short of KILMBURCH (B3779) defended by infantrymen. Here at B410820 the married "A" companies cut the main HALBE-GUTERSLOH (B4335) road. Again vehicles coming from GUTERSLOH trying to escape were caught. Four or five enemy vehicles were knocked out. Another defended road block was encountered at B411828. It took about an hour to eliminate it.

While this was in process, Colonel ANDERSON decided to continue on route "A" even though it meant going through HALBE. An SS officer told us that there were SS troops in the town and that the town was defended. Married "A" companies went in shooting and immediately collected approximately 300 prisoners.

There was a defended road block at the northern edge of HALBE. Strangely enough the pass through the hills was not defended. Another road block was encountered at B461861. One of "A" companies' tanks was knocked out by a bazooka. The town was burned and fifteen or twenty Krauts were killed. The column drove on through WERTHER (B4696) down Route "A". Resistance was again encountered at JOLLNBROCK after passing two undefended road blocks along the road.

No losses were sustained at JOLLNBROCK, but the leading tank was only 60 yards away from a man firing a Panzerfaust who fired four rounds missing every time.

As soon as JOLLENBECK was mopped up the column proceeded down Route "A" to B615912. At this point a bunch of Kraut bicyclists were encountered--probably a company of them. "A" companies fired on them killing four. About a dozen were captured and the rest escaped.

About 500 yards further along the road, a very strong road block was encountered. It was defended by a 75mm anti-tank gun and two 35mm high velocity anti-tank guns. No tanks were lost in the initial engagement, but two tanks were knocked out in taking the position. The guns were located by forward observers, precision adjustment was made and the positions were then attacked by infantry. The Krauts had left the positions having had underground tunnels into the positions. The three guns were captured later in the afternoon, just at darkness. The command buttoned up for the night 2-3 April.

Interdiction fire was carried on during the night on the town of HERFORD (B6492). The initial mission for the 2d of April was to capture a bridge over the WERRA river. Colonel ANDERSON decided that the following day OGR would march in two columns each task force having a separate route. If either column was held up one would possibly reach the objective. The primary mission was the Autobahn Bridge at B7602. Because of the resistance which had been encountered in the outskirts of HERFORD it was believed the bridges would be blown and that the city would be strongly defended. Troop "C" of the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was attached to the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion for the operation on the 2d of April. The 10th Tank Battalion was to envelop the position east of JOLLENBECK where resistance had been met the day before. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was to follow the autobahn highway.

The command attacked at 0830, 3 April. Reconnaissance had been sent out at daylight by the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion and had reported at 0800 that the autobahn bridges over the WERRA River were intact. The 10th Tank Battalion jumped off at 0830 and by 0900 reported they had wiped out the remnants of the position which had held them up the previous day, had flanked the town of HERFORD and were held up at the underpass at B640930. They had no report on their bridge. They were able shortly however to move through the road block and then discovered that attempts had been made to blow the bridge over the WERRA. Though the roadway had been blown the sidewalks were wide enough for any of our vehicles and the bridge was still usable. The 10th continued over the bridge.

The entire route followed by both the 10th Tank Battalion and the 47th Armored Infantry was a fight, almost a house to house affair. In many cases the enemy were drunk. Three Mark IV, self-propelled guns were captured with filled gas tanks and in operating condition except for drunken crews including the officers. Twelve officers were captured in one group and all of them were drunk.

Both columns continued to move, the 10th Tank Battalion slightly in the lead. When the 10th reached the autobahn at B743979, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion reported that their leading elements were at B723961 and that they were receiving fire from due north. They believed that the 10th Tank Battalion was firing on them. The 10th Tank Battalion reported that they were not firing on them but they had a 60mm anti-air position located at B723961 in which they could see six 60mm guns and that they would immediately go to work on it. As soon as

the 10th Tank Battalion engaged the SS's the 47th was able to proceed and was given orders to move northeast on the autobahn and capture the highway and railroad bridges over the WESER River while the 10th Tank Battalion knocked out the anti-aircraft positions.

At 1800 on the afternoon of the 3d, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion reported that the autobahn bridge had been blown. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was given orders to withdraw so they would not be under direct fire from across the WESER River. By 1800 the 10th Tank Battalion had mopped up the anti-aircraft positions and had captured and destroyed eight SS's and about 100 men with a loss of one officer killed and four enlisted men wounded.

On the same day about noon two German medical officers from RAF OEF-WHAUSEN had contacted the column and stated there were numerous hospitals located in the town and that they wanted to arrange its surrender unconditionally. Reconnaissance elements accompanied by the German medical officers were sent to the town to accept its surrender under the condition that all German military personnel would be turned over and that the town would not be used for German troop movement. CGR IPW officer, Lieutenant HOEBING, accompanied the surrender party. Upon reaching RAF-OTWHAUSEN it was found that the telephone system was still working so LT HOEBING immediately called MINNEN (B8010) and informed them that the town was surrounded, American artillery was within reach and unless they surrendered the town and bridge intact to the Americans, MINNEN would be leveled. The Burgomeister requested thirty minutes grace to think the matter over. During the thirty minutes he called the head burgomeister at HANNOVER (X8621) and was given instructions that under no circumstances could he surrender the bridges intact and that the situation was only a temporary reverse, the German Army would rise again. The burgomeister of MINNEN was arrogant when he was contacted after the thirty minute interval.

At 1800, 3 April, Colonel AMERSON told division that CGR would remain in place for the night. At nightfall the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion made contact with CGR on the north flank.

The following morning, 4 April, in accordance with instructions, the command was to drive to the east and secure any bridge intact in the Corps zone. The order of march was 10th Tank Battalion, CGR Headquarters, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and 47th Armored Infantry Battalion. The command marched on Route "A". Some resistance was encountered but no losses were effected. At 1000 in the morning reconnaissance planes reported that the bridge at RINTLEN (B9200) was intact. In order to have supporting artillery, Colonel AMERSON delayed the attack on the bridge until afternoon to give the artillery a chance to get into position, in the area B8595. Meanwhile reconnaissance was setting up OP's and moving down the river. Leading elements of the force moved as far as MOLLERBACH (B8897).

Civilians reported that the bridge at RINTLEN was prepared for demolition and that preparations consisted of two 1000 pounds bombs in the middle of the bridge. RINTLEN was a hospital town. At least four large hospitals could be observed from the OP's.

Upon recommendation of Major RICHARD E. WILKINS, Command 3-2, that he be authorized to take a party to the town to ask for its surrender, Lieutenant HOBBS and he were sent to the town at 1430, 4 April, to accomplish the surrender of the town and secure the bridge intact. They were told that Colonel ANDERSON expected to start his attack at 1530, 4 April, and to bring a decision back by that time. Major WILKINS and Lieutenant HOBBS had some difficulty in finding the German Major in command of troops and when they did find him at 1530 in the afternoon they were told that their mission was useless, the fuse had been activated to blow the bridge. (The party had contacted the Germans on the north side of the river). At 1525, 4 April, the bridge blew up.

At 1700, when Major WILKINS had not returned, his driver who was concerned for his safety having been alone on the southern outskirts of RINTELN, found a German medical officer and with him toured the southern part of the town in an effort to find the two officers. He was unsuccessful. However, after explaining his mission to the German medical officer the officer was concerned for the safety of his hospitals and told the driver that if he wanted to return to his unit for instructions he would wait on the outskirts of town and serve as guide.

The first word Colonel ANDERSON received of Major WILKINS was at 1800 when the driver returned to the CP. In the meantime artillery time-fire had been put on the town. As soon as Colonel ANDERSON was informed of the situation he sent a public address system along with a section of the 85th Reconnaissance Squadron back into the town to broadcast instructions. The instructions stated that any damage that resulted to the town would be because German commanders had retained two army officers who were under the peace flag and that the German commanders would be responsible for damage to the town. This party was to wait forty-five minutes and if nothing happened were to leave the town.

Meanwhile the German medical officer feared that the two army officers had been taken to the north bank of the river prior to the blowing of the bridge and offered to go to the north bank to see if he could locate and return the officers. After an hour and a half the officer returned stating that Major WILKINS and Lieutenant HOBBS were unharmed and being given the best of care. It was explained that they were being retained because they had not entered the town in the proper manner, specifically that they were not blind-folded and were carrying arms. Even though they had promised not to use military information gained, being troop commanders it would certainly influence their decisions and as a consequence the officers could not be returned until the battle for RINTELN was over. Then they would be returned at a time and place agreeable with the German Army.

Upon receipt of this information the peace envoy was told to return with this information that the previous instructions still stood and the two American officers were to be returned by 0900, 5 April, the following morning. The German medical officer then offered to send the commanders of two of the military hospitals to the Americans as guarantee for the two American officers until they were returned. This Colonel ANDERSON refused because he said he could take the place any time he wanted to and take them prisoner anyway. Then the German medical officer offered to serve as guide again the following morning.

Colonel ANDERSON then wrote an ultimatum to the German Commander of Troops. The second party into the town had been able to find out the name of the German troop commander from the German Medical officer and the actual location

of his command post in the Pomona Pavilion. Colonel ANDERSON addressed his letter to Major "So and So", CP, Pomona Pavilion. He stated that the reason the officers had not come into town properly was not his fault but the fault of the Germans themselves, they could have blindfolded the officers and taken their side-arms. He demanded the return of his officers by 1000, 5 April. He told them he had held his artillery and his "terror" bombers off the town the previous day but that he could not continue, that the blood of the town of HANNOVER would be on the hands of the German commander and that he would send a copy of this letter to the commander of each of the German hospitals in the town and to the burgomeister.

Lieutenant LINFSEY was selected as envoy. This letter was to be used only in case the officers were not present at the burgomeister's office the following morning. When Lieutenant LINFSEY arrived the next morning at the burgomeister's office, Major WILKINS and Lieutenant HOBING were not present. However, a note was there, signed by Major WILKINS, stating that he was unharmed and for Colonel ANDERSON not to try to bargain further for his safety. Nevertheless Lieutenant LINFSEY delivered the ultimatum. The ultimatum was delivered by messenger then to the German Commander of Troops. At 1000 the officers had not arrived and artillery started to work over the northern part of the town. At 1015 the two officers were released and the artillery was pulled off the town.

While the incidents of the morning of the 5th were taking place, Lieutenant Colonel ROYER had been given instructions to drive on and try to get a bridge intact at HESSELN (CO398). At daylight on the morning of the 5th of April, he moved from HESSELN (CO398) with the 95th Armored Field Artillery. The artillery was so emplaced that it could fire on both HESSELN and RINTLEN. At noon reports arrived that the HESSELN Bridge had been blown.

GCR was then given instructions to take up defensive positions along the west bank of the WESER River and to reconnoiter for bridge sites and to rest and rehabilitate. Positions were taken up as follows: 10th Tank Battalion and "C" Company of the 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion at LANGENHOLZ (B494), GCR command post at HEMMELBECK (B792), 47th Armored Infantry Battalion at FRIEDRICHSBURG (B9898), 95th Armored Field Artillery at FRIEDRICHSBURG (B9794), Trains at HEMMELHUSEN (B291).

An ideal bridge site was discovered and reconnoitered at B99991 but a bridge was not built there.

GCR remained in defensive positions from 5 April until noon on the 5th. During this time one platoon of "C", 85th joined GCR to keep the command informed on progress of the bridgehead of the 84th Infantry Division east of HANNOVER. Also on 5 April the 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion joined GCR.

On the night 7 April, GCR was informed by an officer from VIII Corps Artillery that the bridge the 2d Armored Division had used to cross the WESER River at HANNOVER was now being used for administrative traffic. Colonel ANDERSON reported this information to division and requested clearance for his combat command to cross the bridge. At 1125, 8 April, Colonel ANDERSON was informed

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that the bridge at HAMELN was reserved for crossing of his combat command from 1300 to 1800 on that date. The command was immediately alerted and put in road march formation. The order of march was "C", 85th, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion married, CCR Headquarters, 95th Armored Field Artillery, 10th Tank Battalion, 895th Armored Field Artillery and trains.

Leading elements of the command actually marched at 1210, 8 April without orders because Colonel ANDERSON had not returned from division. When he did return instructions had been changed and clearance on the bridge was from 1400 to 1900 instead of 1300 to 1800. Leading elements crossed the bridge at 1410 having been held up by traffic blocks. The command crossed the bridge at HAMELN and contacted the G-3 of the 30th Infantry Division who informed Colonel ANDERSON that his outposts, on the route we were to follow, were 3000 yards east of HAMELN, that there were friendly outposts at MUMMER (X1901) and at VOLKSEN (X2804) but that SPRINGE (X2802) had not been cleared and that enemy were known to be entrenched there.

The command continued along the route and ran into two road blocks neither of which was defended. It took some time to clear them however for they were craters in the road. The first resistance was met at SPRINGE where a heavy barrage of 81mm mortar fire was received. After the Air Corps had worked on the town, the command went into SPRINGE shooting and took the town. 700 prisoners, one battery of eight 81mm mortars and a hospital were captured.

The command drove on and contacted the 2nd Armored Division which had road blocks at VOLKSEN then continued until dark and went into position with the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion at X3806, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion at X3704, CCR Headquarters at X3803, 10th Tank Battalion at SPRINGE and VOLKSEN.

The objective for the next day was to secure a crossing over the LEINE River and then swing north to a position just east of HANNOVER. Again it was decided to use two columns.

At 0830, 9 April, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion jumped off, bypassed PATFUSSEN (X3809), drove to the North and secured a crossing on the LEINE at X4110.

The 10th Tank Battalion did not get started until about 0900 at which time they moved by a different route to cross the LEINE at RUTHER (X4307).

At 1000 information was received that the 2nd Armored Division, on the right flank driving to cut off HANNOVER, was stopping their attack and returning to their original positions. About five or ten minutes later the head of the column came under heavy anti-aircraft artillery fire from the vicinity of X4216. The 47th Armored Infantry and the 10th Tank Battalion were held up. Reconnaissance was sent out to find ways to hit the position and other enemy anti-aircraft positions were discovered in the locality.

At 1400 in the afternoon SEN LINGFORD R. OLIVER visited CCR's command post at RUTHER (X4212) where he told Colonel ANDERSON that his mission had been

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changed and that CGR was to drive on as rapidly as possible and secure a crossing over the ELBE River. Colonel ANDERSON issued orders to that effect and stated that the 10th Tank Battalion would lead.

Elements of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion withdrew from positions in the vicinity of the BOCKHEE HOLZ FOREST (X4615) following the 10th Tank Battalion east in the general direction of PRINE (X7016). When the head of the 10th Tank Battalion reached SCHWEICHELDT (X6413) they were fired on from the vicinity of EQUORF (X6213). No losses were sustained and the column moved on. After the leading company had passed, however, fire was again received from the same vicinity. Three Jaeger Panther tanks, 88mm guns on Mark V chassis, were seen moving on the ridge between EQUORF and SCHWEICHELDT. The leading company of the 10th Tank Battalion was given orders to continue its march while the support companies were ordered to mop up the position. At 2000 the leading company reported it had cut the autobahn at X6620 and had knocked out about twenty German vehicles. Two companies that were sent to mop up the position in the rear knocked out one Panther at the crossroads X6214, forced the crews to abandon two others then blew them up at X6416 and captured intact an American M-20 reconnaissance car. Tank destroyers reported that they knocked out a Jaeger Panther at X64469. The command buttoned up for the night of 9-10 April.

During the course of the night 9-10 April the burgomeister of PRINE contacted Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM A. HAMBURG and offered to surrender the town unconditionally to the American forces. Colonel HAMBURG told him to go back and prepare the town for surrender by collecting all fire-arms, placing them in the town square, and surrendering all German soldiers in the town. The town was not used for German military movement during the night. All this was complied with and at 0800, 10 April, the town was taken formally with 400 prisoners and three large military hospitals.


That morning the march continued in the same formation, the 10th leading. As the leading tank reached X713226 it was knocked out by high velocity fire. The half-track behind it was also hit and knocked out. The tank behind it was hit but not damaged. Reconnaissance and air disclosed that there were German tanks in the area, and in the town of EDEMISSEN (X7224). Air worked over the town, flushed three tanks and knocked two of them out. The town was enveloped and entered. One Jaeger Panther was fired on, hit and abandoned by its crew. It was then captured intact and destroyed. The command continued the march meeting some resistance all the way, running into road blocks, on up to FLITZ (X7231). From there the column continued north to the road intersection at X7234 where more resistance was encountered. The position was mopped up and four or five bazookamen and forty or fifty riflemen were captured. The column then turned east.

Every Belgian prisoner said there were German tanks immediately ahead all the time. Fresh tank tracks could be seen confirming these reports. The Air Corps knocked out a German tank at X8034. The command buttoned up for the night 10-11 April with the 10th Tank Battalion at SEEHAUSEN, its artillery at X7734; CCR Headquarters and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion at HARBESSE (X7535); the 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was with the 10th, 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was with the 47th.

That night Colonel ANDERSON decided that the 10th would move to GIPROSW (X9136) the following day, at which point the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion would

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pass through the 10th and take the lead. The command moved at 0615 on the morning of the 11th. GIEFHORN was reached by 1000. Three hundred prisoners were captured there; the town did not officially surrender but there was very little fighting. The 47th encountered difficulty in doubling the column when passing the 10th Tank Battalion because of knocked out and burning German vehicles on the road. They were unable to get by the 10th until 1200, 11 April.

The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion attacked at 1200, moving northeast in the general direction of KHRA (Y0745). They were held up by a tank battle at WESTERBECK (Y9639) and two German tanks were again knocked out by fighter bombers of our air corps.

At this time instructions were received from division that WITTINGEN (Y0263) would be cleaned out so Lieutenant Colonel HAMBURG was given the mission of accomplishing this. The 10th drove on meeting heavy resistance all the way, numerous road blocks, defended by infantry bazookamen. They lost one tank and several infantrymen.


During the night of 10-11 April at SEEHAUSEN, (X7632), three Americans who had been prisoners of the Germans were picked up. They stated that they were part of a group of 1000 who had been working on the air field at WESSENTORF (X8947) and that a week ago the Germans had started to march them to the east side of the ELBE River but they had slipped out and walked all the way to the American troops. This air field at WESSENTORF was the heavily defended field which the 10th Tank Battalion encountered now. Later civilians reported that the Germans destroyed all planes on the field as the Americans approached on the 11th. Evidence of this was seen when the command moved back to the vicinity of the airport, 25 April.

At 2000, 11 April, the head of the 10th Tank Battalion column reached WESTERNHOLZ (X9148), the column was fired on by a heavy concentration of Nebelwerfers and rockets from nearby positions. These positions were found and considerable damage was inflicted on the Nebelwerfer battalion in its withdrawal.

At this time reports were received that the head of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion had reached ROHRBERG (Y2362). In order to prevent his command from being split at darkness, Colonel ANDERSON ordered the 10th Tank Battalion to withdraw from its positions, follow the route of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion and close with them for the night. The 10th Tank Battalion pulled back to the intersection at GIEFHORN, thence to ROHRBERG.

At ROHRBERG, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion captured the Lieutenant General Commanding the XIth German Corps area. They also captured his staff headed by a major general, the secretaries and mistresses, colonels (chief's of sections) and a large group of enlisted men. They were merely driving down the road. They said that recon aissance planes had told them the American forces were not in the area and that they believed they were driving on further north. Number of prisoners for the day was considerably better than a 1000. The next day they were evacuated in twenty trucks. There was one full truck load of officers, 45 of them. The command buttoned up for the night of 11-12 April in the vicinity of ROHRBERG.

Colonel ANDERSON decided that the 47th would continue spearheading the drive on the next day. The 47th left ROHRBERG at 0830, 12 April, meeting resistance in every town. From every side road throughout the day German vehicles out into the column, however no "organized" defenses were met at any time during the day.



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The column left ROHRBERG at 0830 and at 1200 it was at DRUSEBAU (Y6780). The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was still leading, they made the 40 mile march in three hours and forty minutes and took approximately 360 prisoners along the way.

At DRUSEBAU the column was halted in order to close it up and evacuate the German vehicles, and to give the men a chance to do some work on their tanks after this lengthy march. A thirty minute break was taken there and ten Kraut trucks were knocked out while the column was halted.

At that time information was received that there might be a bridge intact across the ELBE River and the crossing at WITTENBERG (Y7096) was to be checked. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was given the mission of driving on to WITTEBEN (Y8681) and reconnoitering the crossing over the river. If any bridges were intact they were to seize them.

Meanwhile, the 10th Tank Battalion was given the mission of driving north through SEEHAUSEN (Y7084) to capture the bridge at WITTENBERG. As soon as the head of the column of the 47th hit the STENIAL (Y7955)-WITTENBERG highway their progress was considerably slowed by the steady traffic of German vehicles passing in front of them. A road block was set up on the highway and the 47th drove on. At 1400 the 47th reached WENDEMARK (Y8281). The sub plane reported that there were no bridges across the ELBE in CCR's area except the one at WITTENBERG, the 10th Tank Battalion's objective, which was intact. Colonel ANDERSON issued orders to the 47th to withdraw from the river and take up defense positions in LOBBRUN (Y7278).

The town of SEEHAUSEN surrendered unconditionally to the 10th Tank Battalion and a large number of prisoners were seized. Enough trucks were never available for evacuating the prisoners.

The road from SEEHAUSEN to WITTENBERG was one series of road blocks and the 10th Tank Battalion fought through seven very heavily defended road blocks before it was able to bring direct fire on to the bridge at WITTENBERG. As soon as it was brought under direct tank fire the Germans blew the bridge.

As soon as the bridge was blown, Colonel ANDERSON issued orders for the 10th Tank Battalion to withdraw to SEEHAUSEN. One company was to come back to the rear behind the artillery and protect that area. All command posts except the 10th Tank Battalion were in DRESDAU. The 10th was at BRITSCH. The night 12-13 April was uneventful.

Company "G" (married) had established a road block at Y6684. The first thing the next morning two Germans on a motorcycle rode into the road block from the northwest. One was killed and one wounded. The wounded man stated that he had passed a large number of American prisoners of war at SARE (Y6088) at 1800 the night before. The sub plane was immediately set up to reconnoiter but he could find nothing.

However a civilian was picked up during the morning who said the prisoners were being marched across the ELBE and on the 12th they had been at ARWIDSE (Y5882). At 1400, 13 April, the sub spotted a large group of men in the vicinity of DEUTSCH (Y8082). As he circled the men, blankets were spread out on the ground as panels to spell out "U.S.A.". As the sub circled, it was fired on with great inaccuracy

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with a pistol. When the observer saw that the Americans were under a very small guard the pilot decided to land.

As he landed, some of the men ran to the pilot and informed him that the cub had been fired on by a German SS officer who was in a barn nearby but that he was unable to fire at the plane now because of the mass of Americans in the way. He was told by the American sergeant in charge of the men that there were approximately 450 Americans there and the Lieutenant piloting the plane told him he would bring help immediately.

As soon as the cub had radioed that the men had spelled out "U.S.A." the married "C" Companies of the 10th Tank Battalion had been alerted and were standing by.

When the cub plane took off it was fired on again. As soon as it radioed its information back, the "married" "C" Companies, 10th Tank Battalion, were told to proceed with the rescue. The cub plane meanwhile keeping them informed radioed the "C" Companies that the Germans were lining the men up either for marching them somewhere or for shooting them. The rescue was made almost immediately and some 435 Americans were picked up in trucks and brought to the rear. Meanwhile all units of the command continued to pick up stray Americans who had dropped from the column on its march from WESSENDORF. The following day more than 600 of the original 2000 were evacuated.

This group of 2000 had begun a march from DANZIG in January to work on the WARRENDORF air field and had arrived at the air field only a month or so ago, approximately 15 March. The Germans were able to work them only a month when they had to start them back toward the east again because of the American drive.

The command received instructions to force a bridge crossing over the ELBE River the morning of the 14th at first light about 0430. Plans were drawn up for crossing at SANDAU (Y9174) and HAVELBERG (Y9378). The 1st Battalion, 334th Infantry, 84th Infantry Division commanded by Major ALCKE PETERS, and the 1st Battalion, 406th Infantry, 102d Infantry Division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel SCOTT were attached. The 406th was to make the SANDAU attack and the 334th to make the HAVELBERG attack.

Due to intelligence reports of the heavy resistance to be expected on the east bank, higher command cancelled the operation at 2000 on the 14th of April.

At 1400 on 15 April, CCR was relieved from positions on the river and given the mission of mopping up the area in the vicinity of WITTINGTON (Y0363) and the area southeast thereof.

During the drive CCR had captured a Major General on leave with his mistress in BOOCK (Y8672). He was a Major General complete with aides and mistress and it was all done in the most proper manner. The aide came out on the road and stopped a tank. The sergeant from Company B, married, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was approached and the aide wanted to know where his commanding officer was. The sergeant immediately disarmed him and took him prisoner. The aide began to fear he was not going to accomplish his mission and informed the sergeant that his purpose was to offer the surrender of Major General Sperling. The surrender was then executed and the general taken prisoner.

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This general had everybody along, a colonel, a major, cook, and chauffeur.

On the 18th of April the command moved to the vicinity of WINTERFELD (3766) Germany with the mission of mopping up its assigned area. GCR remained in the vicinity of WINTERFELD until the 18th of April - meeting only scattered resistance during the mopping up operations.

On the 18th of April, GCR moved to the vicinity of SALZWEDL (3078) Germany. OP located at 341770. Mopping up operations were continued and road blocks were established, the 10th Tank Battalion just north of SALZWEDL, the 47th on the south in the vicinity of STAFFENBECK (3074).

At this time plans were being drawn up for an attack north to the ELBE River. The mission was to mop up the area originally in the British Zone. GCR's boundary on the left was a line approximately following the 20 north-south grid line, on the right approximately the 40 north-south grid line. CCA was to attack on the left of GCR and the 84th Infantry Division was to attack on the right.

CCA was at the present time southwest of GCR along the former Corps boundary so COLONEL ANDERSON requested permission to delay his attack until CCA came abreast of GCR. This was to protect the command's exposed left flank. The request was granted.

CCA attacked north on the 20th of April. At this time COLONEL ANDERSON sent elements of G/85 to reconnoiter routes toward LUCHOW (3090). Enemy road blocks were encountered at 312880 and 362881. Enemy tanks and infantry flushed and bypassed by CCA, were reported in the woods west of SALZWEDL. The 10th Tank Battalion set up OP's along the railroad west of the town.

On the 21st GCR was ordered to attack. The enemy tanks and infantry in the woods west of SALZWEDL had not been cleared out so the job was given to the 10th Tank Battalion. In the meantime, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was to push on as far as LUCHOW and then await the advance of the 10th. After LUCHOW the command would continue in two columns, the 47th on the right, the 10th on the left, boundary between units, the JETZE River. GCR command post was to follow the 10th Tank Battalion.

A line approximately on the 56 east-west grid line was designated as phase line "A". When the 10th and 47th reached this line they were to coil up and await displacement of the artillery so it would be able to fire along the ELBE River at any point in GCR's zone. The 47th attacked north at 1445 on the 21st, route of advance; the main SALZWEDL-LUCHOW ROAD. The 10th continued to clean up the woods W of SALZWEDL.

The 47th first met resistance at the road block at 312880. This was reduced and the 47th moved on toward LUCHOW. As the column approached the town, heavy rebelverfer fire was received from a patch of woods at 3691. Mines were also encountered which had to be removed as the column proceeded.

The 47th was now practically out of radio contact so GCR command post was moved forward along the road north of SALZWEDL. The 10th Tank Battalion was still mopping up the woods to the west. Enemy tanks, infantry and motor transport were being encountered.

The command buttoned up at 2100, GCR command post and the 47th headquarters at LUCHOW (3284); the married "B" companies at SAASF (318); the 10th headquarters

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at SALZWEDEL; and the married "A" companies and "C" companies west of SALZWEDEL. During the day the 10th Tank Battalion had knocked out 9 enemy tanks (long barreled 75's on Geschonovukim chassis), 3 armored vehicles, 1 Volkswagen and 12 trucks. Total number of prisoners captured by the 10th and 47th during the day was 300.

At 0645 on the 22nd of April the 10th Tank Battalion moved out in the direction of LUCHOW in two columns, "C" companies via SINDEN (2200) and LUCKAU (2206), "A" companies via BRITZ (2270) and WUSTROW (2706). At POLGOW (2707) the two columns joined at which time "C" companies took the lead into LUCHOW. No resistance was encountered, LUCHOW surrendered unconditionally and the 10th and 47th proceeded north, the 10th on the left, the 47th on the right, GCR command post following the 10th.

At 1024 the left column reached phase line "A" at 250067, the right column had run into a defended mine field at SHERAU (212050) which was being mopped up. At 1145 the 47th also reached phase line "A" at 214935. Both columns were now halted and were awaiting displacement forward of the artillery. Reconnaissance was being made to the front and the area was being cleared on the flanks. Enemy nebelwerfer and high velocity fire were coming in.

Colonel HAMBURG requested permission to move his left column forward as far as JAHLEN (2490). Request was granted and the move was accomplished.

As soon as the artillery was in position the two columns pushed on, meeting heavier resistance all the way. The columns were converging on DANKENBERG (2205).

The married "E" Companies on the right met continuous heavy resistance starting at KADRAU (2100). The road was crisscrossed by a network of small canals and the territory was defended by a large group of Hitler Youth who were exceedingly stubborn and would die fighting rather than surrender. The 47th's losses were great, mostly from sniper fire.

By dark the 47th had reached NEBENSTEDT (2705), the 10th was on the southwestern outskirts of DANKENBERG. Both columns had run into very heavy resistance. The command battened up for the night, GCR command post and the 10th headquarters at SCHAAFHAUSEN (2402), 47th at NEBENSTEDT.

During the night 22-23 April, all available artillery was put on DANKENBERG and on ferry sites along the ELBE RIVER in GCR's zone. It had been learned that the Germans were ferrying troops from the far to the near side.

At 0730 on the 23rd DANKENBERG put up the white flag and elements of both columns entered the town. Reports were received that the Germans were ferrying across the river at DOMITZ (2510) so TOY artillery was placed on that location.

During the day GCR accepted the surrender of many small communities in the vicinity and CGA was contacted on the left. The entire area was being mopped up by the 10th and 47th. No organized resistance was encountered during the day but many prisoners and vehicles were captured.

On the previous day, the 10th Tank Battalion had captured a V-1 assembling plant. The V-1's in the plant were of a new type in that they had a cockpit which carried one man as pilot. This was reported to higher headquarters and a guard was placed on the plant.

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The 24th Infantry Division had moved up and was to relieve CCR sometime within the next few days. On the morning of the 24th the 10th Tank Battalion moved back to the vicinity of LUCHOW, battalion headquarters at BOSZL (8288). CCR command post, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 95th and 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalions remained in place.

On the 25th of April, CCR was relieved by the 29th Infantry Division. The command moved to the vicinity of GR. OSINGEN (8558) Germany, CCR command post at GR. OSINGEN, 10th (unarmored) at WANKENSBUTTEL (9464) and the 47th (unarmored) at LACHENDORF (7050). The movement was also executed in unarmored formation. The 95th and 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalions, C/65, C/628 and C/22 were detached from CCR before the move.

CCR's new mission was to establish road blocks, guard installations and screen and control civilians.

The command remained in the vicinity of GR. OSINGEN for the remainder of the month of April.

E. NOTE:

During the period 1 April - 30 April, Hq & Hq Co 3d Armored Group was attached to Hq CCR, 5th Armored Division and as such this report for the period will cover the report of Hq & Hq Co 3d Armored Group as Hq Co 3d Armored Group served as Hq Co CCR.