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**Report date:** August 1944 – April 1945

**Title:** After Action Report, United States Army 5<sup>th</sup> Armored Division

**Abstract:** U.S. Army 5<sup>th</sup> Armored Division After Action Report from August 1944 to April 1945 in the European Theater of Operations to include narratives and journals.

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

5TH ARMORED DIVISION

AUGUST 44 THRU APRIL 45

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## REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

AUGUST 1944

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
U. S. Army

Auth: CG 5TH ARMORED DIV  
Initials: *aca*  
Date: 13 Nov 44

319.1 GFM 14

13 November 1944.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - AUGUST 1944

1. CAMPAIGN: Western Europe.

2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

a. Personnel:	Officers	EM	Total O & EM
Killed in Action	14	111	125
Seriously Wounded in Action	18	151	169
Lightly Wounded in Action	11	286	297
Seriously Injured in Action	0	14	14
Lightly Injured in Action	7	69	76
Missing in Action	1	24	25
Total	51	655	706

b. Vehicular:	Destroyed or Abandoned	Evacuated
Type		
Car, Armored, Light M8	4	1
Carr., Mtr, 75mm How., M8	1	
Carr., Mtr, 105mm How., M7	3	1
Carrier, Pers, H/T, M3 & M3A1	17	5
Tank, Light M5A1	6	7
Tank, Med., M4, M4A1, M4A3, w/75	27	19
Tank, Med, M4, A3 w/76		1
Tank, Med, M4, w/105mm How	1	
Trailer, Amm, M10	8	
Truck 1/4 ton, 4x4	37	12
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo	4	
Trailer, 1 ton, Cargo	13	1
Vehicle, Tank Recovery, M32	1	
Total	122	47

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

Type	Expended	Loss due to Enemy Action
Carbine	168809	1235
Cal. .30	1732614	609250
Cal. .45	233945	47430
Cal. .50	114030	18350
60mm	1242	
81mm	471	20
37mm	2302	1185
57mm	206	
75mm gun	6502	2232
75mm how	400	500
76mm		
3" gun		
105mm how		

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(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div,

155mm How		
155mm gun	271	
Grenade, hand	5717	2145
Grenade, rifle	421	
Rocket AT	1278	150
Signals	57	
Mines AT	120	
Total Tonnage	729.25	84.99

4. COMMANDERS (Beginning of Period):.

On 1 August 1944 units of the Division were commanded by the following named officers:

5th Armd Div - MAJ GEN LUNSFORD E OLIVER, 03536, USA  
 Combat Comd "A", 5th Armd Div - BRIG GEN EUGENE REGNIER, 08295, USA  
 Hq & Hq Co, Combat Comd "A" - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF  
 Combat Comd "B", 5th Armd Div - COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV  
 Hq & Hq Co, Combat Comd "B" - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
 5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
 Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Armd Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA  
 Reserve Command, 5th Armd Div - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
 Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283066, INF  
 Hq 5th Armd Div Tns - LT COL GLENN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV  
 Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tns - CAPT JAMES R BAGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
 MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 0335298, CAV  
 145th Armd Sig Co - 1ST LT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
 85th Cav Ron Sq Mecz - LT COL KENT FAY, 0286301, CAV  
 10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0292156, INF  
 34th Tank Bn - LT COL THOMAS B BARTEL, 022019, CAV  
 81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF  
 15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL JOHN S WINTERMUTE, JR, 022039, INF  
 46th Armd Inf Bn - MAJ WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
 47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF  
 47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
 71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
 95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703, FA  
 22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E HESSEGINU, 020575, CR  
 127th Ord Maint Bn - MAJOR ROLAND S BIERBACH, 0318269, ORD  
 75th Med Bn, Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BADER, 0372570, MO

5. NARRATIVE.

The 5th Armored Division, assigned to the Third U.S. Army and attached to XX Corps, landed at UTAH BEACH and was assembled in bivouac in the vicinity of ST SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE in NORMANDY during the period 26-31 July 1944.

At 0935, 1 August 1944 the Division was attached to the IV Corps. An oral movement order was issued by the Commanding General for the Division to assemble with the Division CP in the vicinity of LA FEUILLIE. The move was started at 1000, 1 August and completed by 1000, 2 August.

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(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div, cont'd)

At 1100, 2 August orders were received for the first action by the Division. The Division was given the mission to capture the town of FOUGERES, and reconnoiter vicinity ST JAMES, ST MARTIN and ST GEORGE for further action.

The Commanding General issued orders to the Major Commands to drive south with all possible speed on two routes and to capture FOUGERES. Order of march: East Route; - CCB and CCR; West Route; - CCA, Division Headquarters, Division Troops; Division Trains to remain in vicinity of MINEVILLE. The movement was started at 1430, 2 August 1944, by the 85th Cav Ron Sq, Meuz.

Upon departure from initial concentration area duffel bags and baggage were left in open storage in the vicinity of ST SAVEUR LE VICOMTE with a Warrant Officer and twelve men of the Band as a guard detachment and caretaking detail. Latrine screens, truck tops and extra tentage were utilized to cover this baggage. In anticipation of battle casualties bags were systematically arranged to insure rapid and easy access to baggage of any individual.

The march of the Division was made difficult by cross traffic of troops of the XX Corps moving East into the First Army zone. Control was very difficult at many points. Columns were cut and held up for so long, at times, that the Division CP could not keep radio contact with the heads of the Combat Commands.

Elements of the 85th Cav Ron Sq made first contact with the enemy, in the vicinity of the line ST ELLIER - FOUGERES. Enemy vehicles were pursued by C Troop patrols at 0850, and small arms fire was encountered East of this line at 0930. Five prisoners were taken. Civilian reports and reconnaissance indicated that the enemy was falling back rapidly in a disorganized retreat, without attempting to erect defenses or to establish road blocks or strong points.

At 0320, 3 August a message was received from XV corps to halt movement until further orders. Combat Commands and the Reconnaissance Squadron were ordered to clear roads, bivouac in adjacent fields, and await orders. By this time the Reconnaissance Squadron was well South and in contact with some light enemy resistance along the line: A Troop at LES VIEUVILLES, B Troop at LE PERHANDIER, C Troop at MALVAL DES BOIS. CCA was between ST DENIS and DUCEY. CCB was between ST DENIS and SEE RIVER. CCR and Division Troops were in vicinity of ST DENIS. The Division was attacked at various times during the night 2-3 August by enemy air. All attacks were light.

At 0820, 3 August, the Commanding General departed for Headquarters, Third Army and returned at 1015 with instructions for continuing the action. The Division was to occupy positions in Corps reserve with the leading Combat Command at LA CHAPEL UREE between roads GC 5 and GC 47, the second Combat Command at ST JAMES, and the remainder of the Division between the two Combat Commands.

The 79th Infantry Division captured FOUGERES on this day.

At 0355, 4 August 1944, CCA had first contact with the enemy when the Service Company of the 46th Armd Infantry Battalion was engaged. No casualties were suffered. At 1300, 4 August, orders were received for the Combat Commands in present positions to move to the vicinity of ST JAMES, South of SELUNE RIVER; Division Trains to move to vicinity of ST JAMES; Reconnaissance to start patrol of line VITRE - LAVAL - MAYENNE, contact being

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**S E C R E T**

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div, cont'd)

maintained with 100% humidity. The temperature was maintained on left.

The reconnaissance screen moved toward the designated line encountering small scattered elements which were easily mopped up. Enemy aviation was active during daylight and evening hours, strafing columns by day when allied fighter cover was absent. 15 PW's and 16 enemy dead were reported by the Division. Civilian reports stressed the absence of transportation with enemy straggler groups which were moving at night along roads towards LAVAL and DOMFRONT.

On 4 August a directive was received from XV Corps to furnish one hundred trucks immediately to help motorize elements of the 79th and 90th Divisions. Assurance was given that no movement of the Division would be ordered until these vehicles had returned. Fuel and lubricant trucks of the unit combat trains were dumped to provide this detail.

At 0730, 5 August, orders were received from XV Corps stating that the Corps mission was to secure crossings of the MAYENNE RIVER from LAVAL to MAYENNE. The Division's mission was to advance, echeloned to the right rear of the 79th Infantry Division, prepared to support the attack of the assaulting divisions; to extend the front to CHATEAU-GONTIER or extend Corps front as far South as ANGERS.

By 1800, 5 Aug, units were encountering scattered roadblocks and defensive positions, covering small retreating enemy groups. Tanks and artillery were reported by civilian sources but were not encountered by our troops. The Division on this date had taken 80 PW's, identifications being: 5th Procht Div, 2nd SS Pz Div, 266th Inf Div, 17th SS Pz Gren Div, 91st Inf Div, 319th Inf Div and scattered service units. Bivouac areas were again strafed and bombed by enemy aircraft with some casualties.

The Division prepared to move on 6 August, using main route ST JAMES - FOUGERES - VITRE. However, the 100 trucks had not returned from their detail with the two infantry divisions. On the night of 5 August the 3912th QM Truck Co was attached and ordered immediately to fill trucks with gasoline at the Army Cl III Trkhd and join the column at ST JAMES the next morning. Gasoline was not made available at the Trkhd in sufficient time to permit the Company to carry out orders. As a result of our movement this information was not received until Div Hqs had reached VITRE. An officer was sent back to locate the Truck Company and to lead the gasoline train forward. Due to delay in the loading of trucks at the Trkhd and traffic congestion at ST JAMES and FOUGERES, these vehicles did not reach the combat elements in time to permit refueling of combat vehicles until the early morning hours of 7 August.

At 1430, 6 August, orders were received to push forward rapidly on LE MANS by all possible routes in Corps Zone that would not interfere with advance of the 79th Inf Div. The advance was to be made as follows: CCA to cross the MAYENNE RIVER in the vicinity of CHATEAU GONTIER, to proceed East on the axis CHATEAU GONTIER - GREZ EN BOUFRE - BOUESSY - CHANTENAY - CHEMIRE LE GAUDIN - LE MANS, to stay North of SARTHE RIVER, sieze and hold LE MANS, to block all movement of enemy to South and East; CCB to cross the MAYENNE at MOUSSAY, proceed East on axis VILLIER - CHARLEMAGNE - MESLAY - CHEVILLE - LOUE - LA CROIX - LA FLECHE - CCR to follow CCA; Division Headquarters, Division Zone.

REF ID: A66011

(Center, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div, cont'd)

follow axis of 338. Only light enemy resistance was met and the advance was rapid. CCA attacked the town of JACON where some enemy resistance was met and the bridge was destroyed. CCB's column met only light resistance and at 1800 had reached the town of DRELOY. CCA at 1800 had reached LAIGNE after by-passing a blown bridge at JACON. The Division CP was in the vicinity of COSSE LE VIVIEN. By 2200 CCB was in HOUSSAY. The bridge at HOUSSAY was taken intact by CCB and its columns were crossing at 0005, 7 August. However, lack of fuel resulted in the halting and bivouacking of the column; the major position of CCB on East side of river, Division CP on West side in the vicinity of HOUSSAY.

In the meantime, the organic fuel and lubricant trucks had been released from their detail with the 79th and 90th Division. They returned to their old areas, picked up dumped loads and joined their parent organizations about 0530, 7 August. An additional 100,000 gallons of gasoline was moved by Third Army to COSSE LE VIVIEN on trucks which arrived 070700. This was moved across the MAYENNE RIVER in the vicinity of VILLIERS CHAMPAGNE where a Division Class III Dump was established under the control of the assistant Division Quartermaster. A platoon of Engineers was left as a security detachment until the Civil Affairs Section could secure a sufficient number of FFI to provide adequate guard for the Dump. Communication was maintained with Division thru the SCR 399 radio of the Division Quartermaster station in the Administrative Net.

Prior to crossing the MAYENNE one platoon of the attached Quartermaster Truck Company was attached to each of the three combat commands to carry a fuel reserve. This was deemed necessary due to the uncertainty of being able to maintain supply points at a reasonable distance behind an Armored Division operating on an exploitation mission deep in enemy held territory. This plan proved to be sound in subsequent operations throughout FRANCE where distances between supply points and the using elements were habitually abnormal.

With the arrival of fuel at 0530 on the morning of 7 August the units of CCB were ready to push on within a half hour.

The resistance in front of CCA at CHATEAU GONTIER proved to be about one company, reinforced. The bridge was repaired and crossing started at 0700. Enemy resistance was much less at this time and by 1100 CCA was in GREN BOUERE and CCB was at MESLAY. The advance of the Division continued throughout the day and night of 7 August, against enemy delaying actions on both columns.

The IV Corps order for the advance from the MAYENNE RIVER to LE MANS designated a zone of advance for the 5th Armored Division and for the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions, who were to shuttle. The 5th Armored Division, was given permission to use any routes in the Corps Zone providing the advance of the infantry divisions was not hindered. The original Division plan was for CCB to cut Northeast ahead of the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and by passing on the West side of LE MANS to move to the North and East of the city to prevent escape of the enemy therefrom to the Northwest and East. CCA was to approach the city from the South and Southwest and to prevent escape of enemy therefrom to East and South. The 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions were to attack the city from the West.

Due to the destruction of the railway bridge over the Mayenne River it was impossible for the Division to take advantage of routes other than those assigned. As a result of this rapid advance a shuttling column of the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions was formed.

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(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - As of 1041, 11th Armored Div., 1940)

Infantry Division moved via a route which entered the 5th Armored Division zone and so conflicted with the advance of CCB that it was necessary to completely re-route both CCA and CCB by shifting to the South. Fortunately the road net permitted. However, this also necessitated a complete change in the tactical plan for the containment of LE MANS, as is shown below.

The enemy was using AA units for scattered AT positions, two Mark IV tanks were knocked out by our troops. Snipers continued to annoy our columns but with little effect. A moderate number of tanks and some artillery were reported by civilians as retreating toward LAVAL. On this date 55 PW's and 2 enemy killed were reported. During this period considerable difficulty was experienced by units of the Division, below major commands, due to the lack of operational maps. Up to this time they had been using Michelin road maps, ungridded. No other maps were available.

Reconnaissance by 8 August was patrolling North and East of LE MANS along line BON ETABLE - BOULONE - TRESSOY. LE MANS was being used as a straggler point by the enemy, who there reorganized men into provisional units for delaying actions. Some artillery was encountered but was of little consequence. Combat aviation lessened its activities on both 7 and 8 August. Demolitions by the enemy were being carried out in LE MANS and MAIGNE.

At 080900 the Division was advancing on LE MANS with heads of columns three kilometers from their objective. CCA and CCB both crossed the SARTHE RIVER South of the city; CCA swung in a wide arc East of and around the city and took a position North and Northeast of the city from the river to the city and the main LE MANS - PARIS road; CCB took position South and Southeast of the city, covering the section between CCA and a point midway to the river; CCR took position immediately South of the city covering the section between CCB and the river. The Division CP located five kilometers Southeast of LE MANS. All exits from LE MANS were closed by 082300. Units were instructed to make all possible preparations for a further move, possibly to North and East.

Our casualties were light throughout this operation. Six enemy tanks were destroyed in various engagements East of LE MANS and enemy infantry activity had considerably increased. Enemy killed were reported for this date as 50, PW's 200.

At 0400, 9 August, orders were received from XV Corps to reconnoiter line ST MARTIN DES MONTES - COSME DE VAIR - COURGAINS - FRESNAY SUR SARTHE, prepared to advance to North and to protect East flank of the Corps. At 1940, 9 August, the Division was given the mission of seizing and holding the crossings of the ORNE RIVER between MONCE and STE JAMME, and to reconnoiter to line NOGENT LE ROTROU - MORTAGNE - ALENCON.

During the consolidation in the LE MANS area normal maintenance and evacuation was accomplished and basic loads of most items were reconstituted. Diesel fuel and WP ammunition were in short supply and neared the critical point. There was some delay in providing adequate stocks of Cl I, III and V supplies at the Army Dumps Northeast of LE MANS but reserves carried by rail proved sufficient to provide for such contingencies.

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**SECRET**

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 9th Army Div., 30 Aug 44)

At 0300, 10 August, information was received that XV Corps would attack at 0800, 10 August to seize line ~~SENE - GAMBOURG~~. The Division was to attack in the ~~SENE~~ with 2d French Armored Division on the left. The Division crossed the line of departure at 0800 with CCA on the left and CCR on the right, and at 1100 both columns were meeting strong armored and artillery resistance. Some 50 enemy tanks were active and several counterattacks were repulsed in securing the river crossings. Hostile elements identified were portions of 708th Inf Div on the left, 9th Pz Div in center, and 130th Pz Lehr Div on the right. AT units were found at road junctions and critical points. 9 tanks and 2 armored cars were destroyed on 10 August, with 84 enemy dead and 116 PW's. Morale of the enemy was reported by IPW teams as somewhat better and greater resistance was noticed in enemy positions. Weather continued warm and dry.

By 1700 all elements of CCA had pushed North of the river and the situation was more favorable in its sector. By nightfall 10 August CCA had contacted strong tank forces in vicinity of MORROLLES and CCR was in contact with the enemy in vicinity of MAMERS. The enemy had been steadily withdrawing before our pressure all day. Both Combat Commands remained in position for the night with instructions to continue the attack at 0700, 11 August on the same objective with same axis of advance, CCA to by-pass the town of MORROLLES and CCR to by-pass MAMERS. The 79th Infantry Division was to take the towns. Reconnaissance was to stay forward and on the flanks.

It was during this day's action that the Division experienced its first loss among battalion commanders. Lt Col John S. Wintermute, Jr, Commanding Officer of 15th Armd Inf Bn, an element of CCR, was seriously wounded in action and evacuated. Major Tony Giorlando, Battalion Executive Officer, 15th Armd Inf Bn, assumed command.

The advance of the Division was much slower during 11 August due to enemy road-blocks and armor. Bitter resistance was encountered at some road blocks, and the rear guard action of the enemy continued. Concentrated fire from 105mm and 150mm artillery howitzers was reported for the first time. Advance reconnaissance had reached line Southwest corner FORST DE PERSEIGNE - BELLEME - BELLEME - ROBERT LE ROUSSE - East around FORST DE PERSEIGNE - Northeast FORST DE BELLEME - North to MALSAY - REMYCHERES - MAUVES.

The Division plan contemplated that CCA should pass through the FORST DE PERSEIGNE and directly North to the objective. Information indicated that the enemy held the FORST in some strength and that it was a tank trap. CCA was, therefore, ordered to by-pass the FORST to the East and to push on to the North. Further information was received that the FORST was to be bombed with all bombs on the following day, but the bombing was subsequently cancelled.

At 1800 CCR's column was at LELLES LEVE and CCA was passing to the East of LELLES LEVE which had the appearance of being an enemy trap, the same week. The Division CP was just south of BELLEME.

CC 1st Pz Div Co was attached to the Division on 11 August. The division and subsequent operations for 12 August are reported as follows.

**S E C R E T**

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 10th, 1964, HQ 1st AF, Saigon)

At 1945 orders were received giving a new objective and at 2210 the 1st Cavalry Division was ordered North of MAMRES to prepare plans for new advance. The Division was given the mission of continuing on to ARGENTAN, to cut all communications to North, and to help close the "ARGENTAN - FALAISE GAP". The Division Artillery was ordered to have fires prepared to catch enemy trying to get out to the East. CCA was to cut communications to Northwest, CCR to Northeast, and CCB to fill in the gap to South and East. At this time the head of CCR's column was in contact with the enemy in vicinity SEES, and CCA was North of the FORET DE PERSEIGNE.

The resistance in front of CCA on the morning of 12 August was very light, CCA having turned in the direction of SEES to relieve the pressure on CCR. The town of SEES was taken by the combination of CCA - CCR at 1000 and the advance continued to the North. The Division CP was in vicinity of LES MESLE at this time. The advance of the Division was held to a slow pace until noon. By afternoon the main line of contact was North of FORET DE BELLEME - ST VOUEA DE BINVOV - GOULANGES SUR SARTHE - North of MONTREEE. The enemy continued withdrawing, attempting to evacuate troops to EVREUX, DREUX and BERNAY. Armored forces appeared in greater numbers in an effort to stop the advance, as many as 200 tanks being reported in the general area. Tanks replaced AT at some roadblocks, showing more tenacious defensive tactics.

Support from our Air Forces materially assisted in regaining and maintaining the rapid rate of advance. At 1445 CCR cut the railroad at LAMOUVILLE and at 1450 was advancing on GACE. The Division CP at this time was in the vicinity of SEES. By 1700 CCR had the railroad cut at an additional point and had roadblocks cut on the Northwest on Highway N 24. The 10th Tank Bn, advancing on the town of GACE, ran into a well defended mine field in vicinity of MONTANT. Enemy appeared in considerable numbers, with several tanks to North and East of GACE. At 1900 the head of CCA was at MORRÈRE. By 2000 CCA was five miles South of ARGENTAN but was unable to carry out the attack due to the lack of fuel. During the afternoon and early evening a column of a combat command of the 2d French Armored Division blocked the supply route through SEES. SEES was some five kilometers East of the boundary between the 2d French Armored Division and the 5th Armored Division Zones. Refueling of CCA was delayed six hours by this conflicting traffic. Consequently CCA's attack towards Argentan was not launched until just before dark and was stopped short of the town by darkness. During the night patrols did enter the town.

Hostile aviation was active, strafing our columns three times during the day. Casualties of the enemy this date were: killed 301, captured 362; vehicles destroyed: 70 tanks, 80 miscellaneous motor vehicles, 2 armored cars, 7 pieces of artillery. Units identified through PW interrogation: 2d SS Pz Div, 8th Frecht Div, 9th Pz Div, 9th SS Pz Div, 10th SS Pz Div, 12th SS Pz Div, 17th SS Pz Gren Div, 130th Pz Lehr Div, and scattered service and GHQ units. Questioning indicated that individuals on leave or returning from hospitals were banded together in temporary formations, no matter what their proper units.

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(Lower, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624

At this point orders were changed and rechanged. Corps ordered that the plan of ARGENTAN be taken. After the attack was again started by CCA, this order was countermanded. Orders were also received to send a combat command up the ARGENTAN FALAISE Highway in an attempt to join the Canadians in the vicinity of FALAISE. This plan also was changed before it could be put into effect. The Division was then ordered to follow a plan as follows: The 2d French Armored Division would relieve CCA at ARGENTAN. CCA was to be put into position Southwest of ARGENTAN; CCB which had put in additional roadblocks at FALAISE, to remain in position on roadblocks, being given the 15th Arm'd Infantry Bn from CCB to perform this mission; CCB to move into position just North of SEES. The necessary moves to put this plan into effect were accomplished on 13 August. The Division was ordered to perform as much maintenance as possible and get ready for further movement.

Colonel Gustin M Nelson, who had been serving as Executive Officer of CGA returned to his former command, Headquarters, Division Trains, taking over from Lt Colonel Dickenson.

On 15 August the enemy front line was in the vicinity of DREUX with isolated strong points in the bend formed by the junction of the AVRE, EURE and ELAN RIVERS along a general line with a salient facing directly East. Our attacks was to be in the direction of the EURE River and DREUX to the North and South. Elements of 1st US Infantry Division

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(Continued, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, 1st Sst Arm Div, Cont'd)

were identified near DREUX and a concentration of tanks, infantry and artillery was reported at JUMILLIES. All regiments of 331st Infantry Division and elements of 118th Pz Division were reported in addition to the other two Panzer divisions.

During the day (15th) the 90th Infantry Division relieved the Division in the ARMENTAN - GAGE sector and the Division started on its new mission. CCB moved at 1600 and CCR at 1630. During the march maintenance of radio communications was very difficult due to enemy interference and unfavorable terrain features. At numerous times the Combat Commanders lost contact with heads of columns, which made control difficult. The enemy resistance on all routes was light, consisting mostly of road blocks. These were not strongly defended, an occasional anti-tank gun being the only armament. The enemy withdrew to DREUX and East of the EURE RIVER. 85 enemy were killed, 160 captured. Weather was good.

At 1100 on 16 August, 1944, CCB had accomplished its mission, a crossing having been seized and held to the South of DREUX. Our forces found the town defended, with large forces of enemy fleeing to the East out of the town. The enemy resistance was reported to be strong tank forces and anti-tank defense. At this point the boundary between CCB and CCR was changed to give the town of DREUX to CCB. The enemy line along the AVRE RIVER extended CLOCHES - MOUDAN - BRISSARD - then along bank of AVRE RIVER from Junction West to VERT EN DROURS. Reconnaissance elements of our Division were pushing East and Northeast to establish a line MAHES - GASSICOURT - POISSY - TRAPPES. Of two enemy battalions left in DREUX one was destroyed on late afternoon of 16 August, and the other retreated across the EURE RIVER pursued by our Recon Squadron. AAA fire was active during this period and artillery fire was reported in vicinity DANNEMARIE and BOURG ABBE. Engineers demolished bridges across EURE RIVER, leaving only three. One company of tanks was reported vicinity of MOUDAN and we engaged a company across the EURE RIVER, damaging 7 out of 30 tanks. Hostile planes were active, 6 attacking once, and 13 at another time. 129 enemy were killed, 161 captured, and 6 motor vehicles were destroyed. Civilian reports indicated that the German withdrawal through this area had been going on for about 7 days, SS troops earliest.

The Division CP closed in bivouac this day in vicinity of MARVILLE, having marched onehundred ten (110) kilometers. CCA, following CCR, had met some tank opposition, also heavy artillery fire, and had dropped behind. CCA was ordered to push rapidly to just North of DREUX by any routes. The town of DREUX was taken by CCB at 1745.

By 0600, 17 August, CCA was in bivouac in vicinity of BLAINVILLE, Southeast of DREUX, and the assembly of the Division in the DREUX area was completed at 0835. At 1035 CCR was given the mission of securing crossings from DREUX to TURY inclusive. At this time, 1035, 17 August, the Division CP received its only strafing to date. One plane only was employed and it was shot down on its first attack. At 1420, 17 August, orders were received from Corps that not more than four crossings over the EURE RIVER were desired for use of the 2d French Armored Division at MONTREUIL, MARGILLY - SUR - EURE, CROTH and EZY - SUR - EURE, but that the Corps Commander did not want the Division to become involved in a serious fight to secure these crossings. CCR had secured a crossing at MUZY and had considerable enemy opposition in tanks, infantry and artillery.

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(Lester, Report After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div, Cont'd)

The enemy resisted stubbornly along the EURE RIVER to allow his troops escaping from ARGENTAN GAP to withdraw safely. Reinforcements from 17th GAF Division arrived on CCR's front. Small groups of tanks were reported around HOUDAN and ST LUBIN DE LA HAYE. Enemy front lines were South bank of AVRE RIVER LE MESNIL - thence Northwest. The Reconnaissance Squadron found a line of resistance from TILLY South for about 6 miles. The 17th GAF Div was to our North and West and along the AVRE RIVER, having come from the channel coast to defend DREUX, too late to accomplish that mission. One ME-110 was shot down by CCR but little air activity was reported in the area. A USAF escapee reported that the enemy was moving everything out of the SOMME and SEINE RIVER areas.

The action was carried on throughout the afternoon and at 1045 CCR reported that the bridge at ARVE could be used, but enemy opposition made it impossible to cross before dark. The Commanding Officer, CCR, was ordered to hold along ARVE for the night. CCB had crossed the EURE RIVER to the North by 1900. At 2030 a warning order was issued to all units for a probable move of the Division on 18 August. The enemy opposition had been strong throughout 17 August but our losses were light in both personnel and equipment. Enemy casualties during the day were 65 killed, 44 captured; and 6 tanks, 2 artillery pieces, and 8 motor vehicles destroyed; 2 motor vehicles and 9 artillery pieces captured. Morale of the 17th GAF Division was reported high by one PW, due to promises of a counteroffensive.

At 0815 on 18 August 1944, new orders were received. The Corps mission was to secure an objective in the vicinity of MANTES - GASSICOURT. The Division was to occupy the MANTES - GASSICOURT area, to interdict the SEINE RIVER and roads East of the river and to protect the left flank of the Corps. Orders were issued at 1015, 18 August, for movement of the Division, with CCB on the right, CCA on the left, CCR to protect the bridgehead at DREUX until relieved by elements of the XI Corps (7th Armd Division), trains to remain in vicinity of BLAINVILLE, the Division CP to follow in the right zone. CCB moved out at 1220 and CCA at 1230.

Enemy resistance on this march was very light. CCA had first contact at 1300, some light machine gun resistance which was easily reduced. CCB had its first resistance at 1735 and either drove out or destroyed the opposition. At 1900 CCB combat elements had closed in assembly area. Orders were received from Corps that CCR, upon being relieved of its mission in vicinity of DREUX, was to proceed to and hold high ground four kilometers East of ARST to prevent movement of enemy to East of the EURE RIVER in that vicinity. Orders were sent to Division trains to move to vicinity LES BOSSIS early 19 August. The combat elements of CCA closed in their assembly area at 2215, 18 August. The Division CP bivouacked in the vicinity of LES BOSSIS at 2245.

On 19 August enemy front was along line LE HAYE DE BREANVILLE - CEANFOUR LES BOMBIERES - HILLEGANS - BASVILLE. Our roadblocks along this line were picking up PW's coming from scattered disorganized groups, who offered no opposition. The enemy offered slight delaying action at isolated points, such as road junctions. The 28d Armored Engineer Battalion column was attacked about 0100, when passing through GILLES, by 100 infantry with MG's. The column lost 6 vehicles. CCR repulsed several counterattacks South of AVRE RIVER, killing 100 foot troops, and destroying 3 tanks and 3 75mm AT guns. At BREVAL French 1st Cavalry Div, captured 102 PW's from 118th Regt of Eng Bn of 118th Div, which was lost in the battle.

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(Lester, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Arm Div cont'd)

Other PW's were captured during the night, when overrun by the advance of the Combat Commands. All guns were reported in several localities in roadblocks, but little armor was reported. Hostile aviation was extremely active. 30 planes attacked CCR's column in the morning, and other columns were attacked; planes were over our area both day and night.

The Division CP moved from LES FOSSIS to vicinity CRAVENT at 1345. During the day of 19 August CCA placed interdiction fire on PACY-SUR-EURE and surrounding roads and CCB placed fires on roads and targets of opportunity in its sector. The Division Trains closed in their assembly area at 1840 completing the move of the Division from the DREUX area. At 1920 both CCA and CCB reported tanks to their front. Artillery fire dispersed those in CCA sector to the Northeast. CCB reported that two enemy tanks have been knocked out in its sector, others dispersing into the FORET DE BEZET. CCR reported that enemy had withdrawn from the town of ALLI; that enemy mortar fire was falling in the town and that the enemy had withdrawn anti-tank guns from that area by hand. At 1800 on 19 August the Commanding General ordered the Division Engineer to blow a lock on the SEINE RIVER. At 2130 the Engineer reported the lock out of commission. The Division Artillery was placing fires on known enemy assembly areas at 2100. At 2030 orders were received from Corps that a new mission was planned for the Division with probable operations early 20 August. Total enemy casualties this date: killed 100, captured 200; 3 tanks, 6 motor vehicles, 1 armored car, 20 SP 105mm guns, and three 75mm AT guns destroyed. PW's from scattered divisions had apparently been banded into March battalions. The units of the 17th GAF Div predominated in PW's from regularly organized units.

At 0700, 20 August, CCA was ordered to move North between the EURE and SEINE RIVERS to block crossing at LES ANDLES and to occupy ground at REDBOUTVILLE and cut road net there. CCA started this action at 0845. At 0930 orders were issued to CCB to move North between EURE and SEINE RIVERS to occupy plateau South of ANTHEUIL and to cut road from ANTHEUIL to GAILLON, the limit of its sector on the EURE to be from GAILLY inclusive to CHAMBRAY inclusive, and to secure a supply route from its zone to CCA zone. CCR was ordered to move North to the vicinity of LA HEUNIERE to cut roads running between EURE RIVER and PACY to VERNON and to secure supply routes in Division zone to CCB zone, the limit of its sector to be along EURE RIVER from CHAMBRAY exclusive to a point six hundred yards Southeast of PACY, the town of PACY exclusive. The 55th Cav Recon Sq was to reconnoiter line EURE RIVER from point six hundred yards Southeast of PACY to road junction at (396583), to protect the Division Trains and to secure supply route from Trains zone to CCR zone.

At 0900 20 August CCR was attacked Southeast of ALLI by approximately three companies of enemy infantry with some artillery support. The attack was repulsed and the command continued on its new mission. At 1100 CCA, moving up Highway 78, had its first contact, some enemy machine gun fire. The opposition was cleared away and the advance continued. At 1220 CCA had further contact with an enemy force of 15 tanks and some infantry. The enemy was engaged by artillery fire. Air support assisted CCA to resume its advance by 1330. At 1415 CCA again met strong enemy resistance from tank, anti-tank and infantry elements. Losses of CCA to this time were three M4 tanks and three attached M20 tank destroyers. By 1530 the advance had carried only one quarter mile, but by 1920 CCA was bypassing to the West in an effort to regain Highway 78 in vicinity ST VINCENT DE MARS, and to reach JAILLARD by dark. By 2000 it had reached a point two miles

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North of DOUAINS and was held up by relatively strong resistance. CCA continued its attack, and at 2345 its advance guard was holding the town of LA HEUNIERE with outguards on the East-West highway North of the town. CCR, at 2000, went into bivouac in vicinity of CRAVENT, having had no further contact with enemy.

The enemy front line on 21 August was FIEROS D'AUTILE - ST ETIENNE SOUS BAILLEUL - VILLER SOUS BAILLEUL - CHAMPENARD. The enemy resisted our advance with road blocks and strong points. There were still enemy forces in the FORET DE BIZY and vicinity PACY SUR SEINE. The East bank of the EURE RIVER South of PACY was clear and the enemy was driven out of CHALSSE D'IVRY. AM was reported at BONNIERES and BONNEBOURT. Dual purpose 88mm guns were located in the FORET DE BIZY and nearby towns, being used as AT. Enemy tanks encountered increased in number. Artillery fire also increased. Hostile aviation was limited to reconnaissance at night.

At 0015 21 August the main body of CCA continued the attack and encountered enemy small arms and anti-tank fire from forces which had infiltrated between the two elements during the night. In this action Major William H Burton, Commanding Officer of 46th Armd Inf Bn, was slightly wounded.

At 0845 the Corps Commander visited the Division CP and stated that the enemy was reported attempting to cross the EURE RIVER to the East between AMER and IVRY. The 65th Cav Recon Sq was directed to observe the road not between these two towns and to report any major movement across the river to the East. CCR was alerted to move to the South in the event of a serious threat to the Division rear and lines of communication.

The Division Commander visited the front, returned to the CP and at 1100 ordered CCB to proceed as soon as possible to the FORET DE BIZY to relieve the pressure on CCA. CCB was ordered not to operate North of nor in the vicinity of Highway GC 75, so as not to interfere with the operations of CCA, and not to advance North of Highway N 181 without orders from Division. The Division Artillery was ordered to furnish all available artillery support to CCA and CCB.

At 1100 CCA's advance guard was still holding LA HEUNIERE; the main body of CCA had not yet effected a junction with it. There were still some enemy tanks and ground machine guns between the two forces. At 1100 our reconnaissance made contact with reconnaissance of XIX Corps in vicinity of IVRY. At 1600 CCB started its attack into the FORET DE BIZY with dismounted infantry and had made no contact by 1700. The commanding General ordered CCB to continue to its objective, to probe the town of VERNON, and if no serious opposition was encountered to take possession of the town, and to continue to clear out woods along the West bank of the SEINE RIVER as far to the Northwest as the stream which runs from GOULET Southwest to LA CHAPELLE. At 1720 CCR was ordered to block the two main highways running East and Northeast to PACY SUR EURE, to be prepared to move early 22 August to clear out FORET DE PACY. By 1720 CCA was approaching AMERCEY. Some anti-tank opposition had been met and overcome at ST VINCENT. At 1800 CCB had a medium tank company skirting the Southwest edge of the FORET DE BIZY proceeding to Northwest. Its infantry at this time was halfway through the forest, meeting no opposition. At 1845 the advanced elements of CCA were at MERCEY. At this point there had been a misunderstanding on the time of a concentration of artillery fire,

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(Letter, 100000 After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Arm Div cont'd)

and elements of CCA advanced too closely to the point of concentration. The result was six casualties including the former Executive Officer of CCA, Lt Col Scott H. Case who had been placed in command of the 46th Arm Div, and who was seriously wounded. At 2030 the infantry of CCB had passed through the FORET DE BIZY and were on the main highway to VERNON. Here they stopped for the night, having reported VERNON clear at 2300. By 2045 CCR had the road blocks placed, in two cases using German mine fields reinforced with our mines. At 2235 CCA had reached a point just South of CHAMPENARD, and stopped for the night, probing the town by dismounted reconnaissance. No strong enemy resistance appeared at this time.

CCA resumed its attack at 0700, 22 August. It reported that two enemy "Panther" tanks had infiltrated into its position during the night and had knocked out three light tanks just after daylight. The infiltrating tanks were destroyed. CCB continued its advance at 0800, 22 August and at 0940 was still moving North without opposition. At 1030 CCB had made contact with light resistance. The advance continued with artillery support. At 1045 the Infantry of CCA had taken the town of CHAMPENARD and was deployed in the fields North of the town, opposed by some infantry and two "Panther" tanks. The fog was so dense at this point that observation of artillery fire was impossible. The weather cleared by 1230 and at that time Air Support and artillery were used on targets in front of CCA, just North of CHAMPENARD.

At 1245 CCR was taken under Corps control and ordered to dislodge the enemy from the area within the boundary MENILLES - DOUAINS - CHAFOUR LES VONNIERS - the main highway through PACY - MINILLES then to return to original position. By 1315 the right column of CCB had reached the stream running Southwest from GOULET to LA CHAPELE, and was waiting to cross. It crossed behind the left column at 1335 and at 1550 was opposed by enemy anti-tank guns and dug-in infantry. At 1600 CCB was attacked from the air by ten ME-109's, bombed and strafed. Casualties were ten wounded. By 1700 on 22 August, Combat Command A had penetrated North of CHAMPENARD and was facing Combat Team WAHL-FRANKE, which had about 30 tanks and 10 assault guns, plus 500 to 600 infantrymen. A fortified line was reported in front of them. Combat Command "B" was through the FORET DE BIZY to ST ETIENNE SOUS BAILLEUL where about 200 infantry opposed it, backed up by an estimated reserve of 200 infantry, with one tank in the vicinity. CCR on the North side of the FORET DE PACY was confronted by a Combat Team of 20 tanks, and 300-400 infantry in the North half of the forest. The 85th Cav Ron Sq was holding a line along the East side of the EURE RIVER South of PACY, facing elements of the 17th GAF Division, Combat Team WAHL-FRANKE, including elements of 1st SS Panzer, 17th SS Panzer, 2d SS Panzer Grenadier, 4th SS Panzer Grenadier, 711th Infantry, 7th SS Mountain, 22nd SS Panzer Divisions, scattered AA and replacement units. The enemy had been fighting in and reorganizing along the front between EURE and SEINE RIVERS, while tank forces composed of tanks and infantry were delaying us at strong points to the North. Tank fighting was heavy in the vicinity of CHAMPENARD where enemy infantry fought from dug-in positions. All three combat commands were bombed and strafed by hostile aviation. One plane was shot down by CCR.

At 2300 CCB reported that its forward elements were just the edge of the forest. Four British paratroopers, having eluded German capture, had been killed. Total enemy casualties for the 24 hours period included killed 100, wounded 100, tanks destroyed 7. Visibility was poor during this period.

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div cont'd.)

The attack was continued early 23 August 1944. Resistance continued as the enemy strove to keep us from harrassing the armor escaping between EVREUX and LOUVREUX. Small groups of infantry, anti-tank guns, and armor all stubbornly resisted our advance up the narrow neck of land bordered by the two rivers. The front line was in vicinity of LE PIPET and West of GAILLON. Progress was still slow though enemy resistance did not appear as strong as the night before. At 1030, the control of CCR was released by Corps. CCR was given orders to move to an area West of LA HEUNIERE and to proceed along the East bank of the EURE RIVER to clear out the woods on the Division left flank as far as the road between ST CALOMBE and CHAMBRAY. Upon reaching the road it was to establish liaison with CCA and if the situation permitted to proceed Northwest to the main highway running Northeast from ANTHEUIL. Upon reaching the highway it was to request instructions from Division. CCR was also to maintain liaison with the 30th Infantry Division to our left. The Division Commander directed CCB to form "Task Force 15" under the Commanding Officer of 15th Armd Inf Bn, consisting of the 15th Armd Inf Bn, less one company, with one platoon of light tanks, and one platoon of Tank Destroyers attached. This force was to proceed from its position in vicinity ST PIERRE DE BAILLEU in the direction of GAILLON, to clean out woods between present location and GAILLON, as far as the main road leading Southwest from the town. At this point the Task Force would pass to the control of CCA until CCA reached its objective, at which time the task force would be returned to control of CCB. The remainder of CCB was to clear out the dug-in enemy position reported to its front. The 744th Infantry Regiment of the 711th Infantry Division, as well as elements of 17th GAF and Combat Team WAHL-FRANKE continued to oppose us. No artillery or aviation was reported. CCR moved on its mission at 1130 and by 1630 the combat elements had reached the objective. They reported the area clear of enemy by 1700 and contact made with friendly troops in AUTHOUILLET at 1800. The only enemy contact reported on this mission was fifteen enemy at CHAMBRAY, all killed by Troop D, 85th Cav Ren Sq.

CCB's Task Force 15 moved at 1250, and at 1420 had reached its objective astride the highway Southwest of GAILLON. No enemy resistance was met during the advance. CCA's progress, though slow, was steady. Artillery fires were placed on the town of AILLY at 1200, and a heavy concentration was requested for 1600. The advance continued until 1700 at which time elements were in contact with enemy at LES QUAIZES - AILLY - GOURNAY. The enemy was estimated to be one enemy infantry battalion reinforced with some tanks. Liaison had been established with Task Force 15 which was being moved up on the right. At 1450 the 85th Cav Ren Sq was relieved of its mission of securing the left flank of the division and moved to reconnoiter and secure the right flank. Our infantry grenaded infantry positions in wheatfields under shocks of wheat with great success. Four out of nine tanks which opposed CCA near CHAMPENARD were destroyed. The Cavalry reported that Germans returned to the town of AIGLEVILLE on the night of 22 August after we had passed through, killing 21 civilians. Citizens of VERION were afraid of the same situation. German outposts were visible across the SEINE from VERION, and enemy troops crossed by a footbridge, which was still usable, when American patrols were not present. Enemy losses during this day were: Killed 295, captured 88; vehicles destroyed: 15 tanks, 1 anti-tank gun, and 1 mortar. USAAF destroyed 50 to 60 vehicles vicinity CAUDEBEC LES ELBEUF. Visibility was bad, weather dull.



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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div cont'd)

CCA continued the attack early 24 August. Observation was very poor due to fog. At 0855 CCA was preparing to attack the towns of GRUCHET, GOURNEY, MONTAINE, GELLENGER, INGENIERE and HEUDEBOUVILLE in order. The artillery preparation was being fired at that time. The Division CP was now located one and one half kilometers Northeast of CHAMPELARD. The Division Commander received oral instruction from Corps to move one Combat Command to the vicinity of JUMEAUVILLE to clean out area West of MAULDRE RIVER north of BEYNES; to coordinate action with 106th Cavalry Group (Mecs); the remainder of the Division to assemble and move on Corps order to assembly area South of MANTES - GASSICOURT prepared to cross the SEINE RIVER. This Combat Command mission was given to CCR. CCR, 95th Armd FA Bn attached, moved at 1330 and at 1600 had reached BREVAL. At 1800 it made contact with 106th Cavalry Group East of ARMOURVILLE. Orders were received by CCR, direct from Corps, to cross the river at BEVILLES and clear out a pocket North of SEINE; to reconnoiter to POISSY but not to cross East of the MAULDRE except on Corps order. The Combat Command was assembled in vicinity of BEVILLES for the night. CCA continued its attack through the day in heavy rain and mud which hampered movements of all types of vehicles. By 1800 it was about one half mile South of HEUDEBOUVILLE, with an artillery concentration being fired on the town.

The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron moved to oppose a reported infantry regiment observed along East bank of EURE RIVER vicinity PACY. Strong fortified positions were reported along reverse slope area on both sides of the river in vicinity of MCIDS. Air reconnaissance was active during the night. Minefields were reported in vicinity of VERNON on the East bank of the SEINE RIVER.

At 1620, 24 August, information was received that XV Corps had been attached to the First US Army at 0600, 24 August. At 1800, orders were received to move the Division to the MANTES - GASSICOURT area, the 85th Cav Rcn Sq to be left to screen HEUDEBOUVILLE - GAILLON and the road net Northwest of VERNON. The 85th Cav was to be relieved by 1800, 25 August, by the 113th Cav Group. The Division less 85th Cav Rcn Sq, was ordered to the South of the line BONNIERS - PACY by 0600, 25 August. The march was started at 1950 on the 24th by the Division Headquarters, followed by Division Troops and CCB.

CCA had released Task Force 15 at 1735 and at 2100 broke contact, Reconnaissance screening the withdrawal. At that time the enemy had been driven from HEUDEBOUVILLE and was retreating North. CCB likewise withdrew, and CCR continued its Corps mission East of MAULDRE RIVER reconnoitering area THIVERVAL - DAVIGNY - ORGEVAL. CCR encountered heavy 88mm fire at LES CLEVES, and a short contact was made by 121st Cavalry Group, working with it, with a force of about 400 Germans. A transport plane was captured intact with other air corps equipment near THIVERVAL. 120 Germans were killed, 57 captured; 5 tanks, 3 armored cars, 11 cannon and 1 motor vehicle destroyed by the Division during the day.

At 0645 on 25 August the Division CP was in the vicinity of MCIVILLE. By 0125 all elements except the Reconnaissance Squadron were below the indicated line. CCR continued its Corps mission, reconnoitering along the West bank of the SEINE RIVER from VILLENNES to MUREUX. The latter town was found clear. Infiltration by elements of 6th Security Regiment and 3rd Sturm Battalion "Paris" was attempted in area ORGEVAL and SEINE RIVERS vicinity LES ALLIETS LE ROI VILLENNES, MONT LOIS DE VITTEUIL and MUREUX. CCR received orders direct from Corps for an attack.

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(Location, 7 miles West of Paris August 25, 1944 - August 1, 1944, in the Paris area)

early 25 August in direction of CRASPIERES - ORGEVAL - VERNEUIL. CCR at the time was in position just West of LA COFFRE. It crossed the river at BATHES au Pont and attacked at 1200, encountering enemy Mobile troops North of DAVACH. Clearing the woods in the area was a slow process and the advance was carried slowly to the Hill line extending Northwest of FEUCHEROLLES. By 1300 combat elements were moving on the town of MORAIN VILLIERS, disposed to move through MARIVAL and VERNEUIL and swing left for a crossing of the MULDRA RIVER. CCA at 1930 was closed in new assembly positions in the MANRES - GASTICOURT area. CCR reverted to Division control at 1500, 25 August. At 2015 CCR had reached the line MARSEVAL - CHAPER and had sent strong patrols into MUREUX and MEDEVILLE, to rally for the night East of ORGEVAL between CHAPER and MORAIN VILLIERS. At 1500 the Division Commander had received orders to be prepared to advance one combat command across the SEINE RIVER in vicinity of MEULAN. CCB was alerted for this mission.

CCR continued mission on 26 August and at 0850 was driving enemy out of the woods in the vicinity of VERNEUIL and MUREUX. It moved West through ECQUEVILLY - FLINS - EPONE at 1230, having cleared the entire area.

At 1330, 26 August, the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved of its Corps mission and immediately started to move to its assembly area with the remainder of Division. Its commanding officer reported that the Squadron had been strafed by enemy aircraft and that hostile air reconnaissance had been active early in the morning. At 1430 all orders with reference to an attack across the SEINE RIVER by the Division were cancelled. The Division would instead assist the attack of infantry division of the Corps by artillery fire from positions South of the SEINE, reconnoiter routes to the vicinity of ST CYR, and be prepared to move to that vicinity on order of First Army through XV Corps. When released by XV Corps the Division would be assigned to V Corps. By 1500 CCR had completed its mission and had outposted the river line from MEULAN and POISSY. The outposting was necessary due to the return of the enemy to areas which had been cleared earlier.

On this date numerous civilian reports were received of fortifications in the PARIS area. Germans were also reported fleeing towards the frontiers, via BEAUVAIS - AMIENS - GISORS - GORNEY. The Division reported this date 90 enemy killed, 30 captured. Thirteen guns were destroyed: nine 88's and four 105's. Forty bicycles were also destroyed. Among PW's were some from 3rd Sturm Battalion "Paris", made up of civilian workers in Paris who had been given uniforms, rifles and a few days training, and from the 6th Security Regiment which was originally used to guard military installations around PARIS but had recently been sent out as infantry. There were 100 men per company, of ages between 38 and 45 years.

On the next day, 27 August, CCR reported that the enemy was withdrawing further to the East, and Military Intelligence reported troops massing in the vicinity of PONTOISE. Some artillery and mortar fire was received vicinity MEULAN. 7 training planes were discovered and destroyed by CCR in BOIS DE VERNEUIL. Some were marked with swastikas, others with British insignia.

A report from CCB stated that the sector along the SEINE had been active with enemy all day, that the enemy had considerable installations around MEULAN and to

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(Letter, Report, After Action Report Enemy - 10 Aug 1944, 11 Aug 1944, 12 Aug 1944)

the East and also in the POISSY loop of the SEINE. Artillery was used on all known targets. Air support was used on the town of MENUCOURT against a reported concentration of enemy motorized infantry, and on CHATEAU VILLETTE, reported to contain an enemy headquarters. The general movement of the enemy had been to the East along the North bank of the SEINE and it was reported that anti-tank guns, mortars and machine guns were being installed in considerable numbers. All day the Division Artillery supported the 29th and 30th US Infantry Divisions in their bridgehead across the SEINE RIVER, firing on enemy retreating in direction of the MEULAN RIVER. Units opposing these 2 divisions were from left to right: 49th Infantry Division, 17th GAF Division, 18th GAF Division, Parachute Regiment Lehr (6th Pz Div Division?).

At 2230 the Division Artillery was relieved of its mission of supporting XV Corps and the Division was released from attachment to XV Corps and attached to V Corps. Forty eight PW's were taken this date: four 105mm guns were destroyed; Two warehouses in MAREUX were captured, with an estimated two million dollars worth of GAF equipment.

During the period 25-30 August the Division utilized all available time for heavy maintenance, for which this was the first opportunity. Needed tank parts, engines, tracks and replacement vehicles were received and vehicular rehabilitation accomplished.

On 28 August Major William H Burton returned to duty with the 46th Armd Inf Bn and resumed command. Lt Col Gilson, who had been assigned to the battalion to command during Major Burton's absence, was transferred to the 15th Armd Inf Bn and assumed command of that unit on the same day.

Unit commanders of the Division as of 28 August were:

5th Armd Div - MAJ GEN LUNSFORD E OLIVER, 03536, USA  
Combat Command "A" - BRIG GEN EUGENE REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF  
Combat Command "B" - COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Armd Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA  
Reserve Command - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Armd Div Tn - COL GUSTIN M NELSON, 014512, INF  
Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BAGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 0335298, CAV  
145th Armd Sig Co - 1ST LT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
85th Cav Ron Sq Mecz - LT COL KENT FAY, 0286301, CAV  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0292156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - MAJ GLEN L FOOTE, 0450438, CAV  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF  
15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL KENNETH P GILSON, 0359160, INF  
46th Armd Inf Bn - MAJ WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF  
47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div, Cont'd)

71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B. WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703, FA  
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGUIE, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - MAJ ROLAND S BIERBACH, 0318269, ORD  
75th Med Bn, Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BADER, 0372570, MC

On 29 August orders were received from V Corps for the Division to move on 30 August through the city of PARIS on three routes: Route "A", Highway N 13 through ST GERMAIN EN LAYE to N 310; Route "B", Highway N 30 through ROUQUENCOURT and N 307 through AUBERVILLE; Route "C", Highway N 10 through VERSAILLES and N 186 to N 306 to N 24. All routes ran through PARIS to a line of departure about six kilometers Northeast of AUBERVILLE. CCA was given Route "C", CCB Route "A", followed by CCR; Division Headquarters, Division Troops and Division Trains moved on Route "B", following a married infantry-tank company to and through PARIS.

The march of the Division started with CCB moving out at 0625, 30 August, CCA moving out at 0630, and the Division Headquarters moving out at 0740. The Headquarters moved through MANTE - ST CLOUD - CRISPIERES - BAILLY and entered the outskirts of the city of PARIS at 1000, clearing the city at 1130. Orders were issued to the 35th Cav Rcn Sq to continue on and report condition of crossings of LOISE RIVER over five routes in the Division zone. At 1600, CCA had reached the town of CLAYE - SOULIY, and CCB had reached SENLIS, where light enemy resistance was encountered. Troop B, 35th Cav Rcn Sq, captured ninety prisoners at this point. The Division CP was located just South of DUCY, with the head of the column held up by enemy anti-tank guns and infantry. Lt Col Kent Fay, commanding 35th Cav Rcn Sq, was killed in this action. Major John P Gerald, Executive Officer of the Squadron, assumed command. The Division Headquarters and Division Troops columns were shelled by enemy artillery fire at this location. One casualty resulted from shrapnel. At 1700 CCA was refueling at LEISSY. CCB's left column was in contact with the enemy at LAMORLAYE, and its right column was still engaged at SENLIS. The reconnaissance of CCB was moving on BARBERY, the remainder of the task force and the CP were Southwest of CHAILANT. The Division Trains went into bivouac just South of BARON.

Both CCA and CCB were given instructions to move forward until dark, then bivouac and report locations, both to continue attack at daylight 31 August. CCB took the town of SENLIS at 1845 and reported enemy to Northeast and to West of the town. At 2330, 30 August, orders were issued to CCR to move at daylight to clear route North of Division Headquarters. During the day 30 August, CCA had no enemy contact along its routes. CCB was still in contact with enemy at dark.

Throughout the day the enemy had fought a delaying action as he retreated North, launching small counter attacks to slow down our advance elements and by steady shelling from his rear guard units. During this period the enemy was withdrawing from his last positions only about two hours before our forward elements reached them. Enemy casualties for 30 August were: killed 104, captured 164. The 100th Security Battalion was practically wiped out during the day as it tried in vain, fighting desperately from road blocks supported by anti-tank guns, to stem the Division's advance.

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Arm'd Div, cont'd)

On 31 August the delaying tactics of the enemy continued, as he retreated slowly to the Northeast, in order to keep an escape route open West of OISE RIVER along the FORET DE COMPIEGNE and the FORET DE L'IGUE for units in the path of our advance.

The advance of the Division was resumed at 0600 31 August. CCB made contact with an enemy roadblock at 0630 just North of SENLIS, quickly reduced the resistance and continued a rapid advance. At 1000 both columns of CCB were moving forward without opposition in an attempt to obtain crossings over the OISE RIVER at COMPIEGNE and Southwest of COMPIEGNE. At 1100 CCA, still advancing, had made no contact with enemy. At 1115 CCB reported the bridge at VERBERIE blown. Also reported by CCB was the capture of an air field near VERBERIE with concrete runways not greatly damaged and believed repairable for heavy bomber use. CCR reported contact made with the enemy at BETH at 1215, that bridges were blown and the enemy observed digging in across the river. At 1315 troops A, B and C, 85th Cav Rcn Sq were attached to Combat Commands A, B and R respectively and the Squadron less A, B and C attached to Division Trains in vicinity of BACON to furnish protection. At 1430 CCR was closing in on the river. Enemy resistance was strong but undetermined. CCB reported that an enemy horse-drawn artillery column had run into its column and was being destroyed by tanks. At 1500 CCB reported the bridge out at CRIEL. CCA made first contact (small arms fire) with the enemy at the same hour. At this point in the advance all routes ran through heavily wooded areas and the advance slowed considerably. The bridges at COMPIEGNE and POMMIERS were reported intact.

Effort was being made to force crossings the night of 31 August and push forward to a line CHAUNY - NOYON - LASSIGNY. At 1800 the right column of CCA crossed the river at POMMIERS, unopposed. At 2000 CCB was five hundred yards South of COMPIEGNE, preparing to attack to secure bridges there. CCR was meeting heavy enemy resistance in the forest North of ORROUY and GILOCCOURT. Enemy resistance made it impossible to cross any units over river on 31 August, except the right element of CCA. This crossing was made at POMMIERS on the extreme flank of the Corps zone. At 2310, 31 August, the left column was in the vicinity of PONT ST MAXENCE helping the 28th Infantry Division to hold a bridge head there until a bridge could be built. The right column of CCB was just short of COMPIEGNE. The 112th Infantry Regiment was passing through to attack the town and secure crossing. During the day 180 enemy were killed and 194 PW's captured. The advance was fast and the enemy were forced to abandon five Russian 76.2mm AT guns, five 105mm howitzers complete with prime movers, and 12 trucks intact. 4 tanks and 13 artillery pieces were destroyed.

Total enemy casualties for the month of August were: Enemy killed 2811; captured, 4320; tanks, captured and destroyed, 200; armored cars captured and destroyed, 11; motor vehicles captured and destroyed, 404; artillery pieces captured and destroyed, 121.

While the Division was engaged in operations in the FORET DE COMPIEGNE, its supply points were located Southwest of PARIS, resulting in a long haul for supplies. Traffic congestion and much confusion around PARIS complicated the resupply.

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq. 5th Army, 1st Div., 1st Bn., 1st Co.)

C. COMMENTS.

The Division's first month of combat brought forth a number of lessons believed worthy of being recorded. These comments are divided into four parts corresponding roughly to the activities supervised by the four General Staff Sections.

Section 1 - Personnel Matters

a. Replacements: During the Division's first month in combat, the first group of replacements was received in the vicinity of Perier, France. This group, made up of 22 enlisted men, was picked up at the 3d Replacement Depot, requiring a round trip of 100 miles.

Groups of 50 or more picked up during the month, and the total for August, were as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
15 Aug, Vicinity of Lees, France	6	180
22 Aug, Vicinity of Les Bossus, France	14	141
23 Aug, Vicinity of Les Bossus, France	7	175
27 Aug, Vicinity of Thoiry, France	3	147
Total received during August	37 (Repls) 7 (RTD's)	622 (Repls) 85 (RTD's)

All groups picked up required long trips back to Replacement Depots. For example, at Les Bossus, a 300 mile round trip was required.

All replacements were received under combat conditions. The units to which they were to go were constantly in action or on the march. Immediately upon pick-up of replacements, a roster was made and checked. They were then placed in charge of a billeting NCO working under the direction of the Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company Division Trains and the Division Classification Officer. The replacements were quartered and rationed with Headquarters Company, Division Trains, and remained with that unit during processing and classification and until forwarded to their assigned units.

Included in this period was an Ordnance check of personal weapons and ammunition as well as checks by the Quartermaster of personal equipment and medical check for questionable or limited assignment personnel. Further, a brief orientation talk was given by the Classification Officer. A resume of the tactical situation by the Commanding Officer, Division Trains was given and, whenever time permitted, a brief history of the Division from its activation to date. Also included were talks which included new APO, allotments and insurance. Every effort was made to make the men feel they had finally found their permanent home.

Throughout this period assignments were being made by the Classification Section. They were based on qualifications, personal interview and unit requisitions and needs. Upon completion of assignments a final check was made and the replacements were then ready for shipment.

Units were notified of the number assigned to them and when they would be available. Usually, direct contact was made with units concerned. When this was impracticable because of lack of communications, the information was relayed thru the Combat Commands. Replacements were then picked up by or shipped to the units.

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, HQ 5th Armored Div., 1944)

No replacements were moved from Headquarters Company, Division Trains without clearance from unit to which assigned. Thus, units had a supply of replacements moving to them, but only at such times as they were in a position to receive them.

Difficulties have been encountered in several instances, namely:

(1) Replacement Battalions were at first not cognizant of the type of personnel needed by an Armored Division and did not carry the stockage required. This was remedied by personal interviews between Division and Army and later with the Replacement Depot or Battalion Classification Officers.

(2) Much checking was necessary to track down non-receipt of replacements who were on order to the Division. The usual result was a long trip to pick up the missing replacements.

(3) While Division was on the march or in action, transportation of replacements obtained but not sent out to the units, from old Trains area to new Trains area, presented a transportation problem which was usually overcome by shuttling.

(4) Replacements were received in some cases over-equipped and in others with less than required equipment. This condition was remedied by personal contact with the Replacement Battalions. Very few RPD's were received in August.

(5) By making almost daily requisitions it was intended that a steady stream of replacements be maintained, consisting of groups small enough that transportation problems could be reduced to a minimum; processing and assigning made easier; and absorption of the replacements by the units greatly simplified.

b. Graves Registration and Burial: Despite the nature of the Division's mission during August and the speed with which it moved, practically all men killed in action were evacuated for burial in the Army Cemetery. Of more than 100 killed in action, all but four were evacuated and for these, though interred by hasty burial, it was found possible to accurately mark the location of the graves and insure the identification of the soldiers buried so that later removal for burial in the Army Cemetery was possible. In only ten cases was the tactical situation such that it forced the abandonment of men killed in action.

Positive identification was made of killed in action by the presence of identification tags or Soldier's Individual Pay Record Card. In their absence, unit commanders were required to submit certificates of identification. Except for this one requirement the units were relieved of all administrative requirements. Final checks were made against the Battle Casualty Reports and Admission and Disposition Reports.

The primary difficulty encountered was lack of transportation. Despite the commands being either constantly in action or on the march, and with all units having sustained vehicular losses, it is felt that this difficulty was overcome by the wholehearted efforts of all concerned. The extremely small number of hasty burials clearly evidences the determination of every unit to never abandon its dead.

c. Decorations and Awards: During the first month of operations--August 1944; 2 Distinguished Service Crosses, 11 Silver Star Medals and 51 Bronze Star Medals were awarded for extraordinary heroism, gallantry in action or outstanding achievement.

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div cont'd)

During the two months that followed many recommendations from Division units were received and approved for acts that had occurred during August. These had been delayed because of the constant combat in which the Division was engaged. In appraising the decorations won by the Division during this month it is, therefore, necessary to survey the combat period for not only this month but for September as well, toward the end of which action had slackened to the point where many decorations won during August were recommended and awarded in September and October.

d. Prisoners of War: The securing and evacuation of Prisoners of War by an armored division is a problem that for its solution depends upon the availability of sufficient personnel and transportation. During August 1944 neither was available to the extent required. In that month more than 3000 prisoners were evacuated. The number captured by the Division alone, based upon a head count at the many Prisoner of War Cages, was 2,960. To this must be added many sent by the various units to Prisoner of War Cages other than those of the Division. The rapid advance of the Division required that many cages be established; the long marches meant evacuation back over correspondingly long distances. The problem was met by keeping available, in the Division Headquarters Forward Echelon, sufficient Military Police to at once establish a cage as the necessity arose; and at the same time closing the cage to the rear and leap-frogging the personnel forward to take over and release the Military Police for the establishment of the next cage. The highly mobile nature of the Division operations made traffic control largely unnecessary. Had this not been true it would have been necessary to employ combat troops in the guarding and evacuation of Prisoners of War.

In only one case was it necessary to turn over prisoners to the French Resistance. This occurred when approximately 500 were taken at the same time that orders for the Division to move were received. When the turn-over was made explicit instructions were given to the French as to the treatment to be given the prisoners and arrangements were made for another unit to take over and evacuate these prisoners.

e. Civil Affairs: The highly mobile operations of the Division during August 1944 made a great deal of activity by the Civil Affairs Section not only largely unnecessary but, in most cases, impracticable.

The system set-up by higher Headquarters whereby a Detachment was made available to take over a community, remaining behind as the Division moved on, worked very well.

No evacuation of civilians was necessary; nor did they constitute any problem in impeding progress by using roads on which the Division was moving. Occasionally the enthusiastic crowds in cities and towns which welcomed the Division's advance boiled over the sidewalks and into the streets. When necessary the Civil Affairs officers obtained the cooperation of municipal authorities to prevent injury to the civilians from our moving vehicles.

Occasionally duties involving civilians arose which Civil Affairs was particularly well adapted to handle. An example occurred in the vicinity of Raudin when a large load of gasoline had to be dumped and the tactical situation made it inadvisable to use combat troops to guard it. Free French to the number of about 20 were secured, armed and instructed thru the efforts of our Civil Affairs Officers.



Food stuffs, clothing, medical supplies and the like were frequently located by Civil Affairs Section in areas the Division had liberated and arrangements made for guarding and distributing them.

In every case where local conditions warranted and where the Division remained long enough to make it possible, the circulation of civilians was regulated and curfews put in effect. Local municipal authorities were found to be fully cooperative.

f. Religious and Special Service Activities:

(1) Religious. During the month of August despite the rapidity with which the Division moved, the spiritual welfare as well as the entertainment of the men was met to the full extent permitted by the tactical situation. Division Chaplains made approximately 700 visits with the sick and wounded; conducted 2800 communions and more than 1000 confessions; and held 150 services.

(2) Special Service. Two "live" shows and about 20 moving pictures were shown during August. Stars and Stripes was distributed throughout command on an average of every other day, on a ratio of one for each four men. Yank Magazine proved more difficult to secure but sufficient copies were obtained for circulation throughout the Division.

Gratuitous PX rations first received in the Marshalling Area were continued on the Continent; but due to transportation problems distribution was somewhat below the average that was originally established for each man. This was particularly felt by the men, first, in so far as cigarettes were concerned and second, candy. The use of 10 and 1 rations partially alleviated the situation.

SECTION II - Intelligence Matters

[It is felt that on the whole, intelligence sections and agencies of the Division functioned very well for their first combat test. It is believed that the considerable emphasis placed on Intelligence Training during the pre-Combat Training of this Division has paid good dividends.] The operation during this period, being as it was, a very rapid pursuit of a fleeing enemy, and with the Division operating far behind enemy lines in enemy territory, it was extremely important that the Division and its units have as accurate and timely information of the enemy as possible. Generally the reporting of enemy information was very good. Practically no detailed information of the enemy was given to the division before it went into the first engagement; and actually at the time very little detailed information was available due to the rapid break-through which had been made. Soon after contact was established, and generally thereafter, the Division was able to keep a fairly accurate picture of the enemy. Much of the credit for this can be given to Commanders and unit S-2's who were aggressive in obtaining information. All of S-2's had been in the position for a period of at least 5 months before the action started; and were trained in their duties and had to some degree been able to indoctrinate their units with the importance of timely and accurate reporting of information. It is believed also that the repeated emphasis placed on Intelligence Training by the Division Commander had imbued unit commanders and through them other officers and men of the Division with the importance of reporting information. The information obtained from Reconnaissance was generally good.]

The reporting of information by all units of the command was generally good. Although at times confused messages were received, it is felt that the resultant writing

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy - August 1944, by The Division)

program by which every man in this Division was required to write messages, worth while and paid dividends. It is believed every man, before entering combat should be required to write at least one message describing some actual happenings. This would do much to eliminate confused messages.

PWs proved to be a very fruitful source of information. If there is one thing in which the German army has failed, it is in the giving of security training to its soldiers. Throughout the period approximately 4,325 PWs were taken. Out of this total number hardly a single one refused to talk and generally the information given by them was accurate and reliable if properly evaluated. PW interrogators were kept forward with the combat units so that interrogation could be made on the spot and information was obtained quickly in this way. In some instances interrogators travelled with Reconnaissance units. Generally the practice of keeping a trained interrogator and 2 assistants at each Major Command engaged works out very satisfactorily. (Note: PW documents proved to be a very valuable source of information, although they were frequently inadequately marked as to time, place, etc.).

French civilians also proved very excellent sources of information, although many reports received from civilians were greatly exaggerated. Properly evaluated, however, these civilian reports often gave warning of enemy which saved many lives and much equipment. Several French Officers, French Combat Volunteers and all interrogation of civilians gathered much valuable and timely information.

It is believed that there should be at least one person, who speaks the language of the particular section in which the fighting is occurring, with each Battalion. It is well worth any effort it takes to get them.

During this period the map supply was totally inadequate and for the first week the Division operated on limited supply of ungridded road maps, which made accurate reporting difficult. Throughout the whole period no adequate supply of maps was furnished, and supply received often were maps of areas over which we had already passed.

*Amat* Considerable information was obtained from fighter-bomber planes, but it is not felt that this source of information was fully exploited. Perhaps the most disappointing failure of information was from Tactical Air Reconnaissance, which, it is thought, should have proved a very valuable source of information in an operation of this kind. Actually, during the period practically no information was received from Tactical Air Reconnaissance, and although repeated requests were made, it was not possible to obtain information from this source or to obtain an answer as to whether requested missions would be flown.

The movement during this period was so fast that little information was obtained from aerial photography since it was not possible to obtain photographs to keep up with the movement.

Communication with Corps was inadequate. Telephone was often impossible and frequently the necessary radio link to span the distance between Corps and Division was not advanced far enough forward. At times this resulted in poor dissemination of information both to and from Corps.

During this month this Division was in actual contact with sizeable elements of 22 different divisions. The Division was also in contact with 28 additional various

casual units. During the day of 17 August 1944 in the vicinity of Le Mans, PWs from 27 different divisions and numerous other casual units were identified. The enemy's lack of communication and lack of knowledge of the situation of their forces apparently added greatly to their downfall. The known damage done to the enemy during the period is listed below. Much additional equipment was certainly destroyed but not reported.

VEHICLES (Destroyed)

1201 Tanks  
8 Armored Cars  
384 Motor Vehicles

VEHICLES (Captured)

36 Tanks  
3 Ambulances

AIRPLANES (Captured)

8

ARTILLERY

20 SP Guns  
72 Arty Pieces  
59 Infantry Weapons  
18 Arty Pieces (Captured)  
Enemy Killed 2,811  
Enemy Captured 4,325

Section III - Operations

During the month of August 1944 this Division covered well over 1000 miles; it moved rapidly and both day and night. This rapid advance brought out the following points:

(1) An armored division, if given a mission of reaching a certain distant objective deep within enemy-held territory, should not attempt to clean out every obstacle in its path, but should by-pass and proceed. After reaching its objective, then should it act to destroy and cripple enemy personnel and installations. If an armored column on an exploitation mission attempts to mop-up every town and every patch of woods that contain enemy, it will never reach its objective. Main routes should be avoided, the enemy, it was found, invariably defends these routes. Secondary routes, circuitous though they may be, are far better. The enemy cannot be strong everywhere.

(2) When an armored column meets strong enemy resistance at night, it is far better to wait for daylight. Enemy infantry with bazookas can get in close to tanks in darkness.

(3) For tanks to attempt to fight in heavy woods against an enemy who is prepared to defend that wood, is suicide. Tanks must be able to maneuver and must be able to see what they are fighting.

(4) This division utilizes a system which it knows as the "married formation". The armored infantry platoons are married to the tank platoons; they live

(Letter, Reports After Act. Against Enemy - August 1944, 1st Army Div. 1944)

together and fight together. The tanks provide the armor and fire protection for the infantry; the infantry provide security for the tanks against such things as machine guns, bazookas, grenades, etc. and mop up what the tanks over-run. This system has proven very successful, particularly in the close country found in central Europe, as compared to the desert. It must be added that this marrying process does not in any way preclude the separate use of the infantry when the situation so demands. Further, the addition, to each tank platoon, of two squads of armored infantry as an integral part of the tank platoon, has already been recommended. This would provide protection for the tanks without tying up the normal armored infantry battalions.

(5) When an infantry Division, motorized or smuttled, follows an Armored Division thru enemy territory, it must be remembered that: (1) The armor is usually having to advance by fighting against enemy delaying forces which are bound to slow down the advance, and (2) Infantry, moving in trucks at speeds up to 30 m.p.h. over roads already opened up by the armor, is bound to be held up by the armored columns. There must, therefore, be some time interval allowed, or the armor and infantry must be given objectives far enough apart in depth to offset this difference in speed of movement forward and to permit the armor to "tuck-up its tail". It may be added that this division at least partially solved the problem of a "long tail", by adopting the procedure of "coiling-up" into fields, off the roads whenever forward movement was halted for any appreciable time.

(6) In a rapid advance such as experienced by this Division during August 1944, it was found that reconnaissance in front of armored columns must be done by light fast vehicles such as the Truck, 1 ton. If reconnaissance elements attempt to "slug it out" they lose their value and hold up the following armored columns. A mission to a reconnaissance element should give the element an objective to reach and upon which to report, not simply a route to be reconnoitered. Reconnaissance, if expected to furnish information should not be used as an advance guard.

#### Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters

Third echelon maintenance functioned quite satisfactorily during the month by having one maintenance company support each of the Combat Commands. A forward detachment of 40-50 men of the automotive repair, parts and recovery sections operated with the combat trains while the remainder of the company operated from the Division Trains area. This forward detachment was able to make "on the spot" repairs and adjustments, including engine replacements, to keep a maximum number of vehicles in condition for combat. Liaison was maintained at all times between forward detachment and the parent company.

The need for a larger reconnaissance section in Division Trains Headquarters was brought out in the operations. The Division passed rapidly through enemy held territory without mopping up and many disorganized groups of the enemy were encountered by the rear elements as they trailed at variable distances behind the combat elements. Bivouac areas had to be cleared of such groups before they could be occupied. As at present constituted the reconnaissance platoon of Train Headquarters Company is not large enough to effect reconnaissance on multiple routes of advance.

Liaison between G-4 and the QM Section was maintained by having the Division QM or the Assistant Division QM in the forward echelon. The QM officer made a daily trip to the C1 I and III supply point and returned to the forward echelon each evening. The Division C1 II section was established at the C1 I-III Trkhd serving the Division and moved with the Trkhd. Thus all QM supplies were picked up at one place.

Ordnance liaison was maintained by using an officer of Hq Co of the 3rd Maint Bn as liaison between G-4 and the Battalion.

Considering the type of operations involved, supply, maintenance and evacuation present no major problems.

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(Letter, Reports After Action Against Enemy, August 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div cont'd)

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

6 Incls:

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal
- Incl 6 - G-2 Overlay

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## REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

SEPTEMBER 1944

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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#### 5 Incls:

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal
- Incl 6 - G-2 Overlays

Co. No. 1

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:Auth: CG 5th Armd Div.  
:Initials: *clt*  
:Date: 28 Nov 44  
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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

319.1 GWFJG

28 November 1944.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - SEPTEMBER 1944

1. CAMPAIGN: Western Europe.

2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

a. Personnel

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EN</u>
Killed in Action	5	129	135
Seriously Wounded in Action	3	80	83
Lightly Wounded in Action	37	435	472
Seriously Injured in Action		2	2
Lightly Injured in Action	7	71	78
Missing in Action	1	11	12
Total	<u>55</u>	<u>737</u>	<u>792</u>

b. Vehicular:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
Car, Armored, Light M3	2	1
Carr., Mtr, 105mm How., M7	1	
Carrier, Pers, M/T, M3 & M3A1	18	3
Tank, Light M5A1	6	0
Tank, Med, M4, M4A1, M4A3, w/75	10	4
Tank, Med, M4A3 w/76	1	3
Tank, Med, M4 w/105mm How		1
Trailer, 2mm, M10	7	
Truck, 1/4 ton, 4x4	25	3
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo	12	6
Trailer, 1 ton, Cargo	16	2
Ambulance, 3/4 ton, 4x4	1	
Truck, Trailer, 40 ton, Trk Brns	25	1
Truck, wrecking, 10 ton, M1		1
Truck, 3/4 ton, 4x4 W/C w/winch	1	
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, Dump, w/winch		1
Total	<u>100</u>	<u>32</u>

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Lost due to Enemy Action</u>
Carbine	18324	900
Cal. .30	633713	300250
Cal. .45	26840	17140
Cal. .50	63580	10138

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60mm	2014	
81mm	3332	
37mm	1018	1030
57mm	131	
75mm gun	5823	1080
75mm How	3359	62
76mm	951	71
3" gun	1210	
105mm How	45694	244
155mm How	2039	
155mm gun	2989	
Grenade, Hand	4776	1726
Grenade, Rifle	460	
Rocket, AT	443	150
Signals	43	
Mines, AT		
Pots, Smoke	150	
Total Ammunition	1792.16	42.05

## 4. COMMANDERS:

On 1 September 1944 units of the Division were commanded by the following named officers:

5th Armd Div - MAJ GEN LE SPORD L OLIVER, 00536, USA  
 Combat Command "A", 5th Armd Div - MAJ GEN EUGENE REGNIER, 00205, USA  
 Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT EARL W ROTH, 01010740, INF  
 Combat Command "B", 5th Armd Div - COL JOHN T COLE, 00258, CIV  
 Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOHN W FERRY, 0112397, INF  
 5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J FINE, 0-490, FA  
 Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Armd Div Arty - CAPT FORREST W CUSICK, 0460727, FA  
 Reserve Command, 5th Armd Div - COL GLEN F ANDERSON, 08032, INF  
 Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY E GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
 Hq 5th Armd Div Pn - COL GUSTIN F WILSON, 011512, INF  
 Hq Co, 5th Armd Div Pn - CAPT JAMES R MITCHELL, 01011081, CIV  
 IF Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T WILSON, 0335298, CIV  
 145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLEN L WILDE, 0403447, SC  
 85th Cav Rec Sq Mecz - MAJ JOHN P GRAID, 023009, CIV  
 10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A. HANEY, 000163, INF  
 34th Tank Bn - MAJ GLEN L FOOTE, 0400436, CIV  
 81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0231452, INF  
 10th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL KENNETH P WILSON, 035513, INF  
 10th Armd Inf Bn - MAJ WILLIAM H BURTON, 0330028, INF  
 47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218390, INF  
 10th Armd Pn Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0210201, FA  
 11st Armd Pn Bn - LT COL ISRAEL S. M. S. 023630, FA  
 15th Armd Pn Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEEL, 0023703, FA  
 21st Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESER, 020075, CIV  
 117th Ord Maint Bn - MAJ ROLAND S. 0318138, ORD  
 28th Med Bn, Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN W. 0372370, SC

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5. NARRATIVE.

At 0150, 1 September 1944, CCA with the 47th and 400th Armored EA Bns attached was attached to the 4th Infantry Division. Task Force Burton of CCA was advancing rapidly Northward in the Eastern part of the Corps Sector.

The attack on the town of COMPIEGNE progressed slowly with elements of the 118th Inf Regt, 28th Infantry Division, entering the town at 0138, 1 September. Bridges were destroyed by the enemy here and at other places on the river, but our Engineers rapidly constructed bridges, and the Division pushed on. During the early hours of 1 September a combat team of the 28th Infantry Division was attached to assist CCR to clear the forest in an attack in the direction of CHOISY. Contact between the CT and CCR was made at 0730. At 1115, CCR reported that both columns were moving satisfactorily against minor resistance, and that the infantry was being carried forward on the tanks. At 1400 they were moving into CHOISY and found the bridges there had been blown.

Most of the opposition in the FORET DE COMPIEGNE came from elements of the 47th Infantry Division and the 312th Mobile Battalion. Both the 104th Infantry Regiment of the 47th Infantry Division and the 312th Mobile Battalion suffered very severe losses at the hands of CCR before they withdrew across the AISNE RIVER to the North. The 348th Infantry Division, sharing the defense of the area with the 47th Division, was also driven to the North, but managed to withdraw without heavy losses.

Meanwhile, at 0535, orders for the advance of the Division were received. The mission was to proceed rapidly North to the Corps Objective: COMDE on the Belgian border.

CCB was ordered to cross the river at the earliest possible time and to proceed rapidly North until contact was made with the 4th Infantry Division or elements of CCA, then to follow on their axis. It was presumed that the 4th Division with CCA would effect a crossing to the East, prior to the crossing of the 6th Armored Division at COMPIEGNE and FORT ST. MARCOUS.

The bridge at FORT ST. MARCOUS was completed at 1800 1 September. The left column of CCB crossed at 1800 and advanced steadily with no enemy resistance. The Division CT at this time was about three (3) kilometers South of COMPIEGNE. At 1700, CCR was ordered to make contact with CCB at COMPIEGNE and be prepared to follow the Division troops' column across the bridge and to move North following CCB's route, prepared to move abreast and to the right of CCB following 4th Division elements. The bridge at COMPIEGNE was completed at 1815 and the remainder of CCB started crossing at 1820. The advance was rapid until 2200 when enemy resistance consisting of anti-tank artillery and dug-in infantry with rocket launchers was encountered just North of CHIRY.

By the close of operations at midnight on 1 September, the main body of the enemy was North of NOYON. The enemy was using road blocks, artillery, and mortar fire to impede our advance. Enemy casualties for the day were: killed 100, captured 115. We captured 100 bicycles used by enemy Reconnaissance troops, and 35 motor vehicles, as well as 100 machine guns.

During 2 September, the enemy withdrew rapidly to the North but he was not sufficiently motorized at this time to cut out all his troops and material. At NOYON, however, he fought with determination, using reinforced infantry battalions of the 348th Infantry Division and various elements of other Division to slow down our advance. At 0930, 2 September, the left column of CCB encountered a heavy anti-tank troops and infantry at G.GNY. At 0525, both columns were still advancing slowly against stiff resistance. The right column was approaching NOYON; the left approaching G.GNY.

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The left column had found that bridges over canals were out and a crossing was not found until 0845, after which time the advance of this column was again rapid. The right column cleared NOYON at 0915. The enemy resistance was no longer heavy. Some anti-tank troops and some infantry were encountered. At 2225 the task force of CCB which composed the Combat Command's right column, was in bivouac in vicinity CONDE-sur-EXCAUL. The remainder of the Division was bivouacked off the road to the South with the Division CP in vicinity of IAINC. At 2230 orders were received to halt the advance on the general line LAURELIS - LE CATEAU - CAMBRAI, to await orders and protect the Corps' left flank. At this time however, the Division had already reached the original Corps objective, well north of the line mentioned in the new order. Enemy casualties for the day killed 200; captured 219. We destroyed 21 enemy vehicles and captured two batteries of 105mm howitzers intact. CCA reverted to division control 2 September, and was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of ESNEZ. Lt Col Karl L. Scherer was assigned to the 34th Tank Battalion, on this day, and assumed command. Major Foote remained with the Battalion as Executive Officer.

On 3 September road blocks were established and pockets of resistance were cleared in the vicinity of the BELGIAN border around CONDE, and between that city and VALENCIENNES. BRITISH troops passed to the North during the day, sealing off the German troops in a pocket. All day isolated groups of Germans, some of them already bivouacking in the area when the Division arrived, made frantic efforts to break through the lines but failed. CCA completed its assembly in the vicinity of ESNEZ. Division Trains were moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of HAUTEVILLE. During the day the Division killed 150 enemy and captured 531, its biggest bag of prisoners since 13 August. Fifty enemy motor vehicles were destroyed. Between midnight of 3 September and 0700 of 4 September, the Division captured an additional 179 prisoners who were trying to escape to the East.

Orders were received from Corps for movement of the Division to the Southeast. The Division Commander ordered a move on 4 September to assembly areas in the vicinity of WASIGNY; CCA to march in the right zone, CCR in the left zone of the Division; upon arrival in new cross CCR to be prepared to push reconnaissance to seize and hold crossings of the BAR River; CCB to move by way of CONDE - VALENCIENNES - SOLESMEZ, then to follow Division Headquarters and Division Troops.

While on the march, on the morning of 4 September the Division was ordered not to stop in assembly areas as previously ordered but to push on to the East and secure two crossings of the BAR River and REUSE River in the South portion of the Division Zone. Information was sent to CCA that reports indicated all bridges to have been blown by the enemy and the Combat Command was ordered to secure bridge heads and build bridges. The necessary bridge equipment was attached. CCA was also to make contact with the 4th Infantry Division on the left and elements of the XX Corps on the right. The march continued on schedule. At 1140 CCA reported that the bridge at ORIGNY was out, and that it was building another. At this time CCR had reached LE PONT de PIERRE. The Division CP was at NANAPPES. At 1630, the main body of CCR had reached MEZIERES, and had made contact with Troop "C", 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, which reported all bridges in the vicinity MEZIERES to be blown. The troop was reconnoitering for sites there and at MOHON. A shortage of fuel prevented CCR from making any further advance. At 2345, CCR was attacking (dismounted) with one company of

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Infantry from the high ground East of CHARLEVILLE to remove small arms and machine gun fire from the bridge site at MOHON. Orders were issued for CCR to relieve such units of the VII Corps as were in vicinity of MEZIERES. CCR was halted West of VINDRESSE. The Division CP was at MASSIGNY.

CCR was in contact with enemy throughout the night of 4-5 September and was unable to get a sizeable force across the river until 0300, 5 September. The enemy was forced back by 0600, so that work could continue on the MOHON Bridge site. CCR at this time was reconnoitering the river for suitable crossings.

At 0740 CCR reported heavy resistance from fortified positions; all of its infantry was engaged in trying to keep the bridge site clear. By 1040 the work on the bridge at MOHON was progressing rapidly. The bridge was completed at 1500, and the remainder of the command crossed immediately to the high ground East of MEZIERES. The Division CP moved to the vicinity of MONTIGNY SUR VERCE.

At 2050, CCR had secured a bridge site at MATRILLES and started bridge construction at midnight 5 September. At 0300, 6 September construction was interrupted by an enemy counter-attack. The attack was repulsed and work was resumed on the bridge at 0855 and completed at 1220.

CCR launched its attack at 0800, 6 September in the direction of SEDAN, with axis of advance VIVIER - VRIGNE - ST LEUCES - GIVONNE. At 1015, the advance had carried only about two (2) kilometers, due to enemy road-blocks covered by anti-tank guns, mortars and automatic weapons. This resistance was reduced and the city of SEDAN was taken at 1600. The advance of both CCR and CCR throughout the day was made against a continuous series of road-blocks; CCR progressed about sixteen kilometers, and CCR bivouacked between GIVONNE and V.IGNY. The Reconnaissance Squadron bivouacked at VILLER-GERWAY, and the Division CP was located in the vicinity of NOYERS. Enemy casualties for 6 September were 48 killed and 116 captured. Enemy forces facing our troops here were the 195th and 199th Security Regiments.

At 0100, 7 September, CCR and CCR were informed that the 28th Infantry Division would attack through them early in the day. All roads were cleared for the advance of the 28th Division. Both combat commands were directed to be prepared to attack through the 28th Division on order. This brief halt came at an opportune time for the Division. There had been a shortage of fuel for the past thirty six hours and most gasoline tanks were about empty. At 1350 V Corps stated that the limited supply of gasoline made it necessary to suspend further advance of the 5th Armored Division. The 28th Infantry Division would continue the advance and orders for 8 September would depend on progress made by them on the 7th and on the gasoline supply.

The supply and maintenance situation requires some review and consideration here. Progress thru the FORET DE COPIEGNE had been rather slow and units were therefore able to reconstitute basic loads and partially refill reserves of Class I and III supplies from the Army Truckhead which was located in the vicinity of ERMONTVILLE. The combat units which pushed Northwest

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from the vicinity of COMPIEGNE to the Belgian border Northwest of VALENCIENNES covered a distance of approximately one hundred (100) miles in thirty (30) hours. Several vehicles were destroyed by enemy action during this operation and several others were damaged and required evacuation. No resupply of fuel was available at the Army Truckheads to reconstitute basic loads of Class III supplies. Supply trucks which normally evacuated PWs were waiting back at the Army Truckhead so the evacuation of prisoners became a major problem. In several cases they were left in charge of the PW to be turned over to U. S. Troops who were following. When the Division was shifted to the area Southwest of SEDAN a march of approximately ninety (90) miles was involved. CCA, which had been detached, reverted to Division control very low on gasoline. Many vehicles arrived at the assembly area with empty vehicular tanks. Some tanks had to drop out and await fuel trucks which had been able to draw a very limited amount of gasoline at the Truckhead in the vicinity of SOISSONS. Vehicles which had fallen out due to mechanical trouble or enemy action were scattered along the path taken by the combat elements in the drive to VALENCIENNES. Repair and evacuation crews made "on the spot" repairs in most cases, but were then confronted with the problem of getting sufficient fuel to drive the vehicles through. The cleanup of this area required approximately a week before all vehicles were evacuated or returned. Engine and track replacements were becoming critical.

The supply of gasoline continued to be critical and operations were on a day by day basis dependent upon availability of gasoline and diesel fuel. Corps allocated gasoline to the Division and the breakdown to units of the Division was indicated by Division Headquarters. At one time Division furnished fifty (50) trucks to transport gasoline from the Army Railhead at SOISSONS to the Truckhead in the vicinity of REZIERES. The Truckhead remained in this location until after LUXEMBOURG had been occupied by the Division. The supply line to the combat elements became elongated to such a degree that the more advanced elements were making a turn-around in excess of two hundred (200) miles to pick up their daily supplies.

Replacement engines and tracks for tanks were received in considerable number so that the mechanical and combat efficiency of these vehicles was materially increased. The rapid movement over cobblestone roads had caused abnormal wear on tank tracks. Many radial engines which were replaced had operated in tanks in excess of fifteen hundred (1500) miles.

At 1730, 7 September, orders were received from V Corps for movement of the Division on 8 September. The 85th Cav Ren Sq was attached to the 28th Infantry Division. CCA was to move behind the 28th Infantry Division on axis DOUZY - SACHY - CARIGNAN - FROMY - THOMME LA LONG - SOME THONE - HOUDRIGNY - ST MARP - LATOUR and bivouac in the vicinity of LATOUR. The Division Headquarters would follow CCA to the vicinity of VIRTON; Headquarters Division Artillery would follow Division Headquarters. CCB was to cross the river at PONT MAUGIS, follow Division Artillery and bivouac in vicinity VILLERS LA LOUE. The 22nd Arm Div Engr Bn was ordered to follow CCB and bivouac in the vicinity of the Division Artillery; Division Trains to cross behind the 22d Arm Div Engr Bn at PONT MAUGIS and bivouac in the vicinity THOMME LA LONG. CCR was ordered to move at 1200 behind the 28th Infantry Division on axis VIDMIGNE - VILLERS CERREY - FRACHEVAL - ESCOMBERTS - LESSINCOURT - CHASSE-PIERRE - FLORENVILLE PLE VAOIGNE - TINTIGNY and bivouac vicinity MARIE.

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The move was started by CCA at 0815, 8 September. At 1600, 8 September orders were received from V Corps that the 85th Cav Recon Sq Hecq would be relieved from attachment to the 28th Inf Div at 0815, 8 Sep and that early 9 Sep the 5th Armored Division would pass through the 28th Infantry Division. Orders were issued to CCA to advance on axis VIRTON - AUBANGE - LUXEMBOURG; to CCR to advance on axis IZEL - ST MARIE - ARLON - GUIRSCH - MERSCH; the remainder of the Division to follow route of CCA. The Corps Commander authorized the Commanding General, 5th Armored Division to continue at his discretion to the North - South railroad through the city of LUXEMBOURG and reconnoiter to the German Border. All units of the Division were closed in bivouac by 2300, 8 September and CCA and CCR were prepared to attack early 9 September.

When the advance was resumed on 9 September the enemy resistance had stiffened somewhat. Numerous roadblocks, craters and blown bridges were found in the path of the Division. The first enemy contact was at 1300 by CCA East of FROMY. CCR at this time had reached ELLIE where a ford was used to cross the stream located there. Air support was bombing and strafing in front of both combat command columns.

In front of CCR was a column of horse drawn artillery attempting to escape to Northeast to HARRY LA NEUVE. The resistance in front of CCA was a force of bicyclists and infantry, some vehicles and anti-tank guns. At 1500 CCA had advanced about ten kilometers and CCR was approaching HARRY, engaged with the enemy and progressing slowly. At 1645 CCA was fighting enemy tanks just East of B. SCHLANGE, with more tanks reported coming from LUXEMBOURG. CCR had cleared HARRY and was moving on LOTTERT. The Division CP was located at AUBANGE. The air support was doing magnificent work in front of both columns and the advance continued. At 2200 CCA was still in contact seven (7) kilometers West of the city of LUXEMBOURG and were interdicting main escape routes from the city. CCR was just South of USELDANGE. The city of ARLON was reported as being heavily mined and was by-passed by CCR. The losses of both columns in equipment and personnel for the day were very light. During the day our air support destroyed 12 tanks and 70 other enemy vehicles.

The advance was continued on 10 September and at 0945 the city of LUXEMBOURG was taken by CCA. At 1000 the Division Commander escorted Prince Felix of LUXEMBOURG into the city. At 1100 CCA reached the town of MERSCH after a brisk two and a half hour fight against AT guns. The bridge was blown as CCR column approached. The railroad bridge at MERSCH was wired but not blown. CCR removed demolitions and floored the bridge for use in crossing. It also used a ford one mile North of the town and was crossing there at 1350 against slight resistance. CCA captured intact the bridge leading from the city of LUXEMBOURG and was proceeding against moderate resistance at 1435. CCB was ordered to move on a route between CCA and CCR to assembly area in vicinity of ERMSDORF. Moving as ordered it found bridges out at STIENSEL and LOPSTAL, used fords to cross, and was advancing slowly against undefended road blocks at 1600. At 2230 one column of CCA was one and one half kilometers West of RAMELDANGE. The other column was four kilometers East of LUXEMBOURG. CCB was at ELASCHETTE, CCR was at SCHRONDWILLER, all meeting scattered resistance. At 2340 CCA reported that it was heavily

engaged with an infantry force that had adequate large and small mortars, artillery, and tank support. The Combat Command had been reduced in strength by a task force which had been left to protect the city of LUXEMBOURG. On this date 255 enemy were killed and 180 captured, while the Air Force continued its successful bombing of enemy vehicles, destroying 11 tanks, and about 70 miscellaneous vehicles.

The advance continued on 11 September, CCA advancing against determined resistance. CCB was ordered to proceed to assembly area in the vicinity of SCHLINDER and to push reconnaissance to the German border. The move was made without any enemy contact and the first patrol crossed the German border at STALZENBURG, North of VIANDEN, 1815, 11 September. CCR was assembled in the vicinity of BRUCHERHOF. CCA at 1900 was given a special mission of sending a light, fast force to seize the radio station at JUNGLINSTER. At 2235 instructions were received from V Corps that the 112th Infantry Regiment was attached to the Division; that the Division's primary mission was to clean up enemy pockets of resistance in the LUXEMBOURG area and to hold the area secure. The 85th Cav Recon Sq (Less A, B, and C Troops), was moved to LUXEMBOURG to relieve the task force of CCA, to protect the city, and to patrol the Division South boundary to the East to the MOSELLE River. At 2100, CCA having fought against heavy enemy resistance all day, had reached a point about three kilometers West of MUMSBACH.

At 2400, 11 September, the Division's troops were in a general North-West - Southeast line from point along the OUR River South of RODERSHAUSEN to a point South of GREVINGBERG on the MOSELLE River.

At 0850, 12 September, CCA reported that the radio station at JUNGLINSTER had been seized intact. The 112th Inf Regt was ordered to relieve the detachment of CCA at JUNGLINSTER and to protect the radio station, the remainder of the regiment being assembled in the vicinity of OBERNIEVEN. The enemy resistance in CCA's sector on 12 September was mostly roadblocks and delaying actions. By 2300 the command was in an assembly area in the vicinity of LITTEG. CCB and CCR continued to clear areas and with the 112th Inf Regt to patrol the Southern boundary of the Division from LUXEMBOURG, East to the German border.

A demonstration against enemy fortifications of the SIEGFRIED LINE with tank, tank destroyer and artillery fire was ordered by Corps and was carried out beginning at 1500, 13 September. Firing was coordinated by the Division Artillery Command. Orders were received for CCB to prepare to move North on two hours notice on Corps order. Patrolling as well as the demonstration activities was carried on throughout 13 September. Patrols in CCA's sector were meeting roadblocks and enemy resistance in the vicinity of GREVINGBERG. There was some resistance to the North across the entire sector. CCR delivered direct tank and artillery fire on enemy pill boxes between AELDINGEN and GLETTINGEN. No enemy fire was returned. At 1925, orders were received directing the Division to take V Corps Objective Number 3 (high ground in vicinity of METTENDORF) and Number 6 (BITBURG). CCA with one battalion of infantry attached was to continue to protect the city of LUXEMBOURG and the South (Right) flank of the Division; CCB was to continue present mission and was alerted for movement on Corps order; 85th Cav Recon Sq Mocz was to remain in present mission. The Division Engineer was ordered to furnish CCR such

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engineer equipment and material as were available and needed, to make an attack. Patrol activities continued during the night of 13-14 September. Enemy was contacted along the entire line. The 112th Inf Regt reported that the road between HUNDEN and EDINGEN was mined by the enemy with electric mines and that the town of ECHTERNACH was still held by enemy. The 112th Inf Regt was prepared to repel any counterattack from the South or East.

The First Battalion of the 112th Infantry Regiment joined CCR at 1200, 14 September, and CCR attacked promptly, crossing the border near WALLENDORF, where the OUR River and the SAUER River join, and the boundary becomes the SAUER River. At 1330 CCR reported enemy resistance as mostly automatic fire. Our artillery fired white phosphorus on pillboxes and dugouts on the forward slope of the hill and brought the enemy out in the open and under our machine gun fire. Company B, 47th Armd Inf Bn with one platoon of tanks attached, proceeded to clear out the town of WALLENDORF and to take the high ground beyond. At 1545, the 1st Bn 112th Inf Regt was clearing out remaining enemy resistance in WALLENDORF and the high ground to East of town had been taken by the tanks and armored infantry. At this time a force of CCA was in contact with enemy bicycle troops at MOSDORF and was attempting to enter Germany at that point. The advance of CCR was steady and at 1825 the bulk of its force was across the river and on the high ground East of WALLENDORF with a tank destroyer force on each side of the town and a force of the 112th Inf Regt pushing North up the valley. The resistance in front of CCR was heavy and obscured by smoke. CCA reported at this time that the enemy was infiltrating bicycle troops across the river and that none of their patrols had been able to cross into Germany. At 1820, CCR reported that it was having the greatest difficulty in getting off the ridge toward BIESDORF, that the Valley beyond was strongly held. It should be noted that during the entire operation within Germany in the WALLENDORF area, the enemy at all times had the advantage of observation. Had continuous advance been permitted, this advantage would have been overcome. The 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt reported anti-tank guns in the valley. CCR was blowing up and burning block houses, many of which were inter-connected by tunnels. At 2230, the 112th Inf Regt was ordered to relieve CCA at daylight, 15 September, in the Southern sector and to take over the entire sector. CCA was ordered to assemble in the vicinity of COLBET. Both CCA and 112th Inf Regt were to prevent all civilian traffic to and from Germany. CCA attempted to push a patrol into Germany at METZDORF. The patrol was met by small arms, mortar and artillery fire, and forced to withdraw. Enemy casualties: 12 killed, 67 captured.

CCR resumed the attack at 0800, 15 September. Visibility was very poor. Some enemy tanks had moved into its front during the night and at 1000 it was advancing against heavy resistance which consisted of enemy tanks and some 88mm guns. At 1110 the Commanding Officer, CCR, reported that his right column was moving into HOMERDINGEN, his left column was still heavily engaged with enemy tanks. The 1st Bn, 112th Inf, was in BIESDORF at 1240. At 1515, CCR was on objective #3 and had forces clearing out the enemy between HOMERDINGEN and CRUCHTEN.

At 1530 the 112th Infantry Regiment reported it had crossed a six man patrol into GERMANY at one kilometer South of WALTERBACH; that at 1100, 14 September, the patrol had crossed an enemy foot bridge and penetrated about

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five hundred yards; only contact was a few enemy who fled. The patrol recrossed the foot bridge at 0630, 15 September, and received machine gun fire from the west bank of river. CCA reported reconnaissance patrols across the river at BOLLENDORF and at one kilometer North of ECHTERNACH at 1440, 15 September. At 1700, CCA closed in new area around COLETT. At 1740 CCR's forward elements were in ENZEN and the enemy was withdrawing to the North in front of the force on Hill 407. The axis of advance for the right column was ENZEN - STOCKEM - BETTINGEN. The head of this column was entering STOCKEM at 1800 and at 1900 were just South of BETTINGEN, receiving heavy artillery fire at this point. At 2100 the 112th Inf Regt had effected its move into the sector of and relief of CCA. Its 3rd Bn was in position to the East of LUXEMBOURG and the 2d Battalion and Regimental CP in the vicinity of BROUCH. At 2300, CCR was stopped by darkness at BETTINGEN. At 2310, 15 September orders were received from V Corps to secure objectives #5 and #6 and advance North on PRUM and PRONSFELD, that CCB was released to Division control for this mission, and that CCA was to take over protection of the entire Duchy of LUXEMBOURG. CCR was ordered to continue its mission and to "tuck up" the tail of its column so that CCB would be able to cross the river. During the night enemy patrols worked into the ford in the vicinity of WALLENDORF and caused much trouble. They were cleared out at daylight 16 September. Enemy casualties for 15 September: killed, 127; captured, 441.

At 0135, 16 September CCA reported that enemy anti-tank guns firing from stone retaining walls on the East bank of the river had knocked out three tanks at 1000 yard range. Patrols reported that the enemy line across their entire front was heavily defended by infantry with many machine guns and supported by anti-tank guns. The East bank of the river was occupied by dug-in infantry and the attitude of the enemy indicated they were on full alert for an attack by our forces. CCR continued its advance on 16 September; visibility was about fifty yards. CCB was ordered at 0930 to move the head of its column just North of REISDORF, prepared to cross the river. At 1015 CCR reported that enemy tanks had moved into the area Southeast of NIEDERSGEGEN and were holding up the movement of its artillery and trains. CCB was ordered to send a force to help relieve CCR's rear elements. At 1500 CCR was still up against heavy enemy resistance and had made no advance during the day. At 2145, CCR reported that the enemy was counter-attacking five hundred yards Southeast of WETTLINGEN. The 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt was dug in at WETTLINGEN. The right tank column was at FREILINGEN and the attached 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion was at ENZEN. At this time CCB was closed in an area South of HOERDIGEN with a force engaged in clearing out NIEDERSGEGEN. At 2250 orders were received from V Corps to consolidate the Division forces on objective #3; to send strong patrols to develop the enemy situation in the BITHURG area; to mop up the SIEGFRIED LINE to the West and Southwest; to make no attack on BITHURG except on Corps order; CCA to move South with CP in vicinity of BEIDWILLER and to maintain a mobile force to attack any threat to the Corps South flank of the city of LUXEMBOURG. During the course of the afternoon and night 16 September, CCR repulsed three enemy counterattacks and was under continuous enemy artillery fire. The Division captured 212 prisoners during the day.

At 0645, 17 September, the roadblocks of CCB at the ford in the vicinity of WALLENDORF were receiving enemy machine gun and mortar fire. At 0745 CCR

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reported that its artillery was firing on enemy tanks to the Northeast; that the 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt was receiving enemy machine gun and artillery fire Northeast of WETTLINGEN; that the right tank column was fighting in the vicinity of STOCKEM; that artillery fire was coming from the North, Northeast and East and enemy tanks were to the Northeast and East. At 0830 CCR reported the fifth enemy counterattack repulsed, that a total of eight enemy tanks were knocked out, and that a company of tanks was assisting the 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt, to counterattack the enemy. The enemy attacks were supported by at least forty tanks. The counterattacks continued throughout the morning of 17 September and at 1230, CCR withdrew the 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt, to a position East of STOCKEM. The Battalion had had heavy casualties from enemy artillery fire with only small ground pressure on them at that time. At 1425 CCR reported that the general enemy movement seemed to be from North to South and from East to West. An enemy attack from North and East had been repelled with fourteen enemy tanks destroyed. Visibility at this time was about six hundred yards. At 1600 orders were received from V Corps for operations 18 September. The Division was to patrol toward the PITSBURG area, to continue cleaning up the DIERFRIED LINE to South and Southwest; CCA to keep close touch with the situation in the LUXEMBURG area and be prepared to act promptly in the event of a threat there. At 1700, CCB reported a force in the woods North of AMELDINGEN, that the enemy was again at the ford South of AMELDINGEN and that a platoon had been sent to clear them out. The CO, CCB, was planning to cease operations for the day because of low visibility and heavy mud. Tank mobility was being greatly hampered by mud. At 1800 CCR reported the 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt, digging in on high ground West of STOCKEM. At 1915 CCA reported that enemy was holding bridgeheads at ECHTERNACH, WASSERBILIG and GREVENMÄCHER with dug-in infantry, light machine guns, light and heavy mortars and artillery. At 2000 CCB reported all operations were mired down and that each group had been ordered to defend in place; that all elements were under enemy artillery fire. At 2200 CCR reported its forces on a line from seven hundred yards South of STOCKEM to the North side of Hill 407; that the 112th Inf Regt was receiving artillery time fire and that some artillery fire was falling over most of the area.

By night of 17 September our bridgehead had reached its greatest size. It was the approximate shape of a horseshoe and extended from a point South of GUTTINGEN on the East Bank of river, South of HUTTINGEN - METTENDORF, Southeast towards STOCKEM to where CCR had been forced back from BETTINGEN, then Southwest back to the SAUER RIVER at a point about halfway between WÄLLENDORF and BOLLENDORF. Its area was about 35 square miles. On this day the Germans lost 326 killed, and 89 prisoners, with 15 tanks and 12 half-tracks destroyed.

By midnight 17 September the ground activity in CCR sector had almost completely stopped and at 1000, 18 September, there still had been no contact with enemy ground troops. However, all units of the command were still under enemy artillery fire.

The Division CP moved to MOSTROFF at 1100, 18 September. A report from CCB at 1200 indicated one column advancing in the direction of GUTTINGEN, and a second column advancing on KORAORICH and HUTTINGEN. The Combat Command was continuing with mopping up and demolition work. Both columns were moving on foot, progress very slow. The enemy had again penetrated to the vicinity

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of the ford during the night and laid some mines, which our troops later cleared. At 1530 CCB reported that increased enemy activity was being encountered and that three tanks had been lost from enemy rocket-launcher fire. CCA was ordered, at 1500, to send one of the other two battalions of the 112th Inf Regt to replace the 1st Bn, then with CCR. The activity of CCR on this date had been limited to the firing of its artillery on enemy in its sector. The 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt, had heavy casualties from enemy artillery fire, and a platoon of Company A, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion had stayed with the infantry to its last round of ammunition in assisting in the withdrawal. At 2125, the enemy artillery fire in CCR sector had slackened considerably. The town of METTENDORF was on fire and found to be more heavily occupied than previously thought.

A report was received from CCA that an estimated battalion of enemy artillery was in position in the vicinity East of GRAVENLACHER, that civilians had been warned that the enemy was to attack through the zone GRAVENLACHER - HORMERDINGE - REMICH. At 0400, 19 September, CCR reported enemy vehicles moving in its sector and placed artillery concentrations on them. Considerable movement of enemy tanks was reported in the vicinity of METTENDORF. At 0740 the positions of CCR were being heavily shelled by enemy artillery. At 0300 the enemy launched a two-pronged tank and infantry attack on CCR, moving Southeast and Southwest from METTENDORF. Eighteen enemy Mark IV tanks are known to have been knocked out by CCR in repelling this attack. At the same time CCB reported enemy working West and Northwest from BLES DORF with continuous light and medium enemy artillery fire coming from East and Northeast. At 0910 CCR reported its CP had moved to HOMERDINGEN to avoid enemy artillery fire. At 1037 CCB reported that BLES DORF was clear of enemy. At 1130 enemy infantry attacked and took the bridge at WALLENDORF but were forced out again and had withdrawn by 1250 to Southeast edge of WALLENDORF. At 1225 CCB was attacked by enemy tanks from the North. CCR was attacked at 1325 from the Northeast by enemy tanks. Both attacks were repulsed. At 1455 the bridge at WALLENDORF was reported secure. Both CCR and CCB were still receiving heavy artillery fire. The 2d Bn, 112th Inf Regt going up to relieve the 1st Bn with CCR had been halted by fire North of BLES DORF. CCB was ordered to send a force to relieve the pressure on them so they could continue. This pressure was neutralized by CCB at 1600. At 1900, orders were received from V Corps for operations for 20 September: To consolidate present bridgehead positions and prepare for offensive action to North, Northeast or South, and continue protection of LUXEMBOURG area. The 1st Bn, 112th Inf Regt, having been relieved from CCR was given the mission of protecting the bridge at WALLENDORF for the night 19-20 September. At 1800 the Commanding Officer, Division Artillery, was ordered to move all artillery to the West of the German border without delay.

At 1830 CCR was ordered to have the 2d Bn, 112th Inf Regt, protect its East flank while the remainder of CCR withdrew west of the frontier to a position South of DIEBIRCH. CCB was ordered to consolidate its position, prepared to follow CCR on 20 September. At 1845 the Commanding Officer, Division Artillery was given a fire line and ordered to lay heavy fire East of the line to cover the withdrawal of CCR. At 2005, orders were received from V Corps that CCB would not be withdrawn West of the German border except on Corps order. At 2145 CCB reported that its position had been established as

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ordered; that B Company, 81st Tank Bn, was heavily engaged by enemy infantry, anti-tank guns and artillery on the outskirts of BIESDORF; that they were sealing off the town and stopping for the night. At 2247, CCB was instructed that it would hold the bridgehead until Corps permitted withdrawal. The 2d Bn, 112th Inf Regt was holding on the road between BIESDORF and WALLENDORF. CCA had continued patrol activities on 19 September with some contact with enemy patrols in its sector.

By 0110, 20 September, all of the artillery of the Division had displaced West of the river. CCR's headquarters was just South of GILSDORF. CCR completed its withdrawal and was closing in assembly area at 0500. During the day the 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th Inf Regt, were attacked by the enemy but held the WALLENDORF bridge under heavy artillery and mortar fire and in close contact with enemy ground troops. CCB continued its pressure North of the bridge. An enemy tank and infantry attack from the North was repulsed. CCA continued its patrol activity, with negative reports. CCA artillery destroyed one armored vehicle and a freight train in the vicinity of GELVENHUCHER. At 1605, a heavy artillery concentration was placed on the hostile forces in BIESDORF, followed by a strafing from planes. At 1900, CCB reported the 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th Inf Regt, were moving into position on the right flank, and that the air support was temporarily neutralizing the enemy. At 1745, orders were received from V Corps for operations 21 September: Continue mission under current orders, maintain and improve all positions, mop up areas and prepare for further advance to the East. At 2130, CCR was ordered to place one tank company in position along the road East of the river and South of WALLENDORF, to prevent movement of enemy along the river. During the night the enemy demolished both the trestle bridge and timber bridge at WALLENDORF and mined approaches on German side.

Lt. Colonel Gils n, Commanding 15th Arm Div Bn was wounded in action and evacuated. Major Garland, Executive Officer, assumed command.

At 0730, 21 September, CCB's tanks were attacked by the enemy with rifle and machine gun fire. Heavy fog prevented observation of enemy activity. At 0815, V Corps ordered aggressive patrolling to be carried out in CCA's sector. At 0900, CCB was heavily shelled by enemy artillery. The enemy pressure in CCB's sector continued to be heavy to about 1500 when it lessened somewhat. The Commanding Officer, CCB, estimated casualties of 30 to 50 percent had been inflicted on the enemy. The area was still under heavy enemy artillery fire at that time. The Division Artillery reported that several enemy artillery batteries had been observed and shelled and that some anti-aircraft guns had been spotted and destroyed. A heavy gun disguised as a house was shelled and bombed by the Air Forces. At 1700, CCB reported twenty enemy tanks crossing the Ford at NIEDERSEGEN. Air support stopped them; one was known to be destroyed. At 1930 CCB was ordered by trapped message to withdraw West of the river, starting at 2130, to move by route WALLENDORF - BIESDORF - BIESDORF - GILSDORF to vicinity INGLEDORF; CCB was ordered to cover the withdrawal of CCB and to maintain forces along the river at WALLENDORF until further orders; the Division Artillery to deliver heavy fire to cover the withdrawal.

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The withdrawal was executed as planned and at 0400, 22 September, CCB had cleared the ford and was going into an assembly area. Throughout the day of 22 September artillery fires were delivered on enemy targets. Air support was also employed. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 112th Inf Regt reverted to and rejoined their regiment with CC. and the Division CP moved to the vicinity of FEIS. CC. continued patrol activity.

The total enemy casualties and material destroyed during operations around the bridgehead across OUR - SAUR RIVERS in German territory from 14 September to the night 21-22 September 1944 is as follows:

	<u>5TH ARMED DIV</u>	<u>9TH U.S. AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
	<u>Enemy Personnel Casualties</u>		
Killed	2,353	150 (est)	2,503
Prisoners	1,213	---	1,213
Totals	3,571	150	3,721
	<u>Enemy Material Destroyed</u>		
Tanks (all types)	45	24	69
All other motor vehicles	50	32	142
Artillery (Incl AA-AT)	42	2	44
Avy Inf Bn, Lt AA	17	-	17
Total	154	118	272

No Air Force damage or casualties are included in any totals for the 5th Armored Division as given in this narrative, other than in the above table.

On 23 September it was planned to move CCR from its position along the river to the vicinity of DIEZELRICH. The enemy at mid-day placed a heavy mortar and artillery concentration on CCR so the plan to withdraw was abandoned and they were ordered to remain in place. At 1815, 23 September, orders were received for operations for 24 September: To continue present assigned missions and to employ sufficient forces across the Division zone to prevent enemy from crossing the border. Instructions were also received that one Combat Team of the 83rd Infantry Division would arrive in an area to the South of the Division on 23 September; that the 83rd Infantry Division would close in this area on 25 September. At 2130, a directive from V Corps ordered aggressive counter measures to be taken at once in CC. sector by patrolling across the river into enemy held territory, and that demonstration artillery fires, and air support as available, be placed on any known enemy targets.

Lt. Colonel Glenn G. Dickenson was assigned to the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, joined, and assumed command on 23 September.

On 24 September CC. made a demonstration before GREVENLACHER. Visibility was poor due to rain. Mud greatly hampered movement. Demonstration activities were discontinued at 1300. Patrol activity in its sector had no enemy contact to this time. Some enemy artillery fire fell in the sector during the day.

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At 0815, 25 September orders received from V Corps stated that when the Second Combat Team of the 83rd Infantry Division had closed in the LUXEMBOURG area the 112th Infantry Regiment would move to rejoin the 28th Infantry Division; that when the entire 83rd Infantry Division had closed in, CCA would be moved North to join the remainder of the Division; that the 5th Armored Division would retain responsibility for the Northern half of the Duchy of LUXEMBOURG. At 0830 CCB was ordered to relieve CCR at the frontier during the day. At 0825 CCA reported it was to take a demonstration in the WASSERBILIG area. One boat load of enemy was sunk by artillery fire while attempting to cross the river near WASSERBILIG. At 1900 the relief of CCR by CCB was completed. CCR was assembled in the vicinity of DIEKIRCH. At 1910 V Corps ordered the Division to maintain sufficient forces along the German border to prevent enemy infiltration into the Corps sector, the 112th Infantry Regiment to be released at daylight, 26 September.

At 1000 26 September the 85th Cav Reg Sq was relieved in the LUXEMBOURG City area. The 112th Inf Regt moved at 1015 to rejoin the 28th Inf Div. At 1245 the 83rd Inf Div had closed in its area and had completely taken over the sector from CCA. At 1505, CCB reported that patrols on its right flank caught six enemy pulling a barge and that the enemy were killed and the barge destroyed; that patrols on its left had caught intermittent enemy patrols of which most had been killed. At 1515 orders were issued to CCA: 85th Cav Reg Sq less C and D Troops attached to CCA at once, CCA to move a light force to the North and take over the sector held by the 102d Cav Group, relief to be effected before dark; boundary between CCA and CCB: SAUER RIVER - BITTENDORF - GENTIGEN; CCA less its light force to move North that day, into assembly area at daylight 27 September in vicinity of CONSTHUM.

The force from CCA completed taking over from the 102d Cav Group at 2200, 26 September. During the day 26 September air support bombed and strafed the area GOLLENDORF - WALLENDORF - AMELDINGEN. V Corps reported at 2100 that one truck had been captured by the enemy in the vicinity of RCDER and that the enemy was constantly infiltrating in that area.

CCA moved at 0800 27 September and closed in area at 1700. The Division Trains moved to ETTLEBRUCK, closed in area at 1800. The only enemy activity during the day was a small amount of artillery fire during the afternoon and some enemy air activity from 2100 to 2400. Information was received from V Corps that elements of VIII Corps would arrive in the area on 29 September.

At 1130, 28 September, a report from Corps stated that there was enemy activity in the town of HOSINGEN, that the 28th Inf Div was evacuating the town. CCA was instructed to coordinate with the 28th Div and clear the area of enemy. At 1130 CCA reported it was in contact with a company of enemy infantry just East of WEILER. At 1135 Division Artillery Headquarters reported enemy at the German pontoon bridge at VIANDEN and enemy troops on the West side of the river. Air support was given the bridge as a target, results not reported. During the afternoon CCA cleared the draw running from the vicinity of DORSCHIED to the vicinity of RODENSHUSEN, reporting area clear at 1800. It reported also that contact with enemy patrols of

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from five to twenty men had been made during the afternoon. At 2220 CCB reported considerable movement of enemy South of WALLENDORF and enemy air activity over the area.

On 29 September there was no contact with the enemy. Artillery concentrations were fired on BOLLENDORF and on enemy vehicles in vicinity of DÄMMEN. At 2000 Field Order number 28 was received from V Corps: The Division, when relieved by elements of VIII Corps, was to assemble in the area around the town of FLYNONVILLE, BELGIUM, prepared to pass through the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions on Corps order and to spearhead the V Corps attack through the SIEGFRIED LINE; upon relief, to move the 85th Cav Ron Sq to the North to relieve Corps Troops in the zone between V Corps' temporary North boundary and VII Corps' permanent South boundary; to screen the assembly of V Corps, maintain contact with VII Corps, and protect V Corps' left flank; the 85th Cav Ron Sq attached to 102d Cavalry Group on arrival in new area.

The only contact with enemy on 30 September was a patrol in CCA sector fifteen to twenty strong. V Corps gave permission for the Division to extend its new assembly area Southwest to the line RECHT - BORN if needed.

Total enemy casualties for the month of September were: killed, 5387; captured 3087; tanks captured and destroyed, 61; motor vehicles captured and destroyed 398; artillery, captured and destroyed, including AAA and AT arty, 138; infantry heavy weapons captured and destroyed, 192. Also captured were 8 airplanes, intact; several hundred reconnaissance bicycles; 1 warehouse, containing miscellaneous air force equipment valued at \$2,000,000.

During the comparatively static situation in LUXEMBOURG, units had had an opportunity to perform maintenance, to evaluate losses, and to salvage personal equipment and clothing.

In the penetration of the SIEGFRIED LINE equipment and material losses were heavier than at any other like period of time in the campaign. Supply and evacuation was difficult due to inability to protect the supply line within German territory. In the previous phases of the campaign it had been necessary for the combat units to keep their combat trains close behind for protection of the trains. This policy resulted in abnormal losses in GELINNY when the trains were subjected to enemy artillery and mortar fire. The withdrawal from GELINNY was accomplished with the evacuation of the majority of the damaged vehicles which were repairable.

After the unit trains had withdrawn from GELINNY CCB found itself cut off and running low of ammunition, gasoline and water. An armored supply train was formed, using half-track personnel carriers from one of the Arm Div Bns to fight its way up to the troops. Supplies were delivered and the combat command was able to withdraw under the cover of darkness.

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For the few remaining days of the month the Division was on a defensive mission which permitted time for an organized plan of inspection and maintenance. The vehicles and personal equipment of the Division were rehabilitated in readiness for continued operations.

On 28 September a convoy of 80 trucks was sent back to NORDENJOY to bring forward duffle bags and baggage. Arrangements were made for subsequent inside storage in the city of LUXEMBOURG.

## 6. COMMENTS.

Following are comments for the month of September 1944.

### Section I - Personnel Matters

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a. Replacements: In general the comments made on August operations are still applicable. The practice of making almost daily requisitions was found to work well and was continued. The Replacement Battalion serving the command was moved closer to it thereby greatly facilitating the receipt of replacements. The quality of replacements, as in the preceding month, ranged from very satisfactory to excellent. Difficulty was still experienced in obtaining certain categories of specialists. Too much time elapsed between requisition and receipt of personnel. This resulted in important positions remaining unfilled over too long a period; and in MOS being converted to meet the requisitions--sometimes without sufficient accuracy. It is appreciated that, this being a question of stockage, it goes back ultimately to training necessary specialists at home in sufficient numbers and of the needed kinds. To the extent that numbers and diversity of specialists available as replacements can be increased, it should be done.

The number of our men returned to duty continued unsatisfactory. The present policy of holding them for 30 days before use as replacements for other units is not enough. It is felt that, even at the expense of rendering the Replacement system less flexible, all men as they become fit for duty, should be returned to their own units. Ordinary time lags and non-battle losses would largely offset overstrength resulting from such a policy. Moreover, if commanders were assured of getting back their own men, the number of men requisitioned would be reduced.

b. Graves Registrations and Burials: Though there was heavy fighting during the month, in only two cases were hasty burials found necessary.

c. Morale and Discipline: The morale and discipline of the command were excellent. Only 15 courts-martial cases were tried throughout the command. AWOL and straggling presented no problem; while the Provost Marshal's reports showed a surprisingly small number of violations of ordinary standing orders such as leaving vehicles unattended, speeding and the like.

d. Special Service: The comments for August 1944 regarding distribution of PX rations, particularly cigarettes, remain applicable. While the difficulties caused by lack of transportation or priorities for movement of gasoline, ammunition, etc., are understood and appreciated, it should be noted that an inadequate supply of cigarettes becomes more serious as a campaign progresses and reserves are used up.



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Section II - Intelligence Matters

1. Observation of German defense against our penetration of Siegfried Line:

a. The German will counter-attack with any force he can collect from a squad up.

b. His counter-attacks were uncoordinated.

c. Any penetration into Germany will be met with all the force the enemy can collect and unless other attacks are made simultaneously to tie down enemy forces, he will bring forces from other sectors of the line.

d. The Siegfried Line in itself, although a strong natural position, is not what it was ballyhooed to be by the Germans. Pill-boxes were not built with gun emplacements or guns of adequate caliber to stop modern tanks. Without strong mobile reserves to attack a penetration (German's original theory of the defense of the line) it will not be too difficult to break. In general the great expenditure of money, material and time the Germans made on the Siegfried Line is as great a waste as the French Maginot Line proved to be.

2. In a fast moving situation it is believed necessary for the Corps to advance a relay radio station in order to maintain contact. Failure to do so results in most undesirable delays in reporting and receiving information.

3. During the month it was possible for the Division to keep a fairly accurate picture of the enemy. This was due to very good reporting upon the part of the units of the Division.

4. The importance of the rapid dissemination of information and the results which can be obtained therefrom were well illustrated by the immediate transmittal, to attack bombers in the air, of information received from a PW, resulting in the destruction of a large quantity of enemy matériel, the killing of a great many personnel and the capture of an entire regiment.

5. Air Reconnaissance continued to be a disappointment, partially because of weather conditions but principally because it was not readily available and communication with the air was too indirect.

6. The presence of hostile civilians in our area of operation was a constant threat to security. Several cases of civilians giving information to the enemy and of enemy soldiers operating in civilian clothes were found. These conditions call for constant vigilance upon the part of all personnel and extreme activity by CIC.

Section III - Operations

Operations of the Division during the time of the initial penetration of the Siegfried Line again indicated that our tactical principles as taught are sound and that violations of these principles are costly. It is quite apparent that the Armored Division is capable of attacking and penetrating a fortified position such as existed at HALLENDORF. However there are several lessons to be learned from that attack.

S E C R E T

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - 3 September 1944, by 3d Arm. Div.)

a. The day before the attack, the Division demonstrated by fire and troop movements in the same general area as the attack area. This, it was understood, was for the purpose of drawing enemy troops from another sector of the front. The result was that when CCR attacked on 14 September, the enemy had troops readily available to counter-attack.

b. The attack of a fortified position, particularly when it involves a river crossing, requires time for planning and coordination. The orders to attack were received by the Division at 1325 on 13 September. It was 2330 before commanders could be assembled and the Division Commander finished giving orders for the attack which was launched at 1200 the next day. The attack succeeded and the Siegfried Line was completely penetrated but only due to the boldness of execution and the comparative thinness of the line in that area. Time for planning for daylight reconnaissance, for coordination and for issuance of orders must be allowed.

c. Even a penetration is made by any force, and particularly when made by an Armored Division, there must be provided other troops, infantry, to hold open the line of communications. The attack force can go forward only just so far as it can be supplied.

d. The choice of location for a penetration of a fortified position must take into consideration many factors. The density of the fortifications is a major factor, but it may be offset by the nature of the terrain on either side of the point of penetration. If the attack is to be only a limited objective operation, ending in a holding of the ground taken, the penetration should not be made at a point where the attacking-holding force will be subject to dominating terrain on both flanks, i.e. a defile. At WALLENDORF, the attack of CCR was stopped by enemy action in its rear, not to its front. The Division had insufficient infantry to hold a long line of communications. When the forward progress of the attack was thus stopped, the two CC's were ordered to consolidate and hold. They were forced to do so in the center and bottom of a "saucer", into which, from all sides, the enemy had excellent observation and poured much artillery fire.

e. The attempt to hold ground with assault troops for a considerable period of time proved very expensive. The large number of stationary vehicles offered an excellent target for the enemy. The percentage of infantry to tanks and other assault weapons is too small to permit them to establish dug-in positions of sufficient strength to protect the whole force for any length of time. Assault forces, when momentum has been lost and securing infantry is not available or soon expected, should immediately be withdrawn.

f. During this operation it was necessary in several instances to use platoons of AAA (AI) for direct fire defensive missions. Such use proved to be very effective. Besides the effective covering of such concentrated fire, the psychological effect was also very successful.

- 19 -  
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - September, 1944, Hq. 1st Army, 1944)

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance

1. Units of an Armored Division must be prepared to form armored supply trains, using light armored vehicles. To carry needed supplies to elements over routes which are under small arms fire. The half track personnel carrier is an excellent vehicle for this purpose.

2. When supply lines were abnormally long much unnecessary travel was saved by maintaining radio communication with the Army Truckhead to keep the units of the Division advised of the status of QM supplies. This was accomplished by setting up a portion of the Division Quartermaster section at the truckhead with a high power radio set (SCR 399) in the Division Administrative Net.

3. Maintenance personnel should do familiarization firing of vehicular weapons of all types of combat vehicles in the Division. Weapons of vehicles undergoing repair are a source of added firepower for defense of service areas. In one case a disabled tank which was being evacuated by Ordnance personnel took under fire and destroyed an enemy artillery piece which was firing on the column.

4. Serviceable enemy artillery pieces and ammunition were left by forward units for following troops to evacuate or destroy. This practice might prove disastrous in an exploitation in enemy territory where by-passed enemy troops are protected by the civilian populace.

5. Unit supply officers should be authorized to carry a small stock of personal clothing and equipment to readily re-equip troops whose equipment is lost in a destroyed vehicle. The tactical situation and lengthy supply lines precluded the re-equipping of some such personnel within a period of a week to ten days.

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

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- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal
- Incl 6 - G-2 Overlays

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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

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: Auth: CG 5th Armd Div :  
: Initials: REW :  
: Date: 14 Dec 44 :  
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319.1 5M:00

14 December 1944.

SUBJECT: August 1944 After Action Report, 5th Armored Division.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

FROM : Commanding General, V Corps, APO 305, U. S. Army.

August 1944 After Action Report, Headquarters 5th Armored Division, forwarded by letter this headquarters, subject: "Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Reports", 19 Nov 44, is amended as follows:

- a. Line forty (40), page twenty (20), as reads: Captured 4325, is amended to read: Captured 2960.
- b. So much of line forty (40), page twenty (20), as reads: tanks captured and destroyed 200, is amended to read: tanks captured and destroyed 203.
- c. Line twenty-one (21), page twenty-six (26), as reads: Enemy captured 4325, is amended to read: Enemy Captured 2960.
- d. That part of line seven (7), page twenty-six (26), as reads: 1201 tanks, is amended to read: 203 tanks.
- e. Line seventeen (17), page twenty-six (26), as reads: 72 Arty pieces, is amended to read: 37 Arty pieces.
- f. So much of line forty-one (41) and forty-two (42), page twenty (20), as reads: Arty pieces captured and destroyed, 121, is amended to read: Arty pieces captured and destroyed, 125.

For the Commanding General:

*[Signature]*  
J. J. DEVALLET,  
Lt. Col., A. G. D.,  
Adjutant General.

319.1

(14 Dec 44)

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS, APO 305, U.S. Army, 18 December 1944.

TO: Commanding General, First U.S. Army, APO 230, U.S. Army

1. Reports referred to in basic communication were transmitted to your headquarters on 23 November 1944.

2. Request amendments as indicated in basic communication be made.

For the Commanding General:

*[Signature]*  
SAM F. TEAGUE, Jr.,  
Major, A.G.D.,  
Asst Adjutant General.

SECRET

2-124

Ltr Hq 5th Armored Division, dated 14 Dec 44, subj: "August 1944 After Action Report".

319.1 (AG/TSC) 2d Ind.  
HEADQUARTERS FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY, APO 830.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, APO 887.

August report of 5th Armored Division was forwarded as Inclosure #1 to letter, this headquarters, dated 24 November 1944.

For the Commanding General:

*RG Senior*

*1w 2cc*

22194

370.2  
319.1 (AG-O) 3rd Ind  
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, 22 December 1944.

TO: Commanding General, ETOUSA, APO 887.



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## REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

OCTOBER 1944

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

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: Auth: CG 5th Arm'd Div :  
: Initials: *CPH* :  
: Date: 2 Dec 44 :  
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2 December 1944.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY, OCTOBER 1944.

1. CAMPAIGN: Western Europe.
2. On 1 October 1944 units of the Division were commanded by the following named officers:

5th Arm'd Div - MAJ GEN LUNSFORD E OLIVER, 03536, USA  
Combat Command "A", 5th Arm'd Div - BRIG GEN EUGENE REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010840, INF  
Combat Command "B", 5th Arm'd Div - COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
5th Arm'd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Arm'd Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0463737, FA  
Reserve Command, 5th Arm'd Div - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632 INF  
Hq Co, 5th Arm'd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Arm'd Div Tn - COL GUSTIN M NELSON, 014512, INF  
Hq Co, 5th Arm'd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BAGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Arm'd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 0335298, CAV  
145th Arm'd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
35th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz - MAJ JOHN P GERALD, 023009, CAV  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0292156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018734, CAV  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0259452, INF  
15th Arm'd Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G DICKINSON, 0197335, CAV  
46th Arm'd Inf Bn - MAJ WILLIAM E BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Arm'd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E ROYER, 0218330, INF  
47th Arm'd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWIG, 0246291, FA  
71st Arm'd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
95th Arm'd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703, FA  
22d Arm'd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGUIEU, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - MAJ ROLAND E BIERSON, 0318269, ORD  
75th Med Bn, Arm'd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BADER, 0372570, MC

3. Battle Casualties for Month of October 1944:

	Officers	EM	Total O & EM
Killed in Action	1	4	5
Seriously Wounded in Action	2	4	6
Lightly Wounded in Action	3	21	24
Seriously Injured in Action	0	0	0
Lightly Injured in Action	0	2	2
Missing in Action	1	1	2
	7	32	39

- 1 -

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(Letter, Report After Action Against Enemy - October 1944, Hq 5th Arm Div)

4. Vehicular Losses:

Three (3) vehicles destroyed by enemy action and nine (9) were evacuated for repair.

Vehicle	Destroyed or Abandoned	Evacuated
TK Truck, Light - M5A1	1	1
TK Truck, Medium		3
Truck, 4 Ton X 4	2	4
Trailer, 1 Ton Cargo		1
	3	9

5. NARRATIVE.

On 1 October units of the Division were patrolling the border between GERMANY and LUXEMBOURG along the West Bank of the SIEGER RIVER from just north of RODERSHUSEN to a point opposite BOLLENDORF. Enemy activity was limited. Artillery fire fell on a road in CCA's sector. An ambulance from CCB was destroyed by an enemy mine on a road North of HOSINGEN. In a succession of small patrol encounters one enemy 6-man patrol was captured intact, and several others were ambushed. Total enemy casualties: killed, 8; captured, 7. The relief of the Division by the 8th Infantry Division was partially affected by evening.

The 8th Infantry Division completed relieving the Division on 2 October. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was detached to Corps control, to assist the 102d Cavalry Group and other Corps units in patrolling the Corps front, which extended from North of MONSIEU generally South to the vicinity of GEROLSTEIN, following the German boundary through the South half of the Corps sector.

On 3 October, CCR, with the 95th Armored FA Battalion in support, and the Division Trains marched North from the Grand Duchy of LUXEMBOURG into BELGIUM. During the day an enemy artillery concentration fell in CCA's area. CCA moved into BELGIUM on 4 October, and the remainder of the Division followed on the 5th. No enemy contact was experienced. The Division CP was located near FAYONVILLE. For this move all unit identification on vehicles was obliterated, and radio silence was imposed. The radio silence continued in effect until 24 October.

On the 6th, Company "D", (light Tank Company) 10th Tank Battalion, was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and moved to the vicinity of BILLINGEN.

Troops A and C, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, were relieved from 102d Cavalry Group and reverted to Division control on 7 October and were attached to Division Trains for the protection of the trains units.

From the 8th to the 23d, the Division, less detached elements, was occupied in maintenance, training, and planning for future operations.

S E C R E T

(Letter, Reports After Action Against the Enemy - October 1944, Hq 5th Army)

On 11 October, CCA passed to the control of First Army and moved to the XIX Corps sector in the vicinity of EYNATTEN, in Army Reserve.

On 14 October, CCB also passed to the control of First Army for operation in VII Corps sector in the vicinity of OBR FORSTBACH, in Army Reserve.

CCR reported hostile artillery fire (estimated to be 4 rounds of 150mm) in its area during the late afternoon of 16 October.

The Commanding Officer, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Major John P. Gerald, was killed while on patrol on the 17th. Major George C Benjamin was transferred from the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion to the Squadron and assumed command on the 18th.

The Division CP moved to the vicinity of MODERSCHEID on 17 October. The only enemy activity in the Division area continued to be a few rounds of artillery fire daily on CCR's position. Many flying bombs flew over the Division during the month, a few of which exploded in the Division area but no casualties resulted therefrom.

On 23 October, the front of V Corps was extended to the North, and the Division was assigned the central sector, which had been the Northern half of the Corps front. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troops A and C), reverted to Division control from the 102d Cavalry Group. For the remainder of the month, the Division's front extended from just South of HOFESCHU generally Southeast through HOFEN and ALZEN to a point about two miles Southeast of ALZEN.

The assigned mission of the Division was one of defensive holding of a sector of the established line. The task of carrying out this mission was assigned to CCR, to which the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less A and C Troops) was attached. All of the Division Artillery was employed to support CCR. The remainder of the Division continued training, rehabilitation and maintenance.

Enemy action for the rest of October was confined to scattered mortar and artillery fire, and to patrolling.

Our artillery scored direct hits on enemy positions on several occasions, causing the following known casualties; 23 October, 15 killed; 27 October, 6 killed; and 28-31 October, 3 killed. Seven prisoners were taken during the period 23-31 October.

Total enemy casualties for October: 31 killed, 40 captured. CCA rejoined the Division on the 26th and CCB rejoined on the 28th. Both Combat Commands returned to the PLYMOUTHVILLE area.

6. COMMENTS.

The following are comments for the month of October 1944.

(Letter, Reports After Action Against the Enemy - October 1944, 4th Army)

### SECTION I - PERSONNEL MATTERS

a. Replacements: Groups of 50 or more replacements were picked up during the month, and the totals for October, were as follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
1 Oct, Vicinity EATELBRUCK, LUXEMBOURG	8	108
4 Oct, Vicinity WEIMES, BELGIUM	2	217
10 Oct, Vicinity WEIMES, BELGIUM	0	35
 Total received during October	 11 (Repls)	 327 (Repls)
	2 (RAD's)	163 (RAD's)

b. During the month of October the pick up of replacements proceeded satisfactorily. The 41st Replacement Battalion serving the Division was only 5 miles from the Division Rear Echelon and time involved to transport replacements to the Division was therefore not a factor. Along with the replacements received during this period for filling division T/O, the Division had 20 officers and 275 enlisted men on DS from the 41st Replacement Battalion for training. These were allocated to the various combat commands according to branch.

c. The remarks concerning August replacements are in general applicable to those received in October. Replacements received were found to be properly equipped for their arm or service and MOS.

d. During the month of October the number of PTD's received tripled previous receipts for August and September.

### SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

a. Enemy Operations Encountered: Enemy was engaged in strengthening his defenses of the Siegfried Line. He opposed our patrols with mines, booby traps, scattered mortar and occasional artillery fire. His own patrols were not very aggressive although he occasionally tried by ambush to take a prisoner in order to learn our intentions.

b. The large number of German civilians in our area presented many security problems. These were checked frequently and were well controlled. Numerous deserters from the German Army were picked up by the CIC. There were several instances of German soldiers operating in civilian clothes.

c. Intelligence Training of Replacements: It was found that replacements were insufficiently trained in security and intelligence. A system was set up whereby replacements received limited training in censorship, general security and the reporting of information.

d. Aerial Photos: The number and quality of aerial photos received greatly improved. Much use was made of them for planning.

### SECTION III - OPERATIONS

During the month of October, the Division had no offensive missions. When deployed in the line in a defensive (holding) role the combat commands could use only their infantry battalions for this purpose. However the period was not one of entire loss to the remainder of the Division. All of

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**S E C R E T**

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## S E C R E T

(Letter, Reports After Action Against the Enemy - October 1944, Hq 5th Army)

the organic and attached artillery was gainfully employed throughout the period firing planned fires under Corps direction as well as many targets of opportunity spotted by observers with the holding forces. Likewise, the TD's and tanks were all given an opportunity to engage in considerable indirect fire of interdiction and targets of opportunity. The efficiency of the gun crews was thereby materially improved.

### SECTION IV - SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE MATTERS

While the Division was in the LUXEMBOURG AREA the convoy returned from the NORMANDY PENINSULA with the duffel bags. Two truck loads of miscellaneous equipment which had been left at the storage area were turned in at OHLERBOURG as salvage.

A clothing factory in LUXEMBOURG which had been used by the German Army for manufacture and repair of German uniforms was utilized for restorage of this baggage, after troops had removed winter clothing. The regular guard detail of a Warrant Officer and twelve enlisted men from the Band was posted over the stored property, and remained after the departure of the Division for Belgium. The month's lull in activities gave the troops an opportunity to ascertain shortages in clothing and equipment and the refitting process continued throughout the month. Heavy underwear, woollen socks, and sleeping bags or additional blankets were issued. Arctic overshoes were issued but a shortage in some of the larger sizes still existed at the end of the month.

The movement of the Division from LUXEMBOURG to the KILMEDIY-ST VITH area in BELGIUM reduced transportation problems and simplified supply due to proximity to supply depots and truckheads.

Upon Army orders the Division's authorized strength of medium tanks with 75mm or 76mm guns was reduced to one hundred fifty. This meant a reduction of six tanks per tank battalion. At the end of the period the shortage of replacement tank engines was again becoming critical.

In preparation for operations within hostile territory a system of operating protected convoys was instituted. This entailed establishment and operation of a Division Service Area into which units dispatch supply vehicles protected by armed escort from the unit, and from which the Division dispatches convoys to supply points with Division protection. Division Class I and III dumps were established, utilizing transportation of the attached QM Truck Companies with personnel from the truck companies and a detachment of service troops provided by Corps. Scheduled convoys operated between Army Truckheads and Division dumps.

Losses in equipment due to enemy action were negligible, due to the fact that the Division was in reserve, or on defensive or patrolling missions. Only three vehicles were destroyed by enemy action and nine additional vehicles were evacuated for repair or replacement. Ammunition expenditures for the month amounted to two hundred seventy tons.

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*Approved*  
*Disputed*

Communications equipment authorized by T/O and E is insufficient to provide adequate wire communications in static situations when armored units are utilized on patrol and outpost missions. Additional telephones, switchboards and field wire must be made available for such special situations.

Present T/O and E does not provide adequate personnel in the Division Quartermaster section for operation of a Division Class I and III dump. The loss of a detachment of Quartermaster service troops provided additional personnel for this purpose.

The protection of supply convoys between Division service area and Army supply points may necessitate the attachment of combat elements to Division Trains for this purpose. This is undesirable as the efficiency of combat elements is reduced thereby. Light armored vehicles should be added to the T/E of Division Trains Headquarters Company for this purpose.

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

5 Incls:

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

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REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

NOVEMBER 1944

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

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: Auth: CG 5th Armored Div.  
: Initials: *[Signature]*  
: Date: 7 Dec 44  
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319.1 GNNJG

7 December 1944.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - November 1944.

1. CAMPAIGN: Western Europe.

2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

a. Personnel:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EM</u>
Killed in Action		37	43
Seriously Wounded in Action	1	27	28
Lightly Wounded in Action	7	171	178
Seriously Injured in Action	0	0	0
Lightly Injured in Action	0	29	29
Missing in Action	0	4	4
Total	14	268	282

b. Vehicular:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
Carrier, H/T, M3	1	
Tank, Med. W/75mm Gun	4	2
Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 4x4	3	6
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 6x6 Cargo		2
Trailer, 1 Ton Cargo	1	
Ambulance, $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton, 4x4	1	
Total	10	10

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Loss due to Enemy Action</u>
Carbine, Cal. .30	7130	
Cal. .30	71263	6000
Cal. .45	20980	
Cal. .50	36403	
60mm	88	
81mm	230	
37mm	1304	
57mm	17	
75mm Gun	6120	
75mm How	2398	400
76mm Gun	182	
90mm Gun	4871	
3" Gun	522	
105mm How	19706	
155mm Gun	1397	
Grenades, (all types)	1011	128
Rockets, AT	132	
Total Tonnage	998.86	5.00

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(Reports After Action Against the Enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div)

4. On 1 November 1944 units of the Division were commanded by the following named officers:

5th Armored Division - MAJ GEN LUNS FORD E OLIVER, 03536, USA  
Combat Command "A" - BRIG GEN EUGENE A REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF  
Combat Command "B" - COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq & Hq Btry, Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA  
Reserve Command - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Armd Div Tn - COL GUSTON M NELSON, 014512, INF (1-7 Nov 44)  
Replaced by LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV, par 1, SO 230,  
Hq 5th Armd Div, 8 Nov 44 (8-30 Nov 44).  
Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BIGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 0335298, CAV  
145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz - MAJ GEORGE C BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0292156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV, (1-8 Nov 44),  
Relieved per par 1, SO 230, Hq 5th Armd Div, 8 Nov 44;  
Succeeded by LT COL WILLIAM L CARBONISS, 0293176, INF, (1-8 Nov 44)  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF  
15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV  
46th Armd Inf Bn - MAJ WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF  
47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703, FA  
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGLER, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - MAJOR ROLAND S BILBRICH, 0318269, ORD  
75th Med Bn Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BIDER, 0372570, MC

5. NARRATIVE.

During the month of November the Division did not operate as a Division against the enemy, but on three (3) occasions, however, units of the Division participated in combat operations.

During the period 1 thru 5 November, CCB continued patrol action and the defense of a zone in the KALTERHERBERG area. CCL was moved to the vicinity of NEUDORF, BELGIUM in preparation for action on order of V Corps. The Division established an advance CP in the vicinity of NEUDORF in order to more conveniently control the action of CCL. The remainder of the Division continued in the WILLES-FAYIONVILLE area with the Division CP in the vicinity of MODERSCHIED. Training for future operations was continued.

During the period 6 thru 10 November, the Division less CCL, had a defensive holding mission in the KALTERHERBERG sector of the Corps line.

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(Reports After Action Against the Enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div)

On November 8, CCB was placed under Army control and the Division, less CCB, was placed in Corps reserve. CCB continued the defense of the KALTERHERBERG area until relieved by the 99th ~~Division~~ at 1500, 10 November. CCB then reverted to Division control. On November 9th, CCR was attached to VII Corps and moved to the vicinity of WALHORN on 10 November.

CCB was moved to an assembly area in the MODERSCHIED-SCHOPPEN area at 1700 on 11 November. The 85th Cav Rn Sq was moved to the 102d Cavalry Zone in general support of the 102d and the 85th Cav Rn Sq CP was established three (3) Kilometers Southeast of EUPEN. The remainder of the Division CP moved from MODERSCHIED and closed with the advance CP in the vicinity of NEUDORF at 1500.

From 12 thru 14 November, the Division continued its preparation for action, with CCR in VII Corps Zone at WALHORN preparing a plan of attack against the town of VOSSENACK.

CCA and CCB prepared plans to repel any possible breakthrough in the North Sector of the V Corps Zone. The Division, in general, continued training for future operations.

During the period from 13 thru 25 November, the 85th Cav Rn Sq remained in general support of the 102d Cav Group; CCA continued in readiness to support CCB in the event of a possible breakthrough by the enemy. On 17 November, CCB moved from the FAYTONVILLE area to the vicinity of ROTGEN. Further planning was made to repel any possible enemy breakthrough in the LAMMERSDORF-ROTT area. The Division Artillery was moved from the KALTERHERBERG area to the vicinity of ROTGEN on 18 November. CCR reverted to Division control from attachment to VII Corps at 1700, 19 November. At 2400, 19 November, CCR was attached to the 8th Division. On order of V Corps, CCB moved the 15th Armd Inf Bn to an assembly area 2 Kilometers East of LAMMERSDORF to provide an immediate available force in event of an enemy attempt to attack towards EUPEN. Troop "D", 85th Cav Rn Sq, was attached to CCB. CCR continued in attachment to the 8th Division and was committed on 25 November, in an attack on the town of HURTGEN.

During the period 26 thru 30 November, the Division, less CCR continued training and planning for future operations.

During the period in which CCR, attached to the 8th Division, was engaged in the HURTGEN-KLEINHAU area, many difficulties were encountered. Enemy mines and soggy ground made movement of tanks almost impossible and intense enemy mortar fire, artillery fire, and anti-personnel mines made dismounted advances most difficult. The 47th Armd Inf Bn and Co "C", 22d Armd Engr Bn, suffered heavy casualties from small arms, artillery, and mines. Several Tank Commanders were lost due to enemy time fire and snipers.

On 29 November, the Division, less CCR, was relieved from attachment to V Corps and attached to VII Corps at 1200. CCR remained attached to

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(Reports After Action Against the Enemy - November 1944, 1st 5th Arm Div)

8th Infantry Division. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion (of CCA) moved to the 4th Infantry Division Zone and was attached to the 22d Regimental Combat Team by VII Corps. On this date CCR captured KLEINHAU and the high ground to the Northeast in the face of heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire.

On 30 November, CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and moved to the 4th Infantry Division Zone at 1000A, closing at 1400A in the vicinity of ZWEIFALL. Preparations were made for the relief of the 85th Cav Rcn Sq and CCB by the 9th Infantry Division in V Corps Sector. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion attacked with the 22d Regimental Combat Team at 0700A to seize high ground Northeast of KLEINHAU. Resistance was strong and the 46th's casualties were heavy.

## 6. COMMENTS.

### Section I - Personnel Matters

a. Comments made in the September and October report remain generally applicable.

b. As far as replacements are concerned, however, to the problems previously mentioned has been added inadequate stockage of both officer and enlisted replacements. As is usually the case, the proportion of platoon leaders and NCO's lost is greater than privates; while the resultant loss in combat efficiency is even greater. Return of wounded, battlefield appointments and promotions of NCO's have been wholly inadequate to offset losses. Increases in officers and enlisted replacements from the United States is believed the only solution. If this can be done, stockage in the replacement depots can be maintained at high enough levels to permit filling requisitions as they are received.

### Section II - Intelligence Matters

From reports of units operating in our immediate area, during the period, it is evident that the enemy is engaging more in night attacks. Some of these night attacks were reported to be in strength approximating one infantry regiment supported by as much as a company of tanks. The enemy's desire to limit the effectiveness of our artillery and fighter bomber support and his familiarity with the ground were factors which probably caused him to discard his former dislike for night attacks.

A marked increase in the number of automatic weapons in German units encountered was noted.

Air Reconnaissance continued to improve and the system, as inaugurated whereby broadcast is made from the airfield as soon as pilots return from missions, enabled the Division to keep a much better picture of the enemy situation. Aerial photographs continued to improve. By rapid delivery and interpretation, much timely intelligence was obtained.

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(Reports After Action Against the Enemy - November 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div)

PWs taken during November numbered 77 and the number killed (estimated) was 140

Section III - Operations

Most of the period was devoted to training and maintenance. It should be noted that weather conditions and the locations necessarily occupied by the Division made anything but limited training impossible. Crew drill for crew served weapons was carried on daily and a small amount of firing of new and reconditioned weapons was accomplished. During the latter half of the period daily communications exercises were conducted throughout the Division.

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters

Maintenance activities were hampered by lack of suitable hard standing and the excessive distance between line units and the 127th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion.

Personnel of the Division have shown marked improvement in supply discipline regarding the care of empty gasoline cans.

B ( "The threatened high casualty rate from Branch Foot was checked by the issue of overshoes. No new cases have been reported since the last issue was completed. "

C ( "'Duck bills' (extended track connectors) have materially improved the performance of medium tanks over muddy and soft terrain. Supply during November has permitted each tank to be 50% equipped with duck bills. Performance in winter mud will be further improved when this track modification can be completed."

Trucks of the two (2) attached Quartermaster Truck Companies have averaged seven hundred thirty nine (739) miles per truck per month for the past two months.

→ The relative comfort and warmth of the newly issued sleeping bag over the regular issue of GI blankets was initially a controversial subject. However, after a short period of trial, all personnel who had given this item a fair trial were universal in their praise of it.

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

5 Incl.

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

Headquarters 5th Armored Division  
APO 305  
c/o Postmaster, New York, N. Y.

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319.1 GMMJG

8 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Report After Action Against the Enemy/ Reports After.

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

FROM : Commanding General, V Corps, APO 305, U. S. Army.

*noted  
in report*  
Request so much of paragraph 4, Report After Action Against the Enemy, October 1944, Headquarters 5th Armored Division, as reads: "Tank, Light", and "Truck, Medium", be amended to read: "Tank, Light", and "Tank, Medium".

For the Commanding General:

*[Signature]*  
J. C. GIBSON,  
Lt. Col., U. S. A.,  
Adjutant General.

319.1

1st Ind.

(8 Dec 44)

HEADQUARTERS, V CORPS, APO 305, U.S. Army, 18 December 1944.

TO: Commanding General, First U.S. Army, APO 230, U S Army

1. Report referred to in basic communication were transmitted to your headquarters on 23 November 1944.

2. Request amendments as indicated in basic communication be made.

For the Commanding General:

*[Signature]*  
SAM F. TRAGUE, Jr.,  
Major, A.G.D.,  
Asst Adjutant General.

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The following  
image(s) may be of  
poor quality due to  
the poor quality of  
the **original**.

Ltr Hd 5th Arm Div, dtd 8 Dec 44, subj: "After Action Report for October Amended".

319.1 (AG/TSC) 2d Ind.  
HEADQUARTERS FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY, APO 930,

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington 25, D. C.

THRU: Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, APO 887.

October report of 5th Armored Division was forwarded as Inclosure #1 to letter this headquarters dated 11 December 1944.

For the Commanding General:


*Senior*

22193

370.2

319.1 (AG-O) 3rd Ind  
Headquarters Twelfth Army Group, APO 655, 22 December 1944.

TO: Commanding General, ATCUSA, APO 887.



WS

AG, Mail Sect., Hd.  
Army Group

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REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

DECEMBER 1944

HEADQUARTERS 8TH ARMORED DIVISION



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5 Incls:

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

Copy No. 1

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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION

APO No 255

U. S. Army

: : : : :  
: S E C R E T :  
: Auth: CG 5th Armored Div :  
: Initials: *[Signature]* :  
: Date: 5 January 1945 :  
: : : : :

319.1 GNNJG

5 January 1945.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - DECEMBER 1944.

1. CAMPAIGN: Germany.

2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

a. Personnel:	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EM</u>
Killed in Action	9	159	157
Seriously Wounded in Action	4	138	142
Lightly Wounded in Action	42	632	674
Seriously Injured in Action		3	3
Lightly Injured in Action	1	83	84
Missing in Action	1	106	107
	<u>57</u>	<u>1120</u>	<u>1177</u>

b. Vehicular:	<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
Car, Armored, Light, M3	2	
Carrier, Pers., H/T, M3, w/w	9	3
Carrier, Pers, H/T, M3A1, w/w	1	
Tank, Light, M5A1	5	1
Tank, Medium, w/75mm Gun	44	5
Tank, Medium, w/76mm Gun	1	1
Tank, Medium, w/105mm How	3	
Tank, Med, w/Mine Exploder (Crab)	2	
Trailer, Ammunition, M10	1	
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4	1	6
Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6 Cargo, w/6 wheel		2
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, w/c, w/w		1
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, Cargo	5	
Total:	<u>74</u>	<u>19</u>

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

Type	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Loss due to enemy action</u>
Carbine	95164	
Cal., 30	395263	215425
Cal., 45	27050	10073
Cal., 50	163083	10574
60mm	1074	
81mm	4705	
87mm	237	371
87mm	43	120
75mm gun	6015	3814
75mm how	5826	
76mm gun	541	
90mm gun	444	
4.2 mortar	1679	

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(Over)



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(Reports Against the Enemy - Dec 1-31, 44, 5th Arm Div)

Type	Ex. total	Loss due to enemy action
105mm how	5441	45
155mm gun	200	
Rocket, AT	3	
Grenade, hand	4447	
Grenade, rifle	23	
Signal, ground	1	
Flare	118	
Total Total:	1177.34	50.26

4. COMWMDR: During the month of December 1944, units of the Division were commanded by the following named officers:

5th Armored Division - MAJ GEN LYNSTON E CLIVER, 03038, USA  
 Combat Command "A" - MAJ GEN EUGENE REEF, 03208, USA  
 Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT KARL W. BETH, 01010740, INF  
 Combat Command "B" - COL JOHN T COLE, 08286, CIV  
 Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE W. PERAY, 0112347, INF  
 5th Arm Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J. PAGE, 04408, FA  
 Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Arm Div Arty - CAPT ROBERT W. STICK, 0466787, FA  
 Reserve Command, 5th Arm Div - COL GLENN A. DICKSON, 08632, INF  
 Hq Co, 5th Arm Div - CAPT LARRY H. GRESTWOOD, 01283065, INF  
 Hq 5th Arm Div Tn - LT COL KARL L. SCHERER, 018784, CIV  
 Hq Co, 5th Arm Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R. ASPELL, 01011081, CIV  
 17 Platoon, 5th Arm Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T. BELSH, 0335298, CAV  
 148th Arm Div Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A. WELDE, 0103447, SC  
 85th Cav Recon Sq Decz - MAJ GEORGE C. BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV  
 10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A. WARTER, 0232156, INF  
 34th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM L. CAMANISS, 0203173, INF (Atchd)  
 81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H. ANDERSON, 0219482, INF  
 15th Arm Div Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G. DICKE SON, 0197385, CAV  
 46th Arm Div Inf Bn - LT COL WILLIAM H. BURTON, 0366028, INF  
 47th Arm Div Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E. BOYER, 0218680, INF  
 47th Arm Div FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B. ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
 71st Arm Div FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B. WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
 95th Arm Div FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W. MC NEER, 0228703, FA  
 22d Arm Div Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E. RESSBACH, 020575, CE (1-13 Dec 44)  
 (13-31 Dec 44); MAJ ALBERT M. BROTH, 0369773, CE, (13-26 Dec 44)  
 per par 6, AR 6 5-20.  
 127th Ord Maint Bn - LT COL ROLAND S. BIERSON, 0318269, ORD  
 75th Med Bn Arm Div - LT COL BENJAMIN H. BADER, 0372570, MC

## 5. NARRATIVE:

During the period from 1 December thru 4 December, the Division, less CCA and CCR, continued to train for future operations. At 1200, 1 December, the 4th Cavalry Group Headquarters (plus 1 light tank company), was attached to the Division. The Division CP moved from the vicinity of NEUDORF, BELGIUM to HAHN, GERMANY, at 1300, 1 December. The Division Ammunition Office was opened at HAHN pending forward displacement of Division Trains. CCA continued to operate in attachment to the 4th Infantry Division. At 1800, 1 December the 48th Armored Infantry Battalion was relieved from attachment to the 22d Regimental Combat Team, and reverted to the control of CCA. This Battalion

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had been attached to the 22d Regimental Combat Team for the purpose of relieving high ground Northeast of KLEINHAU. The Battalion succeeded in driving a small salient East of GROSSHAU and Northeast of KLEINHAU but suffered very heavy casualties. Vehicular casualties were generally of a temporary nature consisting of punctured radiators and tires. Losses of mortars and machine guns were comparatively heavy. CCR remained attached to the 8th Infantry Division, (V Corps) and was held in reserve pending orders for a new mission with the Infantry Division. The 15th Armored Infantry Battalion (CCF) was relieved from its mission in the LAUDERSDORF - ROTT area by a RCT of the 8th Infantry Division.

At 0730, 2 December, CCR attacked in the direction of BRANDENBERG. After gaining about 3 kilometers, the advance was completely held up by anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. At 1600, the 4th Cavalry Group Headquarters (plus 1 light tank company), was ordered back to Corps control by VII Corps. CCR reverted to Division control at the same time and the Division Commander immediately submitted a request for the relief of the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion for the purpose of reorganization. The 46th had been attacked during the day by the 1st Battalion of the 948 Regiment (383rd Infantry Division). Three (3) companies of this enemy battalion participated in a general attack on the 4th Infantry Division position. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion killed 75 enemy personnel before it was forced to withdraw at 1500. However, no ground was lost as elements of the 4th Division took over. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved by the 4th Infantry Division of its mission in general support of the 102nd Cavalry Group.

On 3 December, CCR resumed its advance, after Engineers had removed the mines during the previous night. BRANDENBERG was captured by the combat command at 1115. 276 prisoners were taken by CCR on this date. Its advance reconnaissance elements penetrated as far as BERGSTEIN and some prisoners were taken from the 139th Anti-Tank Battalion, reported guarding that city.

The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion of CCA was withdrawn to the Northwest of KLEINHAU to reorganize. The Division area was attacked about 1400 by an estimated 35 to 40 enemy planes (IE 109). There were no casualties and the Division Artillery Command reported that one of its units, the 387th Anti-aircraft Battalion, had destroyed a total of 14 enemy planes and had damaged 8 others.

CCR remained in place on the 4th of December in BRANDENBERG and utilized its time in mopping up any remaining enemy resistance. The only other action taken against the enemy in that area, by CCR, was the placing of mortar and artillery fire. CCA reorganized in preparation for the assembly of its units in the area of the CCA CP North of ZWEIFALL.

From 5 December thru 9 December, the Division, less CCR, continued plans and training for future operations. CCR remained attached to the 8th Infantry Division (V Corps) in the BRANDENBERG - BERGSTEIN area.

At 1400, 5 December, CCR began the attack on BERGSTEIN along the West bank of the ROER RIVER and by 1530 hours, its advance elements were fighting in the streets of the village. At 1630, CCR had completed the mopping up of

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remaining resistance in the village and immediately formulated plans for its defense against enemy counter-attacks. Fifty (50) prisoners were taken in the operation and at the close of the day a determination of the number of enemy dead had not been completed. Extremely ~~severe~~ enemy resistance coupled with very difficult terrain was the cause of heavy losses sustained by CCR in both personnel and equipment. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was especially severe throughout the operation and continued during the entire period. Many enemy planes were over the Division area but no offensive action was reported. CCA moved the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, Company "A", 22d Armored Engineer Battalion, and elements of the 34th Tank Battalion, to its assembly area in the vicinity of ZWEIFALL, and all units were closed in the area at 1450. Troop "D", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was relieved from attachment to CCA and reverted to Squadron control.

CCR in continuing defense of BERGSTEIN, sustained 3 enemy counter-attacks during the day on 6 December. The first attack was launched at 0700 by approximately 500 enemy infantry supported by 10 tanks. This attack lasted until 0930 and the strong determination of the enemy succeeded in their temporary seizure of a few houses in the southern part of the village. However, this gain was nullified and the enemy driven completely out of the village by 0930. This engagement cost the enemy 6 of their attacking tanks and five anti-tank guns which were knocked out by CCR. Again at 1130, a second counter-attack was made by a weaker force of enemy infantry, supported by 1 tank, but this attack was quickly repulsed. At 1420, a third counter-attack was made by enemy infantry, approximately company strength. No armor was in support, and the attack was beaten off by 1345. During the whole day and throughout these attacks enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to be extremely heavy.

CCR reported 41 prisoners of war taken, including one (1) officer. The enemy units participating in the attacks were identified as the 1st and 2nd Battalion of the 980th Infantry Regiment (272nd V. G. Div). Prisoners claimed that this Division moved to the BERGSTEIN area from SCHIEDT during the night 3-4 December.

Throughout the night of 6-7 December, CCR received intermittent artillery and mortar fire in BERGSTEIN. The 2nd Ranger Battalion arrived during the same night to help CCR in its defense of the village, and on the morning of 7 December pushed out an OP line in a rough semi-circle of about 500 yards to the East, around the village to the Southwest. Light enemy resistance was encountered. CCR continued to hold the inner ring of defense East, South, and Southwest of the village. In the meantime elements of the 8th Infantry Division attacked the wooded area, North of the village and successfully outposted the area. This move gave some assurance that BERGSTEIN would not be endangered by counter-attacks from the North. Approximately 89 prisoners were taken in this operation and the previous move by the 2nd Ranger Battalion. Continued heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on BERGSTEIN throughout the day.

CCR was relieved during the night 7-8 December and moved to the vicinity of WALHORN on the morning of 8 December. The command remained attached to V Corps and was placed in Corps Reserve. Re-fitting of the CCR units was given highest priority by Division Supply Agencies. Losses in tanks

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had been extremely heavy due to anti-tank line and mines. Recovery operations were hampered by artillery and mortar fire, shellfields and difficult terrain. Heavy traffic and long hauls over poor roads from the forward collecting points created quite a problem in vehicular evacuation.

The Division CP was moved from HAIN to ZWEIFALL at 1830, 8 December 1944. Division Artillery moved from ROETGER to ZWEIFALL, and were joined in the Division assembly area, one (1) kilometer West of ZWEIFALL, by the 400th Field Artillery Battalion. This battalion was attached to the Division at 1800 after having been detached for a long period. The 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved in the vicinity of WALDWIN.

On 9 December, 1944, CCB was alerted for movement to the KLEINHAU area. During the afternoon of the 9th, the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, (plus 3 platoons of tanks of the 81st Tank Battalion), was sent to the new assembly area. Company "B", 626th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to CCB in place. The 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion was ordered to reconnoiter firing positions in the CCB assembly area and to move thereto without delay. The battalion was placed in the direct support of CCB, CCA moved to the vicinity of HAIN and set up its CP in the village. The Division prepared for action at an early date.

On 10 December, the remainder of CCB moved to its assembly area West of KLEINHAU and closed at 1600. Orders originally issued by VII Corps for CCB to attack on 10 December were cancelled and the attack was ordered for 0730, 11 December. The CCB assembly area was bombed and strafed by enemy planes at 1726. Fourteen (14) casualties were inflicted on our troops. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was moved to the CCB assembly area, West of KLEINHAU, and closed at 1100. The 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved to the assembly area of CCB, and closed at 1600.

The 5th Armored Division, operating as a division for the first time since being attached to VII Corps, sent CCB to attack in the direction of SCHAFBERG at 0730. The 4th Cavalry Group, with the 759th Tank Battalion (light) and the 635th TD Battalion attached, became attached to the Division at the time of the attack (0730), to perform a blocking mission on the Division's South flank. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less "C" Troop), was attached to the 4th Cavalry Group to aid in the performance of this mission. The attack was temporarily held up just West of the town at 0825 by reason of the Combat Command's lead tanks being knocked out. Three (3) companies of the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion (A, B, & C) went forward on foot, supported by 1 platoon of tanks from each of the corresponding companies of the 81st Tank Battalion. This force passed to the South of SCHAFBERG. The town previously had been reported clear, but was found to be occupied by the enemy. Elements of the 83rd Division were attempting to dislodge these enemy troops. At 1245, the CCB column had occupied the nose of a hill Southeast of the town. Opposition was heavy, both from dug-in infantry and mortar and artillery fire. The latter, especially severe, caused many casualties during the operation. The remainder of CCB, under cover, West of SCHAFBERG, waited for the 83rd Division to clear the town. At 2200, CCB reported that the Infantry-Tank force from the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 81st Tank Battalion was supported by tank

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destroyers and elements of the 759th Tank Battalion. Our casualties were reported to be one hundred sixty (160), with 30 to 40 of this number killed. Officer casualties were thirty (30) percent and it was reported that evacuation of all casualties was extremely difficult. The supply line to forward troops was over terrain that was under constant shelling and was impassable for wheeled or semi-track vehicles. It was necessary to use light tanks for all supply and evacuation of these troops. Enemy units opposing the advance of CCB, were identified as part of the 2nd Battalion, 941st Infantry Regiment, organically a part of the 2nd Parachute Division, but believed to be under control of the 85th Infantry Division. Enemy losses during the period consisted of 31 prisoners of war and 30 killed.

CCA had begun movement to the East from the vicinity of HAHN at 0730, prepared to pass through elements of the 83rd Division in GEY, and to continue the attack to the East. At 0950, CCA was halted one (1) kilometer west of GROSSHAU. This halt in operations was due to the inability of the 83rd Division to clear GEY of enemy resistance and multiple mines. CCA was unable to move forward and went into an assembly area West of GROSSHAU. However, one married (Infantry-Tank) company was forced to return to HAHN in order to clear the road. At 1830, the Division Commander ordered CCA to remain in place for the night and prepare to move thru GEY for attack to the East on 13 December.

CCB was ordered to continue mopping up in the vicinity of its location and be prepared to resume the attack at 1300, 12 December, provided that the 2nd Bn, 330th Infantry, 83rd Division, became available for attachment to CCB. The 4th Cavalry Group was ordered to continue on its blocking mission. Company "D", 87th Chemical Battalion, was attached to CCB, and was located in the vicinity of GROSSHAU. The 400th Field Artillery Battalion was moved by Division Artillery to the GROSSHAU area and closed at 1800. Heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on the CCB area continuously.

The Division Trains moved from the WALLES-FAYONVILLE area in BELGIUM at 0740, 11 December, with the Headquarters, Band, 145th Signal Company, and the Division Administrative Center moving to ZWEIFALL. The 127th Ordnance Battalion (-B and C) and the 3907 Quartermaster Truck Company located at WALBEIN. Headquarters, 75th Medical Battalion, and Company "C", 127th Ordnance and 3912 Quartermaster Company moved to RAEREN.

The action was continued on 12 December, CCB consolidated its positions taken the previous day and was subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. Companies "A", "B", and "C", 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, were reported to have suffered extremely heavy casualties during the two (2) days fighting. The Commanding Officers of all three (3) companies were among the casualties. The 4th Cavalry Group took very heavy artillery and mortar fire all along the lines, and "D" Troop, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was hit the hardest, suffering fifty (50) per cent casualties. All units remained in place during the day. Ten (10) prisoners were taken by elements of the Division on this date. A platoon of "A" Company, 733rd Tank Battalion, consisting of 2 - T1E1 mine exploders, 3 - T1E3 mine exploders, 1 - tank dozer and 1 - medium tank was attached to the Division. The 2 - T1E1 mine exploders and the tank dozer were moved to CCA area and were used in clearing the road in

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the vicinity of GEY. Terrain and road conditions precluded the use or movement of the heavier TIE3. At 1840, the Division Commander issued orders for an attack on 13 December 1944.

The attacks by CCA and CCB for 13 December were cancelled, and the period was spent in preparation for attacks on 14 December: CCA to attack East through GEY at an early hour, and CCB to attack East on its initial objective from its position on the high ground Southeast of SCHAFBERG. The 15th Armored Infantry Battalion was designated to launch this attack at 0645, 14 December. The 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry (83rd Division) reinforced with Company "C", (less 1 platoon), 81st Tank Battalion, was ordered to attack to the East from STRASS simultaneously with the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion. The 4th Cavalry Group, with the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (less Troop "C"), continued the security screen on the Division flank. Enemy action during this period consisted of a fairly heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire, delivered mainly on the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion's positions. This Battalion's casualties continued to mount. During the day Company "C" (-1 platoon), 81st Tank Battalion, attempted its move to STRASS to take position with the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry. The tanks met with severe anti-tank fire and were forced to take cover, after two of their number had been knocked out. It was then decided to wait for darkness as the movement of the tanks in daylight invited a heavy concentration fire over the entire area. At dusk a patrol was sent forward under cover of darkness to reconnoiter a possible route of movement for the tank company. This patrol returned at 0200, 14 December, and reported that it was most impracticable to attempt movement of the tanks thru the existing minefields, at night. The Company was then placed in reserve just West of SCHAFBERG and was to be on instantaneous call when the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry, needed its support.

On the morning of 14 December the Division initiated its attack as planned. CCA attacked thru GEY at 0925; its advance elements having reached the outskirts of the city at 0900. The attack was delayed for a few hours in the late morning by considerable quantities of mines which had been layed on the road leading from GEY to HORN. These fields were breached shortly before noon and the attack pushed on. Enemy artillery fire was reported to be moderate and the enemy was withdrawing to the high ground Northwest of the CCA advance. At 1500, the leading elements of CCA reached HORN and began to receive heavy artillery fire from the direction of KUFFERATH. An air mission was directed on that town and on an enemy battery located on the final objective, the high ground to the East of KUFFERATH. The attack was then pushed toward KUFFERATH, the initial objective of the combat command, and by late afternoon, elements were deployed on the Northern and Eastern fringes of the town. The advance had been slow but steady and at the end of the period, CCA was the furthest East of all units in the First or Ninth U S Armies. Contact had been made with 331st Infantry Regiment (83rd Division) during the closing minutes of the period. This Infantry Regiment had the mission of holding the hill Southwest of BERZBUR.

In the meantime, on the Southern front of the Division sector, CCB (plus the 2nd Bn, 330th Infantry attached), attacked East at 0645 but the advance was almost negligible due to extremely heavy enemy resistance from

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artillery, mortar and small arms fire. "D" Troop, 35th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, which was in contact with Co "C", 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, reported at 1530 that approximately 200 rounds of enemy mortar fire were falling each hour during the afternoon. In spite of the severity of enemy resistance, CCB gained about one (1) Kilometer for the period. At 1655, further advance was halted by order of the Division Commander and CCB was directed to continue on the following morning. Troops "A", "B" and one (1) platoon of "F" Company (light tank company), 35th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, were attached to CCB at 2130 to strengthen the attacking force. The 4th Cav Gp with the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (-) attached, continued the security screen on the Division's Southern flank. The 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment (83rd Division) attached to CCB, took 109 prisoners during the period. Air support for this period, consisted of twelve planes which bombed and strafed the enemy positions. Enemy losses to Division elements for the period were as follows: 100 enemy killed, 23 prisoners taken; 5 self-propelled guns, 1 Antitank gun, destroyed.

On 15 December, the attacks of CCA and CCB were resumed with CCA stepping off at 0730 and CCB (plus 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry) at 0800. CCA launched its attack against the town of KUFFERATH with one married company (Co "A", 34th Tank Battalion and Co "A", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion). The assault carried against light resistance and the town reported clear at 0900. At the same time another married company (Company "B", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion and Company "B", 34th Tank Battalion) pressed an attack to the final objective of CCA, the high ground to the Southeast of KUFFERATH, known as hills 209 and 211. Enemy resistance was light and the bulk of that came from three or four assault guns to the East and Southeast of the objective. This mission, which was accomplished at 0820, carried the combat command's elements to within a few hundred yards of the ROER RIVER. The enemy had apparently withdrawn its infantry during the night. CCA encountered fire from artillery, mortars, anti-tank guns and SP guns, but of less intensity than that of the preceding day. Four (4) enemy tanks were observed in the near vicinity at 1200, and these maneuvered around until our fire destroyed one (1), and the balance withdrew at 1400. Companies "A" and "B", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, were moved to the high ground just West of KREUZAU and the 34th Tank Battalion (less Co A) went into position in the vicinity of GEY. Company "A", 34th Tank Battalion, at this time was operating with the 331st Regimental Combat Team whose mission was to hold KUFFERATH. During the afternoon CCA consolidated its positions and established contact with adjacent units. Defensive positions were improved so as to repel any enemy counter-attacks during the night (15-16 December).

CCB started its attack at 0800 against much lessened enemy resistance. One spearhead plunged to the North from the East of STRASS and by 1100 had taken LANGENROICH. In the meanwhile a second spearhead pushed South from positions East of SCHAFBERG and penetrated the woods West of BERGHEIM, reaching a point just North of UNTERMUDACH. This attack met some fire from artillery and mortars. At 1130, the woods West of BERGHEIM had been cleared and this force, made up of the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, Troops "A" and "B", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry Regiment, was on line looking down into the town

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of BERGHEIM. CCB was held up at this point until a coordinated attack could be made on the town. In the meantime both the Southern and Northern spearheads had converged outside of the town. At 1415, the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry, was designated to take the town; Troops "A" and "B", 89th Cavalry Squadron, supported by 1 platoon of medium tanks from the 31st Tank Battalion, were to seize the high ground to the South of BERGHEIM at an early hour, 16 December. The 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry took the town at 1545 and by 2000 the town was outposted by one (1) company and the remainder of the battalion withdrew to the North side of the woods in the vicinity of LANGENROICH. Enemy resistance in the town was light and one (1) anti-tank gun was reported destroyed. A small force of enemy was routed by our preparatory artillery fire. The 4th Cavalry Group (-) with the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (-) continued to exert pressure on the enemy screen of the Division's southern flank. Several patrols had attempted to penetrate this line but were repulsed. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued heavy in that sector. Enemy losses for the day were as follows: Personnel; killed, 127; captured, 100 (this figure includes 62 PWs taken by the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry); material captured or destroyed; 1 tank, 5 SP guns, 3 - 89 mm anti-tank guns, 4 anti-tank guns (caliber unknown), 1 field gun and 12 mortars.

On 16 December, CCA launched an attack in its sector, with Troops "A" and "B", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, supported by 1 platoon of medium tanks from the 31st Tank Battalion, attacking to the Southeast from BERGHEIM, to take the objective: the hill to the Southeast of BERGHEIM. The advance was rapid and at 0830, the force had taken the high ground and established positions on the objective. These positions were then consolidated and the area stepped up. Several prisoners were taken during the attack. The 15th Armored Infantry Battalion moved South from BERGHEIM in the afternoon, and seized the town of BILSTEIN, completing this action at 1720. The remainder of CCB with the attached 2nd Bn, 330th Infantry, consolidated positions. One company of the Infantry Battalion continued to hold BERGHEIM and the remainder of the Battalion moved back to a covered position in the vicinity of LANGENROICH. The enemy, during the previous night, had continued to withdraw and extricate the majority of his supporting weapons, but isolated groups of enemy continued resistance in the remaining pockets West of the ROER RIVER near WILDEN. Considerable night movement was heard in the vicinity of ROGHEI and WILDEN. These two places were fired on by our artillery. In turn, heavy enemy artillery fire was received in KUFFERATH but the bulk of it was believed unobserved. CCA consolidated positions in its sector, with "A" Co, 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, being relieved on hill 211 by "K" Co, 331st Infantry (83rd Division). At 1200, the boundary between the Division and the 83rd Division was changed on the North, returning to CCA the responsibility for the town of KUFFERATH and hill 211. Co "A", 34th Tank Battalion, was in position to take over the town from Co "L", 331st Infantry, however, Co "A", 34th Tank Battalion could not enter the town until such time as Co "L", 331st Infantry had departed; their departure was planned for an early hour 17 December. Company "A", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, again took up positions on hill 211, relieving Co "K", 331st Infantry. Co "K" did not move from the hill this date and it was necessary for the two (2) companies to double up for the night, with the A/46 digging in along side of Co "K", 331st



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Infantry. At 1800, CCA was disposed in its sector with the 34th Tank Battalion having an advance CP at KUFFERATH and a rear CP at GEY. Co "A" was in KUFFERATH, reinforced with one (1) platoon of Co "A", 22d Armored Engineers, one (1) platoon of Co "A", 628 Tank Destroyer Battalion and the Reconnaissance platoon of Co "A", 628 Tank Destroyer Battalion. Company "B", 34th Tank Battalion, of which only one (1) platoon remained operative, was in the vicinity of GEY. Company "C", 34th Tank Battalion, and Company "C", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion (a married company), moved to the established CP of the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion in the vicinity of LANDENBROICH. The 4th Cavalry Group and the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued the screening mission on the Southern flank of the Division along the general line GROSSHAU to BILSTEIN. Some small arms fire was received from the vicinity of ROGHEIM to the South. CCA had received a continuous shelling throughout the day. Approximately 5 to 6 rounds of 150mm an hour, 80 rounds mortar fire, 75mm and 105mm an hour, constituted this shelling.

During the night 16-17 December an unknown number of paratroopers were dropped by the enemy over a wide area. A large enemy counter-attack was reported in progress on the V Corps and VIII Corps Sectors. Enemy air activity over the Division area was much increased and some bombs were dropped but no damage was reported. Enemy losses for the period consisted of 41 personnel killed; 50 captured, of which 21 were taken by the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry. The enemy materiel captured or destroyed was four (4) SP guns (abandoned by enemy), three (3) anti-tank guns (abandoned by enemy); twelve field guns, two anti-tank guns; seven infantry mortars and 2 vehicles destroyed.

On 17 December, the action of the Division was confined to consolidating positions; and elements of CCA completed the relief of 83rd Division elements in the town of KUFFERATH. Enemy planes were active over the entire Division area in the early morning hours. CCB was strafed and bombed in its positions but no casualties resulted therefrom. In general, from midnight 16-17 December to midnight 17-18 December, enemy air activity was extremely heavy. VII Corps reported a number of parachutists dropped in the Corps area and during the entire period a search was conducted throughout the Division Area. Counter-measures were taken in the form of additional road blocks, traffic check-points and listening-points. The first parachutist reported killed in the VII Corps sector was in the area of one of the Divisional units.

CCA continued to receive sporadic artillery and mortar fire in the town of KUFFERATH and on hill 211. Troop "D", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was subjected to a very heavy concentration of mortar fire at 2000. Medium artillery also fell on and in the vicinity of GEY, STRASS, and GROSSHAU. The 4th Cavalry Group (-) and the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (-) continued the defensive screen on the Division's Southern flank. "D" Company, 87th Chemical Battalion, attached to CCB, placed fire from its 4.2 mortars on suspected enemy artillery and mortar positions and fire from these positions was stilled. Enemy units in contact from North to South along the Division front were identified as follows: 353rd Engineer Battalion; 334th Alarm Company, remnants of the II Battalion, 6th Parachute Regiment.

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On 18 December, the Division continued to hold defensive positions along its front. CCA held the town of KUFFERATH and positions on the high ground to the West of KREUZAU and Northwest of WINDEN. CCB held the town of BERGHEIM and BILSTEIN, and the high ground East of ILSTEIN and South of WINDEN. The defensive screen on the Division's Southern flank continued, with the 4th Cavalry Group (-) and the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (-) maintaining a line running generally from KLEINHAU to BERGHEIM with contact with the 8th Infantry Division on the right, and the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion (CCB) in BILSTEIN. Patrolling was continued to the South and East and in the BERGHEIM area. The enemy was reported to be active in this area, both mounted and dismounted activity being observed. Our artillery fire was placed on this target with good effect. Enemy activity was also prevalent in the WINDEN area with a great deal of vehicular movement being observed. One enemy patrol attempted penetration of the CCA sector at 2145 but was repulsed. The remainder of enemy action during the day was confined to the placing of large caliber artillery fire in the areas of CEY - NORM - KUFFERATH and on the high ground to the West of WINDEN, which was held by Companies "B" and "C", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion and a platoon of the 34th Tank Battalion. This position was subjected to sporadic harassing fire for the entire period. Some artillery fire fell along the entire front during the day. Enemy planes bombed the positions of the 13th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and 400th Field Artillery Battalion during the morning and inflicted some casualties on the former. At 1130, the 400th Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from attachment to the Division and moved by order to the V Corps zone. Parachutist counter-measures were rapidly continued and the Division area was constantly searched for enemy. Generally, the enemy continued fairly heavy air activity over the Division but limited offensive actions were reported. Intelligence reported that the enemy laid smoke screens in two places; the vicinity of DUREN and at LAIR. Artillery battery positions were being shifted by the enemy but whether the shifts were to the South or North could not be determined. The enemy suffered light casualties during the day with 1 killed, and 2 prisoners reported.

On 19 December, enemy patrolling was very active and became increasingly aggressive. In at least one instance, enemy patrols were supported by artillery and mortar fire. In general, an increase in the volume of mortar and artillery fire was followed by a considerable movement of vehicles in and behind the front line areas. Air activity was negligible insofar as the enemy was concerned. CCA and CCB regrouped their forces in preparation for an attack on 20 December. All defensive positions held for the previous periods by CCA and CCB remained the same with the exception of a change of boundaries between the two combat commands. The responsibility for the town of BERGHEIM and the high ground to the East of the town came to CCA. Orders were received from VII Corps to clear and occupy the ENTENHUBACH-ORBERHUBACH areas and to clear up the block to through ROCKHILL to the ROCK RIVER. CCB was designated to pursue this mission and the 4th Cavalry Group was attached to it for that purpose. The Division Commander also ordered that the patrols and task forces be pushed as far forward as possible during the night 18-19 December. CCA's plan was to clear their sector preparatory to attacking WINDEN and ROCKHILL, GERM. The 4th Cavalry Group (-), with the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (-) attached,

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continued the defensive screen of the Division's Southern flank. Enemy activity was reported to be observed in the area: BOGHEIM-WINDEN-UNTERMAUBACH-OBERMAUBACH. Enemy artillery and mortars continued harassing fire into the Division areas. Losses sustained by the enemy for the period were reported as three (3) killed and seven (7) PWs taken.

On 20 December, CCB launched its attack to clear the towns UNTERMAUBACH and OBERMAUBACH and pockets to the South and Southeast to the ROER RIVER. The 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry, attached to CCB, moving to the South on UNTERMAUBACH, reached the Northeast edge of the town at 0845. Here immediate contact was made with the enemy and stubborn enemy resistance was backed by cross-fire from heavy machine guns, bazookas and anti-tank grenades. Progress for the remainder of the day was very slow and developed into a house-to-house fight after reaching the town area. The 4th Cavalry Squadron, attacked BOGHEIM and were on the objective and clearing the town at 0845. A few prisoners were taken and the town completely occupied by 0920. A force was then sent to the Southeast to clear out the wooded areas toward Hill 72. This force hit a mine field of anti-personnel mines and was forced to halt, until such time as the area could be cleared. "A" Troop, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, established a road block on the road running along the river from WINDEN to UNTERMAUBACH. This road block was located in the loop overlooking the river just Southeast of DILSTEIN. The 759th Tank Battalion (dismounted) moved to the South and occupied the high ground West of BOGHEIM, linking up with the Cavalry on the left and the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion (dismounted) on the right. The 635th moved down the Division right boundary.

CCA attacked at 0900 for the purpose of clearing the high ground West of WINDEN. The 15th Armored Infantry Battalion (detached from CCB on the night of 19 December and attached to CCA) was used for this mission and was on its objective at 1120 and digging in. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was severe on that position and either tanks or SP guns fired on the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion from the Southern edge of WINDEN at 1500. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion advanced toward the town of SCHNEIDHAUSEN at 1525. Initial progress was good but extremely heavy artillery fire from across the ROER RIVER made the town proper untenable. Attempts to send patrols to blow the main bridge across the river were frustrated by fire from the town and across the river. The town was swept by enemy small arms and grazing fire from machine guns from the East Bank of the ROER. In addition, artillery and mortar fire was very heavy. During the late afternoon enemy tanks or SP guns were reported moving into and out of WINDEN.

During the attack on UNTERMAUBACH the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry, flushed enemy vehicles and personnel from the town, and these ran into the road block established by "A" troop, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, on the highway between UNTERMAUBACH and WINDEN. The enemy lost an undetermined number of vehicles and personnel in this encounter. The CCB sector was comparatively quiet during the first part of the night except that enemy tracked vehicles were sent down the road South from WINDEN in an attempt to break into UNTERMAUBACH from the East. This force ran into

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the road block held by the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and an artillery concentration was laid on the column forcing it to withdraw after the loss of one or two of its vehicles. Artillery fire from East of the ROER RIVER was very intense throughout the period. Enemy losses were reported as seventy five (75) killed; 41 PWs taken; materiel captured or destroyed; 2 tanks, 1 half-track (ammo carrier), 2 SP guns, 6 artillery pieces and 10 mortars.

On 21 December, the Division's action continued with CCA fighting against stiff enemy resistance in an effort to get into town of SCHNEIDHAUSEN. The enemy resisted stubbornly, employing small arms, artillery and mortar fire from the East bank of the ROER. At 1800, CCA had fought its way about half way into the town. Scattered fighting continued until after dark.

CCB continued the action in its sector with the 2d Battalion, 330th Inf fighting a house-to-house action in UNTERMAUBACH. At the end of the day its forces had advanced approximately half way thru the town and were then held up by intense fire from machine guns and small arms. During this action many additional enemy troops were flushed from UNTERMAUBACH into the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron road-block and reports indicated that about 50 personnel were killed and an enemy staff car, a tank and a SP gun were destroyed. "B" Company, 81st Tank Battalion, was sent up to UNTERMAUBACH to reduce the resistance which was holding up the 2d Battalion, 330th Infantry. However, the company was unable to get into the town prior to dark because of enemy mines and therefore further advance in the town was held up for the night. The 4th Cavalry Group continued to advance in the Southern sector towards OPBERMAUBACH with the 4th Cavalry Squadron advancing to Hill 72, clearing and consolidating its positions. The 24th Cavalry Squadron advanced and took the high ground overlooking OPBERMAUBACH from the West. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron continued to hold the road block to the Southeast of BILSTEIN and besides halting the enemy flushed from UNTERMAUBACH, prevented reinforcements from moving from the WINDEN area. In general, the enemy all along the Division front resisted, stubbornly, our efforts to clean out the pockets.

During the afternoon of 21 December, orders were received from VII Corps to relieve the 4th Cavalry Group which in turn would revert to Corps control. The Division Commander was authorized to contact the CG, 8th Infantry Division and arrange for a force to effect this relief. The 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, was designated for this mission and at the close of the period the relief was still going on. The boundary between the Division and the 8th Infantry Division was moved to give BOGHEIM to the 8th Division and ran South east to the river just South of UNTERMAUBACH. The town of UNTERMAUBACH remained the responsibility of the 5th Armored Division. The 759th Tank Battalion and the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion started to move from their area at 2100.

The enemy blew the bridge to the East of UNTERMAUBACH in the morning of 21 December. This was believed to have caused some confusion in their forces. A new force had been sent into the town to relieve the enemy parachute unit, defending. It is believed that information of the blowing of the bridge was

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not passed on to the relieving force and the result was that enemy flushed out of the town were forced into the 85th road block. Enemy losses in personnel and materiel for this period was reported as: killed, one hundred seventy five (175); captured 51; materiel captured and destroyed; two (2) tanks, two (2) half-tracks, one (1) SP gun, 1 command car, 2 anti-tank guns and 6 mortars.

On 22 December, the Division continued its action along the ROER RIVER. CCA was relieved of its mission at SCHNEIDHAUSEN at 0745, by the 1st Battalion, 331st Infantry (83rd Division). The 15th Armored Infantry Battalion (CCB) remained attached to CCA and continued its mission of holding the high ground to the West of WINDEN. The 4th Cavalry Group on the CCB Southern flank was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry (8th Division) and boundaries between the Division and the 8th Infantry Division were established as planned the previous day. The 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry (83rd Division), continued its assault and mopping up of the town of UTERMAUBACH. This Battalion was supported by Company "B", 81st Tank Battalion. By 1245, the tanks of this company had reached the river in the Southern portion of the town and during this move had captured a good many prisoners. Company "G", 330th Infantry, had cleared the Northern portion of the town including a large castle reportedly used as the CP for an enemy unit. Other elements of the Infantry Battalion moved thru the remainder of the town mopping up as they advanced.

During this action, orders were received from XIX Corps for relief of the 5th Armored Division by the 83rd Infantry Division during the night of 22-23 December. The Division was to move to an area designated by V Corps and upon arrival in the new area would pass to the control of V Corps.

At 1800, CCB reported UTERMAUBACH clear with the exception of two (2) strong-points in the Southwestern part. These points consisted of two houses which were under direct enemy observation from the East bank of the ROER RIVER. Every attempt to move on these points was balked by intense concentrations of mortar fire, and artillery fire from high velocity guns, firing direct fire from their positions on the ROER's East bank. Enemy positions on the East side of the river also enabled them to use accurate, heavy fire from many types of small arms. Troop "A", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron which was holding the road block to the Southeast of BILSTEIN, was relieved during the hours of darkness and was back in the 85th assembly area by 2400. The following changes were made by the Division effective as of 2400: The 47th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was attached to CCA; the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion passed to control of CCB; the 2nd Battalion, 330th Infantry, was relieved and passed to control of the 83rd Infantry Division. At the close of the period the relief of the Division by the 83rd Infantry Division was progressing without incident. CCA was relieved by the 1st Infantry, and CCB was relieved by the 330th Infantry. Enemy losses sustained for the day were as follows: personnel; killed 85; captured, 172; materiel captured or destroyed, as reported, 5 mortars.

On 23 December, the Division completed its withdrawal from front line positions to assembly areas in the rear. CCA assembled in the Vicinity of MAHN. CCB, with the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, assembled in the

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wooded area to the West of GROSSHAU. All units of the Division maintained a rigid system of patrolling for the purpose of eliminating any threat from enemy parachutists. The XIX Corps had extended their front from the North to include the VII Corps front on 21 December, and the Division was under XIX Corps control from 22 December until the withdrawal to the V Corps sector was accomplished.

On 24 December, the combat elements of the Division moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of LIMBOURG, BELGIUM and the Division CP moved to EUPEN. The Division Trains remained in the ZWEIFALL area. Movement of the Division was completed without difficulty and units were closed by 1800. Upon arrival in the new area, the Division was attached to V Corps in FIRST Army Reserve. CCR reverted to Division control. This combat command had been operating with V Corps units for the entire month and had remained attached to V Corps when the balance of the Division had gone to VII Corps Control.

The entire day of 25 December was utilized in settling the Division units in their new areas and regrouping in preparation for future operations as called for. The Division remained in Army Reserve and was placed on a 2 hour alert status. One married company of CCR ("A", 10th Tank Battalion and "A", 47th Armored Infantry Battalion) had been attached to the 9th Infantry Division. Company "A", 10th Tank Battalion was relieved from the 9th Infantry Division and closed with the 10th Tank Battalion in the CCR area. Company "A", 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, remained attached to the 9th Division. Orders were received from 21st Army Group through FIRST Army to prepare plans to support V and XVIII Corps, FIRST Army and XIII and XIX Corps, NINTH Army.

On 26 December, the Division's action was confined to preparation for future operations and continual patrolling of the Division area for enemy airborne troops reported to have been dropped in the sector North of CCB. All patrols reported negatively. The Division Commander with G-3 and G-4 reported to Headquarters NINTH U.S. Army at 1430 for instructions on future operations. The Division CP was bombed at 1515 but no casualties resulted therefrom.

The Division Trains moved from the ZWEIFALL area to the vicinity of VERVIERS with the Division Administrative Center setting up in the city and Train Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 75th Medical Battalion, and the 145th Signal Company moving into PEPINSTER; the 127th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion set up in THEUX. The 22nd Armored Engineer Battalion moved to its area, just South of WALHORN. The remainder of the Division remained in place. The Division was put on a 4 hour alert status and remained attached to V Corps in Army Reserve.

No change in unit disposition or in the status of the Division was made on 28 December. However, a very careful reconnaissance was made of possible routes from Division assembly areas for use in future operations. Plans were then drawn up for ultimate action in case of enemy attacks in either V Corps sector or the sectors occupied by the XIII, XVIII and XIX Corps.

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During the period 29 December, thru 31 December, the Division continued on an alert status with all elements making preparations for future action. Counter-enemy-paratrooper measures were maintained and Division units patrolled surrounding areas. At 0645, 31 December, enemy planes were over the Division area but heavy flak diverted this aircraft and the bombs which were dropped did no damage to Division installations. At 1100, enemy planes were over the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion area but no offensive action was reported. Three casualties, one killed, resulted from flak during this action.

Total enemy casualties for the month of December were: Enemy killed, 974 (estimated); Captured, 977 (64 of this total are carry-overs from November which were unreported for that month); Tanks, captured or destroyed, 17; motor vehicles 6; SP guns, captured and destroyed, 17; arty pieces, captured and destroyed, 39; Heavy Infantry weapons, captured or destroyed, 41.

6. COMMENTS:

SECTION I - PERSONNEL MATTERS

1. a. Comments pertaining to the four preceding months remain generally applicable.

b. While serving under VII Corps some RTD's came back to the Division thru medical rather than replacement channels. While the numbers so received were small, they constituted a steady, daily flow and greatly reduced the time elapsed between discharge from hospital and return to duty. The method used was the medical battalion and only those wounded and sick who remained in hospitals within the Army Area were so handled. These men returned with no equipment and only the clothing they were wearing. Units retain the clothing and equipment of evacuated for 20 days. Since the period of hospitalization plus time for return usually exceeds this, a problem of initial equipment is presented. The method is, however, good. Anything that speeds up the return of men to their units is highly desirable.

c. As in the preceding four months, discipline within the command has presented no problem. The total number of courts-martial cases tried during the month -- fourteen -- is considered very small. Of these, thirteen were Summary Courts and the remaining one a Special Court. As in the past, ordinary violations such as leaving vehicles unattended, etc., have been very few.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

1. ENEMY TACTICS: (Fighting in HURTGEN Forest).

a. Enemy Use of Mines. The enemy having had time to prepare defensive positions, a greatly increased use of mines was encountered. Wooden Schu mines (Anti-Personnel) proved difficult to locate and were frequently connected with different booby traps which increased their effectiveness. AT mines in quantity were encountered. The absolute necessity for proper marking, recording and reporting of minefields both enemy and our own was again brought out.



b. Enemy Mortars. Mortars again proved to be one of the enemy's most effective weapons and caused a high percentage of our casualties. Extreme difficulty was experienced in locating enemy mortars. All available information on type, characteristics, etc. of enemy mortars has been collected and a summary of this information is being furnished all units. IPW teams are given this information and are instructed to give location of enemy mortars a high priority on questioning of PWs. Interrogators are instructed to obtain as much information as possible on enemy mortar tactics. This information will be furnished all units as obtained.

c. Enemy Air. There was a great increase in number and aggressiveness of enemy air. Numerous reconnaissance planes were reported. There were frequent instances of straffing and bombing and several parachutists were dropped. Our AA proved very effective.

d. Counter-Intelligence. Many instances of the enemy operating in civilian clothes, U. S. uniforms and with U. S. equipment were reported in adjacent sectors. Our security measures were tight and have thus far proven effective. Continuous checks are being made and all information obtainable on enemy tactics and subversive activities is disseminated. PWs captured (1st Army sector) operating in U. S. uniform with U. S. equipment report that they were given details of 5th Army and Division in order to better imitate U. S. soldiers.

e. Enemy Morale. The counter-offensive and German propaganda considerably improved the enemy's morale. Many Germans still believe they will win the war. Many others fight to the last because they see no other alternative. Their propaganda convinces them we will shoot them or send them to Russia, etc. Our propaganda seems seldom effective on their badly warped minds.

### SECTION III - OPERATIONS

*Use of Armored Inf. as Recon and Inf.* ↑  
Action during the period again indicated that when armored units are employed against dug-in defenses on terrain which does not permit of deployment, losses in consequence are extremely heavy. Armored Infantry and reconnaissance elements can satisfactorily perform dismounted infantry missions but in doing so unreplaceable casualties result to the end that the armored unit's efficiency is greatly reduced for the performance of the primary missions for which it has been created and trained. It is believed that armored units should be used to perform dismounted infantry missions only in emergency and not in deliberately planned offensive operations.

Mine blowing equipment made available during this period (T1E1 and "Crab") was of great value in permitting tanks to move forward in otherwise impassable country without great loss of time. It is hoped that this equipment continues to be available in close support.

### SECTION IV - SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE MATTERS

1. The tractor of the M-25 Tank transporter was used as a tow vehicle in evacuation of disabled tanks over roads which would not permit traffic of the complete unit carrying a tank.

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(Reports After Action Against the Enemy - December 1944, Hq 5th Armd Div)

2. Light tanks and armored trailers were used to carry supplies forward and evacuated personnel casualties over terrain which was impassable to 1/4 ton trucks or half-tracks.

3. Supply procedure becomes confused when a division unit is detached from division control. Lack of adequate communications and resultant time lag of reports causes an abnormal period to elapse in procuring replacement of major items.

4. Tank mine exploders are generally very sensitive to terrain and weather conditions. The "Crab" (chain flail) type is the most suitable, from the stand-point of mobility, as a normal attachment or assignment to an armored division. The roller type (T1E1 and T1E3) presents major problems of transportation or movement to the immediate zone of action.

5. In an armored division the loss of personal equipment is not in proportion to the number of personnel casualties. When a vehicle is destroyed the personal equipment of the entire crew is generally lost while only a portion of the crew become personnel casualties.

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

5 Incls:

Incl 1 - G-1 Journal

Incl 2 - G-2 Journal

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Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal

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REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

JANUARY 1945

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

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:Initials: JLB:
:Date: 6 Feb 45:
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6 February 1945

**319.1 GNNJG**

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - JANUARY 1945

1. CAMPAIGN: Western Europe.

- ## 2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

- a. Personnel:**

Killed in Action	1
Seriously Wounded in Action	1
Lightly Wounded in Action	1
Seriously Injured in Action	1
Lightly Injured in Action	1
Missing in Action	1
Total	6

<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EM</u>
0	2	2
0	5	5
1	17	18
0	0	0
1	8	9
0	0	0
<u>2</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>44</u>

- b. Vehicular:**

Type  
Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4  
Truck, 3/4-ton, 4x4, WC w/winch  
Truck, 2-1/2-ton, 6x6, Cargo w/o winch  
Trailer, 1-ton, 2 wheel, Cargo  
Vehicle, Tank Recovery M32

<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
	8
	1
	1
	1
	1
	<u>12</u>

- ### 3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Loss due to Enemy Action</u>
Carbine	15725	
Cal. .30	76668	
Cal. .45	9325	
Cal. .50	93562	
60mm	537	
81mm	90	
37mm	1866	
57mm	88	
75mm gun	909	
75mm how	150	
76mm gun	717	
105mm how	517	
Smoke Pots	4	
Rockets, AT	202	
Grenade, rifle	28	
Grenade hand	146	
Total Tonnage	<u>56,75</u>	

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4. During the month of January 1945 units of the Division were commanded by the following named officers:

Hq, Combat Comd "A", 5th Armd Div - BRIG GEN EUGENE A REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq Co, Combat Comd "A", 5th Armd Div - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF  
Hq, Combat Comd "B", 5th Armd Div - COL JOHN T COLE, 05255, CAV  
Hq Co, Combat Comd "B", 5th Armd Div - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
Hq, Div Arty, 5th Armd Div - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq Btry, Div Arty, 5th Armd Div - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA  
Reserve Command, 5th Armd Div - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Armd Div Tns - LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV  
Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tns - CAPT JAMES R BAGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 0335298, CAV  
145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
85th Cav Ron Sq Mecz - MAJ GEORGE C BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBURG, 0292156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM L CABANISS, 0293176, INF (1-30 Jan 45)  
LFA 30 Jan 45 Succeeded by MAJ GLEN L FOOTE 0450438, CAV (31 Jan 45)  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF  
15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV  
46th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF  
47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223703, FA  
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGIEU, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - LT COL ROLAND S BIRSACH, 0318269, ORD  
75th Med Bn Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BADER, 0372570, MC

628th TD Bn - LT COL WILLIAM J GALLAGHER, 0384592, FA  
387th AAA AW Bn (SP) - LT COL ELMER I KENNEWEG, 0265282, CAC  
3907th QM Truck Co - CAPT CHARLES H DUDLEY, 01581668, QMC  
3912th QM Truck Co - CAPT JOSEPH L ZIOLKOWSKI, 01573993, QMC  
Det "A" Hq & Hq 3rd Armd Gp - MAJ RAY S TREADWELL, 0389764, INF  
505th CIC Det, Hq European TO, U. S. Army - 1ST LT THOMAS A. RYAN -  
01017183 INF

5. NARRATIVE:

The 5th Armored Division having been placed in Army Group Reserve in the late part of December, continued in that status, for the first 25 days of January. The Division was on a four (4) hour alert status during this entire period and all combat elements had reconnoitered routes of movement to support the V, XIII, XIX Corps, or British XII Corps. Assembly areas were selected in each Corps vicinity and these were carefully checked for mines or other obstacles which would slow the division's action. Plans were further worked out for support of the XVIII Airborne Corps from the present Division positions. Each assembly area, or alternate assembly area, chosen by the division was carefully maintained so as to provide an unerring movement thereto if division support was called for by any of the above mentioned Corps. The division carried out maintenance and training programs and by the end of the first 25 days of January, new equipment and reinforcements brought the division close to T/O and T/E strength.

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On 20 January, Company A, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, which had been attached to the 9th Infantry Division returned to division control and joined the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion in the CCR area. Thus, 20 January 1945, marked the first day since 2 August 1944 that some element of the division was not in either direct or indirect action against the enemy.

On 25 January, Troop "C", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was relieved from attachment to CCR and reverted to Squadron control.

On 26 January, the division was alerted for movement to the XIX Corps sector (NINTH US ARMY) and a warning order followed, stating that one (1) combat command of the division would be attached to the 78th Infantry Division for the operations of the latter in the KONZEN area. The Division was to be attached to XIX Corps but with a stipulation that not more than the one (1) combat command would be used without Army approval. Combat Command "A" was attached to the 78th Infantry Division.

On 27 January, the Division was relieved from assignment to First US Army, assigned to the Ninth US Army, and attached to the XIX Corps.

CCA moved to the vicinity of RAEREN and closed in its area at 1415. The combat command was immediately attached to the 78th Infantry Division. The 628 Tank Destroyer Battalion was relieved from First Army and assigned Ninth Army; attached to 5th Armored Division. CCR moved by infiltration to WALHORN.

The Division continued its move into the Ninth U S Army area on 28 January. CCB moved to the vicinity of HERGENRATH. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron moved to BLEYBERG, and the Division CP moved to MORESNET. All moves were accomplished without incident. Plans were made for the movement of the Division Trains on 29 January. Troop "A", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, was attached to CCA effective 1400, 28 January.

During the period 29 January thru 31 January, the Division, less CCA, remained in place training for future operations.

Effective 29 January, 1945, the Division (-CCA) was relieved from attachment to the XIX Corps and attached to the XVI Corps.

On 29 January, the Division Trains moved from the First U S Army area to AACHEN with the Division Administration Center joining the Division CP at MORESNET.

CCA, attached to the 78th Infantry Division, attacked at 0815, 30 January in the direction of EICHERSCHIED. The town itself, plus the high ground to the South and East of it, composed the objective of the combat command. Extensive minefields were encountered initially, which slowed the advance to some degree, but CCA pushed on steadily and at 1600, its advance elements were in EICHERSCHIED. Resistance was quickly reduced within the town and at 1810 it was reported that the town was clear and the high ground to the East, South and Southeast had been outposted.

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The Commanding Officer of the 34th Tank Battalion was wounded by shell fire in completing the mission and was evacuated.

CCA held its positions throughout 31 January, and mopped up scattered enemy resistance in its sector. As the month ended elements of the 78th Division were relieving the combat command in its sector and CCA began moving its units back to its assembly area in the vicinity of RAEREN during the night 31 January-1 February.

The entire operation of CCA was made against light enemy forces and the majority of resistance came from artillery and mortar fire, and as previously stated, extensive minefields were encountered throughout. Enemy casualties for the entire two (2) day operation were as follows: personnel; captured, one hundred twenty four (124), killed, twenty five (25), estimated; materiel captured and destroyed, four (4) 88mm Anti-tank guns, three (3) 120mm mortars, one (1) 105mm field howitzer.

## 6. COMMENTS

### Section I - Personnel Matters

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ENCE*

Reinforcements received in January were, in general, very satisfactory and totalled 923, primarily enlisted men. Receipt of basic infantry riflemen again reflected the difficulty of obtaining armor-trained infantrymen.

Officer shortage in combat arms was alleviated to a small degree by battlefield appointment of a limited number of NCO's as second lieutenants.

Cavalry reinforcements, as before, were unobtainable during January and the situation was relieved to some extent by conversion within the Division of infantry-trained reinforcements to cavalry where MOS's were adaptable to cavalry needs.

RTD's received this month were numerous enough to more than offset the normal daily non-battle losses, 45% of the total reinforcements received being in this category.

### Section II - Photo Intelligence

*↑*

In furtherance of efforts to increase efficiency in the location of enemy mortars, the LA's, artillery observation planes of the division, are being equipped with K20 Air Corps Cameras. The Photo Interpreter's vehicle has been rebuilt for developing purposes and through recent experimentation during Combat Command A's attack on EICHERSCHIED, it has been found that pictures taken and delivered to the PI team can be developed and distributed to units in less than two hours time. The pictures have been excellent and though, so far, no actual shots have been taken of enemy mortar positions it is felt that this method will greatly assist in the location and eventual neutralization of the enemy's mortars. This method of photography is of a decided advantage over normal Air Photos, due to the frequency with which the enemy changes his mortar positions.

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Section III - Operations

*Armed*  
↓  
Due to the limited action of the Division during the month of January, it is believed that, in general, any remarks made would be a repetition of previous months' comments. However, too much emphasis cannot be given to training during periods when units are in reserve. All units of the Division carried out training programs during January, and the value resulting therefrom, especially as pertains to reinforcements was inestimable. It was found possible to complete an appreciable amount of practice firing of both small arms and large calibre weapons on improvised ranges. This firing coupled with small unit problems maintained the fighting efficiency of the unit and helped to assimilate new joiners.

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters

a. During the month of January no serious problems in Supply and Maintenance confronted the Division. As there was very limited action during the entire month, all echelons of supply and maintenance in the division were afforded, and took good advantage of, opportunities to bring their units up to T/E allowance and to perform necessary maintenance.

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

6 Incl.

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REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

FEBRUARY 1945

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

SECRET  
With: CG 5th Armored Div.  
Initials: *CLD*  
Date: 7 Mar 45

319.2 0000

7 March 1945.

**REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - February 1945.**

1. CAMPAIGN: Western Europe & Battle of Germany.
2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

**a. Personnel:**

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EM</u>
Killed in Action	1	12	13
Seriously Wounded in Action		8	8
Lightly Wounded in Action	3	55	58
Seriously Injured in Action		3	3
Lightly Injured in Action		9	9
Missing in Action		3	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>90</b>

**b. Vehicular:**

<u>Type</u>	<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
Carriage, Mtr., 75MM How., M8		1
Carrier Pers., H/T, M3	4	2
Carrier Pers., H/T, M3		1
Medium Tank, M4, M4A1, 14A3 (75MM gun)	10	5
Trailer, ammunition, M10		1
Truck, 1/2 ton, 4x4	4	5
Truck, 2 1/2 ton, 6x6, Cargo w/o/w		1
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>

**3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:**

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Loss due to Enemy Action</u>
Carbine, Cal. 30	12,750	
Cal. .30	75,044	87,750
Cal. .45	6,000	10,400
Cal. .80	12,850	6,620
37mm	862	
57mm		
60mm	16	
81mm		
75mm gun	4,409	
76mm gun	1,080	142
90mm gun	3,631	
105mm How	22,440	
155mm gun	363	
Rockets	56	
Grenades, Assorted	200	
Signal, Assorted		
<b>Total Tonnage</b>	<b>795.9</b>	<b>16.7</b>

0 3278

(NOTE: 38.6 Tonnage expended for training purposes only.)

4. COMMANDERS:

5th Armored Division, commanded by MAJ GEN JAMES E. OLIVER,  
03536, USA.

During the month of February 1945 units of the Division were  
commanded by the following named officers:

Combat Command "A", 5th Armd Div - BRIG GEN EUGENE A REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF  
Combat Command "B", 5th Armd Div - COL HUGH J FITZGERALD, 06719, CAV  
(1 - 8 Feb 45) COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV (9 - 28 Feb 45)  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq & Hq Bn, 5th Armd Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA  
Reserve Command, 5th Armd Div - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
Hq, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Armd Div Tn - LT COL KARL L SCHERRER, 018784, CAV  
Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BACWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 335298, CAV  
145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
88th Cav Bn Sq Mee - MAJ GEORGE C BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV (1 - 12 Feb 45)  
MAJ CHARLES W HENNINGTON, 0452900, INF (12 - 15 Feb 45) - LT COL GEORGE  
C BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV (16 - 28 Feb 45)  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0292156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - MAJ GLEN L FOOTE, 0450438, CAV (1 - 14 Feb 45) - LT COL  
RICHARD H JONES, 0238409, CAV (15 - 28 Feb 45)  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF  
16th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV  
40th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF  
47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
98th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0223705, FA  
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E HESSEGLER, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - LT COL ROLAND S BIERSAH, 0318269, ORD  
75th Med Bn Armd - LT COL BENJAMIN H BADER, 0372570, MC (1 - 4 Feb 45)  
MAJ THOMAS G GARDNER, 0421797, MC (5 - 7 Feb 45) - MAJ RAYMOND J.  
WINKLER, 0357402, MC (8 - 28 Feb 45)  
62nd TD Bn - LT COL WILLIAM J GALLAGHER, 0384582, FA  
63rd Armd FA Bn - LT COL HERBERT W KALE, 0360514, FA (1 - 20 Feb 45)  
MAJ JAMES F CAMPBELL, 0396657, FA (21 - 28 Feb 45)  
307th AAA AW Bn (SP) - LT COL ELLER I KENNEDY, 0265282, CAC  
307th CM Truck Co - CAPT CHARLES H DUDLEY, 01581668, QMC  
3912th CM Truck Co - CAPT JOSEPH L ZIOLKOWSKI, 01573993, QMC  
Det "A" Hq & Hq 3rd Armd Gp - MAJ RAY S TREADWELL, 0389764, INF  
805th CIC Det, Hq European T of Opns, U S Army - CAPT THOMAS A RYAN  
01017183 INF

S E C R E T

(Report After Action Against the Enemy - February 1945, Hq 5th Armd Div)

5. NARRATIVE:

On 1 February 1945, the Division, less CCA, was relieved from attachment to XVI Corps and attached to XIII Corps in place. The Division was not to be moved without prior authority of Headquarters Ninth Army.

CCA was relieved from attachment to the XIX Corps after its successful missions, carried out against the town of EICHERSCHIED and vicinity, had been completed during the last two (2) days of January. The Combat Command moved from an assembly area in the vicinity of RAEREN, to the Division area and closed in the vicinity of NEUDORF at 0430, 1 February.

The Division remained in place through 2 and 3 February, utilizing its time by re-equipping its personnel and maintaining its vehicles.

At 1830, 3 February, Ninth Army lifted restrictions on movement of the Division and at 1950 orders were received for the Division to prepare for movement to an area South of HOENSBROEK, HOLLAND, during the hours of darkness, 4 - 5 February. Movement was postponed 24 hours due to road priorities and at 1800, 5 February, the movement was commenced. Prior to the start of the move an advance party had opened a Division Forward CP at HOENSBROEK and the Division Forward and Rear Echelons moved to this location, closing at 2200.

CCB followed Division Headquarters and closed in its new area at 0130, 6 February.

From 6 through 9 February, the remainder of the Division moved to the new Division locality with CCA, CCR, the 22d Armored Engineer Battalion and Division Trains moving during the hours of darkness 6 - 7.

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3rd Armored Group was assigned to Ninth Army, 6 February, and was immediately attached to the Division to continue its role as a Headquarters Company for CCR, with a small group of officers and enlisted men forming the Armored Section of XIII Corps.

On 7 February, Field Order #5, Headquarters XIII Corps, was received by Division. This order attached CCB to the 102d Infantry Division for an operation scheduled for 10 February. The remainder of the Division was placed in Corps reserve, to remain in its present location in the vicinity of HOENSBROEK, HOLLAND. Plans were that the Division should be prepared for employment on Corps order in the right of the Corps zone to either:

- a. Assist in the capture of the German town of ERKELLENZ.
- b. To pass through the 102d and 84th Infantry Divisions upon completion of the first phase of the Infantry attack on the area generally 3 to 4 miles in South East of the Roer River. The Division's mission was then to be one of exploitation to the Rhine River in the Corps zone.

It was further directed that reconnaissance be conducted in the zone of the 102d Infantry Division with the possibility of employment of the 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion in that zone prior to actual commitment of the entire Division.

(Report After Action Against the Enemy - February 1945, Hq 5th Arm Div)

The 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How) was attached to the Division and closed in the Division Artillery area at 1600, 7 February.

Orders were received from XIII Corps for the movement of the Division Artillery to 102d Infantry Division zone, to be attached to the 102d for operations only. Division Artillery Headquarters, the 47th and the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalions moved during the night 7 - 8 February; the 71st Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved the following night. The entire movement of the Division Artillery was completed by 0600, 9 February.

CCB completed its preparations for the proposed mission with the 102d Infantry Division on 9 February. The remainder of the Division (less Division Artillery) continued plans and training for future operations.

During the period 10 through 17 February, the Division (less CCB and Division Artillery) continued in Corps Reserve. Training and maintenance were carefully planned and executed. CCB and Division Artillery continued in operational attachment to the 102d Infantry Division. CCB carried out training and test firing new weapons. Division Artillery supported the Infantry Division with its artillery fire. During the period the Division also carried out a program of road repair and maintenance, which work was highly praised by the Corps Commander.

The XIII Corps inaugurated a security plan in the Corps sector and the Division was ordered to set up five (5) road blocks as its part of the plan. Accordingly, CCA set up one (1) of the road blocks and CCR and the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized established two (2) each.

During the period 18 through 23 February, the Division less CCB and Division Artillery, continued in Corps Reserve and maintained its security road blocks in the Division zone. The Division Engineer supervised the repair and maintenance of roads throughout the zone.

CCB and Division Artillery remained attached to the 102d Infantry Division for operational control. CCB, was located in the area WELTEN - KUNRADE - URACHSBERG. Division Artillery delivered supporting fire under control of the 102d Infantry Divisions' Artillery.

At 1300, 24 February, CCB moved to the vicinity of BAESWEILER, and at 1630 the Combat Command was relieved from attachment to the 102d Infantry Division, reverting to control of the Division. At 2245 the same day, orders from XIII Corps were received, directing the movement of CCB across the Roer River in the zone of the 102d Infantry Division. This was to take place upon completion of the Infantry Division's attack on Corps objective number four (4). CCB was to relieve an Infantry Regiment on the right flank of the 102d and also assist in the eventual assault on ERKELENZ.

The remainder of the Division, less Division Artillery, prepared for its commitment on Corps order.

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(Report After Action Against the Enemy - February 1945, Hq 5th Armd Div)

On 25 February, the Division Artillery Command was placed under Corps Artillery control.

The Division CP moved from HOENSEBROEK HOLLAND to UBACH, GERMANY at 0930, 25 February.

CCB began to move its units across the Roer River at 0600, 25 February. Task Force "D", consisting of "A" Company, 81st Tank Battalion, "A" Company, 15th Armored Infantry Battalion, one (1) platoon of "A" Company, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion and one (1) platoon of "A" Troop, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized crossed at 0600 and at 0800 it had relieved elements of the 406th RCT on the right flank of the 102d Infantry Division. The remainder of CCB moved across the river, starting at 1830 and had closed just South of HOTTORF by 200, 26 February.

The 22d Armored Engineer Battalion (less A, B & C Companies) moved to UBACH and closed at 1400, 25 February. CCR moved to the vicinity of PALENBERG, closing at 1700. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized (less B Troop) closed in the PALENBERG area at 1930.

Effective 25 February, the following units were attached to the Division by XIII Corps Order:

"C" Squadron, 1st Lothians and Border Yeomanry (this British Unit consists of 15 flail tanks and 185 men), attached as of 1545.

The 989th Treadway Bridge Company (less 1 Platoon) attached at 1800.

The 557th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm SP Guns) to be attached upon the Division's closing across the Roer River.

At 1200, 26 February, CCB attacked from its position South of HOTTORF, to the North on the Corps right boundary, with the mission of cutting the roads to the East and North of ERKELENZ. The attack progressed well against moderate enemy resistance. The towns of WACKERATH - MENEKRATH - KAULHAUSEN and TERHEEG, were seized by 1700 and positions were consolidated for the night. This operation was made extremely difficult by reason of the muddy terrain. Half-tracked vehicles bogged down and the movement of tanks over cross country routes was slow and tedious. During the operation 2 enemy AT guns were destroyed, and a number of Mark IV tanks were engaged, but definite results were not determined at the end of the period. Enemy mortars fired on Division troops from the town of HOLZWEILER, but these were quickly silenced by assault guns of Troop "B", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

The Division Commander ordered CCA to move from HEILENHEIDE to an area just South of HOTTORF. This move was accomplished at 0900, 26 February.

The Division CP moved from UBACH at 2300, 26 February, crossed the Roer River at LINNICH at 0030 and went into bivouac in the vicinity of LOVENICH, GERMANY, closing at 0245, 27 February.

On 27 February, Troop "A", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized crossed the Roer and joined CCA in its area South of HOTTORF.

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CCR began its crossing of the river (at LINNICH) at 0330 and its last elements closed in an area South of HOTTORF at 0730, 27 February.

The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized (-) followed CCR across the river and closed in the CCR area at 0900.

The 22d Armored Engineer Battalion made its crossing at 1200, 27 February and went into bivouac just North of HOTTORF.

CCB launched an attack at 0700, 27 February for the purpose of seizing Corps objective number 5, the area around the town of GLADBACH - RHEINDAHLEN. Task Force Anderson reached the South edge of town and also the town of GUNHOVEN by 1020, 27 February, although advance elements of the force had arrived at that point by 0900. Enemy resistance was moderate and consisted, for the most part, of AT and small arms fire. The terrain in this sector was in very poor condition and vehicles bogged down badly. After replenishing its supply of ammunition the Combat Command attempted continuation of the advance, but the condition of the terrain proved an impossible obstacle, and tanks, as well as half-tracks and wheeled vehicles, could be moved only with great difficulty. At 1625, CCB was ordered to abandon its attempts to move forward and to allow the 102d Infantry Division to pass through and continue the attack. Task Force Dickinson (CCB), moving North towards ERKELENZ, was delayed by an anti-tank ditch at 0800 and as a result was unable to get on his objective until 1400. This force also experienced the difficulties of muddy terrain and many of its vehicles bogged down. It may be pointed out that in some places the terrain was passable, but in the majority of cases the mud seemed bottomless and the difficulty of trying to discern between the passable and the impassable was a continuous hinderance to the Combat Command.

After the completion of the 102d Infantry Division's movement through CCB, the Combat Command regrouped its units to the Southeast of GLADBACH-RHEINDAHLEN.

The Division Trains moved from HOENSBROEK, HOLLAND to the vicinity of UBACH, GERMANY with the Rear Echelon, Division Headquarters, moving to PALENBERG, GERMANY.

On 28 February, the Division remained in place and continued in a Corps Reserve status. CGA and CCB were given the responsibility for protection of the Corps right boundary; CGA having the sector from VENRATH, North to WICKRATH, and CCB with the sector from WICKRATH, North to a point on the railroad at the Southern edge of RHEYDT.

Division Artillery continued to furnish supporting fire to the 102d Infantry Division.

Oral orders, later confirmed by Letter of Instructions #29, were received from XIII Corps, recommitting the Division to action. The Division was to continue the attack in the zone of the 102d Infantry Division, secure bridges East of VIERSEN, cut lines of communications South of

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KREFELD, and be prepared to continue the advance to the Rhine River to seize the bridge across the river in the vicinity of UERDINGEN. (The latter to be on explicit instructions from Corps.)

The orders issued by the Division Commander were as follows:

CCB was to relieve elements of the 102d Infantry Division in the area West of RHEYDT after CCA had cleared MUNCHEN - GLADBACH - RHEINDAHLEN, road.

• CCB, operating from its present position, was to relieve the garrison in WICKRATH, proceed to the area then held by the 407th RCT (102d Infantry Division), North and East of WICKRATH and to relieve that Combat Team. Also, CCB was to secure the right flank of Corps in the MUNCHEN - GLADBACH area.

CCA was to move North, by-passing to the West of the 102d Infantry Division and continue its advance in the Corps zone through HARDT, on condition that the Infantry Division had secured the town and prepared exits.

CCA advanced to HARDT by late afternoon and found the first and second battalions, 406th RCT (102d Infantry Division) engaged in a fire fight against strong resistance which was supported mainly by AT and SP guns in the Northern portion of the town. CCA was unable to bring artillery support forward for the attack on VIERSEN before dark and therefore the Combat Command assembled just short of HARDT and sent patrols to the East and Northeast of the town to determine enemy defensive positions, in preparation for an attack of first light on 1 March 1945.

6. COMMENTS:

Section I - Personnel Matters

a. In general the comments for preceding months remain applicable. Morale and discipline which had been excellent became even higher as the Division again went into action toward the end of the month.

b. The flow of enlisted reinforcements was sufficient to maintain the Division at strength plus part of an authorized overstrength. Of these, 47% were returns to duty - the total received being 554. For the most part these were received daily and in small numbers, thus facilitating handling, assignment and absorption. Officer reinforcements were not so satisfactory. Of thirty-four received, only 15% were returns to duty; and the total received plus 13 battlefield appointments made during the month, was insufficient to fill shortages.

c. The following awards or decorations were made during the month of February:

Bronze Star	63
Oak Leaf Cluster to Bronze Star	10
Second Oak Leaf Cluster to Bronze Star	2
Silver Star	13

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Section II - Intelligence Matters

The enemy committed what forces he could gather, piecemeal, in order to man his battered defenses. Some VOLKSTURM (people's infantry) was encountered by us. As our forces advanced, the enemy showed signs of increasing disorganization. On occasions entire organizations were captured complete with their officers. Several guns and artillery pieces were captured when the enemy found that no fuel was available for his prime movers.

A definite change in attitude of the German PW was noted. Many PWs, some of them officers, stated that they now believe that Germany had lost the war.

Areas immediately on the Rear were found evacuated, but areas farther East were found, on an average, 50% populated. In bombed out cities, such as MUNICH - GLADBACH, the civilians had evacuated the center of the city, but the outskirts were thickly populated.

Enemy losses for the month of February were as follows:

Personnel

PWs for February - 253  
Estimated enemy killed - 175

Material:

- 1 - Light tank, (US) KO'd (was used by enemy)
- 2 - MK V Tanks
- 2 - Trucks
- 4 - Trailers (Misc)
- 1 - 88mm AT-AA-Gun
- 4 - SP guns (75mm, mounted on MK III chassis)
- 3 - 150mm Hows
- 3 - 105mm guns
- 12 - AA-AT guns (Cal. unknown)

Section III - Operations

a. Experience has shown that some men have better night vision than others. During a period of inactivity in February, the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized conducted some tests in an attempt to rate all the men of the squadron on night vision. Equipment was improvised but was satisfactory enough to permit the comparison. This rating now makes it possible to pick men for important night patrol with some regard to their nocturnal visual abilities.

b. It is believed that a scientific test should be devised and administered to all personnel during the training period with the resultant rating permanently recorded on form 20 and 66-1. The efficiency of night operations might thereby be increased.

c. The operations in which this Division took part during the latter part of this month serve to show again that armored units cannot be efficiently used in muddy ground. When they are so employed, they lose

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their greatest asset - mobility. When the terrain is sufficiently solid to permit rapid movement, especially cross-country, armored units are especially effective in maneuvering around cities and large towns to cut off communications and thereby permit infantry units to more easily take the objective

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters

No comments.

For the Commanding General:

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.


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Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal  
Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

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**REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY**

**MARCH 1945**

**HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION**



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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

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Date: 17 Apr 45

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17 April 1945.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - March 1945.

1. CAMPAIGN: Battle of Germany.

2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

a. Personnel:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EM</u>
Killed in Action	2	18	20
Seriously Wounded in Action	3	24	27
Lightly Wounded in Action	7	94	101
Seriously Injured in Action	0	0	0
Lightly Injured in Action	0	7	7
Missing in Action	0	2	2
Total	12	145	157

b. Vehicular:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
Car, Armored, Light, M8.	2	
Carriage, Motor, 75mm How, M8.	1	
Carrier, Pers, H/T, M3, w/w.	3	
Carrier, Pers, H/T, M3, wo/w.	2	
Tank, Med M4, w/75mm Gun.	3	4
Tank, Med M4A3, w/75mm Gun.	1	2
Tank, Med, M4 A1, w/76mm Gun.		1
Tank, Med M4, w/105mm How.		1
Truck, $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 4x4	1	7
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ -ton, 6x6, w/w		2
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, Cargo	1	
Truck, 10-ton, hvy, Wrecker, M1.	1	
Total	15	17

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Loss due to Enemy Action</u>
Carbine, Cal. 30	77,627	
Cal..30	442,035	57,190
Cal..45	74,800	
Cal..50	24,500	2,250
37mm	1,473	160
57mm	81	
60mm	340	
81mm	32	
75mm Gun	4,812	576
75mm Mort	138	48
76mm Gun	2,813	

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105mm How	21,010	
155mm Gun	944	
90mm Gun	4,658	
Cal..50 AA	68,085	
Grenades, Hand	708	112
Grenades, Rifle	100	
Rockets, H.E.	0	0
Total Tonnage	804	10.4

NOTE: 5. Total tonnage expended for Training purposes only.

4. COMMANDERS:

5th Armored Division - MAJ GEN LUNSFORD E OLIVER, 03536, USA  
CC "A" 5th Armd Div - BRIG GEN EUGENE A REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq & Hq Co, CC "A", 5th Armd Div - CAPT KARL W ROTH, 01010340, INF  
CC "B" 5th Armd Div - COL JOHN T COLE, 05256, CAV  
Hq & Hq Co, CC "B", 5th Armd Div - CAPT JOE W PERRY, 01012397, INF  
Div Arty 5th Armd Div - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq & Hq Btry, Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W GUBICK, 0466787, FA  
Reserve Command, 5th Armd Div - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Armd Div Tn - LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV  
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BAGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 335298, CAV  
145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
85th Cav Ron Sq Meez - LT COL GEORGE C BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0092156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - LT COL RICHARD H JONES, 0238409, CAV  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0230452, INF  
15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV  
46th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E BOYER, 0218680, INF  
47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEE, 0223703, FA  
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGIEU, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - LT COL ROLAND S BIERBACH, 0318269, ORD  
75th Med Bn Armd - MAJ RAYMOND J WINKLER, 0357402, MC  
  
628th TD Bn - LT COL WILLIAM J GALLAGHER, 0384592, FA  
387th AAA Av Bn (SP) - LT COL ELMER I KENNEDY, 0265282, CAC  
3907th QM Truck Co - CAPT CHARLES H DUDLEY, 01581668, QMC  
3912th QM Truck Co - CAPT C. SEYMOUR L ZIOLKOWSKI, 01573993, QMC  
Det "A" Hq & Hq 3rd Armd Gp - MAJ RAY S TREADWELL, 0389764, INF  
505th CIC Det, Hq European T of Opns, U S Army - CAPT THOMAS A RYAN  
01017183, INF

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5. NARRATIVE:

At 0130, 1 March 1945, CCR moved to an assembly area in rear of CCA in the vicinity of HARDT. CCB relieved the 407 RCT of the responsibility of maintaining road blocks in the vicinity of WICKRATH. Task forces from the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion and the 81st Tank Battalion were given this mission to relieve the 407 RCT and the relief, which started at 0230, was well under way by 0600. At 0900, CCB sent a reconnaissance patrol into the town of RHEYDT. This patrol reported that the town was clear of enemy troops. At 1430 the task force from the 15th Armored Infantry Battalion had completed a move to relieve the 407 RCT on a road block astride the highway at the railroad crossing on the southeastern edge of RHEYDT. Contact was made with elements of the 29th Infantry Division on their right. All relief of the 407 RCT installations was completed at 2225.

CCA sent Task Force Burton (Companies B and C, 46th Armored Infantry Battalion and Companies B and C, 34th Tank Battalion, married) in an attack to the northeast from the vicinity of HARDT at 0630. Resistance for the most part was scattered with anti-tank guns, SP guns, and a smattering of infantry composing the enemy forces. Terrain and roads were the principal factors in holding the command to a slow advance. Frequent changes of direction had to be made to locate passable road nets. At 1535 advance elements of the combat command had seized a bridge-site on the NIEERS Canal located on the main road from VIERSEN to ANRATH. The bridge over the canal had been partially destroyed but engineers utilizing that part of the bridge's structure which was still intact, began building a trestle bridge at 1640. At 1830, the canal had been bridged and CCA continued its advance on ANRATH. The town's outer ring of defense was smashed by 2240 and troops of CCA were in the town mopping up a sizable force of enemy infantry. Many deliberate road obstacles were found on the roads approaching the town and in the streets of the town. These made the movement of tanks and other vehicles most difficult, and it was necessary to employ the use of clearing parties to allow the passage of the column. ANRATH was completely cleared at 0600, 2 March and CCA reorganized in preparation for continuation of the attack at dawn on 2 March.

Both CCA and CCB had made contact during the day with elements of several enemy divisions, but it was noted that the bulk of prisoners taken by the 2 combat commands were from scattered separate regiments, battalions and companies.

Enemy air activity was much increased over the Division's area and several dog fights were reported. One of the Division Artillery L-4, liaison planes, was shot down by the enemy planes. Incomplete figures on enemy materiel destroyed or captured, were as follows: Two (2) Mark V Tanks, two (2) trucks, four (4) ammo-miscellaneous trailers, one (1) 88mm AT gun.

The Division CP moved North of HARDT during the day on 1 March, closing in bivouac at 1817. CCR remained in place in the vicinity of RATH.

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CCA renewed its forward thrust at 0650, 2 March and at the end of the two (2) hours, a gain of 1 kilometer had been made against steadily increasing enemy resistance. Enemy forces were now steadily withdrawing across the Rhine River and strong rear-guard actions were becoming more and more frequent. As a result, though good progress was made by Division forces, it was not up to the swift scale of preceding days. At 1240, after a slow but steady advance, elements of CCA were within six hundred (600) yards of the town of FISCHELN, at a point just south of the approaches to the town. The combat command was then given orders to halt its advance and assemble off the roads. This was for the purpose of allowing the 102d Infantry Division to advance on the town of KREFELD. When the advance of CCA was stopped, its elements had already reached and gone past the XIII Corps boundary into the XIX Corps zone. Contact had been made at this point with the 2d Armored Division of the XIX Corps which was moving North in the path of the CCA advance.

CCA immediately assembled its forces with Task Force Burton assembling around the point held just South of FISCHELN and the remainder of the combat command assembling at HEIDE. The GP of the combat command was located at SCHRIKENEND.

Task Force Burton was held in place until 1735. At this time the force was ordered to move into the town of FISCHELN in order to establish the force West of the North-South grid line twenty (20), which was then the XIII Corps right boundary. Upon entering the town the task force encountered stiff resistance from a small enemy holding force and one (1) of the attacking tanks was lost to anti-tank fire. Moderate enemy artillery and mortar fire was placed on the Burton column, but with little or no results. Artillery of CCA fired on six (6) enemy tanks as they withdrew towards KREFELD. These tanks were not engaged by the combat command's infantry. As usual every available AT gun was manned by the enemy as he attempted to protect his withdrawal. Some vehicular, bicycle and foot troops were engaged while Task Force Burton was mopping up in the town. Contact was made between Task Force Burton and the 379 Infantry Regiment (95th Division) shortly after the mopping up had been completed. Elements of the 379th took over the town and Task Force Burton assembled in the Northwest corner of the town. It might be well at this time to note the order of battle of CCA. Task Force Burton consisted of the following units:

- Company "B" and "C", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion and companies "B" and "C" 34th Tank Battalion (married).
- 1 Platoon, "A" Company, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion.
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 46th Armored Infantry Battalion.
- 2 Platoons, "A" Company, 22d Armored Engineer Battalion
- The assault gun platoon, 34th Tank Battalion.

Task Force Jones consisted of the following:

- Company "A", 34th Tank Battalion and Company "A", 46th Armored Infantry Battalion (married).

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1 Platoon, Company "A", 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion  
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 34th Tank Battalion

CCA held the following units in its reserve:

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CCA.  
Company "A", 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion (-)

CCB was relieved of its containing mission in the vicinity of WICKRATH - HEYDT and the combat command assembled its units in the vicinity of Institution and HERN with the combat command CP setting up at GLADBACH - REINDAHLEN.

The units of Division Artillery had been displaced well forward and were used in general support of the CCA operation.

The Division CP remained in place north of HARDT. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was moved to the vicinity of VORST and Division Trains into the town of BUCHOLZ. CCR remained in place.

Enemy air activity was encountered during the early hours of 2 March and the CCB area was hit by several bombs, but only slight damage and a few casualties resulted.

On 3 March, CCA was ordered to be prepared to aid the 102d Infantry Division in the latter's attack on KREFELD provided that the Infantry Division needed such aid.

At 0230, Letter of Instructions No. 38, Headquarters XIII Corps, dated 030100, was received by Liaison Officer from XIII Corps. This directive gave the Division a zone of action in the northern sector of the Corps zone in which forces of the Division would mop up, clear roads and cut the roads along the Rhine River in the vicinity of ORSOY. The Division Commander issued oral orders to CCR to move north through HARDT - DULKEN, cross the canal at OEDT, and advance as rapidly as possible to the east to accomplish the mission as outlined by the Letter of Instructions.

At 1420, Letter of Instructions No. 39, dated 031215, Headquarters XIII Corps, arrived at Division. These instructions changed the boundary and slightly altered the plans and instructions which previously were issued. The Commanding General immediately left the Division CP to visit the commands and issue revised instructions. The substance of the Commanding General's orders were as follows: CCA was ordered to move to an assembly area northeast of KEMPEN; CCB to assemble to the southwest of the same town; Division Artillery to support CCR in fulfillment of its mission.

CCR started to move towards its objective at 1245. The route of advance was as follows: HARDT - DULKEN - SUCHTLEN - OEDT - KEMPEN - HULS. The advance was rapid and no enemy resistance was encountered until the combat command reached a point just north of HULS at approximately 1515. Prior to this meeting

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with the enemy, however, CCR was slowed considerably by a rather confusing situation to the front and on its left flank. Apparently elements of the 8th Armored Division had confused their boundary and as a result had run into the CCR zone of approach in the area KEMPEN - ST HUBERT. This situation was rectified quickly and CCR pressed its attack. As previously stated, some enemy resistance was encountered north of HULS. This was mainly a few scattered pockets of infantry, however, and these were quickly liquidated by CCR.

At 1855, leading elements of CCR ran into the day's first heavy resistance. At a road junction 800 yards west of MORTS, anti-tank, mortar and artillery fire became quite intense. The combat command halted and regrouped, and at the same time reconnaissance was made on the approaches to the objective. Positions were established for the night and reconnaissance continued to search out possible routes of movement. Division ordered CCR to turn north to REPELEN but to stay within the Division zone. (This was necessary so as to keep clear of the 84th Infantry Division operating to the right of CCR). A report from CCR, stated that houses and basements were full of enemy troops and mopping up during the late evening was an extremely slow process. Some artillery and mortar fire continued to fall in the area. It was also reported that reconnaissance had located strongly held positions to the front of the combat command and that the attack would continue at dawn.

Again during the late evening of 3 March, impassable roads were the chief obstacle encountered by CCR. However, in this day's operation it was demolition and craters in the roads which caused their poor condition. It was thus advisable for the combat command to stop for the several hours to daylight and prepare for a more rapid and less risky advance by reconnoitering the roads and sweeping or clearing those which were indispensable to the attack.

Enemy losses in materiel were as follows:

One (1) AT gun (75mm)	One (1) Ammo dump (captured intact)
One (1) AT gun (37mm SP)	One (1) Bazooka dump (captured intact)
One (1) SP gun (Cal unknown)	One (1) Battery search lights.
Two (2) Pers carriers (full track)	
Eight (8) trucks (with ammo)	
Four (4) motorcycles	

CCA and CCB began their movement to the assembly areas designated by the Division Commander late in the day, 3 March. These moves were completed on 4 March and the combat commands were ordered to garrison the larger towns in the vicinity and to screen the civilian population.

During the early morning of 4 March, as CCR was preparing for a daylight attack on REPELEN, its reconnaissance elements probed the enemy's positions and confirmation was made on captured maps and photos which showed a strong OPL running generally north and west of MOERS and probably beyond. During the remaining hours of darkness, advance elements of CCR received small arms fire and artillery fell intermittently to the north of their positions.

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At dawn CCR resumed its attack, with its elements advancing north toward REPELEN. The enemy employed small arms and bazooka fire in an effort to block the attack. However, by 1200, enemy artillery fire which at the start of the attack had been sporadic, became increasingly heavy as CCR forces moved to within 2 kilometers of REPELEN. Shortly after 1230, the head of CCR's column had entered REPELEN. The reconnaissance troop of CCR was immediately sent out to screen the left flank of the combat command during the fighting for REPELEN. House-to-house fighting developed in the town shortly after the initial entry by CCR. To sum up the situation at this time was substantially as follows: One married company ("A", 10th Tank Battalion and "A", 47th Armored Infantry Battalion) of TFH was in the town of REPELEN and had ground its way through to the northern part of the town; the married "C" companies (10th Tank Battalion and 47th Armored Infantry Battalion) were by-passing the town to the south and east and aiming for a vital enemy escape route northeast of the town. Task Force Boyer, with the married "B" companies, Hq & Hq Co (47th Armored Infantry Battalion) and platoon from the 22d Armored Engineer Battalion and 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion remained in an assembly area south of REPELEN.

At 1725, the married "C" companies had cut the main north-south road running between RHEINBERG and MOERS at a point southeast of REPELEN. The married "A" companies had made little progress as they smashed at enemy defense positions in the northern part of town. No air observation was possible due to bad weather hence inability to locate Bosch 88's. Bitter resistance continued in that area with the bulk of enemy fire coming from 14 88mm towed AT guns and several 88mm SP guns. At this time large numbers of enemy were being slowly squeezed into a narrow pocket between the Allied forces advancing from the north, west and south. The cutting of one of the few remaining escape routes for these enemy troops by CCR, resulted in a continual pressure on the combat command's positions as the enemy attempted to flee towards ORSOY on the Rhine River. Highly aggressive action on the part of the combat command broke up these attempts to escape the jaws of the trap which was closing off the Rhine exits to the German troops in the sector and escape was held to a minimum. No further progress in force was made by CCR during the night 4 - 5 March, but patrols were sent out and these discovered a large enemy force in position along the railroad north and east of REPELEN. This force was composed principally of anti-tank guns and infantry; also artillery and mortar positions were located in the woods southeast of the town. Some high velocity and 120mm mortar fire was reported falling on the CCR position from this area during the night.

The Division CP moved and the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron moved to KEMPEN on 4 March 1945. "G" Squadron, 1st Lothian and Border Yeomanry (British), attached to CGA during its operation were relieved.

At dawn, 5 March, CCR resumed its attack and sent the married "C" companies of Task Force Hamburg to the north from their position on the RHEINBERG - MOERS road. This force overwhelmed enemy resistance in its path and seized the road junction at HEINKAMP northeast of REPELEN thus opening a route of advance for

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Task Force Boyer who had moved from his assembly area south of the town shortly after 0900. Task Force Boyer seized this opportunity and sent his forces speeding towards ORSOY at 1010. It is of interest at this point to bring out the remarkable mobility of an armored force on an exploitation mission of this sort. Task Force Boyer in a running fight against the enemy smashed its way from RHEINKAMP to ORSOY, a distance of five (5) to six (6) kilometers in thirty five minutes. Aggressiveness and speed were contributing factors in holding Division casualties to a minimum while the force over-ran numerous enemy positions. The married "A" companies of CCA's 34th Tank Battalion and 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, were attached to CCR on the afternoon of 4 March. These companies followed Task Force Boyer a few kilometers east of the road junction at RHEINKAMP and stopped there, setting up a line of defense east of the junction facing north. "A" companies of Task Force Hamburg mopped up the northern edge of REPELEN and then established a line running north of the town to the road junction at RHEINKAMP, where it linked up with the married "C" companies who were consolidating their positions on the junction.

In the meantime, Task Force Boyer reported that his force had taken many prisoners and that enemy units were still being flushed into his sector as they attempted to reach the ferry-site at ORSOY on the river. The task force had been attacked by four (4) SP guns (caliber unknown) from the north as its advance elements entered the town, but these were destroyed by tank and artillery fire. While fighting through the town the tanks of Task Force Boyer caught a large column of approximately fifty (50) to sixty (60) enemy vehicles awaiting withdrawal across the Rhine. This column was completely destroyed by the tank guns. Shortly thereafter, a smaller enemy column coming into the ferry-site from the north, suffered a similar fate. Mopping up operations continued in ORSOY and the areas in the vicinity of REPELEN. Contact was made with the 8th Armored Division on the XIII - XVI Corps boundary north of REPELEN.

At ORSOY, Task Force Boyer encountered artillery and direct AT fire from an enemy pocket in the vicinity of BUDBERG and also from the east bank of the Rhine River across from ORSOY. Fire from artillery and tanks of Task Force Boyer was directed against targets located near BUDBERG. Reports indicated the enemy troops in that vicinity were elements of the 116th Panzer Division. At 1710, the enemy began laying smoke across the road southeast of ORSOY; apparently to protect his withdrawal. Repeated attempts to reach the ferry were frustrated by CCR.

By late evening, CCR reported the situation well in hand, with only spasmodic artillery fire from the enemy positions. Task Force Boyer had pushed a line just outside of the northern edge of ORSOY and it was planned that Troop "C", 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron and infantry from Task Force Hamburg would reinforce the troops in this sector during the night.

At 1055, 5 March, Division Trains and Division Headquarters Rear Echelon closed in KEMPEN, GERMANY. CCA and CCB completed occupation of the larger towns in their respective zones and began screening civilian populace in those towns.

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Enemy air activity was light during the Division's operations 5 March. However, enemy fighter planes had attacked elements of CCR while the combat command was pushing its attack, but these were driven off after Division anti-aircraft fire had destroyed one (1) of their number. No loss was reported by the combat command as a result of this action.

Enemy losses in personnel and materiel during the day's operation, were reported as follows: personnel losses, approximately 50 killed, 473 prisoners of war, materiel captured or destroyed, four (4) 88mm SP Guns, nine (9) 20mm AA Guns, eight (8) 75mm AT Guns, nine (9) 88mm AA AT Guns (towed), four (4) 155mm howitzers (towed), two (2) 75mm howitzers (towed), one (1) Mark IV tank, forty eight (48) miscellaneous trucks, fifteen (15) staff cars, sixteen (16) horses, eleven (11) barges, one (1) tug, one (1) ammo dump, one (1) oil dump, one (1) warehouse full of food staples. One complete battery of guns was taken by CCR on this date and a few days later the Battery Commanding Officer was captured by the combat command.

On 6 March, CCR was engaged in mopping up of the entire area centering around ORSOY. Contact was made with the 335th RCT (Div) on the right at BAERL at 0900. CCR was forced to use the bulk of its forces to protect the northern flank from enemy forces reported in that area. However, at 1915, it was reported by CCR that elements of the 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, had entered ORSOY from the north, thus eliminating the threat of an exposed flank. Arrangements were being made at that time to turn over the town to the 35th Infantry Division. Most of the CCR zone had been cleared and it was contemplated that the balance would be completed on 7 March.

CCA had completed approximately 75 per cent screening of the civilian populace in its area. CCB was still deeply engaged in completing its screening. This work in KEMPEN, was being done by Division Trains with help from the 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and the Division CIC detachment.

Enemy losses reported for 6 March, were as follows: Personnel, eighty seven (87) prisoners of war; materiel, fifty (50) carloads of coal, one (1) SP Gun (88mm).

On 7 March, CCR continued mopping up in the town of ORSOY and the surrounding areas. The married "C" companies of the 10th Tank Battalion and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, relieved the married "B" companies and "C" Troop, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron in ORSOY. Close contact was maintained by the combat command with units of the 35th Infantry Division on the left as the Infantry Division advanced towards ORSOY. At 1800, CCR reported that elements of the 75th Infantry Division were relieving the combat command units in ORSOY. The relief was complete at 1940 and the combat command withdrew its troops behind the line BORNHEIM - WINTERSTICK. Contact points were established with the 75th Infantry Division and the 84th Infantry Division, the latter being on the right flank of CCR. Three enemy planes bombed REPELEN at 1910, but no casualties and little damage resulted therefrom.

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The remainder of the Division continued policing, patrolling and screening of enemy personnel throughout the Division zone. The Division Artillery was placed under control of the XIII Corps for operations only.

Forty five (45) PWs were taken by the Division on 7 March. A great mass of miscellaneous materiel was captured or destroyed by the Division excluding that materiel previously reported, the following list is indicative of the speed and element of surprise which marked the Division's push to the Rhine: numerous warehouses, containing mines, bazookas, ammunition, grenades and similar supplies, seventy five (75) carloads of coal and clothing (this in addition to the previously reported 50 cars of coal captured by CCR on 6 March), several ammo dumps, one (1) signal equipment depot, one (1) medical supply depot, one (1) food depot, and various other supplies including a complete search light battery, motorcycles, bicycles and a barge.

The married "A" companies of the 34th Tank Battalion and the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion (1st) were relieved from control of CCR and reverted to CCA on 8 March. "C" Company, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was relieved from CCR and reverted to Division control. The Division as a whole, continued its screening and patrolling missions.

On 9 March, the 695th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the 557th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm gun SP) were relieved from attachment to the Division and reverted to control of XIII Corps Artillery.

The Division was given a new area of responsibility bounded by the towns of HULS, KREFELD (exclusive), ST TONIS south to WILLICH (exclusive) to SCHIEFBACH (exclusive), east to the NIEERS Canal, north along the canal to MULHAUSEN (exclusive) northeast to KEMPEN (exclusive) to HULS. All other elements of the Division continued processing in their old areas and plans were made to move troops, not then needed, to the new zone. Early contact was contemplated from the 75th Infantry Division which was to relieve the 5th Armored Division in the KEMPEN - REPELEN area.

Twenty three (23) PWs were taken this date as the Division patrolled the area between the BAERLER woods and VLUYN. Several missions were fired by Division Artillery on targets east of the Rhine River.

On 10 March, the Division moved its elements to take up positions in the new zone. Small police detachments were left in the old area; these to remain until relieved by the 75th Infantry Division. The Division CP moved to NEERSEN. CCB moved its CP to OEDT and placed the 81st Tank Battalion in that town. The 15th Armored Infantry Battalion (CCB) was left in the town of ZIEGLEHEIDE. CCR assembled its units around ST TONIS with the exception of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, which remained at REPELEN. The 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, moved to the vicinity of MUNSCHHEIDE and the 22d Armored Engineer Battalion moved to TEMMENHOFE.

Oral orders received from XIII Corps at 1100, enlarged the Division zone to the Corps boundary on the west. This would include to the town of VIERSEN,

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but exclusive of the town itself. Military Government activities in the area west of the NIEERS Canal would be handled by XIII Corps. The new area extended the Division zone to the west from the canal at MULHAUSEN, to BREYELL, south to BOLSHEIM - DULKEN - HARTDT, east to LAMERN, northeast to GROSSHEIDE, east to HOVEN, and northeast to DONK.

On 11 March, the 75th Infantry Division relieved Division units in the KEMPEN - REPELEN area. Division elements not physically relieved, were ordered withdrawn and all were moved to the Division zone. The Division expanded its zone to the west as ordered the previous day. Security road blocks were established throughout the Division zone and all units continued road patrols and the screening of German personnel. Division Artillery under Corps control for operations, was moved to the 11th Cavalry Group sector and went into direct support of that organization.

The major portion of the Division zone had been closely checked and cleared by 2000, 12 March, and screening of personnel was progressing rapidly.

From 12 March through 15 March, the Division continued patrolling, policing, screening and the manning of its road blocks. Due to the many jobs during this period, training was held to a minimum, but considerable time was spent in maintenance of equipment and administrative matters.

At 1030, 15 March, the Commanding General, XIII Corps, Major General A. C. GILLEN JR, arrived at the Division CP at NEERSEN, GERMANY for the purpose of awarding the Division Commander a 2d Oak Leaf Cluster to the Bronze Star Medal for meritorious achievement during the period 23 February through 5 March 1945. General GILLEN addressed the assembled officers of Division Headquarters and the Commanders of CCB, CCR and Division Artillery. The Corps Commander commented on the Division's activity during the operation across the Roer River and the following smashing assault to the west bank of the Rhine River. The General, quoting a high allied Staff Officer, stated that "The Fifth Armored Division is one of the two finest American Armored Divisions on the continent." Going further, General GILLEN stated that Field Marshal MONTGOMERY, Commander of the 21st ARMY GROUP and General SIMPSON, Commanding General NINTH US ARMY, were among the many who applauded this latest operation of the 5th Armored Division.

During the period 16 through 30 March the Division was held in the aforementioned areas with the Division CP remaining at NEERSEN. Besides maintaining its security missions, training was carried out for the purpose of perfecting small deficiencies noted during the Divisions last operation. Mortar firing was given priority by some of the units. Small arms and tank guns were best fired frequently. The 22d Armored Engineer Battalion maintained road patrols throughout the Division area and all roads were closely checked with any needed repairs quickly administered.

On 24 March, the 387th AAA AW Battalion was relieved from attached to the Division and moved to the NINTH ARMY bridgehead over the Rhine River

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where it was employed by reason of its experience. A newly arrived AA Bn, the 573rd AAA AW Bn, was attached to the Division to replace the 387th. On 30 March, the 387th returned to Division and relieved the 573rd.

On 30 March, Letter of Instructions, No. 46, Headquarters XIII Corps, was received at Division Headquarters. The Division was to be recommitted to action on 31 March with the mission to be as follows: Cross the Rhine River at WESEL and attack east in the Corps Zone; by-pass MUNSTER and seize crossings over the DORTMOND - EMS Canal, cut lines of communications to MUNSTER and south and east of the city; seize crossings over the EMS River and be prepared to continue the advance in the Corps zone. The Division published two (2) letters of instructions dated 301200 and 301300. Those letters detailed the instructions contained in the XIII Corps Letter.

At 0530, 31 March, CCR started its move from ST TONIS and the balance of the Division followed in the wake of the combat command. Order of March was as follows: CCR, CCB, Division Headquarters, Division Artillery (-), 22d Armored Engineer Battalion (-), Headquarters 1149th Combat Engineer Group, 292 C Engineer Battalion, CCA, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and Division Trains. CCR crossed the IP at ISSUM at 0700 and reached the Rhine River bridge at WESEL at 0745. The crossing of the river by CCR was completed at 1150 and its units were moving east in the zone toward an assembly area south and west of MUNSTER. Reconnaissance reported some enemy resistance in the zone of CCR, east of APPELHULSEN. Elements of the 83rd Infantry Division were in SENDEN and the 17th Airborne Division held a line APPELHULSEN - NOTTULN. The 17th had formulated plans to attack to the east and MUNSTER. CCR continued its advance and east of AMELSBUREN, enemy tanks, SP guns and infantry attempted to halt the combat command. However, friendly air dispersed the tanks and guns and CCR mopped up the infantry, capturing two hundred seventy (270) PWs. The railroad bridge in AMELSBUREN was reported by air to be intact and at 2400 CCR was preparing to launch a night attack to seize the bridge.

CCB, following CCR, was to go into an assembly area east of MUNSTER. When the combat command approached its area it found the 17th Airborne Division holding a line between APPELHULSEN and NOTTULN, engaged in a fire fight with enemy forces west of MUNSTER. These enemy forces were attempting to disrupt the Airborne Divisions attack on MUNSTER. CCB went into an assembly area north and west of APPELHULSEN, to await results of the 17th Airborne's attack.

The Division CP moved from MEERSEN at 1415, crossed the IP at 1625 and began crossing the Rhine River at WESEL at 1742. The assigned area for DHQ and Division troops was to have been in the vicinity of APPELHULSEN, but the delay in CCB's movement caused a change of plans. The Division CP opened 1 kilometer southeast of STOCKUM at 2210 after a march of one hundred twenty seven (127) kilometers. Under the new plan, the 22d Armored Engineer Battalion and attached engineer support were to assemble in the vicinity of BULDERN; Division Artillery west of the Division CP; the 85th along the road east of STOCKUM; CCA along the main road IJZEL - DULMEN. The above units were en-route at the close of the day. The 6th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was attached to the Division at 311200.

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6. COMMENTS:

Section I - Personnel Matters

a. Casualties sustained were relatively light in the Division's operations the first week of March and the last two days of the month. Reinforcements (1 officer and 169 enlisted men) and RTD's (11 officers and 231 enlisted men) brought the Division to an overstrength in enlisted men and reduced the shortage of officers, except in Infantry where the condition continues to exist.

b. In the nine days the Division was in action 1214 PWs were captured. Evacuation of PWs was rendered difficult by reason of the rapidity of advance and the consequent operational demands made upon the Division's organic transportation. This situation was alleviated to some extent by use of trucks furnished by the Corps PM.

c. (1) Decorations awarded during March were as follows:

Silver Star	23
Bronze Star	121
Soldiers Medal	1

(2) Seven (7) battlefield commissions were awarded to enlisted men of the Division during the month.

Section II - Intelligence Matters

In the defense of the east bank of the Rhine River the enemy was most active with patrols and even more active in his anti-patrol activity. One interesting development in the furtherance of the latter effort was the employment of searchlights to scan the west bank in order to pick up our patrols as they crossed. Gunfire, or the setting off of any trip-flares set by the enemy was the signal for these searchlights to sweep the river zone. Artillery fire was found to be an excellent counter-measure against the enemy's use of searchlights.

Operations east of the Rhine produced four interesting developments in enemy tactics:

(1) The absence of the renowned "anti-tank ditch." This obstacle which had been so extensively prepared between the Roer and Rhine Rivers was almost totally absent east of the Rhine.

(2) The definite increase in trend of employment of the enemy's dual-purpose (AA/AT) guns as flat trajectory, ground weapons. These gun positions were, as normal, defended by entrenched SA positions. This being the case, these positions have been given high priority. Aerial photos, and APID reports are extremely valuable in the location of these guns.



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(3) The use of the abatis road block; probably as a substitute for his heretofore profusion of anti-tank ditches. As normal in an abatis, the trees are felled across the road from both sides. Either buzz-saws or explosives are used to fell the trees. Prepared logs have also been used, both in lieu of, and in addition to, the abatis. The majority of abatis which we have encountered have been defended with AT, SA and bazooka fire.

(4) Some showing of the threatened "Volksturm" manning bazookas." On several occasions members were captured, and killed, in the act of employing bazookas against our forces.

Section III - Operations

G-3 Air--

Use of Fighter-Bomber Pilot as Forward Controller with VHF Radio.

Morse  
Armed  
During the past eight months of almost continuous operations it has become increasingly apparent that the policy of changing the Fighter-Bomber pilots with the forward VHF radio in tanks every ten (10) days does not maintain the efficiency necessary in Air-Ground cooperation. It usually takes several days for a new pilot to become familiar with the ground picture and his new job. It takes a few more days for him to feel sure of himself in his vastly different role. By that time his replacement is on hand, which often times occurs in the middle of an operation, and the pilot must return to flying status. Then, too, pilots working with the ground troops and aware of certain operations are necessarily grounded for a few days upon return to their base because of this knowledge.

In an armored division it is often times necessary in order to operate efficiently to have two (2) VHF operators, one with the combat command CP and the other with a task force of the combat command. This necessitates having two (2) pilots per combat command or a total of six (6) per armored division. This number of pilots is not available and inasmuch as a TAC ruling prohibits anyone other than a pilot from using the VHF radio it automatically cuts down on the maximum possible ground effort.

The solution, as we see it, is to have the Division G-3 Air, Combat Command S-3 Air and Tank Battalion S-3 Air Officers that are provided by T/O, all trained by Air Corps personnel and to use them as Forward Controllers as and when necessary. The AGCO and party could still remain in control at the Division CP. This system would eliminate all present deficiencies, insure adequate VHF operations for all situations, would not deplete the present pilot strength and would guarantee maximum ground effort and Air-Ground cooperation.

If the above corrections cannot be made at this time then the pilots operating as VHF controllers with armored divisions should be placed on DS, just as the AGCO and party and for the same period of time (2-3 months), and increased in number as recommended above.

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✓ This is a collective view of not only Combat Commanders, Tank Battalion Commanders but also of Air Corps AGCO and G-3 Air and S-3 Air officers.

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters

No comments.

Section V - Military Government

During the first part of the operations from 25 February to 5 March 1945, Military Government personnel was occupied chiefly in keeping civilian population from circulating, herding Russians, Poles, Dutch and Displaced Persons off the roads and separating them from Refugees flushed out and driven into our area by other units that had not then adopted the stand fast policy.

The Spearhead Detachment (3 officers and 6 enlisted men) was brought forward to RATH, which had been evacuated of its civil population, and a Temporary Displaced Persons Center was established there handling several hundred persons. A refugee center was established at KIPSHOVEN.

The detachment then moved to HARDT, where the civil population remained for the most part undisturbed. Normal Military Government operations were conducted including collection of firearms, re-establishment of civil police, appointment of new burgermiesters, clearing of streets, and so forth.

At the same time Displaced Persons were coming into the CCB area at RHEINDAHLEN and a Displaced Persons center was set up in the Adolph Hitler School, and on the day the Combat Command moved forward, over 1000 Displaced Persons were collected with some food supplies made available to them. They were turned over to the CIC detachment of Corps upon leaving. Food was previously made available to several hundred Displaced Persons in an institution along the road between RHEINDAHLEN and MUNICHEN GLADBACH, beginning the afternoon the area was taken by the infantry of CCB.

Corps adopted the policy of freezing the civilian population some time after operations began, but it was not actually put into effect by the two infantry divisions until about the time HARDT was taken, and in CCA's operations south of KREFELD, an estimated 2000 civilians from the town had to be driven back.

While CCR was in the REPELEN - ORSOY area many refugees were driven into the area from MORS and many Displaced Persons came back from the mines near ORSOY. About 1200 civilians were found in one building, a hospital at ORSOY. A survey of the mines in our area has been made, and reports thereof and of industries have been made to G-5 of Corps.

Electric power restoration in parts of area made through direction of Military Government Offices of Staff and Detachment, with approval of Engineers. Particular places included are mines near REPELEN and towns of ST HUBERT, KEMPEN, GELB, MEIHAUSEN and ST. TONIS.

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Preliminary registration of all persons 12 years and older of Division area completed. This has aided security and civilian control.

Local governments now functioning in entire Division area including opening of some banks.

Youths above 12 years of age have been put to work chiefly on farms throughout the entire area.

In area of KEMPEN the population, as has been usually the case in areas recently subjected to bombing or severe fighting, were dazed and bewildered for about 36 hours after "R" went through, and except for the house to house search by troops for firearms, made before the people had an opportunity to turn in firearms or report same, usual Military Government functions were carried out by the detachment when it moved from HARDT to KEMPEN the same day as Division Headquarters.

Military Government cases tried to date included violation of circulation, of enemy propaganda, and harboring German soldiers. Penalties were given up to 2 years.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

5 Incls:

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

*Edward G. Farrand*  
EDWARD G. FARRAND,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
Chief of Staff.

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REPORT OF DEER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY

APRIL 1945

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION



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
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HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO No 255  
U. S. Army

S E C R E T

:Auth:CG 5th Arm'd Div:  
:Initials: ced  
:Date: 8 May 1945

319.1 GNNJG

8 May 1945.

REPORT AFTER ACTION AGAINST ENEMY - April 1945.

1. CAMPAIGN: Battle of Germany.

2. LOSSES IN ACTION:

a. Personnel:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Total O &amp; EM</u>
Killed in Action	10	58	68
Seriously Wounded in Action	1	53	54
Lightly Wounded in Action	17	158	175
Seriously Injured in Action	1	2	3
Lightly Injured in Action	1	27	28
Missing in Action		8*	8
Total	<u>30</u>	<u>306</u>	<u>336</u>

(\*Four (4) of this number returned to duty the first few days in May)

b. Vehicular:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Destroyed or Abandoned</u>	<u>Evacuated</u>
Car, Armored, Light, M8.	2	
Carrier, Pers., H/T.	6	2
Tank, Mod., w/75mm gun.	7	8
Tank, Mod., M4A1, w/76mm gun.	6	6
Exploider, Mine, (Grab).		1
Trailer, ammunition, M10.	1	2
Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ ton, 4x4.	10	22
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton, 6x6, Cargo.	5	1
Trailer, 1 ton, 2 wheel, Cargo.	2	2
Vehicle, Tank, Recovery, M32 series		1
Gun, 57mm, M1, w/Carr., M1A3.		1
Total	<u>39</u>	<u>46</u>

3. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES AND LOSSES:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Expended</u>	<u>Loss due to Enemy Action</u>
Carbine, Cal. 30	32,000	
Cal..30	646,009	146,500
Cal..45	61,306	
Cal..50	182,373	60,780
37mm gun	3,122	1,878
57mm gun	386	
60mm mortar	312	
81mm mortar	340	
75mm How	1,968	870
76mm gun	1,776	406

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90mm gun	607	
105mm How	21,994	
155mm gun	2,032	
Gronados	1,698	344
Signal Assorted	120	
Rockets, AT	110	
Total Tonnage	<u>766.3</u>	<u>34.0</u>

4. COMMANDERS:

5th Armored Division, commanded by MAJ GEN LUNSFORD E. OLIVER,  
03536, USA.

Combat Command "A", 5th Armd Div - BRIG GEN EUGENE REGNIER, 08295, USA  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "A" - 1ST LT R B WHITAKER, 0517645, INF  
Combat Command "B", 5th Armd Div - COL JOHN T COLE, 08256, CAV  
Hq & Hq Co, Combat Command "B" - CAPT JOE J FEERY, 01012397, INF  
5th Armd Div Arty - COL DOUGLAS J PAGE, 04495, FA  
Hq & Hq Btry, 5th Armd Div Arty - CAPT NORMAN W CUSICK, 0466787, FA  
Reserve Command, 5th Armd Div - COL GLEN H ANDERSON, 08632, INF  
Hq Co, 5th Armd Div - CAPT LARRY H GREENWOOD, 01283065, INF  
Hq 5th Armd Div Tn - LT COL KARL L SCHERER, 018784, CAV  
Hq Co 5th Armd Div Tn - CAPT JAMES R BIGWELL, 01011081, CAV  
MP Platoon, 5th Armd Div - MAJ ALEXANDER T NELSEN, 335298, CAV  
145th Armd Sig Co - CAPT GLENN A WELDE, 0453447, SC  
85th Cav Ren Sq Mocz - LT COL GEORGE C BENJAMIN, 023422, CAV  
10th Tank Bn - LT COL WILLIAM A HAMBERG, 0292156, INF  
34th Tank Bn - LT COL RICHARD H JONES, 0238409, CAV  
81st Tank Bn - LT COL LE ROY H ANDERSON, 0239452, INF  
15th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL GLENN G DICKENSON, 0197385, CAV (1-17 Apr 45)  
NBI 18 Apr 45 Succeeded by MAJ EMERSON F HURLEY, 0318926, INF  
46th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL WILLIAM H BURTON, 0366028, INF  
47th Armd Inf Bn - LT COL HOWARD E ROYER, 0218680, INF  
47th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JOHN B ROSENZWEIG, 0246291, FA  
71st Armd FA Bn - LT COL ISRAEL B WASHBURN, 0235367, FA  
95th Armd FA Bn - LT COL JAMES W MC NEER, 0023703, FA  
22d Armd Engr Bn - LT COL FRED E RESSEGIEU, 020575, CE  
127th Ord Maint Bn - LT COL ROLAND S BIERSON, 0318269, ORD  
75th Mod Bn Armd - MAJ RAYMOND J WINKLER, 0357402, MC

628th TD Bn - LT COL WILLIAM J GILLESPIE, 0384592, FA  
387th Col. M Bn (SP) - LT COL SIMON I KENNEDY, 0265082, CAC  
3907th QM Truck Co - CAPT CHARLES H DUDLEY, 01581868, QMC  
3912th QM Truck Co - CAPT JOSEPH L ZIOMACSKI, 0157313, QMC  
Det "A" Hq & Hq 3rd Armd Gp - MAJ RAY S CALDWELL, 0009764, INF  
505th CIC Det, Hq European F of Opns, 1. C. Armd - CAPT THOMAS A RYAN  
01017183 INF

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5. NARRATIVE:

The 5th Armored Division having started its movement to an assembly area east of the Rhine River on 31 March, concluded this phase of the assigned mission on 1 April.

CC 'R' continued its attack to the east in pursuance of the Division mission as outlined on 30 March by the XIII Corps Letter of Instructions. A trestle bridge was constructed over the Dortmund - Ems Canal and, upon its completion at 0830, CC 'R' moved rapidly through RINKERODE - SENDEN - HERST - EVERS WINKEL - FRECKENHERST - DORFBAUERSCHAFT and BEELEN to the Ems River at GREFFEN. This movement had been rapid and with the exception of a small fire fight at EVERS WINKEL, enemy opposition was reported as slight. The bridge over the Ems River at GREFFEN had been blown, and a small pocket of enemy resistance confronted CC 'R' at this point. The pocket was quickly reduced and reconnaissance elements of the combat command moving east and west of GREFFEN had seized a bridge intact at a point two kilometers west of GREFFEN. One (1) married tank-infantry company -- one (1) infantry platoon) crossed the river and secured the bridge while the balance of CC 'R' assembled in an area south of the bridge to resupply and rest for the night.

CC 'B', initially following CC 'R', crossed the canal just north of VENNE and moved into the town of ALBERSLOH. At this point the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) proceeded northeast to EVERS WINKEL and thence to WARENDORF where the most comparatively strong enemy resistance was encountered. The advance of the 15th Armd Inf Bn was halted and strong road blocks were placed astride the WARENDORF - TELGTE highway. In the meantime, the 81st Tank Bn (married) sent reconnaissance north from ALBERSLOH, through WOLDBECK to TELGTE. This force consisting of one (1) reconnaissance platoon, overpowered enemy defenses and took about fifty (50) PW's. The platoon commander accepted what apparently was the unconditional surrender of the town at 1900, but at 2000, about 200 German infantry, supported by several tanks entered the town from the north and the platoon withdrew a few kilometers to the south to await daybreak.

The remainder of the Division stayed in place until 1700, when the Division moved east following CC 'B'. The Div Arty Hq, 22d Armd Engr Bn (plus supporting engineer units), the 557th Arty Bn, 628th TD Bn (-), CC 'A' (minus 1 married company attached to Div Hq), 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) and Div Tn followed in that order. The advance went well until the head of the column arrived just south of VENNE, where it came on the trail of the 81st Tank Bn (married) column which had stopped for the night. This unreported stop caused momentary confusion as the terrain was difficult and the roads for all purposes impassable. All elements were ordered to assemble off the road while routes were reconnoitered. The reconnaissance showed that all routes open to the Division in this area were third grade dirt roads and were breaking down badly. Throughout the day enemy resistance had not been heavy and it is believed that the determination of enemy forces in holding TELGTE was due to the necessity of protecting escape routes northeast out of MUNSTER. One hundred twenty nine (129) PW's were taken on 1 April.



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On 2 April, the Division resumed its attack to the east. CC 'R' moved swiftly from the bridgehead on the Ems River passing through HARSWENKEL - HALLE - BERTHER and on to the outskirts of HERFORD. Up to this point the combat command encountered a series of road blocks around each town. These were defended by AT guns in some spots, but mainly, infantry armed with bazookas and small arms put up a stubborn, but vain attempt to halt the armored column. At 2000 CC 'R' was engaged with a strong dismounted force supported by assault guns at the west edge of HERFORD. This engagement continued through 2400 and as the day closed plans were being made to by-pass the city at daylight on 3 April. The plan was to use two columns; the 10th Tank Bn (married) to go north of the city and the 47th Army Inf Bn (married) to by-pass to the south and strike for the Autobahn highway at AHMSEN.

CC 'B' attacked to the northeast from WARENDORF in two columns with the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) pushing its way through MILTE - SASSENBERG - HESSEL and to BERGHOLZEN, and the 81st Tank Bn (married) attacking north from VENNE through ALBERSLOH - ALVERSHKIRCHEN - EVERS WINKEL - MILTE - FUCHTORF - VERSMOLD and ODENDORF. The entire advance was very rapid, and though road blocks were less prevalent than in the CC 'R' sector, tanks and AT guns were plentiful. Heavy resistance was encountered in and around every town. At 2000 the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) was attacking through the town of BERGHOLZEN before securing for the night. The advance of CC 'B' had carried twenty six (26) kilometers to the northeast and placed leading elements of the combat command approximately one hundred forty three (143) kilometers northeast of the Rhine bridge at WESEL.

CC 'A' had been given a mission of moving north on the west side of the Dortmund - Ems Canal for the purpose of establishing a bridgehead across the canal about one (1) kilometer east of HILTRUP and to clear an enemy pocket from HILTRUP to WOLBECK. The enemy's 348th Tng Bn which had moved to the vicinity of HILTRUP to defend the sector was caught by CC 'A's advance. Resistance was stubborn for awhile, with the enemy employing Arty, AT guns, bazookas and small arms, but at 1900 CC 'A' reported the enemy overcome and work had been started on the bridge. During this operation CC 'A' killed and captured six hundred forty-four enemy troops, and a good quantity of materiel was seized.

The Division CP, supported by a married tank-infantry company ("B", 46th Armd Inf Bn and "B", 34th Tank Bn, CC 'A'), moving from VENNE to EVERS WINKEL, planned to move by way of WOLBECK in an attempt to outflank the enemy facing CC 'A'. The move started at 1430 and at 1650 the column met an enemy infantry force supported by at least six (6) tanks and SP guns north of ALBERSLOH. The married "B" companies supported initially by one (1) battery and later by the entire battalion of 155 guns, engaged this force. The attached companies were released to CC 'A' control and the Division CP continued on to EVERS WINKEL via ALBERSLOH - SENDENHORST, arriving in the vicinity of EVERS WINKEL at 2215. In meantime, the married "B" companies continued to probe against the enemy force in an attempt to force it back into the path of the CCA advance on WOLBECK. The 85th Cav Ren Sq Mocz assisted CC 'A' in its operation. Div Tn was assembled in the vicinity of BULDERN awaiting completion of the bridge. Once they would follow the 85th across the canal.

Enemy losses for this day were as follows: personnel killed, one hundred

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fifty (150), captured ten hundred sixty (1060), materiel captured or destroyed, two (2) Mark IV tanks, eleven (11) AT guns (8 - 88mm, 2 - 75mm - 1 caliber unknown), six (6) 40mm AA/AT guns, six (6) 105mm guns, one (1) ammo dump, one (1) searchlight battery and an airfield with approximately sixteen (16) dummy planes. (NOTE: Seventeen (17) German prison camps were overrun during the course of the day.) Several of the PW's taken were members of the Volksturm who were armed primarily with small arms and bazookas.

On 3 April, CC 'R' was to make every effort to secure the Autobahn bridge over the Weser River at VENNEBECK. It was hoped that this bridge might be seized intact. CCB likewise was to attempt seizure of intact bridges north of the Autobahn to MINDEN, inclusive.

CC 'B' attacked at dawn with the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) moving up the river valley from BERGHOLZEN and east to WERTHER. The 81st Tank Bn (married) followed the 15th Armd Inf Bn through BORGHOLZEN, then turned northeast to HOLTERDORF and proceeded through REIMSLOH to BUNDE, thence northeast to BERGKIRCHEN. Movement of both columns was extremely rapid and resistance, although stubborn, was not concentrated sufficiently to stop the armor of CC 'B'. The advance of the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) met several very stubborn enemy defensive positions. At a road junction just north of BERNBECK a concentration of flak guns opened up on the column and more than two hours time elapsed before this pocket was cleared. Eleven (11) 88mm AA/AT guns were captured or destroyed at this point. The column then pushed on swiftly to overrun the town of BAHNFLOHNE, and its mass of railroad shops, cars and various other equipment, including nineteen locomotives. At 1745, the force had made contact with CC 'R' on the right. Both CC 'B' columns moved forward until shortly after dark, when the 81st Tank Bn stopped at BERGKERCHEN and the 15th Armd Inf Bn at a point 2 1/2 kilometers southeast of BAD - OEYNHAUSEN, to secure for the night and resupply.

CC 'R' had continued its attack during the day with the 10th Tank Bn (married) moving around HERFORD to the north, and the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) going to the south, then cutting east to hit the Autobahn at AHMSEN. The 47th secured one highway bridge intact at this point, and another which was in need of minor repairs. These bridges, though of less importance than those spanning the Weser River, would nevertheless have proven a difficult and delaying obstacle had they been blown. The 47th Armd Inf Bn then moved up the Autobahn and reached the bridge location on the Weser River. This bridge was blown as were those adjacent to it.

The 10th Tank Bn (married) moved up route A through HOFE and WITTEL and finally joined with the 47th column at LOHE. Minor resistance in the form of road blocks, defended by bazookas and small arms, was prevalent throughout the move of the 10th Tank Bn. Upon reaching the blown Autobahn bridge over the Weser, CC 'R' immediately reconnoitered to the south and east for possible crossings. By this time both columns of CCR had converged into one. The combat command commenced the clearing of an enemy pocket from BAD - OEYNHAUSEN and the Autobahn to the river. Stronger enemy resistance was met during this operation, and 88mm AT guns along with scattered armor endeavored to hold back

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CC 'R'. The city of BAD - OEYNHAUSEN, itself, was reached, and its unconditional surrender negotiated by the Military Government attachment of CC 'R'. CC 'R' then went into an assembly area for the night.

CC 'A' completed the bridge over the Dortmund - Ems Canal at 0630 and advanced on WOLBECK from the west. The married "B" companies moved on the town from the south. The companies and the main column converged on the town at 1100. CC 'A' continued east from WOLBECK on route A to an assembly area just east of HERFORD. The move was most difficult because of road priorities which had been granted to infantry units, and also because of the numerous craters and other existing obstacles which had to be by-passed. Use of secondary roads was necessary to continue the advance. At 2400, the combat command was still on the road in the vicinity of TOLLENBECK. The 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mcc and Div Tn had been pulled off the road, waiting to cross the canal bridge. The Division CP moved from EVERSINKEL at 1110, and after a march of seventy six (76) kilometers, the column closed in a new area at 1830. (The location of this area was between HOFE and WITTEL.)

Enemy losses for the day were as follows: personnel, captured, eleven hundred forty four (1144), killed, one hundred (100) (estimated); materiel captured or destroyed, four (4) tanks MK IV, two (2) - 150mm How, forty one (41) AT/AA guns, (88mm), six (6) 76mm AT/AA guns, one (1) 20mm AA gun, forty five (45) miscellaneous motor vehicles. (In addition to the above many military installations were overrun). (NOTE: As CC 'R' approached BAD OEYNHAUSEN (W7202), they were met by two of the city officials who identified themselves as emissaries, seeking a formal surrender of the city. The Military Government and IPW accompanied the two emissaries into the city, and the formal surrender of the city and its garrison of 200 German soldiers, plus three 88mm guns, was accepted at 031515B. Telephone connections were still intact in the city, and CC 'R' placed a call to the city officials of MINDEN, on the Weser River (B8010). Speaking to these officials, it was learned that the bridges in the vicinity of MINDEN were still intact (as of 031521B); CC 'R' then asked for the surrender of the city. MINDEN officials replied that they would have to call higher headquarters in HANOVER (X3722), before answering. Calling back in a short time, MINDEN officials informed us that HANOVER had ordered them not to surrender, and consequently they would have to decline our invitation. To end the phone conversation, MINDEN was again informed of the consequences of this refusal. Local and outgoing circuits were then cut.)

On 4 April, the Division continued to probe the area on the Weser River in hope that a bridge might be secured intact. It was known that the enemy was attempting to concentrate his forces on the east shores of the Weser.

CC 'B', attempting to get the bridges at MINDEN, sent reconnaissance patrols northeast along the river from HAHNEN. These patrols ran into artillery and mortar fire and were unable to get through the pass at OULHAUSEN. Other patrols broke through the pass at BERGKERCHEN, and were searching the area to their front. At 1430, the 81st Tank Bn (married) reported that its patrols had observed troops coming down the valley to their northwest. These were believed to be British, and at 1700 that belief was

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verified by a contact between CC'B' and British 2nd Army troops at TICKHORST. The Division Commander ordered CC'B' to deliver an ultimatum to the garrison in MINDEN for the town's surrender, with bridges intact, by 2000. However, it was discovered that British troops had already stormed the town, and that the bridges were blown as the British force entered. British troops in the town were elements of the British 6th Airborne Division and the 3rd Armored Brigade. The 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) had established road blocks around the MINDEN area prior to its advance on the town. Tanks at the roadblocks took many prisoners and fired on barges attempting to escape from the area. A few mines were found near MINDEN and about ten (10) enemy tanks were observed by patrols of CC'B'.

CC'R' continued its operations east toward the RINTELN bridge at 0900. The 10th Tank Bn (married) was at HARKENISSEN and little enemy resistance was encountered. The combat command used the route EXTER - HOHENSEN - LANGENHOLHSN, and established a tactical CP in LANGENHOLHSN at 1030. The RINTELN Bridge had already been blown when the troops of CC'R' reached the vicinity. On the right flank, CC'R' made contact with the 2nd Armd Div.

CC'A', previously experiencing a tremendous job in attempting to reach WERFORD, managed to clear the roads, and at 040850, the combat command was assembled east of the city. Patrols were sent into the town, and enemy pockets were mopped up. CC'A' then took charge of the administration of the city until the arrival of the 84th Infantry Division. The 85th Cav Ren, Mecz and Div Tn moved across the canal and followed the CC'A' route as far as the town of WERTHER, where the two units established a CP. The Division CP remained in place on 4 April.

During the late hours of 4 April, the 334th and the 335th RCT's of the 84th Inf Div closed in assembly areas in the vicinity of BAD - OEYNHAUSEN. Those two units were to be used to force a bridgehead across the Weser River.

Enemy air activity became increasingly strong on this day. On three separate occasions, groups of up to four (4) planes strafed division installations. No damage or casualties resulted from these attacks, and one badly hit enemy plane was seen smoking as it left the Division area.

Enemy losses for the day were as follows: personnel, PWs - four hundred seventy (470), killed - seventy seven (77); materiel captured or destroyed, twenty (20) 88mm AT/AA guns, six (6) 76mm AT/AA guns, three (3) 37mm guns, twenty six (26) 40 mm guns, two (2) 20mm guns, six (6) flak guns (Cal., unknown) twenty one (21) miscellaneous vehicles, eleven barges loaded with troops (sunk in the Weser River), one (1) locomotive, twenty eight (28) railroad cars loaded with bridge equipment, twenty (20) railroad cars loaded with artillery ammo, two (2) medical dumps, one (1) ordnance dump, one (1) warehouse of motors, one (1) radar station, one (1) ammo dump, one (1) half track factory, one (1) 88mm AT/AA gun factory and a mass of miscellaneous materiel.

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On 5 April, the Division was prepared to assist the 84th Inf Div units in establishing a bridgehead over the Weser in the MINDEN area. The 22d Armd Engr Bn was regrouped in preparation for the building of a bridge after initial crossings had been made. Companies "A" and "B", 22d Armd Engr Bn were detached from CC'A' and CC'B', respectively, to bolster the engineer battalion. CC'B' was ordered to be prepared to furnish direct support to the action, protect the Corps left flank, and maintain contact with British units at MINDEN. CC'R' was to protect the Corps right flank and maintain contact with the 2nd Armd Div. CC'R' moved its CP to the vicinity of WENNER CAMP. The 47th Armd Inf Bn (CC'R') was moved to the wooded area southeast of RINTELN to hold the area for a possible river crossing in that vicinity. The Division CP remained in place. The Div Tn moved to HERFORD, closing there at 1115.

One attempt to cross the river was made by the 335 RCT (84th Inf Div) in the vicinity of PORTA, but heavy concentrations of mortar and small arms fire foiled this effort. XIII Corps ordered the crossing to be made on 6 April.

British troops in MINDEN moved north so as to get back in the 2nd British Army zone.

Enemy losses to the Division for 5 April were as follows: personnel, PW's five hundred forty two (542), killed, ten (10) (this figure is exclusive of 4,662 German soldiers in hospitals overrun by the Division) materiel destroyed one (1) truck, two (2) staff cars.

On 6 April, the Division remained in the HERFORD - BAD - OEYNHAUSEN - RINTELN area. CC'R' did some patrolling in its sector and occupied the town of STEMMEN. CC'R' patrols reconnoitered the ferry site to the northeast of the bridge at STEMMEN. All units maintained security road blocks and patrols. There was a constant flow of stragglers and other enemy personnel to the Division PW cage. The Division CP, and the CP of the 22d Armd Engr Bn moved into the city of BAD - OEYNHAUSEN. The 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz was employed as liaison between the Division and units on the right and left flanks of XIII Corps. During the day, enemy AT guns and medium artillery were sporadically active on the east bank of the Weser River.

Enemy losses for 6 April were as follows: personnel, PW's three hundred sixteen (316), materiel, many types of artillery ammo in BAD - OEYNHAUSEN including a quantity of 340mm shells. Seven (7) railroad cars loaded with ammo were destroyed during the days activity.

On 7 April, Division activity was again held to patrolling and liaison with flanking units. CC'A' remained in the HERFORD area, CC'B' in the BAD - OEYNHAUSEN area protecting the Corps left flank, and CC'R' in RINTELN area protecting the Corps right flank. CC'B' maintained contact with the British on the north, and CC'R' with the 2nd Armd Div (XIX Corps) on the south.

Work was begun on a bridge over the Weser by the 22d Armd Engr Bn. The bridge was started at 1200, and at 2045 a three hundred seventy two (372) foot trestle bridge spanned the river. Construction of this bridge was

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slowed considerably because of the great amount of grading which was necessary to make the eastern approaches usable. Also, sporadic time fire from 88mm guns was received on the bridge site. This bridge, though built by the Division, was to be used initially by the 84th Inf Div, in order that the dominating heights on the east side of the river could be cleared of enemy artillery and troops. At 1600, the 989th Treadway Bridge Company was attached to the Division and at 1800, one (1) platoon of this company was attached to the 84th Inf Div.

Small operations during the course of the day had netted a considerable quantity of enemy materiel and five hundred eight-five (555) PW's. Listed below are the enemy materiel losses during the day's operations:

- Four (4) 105mm AT/AA guns (mounted on RR cars)
- One (1) triple 20mm AA guns
- Two (2) Quadruplet 20mm AA guns
- Two (2) range finders
- Two hundred (200) smoke generators
- Six (6) passenger cars
- One (1) RR kitchen car
- One (1) RR Ord - repair car
- Two (2) locomotives
- Thirteen (13) box cars (misc loads).
- Nine (9) flat cars (misc loads)

Two factories were captured intact, one an ammo (88mm shell) and ordnance equipment, and the other an underground factory for production of 88mm gun parts

Early morning of 8 April found the Division generally static except for a few minor operations. Preparation for future events took precedence. CC'B' garrisoned and secured the town of MINDEN. The 81st Tank Bn (married) and Troop "B", 85th Cav Rcn Sq Moez were used for this job. CC'A' remained in the HERFORD area.

At 0100, CC'R' was ordered on an alert status for an ultimate move across the Weser River. The move as outlined to the CC'R' Commander would send the combat command south into the XIX Corps zone where permission had been granted for the use of the bridge at HAMELN for a period of five (5) hours starting at 081400. The combat command would then turn north to get back into the XIII Corps zone, continue east, attempt seizure of a crossing on the LEINE River and cut communications to the south of HANNOVER. CCR began its movement to the HAMELN bridge at 1230. The 95th Armd FA Bn, 395th FA Bn (105mm SP) and the 557th FA Bn (155mm SP) were placed under Division Artillery control and the latter moved with CC'R' to act in direct support of the combat command. The route of march was to be as follows: KUKENBRUCH - BOSINGFELD - GRUPENHAGEN - MUTLEN - ALTENHAGEN - SPRINGE - VOLKSEN - GESTORF - RUTHE with possible river crossings at RUTHE, GRASDORF or RETHEN. The 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) led the advance, and progress was astoundingly swift for the first few hours. However, at 1600, an enemy road block defended by artillery was encountered at the main road junction east of HESPEDE. This was quickly reduced, and orders

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sent the combat command ahead at great speed for the purpose of overrunning and crushing similar defenses. Resistance at ALTENHAGEN, though set for defense, was overrun before defenders could recover from the element of surprise which the speed of the column produced. At 1700, a road block south of DAHLE again halted the column temporarily, and while this strongpoint was being pounded, air support was put on the town of SPRINGE, which had been reported strongly defended. Excellent results were obtained from the air, and by the time the advance elements of CC'R' (47th Armd Inf Bn married) had reduced the road block at DAHLE, the defenses of SPRINGE had been softened to a point where the 47th could fight through the town and drive on GESTORF. The 10th Tank Bn (married), following the 47th, mopped up in SPRINGE. Many prisoners were taken. At 2130 the entire CC'R' Column was back in the XIII Corps zone. At 2200 reconnaissance elements of CC'R' were in the vicinity of PATTENSEN. Artillery was placing harassing fire on the town itself and also interdicting Leine River crossings.

Enemy losses during the day's operations were not completely reported at the close of the day, but three hundred sixty eight (368) PW's (excluding CC'R') had passed through the Division cage on this date. (NOTE: Due to the mass of miscellaneous enemy units in contact with the Division no attempt has been made to list them in this narrative. The G-2 periodic which is an inclosure to this report lists all enemy units in contact day by day.)

At 0730, on 9 April CC'R' resumed its attack to seize crossings over the Leine River, and less than one hour later, it was reported that its reconnaissance troop (Troop "C", 85th Cav Recon Sq Mocz) had taken two bridges intact; one at RUTHE and the other at KILDINGEN. The combat command crossed the river at once and turned northeast towards LEHRTE. Upon approaching the vicinity of WIRRINGEN, fire from flak guns, mortars, and artillery, was received from the northwest, apparently from HEMRODE and WULFERODE. Enemy air also became active over the combat command. At this point CC'R' was traveling in two parallel columns a short distance apart, and because of terrain features it was almost impossible to clearly observe the situation. Artillery liaison planes could not be used because enemy flak and air were too heavy. The Division Commander visited the CO, CC'R' at RETHEN and issued instructions for the combat command to continue east to a line VETZE - PEINE, push reconnaissance forward to the Oker River to seize crossings over the river, and be prepared to advance to the northeast. CC'R' used the southern route, HARSUM - HOHENHAMELN - SCHWICHELDT - and VOHRUN. The advance east progressed well, and at 2115, the 10th Tank Bn had cut the Autobahn in the vicinity of VOHRUN. At 2200, a message was sent to CC'R' to be prepared to attack north, then east, in the Corps north zone on 10 April.

At 1000, 9 April, CC'A' was ordered to prepare to follow the CC'R' route over the Weser bridge at HAMELN. The 47th Armd FA Bn and the 71st Armd FA Bn (both 105mm SP) were attached to CC'A' for the move. The crossing was to be started at 1300, and CC'A' was to push on, cross the Leine River, move northeast of HANNOVER to a line CELLE - VETZ, and send reconnaissance to the Allen River to seize crossings. The combat command was then to prepare for further advance to the northeast on 11 April. Movement began at 1230, and it was found that the 102nd Inf Div was using the same routes. This delayed the

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combat command to the extent that the bridge was not reached on time and as a consequence CC'A' had to shuttle its heavy vehicles over the bridge one at a time.

At 2200, a message similar to the one sent to CC'R' was dispatched to CC'A' and Division Artillery. This changed the plans, and set up CC'A' for an attack in the south half of the Corps zone on 10 April. Liaison officers were sent out of the Division CP at 2400, carrying additional instructions to CC'A', CC'R', and Division Artillery.

At 2230, CC'B' was ordered to send a married company (tanks and infantry) to the bridge at HAMELN for the purpose of protecting the bridge. This force was to arrive not later than 1000, 10 April, and was to maintain liaison with 102nd Inf Div. CC'B' was further advised that the responsibility for MINDEN and bridges in that vicinity, as well as the Autobahn bridge, would be taken over by the 102nd Inf Div at 0700, 10 April.

Div Tn and the 85th Cav Ron Sq Mecz (-) remained at HERFORD. The 85th patrolled areas southeast of HERFORD which were reportedly still occupied by enemy troops. The Division CP remained at BAD - OEYNHAUSEN on this date, and prepared for movement on 10 April. CC'B' was ordered to attach one married tank - infantry company with assault guns to Division Headquarters. Companies of the 81st Tank Bn and the 15th Armd Inf Bn closed with the Division CP. At 2215, clearance was received from XIII Corps for the use of the HAMELN bridge starting at 1500, 10 April. Division Headquarters, 22d Armd Engr Bn, and CC'B' were to start the move over the bridge at the time specified above.

Enemy losses, including unreported losses for 8 April, were as follows: personnel, PWs - six hundred thirty six (636), killed, unknown, materiel captured and destroyed, one (1) ME109 (fighter plane), one (1) 75mm AT/AA gun, four (4) 88mm AT/AA guns, two (2) tanks (one (1) Tiger, one (1) Panther), thirty eight locomotives, three (3) trucks, eleven (11) 81mm mortars.

(The north boundary of XIII Corps ran generally CELLE - WITTENGEN - SALZWEDEL - WITTENBERGE, and the south boundary PEINE - ABBES BUTTEL MORSE - WALTENDORF - GARDELEGEN - STENDAL. The boundary for the operation between CC'A' and CC'R' was established on a line RODDENS - UETZE - SEERHAUSEN - GIPHORN - EHLA - FARENHORST - STEIMKE - CHEINITZ - THURITZ - PACKENBUSCH - STAPEL - MESSEBERG and east to the River Elbe.)

On 10 April, the Division continued its attack into the heart of Germany.

CC'R' moved north from PEINE after that town had surrendered unconditionally to the combat command. Armored resistance was met by CC'R' at EDEMISSEN, and a fight flourished for two hours before the enemy was smashed. CC'R' then continued north and east, seizing a bridge over the Oker River in the vicinity of AHNSEN. The combat command then went into an assembly area for the night at ELTZE - PACE - MIENERSEN - OHOF, securing the area by blocking roads at the above places.



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CC'A' continued east, following CC'R' as far as PEINE, by-passing the town to the south, then turning northeast to ESSINGHAUSEN, thence due east to MEINE. Little resistance was encountered by CC'A' during the afternoon, but when the bridges were reached it was found that all but one had been blown. This one was stubbornly defended by an enemy company supported by mortars, 105mm assault guns, and nebelwerfers. A stiff fire fight resulted but ended with the enemy's withdrawing its battered forces. CC'A' went into bivouac on the western outskirts of MEINE for the night.

CC'B' was relieved in the MINDEN area by the 102nd Inf Div. The Division CP, followed by the 22d Armd Engr Bn and CC'B', moved from BAD - OENHUSEN, crossed the river at HAMELN, and continued east after getting back into the XIII Corps zone. Division Headquarters ran into some resistance in the vicinity of WATZUM at 2230. This resistance, consisting of infantry armed with bazookas was reduced and the advance continued.

Enemy losses for the day were as follows: Personnel, killed, thirty (30) estimated, PW's six hundred twenty (620) (includes 102 unreported for 9 April), materiel captured or destroyed, two (2) Mark VI tanks, five (5) JAD - Panther, Mark V assault guns, one (1) SP gun. (NOTE: Enemy armor, though more conspicuous than on preceding days, was not organized or concentrated, but instead appeared in several locations in groups of three to four).

On 11 April, CCA and CCR resumed their attacks. Orders were received from XIII Corps to the effect that one (1) task force be sent to objective 44, the town of WITTINGEN, for the purpose of blocking an enemy threat on the Corps Cavalry line. CC'R' split into two task forces, one married infantry - tank company to form the 10th Tank Bn, and the other two married infantry - tank companies composing the force of the 47th Armd Inf Bn. The 10th Tank Bn was to move north from GIFHORN via WESENDORF - KNESEBECK and the 47th Armd Inf Bn east on a route EHRA - BOITZENHAGEN. The combat command started its move to GIFHORN at 0625, and upon arriving at the town a halt was called in order to split the 10th Tank Bn and the 47th Armd Inf Bn for their respective routes.

The attack was resumed at 1040. The 47th Armd Inf Bn under Lt Col Howard E Boyer, first met heavy opposition at WESTERBECK. This consisted of an elaborately prepared road block supported by infantry and two (2) SP guns. The resistance was reduced after almost a two hour delay, and the 47th continued its advance to LESSIEN. At 1400, Col BOYER resumed the push toward EHRA, but his column was halted for more than an hour by an electrically controlled mine field. After the road had been cleared through the mines, the force moved north to BOITZENHAGEN, east to RADENBECK - GADDEN - STEDT - JUBAR - TUDELSEN - STOCKHEIM, and arrived at the town of ROHRBERG at 2100.

In the meantime the 10th Tank Bn, moving north from GIFHORN, had run into a strongly defended position at WAGGENHOFF. Enemy infantry, armed with bazookas and supported by assault guns, stubbornly gave ground and it was not until 1530 that the tank battalion was able to continue its advance. Shortly thereafter the column was again heavily engaged at WESENDORF. Resistance was so great along this route that the CC'R commander stated that it would be impossible to

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reach the combat command's objective without employment of the entire combat command on a concentrated front. The Division Commander authorized CC'R' to regroup its forces on the eastern route. At 2000, the 10th Tank Bn was moving to rejoin the 47th Armd Inf Bn via the route GIFFHORN - EHRA - BOITZENHAGEN, and thence to OHRDORF where it secured for the night.

CC'A' had captured and cleared MEINE by daylight on 11 April and secured the bridge over the WESER - ELBE Canal east of the city. Reconnaissance units were then sent north from MEINE to contact CC'R' in the vicinity of GIFFHORN. After this contact had been made at 1030, CC'A' jumped off and against light resistance and an advance of seventy (70) kilometers was made. The route used by CC'A' was north from MEINE to EHRA, then east at BARWEDEL to BERGFELD - AHNEBECK - BOCKWITZ - GERMANAN - KUSSEY - KLOTZE - KAKSREBECK - NEUENDORF - to PORITZ, arriving in the latter town at 2200 where an assembly was made. Enemy resistance was light throughout the day; road blocks or a few scattered tanks offered the main impedence to CC'A's advance.

The Division CP, 22d Armd Engr Bn, and CC'B' (minus the 15th Armd Inf Bn, left guarding the HAMELN bridge), moved to LEUSIEN and went into bivouac for the night. At 2000, Troop "B", 85th Cav Ren Sq Meos, was relieved from attachment to CC'B', attached to CC'A' and ordered to report to KLOTZE at once.

At 2040, orders were received from XIII Corps for the Division to continue the attack east on 12 April and attempt to seize and secure bridges over the Elbe River in the Corps zone. If bridges were found destroyed, reconnaissance was to be made for bridge sites, and the Division was then to prepare for further advance to the east on Corps order. Clearance was received for the movement of Div Tn and the 85th Cav Ren Sq Meos, and the move was ordered for 13 April to the vicinity of EHRA.

Enemy losses for 11 April were as follows: personnel, killed, no estimate made, PWs, seventeen hundred twenty one (1721), materiel captured or destroyed, one (1) Mark V tank, eight (8) vehicles miscellaneous (part of a wagon kitchen supply train), fifteen (15) railroad cars loaded with miscellaneous materiel, one (1) flat car loaded with Mark IV tanks, one (1) flat car loaded with half tracks, seven (7) railroad cars loaded with 88mm and/or 75mm ammo, one (1) flat car of 88mm guns and more than two hundred (200) miscellaneous railroad cars overrun.

On 12 April, the plan of the day before was changed. The reason being that there existed only one bridge over the Elbe River in the XIII Corps zone at WITTENBERGE, in the CC'R' sector. With this in mind, it was decided that CC'A' should be sent south into the XIX Corps zone for the purpose of attempting to seize and secure the bridge at TANGERMUNDE on the Corps boundary.

CC'A' attacked to the east and south through BRUCHAU - WINKELSTEDT - WERNSTEDT - CALBE - KARRITZ - BISMARCK - KAMDEN - VINZELBERG - LUDERITZ to the outskirts of TANGERMUNDE. The combat command arrived at this point at 1225, and reports from various sources indicated that the bridge was still intact, but that strong defensive measures had been put into effect in the town itself in order that an escape route be left open to enemy units still west of the

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Elbe River. Even as CC'A' approached the town, and in the subsequent fight for the town and bridge, streams of enemy columns fled across the bridge. Every possible means was employed to guarantee the bridge, but to no avail. A severe fight took place for several hours, and at 1550, the bridge was blown. Town officials then began negotiations for surrender, and at 1745 CC'A' went into the town. When the bridge at TANGERMUNDE was blown, CC'A' immediately sent a force north in an effort to seize the railroad bridge north of HAMERTEN. This force reported at 1923 that the bridge had been blown prior to its arrival. CC'A' then prepared the zone for security by placing road blocks on escape routes from STENDAL to the south and east. The 34th Tank Bn (married) blocked the main road north of HAMERTEN; the 46th Armd Inf Bn (married) blocked the road at MILTERN. The CC'A' CP was set up just west of TANGERMUNDE, Division Artillery at ELVERS DORF, and "B" Troop, 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz, screened the south flank of the combat command from DEMKER to BOLSDORF.

CC'R' attacked east from RHORBERG through BEETZENDORF - APPENBURG - WINTERFELD - LADERATH - KALLEHNE - DESSAU - HEILIGENFELDE - LUCKSTEDT - BRITSCHE - DRUSEDAN and SEEHAUSEN. From this point the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) turned northeast toward NEUKIRCHEN and WITTENBERGE. (Stiff resistance was encountered at SEEHAUSEN prior to the split of CCR, and it was not until 1730 that the town finally surrendered.) The 47th then moved rapidly to the east arriving on the Elbe River at WERBEN at 1900, and blocked the roads to the south, thus cutting the escape routes to the ferry site. The 10th Tank Bn moving north, encountered increasing enemy resistance. Road blocks were frequent, and the enemy fought a stubborn rear guard action to allow the harassed columns on the road just ahead of the 10th Tank Bn to withdraw over the WITTENBERGE bridge. WITTENBERGE was reached at 2030, and the bridge was found blown. The 10th Tank Bn then proceeded to move northwest to the vicinity of GARZ - HAVERLAND, after having first blocked the routes leading north and west of WITTENBERGE. (An interesting side light of the day and one which had been encountered throughout the advance from the Rhine River, was the unconditional surrender of many towns to CC'A' and CC'R' after the towns people had rounded up the German soldiers. These, they would turn over to the combat commands.)

CC'B' continued to follow the route of the Division CP and the 22d Armd Ingr Bn. The Division CP moved from LESSIEN to BRUNAU, clearing several small resistance pockets on the advance. The CP closed in BRUNAU at 1925.

Div Tn and the 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz (-) remained in the HERFORD area. The married "C" (Infantry-Tank) companies were relieved from attachment to Division Headquarters and reverted back to CC'B' at 2030.

Instructions were sent out to the combat commands for the clean-up of the Division zone from phase line "D", north and south through SALZWEDEL - CHEINITZ and GARDELEGEN. CC'R' was given the northern sector with the northern boundary comprising a line SALZWEDEL - WITTENBERGE and the southern boundary a line generally WINTERFELD - DESSAU - BEHREND and RABEL; CC'B' the center sector, with the southern boundary KAKERBECK - VIENOLD - HISSDORF - SCHONEBECK - WITTELSCHIDE - MOCKERN and ALTENZAUN; CC'A' to the south of CC'B' to the Corps southern boundary, GARDELEGEN - STENDAL and east to the Elbe River. (This phase to start on 13 April).

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Enemy losses for 12 April were as follows: personnel, PWs - two thousand (2000), killed, unreported, materiel losses were not yet reported, but it was known that one (1) ME109 had been shot down, two (2) enemy liaison planes destroyed (one (1) in an encounter with a Division liaison plane whose pilot and observer shot the enemy plane out of the sky with fire from a sub-machine gun).

Remarks for 12 April:

1. It is believed that a good deal of study might well be made on the signal equipment of an armored division with a view toward improving communications. At times contact was impossible even for short distances. Generally communications were a constant source of difficulty throughout the operation from the Rhine to the Elbe.

2. Added personnel should move with an armored division during an exploitation mission in order to properly handle PWs. In many instances combat command had to resort to the dangerous practice of leaving PWs with town Burgemeisters. This was necessary as Division personnel could not be spared for the task.

3. Displaced personnel became a constant headache to the armored columns and it was necessary to continually chase these people from the highways where they had become a menace to traffic.

On 13 April, the division started cleaning up its zone. All bridge equipment reverted to control of the Division Engineer. The 85th Cav Rgn Sq Mecz (-) and Div Tn moved from the HERFORD area. The Division Rear Echelon moved to JEETZE, the 85th to THURZ, the 75th Med Bn Arm'd to KAKERBECK, 127th Ord Maint Bn to ZETHLINGER and Hq, Div Tn to CHEINITZ. Notification was received from XIII Corps to the effect that two (2) battalions of infantry, 1st Battalion, 334th Infantry (84th Inf Div) and the 1st Battalion, 406th Inf (102nd Inf Div), were attached to the Division at 1800 for operational control and that these battalions were being moved to the Division area. CC'R' was ordered to select bivouac areas for the infantry battalions as it was planned that upon closing, the infantry would be attached to the combat command.

CC'A' cleared its area and moved from TANGERMUNDE to STENDAL, the latter town having surrendered the night 12 - 13 April. Some very bitter fighting still was in process around the TANGERMUNDE early 13 April. Enemy troops, trapped by the combat command, resisted stubbornly. Fire from flak and AT guns supported these stragglers from the east bank of the Elbe River. Enemy air was very active over the sector on 12 - 13 April. CC'A' was strafed several times and six (6) enemy planes were brought down. Toward late afternoon, artillery fire fell in the CC'A' area, apparently from guns just opposite the combat command's positions across the river. The towns of JARCHAU - RICHSTEDT GOLDBECK and MOLLENDORF were cleared by CC'A'. Five hundred (500) American PWs were liberated in the fighting around TANGERMUNDE.

CC'B' cleared its sector through OSTERBURG - MESEBERG - KANMENBERG to SANDAU and sent reconnaissance parties through DUSEDAL - WALSLIEBEN - HINDENBURG and SCHWARZOLZ.

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CC'R' cleared its area KALRENBURG - LICHTERFELDE WENDE and WERBEN, and reconnoitered the river line for bridge sites from WERBEN north to SCHARPENLATTE. CC'R' began negotiating for the surrender of WITTENBERG at 1630. Other elements of the combat command went north to the town of DEUTSCH, where approximately 450 to 500 American PW's were liberated.

Enemy losses for 13 April were as follows: Personnel, PW's, two thousand fifty eight (2058), killed, 30 (estimated), materiel captured or destroyed, eighty (80) airplanes (over-run), forty (40) earloads of V-2s, two (2) batteries of 20mm AA guns, mounted on a train, two (2) armored cars, sixty (60) miscellaneous vehicles, and 1 Mark IV tank, an 88mm AT/AA gun, fifty (50) miscellaneous vehicles, forty (40) horsedrawn wagons and a great mass of miscellaneous equipment which was unreported for 12 April.

On 14 April, the Division continued to mop up its areas. The infantry battalions from the 84th and 102nd Inf Divs closed with CC'R' at 0640.

CC'A, having accepted the surrender of ARNEBURG on the afternoon of 13 April, attempted to send a force into the town, but was met by extremely heavy resistance from bazooka-armed infantry. These were supported by air and artillery from the east bank of the Elbe. It was decided that the town could not be taken without heavy loss as the combat command had lost several tanks, and suffered a number of casualties on the initial attempt. The force was pulled back to reorganize. An artillery concentration was then placed on the town with excellent results, and on the next attack at 1000, the town was cleared. Four railroad guns were destroyed in the town, along with numerous flak guns. CC'A reported that apparently the town at one time had housed a high enemy headquarters. The force that smashed this town continued north, and at 1705, had cleared ALTENZAUN. Other CC'A forces combed roads and villages in the sector and cleared a line EXLEBEN - STENDAL east to the river, and established an outpost line from the road junction 2 kilometers east of STENDAL to STAFFELD. At STAFFELD, enemy raiding parties were a constant threat, and at 2400 the Division outpost there was forced to withdraw. The CC'A CP remained at STENDAL.

CC'B' continued to mop up in its area and cleared the main supply route east to the river in the vicinity of SANDAU. The route cleared was generally a line OSTERBERG - SANDAU. In the northern half of its zone, CC'B' cleared a line from WINTERFELD - CHEINITZ to a line BEHREND - OSTERBERG. The 102nd Inf Div had advanced east to the line OSTERBERG - STENDAL, thus clearing the extreme southern portion of CC'B's area.

CC'R' resumed the mopping up of the eastern part of its zone and sent a force to clear RABEL on the river. The western part of the CC'R' zone was not entirely cleared; however the 84th Inf Div was moving into that area from further west, and the 11th Cavalry Group entered and cleared SALZWEDEL.

The Division CP remained in BRUNAU and late in the evening 14 April orders were received from Corps to the effect that the Division should be prepared to establish a crossing over the Elbe River in the vicinity of SANDAU on the night

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14 - 15 April. CC'R' was given orders to undertake this mission and plans were formulated accordingly. However, the previous order for the crossing was rescinded by Corps, and instructions were for the Division to continue preparation, but not to make an actual crossing without specific orders from Corps. The 71st Armd FA Bn reverted from support of CC'A' to support of CC'R' and an observation outpost line was established along the river across the Division zone. Much enemy activity, including quantities of armor, was reported on the east side of the river. Some artillery fire was received in the Division zone. By night fall 14 April, the majority of the Division zone could be considered clear. However, the area just below CC'A' in the XIX Corps zone was a possible threat to the CC'A' flank.

Enemy losses for the day were as follows: personnel, PW's, three hundred seventy two (372), materiel, four (4) railroad guns, a car load of flak guns, nine (9) 20mm guns, four (4) 150mm guns, many carloads of miscellaneous materiel, one (1) command Headquarters train intact, one (1) large ordnance dump, and four (4) trucks.

On 15 April, mopping up was carried out along the Division zone, and preparations were made for a possible river crossing.

CC'A' sent a small force to STAFFELD where it had been reported that an enemy pocket was forming. This turned out to be a wild-goose chase.

CC'B' moved one (1) married tank-infantry company ("B" companies of the 81st Tank Bn and the 15th Armd Inf Bn) to the Div Trn area to act as protection for Trains. This was done to insure against enemy forces from the British VIII Corps zone cutting into the Division units. There was a report that enemy units attempting to escape, were moving into the northern half of the XIII Corps zone.

CC'R' continued reconnaissance and preparation for a river crossing. Twelve (12) ME109 planes strafed the CC'R' area at about 1300. Little damage was done and three casualties were reported.

In general, throughout the day, the zone was comparatively quiet, besides the strafing of CC'R' some enemy artillery fell in the vicinity of SEEHAUSEN. Several enemy patrols crossed the river in the Division zone, but these were destroyed or driven off. Enemy air was extremely active over the Elbe.

Enemy losses for the day were 2,499 prisoners and an airfield with a number of planes captured. (The majority of this total is made up of prisoners not reported previously.)

The Division continued its previous day's activity until 1200, 16 April. A report came in that enemy forces with tanks were present in the JUBAR - MELIN - BROME area. CC'B' was immediately moved west to engage this force. Div Army with the 71st and 695th Armd FA Bns moved with CC'B' as support. XIII Corps had ordered that the 1st Bn, 335th Inf (84th Inf Div) be attached to CC'B' and ordered a guide to be sent to Corps Headquarters to lead the battalion to the CC'B' area. The battalion was to have been located at OARRENHOLZ, but it was not at that point and the guide returned to CC'B'.

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CC'B' split into two columns one consisting of the 81st Tank Bn (married) and the other the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married). The 81st reached the town of IMMEKATH and contacted friendly troops who know nothing of enemy presence in the vicinity. The 15th Armd Inf Bn reached BROHE at 1712 without contacting enemy forces. Reconnaissance elements of CC'B' probed large wooded areas west of RUDENBECK and WISWEDEL and located enemy forces of undetermined strength. No further action was taken during the night 16 - 17 April. Div Arty established its CP at KLOTZE.

Letter of Instructions No. 65, Hq XIII Corps, dated 16 April, relieved the two infantry battalions of the 84th and 102nd Inf Div from operational control of the 5th Armd Div and returned them to their parent organizations.

Letter of Instructions No. 66, Hq XIII Corps, received at 1125, gave the Division a new area of responsibility effective 1200, 16 April. The area was west of the present Division zone with boundaries generally along the following lines: "north" WITTENGEN - SCHADWOHL - DEUTCHORST - LUNGENAPOL - WISTEDT - GR GERSTEDT - SALZWEDEL - VOLZENDORF - BOCKLEBEN; "east", BOCKLEBEN - BINDE - RITZLEBEN - KASSUHN - KALLEHNE - KERKAW - BRUNAU - BUTTERHORST - KARITZ - KREMKAW - ALGENSTEDT - KASSIECK - JAUENITZ - KLOST NEUENDORF - ZIENAU - DAROSLEGEN - KLUDEN - STAUELLE - ALVENSLEBEN; "south" ALVENSLEBEN - ALTENHAUSEN SCHWANEFELD - BARMKE - UHRY; "west" UHRY - BISDORF - GR SISBECK - TWULPSTEDT - VELPKE - IRANHORST - RUHEN - ANNEBECK - BOCKWITZ - ALTENDORF - BENITZ - DAENBECK - ZASENBECK - OHRDORF - SUDWITTING - WITTINGEN. The instructions ordered that this new area be cleared of all enemy and a constant police and patrol system inaugurated.

CC'B' and CC'R' were ordered to occupy the area north of the line ALTENDORF - GARDELEGEN with the boundary between the two combat commands to be KL GERSTEDT - KUHFIELD - SEIDENLANGENBECK - BELTZENDORF - KLOTZE - WENZ - TRIPPLIGLEBEN - MIESTER - HORST. KLOTZE was to be the responsibility of XIII Corps as stated in the instruction received from the latter.

CC'A' was directed to occupy the southern part of the zone from the line ALTENDORF - GARDELEGEN. CC'A' and CC'R' were ordered to move at once and both combat commands began their move at 1600. CC'A' closed in its new area at 2315. The CP of CCA was at CALVORDE, with the 46th Armd Inf Bn (married) also at the latter town. The 47th Armd FA Bn, plus the married "A" companies of the 46th Armd Inf Bn and 34th Tank Bn located at WEGENSTEDT and the 34th Tank Bn (married) set up in ETINGEN. CC'R' closed at 2230 in its new area and established a CP at WERFELD. The 10th Tank Bn was placed in BINDE and the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) and 95th Armd FA Bn at SCHWILSEAU. CC'B' although already in its area, could not start occupying until its mission of clearing enemy pockets on its west flank was completed.

The 22d Armd Engr Bn moved to GUSSEFELD. "A" Company, 22d Armd Engr Bn was ordered to CC'A' effective 0700, 17 April. The Division CP, 85th Cav Bn, 3d Mocz, and Div Tn remained in place.

Enemy losses in personnel not previously reported were as follows: PW's, seventeen hundred twelve (1712), killed one hundred (100).

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Enemy forces, which had either been concealed in the woods or flushed south by the British advance on the north, became very active against the main supply routes. Many groups, all of whom included a quantity of armor, preyed on supply columns and became an increasing menace in the rear areas.

On 17 April, orders were received from Corps for the Division to move into the wooded areas bounded by VOITZE - EHRA - KNESEBECK - WITTINGEN - BADENBECK - KENSEBECK - FORST. CC'A' was assigned this mission, with CC'B' blocking on the east. The 1st Bn, 335th Inf (84th Inf Div), was relieved from CC'B' and attached to CC'A', and the 407th RCT (102nd Inf Div), less the 1st Bn, was placed under operational control of CC'A'. The 1st Bn, 335th Inf, was located at LAHRENHOLZ and the 407th RCT at GIFHORN. CC'A', less the 46th Armd Inf Bn, which was left in CALVORDE, moved from CALVORDE via GIFHORN - WESENDORF and HANKENS BUTTEL to an assembly area in the vicinity of KNESEBECK. The attack was planned for early morning, 18 April.

CC'B', with the 85th Cav Ren Sq Mecz attached, placed road blocks to the east of the enemy area. "F" Troop, 85th, blocked the area in the vicinity of VOITZE - BROME and WISWEDD. The 81st Tank Bn placed road blocks at RADENBECK, the main road junction between RADENBECK and ZASENBECK, and at ZASENBECK and OHRDORF. The 15th Armd Inf Bn placed road blocks at SUDERWITTINGEN and WITTINGEN and "B" Troop, 85th, was used as a cavalry screen on the northern boundary of CC'B'. The CP of CC'B' was moved to TANGELN.

CC'R' started clearing its zone with the 10th Tank Bn (married) sweeping north from a line BEETZENDORF - BRUNAU, and the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) south and southwest from SEIPE in a circling movement toward KLOTZE. The 10th Tank Bn cleared the towns of KAKERBECK - THURITZ - BABEL - BRUCHAU - NEUENDORF - LOCKSTEDT - CHEINITZ - SIEDENTRAM - BUNDAU - POPPIN - JEEBEN - HOHENNINGEN - MASSUHN - VISSUM - KALLDNE - PRATHE - BRUNAU - JEETZE - HECKLINGEN - BEETZENDORF - SIEDENGREIBEN - QUADENDAMBECK - STAPEN and PRETZIER. The CP of the 10th Tank Bn closed in for the night at ANDORF. The 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) cleared all towns in its assigned zone and closed for the night at ZICHTAU and SCHWIESAU. Negligible opposition was encountered during the day's operations by CC'R'.

At 2000, the 771st TD Bn (less 1 company) was attached to the Division and at 2200, the 261st FA Bn (155mm guns) was attached. The Division CP moved from BRUNAU at 2200 and closed in BEETZENDORF at 0045, 18 April. The 771st TD Bn was split, with "A" company going to CC'R', "C" company to CC'B', and the Battalion Headquarters to STOCKHEIM.

Enemy losses on this day were as follows: personnel, PW's five hundred thirteen (513), killed, ten (10), materiel destroyed or captured, twenty five (25) 88mm guns, several trailer loads of plane engines and parts, one (1) JU88 captured intact, an airport, military equipment warehouse, a large assembly of parts for planes found in several barns, several planes complete except for assembly, one (1) bomb dump, one (1) ammo dump, one (1) Jagd - Panther Mark V Tank, two (2) half tracks and one (1) eight wheel armored car.

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On 18 April, CC'A' opened its CP at KNESEBEEK at 0635, and the attack was begun to clear enemy forces from the KNESEBEEK FORST. The 1st Bn, 335th Inf, moved west toward BOITZENHAGEN, and the 407th RCT southwest toward the same town. At 1250 CC'A' reported the mission complete with no enemy opposition. The combat command was then moved to STEIMKE. The 47th Armd FA Bn moved to HANUM where it went under Div Arty control. The two infantry units (1st Bn 335th Inf and the 407th RCT) reverted to Corps control at 1645. The 46th Armd Inf Bn (CC'A') remained at CALVORDE, and CC'B' continued its blocking mission.

CC'R' assembled in the SALZJEDEL area with its CP at RITZE, the 10th Tank Bn at SALZJEDEL, 47th Armd Inf Bn at STAPPENBEEK, 695th Armd FA Bn at KRICHENDORF, and the 95th Armd FA Bn at WINDMUHLENGERS. The Division CP moved from BEETZENDORF to a castle south of NEUEMUHLE.

Enemy losses for 18 April, were as follows: personnel, PW's, one hundred eighty one (181), killed, thirty five (35), a report on losses from previous days operations which was not listed showed the destruction or capture of the following enemy equipment: one (1) armored car, twelve (12) 88mm AT/LA guns, seventy eight (78) wagons, fourteen (14) ME109 fighter planes and five (5) gliders.

The Division remained in the same general area on 19 April with CC'A' at STEIMKE, CC'B' at TANGELN, CC'R' in the vicinity of SALZJEDEL, the 85th at BROME, 22d Armd Engr Bn at GRAPPENBURG, Div Tn at CHEINITZ and the Div CP in the vicinity of NEUEMUHLE.

At 0530 reports started coming in from CC'B' stating that enemy vehicles had penetrated its area from the north and that the enemy was assembling in the woods east of LUDELSEN. Another group was reported south of HASELHORST, and another south of LINDHOF. A later report stated that it was believed that the main body was assembling in the woods east of SCHADEWOHL. A reconnaissance patrol from CC'B' was surprised and captured in DIESDORF, and it was through use of that route that the enemy units had gotten into the LINDHOF - HASELHORST vicinity. Some few enemy vehicles penetrated the area, following the route LUDELSEN - ALTFERCHAU - NEUFERCHAU - KUSEY - WENZE to the wooded areas south of KLOTZE. By 0900, reports were coming in from both CC'A' and CC'B' of enemy vehicles moving in every direction. No large numbers were reported in any one group, the reports ranging from three (3) to twelve (12) tanks, SP guns, halftracks or other vehicles. It was not considered a great threat to the area, but immediate steps were taken to contain and destroy enemy elements wherever found. Artillery was placed on known assembly areas and fighter bombers continued a dawn to dark attack on enemy vehicles and areas. In Section III of the Comments is described a new technique in the coordination of air-ground which was used with excellent results during the destruction of infiltrating enemy units for several days beginning on 19 April.

In the action against enemy units, CC'A' sent its married "A" companies (46th Armd Inf Bn and 34th Tank Bn) to HANKENSELJEDEL and other forces to LERMEBAU - KUNRAU and IMMEKATH. CC'B' closed in on the wooded area between MELLIN and LUDELSEN and the area near HASELHORST. Enemy infantry had almost surrounded the latter town, and direct fire weapons were located in the

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woods southeast of the town. The 71st Armd PA Bn's CP was forced to move west of OHRDORF for security purposes. The belief, from an operations standpoint, is that the enemy had not known that strong forces were in this vicinity and had hoped that an escape route might be open through the sector.

Enemy losses in personnel were as follows: PWs, one hundred two (102) killed two hundred (200). Reports on equipment losses had not been completed at the close of the day.

On 20 April, CC'A' remained in position until 1300 when a move was started in preparation for the attack to the north. The CP of the combat command moved to ROHRBERG, and the 46th Armd Inf Bn (married) went into position in the same town. The 34th Tank Bn (married) went to WALLSTADE, with a reconnaissance out to a line DAHRE - KL GERSTEDT.

CC'B' cleared the towns of HASELHORST - LINDHOF - WANDERKATH, and also the southern part of the FORST KLOTZE from the east - west line through WANDERKATH to the south. In this action, CCB, with artillery, air support, and tank fire destroyed or captured fifty five (55) enemy vehicles in and around LINDHOF alone. The combat command then readjusted its position and that of the attached 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz so as to allow CC'A' to move into positions for its attack to the north. The CP of CC'B' moved to ZASENBECK, the 81st Tank Bn (married) to LINDHOF and BORNSEN, the 15th Armd Inf Bn (married) to WITTINGEN (with the exception of one small tank force which located one (1) Kilometer north of WANDERKATH and maintained a reconnaissance line to DAHRE and WINKLSTEDT), and the 85th Cav in the vicinity of BROME.

CC'R' took no offensive action except that of directing air on the Elbe River bridges in the vicinity of DOMITZ. All three (3) bridges in this area were knocked out by the coordinated efforts of the CC'R' air-ground officer and the very capable execution of the mission by fighter bombers. The destruction of these bridges left only ferries by which the enemy could hope to escape to the east banks of the river. Enemy air was again active over the CC'R' area with six (6) planes making a strafing run over the combat command. Four (4) of these planes were knocked out of the sky by fire from CC'R' anti-aircraft guns.

Enemy personnel in small numbers were reported to have been observed in nearly every wooded area within the Division zone. Armor was reported in the woods to the north of BOITZENHAGEN. The only estimated strength was approximately three (3) tanks or SP guns, with a small force of infantry.

Enemy losses for 20 April were as follows: personnel, PW's, three hundred twenty seven (327), killed, fifty one (51), materiel captured or destroyed, two (2) tanks, five (5) armored cars, eleven (11) half-tracks, one (1) 75mm AT gun, two (2) SP guns, eighty seven (87) miscellaneous vehicles (including various special purpose trucks), two (2) FW190 planes (not a part of the four (4) reported destroyed by CC'R' in the air), three (3) motorcycles.

On 21 April, the Division attacked north from a line of departure DAHRE - SALZWEDEL with CC'A' on the left and CC'R' on the right. Just prior to the

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attack, CC'A' was counter-attacked by elements of Division "Clausewitz". Artillery fire was placed on the attacking forces and they broke and dispersed into the woods to the north.

CC'A' attacked against a determined enemy who had set up make shift defenses in the woods along the combat command's routes of advance. An increase in the use of anti-tank mines was observed, and fire from nebelwerfers and artillery pieces slowed the advance to some extent. At 2100, the 46th Armd Inf Bn (married) was assembling for the night in the vicinity of GADDAU. The married "C" companies (46th Armd Inf Bn and 34th Tank Bn) went into position with the CC'A' CP near KLENZE and the 34th Tank Bn (married) assembled in the vicinity of BERGEN.

CC'R' was held up in its attack until 1500. The reason for this was that the resistance in front of CC'A' was such that the two combat commands could not parallel each other's advance, and thus a throat existed to the flank of either, if one was held up and the other moved too rapidly forward. After CC'A' had cracked the resistance in its sector, CC'R' attacked with the 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) advancing north on the SALZWEDEL - LUCHOW road and the 10th Tank Bn (married) attacking on the left to clear the pockets in the woods near BOMBECK. The 47th met a good deal of resistance along its route, and mines were found strewn on the road with a minefield near SASSSE. Road blocks defended by AT guns, nebelwerfers, mortars, and infantry, were encountered all along the route and at 2000, heavy fire from LUCHOW, and vicinity, prompted the force to abandon its further advance that night. The battalion went into a security position near SASSSE. In the meantime, the 10th Tank Bn was attacking in the BOMBECK area. The woods in this vicinity had been reported to be a strong-point of enemy armor and infantry. The positions had been sealed off on the north and east by CC'A's attack in the early part of the day. The attack was made with one married tank-infantry company moving south from SEEBEN to the railroad and holding there while the balance of the 10th attacked north from the south edge of the woods. A quantity of enemy personnel was trapped and captured and materiel loss for the enemy was large. Three (3) tanks were known to have escaped the trap and these moved northwest into the CC'A' sector. The 10th Tank Bn secured for the night near GR GERSTEDT.

CC'B', with the 85th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz attached, continued its clearing of the KLOTZE FORST. Many burned out enemy vehicles were found along with others which apparently had been abandoned. The combat command also maintained its road blocks on the western boundary of the sector in the WITTINGEN - ZASENBECK R. DENBECK area, and kept contact with the 29th Inf Div to the north. An advance Division CP was established at SALZWEDEL and Division operations were directed from there.

(NOTE: Div Arty accomplished its usual efficient mission in a supporting role, and the disorganization and dispersal of enemy units attested to the accuracy of the artillery fire.)

Enemy losses were reported as follows: personnel, PW's six hundred fifty (650) killed, one hundred fifty nine (159), materiel captured or destroyed,

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fourteen (14) tanks, four (4) armored cars, nine (9) half-tracks, two (2) SP-guns (1-75mm, 1-105mm), two (2) 88mm AT/AA guns, four (4) 105mm guns, two (2) 20mm flak guns, seventy two (72) miscellaneous cycles, one (1) fuel-lubricant dump containing one hundred fifty (150) 50 gal drums of fuel.

On 22 April, the Division continued its attack to the north.

CC'A' moved north from the KLENZE - GADDAU area through MADDAU to PUDRIPP and thence to the main highway from DANNENBERG to DAHLENBURG. The 46th Armd Inf Bn (married), leading the attack, split into two forces; one the married "A" companies and the other the married "C" companies. One force attacked east through METZINGEN - SAR - CHEM and arrived in PUSSADE at 1840. The other force turned west to GEHRDE, north to POIMMESSEL and northeast to WIETZETZ, arriving at the latter point at approximately 1850. CC'A' made contact with British patrols in the vicinity of COLLASE at 1325. Enemy resistance was not considered heavy during the day's attack. The day's advance by CC'A' put the combat command within four kilometers of the Elbe River. Elements of the combat command were assembled in the vicinity of TOLLENDORF, and secured for the night.

CC'R' attacked at 0645 with the 10th Tank Bn (married) pushing ahead from GR GERSTEDT in an effort to get abreast of the 47th Armd Inf Bn at SASSE. The 10th split into two forces consisting of the married "A" Companies (10th Tank Bn and 47th Armd Inf Bn) and the married "C" Companies. The "A" companies moved via BRIETZ - WUSTROW, the "C" Companies via SEEBEN - LUCKAW. The forces rejoined at DOLGOW and pushed on to arrive at the outskirts of LUCHOW at 0730. The 47th Armd Inf Bn (married) moved north from SASSE to the eastern outskirts of LUCHOW, and at 0815 it was reported that the town had surrendered. The 10th Tank Bn then struck north through GRABOW and about one (1) kilometer north of the town was halted by heavy fire from nebelwerfers. The 47th Armd Inf Bn moved north through SEERAW to ZADRAU. Just short of the latter place, this column was also forced to stop as a result of exceedingly heavy fire from nebelwerfers. In order that the columns might continue the advance, artillery was resorted to, but because of difficult terrain, the job of putting the guns into firing position was a long and tedious task. This resulted in a long delay and it was 1400 before the columns could resume their attacks. During the interim the combat command mopped up the area and cleared mines from road shoulders and a large mine field at SEERAW. At 1400, the 10th Tank Bn again moved into the attack and at 1530 had entered TRAMM. Resistance was light on this advance, but the 47th had encountered a well defended sector, with road-blocks and anti-tank traps at ZADRAU. Such was the resistance in the town, it became necessary to destroy the place with artillery before the column could move on. The 47th Armd Inf Bn moved west through HEIDE, then east to the original route, and at 1900 was in NEBENSTEDT where direct fire was received from the north and west. At this time the 10th Tank Bn was closing in on DANNENBERG from the west and the task-force came under direct fire from the town. CC'R' ordered both columns to secure for the night and the CP of the combat command set up at SCHALPHAUSEN.

CC'B' remained in place and little action was reported for the day. One small task force was sent to BIERSTEDT to mop up some reported enemy stragglers. The Rear Division CP reported small groups of enemy stragglers in its area and these were mopped up by a defense section which had remained behind. The

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advance CP remained in SALZWEDEL. Enemy losses for 22 April were as follows: personnel, PWs, five hundred twenty seven (527), killed, one hundred (100) estimated, materiel captured, destroyed, one (1) ME109, eight (8) 88mm AT/AI guns, three (3) 20mm flak guns, six (6) nebelwerfers, nine (9) miscellaneous vehicles and a great quantity of miscellaneous supplies and equipment.

The Division continued its action on 23 April with CC'A' mopping up the northern portion of its zone. Resistance was slight, and by 2100, the entire CC'A' area had been cleared. The combat command reported that no resistance existed in its zone west of the ELBE River.

CC'R' attacked the town of DANNENBERG with the 10th Tank Bn moving in from the west and the 47th Armd Inf Bn from the east. At 0830, after a small fire fight, the town surrendered. The combat command then commenced the mopping up of its area. The 10th Tank Bn cleared the towns of PRISSER - RISKAU and KARMEN along with surrounding areas. The 47th cleared the area east of DANNENBERG to a line QUICKBOHN - SUSBORN. By late evening the mission of CC'R' was also completed.

In general, 23 April marked the completion of destruction of the 39th Panzer Corps, with its depleted Division "Clausewitz", the 84th Division, and miscellaneous combat teams. Only a very small percentage of its original five to six thousand men, fifty tanks and four to five hundred miscellaneous vehicles is believed to have escaped the trap west of the ELBE River. For the second time in several days the 5th Armored Division fought its way to the ELBE River. The first time on 12 April, when CC'A' and CC'R' reached points less than fifty (50) miles from BERLIN and for several days remained the closest American or British units to the German Capitol.

Enemy Casualties for the past 24 hours: PWs taken, one thousand three hundred (1300) (includes 275 from 22 April), enemy killed, none reported.

Enemy materiel captured or destroyed for the past 24 hours: 3 Tanks (one a Mark V), 14 half-tracks, 46 motor trucks, 6 passenger cars, 10 motorcycles, 7 trailers, 1 barge, 1 gasoline dump, 1 optical warehouse, 1 powder plant, 6 88mm AI/AT (w/ prime movers), 21 nebelwerfers (5 w/ trucks), 1 SP 75mm gun, 1 SP 150mm gun, 12 Field Artillery guns, 2 flak guns, 1 40mm AI gun, 8 20mm guns, 25 machine guns and 1 V-1 assembly plant.

On 24 April, CC'A' and CC'R' remained in place awaiting relief by the 29th Inf Div which was to assume the responsibility for the zone. Relief began during the morning, and at 2130, both combat commands had been officially relieved. CC'B' remained in place in the southwestern portion of the Division zone on 23 - 24 April.

Letter of Instructions No. 75, Hq, XIII Corps, was received by Division. This letter outlined an area of occupation for the Division. The area to be bounded on the north by WITTINGER - HANKENEBUTTEL - SPRAKENSEHL - WEYHAUSEN, on the east by ZASENBECK - BRONE - BOCKWITZ - RUTEN - DANNDORF - MACKENDORF - ROTTORF - MARIENTHAL, on the south by BARMKE - COISEN - DORF - ESSENHOF - WENDEBERG - WENDEZELLE - WAHLE - BATTMAR - MUNSTEDT - TELGTE - SIEVER - SHAUSEN - ARPKE, and on the west by ARPKE - RALLINGEN - WESTERCELLE - ALTENHAGEN - GARSSEN - ESCHADE and WEYHAUSEN. CC'B' and CC'R' were given the

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northern portion with boundaries generally through HANKENSBUTTEL - WESENDORF - KASTORD, CC'A' the southern portion with north boundary DANNDORF - CALBERLAH - LIEFERDE - HELERSE - EDEMISSEN - AMBOSTEL. The remainder was given to Div Tn with the 85th Cav Bn Sq Mecz and 22d Armd Engr Bn to assist. The entire area was to be occupied upon relief by the 29th Inf Div of the Division in present positions. Included was the protection of the MSR and guarding of various captured installations in the Division's new area. CC'B' was ordered to take over patrolling activities on the MSR from the 407th RCT (102nd Inf Div) This was accomplished by 2000.

The advance Division CP at SALZWEDEL moved back to the rear CP near NEUENMUHLE.

Enemy losses for 24 April were reported in one category only, that of PW's, one hundred fifty two (152).

On 25 April CC'A' and CC'R' moved to the newly assigned areas. The CC'A' CP was set up at WEDELHEINE, the 46th Armd Inf Bn at GR SCHWULPER and the 34th Tank Bn at MORSE, with companies at EHMEN and HEILIGENDORF.

The CC'R' CP closed at GR OSINGEN, the 10th Tank Bn at HANKENSBUTTEL, with companies at RPK and surrounding areas, and the 46th Armd Inf Bn going to TACHENDORF.

The 22d Armd Engr Bn moved to UETZE, closing at 1630. The remainder of the Division stayed in place.

The Division's combat commands began patrolling their areas on 26 April. CC'B' was relieved of the responsibility of patrolling the MSR east of the new Division zone. Division Artillery was assigned the west portion of the CC'A' zone from a line WEDTENSTEDT - WENDEBERG - SCHWULPER running west to the Division rear boundary, exclusive of the town of PEINE. The 628th TD Bn moved into this zone with the Bn CP at ZWEIDORF, Co. "A" at WOLTORF, Co. "B" at SIERSE and Co. "C" at SCHMEDENSTEDT.

Division Trains moved from CHEINITZ to its new zone. Tn Hq set up at NEUROKEL, 75th Med Bn Armd at WILSCHE, 127th Ord Maint Bn at RIBBESBUTTEL, with Co. "A" at LIEFERDE, Co. "B" at ISENBUTTEL and Co. "C" at GAMSEN, the 145th Armd Sig Co at ETTENSBUTTEL. The Division Headquarters (Rear Echelon, Administration Center) moved into GIEHORN. Thus, with the exception of Division Artillery, which remained in position on the ELBE, and the Division CP, all units had closed in the new area.

From 27 through 30 April, the Division continued to occupy, screen civilian personnel and handle the displaced persons in its area. Division Artillery was under Corps operational control as the month ended. CC'A' moved its CP to the vicinity of HESSLINGEN. (NOTE: As the month of April ended reports on enemy stragglers decreased. However, civilians on several occasions are known to have attacked soldiers. This was usually accomplished at night and while the soldier was alone).

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6. COMMENTS:

Section I - Personnel Matters

Casualties were relatively light in view of the Division's almost constant employment this month. The officer shortage however became more acute during the month, total losses being 48 and returnees-to-duty numbering 10. An additional 3 officers were gained by battlefield appointment and 2 by non-battlefield appointment. Enlisted casualties during the month amounted to 623 (includes battle and non-battle casualties). This loss was offset approximately by half by receipt of reinforcements and returnees-to-duty. Cavalry trained enlisted reinforcements remained unavailable during the month, and not much success was had in obtaining Infantry reinforcements suitable for conversion to Cavalry.

Decorations were awarded this month as follows:

Silver Star	13
Bronze Star	93
Air Medal	4
	<u>110</u>

Prisoners of War captured during the month totaled 23,343 of whom 4,512 were captured while sick in German military and civilian hospitals, where they were left under guard. Evacuation was extremely difficult due to limited transportation and guard personnel and the distances involved. Because of the limitations as above, hundreds more were disarmed and left under armed guard or with local burgomeisters enroute.

Allied Ex-Prisoners of War uncovered in German installations or freed in transit amounted to 7,207 nationalities as follows:

United States	1656
Russian	1640
British	1349
Polish	1155
French	716
Italian	457
Belgian	167
Hungarian	150
Czech	15
Norwegian	<u>2</u>

Evacuation of these Allied Ex-Prisoners of War was accomplished by use of Division supply trucks, plus a loan of trucks from a regiment of the 35th Inf Div and from XIII Corps. Personnel were fed from captured German military food stocks, supplemented by our own rations. Medical evacuation and emergency medical treatment were not major problems.

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Section II - Intelligence Matters

During the past month as the Division advanced from the Rhine to the Elbe there was a continuation in the enemy's use of his 150 mm guns as flat-trajectory, ground defense, weapons. Having many of these type guns situated around towns, installations, airports, etc, which were rapidly over-run by our forces, and having no means of removing the guns, the enemy concentrated his defenses near these sites.

An interesting development during the period was the enemy's use of "spot" discharge's from the Army and the subsequent changing into civilian clothing. One theory on this, obtained from PW statements, was that the individual soldier after donning civilian clothes could better make his way back through our lines and once more into a fighting unit. Actually, this didn't appear to work in the majority of cases as the individual enemy once obtaining his discharge seemed more interested in remaining out of the Army. A few cases of guerrilla activity by these enemy in civilian clothing have been reported and this may well be a second reason for this action. Constant alertness on the part of our troops, and thorough CIC screening is the solution to this enemy activity.

Two, apparently new and highly secret weapons of the enemy were captured during the period.

At STENDAL, Germany a German research technician was taken prisoner. This technician had in his possession and installed on his automobile, infrared equipment which he was removing from the vicinity of BERLIN and the ultimate danger of capture by the Russians. This equipment was designed for installation on tanks for the purpose of night fighting. The entire equipment, plus the technician was turned over to Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service, NINTH Army. A secret report has been subsequently rendered on this equipment and a copy of the report is on file at this Headquarters.

At RIEKAU, Germany, a V-1 assembly plant was over-run, several V-1s were taken intact. Among the V-1s taken was a new "RE-IV" or Pilot type V-1. The bomb was complete with controls and a parachute was part of the individual bomb equipment, as it was contemplated that the pilot would fly the bomb to its target and then bail out. The entire plant was a lesson in perfect camouflage, built into the wooded area of the surrounding territory. Higher Headquarters was immediately notified and representatives of Target Force, SHAEF, made a subsequent inspection.

Enemy losses for the month of April were as follows:

Tanks - assault guns	46
Miscellaneous motor vehicles	459
Artillery (75mm and up)	206
Guns below 75mm and Inf Howitzers)	104



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Section III - Operations

"Horsefly" Planes As An Aid To Air-Ground Cooperation: One of the most effective methods found for using fighter-bomber aircraft in cooperation with ground troops is by using a "Horsefly" (L-5) observation plane equipped with both VHF (SCR 522) and FM (SCR 510 or SCR 610) radios. This method has been very successfully employed by this Division and has been applauded by all echelons of ground commanders and fighter-bomber squadron commanders alike. It is particularly adaptable for use with an armored division in a constantly moving situation. The "Horsefly", having the same target perspective as that of the F/B's, can be employed to assist a flight in locating a pre-briefed target, or to direct the attack on a target of opportunity. The plane is piloted by either a F/B pilot or a specially trained liaison pilot, while the observer is a ground officer from the division using the "Horsefly" and one who not only has been trained in the adjustment of artillery fire but also an officer who has had considerable training in both S-3 and S-3 Air work. With this combination of personnel operating from the "Horsefly" it affords a central control for the coordination of air, ground and artillery attack on a given target. It is important to note, however, that the "Horsefly" will supplement the existing VHF F/B ground control procedure and not replace it as the combination of the two make certain the coordination of all attacking forces. Then, too, continuous operation of the "Horsefly" is not always possible.

A minimum of two "Horseflies" should be on hand at all times, one engaged in operations and one at the Division base to alternate throughout the day. A second pilot and observer "team" is most desirable as it permits the exchange of personnel for necessary rest and orientation.

The "Horsefly" planes are distinguished from other Liaison planes operating in the area by means of a red, orange or white diagonal stripe, 10" wide, on each of the upper wings.

Procedure: The division controller directs the "Horsefly" to proceed to an area or specific location to work with a certain unit and either conduct close reconnaissance and report observations and/or await the arrival of the F/B's and then direct them to the targets. Oftentimes it may be advisable for the "Horsefly" to sit down close to the CP of the unit with which it is working and obtain the latest picture and arrange for coordinated attacks. The pilot and observer are briefed on the target and terrain from aerial photographs and maps and then directed to rendezvous with the F/B flight. When both visual and radio contact with the flight have been established, the "Horsefly" leads the flight to the target area and describes the target in detail, adding any particular instructions regarding the ground and artillery coordination. The "Horsefly" can indicate the target with considerable ease by simply hovering over or near the target and indicating the bombing or strafing run by his own action. For targets of opportunity an area is usually reconnoitered for targets by the "Horsefly". When one is discovered the "Horsefly" calls the forward controller of the combat command with which it is working. The next flight of F/B's are then directed to a certain

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point and to contact the "Horsefly". The "Horsefly" is given the IP, call sign, operating channel of the F/B's and estimated time of their arrival. The "Horsefly" then takes over as forward controller at the IP and directs the attack. Should targets be observed by other C's the "Horsefly" is notified and ordered to the area to direct the attack.

While the pilot of the "Horsefly" operates the VHF in contact with the F/B planes, the observer keeps abreast of the ground picture by means of one FM channel in contact with all Division and Major Command S-3 Air and S-3 Sections. Another FM channel enables the observer to direct artillery fire for the marking of targets, artillery concentrations either before or after the air attack or the lifting of artillery fires prior to either air or ground attack. Every effort should be made to have the air complement artillery or the reverse. The combined effort of both support arms immediately followed by the ground attack cannot be surpassed or its importance over emphasized.

## Advantages of the "Horsefly";

1. Better Vision: To be of the greatest assistance to the F/B pilot, the ground controller must be able to see the targets. This has been found to be extremely difficult. When with advance guard or the assault wave, fields of vision are always bad. Good positions are usually denied us by enemy fire. Even with a good OP, only a few hundred yards of front can be observed from a tank, and during movement almost nothing can be observed. Also, targets are usually not discovered until they have fired upon our troops. The advantages of an L-5 plane parallels the increased efficiency the L-4 Air OP has given to the artillery.

a. Great Assistance to F/B's in Finding Targets. Due to the great speed and the altitude that F/B's must fly, it is often difficult for them to find and identify targets. The ground controllers' most difficult job is to "talk" the pilot to his target. The "Horsefly" can do this much more readily. By the flight of his plane the pilot is able to indicate the target and "talk terrain" to the F/B's since they both have the same view of the target, and by direct communications with artillery to mark the targets with smoke. Targets can be positively identified as enemy before the attack is made.

b. Ability to Continuously Find New Targets, Both Primary and Secondary. From experience it has been found that the L-4 Artillery Observer has been able to supply the S-3 Air with his best targets. With the good view of the battlefield that the Air OP has, anything holding up our forces can be observed and hit. Even more valuable, and something that the ground controller cannot do, is to find the targets before they become a menace to our ground forces. The air observer is able to find and have ready at all times the most profitable targets for the supporting F/B's. During exploitation he should be able to find many small targets such as road blocks and AT guns that impede the advance, and either attack them with available column and/or artillery, or report the positions to the ground commander. (All targets are cleared with the ground commander before attack is made and the ground attack coordinated.)

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c. To Instantly Spot and Report New Flak Positions. Not only can the "Horsefly" call for anti-flak fire on known positions but it can instantly spot and report any new positions observed during the first part of the attack. This is of great benefit to the F/B pilots, reducing their losses due to enemy flak and increasing their efficiency.

d. Assists in Obtaining Both Friendly and Enemy Information. By use of the S-3 Air FM Net the observer is able to keep each Major Command with whom he is working informed at all times of positions of friendly forward elements and all observed enemy actions or installations.

2. Mobility. The "Horsefly" could control F/B attack on any target regardless of position, while the ground controller is limited by being (in comparison to the L-5 speed) somewhat immobile. This would be invaluable in case of a counter-attack from a flank, or to assist in covering a flank. Enemy movement can be spotted before actual contact is made. The "Horsefly" can control air attacks for any combat command, special task force or any unit of the division regardless of whether or not the force has a VHF radio.

3. Communication. The use of this plane links all S-3 Air officers of the Division in a rapid FM voice net. Fighter-Bombers can be better employed as they are easily shifted as needed between combat commands. This net can also be used for liaison between combat commands and the Division CP. The direct communications with Division Artillery assists in rapid marking of targets, firing of anti-flak and use of air cooperation and artillery in combination or succession.

Recommendation. It is recommended that two (2) "Horseflies" (L-5 aircraft) equipped with VHF (SCR 522) radio and FM (SCR 510) radio be attached or made readily available to the Armored Division. Each plane to be piloted by one F/B pilot on temporary duty or detached service with the Division. The "Horseflies" can be serviced and based at either the Corps or preferably the Division Artillery Liaison plane base. The pilot to be accompanied by an officer observer, selected from the division, who has had S-3, S-3 Air and Artillery Forward Observer training. Said officer observer should be attached to the Division Air Liaison Section as a full time assistant to the Air Liaison Officer. The S-3 Air FM Radio Net to become a standard net within the division, consisting of the Division Air Liaison Officer, the S-3 Air of each Combat Command, the "Horsefly" and one Division Artillery station. One frequency of the two available with the SCR 510 to be used for the S-3 Air Net and the other, for the Division Artillery Fire Control Net linking all artillery battalions.

While the use of the "Horsefly" by this Division has to date been somewhat experimental it has proven to be far more effective than at first anticipated. It is planned that in the future whenever possible it will be employed along with our present ground control procedure. Its use insures the accurate marking of targets and makes possible the complete coordination of the combined air, artillery and ground force attack.

SECRET

(Report After Action Against the Enemy - April 1945, Hq 5th Armd Div)

Section IV - Supply and Maintenance Matters

1. The operation from the Rhine to the Elbe emphasized again the need for additional transportation when an Armored Division is committed on a pursuit or exploitation mission.

a. The two normally attached Quartermaster Truck companies were disposed as follows: 1 platoon with each combat command for Cl 3 supplies; 1 platoon (-) with Division Artillery for Cl 3 and 5 supplies; 1 platoon with Division Quartermaster for Cl 1; and 1 platoon (✓) with Division Trains for a small Division reserve of Cl 3 and 5 and for miscellaneous transportation (reinforcements, returnees from pass and furlough, PX, and so forth).

b. Priority of supply was Cl 3. Fuel trains operated on such a narrow time margin that in several instances a delay of several hours in arrival at the unit service parks would have resulted in the curtailment or cessation of the rapid advance of the Division.

c. All fuel trucks were overloaded in excess of 100%.

d. Army supply points are unable to displace forward fast enough to provide adequate support to armor in pursuit. Turnaround travelled by unit fuel trucks exceeded 360 miles in several instances and was 325 miles when units were on the Elbe.

e. Extra fuel for 100 miles of operation was carried on or in all vehicles in crossing the Rhine. This insured full basic load upon being committed to action from the assembly area east of the Rhine.

2. Experience in continental operations has proven that the fuel consumption estimates given in FM's and TM's are 30% low for combat operations.

3. Replacement of destroyed vehicles was greatly simplified and accelerated by the allocation, by Army Ordnance, replacement stock of combat and general purpose vehicles which were carried in the Division Ordnance Supply Section.

4. Abnormal wear of tank and half track track was experienced, due to the great amount of cobblestone type roads traversed.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

5 Incls:

- Incl 1 - G-1 Journal
- Incl 2 - G-2 Journal
- Incl 3 - G-3 Journal
- Incl 4 - G-3 Air Journal
- Incl 5 - G-4 Journal

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