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Report date:	15 March – 2 May 1943
Title:	Report on Operation conducted by II Corps, United States Army, Tunisia
Author:	Headquarters II Corps
Abstract:	Report includes phases 1-3 of the operation, highlights of the operation, and results of the operation, and appendixes A-D. Reproduced at the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

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CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS II CORPS APO 302

AG 370

10 April 1943

SUBJECT: Report of Operations.

TO : Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Commanding General, 18th Army Group.

Section I.....Authority Section II.....General Section III.....Operation, 1st Phase Section IV.....Operation, 2nd Phase Section V.....Operation, 3rd Phase Section VI....Highlights of Operation Section VII....Results of Operation

SECTION I - AUTHORITY

In compliance with paragraph 10, A. R. 345-105, a report of operations of the II Corps from 15 March to 10 April is hereby submitted.

SECTION II - GENERAL

1. CORPS DIRECTIVES. -- Under letter, 2 March, Hq. British First Army, the C. G., II Corps was ordered to prepare forthwith an offensive operation with the following objects:

a. To draw off reserves from the enemy forces facing Eighth Army.

b. To enable our Air Forces to reoccupy advanced airfields and thus develop the maximum support to help Eighth Army in its attack on the MARETH - GABES position.

c. To establish a forward maintenance center from which the mobile forces of Eighth Army could draw to maintain the momentum of their advance.

d. To be prepared to put the above plan into effect not later than 15 March.

2. CORPS OBJECTIVE.--(See overlay on next page.) The II Corps, under authority contained in letter referred to in par. 1, was given the mission of:

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Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

a. Capturing GAFSA.

b. After its capture to secure and hold GAFSA, and with troops not required for the defense of GAFSA to operate towards MAKNASSY in order further to threaten the enemy's line of communicacation from GABES.

c. As an essential preliminary to the Operation, to establish fighter aircraft on the THELEPTE airfields before 15 March.

d. To hold securely the passes between inclusive ABIOD and SBIBA.

3. COMMAND. -- II Corps passed from under command British First Army to command 18th Army Group, 8 March, 1943.

4. COMPOSITION II CORPS.--For this Operation, II Corps consisted of 1st, 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions; 1st Armored Division; 13th F.A. Brigade (reinforced by 5th Armored F.A. Group which arrived after the Operation started); 1st Derbyshire Yeomanry (a British Reconnaissance Unit of two squadrons); 1st T.D. Group consisting of seven T.D. Battalions (Five Battalions equipped with 75mm guns and two battalions equipped with 3* guns); Corps AA consisting of four automatic weapons battalions plus one extra battery, one 90mm battalion, and three separate batteries; and Corps Service and Supporting Troops.

5. SUPPORTING TROOPS:

a. Air. XII Air Support Command supported the Operation of the II Corps throughout the operations.

b. French. Mobile French Forces operating from the NEGRINE area were on the right flank of the II Corps.

6. LOCATION OF ENEMY ON 15 MARCH.--On 15 March, Rommel's main force, consisting of four Italian Infantry Divisions, two German Infantry Divisions, and the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions together with supporting and service troops was believed to be concentrated along or in support of the MARETH position. The Centauro Division was believed to be in the GAFSA area. Task forces held the passes at FAID, MAK-NASSY, and FONDOUK. These positions were well-organized for defense. The 19th Panzer was not definitely located but believed to be in General Reserve somewhere in the SFAX area.

7. PLAN OF OPERATION. -- The plan for the Operation consisted of having the 9th Infantry Division reinforced (-one CT) defend the passes ABIOD - KASSERINE both inclusive; the 34th Infantry Division reinforced to defend the SBIBA PASS: the 1st Infantry Division reinforced

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Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

to move from BOU CHEBKA via FERIANA on GAFSA; and the 1st Armored Division, with one CT of the 9th Infantry Division attached, to concentrate in an area 25 miles northeast of GAFSA prepared to operate on MAKNASSY after 1st Infantry Division had captured and secured GAFSA. Light forces were to be placed at FERIANA and SBEITLA prior to 15 March to cover airfields in the immediate vicinity.

SECTION III - OPERATION 1st PHASE

8. Prior to March 16th.--Although the operation was ordered by 18th Army Group to begin on 17th March, it was necessary prior to 15 March to move the 1st Infantry Division from MORSOTT to BOU CHEBKA, and the 1st Armored Division from south of TEBESSA to KASSERINE. Although these movements entailed a crossing of columns, concentration of these two Divisions was completed without incident. At this time the 9th and 34th Divisions were occupying the positions they were charged with defending. Light covering forces of the 9th Infantry Division whre in position at FERIANA and SBEITLA, and the Derby Yeomanry performed Corps reconnaissance generally east of and along the road GAFSA - SIDI BOU ZID.

9. MARCH 17 th :

a. Under cover of darkness night 16-17 March, 1st Infantry Division moved into forward assembly areas for attack on GAFSA. Attack jumped off at 1000 hours as scheduled.

b. The first operation was for the purpose of capturing and securing GAFSA with a view to using it as a forward supply base for resupplying the Eighth Army on its move to the north. The Corps left flank was to be secured by emplacing the 1st Armored Division in the vicinity of DJEBEL SOUINIA. Owing to heavy rains and the uncertain state of the 1st Armored Division route--a new road connecting THELEPTE with the **SIDI** BOU ZID road and constructed by 19th Engineers in three days--it was decided to start moving the 1st Armored Division on the morning of 16 March. Col. Benson with a force consisting of one Med. Tank Bn., one TD Bn., and one En. of self-propelled guns was moved to an area southeast of SBEITLA on 15 March to provide flank security.

c. The 1st Infantry Division captured GAFSA at 1230 hours, 17 March. Italian garrison from Centauro Division withdrew without offering serious resistance.

d. At 1510, 1st Infantry Division occupied LALA (3 miles southeast of GAFSA.)

e. At 1630, patrol from 1st Armored Division entered ZANNOUCH.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

10. 18th MARCH:

a. 1st Ranger Bn., attached to 1st Infantry Division occupied EL GUETTAR at 1600 hours.

b. 1st Armored Division closed up with CC*A* at ZANNOUCH STATION, CC*B* in the vicinity of DJ EL HAFEY, and the rest of the Division at SOUINIA.

11. 19th MARCH:

a. 1st Infantry Division completed mopping up of GAFSA and area to the southeast as far as EL GUETTAR, thus accomplishing original mission.

b. 1st Armored Division in contact with enemy north of SENED STATION.

c. Instructions received from Chief of Staff, 18th Army Group, outlining future operations as follows:

(1) To hold GAFSA.

(2) To secure and hold heights east of MAKNASSY, and send light armored raiding party to airfield at MEZZOUNA, to destroy installations and return.

(3) Large forces not to be passed beyond the line GAFSA -MAKNASSY - FAID - FONDOUK.

(4) On passage of Eighth Army north of MAKNASSY, 9th Infantry Division to be turned over to British First Army to relieve 46th British Infantry Division on extreme left (north) flank of that Army.

(5) II Corps after relief of the 9th Infantry Division to attack FONDOUK from the west and southwest for the purpose of securing the heights in that vicinity. 34th Infantry Division to side-slip to the north and attack along the axis MAKTAR - PICHON. (This plan apparently envisaged pinching out the II Corps after capture of the FONDOUK heights.

12. 20th MARCH:

a. 1st Armored Division, with 60th CT attached, attacked and captured DJ GOUSSA and DJ MAJOURA overlooking SENED STATION. This attack was to be assisted by CC"A" moving northeast from vicinity of ZANNOUCH, but owing to bad state of road, little progress was made by

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

CC *A*. The attack of the remainder of the Division was successful however and SENED STATION was occupied. Forces which were believed to be defending the area SENED - MAKNASSY at this time included elements of Kasta O. B., 580th Rcn. Unit, elements 1st Afrika Artillery Regiment, elements 131st Centauro Division, and 50th Special Brigade which had been toughened considerably by the inclusion of key German personnel.

b. Orders issued to 1st Division to attack early 21 March and capture commanding ground east of EL GUETTAR.

13. 21st MARCH:

a. 1st Infantry Division attacked to the east and captured the hills six miles east of EL GUETTAR. This attack was launched over extremely rough terrain, but by clever maneuvering the Division succeeded in taking the enemy in flank. An intense artillery preparation together with the surprise achieved by a night approach over the rugged terrain, enabled the Division to capture with minor losses, over 700 Italians of the vaunted 7th Bersaglieri Regiment and Centauro Division.

b. 1st Armored Division advanced slowly on MAKNASSY.

14. 22nd MARCH:

a. 1st Armored Division captured MAKNASSY.

b. 1st Infantry Division executed local attacks to improve position.

c. Build up of enemy forces east and northeast of MAKNASSY.

d. Two Ju 88's and eight Me 109's bombed east and west of MAKNASSY.

e. 1st Armored Division attacked during night against high ground to east of MAKNASSY to secure Pass leading to MEZZOUNA. MAK-NASSY shelled.

15. 23rd MARCH:

a. 1st Infantry Division counter-attacked by German 10th Panzer Division and elements 131st Centauro Division with at least 50 tanks of the Mark II, Mark IV, and Mark VI variety. The attack was launched at 0600 hours by Infantry and tanks. Although some penetration of forward positions was made and two tanks came within sight of a Regimental CP, the attack was repulsed by 0900 hours with heavy

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

losses to the enemy. Preceded by four heavy dive bombing assaults, the enemy attack was resumed at 1645 hours. On this second attack, German infantry preceded the tanks. Again the 1st Division held to its position and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy forcing him to withdraw by 1900 hours. Our artillery and infantry fire was deadly to the enemy. Only nine survivors of one enemy company were seen to escape. Air bursts were used with devastating effect.

b. During the day at least 30 enemy tanks were put out of. action, of which 15 were later destroyed by Division Engineers. Our losses, destroyed or put out of action, included six 155mm howitzers, six 105mm howitzers, 24 TD half-tracks (75mm), and 7 TD M10's (3"). The 1st Infantry Division in repulsing this strong German attack from positions which had been prepared in a relatively short time demonstrated clearly the ability of Infantry, properly supported, to withstand armored attacks supported by air, provided the defending unit has the will to stay and fight. The performance of the 1st Infantry Division on this day was in keeping with the finest traditions of the United States Army.

c. Repeated attacks by 1st Armored Division against increasing resistance. Heavy losses suffered.

16. 24th MARCH:

a. During night of 23-24 March and 24th March, local enemy attacks supported by tanks were launched all along 1st Infantry Division position. All of these attacks were repulsed. Cver 600 prisoners were taken on 23rd and 24th March.

b. 1st Armored Division attacked but owing to continued enemy build-up east of MAKNASSY was unable to capture the pass, although Infantry elements succeeded in gaining a temporary foothold. Division ordered to discontinue the attack and reorganize. During these attacks considerable casualties were suffered by both sides.

c. To insure security of GAFSA, one Medium Tank Bn., one Bn. of Infantry from 9th Division, and one Bn. of Artillery were moved into area between GAFSA and EL GUETTAR.

d. French on our south reported enemy entrenched BOU JERRA opposite DJ. EDBEL.

17. 25th MARCH:

a. Col. Benson's flank group moved to a position 12 miles from GAFSA.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

b. Commanding General, 18th Army Group, arrived at CP and issued instructions for future operations as follows:

(1) Use 9th Division in conjunction with 1st Infantry Division for an attack on the GAFSA - wABES axis with a view to opening the pass north of hill 369 (near Kilometer Post 110) to permit passage of 1st Armored Division. This attack to be in three phases as follows:

(a) 1st Phase--Secure the road junction north of DJEBEL BERDA and the hills north and south thereof.

(b) 2nd Phase--Secure position as far forward as the pass between DJEBEL CHEMSI and DJEBEL BEH KREIR, thus opening the path for the advance of 1st Armored Division to the vicinity of DJ. TEBAGA FATNASSA.

(c) 3rd Phase--Advance of 1st Armored Division through pass to DJ. TEBAGA from which it would operate against the lines of communication of the Germans. (This phase to be initiated only on order from 18th Army Group).

(2) To insure the integrity of MAKNASSY, one medium tank bn., 60th CT, and two additional artillery battalions were to be left in the vicinity of MAKNASSY.

(3) Firm base (ABIOD - SBIBA) to be moved to the line GAFSA - SBEITLA.

(4) 34th Division to move from SBEITLA on FONDOUK.

(5) Attack to begin on 27th or 28th March depending on when it could be mounted.

18. 26th MARCH:

Movements in preparation for attack. (9th Division to attack on right of 1st Infantry Division).

19. 27th MARCH:

34th Division, leaving one CT less one bn. at SBEITLA, advanced on FONDOUK with little opposition. This was the first time all four divisions of II Corps were engaged simultaneously.

20. 28th MARCH:

a. 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions launched their attack at daylight. Stiff resistance was encountered almost immediately from

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

mixed Italian and German units, largely from the Italian Centauro Division and elements of the 10th Panzer Division who fought in carefully prepared defensive positions. The enemy apparently had spent months of work on these defenses, some of which had been blasted out of solid rock. Extensive use of wire and mines was made. The extremely difficult terrain provided one of the most formidable obstacles of all. Mere climbing of the series of jagged and barren volcanic peaks was a feat of considerable endurance. The men literally wore shoes and clothing to shreds. The width of the sector, and the great difficulties of supply and evacuation--pack mules and native burros were used extensively--were deterring factors.

b. Commanding General, 18th Army Group visited CP, II Corps, and expressed satisfaction over progress of attack.

c. Commanding General, 1st Armored Division ordered to leave Hq. CC*A* at MAKNASSY to command defenses of that area. 81st Rcn. Bn. and one Bn. of artillery ordered from MAKNASSY to olive groves west of GAFSA during night 28-29 March.

21. 29th MARCH:

a. General Holmes arrived from 18th Army Group with instructions as follows:

(1) Armored elements to be launched through 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions during morning of 30th March.

(2) Only a portion of the 1st Armored Division to make the attack--remainder to be located at SENED STATION and MAKNASSY.

(3) FAID PASS was to be left unguarded.

b. Col. Benson placed in command of Armored Task Force to go through 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions under corps control. His force to consist of:

> Two Bns. Medium Tanks 81st Rcn. Bn. Two Armored FA Bns. One TD Bn. (M-10) One Co. Engrs. One Mtzd Bn. 39th Inf. (9th Inf. Div.) 16 Self-Propelled AT-AA Mounts (Total of 160 miles of gasoline in armored vehicles and trains.)

c. Corps Artillery and artillery of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions moved forward to support Benson's attack.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

d. 1st Armored Division harassed by enemy artillery and small infantry attacks.

22. 30th MARCH:

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a. Benson attacked at noon and immediately ran into heavy artillery fire and mines losing five tanks.

b. One Bn. 6th Armored Infantry ordered to join Benson.

c. 34th Division encountering opposition.

d. 1st Bn., 1st Armored Regiment, upon arrival in theatre from Oran where it had been reequipped, was ordered from TEBESSA to SBEITLA.

23. 31st MARCH:

a. At 0600 hours Benson attacked with 3rd Bn., 39th Infantry. This Bn. attacked from a position on the right of the 1st Infantry Division, and by noon had made contact with left of 9th Division.

b. At 1245 hours, Benson launched combined attack of tanks and infantry, broke through mines with loss of nine tanks and two self-propelled TD's.

c. 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions ordered to renew attack at 1600 hours.

d. Commanding General, 1st Armored Division ordered to put on coordinated attack on left of MAKNASSY pusition to draw enemy away from 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions. Attack launched at 1800 hours.

e. 8th Army reports enemy still holding AKARIT position.

f. Chief of Staff, 18th Army Group, arrived at Corps CP.

24. 1st APRIL:

a. 1st Armored Division continued attack launched 31 March.

b. Heavy enemy air attack causing many casualties among troops in EL GUETTAR area.

c. Benson Force again attacked but was met by heavy hostile fire. Force withdrawn by direction Chief of Staff, 18th Army Group, and Infantry Divisions ordered to continue attack to clear defile.

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d. Commanding General, 18th Army Group telegraphed that he felt enemy in front would give way if pressure was continued. Orders issued to 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions to initiate second phase of operation as outlined by Commanding General, 18th Army Group, 25th March.

e. 34th Infantry Division launched small scale Infantry attacks and engaged in artillery duel. Considerable enemy air activity in area.

SECTION IV - OPERATION 2ND PHASE

25. 2nd APRIL:

Second phase of the attack was started and the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions moved forward within their zones. Throughout the dav, action consisted of mopping up small pockets of enemy resistance. The Armored Force under Benson, moved forward during the afternoon in order to meet a possible counterattack by the enemy. This force established contact by reconnaissance patrols with the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions. At 1130 hours 32 tanks which had been seen by artillery observers from hill 574 were taken under fire by three Bns. of the 13th F.A. Brigade. This fire continued at intervals throughout the day. Five direct hits were observed and personnel dispersed. Heavy winds in the vicinity of THELEPTE airfields prevented air support until late afternoon.

26. 3rd APRIL:

a. Attack of 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions continued in face of stiff opposition.

b. 1st Infantry Division operating against troops identified as Germans reached objective prior to dark.

c. 9th Infantry Division continued to battle for hills 772 and 369, suffering many casualties from the enemy's well-prepared positions.

d. Benson Force remained ready to push through 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions at the earliest opportunity.

e. Air Marshal Tedder, Lt. General Spaatz, and Brig. General Williams, visited CP, II Corps, to confer on Air Support. At 1500 hours, during conference, CP, II Corps was bombed.

f. 1600 hours - a delegation of distinguished Turkish officers visited CP, II Corps.

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g. Enemy attempted to remove disabled tanks from battlefield. Our artillery opened fire and four tanks were observed burning. No tanks were removed at this time.

h. Brig. Holmes, 18th Army Group arrived with directive for future operations which was as follows:

(1) FONDOUK operation to be carried out under command Commanding General, 9th British Corps, by 34th U.C.S. Infantry Division considerably reinforced, 128th British Infantry Brigade, and 6th Armored Division.

(2) In addition to Corps Artillery groupment supporting 34th Division, one additional light FA Bn. and one Medium FA Bn. to be dispatched to 34th Division night 4-5 April.

(3) Although FONDOUK operation now had 1st priority, every effort to be made to contain enemy in EL GUETTAR area by continuing to threaten break-through.

(4) MAKNASSY front to be maintained aggressively, and early warning received of enemy withdrawal.

(5) Regiment of 34th Division at SBEITLA to be relieved by one Infantry Bn., reinforced.

(6) As soon as Eighth Army succeeded in breaking through AKARIT position, 9th Infantry Division to move to 5 British Corps to take over part of the front near the sea.

27. 4th APRIL:

a. 133rd CT ordered to join 34th Division after being relieved at SBEITLA by 3rd Bn., 26th Infantry reinforced under command of Colonel J. J. B. Williams, F.A.

b. 1st Derby Yeomanry ordered to join 9th British Corps after being relieved by 9th Rcn. Troops and reconnaissance elements of 601st and 805th TD Bns.

c. 9th Infantry Division continued attack on LITTOUCHI but unable to capture objective.

d. 1st Infantry Division conducted vigorous patrolling during day.

e. Benson force operated during day against enemy strong points, losing one tank and several men.

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28. 5th APRIL:

a. Evidence of considerable enemy activity observed in front of 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions during day. Just prior to dark, enemy tanks and artillery observed moving southeast along southern slopes DJ. BERDA.

b. Troops disposed to meet possible enemy thrust around south flank or to follow up enemy withdrawal should threat prove to be a feint only.

29. 6th APRIL:

a. Early indications of withdrawal of some enemy elements during night 5-6 April.

b. 1st and 9th Infantry Division ordered to attack and secure general north and south line through grid easting Y415.

c. 1st Armored Division launched attack against DJEBEL MAIZTLA and high ground to the east.

d. 1st Infantry Division gained objective prior to dark, but 9th Infantry Division suffered considerable casualties in attacking hill 369 and failed to reach objective. 9th Division ordered to withdraw and reorganize under cover of darkness.

e. Benson Force moved forward at 1400 hours and by dark had reached north-south grid line Y-45.

f. Eighth Army attacked AKARIT position.

SECTION V - OPERATION, 3RD PHASE

30. 7th APRIL:

a. 1st Armored Division continued attack against DJEBEL MAIZTLA.

b. Colonel Martin, British Liaison officer delivered message from Chief of Staff, 18th Army Group, the gist of which is as follows:

> That General Alexander is convinced that the big moment has now arrived for us to give a maximum of aid to the efforts of the British 8th Army. That we must push our armor out into EL GUETTAR section and must be prepared to accept casualties. Everything must be done to push forward.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943 (Continued).

c. 0930 hours--Benson ordered by Corps Commander to take his whole force and push vigorously until he reached the Mediterranean or until he made contact with the Germans.

d. 1610 hours--Benson Force having driven 20 miles east of boundary between IT Corps and Eighth Army, made contact with elements of X Corps, British Eighth Army.

e. Over 1000 prisoners taken by Benson Force.

f. 1940 hours--Brig. Holmes, of 18th Army Group, ordered that' Benson Force be halted and withdrawn west of Corps boundary.

g. Move of 9th Infantry Division from BOU CHEBKA area delayed to not earlier than 10 April.

31. 8th APRIL:

a. Attack of 9th British Corps against FONDOUK jumped off.

·b. 1st Armored Division captured DJEBEL MAIZTLA. One MG company consisting of over 100 men was captured.

c. II Corps began clearing mines and establishing communication along the axis GAFSA - GABES.

d. Enemy pressure at MAKNASSY eased considerably.

e. 9th Infantry Division began movement to BOU CHEBKA area.

f. Commanding General, 1st Armored Division ordered to be prepared to attack FAID by early morning, 10th April (time of attack to be given later).

g. Boundary assigned II Corps ran north and south through high ground east of MAKNASSY, FAID, and FONDOUK. Upon inquiry by Commanding General, II Corps, this boundary was considered to include to II Corps eastern exit of FAID PASS.

32. 9th APRIL:

a. MAKNASSY area evacuated by enemy.

b. Benson Force moved to SBEITLA AREA for concentration with remainder 1st Armored Division.

c. 9th Infantry Division less 60th CT completed assembly in BOU CHEBKA area.

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d. On receipt of orders from Commanding General, 18th Army Group, one Bn. of Engineers less one company was dispatched to 9th British Corps.

e. As a result of a conference between Commanding General, II Corps, and Chief of Staff, 18th Army Group, the following instructions were issued by Chief of Staff, 18th Army Group:

(1) II Corps to operate on extreme north of allied force.

(2) II Corps initially to consist of 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions (34th Division to be available after completion of FONDOUK offensive), and one armored combat command together with necessary corps service and supporting troops.

(3) Remainder of 1st Armored Division to train and refit, and join II Corps later.

(4) 1st Infantry Division to be assembled and await orders for special assignment.

(5) That if everything went well at FONDOUK, FAID attack would not take place.

(6) 1st Armored Division to be held in SBEITLA area until completion of FONDOUK operation.

(7) Proposed objective for II Corps on north front was given as BIZERTA. Commanding General, II Corps emphasized the necessity of assigning II Corps an objective important enough to assure full recognition of the part United States Army Forces have played during the entire Tunisian campaign.

f. Attack of 34th Infantry Division successful and 6th Armored Division effected break-through in FONDOUK area.

33. 10th APRIL:

a. FAID area evacuated by enemy. 1st Armored Division began clearing pass of mines and booby traps.

b. MAKNASSY PASS cleared. Orders issued for 60th CT to rejoin 9th Infantry Division.

c. II Corps troops being regrouped preparatory to move north for new offensive.

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SECTION VI - HIGHLIGHTS OF OPERATION

34. G-2 ACTIVITIES.--A detailed report of G-2 activities is in preparation and will be rendered separately.

35. OUR LOSSES AND REPLACEMENTS:

a. Personnel Losses:

(1) During the operation, personnel losses amounted to a total of 5893 cf which 794 were killed, 4071*wounded seriously enough to evacuate, and 1028 missing. The total number who were wounded but not seriously enough to evacuate is still unknown. Losses were distributed as follows:

				1ST A	RMORED DI	VISION
	1 ST	INFANTRY	DIVISION	INCI	UDING 601	н ст
	K	W	м	K	W	M
Officers	6	43	5	9	64	3
Е. М.	120	973	154	295	1201	113
	126	1016	159	304	1265	116
	9 TH	INFANTRY	DIV. (-)	34TH	INFANTRY	DIV.
	K	W	Μ	K	W	M
	5	40	18	21	59	10
	138	823	342	200	868	333
	143	863	360	221	927	393

* Of this number, 51 have since died.

(2) Losses suffered by 1st Infantry Division on 23 March when attacked by 10th Panzer Division amounted to 19 killed, 146 wounded and 38 missing.

b. Personnel Replacements.--During the operation total replacements of 159 officers and 3504 enlisted men were delivered to units.

c. Nateriel Losses.--During the course of the operation, considerable equipment was damaged or destroyed as a result of combat but no equipment was captured by the enemy. Principal losses were as follows:

Medium Tanks	20
Light Tanks	5
Half-track Vehicles	10
Goneral Purpose Vehicles	30

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Artillery pieces	4
Self-Propelled Guns	15
Mortars	16
Machine Guns	24

d. Nateriel Replacements. -- The losses listed in Par. C., above, have been largely replaced by new or repaired equipment. Certain critical items, particularly tanks, are extremely difficult to replace. Detailed reports of the status of equipment are now in process, and steps are being taken to refit units with mimimum delay.

36. ENEMY LOSSES:

a. Personnel:

(1) A total of 4680 prisoners of war were taken. Of this number, 4200 were Italians and 480 Germans.

(2) It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the number of killed and wounded suffered by the enemy, but they were without doubt considerable. Tales of prisoners of war and wireless intercept indicated terrific punishment by our troops-particularly our artillery. The German is very methodical in evacuating his dead and wounded from the battlefield. Except in the direst emergency, he never abandons them. Therefore, when a position is taken, there is usually little evidence to indicate the extent he has suffered. Likewise, the dead are rarely buried in large cemeteries near the front. In the course of a trip from GAFSA to GABES on 8th April, Lt. Col. Russell F. Akers, Jr., G-3 Section, this Headquarters, noticed a considerable number of German graves along that road. These were later investigated and found to number approximately 800.

b. Materiel Losses by the Enemy.--It is still too early to determine accurately the loss of equipment inflicted on the enemy. When he withdrew to the north he was seen to be towing a number of vehicles and tanks. As in the case of his dead and wounded, he is very thorough in clearing the battlefield of equipment prior to a withdrawal. Estimated enemy equipment damaged and destroyed is as follows:

			G	R	OUND TROOPS	-	AIR
Vehicles	•	•			. 200		650
Tanks			•	•	. 69		59
Field Pieces	•	•	•		. 150		
Machine Guns							
Small Arms							
Mortars							
Ammunition							
AT and Personnel	N	lin	es	•	45000		

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Planes:

Destroyed.	•	•	•	æ	•	•	58	113
Probable .	•	•	•	٠	•	•	53	27
Damaged	•	•	•	•	•	•		74

37. LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS.--Due to the tremendous area over which the operation was waged, and the wide dispersal of troops, the supply problem was difficult from the start. As an additional handicap, the blowing of bridges along the FERIANA - GAFSA railroad, and the KASS-ERINE - SBEITLA railroad, both by our troops during an earlier withdrawal and again by the Germans during their withdrawal, necessitated the use of truck haulage for all supplies. From TEBESSA to GAFSA daily requirements amounted to about 1000 tons. Some of the supply problems which confronted the Corps are outlined below.

a. Quartermaster:

CLASS I

				GAFSA · ·														
Moved	from	TEBESSA	to	KASSER INE	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	. 795 To	n s

CLASS III

	80 Octane	87 Octane	Total
Moved from TEBESSA to GAFSA	692,080 gal.	270,430 gal.	
Moved from TEBESSA to KASSERINE · · ·	275,090 gal.	75,080 gal.	
Total haulage in gallons			
Total haulage in tons			.4,624

SERVICES

Laundry	•	•		•	•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.119,785 Pieces
Sterilization and bath											•					, 10,151 Baths
Shoe Repair					•						•	•	•	•	•	. 5,624 Pairs
Bakery			•		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.604,800 Pounds

SALVAGE TO INCLUDE APRIL 3

Shipped (OULED	RAHMOUN	or	CONSTANTINE	•	•		•	•	٠	•	٠	•	.770	Tons
Salvage M	Aateriel	on Hand	•		•	•	• •	•	•	•	•	•	•	.547	Tong

b. Ordnance:

AMMUNITION

Total Ammunition Moved from TEBESSA to GAFSA	.8,576 Tons
Total Ammunition Expenditure by Troops	.8,226 Tons
Maximum Ammunition Handled by Amm. Co. in 24 hr. period	. 30 Tons
	per man.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

c. Engineer:

Railroad Track Constructed.	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		•		•	•				.2	Miles
Railroad Bridges Repaired .		•	•		•											. 2	
New Roads Constructed	•			•					•				•	•	• •	70	Miles
Road Bridges Rebuilt																	
Road Craters Repaired	•	•		•			•		•	•			•			4	
Mines Laid	•	•	•	•	•	•		•	•	•	•		•		23,	000	

d. Nedical:

(1) EVACUATION FROM DIVISIONS. -- Two Medical Bns. were utilized for this purpose but owing to long distances and rough roads they were hard pressed. Trucks were utilized extensively in augmentmag ambulances. Additional litter bearers were furnished from Corps Medical units to forward units in the EL GUETTAR area to assist in evacuating wounded at night from the mountains.

(2) HOSPITALIZATION. -- The hospital facilities of the 48th Surgical, the 77th Evacuation, and the 9th Evacuation Hospitals proved nearly inadequate to handle the large number of casualties during the period. It became necessary to lower the evacuation policy on all these units and to evacuate to the Communication Zone a large number of casualties who might have been retained in the area until ready to be returned to duty.

Died after Admission . . . 63

(4) TOTAL EVACUATED TO COMMUNICATIONS ZONE. . . . 4749

(5) METHOD OF EVACUATION:

38. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS. -- Signal operations during this phase of the Tunisian Expedition were carried out over a front of approximately 170 kilometers wide and 120 kilometers deep. A few of the highlights of achievements accomplished by signal troops are as follows:

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

a. Wire:

b. Radio:

(1) At one stage of the operation, eight radio circuits were operated from the Corps CP. These circuits included twenty-nine radio stations scattered throughout TUNISIA.

(2) As special forces were set up, it was necessary to furnish radio and cipher teams to units in which these were not organically included. At one time a total of six radio teams from the 53rd Signal Bn. were serving with other headquarters.

(3) Radio traffic was consistently maintained over great distances. The maximum distance over which a circuit was operated was 450 miles.

c. Signal Centers.--Because of the wide front and the necessity for Corps control of the long lines, it became essential that we install and operate signal centers at the key points within the area. Signal centers consist essentially of a switchboard, a message center transfer point, and messenger service. At one time we had as many as five of these signal centers operating over the area in addition to the normal CP installations. They proved to be invaluable because units of the Corps soon learned to look for them and tie themselves into the communication system very shortly after they arrived at any new location.

d. Messenger Service.--Because of the long distances between the various headquarters, there was an unusually heavy load on the motor messenger service. During part of the operation, the Corps messengers were making a 300 kilometer round trip to the flank division. This brought up the necessity for Cub plane messenger service and it has been so recommended.

e. Pigeon Service.--During the operation, pigeon service was available from front line units back to lofts in FERIANA and TEBESSA. A pigeon messenger brought back the first news of the re-occupation of GAFSA.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued). 39. ARTILLERY: a. Organization for Combat: (1) 1st Inf. Division: 3 light battalions, 105mm howitzer. 1 medium battalion, 155mm howitzer. (2) 9th Inf. Division: 3 light battalions, 105mm howitzer. 1 medium battalion, 155mm howitzer. (3) 34th Inf. Division: 3 light battalions, Br. 25 pounder. 2 medium battalions, 155mm howitzer. 1 heavy battalion, 155mm gun. (4) 1st Armd Division: 7 light battalions, 105mm howitzer. (6 of these armd and one towed 105mm howitzer). (2 armd FA Bns. were later detached and placed in support of Benson Force operating under Corps control). (5) Corps Artillery: 1 heavy battalion, 155mm gun 2 medium battalions, 155mm howitzer. 1 Obsn. battalion (6) Total number of guns: lleavy - 24 Med. - 72 Light -228 b. Ammunition expended. -- (Does not include Artillery of 34th Div.) 105 How 155 How 155 Gun Total expended 138,267 14,916 3.953 Maximum in one day. . . . 20,001 2.775 545 Average per day 5,761 622 165 Number guns 206 48 24 Maximum per gun one day . . 97 58 23 Average per gun per day . . 28 13 7

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

c. Results accomplished:

(1) Casualties caused by artillery fire cannot be determined but prisoners of war report that the massed fires of our artillery was morale-shattering even to battle-wise veterans. They also reported that our time shell caused an unusual number of casualties.

(2) Counterbattery fire was very successful throughout the engagement. Batteries were located quickly by our observers and silenced in short order.

(a) The work of the 1st Obsn Bn 13th F.A. Brigade was outstanding throughout all phases of the operation. Prior to the attack of the 1st Infantry Division on 17 March, small survey parties worked well forward in the face of hostile resistance and effected an accurate survey control which was effectively used by the Division Artillery during the early phase of the operation.

(b) This unit continued to carry forward the established survey control with the progress of the action. Upon arrival of the 9th Infantry Division and a portion of the 13th F.A. Brigade for the ensuing phases of the operation, a common survey control was established for all artillery units within the sector.

(c) Aggressive observers, situated on vantage points well to the front with excellent communications, were able to adjust artillery fire on important targets for artillery units of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions as well as for units of the Corps Artillery Brigade. Flash and Sound equipment installed at these observing points furnished accurate counterbattery data for use by the Corps Counterbattery Section.

(d) In addition, the observation facilities of this unit furnished valuable information relative to the location of friendly front line infantry units with respect to the survey control established within division areas. This data in the form of coordinate locations was accomplished, after prearrangement, through the use of flares fired by infantry units and observed and plotted at the Observation Battalion OP's. This service was of vital importance inasmuch as the rugged terrain over which front line units were operating rendered exact location of Infantry positions an almost impossibility due to the inaccuracy of maps available.

(3) By massing the fires of five or six battalions on tank concentrations we were able to stop their attacks almost as soon as they formed up. At no time during the engagement were enemy tanks able to pass through the artillery and tank destroyer fire and overrun our infantry.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

(4) A well-organized system of communications and survey made it possible to centralize under the Corps Artillery Officer the control of all artillery, except that supporting the 1st Armored Division at MAKNASSY sector and that supporting the 34th Division in its advance on FONDOUK. This system was so flexible that any observer in the EL GUETTAR sector could adjust any battery in the Corps and bring the fires of all artillery in the Corps to bear on the adjusted point if the target called for such a mass of fire. The centralization of the artillery in no way interfered with the mission of battalion commanders to give close support to the infantry. On the other hand, it did permit battalion commanders to call for and get additional artillery support at any time.

(5) In the MAKNASSY area seven battalions of light artillery reinforced by a battery of 155mm M-1 guns performed direct and general support missions and counterbattery, all of which were performed with effectiveness. The 155mm M-1 guns were particularly effective in denying the MAZZOUNA Airfield to enemy aircraft. Some enemy planes were destroyed shortly after landing on the field. The German 170mm with a range capability of 32,000 yards was the only enemy weapon in the area that could not be effectively neutralized.

d. Detailed Report. -- A detailed report of employment of field artillery will be submitted to CG, Army Ground Forces at a later date.

40. SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS BY XII AIR SUPPORT COMMAND:

Our operation during the entire period was brilliantly supported by the XII Air Support Command. Missions were flown under the most difficult of conditions, and every effort was made to furnish II Corps close and continuous air support. A more detailed report of the achievements of this fine organization is undoubtedly in the process of preparation.

SECTION VII - RESULTS OF OPERATION

41. DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION. -- Under authority letter 2 March, Hq. British First Army, II Corps was directed to prepare an offensive to begin about 15 March and designed to: (1) Draw off reserves from Eighth Army; (2) To enable air forces to utilize forward airfields, and (3) To provide a forward maintenance centre from which mobile forces of Eighth Army could draw to maintain the momentum of their advance. Specific objectives were assigned as follows:

a. Capture and securing of GAFSA.

b. Operation towards MAKNASSY in order to threaten enemy line of communication from GABES.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

c. Outposting of THELEPTE airfields prior to 15 March to permit fighter aircraft to operate from them.

d. To hold securely the passes between inclusive ABIOD and SBIBA. Supplementary instructions were issued throughout operation, but these did not change the basic mission given II Corps.

42. MISSION ACCOMPLISHED:

a. Airfields.--Airfields were outposted prior to 15 March. Our air forces operated from these airfields throughout operation without threat of ground attack.

b. Firm Base.--The passes inclusive ABIOD to SBIBA were held by us throughout the operation and never threatened.

c. GAFSA.--GAFSA was captured by 1st Infantry Division 17 March. EL GUETTAR 12 miles southeast of GAFSA, was occupied on 18 March. Shortly thereafter supplies began moving into GAFSA for the British Eighth Army. GAFSA was securely held throughout the operation.

d. MAKNASSY.--The operation of the 1st Armored Division towards MAKNASSY so as to threaten enemy's line of communication was launched on schedule and MAKNASSY was captured on 22 March. Although the heights east of MAKNASSY were never completely taken, the 1st Armored Division continued to threaten enemy's line of communication and hold in that area a large number of enemy troops which might have been engaged elsewhere.

e. TOTAL ENENY FORCES ENGAGED.--Including the operation of the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions and armored elements in the EL GUETTAR area, the 1st Armored Division attacks in the MAKNASSY area, and the advance of the 34th Infantry Division under II Corps control on FONDOUK, it is conservatively estimated that a total of 37,000 enemy combat troops were engaged by II Corps and rendered unavailable for service elsewhere. These were disposed as follows:

(1) EL GUETTAR. -- Centauro Division, 2/3 10th Panzer Division, one Combat Command 21st Panzer Division, reinforced by smaller combat units for a total of 19,600.

(2) MAKNASSY.--50th Special Brigade, 1/3 10th Panzer Division, Regt. 104th PGR, 501st Panzer Battalion, KOB, 580th Rcn. Bn., elements 70th Bersaglieri, and smaller units for a total of 10,700.

(3) FAID. -- Two battalions (one tank and one infantry)-1,200.

Report of Operations, Hq. II Corps, 10 April 1943, (Continued).

(4) FONDOUK. -- Elements of 999th Division, 2 Marsch Battalions, one Arab volunteer battalion, German Reconnaissance units, 24th Battalion 5th Bersaglieri, Battalion of 774th Regt. (Italian), Battalion of Superga Division, and smaller units for a total of 5,250. The above figures do not include, of course, the considerable number of enemy aircraft which the enemy operated against units of the II Corps, and which were not available for service elsewhere.

43. CONDUCT OF TROOPS.--The conduct of our troops under the most difficult of terrain obstacles, and in the face of a crafty and experienced enemy operating from carefully prepared positions, was courageous and unfaltering. Their valorous conquest have caused the enemy to fear them. Likewise their courageous expolits have earned for them the respect of their brothers in arms of other nations. By their deeds of the past twenty-five days they have added luster to the imperishable laurels and proud record of the United States Army.

> G. S. PAITON, JR., Lt. General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

P-845-0-C&GSS-24 Aug 43-150







AG 370 (e) Wilder Strand Stran SUBJECT: Report of Ope rations

TO

The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Y AUTHORITY OF AUTHOR

THORITY OF DITLER

HISTUHICAL DIVISION

SECTION I - THE SATIN TASK FORCE SECTION II - OUSSELTIA VALLEY - SENED DIVERSION SECTION III - SIDI BOU ZID - GAFSA SECTION IV - KASSERINE VALLEY THRUST SECTION V - ADLINISTRATIVE

- Report of Operations II Corps from 1 January 1943 to 15 March 1943 is horeby submitted in compliance with paragraph 10, AR 345-105:

SECTION I - THE SATIN TASK FORCE



St ANGING

:By Authority of :CG, II Corps. :Initials RTO :Date: 2 May 1943

2 May 1943

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1. Hq. II Corps, under verbal authority AFHQ, was selected to plan and accoute operation SATIN. The initial studies for operation SATIN price to 1 January 1943 were prepared by Fifth Army under the direction of AFRQ.

2. The II Corps staff assembled for the planning of Operation SATIN as of 2400 hours, 31 Decumber 1942 at the Alexander Hotel, City of Algiers. "pon its arrival at Algiers, the staff was given the mission of preparing chree plane; "A", "B", and "C". Final choice as to which of the three plane: "A", "B", or "C", to be put into effect was to be made by the C-in-C, AFHQ. Plans "A", "B", and "C" all required an initial concentration of the SATIN TASK FORCE in the TEBESSA - KASSERINE area. In Plan "A", the SATIN TASK FORCE was to slese and hold the Port of SFAX, propared to operate northwest in the direction of SOUSSE. In Plan "B", the SATIN TASK FORCE was to sieze and hold GIBES, prepared to operate north toward SFAX. In Plan "C" the SATIN TASK FORCE was to advance on and capture KAIROUAN. After securing KAIROUAN, the force was to advance on and capture SOUSSE, being prepared to destroy the port, bridges, utilities, etc., if forced to withdraw.

3. The SATIN TASK FORCE was directly under the command of AFHQ as of 1 January 1943. For this operation, the force consisted of the following major units:

> Headquarters II Corps 1st Armored Division plus 701st TD Bn. Wi3rd CA Bn. (-1 Plat. Btry A) and 2nd Bn., 16th lied. Rogt. attachud. 26th RCT plus 5th F.A. Bn. and 501st TD Bn. attached 4 XII Air Support Command.

Supporting troops consisted of the French Constanting Division.

4. D-Day for the execution of the SATIN OPERATION was tentatively set for 22 January 1943. Prior to D-Day, the enemy rushed reinforcements and UL Report of Operation:

C.

II Corps, 2 May 1943 (Conti

supplies to Tunisia via TUNIS, BI DETE, SOUSSE and SPAN. Energy reinforcements were arriving at the rate of approximately 800 per day, principally by air. Supplies were snipped by sea and some supplies were trans-shipped from SFAX and SOUSSE to TRIPCLE for the use of ROLLEL'S AFRINA COMPS which was hard-pressed by the British Lighth Army. The enemy's intention at this time was to keep the eastern coast plains from TUNIS to TRIPOLI open for a joining of the TURISIAN forces and the AFRIKA CORPS. A north and south range of mountains, known as the EASTERN DORSALE, overlooks this coastal corridor. Prior to D-Day the enemy's defense of the DASTINI DORSALE in the proposed SATIN TASK FORCE zone of action was based generally on the occupation of a series of detached positions commanding the four main approaches at FOIDOUK, DJEBEL KRECHEL, MAKHASSY, and EL GUETTAR. Behind those out-) posts, as of 10 Janauary, at BOU THADI and at LA TOUCOMMERIE, were approxinately two battalions of mixed German and Italian troops. These battalions were capable of reinforcing the outposts within 12 hours. Energy reinforcements continued to arrive at the rate of approximately 800 per day.

5. On 5 January 1943, the SATTH Staff moved from ALGHERS to CONSTANT-LIE to continue plans of the SATTH Operation. While the plans were being drawn from 1 January to 17 January, troops under the SATTH TASK FORCE were moved to initial concentration areas behind the British First Army. These areas were as follows: 1st Armored Division in the areas TEBOUSOUK and OUED SEGUIN; <u>26th ECT</u> in the areas GUEL A and ATH M'LILA; and service troops in the areas CONSTANTINE and TEBESSA. These concentrations were preparatory to concentration in the TEBESSA - KASSERINE area. A secondary mission of guarding the lines of communications for the British First Army was assigned to the SATIH FORCE troops in these areas. A small infantry and paratroop force under Cold al Raff was at this time operating in the GAFSA - EL GUET-TAR area.

6. While the above concentrations were goin; on, a reserve of 10 days' supplies of all classes was built up in the TEBESSA - KASSURINE area prior to D-Day. Supplies were drawn from the British First Army and from the OMAN and ALGIERS areas. The SATIL TASK FORCE assumed the responsibility for administration east of the line TEBESSA - HORSOTT.

5. An engineer depot was established in the vicinity of TEBESSA prior to D-Day. Water supply was the responsibility of commanders concerned, with information as to available water supply points being furnished by the Engineer Officer. Water distributing points were established after D-Day by the Water Supply Company.

8. Initially, an evacuation hospital and medical supply depot were established in the vicinity of COESTANTINE. One medical battalion was established under Corps control in the vicinity of TEBESSA and a second medical battalion was attached to the 1st Armored Division.

9. The SATIN TASK FORCE annunition supply point was established at THERESA and maintained a stock of four units of fire. Forward communition supply points were established close behind combat troop's throughout operations and a one-unit-of-fire level maintained. The Provisional Ordnance Group provided balanced ordnance maintenance service to all units. Ten dama: Glass I and Class III supplies were assembled in TEBESSA and a signal deput established prior to D-Day.



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Ropart of Operations, Ha. II Corpen: 2 12 1943 (Continued).

10. Effective dark, 17 January, SATIN FORCE troops began movement from QOLSTANTINE - GUELHA area to TEBESSA - KASSERINE - SBEITIA area. Jud Bn., 26th Inf., reinforced, was in GAFSA area and 2nd Bn., 26th Inf. at KASSERINE.

11. Enany ground forces during 17 January to 21 January in the Sector of the line FORDOUK to GARES (inclusive) were estimated to be equivalent to one strong division composed of Italian Infantry and armored elements relaforced by minor elements of German infantry and armored forces. The scale of enemy reinforcements remained constant at about 800 per day. Armored strongth in this area was about 100 to 115 light and medium tanks exclusive of the tank strength of the 10th Panser Division which was morth of KAIROUAN. On 21 January, incidentally, one day prior to SATIN D-Day, the enemy successfully disrupted the French front, secured PONT DU FARS and penetrated down the PONT DU FARS - ROBAA VALLEY. AFIQ immediately erdered a postponement of the execution of SATIN Operation. Due to the above, General ward, commanding the 1st Armored Division, initiated a rocommaissance by direction of General Fredondall and recommended that the SATIN Plan be carried out as of the 22 January as planned with minor alterations to meet the changed situation.

SECTION II - OUSSELTIA VALLEY - SINED DIVERSION

1. A directive issued 1200 hours, 21 January, by AFHQ, signed by General Truscott was received. A summary of this directive was as follows: "Following measures will be implemented immediately to check German offensive. Elements First Army under British command will operate southeast and south in direction ROBAA and OUED EL KEBIR northeast of ROBAA to cut off and block energy advance. General Robinett's Force (CC"B", 1st Armd. Div.) is placed under command General Juin for operations east or west of GRANDE DORSALE as situation requires. This force will be employed as complete unit under General Robinett and not split into detachments. General Juin will notify all concerned as early as possible of mission assigned to this force. General Fredendall will reconstitute reserve including armored units and artillery in area SECITIA to be employed under his command in support of French sectors FOIDOUK and PICHON. Operations are being coordinated with General Juin."

2. To meet this threat from the north, CC"B" was dispatched to the CULSELTIA VALLEY. 2nd Bn., 26th Infantry (plus 33rd FA Bn.) marched to MAKTAR night 21-22 January. General Mard reconstituted a force from the 1st Armored Division at SECITLA similar to CC"B", night 21-22 January, prepared to attack FONDOUK 23 January and observing FONDOUK, MAKHASSY and approaches to GAFSA from GABES. With the dissolution of the SATIN FORCES, the junction of the AFRIKA CORPS and the enemy forces in Tunisia became inevitable.

3. Colonel Fechet, commanding infantry troops in OUSSELTIA VALLEY area, assembled his force in the vicinity of MAKTAR. The 2nd Bn., 26th Infantry and 33rd FA Bn. reached MAKTAR by daylight, 22 January. The 1st Bn., 16th Inf., marched from CULLIA to MAKTAR night 22-23 January. Combat Command "A" had assembled in the vicinity of SB_ITLA by daylight, 22 January.





Report of Operations, Hq II Corps, 2 May 1943 (Continued).

4. In compliance with letter, AFNQ Advanced Command Post, dated 24 January 1943, the II Corps (SATIN FORCE) was attached to the British First Army and the Commanding General, British First Army, General Anderson, made responsible for the employment of American troops in accordance with general policies made known by the C-in-C. In accordance with 1st Army Instruction No. 11, Commanding General, II Corps, assumed command of ground troops of all three nationalities operating south of the general line all exclusive MORSOTT - THALA -SBIBA all inclusive DJ TROZZA - FONDOUK - SIDI AMOR DL KENANI thence exclusive lof SOUSSE and north of the general line exclusive the line of the CHOTTS to GABEC. The mission of II Corps as defined by AFHQ was the protection of the right flank of the Allied Forces in Tunisia.

5. In addition to the American Infantry and Armored Forces in the OUSSEL-TIA VALLEY, there were approximately two Bns. of French Infantry in position on DJEBEL BARGOU. These troops were also placed under the command of Colonel Fechet. General Robinett was in command of the armored units.

6. On 26 January, the 26th CT attacked KAIROUAN PASS in the OUSSELTIA WALLEY and took 400 Italian Prisoners. 16th RCT less 1st and 2nd Bns. and 7th FA BH. bivouaced east of MAKTAR. CC"B" was in contact with the enemy and holding along the KAIROUAN-OUSSELTIA road. Patrols to HAUSOLLEE and KARACHAUM contacted the British at HAUSOLLEE.

7. During these operations in the OUSSELTIA VALLEY, the enemy clearly controlled the skies. He usually made raids over our positions at 0800 hrs., 1200 hrs., and 1500 hrs. In one raid alone, six of our trucks were lost.

8. On the 28th of Jenuary, 26th CT vicinity of OUSSELTLA engaged enemy forces east of the pass through the EASTERN DORSALE and took 70 Italian prisoners.

9. On 30 January by 1800 hours, the OUSSELTIA VALLEY had been cleared of enemy troops to the OUSSELTIA - KAIROUAR road and the eastern slope of BEK ZEROUS. Enemy positions were reported on the north slope of DJEBEL TOULLA. The enemy left many scattered and unmarked mine fields behind him indicating that he had no intention of resuming his push through the PONT-DU-FAHS, ROBAA and OUSSELTIA VALLEY. The enemy, fearing an allied counterthrust up the OUS-SELTIA VALLEY dug defensive positions covering the northern exit from the valley.

10. While the forces under Colonel Fechet and General Robinett were assembling in the ROBLA - OUSSELTLA area, patrols from the Italian garrison at INGLASSY became active in the SENED STATION area.

11. On 24 January, the 1st Armored Division less detachments made a recommaissance in force from GAFSA toward MAKHASSY. This force advanced halfway between SHEED and MAKHASSY, made contact with the enemy and captured three trucks, 20 Cerman PW's and 130 Italian FW's. The 1st Armored Division lost two medium tanks, two were killed and three wounded. By the 28th of January, there was increased enemy activity in the EL GUETTAR area. The French outpost there had been attacked by a small German motorcycle patrol.

12. As the OUSSILTIA VILLEY had been cleared of the enemy, CC"B" was withdrawn and noved to BOU CIEBRA during the night 23-29 January and the Stack



Report of Operations, R. 1 Corps, 2 Lay 1943 (Continued)

Force (CC"C") consisting of one battalien of medium tanks, one battalion infantry, and one battalion field artillery, moved to GAFSA to reinforce the 3rd Bn., 26th Infantry, which was still garrisoning GAFSA. The 26th RCT (-2 bns.) moved to SB_JITLA.

13. On the 30th of January, the Germans initiated an at ack a ainst the French positions at FAID. CC"A" under General McQuillan, and the 26th RCT (-2 bns.) marched from SHEITLA to reinforce the hard-pressed French garrison at FAID. The XII ASC bombed and strafed enemy columns attacking FAID continuously. As of 1700 hrs., 30 January, the small French force garrisoned at FAID were reported to be still holding FAID, but the enemy had infiltrated units to the south and rear of the French positions. By daylight, 31 January, CC"A" reached its forward assembly areas west of FAID and launched an attack against the enemy positions at FAID. At last light on the 31st, the north prong of CC"A"'s attack had reached the energy positions which were $du_{\mathbb{C}}$ in the foothills north of FAID. The south prong of CC"A"'s attack had advanced north from REFNION along the cast side of DJEBEL BOU DZER and had reached the village of F.ID. Throughout the 1st and 2nd of February, CC"A" and the 26th RCT attacked to restore the FAID positions. Little progress was made. The enemy remained in possession of the high ground com anding FAID PACS. CC"A" had some forces to the south of this pass while the French also still retained a rew positions couth of the pass. On the 3rd there was a lull in the fighting in the vicinity of FAID and General -cQuillan regrouped his troops for another assault on FAID. This assault failed to restore the FAID positions. Active contact with the enery was mintained. The 26th RCT (-2 Bns.) was withdrawn from this position on 9 February and on the 10th the responsibility for the defense of the FAID approach was assigned to General Mard, commanding the 1st Armored Division.

14. The defense of the FLID approach by General Ward will be treated s parately under Section III of this report. In the meantime, as this battle of FAID was in progress, the forces stationed at GAFSA began an attack against TANASSY.

15. Due to the increased activity in the vicinity of EL GUETTAR on the 28th of January, CC"C" under Colonel Stack moved from BOU CHEBKA to GAFSA. illen CC""." marchod on the 30th of January, to relieve the hard-pressed French at FAID, CC"C" also marched toward MAID from GAFSA to reinforce the French garrison. As CC "C" was marching, however, orders were received from 1st Army to attack and seize MANMASSY. CC"C", therefore was turned south at SIDI BOU ZID along the road to HAKMASSY and the 1st Armored Division less CC"A", CC"B", and the Stack Force but reinforced by the 1st Bn., 168th Infantry, moved from BOU CHEBKA to GAFSA, closing there at daylight 31 January. From GAFSA CC"D". commanded by Colonel Haraist, and consisting of a battalion of medium tanks, a battalion of the 168th Infantry, and a battalion of armored field artillery, advanced on MAKMASSY. Reconnaissance elements of this force passed STATION Zuriouch at 0745 hours, 31 January without contacting the enemy. As of 1700 hours, CC"D" was attacking chang positions at SEMED. This position had been ruinforced by 18 truckloads of enony infantry during the afternoon. By dark, roconnaissance elements had reached within 8 miles of MKHASSY. The XII ASC, meanwhile, bombed onemy concentrations at BOU THIDI and at MARKINSSY, reporting many onomy vohicles damaged. During the night 31-1 February, the 2nd Bn., 168th Infantry and the 175th FA Bn. ruinforced CC"D" for a coordinated attack on SENED at deylight. By 0916 hours, CC"C" had arrived at the DJ MIZIL PASS and was hoading south to join CC"D". CC"D" attacked STATION SENED at 1100 hours and had captured ST..TION SCHED by 1405 hours. Patrols from CC"C" and

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Report of Operations, 19. II Corps, 2 Lay 1943 (Conti: 1).

CC"D" mot in the DJ LATAIL, PARS as of 1940 hours. By dark, CC"D" had captured SIMED and the 168th RCT had organized the high ground two miles cast of STATICN SIMED for defense. Over 100 FW's were taken in the vicinity of SIMED. Throughout the day, enemy dive-bombers repeatedly attacked our troops between CAFS.

16. Although the energy had definitely given up any idea of attempting to come through the OUSSELTER VELLEY again after his almost disastrous defeat by CC"B", air reconnaissance reported energy concentrations east of the RETROUMH -C SSELTER pass and inexperienced troops whe were unduly charned by their proximity to the energy greatly exaggerated reports of energy ground and air activity. Based on these reports, therefore, a message from 1st British Army received at 1419 hours, 1 February, directed that engagements at SUMED and MEXHASSY areas be discontinued as soon as possible, that an effort be made to clear up energy positions in the FAID area, and that the maximum possible force be concentrated in a mobile reserve position in the area of HADJEB EL AIOUT. In compliance with this order, CC"B" moved from BOU CHERKE to HADJEB EL AIOUT immediately, and later from HEDJEB EL AIOUT to HEKTER during the night 2-3 February. (1st Armored Division less CC"A", CC"B", CC"C", and CC"D" moved to SEDITEA night 2-3 February.) During the night 3-4 February, all forces except a reinforced infantry bettalion (3rd Bn., 26th) were withdrawn from the GAFSA area.

17. The frequent redisposition of forces and the long marches caused thereby had a great influence on the outcome of the operations described in Section III of this report. CC"E" and the 1st Armored Division shifted to the north. During the night 3-4 February, the 168th CT gave up its hard-won positions at SE ED and noved to SECITLA. CC"D" withdrew from the MAKMASSY area and moved to BOU CHEBK.. By the 4th of February all the remaining elements at SE ED had withdrawn to GIFSI. The 1st Bn., 17th Fi moved during the night 3-4 February to BOU CILIBIC. and 1st Bn., 168th Infantry moved from G.FS. to FERIAM. The following moves were made during the night 4-5 February: 168th Infantry (-one battalion) from GAFSA via FERLANA, BOU CHEBRA to SECITLA. lst Bi., 17th F., from BOU CHEBK. to SBEITLE. 1st Rcn. Troop from SIDI BOU ZID to HEKTER to join the 1st Infantry Division, 1st Derbyshire Yeomanry from KILLA DJERDA to SIDI BOU ZID, B Btry and D Btry, 213th CA were moved from CAFSA to SBEITLA. During the night 7-8 February, the following moves were made: 1st Bn., 169th Infantry, moved from SBUITLA to FERIAL. 168th Infantry (less 1st and 2nd Bns.) and 2nd Bn., 17th F.A. moved from SBEITLA to SIDI BCU ZID, and the 1st Derbyshire Yeomanry noved from SIDI BOU ZID to GAFSA. During the night 8-9 February, the 26th RCT (less 2 Bns.) moved from SIDI BOU ZID to FIRIAL and the 1st Ranger Battalion arrived in the TEBESSA area. During the night 9-10 February the 1st Ranger Battalion, Stry C, 213th C. Regt., and Co. B, 805th TD Bn. moved to GAFSA. During the night 10-11 February the 805th TD Bn. moved from BOU CHEBKA to FERIAMA.

SECTION III - SIDI DOU ZID - GAFSA

1. With the Afrika Corps rapidly falling back from TRIPOLI to join Von Arnim's forces in TUHSEA, and the Allied line over-stretched in its attempt to prevent the junction of these two forces, it became apparent that the enemy was going to make a final thrust to disrupt the Allied time table. On the 5th of February, a large number of energy vehicles were reported 15 miles east of CAFSA on the GLESA - GLEES Road. On the 9th, seven or eight enemy tanks from

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the direction of MARMASSY approached to within four or five miles of GAFSA and heavy motor movements were observed on the GUN TREE ROAD. Four or five Italian armored cars and one motorcycle approached HDILLA and drove the french back slightly to the north.

2. To investigate the energy's intentions in the vicinity of GAFSA and FAID, active reconnaissance was initiated by our forces. A light mobile force supported by air was dispatched from GAFSA to investigate the strength of the energy in the vicinity of ZAHENOUCH. This force moved as far east as STATION SENED without contact with the energy. A small mobile force sent from GAFSA easily restored the situation at ADILLA. The energy met our patrols in the vicinity of FAID with a withering fire. Elements of the Afrika Corps were identified in this area.

3. As stated in Section II of this report, on 11 February the responsibility for the defense of the FAID position was assigned to General Ward, Commanding the 1st Armored Division. The scheme of defense was to hold the two key terrain features, DJ. KSAIRA on the south and DJ. LESSOUDA on the north by organizing infantry islands of resistance on these two positions. These positions were not mutually supporting for antitank and small arms fires. A mobile reserve was hold in a position of readiness in the vicinity of SIDI BOU ZID. During the night 11-12 February, the 701st TD Bn. (-A and B Cos.) arrived at SUEITLA and came under the command of the 1st Armored Division for the defense of the FAID positions. During the afternoon of 13 February the C-in-C visited the FAID positions and had a conference with General Anderson, British First Army Commander.

h. At daylight on the lith of February, the enemy attacked our positions in front of F.ID. The positions on DJ. LESSOUD, were attacked by artillery fire, infantry, and approximately thirty energy tanks. The FONDOUK and GAFSA arcas were quiet. As of 0920 hrs. the 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment with two batteries, 91st E. Bn., launched a counterattack and became heavily engaged with enony tanks between SIDI BOU ZID and DJ. LESSOUD. By 1300 hours, the 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, had suffered 50% tank casualtics. By 1700 hours energy tanks had overrun "B" Battery, 91st FA Bn., northwest of the IN. LISSOUNA position. Energy infantry moved from FAID to SIDI BOU ZID in trucks and the position on DJ. LESSOUD: was completely surrounded by the enomy. The 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment was pushed back southwest of SIDI BOU 210 with both flanks threatoned from the north and the south. The XII his Support Command successfully attacked energy tank and truck columns throughout the day. As a result of these operations, and after repeated requests, the irig Commander ordered the 2nd Bastalion, 1st Armored Regiment from CC"B" at FIRER to the 1st Armorod Division at FAID.

5. Due to the critical situation at FAID, the force of American and French troops at GAFS. was withdrawn to positions in the vicinity of FERIAM dering the night of 14-15 February. At daylight on the 15th, the 1st Armored Division Townched a counterattack between DJEBEL HARA and DJEBEL LESSONM. The Monthle Counterattack between DJEBEL LESSONA and DJEBEL KEATRA. The Odwinding Constal, but Armored Division, was directed to affect the withchildle of these troops to positions defending the KASSERINE PASS. By 1535 hrs., the 2nd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment had reached the outskirts of SIDE DOU ZID attompting to take the town and effect the relief of the 168th Infantry.

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150 men from the 2nd Battalion, 163th Infantry, on DJEBEL LESSOUDA managed to withdraw to DJEBEL MARA. The 3rd Battalion, 168th Infantry, still held DJEBEL MSAIRA. Contact was lost with both the 168th Infantry and the 2nd Bn., 1st Armored Regiment, which was near SIDI BOU ZID. Patrols were unable to get through from these forces or to them. The enemy organized a strong defensive position north and south through SIDI BOU ZID. Enemy tanks west of SIDI DOU ZID withdrew towards SIDI BOU ZID. As of 1220 hours on the 16th, about 50 enemy tanks attacked in the vicinity of DJEBEL HARA. Our armored forces lost approximately 86 medium tanks in their attempt to relieve the infantry holding DJEBEL LESSOUDA and DJEBEL KSAIRA.

6. A directive from the Cormanding General, 1st British Army, dated 15 February 1943, directed that forces holding the high ground west of FAID be withdrawn and the pass at KASSERINE organized for defense. A force consisting of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, and the 19th Combat Engineer Regiment organized a new defensive position four miles east of KASSERINE. After repeated requests, CC"B" was released by 1st British Army to II Corps as of 1800 hours, 15 February, with permission to nove CC"B" from EAKTAR to SBEITLA.

7. From the 17th to the 19th of February, II Corps completed its with-drawal to the general line DJ BOU DJELLAL - DJ BOU GAFER - DJ CHARBRI - DJ SEMMAN SERIAL - SBIBA. The XII Air Support Command evacuated both airfields in the vicinity of THELEPTE. The 1st Armored Division withdrew from SBEITLA to an area southeast of TEBESSA. The 894th TD Bn. arrived and went into bivouac in the vicinity of BEKKARIA. The 26th Armored Brigade (less 1 Regt. Group)(British) came under control of II Corps in the vicinity of THALA as of 0600 hours, 19 February, with the provision that they were not to be conditted to action without the authority of the Commanding General, First British Army. Other new arrivals in the II Corps were the 58th C.M. Hortar Co. (British), AT and "L" Co., 39th Infantry, and the 56th Ren. Sqdn (British), all of which were inmadiately dispatched to reinforce the troops holding the KASSERIME PASS positions.

SECTION IV - KASSERINE VALLEY THRUST

1. The WESTERN DORS.LE, a range of mountains 20 miles west and parallel to the E.STERI DORS. LE formed a cross compartment through which the enemy would have to pass in an operation against the Allied right flank. KASSERINE PLES, SBIR: PLSS, the DERILL PLSS above THELEPTE, consisting of three approaches across DJ. DERNLL, and the EL ABIOD PASS were the four main approaches across the MESTIR! DORSILE in the II Corps zone of action. In a clockwise direction from KiSSIRINE PLSS, DJ CLIBI, south of the pass, DJ NOGUEZA and BOU DRIES south and west of the pass, DJ HERI, about 20 miles west of the pass, DJ EL 22D and DJ BINELL, north and west of the pass, and DJ SERLINA form the sides of a bowl around the corridor cut by the OUED HL.TED. Two main roads, separated by the OVED MATEB, cut through this bowl and most in the pass. One road loads northwest to TELLA and the other approximately west to TEBESSA. Since there had been several days' rain prior to the 20th of February, the OUED HITEB was unfordable and communication between the TELLA road and the TEBESSA road was impracticable at any point other than at the fork of these two roads within the pass. Since the rain had filled the KASSERINE bowl with mud, only fulltracked vulnicles were able to operate across country.





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cone During the night 12-20 February, energy infantry infiltrated to poside the high ground month and south of KLSSIRINE PASS. From these positistic the high ground month and south of KLSSIRINE PASS. From these positistic match overlooked the defensive positions in the pass, the energy brought smallesting and montar fire directly on our defensive positions. At daylight on the state infantry supported by artillery attacked the defensive perificity access KLSS_RIME PLSS.

the trace in KARCRINE PASS. The South-TD BR., likewise, moved up to reinforce Colonel Stark's forces in KASSERINE PASS. The 26th Armored Brigade (Bridden) moved to a position along the THALL - KASSERINE read preparatory to supporting forces holding KASSERINE PASS.

Somplus to small arms and mortar fire from the high ground overlooking the 26th Infantry positions, the 26th Infantry withdrew up the road towards High, This withdrawal exposed the north flank of the 19th Engineer Regiment which was disposed astride the road loading to TEBESS.

6. The enough appeared to be directing his main effort up the THALA Road. On the TERESS. Road he appeared to be making a secondary effort using Italians encouraged by supporting German Battalions behind them.

7. CC"B" moved up to DJ HARA and prepared to counterattack to restore the situation on the south side of the pass. The situation at the pass, however, had deteriorated to such an extent that General Robinett, commanding CC"B", had to immediately set about to establish coordination and control of the troops falling back from the pass on the TEBESS. Road. At daybreak on the **21st, CC"B"** had a 4,000 yard front astride the TEBESS. Road about eight miles east of DJRGKL HARA. The 16th Infantry held positions on BOU DRIES. Due to the outstanding leadership of General Robinett, who assumed command of all troops along the TEBESS. Road, he had the situation well under control by daybreak of the 22nd.

8. While General Robinett was engaged south of the OUED MATEB, Brigadier of the Dusphie met the main German attack with his 26th Armored Brigade (British) and a of the OUED MATEB. The 26th Armored Brigade (-1 armored regimental group) as stated above, arrived at TMALA during the night 18-19 February. Brigadier Dusphie reported to Hq IV Corps at OLOU hours on the 19th. After learning the situation, he visited Colonel Stark who was in command of all the forces in the pass. He arrived at Colonel Stark's CP at 1630 hours and Larned that the battle had been in progress since daybreak. Although Colonel Stark's CP was under direct shall arms fire at this time, Colonel Stark claimed that the situation was well in head and that all of his troops were in position. He



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did admit, however, that he was having slight difficulties with communications.

9. Brigadier Dumphie immediately returned to THALA where he reported to British First Army that the situation was very poor at the pass and requested permission to employ his force to restore the situation. 1st Army granted him pormission to unploy not more than one motorized company, 1 armored squadron, one troop of AT guns, and one troop of artillury. This force moved to a position astride the TEALS road along a ridge about two miles northwest of the pass during the night 19-20 February. This force was further reinforced in this position by the 3rd Ba., 6th Armored Infantry. After the 26th Infantry loft their positions in the pass, this composite American and British force hold this covoring position along the ridge astride the TIML' Road until dark, 20 February. The armored squadron lost all of its tanks. The 3rd Bn., 6th Armored, suffered very heavy casualties. During the afternoon of the 20th, the remainder of the 26th Armored Brigade moved up to a covering position about 13 miles south west of TELLA. General Fredendall paid a personal visit to this position at this time and placed Brigadier Dumphie in command of all troops British and Amorican in this area. During the night 20-21, Brigadior Hicholson arrived to coordinate the action of CC"B" and the 26th Armored Brigade. A mouting of Goneral Robinett, Brigadier Dumphie, and Brigadier Hicholson at THILI was arranged. In order to get back to his troops prior to deylight, Gunural Robinutt had to loave before Brigadier Hicholson arrived. Brigadier Dumphie and General Robinett, however, had agreed to a plan of action before General Robinett left THULL. Brigadier Nicholson arrived in TELL at 0245 hours and approved the plans already made by Brigadier Dumphie and General Robinett. ...coording to this plan, General Robinett was to restore the situation south of the OUED HATEB while the 2nd Bn., of the 5th Loicesters, who had arrived early that night, prepared defensive positions astride the road three miles southwest of THLL. The 26th Armored Brigade was to delay the enemy and provent him from reaching the Loicesters position before 1800 hours, 21st of Fubruary. Colonel Stark was to form a straggler point at TILLA for all incrican troops and send them up from this point to reinforce the Luicostors' position.

10. About 0730 hours on the 21st of February, a German force of all arus could be seen from the 26th Brigade's positions forming astride the THILL Road propared to attack north. The approximate strength of this energy force was as follows: 30 tanks, about 20 SP guns, 35 2-track infantry vuhicles, and 2 companies of infantry in trucks who dishounted and advanced by foot. This encey concontration was shelled by the artillery of the 26th Armored Brigade. The energy SP guns engaged the forward tanks of the Brigade and imocked out four. At 1500 hours, the enemy attacked straight up the read. The tanks of the 26th Armored Brigade fought a delaying action back to THLLA and lost 20 tanks knocking out only a small number of German tanks. The 26th irmored Brigade, however, managed to maintain the required delay. The last tank passed through the Luicesturs' position at 1930 hours. Five TD guns of the 805th TD Bn. under Lt. Col. Foreman were the only American troops who fought in this delaying action and in the defense of the Leicesters' positions. Although most of the 805th TD Bn. had been lost in previous fighting, Colonel Foreman by his superior leadership, managed to keep these remaining guns together and they gave an excellent account of themselves throughout the remainder of the battle. The 26th Armored Brighde rollied behind the Leicesters! position. By 1945 hours, machine gun fire inside the Leicesters' positions



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indicated that the energy had broken through those positions. The artillary of 9th Division, however, by marching continuously for four days and nights in the last stages of their march from CASABLANCA, arrived in the THALA area and had gone into supporting positions of the 26th Armored Brigade by daylight. Orders from Brigadiar Nicholson were received to hold the positions of the 26th Armored Brigade at all costs.

LL. To relieve the situation confronting CC"B" and the 26th Armored Brigode, the 16th Infantry launched a counterattack in the vicinity of BOU DRIES and cleared BOU DRIES of the enemy. This counterattack and the sudden increase in artillery fire caused by the arrival of the 9th Division Artillery, consed the enemy to pull back before his line of retreat through the pass was cut behind him. At 1915 hours on the 22nd, the enemy began a general withdrawal towards the pass. Artillery concentrations harassed his movement through the pass by interdiction fire throughout the night.

12. CC^{MAN} moved from BOU CHEBKA to HAIDRA during the night 22-23. From the 23rd of February to the 25th of February, the enemy continued his withdrawal from the KASSERINE bowl, leaving many mines and booby traps. Patrols were pushed out to maintain contact. By daylight on the 24th however, CC^B^H had lost contact with the enemy. Fires were observed in KASSERINE and FERIANA during the night 24-25 February. By the 25th, CC^B^H and the 26th Armored Brigade had regained control of the high ground north and south of the pass and by 1458 hours the Reconnaissance Company of the 13th Armored Regiment entered the pass. The advance of the forward elements was greatly hampered by mines.

13. During the period 26 February to 16 March in compliance with First Army Operations Instruction Number 19, dated 24 February 1943, II Corps reorganised and consolidated its positions along the MASTERN DORS. LE with the 34th Infantry Division on the north, the 9th Infantry Division on the south, and the lst Armored Division in a position of readiness on the south flank. The 1st Infantry Division began its concentration in the BOU CHERKA area.

SECTION V - ADMINISTRATIVE

- 1. Status of strength Appondix "...".
- 2. Casualties and prisoners Appendix "B"
- 3. Ruplacements Appendix "C".
- 4. Evacuation Appundix "D".

For the Commanding General:

Lt. Col

Actg. Adjutant Gunaral.





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Status of Strength of Command by Division and Separate Units on 1 January or on date they came under II Corps control.

	<u>off.</u>	WO	ANC	EM	Total
Headquarters II Corps	7 0	13			83
Headquarters Company, II Corps	7	2		420	429
202d M.P. Co.	4			178	182
lst Armd. Div. (-2 Bns.)				~~ ·	007
Hq & Hq Co., 1st Armd Div.	65	10	•	206 .	281
81st Rcn Bn.	43	1		726 2144	770 252
Serv. Co., 1st Armd. Div.	7 6	1 2 2 2		167	175
lilst Signal Co.	<u>л</u> т О	2		655	701
16th Armd. Engr. Bn.	43	2		281	326
47th Armd. Mod. Bn.	38	12		864	914
lst Armd. Maint. Bn.	11	ī		220	232
lst Armad. Sup. Bn. (-Co B)	8	-		170	178
Hq. 13th Armd. Rogt.	2			187	189
Rcn. Co., 13th Armd. Regt.	27	2		393	422
1st Bn., 13th Armd. Rogt.	20	ĩ		468	<u>4</u> 89
2d Bn., 13th Armd. Regt.	6	ĩ		159	166
Surv. Co., 13th Armd. Regt. Maint. Co., 13th Armd. Regt.	ů,	1		108	113
	27	2		590	619
3d Bn., 1st Armd. Rogt.	27	2		590	619
Rcn. Co., 1st Armd. Regt.	9			193	202
Maint. Co., 1st Armd. Regt.	9 7 5			181	188
Serv. Co., 1st Armd. Regt.	5	2		184	191
1st Bn., 6th Armd. Inf.	24			535	559
2d Bn., 6th Armd. Inf.	23	1		627	651
3d Bn., 6th Armd. Inf.	6	-		78	84
Hq. Co., 6th Armd. Inf.	16	2		125	153
Serv. Co., 6th Armd. Inf.	6	3 1 3 3		142	151
27th Armd. F.A. Bn.	34	1		629	664 71 5
91st Arad. F.A. Bn.	40	د ا		702	745
68th Armd. F.A. Bn.	37	د		696	736
Train. Hq & Hq Co., 1st Armd. Div.	12			135 117	147 122
Cannon Co., 39th Infantry	5 22	2		608	632
5th F.A. Bn.	30	٤		509	539
601st T.D. Bn. (-1 Co.)	23			370	393
701st T.D. Bn. (-Cos. B & Dots)	37		•	683	720
lst Bn., 213th C.A.	35			807	842
106th C.A. Bn.	35			807	842
443d C.A. Bn.	109	5		2047	2161
26th Inf. (-3d Bn.)	25	ź		480	507
334 Fale BR. (1	í	-		48	49
Co. C, lat Engr. Bn. (1 Plat)	3	•	•	· 107	110
Con C, 1st Hed. Bn.	9		٠	· 170	179
lst Rcn. Troop					

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	No. IT Com	1 , 2 Y	19 2943 (Ce	atimet),
	off.	10	ANC IN.	
			بكيتة متغلقه	
30-Basi, 20ab Enf. (Belaf.)	37		901	938
Co. B, 701st T.D. Bn.	1		194	195
Btey C, 105th CA	4		127	131
Det Parstraps, South	2	•	· 84	86
53d Signal She	ਸ਼ੁ	1	740	968
Doth, 203d Sig. Depot Co.	1		50	51
125th Sig. HI Co.	3		83 22	· 86
55tht HI Sectif: (Brite)	28	1	472	25
Slat Mede Bas	. 3	*	30	501
1st Sect., 21 Med. Sup. Dep. 77th Evac. Hosp.	· 3	• •	51 317	····· 33 ····· 115
48th Surg. Bap.	. 18	•		378
9th Evac. Hosp.	47	•	· 57 273 · 52 307	406
2 Sirg. Teams	6		6	· 12
1 Granopedio Team			ž	
1 Shock Team	2.1	• •	2	3
2d Bn., 16th Med. Regt.	32 `		· · 516	4 3 548
Det., 85th QM Co.	Ъ.	•	· 148	152
Co. A, 205th QM Bn.	· 3	•	124	127
Co. D. 244th ON Bn.	3		215	218
lst Bn., 28th QM (-B & C)	'n		· 282	293
93d QLI Co. (Rhd)	-14		108	112
Hq & Hq Det., POG	8	• •	39	47
Hq & Hq Det., 55th Ord Bn.	8	•	. 30	38
30th Ord. Co. (HM)	7		213	220
Co. D, 87th Ord. Bn.	7		191	198
78th Ord. Co.	5		168	173
66th Ord. Co.	5		180	185
Hq & Hq Det., 42nd Ord. Bn.	755857	1	39	48
109th Ord. Co.	5	1	123	
3485th Ord. Co.	7		191	198
Det., 450th Engr. Depot Co.	6		188	194
518th Engr. WS Co.			. 137	1112
761st Engr. RR Co.	5	•	256	261
19th Engrs. (C)	54	. 2	1384	סיויונ
Det., 62d Engr. Topo Co.	1		· 5	6
105th CA (-Btrys A & D)	23 -	2	374	399
688th CA Btry	5	•	. 73	78
689th CA Btry	2		, 73	/0 79
690th CA Btry	Ş		73	79
694th CA Btry	23 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 5		1	78 78 78 15
Hq & Hq Det., 188th Ord. Bn.	4	•	183	190
3485th Ord. Co.		•	· · 136	141
53d Ord. Co.	2		. 100	2 141 7
Det., 162d Sig. Photo Co.	1	•	2	ر ۱۰
Date, 163d Sig. Photo Co.	1		·· 10	11
Det., 175th Radio Repair	1		. 10	0
Dot., Co. B, 829th Sig. Bn.	30		910	3 4 11 9 940
lst Bn., 168th Inf.				/ ··· ·

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Appendix "A" to Report on Operations, Hq. II C	Corps. 2 May 1913 (Continued)
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	Off.	WO	ANC EN	Total
175th F.A. Bn.				
168th Inf. (-1st Bn.)	35	2	565	602
Co. C, 109th Med. Bn.	107	3	1949	2059
Det., Co. C, 109th Engr. Bn.	5		86	91
Dot., SO5th T.D. Bn.	5 1 8		53	54
let Ranger Bn.	31		350	358
2d Bn., 17th F.A.	31	2	476	507
5th Repl Bn.	19	۲	596	629
Roplacements Unassigned	19		161	180
2d Plat., Co. B, 95th CM Blory	2		547	566
LEt Plat., Co. A, 301st CM Bn.	ī		82 60	84
2d Plat., Co. D, 60th CM Idry	ī			61
I Plate, 47th CM (CES)	ī		70 27	71
lst T.D. Group Hq.	16		123	28
2d Bn., 591st Engr. B, Regt. (-F)	20	1	423	139
LET En., JOHR F.A. Regt.	26	ī	616	1444 643
Ster A and Det., B, lst F.A. Oben Bn.	ŭ	ī	79	. 84
34th Divisions	·	-		. 04
Hq., 34th Division	48	10	233	291
Hq. Co., 34th Div.	8	2	126	136
MP Plate	3		73	76
Juth Sig. Co.	10	1	247	258
Juth Cav. Ron. Troop	8		186	194
133d Inf. Regt. (-2d Bn.)	107	6	1976	2089
135th Inf. Regt.	140	6	2850	2996
34th Div. Artillery	16	2	130	148
1290 Fake Bre 1520 Fake Bre	30	2	524	556
18 th TeA. In.	33	2	487	522
109th Engr. In.	34	32	5 57	594
1099h Med. BR.	32	2	680	714
109th QM In.	30	4	437	471
Detay Soluth Tip. Bn.	13 2 4 1	1	206	220
2840 GH Salv, Coll. Co.	2		13	45
SJANA APU	4			185
OFRICA BLEY	<u>i</u>		n	12
2618th CM Prev. Trk. In.	L		n	75
let Enfanter Sivision	•		128	132
Hq. Lat And. Div.	49	8	n.	
Il No. Cost lat Inf. Div.	10	2	96 205	153 217 35
a Alero Philip	4	•		Z1 7
lot State De.	24	1	91 278	
A. Lot Both groop		-		<u>.</u>
i de lot coluis co.	9 9	1	257	
the lot of the	ú	ī	ที่	
26 lot Engly Ba. (-Co C)	26	2 3		
UR lot Mode In. (-Oo C)	31		776	
The The Regis	147	5	3330	15
TOGETHE DELETERATION CONTRACTOR	117	An an an an a	310 3330 2579	2702

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report on Operations, Hq.	II Cor	ps, 2	May 191	i3 (Cor	stinued).
	Off.	WO	ANC	EM	Total
lst Infantry Division (Continued):					
Div. Arty.	- 1				
7th F.A. Bn.	17	2		146	162
32nd F.A. Bn.	27	2		589	618
13th F.A. Brigade:	33	2		588	623
Hq & Hq Co.	75	-		•••	
lst F.A. Obsn Bn (-S & F Section)	15 16	1	·	92	108
17th F.A. Regt. (-2d Bn.)	34	٦		330	346
36th F.A. Regt. (-1st Bn.)	31	1		589	624
178th F.A. Rogt.	67	2 3		709	742
813th T.D. Bn.	37	ر		1295	1365
894th T.D. Bn.	37			849	886
9th Infantry Division;)(852	889
Hq., 9th Infantry Division	42	8		<u></u>	
Hq. Co., 9th Infantry Division	7	8 3		98	148
M.P. Plat.		ر		162	172
9th Signal Co.	3	-		86	89
15th Engr. Bn.	13 35	1 1		350	364
9th Mod. Bn.	22	1		716	752
9th QM Bn.	38	•		473	511
709th Ord. Co.	10 17			228	212
47th Inf. Rogt.	169			<u>Э</u> ЩС	156
39th Inf. Rogt.	129	2		3450	36 24
60th Inf. Regt.	•	5 3 2		3252	3384
Division Artillery	152	2		3088	3242
26th F.A. Bn.	24	•		210	234
34th F.A. Bn.	28	2		597	627
60th Fore Bno	31	2		611	6111
84th Fele Br.	34	1		568	603
9th Rcn. Troop	34	2		547	583
107th CA Bn.	6	•		211	217
62d Engr. Topo Co. (-Det)	39	2		752	7 93
427th Engr. Co. (DT)	4			115	119
Co. B, 601st Engr. Cam. Bn.	4 5			105	109
1 Plat., Co. B, 205th QM	-			77	82
Section Shoe Repair, 218th QM Co.	1			51	52
751st Tank Bn.	1	•		33	34
2619th QM Prov. Trk. Bn.	36	2		730	768
Lith Ord. Co.	20	•		284	304
Btry B, 431st CA Bn.	5	1		140	1 46
Det., 6th Chem. Co.	6			712	153
175th Engr. Regt. (-Det)	20	•		25	25
Cen. B & C, 263d QM Bn.	32	3		617	652
Co. A, 70th Tank Bn.	6			1118	554
899% ToD. En.	6			105	111
776th T.D. Bn.	38			851	8 89
1 2	38		-	895	933
15 March, Corps Total	01	228	157 83	492	88287

Appendix "A" to Report on Operations, Hq. II Corps, 2 May 1943 (Continued)

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AFFENDIX "B" TO REPORT ON OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS II CORPS, 2 May 1943.

1. Prisoners captured by II Corps units during period 1 January to 17 March, 1943.

German		Italian			
Off.	EM	Off.	EM		
2	71	5	548		

2. Casualties of II Corps during period 1 January to 17 March, 1943:

Officers				Enlisted Me	n
K	V	Щ	<u>c</u>	K K H	<u>c</u>
22	7 2 ·	199	3	170 252 2228	29





APPENDIX "C" TO REPORT ON OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS II CORPS, 2 MAY 1943.

Replacements by branch received by II Corps units during the period 1 January - 15 March, 1943:

	OFF.	EM
Infantry Field Artillery Medical Dental	187 34 15 2	40 74 789 193
T.D. Engineer Q.M. C.A.	1 5 6	115 231 199 52
Ordnance Armored Force Cavalry Military Police	28 12	107 858 69 31 5
Signal	290	<u>23</u> 6746



APPLUDIA "D" TO REPORT OF OPERATIONS, HEADQUARTERS II COLS.

Medical Activities During Period 1 January to 17 March, Inclusivo.

1. During the period 1 January to 21 January, corps medical units were concentrated in the Constantine area. These units were the 9th Evacuation Lospital, 77th Evacuation Hospital, 48th Surgical Hospital, 51st Medical Batialion, 2nd Battalion, 16th Medical Regiment, and the 1st Advance Section, 2nd Medical Supply Depot. During this period, only British hospital facilities were available and all hospitalization was in British hospitals.

2. Upon arrival in the Tebessa area, the 9th Evacuation Hospital was established 12 miles south of Tebessa. The 48th Surgical Hospital established one hospitalization section at Feriana, the other section moving to vicinity of Thala. The 77th Evacuation Hospital was held in reserve until 14 February, when it established lightly 12 miles south of Tebessa. The 1st Advance Section, 2nd Hedical Supply Depor, was established 10 miles south of Tebessa.

3. During the period 16 February to 20 February, all medical installations were withdrawn to vicinity of Aine Beida. During this withdrawal it was necessary to move approximately 700 patients with the hospitals because of lack of evacuation facilities to the rear.

4. Supply. The initial medical supplies were adequate and there was no difficulty in maintaining an adequate supply of class one supplies, that is, those supplies contained in medical maintenance units. It became necessary early in the operation to alter the maintenance unit in order that a more nearly balanced stock would be available in the depot. The greatest difficulty in supply was encountered in replacing items of organizational equipment for hospitals and field units. It was necessary to augment the T/BA equipment of hospitals materially, in order that they might function efficiently at near full capacity.

5. <u>Hospitalization</u>. The two 750-bed evacuation hospitals and the 400bud surgical hospital were adequate for the troops initially involved. The two 750-bed evacuation hospitals were placed on a 15-day policy in order that as many patients as possible might be returned to duty in the forward area. This policy was abandoned towards the end of the period when troops in the area were increased. The 48th Surgical Hospital received the majority of cusualties and rendered the initial operating treatment. This unit was on no fixed policy. Clearing platoons of Corps Ledical Baltalions were utilized extensively in the forward areas with surgical teams at eached. These units performed excellently and filled the gap between division units and the more fixed morpitals in the rear.

6. Evacuation. Evacuation from Forward units was accomplished by the Sist Fedical Battalion and the 2nd Battalion, 16th Hedical Refinent. This latter unit was placed untirely in support of the 1st U.S. Armored Division, while the Sist Hedical Battalion covered evacuation from clearing plateons to hospitals. Evacuation to the Contanication Jon. Was entirely by air until 16 February, when his evacuation completely failed due to unfavorable flying conditions. The British First Army then Furnished a section of the 6th Hotor Ambulance Corps for evacuation by road to the 61st Station Pospital at El Guerrah. This unit remained with the Corps Juring the remainder of this period, and covered all rearvard evacuation by road.