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Author: Headquarters Combat Command “A”, 2nd Armored Division

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AFTER ACTION REPORTS

CC "A"

2ND ARMORED DIVISION

21 April thru July 25 1943

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S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND "A"
2D ARMORED DIVISION

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: S-E-C-R-E-T :
: Auth: CG.CCA Date: 27/7/43 :
: Initials: Alca :
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APC 252,
Palermo, Sicily
26 July 1943.

THE OPERATIONS OF COMBAT COMMAND "A"
for the period, April 21, 1943 to July 25, 1943 Inclusive.

SECTION I - Training Operations Prior To Embarkation For Invasion.
SECTION II - Operations During And Subsequent to The Invasion.
SECTION III - Casualties And Prisoners.

SECTION I - Training Operations Prior To Embarkation For Invasion.

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General Order Number 27, Headquarters 2d Armored Division, dated April 21, 1943 constituted Combat Command "A" as follows: 66th Armored Regiment, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less 1st Battalion), 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, "B" Company 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, "A" Company 17th Armored Engineer Battalion, "B" Company 48th Armored Medical Battalion, "A" Company 2d Armored Division Supply Battalion, and "C" Company 2d Armored Division Maintenance Battalion. The Combat Command Headquarters was augmented by additional officers and enlisted men from Division Headquarters Company, Division Service Company, and the 142nd Armored Signal Company.

Having been constituted, Combat Command "A" moved from their bivouac positions from the vicinity of Monod, French Morocco to an isolated area immediately West of the Division bivouac area and Northeast of Rabat, French Morocco. On the 22nd of April 1943, advanced elements of Combat Command "A" were sent to the vicinity of Arzew, Algeria to contact the 5th Army Invasion Training Center and the 3rd Infantry Division under whom the Combat Command was to train for a two weeks period.

The balance of Combat Command "A" moved by rail and motor from their bivouac from the vicinity of Rabat, French Morocco to a new area in the vicinity of Porto aux Poules-Fornaka, Algeria. Upon being assembled in this area a rigid course of training in invasion tactics and physical conditioning was prescribed by the 5th Army Invasion Training Center. This invasion training consisted of speed marching, attacks on pillboxes, and strong points by infantry and reconnaissance elements, street fighting, loading and unloading on various types of landing craft and combined arms problems.

On the 21st of May 1943, elements of Combat Command "A" consisting mostly of the 2nd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment were ordered to move by sea to Phillipeville, Algeria and then overland to Jemmapes, Algeria reporting on arrival to Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division. At that time it was contemplated that

-1-

S E C R E T

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the entire Combat Command would follow.

Colonel Maurice Rose was assigned to and joined the Combat Command and assumed command May 23th, 1943. On the 29th of May, 1943, the balance of the Combat Command was ordered to be moved to the vicinity of Bizerte, Tunisia by sea and by motor. On June 3rd, 1943 all elements moving by sea had sailed. The motor convoy of Combat Command "A" pulled out the morning of June 3rd going by way of Algiers, Setif, Ain-M'Lila, Guelma, Souk Ahras, Beja, Matuer, Ferryville, all elements except those ordered to Jemapes, closing into bivouac in the vicinity of El Alia, Tunisia June 6th.

At that time the Combat Command became a part of the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced; and began preparations for loading on invasion craft preparatory for an invasion. Missing elements from Jemapes closed June 19th. On the 25th of June, a complete loading, insofar as availability of craft was possible, was effected by the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced. This task force put out to sea and conducted a practice invasion on the shores in the vicinity of Bizerte and Ras El Djebel, Tunisia. The Combat Command returned to its bivouac area upon completion of its part in this maneuver with the exception of vehicles which were already loaded. These remained loaded on the various craft. The next few days were spent in checking waterproofing equipment, completion of basic loads and making final arrangements for the embarkation for invasion. The day of July 5th brought all of the plans and loading to completion.

SECTION II - Operations During And Subsequent To The Invasion.

On the afternoon of July 5th the loading of personnel aboard craft was started for the invasion. LCI's were loaded with infantry, LST's and LCT's carrying vehicles were loaded with their crews, with the exception of the infantry, on the 6th and 7th of July. On the morning of the 6th of July, the LCI's weighed anchor and sailed in convoy. The LST's and LCT's remained behind to sail at a later date.

On the morning of July 7th the LCI's dropped anchor at Sousse, Tunisia and men were taken ashore for a short hike and meal, returning to the craft in the afternoon. That evening the LCI's pulled out of the harbor and anchored just off the coast on the outside of Sousse. On the night of the 8th of July, some time during the night, anchors were weighed and the LCI's put out to sea to rendezvous with LST's and LCT's of the balance of the force. This rendezvous was made at about daylight in the vicinity of Malta, the convoy continuing towards its destination.

At 0245B, 10th of July, light landing craft landed the assault infantry battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division and the 3rd Ranger Battalion on the four beaches on either side of Licata, Sicily. By daylight practically all resistance along the beaches had been overcome and the landing was being carried out as scheduled.

Combat Command "A" (less 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment) at that time constituted the floating reserve of the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced, and had with them as part of the reserve the 20th Engineer Regiment (less one company). Combat Command "A" was loaded on 12 LST's and 6 LCI's and the 20th Engineers were

S E C R E T

loaded on 6 LCI's.

The 3rd Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment had been detached from Combat Command "A" prior to the landing. "G" Company landed at Red Beach at daylight to assist the assault battalion in clearing a beachhead and destroying beach fortifications. Company H was landed at the same time at Yellow Beach with the Battalion Headquarters. Company I landed at Blue Beach.

At noon on July 10th the infantry and engineers were landed at the port of Licata, Sicily from their LCI's. LST's bearing the equipment of Combat Command "A" were ordered to the beaches where naval pontons were to be used in getting the equipment to shore from the ships. Several LST's were unloaded at the port of Licata. All during this operation from noon throughout the night of July 10th-11th, enemy bombers were active over the harbor and beaches. Approximately two-thirds of the Combat Command had landed and were in assembly positions Northwest of Licata, Sicily by daylight the 11th of July 1943.

Enemy bombers were again active during the unloading of the balance of the Command on the morning of July 11th and one LST bearing half of Combat Command "A" Headquarters equipment, one company of medium tanks, and vehicles of one company of infantry was demolished by an enemy bomb after having unloaded only 14 of the medium tanks.

At 0600B, 11th of July, Combat Command "A" was ordered to move Northwest on the town of Naro. They moved out in formation with B Company of the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion in front and an advance guard composed of a battalion of infantry with a company of medium tanks attached, Headquarters Combat Command "A" was followed by the artillery, which was in turn, followed by the main body. 1st Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment and "A" Company of the 17th Engineers were initially in reserve. During the night the 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was attached to Combat Command "A" and two batteries of the 443rd Coast Artillery (A) were also attached.

After moving over difficult terrain, meeting slight resistance from snipers, and machine guns and being delayed by enemy planes strafing and bombing the column, leading elements moved into and occupied Naro at 1030B, 11th of July. Brigadier General Maurice Rose, Combat Command Commander, took over the town and pending the arrival of AMGOT authorities left two officers and a platoon of infantry to maintain order within the town. The balance of the Command moved into an assembly position North and East of the town of Naro after securing the town and prepared to move on further orders from higher headquarters.

At 1300B, the 11th of July and until 1500B, the 12th of July, Combat Command "A" was strafed and bombed continuously by allied aircraft, P-38's, P-51's, and B-26's which had mistaken Combat Command "A" for a German Armored Division which had been reported 60 miles Southeast of Palermo. Vehicular casualties from this bombing and strafing added materially to the difficulty of transportation of men and supplies.

-3-
S E C R E T

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At 1330B, 12th of July, an attack from our forward position was launched on the town of Canicatti. Heavy anti-tank gun fire and occasional sniping did not delay the advance and at 1500B on the 12th of July, Canicatti was occupied by troops of Combat Command "A". Immediate steps were taken to secure the town and enemy elements were pushed from the high ground Northeast of the town but could not be dislodged directly to the North and West. During the night of the 12th-13th of July, reorganization of Combat Command "A" was effected and a coordinated attack of infantry, tanks, and artillery was launched against the enemy stronghold in the hills North and West of the town. At 1030B, 13th of July the town was completely secured and the high ground Northeast and West of the town was in our hands.

At this time, Combat Command "A" was to be relieved by the 15th RCT and at 1800B, 13th of July, 1943, the 15th RCT had taken over our advanced positions and Combat Command "A" pulled backed into Force reserve in an assembly position in the vicinity of Campobella.

During the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th of July, intensive, aggressive reconnaissance was conducted in the entire sector of the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced by Reconnaissance Company of the 66th Armored Regiment, "B" Company of 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and the reconnaissance patrols from the 41st Armored Infantry. Due to this aggressive reconnaissance the town of Racalmuto was occupied by "B" Company of the 82nd Reconnaissance on the evening of the 15th of July as was the town of Montedoro. The town of Milano was occupied on the 16th of July; the towns of Aragona, Comitini were occupied by patrols of the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance on the 17th of July. The 41st Armored Infantry was protecting the Northeast flank of the corps during that period by patrolling the area of Ravenna, Delia, Sormantino, Riesa, and on the 16th of July contacted the 128th RCT at Riesa, the 1st Infantry Division at Mazzarino, both of whom were operating with the United States II Army Corps on the right of the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced. The 66th Armored Reconnaissance Company conducted intensive reconnaissance in the area South of the line of Serradifalco, San Cataldo, and Caltanissetta. One foot patrol consisting of one officer and one enlisted man from the 41st Armored Infantry moved through the enemy lines into the town of Caltanissetta, stealing two enemy bicycles and returning through the enemy lines prior to daylight on the night of 16th-17th of July. During the 15th, 16th and 17th of July, contact was gained and maintained over a front extending from Agrigento in the Southwest, North of the towns of Aragona and Comotini - through Milena - to Caltanissetta, an airline distance of 30 miles.

"F" Company of the 66th Armored Regiment was attached to the 7th RCT on the 17th of July and joined them in the vicinity of Agrigento. They rejoined the Combat Command the night of July 18th.

On the 17th of July a report was made that a strong enemy column was approaching from the Northwest towards Aragona and Comotini. A Battalion of Field Artillery and the 1st Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment were alerted to counterattack this enemy force. Our reconnaissance in that area, however, reported no such enemy thrust and the counterattacking force was never used.

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On the night of the 17th of July, Combat Command "A" was ordered to be prepared to assist the attack of the 15th RCT on Serradifalco. Strong aggressive reconnaissance was pushed into that area. Patrols from the 41st Armored Infantry were pushed towards San Cataldo and Caltanissetta ahead of the 15th RCT with a reserve force of a battalion of infantry supported by tanks going into an assembly area immediately North of Camicatti. At 2230B, 17th of July, Reconnaissance Company of the 66th Armored Regiment moved into and secured the town of Serradifalco. Company "E" of the 41st Armored Infantry moved into and occupied the town of San Cataldo at 2335B 17th of July and by 0730B the 18th of July patrols of the 66th Armored Reconnaissance Company and 41st Armored Infantry had moved into and secured the town of Caltanissetta.

During the 18th of July, our reconnaissance elements were relieved by reconnaissance elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. All towns in our hands were taken over either by the 3rd Infantry Division or the 45th Infantry Division and all elements of the Combat Command which had been detached were released to rejoin their units and again become part of Combat Command "A". At this time the 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from attachment as were the two batteries of the 443rd Coast Artillery (AA). The Combat Command moved back into the same assembly area in the vicinity of Campobella where it was joined by the 2d Armored Division and Combat Command "B" on July 18th and 19th. At this time the Combat Command was released from assignment with the 3rd Infantry Division Reinforced and reverted to the 2d Armored Division.

At this time the 2d Armored Division was placed in Army Reserve with Combat Command "A" remaining as constituted, except for "B" Company of the 82nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and "C" Company of the 2d Armored Division Maintenance Battalion which were ordered under Divisional control.

At 2130B, 18th of July Combat Command "A" was ordered to move from its assembly area in the vicinity of Campobella towards Castelvetro. The move was initiated during the hours of darkness, along the main axis of supply of a Provisional Corps, going by the route of Campobella - Licata - Agrigento. They moved into an assembly position South of Agrigento the morning of July 19, 1943 closing at 0630B.

The Corps reconnaissance and patrolling indicated the front line of the enemy to be at that time from Bivona to Calamancia and Sciacca with the crossroads in enemy hands. It was contemplated by the Combat Commander that Combat Command "A" would move on Palermo. Consequently he ordered small patrols and reconnaissance of routes to the point of contact with the enemy. These patrols reached Bivona, Calamancia and Sciacca.

On the 20th of July, 1943, Combat Command "A" was ordered to move on Palermo via the route Ribera - Sciacca - Castelvetro and then swinging Northeast to Palermo. Combat Command "A" was to cross the line of departure (Belice River) at 0600B, 21st of July. The Command moved into march bivouacs West of Ribera and East of Sciacca during the night of 20th-21st of July with the advanced guard consisting

5
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of 3rd Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry, "E" Company 66th Armored Regiment on the line of departure ready to cross at H-Hour. Reconnaissance Company 66th Armored Regiment was ordered to cross the line of departure at 0545B and move ahead on Castelvetro. The 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was again attached.

The reconnaissance company immediately gained contact with the enemy and as soon as contact was gained and while the advance guard was moving across the Belice river Combat Command "A" was ordered to halt in place, clear the roads and wait for the 39th RCT and the 4th Ranger Battalion to pass through their lines.

At 1600B, 21 July, Corps reconnaissance, 39th RCT and the 4th Ranger Battalion had the town of Castelvetro and the area to the North thereof. Combat Command "A" was ordered into an assembly position North of Castelvetro and South of the line of Salemi, S. Minfa, Partanna, to secure that line as a line of departure and to cross it, attack, and seize Palermo at 0600B, 22nd of July. The reconnaissance secured the line of departure and at 0545B proceeded rapidly in the direction of Gibelini and Camporeale. They were followed immediately by the advance guard. Combat Command Headquarters marched between the advance guard and the field artillery, with the main body and the reserve consisting of the 66th Armored Regiment (less reconnaissance company, one medium tank company and 1st Battalion) and 2nd Battalion of the 41st Armored Infantry as the main body. The reserve consisted of 1st Battalion (less one company) of the 66th Armored Regiment.

Progress of the column was uninterrupted until they reached a point one mile South of the town of San Guiseppe. The first contact with the enemy was gained at 1014B, July 22nd at this point. It consisted of an enemy minefield covered by anti-tank guns and machine guns. This was reduced by action of the reconnaissance company of the 66th Armored Regiment and the advance guard. The movement then continued through to the pass North of San Guiseppe where minefields covered by anti-tank guns and machine gun fire halted the forward movement at 1230B. Artillery was called for and placed on gun positions as far as possible. The combined efforts of the advance guard and the reconnaissance company of the 66th Armored Regiment was able to reduce this resistance by 1315B and the column started moving through the pass.

At 1500B leading elements of the column had reached the corps restraining line having encountered enemy resistance of a minor nature from the pass to the point. Patrols were sent out from this point along the route Monreale - Palermo and cross-country to Palermo. These patrols met resistance all the way into the city. The reconnaissance patrol by-passed most of the resistance while the advance guard reduced it and by 1558B had entered the outskirts of Palermo. The entire resistance into the outskirts of the city was from German gun crews.

By 1600B Palermo had capitulated and all resistance along the route to the town ceased. Combat Command "A" assembled in the outskirts of the town and the suburbs South thereof and reorganized on the night of the 22nd of July.

C.P. of Combat Command "A" opened at 2230B in the Villa Tasca on the 22nd of July.

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Reconnaissance Company of the 66th Armored Regiment maintained motorized patrols throughout the town, the remainder of that night and the next day until they were relieved by elements of the 3rd Infantry Division who had moved in from the East. The 41st Armored Infantry maintained patrols in Monreale and the suburbs of Palermo and guarded prisoners at San Guiseppe, Camporeale, Gibellini and S. Ninfa. The 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion was relieved from attachment at this time.

On the 24th of July movement was initiated to the Division assembly area Northwest of Palermo and this movement was completed at 1748B, 25 July 1943. Upon the completion of this movement, orders were received from Division dissolving Combat Command "A" as it had been constituted. As of 1747B all units reverted to Division control at once.

During the entire action of Combat Command "A" on the island of Sicily there was a marked shortage of cargo vehicles and personnel carriers. Consequently the supply of all classes of supplies to the units of the Combat Command became a major problem. It was thought best because of the shortage of trucks for transportation of essential supplies to support the operation, that trucks of all units of the Combat Command should be brought together to operate under centralized control.

This plan was put into effect immediately upon landing at Licata on the 10th, and 11th of July. This centralization was necessary to insure timely receipt of needed supplies of all classes, inasmuch as no one unit of the command had sufficient of its organic wheeled administrative vehicles to be self-sustaining. Thus, part of the ammunition section of the 41st Armored Infantry had to be called upon to haul fuel and lubricants to elements of the 66th Armored Regiment, or, ration trucks of the section found themselves making the run to ammunition dumps and thence to forward elements of engaged units.

Such a method of operation obviously entailed dumping of one type of load in order to refill, at some distant point, with another type. Every effort was made to maintain some trucks as a rolling reserve with balanced loads, but this was possible only to a small degree due to the widely divergent ammunition requirements of the elements of the Command. Operating under conditions as outlined above, advance planning was limited, and as the needs of the front line elements became known, it was a matter of urgent necessity that all cogs in the wheel of supply mesh at once and begin rolling forward with the required loads.

The problem of supply was partly hampered by the fact that supply line of Combat Command "A" at the end of action stretched from Licata in the South central portion of Sicily to the West at Castelvetro and thence Northeast across the island to Palermo, a distance of over 125 miles.

The above outline is not a recommended plan of operation, nor is it anticipated that a repetition be necessary. However, for all its unorthodox and rapidly conceived and extended missions, proof of its efficacy lies in the result "the support of the command logistically was maintained."

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SECTION III - Casualties And Prisoners.

Being an element of an armored division which is not basically set up to capture and evacuate prisoners, the swift capitulation by all enemy resistance presented a problem of the Combat Command in evacuating prisoners in such numbers as had never been anticipated. Consequently, no accurate check could possibly have been made. Where possible prisoners were evacuated to a PW collecting point where a PWI team attached to Combat Command "A" was in operation. Many times units evacuated the prisoners only to the closest infantry unit supporting their action, keeping no accurate count, but merely turning over a group of prisoners to the infantry unit for evacuation.

From July 10th to July 23rd, 1943, there were 3,907 enemy officers and enlisted men who passed through Combat Command "A" PW collecting point, and were turned over to units of the 3rd Infantry Division by elements of Combat Command "A". In addition to this figure, there were over 3,000 prisoners turned over to the 2d Armored Division by Combat Command "A" when the 2d Armored Division took over the evacuation of prisoners during the Palermo push. This gives a total between 6,000 and 7,000 prisoners captured by Combat Command "A" in the 14 day period of action on the island of Sicily from July 10th to July 23rd, 1943.

The amount of enemy material captured and turned over to Force G-4 and other G-4's is undetermined. In many cases because of rapid movement, Combat Command "A" was only able to notify higher headquarters of the position or the location of this captured material. However, it is known that 57 enemy anti-tank guns were knocked out and destroyed and that 15 enemy field pieces were put out of action in addition to thousands of rifles, revolvers, machine guns, and other small arms. The 1st Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment located and notified higher headquarters of a 90mm anti-aircraft battery complete and ready for operation on the outskirts of Palermo.

Among the prisoners captured was Major General Giuseppe Molinero, Commanding General of a Coastal Division near Palermo and Major General Angelo Agro, staff member of the same unit.

The prisoners captured were for the most part Italians. However, there was a small percentage of Germans or troops serving in the German Army.

Casualties of Combat Command "A" were heaviest during the first five days of action, but were very light considering the large scale missions attempted and accomplished by the Command. Casualties of the Command were caused by three general sources: (1) Casualties caused by the bombing of ships and beaches while landing; (2) Casualties as a result of enemy engagements or strafing; (3) Casualties caused by fire and bombing by our own aircraft. In the entire action on Sicily covered by this report, one officer and 25 enlisted men were killed; two officers and 38 enlisted men were listed as missing in action and six officers and 173 enlisted men were evacuated to field hospitals.

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RECAPITULATION

- A. Towns Taken:
1. Palermo
 2. Naro
 3. Canicatti
 4. Serradifalco
 5. S. Cataldo
 6. Caltanissetta
 7. Milena
 8. Racalmuto
 9. Aragona
 10. Comotini
 11. Montedoro
 12. Monreale
 13. Pioppo
 14. S. Guiseppe
 15. S. Ciparrello
-
16. Camporeale*
 17. Gibellina*
 18. S. Ninfa*

*Towns which were occupied with no resistance by Combat Command "A" - 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion had previously been in area however so full credit is not claimed.

B. Prisoners taken: 6,000 to 7,000.

C. Casualties:

<u>Killed</u>		<u>Missing in Action</u>		<u>Evacuated^a</u>	
Off.	EM.	Off.	EM.	Off.	EM.
1	- 25	2	- 38	6	- 173

D. Total mileage covered by Combat elements other than reconnaissance or patrols: 254 miles.

ROSE,
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OFFICIAL:

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BRIGADIER GENERAL MAURICE ROSE COMMANDING CCB 2ND ARMORED DIVISION

ORGANIZATION:

Based on my experiences in Sicily and Tunisia, I have seen nothing to indicate there is anything wrong with our present organization. I do consider that the combat command staff should be increased to provide an understudy for each position. I suffered considerably from this lack—one of my staff would get sick and I would have no one to take his place.

As for the suggestion that the organization of the maintenance ~~company~~ section of the battalion headquarters company be made identical with that of line companies, I would say there is no good reason why ^(line) the company maintenance sections cannot assist the battalion headquarters

~~believe in getting anything to the division.~~

IF URGENT:

We should have more towed 57s to replace 37s—the latter are not of much use.

I believe the diesel is the answer, especially from the supply point of view.

We want a larger proportion of white phosphorous — 20-25%. It is the only thing that smokes the Germans out of their positions. It is effective against personnel in fortified positions. It is a good burning agent for tanks. The Italians don't like anything—the Germans don't like WP.

Practically all tanks burn when hit. I believe it is due to gas. It is definitely a gasoline fire as soon as the tank is hit—the kind of fire is unmistakable.

The M-4 tank armor is as good as we can expect.

The M-4 tank is a marvelous vehicle.

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Rose, contd.

I like the halftrack, some do not. I definitely ~~do not~~ would not replace the Infantry halftracks with trucks. I used my halftrack-mounted infantry as cavalry, sent them around, had them dismount, had the halftracks circle around and back. Never lost a halftrack doing it.

The t-2 is fine. We have made good use of it. Have needed such a recovery vehicle a long time.

We want about our present proportion of motorcycles in the combat command for messengers and for column control.

The armored division must have wire. We steal it right and left. In the 1st Armored Division we always used it. I do not remember a situation, no matter how fast moving, we did not have wire to combat commands.

I believe in dropping the B barrack bag, not the A barrack bag.

SUPPLY:

I would like to be rid of the coverall for anything other than straight dirty fatigue use.

We would like some ordinary pork and beans for a C ration variety.

LESSONS DOCTRINE TRAINING EXPERIENCE

At the time of the NARO-CANACATTI business we were attacked repeatedly and effectively by our own air corps. At that time our casualties totalled the same from our own air action and from enemy action.

The Armored Force doctrine and training is basically sound.

Our marksmanship is far superior to that of the German. Range work has certainly paid dividends. EXAMPLE: When we were moving into Palermo, just north of San Giusseppe, we found two 88s in position with the usual machinegun protection. The artillery was well back at the moment. I brought up two 75mm assault guns and we plugged it out at 500 yards.

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Rose, contd.

Knocked them out completely without the loss of a vehicle to us, tho we did loose several men. As soon as the 88s were knocked out, tanks took out the machineguns.

Just south of Monreale, a suburb of Palermo, there were AT weapons, and armored vehicles (not identified) up on a commanding hill, covering the road on which we were approaching. This enemy position was engaged by assault guns, and the tanks and infantry of the advance guard, while the RCN Company of the 66th A.R. cut across country, by-passed the enemy delaying position, and by the time the advance guard had liquidated the position, the RCN Company had already entered Palermo. The meat of the story is this: A bypassed delaying position is no delaying position at all. Had the position been fought in the orthodox way, the delay would have lasted until dark, and the advance could not have been resumed until morning.

The biggest lesson I learned was to, as early as possible, yet my tanks on a broad front and keep moving. As soon as there are two tanks on a front instead of one, each tank has only about fifty percent of the enemy fire to withstand. As soon as there are a number of tanks on the front the enemy fire is so distributed as to be almost neutralized by formation alone; our own fire completes the neutralization.

There has been too damned much talk about caution and fine reconnaissance. There must be boldness.

I was the officer sent to deliver our terms to the Germans in Tunisia. ~~He~~ We would give no truce until we had received an unconditional surrender so I entered the German lines with a German officer while the battle was in progress. I approached the German commander, General Krause, and gave him the terms, Unconditional surrender.

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Rose contd:

~~General Krause~~

General Krause asked how much time he had. I pointed to a line of our tanks approaching— a line extending as far as the eye could see— and said, "There they are, you can figure for yourself how much time you have." He said, "I accept. Now, how much time do I have?" I said, "Twenty minutes". This implied twenty minutes to pack up and accompany me to General Harmon. They were shelling the German command post which helped to speed things up. In my presence he gave the order over the voice radio in the clear— "Cease firing, have surrendered, terms unconditional". I radioed General Harmon. After the Germans ceased fire we did so.

(In the Sicilian Campaign) I used my halftrack-mounted infantry as cavalry; sent them around; had them dismount; had halftracks circle around and back; never lost a half track doing it.

I do not believe ~~the~~ a commander of the grade of colonel or higher will ever get into a tank. I operated from a bantam with a 193 radio. You just can't see or control from a tank. You never see the command post from the start of the battle to the end of it. You just see a motorcycle messenger from time to time.

There must be bulldozers in the advance guard.

Where defiles are encountered, lead with infantry; where broad going is possible, lead with tanks.

As a training to instill responsibility, I recommend the turning of squads, sections, and the like, over to noncommissioned officers to take out and guide and control for periods of 24-48 hours.

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LT COL B F JOHNSON, Executive Officer CC B 2nd A.D.

EQUIPMENT:

First and foremost, we need a better sight.

Better vision devices are indicated. I stood a buttoned tank a GELA while it was fighting; several times I had to call to the tank commander about new threats he did not see. The main need for the device is to get under our own barrage of time fire.

The rubber track now furnished is worthless; we want the steel track; chevron type.

Lessons training doctrine experience.

Since our situation varied so far from normal in this campaign no lessons are to be drawn.

We lost three killed and eight tanks knocked out in the campaign and will need replacements accordingly.

RULE: Never gas at a gasoline dump; move 50-100 yards away.

Most evacuations of vehicles will be in the dark. We have done some repair successfully under artillery fire, tracks off, etc..

The German IV certainly, and maybe the VI, can be destroyed by smoke shells (burning) or by HE on tracks and suspension.

Stress in training: Arm signals for use when radios go out; fire orders and target designation.

In some of our movements the point cars were making forty miles per hour when fired upon and they just couldn't be hit; kept speed til they could pull off under cover.

Any detachments sent to other organizations must have with them trucks for supply, maintenance parts, personnel, etc.. Outfits to which they are attached do not properly provide for them.

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LT COL B W MCQUADE, COMMANDING XX 58TH FA BN (ARMED)

EQUIPMENT:

We want all the halftracks in the battalion which are used for ammunition transport replaced by standard 2 1/2 ton trucks.

There is no shadow of doubt that our great number of cal. .50 MGs makes the German airman change his mind, and quickly.

SUPPLY:

The parts supply was totally lacking in this campaign.

Ammunition is still coming in all bent up.

ADMINISTRATION:

The usual procedure in making NOCs is to put their maintenance qualifications ahead of their fighting qualifications; this should be reversed.

Reports that are never read should be dropped.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

There was a tendency to fill areas available with artillery, rather than simply sending the needed guns. In this campaign there was not but one instance of using an emplaced battalion for longer than eighty minutes.

Organic battalions do not use our observation facilities. We should be assigned to support a battalion or regiment of infantry or tanks rather than to reinforce their regular supporting artillery.

It is easy to get in and work with an organization that has been fighting before.

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COLONEL I. D. WHITE, COMMANDING CC B, 7ND ARMORED DIVISION.

ORGANIZATION:

There is some duplication in the regiments and in the combat command. If the new organization with separate battalions, this will be taken care of. I am not very familiar with the proposed T/O. I am inclined to think it uneconomical with so many separate battalions having separate maintenance units and the like. I would not at all say that the present divisional organization has been proven wrong.

I rather like the one light tank company, two medium tank company battalion; I have never used it in combat but in maneuvers it works.

~~There~~ There should be ~~the~~ a maintenance section in the BN.
H. CC. identical with that in a line company.

350.09

One of the three 105mm battalions of field artillery in the division should be replaced with the 155mm howitzer battalion. Our armored artillery is fine.

I think the division should have a RCN regiment and that we should do away with the regimental RCN companies. The regimental RCN now actually works under the CC. This move would simplify RCN training if one officer was in charge. The present regimental RCN company seldom equals a company of the RCN battalion. The difference is in the training. The RCN company requires more training than any other type unit to be worth its salt; regimental RCN companies are not getting such training. I as a regimental commander was deeply interested in my RCN company, but with my multitudinous other duties I could not give it the support that it needed and I knew was right; I could not bring it up to the RCN battalion standard. I have commanded a reconnaissance battalion and I know. Two possible, not well considered, basic organizations for the proposed

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I D White, Contd:

RCN regiment are: (a) A two battalion regiment, each battalion with two RCN companies, and one tank company. (b) A three battalion regiment, one battalion to be composed of two tank companies, and the other two battalions each to be composed of ~~two~~ two RCN companies..... In any case, the main thought is to improve training and administration. I consider this change essential.

EQUIPMENT:

The M-6 is one of the sweetest vehicles we have; we are thinking about the idea of one M-6 in each light tank platoon-- no conclusions. The M-6 will do anything the light tank can do and better.

The 37mm is out; we want the 57mm or better, as tank gun for lights.

The 75mm in medium is OK

We must have a better sight for the 75mm; must be higher powered and lighted.

All towed 37s should be replaced with 57s.

The 2-ton amphibious jeep should be dropped.

The rubber tracks are no damned good at all; I don't know anything about steel tracks.

The half track won't do for RCN. We need an armored car for this purpose; no vehicle I have seen approaches this need.

The 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck should replace the halftrack as a personnel carrier for the infantry.

We don't want any M-2 halftracks for any purpose.

The radio on the M-6 prevents its use as a command car.

I think, in general, that our equipment is satisfactory as to type, quality, quantity, serviceability; tracks excepted, damned good.

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ID White, Contd:

The ammunition on our H-4 should be armored in some way; I think it is ammunition that results in fires.

I want the four point two mortar; have wanted it ten years; must be mounted to shoot to the front; more smoke can be laid; HE from this gun twice as powerful as that from the 41mm.

The SCR 522 is satisfactory-- little experience.

I prefer the diesel motor to the gasoline even if two types of fuel are made necessary by this step. I don't know the types of diesels but I do not like the Guiberson.

For ammunition we want HE/AT, Smoke, HE super, HE normal: NO AP.

I want no motorcycles, even for messengers.

SUPPLY:

Get rid of the coverall as a uniform; should be only a fatigues and maintenance suit; we should use ordinary uniforms in tanks.

The five in one ration is better even than the E ration-- swell.

Too many highly flavored meats issued.

Ration can should be dull-finished.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

There is a tendency to break up light battalions with the attendant evils.

I have never seen air support approved for a lesser applicant than a division commander.

There is nothing to approach the armored force doctrines and literature for completeness, correctness, and simplicity.

The AFOS graduates are not satisfactory. Technically they are well qualified in most cases. They fail in leadership, discipline,

41
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ID White, Contd:

and administration. They have an insufficient sense of duty and responsibility. They have a good knowledge of weapons and minor tactics. The graduates of the year just past are better than those of the first year. Specifically: I know they have been taught to "Look out for their men". They have misunderstood this; they think this sound phrase means that they are to be buffers between higher authority and the men. Also those that went to OCS from the services are less good than those that went from the line.

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Lt. COL A R WILLIAN, Commanding 3rd Bn, 66th AR.

ORGANIZATION:

I suggest that the assault gun platoon be commanded by a 1st Lieutenant with a 2nd Lieutenant as second in command.

I have an unusually good maintenance officer and he has made the present maintenance section in the battalion headquarters company work out.

I do not like the mixed light and medium tank idea for battalions, mainly on account of the guns. I like that big gun.

EQUIPMENT:

I have toyed with the idea ~~1/4/4/~~, but have reached no final conclusion that the light tank as heavily armed as the medium would be better than the medium. Such a tank might have cleaned up my last fight quicker than was the case. If you meet an eighty eight or a ninety millimeter it makes no difference whether you have one or three inches of armor.

I know nothing of Erypton lights.

Motor cycles are very valuable and safe for messages; no other use.

I don't know anything about HE/AT. Probably some ~~1/4/4/~~ HE/AT should substitute for AP but not for HE. There must be a supply of normal and super charged HE back of us at all times.

Within the tank company the M-2 halftrack is not worth much; it could be eliminated but there should be one (or better still, two) ^{quarter} ~~1/4/4/~~ ton peeps issued in place of each one eliminated. Eliminate also the half-tracks of the platoon commanders of the assault gun and the ~~1/4/4/~~ mortar platoons and replace similarly. The substituted quarter tons must, of course have radios.

The t-2 recovery vehicle is a grand thing.

It seems to me that the infantry of the division would be better served by 2 1/2 ton trucks than by halftracks. They would require less road

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Quillian, Contd:

space, would be a cheaper vehicle, and could be concentrated more quickly.

LESSONS DOCTRINE TRAINING EXPERIENCE

Every case of penetration I have seen has resulted in burning. That is nothing to be alarmed at. Our casualties are less than one per tank.

I believe the gasoline-diesel controversy can be better settled on the proving ground than off the battle field.

My idea of the normal loading of ammunition for the medium tank is: 20% white phosphorous, 40% high explosive, 40% armor piercing. The latter two percentages should vary with the expected targets. I don't know anything about HE/AT. Probably should substitute some HE/AT for AP but not for HE. There must be a supply of super and normal charged HE back of us at all times.

We use smoke against personnel. Example: We ran into machine guns in some houses. We tried HE on them; it would stop them momentarily and they would open up again. We threw some smoke in; the machine guns were quiet from then on.

After the Third Division landed at Licata, one of my platoons of tanks formed a base of INDIRECT fire for a small attack by twenty infantry men. The Infantrymen took two hundred prisoners. This was on the march to Gela.

We have Battalion Commanders asleep at the Regimental command post; company commanders at the battalion command post. This system works very well in deed. (This makes an added need for quarter tons).

The anti tank gunners we have met are not as good as our gunners.

The usual set up is this: The AT gun sees you first. He gets off the first shot; this first shot is almost always a miss, but by ob-

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QUILLIAN Contd:

serving his fire he now has the range. Our gunner has to estimate the range and hit the target before the AT gunner can get/^{off} his second shot preferably, certainly before the AT gunner gets off his third. Our gunners must be damned good. The AT gun is located by its flash.

With inexperienced tankers, if friendly artillery is falling in the AT gun area, the muzzle flash of the AT gun is likely to be confused with the burst of artillery shells.

Armored force doctrine is ok.

AFCS graduates are satisfactory.

AFS graduates from various specialists courses are satisfactory.

A man has to have perfect vision to see the graduations in the present gun sight.

I haven't seen a gun position yet that could not be out flanked.

Battalion Commanders must NOT fully believe the first reports of the first casualties of the first battle. These will be exaggerations of the fact. Officers and men should be warned of their own natural tendency in making reports, especially in the first battle, that exaggerate the facts.

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Lieut Col C.C. Peterson, Asst. C. of S., G-4, 2nd Armored Division,

ORGANIZATION:

Our present table of organization is satisfactory except that the Graves Registration ~~Quartermaster Battalion~~ Platoon should be an organic part of the division Quartermaster battalion.

EQUIPMENT:

We were cut to the bone (in loading out for Sicily); nine trucks for one tank battalion; no fuel or lubricant trucks:

Extra canteen not needed in Sicily. Tankers do not need it anywhere.

DUKWS tops.

We are short of watches. A watch repairman, properly equipped, should be part of the Ordnance Company.

350.09

The Infantry Regiment should have four ten-ton wreckers: one per battalion; one per Service Company.

The M-3 personnel carrier should have at least one cal. .50 AA gun, better two.

Some extension ramps, to piece out the present ramps on the LSTs and the LCTs, would be very helpful. Just some pieces like we use to unload tanks from freight flats. Should be 25 feet long, heavy enough to support a medium tank, and an integral part of the ships equipment.

LESSONS DOCTRINE TRAINING EXPERIENCE

For the Armored Division, the most advantageous loading is on the LST. For such moves as we have just completed Liberty ships just wont do for the Armored Division. The booms on the Liberty's will not enable the loading of heavy vehicles in three of its holds; just things like peeps in these three. We loose 50% of the space on the Liberty.

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Peterson, Contd.

The LCI is superior to the LCT at the ^{landing} ~~loading~~ end; the LCT is superior to the LCI at the loading end.

LCIs are magnificent for Infantry.

My supply line was at one time a 178 mile turn round to my installations, which installations were forty-five road miles in rear of the Division. The wise G-4 will prepare to meet just such situations regularly. The teachings at our schools should cover this problem and this thought.

As a matter of training back in the States, the Post-Unit Liaison now normal should be broken. This would train G-4s in an important function. G-4s get accustomed to calling the Post CM., the Post Engineer, the Post Transportation Office, etc., when there is a problem— in the field it comes as a shock that they no longer can do so. I was so shocked.

One of the greatest things they can do in the states today is to have problems where one day's rations must be stretched to cover two days. It's a mess sergeant problem that good mess sergeants must master. In the field trucks get lost, get knocked out, and mess sergeants must know how to meet the problem so imposed.

1st Echelon maintenance must be stressed indefatigably.

We have ^{large} scale drawings of LCTs, Liberties, LSTs, all kinds of ships. We also have little card board rectangles cut to represent tanks, peeps, trucks, etc., on the same scale. For loadings, we paper-load the scale drawings many ways before arriving at THE solution. Now we can, with this set-up, order in detail the loading of any organization in three hours time. (System set up by Capt F.M. Mueller)

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We are ~~not~~ very highly rated in the Armored Force in general, but the radio tender in the tank has no rating. The theory is you just push a button and start talking. Theory is false. Operator must be an intelli-

gent man capable of maintaining his cot. As it is good men wont stick with this job; seek promotion by getting into other work. Tender should be rated a Technician fifth class.

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Lt. Col. H.L. Hilliard, Cmdg 3rd Bn, 67th AR.

ORGANIZATION:

I do not believe in tank regimental formations. I do believe in the separate tank battalion idea. We are so frequently separated that the facts should be admitted by our organization. At the present moment I am in Sicily and the Regiment is in North Africa and I have to extemporize supply, administrative, etc., organizations. There is no S4 or S1 on the battalion staff as such. We actually, thru out the regiment, use the A3 as the S4. A3s have been seldom or never necessary thus far. 350.09
If the present organization is confirmed, a battalion maintenance section of about thirty men should be authorized and furnished with appropriate ratings, shop equipment, parts etc.. Right now I have attached to my battalion a section of the regimental maintenance company.

In the Battalion Hq Company there is one maintenance M-3 half track and a small crew. The Headquarters company has more types of vehicles than any other organization in the battalion to care for. Headquarters Company's maintenance section should be identical with that of a line company. The T/O at present forces its own violation.

The present battalion is exceptionally weak in RCN. To operate independently or on a separate mission it is necessary to have attached RCN and infantry.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EQUIPMENT:

We probably are carrying too much individual equipment. We are carrying equipment to meet every possible eventuality. We once carried shoe impregnate, capes, eyeshields, impregnated clothing, gasmasks, etc.. It is too much for us to carry. Here I want to put in a word for the training type mask as against the service type mask for tank crews.

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Killyard, contd:

worn to the pins in 200 miles. If we cant get real rubber, steel is the answer. I have seen two types of steel tracks-- one very heavy with three lugs on each block, the other is a lighter track patterned after the rubber block and with a chevron on it. The latter is much the better. The heavier track is a strain on the power train, makes shifting difficult, and causes maintainance difficulties.

Our mediums wont withstand the German 88. I don't really expect it to do so. I know of no mediums penetrated by 57s. I think the emphasis should be on the power and accuracy of the gun rather than on the thickness of the plate. We destroyed Mark VI's with our 75mm guns on their suspensions, tracks, enginecompartments, but no known penetrations. Armor about equal to the present is about all we feel we can hope to get. I would rather sacrifice more armor and get more power and flotation and maneuverability and more gun.

Dog tags that do not melt should be issued to tankers. The torso usually remains after a fire but no tag; makes identification most difficult.

The Tank gun is a very fine weapon but needs a better sight-- the gun is the best thing we ever had. We Do need a standardization of scales and devices to be used in indirect firing. We have dope to the effect this is being done but not yet received by us.

The suspension system on the halftrack used for ammunition and maintainance is not satisfactory; the volute spring will not standup. We have, where possible, substituted light tank volutes.

Tankers should have a small bed roll or sack instead of so many blankets

We need radios in the medico's car in a moving situation.

Our 81mm howitzer is not satisfactory-- insufficient traverse-- shoots to the rear; hard to maneuver; need 360 degree traverse.

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Hillyard , contd:

I have had no experience with the Krypton light,

The four mortar cycles we now have in the battalion are in about the correct quantity I think; they are used purely for messenger service.

The replacement of the periscopic sight with the coaxial sight is not urgent, but the replacement of the periscopic sight with a more powerful sight of any kind is Urgent.

I cannot chose between diesels; I have had experience with one only (Guiberson).

For ammunition we want HE/AT and WP— no time shells. I cant say for sure but believe HE/AT will replace both HE and AP. All loadings should be SUPER; the more super the better.

AP ammunition is not liked because of the frequency of seperated cases, powder spilling, jams, etc..

ADMINISTRATION-SUPPLY.

I do not like to wear the same ribbon as the GIs of the area, neither do my men. There should be some distinctions. The distinctions would be hard to make. Thoughts: An amphibious ribbon; and assault echelon ribbon to distinguish between the D-1 and the D-20 boys. We should have quick decisions on battle stars.

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Hillyard, contd.

ADMINISTRATION - SUPPLY.

More replacement equipment than replacement personnel is usually needed so don't believe the tank-and-crew or the crew system of replacements is practical. We have received twenty replacements, satisfactory.

The T-2 tank recovery vehicle makes battle field recovery practical. Very satisfactory, except that it IS a tank that at best is under powered with an aircooled radial engine. It has all the usual tank maintenance problems. Tank recovery to date has been complete; none have been lost to the enemy.

Too many people think the Ordnance repairs our tanks and we just drive them.

No more Vienna sausage PLEASE.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

In the event tanks from an armored division are to be attached to an infantry division then a competent tank advisor should be sent to stay with the infantry commander. This advisor must be furnished by higher headquarters with a car-mounted radio for direct communication with the tanks. There is a definite tendency on the part of infantry commanders to use tanks as the leading elements of advance guards. An advisor with sufficient rank and prestige must be along to prevent ~~the~~ misuse of tanks in defiles, against anti-tank guns and the like.

In this operation we had six tanks hit and burned by enemy fire. Four were by 88mm tank fire, and two were probably by artillery fire. In almost every case there seemed to be an initial flash that burned the exposed parts of the men's bodies, but did not burn clothing. After the initial flash there seemed to be a slower burning that picked up burning speed

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Hillyard, Contd:

as the powder and ammunition took fire. This leads me to believe that when a tank is penetrated the gas fumes in the hull and thereafter there is normal burning until the ammunition starts exploding.

Auxilliary gasoline tanks should not be carried on exposed parts of the vehicle. They should be dropped when combat is imminent. Even in rear areas it is questionable whether they be carried.

Personnel in the tank that is hit usually get out unless the penetrating projectile hits them. We have had several such cases (One man killed, say, and the others without a scratch, just some burns from which they will recover). The burns are usually second degree, rarely third degree (This statement checked at the time with his Battalion Surgeon).

We have never yet fought as a battalion, just engaging a few tanks here and there.

The Field Manuals and the AFS literature ^{are} ~~is~~ correct.

More emphasis should be places on fire control and coordination within the crew and within the platoon. The biggest obstacle to training crews is maintainance. If we could approach the air idea of distinct combat and maintainance crews we would profit. So much of our time is spent moving and so little fighting; there are so many guns and so much equipment, we tend to end up as a bunch of grease monkeys rather than fighters.

AFOCS graduates are as satisfactory as any junior officers I have seen. There is in all junior officers a definite failure to realize their responsibilities as officers. Their backgrounds are not thorough enough in: Discipline and basic military training; customs of the service; responsibility as to veracity and conduct; administration.

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Hillyard, Contd.

Br alding the CCS graduates down another way, I would say that they are in character qualifications, bearly satisfactory; in physical leadership qualifications, satisfactory; in mental leadership qualifications, excellent.

Officers, both here and at home, should be assisted in maintaining their places and prestige by making certain places out of bounds for enlisted men, and by provid~~ing~~ing for them in much the same way enlisted men are now provided for.

Using reduced charges in practice tends to make false (over) range estimation prevalent in battle.

We carry one round of howitzer ammunition in each tank to reduce jams.

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COLONEL STOVALLS INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL GAFFEY, CMDG 2ND A.D.

Equipment:

Tank tracks as now issued are no good; the rubber in them is not worth a damn. After not more than three hundred miles every track had to be turned or replaced— mostly replaced.

The 75mm gun is a sufficient gun for the medium tank, however the possibilities of the T/D gun (76mm) as a tank gun are well worth looking into.

Also I would like to see the 155 How tried in our medium tank chassis; I may be alone in this but I still think it.

Self propelled artillery is superior to towed; but a 105 on a smaller, lighter, faster vehicle should be our aim. This will give artillery the speed of the light tank.

Ammunition racks must be armored; gasoline is not the cause of our tank fires. This change is classed as urgent. The British know how to do this job. Brigadier Dunphy, British Army, London, has the plans for the necessary work to armor ammunition racks; General Crane of AFHQ G-3, can supply a better address for Brigadier Dunphy.

Doctrine- Training- etc:

The doctrine and teachings of the AFS and of the various Armored Force publications are sound; we must learn to follow them better is all.

Crew drill cannot be too much stressed; we had a lot of it and it has paid dividends.

I think every Infantry Division should have a GHQ tank battalion attached to it— preferably mediums, or maybe a mixed battalion.

This would give them their own tanks that they would know, and

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General Gaffy contd:

armored divisions whole. I further think that infantry combat teams should have a small number of tanks attached.

(NOTE: In further un-recorded conversation, General Gaffey exhibited a general contentment with the present organization, equipment, administration, and use of the division as presently constituted; however this note must not be construed as a statement that there is any compaisency or lack of forward looking work— quite the contrary is true.)

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COLONEL STOVALL'S INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL REDDING F PERRY C OF S 2ND A.D.

EQUIPMENT:

We want the 155 mm selfpropelled; we are constantly out ranged.

We have too much miscellaneous equipment.

Our equipment is generally good, but we need heavier guns.

The amphibious jeep is utterly useless.

I cant speak too highly of the DUKW.

LESSONS, EXPERIENCES:

In any amphibious operation the supply supporting us must be built up. This operation could have been very embarrassing, had our ammunition expenditures been greater. Gasoline and rations hauled over 140 miles of a mountain road greatly overextended our trucks.

I fully agree with General Gaffey's statement on tanks for the Infantry. Infantry should be trained in the proper use of the tank. I very definitely do not want divisions cut up to give tanks to the Infantry. I think it immaterial whether the Infantry divisions get GHQ tank battalions or organic tank battalions.

We have a long way to go in effecting control in landings.

Road blocks were not reduced as rapidly as they should have been.

This rubber problem is serious; reclaimed rubber for tracks wont do.

I think the metal track must be accepted.

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COLONEL STOVALLS INTERVIEW WITH LT. COL. HAROLD M. FORDE, G-2, 2ND A.D.

ORGANIZATION:

The T/C for the G-2 section of an armored division is wholly inadequate. For the Sicilian operation I had four officers. I borrowed a fifth for one period in order to provide rest periods for some while the section yet gave 24-hour service. These four officers were: The G-2; the Asst. G-2; a photo-interpreter; and a prisoner of war interrogator. Each pulled a shift as duty officer. A second officer on duty was found necessary to check reports, keep up maps, make estimates, make terrain studies, etc.. The enlisted section of my office had: a chief clerk, a stenographer, a draftsman, and an order of battle clerk. The duties of the order of battle clerk consisted of keeping a record of opposing units; tracing enemy movements from reports received from adjacent and lower units as well as from Army; he was also used to make preliminary examinations of documents. The overall average of work hours in the enlisted section was fifteen to twenty hours per day, the stenographer's hours being the longest. 350.09

I propose as an adequate T/O for the A.D. G-2 section:

- 1— Lt Col———G-2
- 1— Maj———General assistant to G-2.
- 2— Capts——— " " " "
- 1— M/Sgt———Chief Clerk.
- 1— S/Sgt———Stenographer
- 1— T/4——— "
- 1— T/5⁴——— Draftsman
- 1— T/5——— "
- 1— T/4———Order of Battle clerk

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FORDE contd:

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And to be NORMALLY attached:

1—Lieut———Photo-interpreter

x—xxxxx———Prisoner of War interrogators.

Plus a general broad authority to secure the services of any available talent suitable for any given, prospective, campaign.

A Division should have on its table of organization for public relations, one captain, one typist, and one or more qualified photographers. The duty of the public relations officer would consist of writing stories for press release, obtaining data and pictures for the division history. The present practice of having the public relations officer issue mimeograph forms to companies to fill out and then sending them out as press releases whenever a soldier is promoted should be a very minor part of the Public Relations Officers duty. It is not believed that such activities have any value to the division as a whole. At the present moment, a serious attempt is being made to obtain stories of outstanding gallantry in action, whether such gallantry is recognized by an award of decoration or not. It is believed that such stories have a great morale effect for the division as whole whereas the press release concerning some private's promotion can be interesting only to his family and friends. The photographers should be accredited War Department Cameramen and should obtain as many pictures of troops in combat as possible— Besides their historical value, these would assist in the study of men and equipment under actual combat conditions.

EQUIPMENT:

We urgently need a suitable machine-gun mount on the Peep, one to be fired from the seat beside the driver's seat. The Rangers have

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Fords, Contd:

such a mount. (Your interviewer saw such a mount on Colonel Darby's peep. It consisted of a piece of two inch (estimated) steel pipe about fifteen inches long welded vertically on the cowling directly in front of the right hand front peep seat; in the upper end of this pipe fitted, and swivelled, a Y yoke blacksmithed to receive a light machinegun. The overall height of the installation was such that the gun could ride vertically.)

SUPPLY:

There should be coffee in every K ration.

LESSONS-DOCTRINE-PROCEDURES.

The photo-interpreter with us in the Sicilian campaign was excellent; however we want our photo-interpreter to be a PERMANENTLY assigned, ex-Armored Force- line officer, appropriately trained. I used the photo-interpreter to make terrain studies.

We had, on paper, from the Counter Intelligence Corps, one officer and five enlisted men. They were pushed in immediately upon capture of a town. Their mission was security for the military, and the protection of property, banks, foodstuffs, etc., from looting by the local populace. They also searched local offices for documents, and gave assistance to the AMGOOTS (Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories). As the Division advanced these CIC's would of necessity be pulled out of one town and placed in another, sometimes ~~resulting in rioting and looting~~ leaving the rearward town vacant of controlling authority which, in turn, sometimes resulted in rioting and looting. There were not enough CIC agents to leave even one in each town. There was frequently a time lag

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FORDE Contd:

between the CIC withdrawal and the take over by Army agents. These Army agents then had to start all over again, sometimes reversing the CIC decisions as to who should go to jail and who should be let out of jail. None of the CIC spoke Italian.

The only trained interpreters available were the PWI (prisoner of war interrogators) who were already doing more important work. We provided interpreters from divisional personnel. These were not trained nor were they well educated. Most had graduated from the seventh grade and learned Italian at home. I recommend that the Division have an assigned team of one officer and two enlisted men, one of whom must be able to speak the language of the country. This team will be concerned primarily with military security and will have nothing whatever to do with civil administration or government.

All other agents ~~maintain~~ available to the Army should be pooled and assigned prior to the operation to a specific area or locality. There must be enough of these agents to provide these operatives for all large towns and communities which will be taken by troops during the entire campaign. These army agents would follow hard on the heels of the assaulting troops and take over the locality previously assigned as soon as captured by our troops.

As PWI (Prisoner of War Interrogators) for the Sicilian operation, the Division had four officers and ten men. An attempt was made to provide a team with the REN tropp, one with each combat command, and a reserve team at Division Headquarters. Due to the bilingual nature of the campaign, the teams were unbalanced with two German and one Italian, or one German and two Italian interrogators. I believe assignments to teams of four men is most satisfactory and effective where two languages are involved.

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Fords, Contd:

A three-man team with a 1/2 ton truck are, I believe, the ideal solution if but one language is to be met. Training of PWI should include more time spent in the study of tactical doctrine, and less in the memorizing of tables of organization and equipment. I believe some study of T/O is suitable, but details can be obtained from reference books and not clutter up the minds of the PWI's. A knowledge of what troops do and how they do it is essential to their tactical interrogation. A broad military background is desirable. At the present time the PWI prerequisite is lingual proficiency-- ability to grasp military principles is not considered and one seldom finds an interpreter whose curiosity about military matters enables him to extract all the available information from prisoners. The curriculum at Camp Ritchie has seemingly been designed to turn out experts/^{only}in the recognition of rank, branch or service, and enemy material.

Case: Where a 1st Lt. of Field Artillery was the interrogator, an enemy officer told him that our time fire was no good, the interrogator pursued the question no further; he did not ask the whereabouts, the cause, the amount of damage that was done, etc., etc..

Case: Where numerous German prisoners are reported as saying they lost "because the supply system fell down", no pursuing questions (such as, "Was it simply that there were no supplies in your rearward dumps?" "Was it because bridges and rails were blown out, and where?" "Was it area-denying barrages or interdiction fires that kept your supplies from coming up?" etc.) were asked.

In both cases valuable information was probably lost thru lack of military knowledge of the important.

In this immediate connection, I recommend that all regular officers be required to become fluent in some officially selected foreign lan-

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FORDE, Contd:

guage. The French Army, in its colonial services, has this system as it appertains to the colonial tongues-- there is additional pay for such proficiency.

/ AMGOT's. An officer of the Amgots should be permanently detailed as a member of the Special Staff of all divisions engaged in operations in hostile territory. His function should be that of advisor to the commanding general on policies, and methods of implementing these policies, as regards civil populations. He should be capable of conducting instruction for all field officers and all company commanders in how to administer an occupied town or community. This must be done prior to the invasion. In Sicily there were not enough Amgots available to take over the administration of captured towns and villages. In most cases it fell to the lot of a lieutenant or company commander to assume the functions of the mayor- treasurer- chief of public works- chief rationeer- and chief of police, of some town. None of these officers had had any previous instruction or training in the discharge of such duties. It is believed that considerable harm was done to the local economy because these officers did not know who to trust,, how rations were to be distributed, or what prices were to be for rations or services. As in North Africa, immediate inflation resulted. The American soldier with his pockets full of money would pay any price asked by local merchants and/or women. There should be sufficient Amgot agents available to take over the administration of the larger communities, at the same time supervising and advising line officers who are administering the smaller towns. It is recognized that it would be impossible to have one Amgot for each village captured, and that ~~AMGOT~~ officers must be used in all cases.

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Ferde, Contd:

I am working on the idea of using the S-2 of the divisional ordnance maintainance battalion as my man to investigate and report upon captured vehicles, machines, guns, and material of all kinds. In this campaign, for lack of such an investigator who could be constantly on the job, a captured, brand-new, fully battle stored, German Mark VI tank was used by ~~the~~ troops ignorant of its value to our services to practice with their bazooka guns.

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Armored Force

Introduction:

The Armored Force representative on the ACF Board in the NATO was assigned to accompany the DIME sub-task force in the invasion of Sicily. The core of this force was the 1st Infantry Division, Major General Terry Allen commanding both the Sub-task Force and the Division. The Armored elements played various roles at irregular intervals thru-out the campaign. These roles, from the point of view of the observer will be related in more or less chronological order, the interview data being placed in its proper sequence.

1. On the morning of the second day of the campaign a number of German tanks, 12-30, probably nearer the latter figure, emerged into the Gela plains from the hills some four miles east of Gela. Your observer, having left the Division of some fifteen minutes earlier fully primed with the G-2 knowledge of the situation, but having no knowledge of an impending tank attack, saw a great number of soldiers of all branches leaving the tall sand dunes 600 yards in from the waters edge and some two miles east of Gela. Upon enquiry, I was told German tanks were approaching. I climbed the dune and found myself between a couple of the guns of the 33rd FA Bn which were busily shooting at about twelve German Tanks which were milling about on both sides of the Gela-Niscemi road in that area where it is approximately aprrail to the beach. I saw a tank or two hit, but none immediately stopped until one was hit and burned. The tanks were giving the guns near me a rapid return fire until suddenly they began getting fire from one of the 1st Div. Cannon companies from far to their left (vicinity of 298278). At this time the two guns in my vicinity gave out of ammunition and retired with

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their guns. Also at this time all except three or four of the German tanks turned eastward to meet the new threat. As they turned there was some further milling as tho with indecision; further tanks were hit (there were a total of seven left within a five hundred yard circle about point 260290) and the eastward moving tanks disappeared from my view. I am not quite sure what became of the tanks that did not move eastward. I am told that tanks belonging to the 2nd Armored Div (CCB) rolled off LCT's, moved some five to seven hundred yards and gave battle-- I did not see this and have not seen the 2nd Armored to check it. I am further told that there was some naval gun fire (the Savannah) on these tanks. I did not recognize it as such. In any case, the German Tanks came within some fourteen hundred yards of completely cutting thru the 1st Division front to the sea and were right handily stopped with heavy loss.

2. During the next few days it was impossible for the division commander to attach to the CTBs under his control groups of six to twelve tanks. It is improbable that these attachments did very much actual execution but their effect on our own infantry's morale was immense.

3. My next contact with tanks was to watch a day long battle of the 26th Infantry CT to which the 70th Tk Bn was attached for Barra Franca. My OP was very high and I could see a great many details. The infantry was attacking, two battalions abreast along the ridge which parallels the Mezzarino-Barra Franca road. The 70th Tank Bn was on the right, east flank, of the 26th. About nine o'clock in the morning some twelve -fifteen German Tanks waddled down from an eastern exit from the hilltop town of Barra Franca. Our tanks were alerted from the OP I was on. The German Tanks progressed very slowly and with excellent care for cover down a stream line and thru wooded areas toward the position of

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our tanks. It seemed to me that our tanks were slow getting set, but some ten minutes in advance they did get perfectly set with the tanks of one company of hulldown defilade behind a ridge that commanded the low ground being followed by the German tanks. The remainder of our tanks were loosely disposed in waides in rear of this front line. As the German tanks came into range and view our lights let them have what they came for-- 37mm at 300 or less yards. Seven German tanks stayed. A small number retired. Most of the German tanks were burned. At least two more were knocked off well back toward Barrafranca by artillery. Our tanks did not follow thru immediately. An hour or two later they moved a short distance forward (3-400yds) and then retired. Somewhile after mid afternoon they did move forward and disappear into the shrubbery all guns talking. Which concludes the important parts of what I saw save this: about midday I saw a couple of groups of six nebelwerfer rocket shells land among our lights. Yet when moving time came they all moved off in good order except two that had thrown their tracks. (Col Wellborn the Tank Commander later told me that these nebelwerfers killed four who were momentarily outside their tanks but did not in any wise hurt the tanks.)

4. The morning after the Barrafranca fight I met Lt. Col Wellborn and his executive Major Davidson, and Captain Wampler his S-3 on the road and talked to them and took the following notes, notes that must be read in the light of the fact that they were just out of a right hot battle.

"210mm mortar shells landed within 10 ft of tank but left it undamaged.
Use only mediums or better in combat.
Speed of the light tank is not necessary in combat.
Must have a larger gun for combat.

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The 75mm howitzer in light tank chassis, the m-8, would be better with a 75mm gun.

The Platoon leader in a half-track lacks mobility-- has to use a M-8 to keep up.

Drop all half-tracks in the tank battalion except those of the medical people.

Make no change in AFS tactics
teachings-- but drop the phrase, "normal situation". there is no such thing.

All officers fight unbuttoned to assure control-- must keep head out-- teach that this is necessary.

Higherpowered field glasses are necessary for higher officers (eight power)

Do away with cannister.

→ We want only two kinds of ammunition, HE and AP, both as high powered as possible.

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The next observed action of tanks was in the fight for BOMPIETRO. The plan for this fight was simply that some thirty tanks of the 70th light Tank Bn plus a dozen or so attached Mediums would be the leadoff, the shock elements and would be followed thru closely by the 26th Inf. Altho I observed this action from a high vantage point, I could see but a very few individual tanks and those only for a very short while. The broken nature of the terrain, its cover, the smoke of battle, and the smoke of burning fields prevented anything like the over-all view I had earlier at Barrafranca and was to have later at Gangi. Later reports show the Tank Bn entirely successful in driving thru all opposition tho they suffered relatively heavy tank casualties, this latter probably due in part to the fact that the 26th Inf Combat team did not follow thru closely.

A Day or two later I interviewed Major Davidson and Captain Wampler, Executive officer and S-3 of the Bn respectively with the following results:

ORGANIZATION: recommended that one Warrant Officer Maintenance be changed from the Bn Hq Company to the Service Company-- that is where he is actually used.

We want one company of medium tanks in each LIGHT bn.

EQUIPMENT:

We want at least a 57mm gun in our light tanks (but also we want one medium company in each light battalion).

The multitudinous pieces of soldier uniform should be streamlined along the British lines of simplicity.

Self sealing gasoline tanks for tanks are not considered

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practical.

The gasoline cruising radius of armored vehicles is considered good to excellent.

For the fire-proofing of tanks we recommend a more generous use of asbestos.

We recommend the deletion of all half tracks appearing in the Tank Bn Tables except those assigned to the medical detachment.

As to armor thickness and ability to withstand penetration we can say we getting hurt in lights by anything that does not also hurt the mediums.

We have no experience with Diesel driven tanks but with gasoline we are using a lot of tanks to burning-- we would like at least some diesels for comparative and experimental purposes.

The T-2 recovery vehicle has been invaluable. The casualties in the battalion to date (July 25 1943) have been roughly as follows: Of 39 officers, one killed, two seriously wounded, one slightly wounded. Of 726 E.M., eight killed, four missing, fourteen seriously wounded, fifteen slightly wounded. Of fiftyfour tanks only seven have been total losses-- a good many others have been knocked out, left, recovered repaired and are ready for action again.

As to tank vision devices, especially for tank commanders, we believe that tank commanders MUST KEEP THEIR HEADS OUT until small arms fire is received regardless of vision devices now available. Further we believe that this fact should be taught as basic doctrine.

We have had no experience with steel tracks; however in Sicily rubber tracks used from CLIA thru Petralia are now of necessity being

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turned after an average of just under two hundred miles wear.

ADMINISTRATION:

When battalions are attached to Infantry divisions, as this one now is, the Ordnance supply must be closer than has been common in this campaign.

We greatly desire to have the idea of furnishing tanks and tank crews as complete units of replacement pursued to a conclusion. One hundred fifty replacements received from the RTC at Cannistelle about 6/15/43 were unsatisfactory, altho there were a few excellent men among them. Almost none had armored training. Some had as little as eight days basic training.

Battle field recovery of all useful materiel has to date been 100%. The T-2's are grand.

Canned heat, like that of the British, desired.

TRAINING:

Discipline--- Discipline--- Discipline-----.

Infantry support must be close and immediate.

Air Corps officers need a couple of lessons in map reading and a couple in strafing and bombing. Our only air attacks to date have been four by our own planes and we have suffered no casualties from them.

Medium tank crews should be capable indirect-fire artillerymen.

Tank commanders must keep their heads out until small arms fire is received regardless of the division devices now available--we believe this should be taught as basic doctrine.

Shortly after the foregoing interview the commanding officer of the

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battlaion (Lt. Col. Wellborn) came in; He went over my notes and agreed with his subordinates in detail and added:

We believe that a new type tank designed as a special Lead tank should be built. Its use-- to be the lead tank in channelized operations. Such a tank would have a heavy gun, would have its armor lightened everywhere except in front; the front armor would be thickened by as many inches as proves possible-- six inches or more of armor in front would not be too much.

Shoulder holsters should be furnished tankers to ease their evacuation of a burning tank.

Range estimation THRU TELESCOPIC SIGHTS must be taught all tankers. Range estimation is not the answer; the answer is range estimation THRU THE TELESCOPIC SIGHTS thru which the tank gunner ever sees his prey.

We have developed a couple of items in the battalion that are of interest. One is a small metallic point so welded on the roof of the tank turret that it is in alignment with the vertical hairs in the tank commanders periscope, when the tank commanders periscope is parralel to the gun. With this device in place the tank commander who has found a target, puts his gunner on it by having the gunner rotate the turret until the metallic point takes its place in front of the guid hairs; the turret is thus stopped at the right place for the gunner with his fixed periscope to pick up the target. The second item is a black out tent which slides up accordion fashion over the regular bows on an M-3 half track. The frame for this is two pieces of angle-iron which slide along the top of the half track sides, plus three bows of slightly greater

41
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height than the bows on the half track proper. Pulled out with its cover in place, and with the half track rear door open, we have a nice roomy blackout tent.

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The next time I saw tanks in action was just east of Gargi, on the road to Spirlinga. The set up was this: A combat team was first sent down the road to capture two quite prominent hills that rose from the floor of the broad east west valley thru which the road passed; this was in part accomplished but further progress would be difficult and costly in casualties. Then a combat team was sent down each of the two ridges bounding the north and south of the valley. This was done but it was found that to close the pincers thus in part established and to clean out and mop up the pinched out area would likely be a matter of trading the German a one for one casualty list-- not our way. It was then decided to send right down the floor of the valley the 70th Tank BN reinforced with some twelve mediums. The bottom of the valley was narrow-- in rare places there was a maneuver width for tanks of two hundred fifty yards and this cut by a dry stream bed with sharp

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71

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and/or undercut four-foot banks. The average maneuverable width was no more than 100 yards and in a place or two it was only the width of the road. From an excellent vantage point I watched the tanks pour in just at last light of evening. There was no shooting before the tanks were lost to view in the closing dark. Then as I started to the rear and had gone some four or five hundred yards all guns seemed to open at once, I turned to look at the fireworks when I heard Col Wellborns voice as he spoke into the CP Microphone.. I went over and joined him. We watched for a while what was to appearances only a fireworks display. Soon Wellborn said in effect, "George you may disengage your outfit now"; "Bill you cover him"; "Jim you come out now", "Bill will cover you to", etc etc". The radio communications were working perfectly. A Company commander said "Colonel, please send an ambulance and a doctor to control point XX; there is a tank on its side there". A new voice broke in as follows "Never mind repeating that, Colonel, we heard and the ambulance and the doctor are on the way". The Company Commanders voice said "Fine, Doc". The whole tank force was in the clear about forty minutes after nightfall, about fifteen minutes after the first disengagement. The next morning it appeared that not too many Germans had actually been killed, perhaps a dozen or two, bu the attack, but they had had emplanted in their souls a hellova desire to be elsewhere and they had very promptly acted upon it. The Valley was cleared and the slowed movement of the Division eastward became a smart movement. Cost: two burned tanks; two dead, five wounded.

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The attitude of our infantrymen toward tanks can perhaps best be shown by two observed happenings on the campaign. One. I was a division CP listening to the preliminary instructions being given a combat team commander for an attack his team was to make. The CT Commander started talking about the weariness of his men, how hard they had been fighting and marching etc.. Then that part of the instructions that said a number of tanks would be attached to his team was given him; he looked a great deal happier and said no more about tired men. Two. I was in the CP of a CT. The Regimental communications officer came in and said to the colonel in effect, "The tanks are coming up and you know what that means; they'll tear up half our wire". The colonel, who I know was not indifferent to communications problems and necessities, replied "I don't give a damn if they tear it all up; hell, we've got TANKS haven't we". These and other like things leads your observer to believe that tanks are almost a morale-necessity to the infantryman in almost any situation. Their worth as a morale factor indicates the attachment of some to infantry whether they are to be used or misused, either way they will pay their way.

The following officers of the division with which I travelled all stated in various languages that they wanted a tank battalion as an integral part of the Infantry division.

Colonel J. W. Bowen-- Bn Comdr thru Tunisia, Rgtl Comdr Thru Sicily.

Lt Col C E Beck, Bn Comdr thru Tunisia, Regtl Ex. thru Sicily.

Maj Walter H Grant, Bn Comdr thru Sicily, Regtl S3 thru Tunisia

Lt Col John Williamson Regtl Ex Tunisia and Sicily

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Lt Col. J O Curtis Asst G-2 Division, Tunisia and Sicily

Lt Col Robt. W. York Bn Comdr Tunisia and Sicily

Lt Col Ben Sturnberg Bn Comdr Tunisia and Sicily.

Capt Carlo Randall Co Comdr Tunisia, Bn S-3 in Sicily.

Maj Frank Calisico Regtl S-3 Tunisia and Sicily.

Colonel George Taylor Combat Team comdr Thru Tunisia and Sicily

Lt Col R. S. Porter Division G-2, Tunisia and Sicily.

Some of the foregoing said Reconnaissance Squadron rather than Tank Battalion but they all indicated one company of light tanks and two of mediums.

Major General Trop Middleton in a letter to TD (Ops Div) dated July 31st 1943 said in part:

The 45th Division Task Force could have used a light tank company in lieu of one of the medium tank companies of the attached medium tank battalion. Later in the operation a medium tank company was traded to the 1st Division for a light company. Light tanks are more maneuverable and can go places where it is difficult to get the medium tank. I consider medium and light tanks an essential part of an infantry division, unless the division is operating where tanks cannot be used. The mere presence of friendly tanks adds much to the morale of infantry.

I was recalled from Sicily before it was possible for me to interview members of the 2nd Armored Division. This will be done as early as circumstances outside my control permit.

The notes pertaining to tanks taken by Colonel R. C. Hamilton Infantry member of the AGF Board who accompanied the sub task force of which the 45th Division was the core, are hereto attached in appendix form.

A.S.J. Stovall, Jr. etc.

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FIRST LIEUTENANT ROATH E. BEICHLEY, "G" COMPANY 67TH ARMORED REGIMENT
(This officer took part in both the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns)
~~RECOMMENDATION~~
EQUIPMENT:

Tunisia was a case to show the tankers need of a radio more reliable as to reception; a gun with more muzzle velocity; and a tank with less fire hazard.

The armor~~y~~ on the tank could be heavier, but a heavier gun comes first. Maneuverability should not be sacrificed to armor.

Only one of the tanks I have seen knocked out did not catch on fire.

Our sights compare unfavorably with the German sight.

Our new M-3 glass is superior to the German glass.

Our cal. .50 AA gun is the best AA gun we could have. The drawback is that the turret ring is hard to move when the tank is moving or on a slope. We should have a ring mount similar to the M-32 mount on the kitchen trucks.

Our radios just do not reach out far enough. The Army should standardize radios to enable working with other organizations and branches.

The German muzzle brake also serves to break up muzzle blast. Our muzzle blast has given our positions away.

TRAINING DOCTRINE LESSONS EXPERIENCE

Tunisia was a case to show the tankers need for ^{very} close reconnaissance.

For control and observation you have got to be where you can see. You can't get enough observation buttoned up. Only air bursts or concentrated strafing should cause the closing of the tank commanders hatch. I had one man killed inside a tank with a 20mm slug from a plane and I still think this.

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Beichley, contd.

We landed in Sicily on D plus one, were attached to the Sixteenth Combat Team and went into an assembly area. At 2030 we were told to be prepared to get up at 0400 for an attack with the infantry. We did get up at 0400, and I was told by my company commander (who had been on reconnaissance the evening before) to take my platoon and lead the company to another assembly area right back of the infantry, which area was supposed to be friendly territory. I took the lead and started out. We came to a road block. The company commander pointed out the infantry position to me on the high ground to the front. We were in more or less a valley with high sides. That kept us canalized on the road. Went down the road, turned right at the road block. We had gone about 200 yards down the road when six Focke-Wulfes came over and started to raise hell. Trying to get off the road where we could be so easily seen, we kept on trying to find an exit from the road. I advised the company to watch the flanks and to the front. When we got 400-600 yards from the Infantry position we were opened on by German tanks and 88s. Two tanks and mine got off the road in defilade and brought fire on the enemy. Meanwhile they got one tank; it burned, all men escaped (It is essential that everyone keep the escape hatch free of stuff piled on top of it and in working order) We traded blows from that position; a very small area for three tanks, but good defilade. The order came to withdraw. Since the only way to get out was to go back on the road, and since the Germans had ranged in on the spot where we must enter the road, I ordered the platoon to lay smoke on the German position. We then made our withdrawal to the road block where we pulled off the road in the midst of a heavy artillery barrage. An order came to go down the the road the way we had come, turn right and we would be met by a guide. I took the lead and started out and Lieutenant Finley followed with his platoon. I got about 500 yards down the road. Shells were landing all about anyway. One landed

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Beichley, contd:

on my tank and knocked out the sights. I gave the driver ~~Bill~~ the order to pull off the road when we got to some cover. Then I ordered new sight heads to be put on and I made a foot reconnaissance then. Went to the top of the hill. Saw six German tigers and several other vehicles. Went down to my tank right away. Brought my tank into position. We got an ammunition truck right off the bat. We put three VIs out of action and a personnel carrier pulling a ^{gun} when my ~~gun~~ went out of action; a projectile had slipped out of a case from the heat of rapid fire (we fired 66 rounds). About this time I learned that four of the tanks following me had been knocked out. About 14 casualties, of them two dead. We backed off the hill about twenty yards and the crew tried to reduce the jam, even by using a sledge on the rammer staff, but couldn't make it. Previous to this we were firing AP on the tigers— no stopping them. We had moved from one position to another and ranges varied from 900 to 1800 yards. Stopped three of the six tigers with HE, the other three getting on thru my field of fire. I went on back and started looking for my battalion commander. Found him. We made a reconnaissance of the battlefield. Found the three tanks two days later. They were towed away by the Germans when our gun went out of action— right in plain view. I know we killed not less than ten Germans.

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Second Lieutenant Chas. W. Finlay, 67th Infantry.

(When the above named officer was asked what it was like to be in a knocked out tank, he gave the following story)

It was just east of Gala, on July 12, 1943. I was the tank commander. The top turret hatches were open. We were in fifth gear. When the shell hit the tank I was observing all around. It hit the left side of the turret, knocking out the periscopes of the driver and the assistant driver. The tank was lost from control; started going from one side to the other of the road; stopped in the left ditch. I bent down and asked whether we were on fire. When I asked the radio man said he saw no fire but that it was redhot inside. I told the driver to see whether the tank would move, to back up. He said he could not. I gave the command to abandon tank. I got out first and jumped out toward the road and squatted in the bar ditch. The front hatches opened and the assistant driver and the driver started out. My gunner got out with his tommygun. The radio man followed. When all were clear I motioned them to follow me. The driver and the radioman made a direct run in my direction. The gunner and the assistant driver went to my right fifteen yards. We jumped into good cover in a little ravine; stayed a very few minutes. Could see the tank that was behind me come up-- men were getting out. Because of the shelling we left, climbing a hill. A later shot penetrated my tank. The tank then burned. All hatches were open when the fire started.

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Staff Sergeant Wm. R. Wilson, commanding a platoon of the 67th AR,

EQUIPMENT:

I like the gasoline engine and we are doing alright with thes we have but I would prefer a diesel; more power.

We have a good gun.

We want some smoke, about ten out of a hundred. We use it for designation of targets, to excite the enemy, to lay screens. We should have about fifteen rounds of AP in the hundred; all the rest HE. We use AP only for tanks; HE on all kinds of targets; HE should be super charged.

I like the rubber track; no experience with steel. Steel tracks cut down speed. Speed has not been necessary in this campaign.

The coaxial machinegun should be a .50 cal..

The .50 Cal. AA's are keeping the planes up for us. When we pull an attack we pull the AAs inside, and remount them right after the attack.

We really need a better sight.

The 508 and the 523 radios go out in defilade; also we have some trouble with their fuses.

The belt holsters are OK; the shoulder holster is not necessary.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

(Sgt. Wilson was asked what he now knew that he did not know when he left the States; his reply is contained in the first paragraph below; the other statements were without any direction of the flow on my part)

In tank fighting take it slow. Do lots of observing. Fight a number of tanks together wather that one or two alone. Tank commanders must get out of their tanks and reconnoitre before committing them. Never expose the flank of the tank to the enemy; bigger target, thinner metal.

I was with the Rangers North of Gala; we were shooting at gun emplacements, etc.. We usually hit with the third shot. The range estimation

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Wilson, contd.

was good, I have seen ~~many~~ some better, and a lot worse. The tank commander would make the range estimations with his head out of the tank.

I always fight with my head out of my tank. I would only button up for time fire. I think one hatch should be open always. I am told that ^{if} percussion can kill ~~when~~ both are closed when there is a nearby bomb.

I liked fighting with the Rangers; we were in support and not over-used.

When the platoon commander gets the dope he must tell the tank commanders as much as possible— must say where he is going, what's going to happen.

I control my tanks by radio; hand signals not good; radio important. ^{actual}
Even in/combat the loader should have a rag, should wipe all ammunition, and after every five or six shots should wipe out the breach in about fifteen inches, and should wipe off the block.

Loader and assistant should know the stowage plan of the kinds of ammunition in the tank.

The Gunner should keep his gun bore-sighted at all times— never less than once a day.

The loader should know how to set fuses, super or del-y.

Everyman in the crew should know all the crew jobs.

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Staff Sergeant F.R. Shay, Platoon Sergeant 67th ~~Infantry~~ AR

EQUIPMENT:

I prefer the daisel; I have tried them; more power, more speed; mechanics can be trained to repair.

Our 75 is a good and sufficient weapon.

Our radios have worked well

The tank should be lower, it is altogether too high. I would do away with the space under the basket.

I would rather have a cal. .50 co-axial gun.

The AA .50 is OK on a road march, etc., but in combat it has to be removed.

The gun sight is the best we've got but I wouldn't turn down a better one. It is not as good as the German.

We are carrying no unnecessary equipment.

We like our ammunition in the proportion 45 super-HE, 36 AP, and ~~100~~ 9 AP.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE.

(Sgt. Shay was asked what he now knew that he did not know when he left the States; his reply is contained in the ~~first~~ paragraph below) ~~the~~
~~other statements are not to be taken as a basis for any conclusions.~~

To successfully attack there must be reconnaissance ahead and find out what they have. Plan to suit the findings. If necessary tank commanders should get out and go forward and really look. If there are AT guns the platoon should be brought into defilade; bring fire on the AT guns and send one or more tanks around and fire on the guns' flank. If Tanks are met (Mark VI's) the tanks should not fight tank to tank, but withdraw to defilade and bring fire from there. If the enemy tanks are Mark IV's fight them tank to tank (from defilade if possible). Mines ruin tracks and bend

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Shay, Contd:

bogies but make no holes in the floor. Approach probable areas of mines after engineers have checked the ground. It is likely that the easy route around the trap is mined. Try blowing out mines with a few ~~HE's~~ HE's. If I met a German infantry battalion with bazookas I would try to open all guns and use my Cal. .30's on the infantry. When stopped put out a march outpost even in momentary stops in the battle area.

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41

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(Note: Attempting to run down the cause of tank fires I asked the 3rd Battalion of the 67th Armored Regiment (perhaps the most heavily engaged battalion in the campaign) to let me interview all available occupants of tanks that had burned; most were not available due to their own burns; some were just out of camp; available were only four. The story of a fifth is included as a second-hand story. Each story picks up with the strike)

SERGEANT FRANCIS D'ANDRIA, 67TH ~~ARMORED~~ ARMORED REGIMENT.

FIRE:

There were three strikes on the forward part of the hull and one hit the right front final drive. When we climbed out of the escape hatch I noticed the front armor over the differential housing was red hot. Tank was set fire by tracers hitting us while gas was leaking out of the overturned tank.

SERGEANT VERNON IRWIN 67th ARMORED REGIMENT.

FIRE:

The first strike did not penetrate; hit the flange shield around the point where gun enters turret. The second strike did penetrate; went into the engine compartment and gas tank; did not enter fighting compartment. Gasoline caught fire. No body got burned; six aboard. While we were getting out, one man turned the fire extinguisher on ~~the~~ the seat of another mans trousers, which were afire, as he climbed out, and saved him. (The battalion executive heard this story and took additional names and data for the purpose of looking into an award to recognize the presence of mind of the soldier wielding the fire extinguisher).

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CORPORAL F.C.Brady, 67TH ARMORED REGIMENT.

FIRE:

The tank was first struck just behind turret on the right side of the tank; sheared off the hatch that covers the throw-out bearings; did not penetrate fighting compartment; ruined motor; some smoke but saw

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Brady, contd:

no fire. The second strike hit the hull at the motor compartment, hitting the right gasoline tanks. The tank burned. The gasoline was set on fire. PRIVATE M.E. LYNCH, 67TH ARMORED REGIMENT.

FIRE:

1st Tank.

The tank was hit by 88s several times. Backed off the road and turned over. It was very hot and smoking inside. We came out of the escape hatch. Another shot— fire started. No shots entered the fighting compartment.

2nd Tank.

After being hit several times by a German Mark VI tank about the turret and destroying our gun and gun shield, we were hit by an AT shell; it hit the engine compartment. Guess it exploded the gasoline. Flame came out thru the turret. No shells entered the fighting compartment. MAJOR C.B. BACHELDER, 67TH ARMORED REGIMENT.

1st Lieutenant J.L. White had his tank struck in the left side, just below the sponson, and just in rear of the sprocket. Marks show the projectile had come ~~from the left side of the tank~~ in on a line about normal to the left side of the tank, and was traveling downward. Shell did not penetrate. ^{force of the} explosion of the shell was upward; the floor of the sponson above the point of impact was blown upward and inward. The driver was killed instantly. White, who got out almost instantly had severe burns on the exposed parts of his hands and wrists. White calls it a "Flash Burn". All got out except the driver. All were burned. White is still under treatment.

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Our jobs are as important as the jobs of the majors. Our positions are just as important as theirs; just as complicated if not more so. ~~SECRET~~ should be majors also.

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Colonel Sidney Hinds, Commanding 41st Armored Infantry.

ORGANIZATION:

I would like the fourth battalion proposed by General Rose; the 2½ ton truck would be suitable for this battalion only.

Our Armored Infantry Regimental maintenance personnel should be increased. We have a maintenance platoon; we need a maintenance company comparable to that of the tank regiment. The regimental maintenance officer should be a captain.

~~We need a band in the regiment for morale and general utility.~~

EQUIPMENT:

I like the halftrack as is; I do not want the 2½ ton truck to replace my halftracks.

I want a jeep-mounted 81mm mortar. We have some we have made up. They fire from the vehicle. We have slits to receive the feet of the tripod; an armor plate baseplate welded between the frames. It has never hurt the vehicle. It is mounted to shoot to the front. The jeep carries only about fifteen rounds of ammunition for the mortar.

We have acquired an Italian 81mm mortar to pair with each of our 60mm mortars. This gives us a choice of weapon. We use our 60mm mortar sights on the Italian mortar; our regular range table applies.

We want a cal. .50 gun on each of our m-3 halftracks; drop the watercooled cal. .30.

We NEED the forty SCR 536 radios given us as a special issue. We are using them for many things. We would not like to loose them under any circumstances. I carry a pair in my jeep. I believe this special issue should become standard equipment.

The tables should provide for SCR 506s for the battalion and for the

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Hinds, Contd:

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regimental commander. We have them now as non-standard equipment. Should be made standard. They are easily mounted in the jeep.

Because of enemy fire, and not because of difference in mobility, the jeep can go places where the halftrack cannot go.

Our maintenance is short on personnel and equipment. We need three wreckers (ten-ton); one power plant 2000 watt to run power tools; a thirty ton jack for straightening frames; ~~one power plant 2000 watt to run power tools; a thirty ton jack for straightening frames; one power plant 2000 watt to run power tools; a thirty ton jack for straightening frames;~~ our electric welder is in almost constant use.

We need three three-quarter ton trucks; two for the chaplains and one for the special service officer.

I have no experience that proves the 37mm unsatisfactory but I do go along with those that would substitute the 57mm for it.

We can drop a lot of individual equipment. Drop the A & B barrack bags; the man to carry only what he can carry in a halftrack seat cover. Such a cover will carry a shirt, one trousers, one combat jacket and one blanket.

Recent issues of halftrack tracks are good for no more than six hundred miles of the Sicilian type road, this as opposed to about 2000-2500 miles in Louisiana or Carolina.

We are working on a pair of wheels that can be used to replace the ~~half~~ tracks on the halftrack; an axle is placed between the track and the transition block; The wheel fits on the axle outside the tracks; the wheel extends some eight inches below the track; disconnect the driveshaft and drive from the front.

LESSONS DOCTRINE TRAINING EXPERIENCE

Armored doctrine is generally sound.

As a matter of general practice we use the battalion or regimental

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Hinda, Contd.

reconnaissance to keep contact with the combat command or the division reconnaissance; sometimes use the regimental reconnaissance on the flank when the divisional or combat command reconnaissance is in front.

In the movements on Palermo, Muro, and Canacatti, the advance elements were much the same and all followed the following pattern:

Reconnaissance
followed by a point or advance party, thus:
Platoon of medium tanks
Platoon of Inf in halftracks } All under 1 officer.
81mm Mortar platoon
followed by another similar team, thus:
Platoon of Infantry in Halftracks
Assault gun platoon
Medium tank platoon
followed by still another, thus:
Assault Co. less above two plats.
Tank Co. less above two plats.
Infantry Co less above two plats.
Heavy MG Platoon.

Variations of the above, which has worked well for us, are with the Infantry riding on the decks of tanks; substituting mortars for the heavy machine guns, etc., etc..

If an antitank position is encountered the tanks take a hull-down position as a base of fire and all else maneuvers for the strike to take the position out.

In the pass north of Guiseppe only one infantry platoon was required to take out an SS. They dismounted under cover, worked to a flank over a high hill, and got rid of it in fortyfive minutes. The Infantry was covered by a base of fire from one assault gun, one 60mm mortar, and one light machinegun squad. Had the SS out before the 81mm could come up.

In the fight for Canacatti, one battalion of infantry dismounted too soon; they were getting some light artillery fire, but not enough to force a dismount. They had to move one and a half miles on

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Hinds, Contd:

foot which cost them about one hour.

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We have never a halftrack by bringing it too far forward. We have on occasion brought infantry up in halftracks to within six hundred yards of the front line.

In bringing up troops in halftracks the crucial factor is finding a proper, fast, loop, turnaround. This needs careful reconnaissance and placement of guides. Special weapons vehicles have to be cut out of the column. Previously instructed officers and/or guides do this; they must guard especially against wrong vehicles following the cut-out vehicles out of the column.

We take the 37mm out of ~~the~~ its regular three quarter ton mount, and mount it in the platoon leader's halftrack. This gives us extra trucks for general use. The company also has three towed thirty sevens.

41
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Lieutenant Colonel M.J.Moran, Cmdg 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry.

ORGANIZATION:

The table of organization should provide the armored infantry battalion with an S-4 and an S-2-3. At present the Battalion executive is also the S-2-3, which makes him useless in one capacity or the other.

In the old T/O machine gunners and certain mortar people were supposed to carry the pistol; tommyguns and rifles were substituted; this overburdens the men.

A corporal should be authorized as second in command of mortar squads.

EQUIPMENT:

There is a crying need for a better AA mount for the .50 cal..

The Battalion I&R platoon should have an SCR 528; it gets out of range very quickly with the present SCR 510.

A small generator should be provided to power the SCR 193. A conservative estimate: My battalion radio operated 1150 hours of the first 1200 hours of the campaign.

Neither scout section of the battalion I&R platoon has a radio. Both should have the SCR 510; would increase efficiency immensely.

There should be three telescopic sights per platoon of armored infantry.

The Battalion medical detachment should have an SCR 510.

The battalion surgeon requires a blackout tent for operations at night or in winter; uses small wall fly at other times.

Eliminate #1 and #2 chests, medical; also eliminate from the medical property 1 lantern, one lantern case, and one splint set.

Halftracks, not trucks, are the thing for armored infantry; when hit the casualties are very low.

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Lieut. Col. H.J. Moran, Commanding 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry (A)

EQUIPMENT:

There is a crying need for better AA mount for the .50 cal. platoon

The Battalion I & R ~~platoon~~ should have an SCR 528; it gets out of range very quickly with the present SCR 510.

A small generator should be provided to power the 193 radio.
CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATE: My battalion radio operated 1150 hours out of the first 1200 hours of the campaign.

Neither scout section of the battalion I & R platoon has a radio. Both should have the SCR 510; would increase efficiency immensely.
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ORGANIZATION:

The Table of Organization should provide a Bn S-4 and a BN S-2-3
At present the battalion executive is also S-2-3, which makes him useless in one capacity or the other.

In the old T/O machine gunners and certain mortar people were supposed to carry the pistol; tommyguns and rifles were substituted; this overburdens the men.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

Armored Infantry back home must not expect to be always mounted, especially in amphibious operations. On this operation one of my companies was completely dismounted, two had only ten peeps and one threequarter ton truck. We must be prepared at all times to be good FOOT infantry.

The importance of digging in should be stressed in all training. It saved us twice. First: As army reserve we were nevertheless ashore at 1830 on D day. We might as army reserve have expected to be reasonably safe. Anyway, in a restricted area assigned us, we spread out as much as possible and dug in. A little later, with heavy bombing and strafing, we had negligible casualties. Second: Working with the Rangers, four miles

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Moran, contd.

north of GELA we launched a night attack; it was a step by step attack, and due to resistance to certain of those steps, daylight caught ~~us~~ ~~us before my particular outfit could attack,~~ caught us on a plain before the enemy position. We dug in; from 0530 to 1300 we were under constant fire of artillery and mortars; casualties negligible.

It is necessary to impress on infantry the necessity for a careful mop-up. This was overlooked in one case in my battalion and nearly cost us dearly. The leading company had been sent forward to attack and occupy a definite sector. The company advanced, reached the objective, and concerned itself primarily with digging in. An hour later, when the heavy weapons company was advancing, machine guns opened up on it from a pill box right in the leading company's sector. Too much had been taken for granted.

There is the greatest necessity to develop a day and a night battle ~~fight~~ mentality. Except for decreasing distances on maneuvers, it was common practice to adopt essentially the same formation for a day or for a night march. I found when the combat command was moving north on Palermo this was a false concept. As the column advanced at about 0300 it suddenly came under artillery fire from fixed positions at about 1000 yards. I was commanding the advance guard at the time, and we had both light and medium tanks in it. We found that the only force that could cope with the situation was foot infantry, this due to practically zero visibility. I found the road in the area cluttered with heavy stuff— invaluable in daytime but useless in the night. So many of our operations carry over from the day into the night and the night into the day that we must make generous allowances for modifying our

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Moran, contd:

formations accordingly. In this particular case I took out a battery of 100mm artillery, one mortar and two machine guns with infantry alone.

When the country is known to be free of mines there is no question that tanks should leave the road freely. But when the area is known to be mined it becomes a debateable point. We had been told, from experience in Tunis, that the road shoulders are almost invariably mined. When we have air superiority I see no advantage whatever in running the risk of encountering mines by leaving the roads.

The matter of burial of the enemy dead was handled by having the mess personnel, left far behind, ~~MM~~ aid the chaplains.

The remarkable effect and the ease of control of naval fire surprised me. The cruiser Savannah supported us from Gela to Butera. Technique was ~~the~~ identical with the forward observer system.

Stress the necessity to start building NCOs by giving them added responsibility. Here extremely important missions are given NCOs as a matter of routine— matters that involve life and death. Give them more specific responsibilities during the training periods. Take some of the more menial responsibilities and give them to the noncoms as training.

Halftracks had a tremendous morale effect on the Italians. I saw two halftracks go out, withstand rifle and machinegun fire, and bring in 400-500 Italians. I also saw two tanks and two halftracks work together to do the same trick.

The naval coxswains were awful; we were beached over a spread of twelve miles. The officer of the deck was supposed to give them a bearing; some did, some did not.

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CAPTAIN H.A. CARRELL, COMMANDING "G" COMPANY 41ST ARMORED INFANTRY
EQUIPMENT:

There should be ropes, handles, or other provisions on the decks of tanks for the riding infantry to hold to.

I have no use for a towed AT gun; the 37mm on a halftrack is practical.

We have trouble with the rocket gun denting easily.

I believe the AT rifle grenade is as good as the bazooka. My men do not like or trust the bazooka. The fins on the rocket fall off prematurely, one or two of these guns in the division have exploded.

My men originally liked the tommygun; now they wont carry it if they can get anything else; it is too short ranged.

Mortar men, machine gunners, and bazooka men should be armed with the pistol.

The halftrack turns cal. .30 armor piercing ammunition at 300-400 yds.

Our Halftrack bodies are so shallow some of the personnel has difficulty getting down low enough to be protected.

I would like to see two to four SF Cal. .50, pompon type AA guns in each infantry company.

Our company truck transportation is inadequate; we need one additional $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck; we could do away with the threequarter ton truck from which the AT gun has been removed (and placed in halftrack).

We need one or two twelve-eighteen powered binoculars in each company.

The German and Italian steel handled entrenching type pick ax is better than ours; shorter handle; heavier.

Water proof barrack bags are needed. (Col Hinds, who was present, seconded this motion).

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LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

I think the old concept of five yards between skirmishers is entirely inadequate. At Canacatti we had to advance three quarters of a mile over an open plain; we were getting 50mm mortar fire, a little machine gun fire, and also the shorts from anti tank guns (88s or 90s). At the start I ordered 20-25 yards between skirmishers. We had only three slight casualties. I feel certain, had we been closer, we would have undoubtedly had more casualties. In a similar formation we withstood strafing by p-38s without casualty.

I do not believe in the 120 yard interval between vehicles; 250-300 yards would be better, if road space permits. An air attack passed up my vehicles which had these increased distances and went on to attack some other vehicles at 75 yard distances. (General Rose, ~~disagree with~~ who was present, disagrees with any distance greater than one hundred twenty yards; considerations of road space, of time, and of control.)

The present basic load for our 37s is 20% HE, 80% AP.. We should carry a minimum of 50% HE..

All soldiers should be taught to swim.

I suggest the feasibility of making river crossings in campaign in kapok life jackets.

A Tank carries seven infantrymen on its deck nicely; a tank company carries an infantry company nicely.

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COLONEL STOVALL'S INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL NORTON W. JONES, CMDG THE FIFTH ARMORED ARTILLERY GROUP.

(COLONEL JONES has had as long service with SP artillery as any other artillerymen; he is the only artilleryman other than Brig Gen Robert Harriet who has fought SP in quantity; Brig. Gen. Maurice Rose says of Colonel Rose that he is the best and most experienced artilleryman in Armor.)

Equipment:

The need for longer ranged, ~~light~~ heavier guns in this group, which in effect is Corp Artillery supporting an armored division, has been conclusively shown in the Sicilian Campaign. My letter in this regard, similar to one written after the Tunisian Campaign is herewith (follows Colonel Jones' verbal statements.

I am not sold on the SP. It is uneconomical. Under a camouflage net there is always a question as to whether an SP can be saved from burning after a single hit. German tide fire has burned four of my SP's. The need for SP's in supporting roles (not organic) remains to be proven. I personally have arrived at the definite conviction that the need is disproven, and that Towed artillery is the answer in supporting roles.

The battalion combat trains should drop their halftracks and trailers and get regular 2 1/2 ton trucks for hauling ammunition; the trucks should have cargo trailers.

As to reliability I rate the following vehicles in the order: 1st, 2 1/2 T truck; 2nd the poep, next the half track, next the ~~W~~ M/7, ^{SP} and last the M/5 light tank.

Our .50 cal. AA's around gun positions were a godsend. The AA mount on the halftrack is better than that on the 2 1/2 ton truck.

ADMINISTRATION:

The requirements for DSC's, Legion of Merits, etc., must be clarified. Now, in cases of identical effort, a decoration is awarded one individual, denied to another.

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NY Jones, Contd:

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

Nothing not learned in the Tunisian Campaign has been learned in the Sicilian Campaign. The lessons of Tunisia, already reported, have been verified in Sicily.

We have learned to work to get road time allotted to us rather than attempting to conduct a schedule march.

Our observers are some ten times as effective as most; we have professional observers (3). I believe we should have either six or nine in order to keep up continuous service. About thirty percent of the observers are ineffective at any one moment changing stations, etc.,

The Field Artillery School doctrine and service artillery publications are OK except the idea that the survey can extend into the target area is ridiculous.

Battalion missions are rare with an organization of the type of mine; ours are generally battery missions.

Ricochet fire can only be effectively employed in a very, very few situations. The ricochet requires an angle of ϕ impact generally unobtainable. Heine's wont stay on flat ground, will stay on slopes of hills, fore or aft. There is no assurance there was any ricochet effect in the whole Sicilian campaign (This statement was made in the presence of his three battalion commanders and with their full agreement).

Summary

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HEADQUARTERS
5TH FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP
ABO #758

In the Field
18 August 1943

SUBJECT: Re-armament of the 5th Field Artillery Group.

TO : Commanding General, NATOUSA

1. It is urgently requested that the armament of the three battalions of this Group, the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the 62nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and the 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, be changed from the 105mm Howitzer, Motor Carriage, M-7, to the 4.5" Gun, towed by either a Half-track, M-3, or by a wheeled prime mover.

2. This request is based on the conclusion that long range guns for the reinforcing artillery are essential for successful counter-battery against German divisional artillery and heavy weapons, and for rapid shifting of supporting fires from one sector to another. The above conclusion is based on the following considerations:

a. Our role will be an offensive one. The enemy, forced to resort to defensive warfare, will place his divisional artillery in such depth that the bulk of light artillery will provide a two or three thousand yard coverage in front of his own front lines. His 105mm gun-howitzer firing with super charge may be placed 10,000 yards behind his own front lines and accomplish such a mission. If we allow two thousand yards from the enemy to our own front lines, and a further five thousand yards for positions for our divisional artillery, it is evident that reinforcing artillery must occupy positions that require a range of at least 17,000 yards to reach the enemy light artillery. To effectively counter-battery the enemy medium and heavy artillery requires an even greater range.

b. Both the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns have proved that German light and medium artillery outranges both our divisional light artillery and the reinforcing artillery of this Group. The Germans can and have used counter-battery against us without our being able to retaliate. Had this Group been equipped with the 4.5 gun the above conditions could never have existed.

c. Since the range of the present armament of this Group is the same as that of the organic light artillery of a division, it has often resulted in a serious overcrowding of the available artillery positions and a jamming of the road nets leading into them.

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Ltr, Hq 5th FA Gp, "Re-armament of the 5th FA Gp" (Cont'd)

This condition has resulted in the assigning of position areas for the reinforcing artillery in rear of those of the organic artillery. In some instances these areas were necessarily so far back that they could not be fired from, and, as a result, the battalions of this Group were forced on occasions to actually occupy positions in front of the friendly infantry. This is a most dangerous procedure, and one that could not be considered in the face of strong opposition.

d. The Germans have proved themselves skillful in the delaying action and swift withdrawal. Their use of mines, road blocks, and long range interdiction fires have repeatedly left effective pursuit to the dive bombers and long range artillery. Many profitable targets under observation of our forward observers have escaped because of the short range of our reinforcing weapons.

e. Reinforcing artillery may frequently be assigned missions in adjoining sectors over the Corps Artillery Officer's radio net. With this lateral displacement of targets an increase of at least 3000 yards in range is essential. The range of the 4.5 gun makes possible this shifting of fires without a displacement in most cases.

3. The following facts, proved on the battlefield, are also presented for consideration:

a. The Motor Carriages, M-7, with which the Group is now equipped are requiring so much maintenance at the present time that it will be necessary for a 100% replacement in the near future. It is estimated that a Motor Carriage, M-7, requires four times as much labor maintenance, and ten times the maintenance cost of a half-track or wheeled prime mover.

b. The normal consumption of gasoline has been found to be about one gallon per mile for a Motor Carriage, M-7, against about one gallon per four miles for a half-track or wheeled prime mover.

c. While it has been proved that the Motor Carriage, M-7, possesses truly remarkable ability to negotiate rough terrain, it has been found that truck drawn artillery has been able to negotiate any terrain, the Motor Carriage, M-7, has traversed to date. The increased speed of towed artillery would result in a great saving of road space and time, as the steel tracks have reduced the speed of the motor carriage, M-7, to approximately ten miles per hour.

d. The existing communication facilities of the battalions of this Group is superior to that of a regularly organized battalion of field artillery, making it possible to utilize the increased range of the 4.5 gun to the fullest extent.

4. In view of the above enumerated reasons, and many others not mentioned, it is again requested that the battalions of the Group be equipped with 4.5 guns at the earliest possible date.

NEWTON W. JONES,
Colonel, Field Artillery
Commanding.

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LT COL E A BAILEY COMDG X 65TH FA BN (ARMED) (5th Armd Art Gp)

~~REMARKS~~
EQUIPMENT:

We want a gun that will outrange division organic artillery. I would like the 4.5 towed (prefer to M-12). An SP gun is not needed so far back as we find ourselves. Towed gun saves maintainance. Prefer a truck as the primemover (Diamond T, maybe), a 7ton job.

The forward observer's radio SCR 510 should have half its present weight and twice its range.

If the M-7 must be kept, should be modified to permit high angle fire (above 1171 mls).

The 6X6 can go thru broken country better than SPs.

SUPPLY:

There was no parts support in Sicily. My battalion has had four guns out at once for lack of parts. Parts flow must be stepped up. We have had no regular parts supply since those we brought from Casa Blanca gave out..

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

Everybody needs more map reading.

The FAOCS training is OK, I'm satisfied.

The FAS should teach that artillery is usually 4000-5000 yards behind the lines— not as close as with the 75mm in World War I.

QUESTION: Is there any good military reason why the air corps should not take a couple of looks at our M-7; it looks like nothing else on earth, yet they bomb and straff it.

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Lt Col R C Conder Comdg 62nd FA Bn (Armd)

(5th Armd Art Gp)

EQUIPMENT:

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I would like the 4.5 for use in this group and in my battalion on a basis of having a greater choice of position. We need a gun that will shoot as far as the observer can see. A longer ranged gun would have been fine a Bizerte. I am not certain of the tow.

With the extra communications facilities allowed us for this campaign, communications were satisfactory. The extras must not ~~be~~ be taken away.

ORGANIZATION:

The Group should have a maintenance platoon of its own. As these groups change now, new ordnance outfits come in and wont believe us (We say we need and want 10 tracks, and they come down and check) These Ordnance outfits move off without notice. (Col H.W.Jones and Lt Col B. McQuade agree)

I believe there should be a battery of AA attached to each battalion, non-organic)

EXPERIENCE:

I find that when I ~~RE~~join a unit they make better use of my observers than they do the first time.

The FA OCS product shows some results of the method of selection prior to entry into OCS.

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41

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LT COL L C FRIEDERSDORFF Commanding 14th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored)
(In this interview Colonel Friedersdorff was assisted by several of his staff)

ORGANIZATION:

Our battalion sub planes were difficult to impossible to take care of on our fast maneuvers in Western Sicily. They had to fend for themselves; pick own fields; supply selves; etc.. This would again be true in a similar situation. I recommend they become divisional planes, to come to us on call. The Division can handle them all better in the average situation.

In the case our T/4 worked out satisfactorily.

1st Sgt. should not be set up to man an AA gun.

EQUIPMENT:

We have found our armored trailer very unwieldy to handle behind a tracked vehicle; sharp turns are made difficult, they pull the prime-mover about; they are difficult to load in LST; it has no springs; busts up ammunition. We have wooden racks on our M-7s enabling an ammunition load of 190 rounds. This is a little too much. Recommend ordnance supply a rack for the M-7 enabling a total load of 160 rounds on the vehicle and that the troublesome trailer be dropped.

The halftrack gives an unjustified sense of security to the man. I don't believe the armor is worth a damn. I recommend that twenty two and one half tone trucks be issued to replace our thirty M-3 halftracks which are used for hauling ammunition.

We have been working on reductions; we have too much stuff; we suggest there be dropped:

Cable assembly CC345 and stubs CC344.

All reels DR4 and DR5 above those needed to carry TBA wire.

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Friedersdorff, contd:

All tank grousers; if tracks wont pull you out grousers wont. They tear off.

Ten of the present twenty grousers on each halftrack.

All tire chains except those on 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks and wreckers.

All non-1st-echelon tools now on the halftrack.

All cal..30 AA guns on halftracks.

All except two bolt filling machines per battery.

All except two linkloaders (for .50) per battery.

All ammunition boxes ~~MISSING~~ for Cal .50s except two per gun (now have nine)

One twenty-four gallon GI can from each battery.

One thirty two gallon GI can from headquarters battery.

All tommygun clips beyond six per gun.

All but ten of the present twentytwo fireextinguishers (1-gallon type) from Service ~~company~~ battery.

All but twelve of thirtysix electric lamps from Serv Battery.

The Fife and Drum set.

The 80% platform scales from Serv Battery— They have steelyard.

Chest cleaning for small stores.

Half of present Camouflage Set A.

Radiator flush gun from Serv Battery

Two air operated grease guns from Service Battery BUT REPLACE WITH SERVICEABLE HAND GUNS THAT WORK.

All safety screw hexagonal wrenches from Service Company.

~~But~~ One tool box mechanics w/o tools from Service Battery.

We recommend the replacement of all M-2 halftracks with M-3s w/winch.

We recommend all amphibious ~~itons~~ be replaced by ordinary ~~itons~~.

We recommend that all SP 37 AT guns be replaced with 57 mm towed gun.

We recommend all trucks have the m-3T AA mount.

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Friedersdorff, contd.

Headquarters Battery has thirty nine vehicles and eight motorcycles. It has only a half track for its maintenance section; this section should have an added 2 1/2 ton truck. The half track could then double as a recovery vehicle.

We recommend the issue of an officers mess set to the service and the firing batteries.

We need thirteen instead of ten mine detectors in the battalion; the three extras requested are: one for Service Battery; one for the ammunition train; and one for Headquarters Battery for battery as distinguished from battalion use.

The Battalion Executive Officer should have a 1/2 ton for his own use; we have had to divert one to him.

We feel it would be better to have SCR508s with two receivers, rather than SCR520s with one receiver; this would permit the cooling and resting of one receiver at all times.

All officers and noncommissioned officers should have a pistol or revolver instead of the prescribed carbine; actually we are getting not the carbine but the .03 rifle.

Each vehicle should have TWO pioneer sets; with one set we cannot dig in rapidly enough; we have supplied the second set by rustling.

The mail and personnel sections have no light transportation; they badly need a 1/2 ton.

Watches should be issued "per radio" rather than "per radio operator"; this would take care of the radio tenders.

atches must be issued to officers and the ordnance must have on hand jewels, tools, parts, etc., for the repair of any and all officers' watches in the field.

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Friedersdorff, contd.

We recommend the authorization of a portable sewing machine for the Service Battery. Would effect a considerable savings of clothing.

The Fire Direction Set-up is large and there is insufficient transportation. We need cargo trailers for four of our headquarters battery halftracks: one for the battalion S-3; One for the wire section; one for the machine gun section; one for the radio maintenance section.

We use telephones to control firing batteries; we would like to have SCR 536 radios to replace them; they should be allowed at the rate of eleven per firing battery as follows: One per gun; one for the battery executive; two for the battery commander; two for the RCN officer.

They should be so netted. Eight more are needed in the battalion headquarters, thus: Two for each of three forward observers, and two for the battalion RCN officer.

We need a portable, metal, flyproof, easily sanitized latrine seat.

I like the 105; it is heavy enough, we can carry sufficient ammunition for it; BUT we are outranged by the 88s and the 90s. I feel there is an URGENT necessity for an alteration of the gun and/or ammunition that will give us a 20,000 yard range. Not infrequently our opening ranges from points behind our own leading troops; are/seven thousand yards or more/ even tho we are at the head of the main body, an advance guard consisting of a battalion of infantry, some tanks, some Engineers, etc., we find ourselves pretty well back when the first shot is fired.

The personnel section should have a pyramidal tent in addition to its present blackout tent.

The direct fire sight should be graduated to correspond with the AT Ammunition.

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Friedlander, contd.

SECRET

We need a fuse setter.

We need fuses to fifty seconds.

We need four one-hundred-fifty foot extensions with remote control to operate frequency modulated 508s in the fire direction center.

We have developed a gadget of which we are proud. It is a ~~water~~ fire unit for heating three GI cans of ~~water~~ mess kit water at a time. It is made by altering the standard range fire unit to by-pass the regular burner and lead the gasoline thru a slender copper tube to a U-shaped pipe, the U being some six feet deep and some six inches across. The far end of the U shaped ~~the~~ pipe is stopped. The U-pipe is set up so ~~the~~ one branch is directly above the other. The gasoline enters the upper branch, passes into the lower branch, and exits thru three small groups of sixteenth inch holes. These sets of holes are about two feet apart. As the raw gasoline comes out it is ignited. The heat from the lower branch flame soon heats the gasoline in the upper branch to the vaporization point and thereafter the flame from the lower branch takes on the blow-torch type burning. This outfit is used either in a metal frame made for the purpose, or in a slit trench. Cost: negligible.

LESSONS DOCTRINE TRAINING EXPERIENCE

The best way to load armored trailers ^{on LSTs} is to use a peep as primemover assisted by about ten men; this also holds for any other type trailer.

Camouflage nets must be fireproofed; we have had two fires from them.

Ricochet fire is very effective but time fire is better. We fired three thousand two hundred rounds of ammunition in this campaign. Of these I doubt whether there was a single ricochet. Frankly, with the

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Friedersdorff, contd:

present artillery set up, our own and that of the enemy, it is highly problematical that ricochet fire will ever be used by us.

In firing concentrations a proportion of one round of white phosphorous to each five rounds of high explosive was an excellent general rule. It is an excellent casualty agent; an excellent incendiary agent; an excellent anti-morale agent; it is greatly feared by tankers; it is excellent to burn out gun positions in a dry climate.

In this ~~case~~ Division the artillery battalion commander generally personally accompanies the combat command commander, and is his own liason agent. The battalion is actually conducted by the battalion executive. It is the most effective known method in armored work when the combat command commander has the habit of working well forward.

Field artillery doctrine, as now constituted, is sound.

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL H.M. EYTON, CMC 78TH P.A. ARMORED, 2ND ARMORED DIVISION.

ORGANIZATION:

I like the present six-gun battery especially well. I would, based on this experience, recommend six gun batteries for infantry divisions.

I personally believe the Armored Division is too big as now constituted. I believe in four separate ^{tank} battalions in a division; two artillery battalions each having two 105mm batteries and one 155mm howitzer battery; plus the usual infantry and service elements.

Our wire personnel is much too small. Radio is not used all the time.

~~XXXXXX~~
EQUIPMENT:

Our wire equipment is much too small; radio is not used all the time. We do not have sufficient wire to get a complete wire set up.

Radio has mechanical and declassification difficulties.

We have a great need for SCR 536s; four in a ^{gun} battery. The RCN officers go out in a halftrack, need the 536s to enable leaving the halftracks and going farther forward on foot. The other two in the gun battery are for the battery commander for the same purpose. For Headquarters Battery, I recommend fourteen 536s; two for each of two liaison officers; two for the battalion commander; two for each of three forward observers; and two for the battalion survey officer.

We should have one SCR 193 in each of the liaison vehicles; at the present time we have SCR 528s.

Our present TMA gives us one SCR 193 in the Service Battery; I recommend two additional be allowed for them as the Service Battery should be in the Division Trains net and the Division Administrative net.

I also recommend three light tanks for Headquarters battery; one for the battalion commander; one for the RCN officer; one for a forward observer. Those two mediums and one light in the regiment do not suffice; must have these recommended tanks as organic tanks.

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Exton, contd.

I would recommend a gasoline tanker with each artillery battalion. The armored battalions have them. We have to get all our gasoline by cans.

It would be helpful if we could have some ~~telescopes~~ twenty power telescopes of the infantry type. Some artillery in Tunisia used them and they were a great help. They should be substantially mounted along BCSCOPE lines.

I would recommend all M-2 halftracks be replaced by M-3s with winch.

These SP 37 AT's are no good; I want the towed 57mm AT gun. Neither the present gun nor vehicle satisfactory. The 37SP is the first vehicle to get stuck in bad going. It is so high it takes too long to dig in.

The bazooka is still on trial in my outfit. The percentage of hits in practice was low; the effect negligible.

The AT rifle grenade seems to be pretty good.

I believe that the supporting artillery groups should, generally armed with speaking, be/larger calibred and longer ranged weapons than those of organic ~~division~~ armored division artillery.

We want at least 50second fuses for 105mm's.

TRAINING DOCTRINE LESSONS EXPERIENCE.

The Field Artillery ~~doctrine~~ doctrine is sound.

The Armored Force Gunnery is sound.

My Field Artillery OCS graduates have been excellent, but I do not yet know the last six who joined just as we left Africa.

Ricochet fire has definite possibilities but time fire greatly over-shadows in all respects. We have tried ricochet in battle but were unable to observe effects. Practically all was fired with delayed fuse but observed no actual ricochets. I doubt if there were any because of the long range.

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*Exton's statement re .50
Cal M B A A mount
omitted here - included
elsewhere*

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Extonty Contd.

I recommend as the normal load 50% HE w/fuse M54

20% WP

15% HE w/fuse M48

15% HE w/fuse M67— (HE/AT)

Our experience with white phosphorous is that in addition to other virtues it is an excellent casualty agent and tank burner. I have also heard this from the C.O. of the 14th F.A. and from other artillery officers of the same organization. I saw white phosphorous used by our 75mm assault guns (T-30) against eighty eight very successfully.

In armored artillery my guns are disposed in depth within batteries; hence when we go into fire for effect the range remains stationary, which greatly increases the rate of fire. For the same reason we do not concern ourselves with the width of sheaf (Exception: Point target).

Our guns are usually 50-75 yards apart. Fire control is by voice radio. Telephone would be more sure.

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MAJOR E.F. HAUKENBERRY, SURGEON 41ST ARMORED INFANTRY, AND CCB 2ND A.D.,
ORGANIZATION:

The present Tables of organization; I give you a copy of a letter I have written on the subject. (Copied into the record, immediately following ~~this~~ this report of interview; Major Haukenberry's own pencil changes have been copied directly into the letter.)

We need two dentists in each regiment. This is not just a thought, it is experience.

SUPPLY:

The C and K rations were deficient in vitamin content. I propose fortification with vitamin concentrates.

After discussion with the division surgeon I conclude we need more wire ladder type splints and more bass wood splints and less Thomas arm splints.

EXPERIENCE

Our war neurosis cases were few. I do not believe we can rehabilitate these cases in the forward areas to go back into combat.

The tank fire hazard has not affected the men perceptibly.

Here copy the attached letter calling on Col Stovall to explain any questionable matter.

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CAPTAIN JOHN ERMES, M.C., SURGEON 3RD BATTALION, 67TH ARMORED REGIMENT.
(Immediately following this transcript of interview, there is copied into the record a copy of a letter written by the above named officer.)

E EQUIPMENT:

We have #1 and #2 medical chests, two of each. One of each would be sufficient. Still better, we take the contents out of one set of chests and put them in specially designed chests. These special chests ride on the vehicle easily and we work directly out of our vehicles. ^{The first ~~one~~ of my} ~~my~~ chests is ^a made from/officers mess outfit chest~~s~~. First chest: Lid has built in compartments for small vials, suture kits, etc.. Two trays, six inches deep, hold cotton, solutions, ointments, adhesives, etc.. Under the trays are towels, bandages, etc.. 2nd Chest: (Accident) wooden; Interior ^{scissors} dimensions, eight by eight by twenty, all in inches; carries ~~the~~ 1st aid kit, Sulpha drugs, narcotics, and the like; is compartmented to fit content.

350.09

My jeep is radio equipped with SCR 510; not authorize. but very necessary and very effective.

There should be an SCR 510 or 528 in the ambulance.

A blackout command post tent is used as an aid station when we have a ground set up.

We use an unauthorized trailer to carry some medical equipment.

The medico needs field glasses; should be so equipped.

S SUPPLY:

My personal opinion is that the U ration is the answer to the ration question in semistable situations and should replace the C and the K rations in such cases. I think both the C and K must be recognized as fit only for emergency use and limited to that use.

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Erbes, Contd:

TRAINING LESSONS DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

It is a waste of time for medical personnel to train on tank evacuation. Medical personnel do not perform this function. The medical officers DO instruct the tankers in the matter. It is easily overdone.

The Thomas splint is used in about fifty percent of the lower limb fractures. The arm traction splint ~~is~~ was never used and I do not see that it is practicable for us. On arms we use mostly wire basket splints and bass wood splints— they serve as well.

We have had few neuro-psychopathic cases. In one fight we had five or six tanks knocked out; in another six or seven. One man was in both groups. Neither case produced any psychoses. We have had about four cases to be evacuated due to fear, but not fear peculiar to tankers. There have been no out and out cases of claustrophobia, tho I have noticed when tanks are knocked out they always expect that the tank will ~~be~~ burned~~d~~ and they will be burned within. Of three deaths in the campaign two were from burns.

Here copy attached letter.....

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MEDICAL DETACHMENT
3rd Battalion
67th Armored Regiment

A.P.O. #252,
August 11, 1943.

SUBJECT: SICILIAN CAMPAIGN REPORT.

TO : The Division Surgeon, 2nd Armored Division, A.P.O. #252.

1. Casualties:

a. Three men were killed in action.

- (1) Two were burned to death when their tanks were struck by enemy shells and set afire.
- (2) One died as the result of a head injury caused by enemy shell fire.

b. Sixteen men from this battalion and three men from the attached 540th Engineer Regiment were wounded in action.

- (1) Six men sustained enemy artillery shell fragment wounds; of these, five were of extremities, slight, one was a chest wound, serious.
- (2) Five men were wounded by Allied naval anti-aircraft fire. All were multiple wounds of chest wall, abdominal wall, and extremities, slight. Three of these men were from the 540th Engineer Regiment.
- (3) Four men received second degree burns of extremities when their respective tanks were struck by enemy artillery and set afire. In all cases, ten to twenty per cent of body area was burned.
- (4) Two men received both second and third degree burns of extremities, face, and chest, and shell fragment wounds of extremities as the result of enemy artillery striking their tanks and setting them afire and then enemy high explosive shell fire striking them after they abandoned the burning tanks.
- (5) One man sustained ruptured ear drums as the result of enemy shell fire.
- (6) One man was wounded by small arms fire resulting in a compound fracture of the humerus.

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c. There was no loss of medical equipment due to enemy action. One of the half-track ambulances was struck by an enemy shell fragment. A three-inch hole was blown in the armor of the engine hood, but the use of the vehicle was not impaired.

2. Reports and Recommendations on:

a. Table of Organization - An additional medical officer was attached to the Medical Detachment staff for this campaign. This worked out very satisfactorily, as it did in the previous landing in French Morocco.

It has been noted during this campaign that there have been many routine and emergency dental cases. Those cases required transporting to the Medical Battalion for dental care. This might be remedied by adding a second dental officer to the regimental medical staff so that one could circulate among the battalion aid stations spending a day or two with each battalion each week.

Due to the fact that the tank battalion invariably operates in combat as a separate unit, throwing the added burden of administration, supply, and individual assignment of enlisted personnel upon the detachment, there should be the same ratings available for enlisted personnel as there are now in other separate battalions of the division. I suggest that, in addition to the ratings of one staff sergeant, one corporal, and four technicians fifth grade, there be added the ratings of sergeant to be used for Supply and Pharmacy, Technician fourth grade as a surgical technician, and another technician fifth grade to be used as a medical technician. Even with these additional ratings the tank battalion would have less ratings than the average separate battalion of the division.

b. Table of Basic Allowances -- equipment -- In some instances we experienced difficulty in speedily evacuating casualties with the relatively slow and difficult maneuvered half-track ambulances where good roads were available. In such cases cross-country box type ambulances might have been more desirable; and, in view of the fact that a great percentage of the time, even in combat, is spent in bivouac where this type of ambulance is most practical, I suggest that one of the three half-track ambulances be replaced with a cross-country box type ambulance.

At present, the Table of Basic Allowances permits of two Number 1 and two Number 2 Medical Chests per battalion. This is unnecessary and only adds to transportation problems. I suggest that one Number 1 and one Number 2 Medical Chest be removed from the Table of Basic Allowances.

I suggest that three blanket rolls of twelve blankets each be allowed for the battalion aid station to facilitate dividing them evenly between the three ambulances.

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The contents of the splint set as prescribed by the Table of Basic Allowances are poorly balanced. From experiences of three campaigns, I have found that arm traction splints are very seldom used. All upper extremity fractures are much more easily splinted with wire basket or basswood splints. This also makes the transporting of the patient much simpler. Leg traction splints are used much more frequently, especially in fractures of the femur. I have found that the most satisfactory composition of a vehicular splint set is two arm traction splints and four leg traction splints with accessories. There should be a dozen wire basket splints together with the proper padding material. These splints are very practical.

It is unnecessary to carry extra litters in addition to those used in the ambulances and for the one quarter ton truck litter racks.

The red cross markings on the vehicles might be improved by painting a scarlet cross on a silver black background rather than a red cross on a white background. In poor light the crosses look black and might be confused with enemy markings.

Sufficient red cross flags should be made available for use on every medical vehicle.

c. Equipment used - not Table of Basic Allowances - A one-ton cargo trailer was used by us to transport equipment. It was invaluable, and I recommend it be added to Table of Basic Allowances equipment.

A 510 F.M. radio was used mounted in the surgeon's one quarter ton truck. This proved to be very helpful in getting reports of casualties and in designating their location. Much valuable time was saved by the use of the radio. I recommend that a F.M. radio be added to Table of Basic Allowances for use in the surgeon's one quarter-ton truck and another for use in one of the half-track ambulances to facilitate better control of the ambulances by the surgeon. This would make it easier for him to call for an ambulance after first investigating the situation in his one quarter-ton truck. The radio in the ambulance should preferably be a F.M. 528.

A.C.P. blackout tent was used by us during this and the Tunisian campaign. It is much more satisfactory than the Table of Basic Allowances pyramidal tent in combat, because it can be camouflaged more easily; i.e., it can be covered together with one of the half-track ambulances by a large camouflage net.

Aid Kits made up of empty pine boxes were used in each of the three ambulances and the one quarter-ton truck. They contained approximately fifteen large Carlisle dressings, two dozen envelopes of sulfanilamide crystals, a bottle of 250 sulfadiazine tablets, two boxes of morphine syrettes, several tourniquets, two dozen rolls of gauze bandage, two rolls of three-inch adhesive tape, a pair of bandage scissors, a book of Emergency Medical Tags, a pencil, and a pound jar of sulfadiazine burn ointment. These supplies were divided into various compartments making them readily accessible. These kits proved to be much more satisfactory than the individual first aid bags.

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d. The tactical employment of this unit and supporting units was quite satisfactory. Attaching two cross-country box type ambulances to the battalion on long road marches would simplify the evacuation of patients to the rear even though the supporting company of the Medical Battalion were following the road march, since it is much easier for this vehicle to get through thick and congested traffic than it is for the half-track ambulance. One ambulance, box type, was attached to this unit during long bivouac stays. It proved useful to this unit in several emergencies.

e. Communications - Communication was accomplished by the use of a F.M. 510 radio mounted in the surgeon's one quarter ton truck and by runners. Communication between the surgeon and the battalion or companies was satisfactorily negotiated by means of F.M. radio. This method was fast and accurate. When the surgeon, however, was separated from the aid station or ambulances and needed communication with them, he either had to contact them personally or send a runner. Both methods were slow; much valuable time was frequently lost. This could be remedied by the addition of a second F.M. radio to be mounted in the C.P. half-track and the designation of a medical radio channel. This could be a universal channel throughout the division since the range of these radios is quite short (two to ten miles) and little interference on the channel would be experienced since the units are usually far enough apart that the closer transmission will cut them out.

f. Medical Supplies - Enough medical supplies were carried to carry us through all emergencies. When supplies were needed, however, they were easily procured from the supporting Medical Battalion by means of ambulances sent back to evacuate patients.

Desicated blood plasma was carried in a goodly quantity. It was used in several burn cases. These cases were not severe and could easily have waited until they arrived at the Medical Battalion treatment station. It is my opinion that a moderate amount of plasma will be used at the battalion aid station; and it is therefore not necessary to carry more than a dozen units. This supply can easily be replenished when patients are evacuated.

g. No difficulties were experienced during the landing operation.

h. A change which might prove valuable in future landing operations is better distribution of medical vehicles in the unloading priority list. Our medical vehicles were not unloaded until all combat vehicles were taken off, and, since it is impractical to send company aid men with the tank companies, some of the tank units engaged in combat without the support of our Battalion Medical Detachment. These units could have been taken care of, in these cases, by nearby medical personnel had an emergency arisen; but in some instances this support might not have been available.

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Company aid men were sent with separate tank platoons, which were loaded on L.C.T.'s. These aid men were left on the beach when the platoons advanced into action because of the impossibility of transporting them.

i. There were no problems regarding medical service aboard ship. We held our own sick call in the Sick Bay, and the transport surgeon attended the Navy personnel.

It was convenient on both L.S.T.'s, on which the battalion was transported, for the transport surgeons to care for casualties sustained during the unloading operation. This prevented any delay in the unloading of medical personnel and equipment. Beach medical service was good.

j. No problems were encountered in the care of civilian injured. They were treated, tagged, and evacuated through regular channels. No enemy casualties were handled.

k. None.

/s/ John Erbes
JOHN ERBES,
Captain, Medical Corps,
Surgeon.

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CAPTAIN M E HESS ADJUTANT 66TH AP.

ADMINISTRATION.

Twenty percent of the enlisted men increase their allotments on arrival overseas.

The average officer in the field draws under fifty dollars. I personally draw fifteen dollars.

Three percent of the personnel of the regiment have no insurance. These have been required to sign certificates saying we have done our best to sell them and explaining their refusal to buy—no one to name as beneficiary, etc.. An air raid a while back stopped up business suddenly and momentarily.

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MAJOR J J CUNNINGHAM ASSISTANT ORDNANCE OFFICER 2ND ARMORED DIVISION.

ORGANIZATION:

The Division ordnance has plenty of personnel to do its job.

EQUIPMENT:

Our tracks, made out of what I have been told is reclaimed rubber, are not standing up. I like the steel track. We are using both types successfully. Both are better than the present rubber track.

We have never been able to get enough binoculars or watches. Watches are not standing up— don't know whether it is faulty construction or rough usage. The field glass EE now in use must be replaced by the m-8 or the M-3.

We ought to substitute the towed 57 for the towed 37.

Understand the 4.2 mortar is mighty fine.

All the troops prefer the M-3 halftrack to the M-2—mostly because of the rear door, the size, and the difference in armament.

I believe all halftracks should have winches.

Halftrack rollers serve no useful purpose.

I recommend research on non inflammable coloration for camouflage nets. Sparks from exhaust now sometimes set them afire.

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FIRST LIEUT. SOUTHWARD, GRAVES REGISTRATION SERVICE, ATT. 2ND ARMORED DIVISION

After Gela my graves registration group gave first burials to all of the American dead of the Second Armored Division. At Gela we helped with the wounded. We landed at H hour plus forty five minutes. We cleared all the dead from the beach. We would need seventy men in a harder campaign. Tankers do not climb out and help, but we do not expect it.

CAPTAIN L. BOLAND, CHAPLAIN, 66TH ARMORED REGIMENT

The graves registration service was generally satisfactory in Sicily. However with more casualties it would have been impossible to do the job. Tankers were not used nor should they be. With any probable number of casualties in future campaigns, fourteen men with each armored regiment should do the job back to the collecting point, but not including the collecting point work. The transportation that would be necessary would be two three quarter tonners per regiment. Men should be selected men.

MAJOR (?) URBAN J. WURN, DIVISION CHAPLAIN, 2ND ARMORED DIVISION.

Because of burials, and things connected therewith, I was unable to hold mass or visit hospital ships for two weeks. The G.R.S. must be increased to take this task off of us.

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*This has not come out yet - is just
being mulled over. Unlikely to be
greatly changed*

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Conclusions and Recommendations

of the Army Ground Force Board based on the interviews of Colonel Stovall with various officers and men of the Second Armored Division after the conclusion of the Sicilian Campaign, interviews which have been forwarded in transcript in earlier reports.

Organization

Divisional

The Sicilian campaign ~~1944~~ did not involve the Second Armored Division as a whole in any one fight; hence it is fair to say that the campaign did not test the divisional organization. The conclusion to be drawn is that present organization has not been battle-proven wrong. The recommendation: That the subject of major divisional reorganization be held open, pending further battle test, and further study. Specifically propose for further study is the Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment proposed originally by Colonel White; this regiment would not greatly affect personnel totals as it would be created largely by adding regimental reconnaissance companies to the present divisional reconnaissance element.

Combat Command

Since these are of such flexible constitution they more or less defy any comment other than the most general; it is judged that the on-the-spot constitution and reconstitution of combat commands to meet existing conditions have been powerful elements in the to date successes of armor.

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Regimental

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Armored Regiment: No comment or recommendation.

Armored Infantry Regiment: There now exists some disparity in the allowances of grades for staff officers and of regimental maintenance personnel as between the Armored Regiment and the Armored Infantry regiment, unfavorable to the latter,. In the case of the grades for staff officers it is not believed that the differences are warranted by differences of nature or importance of the positions. In the case of the maintenance personnel it is not believed that the difference in allowances is in proportion to the differences in the actual amount of work performed. It is recommended that the matter be referred to the Armored Command for their views.

Battalion

Armored
Separate/Battalions: No comment or recommendation.

Armored
Interior/Battalions: The comments of the field appear to fully justify the increase of the maintenance sections of battalion headquarters companies to the point where they approach identity with similar sections in armored companies and it is so recommended.

Interior Armored and Armored Infantry Battalions: Because both types of battalion so frequently operate separately, each should be provided with at least one additional battalion staff officer.

Reports of maneuver-tests of mixed (one light company, one medium company) tank battalions have been sufficiently favorable to warrant further school, board, and Command, study and test; note well, however this formation has not been battle tested.

General

(move up top)

Perhaps the most normal factor in war is the presence of the abnormal. It is suggested that this fact be recognized in organizational affairs

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authorizing and expecting all higher commanders to temporarily change any and all normal organizations to meet any and all situations appearing in their fronts. Such a broad authority is usually hesitantly given, but if not given it will be nevertheless seized and exercised by commanders of force and initiative. Such an authority would be especially helpful when an organization passes from a more or less independent status to the status of being an interior unit; it would be invaluable in the necessary reorganizations in sections like the divisional C-2 section, which must change according as the enemy speaks one or two languages, according as the follow-up of AMOT service is close or distant, according as the division is in a fluid or stable ^{campaign} ~~situation~~.

EQUIPMENT

General

In general the equipments of the U.S. Army are superior as to quantity, quality, type, suitability, serviceability. Some exceptions will be noted below. Other possible exceptions (for example, certain items of communications equipment) are not mentioned for the reason that the board is without a sufficient technical background upon which to base an opinion; such facts as are available concerning the excepted items are contained in the transcripts already of record in your office.

Individual

There seems little doubt that the "A" & "B" barrack bag system is a failure, at least in the warmer climates in which the armored divisions have been and are operating. This situation has in general been corrected by dropping the "B" bag in most cases, the consideration of dropping the "A" bag as well in some cases. Recommendation: No AGF action.

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Where any soldier has any other heavy equipment to carry, for example a bazooka or a mortar baseplate, the pistol or revolver should be his prescribed weapon.

SIGHTS

Moreover the American soldier has an even break with his German opponent in the matter of sights, the American marksmanship tips the scale of battle in the American's favor. The American tank sights are inferior comparable to the German sight resulting in a situation where the American has to depend on superior maneuver for his win rather than on his marksmanship. Our tankers are not to be called down-hearted about this situation but they do urgently want a better sight. Since the interviews in which the above impressions were ^{received} ~~received~~ were recorded, this board has been in receipt of two Series # 70 sights which were sent to the TTD Center and to the 1st Armored Division for test. These organizations have reported their tests favorably. It is therefore believed that the cure for the sight situation may safely be said to be in hand.

Self Sealing Gasoline Tanks For Tanks.

The troops in the field have no knowledge as to the feasibility or practicability of this project but will favor anything that will tend to lessen fire hazard. Your board is of the opinion that this question can be more securely answered on the proving grounds than on the battle field.

Auxiliary Gasoline Tanks for Tanks

No direct comment in this matter was received, however many of the people seen were talking in terms of keeping all inflammables in, on, or about the tank to a minimum. The conclusion to be drawn is that the troops would not want any auxiliary tanks.

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Gasoline Cruising Radius of Armored Vehicles

There was no where any adverse comment on the cruising radii of armored vehicles. Such limitations as were imposed on the operating radii of vehicles were imposed by the length of the beach head to division dump haul which taxed available truck capacities to a maximum.

Fire proofing of Tanks.

The only direct suggestion available along these lines was one to "make a generous use of asbestos" with no details specified, ^{an another} ~~with no details specified~~ to armor the ammunition containers within the tank. There yet ~~remains~~ is in the field no unanimity of opinion as to the cause of tank fires, whether the gasoline, the ammunition, or something else. ~~It appears certain~~ ^{It appears certain} ~~that fires have originated with both gasoline and ammunition.~~ ~~There is reason to believe these fires can start with clothing rolls hung on the outside of tanks, the greases and oils in various mechanisms such as differentials and final drives.~~ (A member of this board has examined a stopped tank where the ONY fire was a bedding or clothing roll attached to the outside; and another where the tank burned and exploded when the only identifiable hit was a shot thru a right front final drive which emerged to ^{break} knocked off the inner toothed gear of the sprocket and ~~the track~~ the track/.) Stories of tank ~~strikes~~ strikes indicate that the strikes generate immense heat on impact, a heat sufficient to ignite only mildly inflammable materials. This thought is reinforced by an unverified report that the navy is finding it desirable to omit even ~~some~~ finishing paint from some of the more sensitive portions of their craft. It appears that no serious inroads ^{by tank fires} have been made/on the morale of the tank fighters seen in Sicily; some sending out such messages as Colonel Collier's "I believe it would greatly reassure our States tankers to know just how few killed there are in our stopped tanks. We lost less than average of one dead per stopped tank."

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Fire proofing of tanks, Contd.

Recommendations are that research in the matter of tank fires be continued and be extended to cover other possible sources than gasoline and ammunition, and that as a matter of prophylaxis, such statements as have been made by Colonel Collier and Lt. Col. Quillian on the subject be available to all officers of the Armored command as a counter to any questions raised by the men on the subject. It is further recommended that identification tags of higher fire-resistance than is now common, be issued to Tankers.

Armor (thickness) and ability to withstand penetration.

The troops in the field appear satisfied generally with their armor; they appear unwilling that any other feature be present in their tanks be sacrificed to secure greater armor protection.

Diesel Tanks As compared with Gas Tanks-- Operation.

The experience of the interviewed personnel with the Diesel driven tank had, in general, been ^{very} ~~difficult~~ limited; nevertheless they approached unanimity of opinion that the diesel was superior to the gasoline driven tank. Many associated this idea directly with the subject of tank fires, In nearly all cases the opinion seemed at least indirectly associated with that subject.

Maintenance, and casualties.

Thanks to the excellence of the T-2 recovery vehicle, and to a fast, forward moving, campaign in which there were few tank casualties, there was an almost complete if not complete recovery of non-burned tank casualties. Some of the partially burned tanks were used as sources of spareparts for other injured vehicles.

Tank vision devices, especially for tank commanders.

The attitude of the 2nd Armored Division in this matter can be summed up: Better vision devices are needed, but no vision device will

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Tank vision devices (contd)

be much used; it will be used mainly for passing under friendly, time-fire, barrages; it will be less frequently used to button-up from grenades, small arms fire, etc., than was once contemplated. It is recommended that this item be classified as highly desirable but not urgent.

Rubber track versus steel

The tracks used by the 2nd Armored Division in Sicily, said by some to be synthetic rubber, by others to be reclaimed rubber, and by still others to be a combination of the two, were wholly unsatisfactory as to lasting quality on the terrain encountered. After less than three hundred miles ~~///~~ more than seventy five percent of the Tank tracks in the division were ruined. Had the campaign lasted longer with a need for tanks and ^{might} embarrassing; if not a dangerous situation ~~might~~ have developed. The personnel interviewed had only limited experience with steel tracks but they were so impressed by the failure of the issue rubber track that they were practically unanimous in desiring steel track for future campaigns; further they prefer the lighter of the two steel tracks that they have seen, the one they identify as having chevron type cleats. It is recommended that chevron type, steel tracks be furnished for future campaigns, whatever the scene. Classification: URGENT.

Suspension System

No comments or recommendations.

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.

Supply of Armored Divisions

The nature of the operations of the 2nd Armored Division varied so far from the norm that no lessons are to be drawn from the sicilian Campaign. Transport was, because of shipping limitations, deeply cut. The advance on Palermo was made with such rapidity that the supply lines were stretched just short of the breaking point; however it must be figured that had the

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enemy resistance been more severe and hence the supply requirements (especially of ammunition) greater, the progress would naturally have been slower and shorter, and hence the increased requirements of supplies could have been handled by the transport at hand; this is to say that the supply situation of the division had within itself compensating factors. The supply personnel set up for the Armored Division ~~was considered adequate~~ is considered adequate.

Supply of separate groups and battalions.

The only data on this subject, was a remark from officers of the 70th Tank Battalion as follows "When battalions are attached to Infantry Divisions, as this one now is, the ordnance supply must be closer than has been common in this campaign."

Maintenance

No comment.

Battle replacement of Personnel and Combat Vehicles.

There was none, nor was any particularly needed in this campaign. Had the losses continued, in the ~~numbers~~ proportions they took, for a prolonged campaign of high casualty rates, and replacements had been required, the earlier idea of supplying vehicles-plus-crews as a replacement unit would have failed; the need for tanks would have been at a much higher rate than the need for ^{crew} crewman, perhaps one ~~for~~ for each two or three tanks.

Rations and their preparation.

The U ration appears ideal for the Armored Force; some organizations reported their men were loth to go back to B rations, kitchen prepared, when that became possible. The C and K rations are in general disfavor except for use in true emergencies. Not all the tanks or other vehicles are equipped with the small gasoline stoves available to some. It is recommended that such stoves be made available to all armored vehicles.

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TRAINING-DOCTRINE.

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In sum, your interviewers were told by field commanders, to stress everything in training. This was accepted as a healthy sign that meant, over and beyond their direct statements to the same effect, that the training, the tactics, the doctrine, of the Armored Command, as now stated in the various official publications, are basically sound and in no need of alteration or modification. On a popularity basis it would appear that the items most in need of constant stress are crew-drill and shooting.

When asked to tell what they had learned in Sicily that they had not learned in the United States certain noncommissioned officers mentioned a number of items that your interviewers knew were offered, taught, even stressed in the United States. The lesson to be drawn from this fact is that zone of interior complacency (not unnatural in the best of men) must be thoughtfully met by means as violent as that complacency demands. For example, two noncommissioned officers said they had learned in Sicily the importance of reconnaissance, even to dismounting from a tank and going forward on foot to take a look-see. Rather than let them learn this in the theatre of operations by suffering a loss of men's lives, let them learn it in the Zone of the Interior by suffering the loss of some chevrons.

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There is in the field a general sentiment in favor of a larger, more powerful gun for the light tank, the 57mm gun being generally considered the smallest satisfactory fulfillment of this requirement. It is recommended that this development be given a very high priority but not such high priority as to exclude the development of an even bigger gun for this tank.

n. AT Gun:

The general opinion in the field is that the 37mm AT gun should be replaced by the 57mm gun for the same purpose. There is an insufficient record of failure of the 37mm to fulfill its mission to warrant this requirement being classed as urgent.

o. Armored Artillery:

There is a general sentiment in favor of some longer ranged artillery pieces in the division proper; the opinion in the 5th Armored Artillery Group was apparently unanimous that the Group, which is in effect Corps Artillery, should have longer ranged more powerful weapons throughout. Your board is without sufficient knowledge of the expected nature of future operations to render an opinion in the matter of increasing the range and power of any part of the organic armored divisional artillery; however in the case of the Armored Artillery Group it is unhesitatingly recommended that the Group contain no lesser weapon than the 4.5 gun. In the question of whether the guns of the Armored Artillery Group shall be selfpropelled or towed, it is the opinion of the board that the pros and cons are well enough balanced to warrant the matter being decided on a basis of expediency and cost, a basis better known as to detail in the AGF than to this board.

p. Wreckers:

It is recommended that there be authorized to each armored infantry
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350.09

ANTI-AIRCRAFT MOUNT
FOR CALIBRE FIFTY MACHINE GUN..

During the course of numerous interviews with officers and men of the Second Armored Division two officers, Lt. Col. H. J. Moran, commanding the 1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry, and Lieut. Colonel H. M. Exton, commanding the 78th F.A. Bn. (Armd), spoke of an urgent need for a proper anti-aircraft mount for the cal. .50 machine gun. Of these officers, the latter, Col. Exton, offered a solution. That solution is shown below in the form of two stereoscopic pictures. In picture number one the proposed adapter is used in conjunction with a standard ground mount; in picture number two the adapter is used in conjunction with a standard skate mount in a half-track. The adapter was developed in the 78th Armored F. A. Bn.

PICTURE NO. 1

PICTURE NO. 2.

(NOTE: The above pictures will, if viewed thru a pocket type stereoscope of the style issued by the Corps of Engineers, make explanatory matter unnecessary, but the explanation is added for use in offices where such stereoscopes are not available.)

In picture number two, certain numbers have been chalked on the adapter; they are as follows: -1- Behind this number passes a pin thru the base of the skate yoke and the base of the adapter. -2- Behind this number passes a pin thru the branches of the skate yoke and the central part of

41
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the adapter. 3 (and the arrow) point out a free swivel joint permitting a 360 degree traverse. 4 is a metal block placed between one branch of the skate yoke and the adapter to take up loose motion-- a second such block for the other side of the adapter at pin -2- is missing thru inadvertance. 5 (and arrow) point out the brackets which receive the upper end of the legs-to-adapter braces when the adapter is used on a ground mount.

The adapter permits shooting to within about four degrees of the verticle.

Colonel Exton reports that this adapter has been effectively used in action.

The board understands that a very similar adapter has been under test in the zone of interior since the spring of 1943.

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COLONEL J.H. COLLIER, COLMANDING 66TH A.R.

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ORGANIZATION:

The division has some table of organization flaws; the combat command set up is not yet right; we are all working on it; can't yet give a constructive solution.

We want a battalion of 195mm guns in the division— some long ranged stuff.

I have worked with battalions of one light and two medium companies in problems and liked it; haven't used it in campaign.

I very definitely favor the regimental organization of tanks as opposed to a group of tank battalions. The latter system creates a temptation to break up by battalions. Anyway, why change our organization until it has been proven definitely wrong. I do not believe such proof exists. Battles will be fought by combat commands and these can be constructed and re-constructed on the spot. The first and only time that I know of that the 1st Division was not committed piecemeal, and was sent in as a division, was on the drive past Metz, and there, as presently organized, they did a whole of a good job. I cannot imagine any division organization that will meet all situations. The present organization has not, to my knowledge, so far failed.

The maintenance section of the battalion headquarters company should be identical with that of a line company.

EQUIPMENT:

We URGENTLY need a sight for our 75s that is the equal of or is superior to the German article.

I favor the liquid cooled diesel for tanks. The maintenance bugs can be overcome. Diesels might reduce the battle fire hazard, the most fires may come from loose powder.

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Collier, Contd:

I have no method of fireproofing tanks to offer.

The halftrack is generally damned; many were lost in Tunisia; BUT we must expect to loose a good many personnel carriers when we get that volume of strafing no matter what vehicle is used.

The medium tank tank wont stand the german 88 or the Italian 90, but we just don't expect it to do so.

The Diesel has been neglected; it probably has great possibilities.

The T-2 recovery vehicle is damned good. Most of our stopped tanks burned, but all that did not were recovered. Remember there were no withdrawals, but there was both recovery and maintainance under fire.

Vision devices: We never buttoned up tank commanders; they will be buttoned up when they go thru our own overhead time-fire. Car commanders wore steel helmets (loss liner) over their tank helmets so as to use phones etc.. In problems the present vision devices have worked satisfactorily.

I favor the steel track; it outlasts rubber and will go places where the rubber wont take the tank. I prefer the chevron type steel track.

The present 75mm is sufficient in the medium tank; we could stand some more muzzle velocity. The Mark VI will outrange us but the Mark VI is a HEAVY tank.

We want the 4.2 mortar; alternative fire from ground or vehicle; vehicle fire to have a 360 degree traverse; vehicles changed as much as necessary to secure this specification.

We want the 57mm in the light tank to replace the 37mm.

ADMINISTRATION-SUPPLY:

4/ C rations are awful. The U ration is fine and precisely fits medium tank crews but was insufficiently supplied. C and K rations should be relegated to a true EMERGENCY RATION status.

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Collier, contd.

LESSONS TRAINING DOCTRINE EXPERIENCE

I found and took over a n excellently laid out and very large Italian ammunition dump when the one officer and five men in charge sent in word by a civilian that they wanted to come in and surrender, but COULDN'T GO OFF AND LEAVE THE DUMP UNGUARDED.

As we would pass thru villages the Italian soldiers would come out and join on the tail of our column.

We do not, EVEN IN TRAINING, lift our artillery barrages; we substitute time fire, high bursts, and go right on.

The Artillery believes that the best burst for time fire is at a height of thirty five yards. I have been in more of this fire than they; I believe the twenty five feet is the best height.

Time fire produces only negligible injuries to tanks, holes in fenders, etc.

I favor GMC battalions for close support of infantry divisions. Armored divisions must not be frittered away for this purpose. I do not believe in organic tanks for infantry divisions.

I had a tank battalion ashore with the Third division at Licata at H plus twenty. They crossed from Bizerte in LCT's ; feeding aboard was no problem-- they were all seasick.

I do not believe the ponton bridge method of unloading from LSTs is feasible; some were so unloaded by the method is not satisfactory.

I believe it would greatly reassure our States tankers to know just how few killed there are in our stopped tanks. We lost less than an average of one dead per stopped tank. The tanker comes out safely from the most impossible places.

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Collier, Contd.

In training, a helluva lot of shooting must be done; it develops CONFIDENCE; and battle-field courage is based on CONFIDENCE/in weapon. Fire in all conceivable circumstances until personally felt confidence is built up. We did lots of shooting in Morocco and it has paid dividends.

We never buttoned up tank commanders. This will be done when they are passing under our own line fire mentioned above; Car commanders wore the steel helmet, less liner, over the tank helmet so as to use the phones etc.. AF doctrine should change to provide that the tank commander go in unbuttoned.

My regiment is so trained that any regular artilleryman can step in and fire a company of tanks, or a platoon of assault guns, without changing any of his normal methods or commands. All tankers should be so trained. this MUST NOT lead to any abandonment of the present mission of tanks.

In some fights we carried infantrymen right on the decks of tanks of the non-leading waves. They dismounted, of course, to fight.....

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