

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United States Cavalry Association.

VOL. XVIII. JANUARY, 1908. No. 67

[illegible] GEN[illegible] CHARLES M[illegible]
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THE TROOPER'S DITTY.

BY THE "POET LARIAT."

We're the pilgrims, we're the pilots, the trusty advance guard,
We blazed the way from coast to coast by fighting, riding hard;
And we roughed it on the Border till the Border ceased to be,
Then they shipped us to the Philippines to mix in the melee.

CHORUS:

Then fill up the tin cup, clear up to the rim,
A stiff stirrup-cup as of yore,
And drink with a zest to the fellows the best,
The men of the old Yellow Corps.

We criss-crossed Arizona with our bloody, tortuous trails;
We showed the fierce Apaches that we weren't the kind that fails;
We fought the red Kiowas and Comanches to a still,
And the Sioux and Cheyennes from us took many a deadly pill.

We have parched upon the "Staked Plains" where water was unknown;
We have tramped across the "Bad Lands," for grub—horse meat alone;
We've slept on sheets of alkali in river beds gone dry,
And forded all the treach'ous streams beneath the Western sky.

We rid the precious prairies of their sons whom were our game;
We guarded trains across the plains before the U. P. came;
We modernized the "woolly West" and left it safe and fair,
And kiddies now trot off to school where Red Cloud lifted hair.

We're familiar with her cañons, her mesas and her peaks,
Her "sakys" and her "wallows"—where we've wallowed many weeks;
And we knew the Cacti family, which gave us numerous points,
And now our only clubrooms are the low-down, deadly "joints."

For they took our sutlers from us, likewise our traders, too,
Then orders merciless and harsh made our canteens "skidoo."
Why not desert? We're not that kind; we still lead into line;
We STICK! *esprit de corps*, you know; perhaps for auld lang syne.

CHORUS:

Then fill up the tin cup, clear up to the rim, etc.

EDWARD L. KEYES,
Late Lieutenant Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

WANTED: A SYSTEM FOR FURNISHING REMOUNTS FOR THE CAVALRY.

BY CAPTAIN JOHN W. FURLONG, SIXTH CAVALRY, (GENERAL STAFF).

IN publishing this article the only desire in mind has been to interest cavalry officers in a subject which is felt to be timely and necessary for further progress in the cavalry service.

All intention to offend individuals or departments is disclaimed, and only cordial coöperation is sought to the end that the cavalry may obtain what it wants and needs in the most economical way.

Lack of expert knowledge is confessed, and no opportunity having been afforded to see the inner working of foreign remount systems, many conclusions have been deduced from books, reports and conversations with older officers, and are therefore possibly faulty, but it is hoped that publication may induce cavalrymen of wider experience to take up this important subject, and that the article may thus serve in a modest way as a basis for the formulation of a wise, efficient and economical system. The term economical is used advisedly, as it is believed that the cavalry arm of the service should by every means in its power avoid the charge of being costly or extravagant.

As a preliminary it may be stated that it is not deemed advisable to consider any project which involves supervision or direction of breeding by the government, as it is believed that much may be obtained by the simple laws of demand.

The subject will be taken up in the following order:

(*a*) Desirability of proper organization in peace and war.
(*b*) Type of horse required.
(*c*) Method of purchase and issue.

(*a*) DESIRABILITY OF PROPER ORGANIZATION IN PEACE AND WAR.

As under the present law the Quartermaster's Department is charged with the purchase and issue of remounts, it seems proper that the entire system and care of the horses up to the time of issue should be vested in that department.

The establishment of a division in the Quartermaster General's office to be known as a Remount Bureau is therefore suggested.

To promote system and efficiency such a branch would be an absolute necessity in time of war. Great numbers of animals must then be purchased, and as they cannot be sent direct to troops in the field, remount depots must be established at convenient points, to which the animals can be sent and cared for preparatory to issue.

These depots are further rendered necessities, in that such establishments and sub-depots must be maintained for the purpose of taking care of animals run down in campaign, but which gives promise of further service after recuperation.

In view of the fact that these possibilities exist, it would be wise to have all necessary data on hand in order that work can be systematically commenced at any time. This data would include a list of officers who have shown themselves to be good horse buyers, places where the desired class of animals can be secured in proper quantities and from whom plans for buildings required at remount depots, and estimates of materials, organization of personnel and scheme of administration of remount depots, and a list of officers competent to take charge of such establishment.

The proper time to formulate these plans is during the continuance of peace.

Excluding animals required for transportation and riding horses, the army needs at present 15,150 horses.

The life of cavalry and artillery horses from 1880 to 1895 was approximately between six and seven years.

It is impossible to fix the life at present existing, owing to conditions of service and the absorption of excess horses.

Two potent factors in the short life of these horses are the lack of a systematic course of equitation for recruits and a compulsory course of training for remounts.

The winter is the time for preparation for work in the open and the best time for the training of remounts. To this end, riding halls should be provided at all northern posts where cavalry and field artillery are stationed.

These questions should be taken up and definitely decided.

If properly solved, and a proper system of purchase of animals is adopted, there is no reason why the life of the horse should not be raised to ten years. This would require the annual purchase of 1,515 horses, which, together with the purchase of draft and pack animals, and the collection of the data noted heretofore, should be sufficient work to require the supervision of one officer and justify the establishment of a Remount Bureau in time of peace.

(*b*) TYPE OF HORSE REQUIRED.

All of our experience in the past points to the fact that for the cavalry and artillery service we want at least a fairly well bred gelding.

This horse must have the additional qualities of soundness, hardiness and quickness, and, in general, must have the necessary strength of bone and sinew, fair proportions, steady gaits, normal mouth, good health, good intelligence, and good blood.

It is not necessary that the horse should be thoreughly trained before issue to the troops. For obvious reasons it is preferable that they should do the breaking and training themselves.

In time of war, as much breaking and training should be done before issue as circumstances will permit. However, in any case the horse should be gentle, and should not have been spoiled in disposition, or otherwise, by any previous work. This can be determined by inspection.

The present specifications issued by the Quartermaster's Department are entirely satisfactory and cover all the good

points in a cavalry or artillery remount, except that some artillery officers contend that no great variation is required at present between lead, swing and wheel horses.

All that is necessary is to make sure, by inspection and method of purchase, of getting an animal that closely approaches the type described.

(c) METHOD OF PURCHASE AND ISSUE.

For many years there has been constant complaint of the class of remounts furnished.

The system of purchasing horses under contract is a vicious one. The government has always paid more than it should for the type of horse obtained, and, in addition, it has accumulated many worthless ones.

The people who take the contracts are, as a rule, professional government contractors. For any one else the specifications, requirements, bonds, etc., are prohibitive.

The contractor has to make a big outlay of money, and it is usually borrowed from a bank at interest. At the very outset, therefore, the fact that this interest will, of course, be defrayed by the government lowers the type of horse that will be obtained.

In addition, the contractor is required to pay certain expenses incident to inspection, as follows: Furnishing strong hemp halters for horses purchased; weighing horses; removing and placing shoes and furnishing new shoes when required; sacking tails and preparing horses for shipment; loading horses on board cars; cost and risk incident to branding horses; and other incidental expenses for labor and material in fulfillment of contract.

The contractor also expects to make as big a percentage of profit as he possibly can.

From the very first a conflict is precipitated between the inspecting officer and the contractor. The interests of the two are diametrically opposed. The contractor tries to furnish the cheapest grade of horse possible, and the inspecting officer tries to get the best possible type of horse.

The contractor usually proceeds as follows:

During the first week or so he presents different kinds of the cheapest horses that he thinks may possibly be accepted, until several are accepted. This proceeding is for the purpose of sizing up the inspector; that is, finding out what his idea of a cavalry or artillery horse is, and discovering the cheapest type of horse he will accept. This having been discovered, the inspector never has presented to him any but the cheapest type of horse, which it is believed by any possibility may pass inspection. If the inspector buys any, he is simply selecting those which are nearest to what he desires, knowing all the time that they are "squeezers" and not up in quality to what he ought to buy. Should the inspector be experienced, and during this time reject all horses presented to him, for the reason that in his opinion they are not suitable for the service, the contractor begins correspondence objecting to the inspection on the ground that the kind of horses required by the inspector cannot be obtained and that he wants a better horse than was contemplated by the contract.

If this proceeding be ineffective he invokes political influence.

All this results in delay, expense, and usually, in the end, the acceptance of an inferior grade of horse.

It must be recognized that no matter how well drilled cavalry soldiers are, if their horses are of inferior quality they are correspondingly worthless for strictly cavalry work.

The claim is now made that suitable horses for cavalry service are scarce. This is doubtful. There is probably a smaller percentage of such horses than there were twenty-five or thirty years ago, when, unquestionably, there were plenty of them. However, according to all testimony, the contractor in those days proceeded in the same way and made the same claims that they do now, and did not try to furnish the type of horses desired so long as they could succeed in having lower priced and less desirable horses accepted by any of the methods above mentioned.

The purchase of horses by contract differs from all other purchases by contract, in that there can be no definite fixed

type or standard to go by. To a good buyer each individual horse has a value of its own.

The average contract price of cavalry horses purchased for use in the United States, in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1905, was $151.53. The interest on this amount at a fair rate would probably amount to $4.50. Assuming that it takes the contractor three weeks to furnish a car-load of twenty horses, his expense would probably be as follows:

Purchase of twenty hemp halters	$ 5 00
Weighing horses	2 00
Shoeing and branding horses	20 00
Sacking tails	5 00
Loading horses on cars	5 00
Incidental expenses	10 00
Wages of two assistants ($3.00 per day)	126 00
Total	$173 00

or $8.65 per horse.

An allowance of ten per cent profit to the contractor would be liberal, and would amount to, say, $16.00 per horse.

As a matter of fact, the expenses are probably very much less and the profit more. However, assuming these figures for purposes of comparison, the interest, expense and profit would amount to $29.15 per horse.

In a particular instance, it has been estimated that the expense to the government of inspection and purchase, *i. e.*, transportation of inspector and assistant, per diem expenses, and stabling and feeding of accepted horses, amounted to $3.49 per horse, with the probability that the average for the whole number of horses purchased would be slightly less if it could be figured. Assume it as $3.00. According to these figures the government should obtain a horse worth in open market $122.38 at an expenditure of $154.53.

It is not believed that the cavalry horses in the service to-day average up to this standard. Several plans have been proposed with a view to remedying matters.

One is to put a time limit clause in the contract, and provide therein that if the contractor should fail to complete his contract in the given time the necessary number of horses to complete it shall be purchased in open market, the extra cost, if any, being charged to the contractor. This would simply result in an increased price, with, in all probability, no better results.

Another proposition is to divide the horses purchased into two classes:

1. Horses conforming to present specifications and intended and needed for immediate issue to troops, to be purchased under contract, said contract to contain a time limit clause.

2. Horses between three and four years old, to be purchased in open market and sent to a remount depot, kept until matured and gentled, halter-broken, etc., before issue to troops.

With reference to Class 1, the objections have already been stated.

Horses of Class 2 would, it is believed, in the end be very expensive products.

A careful and conservative estimate has been made of the initial cost of the colts, cost of establishing a depot, running expenses of same, cost of feed, etc., and it shows that the horse when ready for issue would have cost as follows:

Average cost of colt	$100 00
Average cost of inspection, purchase, etc.	8 93
Average cost of keeping for one year	73 29
Average cost of plant and wear and tear	14 34
	$196 56

This estimate does not take into account any excess cost of transportation, nor the probable percentage of colts which would not turn out well, and have to be sold.

The probable cost per horse would be well over $200.00.

Although the remount depot system has the appearance of not being economical, it is believed that the following data should be presented for consideration:

For some time there has been agitation in Europe to make the remount depot serve a better purpose. This agitation has received the support of many civilian expert horsemen, who consider that the remount depot as at

present constituted is nothing more than an equine sheep fold.

Our specifications now provide that the minimum age of the remounts shall be four years.

The troop horse must have certain qualities, the principal of which are soundness and hardiness. It is not necessary that he shall be finely trained. What is required is, that he shall be trained to such an extent as to carry the soldier safely and for a long distance. In addition, his constitution must be such that he can stand the hardships incident to service in the field.

Horses which are intended for racing purposes are raised on grain practically from the time of their birth, and when they are from six to eight months old are getting about six pounds of oats a day. When eighteen months they are stabled, highly fed, and put in severe training. At the age of two years they take part in special races. A similar, but somewhat slower, method of procedure is taken in the case of trotting horses and those which are being raised for fashionable purposes. These horses do not usually begin work until three years old. It may be remarked that not all of those two classes of horses are thoroughbreds. Other horses which would make desirable remounts are rather neglected, and they are kept at grass, as this is the most economical method of raising. A horse grows fast, and his skeleton and muscular system are large. The development of this latter class of horses is not hastened by judicious feeding, and as a consequence his bones ossify slowly and his muscles do not stand out. The older he is allowed to grow under this system, the more debilitated does he become so far as his muscular system is concerned. When three years old we may say that he is backward, but, between four and five years of age he suffers from anæmia. Hence the older such horses gets, the longer the time and the more difficult the process to get him into good shape by proper food and exercise. If the horse is but three years old, a few months may be sufficient time. By the time he reaches five, a year or more may be required.

There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that a horse

three and one-half years old, which is judiciously fed and exercised, would not be in as good condition for work at four years as one which was purchased at five years would be at six.

As regards training, all authorities concede that the horse of three and one-half years of age is more supple than an older horse, and has not yet contracted the habit of going on his shoulder, and hence can be more easily balanced. The most important part of training is to get the horse well balanced; that is, to carry his own weight, that of the pack and rider equally on both ends. Horses left too much to themselves, or which are improperly balanced, go on their shoulders, and the forehand works too much and he gets broken down in front. This is the principal cause of condemnation of a majority of horses at a time when they should be in their prime and have years of work left in them. If we take the young horse in hand to feed up and train at the same time, the first three months must be devoted entirely to developing a good balance, very little riding being done. At the end of this time, the breaking proper can be commenced, and by good, systematic handling the horse can be fairly well broken for cavalry purposes in three more months.

It is believed, however, that the only satisfactory and economical method is to purchase matured horses in the open market, pay a fair price, and pay by cash or check immediately upon acceptance of the horse, or conclusion of the service rendered.

The objections to the method of open market purchase have been stated to be as follows:

1. That horses of the class desired are scarce.
2. That raisers and breeders will not bring to designated points horses of the class desired in response to hand-bills or newspaper notices.
3. That the method of purchase is expensive, at least much more so than the present method of purchase.

It is not believed that the first objection is well founded. The same objection was made twenty-five or thirty years ago when it was well known that such horses were not scarce.

Certainly we do not get them under the contract system because contractors do not try to get them for reasons discussed heretofore. There is, therefore, practically no demand for them by the government at present, and this would tend to make them scarcer instead of bettering conditions. If there was a demand, and farmers and breeders knew they would get a fair price for their stock and cash payment at time of sale, they would produce the class of horse desired.

With reference to the second objection, the printed specifications scare the farmer or breeder. It would be well for the inspecting officer to have this type in mind, but the advertised specification should be in more general terms. Another reason why individuals are loath to bring their horses in is due to the fact that they do not like to deal with the government. They do not want to sign vouchers and then have to chase up or write continually to some individual to hurry up payment. They want to do business in the usual manner—get their money when they make the sale.

As conditions now exist, the farmer does not care to make sales to the government if he can make them anywhere else, even at a lower price.

With reference to the third objection: The average cost of a cavalry remount has been shown to be $154.53. It is estimated that it would take three weeks to get a car-load of horses, purchasing in open market, and that the expense of inspection, purchase, etc., would be $20.46 per horse. This estimate assumes that the buyer and assistant will have to travel about the country picking up individual horses. This deducted from the present cost of horses would leave $134.07 to be paid for each horse in open market purchase. A comparison of the type which would probably be obtained for this amount in the open market, using the method described with the average type now obtained and represented by $122 38, renders the conclusion obvious.

The present system of not buying horses until those they are to replace are condemned, should be changed, no matter what system is adopted.

It is a notice to people that the government has to have horses at once, and the only purpose it serves is to raise the price. In case of open market purchase a change would also prevent the possibility of any one going ahead of the purchasing officer and getting options on desirable horses.

Estimates and purchases of remounts should be made on the basis of one-tenth of the authorized strength.

Organizations would then be able to cast in the fall the number of horses which it was possible to supply them with up to the maximum allowance.

It is believed that many horses are now in the service which should and would be put on inspection report if the commanding officer were not in doubt as to whether, under existing conditions, he would better himself.

If the necessary reforms are made as outlined, and a better grade of horses obtained by means of open market purchase, the life of a horse should be raised from six and a half to ten years.

A large saving would thus be made, which could be used to pay a higher price for horses to be used in the United States.

It is not believed wise, or in the interest of economy, to send high priced horses to the Philippines, on account of the danger of epidemics, but they should be purchased in open market.

There are at present required for service, within the limits of the United States, approximately 8,436 cavalry horses, and 3,239 artillery horses. The average cost is as follows: Cavalry remounts, $154.91; artillery remounts, $157.05.

With a life of six and one-half years there would be required annually, 1,298 cavalry remounts, cost $201,073.18; 498 artillery remounts, cost $78,210.90.

With the life raised to ten years there would be required annually 844 cavalry remounts, 324 artillery remounts.

If the same amount of money were available we could pay for remounts, including cost of inspection and purchase, cavalry, $238.23; artillery, $241.39.

Taking the estimate of the cost of inspection, purchase, etc., of each horse purchased in open market, viz: $20.46,

the following amounts would be available to pay the farmer or breeder for remounts: Cavalry, $217.77; artillery, $220.93.

The following estimates of cost of inspection, purchase, etc., under the contract method of purchase and open market method of purchase are presented to make clear some of the figures heretofore used:

CONTRACT METHOD OF PURCHASE.

During three months (December 9, 1903, to March 7, 1904) there were inspected and purchased under the contract system 252 horses (cavalry, artillery and draft) and 419 mules, a total of 671 animals. These animals were delivered at the national stock yards, East St. Louis, Illinois, and Lathrop, Missouri, at which places the inspection and purchases were made.

The station of the inspecting officer and clerk, in this case, was at Washington; that of the veterinarian at St. Louis, Missouri.

Because of the small number of horses delivered at some of the inspections it is thought the cost of inspection of horses during this period is in excess of what it would be under ordinary circumstances for an entire fiscal year, and in view of the fact that on almost every inspection trip both horses and mules were inspected and purchased, the actual cost of inspection, purchase and shipment of the total number of animals only (671 horses and mules) can be stated, from which an approximate cost thereof for the horses and mules separately is determined.

If there be included in the cost of inspection and purchase of animals all expenses incurred on account of transportation and per diem allowances for the inspecting officer and his assistant from the time they leave their stations until they return thereto, and for care, stabling and feeding the animals purchased up to the time they are shipped to their destination, the cost of inspection, purchase and shipment under contract of the above mentioned animals, is found to be as follows:

	Account Transportation	Account Per Diem Expense.	Account Stabling, Feeding, etc.	Total.
671 Animals	$969 19	$196 02	$818 25	$1,983 46
252 Horses	626 53	101 77	150 50	878 80
419 Mules	342 66	94 25	667 75	1,104 66
Average per animal	1 45	29	1 22	2 96
Average per horse	2 49	40	60	3 49
Average per mule	82	23	1 59	2 64

OPEN MARKET METHOD OF PURCHASE.

It is assumed that it will take three weeks to get a car load of twenty horses; that the inspection and purchase are made by a similar party, viz: inspecting officer, veterinarian and clerk, starting from the same stations as above, and keeping away from the general horse markets; and that all horses are to be purchased at first hand in the best horse sections throughout the country.

ESTIMATE.

Hire of wagon and driver, 10 days, at $5.00 per day	$ 50 00
Per diem expenses, veterinarian and clerk, 21 days	126 00
Stabling and feeding horses awaiting shipment	105 00
Assembling horses for shipment	25 00
Purchase of 20 hemp halters	5 00
Weighing horses	2 00
Shoeing and branding horses	20 00
Sacking tails	5 00
Loading horses on cars	5 00
Incidental expenses	25 00
For inspection, purchase and shipment of one car load	$368 00
At the same rate, cost of inspection, purchase and shipment of 252 horses (13 cars), would be	$4,784 00
Transportation of inspector and assistant from station to first place where purchases are made	110 65
Transportation of inspector and assistants to other places where purchases are made	150 00
Transportation of inspector and assistants from last place where purchases are made to stations	110 65
Total estimate for inspection, purchase and shipment of 252 horses	$5,155 30
Estimated average cost per head	$ 20 46

Assuming the cost of inspection, purchase and shipment under contract to be $3.00 per head instead of $3.49, and add-

ing to it interest, expenses of contractor, and profit, $29.15, we have $32.15 per head, and the difference in favor of the open market purchase, according to the figures presented, is $11.69 per head.

The next question is, when and how issue shall be made? The procedure in time of war has been discussed under subhead (a).

In time of peace every energy is devoted to instruction. The best results are obtained when it is continuous and progressive in character.

In the days before the Spanish War reënlistments were numerous, and it was not necessary to devote so much time and attention to individual instruction as at present. Recruits arriving in small numbers could be easily assimilated, and every troop had a sufficient number of well instructed, good riders, who could take up at any time the training of remounts without material interference with instruction. However, conditions are now different, and the progressive scheme of instruction should not be interfered with by the necessity of training remounts. They should take the place of horses condemned at the end of the outdoor season of drill and be trained during the winter months. The purchase of horses is, however, comparatively slow work, and it would probably take all the spring, summer and fall to purchase the animals required at the end of the year. If they should all be sent to organizations at a stated time, the establishment of remount depots would be rendered necessary. This would be expensive. The following plan is believed reasonable:

Allow each organization to condemn annually, at the end of the outdoor season, one-tenth of its authorized mount as a maximum; and require each organization commander to report by July 1st just how many animals he intends to condemn inside this limit. It may be assumed as a fact that no troop commander will condemn a good horse.

Horses should then be purchased on this basis. One or two cheap frame stables should be constructed at each post to accommodate extra animals, and animals should be shipped to the post for which they are destined as soon as purchased.

They would then become acclimated and could be handled, to a certain extent, before the serious work of training was commenced.

No matter whether this plan is adopted or not, riding halls should be constructed at all posts where outdoor work cannot be carried on by mounted troops in the winter months.

With a three-year enlistment and few reënlistments it is essential that the mounted soldier should be riding every working day of the year, if efficiency is expected.

Under the present system of issue, remounts are not purchased until after the horses they are to replace have been condemned. The time of arrival is problematical and usually as necessity exists for their use; the time for outdoor instruction being limited, they are rushed into the ranks before being properly trained.

In addition to the above, there is no uniform and compulsory system for training remounts, and even under favorable auspices the kind and amount of training given depends upon the views or amount of knowledge of the individual organization commander.

In most cases the result is that the remount gets insufficient or improper training, and not being properly balanced, goes on his shoulders, breaks down in front, and is condemned after a comparatively short life.

Finally, the officer selected to purchase in open market should not only be a good judge of horses, but a good buyer. He should be permitted to pay a stated average price with a maximum and minimum limit, and in no case should any horse, no matter how desirable, be permitted to influence in any way the acceptance of any other or others, if any doubt exist as to the propriety of acceptance. This is a trick which horse sellers frequently practice.

It is believed that as a preliminary, a study by the officer detailed in charge of the remount bureau, and by the purchasing officers, of the manner of handling horses at the stock yards at East St. Louis, would be valuable, *i. e.*, following a dealer from the time he has purchased his bunch until he has finally disposed of them at the stock yards.

These men know every horse in their section of the country, and simply gather and pass along bunches of horses of from one to three car loads, and it is believed, from information gathered, that there is no large profit in their business.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE RIDING SADDLE.

FROM KRIEGSTECHSNISCHE-ZEITSCHRIFT.*

NINETEEN hundred years have passed since the first authentic use of the saddle for riding purposes. Its convenience and advantages quickly gained for it universal favor and assured its rapid development. The latter has from the beginning proceeded along two separate and distinct lines. These are shown to-day in what may be generally designated as (1) "platform" saddles and (2) "frame" or "saw-buck" saddles.

In the completed saddle, both forms seek to fulfill the requisite conditions of a base or groundwork consisting of two symmetrical parts, which, without pressing upon or touching the horse's backbone, lies parallel to it along the back and are held together by two arched binding pieces called the forks or trees.

By this arrangement is formed a concave or hollow seat, the long flat sides of which lie parallel to the backbone, and the short sides overspan but do not touch the vertebræ. In the earlier saddles the two systems, notwithstanding a great variety of detail, approach each other very closely in their essentials. In the later forms they differ widely.

In the platform system, the entire seat space between forks and side-bars, *i. e.*, the long pieces parallel to the backbone, is covered with a single piece of leather. The under surfaces of the side-bars are thickly padded and furnish all necessary support.

In the frame or saw-buck system, narrow supporting straps are tightly stretched between the front and rear forks. A padded seat cushion is placed upon the support so formed

*Translated by Captain W. D. Chitty, Fourth Cavalry, U. S. Army.

nd a thick cloth several times folded (the saddle blanket) akes the place of the thick padding under the side-bars used in the platform system.

From the two systems may be noted the following examples: In the first class or platform system is (1) the German or school saddle, which is provided front and rear with padding from ten to twelve centimeters thick. This saddle, at one time used by the cuirassiers, is to-day found only in cer-



FIG. 1.
OLD SADDLE FROM ABOVE. a'. WOOD. b. LEATHER TREE WITH STEEL BAND.

tain riding schools. It affords a very firm seat, and is therefore especially favored for young riders and for the breaking of young horses. (2) The French saddle is padded in front only, and constitutes a compromise between the German and (3) the English saddle, the lightest, most durable and popular of its class. This saddle, distinctly a platform saddle, hrough its close and firm seat, gives the rider perfect sympathy with the motion of the horse, and consequent improved control. The true English saddle has a long smooth seat and is principally used as a racing saddle. The padding and raising of the rear portion of this saddle forms what may be

called the German-English saddle. This saddle is used generally by our mounted and riding officers.

The other system (frame or saw-buck saddles) is seen in (4) the Hungarian saddle, bearing high spoon-shaped forks fro t and rear. A seat cushion is attached to these forks and rests upon thongs or straps stretched between the pommel and cantle. This saddle was used by all our mounted troops, the cuirassiers excepted, until the adoption of the present German army saddle.

The latter saddle was adopted for all the German cavalry in 1889, and was intended to combine the best features of the



FIG. 2. CROSS-SECTION OF THE OLD SADDLE.

Hungarian and English saddles. Its frame is formed of two curved and hollowed-out sidebars similar to those of the English saddle. These are padded on the lower faces. The forks, likewise similar to the forks of the English saddle, are connected by a seat strap or thong, broad at the rear and narrowing toward the front, upon which the leather seat is fastened.

All these saddles, whatever name they bear, possess, as well as certain advantages, various defects which stand very much in need of elimination before an ideal saddle can be obtained.

Of the first importance is the requirement that the saddle shall function perfectly with the horse's back. Otherwise

painful pressure at the edges and ends will be developed. If the saddle does not fit, the influence of buttocks and thighs as an aid to control is defective if not altogether useless, and the rider's seat is a faulty one.

A riding saddle adjustable to the back of any horse (thus avoiding the necessity of keeping in the saddle room, as is done in our field artillery, several sizes for exceptional backs) is said to have been exhibited at the Brussels Exhibition in



FIG. 3. SADDLE "GERMANE." VIEW FROM ABOVE.

1897. This saddle belonged to the class of frame saddles and was provided with movable sidebars. It was generally presumed that this saddle was similar in its adjusting mechanism to the adjustable collar, in which separate adjustments are necessary in order to obtain proper fitting. This, however, was not necessary in the adjustable saddle. The action of the sidebars was strictly automatic, the two parts through a peculiar connecting device placing themselves in proper position to fit the horse's back. It is said to have been in use by the Belgian field artillery, but it has not found favor with our service.

The successful elimination of the defects mentioned has

been obtained in part by means of a new and singular saddle construction. It has very recently been adopted by many officers, and is built by the court saddler, Friedrich Beyer, No. 7 Theresienstrasse, Munich, Germany.

The new steel spring tree saddle "Germane" owes its construction to the numerous complaints made concerning the hard and uncomfortable seats of the saddles heretofore in use. It therefore seems probable that the interest of all mounted and riding gentlemen will be attracted to the new saddle, which is already in use by a large number of the offi-



FIG. 4. CROSS-SECTION OF THE SADDLE "GERMANE."

cers on duty at the Royal Bavarian School of Equitation in Munich. These gentlemen all speak in terms of highest praise of the superior qualities and advantages of the new saddle. The latter appear in an improved action of the saddle upon the most difficult backs; an improved effect of the forward driving buttocks and thighs; a comfortable if not almost ideal seat for the thinnest and most pointed buttocks. Rupture of the saddle frame from ordinary causes is practically impossible.

In the wood and leather trees heretofore in use (Fig. 1), the sharp pointed pelvic bones, provided with comparatively thin muscular covering and surrounded with sensitive nerves,

bear directly upon the sharp edges of the side-bars, more especially if the saddler has drawn the seat leather too low or too loose and the saddle has been in long use. (Fig. 2.)



FIG. 5. LONGITUDINAL SECTION OF THE SADDLE "GERMANE."

If, on the other hand, the seat leather is too tightly drawn, thus raising the buttocks from the sidebars, the seat from the beginning is too hard and too much arched — one



FIG. 6. SADDLE "GERMANE." SKELETON FROM ABOVE.

might almost say too pointed. The effect of this is not only painful pressure upon the pelvic bones, but a force tending

to spread them apart. Which of these two cases is most likely to cause pain is a question which cannot be settled by the opinions of professional riders, but must be determined by individual experience.

The steel spring tree saddle "Germane" completely eliminates both of these serious defects by means of a singular construction of the frame.

The new saddle-frame is shown from various view points in Figs. 3 to 7 inclusive.

In Fig. 3 the tree is shown in outline from above; in Fig. 4, in cross-section, and in Fig. 5. in longitudinal section. Figs. 6 and 7 show the groundwork or skeleton of the saddle



FIG. 7. SADDLE "GERMANE." LONG SECTION OF SKELETON.

frame, the first from above, and the latter in longitudinal section. Fig. 8 shows the saddle complete.

The tree of the new saddle (Fig 3) consists essentially of a leather covered steel skeleton (Fig 6). The lyre-shaped sidebars of the skeleton (a Fig 6) are secured at their free ends and held firmly in place by the headpiece (b), to which they are riveted. The short braces (c) provide the necessary stiffening. Directly in rear of the headpiece, a secondary headpiece or support (e) is attached to the sidebars and carries the stirrup irons (d). The lateral arms of the headpiece are provided with a flange to which the saddle rings and other devices for carrying pouches and saddle bags are attached.

The frame formed by the uniting of the two headpieces with the ends of the sidebars is covered on both sides with leather (figures 3 and 5) and is thus formed into a strong,

stiff and compact leather body. Additional strength and stiffening for the frame is provided through a leather covering for the sidebars (a Figs. 3 and 5) extending around the rear of the saddle. This covering is securely fastened to the headpiece, the sidebars and rear of the saddle, and is stiffened by the processes in general use. It thus forms at the rear a broad surface for the support of the saddle cushion and augments the spring effect of the steel skeleton frame.



FIG. 8. COMPLETE SADDLE "GERMANE."

The most sensitive rider therefore finds in the "Germane" saddle a thoroughly comfortable and pleasant seat. Contrary to the trees heretofore in general use the weight of the rider is not supported entirely by the seat leather, but by the latter in conjunction with the soft saddle cushion.

Through this construction, the rider is enabled to sit close to the horse's back, the reciprocal movements of the rider's body with those of the horse thus attaining the maximum effect in comfort to the rider and control of the horse.

Other advantages, in addition to those enumerated, are to be found in the new saddle.

Rupture of the headpiece, common enough in the older trees, is practically impossible in the new tree, inasmuch as

the secondary headpiece, while carrying the stirrup irons, also provides a powerful support to the principal headpiece. (Fig. 6.)

The headpiece being attached to the sidebars in a very simple manner, it is practicable for any saddler to change the headpiece for another to suit the form of the particular horse, without the aid of an iron worker or of a saddle factory. The troublesome but necessary makeshift of padding the saddle in order to make it fit the backs of exceptional horses will therefore be obviated. Likewise the slipping of the saddle forward and the dangerous pressure resulting upon the withers will be prevented.

Through the improved construction of the headpiece, the saddle nails are attached directly to it. The carrying of equipment or saddle pockets is thus simplified and rendered more secure.

The application of the new construction to ladies' saddles has been productive of most favorable results.

It may be finally observed in comparing the new construction with the old, that the cost of the former, though in the first place some fifteen marks greater, is in the end really less, by virtue of its greater durability and the reduced expense of repair. The new saddle can be re-covered by any good saddler.

The foregoing remarks relating to the description of the new saddle "Germane," rest upon established facts.

It may consequently with certainty be predicted that this saddle has a great future before it.

A VISIT TO WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS.

By General W. H. CARTER, United States Army.

DURING the years 1780–81–82, the Marquis de Chastellux, a member of the French Academy and a major general in the French army, serving under Count de Rochambeau, made a tour of the colonies from New England to the James River in Virginia. His description of his experiences were translated and published. The Marquis enjoyed the friendship of Washington, who continued to correspond with him for some time after the former's return to France. There are many details of colonial and army life in this book of travels, some extracts from which may be of interest at the present time.

After a visit of inspection to West Point and the defenses of the Highlands, he made his way through New Jersey to Washington's headquarters, where he arrived as a dinner party of the General's were about to quit the table. Instructions were immediately given for the following day in order that the Marquis might see the army which was about to march to winter quarters. Let him tell his own story:

"Whilst we were at breakfast, horses were brought, and General Washington gave orders for the army to get under arms at the head of the camp. The weather was very bad, and it had already began raining; we waited half an hour; but the General, seeing that it was more likely to increase than diminish, determined to get on horseback. Two horses were brought him, which were a present from the State of Virginia; he mounted one himself, and gave me the other. Mr. Lynch and Mr. de Montesquieu, had each of them, also, a very handsome blood horse, such as we could not find at Newport for any money. We repaired to the artillery

camp, where General Knox received us; the artillery was numerous, and the gunners, in very fine order, were formed in parade, in the foreign manner; that is, each gunner at his battery, and ready to fire. The General was so good as to apologize to me for the cannon not firing to salute me; he said, that having put all the troops on the other side of the river in motion, and apprised them that he might himself march along the right bank, he was afraid of giving the alarm, and of deceiving the detachments that were out.

"We gained at length, the right of the army, where we saw the Pennsylvania line; it was composed of two brigades, each forming three battalions, without reckoning the light infantry, which were detached with the Marquis de la Fayette. General Wayne, who commanded it, was on horseback, as well as the brigadiers and colonels. They were all well mounted; the officers also had a very military air; they were well ranged, and saluted very gracefully. Each brigade had a band of music; the march they were then playing was the Huron. I knew that this line, though in want of many things, was the best clothed in the army; so that His Excellency asking me whether I would proceed and see the whole army, or go by the shortest road to the camp of the Marquis, I accepted the latter proposal. The troops ought to thank me for it, for the rain was falling with redoubled force; they were dismissed, therefore, and we arrived heartily wet at the Marquis de la Fayette's quarters, where I warmed myself with great pleasure, partaking from time to time of a large bowl of grog, which is stationary on his table, and is presented to every officer who enters. The rain appearing to cease, or inclined to cease for a moment, we availed ourselves of the opportunity to follow His Excellency to the camp of the Marquis. We found all his troops in order of battle on the heights to the left, and himself at their head, expressing by his air and countenance that he was happier in receiving me there than at his estate in Auvergne. The confidence and attachment of the troops are for him invaluable possessions, well acquired riches, of which nobody can deprive him; but what, in my opinion, is still more flattering for a young man of his age, is the influence and con

sideration he has acquired among the political, as well as the military order; I do not fear contradiction when I say that private letters from him have frequently produced more effect on some States than the strongest exhortations of the Congress. On seeing him, one is at a loss which most to admire, that so young a man as he should have given such eminent proofs of talents, or that a man so tried should give hopes of so long a career of glory. Fortunate his country if she knows how to avail herself of them; more fortunate still should she stand in no need of calling them into exertion!

"I distinguished with pleasure among the colonels, who were extremely well mounted, and who saluted with great grace, M. de Gimat, a French officer, over whom I claim the right of a sort of military paternity, having brought him up in my regiment from his earliest youth. This whole vanguard consisted of six battalions, forming two brigades; but there was only one piquet of dragoons or light cavalry, the remainder having marched to the southward with Colonel Lee. These dragoons are perfectly well mounted, and do not fear meeting the English dragoons, over whom they have gained several advantages; but they have never been numerous enough to form a solid and permanent body. The piquet that was kept with the army served then as an escort to the provost marshal, and performed the functions of the Marechaussee, until the establishment of a regular one, which was intended.

"The rain spared us no more at the camp of the Marquis than at that of the main army; so that our review being finished, I saw with pleasure General Washington set off in a gallop to regain his quarters. We reached them as soon as the badness of the roads would permit us. At our return we found a good dinner ready, and about twenty guests, among whom were Generals Howe and Sinclair. The repast was in the English fashion, consisting of eight or ten large dishes of butcher's meat, and poultry, with vegetables of several sorts, followed by a second course of pastry, comprised under the two denominations of pies and puddings. After this the cloth was taken off, and apples and a great

quantity of nuts were served, which General Washington usually continues eating for two hours, toasting and conversing all the time. These nuts are small and dry, and have so hard a shell (hickory nuts) that they can only be broken by the hammer; they are served half open, and the company are never done picking and eating them. The conversation was calm and agreeable; His Excellency was pleased to enter with me into the particulars of some of the principal operations of the war, but always with a modesty and conciseness which proved that it was from pure complaisance he mentioned it. About half past seven we rose from table, and immediately the servants came to shorten it and convert it into a round one; for at dinner it was placed diagonally to give more room. I was surprised at this maneuver, and asked the reason of it; I was told they were going to lay the cloth for supper. In half an hour I retired to my chamber, fearing lest the General might have business, and that he remained in company only on my account; but at the end of another half hour I was informed that His Excellency expected me at supper. I returned to the dining room, protesting against this supper; but the General told me he was accustomed to take something in the evening; that if I would be seated I should only eat some fruit and assist in the conversation. I desired nothing better, for there were then no strangers, and nobody remained but the General's family. The supper was composed of three or four light dishes, some fruit, and above all, a great abundance of nuts, which were as well received in the evening as at dinner. The cloth being soon removed, a few bottles of good claret and madeira were placed on the table.

"The weather being fair, on the 26th I got on horseback, after breakfasting with the General. He was so attentive as to give me the horse he rode on the day of my arrival, which I had greatly commended: *I found him as good as he is handsome; but above all, perfectly well broke, and well trained, having a good mouth, easy in hand, and stopping short in a gallop without bearing the bit. I mention these minute particulars because it is the General himself who breaks all his own horses; and he is a very excellent and bold horseman, leaping the*

highest fences, and going extremely quick without standing upon his stirrups, bearing on the bridle, or letting his horse run wild, circumstances which our young men look upon as so essential a part of English horsemanship, that they would rather break a leg or an arm than renounce them.

"Here would be the proper place to give the portrait of General Washington; but what can my testimony add to the idea already formed of him? The continent of North America, from Boston to Charleston, is a great volume, every page of which presents his eulogium. I know, that having had the opportunity of a near inspection, and of closely observing him, some more particular details may be expected from me; but the strongest characteristic of this respectable man is the perfect union which reigns between the physical and moral qualities which compose the individual; one alone will enable you to judge of all the rest. If you are presented with medals of Cæsar, of Trajan, or Alexander, on examining their features you will still be led to ask what was their stature, and the form of their persons; but if you discover, in a heap of ruins, the head or limb of an antique Apollo, be not curious about the other parts, but rest assured that they all were comformable to those of a god. Let not this comparison be attributed to enthusiasm! It is not my intention to exaggerate, I wish only to express the impression General Washington has left on my mind; the idea of a perfect whole, that cannot be the produce of enthusiasm, which rather would reject it, since the effect of proportion is to diminish the idea of greatness. Brave without temerity, laborious without ambition, generous without prodigality, noble without pride, virtuous without severity, he seems always to have confined himself within those limits, where the virtues, by clothing themselves in more lively but more changeable and doubtful colors, may be mistaken for faults. This is the seventh year that he has commanded the army, and that he has obeyed the Congress; more need not be said, especially in America, where they know how to appeciate all the merit contained in this simple fact. Let it be repeated that Conde was intrepid, Turenne prudent, Eugene adroit, Catinat disinterested. It is not thus that Washington

will be characterized. It will be said of him, *at the end of a long civil war he had nothing with which he could reproach himself.* If anything can be more marvelous than such a character, it is the unanimity of the public suffrages in his favor. Soldier, magistrate, people, all love and admire him; all speak of him in terms of tenderness and veneration. Does there then exist a virtue capable of restraining the injustice of mankind; or are glory and happiness too recently established in America, for envy to have deigned to pass the seas?

"In speaking of this perfect whole of which General Washington furnishes the idea, I have not excluded exterior form. His stature is noble and lofty; he is well made and exactly proportioned; his physiognomy mild and agreeable, but such as to render it impossible to speak particularly of any of his features, so that in quitting him, you have only the recollection of a fine face. He has neither a grave nor a familiar air, his brow is sometimes marked with thought, but never with inquietude; in inspiring respect, he inspires confidence, and his smile is always the smile of benevolence.

"But above all, it is in the midst of his general officers that it is interesting to behold him. General in a republic, he has not the imposing stateliness of a Marechal de France who gives the order; a hero in a republic, he excites another sort of respect, which seems to spring from the sole idea that the safety of each individual is attached to his person. As for the rest, I must observe on this occasion that the general officers of the American army have a very military and a very becoming carriage; that even all the officers, whose characters were brought into public view, unite much politeness to a great deal of capacity; that the headquarters of this army, in short, neither present the image of want nor inexperience. When one sees the battalion of the General's guards encamped within the precincts of his house; nine wagons, destined to carry his baggage, ranged in his court; a great number of grooms taking care of very fine horses belonging to the general officers and their aids-de-camp; when one observes the perfect order that reigns within these precincts, where the guards are exactly stationed, and where the drums beat an alarm, and a particular retreat, one is

tempted to apply to the Americans what Pyrrhus said of the Romans."

The Marquis later visited Philadelphia, and describes a dinner at the house of Chevalier de la Luzerne, French ambassador. Amongst those whom he met at dinner was "Colonel Laurens, son of Mr. Laurens, late President of Congress, and now a prisoner in the Tower of London; he speaks very good French, which is not surprising, as he was educated at Geneva, but it is to his honor, that being married in London, he should quit England to serve America. He has distinguished himself on several occasions, particularly at Germantown, where he was wounded." To this the translator has added the following note: "Among the numerous traits that might be cited to do honor to this illustrious young man, so prematurely and unfortunately lost to his family and his country, the translator has selected the following, extracted from the journals of Congress:

"THURSDAY, November 5, 1778.

"*Resolved*, 'That John Laurens, Esq., aid-de-camp to General Washington, be presented with a Continental commission of lieutenant colonel, in testimony of the sense which Congress entertains of his patriotic and spirited services as a volunteer in the American army, and of his brave conduct in several actions, particularly in that of Rhode Island on the 29th of August last; and that General Washington be directed, whenever an opportunity shall offer, to give Lieutenant Colonel Laurens command agreeable to his rank.'

"FRIDAY, November 6, 1778.

"A letter of this day, from Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens was read, expressing 'his gratitude for the unexpected honor which Congress was pleased to confer on him by the resolutions passed yesterday, and the high satisfaction it would have afforded him could he have accepted it without injuring the rights of the officers in the line of the army, and doing an evident injustice to his colleagues in the family of the commander-in-chief; that having been a spectator of

the convulsions occasioned in the army by disputes of rank, he holds the tranquility of it too dear to be instrumental in disturbing it; and, therefore, entreating Congress to suppress the resolve of yesterday, ordering him a commission of lieutenant colonel, and to accept his sincere thanks for the intended honor.' Whereupon

"*Resolved*, That Congress highly approve the disinterested and patriotic principles upon which Lieutenant Colonel Laurens has declined to accept the promotion conferred on him by Congress."

It is a far cry from the Revolution to the War with Spain, and one is apt to say, in these iconoclastic days, that such things no longer occur, yet it is an established fact, at least in two cases known to the writer, that young men of merit and capacity, appointed to volunteer staff commissions in the war with Spain, presumably because their fathers were influential Senators, declined the appointments with the full consent and approval of their distinguished parents.

It was a genuine privilege to have access, upon terms of intimacy, to those controlling the destinies of the colonies. It is also a privilege to have the opportunity to read the opinions of so distinguished a Frenchman upon our military system and the customs and manners of the Revolutionary period in the Colonies.

CHICAGO, ILL., October 31, 1907.

Editor Cavalry Journal:

In reading Marquis de Chastellux's journal of his travels I was impressed with certain parts which may be of interest to the young officers, who must ever constitute the main support of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. When I was the editor I was sometimes puzzled for an article which would lend variety to the contents, and it is the memory of that fact which has led me to quote these extracts.

Yours very truly.

W. H. CARTER.

THE BRITISH REMOUNT SYSTEM.

By COLEMAN NOCKOLDS, Veterinarian First Cavalry.

THE British Remount System is a branch of the Quartermaster General's Department, and is controlled by the Director of Transport and Remounts at the War Office. The term quartermaster will soon be a thing of the past in connection with the British military system (except, perhaps, when referring to the Quartermaster General). The following is found in paragraph No. 149, The King's Regulations and Orders, 1904:

"Commanding officers will report through generals commanding to the War Office whether they recommend the continuance in active service of the quartermaster, serving under their command on their completing ten, fifteen and twenty years service in those ranks respectively."

Quartermasters are being retired as quickly as the rules of the service admit. The executive functions of the Quarmaster General in the several commands are carried out by the Army Service Corps. Everything in the line of work that would otherwise detract from the fighting strength of the army by the employment of the enlisted men from the ranks is done by the Army Service Corps. This is really a working corps to serve the army and to supply the needs of its daily life. Its chief duties are caring for and issuing of food and rations for men and horses and providing transportation of every kind needed by the army. They also do the clerical work of the army. They have charge of the barracks, stables and their furniture, allot them to the troops, and attend to the supply of fuel, light and water. Men of every trade that can be used in the service are enlisted in

its ranks. Comparatively lately, the duty of providing the personnel for the remount depots has been given this corps.

In the United Kingdom there are four remount companies of the Army Service Corps, with headquarters at Woolwich and Dublin. There are four farms attached to depots, which are designated by numbers: No. 1, depot, Lusk; No. 2 depot, Plumstead Marshes; No. 3 depot, Melton Mobray; No. 5 depot, Aborfield Cross. The cadre of Nos. 1 and 2 are supplied from the remount companies of the Army Service Corps. Depots Nos. 3 and 4 have a civilian personnel. Each depot is independent and its administration is directly under the War Office.

The general function of these depots is the receiving and issuing of new purchases and recuperating stations for convalescent and wornout animals. Usually after maneuvers on a large scale these farms are taxed to their limits with animals temporarily inefficient, which otherwise would require the enlisted strength of their regiment to look after them, thus interfering with the drills and training which are so necessary for the complete efficiency of the fighting man. In the event of mobilization these depots are expanded, and they are cleared to admit newly purchased horses; the sick unsuitable and those under six are removed; all animals on hand fit for active service are sent to units needing them, chiefly those that are mobilizing to war strength; all outgoing regiments are relieved of inefficients and efficients are given in exchange. At each depot the mobilization sheds are used for the concentration of those animals that are on the registration lists for supply during war.

The Woolwich remount depot is typical, and the farm connected with it is as large as any of the others, but I cannot say that it impressed me as an ideal one for its purpose. There is not room enough, and the stables, like all other modern ones under the control of the army, are one storied, many of them being divided into a number of loose boxes, which take in the whole depth of the building, and open into quadrangles which they surround; the rest are simply large buildings, divided into single stalls. Besides the stables there are buildings on the same plan fitted up as

shoeing shops, veterinary pharmacies, offices, carriage and equipment sheds and quarters for the non-commissioned officers and men of the Army Remount Service and Veterinary Corps. The exercising grounds are soft turf and laid out for saddle and driving purposes; there are high and broad jumps, and places to exercise horses without riders, so arranged that one man can exercise a number of horses at all paces. There are also corrals and chutes and other devices arranged so that horses can be easily caught and handled. The forges are fitted with special arrangements for handling and shoeing young animals, extraordinary precautions being taken that they are neither frightened or hurt during their first lessons in shoeing. Most approved harness and rigging for breaking and gentling young horses are in use.

Attached to each remount depot is a detachment of the Army Veterinary Corps which with the Army Service Corps makes up its personnel. The commanding officer and his adjutant are officers of the Army Service Corps.

The remount department is responsible for the training and conditioning of animals and turning them out fit for work, shod up and in good wind. All animals that have become unfit for service are taken in and serviceable animals exchanged for them.

During active service, base depots are established, which are in charge of deputy assistant director of remounts, and they are responsible for the reception of all animals arriving by sea, their issue to depots; the organizing of convalescent farms on the lines of communication, and for the keeping of all animal and other accounts connected with their department. Each advance depot is also commanded by a deputy assistant director, who is responsible for keeping the assistant director informed of all probable requirements.

Embarkation depots are on the same lines as ordinary peace depots. They are required to accommodate at least six hundred animals, must be in thorough working order, and always have a proportion of extra animals on hand to take the place of any that may be rejected at the ship's side. Rejected animals, except those seriously injured, are kept at

the embarkation depot until ready to ship, and those in bad condition are sent to the veterinary hospital.

At a base depot all the functions of an ordinary remount depot can be carried out as regards training, recuperation, etc. Regular cattle trains, under the control of the Army Service Corps convey the animals to and fro. After animals have been received at a base depot they are forwarded to the advance depots, from whence they are distributed to the troops on the fighting line as required. The officer in charge of an advance depot is also required to replace casualties. Each depot is divided into sections, into which animals are passed and classified as "fit for immediate issue," "temporary detention," and "prolonged rest or disposal;" these latter are immediately sent to a base depot. In general the functions of the depots are to feed one another in efficents from the embarkation depots to the troops in the field, and to relieve one another of inefficients back again to the embarkation depot.

The duties of the Remount Service are to supply the army with suitable animals for the requirements of each branch, to keep the units up to the standard, to regulate the issues and maintain an equal establishment in each unit; to control the castings (horses that are to be condemned), and to make recommendations with a view to economical administration.

The Army Remount Service formulate plans so as to meet the contingencies of war, by keeping tab on the available supply of horses by a system of registration (described later on) and by collecting reliable information as to the conditions of the horse markets of the world, and the likely locations where animals are to be found. It also, through the director of transports, prepare for the necessary ships and the necessity of fitting at foreign ports, ships that are not already fitted as horse transports. Under the director of transports and remounts, the assistant director of remounts at headquarters is responsible for the maintenance of the intelligence section of the office, which deals with supplies and capabilities of over sea countries; and with information, capacity and suitability of ports and railway communica-

tions, with a view of the contingencies of war. He maintains a roster of officers and others suitable and available for the remount service, at home and abroad, either in peace or war. He is assisted by a staff captain. There are three inspectors of remounts who are the purchasing and distributing officers for the branches of the service for which they are responsible, viz: Cavalry, artillery, royal engineers, army service corps, and other draft animals. They control the admissions to and issues from the respective depots and are responsible for acquiring the necessary supply.

The deputy assistant directors of remounts are attached to the administrative staff of the general officers commanding in chief, and are under the control of the War Office. They are advisers of the generals commanding on remount matters generally; they are responsible for the maintenance of reliable information within their districts, for the provision of the necessary supplies of animals for the troops in the command upon mobilization, and for taking general and disciplinary charge of the remount depots. They also keep a check on the public animals up for casting and supervise the same. Remount officers are on no account employed on other than remount duty either during peace or war. Nor are they permitted to purchase animals for their own use, or to enter into business relations with persons in whom they are directly or indirectly interested without special sanction from the War Office to do so, and they are expected to give their whole attention to the work of their government.

Inspectors of remounts purchase all public animals, and distribute them. They collect information bearing on the horse markets in their reach, and they are held responsible for the economical expenditure of public funds. They have free access to public stables at all times. They are required to keep a diary of the exact details of their work, the number of horses seen and purchased, the veterinary officer who accompanied them, the disposition of their purchases, and their accounts must in all cases show the amount paid for the horse, all contingent expense connected with it, and other details.

Animals are purchased under ordinary peace conditions

by officers of the remount service, who are permanently detailed for that service. They cause it to be known in the district to which they are detailed that they will be at a certain place at a specified time for the purpose of purchasing animals for the particular branch of the service and the kind that they need.

There is a scheme of *registration* by which the British army is furnished with remounts during a national emergency. Remount officers are required to be thoroughly posted as regards the details of this system. It consists of a reserve of horses, established by a voluntary registration of horses by their owners. Private individuals, firms and other owners having a number of animals at their disposal are invited to offer them for registration, and those which on the inspection of a remount officer are found suitable for army purposes are registered, the owner signing an agreement to sell on demand and receiving in return an annual subsidy of ten shillings. These animals are inspected annually by officers of the remount department; the class of work for which they are suited is noted and the price for which they can be bought, if taken during the year, is arranged. By the terms of the agreement the owner is bound to furnish the animal agreed upon or pay a large penalty. These agreements can be terminated by either party by a six months' notice. There are over fourteen thousand horses registered under this system in Great Britain which can be mobilized in about six days. The agreement requires that their owners should have forty-eight hours' notice in which to make delivery. To facilitate this registration the country is divided into fifty districts, a remount and a veterinary officer being detailed for each district.

By special agreement with companies having a large number of draft animals which require large collars, the collars and head stalls are sent with those animals.

Many of these registered horses are the property of masters of hounds and huntsmen, and these make excellent chargers and troopers for the medium and heavy cavalry, and being always in condition are an excellent type of war horse for immediate use.

The two most important things for an ideal remount system which England lacks, are a sufficient home supply of animals and plenty of room to work in. She has to depend to a large extent for her horse supply on her colonies, and even on foreign countries, as was fully demonstrated during the late South African War. It is different with the United States, which has more of both than she needs for that purpose.

England evidently patronizes home products, as I looked over several hundreds of remounts and only saw one foreign horse branded with the broad arrow. He was from the United States, and a splendid type of trooper he was, superior in many respects to many of the home-bred horses.

The system used by the remount department when purchasing in foreign countries is much the same as at home. The officers obtain all the information possible from H. M. consuls and other interested parties in the location or country to which they are sent. They establish embarkation depots, and fit them out in a similar manner to the depots at home.

The following are the specifications for corrals and inspection grounds:

For Handling Horses and Mules.—All to be of the strongest material and to be disinfected constantly; strong, well-built corrals; paddocks for inspection, with good water and food; collecting pens; two chutes for bridling; "temporary reject" pen; pen for rejected horses; pen for accepted horses; gallop, 300 yards long; forge and appliances; branding chute, strongly constructed; veterinary inspection pen; entraining pens. The inspection ground is required to be close to the railroad, and not nearer than a specified number of miles to a city limit, as a precaution against infection.

Minimum Labor Required at Each Inspection.—Three riders for every 100 horses, and not less than five riders if 100 horses are exceeded; one leader for every rider; one blacksmith; three branders and clippers; six helpers; one clerk, and one foreman.

Horses are to be caught up and haltered at least one hour before the inspection commences and kept perfectly quiet.

The inspector will decide whether the horses are to be ridden bareback or in the saddle. Only snaffle bridles will be allowed. Riders will be required to saddle, mount and dismount unaided in the presence of the inspector.

The purchasing officer is responsible for the discipline and general management of an inspection, on the lines laid down by the head of the commission. He decides as to the conformation, size, quality and action of the animal, suitability for military service, and as to what class the animal is suited. He supervises the management of shipping and other expenses inside his district.

The veterinary officer is responsible for the health, sanitation, and unsoundness in every particular, and the recording of ages. No animal will be accepted under any pretence whatever without the sanction of the veterinary officer; his decision is final, and is attested by his signature in the inspection book.

The superintending officer of the depot or corral sees to the entraining and detraining of stock; he makes all arrangements for the conveyance of animals on the railroad, to pastures, and to the railroads. He controls the sufficiency of forage, inspects the same as to quality, and keeps a reserve on hand in case of emergencies, sees that the water supply is good, and that all windmills or engines are in good repair. He sees that the fences, hay racks, and loose woodwork and feed troughs are in good repair, and that there are no nails, barbed wire, or anything that might injure stock lying around any part of the ground occupied by the depot.

Specifications for Horses or Cobs.—Age five to nine years. Riding cobs (not ponies), geldings and mares (not in foal), in fair flesh and condition, able to carry fifteen stone under active service conditions; sound in action, wind and eyes; practically sound otherwise; strong, active and sufficiently fast; fair riding shoulders, strong quarters and loins; good condition and constitution; short, well shaped back and legs, roomy and well ribbed; good, clear, straight action; strong, clean legs and feet, properly shaped and placed; quiet, without vice, well broken and mouthed; teeth complete, well shaped and not tampered with; color not very light gray

or white. The inspecting officer is the sole judge as to suitability.

The following are grounds for rejecting any horse: Small, weak quarters, flat sides, split up and leggy, long, weak and bending pasterns, small joints, close hocks or action, legs not well placed, any mark of brushing except it is due to bad shoeing; any indication of weak constitution, very straight pasterns, small or uneven feet, vice of any kind, evidence of fistulous withers, evidence of operations on the teeth, bad constitution, bad condition, parrot-mouthed or undershot, capped elbows, marks of whip or spur not done under the eye of the inspector, or undue sweating, same being probably indicative of vice or bad manners, very short docks.

In his final reports the purchasing officer describes the place where the commission carried on its operations, the date on which he left England, when he arrived, remarks on the passage, accommodation of the ship, etc.; information as to the means of getting about; accommodation and railway facilities; persons who proved useful; how they were able to help; persons, locations, etc., to be avoided; horses, their class advantages, disadvantages, numbers available, to what degree trained and what for, their characters, staple food, style of shoeing, and at what age they are locally put to work, what kind of work, that is, suitability for light draught, riding and for light and heavy cavalry. Ordinary local market prices at different ages and prevailing market conditions; facilities for moving horses by rail, etc.; for caring for them when bought and for embarking them.

The class of men to be dealt with as helpers, for all operations of purchase, traveling, entraining, embarkation, etc.; the wages to each class, the best means of getting the best men; the best way of getting the horses together; the finance banks used; how accounts are kept, payments made, and if they are audited locally.

As a general rule in the time of peace horses are purchased between the ages of six and seven.

In England lists showing the names of private persons and companies owning stocks of horses from whom they may be bought in cases of emergency, are kept, also the

units mobilizing in the command, with the number and class of horse required to complete each one from the peace to the war establishment.

A list of thoroughly qualified gentlemen in districts who know the country well and who would be useful and willing to act as purchasers on emergency. These gentlemen are kept posted in time of peace so that they may be on the lookout for opportunities of availing themselves of knowledge likely to be of use to the remount officer.

Clear information is required from time to time at short notice on the following subjects: Registration, horse population, importations, purchases by foreign governments, lists of civil veterinary surgeons and smiths, cost of feeding, railway facilities, depots, casting, locomotion, purchasers on emergency, ports of embarkation, facilities and suitability.

In the performances of their ordinary duties remount officers are required to locate animals that would do for government service that are located in the area to which they are detailed. The horse population of these areas should be classified as follows: Heavy draught; light draught and saddle; estimated under five years of age; over five if suited for military use; information as to the number of mules, donkeys and stallions in the district. Officers are warned against overestimating numbers of animals available in their district.

A confidential record is kept of thoroughly reliable civil veterinary surgeons particularly fitted for remount work at home or abroad in case of war, also of smiths, and the current rate of wages paid in that particular locality. A list of undesirables of both these classes is also made out.

The local cost per head for feeding is known, as well as the approximate cost of grazing facilities. The British government considers the method of buying supplies from large contractors is one to be avoided if possible, and advocates the patronage of the small producers as far more satisfactory to both receiver and seller, and advises officers concerned against the letting out of large contracts whenever it is possible to avoid doing so.

Although the accommodations at the remount depots

cannot be compared as far as riding and training goes with most of the cavalry and royal horse artillery, regimental headquarters or the riding establishment at Canterbury, nevertheless animals are broken in for saddle and draught purposes and bitted and handled in a most thorough manner. After this preliminary training a horse is selected by the inspector of remounts for each soldier and forwarded direct to the riding establishment at Canterbury, after about three weeks at the depot. There the horse receives a severe course of training for whatever branch of the service he is best fitted. On the completion of this course the animals to be issued to the cavalry of the line are drafted to those regiments needing them. The soldiers of the Household cavalry and the Royal Engineers take the horses allotted to them, with them back to their respective units; and the horses trained for the Royal Horse Artillery and the Army Service Corps are sent to the depot at Woolwich. After arrival at the units to which they belong all these animals are required to go through a special course of regimental training according to the outfit to which they belong. When the riding master of the regiment can give a certificate to the effect that the animal is competent to do regimental duty, and not before, he is admitted to the ranks. This is also true in the case of officers' chargers.

The system of supplying officers with chargers in the British service seems to be a good one. There is a charge of ten pounds (about fifty dollars, American), made by the government, for which an officer is supplied with a charger as long as he is in the service. If the animal is killed or dies or is rendered unfit for duty, it is replaced by one just as good without further charge; or if an officer is ordered to duty to a place where he cannot take his horse, he is found with a charger in the place of the one left behind. Animals bought by the government as officers' chargers are in every way a very superior class of horse, and a great deal more money is paid for the charger than is paid for the ordinary trooper.

Remounts are treated as such for a period of twelve months after they join their regiments. They commence

quiet work immediately after they are pronounced fit for the same by the veterinary officer in charge, and the duration of their daily exercise is gradually increased as their feed of corn is augmented. At no time is their work such as to reduce their condition or induce fatigue. They are allowed plenty of room and air, and closely watched for the appearance of any signs of disease. They are never put in the same stable with the older horses, and their hind feet are left unshod until after training. A non-commissioned officer is put in charge and one good man looks after two remounts. These men are excused from all duties except from parade. Special care is taken with the fitting of saddles, and the saddle trees are fitted without panels or blankets. Once every week during drill season all the horses are saddled with stripped saddles, and examined to determine as to whether there are any saddles that need readjusting. Once every six months the whole of the saddle horses in a cavalry regiment have their saddles stripped and fitted under the personal supervision of the commanding officer, who sees that the saddle trees fit the horses' backs.

The financial losses to the English during the late South African War, occurring through using green remounts, both in deaths and other casualties, were among their largest, and some few reverses, especially in minor engagements, were attributed to this cause. Among other reasons that remounts should not be allowed to join regular units without preliminary training and handling, are the following: They are often soft through standing and being fed up with a view of selling them, and in this case it takes several weeks to get them into condition, during which time the conformation (transitory) is constantly changing, and the saddle that fits during the first week does not fit later. Most probably if more attention was given to the foregoing, there would occur a less number of sore backs and chafes when on long marches. Very young animals are not completely developed and they cannot stand the wear and tear of the ranks; their bones are soft and they are liable to complaints peculiar to the young horse. The result is a break-down, or spavin, splints, ringbones and kindred diseases occur and render them unfit for

military purposes even before they have become trained. Or as a result of ordinary military operations before they are matured, they become run down and predisposed to chest diseases or other ailments, which either takes them off or renders them useless.

Horses that are not mouthed at whatever age, when taken and bitted with the ordinary service bit, are often ruined either by injuries to their mouths and jaws, or are made confirmed bolters. Horses of any class would last longer and be of more use to the services if they went through a gradual and thorough training and were fit in every way before joining the ranks; in this way many, if not all, the existing evils could be avoided and the government would be the gainer in every way.

Of course, remount depots and farms are a long way past the experimental stage in the European countries. For the sake of experiment one or more remount depots should be established in the United States. Some of the lately disbanded posts offer ideal facilities for this purpose. The stables, buildings, corrals, water, etc., could be used for the animals, and the storehouses and quarters for the attendants. It costs no more to feed remounts at a remount station than at a garrisoned post. The personnel could be made up from volunteers from different organizations who were interested and recommended by their troop or battery commanders as adapted for that particular work. It would be necessary that most of them be good riders and some of them good horsemen. More than enough officers could be found who are both adapted and enthusiastic enough over the scheme to volunteer for it and make it a success. The guard duty would be no more than is necessary for the ordinary ranchman, and could be done by detail. The system that I would recommend is a combination of those of England and the chief continental countries.

THE CAVALRY IN THE EAST ASIATIC CAMPAIGN.*

Lessons and Critical Contemplations
By Count GUSTAV WRANGEL, Captain Austrian Cavalry.

I. INTRODUCTION.

IT almost seems as if the limited and faulty performances of the cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War have had a depressing effect on the pens of those called on to criticise and report their doings.

In spite of the fact that the literature of this campaign is already very voluminous, the cavalry has been almost entirely overlooked, and it seems to us that this fault should, in the interest of the cavalry service, be remedied as soon as practicable.

Entirely ignoring the part taken by the cavalry in the Manchurian campaign has led to erroneous ideas, and to combat these false impressions is our main object, for fear that they gain more and more credence.

Our conviction, that strong cavalry is at all times an essential factor in every army corps, is supported by that high authority, the Japanese. According to the latest information obtainable, the Japanese War Department intends to organize not less than eight cavalry divisions in its forthcoming reorganization of the army. This means a doubling of their present cavalry force.

Now, it is a well established fact that the Japanese have proved themselves to be an eminently practical people, and therefore, they are free of any suspicion of keeping an un-

*Translated from the German by Sergeant Harry Bell, Corps Engineers, U. S. Army.

necessary cavalry force, simply on account of tradition or for mere show. If they increase their cavalry, it is done under the conviction that their numerically inferior cavalry prevented them from reaping the fruits of their successes in the late war.

But a professional man should study the events of this war not merely for the purpose of finding arguments against a diminution of the cavalry arm. The sins of omission with their drastic consequences often offer more instructive lessons than the most brilliant feats of arms. Even if the tactics of cavalry on its open questions, receives no clear answer from the events of the Russo-Japanese War, it will enable us to gain fresh starting points from the results attained by the two other arms in that war.

Considering the present extended fronts of battles, their long duration and the artificial strengthening of positions, the battle efficiency of cavalry must be led into entirely different channels than heretofore. As the larger cavalry battles were not decisive, we have nothing by which we can decide the superiority of mass or group tactics, of saber or lance, but on the other hand, the outcome of several very interesting raids shows the principles which, if followed, leads to success.

Concerning the reconnaissance service of the cavalry of both sides, we have but the outlines of the whole campaign to go by. We cannot arrive at a clear judgment as to this until the respective parties speak out for themselves; before the respective General Staff of both armies throws more light on the many details concerning the service of information, etc.

Therefore we will limit ourselves in this paper, leaving aside all details which cannot now be substantiated, to the discussion of the following questions:

1. What *has* been done?
2. What *should* have been done?
3. On what grounds may we justify the sins of omission?
4. Have we taken the proper steps that *our* cavalry—if called on—will do better?

Only by a correct and complete answer to the last question will we be enabled to properly utilize the experiences of this campaign and fully appreciate our arm.

II. THE PERFORMANCES OF THE CAVALRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

(*a*) *The Russians.*

The very great respect which the Russian Empire commanded from all of Europe before the war with Japan, was based principally on its numerical fighting strength. But real experiences and facts showed that this respect had but a partial foundation in fact. Numerical strength played too much of a rôle; and it had been forgotten that in spite of its numerical superiority the Russian Empire had not been a shining example in the Crimea and in the war of 1877–78.

In the Crimean War, Russia was not able to save Sebastopol, and in the latter war it would have been defeated had it not been for the timely help of Roumania. The excellent qualities of their soldiery; their heroism, blind obedience, patriotism and physical endurance were outweighed by faulty leadership, by bad administration, and by the passiveness of the character of the entire population.

It cannot be denied, however, that Russia had in the years of peace from 1878 to 1904 rectified the faults which so glaringly appeared in their army administration during the Russo-Turkish War. The administration in Manchuria has been almost faultless.

But all their improvements and reforms have not been able to elevate the spirit and morale of their army sufficiently to gain superiority over an opponent like the Japanese.

The reasons why the moral peculiarities of the Russian army leave much to be desired are found deep in the whole system. It would prove too big an undertaking to explain them here. It will suffice for our purposes to state that lax discipline, fear of taking responsibility, rivalry and immorality in the higher leaders, lack of inspiration and of love of

battle throughout the army, are far more to blame for their defeat than the faults of the War Office.

Critics of the campaign have in most cases paid little attention to these psychological factors which laid heavy on Kuropatkin. This exceedingly able and educated general well knew the Japanese soldiers even before the outbreak of the war, and the great difference in the spirit in both armies was no secret to him from the very start.

The first battles, especially the taking of the heights of Kintschou, only served to strengthen his knowledge, and out of this knowledge of the inferiority of his own tools may well have sprung the lack of initiative and the hesitating conduct of the war.

Also in judging of the offensive spirit of the Russian cavalry leaders, we must never forget to take into consideration these psychological factors. The quintessence of wonder and respect accorded to Russia by all of Europe before the opening of the campaign referred especially to the Russian cavalry.

When about twenty years ago the political horizon was very cloudy, Germany and Austria saw in their mind's eye the frontier provinces overrun with innumerable hostile cavalry hordes. Even the highest military authorities were affected by this idea, and when the war clouds finally raised and dispersed the respect for this superior numerical force, its war organization, its fighting qualities, and the excellent material of the Russian cavalry, remained.

A few professional military men, however, saw deeper. They were not deceived by numbers on paper, by the bayonet charges of dismounted cavalry, by long distance marches over ice and snow and by the different equestrian feats of the Cossacks. The little importance to be attached in reality to the Cossack formation in modern war, the low grade of intelligence of officers and enlisted men of the cavalry, and the one sided education of the entire cavalry, was to them no secret.

Notwithstanding all this knowledge, these well informed authorities had no doubt that the weak and inferior Japanese cavalry would be easily defeated and that there would

then be no difficulty in the Russian cavalry divisions placing serious obstacles in the field in front of the advancing Japanese columns.

That the opposite has been proved to be the case, however, should not lead us to condemn the *entire* Russian cavalry without further ado. The contingent which was attached to the Manchurian field army (at Mukden, Kuropatkin had 149 squadrons and sotnias) seems to have been more than sufficient in quantity for the solution of all tasks falling to the cavalry. Considering the *quality*, however, not more than two-thirds of them should be considered.

In fact, but three regiments belonged to the regular cavalry (Guard and Dragoons) of which two, the Fifty-first and Fifty-second Dragoons, reached the theater of operations with the Seventeenth Army Corps only at the end of July, 1904, and the Fourth (Don) Cossack Division reached the army in the field only at the end of October, 1904.

The Orenburg, Ural and other Asiatic Cossack troops, which formed the main part of the Russian cavalry in Manchuria, consisted mostly of troops of the second and third draft, and the disappointment as to the results obtained by the Russian cavalry must be ascribed mainly to this irregular Cossack corps.

Even in foreign military circles it was no secret that the Don Cossack troops attached to the European cavalry divisions could be counted on to perform the duties expected of other cavalry only by half. And for years a scarcity of horses existed. The men called into active service, who were required to furnish their own mounts and arms, were known to be unable to do so, and the task of supplying mounts had therefore to be assumed by the government. So many difficulties had to be overcome in this that it left much to be desired, especially in mounting the second and third drafts, and for this reason the normal condition of cavalry was seldom if at all reached. The paucity of remounts, the insufficient pay, and the increased requirements of the service, were conducive in making the service exceedingly distasteful. This discontent throughout the Russian Empire reached to the steppes of the Don, Ural and the Volga.

Numbers failed to show up for enrollment, desertions were a common everyday occurrence in the Cossack regiments, and their officers were unfitted to raise the *esprit* of the men. Amongst all his comrades in the entire army of the Tzar the Cossack officer stands on the lowest step, morally and intellectually. He is but little superior to his men, and always remains in a patriarchal relation to them. He is entirely incapable of furnishing a shining example when placed in a difficult situation or in cases where self-sacrifice might be required.

In the very beginning of the campaign, the incapacity of the Cossack troops made itself felt, and the Russian government, to raise the quality of the officers, sent a number of cavalry officers of the Guard to the Cossack regiments. These latter officers were not lacking in intelligence, courage and initiative, but were deficient in knowledge of the customs of this service, and above all in knowledge of the peculiarities of their troops. Their appearance in the theater of war was, therefore, without any marked influence on the performances of the Russian cavalry.

Nowhere are improvisations of this kind as disastrous as in the cavalry. The cavalry should be on just the same footing in time of peace as it must be in war.

To the higher leaders, who had to take over the leadership of cavalry regiments or brigades more credit should be given than to their subordinate troops. General Rennenkampf had the making of an especially good cavalry general. If Mischtschenko and Ssamsonow had had better material, they would have stood in a better light. These generals had the confidence of their troops, it is true, but they knew their weaknesses too well to undertake independent, daring movements. The few strategic tasks given the cavalry by army headquarters were, however, carried out with precision. For instance, the guarding of the defiles in the Fonschuiling Mountains against the armies of Kuroki and Nodzus; the protection of the flanks of the Russian army at Liao-Yang (Kuroki's change from one bank of the river to the other, and his attempt at an enveloping movement was reported in good time to Kuropatkin by the brigade of dragoons of the

Seventeenth Army Corps); and finally Rennenkampf's attempt against the extreme right wing of the Japanese at Boensihu in the battle at Yentai-Schaho.

What confidence the Russian commanding general had in the last named general is best illustrated by the fact that he appointed him, at Mukden, an independent commander, calling him in haste from the right to the left wing, when it was expected the Japanese attack would take place on that wing.

Considering the inefficient material of the Russian cavalry we should excuse its lack of activity.

The responsibility for the sins of omission—and that they were numerous cannot be disputed—rests not on the leader alone, but equally as much on the troops themselves. It is even now exceedingly difficult to give a correct and exhaustive answer to the interesting as well as important question, "Did the Russian cavalry do its entire duty in the service of security and information and reconnaissance?" Our own experiences in peace maneuvers should warn us not to give a premature or hasty decision. We cannot invariably accept foreign opinions or reports, before the Russian cavalry has had a chance to justify itself.

In so far as the Russian cavalry is concerned, it has to defend itself against an accusation brought by one high in authority. Kuropatkin, in an army order issued shortly after the battle of Liao-Yang, accuses the cavalry of "having left him in the dark at all times concerning the *intentions* and movements of the enemy."

A few critics, prejudiced by this and similar cases, have thought fit to throw the responsibility of the defeat at Mukden on the shoulders of the cavalry attached to the Russian west wing. It is charged with having failed to report the enveloping movement of the Third Japanese Army (General Nogi). Should this charge be true, it would be an inexcusable crime. The cavalry must have been blind not to have seen, in an open terrain, the march of three and a half infantry divisions, with numerous artillery. But to the honor of that cavalry, be it said, that this was not the case. On February 27th, that is one day after the commencement of the enveloping movement, the presence of strong Japanese

infantry at Tawan, on the Liaoho, was ascertained and reported by the Caucasian cavalry brigade. Cossack detachments also reported that Japanese cavalry had occupied Sinmintin, whereupon the combined Russian cavalry brigade (Buerger) was sent in that direction. So it will be seen that it is unjust to throw the blame of defeat on the cavalry of the Russian west wing.

Had Kuropatkin disposed of his forces differently and more to the point—a shorter front with strong reserves farther to the rear—it would have been easy for him, when he received notice of the movement, to have taken proper counter-measures in good time.

We are, however, of the opinion that the Russian commander-in-chief might and should have been served better by his cavalry. Not only the start of the enemy, but the earlier preparations of Nogi's command for the enveloping movement should have been discovered going on behind the left wing and reported to the Russian commander. The weakness of the Japanese cavalry and the insignificant depth of the Japanese front would have facilitated this task.

A strategical reconnaissance, as we understand it, with detachment and patrols far to the front for the purpose of carrying information, seems not to have been made either immediately before the battle of Mukden nor at any other time or place. But we cannot charge the Japanese with this sin of omission. The Japanese commanders were at all times kept well informed concerning the movements of the Russians. Laymen will persist in asserting that this was the result of a well established system of spies, but we believe that in this assumption the Japanese cavalry is unjustly treated. That single, more or less important reports were received through spies we admit, but to continually and thoroughly orient the commanders in the operations of the Russians would have been impossible by Chinese spies alone, for the latter would not have had sufficient intelligence for that. Such service cannot be rendered without possessing a thorough tactical understanding of the situation.

In performing their duties in the reconnaissance service,

the Japanese cavalry not only did their entire duty, but it also showed its intellectual peculiarities to the best advantage, while on the other hand, the results achieved in this line by the Cossacks did not amount to much, and on account of their low intellectual traits. Also, considering the strength of the cavalry on both sides in Manchuria, double blame attaches to the far superior Russian cavalry. First, because it saw too little in most cases, and second, that it did not prevent its weak opponent from observing their movements.

To guard against misunderstanding, we will state right here, and most emphatically, that we are not a believer in the so-called "screening" tactics which so many authorities persist in stating as the principal duties of the cavalry. Taken in its general sense, these duties are defensive and passive in character and entirely at variance with the spirit of our arm of the service. But besides all this, the placing of a thin cavalry screen to prevent the enemy from obtaining an insight into the movements of our troops, is a very delusive proceeding An energetic and aggressive opponent can penetrate this thin screen without any trouble whatever. A screen can be of value only when it is actively connected with and supported by an energetic reconnoitering service. Whosoever advances into the hostile reconnoitering zone and attacks the closed cavalry bodies, wherever found, with success, gives at the same time the *coup de grace* to the entire message service of his opponent. The latter's patrols and detachments will then be of little use and in danger; for only in isolated cases will they be enabled to return to their commands, to say nothing of sending messages to them.

We may, however, find certain reasons and excuses for the Russian cavalry divisions in not having taken up an active screening policy. The mountainous, roadless terrain over a considerable part of the theater of operations, covered during many months with either mud or snow and ice, was little suited for an energetic, active undertaking. And the Japanese very seldom opposed the Russian cavalry with the saber, but invariably chose firearms for defense, supported by good positions, and almost always by their infantry in addition.

But in spite of this the Russian squadrons were strong enough to boldly attack a few companies or even battalions of the combined Japanese reconnoitering detachments.

Spaits, the Hungarian cavalry captain, says correctly in his highly interesting work "With the Cossacks in Manchuria:" "Besides being deficient in military education, the Russian cavalry lacked the will to sacrifice itself, and that was perhaps its greatest fault."

Furthermore the manner in which the Russian cavalry utilized the long intervals between operations bears witness to their lack of initiative, which should be the main characteristic of cavalry. Neither the great losses sustained in the three great battles, nor any other circumstances during the months of September, November and December, 1904, and April, May, June and July, 1905, can justify the inaction of the Russian cavalry.

Especially during the days after Liao Yang, when it might have been known or expected that great confusion obtained on the Japanese lines of communications and that there would be no danger of attack, it would seem that an extensive raid towards the railroad line Lioayang-Haitschoen would have been in order. At that time the roads were fairly passable, although the crossing of the rivers, which were not yet frozen over, would have taken some time. In spite of this the raid, which was finally undertaken, would have given better results had it been made then when everything depended on celerity, instead of in January.

It is clear that Kuropatkin is partly to blame for this long inactivity of his cavalry squadrons. Even if the latter had no wish to take the initiative, he should have paid more attention to them. Of course, it was by General Kuropatkin's order that General Mischtschenko finally undertook his extensive raid, and the order for it was entirely correct in giving out general directions for this expedition into the country in rear of the Japanese army. The time of starting, as well as all details connected with this raid, were left to the discretion of General Mischtschenko, and he received all necessary assistance in the matter of troops, provisions, etc.

Sixty-six troops, five and two-thirds batteries, four machine gun detachments and four companies of mounted infantry, detailed from different infantry regiments, concentrated on January 8, 1905, at 1 P. M., at Sukudiapu, about fifteen miles southwest of Mukden, to undertake the raid under command of the above mentioned popular general. In addition, a detachment of sappers, a division bridge train and four troops of mounted frontier guards were attached. The best cavalry troops of the Russian Manchurian army, three Don Cossack and three dragoon regiments, were a part of this raiding force, a circumstance which must not be lost sight of in judging the results obtained by Mischtschenko.

The leader of every military operation must have a clear and definite object in view, which object he must strive to attain above all things. This also applies to cavalry raids, but with the difference that the cavalry should not always be tied down by hard and fast rules in obtaining the object in view. It should always be the aim of a cavalry raiding party to take the enemy by surprise and inflict the greatest possible damage on him. The "where" and "how" is of minor importance. If the raid does not succeed as laid down originally, then the leader's instructions should be so elastic as to allow him to proceed in some different way to attain his end. The main point is to appear most unexpectedly on either the enemy's flank or rear and to harass him there as much and as long as practicable.

We cannot say that General Mischtschenko was very successful in his raid, either in the planning of it or in carrying it out. His original plan was to attack the Japanese supply depot at Inkau. Since the harbor there was frozen over—which seems to have been unknown to the Russian cavalry general—the entire Japanese travel went via Dalny. The destruction of the railroad line, Port Arthur-Liaoyang, seemed to him but of secondary consideration. In this we think he was wrong, and the latter should have been his first objective, for that railroad was of the utmost importance to the Japanese, when we consider that just at that time Nogi's army used it in going north, and it was the only vulnerable point as far as the Japanese were concerned. Of course, the unfavorable condition of the terrain—roads covered with

sleet and ice and rough fields frozen hard—was to be regretted, but that could not be helped; General Mischtschenko should have taken all this into consideration and made his dispositions accordingly in order to hasten the advance of his troops. For this reason his taking along 1,600 burden bearers, carrying supplies and rations, was a grave mistake which proved disastrous in the end.

During a raid the cavalry should live off of the country, or better still, from supplies captured from the enemy. The former was feasible in the cultivated, rich country west of the Haitscheon-Liaoyang Railroad. A raiding column should never be accompanied by any wagons except those carrying ammunition. In spite of the fact that the Russian advance was delayed by small Chunchun bands and small Japanese detachments (one half a company, in trenches, delayed Mischtschenko's middle column—more than a division—three hours at Kiliho) and that the entire command traveled but about twenty miles per day, reaching Niuyschwang only at noon on January 12th, the situation was not unfavorable.

It would have been entirely feasible to advance that day as far as Haitschoen, which was reported to be occupied by fifteen hundred Japanese with artillery and infantry. Eight thousand five hundred troopers with thirty-four guns should have undertaken an attack on this weak force. Should Haitschoen have then fallen into Russian hands and should all the railroad tracks and bridges there have been destroyed, then the raid would have been a success. Even if Mischtschenko had hesitated to attack the place on account of the losses entailed thereby, and the losses might have been considerable, his column should at least have advanced that day to different points on the railroad and have destroyed it.

Instead of this, the original plan, a detour towards Inkau, was taken up. The railroad depot there was taken by twelve dismounted troops, all of different regiments, and a few buildings and storehouses burned. In the meantime strong officers' patrols did some unimportant damage along the Inkau Daschitsao and Dashitsao-Haitschoen Railroads. These were all the results obtained by this immense cavalry raiding force. The Russians did not dare to attack the village of Inkau in the dark, and the two reserve battalions of the Japanese army remained in undisturbed possession.

The sudden retreat of Mischtschenko, supposedly caused by the report of advancing hostile infantry columns, cannot be justified by any critic. In the open country there could be no fear of being cut off. Too little had been accomplished before leaving the hostile country. It is said (a foreign attaché who accompanied the raid is said to be authority for the statement) that General Mischtschenko intended to save his forces for the battle at Sandepu, and to return at the proper time for that purpose to his own camp. Such procrastinations are of no use and they only prevent the commander from throwing himself body and soul into his work.

Without any doubt, if we do not consider the excessive cold and the ice, the conditions were exceedingly favorable for the success of Mischtschenko's raid. An extended, vulnerable, weakly guarded line of communication lay in his front, and the road to it lay through an open, cultivated country which could have furnished easily his supplies. Defiles, which could have retarded his advance or endangered his retreat did not exist, and last but not least, the hostile cavalry was known to be a factor from which, considering Mischtschenko's strength, nothing was to be feared.

It is a great pity that this splendid chance to enhance the value of the cavalry arm was not better utilized.

Not only during the cessation of hostilities, but also during the days and weeks of the great battles, the Russian cavalry showed its lack of initiative, which we consider of first importance in the cavalry arm.

But a just critic must confess that existing circumstances made it very difficult for Kuropatkin's cavalry to play an active rôle as "battle cavalry." Yet, we do not fear to declare openly that, according to our view, even any other European cavalry—*based on the same maxims and conditions of our present cavalry tactics*—would hardly have been in position to make any better showing on the Manchurian battlefields. Every sensible cavalry officer will admit the fact

that at the present time an attack against infantry in mass, *which is still in the hands of its leader*, is useless. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 a few such rides into the jaws of death were undertaken by the brigade of Bredow, the cuirassiers of Reichshoffen and the Division Margueritte at Sedan. But since the repeating rifle and bayonet controls the battlefield we cannot even think of undertaking such an attack. Only routed infantry, leaving their positions and running in panic from pursuing artillery fire are fair prey for pursuing cavalry.

As long as both battle lines are engaged with each other the cavalry is forced to respect the teachings of the modern battlefield. As in this war the Japanese infantry never compelled the Russian dragoons or Cossacks to flee in disorder, the cavalry, according to above maxims, could do nothing but perhaps seek to engage the hostile cavalry. This the Russian cavalry never successfully undertook, but whether through its own fault or not, we cannot at the present time say.

At Wafangku the Russian combined Division Simonow and the First Japanese Cavalry Brigade were opposed to each other on the same wing. At Liaoyang we find on the Russian west wing two and one-half cavalry divisions, those of Ssamsonow, Grekow and the brigade of Mischtschenko. It is remarkable that of these one, Ssamsonow's, was held far in the rear in the second line. But the cavalry commander, in spite of this, was enabled, had he so chosen, to concentrate the entire cavalry force for a combined effort on the 29th of August. How we think the cavalry should have acted then we will discuss later.

During the continuation of the campaign the Russian cavalry never again had such an opportunity to do something as the one of which it took no advantage at Liaoyang. Neither on the Schaho nor at Mukden did the dispositions made by general headquarters allow the cavalry to appear at any one point in such force. In both of these battles the cavalry was frittered away so that only an extraordinary and unusual efficiency of single cavalry leader would have enabled them to accomplish anything of importance.

In this manner we find in the advance on the Japanese positions in the beginning of October, 1904 (battle at Yentai-Schaho), the Orenburg Cossack Division of Grekow on the extreme right flank on the Liacho, the two brigades of Mischtschenko in the center of the connecting forces of General Mau, the Siberian Cossack division of Ssamsonow on the eastern wing under Stackelberg, and finally the Transbaikal Cossack Division, Rennenkampf's, with a mixed infantry brigade acting as an independent detachment to envelop the right Japanese wing on the upper Tai-tse-ho. Of the entire 149 squadrons of the Russian army no more than twenty-four were at any one point where they could have been used for a concentrated movement.

And furthermore the dispositions made by general headquarters at the battle of Mukden was just as faulty, as regards cavalry dispositions, as on the Schaho. There was, with the western detachment, at the beginning under Rennenkampf, only a nucleus of thirty-six troops, the Ural-Transbaikal Cossack Division and the Caucasian Cavalry Brigade. The remainder of the cavalry force was again dispersed along the entire front. The Seventeenth Army Corps in the center and the Third Siberian Corps on the left wing, each had strong cavalry forces, the reason for which is hard to determine. The former had the brigade of dragoons, the latter eighteen troops of Siberian Cossacks. Forty-one other squadrons we find scattered among the different infantry commands, and eighteen Cossack squadrons (Transbaikal) with Alexejew's detachment (later Rennenkampf's detachment). The entire Don Cossack division had been sent far to the north as a guard to the railroad and need not be considered in the battle of Mukden.

The thirty-six squadrons on the extreme right wing represented a force which should have made itself felt there, but after Rennenkampf was detached and sent to the Eastern detachment it appears that these thirty-six squadrons were led neither in a competent manner nor in conjunction with other troops. All we learn of them is that a weak Japanese force of sixteen troops steadily drove them back, and that this Japanese force was not prevented by them from taking

possession of Sinmintin or from attacking Buerger's brigade.

The conduct of the Russian cavalry at Mukden gives the general impression that it had suffered severely in its fighting qualities in the previous engagements and hardships, and the numerical strength of the squadrons, less than 100 sabers per squadron, which they had in this battle, seems to confirm that impression.

It is to be hoped that certain circles of our War Department may be warned from this not to underestimate the value of the tireless energy of our brave and competent squadron commanders in time of peace. That which these squadron commanders practice and preach, that is to say, order, discipline, well broken remounts, good horsemen, *esprit de corps* and love for their mounts, are the factors which in war guarantee the battle effect of the cavalry arm.

The Russian cavalry, with whose achievements in battle so much fault is found, has undoubtedly the right to ask us: "What should we have done?" The answer is easy and to the point: "By taking the offensive whenever required to cover its own army's flanks." A cavalry force consisting of several divisions, that much could have been concentrated at Liaoyang, at the Schaho and at Mukden, never should have remained inactive in one place and wait to see whether or not the enemy decides to attack the flank, which they are charged with protecting, or whether he decides on an enveloping movement or otherwise. In remaining inactive such a cavalry force degrades itself to a common battle patrol. In case the enemy does not appear, they have done nothing, but should he arrive, nothing is left the cavalry but to retire on account of his intact infantry masses. Therefore it would seem to be more proper to take the offensive and to solve the problem of guarding the flank by attacking the flank or rear of the opposing hostile wing. Of course this must be done by making proper detours of sufficient extent, and with sufficient "feelers" far to the front and sides. The main point is that the cavalry divisions to which are attached machine guns and horse batteries should be conscious of their power, and should disdain a constant touch with or support of the infantry. To cut entirely loose from its base of supplies should not frighten the cavalry. Nogi's army operated at Mukden from ten to twelve days away from its base.

And this cutting loose is especially necessary in battle raids. Should the enemy plan an enveloping movement from the wing which the cavalry is charged with protecting or attacking, then our cavalry will meet him half way, and our headquarters will receive notification of the impending danger in sufficient time to make the proper dispositions. Our cavalry, ably led, will also find an opportunity to attack the hostile flank movement in its flank. This, in our opinion, the eighty to ninety Russian squadrons which could have been concentrated at Mukden, could have successfully carried through, and then it would have been the cavalry's duty to hang on like a bulldog to the left flank of the Japanese enveloping detachment and to obstruct in every possible manner its progress. Saber charges do not appear to be the best means to accomplish this, but rather should the cavalry utilize to the utmost its assistant means, machine guns and horse batteries, and by fully utilizing its mobility and the terrain, appear suddenly here and there, and especially whenever the fire action of the carbines, machine guns and horse batteries will produce the greatest effect. If once touch has been gained with the enemy he should never again be given any rest. To completely exhaust him, to hinder his progress, must be the purpose of the cavalry in its attacks.

Such a game as we have here outlined the Russian cavalry could have played with the Japanese, only, however, after they had completly defeated the Japanese cavalry. Considering the Russian numerical superiority that would not have been a difficult task.

It is self-evident that movements like we have indicated can only take place after the hostile cavalry has been completely routed, and this object should be our first aim. To attain this we cannot sit still, but must be continually on the move, watching for an opportunity to attack in close formation, and then to hit hard and vigorously.

Should the "battle-raid" of a cavalry corps not meet with

the enemy, then it must be extended as far as to the rear of the hostile battle front, going far around the flank. If thereby their reserve forces are compelled to go into action, part of the cavalry's task has been accomplished. Whenever they successfully reach the enemy's rear, the leader's highest qualities of coming to quick decisions and of correctly grasping the situation come into play. It is his province to determine when the moment has arrived to use his forces regardless of consequences. The general headquarters, in spite of a well organized message service, telephones, telegraphs, visual signaling, is enabled only in very rare cases to give proper directions or to orient him concerning the battle situation. Therefore in his isolated position, the cavalry commander's instinct must tell him when the proper time arrives for his interference. Should the result be against the enemy, then the latter's line of retreat is the goal to which our cavalry corps must give its entire attention.

In such a position was the Japanese cavalry placed towards the end of the battle at Mukden, on the evening of March 9, 1905. Its weakness through extreme fatigue and the break-down of horses prevented it from acting as it should have. We will later return to this interesting topic.

On the contrary, if the decision is in favor of the enemy, then it will be the duty of our cavalry—advanced to the rear of the enemy—to prevent or delay the hostile reserves from making our defeat more severe.

On August 31, 1904, between 7 and 8 o'clock P. M., the attack of the Second and Fourth Japanese Armies on the main fortifications of the line south of Liaoyang came to naught, although their last intact reserves, three reserve brigades, had been called into action. Decimated and entirely exhausted, the columns of Generals Oku and Nodzu had to retire to their own positions. We have seen above that it would have been an easy matter to concentrate a Russian cavalry corps of three divisions at the commencement of the battle on the extreme right wing. Had this cavalry corps utilized the days of the 28th to the 31st of August in reaching the railroad, say near the station Schaho, going

around far away from the Japanese flank, then it could have attacked the retreating Japanese. Whether or not a decided success would have been attained cannot now be discussed; but in any case it seems possible that an attack with the saber would have justified the attempt. Had the attack succeeded, then Oku could never have carried out his charge the succeeding night; and Kuroki's weak attempt to envelop the east wing would not have caused Kuropatkin to leave his south front and the Japanese would not have succeeded in taking Liaoyang.

In a similar manner, according to our conviction, in the latter phases of the battle on the Schaho, an intrepid Russian cavalry leader would have found many opportunities to attack the rear of the thin hostile line, the troops composing which were entirely exhausted through the long drawnout battle.

We do not insist, however, that the battle tactics of the Russian cavalry should have been carried out as portrayed by us above. For that, the details on hand are too meager. Concerning the "when," "where" and "how," is still open to discussion. But it is clear, however, that the large cavalry forces should have done *something* to take the brunt of battle off the infantry and artillery.

That this has not been done in a single case is to the discredit of Kuropatkin's cavalry. It was deficient in the spirit of sacrificing itself to duty. But by this we do not mean to say that only the rank and file is to blame, for the troops might have done their full duty. The disinclination to act independently, which was a characteristic of the entire cavalry in Eastern Asia, has its inception at the very head of the army and influenced all the operations of the cavalry.

There are a few shining exceptions to this rule of passiveness on the part of the Russian cavalry, and they are connected with the name of General Rennenkampf.

In the battle of Ventai-Schaho he led his detachment of twenty-four squadrons, sixteen battalions and eight batteries, with remarkable celerity through the mountain defiles towards the Japanese communications on the upper Taitse-ho. Energetically he attacked for days the hostile posi-

tions in front of Boensiku. The stubborn resistance of the opposing Japanese reserve brigades, supported by the cavalry brigade of Kanin, and the defeat of the remainder of the Russian columns finally forced him, in spite of his utmost efforts, to retreat.

Where he commanded something was being done at least.

After the engagement at Sandepu he replaced the wounded General Mischtschenko in the command of the Russian West Detachment.

In the middle of February, shortly before the battle of Mukden, he started on a raid to Liaoyang, in rear of the Japanese, with thirty-six squadrons at his disposition. Unfortunately no light has been thrown so far on the details of that undertaking. Most of the historians of the campaign are absolutely silent concerning this raid, and we derive our knowledge of it from the above mentioned work of Captain Spaits.

The cavalry of the West Detachment would undoubtedly have been favorably heard from had not Rennenkampf in the first phase of the Mukden tragedy been called suddenly to the East Detachment, which Kuropatkin thought in extreme danger.

Here also we soon perceive his active spirit. Immediately after his arrival the eighteen squadrons of Transbaikal Cossacks displayed a remarkable activity in reconnoitering and in ascertaining the extended front of the Japanese line.

We must also mention the defense of the coal mines at Yentai in the battle of Liaoyang as a fine example of the activity of the Russian cavalry. The Siberian Cossacks of General Ssamsonow's command brought to a stand here the Japanese who were pursuing the defeated division of General Orlow.

These single spots of light on the dark background, which we have here emphasized to conclude our dreary account of the doings of the Russian cavalry in this campaign, may be augmented later by instances not yet known to us. But even then, the entire picture outlined here will not be materially changed thereby.

(*b*) *The Japanese.*

Not being supplied with sufficient means, the Japanese cavalry was confronted with great tasks in the East Asiatic War, and in spite of having used its best efforts in the solution of these problems, it was unable to entirely satisfy all critics, which, however, is only natural.

The foregoing report of the total fiasco of the cavalry arm in that campaign applies also to the Japanese cavalry. Too weak and too badly mounted to undertake brilliant feats of daring against the hostile cavalry or to overcome the hostile forces, it has had to be content with moderate successes. Therefore, its devotion to duty in the small engagements has been crowded into the background by the brilliant feats of the other arms of service of the Japanese armies.

We would remind the critics of the prophecies they made at the beginning of the campaign: "The weak Japanese cavalry force will be simply swept entirely off the face of the earth by the Russian cavalry;" and "The Japanese general headquarters will be thereby left in a bad situation. Reliable reports concerning the enemy will be lacking, and the Japanese communications in the rear will always be in danger of continued interruptions."

Nothing of the kind happened. The Japanese commanders were at all times exceedingly well informed concerning the movements of the Russians; its cavalry held the field, in spite of its weakness, always kept in touch with the enemy, and the lines of communications were always in absolute security.

In the first place, the inactivity of the Russian cavalry was responsible for the easy task which was laid out for the Japanese cavalry. But without competent and fearless leaders, operating as they were in the face of such a superior opponent, the Japanese cavalry never could have maintained such a remarkable reconnoitering service as it did. We have before emphasized the fact that, without doubt, the Japanese leaders had to thank its cavalry for the perfection of its information service, and not—as is generally supposed to be the case—the Chinese spies.

"Intelligence and contempt of death," says an eminent historian of the late war, Major Immanuel, of the Prussian General Staff, "are the attributes which are of the highest value to the soldier." The Japanese cavalry soldier possesses these attributes in their highest form, as does also his comrades of the other branches. And this is the reason why, in spite of faulty equipment, in spite of unsuitable, slow and badly gaited mounts, he has proved himself to be an excellent reconnoiterer and carrier of messages and reports.

Every Japanese company—therefore also every Japanese troop of cavalry—was imbued with the spirit to conquer, be the cost what it may. And this spirit does not permit of inaction, but on the contrary, requires a highly offensive character, and as we shall see, the latter has been carried to a high degree in the conduct of their cavalry.

It is earnestly hoped that we, who pride ourselves on our organization, education and remount material, will learn a lesson therefrom, and to foster the cultivation of the moral element and to neglect no opportunity to further the *esprit* of our men. For in the end, be it in a cavalry attack, in an infantry battle, or in an artillery duel, it is these factors which carry the day.

The specialist, who will take the pains to carefully study what the Japanese cavalry has done in small details, will feel regret that their cavalry was not better equipped in this campaign. Had this been the case, then, following the example of the Japanese infantry, it would have surely roused the dead principles of our cavalry battle tactics from their sleep. Then we also might be enabled to state with absolute certainty that, if wielded by a strong arm and a brave heart, the saber, like the bayonet, has not as yet played its rôle to the finish.

It seems passing strange that the originators of the Japanese army system, who may well be proud of their other labors, have been so niggardly in regard to their cavalry. Did they not see in advance that Japan within a few decades would have occasion to measure forces with an enemy who had strong masses of cavalry at his disposal, and that this trial would take place mainly in the level country of Manchuria? Only by supposing that they did not foresee this, can we account for the reason of their not having a strong, well mounted cavalry force.

It is true that conditions in Japan are unfavorable for the employment of the cavalry arm. A mountainous country, without roads on the one hand, and on the other the plains entirely used for agricultural purposes, do not allow any freedom of movement for cavalry. The breeding of horses is also only in its infancy in that island. Not counting the difficulties in finding suitable grazing grounds, the strong salty land produces but a very poor green forage. Therefore the weak Japanese cavalry could not find a sufficient supply of remounts in its own country and had to content itself with the almost unsuitable ponies of Australia.

The creation of a strong and modern cavalry force will be a most difficult problem in the expansion of the Japanese war forces. But a solution to the question should be found in spite of all obstacles. The experiences of the battle of Mukden point clearly to that. In this battle the absence of a few cavalry divisions was the cause of their not reaping all the fruits of that victory, which the entirely exhausted infantry was unable to pluck.

A peace, as the Japanese people hoped and deserved, would then have been the result of an energetic cavalry pursuit. Eye witnesses of the fleeing mobs of the Second and Third Russian Army Corps will bear witness to this fact, amongst others Captain Spaits.

In the reorganization of its cavalry branch of the service, it would be advisable for the Japanese War Department to send a number of their cavalry officers to study the remount system of Austria, Germany and France. It is first necessary for them, before making practical experiments for the bettering of the Japanese remount system, to cross their home animals with other breeds. Without regard to expenditures, Japan should provide at once a suitable number of studs and stud farms, in order to raise not only the character but also the number of horses produced. Also, as it is true that the average Japanese soldier has little taste for riding, and on that account needs a special course of educa-

tion in it, Japan should not hesitate to obtain the services of a number of foreign cavalry officers as instructors.

In spite of single bold deeds, which the Japanese cavalry executed in the course of the campaign, it was deficient in the correct technique of the cavalry branch of the service. Long continued operations can only be performed with the help of the latter.

It is a pity that neither the Russians nor the Japanese kept records showing what became of their played-out horses. The loss of horseflesh in that campaign was very great, and for the reason that the Japanese cavalry took little care in saddling, bridling or grooming their mounts.

At the opening of the campaign Japan had at its disposition one cavalry regiment of the Guard and sixteen line regiments. The former was armed, in addition to the saber and carbine, with lances, which latter, however, had to be left at home. Each of the thirteen infantry divisions received, as divisional cavalry, one regiment of cavalry of three squadrons each. The line cavalry regiments Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of four squadrons each, formed two independent cavalry brigades. In the battle of Mukden these were concentrated into one division, but before this they had been attached to different armies. The reserve infantry brigades, which were organized later, had attached to them but one reserve squadron.

Considering the great shortage of cavalry, the Japanese general headquarters made a mistake in assigning an entire cavalry regiment to each infantry division. It would have been preferable without any doubt to utilize but one or two troops for that purpose. Then there would have been enough cavalry to form, instead of but two, double that number of independent cavalry brigades, which, if then concentrated, would have been enabled to solve larger strategic or tactical problems.

In consequence of this arrangement the Japanese cavalry undertook, with weak forces, but a single raid at a distance, which, however, accomplished almost unbelievable results.

Shortly before the battle of Mukden two troops had the fortune to gain the rear of the Russian army and to partly

blow up the bridge of Guntschuling, although it was guarded by strong fortifications. Resting during the day and traveling at night, this small force reached, undetected, the vicinity of its object. To prevent detection by the guards at the head of the bridge, the troops dismounted to fight on foot, while a few selected troopers crept, in spite of the running ice, as far as the central bridge pier and fastened there the powder charge. When the latter exploded and a large part of the bridge flew into the air both troops disappeared in the darkness, and in spite of a hot pursuit by the enemy they returned unharmed to their own corps.

This daring deed caused such a panic at the Russian headquarters and Kuropatkin became so troubled about his communications in his rear that he ordered the reinforcement of the frontier guard detachments by an additional infantry brigade, the second of the Forty-first Division, as well as the entire Don Cossack division to guard the railroad leading to the north.

The daring deed of these two troops therefore caused the withdrawal during a decisive battle of about 8,000 men of the flower of the hostile troops! Indeed an excellent example to prove that the rôle of the cavalry in modern war is not yet played out!

Inasmuch as we have no reports about other raids of the Japanese cavalry, we will now turn to its performances in battle.

At the Yalu and in the storming of the heights near Kiutuscho it played no part.

On the other hand, the part taken by the first independent cavalry brigade, that of Major General Akijama, before and during the engagement at Wafankou is very instructive and interesting. As far as the meager data which we have at hand shows, the leadership of this brigade seems to have been excellent. It had been sent ahead from Pulantien by General Oku for reconnoitering purposes towards Wafankou, and there it, supported by two machine gun detachments and two battalions of infantry, carried to a successful issue an engagement with the combined Russian brigade of Ssamsonow, and here it engaged in a hand to hand conflict, so rare in

this campaign, in which the Cossacks are said to have behaved exceedingly well.

When a few days later General Akijama was forced to retire before the superior advance guard of the corps of Stackelberg, he retired in a southeasterly direction, but still keeping his touch with the enemy.

In the engagement at Wafankou, *acting on his own initiative*, he reached the battlefield at the right time to stop the attack of the Second Brigade of the Thirty-fifth Russian Infantry Division (Major General Glasko). By this he relieved the Third Japanese Division, which was in danger of being enveloped on the right by this brigade, and relieved it from a highly critical situation.

When the entire Russian east wing was forced by the results of the battle soon thereafter to retreat, the Japanese cavalry brigade pursued energetically and forced the hostile rear guard to evacuate its fortified position near Tsuitsjatun. All this was done dismounted and with very few casualties.

In the battle on the Schaho the second independent cavalry brigade, under Prince Kotohito-Kanin, assisted the weak reserve troops in repulsing the attack on Boensiku, which was undertaken by superior Russian forces under Rennenkampf.

At Sandepu the cavalry of Akijama defended that village for days against the hot attack of Russian infantry. It should be remarked that it there used explosive bullets as projectiles.

What the Japanese cavalry *actually* did at Mukden is insignificant compared with what it *could have* performed had it been stronger.

As conditions actually were, however, it should again be stated in the interest of justice, that the two independent cavalry brigades of Akijama and Tamura, combined into a weak cavalry division on the 3d of March, did their full and entire duty, considering their strength, in that decisive battle.

In the first phases of this long battle they advanced on the extreme left wing of the Japanese enveloping army with celerity and energy, driving the Russian cavalry of the west

detachment in their front. On the 27th of February, Tamura's brigade had reached already the west bank of the Liaoho at Takou, and its patrols spread out as far as Sinmintin. Through this the enemy received the erroneous impression or report that that place was occupied by strong Japanese forces. Kuropatkin then sent Buerger's brigade with eight battalions, one machine gun detachment and three batteries, together with the Ural-Transbaikal Cossack division of the west detachment, in all haste in that direction. This force, on its retreat from Sinmintin, was attacked on the 3d of March by the Japanese cavalry, which had been reinforced by two battalions, was defeated and cut off from its own army and driven northeastward.

On the same day the advanced troops of Oyama's cavalry reached the Mukden-Tjelin Railroad line.

From this time on, when apparently standing on the threshold of the greatest successes, its activity almost entirely ceased. The causes therefor are easily seen.

The one cavalry division felt itself too weak to cut entirely loose from Nogi's army, to which it had been attached, and to act on its own initiative far to the north against the Russian line of communications, and, in addition, Nogi, in his battle orders on the evening of the 3d of March, had expressly charged it with the protection of his left flank.

The Japanese enveloping movement, planned on a large scale but carried out with forces far too weak, resulted during the days from March 4th to March 9th in a series of bitter frontal attacks.

It is also *very probable* that the Japanese cavalry, finding itself too weak for the important task of harrying the hostile retreat, took part in the above named fights, dismounted and with the carbine. Who knows? There is nothing reported regarding it.

In any case it is certain that the main force of the Japanese cavalry did not get farther than Tasintun by March 10th, or about eighteen miles north of Mukden and six or seven miles west of the Mukden-Tjelin Railroad.

It is very remarkable that it never took the opportunity to fire, from a suitable position, on the retreating columns of

the Russians. The Japanese battery, which by a few well directed shots caused a panic in the Russian trains, *did not* belong to the cavalry division.

It therefore appears that the Japanese cavalry, like its infantry, had about reached the end of its resources by that time. What three to four well mounted, well led and well equipped Japanese cavalry divisions could have achieved at Mukden, even the most vivid imagination cannot predict. Even supposing that the troops detached north of Mukden—General Kuropatkin himself could not dispense with a single man in the last phases of the battle—would have been in a situation to oppose the taking of the defiles near Tjelin, then an energetic pursuit on parallel roads would have caused, without any doubt, the total rout of the Second and Third Russian armies.

The probable long duration of the battles of the future doubtless will furnish some moment, which if rightly grasped, will be favorable for the activity of the cavalry. The cavalry arm of the service will certainly be enabled to approach, saving its own strength for the final effort, that point where it intends to have a word to say in the decision.

With few exceptions the Japanese cavalry has performed all of its feats in the East Asiatic campaign with the carbine in hand and in close touch with its own infantry.

The reason for this is doubtless due to the important fact that even cavalry experts are slow in appreciating the value of their own arm.

"Victory is the main object," should be our motto under all circumstances. In case that cannot be achieved with the saber or lance, then the carbine should help out. It is only when we are too weak to gain a victory ourselves that we should gratefully accept the assistance of our infantry. The Japanese cavalry acted in accordance with this principle, and to blame it for this would be more than unjust. In addition, we should not forget that, on account of its inferiority, their opponents dictated its methods of battle.

Furthermore, the irresistible desire to attack, at a full gallop with the saber or lance, an enemy firing from good cover, only comes to that cavalryman who has an excellent

and well trained horse under him. Therefore, we should excuse the Japanese cavalrymen, with their slow and unsuitable ponies, that they showed no inclination to lay themselves liable to useless losses, and instead, following the enemy's example, dismounted to fight on foot with the carbine.

A typical example of the manner in which both cavalry branches fought with each other is had in the battle of Tschoendschu, in northern Corea, on March 28, 1904, the first engagement of the war.

Six troops of Mischtschenko's Cossack brigade had been sent from the Yalu towards Kasan to reconnoiter. As the vanguard of two troops approached, according to drill regulations, the town of Tschoendschu, which was surrounded with a masonry wall, it was suddenly fired upon. Both troops galloped to the rear to dismount behind a suitable rise in the terrain, to fight on foot. In the meantime, the drawn-up main body hastened to follow suit, and but one troop remained mounted as a reserve. In Tschoendschu a troop of cavalry and one company of infantry were quartered as a Japanese outpost, and while all this was going on the Japanese Guard cavalry regiment arrived as a support from Kasan. This latter regiment at once deployed two troops to fight on foot at the Lisiere of Tschoendschu. The third troop, endeavoring to ride around the town to prolong the skirmish line, was forced to retire by the fire of the Cossacks. After a desultory fire engagement, lasting about two hours, the Russians losing five officers and fifteen men, the Japanese three officers and seventeen men, there appeared a Japanese infantry battalion at double time.

General Mischtschenko thereupon breaks off the engagement and retires, unpursued, or only listlessly so, to his former position.

The action of both sides, in this first encounter, as far as concerns the cavalry, may well surprise us, for it is not at all in accordance with the spirit we are endeavoring to imbue into our cavalry. The strongly superior Russian cavalry, whose task it was to advance as far as possible into the hostile zone, should under no consideration have allowed

itself to be stopped at Tschoendschu. We will admit as correct, however, the dismounting of the two advance guard troops and their firing on foot, to give time for their "feelers" to reconnoiter the hostile position and the terrain. But the main body should not have hesitated a minute in trying to get around Tschoendschu, and as this place is not situated in a defile, that could have been easily done.

If the Russian main body had done this, it would have led to a combat with the Japanese Guard cavalry regiment behind Tschoendschu. The opportunity to ascertain the superiority of the cavalry by a decisive attack should be sought out under all circumstances in the first engagements of any campaign. The side which in doing this keeps the field will always have the confidence of its superiority thereafter as a mighty, moral factor.

It is more than probable that had the six troops of Cossacks gained a brilliant victory with the saber over the Japanese Guard cavalry regiment, the effect would have been to rouse the entire Russian cavalry to an offensive spirit.

The Japanese cavalry, according to our judgment, would also have acted more correctly had it taken advantage of the error committed by Mischtschenko in allowing himself to be engaged in a fire fight, and attacked mounted and with its entire strength, one of the hostile flanks.

Of course, the carrying out of this maneuver depended on the fact whether or not the terrain would allow on either side an approach under cover.

But as Tschoendschu is situated in a mountainous country, we may correctly assume that such was the case.

III. INFERENCES.

The course of the reconnaissance fight mentioned at the end of the foregoing chapter, causes us to ask:

"Considering the experiences of the latest campaign, what instinct of the cavalryman is the most correct? When meeting the enemy, should he put spurs to his horse, draw his saber and charge, or should he dismount and fire?"

The cavalry leader, as well as the rank and file, must be educated up to the one or the other in time of peace; and the officers must also be educated to think and reason, in order to curb, when necessary, their first impulse by judgment.

Our cavalry creed has not been altered in the least by the experiences of the East Asiatic War. As was the case before, so are we now of the opinion that the cavalry which prefers the charge to a fire fight will solve its task better than the one who holds the opposite opinion. The ideal condition would be possibly that the cavalry could do both equally well; that is, to be as well drilled in the use of the carbine as in the use of the saber and lance. But the attainment of this ideal seems to be almost entirely out of the question. Not only because of the short term of service of the men, which precludes the idea of making good foot soldiers and good horsemen out of a man at the same time, but also, and that before all, because the carbine and the saber are such entirely different masters that the cavalryman cannot serve both at the same time with the same loyalty.

An entirely different temperament is required to charge with drawn saber, than that for lying for hours under cover and firing.

So long as we lay more stress on good horsemanship and correct handling of the saber, and accord but second place to marksmanship, so long will we further the offensive spirit of our cavalry, and with that stands or falls the entire activity or usefulness of the cavalry branch of the service.

That this is true has been demonstrated in the late war by the Russian cavalry, which is well known to have given preference in time of peace to fighting with the carbine.

In any European war the first task of the cavalry will be to try conclusions with an equally strong hostile cavalry force. And only after the decision has been reached in this engagement will the victor be enabled to display an *effective* activity through reconnaissance, through raids against the hostile lines of communications, and through raids against the enemy's flank and rear. The decision in this cavalry battle will surely fall to that side which has the most offensive spirit.

A small cavalry detachment, seeking its safety in carbine fire, loses all desire to boldly charge the enemy. On the other hand, the highest advantage of the saber lies in the fact that just this desire to charge at all costs forms the "*conditio sine qua non*" for its use.

Good reconnaissance means to see as much as possible, and that can be performed only through a persistent seeking to gain contact with the enemy.

The Austro-Hungarian cavalry, according to our opinion, is especially well fitted to seek the charge in preference to fighting on foot on account of its traditions, its excellent horse flesh, and its excellent troopers, eminently fitted for mounted service. In spite of influential opposition, our drill methods still run in its old courses, and, according to our opinion, no change should be made on the whole. A few details might be changed, however. Without in the least lessening the education of horses and troopers we might do well, for example, to abolish most of our formal and obsolete drill in the riding hall and on the drill ground. Much time would be then gained for more important instruction. Saber drill is carried on with entirely too much pedantry. Riding with drawn saber for hours at a time is, to say the least, superfluous, as well as is the thrusting at dummies lying on the ground and the fencing on horseback with masks, in which latter exercise the horses take up more time than is profitable. Adeptness in handling the saber, vigor and confidence in the same, can be taught the trooper better on the ground. Given a good seat and a tractable horse, a very few lessons mounted will be sufficient to teach the use of the saber in the saddle.

To have a trooper, who has a bad seat, or who has an unmanageable horse under him, go for hours through the exercises of cut and thrust with drawn saber, will be found of absolutely no use. An obedient, manageable horse is the first requirement in any task, be it on patrol service, in the charge or on a raid.

The proper training of horses is and always will be without doubt the foremost consideration in the cavalry. Our cavalry strives to remain true to this maxim. And the good results attained in riding schools (remount schools) can be changed into *excellent* results if only one system would be used. This, however, is unfortunately not the case. Our drill regulations, famed for their lapidary brevity, are entirely too meager in their directions concerning the training of young horses. An appendix, in conformity with the latest remount science, is absolutely necessary.

The well grounded complaints over the ridiculously small numerical strength of our infantry companies in time of peace are continually getting more voluminous, but as far as the cavalry is concerned nothing is heard. This arm of the service, except horses for non-commissioned staff officers, is in time of peace at its war strength, and everybody thinks a troop commander is enabled to have field exercises with his men in their second and third year of service even in the winter time, as our regulations require. This would be highly desirable, were it so. Any one who, however, looks deeper into the matter will know that it is not true. Even under the most favorable circumstances a troop commander will have to use his utmost endeavors to get fifty men, not counting recruits, together for field exercises in the winter time. And that number is entirely inadequate for proper instruction in squadron drill. In the first place, there are not enough horses. From the number prescribed in regulations we must deduct sixty-four mounts for recruits, twenty not yet broken in, sixteen in the non-commissioned officers' school, with the engineer platoon and on other duties, say a total of 149. Sufficient men may be available to make the fifty mentioned above, because the total number is supposed to be 171. But as far as concerns the troopers there are al-

ways a large number, twenty-five to thirty in each troop, on different duties detached from their troops, a thing which is very injurious to the efficiency of our cavalry in time of war.

As soon as the subject of shortening the term of service to two years is brought under discussion in our assembly of lawmakers, the objection is made on the part of the military authorities that that term is too short for the proper education of the cavalryman. But any one going to the bottom of the thing will have to own up that we of the cavalry cannot now even count on a term of two years of actual practice. During the months from October to May the entire third year men are absent on detached service or on furlough; and every man in his second year will already have had a detail of some three months in the ordnance or staff. It is earnestly recommended that this detaching of men and horses in the cavalry service be stopped. Men of the reserve and horses of those on furlough should be used for detached service.

For service at the front at least seventy well drilled troopers should be on hand, as that is the least number with which a troop commander can do anything thoroughly in exercises in the field or in maneuvers. The detaching of troopers and horses simply leads to an excuse on the part of the squadron commander for having his exercises in the riding hall, letting his command hibernate in the riding hall, so to speak. Should the grounds for this excuse be removed, then the efficiency and capabilities of our cavalry in time of war would be materially increased.

Before the Russo-Japanese War, the possibility of a campaign in the winter time was laughed at, but now we will have to take that into consideration. What has been done in the icy fields of Manchuria can be done more easily in every European climate. Therefore the first thing now is to instruct in time of peace the men and horses with terrain and weather conditions in winter time. And that this is actually done the highest authorities should make it their business to see that all men are drilled not only in the riding hall in winter time but also in the open. And for that the simple patrol rides prescribed are insufficient. That our

cavalry, when it commences in earnest to train for a campaign in winter, should receive a proper and suitable uniform, which it has not at the present time, is self-evident. We will come back to this matter later on.

In the study of General Mischtschenko's great raid in the beginning of January, 1905, the question comes to us involuntarily: "How would a number of Austrian squadrons have stood the same test?"

Well, according to our views, the answer would be satisfactory, as the advance of our cavalry would have been made more quickly than that of the Russians in spite of ice and the frozen ploughed fields.

Our leaders would possibly also have recognized the objects in view quicker and better than General Mischtschenko. The promenade to the flank towards Inkon would not have taken place. Our engineers, ably supported by the main body, would certainly have destroyed the Daschitsao-Haitschoen Railroad, and that thoroughly. The advance of different Japanese infantry columns would hardly have caused our cavalry to retreat precipitately. Only on a single point we are undecided. How would our men and horses have stood the intense cold during the march and in bivouac in the winter nights in Manchuria? We are afraid, with our men unused to the extreme cold and illy clothed to withstand it, we would have had numerous cases of frostbites and much sickness of the respiratory organs, and many of our horses would have refused the forage offered and have became useless.

It is very probable, therefore, that at Mukden our squadrons would have appeared in a worse condition than the Russians.

Could we make up our minds to renounce in time of peace the round croups and shining coats in winter time, then we might be in the situation to look ahead to a winter compaign without dismay.

The importance of instruction in field service has been fully acknowledged by our cavalry for a long time. But we are confined to certain limits in that on account of the ignorance of most of our troopers and a large portion of our non-

commissioned officers—although we strive to overcome this by a special thorough schooling of our younger officers in their duties of commanders of reconnaissance patrols. This is all very well, but this should also be extended to our reserve officers and cadets as well. And we act very much like the ostrich, when we consider that at the beginning of a campaign about half of our subalterns must be drawn from the reserves, and during the course of the campaign this will even be worse yet. These latter named officers serve their twenty-eight days mostly during the months of May and June, and during this period, when nothing is had but inspections, the troop commander has his hands too full to pay very much attention to these subalterns. It is no wonder, therefore, that he does not greet these "summer lieutenants" in a very hearty manner and does not pay as much attention to their instruction as he should. To prevent them from spoiling anything, they are allowed to simply trot along on the drill ground and to follow at their own sweet will behind the troop in field maneuvers—and this means a useless tormenting of costly horseflesh. Of course, exceptions to this rule are sometimes noted, in the case of especially well qualified reserve officers and when under conscientious troop commanders.

Only in sporadic cases do the reserve lieutenants and the cadets, when serving their time as one-year volunteers, obtain the command of independent patrols. This is a fault which leads to serious consequences in actual war. Our cavalry, which has but a limited number of intelligent noncommissioned officers, should strive to mould the reserve officers for the tasks of the reconnaissance service in actual war. The number of reserve officers now available will hardly ever be sufficient to fill the places of patrol and detachment commanders in the first days of a campaign.

To remedy this present condition it would be better to call the reserve officers and cadets as a rule into service only during maneuvers. Then our higher commanders could pay more attention to utilizing the services of these gentlemen.

It would be far bettter for a reserve lieutenant to ride badly in front and to lead a patrol correctly than vice versa.

It would also be better if every second year the duration of the maneuvers for cavalry should be increased from four to eight weeks, as is the case in Germany. This would not hurt any of our reserve cavalry officers financially, that is, not to any marked degree.

In addition to this, we would also recommend the division of our non-commissioned officers into two classes for reconnaissance service. For the first, the more intelligent, the theoretical education should be increased, and for the second, decreased. The latter cannot be trusted in any case with independent tasks.

The difficulties in cavalry reconnaissance do not consist in the art of correctly ascertaining and reporting, but rather in transmitting everything that comes to the patrol's knowledge quickly and securely to the commander.

According to the reports of the foreign observers attached to the Russian cavalry divisions the reconnaissance service was very badly performed. Not only that most reports were incomplete and often totally false, but a large majority of them never reached the commanding general. The Cossacks were greatly deficient in intelligence and partly so in the necessary discipline and devotion to duty. On the other hand, the Japanese carried on their reconnaissance and message service, as well as every other duty, with willingness and untiring devotion to duty.

Our cavalry service expends much time and care on the proper education of competent and trustworthy messengers. But in spite of this expenditure of care and time but few cavalry regiments succeed in educating any appreciable portion of their troopers in this important service. Anyone who is in a position to notice it, can easily see that during our maneuvers always the same two or three troopers in a troop are utilized as messengers; and should the messages be verbal that number is still smaller.

Modern infantry tacticians never tire in emphasizing the fact that the education of the skirmisher in independent action and thinking is the first and most important aim of his military education. And the cavalry has more reason to keep this fact always in mind. Any one cavalry trooper

may find himself in the situation of being separated by miles from his command, surrounded by the enemy, and carrying a message, on the timely receipt of which might hinge the entire campaign.

If the trooper is without the necessary intelligence, the best and most zealous instruction will not make a good messenger out of him. The sad experiences which the Russians suffered with their Cossacks, should be a warning to us and should cause us to pay more attention to the selection of our recruits for cavalry.

As long as the claim of our cavalry in having a voice in the selection of the recruits, is slighted, will the cavalry never be what it should. In time of war this will be felt.

Our drill regulations in the second part, which treats of dismounted fighting, begins with these words: "The utilization of the cavalry for fire action is exceptional."

With that we are fully in accord. On another page we have stated why, in spite of the experiences in the Russo-Japanese War, we still cling to the opinion that the saber is the main weapon of the cavalry.

But in spite of clinging to this principle, no thinking cavalryman will deny the fact that "exceptional use for the fire action of cavalry" will still be the order of the day in a future war.

A good cavalry must therefore have learned in time of peace to feel at home on the firing line. The command, "Dismount, to fight on foot," should not be considered as something unusual.

The Austro-Hungarian cavalry drills with the traditional faithfulness that it employs in everything else, including the fighting on foot. Considering the time and labor expended in this direction it appears to us, however, that much remains to be desired. Many of our troops, so excellent in everything on horseback, display a certain clumsiness and helplessness as soon as the carbine comes into play, and this can be seen at target practice as well as in maneuvers. The main reason for this is to be found in the fact that the instructors, the officers, have not a sufficient knowledge of infantry fire action. As they are strangers to everything concerning the infantry, they stick too closely to the letter of the drill regulations. And how can it be expected that our young officers should have a sufficient knowledge of rules and regulations of the modern infantry battle?

The graduates of the Neustadt Academy, studying for two years the practical conditions of infantry under competent instructors, can easily acquire this knowledge, but those assigned to the cavalry, as a rule, find it beneath their dignity to interest themselves in it, and they do not join with any perceptible knowledge of or ability to instruct in fire tactics.

In this respect conditions are even worse with the cadets and the one-year volunteers appointed as regular officers. They cannot acquire much information from their instructors who do not understand the matter themselves, and can only learn the most formal part of an infantryman's duties.

The course of instruction in the school of musketry, to which a few of the older cavalry officers are sent yearly, tends more to advance their knowledge theoretically than practically, and the training of the troopers in fire tactics is little benefited thereby.

In our opinion the best means to remedy this defect would be to attach a sufficient number of infantry officers and non-commissioned officers to the cavalry as instructors. This might be done in the afternoons, so that their respective commands would not lose the services of these officers and non-commissioned officers altogether.

This proposed arrangement ought to take place at two different periods—first for the separate instruction of recruits, and thereafter for the instruction of the troop as a whole.

It would also be best to have target practice in accordance with the infantry firing regulations. Devotion to duty and pride of our corps of officers will guarantee that the above described plan would have good results in a very few years, and that then the infantry instructors could be dispensed with.

Of course our drill regulations, in as far as they pertain to fire discipline, would have to be amended accordingly.

And they should be, as the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War are in direct opposition to our present regulations.

The most important lesson derived from the late war is that only a strong, well equipped cavalry command will be enabled to carry out all the duties falling to its lot. Theoretically, therefore, a demand for a considerable increase in our cavalry would be justified. The relative numbers of our cavalry to the other arms is less in our army than that in any other of the great powers.

But, considering the financial and political conditions of our Monarchy, any relief seems to be out of the question. We will, therefore, ascertain if other measures cannot be taken that will offset the inferior numerical strength of our cavalry.

In the first place we would recommend an organization of the cavalry which conforms more nearly to war conditions. The divisional cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War played less than a modest rôle; it did nothing worthy of mention, either on the part of the Russians or the Japanese. At most we see them on different occasions prolonging with a few guns the firing line of the infantry, as, for instance, in the engagement at Wafankou, where the Third Japanese Cavalry regiment was posted on the right wing of the Third Division.

The cavalry attached to the Japanese infantry in the battle of Liaoyang was employed in a most unusual manner. It was charged with cooking the meals for the infantry on the firing line and carrying them to the front. This was certainly a very practical, but to this branch of the service an entirely unsuitable employment.

However, we should not blame the cavalry for its inaction, because it was tied down to the limits of the long, intrenched battle fronts during the battles and could do nothing.

The cavalry will be able, in future, to display an activity as prescribed in our regulations only when employed with an infantry division fighting on the flank.

It does seem peculiar, however, that the divisional cavalry, which on both sides was kept so strong, could not have performed the duty of reconnaissance in the immediate vicinity without the support of other arms. For this support the Russians called on the mounted "Jagd commands" of the infantry regiments, and the Japanese reconnaissance service was performed by mixed infantry and cavalry detachments.

In the face of these facts we maintain that the Japanese committed a grave error in attaching an entire cavalry regiment to each infantry division. The small numerical strength of their available cavalry, fifty-five squadrons, did not justify such a lavishness. Had the Japanese commander attached but one-half of a regiment to each infantry division, there would have been enough left to form another independent cavalry division. That the presence of such a cavalry division at Mukden would have influenced to a remarkable extent the entire course of the engagement is without doubt.

In the strict sense of the word, there was no divisional cavalry in the Russian army. The different army corps had cavalry attached according to circumstances or caprice. For instance, at Mukden the Siberian Army Corps had attached six, the Seventeenth European Army Corps twelve, and the Third Siberian over eighteen squadrons. In this case, also, there was an inexcusable weakening of the independent cavalry.

The "ordre de bataille" of our army in the field has the same mistake with which we have just charged the Japanese commanding general. We, also, with our comparatively weak cavalry, have no reason whatever to fritter it away. Three squadrons for each infantry division means a superfluous luxury, which we cannot afford; for our five or six independent cavalry divisions are insufficient for the three to four field armies which we will have to organize in case of war. On the whole, we will have to furnish cavalry to fourteen army corps, not counting the Fifteenth, the Bosnian, for special reasons not far to seek.

One of our present cavalry regiments of six squadrons placed at the disposition of the corps commander, would be

entirely sufficient. This would give on an average two squadrons each for the forty-two regular and Landwehr infantry divisions, a saving of forty-two squadrons according to the requirements of our present "ordre de bataille."

We would then have 264 squadrons for the independent cavalry divisions. Of these we could form eleven divisions of twenty-four squadrons each, sufficient to give each army a cavalry corps of from two to three cavalry divisions.

Sooner or later we will have to come to it to form army corps similar to the French and Germans, of only two infantry divisions.

Hand in hand with this will then come the so much desired reorganization of our cavalry, the forming of regiments of four squadrons each.

In this manner eighty-seven regiments could be formed, of which twenty-one could be utilized as army corps cavalry and the remaining sixty-six as independent cavalry divisions. Whether to make the latter six or four regiments strong would be a matter of no importance, but the latter seems to us to be more logical.

Thereby we would have the imposing number of sixteen and one half cavalry divisions, and our cavalry could then certainly act independently.

Through the continued growth of modern armies the army corps has already taken the place of the division as the strategical unit, and therefore it will be seen that the reconnoitering forces should be attached to the former and not to the latter. Then should one of his infantry divisions receive an independent duty, be it advance guard, flank guard, etc., the corps commander has the means at hand to provide it with cavalry according to the necessity of the case. Under certain circumstances he may also attach to it the entire cavalry force at his disposition.

According to the custom at our maneuvers, the division cavalry forms a reservoir from which are drawn, in addition to the customary three message patrols, a number of smaller detachments for small infantry columns, as well as orderlies, messengers, etc., for all the higher commanders. Should anything remain after this frittering away, the cavalry is

entirely too weak to have much force for reconnaissance duty in the immediate vicinity. The small portion remaining can do nothing but trot in front of the infantry advance guard and to draw back on one of the flanks upon sighting the head of the advancing enemy and be a looker-on in the ensuing battle.

The army corps cavalry should be utilized in accordance with other principles. Holding it for its main duty of reconnaissance, with its entire force, it should be spared at other times. During a battle its insignificant fire action compared with infantry, would be called on only in cases of emergency. But the final crisis of the battle must find them ready to gather the fruits of the victory, hand in hand with the independent cavalry, or to prevent the hostile cavalry from turning our defeat into a rout.

No matter how much we may guard against having our corps cavalry frittered away on unimportant duties, we must admit that the infantry division cannot be left entirely without some cavalry for security, for orderlies and for messengers, but two troops of the staff cavalry ought to be sufficient for that purpose. And these might be augmented by cyclists, as the Prussian Colonel Gaedke advocates so persistently in the *Berlin Tageblatt*.

It would also be well if our higher infantry commanders would practice during peace maneuvers husbanding the cavalry placed at their disposition. At the present time the divisional cavalry is being used at a rate which, in case of war, would mean its entire disorganization within a very few days. If in future wars our independent cavalry should play the important, active and independent rôle for which it is created, then our peace organization should be modified as follows:

1. That in time of peace the cavalry divisions are organized just as they would be in war.

2. That the horse batteries should be numerically increased accordingly.

3. That one machine gun detachment of four guns each be attached to each division.

We might add that in case of mobilization it would be best, as far as the cavalry is concerned, to avoid the creation of new organizations or formations, for in time of war each and every cavalry leader will find himself in a situation where he has to trust subordinate commands with independent duties; it is, therefore, of the utmost importance that he should thoroughly know his subordinates, not only their abilities, but also their character.

The transferring, *en masse*, of guard and line cavalry officers to the Cossack regiments, was especially deplorable in the Russo-Japanese War.

As Austria has but eight horse battery divisions of twelve guns each, an additional organization of eleven cavalry divisions would necessitate an additional six horse battery. Twelve guns are considered the minimum with which a cavalry division can properly carry out its tasks.

No time should be lost in organizing from eleven to sixteen additional machine gun detachments. The opinion of all experts who have had an opportunity to observe the results obtained from the use of this new arm, is that machine guns are especially suited to increase the fighting strength of troops, but only in case where the troops are familiar with their tactical use. The correct placing of the machine guns in the very beginning of an engagement is especially of importance and an art of leadership, as it will be difficult to change their position during the battle. Also, as the number of men serving the machine guns must always be very limited, it would be well for all cavalrymen to be able to handle them in case of necessity. It is, therefore, essential that in time of peace the cavalry should be instructed in their proper use. Up to the present time, but a few of our cavalry regiments have had that opportunity during maneuvers.

It is evident that the planning of larger maneuvers should give the cavalry leaders an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the tactics of battle raids. The short duration of our yearly maneuvers is a serious drawback in this respect. The slow deployment of the modern battle masses lasting for days is an absolute essential preliminary to the carrying out of our tactical problems. Therefore, in peace maneuvers

we, as a rule, will have to be satisfied with simply outlining the more extensive movements, and in any case we will have to omit our present passive manner of carrying out the movements for the protection of the flanks. That we are on a fair way to do this already is proved by the activity displayed by our two Silesian cavalry divisions in the last Imperial maneuvers.

If there is an actual spirit of enterprise animating our leaders, there will be no difficulty in directing it into the right channels.

We, as well as our German allies, will have to discontinue making certain attacks in mass "for the relief of our infantry" against victoriously advancing hostile infantry, but they are executed in maneuvers anyway only as a spectacular affair. The well known Prussian authority, Colonel Gaedke, is fighting with all his might against this practice, which in time of war can only lead to disaster.

We are far from expecting the cavalry to be afraid of losses in action; but when we consider the difficulty of recruiting proper and competent material in time of war, it would seem to be right and proper for the cavalry to strive in all its engagements to proportion its losses to the chances of obtaining recruits and also to the results to be achieved. In this regard entirely too much attention was paid to saving our forces in our past wars.

The small losses sustained in the Russo-Japanese War by the cavalry, compared with infantry losses, should be a cause for shame to the cavalry leaders concerned. Any body of cavalry which has a true conception of its duties will get into situations in any war where it must not be afraid of the greatest sacrifices. And this will always be the case there where it is of great importance to gain an insight into the hostile country. Because nothing can be seen without going near to the enemy, it is of the utmost importance to carefully avoid everything which will lead to a premature discovery, and this fact should lead to reforms in our cavalry armament and uniform. Especially should we Austrians not deceive ourselves and admit that the equipment and

uniform of our cavalry is flashy, very visible, and of very little practical use.

The red riding breeches, the hussar jackets, with their glaring trimmings, the light blue ulankas and coats, covered with the most conspicuous trimmings, the shining dragoon helmets, the polished saber scabbards, the gold belts of the officers, all these are not what we ought to have in war.

The Japanese cavalry took the field with red riding breeches and red trimmed coats, but before very long they were forced to cover that red color with khaki colored overalls.

We Austrians should not cling to tradition as an excuse for our colored cavalry uniform. Our War Department broke all traditions after 1866, by changing the old historic white coat of the infantry in which, as is well known, the infantry never went into field in any case, as well as the uniform of the cuirassiers, and the tasteful uniform of the hussars and uhlans. No time should now be lost in introducing khaki or gray colored field uniforms, with almost invisible rank designations. Everything leading to the identification of officers at long distance should be abolished. A patrol, getting under hostile fire, should not run the danger of losing its leader at the first fire.

In place of the clumsy dragoon helmets, shakos and impracticable hussar head coverings, which in any case would soon lose their shape and brilliancy in campaign, a simple felt hat should be adopted. All bright buttons, buckles, etc., should be replaced by dull bronzed ones.

The heavy riding boots, which after a few wet marches and bivouacs can be drawn on with but great difficulty, should give place to lace shoes and suitable leggins; and box spurs should be replaced by spurs with straps.

For winter campaigns fur coats reaching to the knee, arctic overshoes, fur gauntlets and fur caps with earlaps, should be adopted.

We will lessen the disgust our young comrades may feel over the picture we have drawn by stating that for garrison use a nobby uniform should be retained. For in military

questions especial attention must be paid to the psychological factor; human weaknesses must be respected. Of the Austrian cavalry officer is especially so much expected that we must pardon the little vanity he shows in his uniform.

A nobby and fine uniform will compensate the young men for many hardships, and will give them self-respect, which is very conducive in fostering the desire to forge to the front in battle. And the common cavalry officer, whose lot in time of peace is harder and more disagreeable than that of his brother infantry officer, deserves a uniform in which he can show off on occasions.

Therefore it would be best to retain our present parade and street cavalry uniform, but the field uniform described above should be acquired as soon as practicable. It is to be regretted that experiments with such a field uniform have been made in all branches of our service except the cavalry. The same conditions apply to Germany. Any one who has seen in their maneuvers the white belts, the shining coats and helmets, and the burnished equipment of the cavalry, can only wish them the good luck never to be compelled to take the field in that uniform.

Also, in striving to lessen the visibility of the cavalry, we should not forget to banish the white horse from our troops. Any one who has ever led a patrol can easily remember how easily he saw at a long distance the white horses of the enemy's patrol or troop, showing him the proper direction to take, and enabling him to send back excellent reports. We should not make it so easy for the enemy. Austria and Hungary are rich enough in horse flesh to banish the white horse forever from its cavalry service.

In spite of its inferior numerical strength and inferior equipment the Japanese cavalry did its entire duty, and because of its exçellent *esprit*. This should be a warning to us, who look with a certain degree of self-satisfaction on the tactical and technical advantages possessed by our cavalry. May we never, considering our brilliant achievements in time of peace, underestimate the value of the moral element and neglect to foster it. The largest part of our men are imbued with a healthy *esprit*, not yet affected by temporal

or national conditions; and the spirit of those soldierly virtues which religion and ethics imbued in the Japanese soldier can be developed into a large part, if not all, of our army. Our corps of officers should at all times be able to perform this high duty. Clean morals, a devotion to duty and a love of the profession should never diminish.

It cannot be denied that this requirement is easy to exact but hard to conform to. The present situations and material conditions of the officer are to-day little suited to cause him to be the champion of a rapidly disappearing ideal.

Of this our higher leaders of the old school should not lose sight. They should consider it one of their main duties to lighten, in so far as the interest of the service permits, the struggle for existence of the younger officers. Slavish submissiveness should not be required of subordinates, but instead a cheerful obedience.

He who in time of peace cowardly renounces his own convictions will never strive in time of war for responsibility, that attribute of each and every cavalry officer.

The overwhelming with drudgery of which our subalterns and even our troop commanders needlessly suffer on account of red tape, uses up their best powers, narrows their horizon of view, makes them downhearted and incompetent for coming to independent decisions.

Only officers educated on a liberal and broad minded basis will make competent instructors for our rank and file.

The old military truth "What is not continually inspected will not be practiced," can in a certain sense be applied also in the psychological sphere. The spirit animating a cavalry troop should count for more in the eyes of the troop commander than its purely military performances.

Of course it is not easy in time of peace to designate definite points from which to judge the moral value of a troop.

A commander who is somewhat of a psychologist and who has his heart in the right spot will have no trouble in coming to a correct solution in this regard.

Regimental commanders should first of all strive to lead the moral education of their troops into the right channel.

A colonel without good temperament and without a warm heart is, in our opinion, out of place, however excellent a soldier he may be in other respects. Unfortunately the highest authorities do not seem to coincide with this view in many cases.

Officers of the General Staff, who have nothing to do but be "good soldiers," are not infrequently appointed to the important command of a regiment. Concerning the expression "good soldier," an erroneous opinion has sprung up during our long period of peace. Any one who finds himself at home under all conditions, who never bothers the higher authorities, who guesses the intentions of his superiors and carries them out with fanaticism, is called that. Should, then, such a "good soldier" be appointed colonel, he at once requires the same blind obedience which he has practiced. Laurels at inspection are his highest dreams. A self-consciousness of having done the best with the means at hand he does not understand or appreciate; to gain approval of the powers above is the main thing, causes him to do everything his own way, and brings his subordinates to the verge of despair. And soon the latter perform their duties unwillingly and mechanically instead of with pleasure and devotion. The spirit of the corps of officers retrogrades and all better elements disappear. That, however, does not seem to be material to the martinet colonel, as long as the entire day is consumed in duty; as long as everything goes according to his dictates, the *esprit* is of little importance. He has no decided rule of conduct concerning his manner of thought and action. All he thinks of is "What will the General or His Excellence say?"

If we have portrayed conditions to emphasize the evil in too high a color, there is one fact which we cannot deny, and that is that many excellent men, especially suited for good cavalry leaders, retire as troop commanders. The ideal they looked for and strove to attain in their service did not materialize. Sooner than find their individuality forced into prescribed forms, they went their ways. Our friend, the "red tape" colonel, will, however, dismiss this

fact with the platitude "nobody is unreplaceable." But to that we take exception.

The Russian cavalry, for instance, had very few leaders who knew how to combine intelligence, tactical knowledge and desire to accomplish something with the moral courage of taking responsibility. Should our turn come it is questionable whether we would have a better record in this respect.

The commanders of large infantry forces will be able in future to lead very comfortable physical existences in the field. Even the fatigues of days of battle will not be hard on them, as a rule. Far more than ever heretofore they will be confined to certain places behind the firing line.

It is different with the cavalry leader. Carriages and portable houses of wood or asbestos are not for him. He has to share physical exertions with the youngest recruit, and then have all his wits about him. It is therefore a necessity, though a hard rule, to call a halt on the older captains, who have lost their physical elasticity during the long years of service as troop commanders, and compel them to retire when they attain the rank of major.

Another question is, whether or not we should expose our best cavalry experts to the danger of exhausting their physical strength during long years of weary waiting for promotion. To this we answer emphatically, "No!"

And this should teach us of the cavalry officers' corps to unremittingly care for and foster the physical and moral qualities so necessary to a cavalry leader; and if we succeed in this we need have no fear as to the future, for our tools are good.

NOTE.— Since the above translation was made here, and the paper was in the hands of the printer, an English translation in book form has been received. A review of it will be found under the head of Book Reviews.

THE STUDY OF LAW AT THE SCHOOL OF THE LINE.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE GIVEN TO OFFICERS OF THE SCHOOL OF THE LINE.

BY CAPTAIN HERBERT A. WHITE, ELEVENTH CAVALRY,
SENIOR INSTRUCTOR.

"AS every citizen is interested in the preservation of the laws, it is incumbent upon every man to be acquainted with those at least with which he is immediately concerned, lest he incur the censure, as well as the inconvenience, of living in society without knowing the obligations which it lays him under. And thus much may suffice for persons of inferior condition, who have neither time nor capacity to enlarge their views beyond that contracted sphere in which they are appointed to move. But those on whom nature and fortune have bestowed more abilities and greater leisure, cannot be so easily excused. These advantages are given them, not for the benefit of themselves only, but also of the public, and yet they cannot, in any scene of life, discharge properly their duty, either to the public or themselves, without some degree of knowledge in the laws.*

"There is no branch of knowledge so essential to the proper discharge of the various duties of a citizen. This is especially true with respect to American citizens, whose high prerogative it is, by virtue of the doctrine of suffrage, to have a direct and personal participation in all public affairs. Surely, that man is not fit to be the maker or the guardian of laws who has never been educated in their first

* Blackstone, b. 1, p. 6.

principles. But apart from public and patriotic consideration, self-interest should induce every man to understand his own rights and obligations. This proposition is almost too clear to need enforcement. As the subjects of law, certainly, if not as the makers, all ought to know enough to avoid its penalties and reap its benefits. Unquestionably on the score of practical utility no kind of knowledge can stand higher, for it comes into immediate application almost every hour we live."*

As for a knowledge of law on the part of military officers, that one of us who passes through a day without feeling a need of a knowledge of his powers and the methods of procedure thereunder, is certainly not passing through a day of ordinary military experience. Any officer who is not absolutely sure of his ground, at least in all matters of ordinary routine, is a curse to himself, a burden to his superiors, and a menace to his profession. No one will gainsay the statement of Blackstone that "a person of liberal education should possess at least some knowledge of that science which is to be the guardian of his natural rights and the rule of his civil conduct." It requires only the slightest reflection to comprehend the vast importance of some knowledge of this science on the part of army officers who, in the last extremity, are to be the defenders of these very rights and judges of the rules of civil conduct.

Why have we an army? Simply to defend our institutions. And an army not imbued with a fervent love for the institutions for which it is contending becomes nothing but a body of mercenaries, to be defeated by the first patriotic force with which it comes in contact. Properly to appreciate and love our institutions we must possess some knowledge of them and the laws which support them, for it is hard to be in love with an object with which we are unacquainted.

The Law Department is far from saying that our officers are unfamiliar with our institutions and laws. But to say that we can be too well acquainted with them, as officers practically say when voicing the old statement, "There is too

* Walker, p. 2.

much law in the army," is a queer comment from reasonable men. That such ideas exist is a matter of astonishment and concern. Fortunately the War Department considers that a carefully prepared course laid out for the instruction of selected officers would be woefully deficient if no notice were taken of our relations to our body politic, the perpetuation of whose existence is the reason of the army's being.

It would appear to one unfamiliar with our system of jurisprudence that to gain a knowledge of our institutions nothing could be better than a study of our Federal Constitution. A knowledge of this instrument should familiarize us with the spirit of our institutions, not only with our Federal but with our State institutions as well, for the State governments are each similar to the Federal. But it should be remembered that our Constitution is but a law, and like every law, to be understood must be interpreted by the aid of the lamp of legal knowledge. Thoroughly to understand our great instrument we must become acquainted with legal terms and language else we shall read much with but imperfect understanding.

But there is another consideration yet more important in the question of gaining a knowledge of our law. If you have never given the matter any serious thought or study you may be under the impression that most, if not all, of our laws will be found in our constitutions and statutes and treaties. But in nothing could you be more mistaken. The greater part of the law of this country will be found in no constitution, in no statute book, in no treaty whatever. This discrepancy between our judicial theory and practice is somewhat amazing. Nevertheless it exists. And the fact that the Federal government is said to possess no common law and the fact that many of our States have adopted codes do not render less imperative a grounding knowledge in our common or customary law.

Of course our time is so limited that only the hastiest glance can be given to this subject of the common law. The study of the common law is hardly anything less than a study of our race itself. And if a liberal education is required anywhere, it must be from the students of the law,

for "the sparks of all the sciences in the world are raked up in the ashes of the law."* It is apparent what task devolves upon those who essay to give a short course to army officers upon this subject.

"The general expectation of so numerous and respectable a body as the student officers that are continually passing through this institution, the importance of the duty required from this department, must unavoidably be productive of great apprehension in those who have the honor to be instructors therein. We cannot but be sensible how much will depend upon our conduct in the infancy of this study of the civil law by our officers, for it is still but three years since this course was authorized by the War Department. Law is a study that has generally been reputed of a dry and unfruitful nature, and it is one in which the methods of theoretical elementary instruction are yet sources of contention in our law schools. We cannot but reflect that if either the plan of instruction be crude and injudicious, or the execution of it be lame and superficial, it will cast a damp upon the further progress of this most useful and rational branch of learning; and may defeat for a time the wise design of those whose influence and farsightedness succeeded in placing this study in our curriculum."†

Furthermore, any officer attempting to give instruction in civil law must necessarily feel his limitations in the lack of practice such as comes to the ordinary attorney. This is a difficulty that can be overcome by instructors in this department only by unwearied effort in keeping touch with all that is in progress in the civilian world. It shall certainly be our constant aim by diligence and attention to atone for this serious defect, esteeming that the best offer we can make for your favorable opinion will be our tireless endeavors in some little degree to deserve it.

We expect that officers of the experience now appearing at this institution know their Davis and Winthrop. Life is too short to again go over these works. The course at this institution should be an amplification and not a repetition of

* Bacon.

† Adapted from Blackstone.

what an officer already knows. So we shall present to you the broad field of law in general that you may more properly appreciate the place military and martial law occupy in the whole grand scheme of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. To study military, martial, international and constitutional law without a proper groundwork in the elementary principles of law is not unlike looking at a few stones in a large building with no view whatever of the entire structure and with no idea of the relations existing between these few stones and the whole edifice. When once you have a view of the entire structure, realize its proportions and purposes, you will then, and not till then, be in a position to understand the objects of the separate elements of which it is composed.

Consequently we start the course with a short study of elementary law. We can give you, of course, but an outline. We must work so rapidly that we can hit only the high places, leaving to your own lesiure and inclination the time when you will descend into the valleys fruitful with learning. But we trust this hurried glance will be sufficient to enable you to fill in the details with future study.

The course in elementary law comprises a study of law in general; the sources of law; common and civil; the classification, municipal, international, military and martial; written and unwritten law; government and its functions, National and State; equity; persons; property, real and personal; estates; domestic relations; contracts; torts; remedies, courts and procedure; and judicial references.

Military law is essentially criminal law, so that a study of criminal law as conducted here is but an extension of what has always been taught in our military text-books. The nature of crimes is investigated, and explanation is given of the objects and ends of criminal procedure. It is appropriate to mention here the necessity of keeping our army procedure and punishments in consonance with those that the spirit of our people demand for themselves. "Popular beliefs change often in the course of time, not by force of reason so much as because of their incongruity with the spirit of the age. Our general intellectual tendencies create new attractions and new antipathies, and eventually cause

as absolute a rejection of certain old opinions as could be produced by the most cogent and definite arguments."* As the ideas of people change in regard to crime, so must we change our methods of army discipline. We can no longer keep men on a barrel from reveille to retreat or cause them to pack logs for hours around a ring, as in the past. Our army comes voluntarily from the people, and we can have no abnormal system of justice in it. We necessarily must keep in touch with the beliefs of our people as regards the punishment of crime and the methods of determining guilt.

It is true that the people are not always right, especially in regard to matters with which they are not fully conversant. It is to be regretted that our people do not fully realize the enormity of the crime of desertion. If they did, few deserters could escape detection and capture. But we are confronted with conditions and not theories, and we must do the best we can, realizing that no abnormality of procedure or punishment will be tolerated by the American people in any of their institutions.

All this is true regarding the law of evidence. While we are not strictly bound in our military procedure by the common law rules of evidence, yet these rules are our guide, and must not be departed from except for most excellent reasons. Hence naturally flows the study of the common law rules of evidence at this school, a subject that heretofore has not received from military men the study commensurate with its importance. Moreover, as evidence is procedure, we can here introduce instruction in any and all branches of the law. As you proceed in your study of this subject you will understand our whole scheme of instruction and realize fully that all our teaching of the civil law tends to but one end, such a knowledge of the law that we can understandingly emphasize military features.

The course in criminal law comprises a study of the classification of crimes; mental element in crimes; persons capable of committing crimes; offenses against persons, property, health and morals, public peace and the government.

*Lecky.

The course in evidence comprises a study of the history of our laws of evidence; judicial notice; law and fact; burden of proof; presumptions; admissions; confessions; character; opinion; hearsay; witnesses; examination of witnesses; writings.

Moot courts are also introduced exemplifying the procedure of military tribunals, including commissions and provost courts; preparation of forms employed in military jurisprudence, motions, pleas, depositions, etc. These are given near the end of the course, and are intended to test the knowledge of student officers as gained in the past, amplified by the course here.

Arrangements have been made for the following lectures to be given during the course. No study of lectures is required:

"The Jury." By Mr. John H. Atwood, counsel for Private Grafton before the United States Supreme Court.

"The Dilatoriness of the Law." By Judge J. H. Gillpatrick, of the Kansas bench.

"Federal and State Courts." By Mr. Nathaniel Guernsey, of the Iowa bar.

And if possible the lecture of Judge Webb, of Atchison, Kansas, on "The Trials of Christ" before the Jewish Sanhedrim and before Pontius Pilate.

This completes the instruction for the first year. The Staff College work in law consists in exhaustive study of constitutional law, martial law and military government. The work in these studies is made very complete in order to fit officers for the various duties they are called upon to perform. It has aptly been stated that we are to-day largely an army of pacification,* and as such the problems we are called upon to solve require quite an extensive legal knowledge. From the short course here in civil law we feel assured that student officers will be fairly well equipped to meet the new requirements that the last few years have imposed upon army officers.

*Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Bullard in *Military Service Institution*, July, 1907.

The system of instruction is that known as the quiz system. A certain number of subjects covered by the text book is given out for each lesson. The various points in the lesson are pointed out by the instructor, and then members of the class are questioned over the whole lesson. By this means students are not at a loss to understand the main features and the important parts of each lesson. It has always been a stumbling block to the students of the law to know, in their reading, what parts are more important than others. By this method students soon come to see from the quizzes what are the important parts and what are less important. What the quizzes have developed into are really conferences between the student officers and the instructor. And the term, conferences, is now being used by our universities in place of quizzes. Officers may ask questions at any time, and they should do so if there is anything that arises during a quiz that they do not grasp. But you are cautioned against needless questions or those that slight study would enable you to answer yourselves. Every class has its public nuisance, and it would be a noted exception if this one should find itself minus that individual. Everyone should remember that in asking questions during the quizzes he is taking up time; and it may be the matter he asks about is clear to the other members of the class and it is a waste of time to have them all listening to something they already understand. Questions may be asked of the instructors after the conferences are over if you feel that you want further information and yet are fearful of taking up the time of the class. No markings are given on the daily conferences. Examinations are given at the end of each subject, and partial examinations are given in each subject some time during the course in that subject. The system of marking will be explained to you later. Suffice to say at this point that no paper is marked by itself, except in the case of deficiency. Each question is marked through all the papers before another question is taken up. That is, Question No. 1 is marked through the papers of all the student officers before going on to Question No. 2. This allows of comparison such as could be obtained in no other manner. When the papers

have all thus been marked, the marks are totaled, but not before.

It has been remarked that it seems peculiar that international law has been given no place in our curriculum. As has before been stated, any course given here should be an amplification of what an officer already knows. Officers reporting here for the courses are presumed to be familiar with the elementary work on the subject of international law, written by the present Judge Advocate General, Geo. B. Davis. An amplification of this would require considerable time, and that is what is not given us. Moreover we do study the laws of war under the subjects of martial law and military government.

It is the opinion of the present head of the department that the importance of international law does not warrant any alteration of the present course. The department is in hearty accord with the views lately expressed by our Secretary of State in his paper on "The Need of a Popular Understanding of International Law." Mr. Root points out "that now the governments are controlled by the people oftener than the people by the government; that one of the chief obstacles to peaceable adjustments of international controversies is the violent condemnation of an arbitrator by his own people if he yield any part of their demands, whether such part is lawful or not."

Public enlightenment on any question is to be wished for, and the more intelligent people become the less violent they are apt to be in the matter of their rights before they have fully studied the questions concerning them. But this institution is not a propaganda for general information. It is purely technical in character, and has for its object only the giving of such information as will be immediately useful to an officer in the performance of his duties. And international law is not as immediately useful as any subject in the course.

International law is quite as much an academic study as a legal one. Some of our law schools do not include this subject in their curriculums and many pay but little attention to it. This is no reason why we should not have it, if

it were as necessary to us as some of the subjects we do study, yet it shows that the subject is not considered important in legal knowledge.

International law is mainly a study of history, and a very discouraging one at that, to a lover of justice. No men more than military men, especially those of much service, would more gladly herald the approach of eternal peace. But as long as men take the redress of personal grievances into their own hands, as is daily witnessed in the many cases of the so-called "unwritten law," it takes a dreamer to come to a conclusion that the dawn of international justice and eternal peace is *comparatively* any nearer us than it was a thousand years ago.

We are far from decrying the great good that has come to the world from the adoption of the rules and regulations governing international intercourse. We are not insensible to the lessening of the number of wars since international trade took on such enormous proportions. And certainly some good, however little it may appear, must result from such meetings as the Hague conferences. But large armies and strong navies are to-day, and will be for years and years to come, stronger guarantees of peace than all the international law rules that have arisen since the civilization of man took form.

The department has prepared a small pamphlet that will be of value to officers that in the future care to take up the interesting study of international law. During the course here similarities and analogies between municipal and international law are frequently called to the attention of the student officers, but beyond this our time does not warrant us in going with this subject.

And now, finally, as to the method of study. We are all aware of criticisms of this school that are made by officers, most of the critics being unfamiliar with the present system. The greatest fault of Leavenworth, it is said, is that it is a speck school. This criticism has reached such a point that we are almost led to despise a mind that can memorize anything. However, such criticism must have some good points or it would have died long ago. The *parrot system* of education, or attempt at education, cannot be too strongly condemned. This department has been laboring for three years to eliminate any and all methods whereby a person may gain recognition unless he possess a practical working knowledge of the subjects covered in the course. If any department could be excused for having a system where booking would be prominent it would be the law department. For law is a book study in the sense that most of it will be found in books.

But I wish to call your attention to a distinction that is invariably missed by the critics of this school. Accuracy is not speck. And while the department cares nothing about the latter, it most strongly insists on the former. There can be no successful men in our present work-a-day world that are not accurate men. And if the law department at this institution could do nothing more than impress upon student officers the need of accuracy in all their professional work it could well stand upon that record. We hear caviling at red tape in the army. But if every report made, if every communication submitted, if every return rendered, was correct when it left its place of origin, the red tape, the paper work of the army, would be so decreased that most of our system would stand a model in place of a target.

And so while we care nothing for the words of any book, we insist that principles be so understood that there may remain nothing for an accurate mind to do but apply these principles to controversies that arise.

In your study of the law, at first, you will be beset with doubts and misgivings. You will find yourselves probably in the condition of the blind man looking in a dark cellar for a black hat that isn't there. You will call a veritable fool that man who said, "Law is the pride of the human intellect and the collected wisdom of ages." And you will hurl anathemas at Blackstone for saying, "Law is a science which employs in its theory the noblest faculties of the soul, and exerts in its practice the cardinal virtues of the heart; a science which is universal in its use and extent, accommodated to each individual, yet comprehending the whole community." Yet such language cannot be deemed extravagant.

For municipal law is indeed the grand regulator of human affairs. "Its functions may be appropriately compared to those of gravitation. If you could imagine even a momentary suspension of that great law which regulated the universe of matter, keeping the minutest particle, as well as the mightiest mass, in its proper condition, the stupendous con fusion that would thence result, and which we designate by the fearful name of chaos, you would have strong but faithful illustration of that social disorder which would as certainly result from the suspension of municipal law, and which we designate by the hardly less fearful name of anarchy."*

A clear conception of the grandeur of law will make us better officers, and when once we all realize it the bogie of militarism will or should disappear from the American people.

It is true that the work here crams the student officer. Not in the sense of speck, but so much is gone over, such a hurried view is given that, kaleidoscopic-like, but little remains. But we can get no more time, and we believe more good comes from the present system than from any other that could be adopted. And we make you acquainted with the methods of finding the law, which is after all the great desideratum.

In spite of all the ground we cover, we do not expect you to work yourselves to death. But I may say that you will be considerably disappointed if you look for entertainment without the expense of attention. But an attention not greater than that usually bestowed in learning the rudiments of any other science. But you must dearly earn what you obtain. "Genius, without toil, may, to some extent distinguish a man elsewhere; but here he must labor or he cannot succeed. No quickness of invention can supply the place of patient investigation. A clear mind might determine at once what the law ought to be, but actual inspection alone can determine what the law is. You must make up your minds to hard work. Weigh well the fact, that 'to

*Walker, p. 5.

scorn delights and live laborious days' is the indispensable condition of professional eminence. On somewhat easier terms you may prepare yourself for the ordinary routine officer; but nothing short of resolute, emulous, persevering study can raise you to that height which alone should satisfy a generous ambition."*

*Adapted from Walker.

MEMORANDUM: THE ADAPTATION OF ARMY REGULATIONS TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE BRIGADE POST OF CAMP STOTSENBURG, PAMPANGA, P. I.

THE Army Regulations outline a strict rule of procedure for administration of small posts with all modern conveniences within the United States, and in time of peace. In times of war their requirements must be met as far as possible or practicable under the circumstances; but there arise many military necessities and emergencies which require immediate action which must not be delayed for any cause.

Now that the government is concentrating large bodies of troops in posts, the requirements of Army Regulations adapted to the administration of small commands must be modified and liberally construed in their application, otherwise the time of the commanding generals of these brigade posts will be so taken up with unimportant administrative details that no time will be left them for the important work of instructing and maneuvering their commands on advanced lines and seeing to their military efficiency and preparedness for actual field service.

It is believed that there is nothing in the following pages that violates any army regulation, but that the adaptation of Army Regulations, as suggested within and as is now in operation in the brigade post of Camp Stotsenburg, is for the best interests of the service for large commands from all points of view.

1. As far as possible the details of administration and instruction will be left to subordinate commanders, to whom they properly belong. Post headquarters will deal with

regiments and detachments or separate battalions, through their respective commanding officers. Those commanders will be given latitude in carrying out existing orders for drilling and instructing their commands, but the post commander will, by frequent inspections, see that the results are in all respects satisfactory, and where organizations are found delinquent or lax the commander of the regiment or detached or separate battalion concerned will be held strictly responsible.

2. Leave of absence, under the provisions of Par. 49, Army Regulations, will be granted by the post commander upon approved applications forwarded through military channels. In view of the irregular hours of departure and arrival of Manila trains the following decision will govern in the case of officers going to Manila by verbal permission:

"Regimental commanders, the commanding officer Sixth Battalion, Field Artillery, and the surgeon may, in their discretion, give officers of their respective commands permission to leave the post on one day, returning the next. Such absences will not be counted as leaves, and officers so absent will be shown as present on all morning reports. All officers leaving the post four hours or more, under whatever authority, will register their departure and return, with authority for their absences, on the register at post headquarters."

3. Companies of intact regiments will be considered under the control of their respective regimental commanders in reference to the latter's authority to grant "furloughs in the prescribed form for periods of one month." (Par. 104, A. R.)

4. Under Article XIX of the regulations, the action ordered to be taken by the commanding officer will be taken by the commanding officer of the regiment or detached battalion to which the deserter belongs or by which or in which he is apprehended. These same commanders may send enlisted men in pursuit of a deserter when no expense is involved. In no case, however, are subordinate commanders competent to issue orders which involves issues to be made, or expense incurred by post staff officers. This prohibition is general.

5. Under the provisions of Par. 201, A. R., regimental commanders and the commanding officer Sixth Battalion, F. A., and the surgeon will make frequent inspections of the buildings used by enlisted men of their commands. A post order requires that weekly inspections of the post be made by a medical officer accompanied by the post police officer. Subordinate commanders will remedy promptly any irregularities or unsanitary conditions brought to their attention as a result of these inspections. The commanding general of the post will inspect various buildings from time to time, especially where irregularities have been observed or reported.

6. Post exchange councils for the various authorized branches of the post exchange will be ordered as required by regulations and the necessities of the service, in orders from this office. The roster for these councils will be kept at the headquarters to which they pertain and the proceedings will be forwarded to this office for approval, through the respective regimental or detached battalion commander.

7. The attention of regimental commanders is called to the inspections ordered to be made by them in Par. 328, A. R. The company fund accounts of the batteries and the hospital will be made as required by the post commander.

8. All bakeries, whatever their location in the garrison, will be under the post treasurer, and the baking of bread, etc., for the entire command will be under his supervision. The post treasurer is authorized to make use of all bakeries and divide his work among them as may best meet the necessities of the case.

9. Newspapers and periodicals have been estimated for, for the coming fiscal year, to be addressed to organizations as follows: Third Cavalry, First Infantry (including Sixth Battalion, F. A.), Second Infantry. The commanding officers concerned will arrange for reading rooms or tents in their respective commands.

10. The report called for in Par. 351, A. R., will be rendered for each branch of the post exchange, and through the channels prescribed in Par. 6 of this memorandum.

11. Guards will be turned out for their respective "commanding officers." All guards will be turned out for the "commanding general." When a colonel commands the post all guards will be turned out for him as "commanding officer."

12. The commanding officers of regiments or detached battalions will refer requests for surveys arising in their commands to surveying officers appointed by them. The same commanders will approve or disapprove the reports of survey so submitted. If the amount involved exceeds $500.00, all copies will be forwarded to this office. If the amount involved is less than $500.00, two copies will be furnished the accountable officer and the third forwarded to this office. Requests for surveys by post staff officers, and in any casual cases will be made to this office.

13. General Orders No. 191, series 1905, War Department, will be followed strictly in correspondence between this office and the post staff offices of record. In connection with the above cited order this office will keep a suspended file of all communications received here, whether recorded or not, but which are to come back with some action taken.

14. Copies of all Regimental, General and Special Orders and circulars, and the orders of detached battalions will be furnished these headquarters as soon as they are published.

15. The muster of regiments and detached battalions will be by the commanders thereof. The surgeon will muster the detachment of the hospital corps, and the post adjutant will muster the post non-commissioned staff. The details of each formation for review and muster will be published in orders from these headquarters.

16. Complete efficiency reports will be forwarded to these headquarters by regimental commanders and commanders of detached battalions for every commissioned officer on duty under them on June 30th. The surgeon will furnish complete reports in the case of each commissioned medical officer on duty under his supervision on June 30th. The commanding general will make out these reports only in the case of regimental and detached battalion commanders,

the surgeon, and any casual officers or any staff officers not otherwise reported upon. He will add any remarks he may deem proper in forwarding all reports by endorsement.

17. A general order of the director of posts of the Philippine Islands, published pursuant to an act of the Philippine Commission, required that all official mail matter be stamped with the department, bureau or post from which it is mailed.

18. Under the provisions of 1, Par. 849, A. R., each regiment will have a recruiting officer appointed by the commander thereof. A post recruiting officer will act on all other cases arising in the command. General Orders No. 54, series 1905, Philippine Division, directs that: "Recruiting officers will submit *direct* to these headquarters, immediately upon the enlistment or reënlistment of any man (Philippine Scouts excepted), a written report, giving the date and place of enlistment, the organization for which enlisted; by whom enlisted; organizations previously served in, and the period of service in each, with dates; also date of arrival in the Philippine Islands."

19. The commanding officer of the post is the only officer having power to place officers in arrest, except as provided in the 24th Article of War.

20. Charges and specifications will be forwarded to this office complete, including compliance with Paragraph 962, A. R., and General Orders No. 8, c. s., Headquarters Department of Luzon.

21. Summary court cases arising in the post will be disposed of as follows: Regimental commanders will refer all cases arising in their regiments to the summary court officer appointed by them for their regiment. All cases arising in the Sixth Battalion, Field Artillery, detachment hospital corps, and all casual cases will be referred from these headquarters to the post summary court for trial.

22. Papers forwarded to these headquarters, such as clothing schedules, requisitions for stationery, etc., calling for issues to be made by the quartermaster, will not be prepared for the signature of the commanding general, but after he

has signified his approval of same they will be approved by his command and signed by the adjutant. All such papers will be approved by the respective regimental commanders or detached battalion commander before being forwarded to this office.

23. Ration returns will not be prepared for the signature of the commanding general. When he has signified his approval of same they will be approved by his command and signed by the adjutant. They will always be examined and approved by subordinate commanders before being forwarded to this office.

24. Pay rolls will be completed by regimental commanders and the commanders of detached battalions, and the surgeon as the commanding officer of the detachment of the hospital corps. They will be forwarded by the same commanders direct to the chief paymaster of the department.

25. All dealings with the medical department of the post will be through the "surgeon" as the commander of a distinct detachment.

26. Regimental commander, commanders of detached battalions and the surgeon will take final action on all passes submitted to them. They will also make proper arrangements for having reports of departure and return on passes properly made.

27. Whenever the permanent commander of the post is to be absent for one week or more, the senior colonel commanding during his absence will be carried on detached service from his regiment, the next senior commanding the same, and thus leaving the post commander free and unhampered to see to the proper administration of the post as a whole. Under no circumstances will the headquarters of any regiment be combined in any way with post headquarters.

Respectfully submitted,

GEO. VAN HORN MOSELEY,
Captain Fifth Cavalry,
Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP STOTSENBURG.
PAMPANGA, P. I., June 6, 1906.

The foregoing memorandum is approved and will govern in the administration of affairs of this command. Any communications that may be issued from time to time modfying or amending the above will be attached to or filed with these papers.

J. M. LEE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

THE SABER.

BY CAPTAIN G. B. PRITCHARD, FIFTH CAVALRY.

"Are we thoroughly proficient in its use and is there any room or need for improvement?"

THE weapons of the cavalryman in our service are the carbine, the pistol and the saber. In order to insure proficiency and readiness in the use of the carbine, we have sighting and aiming drills, gallery practice, instruction practice (ball cartridge), and finally record practice, where the details of the individual records of each shot of each man are made of record and preserved, so that the standing of each man in the organization and of the organization as a whole, are expressed mathematically for present information of those concerned in comparing their progress with that of competitors, and for future use as a basis for further improvement, or perhaps as a cause for discharge for disability because of the hopelessness of the soldiers ever being of any use to the government in one of the most important of all the qualities necessary to make a fighting man.

To further stimulate interest, to encourage effort and to reward success in this most desirable accomplishment, we have the division and army competitions, where medals and prizes are awarded and the results of these competitions, as well as those of the record shooting previously referred to, of each organization are published in general orders each year.

In reference to the pistol a very similar procedure is adopted and carried out.

Thus for the two shooting weapons we have a systematic progressive and detailed course of instruction, culminating in the most important feature of all, a test of ability con-

ducted so as to promote competition, rivalry and a desire to excel, capped with rewards for success.

And the results with both these weapons have, wherever the course of instruction was conscientiously carried out by interested and competent officers, been highly satisfactory.

But what of the saber? We have heard much discussion in the past as to the relative merits of the saber and the pistol, and even a hint or two as to the advisability of doing away with the former; but this is not the question under discussion. We have the saber with us, a distinctive weapon of the cavalry branch, and, whatever the purpose or design of the weapon, whatever the wisdom or folly of its adoption as part of our armament, it must be admitted that a lack of knowledge of the weapon and how to use it is, if true, a serious defect, which cannot be remedied too soon, for the saber in the hands of an uninstructed man is like a razor in the hands of an infant—extremely dangerous.

Now I maintain at the outset that our cavalry (by which I mean our average cavalry organizations) is not proficient with the saber; that the average trooper in our service cannot use his saber with the amount of effectiveness he should possess, and control his horse at the same time; that the saber is handled more like a cudgel, held with a death-like grip, with little or no dexterity and suppleness and with little regard, when swinging this three-foot knife from the back of a horse, for the changing center of gravity of the combined animal, man and weapon. In speaking of our "average" cavalry organizations, we must, of course, eliminate the troops at Riley, Leavenworth, Myer and Jefferson Barracks, where crack drillery and show is part of the program and where proficiency and even excellence in saber exercises are attained by a great deal of effort, not *because* of the system but *in spite of* it.

I further maintain that, whilst our troopers undoubtedly have the brawn and eye for strongly propelled, accurately aimed blows and correctly directed thrusts, they would in a mêlée be inferior to a foe whose training in suppleness, dexterity and (what are natural accompaniments) speed and agility would enable them to save their strength and win by skill over a useless output of muscular energy.

The subject of the use of the saber on horseback (for that is almost its sole use) is so intimately connected with or dependent upon good and proper horsemanship that the discussion of the two must go hand in hand.

But before taking up the subject along this line let us see how the course of instruction and practice with the saber, as laid down in our regulations, and as required by orders, compares with the courses and the standards required for the carbine and pistol.

First we have in the Drill Regulations, "School of the Soldier," a "manual of the saber" and a "saber exercise," then the "fencing exercise," one paragraph on "fencing mounted," and one paragraph on "mounted combat." In the "School of the Trooper" we have "Manual of the Saber Mounted," which adapts the "Manual" and the "Saber Exercise" dismounted to mounted use.

Then we have the "Running at Heads" (two paragraphs). So far so good. The foregoing covers the ground, but much of it contains some wide generalities. There is no course laid down on which each man is to be tested and qualified, no system of scoring, no record of proficiency of each trooper or organization for comparison with other troopers or organizations, no stimulus for each man to excel, no rewards, no prizes no special privileges, and the natural result, no excellence.

Can it be, I would ask, that it is thought impracticable to devise a standard test of excellence with this weapon which, when applied to each trooper and organization, will insure throughness of instruction, throw out in bold relief the deficient and into corresponding prominence the distinguished, and thus show us where "we are at," where others "are at," and possibly why we are not somewhere else?

In answer to this it may be claimed: First, that it is impossible to get up a system of scoring for this course; second, that we have enough to do in the cavalry already and that we cannot stand the additional work with its details, reports, paper work, etc.; third, that the saber is

seldom if ever used, and that we are proficient enough already with the arm for all practical purposes.

To the first I would say in rebuttal that a system of scoring is neither impossible nor difficult, as I will endeavor later to show; to the second, that instead of having more work we will have less, for the reason that we will have a definite goal to work for, which will increase the interest of officers and men.

In contrast to this, we have at present a conglomeration of drills in the saber exercise, mounted and dismounted, in order to get in the number of hours required in department orders.

I have seen these drills in many troops, which, from a calisthenic point of view were highly successful, nearly every man in the troop with the saber lying limply on the left arm at the "port," but grasping the gripe with his hand jamb up against the guard, in an embrace so precious and so tenacious that it would seem he had been told that his adversary's object was to pull the weapon out of his hand by main force, and that only death should ever separate him from his vice-like grip.

With this grip such movements as "right point," "tierce point," "right cut" are almost impossible. The instructor meanwhile oblivious or negligent of this error in a first principle, pumps out the commands, and the sabers move promptly and with tremendous force, the imaginary enemy being literally cut to pieces by the beautifully executed cuts, thrusts and parries.

In other words we are now drilling in our service with the saber, and at the end of each season we have advanced to the "*ne plus ultra*" point, having learned the alphabet and the small vocabulary, so to speak, but are unable to express a single idea in a well formed sentence. Is it any wonder that there is a lack of interest, after repeating this old performance each season! Now we have some work—no results.

The plan suggested means more work (perhaps), but surely gratifying results. In the latter case we have a

bigger balance to our credit than in the first; would not the latter be better?

In answer to the third rejoinder of our being sufficiently proficient with a seldom used weapon, I can only say that in time of peace we are preparing for war.

We will not always have the Filipinos to fight on foot with our carbines alone; we are a world power, and the saber must be more effective in the hands of our cavalry than in the hands of that of any other country, if we are to keep the American cavalry where it belongs, above all other cavalry in the world.

The plan I suggest is as follows, and to be convinced of its impracticability, I must needs see it given a fair, systematic, unbiased trial.

A certain number of things to do with a saber to be arranged in consecutive order a fixed distance apart on a straightaway course. The length of the course, therefore, to be definitely known in feet. The runner must make the run and take the objects indicated in the prescribed manner in a given time regulated by a stop watch; and a fixed value being given to each object, a fixed value can be arrived at for his total, and also for the totals of the several runs made.

The paraphernalia for the objects to be furnished by the Quartermaster's or other department, to be strong in construction and material, accurate and uniform in dimensions, and to be furnished just as our small-arms silhouettes are provided for carbine and pistol; a season to be set aside for the practice each year, and reports of the scores made to be rendered, showing the work done.

Starting from the "scratch," fifteen yards in front of where the troopers are lined up, let there be at each fifteen yard point beyond:

First. "Against infantry, right cut." A stuffed leather head eight inches high, six inches in diameter, resting on ground in center of a square piece of board eight inches on side. To be taken as indicated. To count 4.

Second. "Against infantry, left cut." Same as to right. To count 6.

Third. "Quarte point." An iron ring three inches in diameter covered with chamois placed edge across track on a horizontal iron bar bent one and one-half inches away from runner to hold ring, other end of iron bar bent downward ten inches into hole in top of post on right of track to allow full swing of bar, post to be six feet high. Ring to be taken in "quarte point." To count 2.

Fourth. "Left cut." Piece of wood of general shape and size of man's head, of soft wood, supported by wooden pin of soft material about three-quarter inch in diameter, nine inches long; pin to be inserted three inches in bottom of head and sinking three inches into post, leaving three inches exposed, to be cut by sharp edge of runner's saber, head post to be six feet six inches high, placed on left of track. To be taken as indicated. To count 3.

Fifth. "Tierce point," same as quarte point. Post to be seven feet high. To count 2.

Sixth. "Right cut," same as "left cut." Post on right of track. To count 1.

Seventh. "Against infantry, front point." An iron disk placed upright, edge on ground facing runner. To be knocked down by point of saber. To count 3.

Eighth. "Saber exercises." This consists in coming to the "carry saber" at the start and finish; to the "port saber" at the "scratch," and after each object is taken or missed, and after the last object is taken or missed; also in taking each object in the manner prescribed, and in discharging the rings from the saber in the manner laid down. This is the most important part of the run, for it is a known fact that men most expert with the saber in saber exercise mounted and dismounted will frequently neglect all they know in the excitement of motion with a horse to manage and a material object to attack. Giving to each of these points a value of, say one-half, we would have for the entire run, after coming to the "carry saber" at the start:

1. Port saber (at the scratch).
2. Against infantry, right cut.
3. Port saber.
4. Against infantry, left cut.



5. Port saber.
6. Quarte point.
7. Discharge of ring from saber by a moulinet.
8. Port saber.
9. Left cut.
10. Port saber.
11. Tierce point.
12. Discharge of ring from saber by a moulinet.
13. Port saber.
14. Right cut.
15. Port saber.
16. Against infantry, front point.
17. Port saber.
18. Carry saber.

Eighteen points at one-half value for each, to count 9, total value for each run 30, each trooper to have three runs, total possible 90.

At first thought the points above enumerated for "saber exercise" might seem too numerous and complicated, and in the hurry of a run it might seem hard to note and keep track of them; but the invariable rule of coming to the "port" when not engaged in a thrust, cut or discharge of a ring, would make this lapse at once noticeable. The two discharges of the ring by the moulinet and coming to the "carry" at the finish are the only other points outside of the motions made at the objects themselves. As each lapse counts the same against one, it is only necessary to count the lapses as they occur, and one-half of this number is the number of points forfeited. Nine minus this is the number of points to which runner is entitled in "saber exercise."

The reason for using wooden pins and heads instead of leather heads resting directly on the posts, is to insure the runner's making the cuts in the horizontal manner prescribed.

With the leather head, nine men out of ten will habitually tap it with the saber or cut down vertically at it with more or less awkwardness, depending mostly upon the amount of attention consumed with a fractious horse.

The necessity of discharging the ring with a moulinet is apparent.

The cuts and thrusts against infantry have been placed on the ground for the following reasons: Heads on posts three feet high can be almost reached by the saber without any derangement of horse or rider, it being merely a matter of judging the speed sufficiently well to drop the saber at proper time. It is a test of horsemanship to cut objects on the ground, and the feat is by no means impossible or even difficult to properly instructed men. This feat being possible, everyone will thereafter be able to reach the objects between that level and three feet high.

One object of the mounted saber exercise being to extend the trooper's sphere of action, both vertically downward and horizontally to right and left, it can be readily seen that his reach from the saddle is extended, and that he is able to strike a long range blow against an antagonist before the said opponent, who knows only how to fight at close quarters in a limited sphere of action, is aware that he can be reached.

In this connection I would like to ask any one who has had charge of instruction in this line of work, if troopers do not habitually strike too late at all objects when moving at a full gallop, and how many of the men under your instruction did not, in striking objects on the ground, miss them anywhere from five to ten feet.

In the latter case this has two causes: First, misjudgment of the speed; second, a lack of timely preparation for the blow in the matter of position. In "Against infantry, right cut," for instance, the trunk of the body must be bent forward so that the shoulders are no higher then the seat in the saddle, left shoulder near and to the right of the horse's mane, left hand to the left of the horse's mane, pulling right rein taut against horse's neck to hold him straight and keep him from swerving to the right.

The first position of "Against infantry, right cut," is assumed with the right hand at left of breast, saber pointing in prolongation of the trunk of the body. This makes the saber point almost horizontally to the front. With the weight of the body resting largely in the right stirrup, we

have the preparatory position for striking the object—a position which should be assumed with the eye on the object from ten to fifteen feet before the object is reached. To execute the cut little more then an arm movement is necessary over an arc, with the saber-point only long enough to get sufficient momentum in the saber to deliver the desired force when the object reaches the horse's feet slightly in front of you. The center of revolution is the arm socket at the shoulder and the radius equal to the saber plus the bent arm. The necessary bending of the knees and raising of the feet to properly grip the horse of course belong to the movement.

There is no danger, either, in a cut thus delivered, of striking the horse's hindquarters with the last part of the cut. Much energy, muscular tissue and wind are saved by not throwing the whole trunk of the body pivoted on the buttocks into the cut; by this last method the point of the saber travels through the air on an arc whose radius is little short of the trunk of the body, plus the saber arm, plus the saber, all revolving around the saddle as a center, and in many cases with the legs chasing wildly in the direction of the horse's rump around the same point.

I do not mean to say that none of the weight of the body should ever be used in the cut described. The point I make is that this is an easy thing for anyone to do, that only so much of this weight should be used as is necessary, that for most instances some of the weight of the body *is* necessary, and that troopers should be taught to deliver the cut without any body motion, as thus they are taught horsemanship and saber exercise without any danger of their ever in the moment of conflict forgetting how or neglecting to use the little body force required.

In the cut to the left, the operation should be somewhat reversed, the bridle hand going to the right, the right hand crossing over above it, the saber point in "Against infantry, left cut," being up near and close to the horse's head. The legs and the shoulders are the same as in the cut to the right side, substituting "left" for "right," the right arm as in drill regulations, elbow bent enough for effective delivery of the blow.

In "Against infantry, front point," similar principles are employed as to time of preparation and position of the various parts of the body.

In the cut against cavalry to the right and left (especially the latter) the principal fault is lateness of delivery of the blow. This may be obviated in the left cut and still have its position as prescribed in the drill regulations, by bending the right elbow and not carrying the saber point any further to the right than is necessary for sufficient force in the blow, which brings it obliquely to the right front; a further advantage here is less liability to "nip" the horse's ears, of which there is more danger in this cut than in any other.

The body should be lifted lightly in the stirrups in preparing for this blow and the shoulders carried towards and turned to the left, thus permitting a quick, short, arm blow.

It is a common error in this blow that the first position is with the saber point straight to the right, arm extended, elbow stiff. Nothing could be further from the spirit of the Drill Regulations. The trooper is not a jumping jack nor an automaton, and the saber exercise is not to be hampered with rigid positions, straight-line geometry nor distances in feet and inches.

In order to insure the proper crouched position in the saddle for the cuts and thrusts on the ground, it is thought it will be found beneficial to have all troopers assume the position in the riding hall or ring and to move them thus at the gallop around the ring. Next, put a good many objects on the ground, and have this exercise practiced in detail by the trooper. I have seen this tried with excellent results.

As a preliminary to the track course prescribed, after a thorough instruction in the matter of details in the riding hall, the troopers should ride over the track past the objects at a "carry saber." They should next be required to ride the course going through the proper saber motions at each object, no rings or heads being touched, each trooper's run being finished before the other is commenced; the instructor taking only a limited number of men at a time, noting errors

and pointing them out to each man, requiring proficiency in the "saber exercise" before actual practice begins.

Next should come the instruction practice with objects up, the scores being recorded, and this followed by record runs.

The following rules will apply to record runs:

All heads on the ground, to count for the trooper, must be knocked off the base on which they rest.

All rings must be discharged with the moulinet, downward, the saber point having passed through the ring, otherwise no credit is allowed. Ring knocked off counts nothing.

The pins supporting the heads must be cut with the edge of the saber; a pin broken with the flat of the saber or a head knocked off by a blow on the head causing the pin to break, counts nothing.

The time allowance with a stop watch to be twenty-one seconds from scratch to finish at last object.

The gait to be regulation gallop.

If the trooper is still on the track at the end of the twenty-one seconds, he will not be given credit for points made after time is struck.

If a horse bolts no new run will be given.

The judge on exercise to be an officer not of the organization running.

All troopers making 80 points and over out of 90, to be designated "Expert;" those making 70 and over and less than 80 to be designated "Excellent;" those making 60 and over and less than 70 to be designated "Proficient," and a suitable badge or medal awarded each successful contestant.

Several other objects might be inserted as substitutes for any of these designated in the above prescribed course, as for instance, a three-foot hurdle, a five-foot ditch and disks to be fired at to the right and left with the pistol with blank cartridges, the hits to be registered by the powder marks on the white targets of blotting paper or other suitable material. The pistol to be returned and the saber drawn after the pistol firing and before the saber work commences.

These objects could not be added to the others which are sufficiently numerous already, but two courses of five objects each are recommended instead.

To those who have not tried the above scheme and who think it impracticable, I can say that it was tried at Fort DuChesne in 1896, where two teams from each of the two troops stationed there contested for prizes offered. Much interest was shown even with the improvised equipment used, straight twigs being used for the pins prescribed. One of the troopers afterwards won a prize for excellence in a contest of this nature at the Denver athletic games held under the direction of the Department Commander in 1896 or 1897, where contestants from every troop of cavalry in the department took part, and where this trooper won the General's medal for greater all round excellence than any other trooper.

Nor is the scheme above proposed thought to make a trooper a finished sabreur. It is thought, however, to be a most important and indispensable part of the training required. Add to this, or rather preface this by a more thorough course of fencing with the wooden sabers, both mounted and dismounted, and the question of the trooper's ability is a question merely of his natural aptitude.

Every trooper should be at least taught every movement prescribed for both body and weapon in this exercise until it is second nature with him, and then he should be made to fence till he is well proficient or has demonstrated that he cannot become so. With proper instruction there will be very few in the latter class.

In an article in *The Journal of the U. S. Infantry Association* of July, 1904, on physical culture in the army, Lieutenant Koehler, instructor of gymnastics and physical training at West Point, says: "It has been proposed to detail a number of specially fitted young officers to West Point from June 15th to September 1st, to receive special instruction which will fit them to take charge of service gymnasiums. This in reference to the gymnasium now a part of our new exchange buildings."

He further says: "This course of instruction to embrace the practice and theory of (among other things) fencing."

Now for every troop of cavalry to be properly instructed in this art requires that at least one officer or a non-commissioned officer, who is going to stay with the troop, should be well up in its fine points. And if Lieutenant Koehler's idea is carried out, which is not improbable, why could not the athletic officer of a regiment or a post instruct troop officers and non-commissioned officers upon his return to his command, and in this way introduce the desired knowledge.

This with the knowledge brought by young officers joining from West Point should keep the troops well instructed, if the knowledge has been imparted to those needing it.

From the letter written by the Military Secretary to the Commanding General, Southwestern Division, on December 10th last it would seem that an effort had lately been made by some one in high authority to get more paraphernalia in the shape of plastrons and masks for each troop of cavalry, which could have no other object than improvement in fencing. The letter (copy furnished troop commanders) reads as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT, M. S. O.,
WASHINGTON, D. C., December 27, 1904.

The Commanding General Southwestern Division, Oklahoma City, O. T.

SIR:—Referring to letter of 10th inst. from this office, advising you that the present allowance of eight fencing outfits for each troop of cavalry stationed in the U. S. would be increased to forty, I now have the honor, by direction of the Chief of Staff, to inform you that in view of the expense involved the additional supply will not be provided.

Very respectfully

(Signed) F. C. AINSWORTH,
The Military Secretary.

On every field day once a month at each cavalry post one of the principal events should be fencing contests between teams from each organization and substantial prizes should be offered to successful teams. On the next field day the contestants of the previous month will be ineligible to contest. Officers should foster and encourage this exercise, and a strict account of the work done by troop commanders be required in their monthly reports on the subject, only, however, until all have been thoroughly instructed, when, with the exception of the monthly contests, drill should cease.

While the above outlined scheme is thought practical and needful, the writer is aware that it might well, upon close examination, be corrected and improved. It is believed, however, that what has been set forth will be found a good framework upon which to build. That something is needed to improve the cavalryman's use of the saber the writer is convinced, whether it embody a part or any at all of his own ideas on the subject, and any plan of action which will economize time, accomplish the desired result and do away with the present aimless schedule, would, I feel sure, be welcomed by many officers responsible for this branch of instruction in the service.

NOTE.—The above article was found among the accepted material on hand when the present editor took charge of the office. It was evidently written before the passage of the law giving additional rewards in the form of extra pay for expert riflemen, sharpshooters and marksmen.—[EDITOR.]

Reprints and Translations.

FIRE ACTION OF CAVALRY.

By Lieutenant Colonel PAULT LICHTENSTEIN v. HOMROGD, Austrian Hussars.

From the *Austrian Cavalry Monthly*.*

IT is clear that cavalry has use for the carbine to fully perform all its duties. This was well known when that arm was adopted (no rational cavalryman will think of maintaining the opposite), and our cavalry is now permeated with the idea that we must be thoroughly drilled in fire action. In the practice of maneuvers on a small or large scale the carbine is utilized often enough and at war games and other exercises often more than is necessary. Therefore our cavalry is not suffering in any way from an under-estimation of fire action.

But to hear nothing but "fire action," as if that was the most essential thing, easily leads to misapprehension and confusion. And this may lead some commanders, in exercising their commands in the use of the carbine, to exceed all proper bounds and cause the proper mounted drill and instruction to suffer thereby.

We should take things as they are, *de facto*, and not fall into the habit of deceiving ourselves. The ideal for cavalry undoubtedly would be to have perfection in our mounted and dismounted work, but to be cavalry and mounted infantry at one and the same time is impossible. If we insist that cavalry should reach the proficiency of infantry in fire action, then we cannot perfect it in its mounted duties, and if we neglect the latter, we have no longer any cavalry. Be a troop of cavalry ever so well drilled in fighting on foot, it is of little use if unable to ride, because it cannot get to the point where it is expected to fight with the carbine.

*Translated by Sergeant Harry Bell, Corps Engineers, U. S. Army.

At present all contentions and opinions regarding the fire action of cavalry are based on the experiences of the Russo-Japanese War, although reliable and exact reports concerning this war are so far very meager. Official reports are for the greater part not available, and why then should we interfere with our cavalry unless we have more data to go by?

It is contended that from now on good results in reconnaissance can be obtained only through fire action, and to prove this, it is pointed out that the Cossacks in all cases encountered hostile infantry in front of the army. Well and good, but has it ever been otherwise heretofore? Did not reconnoitering cavalry, after defeating the hostile cavalry, always encounter the outposts of hostile infantry at rest, or the advance guard of hostile infantry on the march. And what did the Cossacks do? They deployed for fire action, remained opposed to the enemy or attacked with the carbine, often fought with the utmost valor and then retired, beaten and demoralized, without having attained any results and without being able to continue the reconnaissance, after having suffered great losses.

Therefore we ask, and correctly, where was this great advantage of fire action? What were the results? The results were that many lives were lost and no information gained for the commanding general. Of course we need the fire action, but not in the manner that foot troops carry it out.

We often will have to dismount, but in most cases only with a definite purpose in view, to mislead the enemy, to delay him, to draw his attention to us, to disorganize his lines by inflicting losses, to maneuver to obtain our ends with part of our force, utilizing our mobility therefor.

Our fire action should be carried on mounted when acting independently; we must not seek a decision on foot; we must never continue an engagement dismounted to a decision, unless we are absolutely certain of success. The Cossacks have shown us the hopeless condition of a cavalry detachment beaten while fighting on foot. Any modern intact infantry is exceedingly superior to dismounted cavalry. We cannot attack infantry with hope of success, should it be equally strong or stronger than ourselves. Finally, we must admit that we have also to think of our horses, for without them our usefulness is at an end in the campaign, and the knowledge that, dismounted, we are inferior to infantry, is an important factor.

We should never sacrifice our cavalry to attain unimportant results, for in time of war cavalry cannot easily be replaced, and a useless endangering of dismounted cavalry in an attack on intact or superior infantry means sacrificing it.

On the other hand, there may be occasions when the cavalry, dismounted, carbine in hand, must use everything, even the last man, in order to bring a battle to a favorable decision, regardless of losses, regardless of horses, and regardless as to whether or not the cavalry will ever be ready for battle again. But these cases are very exceptional.

And how is it with raids? Only cavalry that is well drilled in horsemanship and well trained can successfully carry out a raid, and in this lies the chief value of cavalry; this shows whether or not it is professionally educated, whether or not it can maneuver in the terrain according to the object of the raid, whether or not it understands how to properly estimate the capabilities of the horses, etc.; in short, whether it is cavalry or only mounted infantry.

Finally, after so many days have been consumed in the hardest kind of riding, under the most difficult conditions, comes the execution of the fire action, the attack on the point laid down as the objective at the start, the battle with hostile infantry. Cavalry, which is not educated professionally up to an excellent standard, will never be able to overcome all the difficulties en-route and possibly may never reach its objective, or should it do so, it is in a condition

unfit for service; and how it will ever return no one knows.

That the Russian reconnaissance service did not succeed, that the Russian cavalry raids were apparently unsuccessful, and furthermore, that the Russian cavalry during and after the main battles did not play the required rôle, was the result of deficiencies, which we may ask if they also obtain in our service. Was not the apparent inactivity of the cavalry the fault of the Russian leaders? Why should we on this account inaugurate reforms in our service?

Captain Spaits of the cavalry, who participated in that campaign, as is well known, did not mention in his recent lecture, that the failures of the Russian cavalry are traceable to insufficient practice in fire action. On the contrary, he states that it was the result of insufficient professionally educated cavalry squadrons and troops and an absence of efficient cavalry leaders.

It is natural that we strive to reach our ideal. We desire a cavalry which can also fight on foot. We use our best efforts to reach this ideal, but we will soon reach the limits of our powers. These limits are defined by the present material at our disposition and the want of time. These two factors go hand in hand. If we increase the requirements concerning instruction dismounted, then our cavalry can no longer keep the place it has held up to the present time. If we had material excellent in every respect, then the mounted instruction might be facilitated and we might gain time for the dismounted instruction as well. We should strive to attain this end.

Inasmuch as we are unable, with the material at hand, to complete our instruction in fire action because of want of time, we must strive to improve our personnel in every respect, and this can be done with little exertion. Then greater results can be expected of the cavalry. Cavalry must principally be cavalry, and then we can experiment on it with infantry matters. A solid foundation supports much; a weak one breaks down under its load.

Our first attention should be directed to the improvement of our horses, as with our present means the acquirement of sufficient remounts is hardly probable. (Germany

has twenty-six remount depots, and the average price of remounts is 1400 marks.)

Everyone will admit that a good blooded, well built, healthy horse can be trained more easily than one not having these attributes; that the instruction of men, using such horses, is greatly facilitated, and the time gained in this instruction might be used in target practice.

The next is the improvement in the character of our men. In our Empire we have many who are especially well fitted for the cavalry service, people naturally born for it, so to speak. These we should utilize more. How often do we find sons of stockmen, etc., and men who have spent their entire life on horseback in the ranks of the infantry. That is almost a sin! In selecting recruits for the cavalry we should proceed more carefully, with more professional intelligence, and with a better regard for the necessities of our arm of the service. What a large number of men do we receive each year that are totally unfit for the mounted service!

All explanations regarding this fact are refuted by the fact that when in January, 1906, a lot of infantrymen of the 1905 draft were assigned to the hussars, they were found to be the most excellent material for cavalry. Men of the draft of the same year assigned to the cavalry could not be considered in the same class with them.

The ways to remedy this evil are simple and easily carried out, and are to assign experienced cavalry officers to the examination committees. cavalry officers who have the best interest of their branch of the service at heart. The instruction of well qualified men would be hastened, and again, time gained for instruction in fire action.

The utmost care should be had in selecting competent instructors; this means the increasing and improving the corps of non-commissioned officers.

In building up our cavalry by these means we would gain a two-fold advantage: First, the consciousness that we have brought our cavalry to its highest standard with the means at hand, and that such a cavalry corps would have no fears of losing anything of its value as cavalry by the increased requirements in its instruction as a dismounted corps; and

second, we would gain much time in the instruction of our specially selected troopers, which time could be used in improvement in fire action. Only in this manner can we make an appreciable step forward.

CAVALRY MANEUVERS: AN EXPERT CRITICISM.

From the *London Daily Telegraph.*

A MILITARY correspondent, referring to the recent cavalry maneuvers, writes:

The general criticism would, in my opinion, point to the absence of an Inspector-General with real control. In the history of cavalry the highest degree of excellence is found in the German cavalry under Frederick the Great That monarch had the "flair" of the soldier, and was his own inspector general, with authority. There you have to my mind the supreme mistake in our system. Also the actual riding of cavalry leaders is now not so much thought of as it used to be. I put this most seriously, as the hard, tireless man can use his head longer and better than a less hardy sort. You find in history that youth and bodily vigor were the attributes of all really great cavalry commanders, and that these commanders were selected by a great judge of soldiering and men who was in supreme authority.

When the inspector is a capable one he always contrives to produce a good result. Our inspector is "War," and the result is that our mounted troops are "combed" into a far higher state of efficiency at the end of our campaigning. To take South Africa as an example, the commanders of activity in the field, who were all under forty years of age, had learnt "what not to do."

Of course regrettable incidents must happen in cavalry matters, like falls and accidents at polo and hunting, with the very best of systems.

Another point occurs to me. I read that in the attack on both sides, "Squadrons charged individually, shouting." Well, we now, perhaps, have run "squadron training" a bit too hard, and also "initiative" on the part of squadron commanders. As Jorrocks says, "Foxhunting is the image of war," and a pack of hounds can well be compared to a cavalry unit. You want dash and "initiative" in your individual hounds, but they must work as a pack, be in hand and be disciplined. Your brigadier, or huntsman, who sits on his horse blowing his horn while his hounds or men are "initiating," would, in the case of the brigadier, be at the mercy of a quick commander with his command in hand, or, in the case of foxhunting, be the laughing-stock of a good fox. As for the "shouting," it is most impressive when carried out with discipline, and the cheer of a body of men charging in good order I am all for, but this particular cheering, I gather, came from a lot of small units charging without much discipline and could not be sound.

In Germany the inspectors have full authority over cavalry matters, and report direct to the Emperor; they are also constantly leading divisions before and after maneuvers. The inspector of cavalry is the supreme authority over that arm, and ought to exercise large units when feasible. Surely if his opinion is worth having at all, he is entitled to form it his own way. Is that so under the present order of things with us?

Again, to compare with fox-hunting, you are to judge of a pack of hounds in the kennel in July, and pronounce on their merits, or possibly (and I am not sure whether this be not an even better comparison) to form your opinion on the few hounds sent to Peterborough Show, and not even see an entire pack. It's easy to say, as I hear often said, "The cavalry are wonderful now, quite different from what they were in the 'good old days.'" "Intelligence," "initiative," "individuality," sound glorious and better than the terms of the old days—"discipline," "drill," and "d—— your eyes." The fact is, both systems—the new and the old—can be overdone, and you want a high authority to blend the two. If the full responsibility be given to the right man, all will go well; if not, it won't, and there's the rub. I think the system of cavalry and artillery may be lectured and theorized on to too great an extent. We may "override" our staff rides, and when we come to actual cavalry work we make more deplorable elementary blunders. A good many nations may do the same.

SUGAR FOR HORSES.

[From *Broad Arrow.*]

COLONEL J. A. NUNN, principal veterinary officer in India, has recently issued the following note on the use of sugar as a food for horses:

"The value of sugar as a feeding stuff for horses, mules, and other animals, does not appear to be quite realized. In many parts of India sugar is largely grown, and 'ghur' or 'jaggery' can be obtained at reasonable rates; also, from sugar refining works, molasses. This latter, which is a by-product, is largely used on the continent of Europe and in America as a feeding material for all sorts of animals.

"The common impression seems to be that sugar products are only useful for fattening animals, but it has been proved in France that horses can do prolonged and fast work on it. Molasses forms part of the regular ration of the horses of the Paris General Omnibus Company, and competitors in the long distance rides in the French army have been trained on sugar, in some instances as much as six and eight pounds per diem having been given, in addition to the ordinary food.

"Molasses was very largely used to feed the horses of the American army on in Cuba during the war. They did hard work on it and grass alone, at a time that grain ran short. Of course, with only one or two animals 'ghur,' 'jaggery,' or 'molasses' can be mixed in the feed by hand. If a large number of animals are fed on them, and specially with

molasses, the plan adopted by the Americans in Cuba seems worthy of consideration. The molasses was put into a sack and left soaking in a barrel of water all night. In the morning the grass or hay was spread out in a layer, and the solution of molasses and water sprinkled over it with a garden watering pot. The grass or hay was thoroughly saturated and allowed to dry in the sun, so that each separate stalk was covered over with a thin coating. It is claimed for this method that it is more economical, that the ration of molasses is more evenly distributed, that the horses eat very inferior grass and hay with a relish, and that if molasses or treacle, 'which are sticky substances,' are used they are more easily handled than if mixed up with the food in bulk. If 'ghur' or 'jaggery' are used and given in the grain ration it is hardly necessary to take this trouble, as they are both easily handled. If, however, the object is to make inferior grass or hay palatable, the American plan would seem to be most practicable, and worth the labor expended.

"In the Austrian army certain preparations of molasses, 'known in the trade as molasine and molascute,' are authorized as an additional ration for horses after autumn maneuvers, when they are somewhat run down in condition through hard work. It must be clearly understood that it is not intended to convey the impression that sugar products can be substituted for grain or used indiscriminately; all that they are intended to convey is the fact that sugar is a valuable adjunct, provided that it can be obtained at a reasonable rate. This in certain parts of India is the case; in others of course the price would be prohibitive.

"As has been mentioned, as much as six to eight pounds of sugar has been given per diem, but this is an extreme case, where money was no object. For army animals the quantity to be used would depend on the market rate. It has, however, been found that from half to one pound per head of molasses made into a solution, as described, is sufficient to make horses eat inferior grass, and from one to four pounds per head per diem will make an astounding alteration in the condition of run-down animals in a fortnight. Although so far as is known beetroot sugar is not

produced in India, it may be worthy of remark that it is dangerous if given in excessive quantities, six to eight pounds per diem being the maximum that can be used with safety. The chemical composition of beetroot molasses differs from cane molasses."

CAVALRY ARMAMENT OF VARIOUS NATIONS.*

Germany.—Carbine, model 1898, saber and lance. The non-commissioned officers and trumpeters have revolvers. The mounted chasseurs have only saber and revolver. Officers carry sabers (of cavalry officers or of cuirassiers) and revolvers.

Great Britain.—Officers, certain non-commissioned officers, and trumpeters, saber and revolver; other non-commissioned officers and trumpeters, saber and rifle, model 1903. The regiments of lancers, the troopers of the first echelon of dragoons and dragoon guards carry the lance in reviews or honorary service. One machine gun to a regiment. Maxim 7 mm., 7.

Austria-Hungary.—Saber and Mannlicher magazine carbine, model 1895. Non-commissioned officers, saber and revolver. (The lance has been abolished since 1883.)

Bulgaria.—Saber (Russian model) and Mannlicher carbine of the same model as the infantry rifle, but shorter and lighter.

Denmark.—Personnel: To a squadron of hussars, three automatic rifles, caliber 6 mm., 5.

Spain.—Lancers: Three platoons carry lance and saber, one platoon the Mauser carbine, model 1893, and the saber (sharpshooters); the other regiments carbine and saber.

France.—Saber and carbine, model 1890. Non-commissioned officers, saber and revolver. In regiments of dragoons

* Translated from the French in the Military Information Division, General Staff.

forming divisions, the troopers of the first echelon carry the lance.

Greece.—Saber and Gras carbine, model 1874.

Italy.—Lancers: Lance, saber and Mannlicher-Carcano musket, model 1891. Light cavalry: saber and Mannlicher-Carcano musket, model 1891. Non-commissioned officers, trumpeters and sappers, saber and revolver.

Norway.—Personnel: Four automatic rifles, caliber 6 mm., 5 to a corps.

Netherlands.—Saber and Mannlicher carbine, model 1895. Non-commissioned officers and trumpeters, saber and revolver.

Portugal.—Lancers: Lance, saber and Mannlicher carbine, model 1896. Chasseurs: Saber and carbine. Drivers: Revolvers.

Roumania.—Hussars: Men of the first echelon, lance, saber and Mannlicher carbine, model 1893; men of the second echelon, saber and carbine. Chasseurs, saber and carbine. All non-commissioned officers carry the saber and revolver.

Russia.—Saber and magazine carbine, model 1891, with bayonet. Cossacks of the Don, of the Oural, of Orenburg, from Transbaikal and from Siberia carry the lance besides in the first echelon. The Cossacks carry no bayonets. Non-commissioned officers and certain of the men are not provided with carbines, sabers or Nagan revolvers.

Servia.—Saber and Mauser carbine.

Sweden.—Saber and Mauser magazine carbine, model 1896. To each cavalry regiment a certain number of automatic rifles, caliber 6 mm., 5.

Switzerland.—Saber and Mannlicher magazine carbine, model 1893. Non-commissioned officers, saber and revolver, model 1882.

Turkey.—Saber and Mauser carbine, model 1890.

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY.

[From the *United Service Gazette.*]

THE military field is ever open to the master spirit to dictate further changes—to the man of ideas, with capacity to give them shape, to bring about additional improvements. To avail himself of it he must study early and late; not dream, but casting aside professional prejudices and narrow views, become receptive to new ideas; ponder well on the causes which led to success, and even more on those which entailed disaster in the past; work out problems fitted for the altered circumstances of the present, and patiently calculate the means to carry out some high design in future. For this it is necessary that military history should be patiently and consistently studied, but the study should not always be confined to that of modern campaigns. There are other sources, not always sufficiently sought for, which furnish much invaluable information connected with operations of war—of a kind, too, which may not unlikely convey more useful lessons in the conduct of the particular description of warfare that may at the time be the subject of study. With such an enormous, scattered, and ever increasing Empire as ours, the main problem to be studied by an officer who aspires to high command should certainly be, "How best to render each component part of our great Empire strong, within and without, through its own population and resources, and, at the same time, secure such a union of the whole as will safeguard all parts and prevent aggression from any hostile quarter."

It has been said of young officers that while they are "ready enough under encouragement to study strategy and tactics and to read military history, they have in the one case no clear conception of the practical value of the definitions and principles which they may absorb, and in the other they fail to appreciate how a situation must have appeared to a commander when shorn of the light thrown upon it by later events." Though we are not prepared to join to the full in

a reproach of this nature, we are yet forced to the admission that, except for examination purposes, it is rarely that the officer reads military history with the minuteness that it certainly requires, if it is to prove of any real use to him in his professional studies. Yet if an officer aims at the higher branches of his calling the proper study of military history is indispensable to him, affording him, as it does, a masterful insight in fertility of resource or originality in conception of strategy—factors which have countless times contributed to the winning of a battle or to laying the foundations for success in a campaign.

"The value of history to a soldier," says Lord Esher, "is to throw light beforehand, and in good time, upon the uses to which our army may be applied. * * * A little consideration, a short examination of our national history during the past sixty years, will show that although the defense committee may properly be asked to establish a standard for the army, just as years ago a standard, the two-power standard, was laid down for the navy; it would be rash and dangerous to attempt officially, except in very general terms, to stereotype a definition of the purposes for which the army is required. * * * We can, however, by study and examination, gauge the greater possibilities, and even the greater probabilities. That is the task to which the study of modern history invites us, just as it lured Lord Roberts—as we know from his evidence before the War Commission—to plan, in discussion with some young officers of the Staff College, the lines of his advance to Pretoria some considerable time before the spring of 1900."

But when studying military history something more is wanted than the mere absorption of the narrative and the retention in the memory of certain facts. Combined with the mastering of the particulars narrated in the history, there should be a comprehension of the lessons in strategy and tactics which the events recorded in each campaign illustrate, and the mental analysis of the causes which led up to the success of one commander and brought about the failure of another, so that material profit may be wrung from the study, which would be likely to benefit the officer should

he ever be placed in a similar situation. Without a close study of this nature it is quite impossible to gauge the extent of the difficulties that are ever arising in war, and which test to their uttermost the superior qualities of mind which every great commander must possess. All our training is but preparation for war, and it is by a close study of the lessons of war, as well as of the wonders of modern science, that we can hope to acquire that intelligent combination before which brute force and even individual skill must fail.

The young officer on joining the army possesses but a very hazy knowledge of military history. He may know something of Cæsar's wars and the siege of Troy, from his Virgil and Ovid, but he can scarcely scrape acquaintance with the Napoleonic wars, and it behooves him, therefore, if he wishes to make any progress in his profession, to lose no time in making good this hiatus in his educational training. The consideration of Cæsar's wars and other periods of Roman history may not be without use to him if only as illustrating the great strategy of the Roman generals, who effected the subjugation of native races less by the power of Roman arms than by the masterly direction given to tribal animosities, but modern history is equally essential to one's studies if we are to learn the probable line to be taken nowadays by one's adversary, and the best way to make preparation to meet it. By the careful study of modern campaigns, combined with a due reflection on the lessons they afford, we cannot fail to learn what we ought to do if placed in a like situation, whether under war conditions or during peace maneuvers. It helps one, in fact, as one writer puts it, "to know from this side of the hill what an opponent is doing on the other."

Perhaps the best example of the most profitable method of reading history can be gathered from "Napoleon's Précis of the Wars of Turenne and Frederick the Great." He was in the habit of marking paragraphs and sometimes whole chapters in a volume, after which he would comment on them most carefully, illustrating his comments by references to past examples, which he had obviously carefully looked up, or to future possibilities, upon which he had evidently

long reflected. The professional soldier who reads history after this fashion, equips himself with the power to apply the facts of yesterday to the circumstances of to-day and to-morrow. It is not, after all, a difficult habit to acquire, and without it the study of strategy or tactics is of little value to the really practical soldier. If a man be grounded in general history, as well as in the principles of strategy and tactics, he becomes possessed of the ability to take up any campaign and make a study of it, whether it be the Napoleonic struggle of 1805, Virginia, 1861–5, Franco-German War, 1870–1, or Manchuria, 1904. But the study of military history to be of lasting benefit must be continuous and not intermittent; it must not be taken up to-day and dropped to-morrow like an old glove. Besides the personal benefit derived from a knowledge of history, it will make officers more ready to carry out the orders of their commanders in the spirit in which they are given, because of their more intelligible understanding of their motive. Lord Wolseley's advice regarding the study of the science of war, to "read a little and think a lot," applies with equal force to the study of military history, and a few campaigns well studied and carefully reflected upon, will do more to develop a capacity for hard thinking than would a whole course of lectures on the strategy of a score of battles.

PRIZE PROBLEMS.

IN view of the fact that no prize problem appeared in the April, 1907, number of the JOURNAL, there is no solution to appear in this number.

Upon taking charge of the work of editing the JOURNAL, it appeared. at first glance, that there was not sufficient interest being taken in these prize problems to warrant the continuation of their publication; and also that too long a time elapsed between their publication and the appearance of the corresponding solution.

Upon inquiry, however, it is found that while a comparatively few officers compete for these prizes, that many others are interested in them. Many inquiries have been received for extra copies of the maps on which these problems are based, and it is learned that many of our younger officers work out solutions which they never send in.

It is feared that, in some cases at least, these officers hesitate to send in their solutions, as they have a diffidence in competing against older officers or the graduates of the schools, who have had more experience in such work.

As a further indication of the interest taken in these problems, it is noted that the solution to our prize problem No. 3, with the map, was printed in full in the *Revue du Cercle Militaire* for September 21, 1907, with comments thereon by Lieutenant Colonel Frocard of the Frency army.

As to the long time between the appearance of any one problem and its solution, this is found necessary in order to give our members in the Philippines a chance to compete.

Regarding the extra copies of the maps asked for, they can be obtained from the Secretary of the School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth at the nominal cost of seven cents each, or a large scale maneuver map of the same region, mounted on cloth, can be had for one dollar. EDITOR.

PRIZE PROBLEM NO. 7.

(See Map of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, published in Number for July, 1907, opposite page 156.)

THE RESCUE OF PRISONERS.

General Situation.

The Missouri River forms part of the boundary between an eastern Blue and a western Red State between which war was declared August 1, 1907. In the fall of 1907 a Blue army crossed the Missouri River at Fort Leavenworth and advanced towards Topeka, but was met by superior forces and driven back with heavy loss to the left bank of the Missouri River, where it went into winter quarters December 1st, opposite Fort Leavenworth.

The Red force was distributed for the winter throughout the State of Kansas, the first Red division being quartered as follows:

Division Headquarters, Second Battalion Engineers, First Regiment F. A., Headquarters First Brigade, First Infantry, Second Infantry (less six companies), Company A, S. C., field hospitals, supply and ammunition trains, Fort Leavenworth.

Six companies Second Infantry, Kickapoo.

Third Infantry, Lansing, three miles south of Leavenworth.

Second Infantry Brigade, Leavenworth.

Third Infantry Brigade, First Regiment Red Cavalry, Atchison, eighteen miles north of Fort Leavenworth.

Special Situation.

The seventh regiment of Blue cavalry, commanded by Colonel A, was quartered for the winter in Weston, Missouri, opposite the mouth of Salt Creek. Extremely cold weather set in about the middle of December, and the Missouri River froze to a depth of from eight to twelve inches from opposite Kickapoo to the bend opposite the U. S. Military Prison, south of which point the swift current prevented its freezing.

Colonel A having learned from spies the above mentioned dispositions of the first Red division, and also that about 800 Blue prisoners captured by the Reds during the fall campaign were kept confined within the enclosure of the U. S. Penitentiary (south of Fort Leavenworth), submitted to his division commander a plan for a raid having as its object the release of these prisoners. This plan was approved by the division commander and ordered executed without delay.

On the night of December 24th and 25th, a crossing was effected about 1 A. M. A light snow was falling, the ground being covered by about three inches, temperature + 10° F. Colonel A marched by I. E. Daniels (47), Frenchmans and Atchison Pike to the penitentiary, which was surrounded, found to be lightly guarded, and surrendered without a fight, the railway gate on the west side having been blown in by a petard. En route to the penitentiary no one had been seen except a guard of twelve men at Frenchmans, which had been captured with the exception of two men on post at the bridge, who had escaped. All telegraph wires en route had been cut.

At 5 A. M. Colonel A had collected all the Blue prisoners who had been released (760) and was at the east gate of the penitentiary ready to begin his return march when he received the following reports and messages:

OFFICER'S PATROL, TROOP A.
1 mile north of Frenchman, 4:40 A. M.

To Colonel A.

Hostile infantry, about one battalion, approaching from Kickapoo has halted at 17 and sent out patrols east, south and west. I remain in observation.

E.,
Lieutenant.

OFFICER'S PATROL, TROOP M.
Engineer Hill, 4:45 A. M.

To Colonel A.

Fort Leavenworth quiet until 4:40, when call to arms sounded and buildings all lighted up. I remain in observation.

H.,
Lieutenant.

The messenger who brought this message reported that as he had crossed Long Ridge, lights in Fort Leavenworth had gone out.

PATROL TROOP M.
Grant Hill, 4:50 A. M.

To Colonel A.

Signal Corps man has just found and cut electric light wires to Fort. I can hear call to arms being sounded all over town of Leavenworth.

X.,
Sergeant.

By this time (5 A. M.) the snow had stopped, but the sky was still clouded.

Required:

1. Colonel A's dispositions on the march to the penitentiary, *briefly*.
2. His estimate of the situation.
3. His decision.
4. His orders.



CHIEF OF CAVALRY.

IN an article published in the October number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL appears an invitation for one and all to air their opinions as to the advisability or inadvisability of a chief for the cavalry.

Every one in the cavalry, with very few exceptions, will probably agree that we should have a chief, and many of them would probably admit that they could fill the job. If each and every one of us wrote an article on the subject there would doubtless be brought out many good, indisputable, and self-evident reasons for a chief. But after all these valuable opinions had been expressed would the chief of cavalry be forthcoming? Talk is cheap and easy, easier for some than others. But will mere free and unlimited "hot air" bring us any nearer the ideals towards which we strive than we are at present? I have heard this question discussed for many years, and have read many excellent and convincing articles on the subject, but do not see that any

progress has been made or that we are any nearer to having a Chief of Cavalry now than we were ten years ago.

It would seem that a little less talk, a little more organized effort would secure better results. Let the cavalry get together on this proposition and decide upon some plan of action and then carry it out to the best of our ability, every one doing the best he can to push it through. How did the artillery get their chief? Simply by writing a number of indiscriminate articles in service magazines?

If necessary let us select a committee to look into this matter and present it before the proper authorities as it should be presented.

It is work we need, not talk. E. S.

PROPOSED CHANGE IN DESCRIPTIVE CARD OF PUBLIC ANIMALS.

The Editor U. S. Cavalry Journal:

I BEG to suggest an improvement in the descriptive card of public animals (Form 277, A. G. O.) now supplied in lieu of the old descriptive book for public animals, which consists in adding a diagram giving the front view of the horse. A rubber stamp for printing the design can easily be made, and troop commanders and quartermasters can by its use make the requisite addition to the card as now issued.

The card furnished us gives the side view of both sides of the animal, and is useful in recording brands, but it is not easy on these diagrams to note the face markings. On no part of the animal's body are distinguishing marks so likely to be found as on the face. The star, stripe, blaze and snip are frequently so irregular that these marks alone furnish an almost complete identification.

In purchasing horses here in Australia we are obliged to inspect and pass on horses on remote stations far from the

shipping points on the coast. It is therefore necessary to record the description of the horse so accurately and in such detail that it would be practically impossible for an exchange of horses to be effected and an inferior animal substituted before the lot reaches the shipping point and not be detected upon the final inspection as the animal goes aboard ship.



We therefore have printed on the left of the card, as shown in the illustration, the outline of the horse as seen from the front. This arrangement makes it possible to clearly and accurately record any peculiar face markings which the horse may happen to have, and to record also those peculiar markings of the feet and legs which may be more clearly shown in a front view than from either side.

This additional diagram can readily be printed on the cards already in the hands of the troops by means of a rubber

stamp. In printing cards anew a more symmetrical arrangement would be to have the side views shifted a little nearer the right side of the card.

W. C. BROWN,
Major Third U. S. Cavalry.

IS THE GARRISON RATION SUFFICIENT FOR A GOOD MESS?

The Editor of the Journal of the United States Cavalry Association.

SIR:— The article of Lieutenant Sherrard Coleman on the subject, "Is the Garrison Ration Sufficient for a Good Mess?" is one which interests every organization commander, and the account of his work is valuable as showing what one can do who has a gift for such work when he pursues it with interest and energy. He has fallen upon a truth too generally neglected by company commanders when, in speaking of the company mess, he says: "I know of no one thing in the army, which, if properly looked after, will give a better result for soldiers in garrison."

In reading the article, one is reminded, first, that Lieutenant Coleman is an expert caterer, and, whether true or not, there is a general impression that these men are born, not made; secondly, that his lines have fallen in very pleasant places. Running a company mess at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in the shadow of the best of markets, does not present the difficulties which beset the same operation in the Philippines, Cuba, Alaska, or in some of the garrisons in the United States proper.

The writer has contended that the garrison ration is not sufficently varied,* and nowhere has he seen arguments which better support his contention than in Lieutenant Coleman's

*"Articles which should be added to the Garrison Ration," *Journal of the United States Infantry Association*, September, 1907.

article. There is not one of the twenty-one different menus given by him which does not contain at least one of the articles which it is contended should be added to the garrison ration, namely: butter, milk and syrup. He shows conclusively that these articles are absolutely necessary to the successful conduct of a mess, and he provides them by a very careful manipulation of the articles of diet which now compose the garrison ration. He is enabled to do this by the fortunate location of his troop and by his evident capacity for business, a faculty which, unfortunately, has not been developed in the education of the great majority of army officers.

It will be observed in examining his list of savings that the ration components which supplied the bulk of his $126 are bacon and coffee. (The sugar item may be neglected, for he saves issue sugar and purchases granulated sugar instead.) There is nothing new then in his method of accumulating a saving; the components on which he saves are the ones on which savings are always made. Why, then, it may logically be asked, should the government supply a table of ration components which make this manipulation necessary? Why not reduce the bacon and coffee components in the garrison ration and supply directly, at no great increase of cost, the components which Lieutenant Coleman and all company commanders have found to be necessary to the conduct of a good mess?

Lieutenant Coleman's article may be studied with profit by every officer charged with the conduct of a mess, for it shows conclusively what may be done with skillful management under favorable conditions. The object of this criticism is to call attention to the undoubted defects in the present garrison table at this time when there is a general effort being made to better the condition of the enlisted man. It is gratifying to learn that at least one general officer (General Greely, commanding the Northern Division) has called attention to this defect in his annual report. He states:

"Inclined formerly to the belief that the army ration is sufficient for the proper sustenance of the soldier, the division commander now judges otherwise as a result of his inspec-

tions and investigations. While excellent in quality and doubtless of sufficient nutritive value, its quantity and variety do not satisfy the American soldier. Wherever it is not supplemented by the resourcefulness and energy of officers and men, through supplies from gardens, post exchange profits, pool table charges, boarders, etc., it furnishes only a meager, monotonous diet. The wise policy lately inaugurated by the War Department of permitting savings on all articles will do something to increase the food variety. It is believed that an increase of the ration will make the service more attractive. No specific recommendations are made, though it may be pointed out that the 'white meats,' butter, cheese, eggs and milk, found on every American table, even of the poorest people, are entirely lacking in the army ration, although they appear on the naval list."

ELI A. HELMICK,
Captain Tenth Infantry.

FORT LISCUM, ALASKA,
Sept. 26, 1907.

THE CAVALRY PACK.

CELEBES SEA, (en route to Australia) August 1, 1907.

The Editor U. S. Cavalry Journal:

PERMIT me to add a word to the timely and interesting discussion by Captains Vidmer, Gray, Rhodes, and others, on the cavalry pack in recent numbers of the JOURNAL.

All must admit that with the additional weight of the new rifle, its scabbard, and other articles more or less recently added to the trooper's pack, the method of packing, etc., prescribed in the Cavalry Drill Regulations is no longer satisfactory. We seem to be constantly adding to the load of the horse, and but rarely taking anything from it, so that now we seem to have about everything that the trooper needs, and it seems to me, that we have several things which

he, without serious inconvenience, might get along without. Sooner or later we must drop something. Let us, therefore, begin with those articles which we can most easily dispense with. The link, shelter tent pole and picket pin certainly seem to come in this category.

Taking advantage of the ideas advanced by the officers above named, and to whom I wish to give due acknowledgment, and adding a few ideas of my own, I have prepared instructions, which appear below, for making up a pack which is now being experimented with in my squadron. This must be regarded as tentative, being subject to such changes as a thorough trial may demonstate as being necessary.

Personally, I should like to see something like the Patterson carrier for the rifle given a trial. It may not be entirely satisfactory, but it could hardly be less so than the present scabbard, which tends to change the cavalryman into a mounted infantryman, the bulk underneath the left leg preventing the latter from being used in controlling the horse.

W. C. BROWN,
Major Third U. S. Cavalry.

* * *

Memorandum of Instructions for Packing the Saddle (Experimental).

The articles carried, where carried, and approximate weights, are as indicated below:

LEFT (NEAR) SIDE.	lbs.
Rifle and scabbard	11.9
Lariat	2.1
Meat can	.95
Knife, fork and spoon	.38
Cup	.56
	15.89

RIGHT (OFF) SIDE.	lbs.
Saber, scabbard and knot	3.95
Canteen and strap, filled	3.44
Currycomb	.65
Horse brush	.625
Watering bridle	1.1
Two horseshoes and nails	1.75
Nose bag, leather bottom	.43
Emergency ration	1.125
Towel, soap, etc.	.5
Housewife	.2
Four shelter tent pins	.2
	13.97

The following articles, with their weights, are enumerated to complete the total weight, exclusive of the rider, carried by the horse; these, from the very nature of the case, do not have to be considered in balancing the load on the horse:

	lbs.
Saddle complete	17.3
Saddle bags	4.2
Saddle blanket	4.3
Surcingle	.75
Blanket	5.00
Underclothes	1.25
Shelter half	3.00
Poncho	4.5
Bridle and bit	2.6
Halter and strap	2.6
Mosquito bar	.9
Eighty rounds rifle and twenty-four rounds revolver ammunition; Pistol and holster; Lanyard and woven cartridge belt with buckle	10.5
Clothing and F. A. package	6.43
	63.33

It will be noticed that the following equipments are omitted:

Link.—It having been demonstrated that horses can be quite as securely, and quickly enough for all practicable purposes, linked by use of the reins as by the link.

Picket Pin.—The occasions when this is really necessary are infrequent, and it is proposed by experiment to ascertain whether or not the rare occasions when it is absolutely needed justify carrying at all times this additional weight.

Shelter Poles.—The saber in scabbard, with blade withdrawn about five inches, and held in that position by a wooden peg, so as to make the whole the exact height of the shelter pole, will be used as a substitute for the shelter pole, as already explained to the squadron.

The poncho or slicker will be carried instead of the bed blanket, as permitted by G. O. No. 16, c. s., Philippine Division.

To roll the rear pack, spread the shelter half (model 1904) roll straps underneath. Turn in the triangular end flap.

making the tent rectangular. Turn under the roll strap edge of the shelter half eight inches.

Fold the blanket in three equal folds across the longer edge. Lay it squarely and evenly on the shelter half, the longer (folded) edge within one inch of the roll strap edge. Place the left hand in the middle of the blanket and fold over the ends of the blanket to the hand, or to within four inches of each other; place the underclothing on the outer edge of the blanket. As a precaution against ends pulling out, pass the two exposed roll straps across and fasten to opposite buckles. Roll tightly, using hands and knees, from the bottom of the roll to the roll straps, and bring over the entire roll the part of the tent which was turned under, thus binding the roll. Buckle the two available roll straps about the roll, passing them around twice. The roll will then be about thirty-six inches in length and six inches in diameter.

The cup is placed, handle upward, in the bottom of the near saddle bag; meat can, knife, fork and spoon, as usual.

The lariat is rolled and snapped into the near cantle ring; to leave it rolled tends to make the pack more compact. In case it is desired to hold the horse at the end of the lariat while firing dismounted, it can be unrolled and snapped into the halter ring quickly enough for all practicable purposes, and the objectionable end underneath the left leg, so liable to get caught in the spur when dismounting, is done away with.

Canteen snapped into the off cantle ring as usual.

Where the bit and bridoon are worn, the watering bridle is not carried.

The nose bag with strap lengthened about nine inches is slipped over the off end of the cantle roll and secured in the usual manner.

It will be noticed that the heavier articles are carried in the off saddle bag. This is done to balance the excess of weight of the rifle and scabbard over the saber. This is not quite accomplished, but it is the best which can be done.

The principle of the cantle roll is that devised by Captain Vidmer.

The cantle roll being broken in the middle and strapped tightly with the middle coat strap, will not rest on the horse's back. The whole roll sets lower than the regulation roll, lies neatly along the back of the saddle and prevents the canteen and lariat from flapping when at the trot.

Certain other dispositions are those suggested by Captains Gray and Rhodes.

The instructions here given are for making the roll with the blanket, though in the Philippines the slicker or poncho is usually substituted therefor, while the mosquito bar is carried as an addition.

The roll with these articles is made up on the same principle, large at the ends and small in the middle. If rain is not apprehended, the poncho or slicker may be carried in the cantle roll, saving the wear of the coat straps on the rain garment, and wearing holes in the latter.

The surcingle should go over the saddle and incline slightly to the rear to keep the saddle from sliding forward. It should go under all straps, the near end being drawn up until the strap is well up on the near side.

The slapping of the rifle butt against the horse's neck may be stopped by a strap, made up like a link strap, about thirty-one inches long, attached to the off spider ring. A small ring is attached near the lower end of the rifle scabbard and the strap snapped in after saddling the horse.

A CHIEF OF CAVALRY.

THERE is undeniably a strong feeling among the highest military authorities of our army against the organization in the War Department of any office which might ultimately develop into a bureau. The feeling has been that there are already as many bureaus as the efficient administration of military business will stand.

Furthermore, there is a not altogether unnatural feeling that the appointment of a Chief of Cavalry would sooner or later infringe upon the lawful duties of the Chief of Staff; and perhaps, in a degree, tend towards such centralization of cavalry control as would involve the rightful functions of department commanders.

This feeling, it would seem, has not been decreased by the organization and development of the office of the Chief of Artillery. Beginning in a modest way, with a Chief of Artillery and his two aides, having rather advisory functions, the office has grown in a few years into what amounts to an artillery bureau, having half a dozen officers and a number of clerks as assistants, and running dangerously close to the work originally planned for the General Staff and the Adjutant General's office.

No wonder there has been a feeling of reluctance towards the formation of other bureaus of a similar character for the cavalry and infantry; and we must confess that we feel that organization upon the same lines as that of the office of Chief of Artillery would be contrary to good military administration.

But what should be done is this: Reduce the office of Chief of Artillery to the original chief and two assistants, all of whom shall be *ex-officio* members of the General Staff; make similar designations for the cavalry and the infantry; and let these three chiefs take charge of questions which are at present handled by junior officers of the General Staff.

In this way the chiefs of the three services would be subordinate to and report directly to the Chief of Staff; they would relieve the latter of many petty details of training, equipment and recruitment; and each arm would be represented upon the General Staff by an officer of rank commensurate with the importance of the questions submitted to him.

It is impossible for a Chief of Staff to give detailed attention to all the requirements of the arms of the service. The most he can do is to exercise a broad supervisory policy, and leave the details to trusted officers of suitable rank and experience. One can imagine what a loss of efficiency would result were the Chief of Staff to attempt to administer the affairs of the engineer or medical corps through subordinate officers, instead of through their respective chiefs.

And yet the increased complexity of questions affecting the cavalry service, its tactics and training, arms and equipment, horse and forage supply, veterinary service, pioneer or demolition service, etc., is such that nothing but good could result from the detail of a general officer, strictly subordinate to the Chief of Staff, whose particular work should be along the above lines, with collateral duties of a General Staff character.

We must confess, too, that we believe the best results would follow an application of the same methods of selection for these chiefs, as are at present used for the General Staff, viz., selection to be made by the board of general officers from among the colonels of cavalry and infantry, such detail to continue for four years, as for other General Staff officers.

Such a scheme would certainly result in greater *esprit de corps* in the cavalry and infantry; in greater satisfaction that the interests of the arms are receiving at Washington, the consideration which their importance merits; and in more efficient administration in the War Department.

The formation of our General Staff was certainly a long step in the right direction; but its internal organization seems capable of improvement along the lines indicated.

R.

CAVALRY REMOUNTS.

THE following correspondence on this subject is self-explanatory:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
WEST POINT, N. Y., October 17, 1907.

Lieut. Col. Ezra B. Fuller, U. S. Army, Retired,
Editor Journal U. S. Cavalry Association,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

DEAR SIR:—I am enclosing herewith the views of the cavalry officers here on the "remount" question, particularly with reference to your editorial in the last number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL. We would be extremely obliged to you if you would publish it in the next issue, and also if you will ascertain the views of other cavalry officers of other posts on this matter, for we feel your statement is in error in saying that you speak the views of the cavalry.

Very truly yours,
(Signed) J. S. HERRON,
Captain Second Cavalry, U. S. Army.

* * *

WEST POINT, N. Y., October 16, 1907.

The Editor:

On page 269 of the current number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL appears this editorial paragraph concerning a very comprehensive program for a remount system, proposed by the Quartermaster General of the Army, General Aleshire, and contained in the same number:

"There is nothing in all of his recommendations with which the cavalry service will not agree, except the single one that the proposed remount service should be 'a separate division of the Quartermaster General's office, designated *remount division*, and under charge of an officer of the Quartermaster's Department, etc.'

"It is believed that this proposed system of purchasing and training horses for the cavalry service should be under the supervision of a cavalry officer, and in fact this remount division should be one of the branches of the office of the Chief of Cavalry *when we get one.*"

We hope that there will be no attempt made to amend General Aleshire's program in any particular by any cavalry officer. It is too good to be hampered by a breath of criticism.

The Quartermaster's Department is equipped with every facility for the purchase of horses. There are plenty of officers in that department whose homes are in the cavalry or field artillery, and whose interests are vitally connected with those arms. More than all, the remount depots, under

General Aleshire's plan, will be manned by civilian employees, better paid than enlisted men are, and much more likely to be permanent there.

In our judgment the cavalry and field artillery officers of the Quartermaster's Department are just the men to have this matter in hand. Give them and their machinery a chance to develop General Aleshire's plan, and we will have splendid results. It is bad policy to advocate distinct purchasing and training plants for remounts for the cavalry, the field artillery and the wagon trains. We ought not to hope to absorb the supply departments in the office of our much desired Chief of Cavalry. The Quartermaster's Department does not like the existing remount system any better than we do, and the present Quartermaster General is anxious to put in a better system, one that no other cavalryman has ever equaled in conception. Let us all put our shoulders to the wheel and help him push it along, as he has made it. He will have a hard enough task to make it go with our best assistance. Yours truly,

F. C. MARSHALL,
Captain Fifteenth Cavalry.
J. S. HERRON,
Captain Second Cavalry.
H. L. SCOTT,
Col. U. S. A., Major Fourteenth Cavalry.
ROBT. L. HOWZE,
Lieut. Col. U. S. A., Captain Sixth Cavalry.
PETER E. TRAUB,
Captain Thirteenth Cavalry.

* * *

U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KAN., October 22, 1907.

Captain J. S. Herron, West Point, New York.

DEAR CAPTAIN:—Your letter of the 17th is at hand. I will be pleased to comply with your request and publish the combined letter of Scott, Howze, Marshall, Traub and yourself, and also to send copies of it for comment to the several cavalry garrisons.

As to my remarks in the October number of the JOURNAL, you will notice that they follow as comments on Walsh's article on "Remounts," and refer to the extract from General Aleshire's annual report as published in the army papers, in which his scheme for a remount system was not given in full. His article was not received here until after Walsh's paper and the comments on it were in print, and in fact not until all of the first part of the October number was in print or being set up.

Upon its receipt, I saw its great importance, and at once called up our printer and had him "kill" the last article being set up—at some little extra expense—and replaced it by General Aleshire's admirable paper, and by doing so delayed getting out the number a few days, as we had to wait for the plates.

Now, as to my comments, I certainly had no intention or thought of speaking the views of the cavalry, and intended only to give my personal opinion that cavalry remounts should be selected and trained by cavalry officers. It is of course my desire to make the CAVALRY JOURNAL what the cavalry officers want it, and to express their views, and to that end will welcome any suggestions or criticisms of my work as editor. It is new work to me, and I expect to make many mistakes, and it may be necessary to put up a sign in the office similar to one in a Leadville dance house: "Please do not shoot the fiddler; he is doing the best he can," substituting "editor" for "fiddler."

Very truly yours,

(Signed,) EZRA B. FULLER,
Lieutenant Colonel U. S. A., Retired
Editor.

On the receipt of Captain Herron's communication of October 17th, a circular letter was sent all commanding officers of cavalry garrisons, giving copies of the above letters and requesting that they "Please comply with Captain Her-

ron's request and obtain the views of the cavalry officers at your post as to the point in question."

The replies received up to the time of going to press are given in full below, omitting, to save space, the headings and signatures:

From Major H. T. Allen, Eighth Cavalry, Fort Yellowstone:

"Referring to your recent communication relating to the proposed plan of General Aleshire, I beg to state that the officers of this post unanimously approve the remount plan recommended by the Quartermaster General. We believe that it is the longest step in the right direction within the limits of possible early accomplishment."

* * *

From Captain E. L. Phillips, Thirteenth Cavalry, Fort Myer:

"Complying with your circular letter of October 25th, I have submitted the question at issue to the fifteen officers of cavalry stationed at this post. Of these, eleven were disinclined to express an opinion in the matter, while the other four were in favor of having the remount bureau under the Quartermaster General.

"So far as I can judge, the unwillingness of the majority of the cavalry officers here to express an opinion either one way or another, is due, in some cases, to a feeling that they would prefer to carefully consider the question and hear the arguments for each side before coming to a definite conclusion. But there is, unquestionably, a strong feeling here that the present Quartermaster General, as an ex-cavalry officer and one whose experience in the purchase of remounts has been exceptionally wide, is peculiarly qualified to handle the work. And as his proposed remount system contemplates placing the actual purchase and handling of the young remounts in the hands of cavalry officers especially selected and detailed in the Quartermaster Department for the purpose; and as there is, at present, no Chief of Cavalry or other

departmental head under whom the remount depot could be placed; the disposition of the majority of our officers seems to be to accept General Aleshire as the logical one to develop and put in operation a new system of remount purchase and handling; and they are disposed to accept his plan as one that will work admirably under present conditions, and as being the best thing to advocate and support at the present time.

"Of course, if, in future years, good fortune should give us a Chief of Cavalry, and changed personnel and new conditions should make it seem desirable, this system once fully developed could be transferred to another department without difficulty."

* * *

From Major Charles Taylor, Thirteenth Cavalry, Fort Leavenworth:

"In response to your circular letter of the 25th ultimo, I take pleasure in informing you that I have talked over the subject of 'who should have charge of the remount division of our army' with the officers of my squadron, and the concensus of opinion is that you are right and that the same should be in charge of competent mounted officers rather than entrusted to the Quartermaster Department entirely.

"There is no doubt but the scheme proposed by General Aleshire could be satisfactorily carried out by the Quartermaster Department in absolute control, so long as General Aleshire remained at its head. But, suppose the General is succeeded by a man ignorant of the subject involved, or lukewarm or hostile toward the mounted arms of the service, as some are, all the fruits of General Aleshire's labors might be lost.

"We believe that there should be a Chief of Cavalry, and under his supervision the remount depots could be operated with entire success.

"The contract system is strongly condemned, being a waste of good money and unsatisfactory in its results."

From Colonel McClernand, First Cavalry, Fort Clark:

"I have just returned from leave. Your note was received last night. Our baggage is to be shipped from Spofford (nine miles by wagon) on the 15th, and it is impossible for us to take up the subject of remounts at this time."

* * *

An attempt was made to obtain the opinions of the thirty-five cavalry officers on duty at the schools at Fort Leavenworth, but only a few of them could find the time to read the correspondence and submit their views on the question.

Of those who did look over the papers, three expressed themselves verbally as concurring in the opinion given by Major Taylor and the others as follows:

* * *

Captain H. R. Hickok, Fifteenth Cavalry:

"General Aleshire's plan is in itself excellent. It is infinitely superior to the one, or lack of one, now followed. General Aleshire has the advantage of being on the spot, in Washington, where legislation and other things are done. He is the head of one of the great departments, and, aside from the fact that his opinions, due to his high reputation, are worthy of consideration, his official recommendations carry great weight. There is not now in Washington anyone who will probably give as much immediate attention to this subject as General Aleshire. There is the further advantage for his plan—a department already organized is behind it to put it into effective operation whenever it may be granted. It is, therefore, manifest that the best present policy for us is to lend every assistance to General Aleshire in his proposed plan for our benefit and improvement.

* * * * *

"The following may be said in summing up:

"1. A remount system is sorely needed, and that proposed by General Aleshire is excellent.

"2. The supervision of the remount system properly reposes in a Chief of Cavalry, but we do not yet have a Chief of Cavalry.

"3. The best present policy is to favor the system proposed and to lend our voice toward its procurement.

"4. The transfer of the supervision of the remount service from the Quartermaster's Department to the cavalry or Chief of Cavalry, is a question best left to the future."

* * *

From Captain J. C. Raymond, Second Cavalry:

"As I understand it, the main point upon which opinions differ on General Aleshire's remount scheme is whether the officers to be detailed on this duty should be of the cavalry (and field artillery) or the Quartermaster's Department. I believe with you and with General Carter, that the remount bureau should be composed of cavalry and field artillery officers under the supervision of the Chief of Cavalry (when we can get one), leaving the supply of transport animals to the Quartermaster's Department."

* * *

From Lieutenant H. L. Hodges, First Cavalry:

"General Aleshire's plan for a remount system should receive, at this time, the unanimous support of all cavalry and light artillery officers, for it will prove an excellent stepping stone towards the ultimate establishment of a "Cavalry Bureau" under the direction of a Chief of Cavalry. The Civil War showed a "Cavalry Bureau" to be the logical and economical method of handling the horse question."

* * *

From Captain C. E. Stodter, Ninth Cavalry:

"I believe General Aleshire's plan is a long step foward, but I agree with you that it should be one of the branches of the office of the Chief of Cavalry when we get one. It would

probably work well under the present Quartermaster General, but might not under his successor. I am opposed to the contract system of buying horses."

* * *

From Lieutenant L. S. Morey, Twelfth Cavalry:

"I have read the correspondence on the remount question and am of the opinion that General Aleshire's idea could be more easily put through than any without making a radical change in the department which should handle the remount depots. Major Taylor's letter is good on the subject, but why not get what we can be most sure of now, and look to the future for further change?"

* * *

In addition to the above, the following has been received on this subject, although not in reply to the circular letter:

From Major J. G. Galbraith, Inspector General:

"The undersigned is the author of the enclosed communication, which was published in the *Register*. If you will refer to the files of the CAVALRY JOURNAL of about the year 1895, you will find that I was at that time a critic of the methods of the Quartermaster's Department, and my argument was along lines similar to those lately set forth in the JOURNAL.

"But since the 1st of July, 1907, the situation has undergone a radical change, and we have more to gain by helping the Quartermaster General than we can hope to accomplish by stubborn insistence on our own way.

"I would request that the clipping be inserted in the CAVALRY JOURNAL."

CAVALRY REMOUNTS.

[From the *Army and Navy Register*.]

To the Editor:

SIR:—However desirable may be the establishment of a cavalry bureau or the installation of a Chief of Cavalry, it need be no part of the former to supply horses, nor duty of the latter to supervise disbursements. Far-reaching as has become the influence of the office of the Chief of Artillery, it has not trenched on the supply departments of the army. The Quartermaster's Department is designated by law to procure and distribute public animals for the army. The present head of that department has outlined the best scheme yet presented, and there is good reason to believe that he is better qualified than any one else to put it into effect. He has under him an organization that will not be embarrassed by the task, but is accustomed to meet such situations. He is receptive of suggestions from cavalry officers and has had sufficient experience in the cavalry. The development of his plans will require money from the Congress; and his request for the necessary appropriations will the more readily be heeded by our legislators if it is not antagonized by officers of the mounted services. I venture to say, on my own authority only, that his scheme will not be presented to the next Congress if a rival proposition is to be put forward by others claiming to represent the cavalry. Is there any considerable number of cavalry officers who desire to be organized into a purchasing bureau that would grow into a large concern in time of war, with the certain prospect of keeping them away from the combatant ranks? I think not.

The Quartermaster General can have under his control some officers of cavalry experience who will be either permanent or detailed officers of the Quartermaster's Department, and who will properly be available and can be compelled to serve as purchasing officers and in charge of horse depots.

On the outbreak of war if there be in existence a cavalry bureau or an office of Chief of Cavalry, we may anticipate that it will be stampeded into the field and to the front. The Quartermaster's Department will be held together and can be expanded and reënforced from other than combatant

sources. In the minds of many cavalry officers, the contract system is inseparably associated with the Quartermaster's Department; and their distrust of the ability or inclination of that department to break away from that system has much to do with the movement to establish a cavalry bureau. The published program of General Aleshire recognizes the unsatisfactory features of the contract system as applied to the purchase of horses for the cavalry, and contemplates resort to open market buying whenever that method may be the more advantageous.

Why not strengthen his hands, give him united support and encouragement, and help to obtain a fair trial for his scheme? EQUES.

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As the above was going to press, a communication was received from Captain Herron with the signatures of fourteen other cavalry officers on duty at West Point, who concurred in the views given by Captain Herron and the others who signed the original letter. EDITOR.

Editor's Table.

WHAT OUR MEMBERS WANT.

On the blank forms prepared for our members in sending in their proxies for the next annual meeting, was a space for suggestions "for the improvement of the JOURNAL or the advancement of the mounted service generally." The suggestions on the proxies received up to date are so varied and so interesting that a few will be given and discussed.

Many members say "Get a Chief of Cavalry." This is easier said than done, but at the same time it is believed that something is being accomplished toward that end as a result of the agitation that has been carried on by the JOURNAL. At the last meeting of the Executive Council a committee was appointed, consisting of Major D. H. Boughton, Eleventh Cavalry; Captain M. F. Steele, Sixth Cavalry; and Captain M. E. Hanna, Third Cavalry, to prepare a report on this subject to be submitted at the annual meeting of the Cavalry Association. It is hoped and believed that this committee will formulate a report covering the best method of procedure, by preparing a bill or otherwise, which, if it meets with the approval of the Association, can be submitted for the consideration of the War Department authorities for their action. In case the Department can be persuaded to favor the proposed scheme a long step in the right direction will have been taken, and it will then only remain to get favorable action on the part of Congress, if Congressional action is necessary. The President in his annual message says: "There should be a Chief of Cavalry just as there is a Chief of Artillery."

Any of our members who have suggestions to offer on this question, are requested to communicate with this committee.

Two of our members suggest that an improvement be made in the binding of the JOURNALS, so that they will remain open when opened at any place. This fault, and it is one to a certain extent, is common to all magazines that are wire stitched instead of being sewed. An examination of the many magazines of both classes will show, first, that all that are sewed are high priced; and, second, that the sewed ones come apart more readily than do those that are wire stitched. This question of the binding of magazines was discussed a few years since in *Munsey's*, and later, in the *Ladies' Home Journal*, and it was claimed by the publishers of these journals that no low priced magazine could afford to have its publications sewed even if it was thought advisable to so bind them.

Several members have requested that we have an enlarged plate made of the Remington drawing on the front cover of the JOURNAL, in order that proofs might be made from it for sale to members. This can be done, and, in case a sufficient number of orders are received to justify the expense, an enlarged plate will be made.

Another member says: "Give more translations from foreign journals of articles on cavalry subjects." This member will find this number largely made up of such translations, and necessarily so, as the number of original articles on hand were very limited when we commenced going to press on this number.

Among the other suggestions received are the following: "Urge the adoption of a definite and compulsory system for training remounts;" "The adoption of a prescribed course in equitation;" "Better pay;" "One hundred enlisted men to each troop of cavalry;" "The adoption of a double-reined bit and a saddle with a higher pommel arch and longer sidebars;" "Place all officers on detached service for six months or more on an unassigned list;" "The detail of more officers at foreign schools to study the languages, and incidentally to pick up ideas regarding the cavalry service;" "Go back to the system of regimental promotion and thereby again foster a regimental esprit;" "Publish the JOURNAL oftener;" "Have the cavalry supplied with the cal. 45 pistol and a sharp saber;" "Publish schedules and programs of instruction at the service schools so as to enable those who cannot attend these schools to follow the course as much as possible;" "No test rides, but in lieu thereof have a physical examination of all field and general officers every two years;" "Longer enlistments with the privilege of discharge after one year;" "An increase of five regiments of cavalry, and if this is not possible in any other way, get it through a reorganization as suggested by Major Boughton;" "Publish cavalry or hunting songs."

A member, one of our colonels of cavalry, in discussing the subject of better pay for the army, but more especially for the enlisted men, makes the following very pertinent and correct remarks: "I certainly hope the part which affects the enlisted men will pass, though I do not expect that the increase will effect any wonderful change in the enlisted personnel, or that it will have much effect upon the number of desertions. Whenever the government decides to take as much trouble to apprehend deserters as is taken to arrest moonshiners and counterfeiters, desertions will practically cease. The certainty of arrest would be a far greater deterrent than severity of punishment, though that should be equal to the crime. It is certain, in my opinion, that the causes of desertion do not lie in the service itself, and therefore an increase of pay and other measures of like character will not be effective so long as deserters are practically without fear of arrest."

Of those who voted on the proposition to unite with our friends in the field artillery and publish one journal for both branches of the service, about seventy per cent favored such an idea in one form or another. However, as stated in the October number of the JOURNAL, this proposition will probably never come to a vote in the Association, as the field artillery officers have decided to form a separate association and to either publish a separate journal or to have a portion of the *Artillery Journal* devoted to their interests.

OUR BOOK DEPARTMENT.

We regret that there has been an unexpected delay in publishing the work of Captains Cole and Stuart on "Individual and Combined Military Sketching." This delay is due to a failure in receiving a portion of the revision and the plates, and was through no fault of the Cavalry Association. The book is now being printed, and it is expected that we will be able to commence filling the already quite large list of advance orders soon after this number of the JOURNAL reaches our readers.

* * *

It has been suggested that the JOURNAL publish a standing list of the best books for an officer's military library, this list to be revised from time to time so as to include the latest works. It is proposed to make this list in groups so as to include the best ten books, the best twenty books, etc., the smaller lists to include such works as are absolutely essential for the officer just joining, and the expanded lists to comprise those that are desirable but not strictly necessary. We hope to have such lists ready for the next issue of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, and in the meantime will welcome suggestions on this subject.

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Although it was promised that Frederick McCormick's book on "The Tragedy of Russia in Pacific Asia" would be out early in October, we have not been able to fill the orders received for it as yet. The publishers write that this work will be issued in a very few days.

* * *

The Association has just published the third edition of Captain Stodter's Score Book. The demand for this handy score book still continues.

* * *

Attention is invited to Captain Rhodes' review of "The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba," by Captain Sargent, which appears in this number. This book is attracting even more attention than did the previous works by this author, and the reviews and press notices of it are extremely flattering. The publishers write us as follows regarding this book: "'The Campaign of Santiago' is receiving very general praise from army and navy authorities, and within a few days we have been advised by the Bureau of Equipment of the Navy Department that the three volumes will be placed in the officers' libraries of all the ships that may be fitted for service hereafter. Individual orders have been received from army and navy officers all over the country, and the work bids fair to become the authoritative one on the subject."

* * *

The Cavalry Association has undertaken the handling of the "Officer's Manual" by Captain James A. Moss, United States Army, and is now prepared to fill orders of individuals, post exchanges or dealers.

The second edition of this book has just been published, the first having been exhausted in four months. It is a work that should be in the hands of every young officer, and older officers as well, and is invaluable to the officers of the National Guard.

Hereafter, a supplement to this book will be issued the first of each year, which will bring it up to date.

THE SERVICE JOURNALS.

An article on the subject of the casualties among horses in the Russian army during the campaign in Manchuria appeared in the last *Austrian Cavalry Monthly*. The following extract from it is taken from a translation that was published in the *Broad Arrow*:

"Russia sent a total of 203,679 horses into the field, and of these rather more than half were draught animals. During the twenty months that the war lasted the sick amounted to fifty-nine per cent. of the total, while 23,068, or eleven per cent., died, were killed, or were missing, and of these only

3701, or under two per cent., were actually killed in action. Of the sick horses, sore backs, as might be supposed, accounted for a large number, and there were 2263 cases of glanders. Only 1159 horses died of wounds received in action. Three hundred and seventy-seven veterinary officers and 1546 assistants were sent into the field, and the majority were employed in the sick-horse depots and hospitals. Each corps had a base veterinary hospital, to which a staff of seven officers and forty men were attached. There was a great dearth of straw for bedding in the hospitals and even of horse medicines, rugs, etc., and the *sorghum* and Chinese millet, given as forage, produced in many cases colic, which terminated in fatal bowel complaints. Every horse was inoculated before leaving Russia and again on arriving in the field, no less than 676,130 doses of serum being required. The veterinary officers with the troops were further responsible for the freedom from infection of all the slaughter cattle required for the troops, and which were collected from Corea, Manchuria, and Mangolia, and every one of these had also to be inoculated against rinderpest. It is thus apparent that the Russian veterinary surgeons had an immense amount of work and responsibility during the campaign."

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The *British Cavalry Journal* for October has the usual number of interesting and instructive articles on cavalry topics. While the historical ones of "The Action of Campo Mayor" and "Balaklava" are of interest, those on "The Increased Importance of Training Cavalry in Mobility," "The Dismounted Action of Cavalry," "Notes on Scouting," "Cavalry Efficiency" and "Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War" are of greater importance to the modern cavalryman. Besides the usual maneuver problem, the other articles are: "The Native Cavalry of India," "Scottish Mounted Maneuvers," "Cavalry Swordsmanship in 1854," and "How to Hit Your Man with a Pistol."

* * *

The *Austrian Cavalry Monthly* for November has been received and contains, among others, the following articles: "Strategical Reconnaissance in the Past and Now," "The Cavalry Screen," "The Training of Cavalry," "The Danish School of Equitation," "The German Remount System," "Lessons in Hippology" and "Oliver Cromwell as a Cavalry Leader."

* * *

The *United Service Gazette* has the following on the shortage of officers in the British army: "The shortage of officers is the one thing that threatens to seriously affect the prospects of the new territorial army, and to cast the same blight on it that is now sapping the vitality of the regular army, and compelling the authorities to resort to all kinds of subterfuges in order to maintain the fixed establishment of officers of the line. The reason for this lies on the surface. The officer at one time was attracted to the army in the hope of carving out a career for himself with the sword. Provided he possessed all those splendid qualities that go to make up the true soldier, and that have won respect for the British name in every corner of the globe, but little more was needed, and such routine duties as he was called upon to perform in peace time did not tax him so severely as to make his profession anything like a burden to him. But the times have changed much since then, and professional exactions have, in later years, increased so rapidly that the officer finds them simply unbearable in their demands. Moreover, examination tests have become more severe, and entail an amount of close study and investigation which, if applied to a commercial life with a corresponding degree of earnestness and steadiness, would, of a certainty, win success in a business career. Young men are learning this lesson rapidly, and realizing that most of the prizes of life go nowadays to successful business men, while the soldier's life grows daily more exacting, without any corresponding growth of remuneration, the majority of them are eschewing the military career in favor of more lucrative and less arduous work in the city. Until the country grows more

liberally disposed towards the officer, and learns to appreciate his work more fully, the cry of 'shortage in officers' must increase in measure rather than diminish."

* * *

The *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* for October contains but one article relating to the cavalry service, one continued from the previous number and concluded, on the passage of rivers by small bodies of mounted troops. Other subjects of general interest are: "Education in Relation to the Army," "The Military System of the Future in the British Army," "Wars of the Turks with the Germans" and the "Battle of Tsu-Shima."

* * *

The *Journal of the U. S. Infantry Association* for November has the following leading articles: "Experiments with the Cavalry Buzzer," "Collective Fire in Target Practice," "Practical Field Work in Musketry," "The Increased Value of Infantry Fire," "Recruitment, Mobilization and Concentration," "Effect of Abolishing the Canteen," and "New Light on the Campaign in Canada in 1776, and Burgoyne's Expedition in 1777."

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The *Journal of the Military Service Institution* for November contains: "The American Citizen vs. The American Soldier and Sailor," "Left of the Line at Wilson's Creek," "Mounted and Dismounted Action of Cavalry," "Organization of a Military Reserve," "The Trumpeter and Trumpet Calls," and "Points of Interest to Riflemen."

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One of the most valuable of all of our exchanges is that of the *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*. Among its most interesting and instructive articles are: "The Use of Intrenchments and Field Fortifications in the Attack as Exemplified in Modern Wars" (Gold Medal Prize Essay), "The Relative Value of Musketry in Military Training,"

"Intrenching Tools for Infantry," "Universal Military Training as a Substitute for the Volunteer System," and "The Cavalry of the Grand Army in 1805." The following quotations are from this journal: "The nation must depend on the patriotism of its citizens, but it must be the patriotism of forethought, prudence and preparation, not the emotional sentiment aroused when the enemy is at the gate."

"From the fact that but little use was made of cavalry in South Africa and the Far East it has been said that cavalry is not worth much in the campaigns of to-day. This is, however, a great error. In both these wars had cavalry only been available ordinary defeats might have been converted into decisive routs. Modern war has need of cavalry more than ever—a cavalry which is numerous, pushing and ubiquitous. They must undertake the service of exploration and make use of modern inventions, such as telegraphy, wireless telegraphy, heliographs, etc., to submit safely and accurately the information which they have gained. Above all it must be remembered that the cavalry must defeat the opposing cavalry and clear the field. Whether this is accomplished in mounted combat or on foot depends on circumstances. Horse artillery should accompany all the larger cavalry detachments. Cavalry is and must remain the eyes of the army."



"I speak the truth, not so much as I would, but as I dare, and I dare a little the more as I grow older."—*Montaigne.*

* * *

Military History Applied to Modern Warfare.* In recent years the importance to military men of the study of military history has been overshadowed by what has been considered a more practical method of acquiring a knowledge of the art of war; namely, a study of theoretical treatises on strategy, logistics, tactics, etc., combined with the solving of map problems and terrain exercises and the working out of *kriegspiel* and maneuver problems. The pendulum is now swinging back, however, and it is being recognized in both Germany and England that a sound military education must be firmly rooted in a knowledge of the campaigns of former wars. In Germany the wars of '66 and '70–'71 are naturally the first studied, as the materials are the most accessible, the railways play the part

*"Military History Applied to Modern Warfare." A guide to the study of military history exemplified by studies of the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, Vimiero, Corunna, Salamanca, Waterloo and the Shenandoah Valley, by the late Captain J. W. E. Donaldson, R. F. A., P. S. C. Second edition; revised and enlarged by Captain A. F. Becke, late R. F. A. Hugh Rees, Ltd., London (The Pall Mall Military Series). Price, 8s. 6d., net.

in these wars that may be expected of them in future wars, and the outcome of these wars is highly flattering to national pride. Nevertheless, the Germans by no means neglect the study of earlier campaigns, including those of both Frederick the Great and Napoleon, and it may be said of the latter that they are more studied (from a military point of view) and better understood in Germany to-day than they are in France. Motives of patriotism lead to the investigation of wars which have contributed to the upbuilding or advancement of one's own country, and hence the English quite naturally take a pride in studying the campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula and of 1815 in which their own forces contributed so largely to the weakening and final overthrow of the power of Napoleon.

This volume gives a critical outline of seven campaigns, with a view to illustrating the manner in which military history should be studied in order to derive benefit therefrom and also to point out the particular lessons applicable to modern warfare to be gained from a study of these operations. In his accounts of the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena and Waterloo, the author accomplishes both his objects in a masterly manner. The campaigns of Vimiero, Corunna and Salamanca are hardly as well digested as the others. In these the author attempts to cover too much ground in a short space to be either clear or convincing, while at the same time one feels that the operations of such comparatively small bodies of troops, armed with weapons of obsolete type and really partaking rather of the nature of guerilla warfare, have after all but little bearing on the modern art of warfare.

The concluding narrative and criticisms of Jackson's Valley Campaign, in which an attempt is made to describe, and characterize the strategy of the movements of all the armies in the Eastern theater during the first two years of the war, is disappointing. The author falls into all the errors so prevalent among writers on the Civil War before the publication of the war records and other important sources made possible a correct understanding of these campaigns. The time has passed in this country when a writer on the

Civil War can calmly ignore the facts contained in the sources of its history, which are or should be available to everyone, and that an English author should attempt to give a critical discussion of an important campaign based on popular histories and biographies, nearly always partial accounts, is only interesting from a psychological standpoint and as indicating the popular misconceptions regarding our Civil War campaigns prevalent among English military men.

The chief value of the book, however, lies in the method by which the author draws up-to-date lessons from the campaigns of the past, and while we may not feel that he has brought out more than a few of the many lessons to be learned from his study, or may not agree with him at all as to what those lessons are, yet we must admire him as a pioneer in his own country in bringing forward a subject, the study of which has been too long neglected, and overlook the imperfections necessarily to be expected in preliminary work of this character. We hope to see a further development and application of this method, so justly appreciated in Germany, the importance and value of which must be apparent to anyone who gives the subject more than cursory and superficial consideration. A. L. C.

Administration, Organization and Equipment Made Easy.*

This is a good book for those that like that kind of book. We suppose that under the English system of promotion examinations some such book is practically a necessity. The information that English officers must possess to pass successfully their promotion examinations in the subject of organization and equipment is contained in a vast number of official books of regulations, etc. To save officers the trouble of referring to all these different books, this manual of examinations, as it might be called, has been prepared by Colonel Banning.

*"Administration, Organization and Equipment Made Easy." By Lieutenant Colonel S. F. Banning. Seventh edition. Gale & Polden, 2 Amen Corner, Paternoster Row, E. C. London. Price, 4s. 6d.

The fact that this seventh edition has just been brought out, it having been only eight years since the first edition, shows how valuable the work is to English officers.

The book is of some use to foreign officers because with some little study they can learn something about the English army organization. But as with all manuals, the information contained therein is really a sort of hotch potch, and must be supplemented by something more definite before any fair amount of information can be gained.

As for the use of such books in our own army in preparing officers for examinations, we believe the necessity of their being is small. Of course, we have some works similar in character to this book of Colonel Banning, and we generally call them catechisms or syllabi of such and such subjects, as for instance, "Catechism of Outpost Duty," or "Syllabus of Davis' International Law." But personally we have never yet been able to make any great use of such compilations. It has always seemed to us that the best way of preparing for an examination in a certain book is to take the book itself and just prior to the examination make our own outlines and analyses. They are certainly far better for one's own use than those made by any one else. If one is at all familiar with a book he knows the parts he needs to brush up on, and he can do that brushing up himself far better by his own methods than by the compilations or consolidations of others.

While we are on this subject of examinations, we wish to speak of another point, and that is in regard to the methods of asking questions. Examiners are too prone to ask questions involving tests of memory rather than tests of reasoning. The uselessness of such examination is patent. To explain more definitely what is meant, let us take a concrete illustration—one from the subject of "Organization and Tactics":

On page 133, Wagner, we find under the head of "Cavalry Against Infantry," the following: "Cavalry can be used with effect against infantry under the following circumstances." Now follow ten headings.

Each of the headings is plain to anyone who has given the matter any thought, and each one of the conditions can

be explained by an officer undergoing an examination to the satisfaction of the most critical board if he has almost any sense at all, and has made some study of the question. But now take the ordinary question; it will be something after the following: "Under what circumstances can cavalry be used effectively against infantry?"

Now, to get a maximum on the answer, the officer undergoing examination must remember each one of the ten circumstances given on page 133, and put them down on paper. This is pure memory work, and absolutely nothing else. Of course, this is an easy way to get up examinations. It is easy to mark the papers when turned in by making a cut of ten per cent. (there being ten circumstances) for each circumstance omitted. Should the marker ever be called to explain his mark, he can say: "Well, I deducted the proper percentage. This paper gives only six conditions out of ten, and so the paper gets sixty per cent. on this question." There is, of course, no recourse, as the marker has it in black and white on the paper, and yet there has been no actual discriminating test of the officer's knowledge of this subject. This is not only the laziest method of conducting examinations, but it is one of the most pernicious. It gives the officer no chance of showing whether he knows anything of the chances of success or defeat that are likely to attend an attack of cavalry on infantry, and simply makes of him a memorizing machine. It gets our officers into a method of studying for examinations that is faulty to the highest degree, and the sooner we quit having such promotion examinations the better.

How much better would be a system where we took the officer and said to him: "Lieutenant So-and-so, our best military writers say that cavalry can be used effectively against infantry when the infantry is broken by the fire of opposing infantry or artillery. Why is this?" And so on for the ten circumstances given. Unfortunately this method entails more work, and so the former is adopted. Examination boards should be carefully watched, and the minute any board descends to the pernicious method of asking questions that call for memory power and not reasoning power, that

board should be dissolved and a fitting rebuke administered in such public way that other boards will be slow to adopt such methods.

We do not wish to say that such methods are adopted in general throughout our service, but it is such an easy method to drop into that constant vigilance must be maintained to guard against such unfortunate proceedings. Any officer coming up to an examination should feel that it is not so much what any one particular book has to say on a given subject that is wanted, but that the board must be made to understand that the officer has been spending some time on the study of his profession and that he has sufficient mental ability to appreciate the things he has studied and can apply them to circumstances when they arise.

In regard to Colonel Banning's works, we take this opportunity to again call attention to one of his revisions that was reviewed in the CAVALRY JOURNAL in the issue of January, 1906. We refer to his revision of Captain Davidson's "Catechism on Field Training." That was a book that is far superior to its title. It is almost a classic as far as working with it is considered. And it has always seemed to us that a careful system of training on the lines there laid down would make our enlisted personnel appreciate the fact that they belong to a profession, and would eliminate much desertion, and also keep all men as non-commissioned officers that we care to retain. Attention is invited to that review, and we can safely state that any officer having that book in his possession for a sort of rude guide will find it one of the most valuable military books ever published.

WHITE.

Cavalry Studies.*

An absolutely new and valuable book on the handling of cavalry in modern warfare written along the lines of the applicative system of teaching the art of war. It helps to answer the questions, How shall an officer make himself a good soldier? How shall he learn to lead men in campaign and battle? To be sure, military men study their profession and read the campaigns of the great leaders. None are more zealous. At the same time it must be admitted that not enough attention has been paid to the *method* of study or reading. By study and reading a man may become learned but not necessarily wise or practical. One may know the grammar of a language and still be unable to converse. So, too, he may be familiar with the great campaigns and battles, be able to talk fluently of the cause of this success or that failure, and still be unable to lead men, or solve strategical and tactical problems in the field. Education is an art, and the best methods are those that produce the best artisans. That our educators are now realizing this fact is evidenced by the increase in the number of manual training schools and similar institutions where the young are taught to work as they will in after life. This is experience, the best of all teachers. Education is of little value to men unless it makes them practical. In the army we have been groping along the way because the way was dark, because *we did not know how to study*, how to make the experience of others the working tools of our own profession. We have been content with theory, not realizing that the theories of others are of little use to us unless we make them our own, which can be done only by testing them ourselves.

General Haig has produced a work based upon the applicative system of instruction, a system that can be summed up in the word, "problems"—a system that continually confronts the student with "situations" and asks him what he is going to do about them. Reading descriptions of campaigns and battles is not enough. The student must

*"CAVALRY STUDIES, STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL." By General Douglas Haig, late inspector of cavalry in India. Hugh Rees, London S. W., 1907. Price, 8s. 6d., net.

be made to solve problems himself. In this way alone can he be brought to realize his own deficiencies. As the author says, it is *leadership* that tells. The power of rapidly grasping a situation, of coming quickly to a decision and of issuing clear and easily executed orders. This faculty more than any other brings success to the commander in the field. The development of this faculty ought to be the main objective in the training of combatant officers in time of peace, and close attention should be paid to all exercises which tend to develop a power of decision and skill in quickly drafting orders. Military history is all-important to an officer. It shows the great masters at work. We learn from their experience and become acquainted with the difficulties to be encountered in applying principles. But such work contributes little towards developing our powers of decision. On the other hand, *war games* and *staff rides*, properly conducted, are practical teachers.

This new contribution to the art of war is the outgrowth of five cavalry staff rides held in India during the years 1903–6, personally conducted by General Haig. These rides were held under favorable circumstances, as India is especially suitable for such exercises. The winter climate is ideal for outdoor life, the country is diversified, and troops can march and camp as the military situation may require. Moreover, the director was fortunate in having a number of skilled officers, not only on his directing staff but among those receiving instruction as well, who had had practical experience in various parts of the world. We should therefore expect the conclusion of these gentlemen to be in accord with correct tactical and strategical principles.

To present the results of these rides in a manner that would be interesting to those not taking part therein, it was necessary to remodel the original reports, which work was intrusted to Colonel Lonsdale Hale. The result is a book not only of interest and value to cavalry officers, but to all others desirous of understanding the proper use of that military arm. The first four rides are presented in the form of *studies;* the fifth is given practically in its original form, the "estimates of the situation" and orders being those of the

officers in the field. The purpose of the book is to exemplify, primarily, the functions of an independent cavalry division, and secondarily, the tactical uses of this arm under a variety of conditions. Each study is based upon a general situation out of which a campaign is skillfully developed. The situation is carefully estimated (the British say appreciated) and the proper field orders drawn in a manner almost identical with similar work in our School of the Line and Staff College.

In the introduction the general rôle of cavalry is considered. The second chapter gives the organization of the Indian cavalry division, calls attention to the fact that the *studies* are intended to make officers think for themselves, and gives examples of certain orders. Field orders with the British are called operation orders. Then follow the studies. The first is called Jhelum (river in northwestern India) and has for the general subject the work of a cavalry division in an invasion on a double line of operations across a river frontier, and up to and including the first decisive battle. In short, concentration in the presence of the enemy. The second study is called Delhi and treats of the employment of independent cavalry divisions in following a defeated hostile army. In this the author points out the similarity of the country around Delhi to that in the vicinity of Metz, and calls attention to the meager results obtained from the German cavalry in 1870–71. The third study is called Aurangabad, and treats of the employment of the cavalry division and of the army cavalry up to the "decisive battle, the real objective in war." In this are considered the strategical preparation, selection of primary and secondary theaters of war, the use of intrenched depots (illustrated by Napoleon's campaign of 1809), and measures to be taken in regard to a buffer state. The fourth study is called Medak, and is a continuation of the third study, but considers the secondary theater of operations. Then follows the Attock staff ride illustrating the employment of strategical cavalry to cover the concentration of an army on an enemy's flank. This is prefaced with notes on the campaign of Ulm in 1805.

While the leading subjects treat of the strategical employment of cavalry, the development of the *studies* is made

to illustrate its tactical uses and other features which should be familiar to officers. For instance, the first study discusses: Reconnaissance of and advance to meet hostile cavalry in open country; cavalry mounted action; pursuit; occupying a line of outposts to contain an enemy; passage of a river; should infantry ever be attached to a cavalry division? use of artillery; cavalry coöperating in the great counter stroke, etc. On page 265 the difference between Napoleon's and Von Moltke's staff systems is commented upon. It is interesting to note that the ultimate base of the enemy in all of these rides is supposed to be in Europe beyond the Caspian.

On page 108 the manner of handling independent cavalry on reconnoitering duty is pointed out:

"This reconnoitering body will, in the course of its operations, be at least a long day's march in front of the rest of the division, and in view of its independent rôle and the unforeseen which characterizes its mission, it should have a 'central mass' of some strength. This mass must be able, according to circumstances, to send out several sets of reconnaissances in different directions, and either to support them directly, or to send detachments of sufficient strength to their support."

The "cavalry screen" is condemned and justly. Page 155:

"A force of cavalry which is employed on strategical reconnaissance will not have to extend as a dense and continuous screen across the whole front of an army (or armies), as has too frequently been maintained. Such dispersion, without giving it penetrative power and strength at any one point, would leave it morally and materially weak everywhere, and incapable of making any useful effort."

Again on page 277:

"(*a*) First of all make a few soundings with patrols; then, as the situation develops, send out more; (*b*) keep in hand, covered by patrols, the mass ready to strike when the

situation is favorable. Even nowadays these principles are often forgotten, and squadrons are scattered, as in the so-called 'screen' formation."

Again, speaking of the campaign of Ulm:

"There was no 'cavalry screen' put out after the manner suggested by certain theoretical text books with clouds of patrols in front, all arranged with mathematical accuracy. On the contrary, Napoleon's cavalry was kept much concentrated, and *a large mass of it was boldly pushed forward into close contact with the enemy.* Moreover, reconnoitering was kept up by active reconnoitering bodies, not by a cordon of posts of observation."

These lines are quoted to show the character of the work, and also to invite the attention of our officers to the proper method of handling independent cavalry, a subject that has been somewhat befogged by the "screen" idea, and by the term independent cavalry being comparatively new.

In the appendix will be found a series of notes on the work done by officers during the rides; also notes on the organization of a single staff ride, and a number of problems for solution.

The work is supplied with eight general maps and thirty sketches, amply illustrating the various situations. For convenience the maps in the pocket at the end of the book should have the names of the *rides* printed on the outside.

MAJOR D. H. BOUGHTON.

Sadowa.* This is a study, not an "account," of the campaign of 1866; yet the narration of events, from the mobilization of the Prussian armies to the closing scenes of the battle of Sadowa, is in sufficient detail to satisfy the average student of military history.

The book is in two parts. Part I deals with the mobilization and concentration of the Prussians, and the preparation

*"SADOWA: A STUDY." By General H. Bonnal. Translated from the French by C. F. Atkinson, Lieutenant First V. B. Royal Fusiliers. Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119 Pall Mall, S. W., London, 1907. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

of the strategic defensive, the marches and combat until the armies were united, and the preparation of the decisive battle. Part II is mainly devoted to the battle, which is arbitrarily divided into four phases; this division, together with the author's method of discussing the operations of each of the three armies in turn, greatly simplifies the student's task. There is a final chapter on the causes and consequences of the victory and on the strategy of the Prussian General Staff in 1866.

The operations explained in the text may be easily followed on twenty-one loose maps inclosed in a pocket. The scales of these maps vary from one inch equal about thirty miles to one and one-half inches equal one mile. The large scale maps are of the battlefield and show considerable detail. On all of the maps the troops are represented in a manner that appeals to the eye.

The author says in his preface that the "study is not concerned with modifications, present and past, in armament, but has as its special object the doctrine of the Prussian General Staff in 1866, personified by its chief, Von Moltke." The translator adds: "The object of the author is by no means attained by the mere statement of the Prussian doctrine. A study implies criticism, and criticism requires a criterion. Nearly twenty years of research in the archives of the Napoleonic period have provided the material for this criterion, the 'new French' theory of strategy, as worked out by General Langlois, Colonel Foch and others, but above all, by General Bonnal, in the series *L'Esprit de la Guerre Moderne*. *Sadowa* form a part of this series, and must, therefore, be considered as a study of a particular campaign, not only upon its own merits, but also in the light of a definite theory."

The following are some of the strategical and tactical dispositions that are criticised:

The dispersion of the Prussian armies on the 10th of June. The choice of Gitschin as the point of junction for the Prussian armies. Breaking up corps in the I Army into their constituent divisions which became the real unit of operations. The operations of the Austrians and Saxons

under Clam-Gallas. The work of the Prussian I Army during the week which ended with the capture of Gitschin. The action of the Prussian I Corps at Trautenau. Benedek's methods for covering the deployment of his army on the right bank of the Elbe. Benedek's decision to take up a position June 29th facing the Crown Prince. Moltke's plan of operations formed on July 2d on the supposition that the Austrians were withdrawing to the left bank of the Elbe to take up a position with the fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz on the flanks. Lack of telegraphic communication between the Prussian armies. Prince Frederick Charles' employment of the Prussian Seventh Division on the left of the I Army. The holding of the cavalry and artillery reserves in the rear of the armies. The premature crossing of the Bistritz by the I Army on the day of the battle. Benedek's order for the battle. The failure of the Prussian cavalry on the day of the battle.

While the author does not fear to make trenchant criticisms where he believes they are warranted, yet he is liberal with praise where praise is due. Speaking of the separation of the I and II Armies by a distance of eight marches, when the II Army was authorized by the King to march to the Neisse to protect the Silesian frontier, the author says: "It is incredible that the Chief of the General Staff could have approved this flagrant violation of the best known of all Napoleon's strategical maxims, 'Keep your forces united.'" But he adds: "In the spirit of loyalty Moltke defended with all the weight of his authority a decision which he knew to be mischievous, with the sole object of screening the responsibility of his King and his Princes before posterity. When the mistake had been made, he lost no time in recriminations, but used every effort of his genius to mitigate its evil effects. In the result he succeeded, though not without great difficulty, in directing the Prussian forces so as to converge on a common objective point preparatory to the great decisive battle." But in the very next paragraph, after this acknowledgment of Moltke's genius, he says in forceful language: "Moltke demonstrates in the clearest possible way his misconception of the use of strategic rear guards in refusing to admit that the Prussian V and VI Corps (forming the nucleus of the II Army) could contain the five or six corps of the Austrian army. 'Even in a strong position,' he says, 'they would not have been able to resist,' as if to give indisputable proof that the Prussians could only conceive of an *unyielding* defense."

Speaking of Clam-Gallas's position at Gitschin, General Bonnal says: "The five routes by which the Prussians could approach joined at Gitschin, and, by taking up a position to the north of the town the defenders exposed themselves to almost certain envelopment. They should, on the contrary, have (*a*) massed the bulk of their forces a mile or two southeast of Gitschin; (*b*) placed a strong advanced guard close to the town, with detachments out on the roads from Lomnitz, Turnau and Munchengratz; (*c*) observed Neupaka and Liban with cavalry, and in this disposition watched their opportunity to act with the mass against the Prussian columns, while the latter struggled with the Austrian advanced guard for room to deploy in the open."

In the comments on Moltke's plan of operations formulated July 2d, we find the following: "Napoleon in the course of his stupendous career committed errors, some say blunders, but in no single document, whether his own letters or in orders dictated to others, is it possible to find a single plan of operations in which the enemy is left at liberty to move during the maneuver in question." But a little further on in the book is this tribute to Moltke: "It was, thanks to Moltke, and to Moltke alone, that the Prussian armies were able to combine their action on one battlefield under conditions of time, space and direction which ensured a brilliant victory."

These are but samples of the broad and fearless but fair-minded criticism with which the book is plentifully filled. It is a valuable addition to the literature in English on the campaign with which it deals.

The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba.*

Captain Sargent's wide reputation as a critical student of and commentator upon the campaigns of the great Bonaparte led to the belief that the American public would not be disappointed in the work upon which he has been engaged during the past three years. *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, which appears from the house of A. C. McClurg & Co., in three volumes, is the most exhaustive, convincing, and withal scholarly treatise upon this short but important campaign which has yet appeared from any pen. The simplicity and lucidity of literary style which marked Captain Sargent's earlier work is conspicuous in this, his latest effort; and layman as well as military expert will derive pleasure and profit from its pages.

Critical essays of contemporaneous events are ever difficult; and more especially is this true of *military* events, when the critic is an officer in his country's military service. Be it remembered that even now, forty years after the great Civil War, history is being written of men and events which has never before appeared. Therefore, if Captain Sargent has dealt gently with many sins of omission and commission, with blunders and neglects which cost our little army many valuable lives, and which participants remember with some humiliation, it must be frankly acknowledged that his narrative is dispassionate, conservative, and has the genuine ring of truth.

Volume I takes up the Cuban insurrection, our own declaration of war, the theaters of operations, the strategy of the naval situation, the resources, armies and military situation, and lastly the blockade of Havana and Santiago. Volume II deals with the disembarkation of the American expedition, Las Guasimas, El Caney, and San Juan, and the destruction of the Spanish fleet. Volume III continues with the siege and capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, the reembarkation of the Fifth Corps, and general comments. Numerous appendices serve to make plain the author's sources of information.

It is interesting to learn that during the Cuban insurrection, reinforcements to the number of 217,282 were sent from Spain, while the total number of Cubans under arms during the insurrection was at one time and another 53,774. Briefly the author ascribes Spain's failure to subdue the insurrection, first, to the cordon system; second, to the defensive method of warfare; and third, to the lack of Spanish cavalry. "There never was a time during the insurrection," says the author, "when the insurgents, with their lack of organization, poor discipline, and disinclination to concentrate and fight, could have prevented a single brigade of United States cavalry from marching victoriously anywhere in the island. Such being the case, it is plain that if Spain had possessed twenty or twenty-five good cavalry regiments in Cuba, and had energetically taken the offensive and overrun the rebellious parts of the island, she could hardly have failed to conquer."

In discussing the situation of the American and Spanish

CAPTAIN H. H. SARGENT.

*"THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA." By Captain H. H. Sargent, Second U. S. Cavalry. Three volumes. A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicgo. Price, $5.00.

naval forces at the beginning of the war, Captain Sargent believes that Spain should have acted strategically on the defensive, leaving her land forces in Cuba and Porto Rico to bear the brunt of the fighting, meanwhile taking up with her navy some strong position where she could protect her own coast cities and threaten those of her enemy, with the strategical advantage of concentrating her forces in case either American fleet crossed the ocean to attack her.

Our lack of information and misinformation in regard to Cuba is accentuated by the following quotation:

"But at the time the American authorities did not know, even approximately, how many troops were in Cuba and Porto Rico. The number in Cuba was variously estimated by the commanding general, Major General Nelson A. Miles, and others, but none of these estimates it is believed were equal to the actual number. On April 12th, the Consul General of Cuba, Fitzhugh Lee, testified before the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs that there were probably 97,000 or 98,000 Spanish soldiers then in the island, of whom only about 55,000 were capable of bearing arms. General Miles estimated the number at 150,000, which though much nearer the truth, was still about 46,000 less than the actual number."

What a potent argument was this for a General Staff!

The author sums up the American naval strategy of the campaign in a sentence: "An attack on Havana, if Cervera's squadron remained in the Canary Islands, or an attack on Cervera's squadron, if it sailed to the West Indies." Accordingly, the author believes the following general plan, expressed in the form of orders, would have been strategically correct:

First. If Cervera's squadron does not cross the Atlantic, the American army and navy will attack Havana in the autumn. Meanwhile, during the summer the regular troops at Tampa will be held in readiness to make brief incursions into Cuba, for the purpose of supplying the insurgents with food, arms and ammunition.

Secondly. If Cervera's squadron sails to West Indian waters, and is there blockaded in port, the American army will then immediately coöperate with the navy in bringing about the destruction of the Spanish squadron.

Thirdly. If Cervera's squadron is destroyed in the West Indies, and hostilities do not immediately cease, the American army will then undertake the occupation of Porto Rico.

Captain Sargent closes his exhaustive discussion of naval operations, as follows:

"By remaining at Santiago, Cervera gave the Americans the chance of bringing an overwhelming force against him on the battlefield, and of attacking one by one the vessels of his squadron as they issued from the mouth of the harbor. In other words, he allowed the Americans both the strategical and tactical advantages of the situation, thus giving them the opportunity of practically ending the campaign before the greater part of the land force of either combatant had a chance to fire a shot. * * * Cervera had a clear conception of the general strategical situation, but he depreciated the difficulties of his adversary and exaggerated his own. He had great courage, but he was lacking in boldness and aggressiveness. Though he commanded a squadron peculiarly fitted for offensive action, he remained constantly on the defensive. Had he acted upon the principle that *the offensive alone promises decisive results* and taken the risks that the desperateness of the situation justified, he might have struck a more powerful blow for his country and won for himself a greater name."

Early in Volume II the author discusses in detail the strategical and tactical advantages of disembarkation and base of operations of the army, first, at Guantanamo Bay, thirty two nautical miles east of Santiago Bay; second, at Cabañas and Guaicabon on the west side of the entrance to Santiago harbor; and third, at Siboney and Daiquiri, as General Shafter actually did. After an exhaustive discussion, Captain Sargent believes that the latter plan was the one offering the greatest advantages to our army; but that had the Spaniards exercised wise generalship in improving

their opportunities, General Shafter would have had small chance of success. He points out that the Spaniards should have resisted the American landing at Daiquiri and Siboney with artillery, and made every effort to gain time sufficient for concentrating an overwhelming force in front of Santiago, and at the same time delaying the progress of Shafter's corps until disease had, in itself, rendered the condition of the army precarious.

Says the author:

"The sailing of this expedition to Santiago and its successful disembarkation at Daiquiri and Siboney, were in many respects remarkable events in the history of the United States. It was the first time that an expedition of this size and the second time that an expedition of this kind had ever left the American shores. Though numbering less than seventeen thousand soldiers, it contained the greater part of the regular forces of the United States. * * * Practically, this was an army of regular soldiers, commanded by regular officers. On the whole it was thoroughly drilled and highly disciplined; well fitted to win a great victory, and if need be, to endure great hardships. Among its numbers were many excellent soldiers, some old in the service, ripe with the experience of the past, yet filled with the ambition and courage of youth; others, young in years but full of promise. Some destined to fall and die, others destined to survive and conquer. Many there were, too, among the number, who after the bloody work of El Caney and San Juan, would live to carry the Stars and Stripes to victory in the far-away Philippines. Some there were who would die there, and others, who, surviving both campaigns, would live to bear the flag victoriously even unto the very gates of the Chinese capital."

LAS GUASIMAS.

Of the much discussed movement by General Wheeler which resulted in the Cavalry Division passing Lawton's division, and bringing about an engagement at Las Guasimas, the author says: "On the afternoon and night of the 23d,

General Wheeler, who commanded the dismounted cavalry division of General Shafter's army, and who was bent on getting his troops to the front as rapidly as possible, had pushed forward General Young's brigade abreast or in advance of General Lawton's division at Siboney." Later on, Captain Sargent comments on this movement as follows: "It is clear now that if General Wheeler had not pushed forward so hurriedly from Siboney, no engagement would have taken place at Las Guasimas."

In this connection, it may be of more than passing interest to military students to read what report the Swedish military attaché, Captain A. M. Th. E. Wester, General Staff, made to his government of this movement:

"The Commanding General's important decision to remain for the present on the defensive was frustrated, however, before he could embody it in the form of an order, through the inordinate self-will of one of its highest ranking officers. * * * General Wheeler on the other hand, had determined upon an attack against the Spanish position at Las Guasimas, agreeably to which he had transmitted the following report: * * * General Wheeler explained that his decision was based on the ground that it appeared to him most advantageous to attack the Spaniards before they should come under the protection of the fortifications at Santiago. This reason is hardly sustained by the existing military conditions. The real reason, without prejudice to General Wheeler's extraordinary enterprise and known courage, is undoubtedly to be found in his desire to fight the first battle on Cuban soil, and that a favorable opportunity seemed to present itself in an engagement at Las Guasimas."

The author rightly concludes that General Linares, the Spanish commander, should have fought at Las Guasimas *the decisive battle of the war*. For the position was tactically very strong; it was likewise strategically strong, interposing as it did a barrier between the American army and Santiago, and the northern army could not intercept Spanish reinforcements from Guantanamo; and lastly, Las Guasimas

was so situated that Linares could, with small effort, have concentrated there at least three-fourths of the Spanish troops in and near Santiago. If Linares had so concentrated, he would doubtless have won a decisive battle. Furthermore, every effort to delay the advance of the American forces, brought to Linares' aid the deadly Cuban fevers, which were soon to so seriously impair the fighting efficiency of the American army.

"From this discussion," says the author, "it seems clear that if the greater part of the garrisons at Guantanamo, Holguin, and Manzanillo, had been concentrated at Santiago and properly supplied with provisions, the chances of success would have been overwhelmingly in favor of the Spaniards."

In this engagement the Americans had about 964 officers and men; the Spaniards had in their three lines about 2,078 officers and men, but only 1,500 took part in the fight.

EL CANEY AND SAN JUAN.

One of the things which must have struck all officers who participated in the Santiago campaign was the reckless equanimity with which the army pushed forward without careful reconnaissance, and fought battles with the aid of imperfect maps and incomplete intelligence. The author pays a deserved tribute to General Chaffee's invaluable reconnaissance towards El Caney, and to the officers who assisted the chief engineer of the corps in this hazardous work. But unless the writer is greatly mistaken, much of the value of the intelligence service was due to the personal efforts of the late lamented Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, attached to corps headquarters.

"General Shafter made a mistake," says the author, "in fighting the battles of El Caney and San Juan Hill at the same time, for it gave the Spaniards the opportunity of massing a superior force against either part of the divided army." But all successful commanders must take some risks, and Captain Sargent finally comes to the conclusion: "Had General Shafter adopted the plan of leaving a containing

force at El Caney, Lawton's division could have marched on the evening of June 30th to the vicinity of the Ducoureau House, bivouacked there that night, and been ready early next morning to advance along the El Caney-Santiago road for an attack against San Juan Heights. Thus situated, all the divisions of the army would have been practically within supporting distance of each other; and had Lawton's attack been vigorously pressed, as it undoubtedly would have been, it is not unlikely that early in the forenoon he would have forced back the advanced line of the Spaniards, in which case San Juan Hill would have been taken in reverse."

In an over-sea expedition, there is always a tendency to cut down the tactical quota of mounted troops for reasons of economy, time and alleged difficulties of transportation and subsistence. When no other excuse is available, it is quite frequently asserted that "the terrain in the theater of operations does not lend itself to mounted work" This plea was made early in our Philippine service, but both there and in China was proven fallacious.

Referring to the use of cavalry in Cuba, Captain Sargent says:

"However, had General Shafter had two or three thousand cavalry, they could easily have prevented Escario's column from entering the city; and if Linares had attempted to concentrate at Santiago the troops which were in Santiago Province, a strong cavalry force would have been needed to prevent such a concentration. Suppose, for instance, that Linares had ordered three or four thousand troops from Guantanamo to Santiago at about the time General Shafter was considering the matter of withdrawing his lines from San Juan Heights to the high ground near El Pozo. This Spanish column, advancing along the main road that passes El Caney, would have threatened the communications of the American army, and compelled Shafter to fall back. The defeat of the column before it closed in upon him would have been an imperative necessity; and for this purpose cavalry would have been indispensable."

Why was not the American artillery more effective at El Caney and San Juan? This question seems never to have been satisfactorily answered by field artillerymen, except to say that it was not properly used. We read in Captain Sargent's work that at El Caney Capron's battery continued at intervals to bombard the enemy's position, "but the fire was not very effective." That about 2 o'clock this battery was moved forward to within about one thousand yards of the enemy's lines, where its fire became much more effective; and that "about half past 2 or 3 o'clock, the battery got the range of El Viso, shot away its flagstaff, and began to make breaches in its thick walls."

The writer cannot but ask himself the same question which came to him at El Caney: "Why was this battery not pushed up in the beginning to within less than a thousand yards of the stone fort?" If this battery had been properly used, would not El Caney have fallen by noon, and the resultant loss of life been divided by two?

Again we read that at San Juan, "the batteries of Grimes, Parkhurst, and Best, on an elevation near El Pozo, fired over the heads of the soldiers and swept the line of the enemy's trenches." While of course this artillery fire had little effect upon the Spanish trenches, why is it that the fire failed so signally to prepare the infantry attack?

These are questions which Captain Sargent leaves unanswered. We do not believe it would happen with our present splendid field artillery, but it would be of more than ordinary interest for someone to explain these things. Nine years have elapsed since these battles, and we have failed to see any satisfactory explanation in our military literature.

"Out of a total force of 18,218 men, equipped and present for duty, General Shafter concentrated at El Caney and San Juan on July 1st, 15,065 men, while General Linares, out of a total force of 13,096 soldiers and sailors at and in the vicinity of Santiago, brought on these battlefields only about 1700 men. General Shafter concentrated on the vital points eighty-six per cent. of his army. He brought there practically every available man that could be spared from other

important points in the theater of operations, leaving but 2000 or 3000 men to protect his line of communications, to guard his base of operations, and to make the attack at Aguadores. Linares concentrated on these two battlefields barely thirteen per cent. of the 13,096 soldiers and sailors which were at and in the vicinity of Santiago, and less than six per cent. of the 29,218 troops which were under his immediate command in the district. In other words, he fought the battles of July 1st with less than five per cent. of the 36,582 Spanish soldiers in Santiago Province, and with less than one per cent. of the 196,820 Spanish soldiers in the island. These figures tell the tale of the American victories."

Then came the destruction of Cervera's fleet, the capitulation of the city of Santiago, and the re-embarkation of troops for the home land.

In concluding, Captain Sargent makes a powerful plea for the upbuilding of our navy, and for a larger regular army. He points out that although it is true that at Santiago a mere handful of trained soldiers and sailors were able in a few days to bring Spain to her knees and end the war, yet it was a little short of miraculous that all this should have happened just as it did. When we consider that Shafter's little army might in all reason have been expected to meet a concentration of 25,000 or 30,000 Spanish troops upon their own ground, and that it was only poor Spanish generalship and lack of initiative which enabled us to assemble a superior force in front of Santiago, we should make a mental resolution not to try, to the breaking point, the patience of that good angel whose special province is watching over drunken men and fools!

Shall we go on tempting Providence forever? God help us if, as unprepared as we were at Santiago de Cuba, we should have to meet a first-class power. Bismarck has truly said that "God always looks after the fools and — the United States."

As good as Captain Sargent's previous military works have been, this is his masterpiece, and we venture the prediction that not only in this country, but abroad, will it receive that deserved recognition which men of all lands, whether

soldiers or laymen, are wont to bestow upon literary work which stands for truth, ability and sincerity.

The army, and especially the cavalry, is proud that it has within itself a writer so well fitted by nature, experience and study to record its deeds with gifted pen upon the undying pages of history.

CHARLES D. RHODES,
Captain Sixth Cavalry.

Manual for the Philippine Constabulary.*

This handy manual was compiled by Colonel William C. Rivers, Assistant Director of Constabulary, under the direction of Brigadier General Henry T. Allen, formerly the director of constabulary. It contains laws, acts and other sources providing for the organization of the constabulary, and gives the regulations for observance by all members connected with that organization.

While the "Manual" is of greatest use to the constabulary, whose officers cannot get along without it, it is of great value to all officers of the army serving in the Philippines, and contains a great deal of interest to the civilians who desire knowledge of the organization and duties of this efficient body of native police, to whom is charged the policing of the greater part of the islands.

The appendix contains certain acts of the Philippine Commission, the most important of which are No. 175, "Providing for the organization and government of the Insular Constabulary, and for the inspection of the municipal police;" No. 292, "Defining treason, insurrection, etc., and providing for punishment thereof;" No. 518, "Defining brigandage and providing for its punishment."

President McKinley's instructions to the Philippine Commission, 1900, are given in full.

The metric system of weights and measures, in force in the islands, is also given, and a convenient table showing

*"MANUAL FOR THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY." By Colonel William C. Rivers, Assistant Director Philippine Constabulary. Bureau of Printing, Manila, P. I. Price, 1.75 pesos, net.

the conversion of the metric system into English units is shown.

A very complete index is found at the end of this very neat little book.

The Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War.*

A copy of this book was received for review after the translation that appears in this number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL had been made for the Staff College and was partly in print. As our translation gives the book in full and our readers will have an opportunity to judge of its merits themselves, an extended notice of it here is unnecessary.

Manual of Military Field Engineering.†

The ninth edition of this military Trautwine has just appeared. This valuable work is too well known to our officers to need any lengthy review. The idea of bringing out the new edition was to render the book up to date in view of all changes in the subjects treated that seem to follow from the Russo-Japanese War. As the author states in his preface the main point of this matter, we can do no better than quote his views:

"Experiences gleaned from that conflict render it certain that troops subjected to shrapnel fire of well-trained batteries *must* intrench or suffer enormous losses, and, in order to have trenches for both cover and fire effective, opportunity must be afforded the occupants when not firing to sit with their backs and heads close against the front wall of the trench. Profiles of shelter trenches have therefore been changed to meet this requirement."

*"THE CAVALRY IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR." By Count Gustav Wrangel, Captain Austrian cavalry. Translated by Lieutenant Montgomery Hugh Rees, London. Price, 3s. 6d., net.

†"MANUAL OF FIELD ENGINEERING." By Captain Wm. D. Beach, Third Cavalry. Franklin Hudson, Kansas City, Mo. Price, $1.75.

Many new plates have been introduced and quite a lot of new and up-to-date material added, but not in any such amount as to take away from the commendable brevity of this work. We believe a little more information as to the present system of handling field communications would have been a valuable feature. For we dare say that the present edition, even though just from the press, will be obsolete as far as field telephones and telegraphs are concerned. We are strongly in doubt if the army will be much longer encumbered with the lances and wagons for carrying them, and we are sure the next war will see only the insulated wire as far as hasty work in the field is concerned. When the field wire is to be supplanted by a more durable one it will be done, not by the combatant force, but by those who have more time and who are less valuable to the nation than the armed contingent. We think that a fuller explanation of the methods of communications, even though somewhat beyond the true object of the work, would have been exceedingly wise. X. Y. Z.

Ordnance and Gunnery.*

The courses of instruction at the Military Academy cover such a broad field and the time devoted to each subject is so limited that it it necessary to have especially prepared text-books for many of the departments. Particularly is this true of the Department of Ordnance of Gunnery, where the branches of this subject are so many that no one book can be found, even if up-to-date, that covers the ground and, furthermore, the numerous changes continually being made in the materials of war necessitates frequent revisions, either by pamphlets or new editions of the text-book being used by that department.

This is a new book that covers the subjects taught under this head thoroughly and as completely as the time allowed for this instruction at the Military Academy will permit.

*"Ordnance and Gunnery." A text-book prepared for the Cadets of the U. S. Military Academy at West Point. By Lieutenant Colonel Ormond M. Lissak, Professor of Ordnance and Gunnery at the U. S. Military Academy. John Wiley & Sons, New York. Price, $6.00.

The author's reputation as an instructor and student is a guarantee of its accuracy.

The book has over 600 pages of text and tables, and is well illustrated by over 300 figures and half-tone plates. The seventeen chapters of the work cover the following subjects: Gunpowders; measurement of velocities and pressure; interior ballistics; explosives; metals used in ordnance construction; guns; recoil and recoil brakes; artillery of the United States land service; exterior ballistics; projectiles; armor; primers and fuses for cannon; sights; range and position finding; small arms and their ammunition; machine guns and submarine mines and torpedoes and torpedo boats.

BOOKS RECEIVED FOR REVIEW.

"War and the World's Life." By Colonel F. N. Maude, C. B. Smith, Elder & Co., London.

"Great Captains—Napoleon." Volumes III and IV. By Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel U. S. Army, retired. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston.

"The Signaler's Pocket Book." By G. W. Browne, Twentieth Hussars. Gale, Polden & Co., London.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES H WILSON,
UNITED STATES ARMY,
Major General U. S. Volunteers 1865-6 and 1898.

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HOW "C" TROOP SPELLED.

BY THE "POET LARIAT."

Of Camp Supply, decades ago, when Trader reigned as King,
And dear old "Jakey" was "K. O."—these are the times I sing.
By order every man was told to choose a decent name
For his respective mount—it seemed a very easy game;
But every name, by order, mind, perforce had to begin
With the troop's letter, furthermore be neatly done on tin,
And nailed, each in its proper place, above the horse's stall—
A kind of faddish loyal brand, and that was just 'bout all.
Now "C" Troop chanced to be my own, and 'twas as mixed, no worse,
Than any modern country club within this universe.
There were a few without reproach, who early won my heart;
But all the rest were rot to core, from every loathsome part.
Yes; every type and every race, except the African.
And every tongue and every creed since this old world began,
And every shape and every age and every kind of size,
Was hashed into this poor old troop, by chance—or otherwise.
But every blessed one of them from latest "rookey" up,
Would rather fight than eat or play, or fill the old tin cup.
So why should I, a lowly "sub.," disturb myself at all?
Orthography is not a cut, nor thrust, nor wheel, nor call!
And if this biped potpourri should show it couldn't spell,
Well! Andrew Jackson, it is claimed, wrote hell with one lone l.

A few days later, "Stables" went, and with it I went, too;
A trifle curious to behold the strange tin-tinted view.
I felt quite proud when names like, "Cinch," "Cochise" and "Chip" I read,

And surely "Cribber," "Chevron" spoke of "gray stuff" in the head.
But when I came to "Collicky," "Capsule" and "Cuspadore,"
And "Chew," and "Chnapps," and "Conkubine," why should I care for more?
I must admit there were some names for cleverness and cheek,
Quite capable of knocking out a Roman or a Greek;
But these were pulled and burnt at once, so none may ever learn,
How many Smollets, Swifts and Sues were in that troop in turn.
Just then I spied two men engaged in quite a lively fight,
Their currycombs were used on each with accur'cy and might.
Hans went for Pat, and Pat for Hans, till Sayles with punches two,
Sent each through air to separate stalls, with eyes both black and blue.
My inquiry to learn just why the men should take that time,
Brought forth the Sergeant's quaint reply, which I'll attempt in rhyme:
"The name, 'Cubeb,' on O'Flynn's tin was printed just that way,
When Switzer cum along and said the word begun with K,
Then one word, as yer know, Loot'nunt, leads to another quick,
And I can't say which one it was who giv the saynoir lick.
They both feel much raymorseful now, for every kiote knew
Each man was wrong, because cubeb is only spelt with Q."

E. L. K.

THE LAST CAMPAIGN — A CAVALRYMAN'S JOURNAL.*

To the memory of the old cavalrymen who wore the blue and the gray, this little narrative is dedicated.

THREE divisions of the Cavalry Corps have come by way of Memphis, Nashville and Chattanooga, and are encamped along the mountain side from Waterloo to Gravelly Springs, Alabama, in the extreme northwest corner of the State. The forces of mounted men, widely separated in the West and South, have been concentrated here, and are now well in hand—an army of cavalry.

General James H. Wilson is in command. He is one of Grant's trusted generals, who intends a swift saber-thrust at the heart of the Confederacy. When, where, and in what force we are to move, Dick Taylor and our old friend Forrest (who our scouts report just below here with his cavalry) would give a good deal to know.

It is ten miles to Chickasaw Landing on the Tennessee River, from where our trains bring rations and forage. The heavy spring rains have made it difficult to haul supplies, for the streams are bank full, the low lands overflowed, and the swamps almost impassable. The question of forage is a serious one.

While marching orders are delayed, we are getting acquainted.

General Upton, commanding the Fourth Division of the Cavalry Corps, has just been ordered here from the Army of

*By E. N. Gilpin, Third Iowa Cavalry, a clerk at General Upton's headquarters during the campaign described.

the Potomac; limps slightly from wounds received in the battle of Winchester, where he was brevetted major general for gallantry. At Gettysburg he commanded a brigade, at Spottsylvania a division of infantry and artillery. He has his spurs to win as a cavalry officer. He is a young man to be a general, not yet twenty-six. He is slightly above medium stature, keen-eyed, and carries himself as a soldier. His voice is low, usually, and rather pleasant to hear; speaks quickly when excited; when he gets angry he is quick as a



BREVET MAJOR GENERAL EMORY UPTON, U. S. ARMY.
Colonel 4th U. S. Artillery, July 1, 1880; Died March 15, 1881.

flash, and the man he is talking to thinks a revolver is going off at him. He is in dead earnest, one can see that; has military books in his tent and studies them when he comes in from studying his regiments. He rides a tall, long-bodied bay horse, that makes him look smaller than he really is. He says his prayers every night, which is a novelty. Although he is a strict disciplinarian, making the division drill, rain or shine, dismounted and with saber, I do not

hear any grumbling. Every now and then he puts them through some new evolution that pleases them. They are all veteran soldiers, he a new commander, and they are sizing him up. He has made a good impression on his division.*

March 11, 1865. To-day General Wilson is reviewing the Second Division (General Long). It is considered the finest body of mounted men in the army. I have seen cavalry before, but never any that pleased me so well. The day was fair; a fine band on white horses played military music through all the evolutions. Every movement was executed with precision, and it seemed as though the music was timed to the cavalry hoof-beats, General Long's horse keeping step with the marching battalions as though he knew he led Thomas's veterans. The review, while being spirited in one way, must have appeared tame enough in another, there being no ladies present of high or low degree, no newspaper correspondent, and so far as I know not a member of Congress within a hundred miles.

It beat our review all to pieces, and General Upton says we shall have another some day. Is confident, however, that put the divisions side by side in action, the Fourth will carry any place the Second undertakes. General McCook's First Division, not yet fully equipped, is encamped farthest from us; we have not been thrown together in drill or review, and will have to become acquainted in the field. The other divisions of the corps, Third, Sixth and Seventh, are getting ready for duty elsewhere. What plans are designed for them are known only to Thomas and Sherman. They may be sent as flying columns west and south to distract the enemy. If General Wilson knows, he gives no intimation.

To-day I rode over to the camp of the Third Iowa Cavalry, part of the way with Colonel Noble, who commands the regiment. He says they are in splendid shape, and will give a good account of themselves. All are anxious to march, and will welcome the activity of the campaign. Our sick are sent off to Cairo. Lieutenant Duffield had to go, leaving

*General Wilson once wrote of General Upton as follows: "He was the best soldier, bar none, produced on either side during the Civil War."— EDITOR

Lieutenant Newton Battin in command of my old company, "E," Third Iowa Cavalry.

Tom Brenton, orderly sergeant, is away, getting well, though shot through the lungs; big, burly, six feet of solid flesh and bone, and a big heart to fit, it is hard to think of him off duty. He taught me how to roll my blankets, and he threw my McClellan saddle on when I came to the company "a new recruity," with "Boy, what are you doing here, with mother's milk hardly dry on your lips?" I can see him now, his foot resting on the hub of a disabled caisson, after our last fight, writing the names of the killed and wounded, and asking us as we came around if we could tell anything of the fellows who were missing. I fear it will be a long time till I hear his voice again calling the roll.

Mike Worley, "Pap" we call him, is a happy man. He was ordered to the invalid corps, with other crippled old raiders, and wrote an appeal to the President. He has just got a letter saying, "Stay with your company," signed A. Lincoln. He steps around in such a proud way you can play marbles on his coat tails.

When I came back to headquarters I read a letter from General Grierson to General Wilson: "The Third and Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri Cavalry have been sent to your corps; they are splendid troops, the best in my division." General Winslow is to command them, and George B. Rodney, who won laurels at Chickamauga with his battery of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, is assigned to the brigade.

I was with Grierson on his famous raid through Mississippi, and remember him as he sat his horse at the cross-roads below Tupelo, with eyes half closed as though he were lost; but if you looked closer into them you would see he was not lost by any manner of means. Nor was Captain John Brown, of "L" Company, in his desperate charge through the Confederate lines that day, although cut off from his command and surrounded. We all know what he said: "Stick to your saddle, men, and if I fall, ride over me!" It is that sort of stuff this division is made up of, and if General Wilson knows how to handle cavalry, he can ride over anything in the Confederacy.

The General Order governing our march issued to-day, and is very strict. Every trooper carries five days' rations of sugar, salt, coffee, hard-tack, an extra pair of horseshoes, and one hundred rounds of ammunition. The pack train will keep up with the column, leaving the supply train of 250 wagons to follow along as it can. As the wagons are emptied, they will be sent back. One of our generals said he would rather lose twenty men than one mule; the pack animals must not fall too far in the rear. Major Hubbard, with a battalion, has charge of the pontoon train of thirty boats—fifty-six six-mule teams—an awful load; but if the Confederates burn bridges, we cannot cross without it.

The Fourth Regular band came over and serenaded us to-night. We often hear beautiful music from headquarters bands. It looks strange to see an army of 25,000 encamped, and see no long lines of infantry white tents, and hear no beat of drums.

Out riding and sightseeing after writing the day's orders. We are arranging to break camp to-morrow. All are beginning to tire of camp life. We are ordered to subsist on the country, and it will be our fault if we do not have plenty to eat.

March 15th. It has been raining all day, a steady downpour. We will have a bad time starting on the march. The Tennessee River is very high and steadily rising. General Wilson and Major Beaumont, his adjutant general, came over; they are afraid the creeks will be too high to ford to-morrow, and are getting a little uneasy.

March 16th. Chickasaw, Alabama. Morning cold and cloudy; an occasional gust from the northward—a decidedly wintry day. Broke camp early and took up our march over the hills for Chickasaw, General Upton and his staff officers riding together at the head of the division. The General, stern as fate, sitting hard in the saddle, his mouth tightly closed, his eye keen as a hawk's; Latta, his stout adjutant general, with glasses on, suave, undemonstrative, a Pennsylvanian, just assigned to duty here among Westerners; Captain Gilpin, aide-de-camp, lithe, alert, riding at the General's side, waiting instructions as to the crossing at Chickasaw;

the two brothers Keck, aide-de-camp and ordnance officer, medium size, black haired, self-poised; you can read nothing in either face but readiness for duty; and Surgeon Carter, much the elder of the others, sedate, with smooth-shaven face; something in his manner that does not invite confidence, though a very skillful surgeon. A soldier does not like a chaplain or a surgeon for reasons of his own. Leaving Captain Gilpin at the river to superintend the crossing of the command on "*Westmoreland Ferry*" and on barges, we marched on.

Fording Bluff Creek, "Charley" and I nearly went under; my boots full of water—rather uncomfortable riding. In the afternoon the sun shown out from a cloud, while across the valley the snow falling in long level lines against the dark pines, made a picture not soon to be forgotten.

Came to camp among other divisions of our corps, without rations or forage; made my bed under a melodious old pine tree, and concluded I would have a comfortable time of it; but the troops were passing all night, and the wind began blowing cold, and the frost nipped through my blankets.

Our pioneers are at work corduroying the road, and tomorrow we will have plenty for ourselves and horses.

March 17th. Our forage train found us away in among the pines on a mountain side, two miles from Chickasaw. We have a fine camp, both for comfort and beauty. Our headquarters are located in the center of the division, on a high ridge overlooking the First and Second Divisions. General Winslow's brigade headquarters are about fifty yards distant on another hill across a little valley; General Alexander's headquarters of the Second Brigade westward about the same distance. Across on the next mountain eastward, General Long, Second Division, is encamped; and to the left of them, General McCook's First Division. Army headquarters are down toward the river, the center of the circle.

When the pine knot camp fires are burning brightly at night, we have a most beautiful sight. General Wilson has sent this message to General Grant: "Three of the

divisions are mounted. The First, Second and Fourth are in just as fine condition as it is possible for cavalry to be in. I have reviewed Long and Upton, and I am sure they cannot be excelled in our army or anywhere else. With Hatch in as good fix, we cannot be whipped."

March 18th. Chickasaw, Alabama. The wind has been blowing a little all day, making music for us in the pine trees. Down in the valley a beautiful mountain stream, clear and cold, runs swiftly over the rocks, dashing and eddying hither and thither, merrily chasing its bubbles off to the river. Plenty of water for our cooking purposes, good forage and rations, and the Sanitary Commission has visited us in the shape of cabbage and potatoes and kraut. They also sent us compressed cakes which Lun, our mess cook, calls "desecrated vegetables." We have boiled, baked, fried, stewed, pickled, sweetened, salted it, and tried it in puddings, cakes and pies; but it sets all modes of cooking at defiance, so the boys break it up and smoke it in their pipes! They say the Dutch of the "Fourt' Missouri" know how to cook it, but we are too proud to learn.

We are making arrangements to break camp to-morrow. When we cut loose from our base of supplies here on the Tennessee River, we will have to find a new base somewhere. It is 190 miles to Selma, as the crow flies, but we will have to march about 250, the first 100 through a rough, semi-mountainous country, stripped of forage. After that we will enter a fertile region, the garden spot of the Sunny South.

Operations and line of march are pretty well outlined as far as Selma; after that we may form a junction with Canby at Mobile, or strike the east coast to join Sherman. If whipped, we will get out the best way we can. I am glad that General Winslow is with us, in command of his old brigade. He got us out of a tight place once. None of us are likely to forget that, and he may have to do it again. Forrest is a dangerous foe, quick, daring, resourceful, and whoever tackles him will find his hands full. General Wilson has the confidence of the command. His orders are

clear cut. On the march his headquarters will be with the center column.

We are to march at daylight. My horse "Charley," a dappled Canadian, is fat and sleek, well gaited and full of fire. To day I had him groomed till he looked like a picture, and the General, whose sharp eyes see everything, said he liked his looks. He would like to have him himself, so I had to lie about his not being steady under fire. He saw through that too, I believe, but did not say anything.

At midnight orders came to "wait."

March 20th. The command is still waiting for forage.

The Fourth Division is the only one ready for the march, and we are getting credit for it. Made out weekly and tri-monthly reports of the division.

Generals Alexander, Winslow and McCook, and some of General Wilson's staff officers came over to our headquarters —a clever lot of fellows. They had many arguments, and told some good anecdotes. One on the Major, that pleased everybody but the Major, should not be omitted from the history of this campaign, and which gained for him the title "Old Buttermilk." As we scouted through the Arkansas Valley, the command being in need of forage, the Major at the head of the advance, rode up to the barn of what proved to be the property of a maiden lady, who ran the farm. Accosting a darkey boy, "Hello there! Are there any sheaf oats on the place?" This message the boy shouted up the stairs to his mistress, who, affrighted at the approach of the soldiers, was hiding under the bed. "Missus," de soldiers wants de she folks!" What thoughts must have run riot through the poor female's startled soul, who shall say? She came to the window and with a hysterical scream addressed the Major: "Take all I have, gentlemen. Take everything; but spare my honor!" So struck with amazement was the Major, that he squealed back in a high-pitched voice, "Oh, damn your honor, have you any buttermilk?" This title stuck.

While the Second Brigade band was serenading, Captain Gilpin, aide-de-camp, and I started off to make the "grand rounds," visiting the pickets, seeing that every sentinel was

at his post and the guards on duty. We must have gone twenty miles, from 9 o'clock till 12:30, over some mighty rough country, and fording several streams between roads. There is a fascination about the call "halt!" in the darkness, and the order to dismount and advance with the countersign. There is always the thought that some blundering Irishman will shoot you first and inquire for the countersign afterward. We had some exciting and amusing experiences, and found the videttes diligently attending to duty, and everything safe. The boys are all wide awake.

Passing General Wilson's headquarters, he and Upton were busy with maps and papers spread out before them in the tent; the two generals, alike in a way, yet very unlike—alike in this, that each has confidence in the other and in himself.

March 21st. General Wilson has seen service in both Eastern and Western armies. He was an engineer officer with General Grant at Vicksburg. At Winchester he was brevetted major general for gallantry; he fought his cavalry divisions with skill at the battles of Franklin and Nashville. I see him seldom; when I do, he is sitting straight in the saddle and riding hard. He is a superb horseman, and his soldiers like him. He has told some of the officers of Upton's having been wounded at Winchester by a bursting shell that cut his leg open and laid bare the femoral artery; but he did not leave the field; had the surgeon stop the flow of blood, and then his men carried him on a stretcher, where he continued to give orders, and led his division in a successful turning movement against the enemy's left flank. General Sherman, who was commanding in the fight, ordered him to the rear, but he refused to go until the victory had been won. General Wilson was anxious to get him here to command one of his divisions.

While the generals are in the tent laying the plan of march, I will slip over to the regiment and see what the boys of the Third Iowa are about. Mess kits burnished, and blankets fluttering in the wind; the boys all merry; they have made themselves comfortable in camp. Felix Cub-

berly, poet laureate of "E" Company, broke loose after this fashion:

"The earth beneath, my feather bed,
The sky above my cover-led,"

and being a wise poet, he knew when to stop.

Our fellows can do anything, from running a locomotive to a prayer meeting; they are masons, stokers, lawyers, farmers, engineers, store-keepers, shoemakers, horse-doctors, gamesters, and not a few can play the fiddle o'nights, or could before we broke them of it. The regiment has always been popular from the first. A romantic interest in it grew after the battle of Pea Ridge, when it fought Albert Pike's Indians, and Glen Lowe, the handsome young adjutant brought out its wounded Colonel Trimble from under the feet of the Indian ponies. Its ranks are always full. After reënlisting and getting furlough, when they crossed the ice on the Mississippi River, snow-balling in mimic warfare, they found boys enough to make two regiments, and they returned to service under General Winslow, with full ranks.

Harvey Morris was in the midst of a yarn about Forrest. Harvey was standing guard on Wolf River, below Memphis, and halted an old darkey driving out with a dead dray-horse; suspecting something, he stuck his saber in the carcass, and found it stuffed full of cartridges and percussion caps. He said the old darkey driver's eyes bugged out so you could have snared them with a vine! We know that Forrest came into our lines that day driving an old team of horses with some cotton bales, and at night his raiders made a dash into the city, chased General Washburn along the river bank into Fort Pickering, and came within an ace of capturing General Sherman.* It was only by good luck he escaped. Forrest had lived in Memphis and was familiar with the city.

Among other stories they tell one on Jim McCalmont, that now he is promoted should be hushed up, but he takes it good naturedly; too long to tell, yet too good to be lost.

*Generals Slocum and Sherman were to be there that day, but Sherman was delayed.—E. N. G.

As we marched in column of fours out of Fulton, Missouri, and came to the wide outlying fields along the level road, Jim, then a new recruit, a sort of Methodist lay-preacher, the butt of the gibes of the unregenerate, was attracted by the fruit now turning red on a cluster of trees. He had never seen persimmons. Encouraged by sundry seductive remarks, which the captain overheard, he lit off his horse, climbed a tree, filled his pockets and came back with eyes alight to share with the others. In the meantime it had gone all along the line, and the column, charged like a galvanic battery, in ominous silence awaited his return. One after another, the boys took the fruit, and he with his pocket knife cut a slice and with Spartan braveness swallowed the first bite, and with puckered mouth began his discourse: "If this fruit was brought in and *domesticated*—" This was the touch; the fellows of "E" Company followed hard by the whole battalion, yelled and howled and whooped, every note from the piping treble of the second bugler, to the hoarse bellows-like roar of the company blacksmith—all the gamut of derisive sounds, while poor McCalmont rode along crest-fallen; and Jim and his "domesticated persimmons" became a part of the regimental history.

I was by his side a year later, on the raid through Mississippi (we were under General Joe Mower), crossing a drift below Holly Springs, clearing a way for a temporary bridge, McCalmont, with his carbine at his shoulder taking aim, when a bullet pierced the bend of his arm and shattered the bone above the elbow. Leading him back to the ambulance, I watched for the first time the true horrors of war in the working of the surgeon's chain-saw, coiling and uncoiling, serpent-like, around the naked bone. But a gristle grew that answered pretty well in place of bone, and after a time he returned to duty. He had grit. At Ripley, he got little Swift, who was badly wounded, out from under the feet of the stampeding horses and into an ammunition wagon. When Marsh Clark was badly shot and bleeding to death, Jim held on to the artery all night, till the surgeon got there in the morning. We were all glad when he got his promotion.

March 22d. Thompson's plantation. Left camp at Chickasaw at 5:30 o'clock this morning, the Third Iowa leading the column, three of us ahead of the advance guard, when a Confederate officer rode out of a side path, near a farm house. Seeing us, he spurred furiously down the road, and we after him. He was well mounted, and soon distanced us, and after galloping a few hundred yards, we halted for the command to come up. Afterward we were talking with one of the scouts, who thought it was Roddy himself, but he would hardly have been such a dare-devil. We know he is here with part of Buford's division, watching our movements.

It is a scheme of Forrest to brigade his troops by states, so this Alabama division in front of us is made up of men from that State. He has a Georgia brigade, a Tennessee brigade; the Texas and Missouri regiments are his "Old Guard." This is playing State pride for all it is worth. Forrest, the ablest general of them all, has been made a lieutenant general and placed in command of the cavalry forces in the Southwest. As nearly as we can learn he has between ten and twelve thousand cavalry with him now, and ought to make a pretty stout fight when we strike him.

The country over which we came to-day is very hilly, covered with a growth of pine.

March 23d. Newburg, Alabama. Column marched at 5:30 A. M. Passed Memphis & Charleston Railroad at Cherokee Station, the route of Hood's retreating army. Our line of march along sandy ridges. Peach trees are blooming, and they present the only feature of interest.

In the afternoon we descended into the Tuscumbia Valley, a picturesque country with the familiar hard wood trees.

At the little town of Russellville, our scouts were waiting for us with a batch of prisoners, twenty-three in all, among them a major and a captain from Roddy's command. One "pussy" fellow, a swashbuckler in butternut coat, who called himself "colonel," looked like Sir John Falstaff. They told us he had been in Lee's army, and had come home to raise a regiment; he had been on furlough a year and over, and had not raised it yet. Forrest, enforcing a pitiless conscription,

drafted him and put him in the ranks. We captured the fat knight without the loss of a man.

Like other towns in North Alabama, Russellville is almost deserted.

Our march this evening was over the rockiest and dustiest road imaginable. Camped near Newburg. Headquarters at a little farm house, where we found good water, and "bee gums" full of honey.

March 24th. Hubbard's Plantation. Left camp at 5:30 A. M. Pleasant day's march through open country. Late in the afternoon as the column wound down the road, we came upon a house of more than ordinary architectural pretensions. It stood on a sloping mountain side, above a deeply wooded glen, the place deserted except for an old servant and a couple of lean hounds, probably old favorites of the chase, that hung about the kennels. It looked a typical home of the horse racing, fox hunting gentry of the old regime. From the arched doorway it was easy to imagine the figure of some dashing Di Vernon emerging in her riding habit, and the old master of the hall, foot in stirrup, shouting cheerily, "Call Thornie, call all of them!" Now it was forlorn enough. The owner had gone South, his sons away in the army, one of them on Forrest's staff—the great hall deserted.

March 25th. This is a country of rivers. The little wriggles of ink down the page of our military map are mountain streams flowing by stately pine woods, through hemlock-bordered ravines; some clear and colorless, others shaded blue and green, that when falling in sunlit cascades are very beautiful. Clear Creek Falls at the headwaters of the Black Warrior, are the most picturesque imaginable. One would have to be both poet and painter to do them justice in description.

It was necessary to march the divisions on different roads, and they are now converging toward the Black Warrior. Forrest is a wily foe, and it is a question whether he will attack one division separated from the others, at the river. A party of the Third under Lieutenant Battin, the advance of the army, had made camp at Throckmorton's, intending to

try the main ford next day and see if it was passable. All the streams are swollen by the heavy rains. If the artillery takes this ford to-morrow they will have to raise the ammunition in the caissons. After posting pickets on both roads and a sentinel at the crossing, we made camp for the night.

At the head of the falls we found a quaint old mill and a queer little old miller. The trough that conducts power from the dam has fallen into decay, and the old fellow waits for high water to run his mill. However, he did not have many calls for grist, for Hood's army had pretty well cleaned the region of grain. We were lucky to find a few bushels of corn on a by-road to Sipsey Creek. The wheels were soon whirling and the yellow meal was in a jiffy made into batter, spread on cypress shingles, propped up at an angle to the coals, cooked to a turn, and eaten—and we had "ole Kentucky corn-pone and hoecake" galore!

After supper some of the fellows made a raid on a tobacco loft, and soon the air was fragrant with the smell of the long, light brown leaves, crumbling beneath the touch, as we filled and lit our cob pipes about the camp fire in true soldierly fashion.

Suddenly a shot rang out at the ford, followed by another and another in quick succession.

Then Lieutenant Battin's voice in sharp command—"Fall in, men!" and we were in the saddle with carbines ready, when a sentinel galloped up with, "Reb cavalry at the river!"

Skirmishing began, and we fought some three or four hundred Confederates all the way to Jasper.

The citizens had never seen Yankees before and were badly scared. And now the bullets began to fly and test the men who have already stood all the tests. The two or three cowards in every company are well known, but they do camp duty, stand guard, and are all-around useful men but for the one infirmity. With a corporal on one side and a sergeant on the other, they exhibit soldierly qualities. This being under fire is not pleasant to anybody. Sometimes I'd like to have a corporal on one side of me, a sergeant on the other, and two or three non-commissioned

officers in front; for even the bark knocked off the trees stings like a whiplash. It is not a pleasant sound to hear the *ping* of a bullet at the side of your head, or hitting the other fellow and see him swaying in his saddle; the swish of grape and canister and the noise of other missiles in the air is not agreeable. Presently you begin to feel that you are right in the place where the next shell is coming. Then it is time for you to begin firing, or give your horse the spur and get your blood up, for the next thing you know you will have an irresistible desire to get out of there. But taking a firmer seat in the saddle you pull your cap down a trifle over your eyes and get ready to hear the command "Forward!" Our fellows reënlisted for the war after the three years' service expired, and they know why they are here. When they stand by your side in a fight, you get to be like brothers, and after the fight is over you do not like to have any of them gone.

Our pontoon train too far in the rear to be of use. General Wilson ordered General Upton to contrive a way of crossing. The Black Warrior is about one hundred and fifty yards wide, with rough bottom of shelving rock, and runs very swiftly. With some hesitation General Upton decided upon fording. The pioneer corps was at once ordered to work, and soon had a road cut to the water's edge. One of our prisoners was mounted on a good horse and his release offered him if he would cross and return. Many interested spectators gathered on the bank to watch the fun. The brave fellow pitched in alone, carefully moving, occasionally slipping, sometimes almost falling, but at last across safely and back. General Upton and staff moved in after the Second Brigade had crossed; many had fallen into the river, some swimming, others clinging to the rocks, and some plunging far down where the channel ran between precipitous banks at the mercy of the foaming waters. In the midst of the rapids "Charley" stepped off a ledge, and a current dashed him from his footing, but a gentle admonition in the ribs with my spurs soon righted him, and I moved slowly on, stumbling along the broken ledges, the waves surging and foaming angrily away, followed by a dark green ripple that

made me dizzy in spite of myself; but at length I came to good bottom, safely through the deeper water to terra firma.

Troops were all day in crossing. Forrest lost his chance, for he might have taken us at a great disadvantage.

March 28th. Elyton, Alabama. Marched at 9:30 A. M. Skirmishing began soon after leaving camp, and kept up nearly all day, Confederates firing and running. General Upton marched with the advance guard. Halted the command on a plantation of a rich old Southerner who owns the whole magnificent valley. We took possession of his farm and mansion house, with a little army of negroes. Turkeys, chickens, butter, eggs, hams in the smoke houses, thousands of bushels of corn in the barns, and forage of all kinds on the place. Visited the wine cellar, where rows of casks and dust-covered bottles were flanked by baskets and portly demijohns. "And monks might deem their time was come again, if ancient tales say true." Rolled the barrels of peach and apple brandy from among the musty cobwebs into the light of day, and those who were fortunate enough not to have taken the pledge were seen to smack their lips even before the bungs were started! On one point my recollection is quite distinct: An ancient barrel of apple—or was it peach?—brandy, the delightful odor of which pervaded the air as its contents flowed into our cups like syrup, was confiscated without delay, lest it might give aid or comfort to the enemy.

The Second Brigade made a saber charge, driving Roddy's rear guard out of Elyton. From captured scouts we learned that Chalmers' division is marching on Tuscaloosa. General Wilson at once dispatched a brigade to burn the bridge over the Cahawba River, to prevent Jackson from uniting with Forrest, and has slipped the Fourth Division in between their forces.

March 29th. Cahawba River. Our scouts have been out with Colonel Warner, who has 700 men with him, to harass us as we march.

Passed iron works and rolling mills, from which the Confederate government obtains much of its material for the arsenal at Selma. We burned and blew them up.

Citizens told us that General Forrest was expected at the mills to-day; his pioneers had passed through. We cut trees and corduroyed the road, and pushed on, arriving at the Cahawba River at 3 P. M. The Confederates had taken possession of the opposite bank, and began firing as our advance came up. It was too late to cross, and we were ordered into camp. It had been raining, and the prospect was not very bright. I secured a little territory among the trees, made my bed of pine boughs with my saddle for a pillow.

Stayed in camp late this morning, the General and staff occupying rooms in the house, where the old gentleman treated us hospitably.

One of the soldiers while halted, picked up a book lying open on the porch, and reading the title "Les Miserables," asked the old gentleman if it was about Lee's soldiers? The old man gave him a queer smile, but did not reply.

The Confederates were still holding the opposite bank, and began firing when we started to cross. As the shots began to ring out, and were replied to, the old gentleman who had treated us hospitably, with a look of anxiety came to General Upton, saying, "They are not firing at each other, are they?" As the shots came faster and faster, he came up close and put his hand on the horse's neck, "My two boys are there!" and with tears in his eyes he kept repeating, as though he could not believe it, "They are not trying to *kill* each other, are they?"

While a diversion was being made at the ford, the First Ohio crossed on an old railroad bridge a mile above, came down with a yell on the other side and routed them out.

March 30th. Montevallo.

General Upton, with a detachment and two pieces of artillery, marched rapidly over a rough and broken country toward Montevallo. Passed more iron works and mills, and left their smouldering ruins. Eight miles from town our advance encountered the Confederates under General Roddy, fought them into town, and charged them out. Many citizens went with them. We captured their forage and rations.

We have marched forty three miles to-day with the pack train and artillery, leaving the main body to come up later. Our headquarters at Judge Shortridge's. General Upton was up till after midnight with the engineer who plotted the fortifications at Selma, with maps and papers spread out before them, studying and planning the downfall of the city. I stood it as long as I could, and then lay down on the parlor floor and went to sleep.

March 31st. Out in the woods near Randolph.

Remained in camp at Montevallo until 12:30 P. M., waiting for the command to come up, as the enemy was found to be in force. An expedition under command of Colonel Benteen was sent out and destroyed rolling mills and factories, six in all. A brigade of the enemy was encountered. The Colonel ordered his regiment to draw saber and charge, himself leading; stampeded them and came back. The Confederates followed with reinforcements, and drove our pickets in. At noon General Wilson and staff came. General Upton moved out on the Selma Road with the Fourth Division. Lyon's brigade had taken a position on a hill above the road, a mile from town.

The General charged at the head of the Fifth Iowa, and after a sharp fight drove the enemy and captured a number of prisoners. Our division in advance; fighting all day—a continual skirmish, killing and wounding many, and capturing 135 prisoners. Both divisions camped late at night. The Confederates are just across the creek. The Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri did most of the fighting to-day, losing considerably.

The night is dark, and so still that we can hear all their movements. Our artillery is ranked so as to cut a wide swath down the approaches. A little over in the woods one of our twelve-pounders just now sent a shell crashing through the underbrush. It being unexpected, I think I never heard so loud a noise. By the time my hair settled back in place, I heard the shell explode in their camp, on the other side.

It seemed an awfully long night, for I had to keep awake to pilot the different companies to their positions at the

bridge and along the bank of the creek, taking those off duty back to their regiments every two hours; and it had to be done very quietly. The General kept his ears open pretty nearly all night, and if anything was afoot, he heard it.

April 1st. Maplesville Station, on Alabama & Tennessee R. R.

Marched at daylight. Skirmishing all day, driving them slowly but steadily. Near the station Old Maplesville, more generally known as Ebenezer Church, we met the enemy under General Forrest. Long advanced on the right with the Second Division, Upton on the left with our division. We could hear the shrill whistle of the locomotives, and knew the enemy were being reinforced. Upton ordered Winslow's brigade to charge with the saber, and led them himself.

The Confederates held the crest of a ridge, flanked by a deep miry creek, with artillery posted so as to sweep both roads. As soon as we developed their position, one could have sworn that Forrest was in command. A column was advancing to charge our flank. I thought of Guntown, and our boys floundering in the Tishomingo, fighting in desperation for the bridge, as I spurred back at a gallop over the dusty road repeating to myself the order at every jump, "Tell Rodney for God's sake get his battery up!" When I reached the panting artillery horses, Rodney in a flash double teamed, and urging them with his saber—the cannoneers bending forward in their saddles, the horses straining every muscle—gained the hill-top, swung his guns free, and sent the shells whirling over our boys, who were fighting hand to hand in the fields below. By a succession of impetuous charges we forced them from the field, dislodged them from the heights, and drove them helter skelter five miles past Maplesville Station.

The road was strewn with guns, belts, cartridge boxes, coats and hats. "Too fast for their *goods!*" the boys would say.

The day's events have been so many and so exciting, that I cannot record them. It is impossible to record the deeds of personal skill and daring. Captain CRAIL was

wounded. He is always getting wounded; he is a very clever fellow but for that. Captain GILPIN, aide-de-camp, advanced with a detachment of the Seventh Ohio Cavalry under orders to develop the enemy's line. It was bravely done at a great sacrifice, every man being killed or wounded under the converging fire. The genial captain came out on foot, with four or five bullet holes through his coat; if he had not dodged one that went through his collar he would have staid with his horse—that was not good at dodging.

Lieutenant VEATCH, with ten of his men, fell as they tore away the obstructions to the Confederate battery. In justice to the brave artillerymen it should be said, they lost their lives first—their guns afterward.

Sergeant JOHN WALL was shot through the hand that held the guidon, but carried it on in the other, and captured a Confederate officer.

Captain John Brown again distinguished himself, capturing more than his company numbered.

General UPTON was with Lieutenant BATTIN at the head of the Third Iowa Cavalry when they made the last charge at Six Mile Creek, and again and again applauded them for their gallantry.

Colonel Noble* was so pleased with the conduct of his regiment under the eye of the general that he could hardly keep his saddle. Those of us who were with him in the Sturgis raid understand why.

Alexander's brigade of this division made a magnificent charge upon a battery, and proved themselves true soldiers from first to last.

General Upton has captured his division. When the fighting was hottest, he was right there by their side, and they know he is a brave man and a skillful general. Their hearts are with him. He came here a boy—and has *whipped Forrest*, and they all want to yell when they see him riding down the line.

Our division captured two ten-pounder Parrot guns and 135 prisoners; the Second Division one gun and two hundred prisoners.

*Afterwards Secretary of the Interior in Harrison's Cabinet.

The reinforcements did not have time to get off the cars.

The Confederates had unloaded a great deal of forage at the station, intending to whip us and then feed, but we captured every pound of it. There were several Napoleon guns on the cars. The prisoners said, "We will get them later."

While charging, Captain Taylor, our Indiana cavalryman, ran up to General Forrest, hit him over the head with his saber, and ordered him to surrender. Forrest drew his revolver and shot him dead. Another of our boys followed hard after, striking at him with his saber as he ran, and shot as he jumped the fence, and thought he wounded him in the arm. His men say he has sworn he will never surrender. We spiked the cannon, bent the guns, buried the dead and cared for wounded, established hospitals, made preparations for comfort, and as night came on, encamped.

Our headquarters at Dr. Phillips' fine house. Ate my supper and turned in, but was so full of the day's excitement that I could not sleep. In the adjoining room I heard the General turn uneasily in his bed, then start up, give orders, and in his dreams was fighting the battle over again. When I went in his room he said his leg pained. I asked if I should get Dr. Carter? He said no. It was just the nerve giving him a twinge. I set the candle down and was going, when he asked the time. It was after midnight, for the guards had been relieved. I told him everything was right, and he could rest content with the army he had led that day around him. I put out the light, and soon he was breathing regularly, and presently fell asleep.

As I looked from the window, all was quiet where our army lay encamped; not a sound came up through the darkness, and only the light of campfires glimmered in the sky, away south toward Selma.

April 2d. Sunday. Selma, Alabama.

Left camp at 9:30 A. M. General Croxton, with First Brigade, Second Division, had marched toward Tuscaloosa to intercept Jackson.

Detached expeditions burned iron works, factories, rolling and flour mills, and destroyed millions of dollars worth of

cotton. General Upton, with the Fourth Division, took the left hand road; General Long with the Second the right.

Our line of march is along the top of hills that extend to the city of Selma. At the head of his division, his face a little pale, General Upton is being watched by every soldier in the command.

We passed a "Johnny" leaning against a tree, who had received a curious wound; a bullet had cut off the tip of his nose, and the blood was trickling down on the leaves. As the column passed, I heard an old trooper say: "My friend, you put your nose just a leetle too far into this here Rebellion."

Yesterday one fellow was shot through his canteen filled with molasses, and lost it all. Colonel Noble was struck; the bullet dented his saber-belt plate, doubling him up, but he was not seriously wounded. Lieutenant Battin caught one between his leg and the saddle, grazing his leg and plowing through the saddle-flap. Bullets play some very funny tricks; sometimes a Testament or deck of cards will deflect a bullet from the heart of some mother's darling, and for that reason one should read his Testament and play cards when he goes for a soldier.

A wide fertile valley below us shows delightfully green, and as we march we hear the tinkling of bells, the lowing of cattle, and singing of larks in the fields. Stopping here to eat my dinner, the indistinct murmur of life on a farm comes to my ears like music,

Went to the head of the column and found it halted in full view and range of the enemy's works at Selma. General Wilson came up and he and General Upton rode to a little skirt of timber and examined the position with their field glasses. The fortifications are 600 yards distant, a formidable line of forts and earthworks, with palisades extending a distance of three miles, with the flanks resting on the river, above and below the city. On the left, in our front, is a wide stretch of swamp land, into which the road runs and disappears In Long's front the country is open, except for a line of timber skirting a ravine, through which a considerable creek flows. The forts began shelling and

we fell back to a point out of range. While the generals were consulting, I made a return from the last reports of regimental officers of the number of men in the command now formed in compact column, waiting for the order to advance.

Order for assault by the Second Division on the Summerfield Road and by ours on the Plantersville Road, the signal, one gun, at 6 o'clock, to be fired from Rodney's battery.

Our last day's march was pushed so swiftly that no time was left Forrest to make disposition of his forces, until we closed in on the city. He played his old game, however, and a delayed force trying to join the main Confederate column made a dash on the train in the rear of the Second Division, intending to throw it into confusion. General Wilson had provided for that with a regiment on guard there, and trumped his little trick.

When the attack was made on our rear, the Confederates sallied out of their works immediately in our front, and the Second Division, without waiting for the signal, moved to the assault. A sharp volley checked their advance; another accompanied by a yell and a charge, drove them back to their works; our division moved forward, and the battle was on. Volley followed volley; the long loud rattle of our Spencers, and the reply by our batteries to the incessant heavy booming of guns from the forts. With a cheer, our boys charged dismounted across the fields and swamps, over rifle pits and embankments, over trenches and palisades, up through the battery smoke, on to the parapet, yelling like devils. Tearing down obstructions they opened the way. Along half of the battle front the strong palisades held, and the attack of the Fourth Cavalry was repulsed.

General Wilson, on his white horse, led forward the mounted reserves. At a steady trot the long blue line formed across the plain; then spurring to a gallop, the ground trembled with the thunder of hoofs, the air scintillant with the flash of saber blades, the cavalry charge, like a tornado let loose, swept through all opposition! Our carbines and sabers, Yankees and yells, proved too much for the Johnnies, and Selma was fairly won!

We captured everything they had, and 3,000 prisoners. Forrest made his escape along the river road, fleeing with his broken army. As they ran, they set fire to a large cotton storehouse near the arsenal. The fire spread to barracks and ammunition houses, shells exploding and flying in every direction; brigades of both divisions in pursuit. The Confederates running for life, jumping their horses over the bluffs into the river, our cavalrymen after them to the brink, cutting and slashing with their sabers. Soldiers yelling vengeance, for some of our men were shot from their saddles after entering the city; citizens scared, women and children screaming, excitement high everywhere. Of all the nights of my experience, this is most like the horrors of war—a captured city burning at night, a victorious army advancing, and a demoralized one retreating.

The soldiers, overpowered by weariness, wrapped in their blankets, sunk to rest about the streets; the citizens, exhausted by excitement and fear, the cries of their children hushed at last, snatching a troubled sleep; the wounded, lulled by opiates into forgetfulness of their amputated legs and arms; the dead, in their last sleep, with white faces upturned to the sky; for the passion, cruelty, bitterness and anguish of war, this Sunday night now nearly gone, will be remembered. If there is a merciful God in the heavens, He must be looking down upon this scene in pity.

April 3d. Selma.

Up early and out in the city. Several squares burning, and soldiers running with the engines, more for amusement than to put out the fire, splashing the fire and unlucky citizens time about.

Thornton and I rode out to see the battlefield and forts. Two lines of breastworks flanked by miry swamps and quicksands, rifle pits and stockades, extend around the town. The forts are dangerous looking affairs in themselves. Deep ditches and sharp palisades protect them on all sides. Where our boys could not tear them away or pry them apart, they jumped on each other's backs and scaled them in a game of "leap frog." Many guns in each, some fine Parrott guns. The Confederates got out in such a hurry that they did

not spike them. We broke, spiked, and burned them all. Everything is done by strategy on this raid. The Confederate generals have all been fooled, from Forrest down. General Wilson, who looks the dare-devil as he gallops past, is as cautious as an old maid. He waits until "the sign is right," then goes in with a dash. He and Upton play into each other's hands as though the thing were all cut and dried. It is done so quickly, it is over before you know you are hurt. If we had laid siege to Selma, half the command would have been killed or wounded. As it was, we have lost less than four hundred. We struck them like lightning; the thunder-clap was there as soon as the flash; when the storm broke, all we had to do was to take them in out of the wet.

From the forts we went to the iron foundry; immense machinery, hundreds of guns of all sizes, some very fine naval guns, and thousands of shot and shell.

General Upton is in command of an expedition in pursuit of Forrest.

Everything is progressing smoothly with the great cavalry raid. General Winslow is provost marshal of the city, and discipline is strict again.

Word came that Croxton had defeated Jackson and captured Tuscaloosa.

April 4th. Went down to the ordnance train, found Thornton, and together we visited the great Selma arsenal, but could not pass the guard. However, we looked at the shot and shell piled up in great rows, through the long shops. From there we went to the stockade, where about 3,000 prisoners are confined. They prepared this "shebang" for our reception. The fair ladies of Selma are busying themselves feeding and caring for the captured Confederates. Our boys sympathize with the Johnnies, and as a consequence, walk home with the girls. After a long ride around the city, came back to headquarters.

The large foundry was fired just at dark; shells are exploding one after another, then by platoons and squadrons, then back to one, and up and away again, never stopping, a bright light flashing and wavering, throwing shadows over

the housetops, trees, church spires, and in among the columns that support the balcony over our heads. A few of us are sitting together, our chairs tipped back against the pillars listening to the war music, and chatting. The station of the Alabama and Tennessee Railroad with many cars and locomotives, is also burning.

April 5th. The Selma arsenal covers ten acres of ground, and is full of all manner of military stores. Thousands of boxes of ammunition and caissons ready for shipment—but too late! There were rifles, carbines, canned powder, revolvers and muskets—an immense array of stores for killing Yankees. We found 500 darkies under orders, piling dry lumber and other combustibles for the coming conflagration.

Colonels Lyons and Patterson, who commanded brigades, are prisoners; another officer, as report has it, wants to come in and take command of his brigade, which he says is all in the stockade.

April 6th. Writing orders concerning our coming march. It has been raining all day, the Alabama River is high, and we have been delayed preparing the bridge. The river is rising; its current is swift and strong.

General Wilson went to Cahawba under a flag of truce to arrange with Forrest an exchange of prisoners. Found Forrest grumpy and unwilling to make terms, but Wilson got the information he went after. He expects to recapture the prisoners.

April 7th. Saddled "Charley" and rode out beyond town to the forts and works which surround the city. Spent a pleasant day following my fancy. Selma is a beautiful place, and the war has never been much of a burden to it until our Cavalry Corps came in.

April 8th. General Upton and staff came in with the First Brigade, having marched 120 miles and had a skirmish with the enemy near Summerfield. They found a captain and a dozen men, scouts of ours, dead; they had been killed outright in a barn where they were asleep. General Wilson has sent Forrest word that he will retaliate. Surgeon Maxwell came in from Montevallo, where he had been in charge

of our wounded. He met Forrest at Plantersville, who said a captain of a charging regiment ran at him with his saber, struck him and was trying to run him through, when he shot him. The captain belonged to Company "C," Seventeenth Indiana. Forrest said our men showed more gallantry in that engagement than he had ever seen.

We all drew Confederate clothing and made ready for marching. They are concentrating all their forces, intending to whip us before we get out of Alabama.

General Alexander, who is superintending the construc-



BRIGADIER GENERAL A. J. ALEXANDER, U. S. VOLUNTEERS.

Major 8th U. S. Cavalry, July 28, 1866; Lieut. Col. 2d U. S. Cavalry, March 20, 1879
Retired July 3, 1885; Died May 4, 1887.

tion of the pontoon bridge across the river, narrowly escaped with his life to-day. Mike Worley was holding a rope, letting a log go under; drift-wood was running, and it was hard work. The General, provoked with him for not doing it right, and in trying to get hold of the rope, lost his footing and fell from his skiff into the river. The swift current drew him under the pontoons, and he would have drowned

as sure as fate, if Worley had not gone down and held to him till they were hauled out. It took a brave man to do it.

April 9th. Business in the office finished, went out in the city in search of amusement. Went to one of the best looking houses in the neighborhood, sat down on the porch and began a conversation with Mr. Montford. Told him who I was, and the current news at headquarters, and got the old gentleman interested, I suppose. He asked me to dinner; I declined, but said I would come and take supper with him. He seemed a little surprised, but quickly recovering said, "Yes, and spend the evening, and I'll have my girls sing and play for you." While we were talking, I saw two girl faces peeping from behind the curtain, so I thought I would ask Thornton to come too. At the appointed time we appeared at the Montford residence; I, in a blue jacket and gilt saber-belt, gray trousers above my cavalry boots, and wearing a Secesh cap. Thornton is a handsome fellow, and in any uniform would take a girl's eye.

The old gentleman introduced us to his affectionate daughters, the Misses Erminie and Kate. Thornton was at once struck with Miss Erminie. We walked in the garden, picked flowers, and talked of the beautiful in nature, and all that. A sweet faced, elderly lady announced supper, and made us welcome, saying that her son was a soldier too, pointing to a portrait on the wall, a handsome military figure in gray uniform, her eye resting with motherly pride on his features. I noticed that they were like her own.

After supper we were invited to the parlor, and what was begun as a piece of soldierly bravado, was likely to end in a civilized social call. Waverly novels, handsomely bound, were with other books on the table. "There is no more romance in these days, or I might call you Flora McIvor," I said to Miss Kate. She had pictured how she and Miss Ermine used to gallop up the river with a gay cavalcade, to where the Pearl and Swiftwater joined, and have their picnics in the woods. "That," she said, "was before Brother Henry took all our horses and joined Forrest." Miss Erminie played "The Bonny Blue Flag," and other Southern songs, and then Miss Kate, to her sister's accompaniment,

sang, "'Tis But an Hour Since First We Met.' Both girls were little Rebels to the finger tips, and said they "hoped we would be taken prisoners." I told them of a pretty black-haired little Rebel, who sat smiling innocently and fishing, her Capitola hat thrown carelessly beside her, while our command was marching past; but she was counting every company, to report our numbers to General Price, and we all narrowly escaped capture. At this Miss Kate laughed and clapped her hands and said: "That's what I'd like to do!"

Perhaps it was because I had on Secesh clothes that I was so drawn to her; but she was a beautiful girl, and wore the rose that I had given her, and when she sweetly sang, "When This Cruel War is Over," she had to promise immediately to write the words. At the doorstep she gave me her hand and said: "If they take you prisoner, I will have my brother see that they treat you well." She turned quickly away, for she knew I was reading her face.

On my way to camp I kept humming the refrain, "Hopes and Fears How Vain," and trying to recall the tones of her voice. Next morning a parcel came, tied with a dainty pink ribbon, and the song written in a fine girlish hand, with "suit of gray" for "suit of blue," as it runs in the Northern version, the words "hoping that we meet again" underscored, which made the recipient so sentimental that he was unfit for duty all the rest of the day. We have met again, and I found, what I knew I should find, a sweet sincerity added to her girlish beauty; but even you, my curious little journal, shall not know what words were said.

The command left Selma at night, crossing the bridge of boats. The intense lurid glow of the burning buildings on the bank lit up the river, and the long lines of cavalry seemed to be marching upon its surface.. It was all night in crossing. In the gray dawn, as the bridge was torn away, Generals Wilson and Upton, halting their horses on the brow of a little hill, sat looking back to where disaster hung like a pall above the stricken city.

General Wilson thinks the enemy badly crippled, and is determined to press on to Columbus, their stronghold in Georgia, and give the Confederacy a mortal wound.

April 10th. Church Hill, Alabama.

The late rains had laid the dust, and it was pleasant marching. We passed through Benton. At this point skirmishing commenced. Where the roads crossed at a sharp angle, a regiment of cavalry were making a rush to get to the main road, and our boys at close range, poured a stream of fire from their carbines, so near that I could see the dust fly from their coats where the bullets struck. They were gallant fellows, as they rode at a gallop, their long hair blowing behind their little Secesh caps. As they leaped the fences, it was a goodly sight.

As we came to the hill, a Confederate officer lay dying by the roadside. Jim McCalmont had dismounted and was kneeling by his side taking a ring from his finger as I rode up. It was set with a stone, that in the morning light showed red as the blood that was flowing from a ghastly wound in his breast. A swift, vague impression of having somewhere seen his face, made me stop. He was holding Jim's hand as he told his name—Captain Henry Montford, and begging him in broken words to send the ring to his mother, who lived in Selma. Dismounting I went close to his side, but could catch only a word or two of what he was trying to say. In a minute he sank back on the ground, his face growing pale in the shadow of death, while Jim was praying. We marked his grave, and sent his last message to his mother.

This afternoon the Confederates were firing at us from the other side of a creek we could not cross. The steep clay bluffs were fifteen or twenty feet high, and eaten away by the current so that to ford it would be necessary to ride belly-deep thirty yards parallel with the bank before a turn could be made to ascend the further shore. General Upton galloped forward waving his sword and shouting at the top of his voice, so that the Confederates could distinctly hear: "They are flanking them on the left, Forward!" The ruse worked; I could hardly believe my eyes; they all lit out of there like a flock of wild ducks. There was nobody below the bend of the stream on their left but our headquarters bugler, blowing for all he was worth, and an orderly

raising the devil among the corn-stalks! A battalion of men behind a slight breastwork could have held it against a brigade.

Camped at dark. Our new darkey foraged extensively and got us a good supper.

Headquarters at General Robinson's, who owns a fine plantation. He is in the Confederate army. His darkeys had taken all the horses and mules, and hid in the swamps.

Writing late to-night orders of march for to-morrow, and an order for the punishment by flogging of a soldier of the command. When preparing General Upton's explanatory order to the soldiers, I made bold to say to him, that discipline was necessary, but I thought it should be lawfully enforced; if we all got our deserts none of us would escape whipping. "The man," he explained, "had broken into a house, threatened the women, and stolen jewelry. Such things were not to be tolerated by Christian soldiers, and he intended to make an example of him. We could and would take the last pound of food if it were needed, but *thieving* must be stopped." I then had a copy of Burns in my pocket, that I had "confiscated," and felt very uncomfortable.

April 11th. Lowndesborough, Alabama.

Our division marched at daylight. The provost marshal led the soldier out with a detail to flog him. In attempting to tie him, he broke away. A party mounted and pursued him a quarter of a mile, overtook him and brought him back, tied him to a tree and gave him forty lashes upon his bare back, as the column was passing; then his hands were tied behind him, and a placard placed upon his breast, upon which was written in large letters: "Flogged for Stealing." He was made to face the command till all had passed.

These great forests of long-leaf pine, through which we march in a semi-twilight, are cushioned by the fallen needles, deadening the beat of hoofs; and a low continuous murmur is rising and falling around us like the sound of the distant surf.

We had not marched far before we came to Big Swamp River; here we rested for an hour while the engineers were repairing the corduroy road, and then we began navigation

swampward. Of all the swamps I ever experienced, this is the swampiest. Majestic trees with hanging moss, tower above the gloomy waters, while a rank growth of juniper, nightshade and all manner of climbing and creeping shrubs and vines choke up the road and render it almost impenetrable. The country around is low and marshy, often flooded for miles by the rising river, which, when falling, leaves a bed of quicksand and morass, broken and tangled weeds and vines, twined fantastically about the gnarled roots, making the somber forest sublimely dreary.

Our division was all day crossing, and when halted upon the opposite side, presented a muddy spectacle.

After leaving "The Big Swamp" we came up into some very fine country, where we halted upon a rich plantation and rested for two hours. At 4:30 P. M. we reached the beautiful little town of Lowndesborough, finely situated upon the mountain, and surrounded by lovely and picturesque country.

We camped near town, while the pioneer corps is bridging a bayou ahead for our march to-morrow.

The citizens tell us that General Lee telegraphed that he had evacuated Richmond and was moving in the direction of Danville. The news was announced, and the whole army is cheering.

April 12th. Montgomery. Our division marched at daylight. The Confederates in advance destroying bridges and throwing up obstructions in our road; and at every convenient position skirmishing, losing two or three men on each side.

To-day we built a novel bridge over one of these creeks. Our artillery mired down, and it was impossible for a column to ford. General Upton ordered every trooper to carry a fence rail on his shoulder, and when we came to the crossing we found a couple of heavy artillery caissons in mid-stream, for a foundation, and on them rested two forked pine trees for piers, across which ran sapling stringers; every man threw his fence rail for a flooring, and swaying, and swinging the command crossed the rude bridge. I do not believe anybody ever saw that done before; it held all

right, and with drawn sabers we deployed and whipped the Johnnies in the open.

Plantations we have passed to-day are fenced with Mexican rose-hedges, that offer almost as much *defense* as the osage orange. Now that they are blooming, it is a beautiful sight to see them, as far as the eye can reach, in long red and white lines. As they run parallel with the road, the gates and bars opening through them at intervals, serve well as places of ingress and egress for our flankers.

Passed forts and rifle pits; making a wide detour to avoid the intense heat of burning mountains of cotton, we ascended the hill overlooking the city of Montgomery.

General Wilson came up just as we were entering. There, before us was the State capital, the first capital of the Confederate States; now, from the dome, floated the "old flag!" In a moment every hat and cap flew off, and three cheers, loud and long, were given! The town took up the echoes as old familiar sounds; and the people seemed to live as of yore, under the "Stars and Stripes!" The town was surrendered to General McCook; General Wilson and our officers went to his headquarters and had a jovial time. Colonel LaGrange, whose brigade has been temporarily attached to our division, had a slight engagement and captured a number of prisoners and battle-flags from Generals Adams and Buford. They did not offer much resistance, as they do not intend to make a stand until they reach Columbus, where they are concentrating their forces.

We captured a dispatch from Jeff Davis, which reads: "Governor Watts asks help at Montgomery. Says, with the troops that can be spared from Georgia, he can save Montgomery, retake Selma and save Mobile!" All this might have happened, but it didn't! Before His Excellency left his capital, he had seen the handwriting on the wall.

April 13th. Montgomery.

We remain in camp here all day. It is a beautiful city on the high banks of the Alabama River. Early in the morning I employed my leisure in exploring. In a fine old church I found a darkey sweeping and made him pump for me while I played the organ. It sounded magnificently to

one who cannot strike a dozen notes in order, and as there was no one there but the darkey to comment, I ran my fingers up and down the key-board in lively style, then pulled out the stops and let it have it, rolling out billows of sound that made the old church tremble. It brought the darkey up with eyes rolling: "'Deed, suh, dat's suttinly diffunt fum any playin' I *evah* heard!" "That's a cavalry fugue with artillery accompaniment," I said, "and the only one of the kind." "Golly, Gosh, Massa Capting, how yo done fool pore ole Ben."

The Confederates, before they left, set fire to an immense amount of cotton to prevent it falling into our hands; but very much remains stored, because the blockade has been effectual.

We burned the nitre mills and all government stores, but as the town was surrendered, no private property was disturbed.

Our headquarters at a country villa a mile from town. Magnificent gardens and groves surround the house, and beautiful flowers bloom everywhere. The negro cabins, barns, stables, cribs and stacks are scattered profusely for miles over the land adjoining, and the happy, jolly darkeys come in groups to wonder and gaze. This evening our band began playing. At the first toot here came the darkeys, all ages, sizes and complexions, from a deep black to a light saddle-color, swarming with open eyes and mouths, crowding along the fences on tip-toe. To-night is a jubilee in their cabins. We can hear them dancing, fiddling, singing and laughing. They make a curious musical instrument of "cane reeds," and the darkey that performs the loudest, is the grand mogul of the assembly.

We are ordered to march to-morrow.

April 14th. Cowles' plantation.

Marched at daylight, Second Brigade, First Division, in advance. Colonel LaGrange looks natural, and has the same determined style of riding. Our regiment and the First Wisconsin were at one time brigaded together under General George E. Waring, and were almost like brothers on our raids through Missouri and Arkansas. Met an old friend,

now adjutant of the regiment, who tells me there are only a few of the old First Wisconsin left.

The Confederates have been throwing up rail piles and brush defenses every few miles; when our boys come within range, they begin firing, and then run and join their command; another party takes their place, and so the thing goes. We had five men killed to-day.

April 15th. Buchannan's plantation.

Marched at 5 A. M. over some very fine country. Came through Tuskeegee, a beautiful town situated up among the hills. The principal citizens came out and surrendered the town, and their good ladies and daughters came thronging out to see us and were quite friendly, surprised and thankful that we did not charge upon them with our sabers, yelling and swearing, as they expected us to do from all reports.

The Confederates in our advance are burning bridges and piling rails as usual. We saved the most important bridges by charging down before they had time to fire them. We are camping to-night on a fine plantation owned by an old Confederate. Plenty to eat, drink, and make merry over.

Coming in from detached duty with Colonel Benteen, the Third Iowa was deployed on the crest of a hill beyond which they were skirmishing. Benteen had his leg thrown nonchalantly over the pommel of his saddle, sitting like a Centaur, heedless of the bullets that cut the bark along side, when Captain Morse of the staff came tearing past us down the hill, his black, rawboned horse unmanageable, and the gallant captain part of the time on his neck and part on the crupper, his military cape flapping about his ears, still further frightening the animal he bestrode, like Irving's headless horseman. "Stick to your critter!" Benteen, a true son of Missouri, called after him. Then some one in the line sang out, "Grab a root!" which was taken up by the others —"Grab a root!" in all the tones voices are capable of producing, Pete Lunford's high piping treble rising above all the rest, "Wait, darling, till your Mummy comes!" as horse and rider shot by and disappeared in the bushes. Benteen laid back and yelled with laughter. Of course it was against

all military discipline, but you see such a thing but once in a campaign.

April 16th. Sunday. Columbus, Ga.

Marched at daybreak, crossing a bad swamp just after leaving camp. Country is poor, broken and covered with a dense growth of stunted pine and oak, and we had to corduroy much of our road to-day.

Our advance arrived at Crawford at 9:30 A. M. The enemy was here encountered, and slowly driven until at noon we arrived in sight of Columbus. The advance of the division, under command of Colonel Eggleston of the First Ohio, immediately charged to the bridge over the Chattahoochee, with the intention of securing it. General Upton and staff followed immediately. We were standing on a little knoll, watching the enemy across the bridge, and as they did not fire began to think the place was evacuated, when in a moment, every gun in Columbus opened on us. We were not a quarter of a mile from their forts, and the shot and shell came fast and furious. Two of our headquarters horses were killed. One shell struck our chief bugler's horse, tearing him all to pieces. Then grape and canister, more than ever I want to hear again. More horses were killed, but fortunately none of us.

The First Ohio was fighting bravely through the streets of Girard, but the bridge in their front was fired before they reached it, and there was no alternative but to fall back.

Glass in hand, General Upton stood like "Patience on a monument," scanning their position until satisfied it was impossible to attack successfully from that point, then ordered us to withdraw. I did not stand upon the order of my going, but got out of there as fast as "Charley" could take me. A bridge that spanned a little ravine had been torn away; there was no time to think, and my horse took the gap at a tremendous leap; but the distance was too great; he caught the opposite bank with his fore feet and held until I flung myself over his head. My brave "Charley" brought me out safely, but I found that he had been wounded by a piece of shell that cut a tendon, and it was necessary to kill him and thus end his suffering.

From a hill, from which I could see every house in Columbus, every fort and earthwork, I watched the two armies maneuver until it was dark. Columbus is situated on the Chattahoochie River, where it flows through a beautiful plain at the foot of the mountain. Three bridges span the river; one foot bridge, below the town, crossing from Girard; another foot and railroad bridge, entering the main part of the city; and an old forsaken causeway a few miles above the town. The lower and upper bridges had been destroyed at our approach; only the main bridge remained. It was stuffed with cotton, covered with turpentine, ready to be fired, in case of our capturing the forts defending it.

There were two regular forts, with redoubts and rifle pits, and abatis protecting them in front and on flank, and in front of them a line of earthworks along the lower ridge. Forts from across the river had range to these points, and it was next to impossible to successfully attack them through the valley.

A dim blue line of hills, as far as the eye can see, encircles the plain in which the city nestles.

In the twilight General Upton withdrew the First Brigade and Rodney's battery from the line beyond the ridges, and marched them, under cover, up beyond the main forts.

At 9:30 at night the Third Iowa was dismounted, and in rear of them the Tenth Missouri was formed, also dismounted, and in rear of them the Fourth Iowa, mounted.

The Third Iowa was ordered forward at a charge, and away they went, yelling and shooting down upon the Confederates, who were not expecting an attack from that quarter or at night, and after a short resistance were driven from their first line back to the forts and in among the batteries.

The Tenth Missouri, supporting the Third Iowa, charged over the slashing and abatis, up to the batteries, captured them, and charged the flying enemy over the bridge, and in the face of the reserves, captured the guns, loaded with grape and canister. The charge was so impetuous, and as in the night friend and foe could not be told apart, the Confederates were panic-stricken and fled in disorder. Then our men charged over the bridge into the city. Major General Howell

Cobb fled with the remnants of his army, and all defense on the part of the Confederates ceased by 11 o'clock. Columbus was ours!

A wild exultation seized the soldiers, and I believe our division could have whipped anything in the Confederacy.

It was grand to see and hear the battle at night — all dark except when the scene was illuminated by flashes of the guns and glaring brilliancy of volleys from forts and rifle pits. So near were our men to the batteries that some were made blind by the powder flash. There, Captain Miller of Company "D" fell, a shell passing through his side, and he died as he said, "like a Christian and a soldier." The Confederates held stubbornly to their guns until our boys were in among them and forced them to surrender.

The arsenal, foundries, work-shops, the Gunboat *Jackson*, and an immense amount of ammunition were fired. The flames from 60,000 bales of cotton blazed up against the sky.

Now that the battle is over, and we have possession of the city, strict discipline is enforced. Contrasted with the night we took Selma, it seems very quiet. It was nearly midnight when we entered the city, and until morning we could hear the slow rumbling of ambulances to the hospital, where the surgeons were busy. Our headquarters are at the "Battle House."

April 17th. Up early and out in the city. The forts are full of prisoners. Prisoners and artillery everywhere.

General Wilson came to congratulate and compliment the Fourth Division. This is Upton's fight. Our officers think the assault and capture of Columbus a brilliant exhibition of generalship. One thing is certain. General Upton has inspired his men with enthusiasm, and they have confidence in him. He is quick to see the point of attack, and is able on the instant to throw his force with the greatest effect. No delay, no dawdling, no mistakes; he strikes quickly and surely. He told General Wilson that he could now take his division and march through the South in any direction. He is not given to boasting, and as a military man, is sure of what he says. We are masters of the situation.

Flying columns north and south served to divert Taylor, Forrest, Cobb, and the other generals, so they could not concentrate their forces to oppose us, and they have been outgeneraled from the start. I do not believe there is an army in the world that surpasses these divisions, that now march in compact, well-balanced columns, men and horses in perfect form; disciplined, well officered, sure of themselves. It would be impossible to stampede them, and it would require awful carnage to convince them they were not invincible.

April 18th. Lowe's plantation, Georgia.

Marched at early dawn. First and Second Divisions in advance of us. Our division guarding the rear and corps train.

Broken country and a scarcity of water made our march necessarily slow, and I had time to stop and chat occasionally with "ye inhabitants;" the principal question being, "What did you-uns come down to fight we-uns for?" "You-all" and "we all" prevail like an epidemic.

The divisions in our front captured and burned a train, also captured many prisoners and animals. Cactus fences all along the way, bristling up sharp and tough; they would make an excellent abatis. We see an occasional fig tree, and many plants and herbs entirely unfamiliar.

April 19th. Double Bridges, Flint River, Georgia.

Marched early, crossing both forks of Flint River; one forded, the other bridged. Country poor and dusty. An orderly bearing dispatches from General Wilson has just arrived. He reports: "We took and occupied Macon last night. General Howell Cobb has surrendered. We captured many prisoners." The men are cheering. It looks like the end of the war.

April 20th. In the pine woods in Georgia.

We ride and fight all day, hardly stopping long enough to eat and sleep. The day's occurrences must be jotted down, if at all, by the light of the camp fire. The fellows watch me writing, and want to know if I am "making my will." I am writing history, I tell them. "Sacred or profane?" asks the Major. It might be called profane, I reply.

"A —— funny kind of history it will be!" says Lieutenant Battin; "Put that in it."

Who knows, perhaps this road from Waterloo to Macon may some day lie before the reader like a map, for things are being done. We have marched over it, at all events, 500 miles; have had some rough and tumble service, our horses have fallen off very little, and the men are game as fighting cocks, and have taught a new lesson in military tactics. The cavalry as now armed and maneuvered is not considered merely the eyes and flankers for the infantry and artillery, but an effective force against the enemy entrenched, and in fortified cities. For us the road will always be memorable, winding over hills and mountains, through dark forests and green valleys, past cotton fields and plantations, with barns and clustering cabins, by rich cities, along shores of rivers, and by the margin of brooks half hidden in flowers and grasses, past quiet villages and hamlets, beneath the bright blue sky that bends with magic in it above the Sunny South. The pity of it is that the road is marked by devastation and bloodshed and trampled under the rude feet of War. Mayhap in history, as long as America shall endure, will live the scene where Upton fought his battle in the night, and won another star; where Wilson, at the head of his cavalry, charged a fortified city, a stroke of daring generalship, and from the thorn Danger plucked the white flower Victory, that all his soldiers wear with him in their hearts! I hope the historian may also say: On this road the army of cavalry marched and put an end to the great Rebellion.

April 21st. Macon, Georgia.

Crossed the Ocmulgee River on the railroad bridge, and camped in East Macon. The town is full of Confederates, all friendly under the armistice agreed upon between Generals Sherman and Johnston.

Mobile, the last Confederate foothold on the coast, has fallen. General Wilson was right in marching on this line instead of striking south from Selma. The end is not far off.

April 22d. Moved our headquarters to a beautiful green sward near the old Fair Ground. Our office is in a confiscated tent, with ropes and flies decidedly "cottonish," evidently once intended to hold a batch of Johnnies. A fine view of the city is presented from here. The Fifth Iowa band came over and serenaded, and a pleasant evening was spent.

April 23d. A fire in town last night burned our commissary and destroyed much of our supplies; all our coffee is gone.

Macon is a great capture, containing all kinds of military stores and an immense amount of cotton. If we confiscated all the cotton stored in the South it would pay our war debt. Vast quantities of it have been destroyed.

Johnston's soldiers are coming in, and car-loads of reserves from further South.

General Upton was discussing with a number of officers an incident in one of Napoleon's campaigns, where a cavalry force had cut through the infantry and galloped between the opposing lines. "What of our discipline?" asked the General. "If such a thing happened here, what would the Fourth Division do?" "*Do?*" said Captain Morse, mindful of his own experience, "They'd stand and yell 'Grab a root' like a lot of blamed fools!" The General did not join in the laugh that followed, but went on to press his question in that fine, earnest way he has when discussing military problems.

The rumor has just reached us of the assassination of President Lincoln! We cannot believe it.

April 24th. News of Lincoln's murder confirmed. It comes like a stunning blow. The soldiers loved him, and grieve for him as though they had lost a father.

News of peace unsatisfactory and doubtful. We are here to put down the Rebellion, if it takes ten years yet, the men say. Andersonville is so near that the war is a reality indeed with us. Many of our men who were prisoners and escaped, having been lying out in swamps for months, are coming in, starved and naked.

Generals McCook and Alexander came to our headquarters to-day.

April 25th. Saddled my horse and crossed the Ocmulgee on the pontoon bridge that General Cobb surrendered

with the city. Visited the Macon arsenal and other government buildings, and rode about the city. The cars began running to-day. General Winslow came over to headquarters bringing his report and eleven battle flags taken from the enemy. After he had gone General Upton spoke of his efficient service as provost marshal at Selma, saying, "Winslow would make a great quartermaster general." That sounded strange to me. Had he seen him after Guntown re-form the line, and for three days and nights balk Forrest of his victory, holding him at bay with the Third and Fourth Iowa Cavalry, and bringing the scattered army back to Memphis, he would have left out the *quartermaster*. Winslow has not General Upton's military genius, nor his dash, but he is brave and resolute, and can handle a division of cavalry as skillfully as any officer in the service.

Wrote letters to the Department, transmitting flags and other captured trophies. One flag, as fine as I ever saw, it was said Mrs. Lincoln had presented to the garrison at Selma; another, that Tibbetts of Company "I" captured from Austin's battery, inscribed with the names of battles of Shiloh, Chickamauga and Murfreesboro. Each flag had its history. I stacked them all in the corner of the tent thinking if they could speak they would have heroic tales to tell. Some of them were almost new, but others were torn and tattered, lashed by tempests of shot and shell. The fortunes of war have separated them from their brave defenders, and there is no one to even tell to whom they belonged. They have fought their last fight, and made "unconditional surrender." Never again at the "Reveille" to unfurl in the morning light; never at sunset to lower, softly folding upon themselves with rustling murmurs to "Retreat." So I put them all away gently, reverently, as became a soldier. Laid unnoted away, lost to those who loved them, their stillness to be forever unbroken, unless mayhap their muffled folds should stir and thrill to the softly-blown bugles of memory.

We are in uncertainty, and can hear nothing from the North.

April 26th. To-day I wrote a lot of movements for a new system of infantry tactics. General Upon is now busy studying a new line formation, and jotting down notes. I told him of a company of militia we saw drill "up thar in Missoura," when ordering a right wheel, the captain shouted: "Break in two and swing reound like a gate, swing reound!" with emphasis on the word of command, which amused him greatly. He said it had the advantage of simplicity.

April 27th. Still no communication with the North, save through Confederate hands. Everything unsatisfactory. Rode over to the city and saw some beautiful houses, one the most magnificent in the South, parks, lakes, statuary; outside of Tempe's Vale, one would hardly expect to see anything more beautiful.

April 28th. Everything is chaos here, the most extravagant rumors prevailing among the citizens; no reliable news of any kind. The suspense is almost unendurable. We are reduced to about quarter rations, and no coffee, and nobody can "soldier" without coffee. Our clothing is worn out, and we nearly all wear Confederate uniforms. It is time the war was over.

April 29th. Macon, Georgia.

Rode over to General Winslow's headquarters, making quite a little tour through the city. The citizens seem friendly and most of the soldiers, though some of them are moody and cherish resentment. Pillaged property is to be turned over to the provost marshal. It consists of gold, silver, and all manner of trinkets. Fortune favors the brave! Rummaging in an old storehouse, I found a little bag of coffee, a sample lot it must be, bright yellow grains, inclosed in wicker, such as fancy baskets are made of. Lun was in an ecstacy while roasting and getting it ready to grind. "Let it simper slow," he insists, which, doubtless is the true method of making coffee. We keep it to ourselves, but as you can smell it a mile when the wind sits fair, we are likely to be besieged by the whole army.

April 30th. One trait is very noticeable in these Southern people, and it sets one a thinking. Certain families in each State hold themselves in a kind of superiority above the others—an aristocracy of birth; different from Northerners, who think Smith is just as good as Jones, and so is Robin-

son. I was talking about this with a nice looking old lady, who lives just across from our headquarters. She had returned my military salute with a stately courtesy, and so I stopped to chat with her. The kind old soul listened attentively while I stood at the gate and ran over the names of the Georgia boys that I used to know at "Old Hanover." They had come North to school, and brought a new charm to life with their handsome faces and chivalrous ways. There was something captivating about their soft Southern accent. They taught us how to swim and shoot and fence, and we taught them to skate and play football and "hook watermelons." When the war broke out, they all left for home, and I had never heard of any of them since. I suppose, I said, most of them went into the army. "The boys of the best families of the South," she answered, "joined the army."

Two of the college boys she knew, Eli S. Shorter, of Columbus, now an officer in Benning's brigade, and his cousin, Fred Wimberley. This afternoon a servant came over, bearing a tray with a round something, carefully wrapped, and a couple of bottles of Scuppernong wine. Lun looked at the tray with curious attention, chuckling to himself, as he brought out what he called "a noble plum pudding." I think I shall enlarge my visiting list!

Northern papers received, with news of Lincoln's death, and the closing scenes of the war. Much dissatisfaction with Sherman, because of the armistice with General Johnston. We put great confidence in Sherman, and will not believe he did other than that he thought just and right.

May 1st. General Grierson has dispatched that his command is at Eufaula. General McCook at Tallahassee. Our division will probably move to Augusta in a few days. An expedition goes down the Savannah River to the ocean. I went riding to-day beyond the lines to "Cross Keys," where Stoneman fought.

May 2d. General Long, recovering from his wound received at Selma, has issued a farewell address to his division. He is greatly loved by his command. There never was an army of better men, or better soldiers than these now breaking up, soon to be lost in civil life. Closely bound by discipline, welded together under fire, and working harmoniously in a glorious campaign, it is with a feeling of sadness we see the end approach.

May 3d. The First Ohio Cavalry moved to Atlanta to receive the surrender and garrison that place. Orders came from General Grant to-day to garrison all important posts in the South. Our divisions are separating, and we all await orders. All Confederate soldiers are ordered to go home immediately.

May 4th. General Wilson brought to our headquarters an official notice, received from Washington at noon to-day, and he and Upton are conferring. Open questions begin to burn like fire; what to do with the children in orphan asylums, the poor people, many of whom are starving; our relations to the State Legislatures and local authorities; what to do with the railroads; food supplies, cotton, clothing; the negroes who have followed us, men, women and children afoot, on donkeys, in little carts, in a wild flight for freedom.

Struck our tents; our luggage was hauled to the Atlanta depot, but for some cause the train did not go, and we were ordered back to camp. We are to go to Augusta to-morrow.

Generals Wilson and Upton parted company in front of the tent, Wilson waving his hand as he rode away. They have grown very close together in this campaign. I would like to know what fortune has in store for them. General Wilson, with his restless energy, would seem to be a born soldier of fortune, yet amid all conflicting orders he keeps a level head, and is as skillful in administration as he is in the field. He has fully justified General Grant's estimate of him when he placed him in command of this army.

General Upton is a thorough student of military science, and is also a master of the details of military life. He is quick to see and use the material at hand to accomplish his designs. He has the enthusiasm of youth, but he is not rash; he has inordinate ambition, but is neither selfish nor cringing; he believes in himself, yet is neither over-confident nor vain. He has fairly won distinction as a soldier; and as a soldier, loves his country with passionate devotion. I would

like to record the wish that his name may always show clear and bright on the roll of fame.

After General Wilson had gone, General Upton looked grave. It is rumored that General Grant is to come here. The war ending with such suddenness appears to have jolted Sherman and Stanton both off their feet. Secretary Stanton should have remembered that Sherman was an American, as patriotic as himself. Sherman was in command of a great army, flushed with victory, and was idolized by his soldiers; then was no time to force insult upon a commander. However, General Sherman is too good a soldier and too true a patriot to be long affected by it.

Lee's troops are going through here in all directions, a thousand a day, for the past week, and Johnston's men are coming in, taking the familiar paths to their homes after long years of absence, poorly clad, some on crutches, some with empty sleeves, pale-faced from wounds or sickness; the anger and bitterness of hate one feels turning into pity, when coming back to us in silence, they have no homes to go to. I do not wonder that Sherman wanted to give better terms than the government at Washington. They have surrendered, after fighting the thing to the end. That settles it. Now they are Americans and we will be friends again. Grant says to Lee, "Take your horses and go home, put in a new crop and begin again." That sounds as though Lincoln had said it. But there is no good place to begin. They have lost all. We must help them start, and keep them from starving. I have seen a number of our fellows give them money, take their names and postoffice addresses, and heard them say to them, "We will see you through." The darkeys have worked the little plantations, some patches have been kept cultivated; but it is a mighty lonesome homecoming. We are issuing provisions from our stores, and rations of meat from captured Confederate beef-cattle; and that is as good as Henry Ward Beecher's beautiful words "Forgiveness and Reconciliation."

May 5th. On the cars for Augusta and Atlanta, Georgia.

Up early. The Fourth Division marched at daylight. Staff officers, after waiting for two hours at the depot, got a

train and moved out; five hundred men from the First Brigade, and about the same number of returning Confederates with us. Three engines to our train. It is queer to see us all together. Along the way, the people run to their doors to see the Johnnies going home, with their handkerchiefs ready to wave, but when they see our blue uniforms, they drop them, the cheer of welcome for the returning soldiers dies away on their lips, and we pass silently. The road is a desolate one; many soldiers of Lee's army along the way. Had a long chat with two boys who were looking for their homes; had served from the beginning in Longstreet's corps. Potomac, Shenandoah, Chickahominy, Chickamauga, Richmond, are interesting themes in good hands. Near West Point we saw two companies of Stoneman's cavalry. They say they have captured a courier with this pathetic message, dated May 3d, from Jeff Davis to his friend Harrison: "I leave in an hour; if my horse can stand it, I will go on rapidly to Washington, Georgia. All their efforts are directed for my capture. My family are safest when farthest from me. I have the bitterest disappointment in regard to the feeling of our troops. I would not have any one I love dependent upon their resistance against an equal force."

We arrived at Augusta at sundown. City full of Confederates. No Federals were ever here before. In front of the Planters' House, in the center of the city, we are great curiosities. It seemed to me the whole city was crowding to see the Yankees. Major Dee, with his regiment came marching up and we encamped in the public square. The General and staff stopped at the Planters' Hotel.

May 7th. A gunboat came from Savannah escorting a commissary boat loaded with supplies for us from General Sherman. We are not forgotten by him at any rate.

Rode all over the city sight-seeing. Crossed the river into South Carolina, from Hamburg to Aiken, chatting with citizens gathered on the street corners to deliberate on the approach of the Yankees. A company of Confederates, with two pieces of artillery, were guarding the bridge, but I came back unchallenged. The soldiers will all abide by General Lee's orders.

Colonel Jones arrived with the Third Iowa Cavalry. General Molineux, of the Nineteenth Corps, will relieve General Upton.

Augusta is a beautiful place, but blissfully ignorant of the horrors of war. The Yankees are growing in favor. All the churches were opened to-day. Generals Fry, Wright, Imboden, Ruggles, Basil Duke, Colonel Breckenridge, Majors Bigger and Morgan (John's brother) and a host of other Confederate commanders are here.

Many chats and arguments are kept up between our men and the Confederates, for the most part very friendly. Arsenals, foundries, powder-mills and factories, commissary and quartermaster stores, and great stores of cotton, in our possession.

May 8th. Augusta. Gold and silver circulating again. An auctioneer has been steadily plying his trade across the way, and our soldiers and the Confederates intermingle, buy cigars and smoke and chat, while the old fellow puffs his motley assortment as though he knew his goods were worth something. Silver sold at $1,000. Confederate, for $1. I saw a Confederate lieutenant buy a box of cigars for $500 Confederate money, his entire pay for the last seven months in the army before Richmond. His right arm had been shot away in the closing campaign.

A flag raising at the arsenal, General Upton giving the assembly a little impromptu address, and his terse summing up of the results of the war was listened to with deep interest. No one, on the spur of the moment, could have made a better speech. I believe it will not be long until Augusta follows Savannah by the same road into the Union.

May 9th. Augusta.

Paroling prisoners all day at the court house and city hall. Among the number was General Beauregard.

Took a stroll down the bank of the Savannah River, watching the boats floating along with the tide. It is a fine night; a fisherman's beacon fire was flashing out over the water and his jolly song echoed around the river bend.

A reward of $360,000 is offered for the capture of Jeff Davis and his companions in flight. We have captured their

last trunk line, there are no cars that he can travel on, our cavalrymen picket every ford and ferry on both sides of the Ocmulgee River, and it is next to impossible for him to escape.

This is a typical order:

"*Brigadier General Winslow, Commanding First Brigade.*

"Keep me informed by courier of the exact movements of Jeff Davis, and when you have found the true scent, go for him. J. H. WILSON."

General Vaughn, in command of Jeff Davis's escort, came in to make arrangements for the surrender of his forces, consisting of Dibrell's two brigades, Ferguson's and Duke's, and Butler's division of Wade Hampton's cavalry. They started with four thousand men, a hundred boxes of gold, and sixty boxes of silver; most of the specie has been distributed among the men, many of whom have deserted.

May 10th. On the cars for Atlanta, 9:30 P. M.

Passing green woods, factories, fields and country villas, an occasional farm house with its cluster of negro cabins cast its shadow along the landscape, and the lights in the windows glitter like fireflies as they flit by.

Awoke this morning nearing Atlanta. Houses destroyed, farms laid waste, burnt ties and twisted rails plainly showed Sherman's onward march. Very strong works around the city, flanked by numberless lines of rifle pits, protected by *chevaux de frise*, the most impenetrable one can imagine. Here and there are lonely patches of graves dotting the hillside.

Established headquarters in what was once a dwelling. It is pierced by shot and shell in two or three places. I have a room upstairs, and sleep under a hole made by a shell that had burst, tearing out the side of the chimney.

Colonel Eggleston, of the First Ohio, had received the surrender of the garrison, arms, stores, etc.

May 11th. Atlanta is a ruin, not a business house standing, and not a dwelling, except a few marked by shot and shell—every tree and shrub about our camp scarred and cut into grotesque shapes by bullets. All the region is a battlefield; lines of reddish-yellow clay earthworks, in every shape

known to military science, stretch away as far as sight can reach, and torn into shapeless masses by the heavy guns.

May 12th. Out riding over the battlefields, among forts and rifle pits, wire fences, slashings and unknown obstructions, until both horse and rider were tired out. Dismounting, I followed the line of an old fence and found a lot of fine ripe strawberries, and feasted, while my horse browsed in sweet clover.

A report has been received of the capture of General Bragg. Dispatches keep coming in at all times from scouting parties after Jeff Davis. We think he cannot escape.

Citizens came over to see us to night. I do not know what for, unless to drive away the loneliness. It must be miserable living for the people here. They had a hard time of it. It does not seem real to hear them tell their stories. Bomb-proofs are scattered through the city, in which, during the siege, the affrighted people burrowed like prairie dogs. They cut bullets out and sold them to buy bread. The citizens at Griffin are starving. If it were not for our feeding them from our stores, this whole country would perish.

Governor Brown, of Georgia, was brought a prisoner to our headquarters to-day, arrested by order of the Secretary of War.

Soldiers from Lee's army are passing continually. They are all awfully tired of war. I pity the poor boys. General Lee has loyally accepted the results of the war, and the armies will follow his example. They have followed him, God knows, with unfaltering step, without shoes, without blankets or food, grim and gaunt, a skeleton host to the last. That ends it.

Captain McCormick, A. C. M., and Major Bird, A. D. C., have joined our headquarters.

The railroad was completely destroyed when Sherman was surrounding Atlanta. Blackened embers and beds of ashes show where the piles of railroad ties were fired, and the rails at white heat, twined around the trees. The little pines and oaks alongside are seared and blackened by the process, and many have three or more rails twisted around them.

The Vice-President of the Confederacy, Alexander H. Stephens, in poor health and quite feeble, was brought to our headquarters, a prisoner. I vacated my room for him and came down stairs, where the gold and silver is stored to the amount of half a million dollars, which the Confederates confiscated and we captured, besides five thousand dollars in gold from the Confederate treasure chest. I feel like a buccaneer or a bold brigand in here with this "unsunned heap" of treasure. Captain Gilpin has orders to take the State funds and deliver to Governor Brownlow, at Nashville. In barrels and boxes, it makes a load for two six-mule teams.

General Winslow is in charge of all the parties at work on rebuilding the railroad to Chattanooga. It is nearly finished to Cartersville, and our courier line is established from the Chattahoochie. We are to ride out there to-morrow to note progress.

I have listened to-day to Alexander H. Stephens in conversation with General Upton, and to their arguments about politics and the reconstruction of the Union. He is a splendid talker, never at a loss for ideas, or fit words in which to express them. The line of policy in reconstruction * was the main topic. I was impressed with one thing he said, as rubbing his fingers up and down on the back of his hand by way of illustration: "Slavery was a sore on the body politic—constant friction North and South kept it inflamed." He told us of his interview with Lincoln and Seward at Fortress Monroe. He had a high opinion of Mr. Lincoln, and said "His murder was the greatest calamity that ever befell a people; especially will it be felt by the people of the South." He is a learned man and a deep thinker. While he and the General differed widely on many questions, I saw their admiration was mutual.

Rode out along the railroad to where our engineer corps is bridging the Etowah River. Very few inhabitants in the country. Starved out; the last sheaf of oats gone from the barn, the last pound of meal from the kitchen, and in the smokehouse the ground has been dug over for the salt that

*A new word that Mr. Stephens used many times in regard to the seceded States.

had dripped there in curing meat. Passed Marietta—the ruins of it—near the base of Kenesaw Mountain, where Sherman fought his battle. Many of the killed were left unburied, or have been washed out by the rain, for parts of skeletons can be seen all about the battlefield. From a distance you can see lines of works and rifle-pits ascending the rugged mountain, in a winding and tortuous course. I had ridden forty-five miles and was tired, but scrambled over the rocks and through the scrub pine to the highest peak where the fine view of the Blue Ridge range well repaid for the rough climb.

May 13th. Atlanta, Ga.

Mr. Stephens is still here at our headquarters. This morning I walked with him for an hour among the ruins. In one place he pointed out, on a half burnt sign hanging above a crumbling wall, the name of an old friend of his, and continued in a half soliloquy: "I was once a poor boy, here on this very spot; the kind women of Georgia picked me up out of the street, and gave me an education. All I am, I owe to the people of Georgia. I could not desert my State. I loved the Union, but I followed my State." He said this with a pathos that went to my heart like a bullet. This Vice-President of the Southern Confederacy is no more a rebel than I am.

Captain Armitage came, asking for provisions, especially salt, for the citizens in his neighborhood, as they were suffering for food, saying: "People never forgot those who were kind to them in adversity." That sounded like the speech of a man. Nothing was said of their having brought adversity upon themselves, and nobody thought of alluding to it. I believe that nine-tenths of these Southern people are glad in their hearts that the national authority has been restored.

Early this morning we sent our mail by courier who brought back, among other papers, the farewell address of General Forrest to his troops:

"GAINSVILLE, ALABAMA, May 9, 1865.

"SOLDIERS:—The troops of this department have been surrendered. I do not think it proper to refer to the causes

which have reduced us to this extremity. That we are beaten is a self evident fact. The cause for which you have braved dangers, endured privations and suffering, and made so many sacrifices is to-day hopeless. The terms upon which you were surrendered are favorable and should be acceptable to all. They manifest a spirit of magnanimity and liberality on the part of the Federal authorities and should be met on our part by faithful compliance.

"In bidding you farewell, you carry with you my best wishes. Without referring in any way to the merits of the cause in which we have been engaged, your courage as exhibited on many hard fought battlefields has elicited the respect and admiration of friend and foe. I have never sent you on the field where I have been unwilling to go myself, nor do I now advise you to a course which I feel myself unwilling to pursue. You have been good soldiers, you can be good citizens. Obey the laws, preserve your honor, and the government to which you have surrendered can afford to be and will be magnanimous. "N. B. FORREST,

"*Lieutenant General.*"

Forrest was our most gallant opponent, whom we have fought with varying fortunes for the last three years, through Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia. He is a born leader of cavalrymen, the only man left in the Confederacy who need be feared as a guerilla chief. Marmaduke, "Red" Jackson and the smaller fry, could be stamped out inside of a month by State troops if they turned to bushwhacking. General Sherman's fears are needless, since Forrest has made honorable surrender. There will be no more fighting.

GENERAL UPTON'S FAREWELL.

"Before severing his connection with the command, your General desires to express his high appreciation of the bravery, endurance and soldierly qualities displayed by the officers and men of his division. Leaving Chickasaw on the 22d of March, as a new organization, and without status in the Cavalry Corps, you in one month traversed 600 miles, crossed six rivers, met and defeated the enemy at Montevallo, capturing 100 prisoners, routed Forrest, Buford and Roddy in their chosen position at Ebenezer Church, capturing two guns and three hundred prisoners, carried the works in your front at Selma, capturing thirteen guns, 1,100 prisoners, and

five battle-flags, and finally crowned your success by a night assault upon the enemy's entrenchment at Columbus where you captured 1,500 prisoners, twenty-four guns, eight battle-flags, and vast munitions of war. You arrived at Macon, Georgia April 21st, having captured on your march 3,000 prisoners, thirty-nine pieces of artillery and thirteen battle-flags. Whether mounted with the saber, or dismounted with the carbine, the brave men of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Iowa, First and Seventh Ohio and Tenth Missouri Cavalry triumphed over the enemy in every conflict. With regiments led by brave colonels, and brigades commanded with consummate skill and daring, this division, in thirty days has won a reputation unsurpassed in the service. Though many of you have not received the reward your gallantry has entitled you to, you have received the commendation of your superior officers, and have won the admiration and gratitude of your countrymen.

"You return to your homes with the proud consciousness of having defended the flag of your country in the hour of the greatest national peril, while through your instrumentality, liberty and civilization have advanced the greatest stride recorded in history.

"The best wishes of your commanding general will ever attend you.

"E. UPTON,
"*Brevet Major General,*
Commanding Fourth Division Cavalry Corps."

As soon as the Engineer Corps can finish the bridge at the river the different regiments of this command will march northward. None of us, I suppose, understand what it is to disband a great army. The first regiments preparing to go home. The First and Seventh Ohio, and Tenth Missouri, have just marched past headquarters and cheered the General. He made them a little speech. He knows what he has fought for, and his clear-cut statement went straight to the heads and hearts of his soldiers. In every engagement they have seen the result of his strict discipline and constant drill. By their side under fire, on the lookout for the chance to win, and ready on the instant to dash for it; and in camp always attentive to their comfort and welfare; their enthusiasm has changed into affectionate regard, so that now it is with a feeling akin to sorrow that they part. Colonel Benteen, of the Tenth Missouri Cavalry, presented a beautiful tribute from his regiment.*

General Upton has written his official report. A number of officers, staff and regimental, are recommended for promotion for gallantry during the campaign. Most of them, however, are thinking more about being mustered out of



LIEUT.-COL. F. W. BENTEEN, 10TH MISSOURI CAVALRY.
Captain 7th U. S. Cavalry, July 28, 1866; Major 9th U. S. Cavalry, December 17, 1882; Retired July 1, 1888; Died June 22, 1898; Brevet Brigadier General, U. S. A.

service than of the honors. Camp life has become very irksome.

Here in these days of waiting, came two letters bearing the postmark Selma. One, signed Catharine Symmes Mont-

* It may be of interest to those of our readers who knew Col. Benteen to learn that Upton once wrote of him as the most gallant man he had ever seen under fire.—EDITOR.

ford—heart-broken mother, words and thanks—out of place in a soldier's rude journal, that I shall reverently keep, hoping that time may heal the wounds of a cruel war, and—is it too much to hope?—bring the day when North and South shall be again united. The other letter—and I may as well out with it—if sweet Kate be willing, I shall do my part toward that happy reunion. She will not give me an answer, she says, "until peace is declared."

This afternoon, taking General Upton's farewell order with me, I went over to the camp of the Third Iowa, to bid my old company good-bye. It was not a pleasant thing to do. Lieutenant Battin and the boys were gathered about the improvised tents. George Weiney making an attempt to sing, "The Lady I Love Will Soon be a Bride," and much more to the same effect; but I thought it did not go off very well. It is very plain that they are all impatient at the delay of orders to be mustered out. Colonel—General Noble it is now, is as proud of his old regiment as he well can be. Of the two thousand two hundred and fifty men who have been members of the Third Iowa Cavalry, only a few comparatively remain to enjoy the welcome home. Not one of the number has brought dishonor to the flag under which we fought. This narrative would be incomplete if it failed to record the name of Rev. Jas. W. Latham, the faithful chaplain of the regiment. I do not know to what church he belonged, but he has looked after the sick and wounded, consoled the dying and composed for burial the dead. He knows where our boys fell, and their friends may be assured that their resting-places were hallowed by his prayers.

It is not easy to sever the ties that for four long years of hardship, danger, excitement and delight of soldier life, have bound us together. We had talked of the old days, and had called up many incidents of our campaigns, and the time had come to go. My foot was in the stirrup—no more "Prepare to mount!" No more "Boots and saddles!" The thought came almost with the sharpness of a saber thrust. "Good-bye, boys! Good-bye! Good-bye!"

At headquarters General Upton and Major Latta have just come in with the word of the capture of Jeff Davis. He

will be brought here. General Wilson has issued a congratulatory order to the army. A salute of 200 guns will be fired to-morrow morning at sunrise to announce that "PEACE IS DECLARED."

THE LAST NIGHT IN CAMP.

I had walked beyond headquarters till I could dimly see the long lines of tents stretching away to the north. A boyish tenor voice somewhere was singing:

> "We are tenting to-night on the old camp ground,
> Give us a song to cheer."

I knew well their thoughts were turning. When the song ceased, all was still. The sky, down to the horizon line, was crowded so thickly with stars that one could hardly trace "The Dipper." George McCallum came out of his tent to sound "Taps." I stopped to listen. Perhaps he too was thinking it was his last good-night bugle call. The notes rose and fell, and repeated themselves in plaintive echoes among the hills, and floating on until, in other echoes still fainter and more tremulous, they lost themselves among the stars. Bards have gone from the world. Only the musician now has the subtle power to bind as with a spell the hearts of an army of men; and to-night it may be, touched by that call, their thoughts and feelings attuned to harmony, arose even beyond the stars. Good-night!

May 14th. Atlanta, Georgia.

I was awakened at 3 A. M. with the word that Mr. Davis had arrived. The shrill whistle brought every one within hearing down pell mell to the railroad depot. General Upton and one of his staff officers were to accompany the train to Augusta. The soldiers detailed as additional guards were building their fires from the debris of the fallen buildings, throwing on half-burnt signs, door-posts, and window frames, and the blaze showed little knots of them along the railroad track, looking expectantly toward the cars. As soon as the train stopped we went in. The car was full. Mr. Davis and his wife were in the third seat; next back of them Clay and his wife; then Postmaster General Reagan, Colonels

Johnston and Lubbock, aides; Colonel Harrison, private secretary; Mrs. Davis's three children and her brother and sister; Lieutenant Hathaway, and others whose names I did not learn, and a number of colored servants. A detachment of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry under Colonel Pritchard, who had captured the party, guarded them.

They were captured in Southern Georgia, making their way to the Florida coast. They had a little camp, two tents along side of the wagon, in the pine woods a mile from Irwinsville, and were asleep, when our cavalry dashed in on them.

When Colonel Pritchard came up, Mr. Davis was furious. "I suppose you consider this a capture," he exclaimed. "Yes," replied the Colonel. "It is not, it is a *theft!* You make war on women and children!" Colonel Pritchard then said, "Mr. Davis, you must remember you are a prisoner."

The car lamp shone full in his face, and at last I had the satisfaction of seeing the captured Confederate chief. An erect figure, with a somewhat martial bearing, brown hair turning gray, a keen strong face with a pallor in it, smooth shaven to below the chin, a look of sorrow about the lines of the firm set mouth, a high pale forehead sharply defined above cold gray eyes that repelled sympathy.

When the train moved off, quite a crowd of both Federal and Confederate soldiers had gathered. Mr. Davis was standing at the car window, with a cold flinty look in his eyes as they rested unmoved on the distant hills, a long irregular line of earthworks, just growing visible in the dawn. Vice-President Stephens begged General Upton to let him go North in a separate car; there was bitter feeling between them. Governor Brown had no respect for him, he told us, and for a year had opposed his measures. Howell Cobb felt contempt for his government, the disgrace of its termination, and its tyranny while in force, saying it was a relief to him to have a restoration of the national authority. Both Generals Johnston and Beauregard distrusted as well as feared him, and refused further allegiance. General Lee had remained true to him to the last, about the only one,

as we learned from the officers when we paroled them. With Lee's surrender, he became a fugitive.

On my way back to headquarters the deserted fires were casting shadows that seemed to stalk like gigantic specters along the walls, over tumbled and charred roofs and fallen chimneys, and I realized that I had seen the end. The cause was lost!

The sun was rising bright above the trenches beyond the deserted battle ground as Rodney's battery came at a trot down what had once been a street, swung its guns into position and began firing a national salute.

With the roar of guns our flag rose to the top of the staff, unfolding all the stars and stripes as it caught the breezes.

The last campaign was ended.

RIDING TO HOUNDS WITH CAVALRY OFFICERS IN GERMANY.

By First Lieutenant GORDON JOHNSTON, Third Cavalry.

THE HUNT.

THE meet is to be at Isern-hagen at one o'clock, which is an hour's ride from the riding school—alternating walk and slow trot. This is always announced for the next hunt by the M. F. H. (after the kill) stating clearly the place and the time required to reach it at an easy pace.

The first waking thought of the morning is of your horse, and the next is of the weather. In the early grey your eyes seek the windows with a prayer that this may not be another of the rains such as only Hannover can produce—driving sheets of it for hours and all day without a break, far worse than the rainy season in the Islands. For you get soaked and chilled, your saddle gets slippery, but worst of all is the footing, always deep, but now miserable. As you gallop along across fields, the narrow sheets of water may be only an inch or two deep, or may be ugly holes or ditches filled to the brim. The banks of the streams will be soggy and either mire you up at the take-off or cave in and spill horse and rider head over heels. A big fence doesn't make your heart leap for joy when your mount's feet are skating four ways at once.

So the clear blue sky and the glow toward the east are welcome sights. Then you dress hurriedly and go to the stables, anxious for the good report from the groom. "Did he clean up his oats last night? Did he go after them this morning like a hungry horse?" Good! Then your hand slips down over the clean, clear-cut tendons, over the joints and along the pastern to the hoof. All smooth and cool, and

when he playfully drives out with a hind foot as you complete the inspection, you take it as a good omen.

It is a pleasant, comfortable feeling to stay for a moment to watch his morning toilet. His ears point to you every moment or so and his expression seems to say, "What are you watching me so closely for?" He throws his head about carefully within the limits of the grooming reins and you feel sure he has figured it all out. "Let me see; I was out on Tuesday, and my! but we did have a run. The sweat was running down my legs in nasty tickling streams, when we killed, way over by Kiebitzkrüg. Then I remember the black coming in on Thursday, mud from his ears to the tip of his stumpy tail. The groom was mad, too, because he had to wash him all over and then dry him off with towels—which takes about two hours, you know. By George, it's Saturday, and my day too! We'll be out with the hounds sure. If he'd only let me get among those yelping little beasts I'd show them some going, but he never will. I hope that big gray horse with the red hussar will try to brush by me again. He never would have done it if I hadn't hit that fence over by Krähenwinkel, and between the jolt I got on landing and the wind all scared out of me, too, I never could catch him again. He thinks a lot of himself, anyhow, just because there's about a spoonful of Arab blood in him."

And your eyes run over the smooth curve of his loins, the deep-muscled haunches, the long shoulder and powerful forearm, with a pervading sense of satisfaction, while your mind's eye skims ahead, seeing fences, streams, the big field of gay uniforms, the racing hounds, and at last the death in some far-away thicket. Of course you must rub his nose and pat his neck and say to him, "We do have great times together, Old Man, don't we?"

But first it's trot, trot, trot, around the riding hall on other horses, with the hands of the big clock moving eternally slow toward twelve. The double hurdles, without stirrups or reins, don't even liven up the time, for you feel that the ears of all officers riding are listening for the music of the hounds; their knees are feeling the long swinging hunting gallop. Every now and then you become conscious

of the poor instructor who is still talking about tact and tempo, feeling the movement of each foot and the finesse of aids—also that he is blessing that section out for everything he can produce from a language superabundantly provided for just such purposes. At last the welcome command, "First trooper to the left, to the left form front. Thank you, gentlemen," and he turns disgustedly on his heel as the grooms swing open the big doors and the officers peel off their horses, leaving the men to catch them.

There's a rush for the little canteen window where big fat sandwiches are in hot demand—also long glasses of creamy foamed beer to wash out the dust of the riding hall entirely. Similar streams of officers pour from all the halls about the big quadrangle, winds up to the window and trickle away toward the big gate by the blacksmith's shop where the stamping of many hoofs can be heard. So there they stand—bits, buckles and stirrups gleaming; girths, breast-straps and brow-bands fresh and white; with the well worn saddles—the hunters, impatient or eager or with assumed nonchalance, each according to his character.

Then it's mount and take the road. By twos, threes and little columns the riders turn their horses' heads out toward the great open plains called the "Haide." From little side streets others join the column which straggles out as some walk and others jog along. The first to strike the eye is the uniform. Instead of dull, business-like olive drab you may see here not only brilliant and beautiful uniforms, but scores of different sorts, for each cavalry regiment wears a different one, and I think there are about one hundred regiments. Of course there are no helmets or jaunty uhlan headpieces, which look something like a university mortar board cocked over on one side. All wear a cloth cap with a visor, much like ours, only a good deal lighter and softer, and therefore more comfortable.

There are the dragoons, uhlans and cuirassiers, all with the long frock coat, the tails of which are turned over and buttoned to the front edge, leaving the seat clear. The colors are light blue for the first, and dark for the two last named. But the double rows of big metal buttons are either

gold or silver, and each has a high collar of a brilliant color, red, green, pink, white, yellow, and a piping to match, and a cap with a broad band of the same color. The boots are either patent leather or highly polished black leather, and they are adorned with spurs of many different patterns. The hussars are still more picturesque, with their short frogged jackets, gold or silver stripes on the trousers, boots topped with the same, and they have many combinations of colors for both jackets and trousers. There are crimson jackets with silver or gold frogs, dark and light blue with other combinations, some pleasing, but all striking. The black hussars are noticeable, for their uniform is entirely black, frogs and all, except the gold stripe on the trousers, and these wear a white skull and cross-bones on the front of the cap, a distinguishing mark given the regiment a few centuries ago. There is a curiously colored brown hussar regiment which came by its uniform in an unusual way. It seems that Frederick the Great arrived at an old monastery during one of his campaigns with this regiment. The uniforms were in awful shape, and so the King asked for cloth to make new ones. This was refused. So he forcibly borrowed from their store rooms their supply kept there for the cowls and habits of the monks, and turned it into uniforms; and the regiment has used that color ever since. There are many interesting regimental stories going back to the time of Frederick the Great and his great captains of horse, Seidlitz and Ziethen, when cavalry was cavalry, and charged regardless of theory, and then charged again, reckless of horse-flesh, their own necks, and mathematical calculation which proved that it could not be done.

But back to the country road and a glance at the horses. The first point to catch the eye is the undoubted evidence of blood. I don't mean the raking, weedy sprinter, but the marks of what blood should really mean. The well formed head, large, intelligent, game eyes, the wide open space at the throat latch, the long, slanting shoulder with rather high withers, the long croup but slightly drooped, the solid, hard, clean-looking legs, with the tendons standing clear, and the

well proportioned hoofs. There was not a large proportion thoroughbred, but blood was there in plenty.

Next, one cannot help noting their condition. They looked fit, well fed, well groomed and regularly worked. All the equipment gave that same impression of good care and fitness. The steel parts were mostly of the naked stuff without any patent gloss or preservative, and this means daily constant work for grooms, for steel begins to show rust spots a few minutes after use in this raw, damp climate. The leather was unmistakably of the English oak tanned, not polished, but showing a smooth uncracked flexible surface.

In the meanwhile we have jogged about six miles, passing several little villages and a number of farm houses. Some of the latter were really only great big brick barns which the family divided up with the cattle, pigs, chickens, etc., on one side and the living rooms on the other—with the hayloft evidently a general depository. Up in the gable of every barn or house was a big wooden bullseye target, literally plugged full of holes. It seems that the peasants are having shooting matches all the time, so for convenience sake they locate the target ranges each by his own door. I judge that they use a small caliber, low power rifle, for the holes seemed to be the same on all targets, and in many cases the bullets had not penetrated. The villages are very pretty at a distance, with the red brick and tiles always set in a clump of fine trees. There was, however, a distinct flavor of pig in the air, which made one hurry on to get a view. The roads are fine, well built metal beds with always the sand bridle-path at one side, just right for cavalry in columns of twos, and always bordered with trees, in many sections of the country fruit trees. They are well drained, with a good ditch on either side. The frequent piles of crushed stone along these roads show that constant attention is given them. Each village is responsible for its section in all directions.

At last we turn a bend, and in the next village ahead we see the road full of horses which are being led up and down by small boys. As we near it ourselves a horde of the little

mites race up shouting "Onkel, Onkel, festhalten!" Instead of "Mister" the small boy in Germany calls all strange men "Uncle." They are quite happy to earn two and one-half cents for walking your horse. Even the little girls do a good business. It is really comical to see a little tow-headed mite of a girl, not much higher than his elbow, swinging to a great sixteen hand charger for dear life. The men from the neighboring farms and villages generally are on hand, and walk about looking the horses over with critical eyes, for the peasants of Hannover are born lovers of horses and good breeders too. Their inherited hatred of the French has its foundation chiefly in the fact that the officers quartered in Hannover took all of their best blooded stallions and mares away, to say nothing of the fact that they forgot to pay anything—at least so these people say.

Here in the spacious court of an old inn is the meet. The horses get a rest; the riders light up cigarettes and stroll into the "guest room" with its clean sand-scrubbed floor, and tables with solid benches, where the inn-keeper, his wife, and all of the daughters are busy with "jumping powder," alias "schnapps," or gin.

There to one side stands the Lieutenant General, chief of the riding school, Excellenz Von P—, a small trimly built man with fierce gray mustache. Near him, Colonel B—, the commandant, a very determined looking man with a restless, rather fierce brown eye. No one upon even first sight would question his ability to keep as many lusty lieutenants as you may choose to give him mighty well in hand. He must have come from some place similar to a certain State in our country, for he had a mania for wanting to see for himself what was going on, and generally managed to turn up unexpectedly. The General's two aides form the rest of the group. All are in pink hunting coats, white breeches, black boots and hunting caps. On the right arm of each, just above the elbow, is a band of black and white, the insignia of what is called a "pikör" officer, whose duties to the riders constituting the field (averaging 150) are quite similar to those of a whip to the pack. There are a number of these pink-coated pikör officers scattered among the

uniforms. One is chosen from each of the second year riding section as the best rider and mounted officer. Only these and visiting officers are allowed to wear pink coats. It is a most enviable distinction.

Naturally every one wanders over to the hounds, who stand in one corner under the huntsman and whips (who are called pikör non-commissioned officers, and also wear the pink coat and hunting cap, with the white sergeant's chevron on the right arm). Two of these have great brass horns in the form of a circle, which fit snugly over the right shoulder and under the left arm.

The hounds are splendid, sturdy looking fellows of typical English form and marking, except that they are noticeable for bigness of bone and weight, which the deep going of this country demands. They are on good terms with the officers, for they have even shared with them the big banquets at the club. "Why, didn't a lieutenant general of cavalry on the eve of his retirement—for age—mount his hunter towards the morning hours and ride at the head of our very selves up the curved stairway to the banquet room in the second story? And didn't the officers put us up on the long tables and feed us sugar and cheese and ice cream and all sorts of things? And didn't the General, who always rode hot on our heels, make his farewell speech from the saddle? Of course we know these fellows, and never fail to jump up on them with our muddy feet!" But all that's another story, and doesn't belong here unless you are really fond of hounds.

Just here there is a slight commotion, as the master, Count Königsmarck (whom our officers with the China expedition may remember) makes his way, with a hitch in his gait, to crack his spurs and report to the chef—with another hitch in his speech, for he stutters quite badly at times.

He is worthy of more than a passing notice. It would doubtless excite your wonder to figure out how he can walk at all if you knew how many bones in his body had been broken in steeple chases—and some of them several times over. For he was one of Germany's best steeple chase riders as well as one of the most daring. He has won many splen



THE MEET.



AT THE START.

LIEUT. GENERAL COMMANDING THE RIDING SCHOOL ON THE GREY HORSE.

did races, and that on some of the most dangerous and uncertain horses. One peculiarity of his riding at times attracted considerable comment. He took his jumps leaning forward on landing as well as at the take-off. It was against all principles and theories, but the fact remains that his mounts jumped well and willingly under him and won races. His face shows the gameness, too, for at my first sight of him something made me think of a bull-terrier (not meaning to be uncomplimentary).

There comes a whine and a yelp or so from the pack as the pikör sergeants mount. Then two of them sound a call on the horns, and the master trots off with his precious pack. We must wait until the commandant gives us the lead, for such a large field requires a good deal of handling. Everyone is busy with his last look over bits, girths and saddles, and also trying to steady his impatient horse.

At last the stream of riders crowds down the narrow road behind the commandant, pours out into a field, and forms a wide semi-circle back of him. The wagon with the empty cage, from which the boar was released some twenty minutes before, has pulled off to one side. There the hounds whimper and yelp while the whiplashes play among them, for they know that the scent lies strong before them. The chef sits his beautiful breedy grey quite still except that the grey's head is lifted toward the hounds every moment or so. Then in the rear the long line of the field; all horses crazy to be off, some plunging and kicking, others stamping or whirling. The riders have pulled their caps down tightly and are sitting deep in their saddles. The expression on every face says plainly, "Let us off."

The master rides back to the field, salutes, and says, "Gentlemen, the long stretch of water which you see in our immediate front is not a shallow puddle. It is about four feet deep in the middle and I advise you to jump and not try to gallop through." Then he rides back, salutes the chef, and at his sign to the huntsman the hounds break eagerly forward, released—and all of a sudden there is a wild triumphant burst of music as some forty hounds give tongue. They are off with a wild, rushing sweep. And yet

we must sit still until that grey gives us the lead. He seems to have taken root there, almost.

Yet here was a moment to figure on that streak of water ahead. There are many such in the low country which are only an inch or so deep, and the horses gallop through them. I watched the hounds eagerly, for an old hunting proverb flashed into my mind, to the effect that wherever hounds try to jump water you may race at it, but if they just plunge in and go to swimming the rider had better take a pull and a look. So I saw them jump for it, though mostly falling short, and made up my mind to get early to that place and avoid the rush, for I had an idea that there would be all sorts of a mix-up at that innocent looking puddle only fifty yards or so in front of those wildly eager horses. So I told my own that he could make his dash all right, with something from me to help him get off in a hurry too, and that at the edge of that water he must excuse me, but he'd get the spurs sharp and hard just back of the girth.

I did not see the first move of the grey, but the plunge of those horses sounded like a great wave just before breaking. My own hunter shot forward with a mad snort, and to my disgust bored down with the bit so that his nose was on his knees. Going so, he would not and could not jump. There was not a moment to hesitate, so I began to pound the spurs in as fast as my heels could work. With all that, his head only came up in the last stride before the water. Then I called to him and he cleared it twice over. Now he was going like mad, but I turned in time to see a long sheet of white water shoot up in the sunlight as the line hit. In the fleeting glance I saw horses and riders in all sorts of falling poses, and then there was something for me to do. My horse was wild and racing at a killing pace, boring again. No use tearing at his mouth only to jerk what little sense he has for the moment out of his head, and wearing oneself out. One can only let the seat slip back toward the cantle, lean back and keep the legs away from his ribs, and hope that he won't break his fool heart before the hunt really begins.

But the cry of the hounds in the distance is all that he hears; his heart leaps to the joy of the fierce, free pace, and

his whole being thrills in the use of the one talent intrusted to him by his Creator. Let him go. Soon he will miss the hand on the rein that speaks to him, the snug feel of the legs that guide and support him, and the seat that gives smoothly to his motion. Then his head bobs a time or two, the stiff jaw relaxes, I lift him, and he's mine again.

There may be riders who take in the view as they gallop, and see what other riders and their horses are doing, but for me there are only the hounds and hardly more than the narrow vista between the horse's ears. Just now the thought of the Weser River flashes in my mind, and as I think of the steep banks and uncertain bottom of that deep little stream it occurs to me that we shall probably take it more like a submarine than anything else, which thought was not very comforting. As luck would have it, however, there was a long stretch of clear, open going, nearly two miles I should judge, and then he was well in hand, though I had nearly ridden the chef down, and his glances were not hospitable, to say the least. Here there came a check, thank heaven, and what was left of the field, including some empty saddles, came up. How wide and flaming red the nostrils showed! And how clearly the faces showed which rider loved it and which did not.

A two mile race and the hunt hasn't begun. One wonders where that tough old boar, who had freedom until yesterday, is rushing to find it again; over what sort of country he will lead these horses, whose heaving flanks plead for fair going.

But a sharp yelp followed by the whole chorus is heard, and we're off again, scrambling into and plunging out of a stream which flows between high steep banks, on to a bit of level fine grass. An irrigation ditch lined with small brush gives us an exhilarating, flying leap, and then all settle down to business. There's many a "donnerwetter" heard as we gallop into a pine forest with those nasty low straight-out branches. It begins to get swampy, and all veer off along a dim wagon road. Then you hear horses plunging in the water and nasty black mud. Soon your own horse is plunging also, with others before and behind, clean up to your

stirrups. It is quite a different looking outfit when we strike the open again. Many caps are gone, faces are unrecognizable behind big daubs of mud, and uniforms as well as horses have changed color.

In a moment I held up a bit, for the old beast had taken to heavy going, as I feared, and it was telling on my horse. About a third of the field had passed me as we swept around a corner of the wood, and saw a long, open stretch ahead, seamed with fences. My horse's feet were slipping at every stride, but his ears pointed forward at the first fence, as he measured his jump and began to tuck his haunches under, with shortened stride.

An officer of uhlans, Count G—, was riding just abreast, only a bare horse length away. He rose to the jump first, and I heard the timber crash. At the same moment my horse hit the top rail hard, and I felt him dropping away from under me, but he caught himself quickly and scrambled to his feet. As he rose, I looked over to Count G—. His horse had gone clean down. but he had flung himself clear, still holding the reins. His horse plunged to his feet, and began to drag him. Count G—'s head was just about level with the horse's hind feet, on the right side. I was paralyzed for the moment, feeling that something ugly would happen. My own horse was for the instant almost out of control with excitement over his own close call, and had I dashed at the other horse it would only have driven him across the rider he was dragging. Then Count G—'s horse deliberately kicked him on the top of his bare head. It was a most sickening sound. One of the man's hands quivered for a moment in the air, and then fell limply by his still body. Riders were leaping or crashing through the fence to both sides, but no one seemed to care. When I had finally hauled my horse around, the trusty surgeon was there, dismounting. He sent an officer for the ambulance, and stopped a couple of others.

There was nothing for me to do, so I followed the broad tracks of the field. As we neared the other fences I was never so tempted to be unsportsmanlike and take the broken ones. But we galloped on, and as the old fellow rose gamely



A BAD CROSSING.



A CLEAN JUMP

to jump after jump, I felt like throwing my arms round his neck, if only it were not such a foolish thing to do. I did remember and apologize for many mean things I had done to him. The sickening sound of that skull-crushing blow was evidently working on me.

But we were making time, and soon we heard the hounds. They had the boar in a thick body of woods, where he was evidently picking out a good position for his last stand. The hounds gave a different tongue. They were evidently worrying him through the thicket, though not yet ready to deliver a determined attack. We pushed in behind them to get a glimpse, and could see for a moment every now and then the big black hulk of the boar, with the lighter forms of white and black and tan leaping about. He would whirl and make determined rushes, scattering them right and left. But the gap he made quickly closed up again. His beady eyes were dimmed with red, the lips were drawn back over the ugly tusks, and the white foam flecked his neck and sides.

The curtain is soon to drop on the last scene of the boar's life, but I doubt that his angry, blood-shot eyes take in the setting. The gloom of a dense thicket in the midst of the pines, its stillness broken by the baying hounds, now far from musical in tone; the steaming horses stamping and plunging through the brush, as eager to see as their riders; the brilliant colors of the uniforms all splashed with mud.

The master rides close on the heels of his hounds, hovering over them, and ordering riders back with language that admits of no misunderstanding. At that the wave of black and white and tan breaks over the boar. Some brave hound has fastened on a jaw, and then he is literally smothered. The master raises his hand to his visor, and the nearest officers drop from their horses and rush into the mêlée —for the one to throw the boar by his left hind leg wins the head. One dives into the mass, heaves him over, and the master's foot is on the throat, and the long hunting knife drawn. Each rider has bared his right hand, and now holding it high above his head shouts, "Halali! Halali!"

and the knife does its work, the pikör sergeants beating off the hounds.

The officer who throws the boar gets his head for a trophy, so they tumble from their horses and pile in with the hounds until one gets the regulation grip. Somehow, I never felt the desire to take part in this.

We had had the sport for which we came out, a splendid run across all sorts of country, and now *he* was facing his enemies gamely. Let him die by them, for surely it would have been a good death, with his back to a thorn bush and the long tusks ripping at the throats which had bayed so long on his track. After all, he had only a hog's life behind him, and the same proposition to face if he lived.

Now come the formal ceremonies of the "death." The boar is dragged out to some little clearing and the hounds are collected a few yards in front of him. The liver is cut out and sliced up into little pieces and scattered on the ground before him. In the meanwhile, the general commanding distributes a sprig of oak leaves to all riders in at the death. At a given moment all assemble in a circle about the hounds and the boar, which is posed to look as lifelike as possible. The pikör sergeants standing before the hounds now sound a certain call, and at the last note the hounds dash at the boar and growl over the scraps of liver, while the field all raise the ungloved right hand and shout "Halali." It means a fine of five marks to keep the right glove on from the first "Halali," and ten to cross a line between the hounds and the boar. Then the master standing with one foot on the boar, salutes and announces the place and time for the next meet. After this, the senior officer present steps out and wishes all "Weidmann's Heil," and all reply "Weidmann's Glück."

There is now a hurried mounting of horses, and we take the homeward trail, always with the hounds leading, and some fifteen kilometers to make. In that long ride your blood cools off from the excitement of the chase, the sweeping gallop with the wind in your face, and the manes tossing, the music of the hounds, the swing into the air over fences



"HALALI."

Type of German officer's charger imported by First Lieutenant Gordon Johnston, Third Cavalry. Now used at the mounted service school at Fort Riley.

Chestnut gelding, five years old, height 16 hands and 2½ inches. By Alnak, son of Adeptus, out of half bred mare by Landstreicher, son of Nobleman. Registered in Prussian stud book in class to which red certificates (for those horses a shade less than thoroughbred) are issued.

From a snap shot taken by Sergeant Hughes, Hospital Corps, at Fort Riley, February 15, 1908.

and water, and the kill—but there's a warm feeling in your heart for the horse that has carried you from start to finish.

As the dusk begins to fall my eye sweeps along the long column of twos. The bright colors are toned down by the mud of many fields and streams, and the scene is not near as gay or picturesque as it was before; but one thing is clear to me—these brother officers of a foreign service ride hard and true to the line of the hounds.

THE SABER AND THE CAVALRY.

By Major JOHN BIGELOW, Jr., U. S. Cavalry, Retired.

IT is to be hoped that the interesting article by Captain Pritchard, Fifth Cavalry, entitled "The Saber," and published in the January number of the JOURNAL, will give rise to a brisk and general exchange of views on the vitally important subject of which it treats. The following considerations and comments are the humble contribution of a retired cavalryman to this discussion.

The saber is but one of the three weapons with which our cavalry is armed. It is used less than either of the other two, and yet it is taken alone as the symbol of that arm of the service. There is reason in this partiality. The saber is the weapon upon which the cavalry chiefly relies for its distinguishing characteristic, for its essential quality. The chief weapon of the cavalry is the horse. The saber stands for the horse in combat, for the mounted charge, for the shock. There are officers in our cavalry who scorn the thought of being mounted infantry, but think of the mounted charge as a past glory of the cavalry that will never return to it. If their ideas prevail our so-called cavalry is not cavalry. It is no use for it to display cross sabers, and outshine the infantry and artillery in its uniform; it is essentially and simply mounted infantry. To be truly cavalry it must believe in the mounted charge as the essential thing. This does not mean that it must consider it as the most important thing. Modern cavalry must expect to fight more on foot than on horseback, to use its rifle perhaps a hundred times where it uses its saber once, but it must be adapted to meet that one case in a hundred, and meet it effectively. Dismounted fighting may be ever so common, ever so important; it is not essential to cavalry. Cavalry

can be cavalry without it, but it cannot be cavalry without the ability to fight mounted. The essential difference between cavalry and mounted infantry is that the former can fight mounted while the latter can not.

The final aim of mounted drill should be to produce a charging line in which every horse may be counted on to telescope a horse of the enemy. The trooper should feel that he has a contest to settle with his horse before he can use his saber; and the collective, wall-like effect which is called for in a charge, should result as far as possible from every man's moving individually at the proper gait, upon the proper objective, and depend as little as possible upon dressing.

Horsemanship is a great thing in a cavalry officer, but it will not make up for deficiency in drill and tactics. To plan and lead an attack requires qualifications which can not be acquired without study and the practice of leading men in the charge, and should be supplemented with practice in the mêlée, the rally, the pursuit and the retreat. The writer spent twenty-seven years in the cavalry, serving at various posts, under troop commanders, squadron commanders and regimental commanders. He can not recall an instance of his commanding officer at drill giving the command, "Charge!" O! the dreariness and weariness of those ployments and deployments, that everlasting getting into position or formation, and getting out of it.

The prominent and effective use that was made of mounted infantry in the war in South Africa strengthened the opposition to the saber in our army. Influence was at work in high quarters which would probably have stripped our cavalry of its old symbolic weapon had it not been for the resort had to cold steel in the Russo-Japanese War. We may feel that we have it with us now to stay during our time. The saber and the mounted charge must stand or fall together. General Cooke is reported to have said: "There is no middle ground. * * * We shall have, I say, such saber-armed cavalry, or else we shall have mounted infantry, using ponies or the still hardier mule."

I have myself, as troop commander, used some of the means and methods advocated by Captain Pritchard for training cavalry in the use of the saber. I had a straight-away track out of doors. But I put all the objects to be hit, the heads, posts, etc., in one line. The men took them to the right going one way, and to the left returning the other way; or (the distance between posts being sufficient) they changed sides by crossing the line between posts.

Every post was round, fixed in the ground, sawed off squarely on top, and from the top down—a distance of six to ten inches—was padded all around to represent a head. The heads for thrusts were covered with black leather and those for cuts with white canvas. They could thus be readily distinguished. The two kinds of paddings may have been of different composition, I do not remember. The heads on the ground were strapped to picket pins which were driven into the ground. There were also targets on one side of the line of posts to be fired at with the pistol. On special occasions, such as tournaments for prizes, I had heads nailed on boards, set on the tops of the posts, to be knocked off and replaced by attendants. But even then, these arrangements with attendants hardly seemed necessary. Each run lasted two minutes. When a trooper reached the end of the line of posts, he faced about and returned, and so kept on running till the time was up. I rarely used rings, because they required an attendant, and were comparatively hard to provide and rig up.

Captain Pritchard's head on a pin, the latter to be cut by the saber, is objectionable to my mind on account of its complexity. A new pin, I understand, has to be provided and put in place after each successful cut. If the quartermaster furnished the apparatus, including the extra pins, this would not be so bad; but there would still be the objectionable necessity of an attendant. I cannot see the need of a head at all if the exercise consists simply in cutting the pin. Captain Pritchard considers the leather head objectionable because it favors weak and flat hitting. With my posts one can usually tell by looking and listening whether a blow is strong or weak, sharp or flat.

I cannot agree with Captain Pritchard in giving "a value of, say one-half," to points in the manual (port saber, quarte point, etc.); as well score a man on the target range for his manual of the rifle. That kind of thing must detract in the soldier's mind from the seriousness of the exercise. Shooting and sabering should be made as realistic as possible, as much as can be like the real thing. The manual of the saber is nothing more than a preparation for cutting at heads and fencing. When the trooper is in either of these higher stages he should not have to think of the preparatory stage. Much time may be wasted in perfecting the trooper in the manual of the saber and in the saber exercise. There is more or less of such waste due to the incorporation of these drills in the ceremony of parade. It should be withdrawn from it; or, still better, the ceremony itself abolished. For the reason already given, that the exercise should be as realistic as possible, I should not fix the gait. Captain Pritchard would make it the regulation gallop. I should let each trooper learn by experience how fast he can go and make the maximum of points. Dangerous speeding can be prevented by requiring the line to be crossed between posts, as already indicated.

If I understand Captain Pritchard, he advocates the classification of cavalrymen throughout the army, by his system of marking, as *expert*, *excellent* or *proficient*. Unless the paraphernalia necessary to his exercises were furnished by some staff department, troops at different posts, being variously favored as to these exercises by their post quartermasters and post commanders, would not generally compete under similar conditions. But the chief difficulty in the way of such classification is, it seems to me, the great difference among the men as to their mounts. It would not be fair to classify them unless they all had about equally good horses. Judging from my experience, this classification would lead to the selection of a few suitable horses to be used by all the men of a troop, to the greater or less neglect of the other horses in the important training which running at heads affords.

For the development of interest and proficiency in the use of the saber I should depend upon fencing at least as

much as upon running at heads. It is easier, judging from my experience, to get a horse to stand up to a mounted fencer than to train him to ride up to a head post, especially where the track is out of doors with no enclosure. I was surprised to find in the Provisional Regulations for Saber Exercise (Par. 96) the phrase, "Fencing on horseback being generally impracticable." In my experience of about twenty years, off and on, as troop commander, I found it generally practicable. The principal difficulty that I met with was due to the inferiority of the fencing outfit furnished by the Ordnance Department, especially in fencing mounted. The masks are too light, and do not sufficiently cover the head; the plastrons and gloves, too, do not afford sufficient protection. After a contest of some duration between squads there were usually men laid up for a number of days with swollen wrists or bruised heads. The sabers, with their wooden blades, were too fragile; they were continually breaking, and apart from that they are too light. The weapon used in practice should be at least as heavy as the one used in service. Our fencing sabers should be of steel throughout. Thrusting with the ordnance saber is too dangerous to be allowed, at least in mounted fencing, with only the masks and other protection furnished by the Ordnance Department. Even in dismounted fencing it is hardly safe. As for the single-sticks, I would not allow my men to use them. Single-stick exercise, or practice, is not fencing, and leads in fencing to the use of the flat of the blade.

Classification after the system for marksmanship is perhaps desirable in fencing, but is not so necessary to the stimulation of the soldier's interest; and so far as I can see, is impracticable. The only classification that seems to me practicable and worthy of trial throughout the service, is based upon relative, not upon absolute proficiency. It consists in the determination of the best fencer or best fencers to a certain number, of each troop, and as far as practicable, of each squadron, and each regiment. The best fencer or fencers of each troop I would designate as troop fencers, the best of each squadron as squadron fencers, and the best of each regiment as regimental fencers. Each troop, and as far

as practicable each squadron, and each regiment, should have its fencing squad to represent the organization in collective contests.

Within a troop, emulation may be developed by contests among the four barrack-room squads. The JOURNAL may perhaps help the cause of the saber along by publishing rules for saber contests that may be contributed to it, and so lead to the formulation of a set of rules that shall be acceptable to the service at large. The following set of rules is offered as a beginning in this direction.

PROPOSED RULES FOR COLLECTIVE FENCING CONTESTS.

1. Each troop shall be represented by a squad of troopers and a supernumerary. One member of the squad shall be designated as chief of squad. All squads shall be of the same size.

2. Each trooper shall be mounted, and armed and equipped as follows: Two sabers (one in reserve), mask, plastron, right hand glove (gauntlet on left hand), saddle, curb bridle, spurs and leggins.

Each mask will be surmounted by a paper pompon conforming to pattern furnished the referee, and colored according to troop as follows:

"I"—Red.
"K"—Yellow.
"L"—White.
"M"—Green.

No saber shall be used that has not been examined and approved by the referee.

3. Each contest shall consist of two preliminary bouts and one final, each bout to last two minutes.

4. In the preliminary bouts the squads shall be opposed to each other by lot.

5. The squads winning the preliminary bouts will fence with each other as the final bout.

6. The squads will be formed facing each other in line with one yard between the horses, and ten yards between the lines. At a pistol shot preceded by the call "Ready," the contestants move forward and begin fencing. They continue until "Time" is called. Each contestant may choose his opponent at any time.

7. A contestant shall be disqualified and ruled out:

(*a*) If he lose his saber.

(*b*) If both of his feet touch the ground at or about the same time.

(*c*) If he lose his pompon.

(*d*) If he lose all the paper off his pompon.

(*e*) If he seize the pompon or any part of the clothing or body of an opponent.

(*f*) If he strike an opponent with anything but the blade of his saber, or by thrusting.

(*g*) If he hit an opponent below the plastron or hit an unmasked or unarmed opponent (see paragraph 11 following).

(*h*) If he deliver a blow after the call "Time."

(*i*) If he go beyond such bounds as may be fixed and announced by the referee.

8. A man who is ruled out in any contest cannot reënter or be replaced during the contest.

9. A contestant who falls out during a bout will not reenter the contest nor be replaced during that bout. Whether he shall reënter or be replaced after the bout shall be determined by the chief of squad with the approval of the referee.

10. Not more than one man shall be replaced in any one contest. The final bout may have to be fought with reduced numbers, but must start with an equal number on both sides. Who shall fall out when necessary to such equality, shall be determined by the chief of squad.

11. A contestant whose saber is broken, and who has none in reserve, may procure a new one from one of the judges, each of whom should be provided with one or two spare sabers. While thus renewing his saber a contestant will be considered as unarmed in the sense of paragraph 7, *g*, preceding.

12. Any protection that a man chooses to provide for his body beside plastron, gloves, and masks, is permitted.

13. Victory will be awarded to the side that knocks off the greater amount of paper.

RECRUITING.

By Major GEORGE H. MORGAN, Adjutant General.

NOTWITHSTANDING the continuous study of the problem of recruiting an army, as presented in its various aspects to all officers, it is remarkable how varying are the opinions as to the details necessary to eliminate or reduce even the evils incident to the present system in our army. I personally think that the evils of our present system, its impracticability in war, its almost utter breakdown in the last few months under very slight stress of peace conditions, call for some radical legislation.

The system of voluntary enlistments produced good results under the circumstances prevalent immediately after the Civil War, when the conditions of the country were such as to cultivate the martial virtues to a considerable degree, especially in the South and West. Even then there were evils, such as desertion, inability at times to get a sufficient number of good men, etc., and which now under the present state of society have reached an almost unsupportable stage.

The word conscription may not have a pleasant sound to a free man; neither have several others connected with public duty, such as taxes, jury duty, etc.; however, it may be shown to be a necessity in war and even in peace, and will be carried out cheerfully by some and obediently by the majority if made a law.

Theoretically and democratically there can be no question as to the advisability of filling the depleted ranks of the national force by the system based upon a theory of conscription, imposing upon the different States, according to population, the burden of service in the army, and theoretically requiring the rich man to bear his part of the public duty equally with his poorer brother. If a practical method

can be invented whereby the system can be developed in peace, it should be done, so that the method of recruiting may be made familiar to the people and to the officials who are intrusted with its details.

The system must be in charge of the national government, as the army is a national force, but, so far as practical, the details may be in the hands of the States interested.

As a natural result of such a scheme and necessary to its successful issue, the regiments of the national army should be localized for recruiting purposes; assigning regiments to sections in proportion to the population, and also in accordance with probable aptitude of the people of a section for any special arm.

The army would be made familiar to the people, and thus popularized; the crime of desertion would be looked at from a local rather than from the vague general view now held, and would probably be almost eliminated. A regiment of volunteers, with whose history I am familiar, passed through its four years of service without a desertion. Its record is the proudest memory of a proud State.

The regiments would be given a station for its home battalion, and the entire problem of keeping the strength of a regiment in the field would be a scientific work-a-day proposition, the details of which when worked out properly might spell victory and honor, when under the present system the reverse might be possible.

Thoughtful people all over the world are studying and observing the great experiment we are making in popular government. There is no doubt but that great minds, lovers of mankind, generally have the kindest, most helpful attitude towards us, our mistakes, defeats, our victories. One of them, commenting upon our obsolete system of volunteering, as he designates it, says, remembering the great disaster to Germany at Jena, that "the United States probably must be compelled to adopt the conscription system only after some such great disaster."

Fools learn only by experience; what shall we be designated when we do not even learn that way. When the perpetuity of human liberty and even our national life may be

dependent upon our patriotism and intelligence, should we not take seriously a lesson from the experience of other States when it has been illustrated by our own, and especially when the present method is a failure, and worse?

There is little local sentiment at present towards the upholding of the soldierly idea of honor, which is the foundation of discipline; see the disrespect shown to the flag, the uniform, and, when it dares, by a mob towards the individual soldier.

But the highest reason for the substitution of conscription for volunteering, and the localizing of regiments, is that it *must be* resorted to in war, and can be made to work in peace, as the object to be accomplished must be obtained. It would be only sanity to abandon the old method proven to be inoperative. The present system is unscientific, barbarous, expensive and does not accomplish the object.

The voluntary system, if persisted in, must be amended by making it an object for young men to devote their lives to the work; the periods of enlistment must be lengthened to at least the old five years term; in other words, the weakness of the conscription system of short term enlistments must not be grafted on the poorer volunteer system; soldiers must be relieved from all unmilitary labor; the uniform should be made sacred to the service; in short, the military *esprit* must be fostered in all legitimate ways, so that the young men of the country who have inclinations towards a military life may feel no degradation in enlisting, but will have on the contrary a pride in belonging to the strong arm of the Republic.

The details necessary to thoroughly carry out a complete system of reserves for an army in active service are properly to be considered when the system has been announced. They are numerous, although well known, and have been commented upon, and to some extent in a haphazard manner have been tried. In a few localities, the suggestion of General Schofield in regard to the introduction of the preliminary drills in the high schools have been carried out. Next to the regular military academies at West Point and Annapolis, probably the best field for the education of officers for

the war army is to be found in the great State universities. The total of cadets now undergoing instruction in the practical handling of troops in these great battalions is upwards of 30,000. When it is remembered that these are of the elite of the people, educated men, and when they graduate are practically all over twenty-one years of age, it would appear that this is the system to encourage, as the education is far in advance of that of a young man in the ranks, and has not its disadvantages.

To sum up, in my opinion it is either conscription or a matter of money to keep the regular army in working order. If the enlistment in a locality drop off, it is because the working man in that place gets more for his product than the government offers. The government must then do what a private employer of labor is required to do; that is, it must compete in the labor market for the men.

The non-commissioned officers and old soldiers forming the mainstay of the army in its operations, must be recognized by pay commensurate with their value. They are not ordinary laborers.

It is true that we might take advantage of the patriotism of the people at the outbreak of a war. When moved by the causes that have brought it about, the masses rush to the ranks; all should be accepted that are physically equipped, even though they may present themselves to the extent of a million, and although the country we may have a disagreement with be Venezuela. They should be enlisted for the war; when their services can be spared they may easily be mustered out, although it might be impossible to get them to enlist when the horrors of a long and costly war have been fully advertised.

For the purpose of indicating the line of thought a brief of the argument is added below:

- **Enlistments.**
  1. Voluntary.
  2. Conscription.
- **Voluntary.**
  - Good points.
    1. Better men for the service.
  - Bad points.
    1. Break down in war, possible.
    2. Increased desertion.
- **Conscription.**
  - Good points.
    1. Equality of burden on the people.
    2. System in keeping up personnel.
    3. Localizing the recruits.
    4. Reduction of desertion through local pride.
    5. Systematizing the instruction.
    6. Popularizing the army.
  - Bad Points.
    1. Too short service, bad under modern conditions.
    2. Fewer good soldiers proportionally.
- **Essentials for a good Volunteer Army.**
  1. Long service.
  2. System for reserves.
  3. Good pay, especially for re-enlistments.
  4. Localizing regiments.
  5. Home battalions (4th Bat.).
  6. General Service Corps.

The problem for the United States is to combine the good features so far as practicable of the two systems.

MARCHING OF CAVALRY IN ROLLING COUNTRY.

By Major J. T. DICKMAN, Thirteenth Cavalry.

THE march of a cavalry command through undulating country, with its ridges, valleys, slopes and level stretches, furnishes an interesting problem. The question of fatigue of lungs and muscles discourages rapid movements up hill, and regard for the horse's feet and legs, as well as for the safety and comfort of the rider, precludes fast gaits down grade unless the slope be very gentle. It is necessary to do a certain amount of trotting to prevent sore backs, and it is desirable that progress be smooth, uninterrupted, and reasonably rapid. All this is best accomplished by marching with considerable distance between units, the smallest intact organization considered being the troop.

It is a fundamental principle of marching that the gait must be uniform throughout a closed unit. This makes it imperative that the rate at the head of the unit be such that all the troopers can keep up without unusual effort, and that all changes of gait be executed simultaneously in accordance with command or signal.

The cavalry drill regulations fail to prescribe any distance between the troops of a squadron at route order in column of fours or twos, but close distance is generally assumed to be nine yards. In paragraph 981, we find that "The regulation distance between squadrons, or even troops, may be increased to some definite proportion of the size of the organization, so that each may maintain a steady gait." In order to study this question with a view to ascertaining what distance between units is best for average conditions, let us first examine the *march of a squadron, closed up.*

Assume length of each troop in column of twos, fifty men and two officers, 110 yards. Rate of walk 110 yards per

minute, half speed on slopes. Required: Time to march from A to B, one mile. (Fig. 1.)

The head of the squadron will march at half speed from A to C, the end of the last troop then reaching the foot of the slope at D; time, twelve minutes. Then at full speed from C to E, four minutes, and again at half speed from E to B, the end of the last troop arriving at F; time, twelve minutes. Total time, twenty-eight minutes.

On level ground the mile would have been passed over in sixteen minutes. The slopes, therefore, have caused a loss of twelve minutes, and the average rate for the mile was reduced from three and three-fourths to two and one-seventh miles per hour. Now in rolling country one valley to a mile is not above the average, in fact, they often occur with much greater frequency. It is clear that on the ground assumed a closed unit larger than a squadron could march only at the



FIGURE 1.

speed maintained on the slopes; also, that when there are more than two slopes in a mile, even a small squadron would seldom be able to walk at full speed.

If the command be marching at a trot, it would have to take the slow gait as soon as the head reached the slope at A. It could trot only between C and E, two minutes, and the time for the mile would be twenty-six minutes, making a loss of eighteen minutes when compared with the trot on a level road.

While most slopes are not so steep as to reduce the rate of walk one half, yet it is evident that in rolling country rigid closing up necessitates great delay in the march of commands larger than a troop. It may also be said that not many bad slopes are 200 yards in length, but it is the frequency of such obstacles rather than their extent that impedes progress, for, however short the incline may be, the

check will pass through the whole column and its whole length will be forced to march at reduced speed. The same is true whatever the cause of delay—fording of streams, wading through mudholes, crossing railway tracks, etc. The extreme case, squadron closed up solid, was taken for sake of illustration, but the same evils exist in a less degree when distances of only nine yards are permitted.

Let us now consider the *march of a squadron with distances.*

Assume that the troops are marching with the maximum distance of 110 yards, with authority to diminish it as circumstances may require. (Fig. 2.)

When the end of the leading troop marching at half speed has reached A, the head of the second troop will have closed up; and when the second troop has passed A, the third troop will be closed up, etc. The time required for the end of the leading troop to pass the foot of the slope at D, is six minutes.



FIGURE 2

The troop will then march at full walk for seven minutes, followed at 110 yards by the second troop as soon as it has passed D. In ascending the slope EF the leading troop again is overtaken by the second; it will pass F in six minutes, and in three minutes more at full walk will complete the mile. Time, twenty-two minutes. Compared with the march of the closed squadron this is a gain of six minutes, which in a day's march of twenty miles would amount to two hours.

At the trot, say seven and one-half miles per hour, the succeeding troops would gain on the first troop at the rate of three yards in every four marched, and as the end of the leading troop passes A, the whole squadron will be closed up. To prevent retardation of the march at A, and to permit the leading troop to start off at a trot from D, distances of 330 yards would be necessary. There are very few cases in which such a degree of extension would be advantageous.

The best average distance is one which avoids undue extension and at the same time takes up the great majority of checks to the march. The commanding officer selects the best ground for the trot; if he should come to a bad slope or a ford he would naturally sound the walk and wait for a better opportunity to get in the requisite amount of trotting. Moreover, on the slopes of average roads progress could be kept up at better than half speed, in most cases at two and one-half to three miles an hour, which would clear the road that much faster for troops following at the road trot.

For the smooth marching of a squadron in rolling country we therefore have the general rule that troops should be separated by *troop length;* in specially uneven country, or for rapid marching, the squadron commander may order twice that distance. It is understood, of course, that when the leading troop is forced to reduce its rate of march, the others continue at full speed until they in turn reach the obstacle or are closed up, and that the leading troop will resume full speed without waiting for the others. The distance between troops is thus a fluctuating quantity, varying between zero and the maximum authorized.

In the practical application of this method of marching the troops should remain closed up to nine yards until the first halt, and they should resume such formation while going through cities and upon approaching destination. The squadron may be closed up at any time by sounding the "assembly." The gaits should be regulated by the squadron commander, who may give his orders to the first troop by voice or whistle, and to the whole squadron by trumpet.

The distance between squadrons in a regiment need not be greater than that between troops, so far as marching is concerned, but increased distances are very desirable for rests and when it is necessary to water on the road. A convenient way is to prescribe intervals of ten to fifteen minutes in the time of starting the squadrons.

The principal advantage gained by marching with distances is the increase in the rate of progress of the whole, in fact, it is the only satisfactory way for a cavalry command to get over undulating country.

Various objections may be urged against this method of marching; for example: (1) The troops take up too much space on the road; (2) they are out of immediate control of the commanding officer; and (3) the formation is not suitable for tactical reasons. All these objections are valid under proper circumstances. In marching towards a battlefield, if the number of parallel roads is scarce, it becomes imperative to shorten columns. In campaign and at maneuvers, as soon as the troops enter the field of possible tactical employment, they must be in concentrated formation for the sake of control and mobility. But for ordinary road marches in time of peace, changes of station, and many so-called practice marches, as well as for movements in time of war at a distance from the theater of operations, another consideration is paramount, namely, the maintenance of good condition in men and horses. If the horses be stove up or have their shoes knocked off by trotting or galloping down hill and over rocky roads, or if a large proportion of the backs be covered with festering sores, the command certainly will not be able to do itself justice in emergency. When the time comes for the "utmost exertion," it has no reserve to draw on.

The desire to exercise personal control over a large force often springs from hoary tradition or false vanity. When squadron and troop commanders cannot be trusted to manage their units, the regiment is in a bad way. It will not be educated in marching by remaining at all times under the eye of the colonel. It is an erroneous principle which sacrifices the efficiency and comfort of a command to the shortcomings of a few officers.

After the Civil War, and up to 1893, nearly all the marching of our cavalry was done at a walk. The regimental train consisted of army wagons drawn by six mules. Many of the officers endeavored to bring their horses up to the regulation gait, four miles per hour; others insisted on a slower gait so as to make sure that all the horses could keep up at a walk. Nothing more tedious can be imagined than a twenty-five mile march on a dusty July day over the plains of the Southwest at the rate of three and one-half miles an hour, towards distant objectives marked by railroad water tanks dancing in

the mirage. This class of marches has almost disappeared, survivors of that school being only occasionally met with.

A much larger proportion of the troop and squadron commanders of those days had the habit of letting out their horses on the march, regardless of what came after them, and as they generally had the best walkers, the march for the rest of the command became a "*suive qui peut*," in which most of the horses never walked. This method of marching is by no means extinct, as is known from very recent experience; it will be found whenever ignorance or thoughtlessness have their opportunity.

The principles of marching are so simple that it seems a waste of time to dwell upon them. Yet the violation of these principles cost the government many millions during the Civil War—most of the operations being over rolling country—has decimated cavalry commands since that period, and will in future wars work similar destruction. Young cavalry officers of the present generation should familiarize themselves with the application of these principles on all kinds of ground in order to be able to assist in restraining the "horse killers," sure to be found in many positions in future military operations.

FOREIGN HORSES AND HORSEMANSHIP.

By Captain W. C. SHORT, Thirteenth Cavalry.

KNOWING the interest that obtains in our cavalry in foreign schools of equitation and the number of our officers desiring details at these institutions, I am persuaded that some of the notes I made from the report of Captain Féline on his return from the International Concours Hippique, which was held at Turin, Italy, in June 1902, will be of interest.

In accepting the opinion of Captain Féline it must be remembered that he is considered the first master in France, and that means in all Europe.

In order that the notes from the report may be the better understood, I deem it best to state the object sought in the training here at Saumur and the necessity of so much care.

In the first place, horses and forage are very expensive in France, and a big force of cavalry being maintained, it is necessary that a horse when purchased be made to serve his full purpose, both as regards usefulness and durability. The inspection report is not abused here as it is with us, and when ten horses are bought, it means ten horses for service and for as long as they can be kept on their feet, and with the careful training of the officer and the methods of training the remount, I must say the results are excellent.

The objects sought in training the horse are much more exacting than in our service, which I will explain in as few words as possible.

1. The horse must go ahead calmly, boldly and straight, at a walk, trot and gallop.

2. He must lead with the leg desired and change at will of rider.

3. He must jump boldly and at a brisk gait any reasonable obstacle in the open country.

4. He must be supple and amenable to discipline.

5. After the training he should be as sound as when he commenced, and without blemish as a result of the work he has been obliged to undergo.

All necessary time required for the training is allowed, and no military duty is required of the horse until he is thoroughly trained. The methods are simple but reasonable; the horse is suppled, started well on the walk, trot and gallop in the riding hall, all this work being done while moving and never in place; the horse, then, is taken outside every day for part of his lesson, thus combining the riding hall with the outside work. Until the horse is very steady all this work is done with the double snaffle.

The training with the cavesson and longe is a great feature, and I must say it was a revelation to me. It serves to supple, to discipline and to make good, calm jumpers. All extremes of training in any direction are eliminated.

The French, as a rule, have not very good horses to work on, and the results obtained with the material at hand are due mainly to the splendid training of the officers and the traditions of training which have come down for over a century as being the first horsemen in Europe. These traditions have also the great value of keeping up uniformity in training throughout the French army.

As to the horses, the thoroughbred is the favorite, but they are very expensive here, and when one comes within the price fixed for the army, he is not very good or not entirely sound.

The thoroughbreds at this school are good, but not excellent from a point of view of conformation, but they are the most pleasant animals to ride that I have ever mounted, this being due entirely to their training.

The next favorite horse with the French is the Anglo-Arab, obtained generally by crossing the Arab with the thoroughbred or the reverse, and the result is an excellent cavalry horse. As many Anglo-Arabs as possible are raised

and purchased by the French government for the light cavalry. They are less expensive than the thoroughbred.

The heavy cavalry in France requires a larger horse, and for this the favorite is a half-bred horse obtained by crossing the thorough-bred with Norman mares; but this cross is difficult to obtain because the breeders (as in America) try to get a fast trotter and cross their mares with trotting stallions. If the horse does not trot fast enough, he is sold to the army, and as a consequence, the average half-bred in the French army is more of a carriage horse than a saddle animal, and he would not do for the saddle at all if it was not for his splendid training. The French government has started a society to encourage the raising of a type of horse for the cavalry, and prizes are given each year in the different provinces. We would do well to follow their example in this respect.

There is no question but that the Irish horse is the best all around weight carrier in the world. He is a saddle horse, raised for that purpose, and has none of the carriage horse action or conformation, but he is also very expensive and out of reach of all but the rich officer.

One word about the French seat in the saddle. One can find it by getting on a bareback horse and letting the legs hang down naturally, with the heels a little lower than the toe when the stirrups are used.

When the horse jumps or you wish to push him forward, an additional hold is taken on the horse's sides with the upper part of the calf of the leg, the toes being slightly turned out. Except in the training of young horses, all the work, both in the riding hall and cross-country, is without stirrups on the saddle, and consequently one soon learns to fall into the calf grip.

The Concours Hippique was an international contest in equitation held at Turin in 1902. It was open to the world, and each of the following nations sent three judges and ten contestants from its army, viz: France, Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy. Belgium sent three contestants, Spain sent one judge, and Norway and Sweden one judge.

It will be noticed that all great European horse nations were represented except England, which was engaged at that

time in the Boer War. The judges were all field officers or of a higher grade, and were chosen on account of their knowledge of equitation. Of the French officers who were to contest, five were selected from the riding masters at Saumur and five from the army at large. Unfortunately these officers were required by their superiors to take their half-breds, as being a distinctive horse of their country. In spite of this handicap of horseflesh they won almost all the prizes, from pure ability in equitation. One of the Russian officers who was there and who is now at Saumur as a student officer, stated in my presence, that if the Italian authorities had not divided the purses for consolation prizes, the French officers would have taken almost everything.

Attention should be called to the fact that one of the riding masters now at Saumur won the great international cavalry speed contest from Brussels to Ostend on the famous little fifteen-hand thoroughbred "Courageux." I have had the pleasure of riding the little champion here at Saumur, where he still does his share of duty like any of the other horses.

When the matter of the different systems of equitation came up before the class to which I belong, Captain Féline read his report on the Concours, and from the notes I took I have selected the parts most interesting to us, with the view of proving that our War Department is sending our officers to the school that produces riders who win from the graduates of other schools. Also to show that the system followed at Riley, which is on the same lines as at Saumur, should be supported and aided by all as being a move in the line of improvement.

Captain Féline stated that he found the Concours itself very instructive to a supreme degree, because he was able to compare the horsemen and horses of all the powers represented. He proceeded to pass them in review successively, basing his remarks upon what he knew, what he saw and what he learned from talking to the officers of the powers in question.

He began with the Italians, and expressed the opinion that they have neglected their training for the love of cross-country riding. "Formerly the Italians only practiced riding-hall equitation, but at the time of the Concours they thought only of cross-country riding and making their horses jump anything in sight, without regard to how it was done or how many bones were broken."

It can therefore be well understood why the Italians had no contestants for the prize in training. However, the commandant of the cavalry school at Pinerols, Italy, made a visit to Saumur and went away convinced that the methods practiced there were correct, and that a horse could be ridden cross-country just as boldly and with less fatigue and wear, if he was first suppled and prepared by riding hall work. Upon returning to Italy he required his riding masters to follow the system at Saumur.

At the Concours the Italian officers were mounted on magnificent Irish horses, that jumped and galloped as saddle horses should, and it was not on account of the Norman half-breds that the French officers won, but rather to their horsemanship.

The Austrians believe in training, but their method is faulty somewhere, as was shown by the fact that they were not able to perform all the requirements of the Concours. Their horses rushed at their jumps, and the riders were not able to give the necessary amount of rein to allow their horses' hind legs to go over free for fear they would bolt.

However, an Austrian won the contest in training, although it was not considered that the competition was very serious. Only one French officer entered, and his mare, for reasons peculiar to her sex, was contracted and without energy, and would not respond to the demands of her rider. The work in this class was most simple, and for that reason it was difficult to execute well.

The Austrian horses are of the Anglo-Arab type. The German horses brought to the Coucours were not a pretty lot, with the exception of one, but that one, an Irish horse, was the most beautiful horse present; they were all different, without distinction, and too round.

The German riders were much criticised at the Concours on account of their seat in the saddle, tongs across the

wall, and this seat is undoubtedly the cause of their heavy hands. They also overdo the use of their aids, and although their methods are correct and without any grotesque exhibition, yet in comparison with an easy, graceful rider, the German gives you the idea of the difference between an artist and an amateur.

However, if the German officers do not ride well, they all ride and ride hard; they hunt and race and court danger on horseback all the time, which certainly makes better cavalrymen.

The Emperor is evidently of this opinion, as he sends all captains who are to be promoted to major during the year to Hannover for a short course, and if they do not care to ride, or cannot ride long and fast, they must get out. Captain Féline thinks that in order to judge a horseman, it is necessary to see him ride fast and in jumping, as the difficulties on horseback increase as the square of the speed.

The French government is more severe than the Germans with their officers, and each year a class of majors of cavalry is sent to Saumur for three months, and they ride the same horses over the same country, and just as fast as do the lieutenants.

The Russians came to the Concours with horses of every kind and description, and from every country, and to give an idea of them it would be necessary to describe each separately. The riders also had as much difference in their methods as in their mounts. Some of them were very good riders, but all lacked finish.

The judges, at the conclusion of the Concours, were unanimous in stating that the French officers were incomparably superior to those of any other European cavalry in all the branches of equitation, and the most pleasing souvenir which they brought away from Italy was the remembrance of the frank way in which most of their opponents came to them and asked the methods to follow in order to have such calm and well trained horses.

Captain Féline stated that he is informed that great progress in equitation has been made in all Europe since the Concours, but he impressed the class with the necessity of

not deviating from the old traditions, and not to follow the new fashion of the civilian, to shorten up the stirrups too much and to sit like a monkey, or the results for French equitation at the next Concours would be entirely different.

It might be well to call attention to the fact that this school is very old, and the good effects of its instruction have been felt for many generations in the army, and too much cannot be expected from our young school at Riley, but eventually we will arrive at a good system, applicable to our needs, but this will take time.

Let us hope that the day is not far distant when more interest will be taken in "our friend, the horse," in the American cavalry.

THE SADDLE PROBLEM.

By First Lieutenant GORDON JOHNSTON, Third Cavalry.

THE question of "sore backs" has been under consideration and discussion for a long time, and without any decided practical results having been achieved. The service saddle has been subjected to repeated attacks, and the writer would gladly join in them if he could at the same time bring forward a substitute which will answer all demands with greater satisfaction. To condemn it without offering a better is futile.

To carry our rifle and pack is the point where we are all stopped—when it comes to a change.

However, one way toward results is the examination of the fundamental principles involved, a clear understanding of the problems and the fixing of a definite objective or ideal in our minds. There can scarcely be any doubt but that American ingenuity and practical common sense, will find the solution.

The first question (and that is also far from finding a concensus of opinion upon the answer to it) is, "What sort of a cavalry are we going to have?" Shall we be mounted infantry trained also for mounted action in battle, or shall we be cavalry trained also for the action of mounted infantry when the necessity arises. We are practically all of the opinion that both actions are necessary and essential, but they cannot go evenly in hand without detriment to one or the other. In other words, shall ours be a galloping cavalry, where celerity, solidity and certainty of striking are our objectives, where the horse is a weapon, and where the troop, squadron, regiment, brigade or division is also one powerful weapon with which a commander may strike a terrible blow, whatever the cost may be—where the same bodies will upon occasion be capable of dismounted action, and may be moved into it at great speed? Or shall our prime objective be the dismounted action, with mounted action as secondary?

It is perfectly plain what a wide difference should exist in the training, mounting, packing and equipment of cavalry for whichever purpose is to predominate. However, the consideration of this principle belongs to those who stand at our head.

Assuming that our principle is to develop along the first mentioned line, there arises the more practical detail of the principles of saddling, with which this article is primarily concerned. We have a given weight to carry and the first question to arise—in connection with the saddle—is as to the bearing surface upon which this may be distributed. Naturally we wish to utilize every inch of it, for the sake of our mount, and it is assumed that all consideration is due that mount. Having determined as far as practicable the form, extent and nature of this bearing surface, the next question is to fit the under surface of the saddle to the same in such a manner as, first, to prevent injury to the bearing surface of the back; second, to interfere the very least with him in the performance of his function, and also, naturally, to adjust the load in as even a balance as possible and with its center of gravity as low as possible. The latter (referring to the load) does not enter into the present paper.

As to the bearing surface of the back, the restriction offered must be used to fix its limits. There must be no direct pressure on the withers, nor any restriction of the free movement of the upper end of the shoulder blades. That constitutes the limit forward. To the sides, a perpendicular to the ground, tangent to the sides gives us the technical supporting area, but as we move to the rear we realize that pressure on the ribs directly affects the lungs, and consequently the breathing of the horse. This tendency increases particularly after the eighth or last true rib is passed.

As to the limit of area toward the loins, that is more difficult to determine and involves the function or action of

the back. At any rate, we see that our bearing or contact surface of the under surface of the saddle, and the true supporting area of the back, assume the form of a triangle deduced from the restrictions offered by the back of the horse itself. Now as to the rearward limits. We know that the broad flat muscles along either side of the backbone furnish a natural supporting area, and it is generally accepted that we may not trespass on the loins, because there the back is weakest. But there is a still more important restriction, which lies in the function and action of the back.

Saddles are generally fitted, neccessarily, to horses standing still. As a matter of fact, so long as they are standing it doesn't make much difference what sort of a saddle is put on. When it comes to the horse in action, the affair has quite another aspect. There is a forward and backward slide of the shoulder blades, a contraction and expansion of the ribs, and a regular undulation of the back. The last is not only a most important consideration in this connection, but a vital one in all matters pertaining to horsemanship.

Step for step, stride for stride, there is an upward and a downward swing in the back, extending from about the eleventh dorsal vertebra clear through the lumbar vertebræ. The muscles involved in this action are, for the upward swing, or arch, principally the psoas magnus and psoas parvus, secondarily the transversus abdominis, rectus abdominis and the latissimus dorsi; for the downward swing, principally the longissimus dorsi, and secondarily the multifidus spinæ. Less technically, the former lie under and on both sides of the backbone and are attached from the same to the hind-quarters; the latter are above the backbone on both sides, and the principal one (longissimus dorsi) is one with which all are familiar. With this one a horse kicks when the front feet are fixed, and rears when the hind ones are on the ground.

It is, however, the deep and absolutely concealed *psoas magnus*, etc., which are most important. They bring the haunches under, bring the powers of all the others into a position where they may have full play. It may be that this is the real explanation of the track saying that "They run

in all sorts of form," and we know that they jump and trot in all sorts of forms, too. Let this go as a fact, as it is not in place to discuss this function here, especially as I hope to offer a more technical paper later on the subject.

We see at once that this action will have a tendency to lift and lower the pommel and cantle of the saddle. The further the saddle's bearing surface extends to the rear the more dip or dig will be imparted to the pommel's end, and conversely, as the forehand lifts and the back inclines to sink, to the cantle end. But if the bearing surface of the cantle end of the saddle has an upward curve, and that of the pommel is so rounded and curved that it will fit into the hollow just back of the withers on both sides where it will rest on true ribs and muscle, we see that this play is not liable to cause injury. The weight on the saddle has this tendency also, from the inclination of the back, when the horse is in motion, to vary from the horizontal, resulting in tilting first one end and then the other. So the saddle should be made fast only at one point, and that by way of the girth passing over the true ribs and sternum.

For lack of definite data let us close our triangle by a point about the sixteenth vertebra with the under surface curving towards the fourteenth. It does seem that our service saddle departs considerably from the above deductions. First, the under surface of the side bars is nearly straight, and has practically no curve at the ends, thus digging into the horse, front and rear—due to the action of the back—when the horse is in motion. May we not assume that this is at least partially the cause of sore backs? I am leaving entirely out of consideration the part played by the rider, and saddles which are not properly fitted. Second, the quarter straps, binding down the pommel and cantle ends, seem to work directly against the natural action of the back, and intensify the power of the side bars to cause injury. May we not find here also the reason for the slipping of the blanket, due to the wave-like undulations forward and rearward of the back, and the rocking or tilting of the weight borne on the saddle, with corresponding digging of the two ends? Doesn't it seem also unfair that we put the horse in

a straight-jacket, as it were, tie down the very muscles that are most necessary, and then require him to go all gaits and to jump, also?

It goes without saying that the backbone with its thin defense must be protected, and that the same defense or open gullet should offer some ventilation. When the gullet is entirely open, as in the service saddle, we find also two heat-producing bodies directly in contact with one another—the back of the horse and the seat of the rider. The tendency will be to maintain at least a fixed degree of heat, if not to produce more. Whereas, if a non-conductive substance is interposed between these heat producing bodies, with a passage of air from pommel to cantle, we see at once that the heat will be reduced. The non conductive layer should be utilized to make the seat as comfortable as possible for the rider, for the part of his anatomy upon which he sits is none too well protected by skin and bone if he sits correctly. If it is hard or too uncomfortable, he will, instinctively and even unconsciously, attempt to find a more easy position. This leads to an improper use of the stirrups, and a pushing back against the cantle—thereby digging the cantle end of the side bars still deeper into the back, with all the attendant evils.

The protection of the back from direct shock is also necessary. If anyone thinks that a rider weighing about one hundred and fifty pounds can't hurt a horse by thumping on his back he is much mistaken. I am convinced that this discomfort to a horse's back equals that to his mouth in bad riding, and is the cause of much misconduct on the horse's part. The construction, therefore, should be such as to break this shock as much as possible without raising the rider too high from the horse. Furthermore, neither our saddle nor girth nor anything else should interfere with the rider's thigh and knee resting smoothly, and finding a secure grip, or his lower leg having a constant light feeling of the horse's sides. That the knee and thigh must find an easy, secure resting place will hardly be questioned, but the position of the lower leg will probably raise a question in many minds. Nevertheless this is a most important principle, and

particularly so for military riding, where only one hand is free to do the riding. The reins guide the forehand, but the lower leg the haunches. The driving power of the horse lies in his haunches, and for that very reason the control of that power is most important. In every change of direction or turn, the lower legs resting on the girth or just in the rear of it, should act in harmony with the hands.

Further, it is the lower leg which collects a horse by bringing his haunches under him. Also we find that it is one of the most potent driving aids. As the ribs expand and contract the lower leg of the rider plays to them. By alternate pressure, in harmony with the contraction, we increase the same, and consequently, by reaction, the expansion, and the horse feels the impulse to move faster. On the contrary, by restraining the expansion his impulse is to reduce the gait. These are natural aids, and easily comprehended by the horse, whereas when a jab of the spur is his first notice, it must give him a shock, and does appear a bit crude.

The stirrups must be hung so that the thigh and lower leg may most easily and directly perform their duties. Let me repeat that this paper is not offered as a solution, but to tempt others to interest themselves in working out the problem. At any rate, let us give the first and greatest consideration to the animal which bears us. Let us get the very best saddle, then fit our horsemanship to the horse in the same manner, and then let us ask for nobler animals. These secured, it will be up to us to show what can be done.

Reprints and Translations.

THE WAR GAME AND MAP MANEUVERS.

TRANSLATED FROM "REVUE MILITAIRE GENERALE,"
BY CAPTAIN FARRAND SAYRE, EIGHTH U. S. CAVALRY.

UNTIL the beginning of the nineteenth century, European wars were long enough and frequent enough to enable officers as well as soldiers to learn the art of war. An officer needed only to be intelligent and observing in order to acquire the necessary experience and knowledge.

Since 1815, wars—European wars at least—have become rarer and shorter. In 1870 already, our officers had engaged very little in serious war; our generals especially were formed in Algiers and Mexico. Of our two European wars, the Crimean War had been of a special nature and was little more than a long siege; and the war in Italy hardly lasted two months. These two months were enough to reveal many defects in our military instruction; defects which success and a blind sophistry concealed to the eyes of the French nation and of the French army, but to them alone.

At the beginning of 1870, the French army knew no means of instruction except war, but had absolute confidence in the experience of its officers. Its leaders, educated by incessant campaigns in all parts of the world, seemed to us to be much better fitted to conduct military operations than the German officers, the most experienced of whom had seen only two campaigns.

The awakening was bitter. Our defeats showed us that we did not know how to make war. Our leaders, instructed only by experience, employed against the Germans methods which they had used successfully against their old enemies, the Arabs. From this resulted inefficient cavalry reconnaissance, bivouacking troops instead of quartering them in villages, bad march orders, breaking up of batteries, inflexible formations, etc. On the other hand, our antagonists, Prussians who had not fired a shot for fifty years, knew how to make war. They kept themselves covered and well informed, often surprised us, but did not allow us to surprise them, made skillful use of ground, and used pliable formations.

Where and how did they learn all that? We had to surrender to evidence, and to acknowledge that it is possible to learn in time of peace how to make war.

Very soon events showed that it is no longer possible to learn in any other way. Great wars have become so infrequent that in most European armies officers have risen to the highest grades without having been in a battle. Besides, changes in arms and in organization have become so rapid and so important that, although the essence of war remains the same, its methods and instruments continually change. After the War of 1870, the necessity of instruction in time of peace was recognized in France, and the work was begun with enthusiasm. But results do not achieve themselves in instruction any more than they do in war. Methods were lacking, and so, in spite of the zeal displayed, in spite of an incredible amount of labor performed, we were groping in the dark and our progress was slow.

Our love of classic learning led us first to the study of didactic works. Jomini, Clausewitz and Willisen were studied; we learned to discuss the great principles which govern the conduct of war. The works of General Lewal were the most remarkable productions of this period.

We learned, and the publication of the work of Colonel Ardant du Picq aided us in this, that war was, before all, a matter of moral preparation, national character and execution, and, in order to understand it, we must study history and study

it in its details. But the materials were lacking. The war records were inaccessible; instead of military history, we had only *resumés* like "The History of the Revolution and the Empire," by Thiers, and some memoirs which were more or less apocryphal. It was impossible to retrace in detail a single military operation in its entirety, or to extract practical instruction from them To point out the way and to furnish our officers material for the study of military history, we had to make use of the History of the War of 1870–1, published by the German General Staff, the works of Major Maillard on Saint Privat, and of Major Bonnal on Froeschwiller, and Captain Foucart on the Campaign of 1806. The way once shown, the very interesting publications of the historical section of the French General Staff, and works resulting from the private research of a great number of officers, followed each other rapidly; and to-day officers who wish to study military history cannot complain of a lack of material.

Didactic works are indispensable in order to elucidate the principles governing the leading of troops. Historical works enable us to profit by the experience of the past; enable us to review the work of the great masters; acquaint us with the difficulties attending the application of principles, with the preponderating influence of the will and of the morale of leaders and troops, and that the most brilliant conceptions can not bring success unless they are well executed.

But if didactic as well as historical studies are indispensable to develop the intelligence and increase the knowledge, they contribute very little, and only in an indirect manner, toward developing the power of forming decisions; they do not train officers to issue orders rapidly and well.

Now in war we will often find ourselves confronted by situations which will require immediate decision; these decisions should be expressed in clear and practical orders. However, these orders will almost always be given when under the influence of excitement, when the mental faculties will not be at their best.

The chief object of military instruction should be to train officers to make decisions and issue orders.

Lieutenant Colonel Bonnal at the beginning of his conferences held at the War School in 1892–93, was the first, so far as we know, to urge the importance of good mental training, training which can be attained only by frequent exercises in the solution of tactical problems based on concrete situations.

"Tactical problems permit," he said, "by frequently repeated exercises an increase of the automatic, unconscious, power of mental action; they enable officers to diminish more and more the time needed for reflection; to feel rather than judge situations; and consequently to obtain results which will be all the better on account of being spontaneous."

Formerly, officers had this kind of training only in the solution of tactical problems with troops in field maneuvers. This was not sufficient and, a short time after the war of 1870, a forerunner, General Berthaud, then Minister of War, instituted terrain exercises which confronted officers with numerous practical problems. The idea was excellent; however, the attempt failed *because it was premature.* The mental preparation of our officers was not, at that time, adequate to enable them to take up exercises of this kind; the exercises degenerated into minute reconnaissances of ground, or into theoretical occupation of positions, together with wearisome reports and numerous sketches, without any actual solution of tactical problems. And so these terrain exercises died out, to be resurrected with a higher development only when, at a later period, our officers had gained *sufficient mental preparation* to enable them to grasp the mechanism of these exercises and to appreciate their usefulness.

There are three ways in which tactical problems are presented to officers: in field maneuvers with troops, in exercises on the ground without troops (terrain exercises and tactical rides), and in exercises on a map.

Field maneuvers with troops, considered solely as a means of conveying instruction in tactics, are indispensable and can not be entirely replaced by other methods. In these exercises the effort demanded of the imagination is reduced to a minimum. Officers are confronted with situations similar to those which are met in actual war—fatigued troops, diffi-

cult ground, delays and failures in the communication of orders, etc. However, too little knowledge of the effects of the enemy's fire, too much knowledge of the position and strength of the enemy's troops, the necessity of sparing troops from hardships and of respecting certain tracts of ground on account of growing crops, etc., often lead to improbable situations which are likely to convey erroneous lessons to young officers. These field maneuvers are intended for the instruction of the troops as well as of the commanders, and the number of problems set for each officer is necessarily very limited. All of the decisions taken cannot be discussed or even understood by the director, who cannot be everywhere and see everything. Field maneuvers with troops are not, then, sufficient for the mental training of our officers.

In *terrain exercises without troops*, the instruction given is not restricted by the necessity of sparing the troops; maneuvers may be made more extended with less expenditure of time and money. If on one hand we are obliged to rely on our imaginations to depict the movements of troops, on the other we have actual ground before our eyes and can consider the advantages or difficulties which it presents to the different arms of the service.

Compared with terrain exercises, *map maneuvers* have the disadvantage of putting a greater strain on the imagination. We must not only, as in the case of terrain exercises, imagine the movements of troops, but make as well continual suppositions in regard to the ground. The map, if it is correct, gives fairly well the general form of the ground, but it does not show whether a wood can be readily traversed, if a stream is fordable, if a tract of ground would shelter troops, or whether it is intersected by minor obstacles. On the other hand map maneuvers present certain important advantages. They may be carried on with little expense or difficulty; no time is lost in going to and returning from the maneuver ground, or in assembling officers from distant points; there is no fear of bad weather; no need of going out of the way to avoid growing crops; and it is easy to change the theater of operations for the sake of

variety. In these exercises the director is always fully informed in regard to everything; no decision is taken without his knowledge, and he is consequently able to discuss every movement. The same question may be discussed by several officers, who may all be acquainted with the conditions; the number of decisions to be taken and of problems to be solved by each officer may be considerable, an essential requisite for adequate mental training.

Map maneuvers, then, appear to be indispensable to carry instruction by means of tactical problems to a logical conclusion; they prepare officers in an economical way to extract a maximum of benefit from terrain exercises and from field maneuvers.

However, map maneuvers are, in France, of comparatively recent origin. It is true that for a long time tactical problems describing definite military situations and requiring decisions have been given at the examinations for admission to the War School. These problems, however, differ essentially from map maneuvers in that they require only a single decision, which is not carried into execution. They do not present unexpected situations and do not bring about a contest between opposing wills.

About 1889 map maneuvers appear to have been definitely introduced into the War School. They were an imitation of the German *Kriegsspiel*. It is said that this method of instruction was devised about 1840 by Marshal Von Moltke, then a major on the staff of the Fourth Corps.* Given a place of honor by him throughout the army when, in 1857 he became chief of staff, *Kriegsspiel* became complicated later through the use of tables of losses, and of tables showing the effects of fire, which rendered the exercise wearisome. Lieutenant-Colonel Verdy du Vernois led it into a simpler and more practical path through the publication of his "Contribution to Kriegsspiel."† This work attracted the attention

*The author is in error here. Kriegsspiel was devised by Lieutenant von Reisswitz, Prussian Artillery, in 1824; Von Moltke is said to have been an enthusiastic player at the game in 1828.—TRANSLATOR.

†This work appeared in 1876. A translation by Major Eben Swift, U. S. Army, entitled "War Game Simplified," was published in America in 1896. —TRANSLATOR.

of a number of French officers; it was a great step towards practical methods.

The introduction of map maneuvers at the War School is said to have been accomplished only with great difficulty. The directors being without experience, tried a great variety of methods. Little by little, thanks to the freedom in the choice of methods which was given them, they developed and adopted methods acknowledged to be the best. Map maneuvers are now conducted at the War School by methods which are as uniform as the diverse personalities of the different directors permit; and these exercises are now considered as one of the most efficient and most practical methods of instruction.

The results obtained at the War School appeared so promising that map maneuvers were introduced officially first into the Staff (Ministerial Order of February 20, 1895) and later into the garrisons (circular of April 1900). However, if at the present time this method of instruction has gained the favor which it merits in many garrisons, in a few others the ministerial instructions have been imperfectly understood or badly carried out, and it frequently happens that map maneuvers are considered, even by officers who are anxious to gain instruction, as an unprofitable exercise, involving a useless waste of time.

It is important to seek the causes of this disfavor and to spread a knowledge of methods which must succeed everywhere that intelligent officers, well instructed and desirous of improving themselves, are to be found; that is to say, in every garrison and every regiment in France.

The utility of map maneuvers and the interest which they excite depend undoubtedly upon the manner in which they are conducted. In order to be a good director it is not merely sufficient to be an intelligent and well informed officer; the director must understand the method. In order to avoid groping in the dark, directors will find it to their interest to learn the results of the extensive experience at the War School and in the Staffs, as well as the methods which have been finally recognized as the best.

Kriegsspiel is not a game; it is an exercise.

Many have been led into the error by the word *Kriegsspiel* (meaning war game), and map maneuvers have been thought to be a game in which a player won or lost. The consequences of this error have been numerous; it has made two sides necessary, because in order to play a game two adversaries are needed; it has compelled the directors to allow the exercise to unfold itself without intervention, for if one of the players is assisted or favored the game is spoiled; it has made it necessary to give both sides forces which were nearly equal in strength, for if the discrepancy was too great the game lost interest; it has made it impossible to properly organize the units employed, for success or failure would, in actual war, generally depend upon the intervention of supporting troops; it has led to discussions influenced by personal considerations, for each player desires, in order to be successful, to obtain from the director criticisms favorable to his side alone.

It is only after extensive experience that we come to regard map maneuvers no longer as a game but merely as a means of giving certain definite problems, in situations joined with each other and resembling as much as possible situations arising in actual war. There should be no winners or losers, since the moral factors cannot be taken into account; it should only be a matter of dispositions more or less skillfully made, of orders issued, well or badly, and of situations more or less correctly grasped.

This conception of the maneuver makes it easy to manage, while the game idea leads to endless difficulties.

ONE SIDE MANEUVERS.

The one-side maneuver is, at first sight, less attractive than the two-side maneuver. It is, however, especially for beginners, much more instructive. By the one-side maneuver an officer can teach his subordinates more rapidly than in any other way the spirit of the drill regulations and develop their tactical sense.

In the one-side maneuver the director commands the hostile force himself, and makes use of it to bring out the

tactical lessons which he wishes to teach, and to show the mistakes which have been made. If a unit is not sufficiently covered, he causes hostile troops to appear suddenly and throw it into confusion; if a force is too much scattered, he causes it to be attacked at a selected point by a hostile force which is well in hand; if a leader is too timid, he opposes him with a mere screen and then shows him that he has allowed himself to be deceived.

On the other hand, it may happen in the two-side maneuver that many of the mistakes which are made are not pointed out; this would perhaps be the case in actual war, but the lesson is none the less bad; the repetition of the same mistakes or uncorrected carelessness tends to establish bad habits.

It may be objected that the part of the director, commanding one of the forces and knowing the movements of the other, is too easy from a tactical point of view. This would be true if it was a contest or a game; but there is no contest and no game; the director does not compete with the student officers, *he teaches them.*

In order to lighten his heavy task in the one-side maneuver either on the map or on the ground, the director may designate an officer or two to work out the details of the movements of the hostile force in accordance with instructions from himself.

We cannot insist too much on the usefulness of one-side maneuvers; by their use officers get rid of the pernicious idea that they are playing a game in which luck plays a part as well as skill; they no longer seek merely to win the contest, because they are confronted by the director who is free to bring about results at will, and he fixes their whole attention upon learning to handle their troops properly.

Taking up two-side maneuvers immediately and exclusively is like the method of a poor fencing master who allows his pupils to fence in their own way and does not continually seek to show them better methods. The pupils achieve results quickly, but soon cease to improve, and never rise above mediocrity. The one-side maneuver is the lesson with

the master, a lesson which can not be repeated too often and to which we should often return.

It has been used for several years at the War School and appears to give excellent results; it would certainly be very useful in staffs and regiments, where it has been, up to the present time, too rarely used.

TWO-SIDE MANEUVERS.

In spite of the advantages of one-side maneuvers, as soon as officers have attained a sufficient familiarity with map maneuvers, it is best to employ from time to time two side maneuvers. In this way we pit two opposing wills against each other, and show, even on a map, that a poor plan steadily carried out is better than a more skillfully conceived one carried out in a vacillating way.

The method of conducting two-side maneuvers varies with the object which we are seeking to attain. If the commanders merely desire opportunities for practice in handling troops, or, for instance, to test a certain tactical movement to see if good results can be obtained from it, if a certain position is well adapted to defense, or if a certain system of communicating information is efficient; in such cases the director takes the lowest conception of his rôle (as is ordinarily done in regimental map maneuvers) and becomes merely an umpire; he then avoids intervention for the purpose of controlling the course of the exercise after he has given the situations to the commanders; he gives both sides perfect freedom of action; and charges himself only with giving plausible and impartial decisions.

But when on the contrary, as will be most frequently the case, the two-side maneuver carries on the course of instruction and training begun with the one-side maneuver, the director is not merely an umpire but directs the exercise, that is to say, he leads it into instructive channels. Without overruling the decisions of the commanders he leads them to order movements which bring about the situations desired, sometimes by giving information of the enemy, sometimes

by calling attention to a detail which has been overlooked, and, more frequently, by communicating orders from higher authorities, or by the intervention of supporting troops.

Besides, in actual war it sometimes happens that a battalion falls back before a company, a regiment becomes panic-stricken, or a powerful artillery fails to produce an effect, due to the death of an officer, a few shells bursting at a vital spot, or a mistake in estimating the range. The director can, without improbability, rule that an incident of this sort has occurred, and in this way lead the exercise into the course desired. When the maneuver is no longer regarded as a game in which there are losers and winners, the commanders will not protest against such decisions; they will understand that they are made in order to bring about situations which are interesting and to give opportunities for conveying instruction.

PRELIMINARY PREPARATION FOR MAP MANEUVERS.

Map maneuvers, whether one- or two-sided, require serious preparation on the part of the director.

It too often happens that the opposing forces are brought in contact with each other by means of a "situation" (problem) which is plausible enough, but which has no object other than to bring the opposing forces together, the director trusting to luck to bring about opportunities for giving instruction. This method does not secure certainty of results. In every maneuver the director should set himself an object to be attained, and certain definite instruction to be given; the dispositions to be made by an advance guard in contact with an enemy covered by outposts; the dispositions made by the main body of a column to meet an attack against a flank; a combat during a voluntary retreat or a pursuit, etc. In a two-side maneuver it is necessary to study the movements of both of the opposing forces; in the one-side maneuver, on the contrary (and this is one of the reasons why it is less complicated) it is necessary to study in detail the operations of only one force.

The selection and preparation of the lessons which the maneuver is to teach is of the utmost importance. Through lack of this preparatory work, preliminary movements of little interest may take up valuable time and weary the participants to little purpose; but when the director has studied at his leisure the form which the maneuver may take at the beginning, he may easily abridge part of the work if he thinks it necessary.

The director sometimes finds it difficult to decide upon the strength to be given the opposing forces. If large bodies are used the instruction given is generally inconsistent with the rank of the participants. Moreover, for officers who have no great amount of experience with map maneuvers, exercises with large units are difficult to manage; some units are overlooked, others are allowed to occupy positions which the enemy has already taken possession of; the confusion often becomes so great that no instruction can be given.

On the other hand, the employment of very small units on a map is not interesting, since their dispositions depend in a great measure on the smallest features of the ground, features which are not shown on the map; besides, if these units are isolated, their operations are of little importance, for in war the general engagement is the general rule.

In the instruction of the officers of a regiment, it is best to proportion the size of the forces employed to the rank and experience of the officers to be instructed, giving them generally the commands of officers of one or two grades higher rank.

Thus, for the maneuvers conducted at the headquarters of a regiment of infantry, it is unusual to go beyond the division for one-side maneuvers and the brigade for two-side maneuvers.

A mistake springing from the game idea is often made in making the opposing forces in a two-side maneuver equal in strength; greater risk is incurred in this way—since differences in morale can not be taken into account—of making the exercise tedious, indecisive and uninstructive. It is especially important that each commander should be

kept, for a time at least, in ignorance of the strength of the force opposed to him; they are made familiar in this way with one of the commonest difficulties met with in actual war.

It is nearly always best to employ forces which form parts of larger units. For example, to study the operations of a brigade, it should be supposed to belong to an army corps or to a division and acting as an advance guard, a flank guard, or part of the main body of a column, according to the character of the operation selected. The director retains command of the higher unit and of the troops not employed in the maneuver; in this way he can always keep the maneuver in the channel which he desires, without resorting to improbable expedients. When there are no officers in the regiment who understand sufficiently well the handling of other arms of the service, the director will command them also, and explain their movements and the effect attributed to them.

In map maneuvers as well as in field maneuvers it is best to assign to each commander his own proper subordinates as assistants. For instance, if in a regimental map maneuver, a major has been given a command of a regiment, captains belonging to his battalion will be given command of the battalions, and these captains will each have under their orders their own lieutenants, each of whom will command a company or two. In this way the map maneuver will assist in establishing a common point of view and tactical understanding (*l'entente tacticque*) in each unit.

After the director has selected his time and drawn up his problem, he will communicate the general situation and special situation to each of the commanders two or three days in advance of the maneuver. The problems will call out field orders or preliminary dispositions which the commanders will communicate to their subordinates. The latter, in turn, will prepare orders carrying out the details. When this paper work is completed it will be sent to the director, who will study it, with or without the help of assistants. After examining the orders he will decide upon

the first information to be given; he also fixes the hour at which the maneuver will begin and the hour at which each unit, in accordance with the orders given, will appear on the map.*

HOW MAP MANEUVERS ARE CONDUCTED.

For the one-side maneuver all of the participants assemble in one room; for the two side maneuver, in two rooms, one for each side.

Formerly, in two side maneuvers, the director usually occupied a third room devoted solely to his own use; he remained there almost continually and represented on a directing map all of the movements of both sides. He was informed of movements ordered ordinarily by written messages, and sent information and decisions to the commanders in the same way.

This way of conducting the exercise is consistent with the idea that the director is the umpire of a game, but is not consistent with the idea of the director as an instructor; it does not put him in sufficiently close and continuous contact with the commanders. It has become recognized that it is almost always advantageous for the director to go successively from one side to the other, to learn the dispositions made by each, and to ask orally for explanations and reasons.† The third room and the third directing map are no longer regarded as indispensable, but it is necessary that the rooms of the two sides should be so close to each other that the frequent visits of the director may be made quickly and easily.

*While the method of initiating a map maneuver described here possesses many advantages and should be frequently employed, it also possesses disadvantages and it is believed that it should not be made an invariable rule to start maneuvers in this way. After officers have gained a degree of familiarity with these exercises it is believed that the time between giving the commanders the situations and the opening of the exercise should be shortened and that the preliminary paper work should be curtailed or omitted. —[TRANSLATOR.]

† Experience at the U. S. Army Staff College indicates that it is easier and simpler to conduct a tactical map maneuver on one map than on two; and that it is more convenient to have the commanders and their subordinates come to the director than for him to go to them.—[TRANSLATOR.]

Some directors require all orders to be written; this method has the advantage of requiring each officer to form definite decisions and of giving them practice in writing orders; but it has the disadvantage of delaying the exercise.

Other directors have all orders given verbally; this method does not give a definite foundation for the discussion, for no one knows exactly what orders were given, or when or where they were issued.†

It seems that the best method consists in assimilating the exercise to what would be done in actual operations.

We should cause to be written the orders which, in war, would be written; that is to say, all important orders and those sent long distances; simple orders which are addressed to subordinates who are near at hand and which are to be executed immediately will be given orally. We may also, as is done in actual operations, issue brief orders in writing and accompany them with more lengthy verbal explanations, such as might be given by a staff officer.

Formerly, directors were accustomed to question the commanders alone, allowing them to control all of the dispositions of their own forces. This method of procedure also emanated from the game idea; it was desired that the two commanders should play their cards as they wished, since they bore the responsibility; the subordinates, with their special abilities and deficiencies, were almost left out of consideration, or at least played very unimportant roles. It has become recognized that in order to give instruction, it is better to simulate actual conditions; each officer is asked for his action in the place where he is supposed to be, based on the knowledge which he is supposed to possess, the orders which he has received, and the initiative which he believes he should exercise. Thus, in handling a division, for instance, if the advance guard meets resistance, we do not first ask the officer commanding the division what he wishes done, but asks successively for the action of the company, battalion and regimental commanders, who, being at the head of the column, are compelled to act before they can receive orders. It is possible that their action may not accord with the views of the commander, but he is not permitted to modify them except by means of orders which he may issue later, and the director always begins the movement as first ordered.

† The substance of verbal orders can be taken down quickly by the director's assistant. It is believed that the most valuable training obtained in map maneuvers consists in the practice which they afford in forming decisions quickly and in issuing orders verbally.—[TRANSLATOR.]

In order to direct a movement in a systematic way, the director should carry on all parts of it at the same time; the consideration of isolated operations can be postponed only when they do not affect the general progress of the exercise. Movements are made in periods of time which grow shorter as the maneuver progresses, an hour, a quarter of an hour, five minutes, as the action becomes more lively and the troops draw closer.*

When the combat begins, the action must be carried on simultaneously throughout, on account of the influence which the success or failure of one body exerts upon neighboring troops.

A question which the director should frequently ask is, "It is now — o'clock, what is your own position?" The location of the different commanders is very important, for upon it depends the portion of the ground and of the operations which can be seen, the time of the receipt of messages and orders, and the ability to exercise personal leadership.

The director gives all officers freedom of action and controls the progress of the maneuver, sometimes by creating events, sometimes by information which he gives, and sometimes by orders supposed to come from higher commanders. His decisions should not be objected to by the commanders, but the facts and reasoning on which they are based should always be explained; this is essential if the maneuver is to be made instructive.

* The method mentioned here, of deciding first upon the length of a "move," and then moving all troops to the end of it, is believed to be growing obsolete. At the U. S. Army Staff College the director inquires of the commander and subordinates their action, orders and intentions, and then carries on the exercise until the situation of one or more of these officers changes to such an extent that he will probably form a new decision. The maneuver is unfolded continuously and not in "moves" or "jumps."—[TRANSLATOR.]

It is advantageous to criticise the movements when they are made; that is, to show, for instance, that a body of troops has been put into action in a faulty manner, that it is not sufficiently protected by cover, etc., while the incident is fresh in the minds of everybody. On the other hand it is best to reserve for the final discussion general comments upon the operations executed.*

In two-side maneuvers, both sides are called in at the close of the exercise and the situations are read. The commanders state their initial orders and explain their estimates of the situation. After commenting on these orders and the movements which have resulted from them, the director points out the tactical lessons which he has in view, and shows how tactical principles are illustrated by the maneuver. If he wishes to gain the confidence of the officers, he will make criticisms in a kindly spirit, and explain the causes which have led to faulty dispositions and which frequently, in a measure, excuse them.

The final discussion is one of the most difficult and at the same time most essential of the tasks of the director, for through it the instructive features of the exercise are made clear and impressed upon the minds of all.

DURATION OF THE EXERCISES.

On account of the close attention and mental concentration required of all participants, especially of the director, the exercises can not, without excessive fatigue, last more than three hours if the work is continuous.

This period may be sometimes insufficient to bring the maneuver to a satisfactory conclusion; in such cases, rather than to tire out the participants, it is better to divide the

*At the U. S. Army Staff College the general rule followed is to defer criticism till the close of the exercise. It is believed to be more instructive to show the participant the unfavorable results caused by his faulty dispositions than to tell him that his dispositions are regarded as faulty by the director.—[TRANSLATOR.]

exercise up and devote to it two or three sittings on days as nearly consecutive as practicable.*

The preparation for a map maneuver, whether one- or two-sided, and the conduct of the exercise demands of the director a great amount of labor, and requires of him, however well he may be equipped by previous study, a serious mental effort. But he should be convinced that the expenditure of time and effort will not be useless and that he will be compensated by the results attained. The map maneuver is a method of instruction which may yield great returns. By its use, a corps commander or other general officer may, in a few months, develop very appreciably the tactical sense of his subordinate officers; above all, he may thus indicate to them his own ideas, his methods of handling troops, and in this way will assure himself that he will find them, if need arises, correct interpreters of his wishes. He will have established a unity of teaching, by means of which his will may be present everywhere, even beyond his sight and personal control.

The officers who have received this instruction and taken interest in it will be well fitted in their turn to direct in a profitable way those minor exercises recommended by the circulars of April 30 and December 15, 1900; and which, combined with tactical rides, may give excellent results in the instruction of the smaller units.

(sig.) Lieutenant Colonel X—.

* * *

I will take the liberty, with his permission, to add a word to those which Lieutenant Colonel X— gives us with his high

*It is thought preferable in tactical maneuvers, to conclude the exercise at one sitting. An exercise may be shortened by passing rapidly over phases of the operations which are not especially interesting or instructive or which do not illustrate the principles which the director specially desires to illustrate; and if the problem is so drafted as to place the forces at the outset in the situation which the director desires to illustrate the exercise need not last long. When a maneuver is carried through more than one sitting, the interest of the participants is likely to flag, they acquire an abnormal amount of information in regard to the enemy, and there can be no complete discussion till the end of the last meeting, when many of the details will probably be forgotten or remembered imperfectly.—[TRANSLATOR.]

authority and extensive experience in map maneuvers. Our comrade and co-laborer says rightly—and we cannot insist upon it too much—that the *Kriegsspiel* exercises ought to be of short duration. A maneuver can seldom be made instructive without carrying it to a conclusion, and it cannot, as a rule, be taken up again at later meetings; and the interest in the maneuver is likely to disappear in the interim.

But since it is granted that the map maneuver is not a game—and it is indispensable that this should be fully understood—it is not necessary to follow out an operation in all its phases, from putting the various organizations on the march up to the pursuit. We can just as well limit the exercise to the representation of a single phase of the operation.

I will explain.

When we place the two antagonists at a distance from each other at the beginning, the entire sitting is taken up in following cavalry patrols and contact squadrons, in working out the information that would be collected by them, and in transmitting it to the commanders. By the time we bring the advance guards in contact, it is time to conclude the exercise. And so we either do not carry the exercise further and thus limit ourselves to the study of cavalry operations, or else rush hastily over other phases of the operation without taking the pains necessary to make them correct representations of what would take place in actual war, and, in this way, fail to derive any useful instruction whatever from the exercise.

There is nothing to prevent us from starting the war game, for instance, at the time the advance guards come into contact with each other. The director then completes the initial situation by giving to each commander the information which he would probably have obtained up to that time; he points out to them precisely the position of their advanced patrols, their advance cavalry, the point of their advance guards, etc.; he acquaints them with the exact location of every element of their own forces and with the information which they are supposed to have acquired in

regard to the enemy. Then the exercise commences with an advance guard action, and is followed out up to the hour set for the conclusion of the exercise; it should never be carried beyond that.

At another meeting, with another problem, we can commence the exercise when the advance guards have become committed to an engagement, and the artillery of the main body has already come into action; the first orders to be given will be those putting the main body into the action. This war game will have for its object the study of the preparatory stage of a combat.

The director can, equally as well, take up the study of the final stage of the combat. He then makes the supposition that the engagement has proceeded for a considerable time. He describes the precise situation and condition of all of the troops already in action, that of the local reserves and the composition and location of the general reserves, the quantity of supplies available, etc. The exercise begins with orders given the reserves, and has for its object the study of the decisive attack and the counter-attack.

By restricting the study to one phase in this way, the exercise is completed in a short time.

This method enables us to escape from the great enemy, "*ennui.*" It is because maneuvers are long drawn out and consequently "ennuyeux" that they are often disliked in our regiments and corps. To a Frechman, "*ennui*" is a most terrible enemy.

This method is applicable not only to map maneuvers, but also to field exercises intended for preliminary instruction. I have often used it, and it has always yielded the best results; I cannot recommend it too highly.

(Signed) GENERAL H. LANGLOIS.

HORSES AND HORSEMANSHIP.

[From the *United Service Gazette.*]

THE interest that has been taken for some time past in equitation in the artillery branch of our service, finds its reflex in the United States, where President Roosevelt has been subjecting senior officers of the mounted service to tests as to their powers of horsemanship. In the American army cavalry chargers vary from fifteen to sixteen hands in height, and conditions are laid down about their shape, action and treatment. There are regular schools where the raw four legged recruit is trained, his education embracing the fearless swimming of deep and wide rivers, and it is extremely interesting to see a thousand equine recruits drawn up in a ring around the instructor, who opens the proceedings with a sharp shot from an army revolver. The animals are taught to gallop fearlessly in a line at a square of infantry, who are blazing away with their rifles, which, of course, are only loaded with blank cartridges. Lastly, comes a charge upon batteries of quick-firing cannon. In this connection it is worth noting that when smokeless powder came into general use, it was found that many of the horses, flinching the smoke of guns using black powder, balked and shied at the sinister flash and roar of cordite and melinite.

There appears to be as much individuality among horses as among men. Some take the flash and report very quietly, and are passed on to more severe tests, while others rear and try to bolt in abject terror. For this reason the essential qualities required in a cavalry soldier are self-control and patience, combined with courage, firmness, and the absolute confidence born of tried and consummate horsemanship. The French cavalry recruit goes through no fewer than 112 separate lessons before he is considered fit to take his place in the ranks as a trained horseman. His horse is trained simultaneously with him, and both are taught to swim burdened with full equipment, and both are inured to all sorts of startling noises, from the crack of a revolver to the ear-

splitting roar of a parked artillery. Besides the riding-school training, there is also field work across country, with steeple-chasing, jumping over hurdles, and even over the dinner-table, where set meals have been spread. Not so much as a folded napkin must be displaced by the flying leap of the cavalryman right over the table. One part of the charger's education shows him how to lie prostrate on the field of battle and shield his rider from hostile bullets, as the latter takes shelter behind him. So perfect, indeed, is the training of the cavalry horse in our own army that every great war witnesses the curious spectacle of riderless horses galloping to the charge in perfect line. Thus, at Balaclava, the front rank of one regiment was composed almost entirely of riderless horses, their riders having been dropped by the Russian sharpshooters.

Napoleon said of cavalry that it was "good before a battle, during a battle, and after a battle," and in the coming future it will be of still greater importance. But horses are delicate creatures in their way, and require even more careful treatment than men, and hence a cavalry soldier should be educated in all their habits and requirements. He should display the most extreme care in the training of his steed, for a cavalry horse cannot be made too handy or taught its manners too soon or too thoroughly. A half broken charger is a perfect nuisance. Man and horse should be as one, like the fabled centaur, not two creatures of opposite ideals, in a state of perpetual altercation. A spirited horse is all very well in its way, but antics and caprice, and kicking and plunging in company, put other animals and their riders in far from amusing predicaments. Whether for charging in line, or reconnoitering, or ambuscade, perfect training is indispensable. Horses should become imperturbable and entirely subservient to the impulses of their riders; they should be trained to complete indifference to the most unusual surroundings—a very valuable quality in these days of steam, and motors, and huge lumbering traction engines.

But the training of cavalry horses is scarcely a subject that one can theorize about, and on this point we agree with that well-known authority, Colonel Maude, and his opinions

are based on the teachings of history as well as on practical experience with horses, that there is always this difficulty in writing about horsemanship, that whereas some men have a born gift of securing obedience from their horses, which they cannot explain in words, others have to work out these details laboriously, and even then have not that command of language which will render their instruction clear to their listeners. The man whose horses always have obeyed him, who has never found difficulty in making an animal do what he wants him to, finds it difficult to appreciate the troubles of his less fortunate comrades, and as a consequence is very often less successful as an instructor than the worse horseman, who has to learn by sheer intellectual effort; and this difficulty runs through the whole of our cavalry service, almost in proportion as our natural gift of horsemanship is greater than that of most Continental nations.

The general idea prevailing in Continental armies, as well as our own, requires all mounted officers of every grade to keep themselves and their chargers in a fit condition for war. The French, German, Austrian and Italian armies all maintain military schools and institutions (including schools of equitation) for the instruction of officers, and in all of them, as a rule, student officers are instructed in all branches of horsemanship. Cross-country riding to hounds is common in all Continental armies, and all mounted officers participate. In at least two (those of Germany and France) special courses of training in equitation and horsemanship have been established for field officers, with a view to keeping them under observation sufficiently long to test and select them for promotion to active commands.

At the French cavalry school at Saumur, a course in equitation exists for field officers of the French cavalry. The course lasts two months, and includes cross-country work, involving a great deal of jumping of all kinds of obstacles, consisting of fences, ditches, walls, hedges and water jumps. They ride the ordinary school horse and change horses each day, and as the horses are none too good the course constitutes a rather severe test for the rider. During its continuance each officer spends an average of about four and a half

hours each day in the saddle. As each officer also has two or three private mounts, which they must keep in fit condition by exercise outside of school hours, they are seen riding at all hours of the day, and in this manner the average mounted officer takes his recreation. In the German army every officer has to keep himself in condition by taking long hard rides at all times, and it is a matter of common report that a goodly number of officers of captain's rank, and higher, are annually removed from the German army for deficiency in riding or lack of endurance in the saddle. That the officers live in constant anxiety over the regular inspections and maneuvers seems apparent, from the regularity with which they exercise themselves in riding, and the way those who really love their profession struggle against "stoutness" and incapacity for field work, which means that they must go, is said to be really pathetic. But the great maneuvers are the practical testing fields for all these officers, and should an adverse opinion on their horsemanship emanate from a division commander, they are promptly removed to the retired list without further examination or test.

THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY AT MUKDEN.*

By Captain AUBERT, General Staff, First Austrian Army Corps.

THE unsatisfactory conduct of the Russian cavalry in the battle of Sandepu should be charged not to army headquarters, but rather to the cavalry leaders. Different, however, is it with conditions in the battle of Mukden, where at least the cavalry of the right wing showed decided inclination for correct action, but was not only prevented therefrom by army headquarters, but rendered almost entirely useless.

After General Mischtschenko had been wounded on January 27th, Lieutenant General v. Rennenkampf had been

*Translated from *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, by Sergeant Harry Bell, Corps Engineers, U. S. A.

called from the extreme eastern (left) to the western wing of the army to personally take command of the cavalry. It was then the general expectation that the offensive would be taken. On February 12th a few Japanese troops made a demonstration on the railroad bridge at Kuntschuling, about 150 miles north of Mukden. This was successful, for the entire Fourth Don Cossack Division (twenty-four troops, two batteries) was sent to the north, followed soon by half an infantry division. On February 25th General Rennenkampf was ordered to return to the left wing, where the Russians were forced by the Japanese Fifth Army to slowly retire from Tschinhotschin to Matsiundan. The command of the "mounted detachment" on the Russian right wing then fell to General Grekow, commander of the Orenburg Cossack division.

On February 26th the mounted detachment under Major General Pawlow was at Ubanjulu and that of Major General Eichholz at Syfantai. These hastily thrown together detachments consisted of:

General Pawlow (14 troops, 1 battery):
- Fourth and Fifth Ural Cossacks (9 troops);
- First Werchneudinski-Transbaikal Cossack regiment (5 troops);
- First Transbaikal Cossack battery.

General Eichholz (12 troops, 2 batteries):
- First Tschitinski-Transbaikal Cossack regiment (6 troops);
- First Caucasian cavalry brigade (6 troops);
- Fourth Transbaikal Cossack battery;
- Twentieth horse battery.

Only the eleven Transbaikal troops and the First battery belonged to the first levy of the Cossacks. The Transbaikal troops consisted of thirty-two troopers, the Ural troops of forty troopers. The original twelve troops of the Caucasian cavalry brigade had been concentrated into six troops of from forty to fifty troopers each. Consequently, of the 166 troops of the Russian army in Manchuria, but twenty-six weak troops were on the endangered flank and in the only

terrain which permitted the employment of large cavalry forces.

This cavalry was charged with the security and reconnaissance between the Liaoho and the Hunho. Its outposts were in close touch with smaller Japanese reconnoitering detachments which seriously interfered with the Russian reconnaissance between the two above named streams. On the 23d and 24th returning patrols reported the concentration of Japanese cavalry on the west bank of the Liaoho. On the 27th the cavalry outposts were attacked by the Japanese, but maintained their positions. A reconnaissance ascertained the advance of three detachments of all arms (advance guards) on Ubanjulu, in the vicinity east of and at Kaliaama. This ought to have been sufficient to establish the commencement of the Japanese enveloping movement directed against the Russian right wing; it ought to have induced a concentration of the cavalry for the purpose of locating the extreme left wing column of the enemy and also of delaying his advance. Instead of this the outposts were reinforced by two troops, and the Fifth Ural regiment was sent with four of its five troops and two guns via Kaliaama towards the Kinschoufu-Hsinmintu Railroad, which road it was feared was utilized by the Japanese in transporting troops towards Mukden. The regiment encountered a strong hostile column (the Seventh Japanese Division) east of Kaliaama and did not continue its march westward. Reporting the fact of meeting the enemy to headquarters, the regimental commander was directed to keep this hostile column under observation, without discontinuing his reconnaissance towards the railroad.

In the meantime General Eichholz had assumed command of the detachment Kossagowski behind the Russian right wing, and on the 28th General Grekow, who had succeeded General Eichholz, marched with the cavalry detachment Eichholz to Ubanjulu. From there he continued his march in a westerly direction in order to concentrate with the Fifth Ural Regiment. General Pawlow's detachment was ordered to reconnoiter southward. Not counting five troops on outpost, it consisted of five troops and four guns. Patrols

had brought full information concerning the enemy's position. It was known that behind the advanced troops, between the Lanzepu-Peidagon road and the Hunho, hostile columns were advancing, that hostile infantry had left Kaliaama marching northward and that an entire division with artillery were advancing on Kaliaama from the south. A detailed report of these movements was sent to General Kaulbars, commanding the army, at eight o'clock in the morning; this message was received at army headquarters at ten o'clock A. M. the same day, but reached general headquarters only on March 1st. Headquarters of the Second Army did nothing at all for the protection of the endangered wing.

After the departure of General Grekow's detachment, General Pawlow's detachment advanced a short distance southward and held up to 11:30 A. M. a village against a slowly advancing Japanese column, while its outpost troops were engaged along their entire front with the enemy also. General Grekow found that he could make little progress to the west, so he turned northward. Receiving report of this, General Pawlow debouched to the west as far as Syfantai, where he remained over night only from 300 to 400 yards from the advanced troops of the Japanese Ninth Division. General Grekow may have been that night in front of the Seventh Japanese Division south of Tichiakangtzu. He did not reach the western bank of the Liaoho on February 28th nor later; during the night of March 1st he ordered four troops of the brigade Pawlow to join his detachment. This latter brigade was in addition ordered by the army commander to send four troops and one battery to the detachment heretofore commanded by General Kossagowski, now General Eichholz, and with the remaining troops cover the right flank of the position at Syfantai. As General Grekow returned the four above mentioned troops, General Pawlow had the disposition of ten troops.

Early in the morning of March 2d General Pawlow took up a defensive position with four troops, and held six troops in close order at Syfantai. From a high hill west of Syfantai the entire plain could be overlooked, and it was seen that the horse batteries of General Grekow's detachment tried in

vain to delay the columns of the enemy, probably the Reserve Brigade and the Seventh Division of the Japanese Third Army. In spite of the open, far extended, enveloping movement of the enemy, the detachment Eichholz occupied at 11 A. M., with six battalions, four troops and four batteries, the already enveloped position at Syfantai.

General Pawlow saw that he was superfluous with his troops at Syfantai, and asked General Grekow's permission to join him, in order to make a combined attack on the flank of the hostile enveloping columns. In this he could not act independently. At 2 P. M. General Grekow consented to this, and ordered a concentration of the mounted detachments. But just then an order was received from army headquarters, directing General Pawlow to proceed with nine troops and two guns to Kaliaama to ascertain the rear of the Japanese column marching via that place. This order, considering the hostile enveloping movement, could not be carried out. Therefore, General Pawlow decided to carry out General Grekow's order; but he now was unable to separate himself from the detachment Eichholz, which was engaged since noon in the Syfantai position, and had already decided on a retreat before dark. General Pawlow covered this retreat. This retreat was in accordance with the views of the army commander, who had ordered it as well as that of the Eighth Army Corps, which was astraddle of the Hunho.

The retreat took place without any serious interruptions. General Pawlow's detachment reached Satchaisa, where it bivouacked for the night but about two miles from the enemy. General Grekow had debouched farther to the north; as to his exact whereabouts during the next few days there is no reliable record.

On March 2d General Pawlow decided to again try a junction with General Grekow. This plan was abandoned, however, in the face of hostile (the Seventh) division arriving from the southwest, considering which circumstance General Pawlow thought it his duty to protect the flank of the army on the Hunho, which was then almost surrounded by the enemy. A prime factor in General Pawlow's decision was

the fact that the line of communications, Syfantai-Mukden, which was rich in supply depots of all descriptions, was entirely unprotected and was entirely clear of the enemy up to noon of the 2d.

In the evening the detachment Pawlow reached Aidiapu. The right wing of the Second Army, retiring on the left bank of the stream, reached Suhudiapu, not much molested by the pursuing Japanese. Salinpu, west of Mukden, had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. The latter occupied the line Tyaschiyinsa-Salinpu-Bsyniulu, with two and one-half infantry divisions. The Japanese Second Cavalry Brigade was at Tsaodiaotei, opposed to General Krekow's detachment, which latter was inferior in strength to the former. This situation clearly shows that General Pawlow's detachment, instead of being on the flank, had gotten to the center of the Russian west front and was here doomed to inactivity.

Interesting are the directions which General Pawlow received during the night of March 2d and 3d from general headquarters; first, an order sent at 9 A. M. to join General Grekow's detachment; second, an order sent at 9:30 A. M. to send eight troops to General von der Launitz, who was in command of that part of the Second Army south of the Hunho; and third, an order sent at midnight to join the general headquarters at Yansytun. The latter order was contrary to one received from General von der Launitz, directing him to remain to the west of Aidiapu.

To order the cavalry from the west front and to send it to the endangered north wing was never thought of even.

The night of March 2d and 3d passed uneventfully. Early in the morning of March 3d General Tolmatschew assumed command of the detachment, now again consisting of fourteen troops and two batteries, and remained with it west of Asiapu. At 11 A. M., according to General Kaulbar's orders, six troops were sent to him at Schandiasa west of Yuhountun. One battery and one troop were placed at the disposition of the garrison of Suhusdiapu. With the remaining seven troops and one battery was the headquarters of the cavalry (Mischtschenko's cavalry), *i. e.*, one division and one brigade headquarters.

When the enemy commenced a frontal attack on Aidiapu with parts of his Eighth Division and the Japanese Ninth Division reached the vicinity northwest of that place, General Tolmatschew evacuated Aidiapu in the afternoon at 3 o'clock, crossed the Hunho at Suhudiapu and remained over night at Yeltaisa. Thereby the remainder of the cavalry was drawn away from the front of the infantry. When during the night of March 3d and 4th Suhudiapu was also taken by the Japanese, and the Russian right wing of the southwest front had to retreat via Yeltasia to Madiapu, the troops of General Tolmatschew, doomed to inactivity, were compelled to also retreat to that place, where it succeeded in calling back some of its detached troops. But soon that cavalry detachment was again scattered. The batteries, under protection of two troops, took up a position at Madiapu and participated in the artillery duel. The remaining troops were utilized in a futile reconnaissance between the closed infantry lines of both opponents. And only in the evening these troops were ordered back to Lanwa, while the two batteries were sent to Yansytun to the west front north of the Hunho, of course accompanied by two troops, in spite of the fact that the batteries were protected by strong infantry lines.

At the same time another change in commanders took place, for General Orbeliani, commander of the Caucasian Cavalry Brigade, taken sick before the battle, reported as well now, and being the ranking officer, took command of the cavalry detachment. The detachment then consisted of but five troops; ten troops and one battery had been detatched under General Grekow and sent northward and were entirely inactive in the vicinity of Tasintun; eleven troops and two batteries were scattered in five different places on different duties. In spite of the fact that the total dissolution of the cavalry had been reported to army headquarters during the night of March 4th to 5th, that headquarters still persisted for days and days in counting on the presence of the combined cavalry and charged it with important tasks, impossible of execution.

March 5th saw Orbeliani's cavalry with its numerous different headquarters and staffs inactive at Lanwa. March 6th,

General Pawlow, who was still with the detachment, was required to repeat the task of advanceing with his remaining troops for a reconnaissance via Yansytun towards Limminsana. This task may have been given because of the inactive conduct of the Japanese Third Army, which was screening its movements on the right. The actual existing break in the Japanese Third Army front, three miles in extent, was in reality not in the direction of Limminsansas, but to the north thereof, between Tinsintun and Ligunpun. To comply with army orders General Pawlow asked for and received two troops from General Orbeliani and marched to Yansytun. At that time heavy infantry and artillery fire obtained at the Hunho on the line Yuhountu-Madiapu, and a participation in the fight on the part of even strong cavalry was out of the question. A new order directed General Pawlow to proceed to Houta, which place he reached with his exhausted troops late in the evening and where, after a weary wait and frequent inquiries, he received directions to go into bivouac wherever he saw fit. He remained for the night close to Houta.

On March 7th the Russian west front was prolonged from Santaitsy to Unguantun. No orders were issued for the cavalry. It remained for the present inactive; but General Pawlow called back his Fourth Ural Regiment, which had been following army headquarters since March 3d, so that he then had six troops east of the grave of Emperor Teitsung, ready for any emergency. The thought to independently try and gain the right wing of the army, which was not very distant, never occurred to him. How little army headquarters knew concerning the station of its troops is shown by the following message to General Grekow, dated March 7th: "Support cannot be sent you, for there is no information at these headquarters concerning the whereabouts of the cavalry detachments of Generals Pawlow and Orbeliani." Only at 5 P. M. security against the Japanese cavalry at Unguantun was furnished by General Buerger, commanding the right wing. General Pawlow hastened to Unguantun late in the evening and took possession of that place without an engagement. During the night the

Japanese, unmolested, damaged the railroad line close to that place at two different times.

During the night headquarters issued orders for the formation of a north detachment under General von der Launitz for the defense of the northern approaches of Mukden and the concentration of the dispersed troops of Generals Pawlow and Orbeliani was also ordered to take place at Unguantun. The Primorski dragoon regiment also received orders to join the detachment. General Orbeliani received directions to reconnoiter the hostile forces north of Mukden and to operate in conjunction with the infantry of the north detachment.

At daylight the Japanese left wing attacked Unguantun, where shortly before that hour infantry with field artillery had relieved the Cossacks. The Japanese are driven back. One battery appears to have been abandoned by its personnel; three troops of the Fourth Ural Regiment ride towards that battery in open order; as they approach to within 400 yards of it, they are fired on by a heretofore masked battery; a few gunners hasten to the apparently abandoned battery, two or three of its guns are brought by them into action, and the Cossacks retreat helter skelter. Their loss is five horses. The Russian authorities do not seem to think anything wrong in abandoning the attack in this manner.

At 3 P. M. General Orbeliani has concentrated but twelve troops and one battery at Siaogosa, north of Unguantun; the dragoon regiment declined to join the detachment. It had received other orders in the meantime.

On March 9th a heavy dust storm prevailed, which both sides utilized in prolonging their north wings, the Japanese in order to be enabled to envelop on a larger radius, the Russians to protect their lines of retreat. The cavalry detachment under Orbeliani then proceeded to Huschitai, engaged there in an unimportant fire action, and later joined forces north of Huschitai with General Grekow's detachment, without coming into action again.

On March 10th General Grekow placed his cavalry detachment in readiness to take part in the offensive movement of the extreme Russian right wing towards Tasintun.

About noon General Mischtschenko, hardly recovered from wounds and sickness, arrived with the report of the fall of Mukden and the general retreat of the Russians. Under his command the cavalry detachment accompanied the fleeing Manchurian army on its right flank, almost continually, but ineffectually, engaged with parallel following Japanese detachments. The shortly after occurring pause in the operations brought towards the end of March also to the cavalry detachment time for recuperation from its exhausting, but entirely useless, services. The Russian officer concludes with the words:

"We may state that the activity of the cavalry was not in accordance with the most elementary maxims of the art of war; that the cavalry leaders were not only deficient in decisions, but in part also lacking in personal courage, and that the cavalry has always avoided battle, of which the small casualties sustained are a clear proof. An impartial critic should, however, in passing judgment on the activity of the cavalry, bear in mind that the poor rôle it played on the battlefield was in part the unavoidable consequence of conditions under which the cavalry suffered."

We can only concur in this screened, doleful, accusation directed against the highest leaders, concerning the employment of cavalry, for general headquarters never seems to have understood to either utilize to the fullest extent the first real favorable results of the cavalry's reconnaissances, or to keep the cavalry together as much as possible for larger tasks. The useless scattering of troops, the frequent change of commanders, the interference by general headquarters, aside from the disinclination of subordinate commanders to act independently, are the direct cause of the peregrinations noted above of the Russian cavalry on the battlefield of Mukden.

THE CAVALRY SCREEN.

By Major General v. FRITSCH, Austrian Army.*

ALTHOUGH the entire cavalry and all officers of the other arms are convinced of the value of the service of reconnaissance, little importance on the whole is attached by them to the cavalry screen. General von Schlichting says in the second part of his "Tactical and Strategical Maxims of the Present Times" (pages 168–169):

"The veil is part of a lady's wardrobe, used more to enhance than to hide the beauties of the wearer. Fairies are adorned with it in art; Spanish ladies in practical everyday life; wherever a hostile scout perceives a screen (veil) formed of hussars or Cossacks, he finds no difficulty whatever in perceiving the formation behind it, for the form of the screen itself is sufficient indication of the formations behind it. And a screen is of little, if any, protection to the troops behind it, for an energetic troop of cavalry can break through it with ease at any time or place it may choose. Officers' patrols sent out by a cavalry division have nowadays little resemblance to that part of a lady's wardrobe called a veil. The supposition that an order using that mode of expression is meaningless will therefore be found correct in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred.

"We must concede that it is extremely difficult to hide our movements for any length of time from an energetic opponent, and that cavalry which confines itself to this thankless screening service fails in gaining the desired ends; it is of far more importance to acquire exact and exhaustive information concerning things the enemy does or does not. This task is more difficult, more dangerous, but also more thankful than mere screening."

Captain Rossbach upholds this view in his excellent work, "Conduct and Reconnaissance of Cavalry," and adds

* Translated from *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*, by Sergeant Harry Bell, Corps Engineers, U. S. Army.

that a successful reconnaissance carries a "screen" in its wake as a natural sequence.

Under certain conditions, but under those only, this is true; and we will endeavor in the following to go deeper into this matter.

The result to be gained in employing the cavalry screen is two-fold; the screen is employed not only to prevent the enemy from getting an insight into our condition, but also by taking proper measures to deceive him concerning our intentions. Both have the object to lead him to take wrong measures on his part. These are important factors in strategic as well as in tactical situations; their importance increases with the manyfold uses to which large bodies of troops can be put.

Operations on the western German frontier of German and French troops depend in the main on the position of the garrisons in time of peace and on the net of railways protected at their terminals by fortresses. This, at the beginning of operations, brings both parties into close contact at once, and therefore little remains to be done by the cavalry concerning reconnaissance, and little is left to screen from view. Far different, however, are conditions on the north-eastern frontier—three times the size of the western—where the Germans by a quicker mobilization and concentration would have a great advantage over the Russians. There the cavalry screen may become of especial value during the course of the war when there are possibilities of different courses of action; but it must not be overlooked that both parties will be on the same footing in that respect. That party which is, or thinks itself stronger than the opposing party, is independent and can pursue its course from the start to gain contact with the enemy at a certain time and place fixed on in advance. Success may be made more complete by causing the enemy to adopt wrong dispositions of his forces (Napoleon before Ulm, 1805); nothing is left to the inferior or weaker party but to cause the enemy to make his dispositions in one place and then to energetically attack him with superior forces at some other place. If a party finds itself in a difficult situation it must strive to disengage

itself therefrom as soon and with as little damage as possible. Therefore each single case must decide if and what necessity for a screen exists and how it should be employed at different points on the flank or in front.

The endeavor to prevent hostile reconnaissance is always present as a matter of course—the intention to deceive the enemy can only be added when we have already arrived at a decision and we desire to keep our movements in that respect from the knowledge of the opponent, when there is no further need of reconnaissance. By this we do not mean that each and every military decision or intention is dependent on prior reconnaissance. Many, and often the most important, decisions are arrived at by utilizing information gained otherwise than by reconnaissance. To mislead the enemy is endeavored in many ways, such as starting false rumors, false messages, cutting in on the enemy's telegraph wires and sending forged telegrams, etc. To deceive him by operations of troops, two things are to be kept in mind: to make the enemy believe that a movement is being made, which, however, does not take place; and, second, to prevent the enemy from gaining information concerning the actual movement. The first will be achieved by a maneuver with part of our force which must be entirely the opposite of what is intended; be this offensive or defensive, so much is clear, that the maneuver must not be carried to completion. Infantry and artillery utilized for this must be formed with widely extended front and with little depth, while cavalry can be formed differently. It will be more successful in deceiving the enemy if the movement is one which seems feasible and natural and corresponding to the general situation. So for instance, in 1805 an attack on Strassburg via the Black Forest was more plausible than the actual detour via Mannheim; and in 1870 the retreat of MacMahon from Chalons or Rheims on Paris, would have been more natural than his advance on Montmédy.

An insight into our actual movements must be kept from the enemy as long as possible. Before all, his attention must not be drawn to the right direction by appearing too early at the point of attack or by extensive movements.

Therefore, to send cavalry far to the front would be wrong, as the main point is to prevent the enemy from gaining an insight into our movements. And as our plans will be discovered just as soon as the enemy sees our infantry and artillery, then, also, no matter how unpleasant such a defensive task may be, the cavalry must be instructed to keep the enemy away. Being armed with good firearms lightens this task and will facilitate it the more the cavalry understands to utilize suitable sectors for defense.

The decision for the main movement is arrived at along general lines, but, especially in combined operations, must have clear and definite starting points to assure success. The cavalry attached to that part of the army executing the main movement will have to proceed from its heretofore reserve to an active reconnaissance. To strike the right mean in this matter is exceedingly difficult; it requires excellent judgment, also careful handling of the squadrons and rightly timed interference by giving correct and definite orders.

To illustrate this we will cite two instances:

From September 25 to 28, 1805, five French cavalry divisions advanced from Strassburg towards and through the Black Forest to give the Austrians (concentrating at Ulm) the impression that the main attack would come from that direction. In the meantime the mass of the French army moved from the line Strassburg-Mannheim towards Stuttgart-Langenburg. Napoleon, believing that the object of this demonstration had been attained, commenced on the 29th to draw his cavalry to his right wing, which it reached on the 3d of October between Plochingen and Göppingen. On this day the army resumed the advance from the line Stuttgart-Jaxthausen, which it had reached in the interim. As Napoleon, whose intention it was to prevent the junction of the Austrians advancing towards the Black Forest and the Russians expected to come from Machren, was in doubt concerning the whereabouts of the Austrians, he caused Murat to energetically reconnoiter with his cavalry division the Donau sector from Ulm to Neuburg on October 4th. This was carried out so vigorously and with such success that Ulm capitulated, as is well known.

In a similar manner events would have occurred had MacMahon decided to commence his march for the relief of Bazaine only with the main part of his army and had utilized his reserve cavalry, reinforced by one or two infantry divisions, to draw the Germans (who then were marching towards Chalons) by a short advance in the direction of the Aisne, on it and thereafter after it, by a gradual falling back on Paris. In the main army the largest part of the cavalry then would have had to be with the right column; it should have been held in reserve in the start, but later should have been sent to thoroughly reconnoiter towards the Naas army and the army of Prince Frederick Charles, in order to gain the necessary time for the further advance of the army.

No hard and fast rules can be laid down for strategical or tactical movements intended to deceive the enemy; circumstances alone must decide. But what we have stated above will serve to show the great and exceedingly difficult rôle the cavalry plays. As false measures taken by the enemy increases our success, we must at all times strive to prevent him from gaining knowlege of our actual intentions and movements. And this task will always be the duty of the cavalry. It must prevent the hostile scouts from seeing the battle columns of our infantry and artillery. This negative task depends in first line on the positive efforts of the enemy, but also here no positive rules can be given for the conduct of the cavalry. We might give the following:

1. In case of collision between a positive reconnaissance task and a negative screening task, the former always deserves precedence.

2. It is not the duty of parties specially designated for reconnoitering (patrols or troops) to prevent the enemy's view into our condition; this is the duty rather of the following stronger forces of the cavalry division, and especially of the divisional cavalry; and the latter should detach sufficient forces for that purpose.

3. It should always be kept in mind which hostile detachments are to be prevented from getting an insight into our affairs. As long as it is but a question of patrols or small troops on reconnaissance, it may be best to divide our

forces, in order to hold a larger terrain and for quicker support at threatened points, by elongating the front of the cavalry division to the flank by regiments or brigades and that of the divisional cavalry by troops or squadrons. In case of attack only timely concentration and an offensive movement will be found effective. A victory gained at a decisive point will have farreaching effects and offers opportunity later on, either by dividing our forces or keeping them en masse, to defeat in succession parts of the enemy coming from the flank; to force them away from their connections towards our main forces and lead them into disaster. Only in exceptional cases would it be advisable to oppose an attack for any length of time with a large extended front. As an effective protective screen is of material advantage only when in close proximity to the object to be screened, then it may be well to strengthen the available cavalry division by the divisional cavalry and parts of the artillery of the infantry division, thus enabling the former to take up the offensive again or to oppose the enemy at specially suited places.

4. If we do not desire to limit ourselves only to a passive obstruction of hostile reconnaissance, then we must take up the offensive. In minor operations bodies designated for this duty should not merely ride in pursuit of an enemy driven off a certain place, as they would hardly overtake him in any case, but they should strive to cut off his retreat.

5. If our numbers allow the seeking and destroying the hostile cavalry, we will do well to do so, thereby furthering at the same time not only our reconnaissance, but also our screening task.

6. When our cavalry, numerically inferior to the enemy's, cannot solve its screening task by an offensive movement, then it must utilize the terrain in a defense to its fullest extent.

7. As the best results attained in reconnaissance are of little value unless reports thereof reach headquarters in good time, therefore, in minor operations, when we have not succeeded in stopping the enemy's advance, we must strive before all to prevent the passage of his messages.

8. As, through ever increasing cultivation of the country, facilities for crossing even the largest rivers are becoming more and more numerous and the hostile cavalry has more opportunities to make extended detours, our cavalry, if inferior, can often do nothing but fight in connection with the forces to which it belongs. But it must not crawl and stay under the shelter of its army, but only seek for support in fighting the superior hostile cavalry and be ready, after victory, to energetically pursue the enemy.

9. Theory occupies itself entirely too much with extremes; it counts as a rule on greatly superior or greatly inferior cavalry along the entire front. Concerning the cavalry screen, it is the duty of general headquarters in actual practice to have a numerical superiority at the place where the decision is to fall and to have as few troops as can be done with safety at other less important points; this applies especially to the weaker party. A screening of the entire front is in most cases, not only impossible, but also not necessary. To screen the entire front the cavalry would be extended in such breadth as to be materially weakened thereby and its screen or line easily pierced at any point by a concentrated movement on the part of the enemy; we should never split up our cavalry to allow this. In forming a screen we must also keep the different arms together just there where it is considered of importance; this will often happen to be the case on the flank where it is material to prevent the enemy from gaining knowledge of the extent of our line or our strength, in case of an enveloping movement on the enemy's part. As it is the practice in maneuvers to let the troops come every day to the final stage, *i. e.*, contact, we place almost constantly infantry and artillery behind our cavalry; but in actual war this is not a matter of course. Through its activity the cavalry must prevent its opponent from gaining an insight into our conditions and to lead him to believe that it has support which it has not at all, and so cause him to take erroneous measures.

Only under exceptional circumstances are troops specially detailed for screening service; that duty is generally performed by troops on reconnaissance and troops used for

security and information, having due regard to the above mentioned rules. They should be, in case of necessity, specially instructed, and also should be reinforced when necessary, as they may not be strong enough for screening duty, although in sufficient force for reconnaissance or security.

In the interest of proper military education it must be insisted on that the screening service is carried out in time of peace just as any other duties. Measures taken to deceive the enemy we may not often be able to practice in maneuvers, but that does not hold good so far as preventing the enemy from gaining an insight into our conditions is concerned. Reasons for neglecting this important duty are manifold. The main blame for this attaches to the higher commanders who require such great results from reconnaissance, results which never can be attained in war; and higher commanders are prone to blame the cavalry without sufficient reasons when insufficient results are obtained. Before attaching blame, it should be ascertained why a reconnaissance has had no better results. It is but in accordance with the conditions of actual war that the higher leaders have to come to decisions based on insufficient results of reconnaissance. Entirely different view points will then arise as well as in the planning of engagements as also in the utilization of reserves.

Doubtlessly reconnaissance and utilization of reserves are closely connected. If the higher leaders are taught in time of peace to base their decisions on results of reconnaissances which are not in accordance with actual conditions in war, then there is danger that in war we will have undecided and vacillating leaders who will allow the opponent to take the initiative. As in peace maneuvers the belief is now almost universal that it does not matter which side is victorious, but only which side has taken the most suitable measures; therefore the cavalry should learn in the matter of reconnaissance that the result achieved, no matter how, is not of so much importance as the taking of proper measures in accordance with actual conditions in war, but that both reconnaissance and measures taken should be in accordance with accepted rules.

To decide unavoidable differences of opinion, a sufficient number of umpires should be detailed in maneuvers who should have sufficient assistants in taking observations, and who can carry the umpire's decision quickly to the respective body of troops.

Prize Problems.

PRIZE PROBLEM NO. 5.

The Editor Cavalry Journal:

DEAR SIR:—The committee selected to examine the solutions of Prize Problem No. 5 has the honor to report that it finds the solution signed "D. K. E." the best of those submitted, and recommends that the prize be awarded the author. In one solution there was an error of carelessness in the order. In another the committee was of the opinion that "Major C." withdrew from the front with a celerity unbecoming a cavalry leader.

Other solutions lacked certainty.

D. H. BOUGHTON,
Major, 11th Cavalry.
MATTHEW E. HANNA,
Captain 3d Cavalry.
E. A. KREGER,
Captain, Act. Judge Advocate.

In accordance with the above report, the prize for the best solution of Prize Problem No. 5 has been awarded to First Lieutenant S. R. Gleaves, First Cavalry.

SOLUTION.

MAJOR C'S DISPOSITIONS.

(*a*) Troop "B" will move as rapidly as possible from Taylor S. H. to a temporary first position about 400 yards northeast of 19, on crest of ridge, from which both Duffin-19 and 21–19 roads can be commanded by fire. From this point, after covering the withdrawal of Troop "A," Troop "B" will retire to the east, ultimately to 15, coöperating with Troop "A" as far as possible in delaying the enemy's pursuit along the Millwood road, and directly protecting Troop "A" against attack from the north. The later movements of the enemy will determine the proper handling of these two troops during withdrawal, and it is therefore impossible at this time for Major C to prescribe the details of their conduct except to order them to maintain active reconnaissance toward the north and the south.

Troop "A," its right flank protected by Troop "B," falls back slowly along the Millwood road, ultimately to 15, scouting toward the south. Neither troop will allow itself to become seriously involved, as no serious stand is contemplated west of Salt Creek.

(*b*) Troop "D" will proceed rapidly from Taylor S. H. via Millwood road across the Salt Creek wagon bridge; thence, turning north along the trail, the troop will move to the north spur of Salt Creek Hill and there occupy a position commanding the M. P. R. R. bridge at I and the approaches thereto. The bridge at I will be obstructed by Troop "D" with brush, if time permits.

Troop "C" will follow immediately in rear of Troop "D," cross the wagon bridge over Salt Creek and take up a dismounted position just west of 15, under cover of crest of hill 875 and edge of orchard, so as to command the bridge and approaches thereto.

Troops "C" and "D," after assuming position, will maintain communication with each other and observation along

Salt Creek by sending patrols along that stream between their respective positions.

Major C, after arrival at 15 with Troops "A" and "B," will form from them a squadron reserve and hold it ready for movement in any direction; the size of the force that can be immediately spared for the reserve will depend entirely upon the activity of the enemy at the time of arrival of Major C at 15.

REASONS FOR DISPOSITIONS.

Major C has been made responsible by the rear guard commander for the crossings of Salt Creek on the Millwood road and north to the Missouri, and their security must consequently be his principal care. He is, therefore, not at liberty to risk a general engagement west of Salt Creek even if conditions were more favorable than they are. He must provide at once against the possibility of a rapid turning movement against the railroad bridge at I, a move which the enemy will very likely attempt, and he must also take such measures as will prevent the superior hostile cavalry from following so closely at the heels of his two retreating troops on the Millwood road that resistance at the wagon bridge will become impossible. A troop sent to Salt Creek hill will secure the crossing at I against a turning movement; a troop in position at hill 875 west of 15 will secure the crossing on the Millwood road, and will, in addition, prevent close pursuit of Troops "A" and "B" as they cross the wagon bridge.

Major C must also effect the safe withdrawal from action of Troop "A;" a hostile turning column is already in rapid motion east toward 21 and has caused Captain A to request protection for his right flank. Major C knows the strength of the enemy in cavalry, and he believes that by posting a troop so as to command the defile 21–19 he can delay the enemy's turning column by dismounted fire, if it turns south toward 19 sufficiently to permit of Captain A's safe withdrawal from his present position; the conformation of the ground is fortunately such that this additional Troop "B"

can also bring effective fire to bear upon the hostile cavalry on the Millwood road as it presses towards Daniels in pursuit of Troop "A."

The withdrawal of Troop "A" being safely accomplished Troops "A" and "B" should easily be able by dismounted fire from commanding points, to keep the enemy at such a distance as to permit of their own withdrawal in good order to 15. Their retreat from J. E. Daniels across the bridge to 15 will be covered by the fire of Troop "C," already in position at hill 875. In order not to mask the fire of Troop "C," it will probably become necessary for Troops "A" and "B" in their retreat to leave the road after crossing the wagon bridge and move into position by following up the first ravine north of 15; this detail of the retirement, however, need not be ordered in the first instance by Major C; he will be present throughout the withdrawal and will meet conditions as they arise by the necessary verbal orders given on the spot.

The dispositions of Major C will still meet the situation in case the turning column now moving east toward 21 does not turn south but moves north across Plum Creek and then east toward the bridge at I. Resistance to such a move is best offered from Salt Creek hill; Major C would make a dangerous mistake in sending troops to the north of Plum Creek.

The attitude of the enemy at the time will determine finally how many troops Major C must actually deploy for firing in the orchard and at hill 875; he will, of course, hold all not necessarily engaged as a reserve ready to send to Salt Creek hill or any other threatened point. It is not probable that the enemy will attempt to ford Salt Creek; if he does his efforts will be readily discovered and easily defeated.

The wagon bridge on the Millwood road must of course be left open for the passage of Troops "A" and "B;" there will probably then be no immediate opportunity to obstruct it; Troop "D," at Salt Creek hill, may also have little time for such work at bridge I if the enemy's movements are

rapid; Major C, however, thinks it may be of value to order this obstruction made.

The destruction of the two bridges cannot be seriously considered.

Wire fences will of course be cut by the troops wherever necessary to leave or regain the road.

THE ORDERS ISSUED BY MAJOR C.

FIRST SQUADRON, SIXTH CAVALRY,
TAYLOR, S. H., KANSAS,
20 JUNE, '07—10:04 A. M.

FIELD ORDERS
No. 2.

1. The enemy's cavalry continues to press forward on the Millwood Road, and is near Duffin; a mounted force is also advancing rapidly to the east over the road one-half mile north of Duffin-19 road.

Troop "A" is withdrawing from the vicinity of A. Daniels; the rear guard of our brigade is making a stand behind Salt Creek.

2. The squadron will cross Salt Creek by the Millwood road bridge and protect the crossings on the Millwood road and north to the Missouri River.

3. (*a*) Troop "D" will move rapidly across the Millwood Road bridge, thence north down Salt Creek to the north spur of Salt Creek Hill, there occupying a position to cover the bridge at I; the bridge will be obstructed.

Troop "C" will follow Troop "D" immediately across the wagon bridge, thence moving to Hill 875 west of 15, and there occupying a position to cover the wagon bridge.

Patrols will be sent from Salt Creek Hill and Hill 875 along Salt Creek to connect with each other on that stream.

(*b*) Troop "A" will retire slowly along the Millwood Road to 15, observing toward the south.

(*c*) Troop "B" will assist the withdrawal of Troop "A," moving rapidly and at once into a temporary first position 400 yards northeast of 19; it will thereafter cover the right flank, scouting north to Plum Creek.

4. I will be with Troop "A," where messages will be sent. Captain A is designated as second in command.

C.,
Major, Sixth Cavalry.

Verbally to assembled troop commanders of Troops "B," "C" and "D," at Taylor S. H., later to commander of Troop "A" verbally.

Copy to rear guard commander from 15.

D. K. E.

PRIZE PROBLEM NO. 8.

(See map of Fort Leavenworth, published in Cavalry Journal for July, 1907, opposite page 166.)

DELAYING ACTION.

General Situation.

The Missouri River forms part of the boundary between contending States.

On April 1st, a Blue (Eastern) army, which has been in winter quarters opposite Leavenworth, has forced a crossing of the Missouri River six miles south of Leavenworth and is deploying on the west bank. Red forces have been ordered from all parts of Kansas to attack it.

Special Situation.

Colonel A., commanding the Seventh Regiment of Blue cavalry, which has been quartered for the winter in Weston, Missouri (opposite the mouth of Salt Creek), was ordered to cross the river north of Leavenworth, create a diversion in the enemy's rear and, if possible, prevent Red reinforcements being sent down from the north.

An expeditionary patrol, sent across the Missouri River in a boat after nightfall April 1st, has succeeded in blowing up the Missouri Pacific R. R. bridge over Salt Creek.

At 9:00 P. M. a reliable spy reported that all troops in Fort Leavenworth had marched south late in the afternoon, except a strong guard of about 150 men at the Rock Island bridge head.

Colonel A. at once ordered the division bridge train, which had been placed at his disposal, to lay a bridge over the Missouri River at the northeastern extremity of the Polo Grounds peninsula, and the bridge was completed at 5:00 A. M. April 2d.

At 5:00 A. M., a spy comes from Kickapoo with the information that two brigades of infantry from Atchison (north

of Leavenworth), have detrained at Kickapoo and are to march south at daybreak to join the Red army.

At 6:00 A. M., Colonel A. has crossed his regiment to the west bank and the leading element of his advance guard has reached the Missouri Pacific R. R. (III) when he receives the following message:

OFFICER'S PATROL, TROOP "A"
HANCOCK HILL, 5:50 A. M.

To Colonel A.:

Column of hostile infantry marching south on KICKAPOO-FRENCHMAN road. Point of advance guard now at crossing PLUM CREEK, head of main body approaching 47. Tail of column not yet in sight. Do not see any cavalry or artillery.

E.
Lieutenant.

At the same time, the sound of heavy artillery fire is heard coming from the south.

Required:

1. Colonel A.'s orders and intentions.
2. His reasons therefor.
3. A sketch or tracing indicating the position Colonel A. expects his troops to occupy at 7:15 A. M., if all goes well.

NOTICE.

In order to induce others to compete in these Prize Problem contests, the Executive Council directs that competitors who have been awarded three prizes will be barred from future competitions.

EDITOR.



METAL FOULING.

THIS subject is of interest to all who have used the U. S. Springfield rifle, model 1903. It has been claimed that this fouling does not affect the accuracy of the rifle, but I do not believe this view is generally accepted.

Arms and the Man has published during the past year several chemical formulas for the removal of this fouling. The best known is probably that devised by Dr. W. G. Hudson. It is made up as follows:

1 ounce ammonium persulphate,
200 grains ammonium carbonate,
6 ounces ammonia 28 per cent.
4 ounces water.

"The ammonium carbonate and persulphate should be pulverized and left in the solution for a half hour, in order that it may become thoroughly saturated.

"A convenient method of manipulation is to force a cork into the chamber of the rifle, and fill the barrel to the muzzle. A half hour will be found a sufficient time for the solution to act on all ordinary cases. The solution before use is col-

orless, but when the fouling is dissolved it imparts a blue color of an intensity corresponding with the amount of metallic fouling present."

C. H. Bierbaum publishes the following:

"The mixture used for this purpose is a saturated solution of carbonate of ammonia dissolved in 26 degree aqua ammonia, to which is added an amount of caustic potash equal to the size of an ordinary pea for every fluid ounce of solution. For making up this solution it is convenient to purchase in a drug store, say, four fluid ounces of stronger ammonia in a five ounce bottle, then buy several ounces of carbonate of ammonia, and also the caustic potash; the last two are solids. The caustic potash should be handled very carefully, as it is an extremely strong caustic. The carbonate of ammonia is introduced into the bottle, using all that will dissolve and giving it several hours time for dissolving. After this the caustic potash is added, and the solution is ready for use."

After use the solution should be thoroughly cleaned out of the rifle and the bore well oiled.

C. E. STODTER,
Captain, Ninth Cavalry.

REMOUNTS.

A QUESTION recently arose at the War Department in connection with the propriety of officers inspecting horses to be delivered under contract, using their judgment to the extent of accepting horses which were admittedly not up to the specifications, because in their opinion the horses specified could not be obtained in the market at the contract price. The Chief of Staff submitted this question to the Secretary of War in the following indorsement:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

WASHINGTON, December 11, 1907.

Respectfully submitted to the Acting Secretary of War.

There has been continual complaint in the cavalry, concerning the quality of horses furnished in recent years by the Quartermaster's Department. In order to raise the standard of horses supplied, the Quartermaster General has long been using specifications covering horses of superior quality; some contractors, however, have persisted in bidding at a price for which horses of superior class cannot be furnished. There has always been a struggle with the Quartermaster's Department, the contractor endeavoring to force the latter to accept horses not up to the standard covered by the specifications. Various inspectors have taken upon themselves to use their own judgment in accepting the best horses that could be gotten, because they realized that superior horses could not be had at the price specified in the contract. Of course, in every such case, they were simply aiding and abetting the contractor in defeating the aims and purposes of the Quartermaster's Department, though without any such intention.

The Quartermaster's Department can never succeed in raising the standard of horses supplied the cavalry service, until inspecting officers realize the necessity for holding contractors up to a strict compliance with the specifications contained in the contract (regardless of contract price) by refusing to accept any horses that do not comply with the specifications, which contain in their language all the elasticity the government desires to embody in them.

I concur in the views contained in the preceding indorsement, and it is recommended that these papers be returned to —— —— for his information and guidance in the future.

SHOEING HIND FEET.

The Editor, Cavalry Journal:

SIR:—While serving in South Dakota, on the Cheyenne River Indian (Sioux) Reservation, during the recent Ute unpleasantness, I observed that many saddle ponies belonging to the Siouxs were shod behind and not in front, and I learned, upon inquiry, that it is their custom to so shoe their saddle animals.

One very intelligent half breed, a school teacher, told me that it was the experience of himself, his neighbors and his associates, to have their ponies become sore-footed behind and not in front when the animals were used unshod; that saddle animals were usually shod behind and rarely in front.

In support of his contention that it is more necessary to shoe the hind feet than the fore, if the horse is not to be shod all around, he showed me four or five ponies in his corral whose hind feet were so badly worn that it had become

necessary to lay them up for a few weeks until their feet grew down again. These ponies, prior to their going lame, had not been shod at all. Their fore feet were in excellent condition. This may interest the readers of the JOURNAL.

Very respectfully,

R. J. REANEY,
First Lieutenant, Second Cavalry.

THE COMPANY LIBRARY.

WHY technical literature should not be included in the number of books usually selected for the libraries of organizations deserves more than passing comment. Indeed, in these strenuous times of ours, it is a matter to be deplored that the men of an organization are denied access to the kind of books that would undoubtedly increase their liking, if not increase their love, for their adopted profession.

In purchasing books for a company library, it will be well to bear in mind that the average man in the company has but a fair common school education. It takes something more than a High School education to develop the average mind to appreciate the true worth of good literature. But, there is one thing that the average enlisted man will be found to have developed to a remarkable degree, and that is the spirit of adventure—the spirit that furnishes the motive power and induces the average youth to leave his home to become a soldier.

There is no reason why this spirit should not be cultivated to a greater extent by giving the men of the company books suitable to their tastes. For this reason, instead of loading up the library shelves with ancient and modern classics, books on geography, travel, adventure, outdoor and indoor amusements, as well as short stories, and good stimulating essays, should occupy a prominent position on the library shelves. Of course, professional books of the soldier's profession should be of first importance and should

not under any consideration be lost sight of; for what professional man would attempt to build up a library and leave out the books most essential to his art or craft? For instance, for instructive purposes, as well as to give men a better taste for their profession, what better book could be had for these very purposes than General Ian Hamilton's "Scrap Book of a Staff Officer?" Baden-Powell's "War in Practice" is another book that will more than amuse an enlisted man—it will instruct him. These two books are only a type of hundreds of others that can be easily obtained through any New York publishing firm. There's an account of the Spanish-American War published by our Navy Department, under the title of "Notes of the Spanish-American War," which should be in the library of every officer and enlisted man in the army and navy. History and biography, especially *American military history and biography;* books about books, such as "How to Read and What to Read;" books of reference, such as Military Dictionaries, Webster's Dictionary, the International Encyclopedia, and Hoyle—all of these excellent argument settlers should not be forgotten in the building up of a company library.

One great advantage of having a number of professional books in the company library, aside from the help they would be to candidates for commissions, would be to develop in the mind of the average enlisted man a greater respect for his officers and non-commissioned officers; because these very books on his own profession would make it clear to him that those placed over him must possess more than *ordinary* knowledge of their profession before they can be promoted to hold any position of authority. This reason alone should serve to stimulate the sympathetic efforts of those interested to build up a sort of military library at least, not of the books of one branch of the service either, but books belonging to all branches of the service.

The very fact of the men having access to books of all branches of the service would develop in them a far greater interest in the service; they would soon learn what relation one particular branch of the service had to another—what their particular rôles were in time of war, how impossible it

is to wage any kind of successful warfare without the co operation of all arms, and so on. A better result, too, maybe, would be a deeper and broader sympathy for each other—sympathy that would soon develop into greater intercourse and camaraderie; and, in addition, the advantage of some *esprit de corps*—something that is very badly needed in our army to-day. P.

SIMPLE LESSON IN REPAIRING FIELD LINES.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KAN., Jan. 29, 1908.

The Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. (Through Military Channels.)

SIR:—I have the honor to submit the following suggestions relative to the repair of field wire lines of information. It is an accepted fact that field (buzzer) lines are absolutely necessary to properly conduct a modern tactical movement. To prevent the loss of electrical power the wire is always insulated; to secure speed in laying it, it is laid on the ground. Experience has shown also that the wire is frequently broken inadvertently or carelessly by troops. It is the business of the signal corps to repair these breaks. Often now when conscious of the fact the person breaking the wire desires to repair it; when the importance of maintaining the line intact is realized every officer and soldier will be eager to repair breaks. What is the proper way to do it? With the idea of having this information a part of the instruction of every officer and enlisted man, the photographs with explanatory remarks are enclosed herewith. It is suggested that Army Regulations be amended by the General Staff requiring that this instruction be given each troop, company and battery for two hours each year. Also that these photographs be lithographed and five copies with such additional information as is deemed necessary be furnished each troop, company and battery.

Very respectfully,

(Signed.) W. N. HUGHES, Jr.
First Lieut. Signal Corps



No. 1.
THE BROKEN LINE. WIRE ENDS SHOWING.



No. 2.
TYING THE WIRE FOR STRENGTH. DOUBLE OVERHAND KNOT.



No. 3.
SCRAPING THE INSULATION OFF THE TWO BROKEN ENDS.



No. 4.
TYING THE METALLIC KNOT FOR ELECTRICAL CURRENT TO FLOW.
Twisting one scraped end around the other.
Overhand knot to be drawn tight.

CHIEF OF CAVALRY.

FORT CLARK, TEXAS, January 12, 1908.

The Secretary U. S. Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.:

SIR:—The President in his message recommends that the position of Chief of Cavalry be created, and I presume his opinion on that subject is shared by over ninety per cent. of cavalry officers.

It has been interesting to read in the JOURNAL what has been said on the subject, but I have yet to see an article that really goes at the thing in a way that is calculated to bring results.

The trouble seems to lie in the fact that every one feels that we can't have a Chief of Cavalry unless Congress authorizes the position.

I believe that the practical value of a Chief of Cavalry can be secured without any action by Congress. What we want is an officer in a position to control the instruction of our arm so as to make it uniform in all regiments; to collect information regarding the conditions and needs of the cavalry and present it to the Secretary of War; to be in the confidence of the Secretary to the extent of securing the backing of the administration in matters which require congressional action, and probably many other functions.

Cannot all this be accomplished by the designation of one of our colonels by the President to act as a Chief of Cavalry? Such an appointment, or detail, would be sufficient to carry out the essential duties of the office. It would at least be a good beginning. It certainly would be a pretty certain step toward securing congressional action creating the position, carrying with it suitable rank.

The Chief of Cavalry thus detailed would have to get along at first without any appropriations, and all of his orders would be issued in the name of the Secretary of War, but I believe that the benefit to the cavalry would be practically the same as though Congress had created the office.

Very respectfully,

BRICE P. DISQUE,
First Lieutenant Third Cavalry.

ELIMINATION.

SEVERAL years ago there was considerable agitation for a change in the method of promotion in the army. Elimination and selection were talked of, and several bills based on elimination were drawn and presented through the army papers. Finally the army was canvassed, with more or less thoroughness, and the large majority expressed themselves as opposed to either elimination or selection.

It is believed that no one, with the possible exception of the self-confessed incompetent, would be opposed to either elimination or selection if administered without partiality, favor or affection, and as it is believed that the opposition developed by the canvass of the army was merely opposition to the bills and methods proposed or which it was feared would be adopted, it is hoped to reopen the discussion of this subject by inviting serious, general and exhaustive discussion of the same for the calendar years 1908 and 1909.

All must realize that promotion by seniority is far from satisfactory, and that there is more or less certainty of a radical change in the present system within a few years, in spite of the fact that the former discussion developed sufficient opposition to apparently kill and bury the subject.

The belief that a bill based on elimination can be devised which will be acceptable to the great majority, and also greatly improve the service, prompts this article.

The outline of such a bill is herewith submitted for discussion, and it is believed will contain, at least, the elements of an acceptable and just method.

The main features of the bill will be:

1st. The officers of the army will themselves determine those of their number that should be eliminated.

2d. The officers eliminated will compose a reserve officer list, subject to duty with the colors as volunteer officers in time of war.

In drafting this bill the following will be assumed as axiomatic:

1. That other things being equal, that army will be most efficient which has the most efficient officers.
2. That different degrees of efficiency are manifested by officers.
3. That some officers are inefficient.
4. That slow promotion with long service in a grade is detrimental to efficiency.
5. That there is a period in every officer's service when his experience and years best fit him for the duties of a particular grade.
6. That after this period further service in the grade is retrogressive.
7. That while the inefficiency due to the inexperience of youth is susceptible of correction, the inefficiency resulting from age is beyond rectification.
8. That absolutely just elimination or absolutely just promotion by selection would produce greater efficiency than promotion by seniority.
9. That just selection, while it would undoubtedly improve the results produced by the present methods, does not remove inefficiency.
10. That just elimination would raise the standard of efficiency by the elimination of inefficiency.
11. That an army is only as efficient as its least efficient, therefore, that an army of both inefficients and efficients would be poorer than an army of efficients.
12. That considering human weaknesses, just elimination is preferable to selection or any combination of elimination, selection and seniority.
13. That the present system has fossilized and destroyed more military genius than it has developed.

Let every officer give this subject his deepest thought, reduce his ideas to writing and give them to the army through the various service journals and papers.

If January 1, 1910, finds us still without an acceptable bill, we shall still have the record of an exhaustive discussion of the subject, and will at least know what we do not want.

We should bear in mind that a change is not only possible, but probable, and that the army after this discussion will know far more about the subject than it does at present.

When the time comes that we want the change, or that it is forced upon us, the committee of the General Staff or others that may be directed to draft the bill, will be far better able to draft a good and just one than under present conditions, with lack of exhaustive study of the subject.

Any united, unselfish effort of the officers of the army for the betterment of the service will be enacted as law.

"THE LINE."

* * *

A BILL to regulate promotion and increase the efficiency of the army.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, that the commissioned officers of the army shall be classified as follows: First, officers of the active list; second, officers of the reserve officer list; third, officers of the retired list.

SEC. 2. That hereafter promotion of the commissioned officers of the active list shall be by seniority after elimination.

SEC. 3. That all officers on the active or reserve officers' lists shall at sixty-four years of age be placed on the retired list.

SEC. 4. That the maximum age of brigadier generals shall be sixty-one years; provided that no general officer shall serve in any one grade for more than ten years.

*SEC. 5. That in the Staff Corps the maximum age of colonels shall be — years; of lieutenant colonels, — years; of majors, — years; of captains, — years; of first lieutenants, — years.

SEC. 6. That in the line the maximum age of colonels shall be fifty-five years; of lieutenant colonels, fifty years; of majors, forty-seven years; of captains, forty-three years; of first lieutenants, thirty-three years; *Provided*, That no person shall be commissioned a second lieutenant who is over

*NOTE.—The ages in this section to be determined by the Staff or after discussion.

twenty-five years of age; and, *provided further*, That an officer shall, on the date he attains the maximum age of his grade, be transferred to the reserve officer list.

SEC. 7. That the vacancies made necessary by the operation of this law shall be obtained as follows: (1) By the retirement of the physically disqualified; (2) by voluntary transfer to the reserve officer list; (3) by involuntary transfer to the reserve officer list.

SEC. 8. That all officers transferred from the active list under the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 7, shall compose the reserve officer list, and shall in time of war be subject to active duty under orders of the War Department, with rank not less than that held when transferred from the active list; *Provided*, That in time of peace no such officer shall be assigned to duty without his consent; and *provided further*, That in either case, when so serving under the orders of the War Department, he shall receive the full pay and allowances of his grade.

SEC. 9. That the pay of officers of the reserve officer list shall be determined by taking three and three-fourths per cent. of their pay when transferred from the active list and multiplying the amount thus obtained by the number of years of commissioned service; *Provided*, That the maximum pay of reserve officers shall be for twenty years commissioned service; and *provided further*, That all officers retired for physical defects shall receive seventy-five per cent. of the pay of their grade.

SEC. 10. That vacancies necessary after the operation of paragraphs 1 and 2, Section 7, shall be made as follows: For five years, fifty per cent. by the elimination of those least efficient, and fifty per cent. by the elimination of those oldest for their rank; *Provided*, That after five years those to be eliminated shall be determined solely by efficiency, all things considered, the least efficient being eliminated.

SEC. 11. That to carry into effect paragraphs 1 and 3, Section 7, each officer shall yearly make a confidential report direct to the War Department on all officers of his own and junior grades in his regiment or corps.

SEC. 12. That these reports shall set forth the certified, unbiased, personal and private opinion of the officers reporting, as to the physical fitness and relative efficiency of the officers reported on.

SEC. 13. That the officers to be eliminated under paragraphs 1 and 3, Section 7, shall be determined by two boards.

SEC. 14. That the first board, to be composed of five general officers, sworn to impartial and confidential action, shall from the reports provided for in Sections 11 and 12, select for each branch of the service, twice as many officers as must be eliminated to insure the proper flow of promotion for the next calendar year.

SEC. 15. That the finding of this board shall be referred to a second board composed of thirteen officers between the rank of captain and brigadier general, and also sworn to impartial and confidential action.

SEC. 16. That the second board shall make the selection of the officers to be eliminated from among those proposed by the first board after a careful consideration of the entire official records of those officers only.

SEC. 17. That the action of the second board shall be final and shall be published in orders to go into effect on the first day of the next calendar year.

SEC. 18. That the provisions of this bill shall become inoperative upon the declaration of war and remain inoperative until one year after the declaration of peace.

SEC. 19. That in order to carry this bill into effect the yearly eliminations shall for the first five years be not more than twice the average that would be necessary were the bill in full force and effect.

SEC. 20. That all laws or parts of laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

NOTE.—A proposed form for the report required by Sections 11 and 12 of the above bill accompanied this article which, to save space is given in substance only. It shows the names, rank, regiment or corps of the officers recommended for elimination, in the order named; the personal relations of the signer with these officers, such as friendly, pleasant, unfriendly, indifferent, hostile, etc., and the reasons for the recommendations, as physically disqualified, inefficient, eccentric, and a poor leader of men, etc. The certificate is as follows: "I certify that in making this report I have considered what I believe to be the best interests of the service; that the views stated therein are my own and arrived at without consulting with others, and uninfluenced, as far as may be, by the opinions of others: that I have not disclosed my opinions as set forth, and will not do so unless required by proper authority; that I have made every effort to avoid the influence of personal favor, affection or dislike and that I have carefully read this certificate before signing the report."—[EDITOR.]

THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR.

A MOVEMENT is on foot at Columbus, Georgia, to place in that city an immense boulder, with a suitably engraved bronze plate attached thereto, to mark the site of the last battle of the Civil War. It is true that there was some desultory fighting and scrapping after the battle at Columbus, Georgia, but nothing of sufficient size to entitle it to the name of a battle. The battle at Columbus, Georgia, began about two o'clock in the afternoon, and lasted until nine o'clock in the night, April 16, 1865. It was about nine o'clock on Sunday night, April 16, 1865, that Colonel C. A. L. Lamer, of General Cobb's staff, formerly the owner of *The Wanderer* (a slave trader), was killed, being shot from his horse on the Columbus side of the bridge in trying to rally the Confederate forces for a last stand in defense of Columbus. This event marked the close of the fight.

The forces engaged in the battle at Columbus were under command of General James H. Wilson on the Union side, and on the Confederate side under the command of General Howell Cobb. The division acting under General Wilson's orders, was that of Brevet Major General Upton, being the Fourth Division of Wilson's cavalry corps.

The fruits of victory for the Union arms were very great, including the Confederate ram *Jackson*, nearly ready for sea, mounting six seven-inch guns, and General Wilson's troops burned 115,000 bales of cotton, four cotton factories, fifteen locomotives, 250 cars, the navy yard, armory, sword and pistol factories, and 1,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, be-

sides immense stores, of which no account could be taken. The Confederates abandonded and burned the gunboat *Chattahoochie* twelve miles below Columbus.

The Daughters of the Confederacy, Lizzie Rutherford Chapter, are active in the enterprise of marking this scene of the last battle of the Civil War, and the citizens, as well as the city officials of Columbus are taking an active interest in this matter.

The information contained in the above will be of particular interest to the veterans of Wilson's cavalry corps. This corps comprised seven divisions, aggregating 3,500 horsemen, all under the command of General James H. Wilson. On the expedition known as the Selma campaign, or the Wilson raid, General Wilson had with him only the fighting force of three divisions, aggregating 15,000 horsemen.

THEODORE F. ALLEN,
Seventh Ohio Cavalry, Wilson's Corps.

CINCINNATI, OHIO, February 8, 1908.

Editor's Table.

CHIEF OF CAVALRY.

Report of committee referred to on page 577, CAVALRY JOURNAL, January 1908, in reference to a Chief of Cavalry:

This committee reports that it has carefully considered the question of a Chief of Cavalry and believes that steps should be taken looking to the establishment of an office at the War Department for such an official, whether he be called Chief of Cavalry, Inspector of Cavalry, or by some other suitable title.

The committee finds that it is the almost unanimous wish of the cavalry officers of our service that there should be a "Chief of Cavalry," with powers and duties commensurate with the position, and that would insure efficiency in that arm.

Many arguments have appeared from time to time advocating such an official, and are familiar to all. It is therefore unnecessary to repeat them here. The Chief of Cavalry should be a member of the General Staff and head of the committee considering questions relating to the cavalry. Such questions include the personnel, remounts, clothing, arms, equipment, drill regulations, instruction, etc.; in short, everything affecting the efficiency of this branch of the service. The chief should also have power to inspect the cavalry for the purpose of discovering defects and of determining where the standards of efficiency were not being maintained. He would thus be able to bring to the immediate attention of the Chief of Staff deficiencies in this arm and point out practical remedies—remedies that the Chief of Staff could rely upon.

It is not intended that this official should command the cavalry, or have administrative duties, though he be called Chief, any more than a Chief of Infantry or a Chief of Artillery should command their respective arms. We do not want a hydra-headed military machine in the line of the army.

The committee also finds that nearly every civilized nation has a cavalry official with powers and duties similar to those outlined above, and believes that the experience of those nations is ample warrant for our asking that a similar office be established in our own army.

The committee therefore recommends that a petition be addressed to the President of the United States praying him to appoint a Chief of Cavalry, preferably from among the colonels of cavalry, or brigadier generals appointed from that arm, with such powers and duties as he, the President, deems best, leaving to future legislation the determination of those questions that must be settled in that manner.

The idea of the committee as to the functions of a Chief of Cavalry may be more readily understood if we should go further and state that we believe that there should be a Chief of Infantry as well as of artillery and cavalry, that each should be a member of the General Staff, and each at the head of a committee of that body, to which committees should be referred questions relating to their respective arms, or to the three committees acting jointly when such questions related to the three arms. This, we believe, would promote not only the efficiency of each individual arm, but of the service generally by securing unity of action upon all questions concerning the army as a whole.

D. H. BOUGHTON,
Major, 11th Cavalry.
M. F. STEELE,
Captain, 6th Cavalry.
MATTHEW E. HANNA,
Captain, 3d Cavalry.

ARMY STAFF COLLEGE, January 16, 1908.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION.

The annual meeting of the Association was held in Grant Hall at Fort Leavenworth on January 20, 1908, with 208 members present or represented by proxy. In the absence of the President of the Association and the Vice-President having resigned, Major C. W. Taylor, Thirteenth Cavalry, was called to the chair and presided at the meeting.

The annual election of officers took place and the following were duly elected by ballot as required by Section 4, Article VI. of the Constitution:

President: Brigadier General William H. Carter, U. S. Army.

Vice-President: Major Charles W. Taylor, Thirteenth U. S. Cavalry.

Executive Council:

Major D. H. Boughton, Eleventh U. S. Cavalry.
Captain M. F. Steele, Sixth U. S. Cavalry.
Captain A. L. Dade, Thirteenth U. S. Cavalry.
Captain Herbert A. White, Eleventh U. S. Cavalry.
Captain M. E. Hanna, Third U. S. Cavalry.

The annual report of the Secretary and Treasurer to the Executive Council was read, (his accounts as Treasurer having been previously audited by a committee of the Executive Council) which report is given below.

The committee of the Executive Council that had been appointed to prepare a report on the subject of a Chief of Cavalry submitted its report, which was adopted. After discussion, it was decided that the Executive Council be requested to continue its efforts to secure a Chief of Cavalry by preparing and circulating petitions and by any other means in its power. The report will be found in this number of the JOURNAL.

The Executive Council was also requested to draft amendments to the Constitution on the lines suggested by the Secretary and other points that they may deem necessary or expedient, and to have the same published to the members

of the Association as required by the Constitution, in order that they may be acted upon at the next annual meeting.

The Secretary read the following letter from Major General J. Franklin Bell, and stated that the resignation of General Bell as Vice-President had been previously accepted by the Executive Council:

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF.

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1907.

The Secretary, U. S. Cavalry Association, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.:

SIR:—Because of the position I occupy in the army, which imposes upon me the obligation to be a representative of every branch of the service equally and impartially, it has just occurred to me as inappropriate that I should continue to be the Vice-President of the Association, and I therefore have the honor to tender my resignation as the same. This action is irrevocable, and would have been taken sooner had it ever occurred to me since I have been Chief of Staff that I *was* Vice-President of the Cavalry Association. Since my departure from Fort Leavenworth I have never been communicated with or called upon to take any action or express any view connected in the remotest degree with the Association. For this reason it has never happened to enter my head until to-day that I was still its Vice-President.

Very respectfully,

J. F. BELL,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY AND TREASURER.

To the Executive Council U. S. Cavalry Association:

GENTLEMEN:—Under the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution, I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report, showing the financial condition, etc., of the Association for the year ended December 31, 1907:

FINANCIAL REPORT.

Cash on hand January 1, 1907		$ 489 98
Received from members and subscribers		2,332 29
Received from advertisers		1,702 75
Received from sales of books		228 32
Total receipts from all sources		$4,753 34
Expended as per classified list herewith		3,708 25
Balance on hand December 31, 1907		$1,045 09

ASSETS AND LIABILITIES DECEMBER 31, 1907.

Assets:

Cash on hand	$1,045 09	
Due from members and subscribers	1,494 00	
Due from advertisers	317 75	
Due the Book Department	75 71	
Due from former members (still officers)	142 00	=$3,074 55

Liabilities.

Due on account of Book Department	$ 70 75	
Due U. S. Infantry Association	43 83	=$ 114 58
Net resources December 31, 1907		2,959 97
		$3,074 55

It will be observed that there is an unusually large amount reported as due from members and subscribers. It is believed that nearly all these outstanding accounts are good and will be paid, and strenuous efforts are being made to collect them. The list of unpaid accounts will, of necessity, be smaller in the future for two reasons. First, because the postoffice department has issued an order that publications can only be transmitted at the pound rate to subscribers who have paid for their subscriptions, and, second, that I will not, with the consent of the Executive Council, in the future permit a member's dues to run over the two years specified in the Constitution before he is dropped, or a subscriber's account to run over one year, even should the ruling of the postoffice authorities be reversed. The latter is now being discussed in Congress.

The small amounts due from former members who have been dropped from the rolls for nonpayment of dues are thought to be just and legal claims and, under direction of the Executive Council, steps are being taken to *force* their payment.

Many of our members fail to realize that our dues are payable in advance, and some are in the habit of making payments every two, three or more years, and occasionally a member pays his arrears of dues and at the same time pays for two or three years in advance.

In scanning the list of delinquents, your Treasurer finds many that he knows personally to be well able to pay their indebtedness to the Association and many that are usually very punctilious about paying their bills, which confirms him in the belief that, generally, the failure to pay dues promptly is the result of carelessness rather than inability to pay them. The list includes all grades in the service from general officers to second lieutenants.

While the prevailing hard times for those living on a fixed salary, particularly on a salary fixed nearly forty years ago, may have had its influence in creating this unusually large list of members in arrears, yet, as stated above, it is believed that it is largely due to carelessness.

If all members, or even a large percentage of them, would promptly pay their dues, the Executive Council could then make a fair estimate of the income of the Association, and could plan accordingly for either increasing the size of the JOURNAL or, which would be better, to publish it more frequently; but when so many are in arrears and pay spasmodically we can have no definite idea as to our future income, and this may delay the much to be desired increased frequency of the publication of the JOURNAL.

Many of our members have suggested that our JOURNAL be published more frequently, to make it a bi-monthly, and some advocate making it a monthly, and I believe that our financial condition will warrant a change to a bi-monthly. To do this, however, will require a change in our Constitution, as it now provides for a quarterly publication, and I suggest that the necessary steps be taken to so amend this provision so as to allow the Executive Council to arrange for making the JOURNAL a bi-monthly or even a monthly whenever they deem it advisable.

If published more frequently, it will be necessary to curtail the size of the JOURNAL or to work up a greater interest in our members as regards furnishing original articles for publication.

Some time since, I wrote the commanding officer of each of our cavalry garrisons as follows:

"It is desired to have one live, active cavalry officer in each cavalry garrison to act as representative or agent of the Secretary and Treasurer of the Cavalry Association. The idea is to have some one officer who has the interests of the Association at heart to round up those cavalry officers who are not members of the Association, to collect proxies from the members when called for, and to mail them in one bunch to the Secretary, and, generally, to be the one particular member with whom I can communicate on matters affecting the welfare of the institution. The enclosed letter will still further explain the duties of such agent."

Nearly all of these commanding officers have complied with this request, and much good has already resulted from this action. Although I had endeavored by correspondence with officers in the larger garrisons to obtain proxies for the coming annual meeting and had succeeded in procuring many, yet it would have been impossible to have had a meeting, as was the case last year and for some prior years, had it not been for the efforts of three or four of these regimental agents.

Furthermore, these agents have induced many new members to join the Association.*

The requirements of our Constitution as to the number necessary to make a quorum should be modified by amendment and thereby save so much correspondence in order to obtain proxies.

It has been suggested by one of the Executive Council that an office of regimental agent or regimental member of the Executive Council be created so that such officer could have an official status in the Association and have his name appear in the list of officers. It might be well to amend the Constitution in this respect.

There are several other minor points in the Constitution that should be amended to make its provisions more clear and positive, in addition to those suggested above.

The membership of the Association on December 31, 1907, was as follows:

Regular members, 697; associate members, 221; life members, 9; and subscribers, 682; this latter number including the 319 infantry subscribers at the club rate.

The membership by regiments, of the cavalry service is as follows:

*Since this report was rendered, one of these regimental agents or representatives has obtained enough new members to bring his regiment (Eighth Cavalry) from next to the foot of the list of regiments, arranged according to membership in the Association, to the head of that list. The gain in membership during January was greater than during any other month for several years.

	Members.	Percentage.
First Cavalry	39	78.0
Second Cavalry	34	72.6
Third Cavalry	41	80.4
Fourth Cavalry	33	70.2
Fifth Cavalry	40	78.4
Sixth Cavalry	39	76.5
Seventh Cavalry	27	53.0
Eighth Cavalry	33	64.7
Ninth Cavalry	37	77.1
Tenth Cavalry	36	69.2
Eleventh Cavalry	35	71.4
Twelfth Cavalry	36	70.6
Thirteenth Cavalry	32	64.0
Fourteenth Cavalry	33	64.7
Fifteenth Cavalry	32	62.7

Of the cavalry officers not belonging to regiments, all but two are members of the Association, or 94.0 per cent., the per centage of membership of all cavalry officers on the active list being 71.1 per cent.

In conclusion, I wish, in submitting my first annual report as Secretary and Treasurer of the Association, covering but half of the year 1907, to repeat what I said in the October number of the JOURNAL, that the present fine financial standing of the Association and the great improvement in the JOURNAL is due largely to the business ability and energy, as well as the editorial accomplishments of my two immediate predecessors, Captains Steele and White.

Respectfully submitted,

EZRA B. FULLER,
Lieut. Colonel U. S. Army,
Secretary and Treasurer.

SECOND-CLASS MAIL MATTER.

The Postoffice Department has recently issued a new order, based upon the law on this subject, regarding second-class mail matter that is of importance to the Cavalry Association, as it will necessitate a change in the practice that has heretofore prevailed in managing the affairs of this

office. The regulation in question has been adopted with a view of curing many of the grave abuses of the second-class mailing privilege that have obtained under the old regulations.

The following are extracts from the report of the Third Assistant Postmaster General on the subject:

"Two great abuses of the second-class mailing privileges have arisen largely, as you are probably aware, from the carrying of expired subscriptions for indefinite periods and from the old 100 per cent. sample-copy privilege—that is, for every copy of his paper sent to a subscriber, the publisher under the old regulations was allowed to mail a sample copy at the second-class postage rate of one cent per pound.

"The essential features of the new regulations fix a reasonable limit for the carrying of expired subscriptions and reduce the sample copy privilege to ten per cent. of the mailings of a publication to subscribers. It is believed that the end sought is being accomplished, not only without real hardship to legitimate publishers, but, on the contrary, judging from the expressions of approval received from many of them, with beneficial results.

"The Department has not attempted heretofore to deal by regulation with the practice on the part of some publishers of mailing for an indefinite period, papers to persons whose subscriptions have long expired, and no rules upon that subject were promulgated. However, such rules have now been made and are as follows:

"3. A reasonable time will be allowed publishers to secure renewals of subscriptions, but unless subscriptions are expressly renewed after the term for which they are paid, within the following periods:

* * * * * * *

Quarterlies within six months,

they shall not be counted in the legitimate list of subscribers, and copies mailed on account thereof shall not be accepted for mailing at the second-class postage rate of one cent a pound, but may be mailed at the transient second-class postage rate of one cent for each four ounces or fraction thereof,

prepaid by stamps affixed. The right of a publisher to extend credit for subscriptions to his publication is not denied or questioned, but his compliance or non-compliance with this regulation will be taken into consideration in determining whether the publication is entitled to transmission at the second-class postage rates."

As to the wisdom or legality of this new regulation, there can be no doubt, and if rigorously enforced, as we trust it will be, it will not only result in an immense saving to the government but be a blessing to the legitimate publishers. Mail matter of this class, now constituting sixty-seven per cent. of the total mail carried, yields only four per cent. of the total postal revenues, and it is not surprising that efforts have been made to curtail the privilege, for it is a privilege, and so designated in the law of 1901.

Under the above regulation, which goes into effect on April 1, 1908, it will be necessary, as is now required by our constitution, that payments be made in advance or within six months after the expiration of any subscription, or to prepay the postage at the rate of one cent for each four ounces or fraction thereof by stamps affixed, amounting to five or six cents per copy for our JOURNAL.

It goes without saying that the Cavalry Association will live strictly up to the letter of the law; but whether or not the subscriber will be dropped at the expiration of the six months' period or be continued and the extra postage charged to his account has not yet been determined by the Executive Council. Your Secretary and Treasurer is strongly in favor of the first method, not only because it will simplify the accounts, but because it is so ordered in our constitution.

Generally, it is as easy for our members to pay their subscriptions at one time as another, and as we do occasionally lose something by payments not being paid in advance, it is to the mutual advantage of all concerned that the rule of advance payments be strictly enforced.

WHAT OUR MEMBERS THINK.

Many of the proxies for the annual meeting that arrived after the January number went to press, contained various suggestions and "kicks," a few of which, and also some from private letters, are quoted as follows:

"Publish more cavalry subjects and leave out such articles as the one about Port Arthur, printed last spring."

"I am strongly in favor of a single service journal, published every two weeks. I believe this would promote mutual interest between different arms, kill foolish but very harmful jealousy, build up harmony, accord with right principles of economy in all of its aspects, give military food at proper intervals, and inure to the best welfare of all branches of the army."

"Publish articles on field artillery beneficial and of interest to the cavalry, especally until they start a journal that covers the field."

"Hold meetings of cavalry officers in each garrison, and a determined effort be made to secure a chief of cavalry, a remount service, and such other legislation as would tend to its improvement."

"Devote more time and attention to the old fashioned close order drills for discipline and getting units 'in hand' before turning them loose in disjointed athletics and still more loose 'field training.' Put a curb on too much so-called 'strenuosity.'"

"Advocate the reorganization of the cavalry on the Boughton plan."

"I believe that it would be for the good of the cavalry if even two regiments could be brigaded together, with a light battery if possible, for actual practice on problems peculiar to our arm."

"We should push hard for a chief of cavalry, and he should be the director or head of the remount service. While the present Quartermaster General is an accomplished

cavalryman, we have no certainty that his successor will be. He may come from any branch of the service, and for that reason it appears to me that a remount system under the Quartermaster's Department would be only a little better than what we now have."

"Print in the JOURNAL a gazette of changes in the cavalry and note stations of regiments, etc. Of course these are given in the service papers, but if put in the JOURNAL we have the facts in a more permanent form for future reference. Also get the military history of each regiment from the Adjutant General each year and publish them. This will give the service the benefit of these histories, whereas now they are buried in the file of the Adjutant General's office and at regimental headquarters, and are not really known to the officers of the organizations to which they belong. You can readily see that the publication would stimulate officers in writing up their personal experiences connected with the incidents recorded in these histories and before it is too late to get accurate data—while the incidents are fresh to the memory. My own habit of keeping a diary when in the field has been a great help to me and, also, by frequent references to these, I find how treacherous my own memory often is, and the memories of others also."

"I have heard that the infantry are pretty well united, and are agreed upon a measure looking to an increase. Of course the most we can expect is an increment of officers from reorganization. The Boughton plan has much to commend it, and so has Michie's; but I doubt whether anyone could answer affirmatively the question: Does either plan bring the cavalry up to date—to the modern practices of military nations? Why not go the whole hog, as was done in the case of the General Staff, of the artillery, etc.? Why not eliminate the squadron as understood in this country and England, and go to the continental practice, thus making each troop a squadron.

"Everyone familiar with the English military system knows that it possesses very few advantages, because it is necessarily greatly modified by politics and unusual geographical conditions. The courage of the Britisher has never been questioned, but I have never met any officer abroad, skilled in military matters (whether German, Frenchman, Britisher or of other nationality), who commended the British system. On the other hand, each and all condemned it while recognizing that it was born of the political necessities there.

"The squadron of military nations is simply our *troop* (a name that should be eliminated in our service). Why not make of each of our regiments two regiments of six squadrons each? That would give a considerable increase in officers—a thing greatly desired by the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff, and would bring us up to date.

"I would therefore think it most advisable to have a board of high grade officers, in whom the cavalry has confidence, appointed at an early date to look into the question thoroughly and make recommendations that all dissenters should be required to indorse, just as was done by the artillery. This measure includes the appointment of an officer at Washington who should be adviser to the Chief of Staff on cavalry matters, and who should be whipper-in for the plan recommended by the board.

"I am by no means hidebound or committed to any particular measure as yet, for I feel that all the plans ought to be thoroughly examined and utilized as far as may be in determining the final measure best suited for our service.

"The work of the board would include a careful study of Aleshire's recommendations.

"Though the amount of cavalry we require in peace time should be in proportion to regular infantry plus the organized State troops, I think no increase other than of officers should be considered now.

"I hope that General Bell will designate an officer as above (as well as one for infantry), and I believe he would favor a reorganization of the cavalry, that all cavalry officials would agree upon. Of course it is of primary importance to have the cavalry solid for whatever organization be determined upon.

"We can no longer say, as formerly, that European

cavalry is solely for mounted action, and should therefore be organized differently from ours."

The above opinions are, with two exceptions, from officers of the higher grades—from generals to majors—and many of them are worthy of consideration and will be taken up by the Executive Council.

Regarding the one quoted, from a colonel of cavalry, about printing more cavalry subjects and leaving out those like the one on "Port Arthur," we can only say, as has been aptly stated by one of the former editors, that the JOURNAL, in this respect, is what our members make it. We are continually on the lookout for articles on up to date cavalry topics, preferably original ones from our members.

All agreed that we should have a chief of cavalry, and a a still larger majority of those voting or expressing an opinion on uniting with the field artillery were in favor of the proposition that was reported in the last JOURNAL. Of the total number expressing an opinion on this question, all but twenty-one out of one hundred and eighty-six were in favor of so uniting, at least in so far as to publish one Journal, and a large majority to unite unreservedly. There were seven members who voted for the proposition qualifiedly, such as "Yes, but not to sacrifice our yellow cover and Remington horse;" "We had better wait until we know whether the field artillery want to join with us," etc.

On the question of the remount system as proposed by General Aleshire and the comments thereon, the only officers heard from since the last number of the JOURNAL was published were those of the Twelfth Cavalry. The regimental special agent of the Association presented the subject to the officers of that regiment, as follows:

"Two propositions are herewith presented, the first by General Aleshire in his paper on the subject. Each officer is requested to briefly express his views on the two suggestions.

"1. That the remount service should be a separate division of the Quartermaster General's office, designated as the 'remount division,' and under charge of an officer of the Quartermaster's Department.

"2. That the remount service should be under the supervision of a cavalry officer; in fact, that the remount system should be one of the branches of the office of the chief of cavalry when such office is established."

The expressions of opinion from these officers are as follows:

Colonel Kerr: "I am in favor of the second proposition. All officers of the remount service to be detailed from the cavalry for such periods as may be desired by the chief of cavalry, their places in the cavalry to be filled when such details are made by promotions as at present provided when officers are detailed in the Adjutant General's, Inspector General's and some of the other Staff Departments."

Major Goldman: "Get a cavalry chief and establish the remount service."

Major Dugan: "I am in favor of a remount system under the supervision of an officer of cavalry. Such would prove more satisfactory in the long run. However, a remount service under an officer selected by Quartermaster General Aleshire would be efficient."

Twenty other officers of this regiment voted simply: "I am in favor of the second proposition."

PAYMENTS FOR ARTICLES.

As was stated in the JOURNAL for October, 1906, the Executive Council had determined to distribute the money heretofore awarded for prize essays among the contributors to the JOURNAL.

In accordance with that plan, the Executive Council, at a recent meeting, set aside $125.00 to be so distributed for articles that appeared during 1907, and approved the report of a committee that had selected the articles to be thus paid for. Checks for the various amounts have been forwarded to the selected contributors.

While the amount so distributed is small, although larger than that awarded for a prize essay, and the individual payments are by no means what the articles are worth, yet it is hoped that this distribution will have the desired effect of inducing the recipients and others to furnish fresh articles on subjects of live interest to the cavalry arm and the service in general.

ELIMINATION.

The article which appears in this number of the JOURNAL under this title has already been published in the two weekly service papers, and undoubtedly has been read by many, if not all, of our members.

However, it is a subject of so much importance, and as it and the accompanying proposed bill is the joint effort of several cavalry officers, it is reprinted in full with the hope that it will be fully discussed, and ultimately bring forth results which will remove the present stagnation in promotion in the cavalry branch of the service.

The question of promotion by elimination has been frequently discussed in these columns, but never before have we had a complete bill prepared and submitted for the approval or disapproval of our readers.

While promotion by selection is still advocated by some, the sentiment of the army is believed to be opposed to it, and it goes without saying that the mental, moral and physical inefficients are opposed to any but the old system of promotion by seniority.

The editor has recently been permitted to read an article by a distinguished retired general officer, formerly of the cavalry, on the subject of promotion by selection and elimination, which he had hoped might be published in this number of the JOURNAL, but the necessary permission has not yet been received.

While it is a fact that the only cases we have had in our army of promotion by selection, *where the selections were made by a board of officers*, was under the law of 1899, the Act of

March 6, 1899—Section 6—when three line officers were selected for appointment into two of the Staff Corps, and these appointments gave general satisfaction, it is nevertheless true that the impression prevails that no system of promotion by selection can be devised with sufficient safeguards to prevent political or personal favoritism from having its influence in making the selections.

Also, it is claimed that a system of promotion by selection retains the inefficients and the least efficient, and furthermore that members of boards naturally, in making their selections, are more impressed with the record of the abilities and services of those officers with whose careers they are familiar rather than of those with whom they have never served.

As was well stated in the JOURNAL of April, 1906, we already have a law that provides for weeding out the mental and physical inefficients—the Act of October 1, 1890—the bill establishing examinations for promotion—and we have a sufficiency of laws that provide for the removal of the moral inefficients.

While under the provisions of the Act of 1890, many of the physically disqualified have been retired, and a few, a very small percentage of those mentally deficient have been ejected from the service, yet the working of this bill has not come up to the expectations of those who advocated its passage, and it has often been pronounced a failure. It has not been a failure in that it has to a limited extent rid the service of disqualified officers, and it has also been an incentive to study, and has had undoubtedly a tendency to check drinking and gambling, which are seen rarely in the service these days. Its defects, if it has such, have been those of administration in its application, rather than in the law itself, but in this respect there has been a great improvement in the last few years.

However, none of the laws now in force have had or will have the effect of ridding the service of those classed in the proposed bill as the least efficient, the careless and indifferent officer, those who have enough intelligence and who study enough, and no more, to pass the required examina-

tions, but who are still, through their habits or lack of energy, practically inefficient.

It is thought that our officers generally will not approve the provisions of the drafted bill which requires them to report upon the lack of efficiency of their brother officers, but it is possible that this unwillingness may be designated as weak heartedness, similar to that found in some commanding officers who, on account of the officer's family or other reasons, hesitate in bringing to trial delinquent officers who, by their conduct or habits, have rendered themselves unfit for the service.

THE RED CROSS THROWN OPEN.

The government has decided to throw open the American National Red Cross to general membership, and already applications for enrollment are pouring in. Under the plan every good American citizen—man, woman or child, is eligible to membership.

On application to Edward R. Johnstone, National Registrar of the Red Cross, 341 War Department, Army and Navy Building, Washington, D. C., the applicant's name will be enrolled, a badge of membership forwarded, and the *Red Cross Bulletin* will be sent regularly for one year.

Every candidate should forward one dollar with application, to cover enrollment fee and necessary expenses.

Information relative to the organizing of Red Cross Circles will be forwarded by the National Registrar upon request.

THE SERVICE JOURNALS.

The following are the articles of interest to cavalrymen that have appeared in our foreign exchanges since our last issue:

A novel method of swimming horses across a river devised by Brigadier General Hon. J. Byng, and practiced by

the First Cavalry Brigade and horse artillery at Aldershot, is described in the February number of the *Journal of Royal Artillery*.

In August last this brigade with its three batteries of horse artillery made a practice march, during which it crossed the Thames at night, swimming the horses by this method, and "was back in barracks by 1:15 P. M., having marched close on to fifty miles in seventeen and one-fourth hours, without doing any damage and without accident to man or horse." "I think this proves General Byng's methods of swimming horses to be infinitely superior to any other." Of it Sir John French said: "The swimming of the Thames by night by the whole brigade in a wonderfully short space of time was an unique performance."

It took but one and one-half hours to cross the guns, etc., in boats, and all the horses were waiting on the landing side some time before the guns, saddles, bridles, etc., were across.

The method employed is briefly as follows:* An endless two-inch rope is run through four snatch blocks, two on each bank of the river, so as to have two lines of the rope or cable across it, one about thirty or forty yards from the other, the whole forming an irregular oblong by the continuous rope. Three of the snatch blocks are fastened to holdfasts sunk in the ground, and the fourth is fastened to a block and tackle by which the tautness of the cable may be adjusted. It was so adjusted that the cable should be from eighteen inches to two feet above the water.

The cable is kept constantly in motion by squads of men on each bank working hand over hand. Other squads of men tie the horses on to this moving cable and untie them on the other side. It was found that four specially trained men could tie the horses as fast as was necessary, each horse being tied about two horses' lengths from the preceding one.

On the landing side, one man stood ready with a knife to cut free any horse in case the slip knot of the "head rope" could not be untied readily and thus prevent the stopping of

*Owing to the fact that this article with its illustrations is especially copyrighted, it is impossible to reprint it in full until the necessary permission is obtained.

the cable. Each horse was so tied as to have about eighteen inches play between the horse's head and the rope.

* * *

The *Journal of the U. S. Infantry Association* for January (1908) contains several timely articles of general interest, particularly those on "Our Military Policy," by Colonel Crane, and "Reflections of an Inspector," by Major Morton. An exceedingly able editorial appears in this number under the title of "Where Danger Lies," which discusses fully and well the question of the detail staff system.

* * *

The *British Cavalry Journal* for January, 1908, contains many papers of interest to the mounted services, the principal ones being: "The Swiss Cavalry;" "Cavalry and Horse Artillery;" "Tactics and Training of Cavalry;" "Maneuvers of 1907 and Dismounted Action of Cavalry." As has been stated before in these columns, it is hoped that this *Cavalry Journal* may have many subscribers among our officers and clubs, and thus reciprocate the interest taken in our JOURNAL, as shown by our ever increasing number of subscribers in the British cavalry service.

* * *

The *Revue de Cavalerie* for February has but two articles of interest to our arm, and these are "Effects of the Law of Two Years Service in the Cavalry" and "Cavalry Against Infantry," the latter being interesting and instructive.

* * *

The *Broad Arrow* and the *United Service Gazette* being weekly publications, it is impossible to give a synopsis of their contents, but our readers can judge of the merits of these service journals from the frequent quotations from them that have appeared in our columns.

The *United Service Magazine* for February and March contain a series of papers on "The Problem of Military Education," which are of great merit and from which, as well as from several other British military journals, the inference may be drawn that there is a complaint, well founded or not, that there is "something wrong" in their service as well as in others.

* * *

The *Austrian Cavalry Journal-Kavalleristische Monatshefte* is a valuable periodical for any of our members who can read German. The last number received, February, has the following articles: "Employment of Masses of Cavalry Against the Flanks and Rear of Hostile Armies;" "Prize Essay—Employment of Cavalry in Upper Italy;" "Instruction in Riding;" "Turkish Cavalry" and "An Endurance Ride."

BOOK DEPARTMENT.

The work of Captains Cole and Stuart on "Individual and Combined Military Sketching," was issued early in January, and all orders for the same have been filled. This book has received favorable notice from reviewers and others and, considering that it is purely a technical work in a particular line, the demand for it has been large. It has been officially adopted as a text book at the Army School of the Line and Staff College and at the U. S. Military Academy. It should be in the hands of every officer who expects to perfect himself in the art of military sketching.

* * *

The "Officer's Manual," by Captain James A. Moss, is such a handy book of reference as to the orders and regulations in force and the customs of the service, and which is kept absolutely up to date by the annual supplements, that it is not surprising that the demand for it continues. While described as for the use of subalterns, it is useful to all who

have anything to do with army administration and particularly is it valuable to the officers of the National Guard. Captain Moss has delayed issuing the supplement for 1908 until he could include the changes embodied in the new Army Regulations soon to be issued.

* * *

Captain Stodter has revised his "Soldiers' Score Book," so as to make the diagrams and data applicable to the new rifle, sights and ammunition. This, the fourth revised edition, is now being printed and will soon be ready for distribution. While this score book was originally prepared for the use of the squadron to which Captain Stodter belonged, the calls for it became so numerous that he was persuaded to publish it for general use.

* * *

The attention of our readers might well be called to the fact that in no military work ever written has been made a stronger plea for the cavalry arm of the service than in "The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba," by Captain H. H. Sargent, Second Cavalry. This work, which was so ably and exhaustively reviewed in the last issue of the JOURNAL by Captain Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry, is being received by the prominent journals of the country everywhere with high praise.

For the benefit of our readers we quote a few extracts from the reviews, which would indicate that the work is destined to have a strong influence in shaping public opinion to the needs of the army and navy:

"Probably the best book yet written on the Spanish-American War."—*Cleveland Plain Dealer.*

"This able and illuminating work is of peculiar interest, both in its matter and manner."—*Brooklyn Times.*

"The book is undoubtedly the most important work yet issued on the Spanish-American War."—*St. Paul Pioneer Press.*

"We do not hesitate to call it the most valuable and useful contribution that has been made to Spanish War literature."—*New York Evening Sun.*

"'The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba' has already in the short time since its appearance become a recognized authority."—*Bookseller, Newsdealer and Stationer, New York.*

"His new work should take high rank in interest and value."—*New York World.*

"Colonel Sargent is interesting and masterly in his three volumes, never tedious."—*Louisville Courier Journal.*

"Colonel Sargent's style is so fascinating that one is tempted to quote more than space allows."—*San Francisco Call.*

"Colonel Sargent now has a foremost place as a critic of military tactics."—*Philadelphia Public Ledger.*

"The present volumes present what is probably the authoritative account of that memorable campaign."—*Pittsburg Dispatch.*

"The most elaborate account of the war that has yet appeared."—*Review of Reviews.*

"One may regret that this effective writer could not have also written of the other faction of the war which transpired in the Philippines."—*St. Louis Globe Democrat.*

"It is the first full and authoritative military history of the campaign written by a military historian of distinction, who himself served throughout the Spanish-American War, and who has had access to official documents."—*Times, London, England.*

"Captain Sargent has produced a very careful and valuable account of the Santiago campaign, both on land and sea."—*The Navy, Washington, D. C.*

"In this work on the Spanish-American War we have a much needed and very valuable analysis of the military movements of the struggle. * * * It is an extremely

valuable work to have in the public or private library."—*The Boston Journal.*

"It is the most thorough, detailed, and well documented history of that extraordinary little campaign—so blunderingly trifling and grotesque in many of its incidents and conditions, so incalculably momentous in its consequences—that has yet been written."—*New York Mail.*

"A splendid and entertaining history. * * * He (the author) has drawn word pictures that will quicken the heartbeats of every admirer of heroic deeds as long as the world counts courage and self-sacrifice among the noblest traits of men.—*Boston Times.*

"His narrative is explicit, unbiased, judicial, and the 'comments' with which he follows every important feature of the struggle with Spain will command the respectful attention of home and foreign readers."—*San Francisco Chronicle.*

"This work should receive a warm welcome, because it gives what the average reader wants to know and very little more. * * * He (the author) has a clear eye for the salient parts of the story; he shows just enough enthusiasm to attract; he is free from the partisan spirit, and he appreciates the courage and spirit of friend and foe alike. Colonel Sargent's work is likely to hold the field for some time to come."—*Argonaut, San Francisco.*



War and the World's Life.*

This work has been reviewed in the January (1908) number of the *U. S. Infantry Journal*, and to this review the reader's attention is invited. The book is so broad in its scope, covering so many diverse and yet correlated subjects, that no review can do it justice. It is more for the statesman than the warrior, yet it is so replete with military information, so interesting in the subjects treated and in the manner of treatment, that one who does not read it will be the loser.

Colonel Maude is a very forceful writer, and though he is an Englishman and writes of England, it is difficult to realize that he is not describing conditions in the United States. The theme is really the sociological and economic relations of the military to the people, and the discussions apply almost as well to America as to England. The author carefully points out the inter-dependence of the army and the people, and shows how each reacts upon the other; and while many subjects are treated in the various chapters, the fundamental idea is the proper relation that should subsist

*"War and the World's Life." By Colonel F. N. Maude, C. B. (Late R. E.), British Service. London. Smith, Elder & Co., 15 Waterloo Place. 1907. Price 12s. 6d. net.

between the army and the people from whom it is drawn, a subject as vital to us as it is to our cousins across the water.

In matters of general policy unrestricted discussion is the only means by which we can arrive at the best results. No one man, however transcendental his genius, can produce the best alone. He must make use of the experience and wisdom of others. From the crucible of diverse opinions will come that which is best for the given conditions. Therefore it may not be too presumptuous if I state here what has long been my opinion as to the relations that should exist between our army and the people, this for the purpose of discussion if nothing more.

The traditions of this country are opposed to a large standing army, or to one created by conscription. The people will not have it. This attitude should be sufficient to convince advocates of a large standing army that they must seek other or additional means for the military defense of the nation. It is natural for a soldier who sees only the complicated workings of a modern military machine, to desire that machine to be perfect in all its parts, and strong enough to accomplish the work for which it was created. But perfect armies are creatures of short lives. Efficient to-day, to-morrow may find them incapable—a machine out of repair. They must be renewed, replaced or repaired, and from what source must the material for such renewal or repair come? Manifestly from the people; and if the machine is not of their liking the material—the money and men—will not be forthcoming. In the first place our army must be an institution acceptable to the people, and it will only be acceptable to them when they come to regard it as their own and can see a necessity for its existence. A friendly relation must exist between the two, for out of the one the other is created. They are inter-dependent and mutually support and protect each other. The world is growing more and more democratic. The time for Praetorian Guards has passed. The army must feel that it was created for the nation, a servant of the body politic, and the nation must feel that it needs the army.

But a small standing army may be insufficient in the day

of peril and danger. How then shall the nation be protected? The answer is *by the National Guard.* That is the ultimate bulwark against which foreign aggression or domestic lawlessness will strike. But, it will be urged, modern wars require trained soldiers, and to-day the National Guard is not prepared, and to send untrained men into the field to fight trained armies would be a national sin, a colossal blunder, and more—a crime. True, but the answer to this is not difficult. Our government must take steps to make the organized militia what it should be. Let suitable laws be drafted, liberal appropriations made, and the result will be what the people want. Is not this the part of true statesmanship? Our government now spends two millions annually on the Guard. What can be expected from so niggardly a sum? It is a wonder the Guard is as efficient as it is. After the nation had existed over a century with the most absurd and ridiculous militia laws imaginable, the Dick bill became a law and for the first time a way was opened for really making the militia a national force. But no perfect institution can be created without trial. The Dick bill must be supplemented by suitable legislation, and especially must suitable appropriations be made.

The President should have power to call out the Guard for as long a time as the emergency demanded. Calling for volunteers is but a feature of the case, and if the Guard were properly fostered and increased it would be a grave emergency that would necessitate the calling for volunteers. By this is meant a volunteer army as we have come to understand that term. All service, except in an emergency, must be voluntary. We should thus be spared the spectacle of creating an army after the war had begun. But, it is argued, the organized militia cannot be sent beyond the limits of the United States. Put a proper and liberal construction upon the constitutional clause, "To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," and the Guard can be sent wherever the nation should rightly send it.

The National Guard and the regular army would thus become the "army of the United States," parts of the same

machine, each with its appropriate functions to perform. Jealousies between the two would disappear, and the regular army brought into closer relations with the people through the medium of the Guard. On its part, the efficiency of the Guard would be maintained by its relations with, and the criterions established by, the regular army. The latter in time of peace would become a great military school, perfecting and disseminating correct military principles, and maintaining the highest standards of efficiency.

One feature which the author emphasizes is the necessity for short service among the men, including the non-commissioned officers. In support of this idea, Colonel Maude gives as a reason, and it is one entitled to due consideration, that if we have non-commissioned officers long in the service they gradually absorb the work of the junior officers, and the latter in time become more or less unfitted from lack of attention to their proper duties. Every officer knows how much easier it is to manage a company with experienced non-commissioned officers, and how much less work he does himself. With non-commissioned officers constantly changing, the junior officers are kept at work, and no doubt develop into better offiers for that reason; but there is a limit to the work an officer can do, and when war comes, with the consequent expansion of the army, we need experienced men. This is one of those questions which can be satisfactorily answered only by finding the happy medium.

There is another thought which the author never tires of reiterating, the duty of self-sacrifice, applicable to the nation at large and to the army as well. To the nation it means patriotism in its highest form; to the army it means that the soldier must be taught that it is his duty to die if need be.

The book is divided into twenty chapters, in each of which a particular subject is discussed, and which can be read independently of the others. These chapters are:

Sociology with regard to Military History.
The Foundation of Home Defense.
Difference of Opinion as to Tactical Training.
The Functions of the Volunteers in Peace.

What Becomes of Money Spent on Military Preparations?
Does Military Expenditure Pay?
Socialism in Germany.
The Armies of France and Russia.
The British Army from 1815 to 1900.
Fleet and Army.
The Problem of Invasion.
The Psychology of Drill Ground Training.
The Psychology of the Battlefield.
Volunteer vs. Compulsory Service.
The Regular Army.
Adequacy of Auxiliary Forces to Resist Invasion.
Esprit de Corps and the Volunteers.
The General Staff and War Office Administration.
The Education of the Nation.
Boy Brigades—The Militia—Conclusion.
Appendix: Narrative and Outline of War Game.

There are also five diagrams and one map illustrating the author's ideas embodied in the text. Diagrams IV and V are particularly interesting. Diagram IV shows the rate of fire of weapons individually, and number of bullets per yard delivered by a normal fighting line per minute; also the losses per hour at various periods from typical infantry battles. Diagram V shows the relation of attack and defense and its dependence on mobility during the last three centuries; it also illustrates the principle of Napoleonic strategy, and shows the influence of increase in range on tactics. The map shows how England might be invaded by the Germans.

The book contains 424 pages, is well printed, and exceedingly light for a book of its size, by no means the smallest virtue in book-making.

D. H. BOUGHTON,
Major, Eleventh Cavalry.

Precis of Great Campaigns.* Every student of military history should sooner or later master Napoleon's campaigns. His methods have been followed, with certain modifications to be sure, in practically every great successful campaign fought since Waterloo. They were employed on the great battlefields of our Civil War. In the years of comparative peace that followed 1815, every military power of Europe studied the tactics and strategy of the Corsican genius. This was especially true of Prussia, and in her victories of 1866 and 1870–71, Napoleonic tactics, the concentration of effort, prevailed. In the early operations of the Boer War the British suffered the consequences of failing to observe his principles, but later in the war, notably during the advance to Paardeburg, they were remembered with decisive results. The grand tactics of the Japanese in the Manchurian campaigns were modeled after those employed by Napoleon a century before.

"But where shall I begin?" This is the question that frames itself in the mind of every student when he confronts for the first time the appalling array of literature that deals with the twenty eventful years from 1796 to 1815. The question is not an easy one to answer, and the same answer will not do for all; but for some Mr. Anderson in his Précis has furnished a way out of the difficulty. Napoleon's campaigns, notwithstanding the valuable lessons to be learned from them, form but a small part of the military history of the world, with all of which the American officer wishes to be familiar. So limited is his time for study that, if he tries to master all, old age will find him with his task incompleted. Most students compromise by first getting a bird's eye view of all, and then gradually building on this foundation. This is a rational method, and one Mr. Anderson encourages by the publication of his book. He has succeeded in giving in 130 pages a comprehensive narrative of all Napoleon's principal campaigns. The strategic marches preceding the battles and the accounts of the latter are given with just enough

*"PRÉCIS OF GREAT CAMPAIGNS." By J. H. Anderson, F. R. Hist. Soc., etc. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119 Pall Mall, S. W., London. Price, 10s. 6d.

detail to satisfy the beginner and enable him speedily to orient himself with respect to any battle or campaign. The maps and plans amply illustrate the text. HANNA.

How to Instruct in Aiming and Firing.* This is a pocket sized fifty page pamphlet giving the outline of the methods of target practice instruction followed in the Hythe School of Musketry. It has the merit of furnishing in a highly condensed, logical form, all the essential methods of training for laying in the mass of green hands the foundations of good shooting, with nothing for the expert to unlearn later. And while primarily designed for the instruction of recruits and the militia, the competition trophy hunter will find food for profitable reflection in its few pages, though no attempt is made to discuss mirage, or moisture or any of the more complex atmospheric effects.

The principal attention has been given to the mental attitude of the instructor and the recruit, and to the muscle and position drills. Each step is presented in its proper sequence and analyzed and tabulated in concise, simple language, bringing the object to be attained, the reason therefor, and the means by which it is to be accomplished, clearly before the reader.

The most of the ground covered in this pamphlet is of course well covered in our firing regulations, but there are also many important phases brought out on which our regulations are silent.

For instance we give nothing in the way of tables or rules from which a marksman, finding that he needed two points of windage, for example, at six hundred yards, would be able to estimate what windage he should require at three hundred yards on his skirmish run, the weather condition being constant.

An officer could pass a very creditable examination in the

*"HOW TO INSTRUCT IN AIMING AND FIRING." By Quartermaster Sergeant J. Bostock-Sergeant, instructor at the Hythe School of Musketry. Gale & Polden, Ltd., Wellington Works, Aldershot, England. Price, 6d.

United States Firing Regulations and yet have no conception of the important fact that the effect of the same wind at different ranges varied so greatly that the deviation at one thousand yards is sixty-two times as great as at one hundred yards, and requires six times as many points of windage for its correction. If the wind gauge is to be a battle instrument and not a mere target range refinement, such points are vital. The table given on this subject, while not very complete, is alone worth the price of the book to a man using the British rifle.

The pictorial methods of illustrating the effects of canting of the piece and incorrect sight alignments are worthy of attention. Some of the remarks on the practicability of wind gauges would be held heresy of the rankest among our riflemen, but are to be read in connection with the fact that the British rifle has only a detachable windgauge which makes a small pigment mark on the rear sight bar.

The importance attached to estimating distance instruction and practical sight setting drill is quite refreshing in our atmosphere of eternal parade ground exercises, and if this book reflects the actual practice in the British service, it augurs ill for Oom Paul Burgher if that little unpleasantness is renewed.

GEORGE C. LEWIS,
First Lieut., 18th Infantry.

A History of the United States Navy.*

Some of the JOURNAL readers may remember a review given in the JOURNAL of last July on a book entitled, "A Short History of the American Navy." It was stated in that review, in short, that this was an attempt to state briefly the main facts in the history of our Navy, mainly with a view to its readableness by the general reader. That book was published under the auspices of the Navy League of the United States. And we mention again for the benefit of those who may not remember or who may never have heard, that the Navy League of the United

*"A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY." By John R. Spears. 334 pages. Chas. Scribner & Sons, New York City. 1907.

States consists of a number of influential men, most of them men of wealth, and the headquarters of the League is at 78 Broad Street, New York City. As stated in our former review, it seemed at first from the prominence of the men connected with the enterprise known as the League, that the main object of the League might be to promote some ship subsidy bill; but the need of an adequate navy is itself apparent enough to call for some such action on the part of thinking men, without any ulterior motive whatever.

The work of spreading some knowledge of the Navy among our people was taken up by the League and one of its first efforts was to get some statement, short, but sufficiently interesting to attract the people. This was well accomplished by the historian, Mr. John R. Spears, in the little volume from Chas. Scribner's press, "A Short History of the American Navy." Mr. Spear evidently became so enamored of his subject that he determined to extend this brief statement to a warranted extent, and give the public an ordinary sized volume, that should contain the main facts of our naval history.

This he has accomplished by restating many of his old chapters, in fact all of them, somewhat revised, and then has added details, such as giving descriptions of more sea battles and also giving in greater detail some of the battles already covered in his shorter work. For instance, in his shorter work, his first chapter devoted to Sea Fights and Fighters of the Revolution, contains seventeen pages. In his larger work, now under discussion, he devotes to his subject thirty-four pages, arranged in four chapters, as follows: Organizing the First Navy; The First Battle of Lake Champlain; With the Ranger and the Bonne Homme Richard; At the End of the War.

In other words, "A History of the United States Navy" contains all the matter that appeared in "A Short History of the American Navy." Any one possessing one book scarcely needs the other. One or the other should be in the possession of every American family where boys are growing into strong American manhood. Any boy will read this book through with as much interest as he will tales of Indian

warfare, and the result will be a boy imbued with love for our navy, undying admiration for our naval heroes and an emulous desire to imitate those great characters.

As for a serious work on the navy, one for military men to study in connection with their duties as the other great defending arm of our country, of course neither of these short works supplant the four-volume work on the American Navy, by the same author. These short histories are popular in character, and while worth anyone's reading, are not sufficiently full of detail for a military student.

We might further mention that the handling of the regrettable quarrel over the honors of the Santiago fight seems to be carried out as one would carry them out who had wished to treat both Sampson and Schley with fairness and drew his conclusions from the findings of facts as developed by the Court of Inquiry. The opinion of the Court is given, as well as Admiral Dewey's personal opinion. We can scarcely find a more unbiased way of treating this question that has so unfortunately arisen. All officers of the navy and army must regret the circumstances that arose out of the conflict, especially when we believe that both interested officers believed that there was enough honor for both. The whole thing embittered the lives of two brave seamen, so much so that one was probably hurried to his grave by circumstances with which he had nothing absolutely to do.

As for the author's quiet little fling at Admiral Dewey as to the latter's refusal to answer a question put to him by the author, possibly the great Admiral thought it better to let the dead past bury its dead and he would invoke no comment except on matters that came to him in an official way. We rather conceive the Admiral did wisely in thus refusing to open a discussion that could be of no use to either Sampson or Schley.

We trust the American government has learned a lesson in thus placing together two men of the same rank, and we hope the same government will be wise enough in our future wars to obviate such difficulty by giving to the commander a rank commensurate with his duties. WHITE.

Notes on the Development of Tactics.*

This is a small unpretentious paper covered pamphlet of 42 pages, beautifully printed in that large clear type distinctive of all the military publications of Hugh Rees of London. It gives the reader, at a single glance, a comprehensive view of the development of tactics from the time of Frederick the Great to the present day. Naturally, in so few pages, the author could not go into much detail, but he has succeeded in stating, with that brevity that many readers enjoy, the principal changes in the tactics of infantry, cavalry and artillery, and of the three arms combined, as illustrated by the wars of the last century and a half. The pamphlet furnishes a profitable and pleasant evening's study for any military man, and is well worth the price.

HANNA.

Great Captains: Napoleon.†

These two volumes complete Colonel Dodge's great work on Napoleon. Volumes I and II were published in 1905, and were ably reviewed in the July (1905) number of the U. S. CAVALRY JOURNAL by General George B. Davis, Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army.

The general character of the work and manner of treating the subject in the last two volumes are, of course, the same as in Vols. I and II, reviewed by General Davis. In addition Colonel Dodge's works have been critically reviewed by the press, so that little can be said that will add to what is already known. From a soldier's standpoint the work is exhaustive and intensely interesting, notwithstanding the fact that the author has compressed the matter into its present size at the sacrifice (he claims) of diction to facts.

Volumes I and II include the campaign of Friedland, June, 1807. Volumes III and IV continue the martial story

*"NOTES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICS." By Major C. Ross, D. S. O., Norfolk Regiment. Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd., 119 Pall Mall, S. W. London. Price, 1 shilling, net.

†"GREAT CAPTAINS—NAPOLEON." By Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel (Retired), U. S. Army. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., Boston and New York. 1907. Volumes III and IV. Price $4.00 each, net.

to Napoleon's last campaign and final abdication. The last chapter of Volume IV, entitled "The Man and Soldier," is a critical review of the great soldier's character.

The work contains the following appendices:

Appendix A. Marshals of France.
Appendix B. Some of Napoleon's lieutenants and ministers.
Appendix C. Titles and names.
Appendix D. Some noteworthy marches.
Appendix E. Modern casualties—
Number killed in some modern battles.
Number killed and wounded in some modern battles.
Percentage of killed and wounded in battle.
Percentage of killed and wounded per nation.
Appendix F. Partial list of sources consulted by the author in writing his History of the Art of War.

Volume IV also contains a good index of the work.

The merits of Colonel Dodge's series of histories of great captains are now so well known to military men that comment thereon is unnecessary. In his "Napoleon" he has depended largely for his authority on the publications of the Historical Section of the French Staff, on Napoleon's correspondence, and other original documents.

The series includes the lives of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon, the whole forming a history of the art of war.

All of these histories are now before the public excepting the Life of Frederick the Great, which has been delayed because the author is waiting for the publication by the German General Staff of its exhaustive study of the Life and campaigns of the immortal Frederick.

The whole work (Napoleon) contains about 3,000 pages, and the fact that it comes from the Riverside Press, Cambridge, Mass., is a sufficient guarantee of its mechanical excellence. It contains many portraits and illustrations showing the dress and equipment of the period, and sketch maps of campaigns and battlefields.

D. H. BOUGHTON,
Major, Eleventh Cavalry.

Map Maneuvers.* Captain Sayre's revised and enlarged edition of his valuable treatise on "Map Maneuvers" has just appeared. This book—full of information and instruction for beginners in map maneuvers, and replete with suggestions for those already more or less familiar with them—was officially adopted last year for use in the Army Staff College and Army School of the Line as soon as the first edition was published. The revised edition is a neatly bound volume of 144 pages, printed in good clear type, and written in concise and readable style.

In the introduction to this work, the value of map maneuvers—possibly better known as the "war game"—is discussed briefly but to the point, the close relation borne by maneuvers on the map to maneuvers on the ground is well brought out, and the value of both as a training for war is carefully considered.

In Chapter I, Captain Sayre discusses in greater detail the utility of map maneuvers and their value in the training of an officer for war. He gives a brief but interesting history of the evolution of the war game of the nineteenth century, from the game of war chess—invented in 1780—in which the troops were represented by pawns and the terrain by a board similar to a chess board, but divided into hundreds of small squares, tinted to represent different kinds of ground. Similarly, he traces the steps by which the war game as formerly played—with its attendant inflexible rules, rigid forms and complicated calculations, and in which the game idea still predominated—gradually evolved into the modern form of map maneuvers, in which the ground is faithfully represented and the troops shown to scale, and

*"MAP MANEUVERS." By Captain Farrand Sayre, Eighth Cavalry, instructor Department of Military Art, Army Staff College. Revised edition, Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On sale by the Secretary, Service Schools, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Price, 75 cents, postpaid.

which can be readily understood and played by any officer who can read a contoured map.

In Chapter II, the various kinds of maps used in map maneuvers are discussed, both foreign and American maps being considered. A description is also given of the other accessories of the game, *i. e.*, the table, blocks to represent troops, scales, etc., illustrated by several plates of the scales used.

Chapter III is devoted to a description of the various methods of conducting map maneuvers in accordance with the most modern ideas on the subject. The method of instructing beginners is made plain, while the duties of the director (or umpire) and of the officers in command of the troops represented in such maneuvers are fully discussed.

Chapter IV is devoted to preliminary exercises and problems, while Chapter V presents an interesting discussion on the subject of fire losses.

The first exercises and problems in Chapter IV are very simple, and are followed by others of a more complicated nature, which can, however, be readily solved by any officer who has worked out the more simple ones. All of these problems are based upon the map of Fort Leavenworth and vicinity, a copy of which—lithographed in colors and on a scale of four inches to one mile—is found in a pocket inside the back cover of the book.

Not the least of the valuable features of this book are the two map maneuvers on the Fort Leavenworth map, which are followed out in detail in Chapter IV. These two exercises are simple in their nature, one being a study of the conduct of cavalry patrols, the other of an attack and defense of a position by small forces of infantry (two companies versus one company). In each exercise the decisions of the players are given verbatim, as are also the remarks and criticisms of the director, the whole forming a word-picture of the conduct of an actual map maneuver. The general and special situations of other sample map maneuvers which have been held at the Service Schools are also given. All of these are based upon the map of Fort Leavenworth—a copy of which, on a scale of twelve inches to one mile, can be obtained from the secretary of the Service Schools. Using these problems as a guide, other problems could easily be prepared for use either in officers' or non-commissioned officers' schools. Valuable instruction to young officers and non-commissioned officers in the conduct of patrols, advance, rear guard, and outpost duties, can easily and thoroughly be given by the use of similar problems.

This concise but complete treatise is sold practically at cost, as is also the "War Game Set" of colored pins, blocks of colored card board (cut to scale to represent companies, troops, batteries, etc.), strings of colored beads (to represent skirmish lines) and a cardboard scale. The improved and enlarged "War Game Set" costs but 60 cents; a cheaper set is also on sale for 50 cents. The "Map Maneuver Map of Fort Leavenworth," scale twelve inches to one mile, based on surveys made by student officers of the Staff College and embracing a tract of ground about six miles by four miles, is used for map maneuvers at the Service Schools, and is sold postpaid for $1.00, which barely covers the cost of production.

Captain Sayre's "Map Maneuvers," the twelve-inch "Maneuver Map" and the "War Game Set" (at a total cost of $2.25 or $2.35) include everything necessary for a complete map maneuver outfit. By placing the above on sale practically at cost of production, the Staff College and Captain Sayre have rendered a great service to the officers of the U. S. army.

R. S. F.

Soldiers' Score Book.* Captain Charles E. Stodter, Ninth U. S. Cavalry, has revised his "Soldiers' Score Book" to make the diagrams and data suitable for use with the new rifle and ammunition recently issued to the regular army and the National Guard.

In addition to revising the tables, etc., he has added several new tables giving the necessary allowances for wind,

*SOLDIERS' SCORE BOOK FOR U. S. MAGAZINE RIFLE, MODEL 1903, WITH 1905 SIGHT AND 1906 AMMUNITION." By Captain Charles E. Stodter, Ninth U. S. Cavalry. Published by the U. S. Cavalry Association. Price, ten cents.

which makes it a still more complete reference book as well as a small, handy and compact individual score book for those engaged in target practice.

Its price is so low as to bring it within the means of all.

Although the first edition was not issued until late in June, 1907, it required two other and larger editions to fill the orders for last year.

Optics of the Telescope.* As is stated in the preface of this book of forty pages, "This little work has no pretentions to be a scientific treatise, but only proposes to give a popular account of the elements of optics as employed in telescopes and such like instruments." It was prepared for the use of those non-commissioned officers who are required to study the subject during their course at the school of signaling at Aldershot, and judging from the simplicity of the treatment of the subject and the clearness of its diagrams, it should fulfill the purpose for which intended. A brief but plain explanation of the refraction of light is given and the action of the various lenses in converging or dispersing the rays of light are explained, all being fully illustrated by neat and clear figures which are colored where necessary to show how the rays of white light are differently refracted from the red to the violet.

The subjects of chromatic and spherical aberration are made clear, and how, by the combination of lenses in telescopes, these may be corrected. Finally, the construction of the ordinary signaling telescope is explained and the uses of the several sets of lenses demonstrated. E. B. F.

*"Optics of the Telescope." By Captain W. Ellershaw, R. A., Chief Instructor in Army Signaling, Aldershot. Gale & Polden, Ltd., No. 2 Amen Corner, Paternoster Row, E. C., London. Price 2s., net.

Hand Book of the Maxim Gun.* This is one of the numerous handbooks, or "make easys," published by Gale & Polden, many of which are quite valuable, especially for non commissioned officers, while many others are not applicable to our service.

This work gives the nomenclature of the parts of the Maxim gun, description of its mechanism and instruction for its use, as well as special instructions how to remedy any failures that may occur in the feed or otherwise.

It also contains the drill for the gun when used with cavalry, mounted infantry or infantry, both when hauled by horses or by hand and also when on the tripod mounting.

The book is written in the questions and answers form so popular with some.

Over Seas in Early Days.† We can see no earthly use for such a publication being thrust upon a long suffering public. We can understand that a person keeping a journal of his travels might wish to have the same put into a more or less permanent form for the benefit of his children and his children's children, and thus, as a personal matter, the journal may get into book form. But where the journal contains nothing that is of any use except as an ancestral relic, the book should not be thrown at the public, and the publishers should tell the interested relatives that they must stand the whole cost of the production, as the publication is going to be of no use to the world, except so far as family gratification may conduce to universal happiness, which is not exceedingly far.

The fact that a lieutenant, John Farley, of the United States army made a visit to Europe some time in 1829, or in 1729 or 1929 for that matter, may be of vast historical in-

*"Handbook of the Maxim Gun—Its Mechanism and Drill." Gale & Polden, Ltd., No. 2 Amen Corner, Paternoster Row, E. C., London. Price 6d. net.

†"Over Seas In Early Days." By J. P. Farley. Franklin Hudson Co., Kansas City, Mo. Price, $1.00.

terest, but we fail to see it. Of course there is this much about history; the accurate historian may gain much information from such journals as "Over Seas In Early Days." Such historians as Green, for instance, who write not so much the history of a country as a history of the people of that country, may pick up information from little sketches of the nature of Lieutenant Farley's. But he would find such poor picking in this particular instance, that he would have found it necessary to live a thousand years to produce such a work as he did were his only sources of information such writings as the one of which we are speaking.

Of course it is somewhat interesting to know that young Americans were nicely entertained by the great Lafayette in the latter '20's. But if one looks for any other such valuable information as this in the book he is apt to be disappointed. We, therefore, advise readers of THE JOURNAL, unless they are making a collection of all the books in the world, to be somewhat slow in making purchases of personal journals of the Farley type.

There are too many books in the world of mediocre value, and not enough books of great value. While we do not wish to discourage the industry and commendable zeal that the writing of a book entails, yet we do hope that hereafter people will write less and think more. We trust we may some time see the day, or at least the world may, as we do not expect to live long enough ourselves, when people will not write books unless they have something original to say or else can say things not original in a far better way than they have yet been said. There is ample opportunity in the latter field, particularly in our profession. X. Y. Z.

Guide to Promotion.*

Captain Legge is again at work, and through the press of Gale & Polden has brought out a compilation of information, the reading of which clearly shows one the scope of the examination of British officers in this particular subject.

According to the system at present in vogue in the British service, officers of all rank up to and including major, must undergo an examination and obtain a certain percentage before being promoted a step in rank. It is stated that the object of these tests is not so much to ensure a simple passing of the tests, which are in reality fixed at a fairly low standard, as to encourage officers to improve themselves, by reading and practice, in professional knowledge and attainments.

Each of these examinations has its own particular syllabus, which is fully detailed in Regulations, and is formed into what is termed a subject for promotion, these subjects being lettered from "A" to "I." It is with subject "A" alone that Captain Legge's last work has to do.

Subject "A" is termed Regimental Duties, and the examination consists of certain oral and written questions based upon the syllabus in the Regulations. Subject "B," which consists of drill and field training, is purely a practical examination, must be taken up in conjunction with subject "A." However it is not dealt with in the book.

It is provided in the English service, that when an officer considers himself ready for his examination he will make application to his commanding officer, who will then appoint a regimental board of examination, with himself or the next senior officer as president, and two officers not under the rank of captains as members.

The examination is both oral and written as stated above. For the written examinations candidates are given a paper containing about ten questions, and one hour is usually allowed for the answers. After the written examination,

* "GUIDE TO PROMOTION FOR OFFICERS, SUBJECT 'A,' (Regimental Duties)." By Captain R. F. Legge. Gale & Polden, Ltd., No. 2 Amen Corner, Paternoster Row, London, E. C. Price, 4s.

each candidate is called in separately before the board and ten oral questions put to him by the president, these having been prepared beforehand, and the candidate's answers to them are taken down in writing by the president. Candidates may be required to perform something practical, such as making out returns, and those in the mounted service may be required to show their knowledge of saddlery fitting, etc. Nothing is laid down about the number of marks allotted for the papers or the minimum required to pass, but as a rule ten marks are given for each question, and a passing mark of fifty per cent. is required of each candidate.

It would thus seem that in some ways the British system is not as good as ours, while on the other hand in some ways it is better. I think it better to have a permanent board under the direction of the War Department than to have regimental boards, but on the other hand there is more power given the board than with us. It seems a wise thing for us to do would be to select our board with care and then let them conduct the examination with a view to bringing out the knowledge the candidate has and if he fails to come up to the standard, considerably higher than fifty per cent., let him retire with a year's pay and give him no second examination.

The English are certainly great on getting out such books as this of Legge's, which is in a sort of a catechismal form, only better. We have aired ourselves so much on our small opinion of the value of such works in general that we shall not now repeat, although one can gain much information from these books of the English compilers. Yet if any English subaltern does not know as much as is found in them, without reading them, he should get less than the required fifty per cent. and be dropped. X. Y. Z.

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