


GENERAL SUBJECTS DEPARTMENT


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TITLE LOGISTICS IN THE KOREAN WAR



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Logistics has been defined as all activities in the military establishment involved in the handling of personnel, materiel, facilities, and services. ¹ Since this involves nearly all army functions not tactical in nature, this paper will be limited to the following aspects of the Korean War:

1. Initial personnel procurement and facility expansion
2. Initial transportation methods
3. Initial materiel build-up
4. Later logistic problems

"...I think it is important that the nature of our military action in Korea be understood. It should be made perfectly clear that the action was undertaken as a matter of basic moral principle. The United States was going to the aid of a nation established and supported by the United Nations and unjustifiably attacked by an aggressor force. Consequently we were not deterred by the relative immediate superiority of the attacking forces, by the fact that our base of supplies was 5000 miles away or by the further fact that we would have to supply our forces through port facilities that are far from satisfactory. ²

.....

"It is apparent that the United States is required to increase its military strength and preparedness not only to deal with the aggression in Korea, but also to increase our common defense with other free nations against further

aggression. The increased strength falls into three categories:

"In the first place, to meet the situation in Korea we shall need to send additional men, equipment, and supplies to General MacArthur's command as rapidly as possible.

"In the second place, the world situation requires that we increase substantially the size and materiel support of our Armed Forces over and above the increases which are needed in Korea.

"In the third place, we must assist the free nations associated with us in common defense to augment their military strength.

.....

"To meet the increased requirements for military manpower, I have authorized the Secretary of Defense to exceed the budgeted strength of military personnel for the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and to use the Selective Service System to such extent as may be required in order to obtain the increased strength we must have. I have also authorized the Secretary of Defense to meet the need for military manpower by calling into active Federal service as many National Guard units and as many units and individuals of the Reserve forces as may be required."³

FOOT INDEX
REPLY TO

In these words, the President of the United States gave the cause and the authority for a limited mobilization in the United States to meet the Korean emergency. The President

went on in his speech to request ten billion dollars in excess of his budget for initially supporting the war. In addition he asked that military aid to the Phillipines, Formosa, and Indo-China be speeded.⁴ But for a chain of past world-wide threats, implementation of the President's directive would have required a vast time delay in establishing administrative machinery alone. For the first time in our history we were in position to act at the outset of a war.

The Army had two partially "combat-ready" field armies overseas at the time; one was in the immediate theater. The Air Force was on a state of constant alert for both air defense and strategic retaliation. The Navy had elements patrolling the Formosa Strait with orders to engage any Communist invasion force. In addition to the industry engaged in supporting the Armed Forces, other manufacturing facilities were filling foreign military aid commitments. Further, there were stockpiles of preserved war materials from the past war -- only five years ago.

Let us examine this country's initial logistic efforts one phase at a time.

THE PERSONNEL EXPANSION

Even though our country was becoming aware of the Communist threat before the Korean War, still we had a feeling of dislike for defense preparations. The postwar desire to reduce the Armed Forces was still prevalent. Although our

national economy was for the first time in five years starting to decline, the standard of living was as high as it had ever been in our history. The returned veteran was now firmly established in his community. The majority of the personnel in the Armed Forces had entered after the close of World War II..

Strangely enough, the Eightieth Congress had passed Public Law 759 in 1948 which had established a selective service system for the peacetime army.⁵ Although this was law, it was not being carried out strenuously. In fact, it was more of an inducement to join the Reserves or the National Guard than it was an effort to strengthen the active elements. Announcement was made to the effect that anyone wishing to avoid conscription could join either the National Guard or one of the reserve components prior to the law taking effect. This would fulfill the military obligation under PL 759.

Military strength at the start of the Korean War was less than 1,500,000.⁶ Approximate strengths were as follows:

Army	591,000
Navy	380,000
Marine Corps	74,200
Air Force	412,000

Obviously the President was well-based in his order for immediate expansion.

During the first seven weeks of the war the following steps were taken:

A. Selective Service.

Initially some 20,000 selectees were called for immediate service under PL 759. Later, another 80,000 were notified to report to Army service in September and October.⁷

B. Extensions of Enlistments.

Public Law 624 (81st Congress) was passed rapidly to support the President's demands for manpower. It provided that all persons whose enlistments ended on or after 27 July 1950 would remain in service one more year. No resignations of officers or warrant officers would be accepted. Those who were over age in grade would be retained until they were sixty years old. All rotations to CONUS from overseas theaters except FECOM were deferred for six months. Those from FECOM were deferred indefinitely.⁸

C. Enlistment Qualifications Modified.

Minimum mental qualifications for enlistment were lowered. The minimum enlistment period was lowered from three years to twenty-one months for the 19-25 year age group. The program of enlisted career guidance promotion and assignment was suspended. The policy of promotion to fill local vacancies was re-opened without restrictions of time in grade or time in position.

D. National Guard Units Called into Federal Service.

At the beginning of hostilities, National Guard strength stood at 369,489 total officers and men. Of the figure, 44,728 were Air National Guard. Initially a scattering of

specialist non-divisional units were activated to fill vital gaps in certain fields. Members were given up to thirty days time to report for duty. Then, in August, the following units were ordered to report for duty in September.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>State of Origin</u>	<u>Training Station</u>
28th Inf. Div.	Pennsylvania	Camp Atterbury,
40th Inf. Div.	California	Camp Cooke
43d Inf. Div.	Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island	Camp Pickett
45th Inf. Div.	Oklahoma	Camp Polk
196th RCT	South Dakota	Camp Carson
278th RCT	Tennessee	Fort Devens

(Later, two more National Guard units were ordered to report for duty in early 1951. They were the 31st Inf. Div. and the 47th Inf. Div.)

E. Reservists Recalled to Duty.

The first Army reservists to be called were assigned in their reserve grades in their usable skills. There was a voluntary program of recall for company grade officers with emphasis on Medical, Dental, Engineer, and Infantry branches. In addition, the Army recalled involuntarily 7,862 reserve captains and lieutenants who were not assigned to a regular unit in the ORC. Also involuntarily recalled were 1,582 officers of the Medical, Dental, Veterinary, and Medical Service Corps'. Unassigned reserve enlisted men involuntarily recalled numbered 62,000 in September and October.

Initially the Navy recalled all Organized Naval Air Reserve units.. Later, more men were called individually to fill ships as they became available.

All Marine Organized Reserve ground units were called to bring the First and Second Marine Divisions up to strength. Two organized reserve air squadrons were initially recalled to bring both Marine air wings up to nine squadrons each. Later other air units were called. Finally the Volunteer Reserve was activated. By the end of October, 1950, 50,000 officers and men had been called to active duty.

The Air Force recalled 8,000 captains and lieutenants and 42,000 enlisted men by early fall.

F. Service Strengths Raised.

In PL 655, the 81st Congress suspended service strength ceilings.. The Army was formerly authorized 837,000; the Navy, 666,882; and the Air Force, 502,000.

G. Service Facilities Expanded.

Replacement centers were opened at the following locations:

Fort Jackson, S. C.	Camp Rucker, Ala.
Camp Breckenridge, Ky.	Camp Stewart, GA.
Camp Chaffee, Ark.	Camp Roberts, Calif.
Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.	Camp McCoy, Wisc.
Camp Edwards, Mass	

Training divisions were organized at Fort Ord, Fort Dix, Fort Knox, and Fort Riley.

All things considered, this was the fastest manpower mobilization our country had ever accomplished. The National Guard and Reserve programs in force paid off handsomely in availability of men. The training status of those called will not be examined in this paper, because it varied from well-trained to untrained according to the reserve unit from which a man was called.

THE TRANSPORTATION EFFORT

Korea was thousands of miles from the ports of our nation. How could we hope to support andearily build-up of forces there? In addition to the transportation requirements for hauling the personnel of an infantry division, there are some 17,000 tons of organic equipment which must accompany them. To sustain such a division in the withdrawal requires 436 tons of materiel daily. Were this division to assume the offensive, 580 tons daily would be required. ¹³

Our world-wide dispositions paid off. In Japan there were numerous large, ice-free, well equipped ports. These could be used for staging areas to segregate, store, and reload ships. The distance from Japanese ports to Korean ports was measured in hours. Ships could depart from Japan to Korea with required loads according to the port facilities available for unloading. Turnaround time was thus cut to a minimum. Further, ships of inferior quality could make the Japan-Korea shuttle run and release better ships for the

long ocean voyage to the United States. Not one man or piece of equipment was delayed going to the combat zone for lack of shipping.¹⁴

On 1 June, 1950, the Military Sea Transport Service operated 174¹⁵ Navy owned vessels and six chartered commercial vessels. After World War II, we had mothballed hundreds of cargo ships in lieu of scrapping them. True, the reprocessing of these stored vessels required time, but the time was much less than that required for new ship production. By November 1950, the MSTS operated 215¹⁶ Navy owned ships and 232 commercial charters. All troop movement was done by Navy ships, while the charters carried cargo only. MSTS ships included transports, cargo ships, tankers, escort carriers, hospital ships, and smaller craft.

MSTS had no organic port facilities or stevedores. It relied entirely upon facilities available at the ports. Ships were dispatched under direction of the branch responsible for the cargo aboard, except for tankers which remained under control of Headquarters, MSTS.¹⁷ Ships left the United States from ports on both coasts, using the Panama Canal for the long voyage from the East Coast. Tankers moved directly from Mid-East oil fields.¹⁸ Because of the complete lack of danger from the enemy at sea, convoys were not used. Time was saved by the single ship method.

During the first six weeks after the opening of hostilities, MSTS ships carried more than 50,000 men, 500,000

measurement tons of cargo, and 2,000,000 barrels of petroleum products into the combat zone. Most of this cargo was out-loaded from our seaports at the Oakland Naval Supply Center (largest in the world), Seattle, and San Diego.

To augment our surface shipping, air transport was required. The Military Air Transport Service had in service 236 planes. Of these, 160 were Government owned, 66 were commercial charters, nine were loaned and flown by Canada, and one was owned and operated by Belgium. These planes operated mainly from McChord AFB, Washington, and Fairfield-Suisun AFB, California. MATS had learned valuable lessons from the 1948 Berlin airlift. Its growing pains had been endured in Europe.

Flight time from Tacoma to Tokyo was 72 hours. From San Francisco, the time was 120 hours. Turnaround time at each end was an unbelievable twelve hours. During one forty-day period, 15,000 passengers and 3,000 tons of equipment were ferried by MATS.

Once in Japan, cargo could be moved either by sea or by air to Korea, according to its priority. Having briefly mentioned the sea transport shuttle, let us examine the air shuttle. At the outset of the war, there were three squadrons of transports in the theater. All were C-54's. Two were already in Tokyo or the immediate area, and one had to be moved from the Philippines. These planes immediately assumed the task of evacuating Americans from Korea.

All C-46 and C-47 aircraft in the theater were thrown into a pool. Soon there were enough planes to form two units which were designated the 1st Provisional Group. By this time the C-54's had been reduced through losses to two squadrons.²⁴ These planes not only delivered cargo to poorly developed airstrips, but in many cases, were required to evacuate the same cargo in the face of the enemy advance. When the U.N. Forces stopped at the Pusan Perimeter, airlift demands finally became more normal; and the planes could be utilized to deliver priority cargo and to paradrop supplies.²⁵

THE MATERIEL BUILD-UP

At the end of World War II, millions of tons of equipment had been abandoned, destroyed, and salvaged. However, additional tons had been wisely mothballed in the event of a future emergency. For example, Ordnance storage sites²⁶ were located in dispersed areas as follows:

Letterkenny Ordnance Depot, Penn.	Toole Ordnance Depot, Utah
Sierra Ordnance Depot, Calif.	Anniston Ordnance Depot, Ala.
Red River Arsenal, Texas	
Mount Ranier Ordnance Depot, Wash.	Lima Ordnance Depot, Ohio
Erie Ordnance Depot, Ohio.	

Besides the strategic stores, numerous stores still existed in Japan to support the theater. Military production was in process at home to support the armies abroad and to fulfill Mutual Defense Assistance commitments. The saber clanging of

Soviet Russia had spurred our government to the defense contract subsidizing of certain key production facilities. We were not hog tied by Lend Lease as in WW II, and we still had experienced producers remaining from that war.

Largely speaking, major equipment changes had not come into effect since the last war; so dormant, cobwebby armament plants could be reopened to produce the same equipment which they had lately stopped producing. As an example of this we may cite the explosive ordnance factory at Meade, Nebraska, which was placed in full production in short order. Luckily, we did not face armament which required more advanced equipment than we had faced in the last war. (Exception: 3.5 in rocket launcher required)

Equipment, then, for the first time in our history of wars was not the critical factor. Speeded defense contracts only served to reenforce our newly-diminishing national economy.

LATER LOGISTIC PROBLEMS

Other than the initial build-up problems, we experienced two major strategic logistical problems -- ports and railroads.

A. Ports.

Ports were the dominant factor as is evidenced by the initial strategy of falling back on Pusan as the final defensive position. Facilities at Pusan were such that only a

limited supply rate could be sustained over the docks.

A major factor in the later decision to assault at Inchon was the dock facilities located there. Even this port was limited to shallow draft vessels by the much publicized twenty-nine foot tide.

Still later in the war, General Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army had to have the port at Chinnampo cleared of mines or they would have run out of supplies.²⁷ Road conditions from other ports were so poor that this unit would soon have been combat ineffective.

The Marines used the port facilities of Hungnam to life-saving advantage after their retreat from the Chinese onslaught.

Other than the four ports mentioned, Korea was almost devoid of ports adequate to support us. Few beaches would lend themselves to support operations. In another limited war, port facilities will still be an unresolved problem.

B. Railroads.

Railroads moved ninety-five percent of the tonnage to the front, because the Korean road network was so poor.²⁸ Yet, railroads were a major problem. On 7 July 1950, a detachment from the 8010 Army Unit, Transportation Military Railway Service, was activated in Korea to advise and supervise the railway system. This detachment consisted of only nineteen officers and ninety enlisted men. Because of lack of strength, it had to depend upon Koreans for operating

29
personnel.

In Korea two engines were required to pull thirty cars, and thirty cars was the maximum train length. Limiting factors were the short sidings and the single track system. To operate effectively we needed 8,500 freight cars. We had only 7,000, of which 500 were in very bad shape.³⁰ In retreats much rolling stock was lost.³¹ At the onset of the war, due to lack of railroad equipment, the only vehicles which could be moved by railroads were those over 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ tons going farther than Taegu. Others had to move under their own power.³²

The problems in sustaining the railway system in Korea were reconstruction, operation, maintenance, destruction (with retreat), and reconstruction again.³³ Another problem was keeping the tracks clear from derailments and sabotage. Korean gangs were employed in this task. It was found that they could outwork the U. S. Engineers except when cold weather set in. Then Korean clothing was inadequate.³⁴

Additional problems were the lack of marshalling yards,³⁵ the ineffective communications system, and the damaged and destroyed water pumps on the entirely steam-operated system.³⁶ (Later, U.S. Diesel engines were brought in.)³⁷

SUMMARY

In essence, our logistic experience in Korea was one of mechanics. We were completely unopposed by the enemy in

manufacture and in delivery of the tools of war. Our Country was never completely mobilized.

A lesson to be learned is that we must maintain adequate reserve and delivery systems to cope with another such problem.

Techniques to be developed are an intra-theater delivery system to the front and a better system for unloading without proper dock facilities.

ANNEX A -- Footnotes

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3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. Ibid., p. 9.
5. Army Information Digest, Sept. 1950; "Building Our Military Manpower," Staff, p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
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8. Ibid., p. 4.
9. Ibid., p. 5.
10. Army Information Digest, Febr. 1951; "Guard Divisions Ordered into Active Military Service," Staff, p. 53.
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17. Ibid., p. 37.
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23. Airpower the Decisive Force in Korea, Stewart, p. 254.
24. Ibid., p. 255.
25. Ibid., p. 257.
26. Army Information Digest, Jan. 1951; "Long Term Storage Proves its Worth," Daniels, p. 12.
27. Battle Report, Karig, Cagle, and Manson, p. 354.
28. Combat Support in Korea, Westover; "Railroading in Korea," Brown, p. 65.
29. Ibid., "Railhead at Masan", Wildrick, p. 60.
30. Ibid., "Railroading in Korea," p. 66.
31. Ibid., "Problems in Railroad Operation," Mossman, p. 64.
32. Ibid., "Railhead at Masan," p. 60.
33. Ibid., "Problems in Railroad Operation," p. 62.
34. Ibid., p. 63.
35. Ibid., "Railhead at Masan," p. 61.
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37. Ibid., "Railroading in Korea," p. 65.

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