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THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION:

A COMPILATION OF THE
OFFICIAL RECORDS

OF THE
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
The Hon. REDFIELD PROCTOR, Secretary of War,

BY

MAJ. GEORGE B. DAVIS, U. S. A.,
MR. LESLIE J. PERRY,
MR. JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY,
Board of Publication.

SERIES I—VOLUME XXXVIII—IN FIVE PARTS.
PART II—REPORTS.

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1891.

P

of no railroad bridge in this vicinity. The people, negroes and others, say the road runs on a ridge, but if we do nothing to the road it will create a diversion.

GEORGE STONEMAN,
Major-General.

Major-General SHERMAN.

CAMP NEAR VILLA RICA, *July 15, 1864.*

GENERAL: As I indicated to you in my last note, we completed the bridge (Moore's), and were ready to cross at daybreak yesterday morning, but before we essayed it a report came from Major Buck, in command of a battalion seven miles above, that the enemy had been crossing above him on a boat or a bridge, and that his pickets had been cut off. I, of course, made preparations accordingly, and found that the report originated in the sound made by the enemy crossing a bridge over a creek on the other side of the river, and nearly opposite to Major Buck. On attempting to cross the bridge, the enemy opened upon it with four pieces of artillery from the edge of the timbers on the opposite side, and made an endeavor to retake their rifle-pits near the water's edge. Deeming it inexpedient to push our endeavors further, and knowing that it was easier to retain the men long enough to burn the bridge than to get them back again after they had been driven off, I ordered the bridge to be burned and the boats that had been collected there for security destroyed. During the day I sent scouts down the river to within thirteen miles of Franklin, where there is another bridge, and found neither ford nor ferry-boats, and in the evening came to this point. We shall remain here and graze during the day, and in the evening move to the vicinity of Sweet Water town, or within eight miles of it. Colonel Bid- dle, who was left with his brigade at Campbellton, reports the en- emy quite strong at that point, with two guns of long range in each of the two redoubts on the opposite bluff, which are opened upon him whenever any of his men show themselves. We get plenty of forage for the horses, beef and blackberries and some bacon for the men, and are getting on finely. We want horseshoes and nails, and a little time where we can avail ourselves of a blacksmith shop to fit the shoes, to complete the cavalry and make it ready for any serv- ice. The artillery, however, want better horses and better ammuni- tion, as the horses they have would be unable to make long consecu- tive marches, and the ammunition is but little better than solid shot. I was very anxious to strike the railroad, from personal as well as other considerations, but I became convinced that to attempt it would incur risks inadequate to the results, and unless we could hold the bridge, as well as penetrate into the country, the risk of capture or dispersion, with loss of animals (as I could hear of no ford) was almost certain. It is impossible to move without every step we take being known, women as well as men acting as scouts and messengers. I have sent to the rear about 40 prisoners, 1 of them the commander of the picket at the bridge on this side, and 16 or 17 of them pickets and scouts in the vicinity of the bridge. I am unable to say how much force is opposite to us, but from what can be seen and I can hear, I am convinced it is no inconsiderable one.

GEORGE STONEMAN,
Major-General, &c.

Major-General SHERMAN.

58 R R—VOL XXXVIII, PT II

MACON, GA., August 6, 1864.

GENERAL: In regard to the operations of my command from the time I left the army up to the time I turned back from near this place, I will only say now that I feel assured, when you know what was done and why it was done, you will be satisfied with reasons and results. All I wish to say now, through the medium of flag of truce, is solely in regard to how I and a small portion of my command became prisoners of war. Before I had completed what I desired to accomplish I learned that a force of the enemy's cavalry was close upon my rear, and the only course for me to pursue to get out was to turn upon and, if possible, whip this force. This I think we might have done had my command fought as it ought to and as I hoped it would have done. Without entering now into particulars, we were whipped, and this principally on account of the bad conduct of the Kentucky brigade in the attack during the morning, and in fact throughout the day. In the afternoon the enemy attacked us, when Capron's brigade gave way at once and was followed by Adams' (Kentucky) brigade, leaving me with Biddle's (Indiana) brigade and the section of artillery to contend against the whole force of the enemy, and cover the retreat of the remainder of my force. A portion of this brigade I sent to hold a cross-road and keep the enemy from getting between me and the main force, pack train, &c. This also gave way and followed the rest, so that near the end of the day I found myself with about 200 of the Fifth Indiana Cavalry and the section of artillery. This regiment had been engaged nearly the whole of the day previous. I insisted on continuing the contest and, if taken prisoners at all, upon being taken fighting, but the officers with me protested that, being without ammunition and surrounded, our escape was next to impossible; that there was no use in fighting longer; that we had accomplished our object in covering the retreat of the rest of the command until it was well under way, and that in justice to all concerned we should surrender. To extricate the section of artillery and the men with it was impossible. My own horse had been shot under me and I was scarcely able to mount the worn-down one and the only one I could find to replace the one I had lost, and our chances of escape were so small that I consented to be taken prisoners of war, and as such our treatment has been everything that could have been expected. Our loss in killed and wounded was quite large.

I understand from captured fugitives that they were informed that I had surrendered the whole command, and that the order was given for every one to save himself. I have not heard from the Kentucky brigade since it left. Capron's brigade I learn was considerably cut up, and several hundred of it captured. I feel better satisfied with myself to be a prisoner of war, much as I hate it, than to be amongst those who owe their escape to considerations of self-preservation.

I am, general, very respectfully, &c.,

GEORGE STONEMAN,

Maj. Gen., U. S. Army, Prisoner of War.

Major-General SHERMAN.

[Indorsement.]

OCTOBER 25, 1864.

Received and respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, as General Stoneman's explanation of the result of his movement on Macon.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

No. 433.

Report of Lieut. Col. Robert W. Smith, Assistant Inspector-General, of operations July 27–August 6 (Stoneman's raid).

HDQRS. CAVALRY CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Marietta, Ga., August 7, 1864.

SIR: In compliance with the direction of Major-General Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, I have the honor to submit for your consideration the following report, touching the late cavalry expedition to Macon, Ga., under Maj. Gen. George Stoneman:

July 27, left camp at 4 a. m., four miles north of Decatur, Ga.; entered Decatur at sunrise, and there met General Garrard with his command. The force under General Stoneman consisted of three brigades, one composed of the mounted portions of the Fifth and Sixth Indiana Cavalry, commanded by Col. James Biddle, amounting to about 700 men; another, of the First and Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry, commanded by Col. Silas Adams, numbering 550 men; the other brigade was composed of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, the Eighth Michigan Cavalry, and a part of the First Ohio Squadron, numbering 800 men, commanded by Col. Horace Capron; a detachment of the Twenty-fourth Indiana Battery, under command of Captain Hardy, with two 3-inch regulation guns and fifty-four men, in all about 2,104 officers and men, the general, and seven members of his staff. At Decatur it was reported the enemy's cavalry were in our front, and a line of battle was at once formed and preparation made for a fight. Upon scouting well to our right and right front, no enemy was found, and thereupon General Stoneman, with his command, went forward, General Garrard remaining with his forces to hold and engage the enemy so as to prevent his pursuit of us if possible. The march was continued all day and most of the night, reaching to within two miles of Covington, Ga., where the command halted at 4 a. m., and rested until about 8. July 28, march resumed at 8 a. m., passing through Covington at 9 a. m. Nothing of interest occurred during march to-day; went to within one mile of Monticello and halted. July 29, arrived at Monticello at sunrise. At this point Colonel Adams' brigade was sent to the right on a diverging road, with directions to scout the country and join main column at or near Clinton. Nothing special occurred to-day. A few prisoners were taken and some 6 rebel pickets captured. The march was continued to within twelve miles of Macon, Ga.

July 30, column moved at 4 a. m. Colonel Adams' brigade was again sent to the right with instructions to strike the river at some point above Macon, sound it for fords or examine for ferries or other means of crossing, and feel the enemy as he advanced down the river and drive him in if found. A detachment of the Fourteenth Illinois, under command of Major Davidson, was sent to the left with instructions to strike the Macon and Milledgeville Railroad as near the latter point as possible and destroy it. When the column was within five miles of Macon, another detachment was sent to the left to strike the same railroad at or near Gordon. Both these parties reached the railroad with but little interruption, and each burnt some small bridges and culverts and tore up the road at these points for a distance of two or three miles. They also destroyed three trains of cars, and three engines that happened to be upon the road

at the time, between the points above named. There were twenty-two box-cars loaded with commissary and quartermaster stores, and some stock and three passenger coaches with citizens and soldiers aboard. All the cars and engines were completely destroyed. The main column advanced in the mean time on the main road toward Macon, and met the enemy's pickets about three miles out. Colonel Adams had moved down the river, and when about one mile above Macon met the enemy in force, and gave him battle, driving him back until he fell in cover of his own battery on the hill near the river, and about half a mile above Fort Hawkins. Colonel Adams was then unable to advance any farther, but continued to engage the enemy at this point, until his withdrawal was ordered at 3 p. m. In the mean time Capron's and Biddle's brigades were engaging the enemy in front, and to the left of Macon, but with little success, the enemy being protected in his works and lines by the battery in Fort Hawkins. Our battery could get no position from which it could operate effectively against that of the enemy in Fort Hawkins. We threw a few shells into the city. At 3 p. m. General Stoneman, finding it impossible to reach the railroad bridge with the force he had, ordered a withdrawal of all the forces, and directed the march to commence southward, sending Colonel Adams' brigade in advance, with a view to cross over the river and railroad south of Macon, some seven or eight miles, and continue on in that direction, as, I suppose, with a view to strike down through this State, and out at Pensacola or other favorable point. When the head of the column, with the pack train, had advanced in this direction some two miles, a scout reported a large column of rebel cavalry coming into Macon, estimated at from 1,000 to 1,500 strong. Fearing that this column would reach the ferry, where it was designed we would cross, and intercept our column, the general ordered a countermarch, and started back on the road we had gone, designing at that time, I know, to strike out in an easterly course, in the direction of Milledgeville, as soon as practicable, for he thus expressed himself to me personally, and I do not yet know why this course was not pursued. We came on in the direction of Clinton, on the same route we had gone down, arriving at Clinton just at dark. Here the advance drove in a picket of the enemy, supposed to be fifty strong, some of them retreating west from Clinton, and the remainder north, along the route we had pursued as we advanced toward Macon. The general ordered the column to advance north along our old route, and about 9 p. m. the advance began to skirmish with the enemy, which was kept up, we advancing very slowly, until about 1 o'clock at night, when the skirmishing became so heavy in our front, as to prevent any farther advance. We had now got some six miles north of Clinton, and a halt was ordered.

July 31, our advance kept up a heavy skirmish with the enemy until daylight, when an advance was ordered. We had gone about one mile and a half, when very general and heavy skirmishing commenced. A line of battle was at once formed, and the enemy strongly felt, which resulted in the development that the enemy was there in force, upon ground of his own selection, with strong works and barricades, on an elevation in the road in our front, with his lines of battle extending out from this point in the shape of a **V**, completely covering and enfilading our right and left flanks. General Stoneman at once prepared his command for a vigorous attack upon the enemy, advancing himself with the skirmish line. We

were repulsed almost along our whole line. The enemy charged upon our left, and were in turn temporarily checked, but still kept gaining ground upon us, and using his battery with most wonderful effect and accuracy. The fight thus continued, with doubtful results, until about 2 p. m., when it became apparent that the enemy was being re-enforced directly in our rear by the force that we had fought the day before at Macon. The fight then became general all along the line, and from that time until the surrender we lost heavily in killed and wounded, but the enemy suffered none the less. About 4 p. m. General Stoneman, his staff, and most of the brigade commanders held a consultation, and it was thought best to make a desperate effort to cut our way out to our right rear, as this seemed to be the weakest part of the enemy's lines. Just as the general had given his directions for this movement, and the respective officers were starting to their commands, the enemy opened a battery on our right and left flank, and continued their fire from the one in front, followed by a general charge. Our lines gave way, and fell back. I was ordered to a certain point to rally a line. Whilst doing this I became separated from the general. The line soon gave way again, the enemy then being within fifty yards, both in front and on the left flank. I at that moment met Colonel Adams, who had just come from General S[toneman] with permission to cut out if he could, stating, moreover, that the general was about to surrender, but that he desired all to get out who could, and he would remain in person and engage the enemy as long as possible, so as to give those making their escape as much start as possible. This we know he did, for we could still hear cannonading when we were out some two or three miles from the battle-field. I came out with Colonel Adams and his brigade. Colonel Capron had escaped a few minutes before, with a part of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, Eighth Michigan Cavalry, and the First Ohio Squadron. Lieutenant-Colonel Matson came out with most of the Sixth Indiana Cavalry, all striking out in a northeasterly direction. There thus escaped about 1,200 or 1,300 men, at least two-thirds, if not three-quarters, of the command that was left at the time the battle closed. Colonel Adams came by way of Eatonton, passing it some five miles before we halted, being then about thirty-five miles from the battle-field. Colonel Capron came farther to the left, but getting out about as far as Colonel Adams.

August 1, to-day Adams' brigade was joined about noon by a detachment of the Eighth Michigan, under command of Major Buck, and the Sixth Indiana, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Matson, came through Madison about 2 p. m., and here destroyed a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores. Burnt some coffee and 50,000 pounds of bacon. The march was continued until dark, when we were joined by Colonel Capron and his command, and the column then moved on until about midnight, when we stopped twelve miles from the bridge crossing the Oconee River, near Athens, Ga.

August 2, to-day we approached the Oconee River, near Watkinsville, hoping to be able to cross at this point and destroy the armory and other government works at Athens. Adams' brigade was in the advance, and when within five miles of the river captured 6 of the enemy's pickets, and within three miles, captured all the reserve picket, consisting of about 20 men. On his approach to the river at the bridge, he was opened upon by a rifled battery. It was then

thought impracticable to attempt a crossing there, as we were not in a situation to bring on a fight that might last for some time, for we were very nearly out of ammunition. It was then agreed to follow up the Oconee River in the direction of Jefferson, and this intention communicated to Colonel Capron, who was then in reserve some two miles in the rear. For some reason, not yet known, Colonel Capron did not come on the road after us, but got off farther to the left. We came that night to a point about sixteen miles northeast of Lawrenceville, and halted at midnight, the command lying to horse, unsaddled, without going into camp. Our command was very much exhausted and worn out, but few having had any sleep or rest for four days and nights. August 3, started early; had gone about two and a half miles, when a soldier came galloping through the woods shouting "Capron has been attacked and cut all to pieces." Adams went on double-quick to the road on which we learned Capron's command had been attacked, and there soon discovered the evidences of a routed and defeated command. Learning the direction they had gone, Adams, with his advance, charged after the rebels, overtaking the rear of their column half a mile distant. He charged them, driving them in great confusion, and wounding and killing, he thinks, some 40; but knowing his ammunition was nearly expended, and that there was still a rebel brigade pushing on to strike our left and cut us off from the river, we turned at right angles to the left, and came in the direction of the Chattahoochee, knowing that our only hope was to cross it at some point before night. All the information we could in the mean time get from any one was, that General Sherman had fallen back north of the river, and if this was true, our situation was still more perilous. We struck the Chattahoochee about twenty-three miles northeast of Marietta; sun an hour high; found an old but difficult ford, and succeeded in getting the command all over about 9 p. m., and went into camp. August 4, started at daylight, and arrived at Marietta at 11 a. m. Colonel Adams returned with about 490 men, having lost some 40 on the 31st ultimo in killed, wounded, and captured, about 20 during the march here. Most of them were lost at night by getting behind, and falling asleep from exhaustion, and who, no doubt, became lost or were picked up by the enemy.

Great credit is due to Colonel Adams for the energy and management displayed by him in bringing his command out as safely as he has. The same remark would apply to Colonel Capron, had he not met with the misfortune in allowing his command to be separated from Adams, and in addition to this, his command was completely surprised on the morning of the 3d, the first intimation in his camp of the presence of the enemy being their charging over his men, who were asleep, with their horses unsaddled. It is said, however, that he had a strong picket in his rear, and that instead of his giving orders to unsaddle, that he had expressly forbidden it. Here statements seem to vary. I fear but few of his command will find their way into our lines. Not more than 100 have already come in, and I doubt whether as many more will arrive, although small squads are coming in all the time, and there may more get in yet than we had expected.

General Stoneman, Major Keogh, Major Brown (medical director), and Captain Perkins, of the staff, surrendered. Major Tompkins, Captain Lord, Captain Sea, and myself, of the staff, made our escape. Of the latter, all are now here but Major Tompkins, who, I

fear, is either taken prisoner or wounded. Colonel Biddle, Colonel Butler, Major Thompson, and Major Soper were all the field officers who were included in the surrender. It is impossible for me to state the number of officers of the line who were included in the surrender, or how many of those who escaped from the battle-field will get into our lines.

Major Buck and Lieutenant-Colonel Mix, of the Eighth Michigan, escaped from the battle-field, also Colonel Capron, Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, Major Davidson, and Major Quigg, of the Fourteenth Illinois, and Lieutenant-Colonel Matson and Major Smith, of the Sixth Indiana. They were all with Colonel Capron, and none have yet come in but Lieutenant-Colonel Jenkins, and they are all, no doubt either taken prisoners, or killed or wounded.

The disaster to the command would have been comparatively small had not the misfortune, already detailed, occurred to Colonel Capron and his command, when we were so near home and so near out of danger.

I am, major, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. W. SMITH,

Lieut. Col. and Asst. Insp. Gen., Cav. Corps, Dept. of the Ohio.

Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MARIETTA, August 8, 1864.

Colonel Capron himself and six men came in this morning, also Captain Bell, of the Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry, who was left on the battle-field on the 31st; both came on foot.

SMITH.

Major CAMPBELL.

No. 434.

Report of Maj. Haviland Tompkins, Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, Provost-Marshal, of operations July 27-August 6 (Stoneman's raid).

MARIETTA, GA., August 12, 1864.

At the request of Major-General Schofield I have the honor to make the following report of facts of Major-General Stoneman's late raid on Savannah and Macon Railroad, coming within my own knowledge:

Left camp near Decatur, Ga., 3 p. m. 27th of July, with about 1,800 men; halted two hours, and fed at Covington on morning of 28th. Colonel Adams, with his brigade, was sent to Mechanicsburg, on the Ocmulgee River, to watch movements of enemy, and to communicate with the general at Monticello in the evening. The general, with command, arrived at Monticello in the evening at dark. No communication from Colonel Adams at 12 o'clock; became impatient; sent party to communicate, and order his command to join main column on road to Macon. At Monticello, in the evening, the general received the first information that there were no bridges over the Ocmulgee River. His information, and on which his movements were based, was that there were three bridges north of Macon over this river. His plan was now changed to destroy the Savannah and

Macon Railroad. Moved from Monticello morning 29th. Major Davidson, Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, was sent with five companies (125 men) to strike railroad near Gordon, and destroy it east and beyond Oconee River. Colonel Adams' brigade moved on right hand from Clinton to Macon, Colonel Biddle's brigade on left-hand road, and Colonel Capron's brigade on the left to strike railroad. Met resistance on all the roads about 10 p. m., with a vigorous assault on Colonel Adams' brigade. On morning 30th, at daybreak, each brigade moved rapidly forward, charging whatever was in the front, driving the enemy with loss. They drove the enemy within one mile of Macon. Colonel Capron's brigade reached railroad, tore up track, burned 2 bridges, trapping 3 trains of loaded cars, which they destroyed. The guards fled from trains. Having now given time for Major Davidson to destroy railroad bridges, and scouts reported a large cavalry force moving on west side of river toward Macon, and that all the ferries were destroyed above and below, he withdrew main force, with intention to move in direction of Milledgeville. Information soon came that the demonstration east had drawn the enemy in that direction, and that but a small force was on the Covington road. Hence he desired to press hard on that road and reach Hillsborough if possible, at which point he could take choice of three roads at daylight. But the enemy were too strongly posted, and he could not reach Hillsborough by two miles. The enemy had now concentrated their forces in front, covering the roads. And being now between two rivers, only about twenty miles apart, with an enemy in his front and rear, he decided that he must break their lines in the direction in which he must move out. Desperate efforts were made from sunrise of 31st until 12 o'clock to break through their lines, but at every assault our lines were driven back except the right. We had now lost many valuable officers and men. The men were nearly out of ammunition, and fatigued almost beyond endurance. The proposition was made to move to the right and pass the enemy. He said he could not move the whole command without being discovered; he could make no resistance when pursued; he would have the outside track, with an enemy fresh to pursue; his men would be broken up in detachments and murdered, as some had been on the 29th; he would not refuse any from going, nor order them; if the enemy assaulted and broke our lines, do the best we could, but as for him he saw no other way for the lives of the men to be respected but for him to surrender, which he would do only as a last resort. By this means all the detachments that did leave had five hours the start of any force that could follow in pursuit. The general was much broken down at the thought of a surrender; he seemed to have but little regard for his own personal safety, if he could only save his command; he was not in the whole day scarcely from under the most severe fire of the enemy. Major Davidson returned and joined Colonel Capron when Colonel Capron was making his escape from the enemy in afternoon of 31st. He made to me the following report: Struck railroad seven miles east of Gordon, burned trestle-work and bridge; destroyed everything at Gordon. The agent said that there were 275 flat and box cars, mostly loaded with supplies and the best of refugee goods; 9 engines and 150 passenger and express cars within that point destroyed. Seven of the engines had steam on, which were destroyed by running them in a general smash and burning the whole thing. Destroyed the long

bridge over the Oconee River, also over Buffalo Creek, and all between those points. Caught 4 trains between Gordon and Buffalo Creek; destroyed them entire. The supplies at Gordon and every depot were large, having been removed from the Anniston and Atlantic Railroad after General Garrard's raid on that road. Met no resistance. Returning, passed within two miles of Milledgeville; destroyed bridges on that railroad. This destruction of property was immense, and a severe blow to the enemy at that time. About one-half of command has returned. Major Davidson, with his command, is still out; we fear they are captured. They were with Colonel Capron's command when attacked on the 3d of August.

We regret deeply the loss of the noble men who fell in endeavoring to do their duty before the enemy of our country in the hazardous undertaking from which some of us have escaped, and the severance from and the sacrifice the commanding general made of his own freedom to save his command.

I have the honor to be, major, yours, &c.,

H. TOMPKINS,

Major and Provost-Marshal, Stoneman's Staff.

Major CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 435.

Reports of Col. Israel Garrard, Seventh Ohio Cavalry, commanding Cavalry Division, of operations July 27-September 9.

HDQRS. CAVALRY COMMAND, DEPT. OF THE OHIO,
Before Atlanta, Ga., August 11, 1864.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that, under the orders of last night to scout the country south of Utoy Creek, I took about 450 men of the Ninth Michigan Cavalry, Seventh Ohio Cavalry, and Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, and crossed Utoy Creek at the bridge. Rebel vedettes were found not far from the bridge and again at Sandtown. There was a picket-post near Sandtown, on the Fayetteville road; when driven from it they retreated southward. He showed but a small force, and there appeared to be no re-enforcement of the rebel picket. I concluded that it was a post of observation only. General Kilpatrick had shelled Sandtown day before yesterday, but there were none of his troops in sight from Sandtown. I then took the road from Sandtown to Atlanta, and returned on it two and a half miles to the road that leads to Owl Rock Church. I made a scout out on this to the camp-ground. Many fires of a large camp were still smoking. A respectable citizen, an old man, Mr. McWilliams, who lives near the church, stated that Armstrong's division of three brigades had camped there night before last, and had left there yesterday morning on the road toward Campbellton, saying that they were going on a raid. A small force of about 200 came back over the road this morning, and turned down the road that takes them either to East Point or Atlanta. A number of picket-posts at cross-roads on the Sandtown road were found, but the corn blades were two days or more old. It was evident that the cavalry had been moved out of that part of the country. On reaching the post of the cavalry on the Sandtown road in rear of the infantry position I sent that which I had with me to their old positions

HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Near Decatur, Ga., September 14, 1864.

MAJOR: I have the honor to forward herewith report of casualties, so far as received, of the cavalry, on the late raid of General Stoneman. The report of casualties, since I assumed command, was forwarded several days since with my report of operations. I find no record of the casualties in General Stoneman's command previous to the raid.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ISRAEL GARRARD.

Maj. J. A. CAMPBELL,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio.

Recapitulation of losses in Cavalry Command, Army of the Ohio, during the Stoneman raid.

Command.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Maj. Gen. George Stoneman and staff.....					a 3	
Company D, 7th Ohio Cavalry (escort to General Stoneman).....					1	32
14th Illinois Cavalry.....		2	2	8	19	315
8th Michigan Cavalry.....		4		12	7	203
5th Indiana Cavalry.....		1			16	363
6th Indiana Cavalry.....	1	2		2	8	157
24th Indiana Battery b.....					2	48
McLaughlin's squadron.....				2	2	53
1st Kentucky Cavalry c.....						
11th Kentucky Cavalry c.....						
Total.....	1	9	2	24	58	1,171

a General Stoneman, Major Keogh, and Captain Perkins. b Two guns. c No report received.

ISRAEL GARRARD,
Colonel, Commanding Division.

No. 436.

Report of Col. Horace Capron, Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, commanding Third Brigade, of operations July 27-August 6 (Stoneman's raid).

HEADQUARTERS COLONEL CAPRON'S BRIGADE,
CAVALRY COMMAND, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
Marietta, Ga., August 10, 1864.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the movements of my command, consisting of the Fourteenth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Cavalry, Eighth Regiment Michigan Volunteer Cavalry, and McLaughlin's Squadron Ohio Volunteer Veteran Cavalry, on the late raid to Macon, Ga., and return:

On the 26th ultimo I received orders from General Stoneman to prepare my command, with ten days' rations and in light marching order, to be ready to move on the morning of the 27th at 3 a. m. In accordance with the above order, moved out with the cavalry command, following the line of the Georgia Railroad, until 5 a. m. the 28th. Passing through Covington, we left the railroad in our rear,

and crossed the Ulfouhachee River at 9 a. m., thence, through Stearnesville, to within three miles of Monticello, a portion of my command going into the edge of the town, the whole command remaining in their saddles all night. At Stearnesville Capt. Samuel Wells, acting assistant adjutant-general, on my staff, was detached, by order of General Stoneman, with eighty-eight men of McLaughlin's Squadron Ohio Veteran Volunteer Cavalry, with instructions to destroy the bridge and a large flouring mill at Henderson's Mill, and the bridge and factory at Newton's cotton factory, on the Ulfouhachee River.

The captain joined the command at 4 a. m., the 29th, after accomplishing the object of the expedition. I immediately took up my line of march, passing through Hillsborough, and halted about 12 m. within four miles of Clinton. At this point I detached Major Davidson, of the Fourteenth Regiment Illinois Volunteer Cavalry (by order of General Stoneman), with 125 picked men from his regiment, with instructions to move to Gordon, the junction of the Eatonton and Georgia Central Railroads, and, using his own discretion, destroy all public property that he could find on either railroad, do all the damage he could, and bring his command out safely. The command then moved forward, passing through Clinton to within ten miles of Macon, where I was ordered to halt and go into camp.

I remained in camp until early dawn, the 30th, when I was ordered to take up line of march with the balance of the command toward Macon. Colonel Biddle's brigade, being in the advance, came upon the enemy's pickets at the forks of the Griswold road, seven miles from Macon, and drove them in. General Stoneman then ordered me to picket the Griswold road, and, with the balance of my command, move to the left and strike the Georgia Central Railroad and follow it up to Macon, and destroy the railroad and all public property and join him in front of the city. I divided my command into detachments, striking the railroad at different points from six and a half to three miles from the city, burned and destroyed 5 miles of track, 2 passenger trains, and 1 stock train loaded with hogs and horses, also destroyed 3 locomotives and burned 1 large machine-shop, within three miles of the city, used for the manufacture of gun carriages. In co-operation with Colonel Biddle's command, we burned a railroad bridge over a creek within one mile and a half of the city, 200 feet in length, and about 300 feet of trestle-work. At 3 p. m. I was ordered to take up line of march with the command and return on the same road we came; moved in the advance on the Clinton road. When near the forks of the Milledgeville road I was ordered to halt and form a line on the first elevated ground and rest one hour. With my brigade in the advance we then moved forward on the Clinton road and came upon the enemy's pickets about one mile from Clinton, charged them and drove them through town, liberating 33 of our men who had been captured by the enemy on our march to Macon, captured the guard, and burned the jail in which they were confined. We then moved forward on the Hillsborough road with orders to charge and drive the enemy whenever we met him. Some three miles from Clinton found a strong advance guard of the enemy; charged and drove them about half a mile, when we met an increased force posted behind barricades. I ordered the Eighth Michigan Cavalry, being in the advance, to charge them, which they did, driving them from their position. Recharg-

ing them, drove them from position to position until they fell back to their main force at a point about eight miles from Clinton, near Hillsborough. Being now attacked in my front and on my left flank, I reported the fact to General Stoneman. Heavy skirmishing was kept up all night.

At daybreak, the 31st, General Stoneman ordered me to advance with my brigade and drive the enemy from their position, which I did for about one mile and a half, when I found them drawn up in line of battle in my front and on my left, with two pieces of artillery in position, with which they opened on us as we advanced. General Stoneman now came up and formed his whole command in line of battle, Colonel Adams' brigade and the Eighth Michigan Cavalry, of my brigade, on the left, and the balance of my brigade on the right, with Colonel Biddle's brigade and one piece of artillery as reserve, the other piece of artillery taking position in the center. Between 9 and 10 a. m., in compliance with orders from General Stoneman, the whole line moved forward and engaged the enemy. They met us in superior numbers, and with a yell charged our lines, causing the left of the Eighth Michigan Cavalry to swing one-fourth way around, the right of the regiment holding its position. A mounted force of the enemy, coming up a road to the right and rear, charged my extreme right, but were repulsed. I then ordered two companies of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry to charge them mounted, which they did, driving them two miles and a half, when they took position behind barricades. The enemy now rallied in strong force and drove my men back. I immediately brought up four companies of the same regiment; checked them, charged and drove them a second time to their barricades. During this time the balance of the Fourteenth Illinois and the McLaughlin Ohio Squadron held the enemy in check in my front. I then fell back a short distance from my original position, and held the ground until 12.30 p. m. I was then ordered to strengthen my lines and prepare to make a heavy charge, dismounted. I brought every available man to the front, including my provost guard. At 1 p. m. General Stoneman ordered an advance, he holding one regiment of Colonel Adams' brigade in reserve. As we moved forward the enemy rose up in heavy force, and with a yell charged our lines, cutting off my communication with General Stoneman. When nearly surrounded I was forced to fall back to the horses, which created some confusion among my men, as the enemy followed close upon us. So closely did the enemy press my command many of the men were unable to mount their horses, the enemy capturing and mounting the horses, repeatedly charged my rear as I continued to retreat. I made every effort to communicate with General Stoneman, but my staff officers were cut off and unable to report. I have since learned from one of General Stoneman's staff officers (who escaped) that General Stoneman made a strong effort to communicate with me, but was unable to do so. Lieut. Col. E. Mix, of the Eighth Michigan Cavalry, now came up and reported that General Stoneman had surrendered. I determined to extricate what I could of my command, and, if possible, reach our lines. I moved rapidly on, struck the Eatonton road and moved toward Eatonton, the enemy still pursuing me, harassing my rear, wounding and killing a number of my men. After going some seven or eight miles, several detachments of General Stoneman's command, who had escaped and followed our course, came

up, drove off the enemy, and relieved my rear. As my men in the confusion which took place when our lines were broken on the battle-field lost many of their arms, I now reorganized them, placing those with arms and ammunition in my advance and rear, and moved on. My command now numbered about 300, including the detachments which had just joined me. After fording Murder Creek I moved off toward Madison, leaving Eatonton on my right, marching all night, bearing off to the left of Madison.

The following morning, the 1st instant, Major Davidson, with his detachment, joined my command. I then made a rapid march through Rutledge Station, and joined Colonel Adams' brigade at Pouders farm, seven miles from Rutledge. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Matson, of the Sixth Indiana Cavalry, with a remnant of Colonel Biddle's brigade, came in and joined us. The whole command now moved forward toward Watkinsville, arriving there the morning of the 2d instant, and, after consultation with Colonel Adams, it was thought best to attempt to cross the Oconee River at Athens. Colonel Adams was to make a demonstration on the town, with the understanding that if he could not effect a crossing at the bridge he was to send a courier and guide, and I was to join his command and cross the river at a ford two and a half miles above the town. The courier and guide reported after it was found that we could not cross the bridge, as it was protected with artillery. The guide mistook the road, leading me six miles away from the route agreed upon. After a delay of six hours in trying to open communication with Colonel Adams, and learning that a heavy body of cavalry and infantry was approaching me from the right, I moved forward on the Hog Mountain road to Jug Tavern, eighteen miles, when I halted and fed, and again moved forward on the same road until I passed the Jefferson and Lawrenceville road. Finding my men and animals completely exhausted, having marched fifty-six miles in twenty-four hours, and in their saddles almost constantly since the battle of the 31st ultimo, I concluded to go into camp and rest for two hours. For several hours previous to going into camp I found it necessary to have a rear guard to bring up the men, who were constantly falling out by the roadside fast asleep on their horses, being so worn out for want of rest. I also ascertained that I had passed all the roads from which I was liable to be flanked. Selecting my camping-ground, I placed the Eighth Michigan Cavalry on picket in my advance and Major Davidson's battalion, of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, in my rear, they being the only men who had arms and ammunition in the command. A large body of negroes, who had followed the command, and who had been ordered away to prevent confusion if I was attacked, fell in the rear and lay between rear pickets and the main body.

Just before daylight, the morning of the 3d instant, a body of the enemy's cavalry came up in my rear, and, as near as I can ascertain, passed around the main body of the pickets on both flanks, striking the road where the negroes lay. The negroes became panic-stricken and rushed into the camp of my men, who were yet asleep (we having been in camp about one hour and a half), throwing them into confusion. The enemy now charged into my camp, driving and scattering everything before them. Every effort was made by the officers to rally the men and check the enemy's charge, but it was found impossible to keep them in line, as most of them were with-

out arms and ammunition. Partial lines were formed, but, owing to the confusion which ensued in the darkness, they soon gave away. A stampede now took place, a portion of the men rushing for the woods and the balance running down the road and attempting to cross a bridge over the Mulberry River, in our front. The enemy still continued to charge my men, killing, wounding, and capturing a large number. In their rush across the bridge it gave away, precipitating many of them into the river. The men now scattered in every direction. I became separated from my command, and made my escape through the woods, arriving at this place on the morning of the 7th instant.

It is impossible to give the number of killed and wounded, and the fate of many will always be unknown. The men after the surprise were pursued by both Confederate soldiers and citizens, and undoubtedly a large number were murdered by them even after they surrendered.

I would mention that Major Buck, of the Eighth Michigan Cavalry, with seventy men of his regiment, having made his escape from the enemy on the 31st ultimo, passed through Eatonton, burned the depot, which contained a large amount of commissary supplies and clothing and over 1,000 stand of Enfield rifles, and joined me on the 1st instant.

I also give you the following report of Major Davidson, of the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, who was detached near Clinton, on the 30th ultimo (now missing). Striking the Georgia Central Railroad at Gordon, the junction of the Eatonton and Georgia Central Railroads, he burned a large brick depot filled with army supplies, destroying 11 locomotives, and burned 11 trains of cars consisting of 40 passenger-cars, 80 box-cars filled with commissary and quartermaster stores, and 20 open cars loaded with machinery, also burned a large building stored with tools and machinery belonging to the railroad company, and 1 cotton factory; destroyed the telegraph office, with several instruments, capturing the operator, and tore up half a mile of railroad track; following the Georgia Central Railroad east of Gordon to Emmett Station, sixteen miles, burning all the cattle guards on the road. At Emmett burned a large depot filled with supplies, and tore up a quarter of a mile of track, moved eight miles farther to Toombsborough, burning along the road the cattle guards, half a mile of trestle work, and 4 creek bridges. At Toombsborough burned a large brick depot filled with supplies, a flouring mill and saw-mill, also burned a railroad bridge across the creek, at the edge of town, some 300 feet in length. Bearing off to the left, to avoid a swamp along the railroad, he struck the railroad again four miles farther down. Here he burned several thousand cords of wood, destroyed cattle guards, and burned one mile and a half of trestle-work. He also burned the railroad bridge across the Oconee River, said to be 700 yards in length. After accomplishing his work he commenced a retreat, leaving the railroad to his left. Passing to the right of Milledgeville, he joined my command on the 1st instant.

Too much praise cannot be given to the officers of my brigade for their good conduct. The disaster which finally occurred was not attributable to any inefficiency on their part, but was altogether unavoidable.

I would here mention the valuable assistance which Captain Lord, of the Fourteenth Illinois, and assistant commissary of musters on General Stoneman's staff, rendered me, not only in the engagement of the 31st ultimo, where he exhibited great gallantry and bravery in leading a portion of my command several times in the charges made on the enemy, but also on my retreat in obtaining information in regard to the best route to be taken, and in constantly leading the advance of my command.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HORACE CAPRON,

Colonel Fourteenth Illinois Vol. Cavalry, Comdg. Brig.

Major-General SCHOFIELD,

Comdg. Department of the Ohio, near Atlanta, Ga.