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25 Oetober 1944

SUBJECT: Operations.

TOs Commanding General, 4th Armored Division, APO 254, U.S. Army.
At 2330 , on Sunday, 16 July 1944, word was received that this unit would be ready to move to the front lines by 0900 the next day to replace the Fourth Infantry Division.

Field Order \#l, Headquarters Fourth Armored Division, was received to oover the movement. The Division was assigned to the VIII Corps, lst Army. The battaliea moved out at 1100, on 17 July 1944, as part of Combat Command "B" which was in the lead. And the 51 st led the colump, with the third platoon of Ccrapany "B" as the point. The unit moved through ste Colombe, Orglandes, Etronvilles Apperille. Boupte, and went into an assembly area one-half mile Eats of Blohou. The tripsmat approximately forty miles.

Late in the ovening on 18 July 1944, word was received that the 53ra prmored Infantry Battalion was being attacked in its positions in the front line, and the battalion was alerted to move to help thom. At 2315, the unit moved out hastaly and up to position one mila mest of Sainteny. There was a great deal ef eafusien and members of the 53rd were coming to the rear and telling stories about sindr unit being wipod out. Company "B" moved up to support the loth Arieor ed treatery Battalion, which was taking over the 53 rd positions. Co wan followad ce Binget was later ordered tc come back in rosorve. Co "cN remained in ponition fir rearre. Co "B" remained in support of the 10th. Cesuaitios wore ovidently heavy in the s3rd and lOth, but this unit was in the rear and was not subjected to muoh firee still the men were frightened after hearing the weird tales from soldiers returning to the rear fron the other two infantry battalions.

On 19. July 1944, Co "B" moved into a dofensive position behiad de Mam, 20th Ariad Inf Bn, at 0530. Then they were ordered-to move back to proteet the laft 14 ank and rear. About noon, Co ${ }^{n} B^{\prime \prime}$ returned to the original position. 111 this took place under heavy shelling. They remained in support of co "A", Xith Aruad Inf Bue At 1530, Co "A" was alerted and moved up on foot at 1900 to take up positien bee hind Co ${ }^{\boldsymbol{n}} \mathrm{B}^{\boldsymbol{\omega}}$.

At 0100 , on Thursday, 20 July 1944, Co "B" relieved Co "A" of the loth on the front line. There was oontinued sholling in their area. The onomeput dowa a heavy barrage about 1840 and continued it during the ontire night. 2 he anemy counterattaoked and, although $C o{ }^{"} B{ }^{\prime \prime}$ and $C o{ }^{\prime \prime} A^{\prime \prime}$ suffered heavy casinitichethey held thedr positions, and the ocunt or-attaok was repilsed. The lst platoon ex wan and squad of the and platoon noved forward to fill in Co "B'sn arem at the battalicia CP, there were wild rumors coming back, with acaggerated reperte of camaitien sufferad. There was a great deal of oonfusion at the ci. Our. artillery Pirel aherth

had withdrawn. Thus, a oarrage landed in our own front lines. There were many stragglers, too. One soldier roturnod to the Battalion CP and gave olear pice ture of the situation. Ho reported that the companins were recoiving heavy fire and sufforing oasualtios, but the situation was not dosperate, and the companies would ramin in their positions despite ererything. The assault guns and mortars fired for the first time, and the Reconnalssance platoon moved forward and reinforced the front linel. The drivera and anti-tank platoon of Co " $\Lambda^{\prime \prime}$ moved in to proteot the rear and flanke of their company, and the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 704th Tank Deatiogree Bn also went into the front. Every available man was establishol initimadefonse around the C9. There was a total of 134 casialties in the battalion.

On Friday, 21 July 1944, the big concern of the early morning hours was to oracuate the oasualties and to supply the front-line ocompanies. There was a light shelling duriag the morning. Co "G" was alerted to ralieve " $A$ " and "B" and moved into position. Co "C" ocmpleted its relief by 2200. The 83rd Division was on the loft flamk and was contacted. The 90 th Division was on the right flank of the loth
area.

- On Saturday, 22 July 1944, Co "C" spent a comparativoly quiet night at the front byt used the time in improving positions propared by " $A^{\prime \prime}$ and "B". The latter oompanies had a chance to reorganise. Co "A" and Co "B" moved forward on foot to be able to support "C" in case of anothor attack. The Rattalion CP changed position to one mile southwest of Sainteny at 1245. There was little onemy activity all day. Co " $A^{\prime \prime}$ moved into position on the left of " $C$ " and contacted the 329th Infantry Regimeat of the 83 rd Infantry Division. Patrols were sent out by "C". Salvage was gathered out of matoriel left by units in position before us.

On Sunday, 23 July 1944, the men had their first view of air support attacking enemy installations to the immediate front. Positions remainod statio. There was slight intermittent shelling and sniper fire on "C" and patrols were sent out to deal with them and to maintain contact with units on the flanks.

Monday, 24 July 1944, was the quietest day since arrival in this sector. Co " $A$ " was disturbed during the night and feared an attempted onemy counter-attack, but it did not develop. Out artillery was active.

At 0230, on Tuesday, 25 July 1944, there was sniper fire in Co "B's" area. The men wore all thrilled by a spectacular array of bombers which passed overhead and bombed onemy installations to the front from 0930 to 1100. There were hundreds of planes that could be seen. News was received that a big push was about to begin. The first replacements, one officer and sixty-six enlisted men, were received. German propaganda leaflets ware dropped in Co "C's" area. On Wednesday, 26 July 1944, a terrific concentration of our artillery was laid
down on the enery. It was the biggest barrage seen by the unit up until this time. Co "C" reported hearing enemy vehicles moving between 0200 and 0300. Some enemy artillery was received, but it was light. At 1300 , Co " $A$ " discovered its left flank was exposed when a patrol failed to find the 329 th Infantry there. The company established its own security there.

From 0001 to 0100, on Thurs day, 27 July 1944, there was a heavy enemy barrage in the battalion area. It was believed that the en emy infantry was withdrawing along the entire Corps front. Orders were expected at any moment for the unit to

advance. It Col enter the town of Raids.

At 0300, on Friday, 28 July 1944, the Commanding Officer issued warning orders for the battalion to be ready to move at 0800 as part of CC" $A^{\prime \prime}$. The battalion did not move. Thirty-three replacements were received during the day. At 1900, the unit was put under command of CC"B". The battalion finally mored out at 1900, after waiting for most of the day for other units of the Division to clear the IP. The unit was far back in column as part of CC"Bn, which followed CC"A". Battalion Headquarters passed through Raids at 1952, Periers at 2009, St Sauveur Lendelin at 2030, and halted on the road outside of Coutances from 2055 to 2130. The unit continued through Montuchon at 2155 and pulled into bivouac one nile North East of Coutances at 2205. Co "A" went into position in support of the 53rd Armd Inf Bn on the south side of the town. The distance of the march was fourteen miles.

On Saturday, 29 July 1944, the battalion roved forward at 1315, passed through Coutancesat 1318 and proceeded southeast and moved into bivouac one mile nor th of Lengronne - a distance of fifteen miles. Nany prisoners being sent to the rear were passed along the road. The battalion closed into birouac at 2330.

On Sunday, 30 July 1944, Co "B" captured two officers and nineteen enlisted German prisoners early in the morning. They were members of the 942nd Grenadier Regiment. The battalion left the bivouac area at 1130, passed through Lengronne, Ver, and halted $1 \frac{1}{2}$ miles south of the town, where Co "B" rai into light enemy resistance at Loiretel. An enemy delaying action caught the company on a narrow road. Attempts of enemy tanks to move in were frustrated by firs from the antitank guns, which knocked out one tank. The enemy seemed to retire but opened fire on Co "B" with anti-tank guns and AP ammunition, inflicting heavy losses in personnel. There were two enciry timiss destroyed, with four or flve more probably destrcyed. Six battalion vehicles were damaged. The battalion went into bisouac near Ver. Twenty prisoners were taken during the day. The battalion lost fifty-two men.

On Monday, 31 July 1944, the battalion left the bivouac at 0900, with the obe jootive of moving to an area south of Arranches. Movement was slow, with long halts in the column. Destroyed en emy vehicles all along the route showed the effectiveness of the dir Corps. The route of march was through La Blanchmiere, La Meurdiquiere, Blauchamp, La Mouche, and Pte Coquerie. The battalion went into an an assembly area three miles northeast of arranches after a lon wait along the road for orders. Many prisoners were captured - more than 150. at 1700, orders were received to move out to the vicinity of Tirepied and to contact the 8th Tank Battalion, which was being attacked. Co "c" sent a platoon to help the 22nd Armd FA Bn , which was also being attacked. The battalion reached its objeotive narth of Tiropied at 2300, and contacted the tanks. A platoon of Co ". A" outposted the tank area. So many prisoners were captured that many were sent to the rear by themselves.

On Tuesday, 1 Auzust 1944, the third platoon of Co ${ }^{\prime \prime}{ }^{\prime \prime}$, outposting the tanks, apent most of the night engaged with small enemy forces, and captured ane German officer and fifteen men. The battalion moved out at 1000, with Co "A" in the lead. The mission was to secure and hold the crossroads and bridge at Montviron. Upon reaching the objective, at 1430, Co " 4 " outposted the area, and the 3rd plation was fir ed upon by eneny tanks. The $A T$ squad knocked out the first tank. The 3rd platoen command half-track was set on fire. The attached plation of TD's engaged the eneny

tanks, 2 one with the Co "A" AT platoon. Moaminile, Co "B", moving into a noarky assembly area on high ground off the road, lost three half-tracks from "88" fire, and moved into another area hastily. one oneng tank tried to outrun our guas and overran a Medioal Detachment pool as it rounded a corner. The tank was stopped later. By 1640, all memy resistance was ovoroomob atotal of four ancay tank and two personnel oarriers was dentroyed - all hy fire from the attackel Tple. exoopt for the one tank knoaked out by an "A" Co AI grn.

The dotail of the Roconnaissanoe Platoon, the Adjutant, and Battalitul Serycando Major, which had beon sent out the day before to oraouate prif somers. foturach. ymey had beon through Arranches, oontaoted the 53rd Armd Inf Bn, were out off, coul cist find the battalion and started baok thila morning. On the way, the group; comaistias of two officers and twenty-one men, oapturod more than two hunered omeng, oemprising the remants of the Gorman 896th Fiold drtillery Battalion, in a atrongepoint at Tiropied. Three soldiers from the 3rd drmored Division, in the hands of the Germane. were reoaptured, alons with tifteon German prisoners, by Co "A" and co "B" curing the day. There wore a few known enemy dead.

At 1700, three German planes flew overhead very alose to the ground but did not attack. The battalion loft at 1930 to nove to Ducoy to join the Reeerve Ocemand. Upon arrival at 2330, the hoad of the colum halted at the town, pulled off to the side of the road, and waited further orders.

During the night of 2 August, there was a great deal of anemy air aetivity a short distance away. Planes were attacking another column, and the sky was lit up with flares and tracers. At 0230, the column moved into bivouac areas off the roap while waiting for further orders. Early the next morning the battalion mor od out, with Co "C" in the lead. The march was thirty-two miles from Duooy to an asembly area just south of St Aubin-d'dubigne, arriving at 1400. The population al ong the way lined the streets, oheared, and passed out bottles of wine and cognac to the vohioles.

On 3 August 1944, the battalion reverted to CC"B", whioh was given the mission of blocking the $\operatorname{rrittany}$ Poninsula. The colum moved along and was supposed to be divided into three task forces to take and defend the towns of Derval, St Vinoeraty, and Chateaubriant. The colum moved through St Germain, Vignoc, Bedec, and reached Phelan-le-Grand at 1430, where a road block was encountered. .Co "C", whioh was at the head of the colum, reduced the bl ock, and a small group of conemy armed with machine guns. We passed through Guer at 1700 , after meeting resistance there, too. Evidently the enemy was attempting to delay our advance by establishimg small strongpoints at each town alogg the route. We passed through Car eatoir at 1825. dlong the route, warning came back al ong the oolum by radio to beware of mines along the shoulders of the road. The battalion reached Derval by midnight. There was a ohange in orcuers at first but the ordors wore ohanged again to the originallyplanned three task force set-up.

On Friday, 4 August 1944, a task force consisting of Co "B" and other units, undor Major Alanis established a strong-point at Derval amid the exoited populace, whioh suddenly beoame aware of its freedom as this unit oame upon them in the middle of the morning. Church bells began to ring, as they had done all aloang the 81 -mile march to this destination, and the people had to be quieted down. 00 "A", as part of another task force, was supposed to drop out al ong the way at st Vincent

but sot lost and continued on to Chateaubriant, with the task force consisting of $\mathrm{Hq} . \mathrm{Hq} \mathrm{Co}$ and Co "C", under the command of Lt Col Maybach. There was a great deal of confusion in Chateaubriant as it grew light. The 696th Armd FA Bn was also in town. But eventually things were straightened out, and units went to their correct qssembly areas. Hq \& Ho Co remained in Chateaubriant, looking for the remainder of the task force, whicn was south of town. Before getting out, the maintenance section of Hq Co shot up four enemy ammunition trucks which were coming into the to wn at first light and blew them up. Finally, the Hq section rejoined the remainder of the force on a ridge south of the town. The men dug in and prepared to meet enemy coming from the front and rear. It was believed that enemy troops would be moving south from Rennes, which had been taken, and would thus fall into the hands of the column at one of the three points. During the morning, a fow enemy vehicles and personnel started to come along the roads which were well covered by our men, and they were fired upon. Prisoners and enemy wounded vere coming in, and various elements were in contact with enemy forces. At approximately 1300, an order came for the unit to move out at once and to assemble for a new mission. The other two task forces remained in position, but the one at Chateaubriant had to break contact and pulled out at 1345 and went into an assembly area one mile southwest of LeJarrier, where it remai ned overnight. Co." $A^{\prime \prime}$ still remained at St Vincent with the 8th Tank Pattalion, and Co "B" remained at Derval. The total number of prisoners captured today and yesterday was 72 .

On 5 August 1944, the entire battalion moved in the morning to reas semble in the vicinity of Redon and to secure crossings of the river there. Bn Hq. Hq Co and Co "C" moved at 0825 through Derval, Guemene-Penfao, and went into an assembly area in the vicinity of Messac. Co "A" and Co "B" rejoined the battalion there. There was a change in mission at 2200, and word was received that $C C^{\prime \prime} B^{\prime \prime}$, of whi oh this battalion was a part, was to move west into the Brest Poninsula and to seife and secure the city of Lorient. The battalion remained in assembly overnight and prepared for a long march.

On 6 August 1944, Co- "C" lead $C C^{\prime \prime} B$ " and moved out at 0445. The route was le Grand Fougeray, Messac, Carentoir, Malestroit, St Jean-Brevelay, and Baud. The battalion and other companies bivouacked in the vicinity of Baud, while 0o "C" went through the town and outposted the other side of it. Word was received that the commander of the garris on at Lorient was willing to surrender and that arrangee ments were being made with him. There was:no contact with enemy troops during the day.

On Monday, 7 August 1944, the battalion pulled out at 0600. The colume passed through Plouay, Arzano, and Pont-Scorff. Coi"C" met heavy onemy resiatanoe in moving toward Queven and was ar dered to secure and hold the high ground overl ooking Loriant and establish outposts. Co "B" and Co "C"moved out on foot to take up their positions one mile southeast of Queven.

Co "A" moved into an assambly area south of Pont-Scorff as looal protection for $C C^{\prime \prime} B^{\prime \prime}$. And shortly after moving into position, the entire field in whioh CC"B ${ }^{(1}$ and Co " $A$ " were assembled was subjeoted to a terrific shelling by mortars. and artillery from the east before they had a ohanee to digin. Evidently, there was an OP overlookin; the field because the fire was well directed. The barrage killed seven, one of whom was the company cammander, wounded 31 , and destroyed four halftraoks and two peeps. Finally, the $O P$ and some of the onemy guns were lenocked out. The company was completely disorganized, and the men had spread out in all dir cotions.


The two remaining officers, attempted to reorganize the company in a field on the southern age of town. The only part of the company left intact was the list platoon, which remained behind as rear guard for the combat commend. The men from Co "A" were badly shaken up after their fierce shelling.

Co "A" moved in behind the battalion CP, which was located one mile north of Queven, for the night. $C 0$ "B" and $C 0$ " 6 "; on the line, were receiving heavy shell fire and light small arms fire. Enemy patrols, were active in the area. While dig sing in on the ridge, 00 " $B^{\prime \prime}$ watched two large' German patrols pass by on the road to their front, but the German did not notice them.

There wore estimates of large forces of enemy troops in and around lorient. and evidently the Germans were prepared to hold out. They were firing heavy arillory, belifered to be sane coastal batteries, and continued to keep the entire area under shall fire. 111 personnel of Hq and Hq CO, except for a few to remain at the vehicles, wore al erted to move on foot and occupy a position on the line that night, but it was later deoided to remain there for the night.

A patrol from the lit platoon of Co "C" was sent out at night to establish an outpost further to the front, where more of the terrain could be observed. Contact with them was lost. Hq Co lost two $M-8$ assault guns from shell fire.

On 8 august 1944, the CP personnel, minus the Adjutant and a group of men to furnish personnel for the radios and the defense of the area, moved up at 0700 to take up a position between $C o{ }^{\prime \prime} B^{\prime \prime}$ and $C O^{\prime \prime} C$ " on the line as forward CP. Co "A" remained in the rear as the battalion reserve.

A report was received that the $C^{\circ} 0^{\prime \prime} C^{\prime \prime}$ patrol had contacted Co "B" and had set up defensive positions near $C 0$ " $B$ ". All front-line elements continued to receive heavy shell fire during the day.

Several patrols were sent out by $C o$ " $B$ " to attempt to locate enemy gun emplacemeats. One of them ran into a three man German patrol and killed all three.

On 9 August 1944, the day was filled with the same type of activity; remaining in position under shell fire and patrolling to the front. A group of FFI men joined the battalion at the front. Orders were received to take the camouflage nets off after dark and to be ready to move early the next morning to positions northeast of pont-Scorff. A total of 14 prisoners was taken.

On 10 August 1944, in the early morning, under over of darkness, the battalion moved back beginning at approximately 0200. The battalion CP moved into an. area $3 / 4$ mile northeast of pont-Scorff, with outposts ahead of the road. There as intermittent shelling, but things quieted down, and aside from normal patrolling by the line companies, things were quiet.

On 11 August 1944, the day was rather quiet. The men contr hued to clean up and to take care of their weapons and equipment. Our mission was to contain the troops in the vicinity of Lorient for the present. The and and 3rd platoons of Co "A" were on outpost, and the list platoon was used as a roving patrol between them. Word was received that one of the outposts was being attacked by thirty Germans, and the remainder of the and platoon was sent up to investigate, but it was only nine men who were walking up on the outpost without seeing it. A machine e

gunner had his gum trailed on them and a man from behind fired his rifle, warning the Germans and they got away. The other companies also sent out patrols. All patrols were on a planned schedule so that activity was constant in patrolling, from our front lines to the vicinity of queven. At 1845, friendly planes dropped propaganda leaflets on the enemy, but some dropped in the vicinity of the battalion CP. Twenty-thr ee replacements were received.

On 12 August 1944, a Co " $B^{n}$ patrol was out all night on patrol, and returned at 0600. A Co "A" patrol, which went out next, was cut off by the enemy and had to fight its way back. Lt plumley, in conmand, employed marching fire, and returned through the enemy with a minimum of casualties incurred. Evidently, both enemy and friendly forces ware content to hold what they had, and most of the activity onsisted of patrolling. Co "C's" patrol, sent out. in the early afternoon, contacted the enemy, too, and returned at 1830. Casualties were twenty-three, and thirteen prisoners were captured.

On i3 August 1944, the onemy shelled Co "C's" area all during the carly morning. Patrols encountered no enemy resistance. It was a very quiet day. There was only one casualty, but three prisoners were captured.

On 14 August 1944, word was recived early in the morning that the entire division was to be relieved by the 6th Armd Div, which was on its way down from the Brest area. The day was spent in preparing for the move. A quartering party from the 44th Armd Inf Bn arrived about noon. They relieved our units by placing the equivalent of theirs in the same position. They also took over the telephone communication system, which consisted of a total of twenty-eight miles of wire, laid by our commanication section.

The ordar for the relief stated that the 4th Armd Div was relieved from assignmont to VIIICCorps and reverted to Third Army in the vicinity of St Calais. As the organizati ons of the battalion were reli eved, they moved towards assembly areas in the vioinity of Baud. The entire battalion weat into bivouac in an area five miles east of Bauc.

On Tues day, 15 August 1944, the battalion closed into the area by early morning. En Hq loft the bivouac area at 1007 at the head of the main body of CC"B". Co "B" was in the advance quard. The towns passed through en route weres Locmine 1045, Bighan 1102, st Joan Brevelay 1118, Plumelec 1137, Serent 1206, Kalestroit 1342, Ruffiac 1351, La Gaoilly 1411, Sixt 1418, Pipriac 1448, Guipry 1502, Liossac 1509, Bain de Bretagne 1523, Teillay 1603, Chateaubriant 1640, Soudan 1658, Pouance 1719, Vergomes 1735. The colum halted at 1830 for two hours for supper, gassing of vahiol as, and rest. The oolumi started moving again at 2030. The route was Segre 2050 and Andigne 2123. The Sarthe Fiver could not be orossed, an originally planned, at Chateauneuf-sur-Sarthe, and the column swung north and arossed at sable, at approximately midnight.

On 16 August 1944, the colum comtinued to move through Villaines-iur-Malicorme, after a long halt near Sable bocause of a mix-up in the oolvm. Some units had takon the wrong road as a result of the ohonge in route. Vorron was passed through at 0805, Lapleohe at 0818, Clermont-areans at 0830, Pringe at 0851, Luche at 0925, 1e Lude at 2003, Chateau-la-Valliere at 1053, Beaunont-la-Ronce at 1213, and ChateauRenault at 1325. The battalion mored into assembly area at Villethiou at 1400. All units worre bivouacked near a small strcam, and the men had an opportumity to rest and olean up. Everybody was tired. The march had beon approximately 230 miles.


On 17 August 1944, (ine battalion was prepared to move on call, but there were no definite orders for the futurs, and the men had the opportunity to take oare of their personal things. Small suards were maintained, and there was a great deal of opportinity for rest. sixty-seven replacements. were reooived.

On 18 and 19 Aupust 1944, the battalion romained in the same area.
On 20 Aucust 1944, the battalion remained in the same area. Orders were recoived to be prepared to move out the next day.

On 21 August 1944, the battalion started to move as. part of $C C^{n} B^{n}$. Co " $A^{\prime \prime}$ was in the advance guard and left at 0730. The route of maroh was Vendome at 0845, Coulommi ers at 0905, Ouoques at 1003, St Leonard at 1030, La Columbe at 1110, Minas at 1213 , Ouzouer-le-Marohe at 1225, Charsonville at 1405, Saran at 1703, Trainou at 2010, Sully at 2025, Ingranne at 2034, Nibella at 2056, Boisoonm at 2110, Juranville at 2150 , and Lorcy at 2330. The battalion pulled into bivouac one half mile northeast of Lorcy at 2350. The distance of march was ninety-ai ght miles, ant no resistance was met.

On 22 Aurust 1944, Co "A" was the advance guard for CC"B". The oompany was supported by a platoon of TD's, the assault gun and mortar platoons. The column's mission was to oross the Loing River at Souppes and to come down and take the town of Montargis. The route was: Sceaux at 1205, Chateau-Landon at 1308, Souppes at 13.30, Fonteneilles at 1336, Chaintreaux at 1358, Egreville at 1421, Jorey at 1515, and Ervauville at 1615. At this point, the column split and the $\mathfrak{5}$ st, with the 179 亡h $F A \mathrm{Bn}$, a 155 howitzer battalion, Battery " $A$ " of the 22 nd FA Bn , and a platoon of TD's, Enrineers, and Cavalry, attached, moved toward Montargis. The column passed throurh Merinville at 1635 and La Selle-sur-LeBied at l730. Coming through the Forest of Montargis, Co "A", as advance guard, was fired on ne ar Paucourt. All elements pulled off the road. Co "B" was sent to support Co "A". The situation seemed dangerous because the battalion was deep in a forest. There was some heavy finhting during the eroning. Our artillery and the mortar platoon laid down a heavy barrage on the enemy. The column had travelled a total of forty-two miles for the day. Seventy-five replacements were received, including one officer. Twentyeight prisoners were taken. Co "A" and Co "B" maneuvered into position to be prepared to attack in the morning.

On Wednesday, 23 August 1944, in the morning, el ements of Co "B" oleaned out some houses in town, and Co "A" sent a patrol through the town. Prisoners oaptured were from the 338 th Infantry Division, the 757 th and 758 th Gr enadior Regiments and the 338 th Artillery Regiment. Prisoners stated that they had marohod 150 kilometers to reach the area. The column started moving at 1530 , as soon as it had been determined that the town was clear. While on the road, word was received over the radio that Paris had fallen. Dead Germans were strewn all over the town of Paucourt. The column moved on to the vicinity of Montargis. Word was received that the 35th Infantry Division had entered the town from the other side and was now holding it. The enemy was withdrawing to the east and southeast. The battalion bivouacked north of Montargis and the battalion CP was estallished in the Montargis Stadium. A total of 250 prisoners were taken. Most of them were captured in the forest of Montargis by a platoon of Co "C", which was rear guard for the column. They were - assisted by the tanks. A great many enemy were killed, too. Orders were received for the battalion to be ready to move the next day.

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On 24 august 1944, ( 0900 , the 51 st and its attache ints moved out with a missior of tiking Ferrieres, cleaning up the town and continuing on to Bazoches. The 177 th FA Gp , with the 253 rd FA Bn , joined the column, and the 179 th and $\mathrm{A} / 22$ were put under the group. Bn Hq left at 0930, passed through Paucourt at 0953, Griselles at 1030, and halted on the road outside of Ferrieres, where some enemy resistance wa met and overcame by Co "B". At 1300, the column continued on, moving throuzh Zignon at 1350. Bazoches-sur-leBetz was entered at 1418 without mesting any resistance. The 51 st, minus co "A", $A / 704$, minus a platoon, and the 253rd minus a battery, remained in Bazoches. A task force consisting of Co "A", a ulatoon of A/704, and a battery of the 253 rd moved to take and hold Cheroy. The ciery had withdrawn without fighting, and there was no encounter as this task force entered the town. The two towns were outposted for the night. No casualties were suffered. Twenty-seven prisoners were taken that day.

At 0824, on 25 Au ust 1944, the battalion and attached units moved to take the town of St Florentin. Co " Cl " was detached to join a task force with the 8th Tank Battalion. The route of the Battalion was through Jouy at 0835, Cheroy at 0915 , where the separate task forces merged, St Valerion at 0938, Sens at 1030, Maloy la-Petit at 1110, Le Petit-Villiers at 1130, and Vaumont at 1145. At that point, it was learned that St alorentin had already been taken, and the new objective was Auxon. The colum started movin a a ain at l230, passing through Cerisiere at 1235 , Arces at 1338 , Tachy at 1342 , Champlost at 142 , Sonmery at 1457 , and EauxPuiseaux at 1742. The column al os in bivouac area on the east e:dge of the town at 1745. Another cutum had alread. taken Auxon. Co "C" rode up on the tanks in their column. The batcalion went into position around the town of Eaux-Puis eaux, and $c 0$ " $A$ " and $C 0$ " 2 " outposted the town. 00 " $C$ " remained with the 8 th Tank Bn , east of Auxon. The battalion ing in and awaited orders.

During the early morninc; of 26 August 1944, a German transport crashed in the vicinity. The 3 rd platoon of co " $\mathrm{g}^{n}$ was sent out to establish an outpost south of Auxon. An ur ent call was received at CC"B" that a Cavalry froup screening to the south was being attacked. A task force was quickly gottion together from the tanks, Co " C ", and includin" the 3rd olatoon of Co " B ", and went to their aid.

At 1000, 27 Allust 1947, the task force returned from Cerisey, reporting that the enemy $h$ d fallen back by the time they arrived. It was generally a quiet day. The battalion was prepared to move at a moment's notice, but there were still no definite orders.

Cn 28 Aucust 194t, the battalion moved out as part of CC"B" at 1220. Co "C" was still attached to the 8th 2ank Battalion. Our objective was Piney. The route was throuh iuxon at 1242, Chamoy at 1252, Le Cheminot at 1300, Villery at 1307, Sovilly at 1315, Shevilelle at 1330 , St crmain at 1335 , St Andre at l363, Troyes fron 13.1 to 1409 , where we crossed the Seine River, Crenery at 1418, Belle-Epine at 1441, and Piner at lol2. Te meved into bivouac south of Piney at 1545. The march was uneventful, but destroyed ierman vehicles were strewn all along the
ros. $J 0$ " 5 " concinued to ride on the tanks and red. so conginued to ride on the tanks and noved into an assembly area Test or fingy. Intolli ence information revealed great numbers of enemy in the vicinity. co "A" me Co "-" established stron? outposts around the town. There were no engarnents rith the remy.

On 20 nu ust in. the cntire battalion was awakened at 0500 in case of an eneny attack, but nothin jeveloped. It was reported that the 15 th Panzer Division was movin towards as in two colums. Do "C" reverted to battalion control and
was placed on outpost
establish a line with the rifle companies men at the sattelion CP were duff ir to attack was off. The liaison planes and otheridently, the pressure of an enemy enemy in the immediate vicinity. and other sources of information reported $r$. On 30 August 1944 ,
mont. Our mission was to cleartalion was awakened at 0500 in preparation for move c pulled out at 0700 and arrived out the lara woods to the south of Piney. En Eq assembly. The line companies dismounted, and after, where the battalion went into reported there. They met no fort to drive out an on artillery barrage on the and moved through the Frost opposition. By 1020, the terce of shout six-hundred be seen tremendous umps for diorient in column. On b the sidon was reassembled Germans themselves, and the day and ammunition. $S$ me had been of the road could of Co "B", had set off same of before, the mainers, accomean destroyed by the The column passed through Ven the fuel. Still a great deal of it by the 3 rd platoon Brienne-ia-Vieille at 1928 endeuvre at 1817, Arance at 1848 , of it was untouched. le-Chatour at 1940. Distant, and pulled into bivouac ares two Dieaville at l915, that the enemy might attempt of the march was twenty -nine miles south of arlenethe tracks were mined. lowing towns: La Roth ere at 0805, Petit-lion out at 0800 and passed through the folChaise at 0854, Soulaines at 0916, Tremillyesnil at Oil, Chaumesnil at 081e, La 1000, Villieres-aux-Chenes at 1038, Dreamily at 0930, Null at 0935, Elumerly at halted. The column was, Mathons at 1410, Nomele-Chateau at 1127, Charms-on-1'Angle all bridges were out in supposed to cross the larne River, where the column a crossing while the engine vicinity of Chatonrupt. Co ni but it was reported that outposted that town and miners repaired the bridge. Co "A" went ahead and secured The remainder of the ba the towns of Averanville ard Villi moved to ifarneax and an assembly area just notion halted along the road until es, with a platoon each. crossed the route of thertheast of Sommancourt. At this point 1745, when it went into twenty-one prisoners were $5 l s t$ in the last war. There were point, the battalion timon waiting for the were captured along the way. The were no casualties, but bridge to be built.

For the Battalion Commander;

4 Incls:
Incl \#\# 1 - Memo re: Loss of S-2 Journals
Incl \# 2 - Memo re: Loss of S-3 Journals
Incl \# 3-5-3 Journal, 23 Aug 1944 to
Incl \# 4 - Work Sheet Journals 23 to 31 Aug 1944
Incl \# 4 - Work Sheet Journal, 19 Aug 1944 to 31 Aug 1944


# HEADQUARTER U FIFTY FIRST ARMORED INFANTRY BAAIALION APC 254, U. S. Army 

25 October 1944

To
1 Commanding General, 4th Armored Division, APO 254, U. S. Army.

The S-2 Journal prior to 19 August 1944 was destroyed and is not submitted for that period of operations.

For the Battalion Commander;


1 Commanding General, fth Armored Division, APC 254, ir. S. Army. able for the period until 23 August destroyed in actual combat and is not avail-
2. Message file was incomplete, and messares remairin
information for this phase of operations, there renin save no additional

For the Battalion Commander:

INCL $\boldsymbol{H}_{2}$


SUEJEOT: S-3 journal o: Operations, from 23 August 1944 to 31 August 1944.
TO : Commanding, General, 4th Armored Division, APO 254, U. S. Army.
23 Adust Nission-Accomplished-ifontargis cleared of enemy. Bivouac 2


24 Aucusts $\because$ roved out at 2015 contacted 320 th Inf at Montargis 1050. Moving N.E. on new mission. Objective Cheroy. In assembly area at Bayachis located G4759.

25 August; ".ovid out and crossed IP at 0900 moving Florentine. Orders changed at check point (13) to move to Auxin. Bivouac at Eaux-Puiseaux Yl3642.

26 Adjust, En reported St Carisey. Task Force of Inf \& Art to clear Carisey rept clear. Task Force returns to Y140545.

27 Augusts Remained in bivouac at Eaux-Puiseaux of waiting orders.
28 Aurist, 1235 Left Bivouac Eaux-Puiseaux Y136542 1:100,000 Auxerre Map. at l235. Arrived assembly area South of Piney Y483787 Maps Troyes 1; 50,000 at 16.30. Remained here until. 073030 August 1944.

22 August, Remained in bivouac awaiting further orders. S. Piney Y483787 Maps Troyes 1:50,000.

30 Aurist, Moved South toward Geroudot-0730 from Bivouac Piney Y483787 Nap; Troyes 1,50,000. Fission of 51 st AI $B n_{8}$ Clear area and forest East of line Pinej-Lusigny. Then move E. from Brienne with CC"P". At 0830 moved into assemSly area $1 / 2 \mathrm{Lm}$ Si l of Geroudot 9475734 Map Troves $1: 50,000$. En fired upon in woods 1 Km S. of Assembly Area by artillery. Left assembly Area 1630. Proceded $1 \mathrm{l} / 2 \mathrm{Km} \mathrm{S}$. of Piney turned S.E. toward Vendevere. Arrived bivouac area 1900 Y 54578.13 km S.E. Brienne-la-Vielle. No enemy activity.

31 Augusts Left bivouac ar ea 0800 crossed IP Y675785 0830. No enemy activity. 15 minute halt Y Y ? 0781 Maps $13 \mathrm{G} 18100,000$ ( 1000 B ) Bridge blown at river crossing moved into bivouac area 2013937 Sheet $13 G$ awaiting further orders.



28 October 1944
SUBJECT: After Action Report.
TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (through channels)
In compliance with AR 345-105, Change 3, the following after-action
report is submitted for the month of September, 1944.
Friday 1 September 1944.
Company "B" load the Battalion across the Marne; moving from its assembly area at 0315. The order of march for the Battalion was Company "B ${ }^{n}{ }^{n} A,{ }^{n}{ }^{n}{ }^{n} \mathbf{N Q},{ }^{n}{ }^{n} \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{n}$ The route was Chatonrupt 0715, Autigny le Grand 0845, Autigny le Petit 0847, Carol 0852, LeVal D'Onse 0902, Effincourt 0932, Pancey 1005, Echenay 1036, Gillaime 1110, Cirfontaines 1200, Chasse 1214, Lumeville-en-Ornois 1220, Horville 1232, Gondrecourt 1246, Gerauvilliers 1326, Badonvilliers 1427, Epiez-sur-Kouse 1504, Burey-envaux 1517, Meuse River 1535, Sopvigny 1545, bivouac area north of Sepvigny on the high ground (507976).

Little enemy resistance was encountered en route. at Chassey an enemy colum was intercepted coming into town from the southwest. They immediately retreated on the main road going eastrirom Chassey. A platoon from Company "B," plus the assault gun platoon, gave chase and succeeded in capturing twelve prisoners bee fore the enemy escaped into the Boas d' Horville. These prisoners were part of an onginear-labor unit moving up from the south of France, and they ware inter costed only in flight, not fight.

Our Reconnaissance elements reported seeing Germans on bicycles fleeing to the east at the point where the Battalion crossed the Mouse.

Upon arrival in the bivouac area, the Battalion took up a defensive position with companies " $A$ " and " $B$ " abreast, " $B$ " on the right, prepared to defend against any attack from the east. One platoon from "A" outposted the Battalion position at Uruffe. One platoon from " $\mathrm{B}^{\prime \prime}$ had the same mission at Pagny-la-Blamehe-Cote.

Period 2-9 September 1944.
The Battalion remained in this location during this period. It was felt that we had "run away" from our supplies, as we could not obtain gasoline. Some gasollie was flown in by C-47's. Other than nightly aerial action, enemy contact during this time was non-existent. On September 9 th, the Battalion received a warning order preparatory to movement.

Sunday 10 September 1944.
Company "C" rejoined the Battalion at 1500. The Battalion was alerted for movement that afternoon. A change in orders required movement the following morning. Another change stated movement would be at 1900, and shortly thereafter $s$ till another order to move the next morning. Finally orders were received after 1900 to move at 1900. The movement started at 2000, with Company "B" acting as advance guard for the Battalion. The normal attachment was made of a platoon of
 march was Sepvirny, Champousny, Pagny-la3lanche-cote, Traveron, Sauvigny, Runes, Punerot, Autreville, Harmonville, Saulxerotte, and Favieres, which was the location of the column at midnight. No contact with the enemy.

Monday 11 September 1944.
The column continued to move through the early morning hours, along the route ratticny, Mont-Curel, Thorey, Chaouilley, Praye-sous-Vaudemont, Xirocourt, Vaudeville, Boise. The Battalion moved into an assembly area (894834) at 0645. The bridge over the Moselle at Eainville was blown. Companies "A" and "C" roved forward to establish a bridgehead. The boundary between companies was the east bound road at Banville. Their mission was to seize the high ground across the river while the engineers repaired the bridge. Company " $C$ " on the left of the road, fired to the east bank of the Moselle, where it came under extremely heavy mortar and small arms fire. There was no opportunity to maneuver owing to the course of the river. It's leading elements were driven back into BanFile. Company "A", which had originally planned to use assault boats, found a ford and moved to the center of the river valley. There it halted and attempted to establish contact with "C" so that the advance could be resumed. Contact was impossible as "C" had withdrawn to Bainville. The Battalion pomander decided to cross Company "B" behind "A" and then have Company "A" slip to the left across the company boundary. This would then place " $A^{\prime \prime}$ and " 3 " abreast, with " $B$ " on the right.

This movement was practically completed before dark, under sporadic mortar and small arms fire. These two Companies remained in position all night. Company "C," which had suffered thirty-five casualties, was placed in reserve. A total of nine prisoners had been taken, and a patrol from Company "B" had found five enemy dead, indicating they had suffered rather heavily. The prisoners were from the lath Panzer Grenadier Division and stated they had just arrived from Italy.

Tues day 12 September 1944.
Meanwhile, the north column of Combat Command "B" had effected a crossing at Rayon, to the north. The Combat Command plan now called for the south column to move to the north and cross at Mayon. Accordingly, the Battalion, plus attachments moved north at 1450 along the route Lebeuville, Lemenil-Mitry, Roville, and crossed the Moselle River at Bayon. An assembly area was occupied in the infinity of rillacourt. One platoon ir om "B" was placed on outpost duty at proville. The Battalion remained in this assembly area for the night. Enemy and friend artillery was active throughout the nirht.

Fednes lay 13 Seytoman 9 24.
 This - ore started at 1355 , and the route of march was Froville, Birvaux, Landcourt, Lent:, 'ont. The bridge at Mont was out, but there was a ford which the tanks could use.

A plat ion fro: " ": 2 many was sent to Luneville to investigate the bridge at the point. Ting plat or met resistance in the form of dismounted men, mortar, and small arms fire. it the approach of the platoon, the enemy withdrew back across the bride and then set off prepared demolitions on the brides.

Meanwhile, the remainder of the Baton ion moved into an assembly area on the south ban: of the keurthe near hon tax
man company mounted on there, forded the
 ad seer potured, and tro Thursday 14 September 1944.

During the early mornins hours, the ene neers connleted an excellent pontoon bridre on which the columr crossed at 0730. Sompany "A" moved forvard to the North edge of the Foret de Vitrimont. The renaired of the Eattalion moved into an assembly area ir the Foret devitrinont. The hig' arourt north and northesst of vitrimontwas the next objective of the Battalion. Two platoors of tanks and two plavuons of "B" Company were given the right helf of the objective. One platoon of tanks and "A" Company were firen tre left (west) half of the objective. A platoon of tank destroyers was attached to each attacking company. "3" Company's attack jumped off at 1530 , ereceded ty a strong fifteen-minute artillery preparation on the woods east of the objective. The artillery concentration was designed to drive out en: enemy osoupying these woods, as it was felt that this position was the mst dargerous in our path. As the mounted attack progressed across the intervening ground, it came under anti-tank fire from these woods.

This fire caused immediate loss of one tank an: the eventual loss oi two more, "S" Company suffered one casualty. mine tanks halted, as planned, jist, short of the crest. "B" Company dismonted, crossed the crest, and dio in. Civilian reports irdicated the enemy had withdrawn in rreat haste as tho attack progressed towards them. According to plen, Sompany "A" jumped off at this point and proceeded to its objectire without any diraiculty. The eneny antitank weapons had been engaged and driven off $\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{j}}$ our tank destroyers. Comery "C's" mission was to protect the Ba;talions' right flank from our okjective back to the Meurthe. This necessitated a rreat deal of "strinein; nיt" but the mission mas accomnlished.

The platoon from "B" Company at Luneville was returned to the Corapany prior to darkness. The remainder of the colum erouped in behind the defensive positions of " 5 " ard " $C$ " companies and remained there for the nisht.

Friday 15 September 1944.
The column now received the mission of movinc to Serres. Company "A" moved out at 9800 , $u \downarrow \perp$ owed by the tank comrany and a battery of the 253 d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. Before the reaainder of the column could move onto the road, Company " $A$ " come under mortar, urtillery, and machine-gun fire from the woods southeast of Maixe and from the high ground northe st of Einville. Company "A" dismounted and sent one platoon to the woods, meanwhile moving two platoons around to the southwest of Maixe. Cannany "E" was ordered forward to reinforce " $\boldsymbol{A}^{\prime \prime}$ Company's right. "g" Company moved into the woode, which was the " $A^{\text {" }}$ company's platoons objective. The Sattalion now held the high ground south of Maixe. Meanwhile, the other colum of sombat Comand " $\mathrm{E}^{\prime \prime}$ had crossed the Marie Canal west of our nosition and was prepared to swing to the east and drive off the enemy holdin us up. Twentrmour prisoners had been oaptured during the day and the Battalion had three casualties.

Saturday 16 September 1944.
A task force from the west column moved to positions across the canal from the Battalion and secured the high ground comanding biaixe. "d" Company forded the canal and held this high ground, relieving the task force. Cur ongineers laid two sections of treadway and it was now dossible for the Battalion and the remainder of the colum began

4

 advance guard composition, plus a plation of tank destroyers, and the assault guns was proviag the iest possible combination for speedy derloyment and em-
pioyment.

The Battalion roved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Serres. foeville to the north was held by the onemy and formations could he observed exitir. from the town to the northeast. $1 l l$ of our column's lonc-range, direct and indireot weapons were engaged in hastering his exit. A platoon fram " $A$ " Campany moved forward that night to clean out Hoeville. This platoon occupied the town, captured three onemy field pieces, two vehicles, and seven prisoners.

The remainder of the colum remained in the vicinity of Serres for the night.

## Suaday 17 Sopt amber 1944.

Using the normal column camposition, with ${ }^{n}{ }^{\prime \prime}$ Company leading, preceded by a platoon of Cavalry, the Battalion moved out at 0730. The head of the columa passed through Hoeville and enter od the town of Sorneville. The Cavalry had passed through one half hour prior to the head of the colurn. Owing to poor visibility, however, there had been a failure to discover an enemy 20-MA gun in position in town. This gun opened fire on the leadirg vehicles of " $B^{n}$ Company. "The leading elements dismounted and drove this gun off. Several of our vehicles were damaged but not inoperative. The civilians in this town started to give our troops information about the location of vermans, with the result that soon a house-to-house search was beine conducted. Twentysix prisoners were captured, and in many houses, German uniforms were found. 4. Proglish-speaking civilian reported that a battalion of enemy paratroopers had left the town the night before in civilian clothes. . When the town had been thoroughly scarched, the column started to move uut apain at about 1330. Progress was made through moncel-sur-Seille and then east towards Chambrey. The cavalry reported a road block at the road junction one half mile south of Chambrey. As the 25th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron investigated. the block, the head of the column closed in to about four hundred yards of the Cavalry's rear. The force defending the road blook opened fire on the Cavalry, causing one vehicle and one personnel casualty. The Cavalry withdrew, and the head of the column prepared to attack. A preparatory artillery barrage was placed on the "enemy" position, and a platoon from "B" company prepared to move forward on foot and seize the high ground commanding the road block.

Word was received from higher headquarters to be on the look-out for friendly troops in this vicinity. The platoon from " 3 " Company cintacted the opposing force, and it was learned that they were friendly troops fram Combat Command "A" The column was ordered to bivouac in place for the night.
Monday 18 September 1944.
The column received orders to move to Fresnes-en-Saulnois, via ChateauSalins.

The last friendly outpost was passed at the cross-road two miles south of Chateau-Salins. They did not know if Chateau-Salins was occupied. Shortly after passing the outpost, the Cavalry reported road blocks on the edge of Chateau-Salins, and then artillery fire was received from the high pround east of the town. The onemy guns were locataderat takentunder fire by our advance
 a bridgehead around the road bld
Company junped off at 1430 from igineors could reduce then. " $\mathrm{B}^{n}$ outh of town. A fiftern minute artillery preparation preceded their departure. The attack drove in the onemy's outoost line, and the oompany moved to a position abreast of the road blook. Here the ocmpan: haltod and oommoniad difging in. Bnomy artillery and mortar firo, at this time, beoane very heavy and then ubsided. "B" Company was then ordered to move into town. Darlaess had fallon when this move started, making control very diffioult in this strange terrain. The Company moved to the road junction at the cath odge of town bofore onoountering any resistance. Hore agreat deal of remote-ocontrolled explosives were apparently set off, oausing considerable confusion among the mon. It was oonsidered inadvisable to try to enter the town, 0 the company was withdrawn to its dug in positions. Hore it was ordered baok to the vehicular assembly area so that heary artillary could be placed on the town. This was acoomplished.

## Tuesday 19 Sept amber 1944.

Combat Command "3" issued orders to withdraw from the town and then changed ther to have the Battalion attack the town. The attack plan called for "A" and "C" Company to move on the town, using the north-south road as the axis of ade vance and boundary tetween companies. Company "P" 35 th Tank Battalion would supvort the attaci. The attack started at 0730, but the enemy had ocoupied the line of departure durin the night, and a platoon from "B" Company drore them off, allowin. the uvぃulk to move forward. "C" Company, on the irght, was moving across open terrain anci was pinned down on several occasionse "A" Company's terrain lent itself to lottor use, and they were able to progress without a great deal of difficulty, to the southern odge of town. Here the attack halted, while consijerable artillery. fire was brought to bear on the town. At 1330, the attaok contilued, and " $A$ " Company moved through the town working very closely and well with the tanks. The onemy withdrew to prepared positions in the arricultural college on the northeast edge of town. "C" Company had moved to positions abreast of the center of town and east of it. "B" Company was brought into town, and a perimeter defense of the town was established by nifhtfall, These positions were held throughout the night. The Battalion had thirty-three casualties and had taken thirteen prisoners. The prisoners claimed that they had been forced to fight by SS Troops. Sporadic enemy artillery, mortar and small arms fire fell throughout the night.

Wednesday 20 Sentember 1944.
The mortar platoon was brought into town during the morning. Mortar fire was placed on enemy positions in the vicinity of the school. Heavy artillery c.oncentrations were also placed on the school and the woods adjacent thereto. The eifect of the crtillery sire was greatest in the wooded area, where halfnaked Germans could be seen running madly about. The enemy could not be dislodeed from the school, and late in the afternoon Combat command "B" ordered our colurn to proceed to Pr esnes-enSaulnois. The original route given was decided afainst because it was under enemy observation and fire. The column took the followinw route: Moncel-sur-Seille, Fettoncourt, Gremecey, Fresnes-on-Saulnois. "A" Companv, plus a platoon of tanks, covered the withdrawal from Chateau-Salirs. The enemy shelled the town and road as "A" Company withdrew.

The head of the column reached Fresnes at 2100. The Battalion, plus attachments, was given an assembly area just south of the Fresnesmen-SaulnoisJallaucourt road. "B" Company outposted the pagition, with a platoon at Jallau-
"E" Jompany's outpost captured two prisoner. These men were apparently. nart of a strambler unt tryine to made its way back to fermany. Sporadic enemy artillery fell in the Battalion's area. Fwo platcons of "C" Company were moved out to inomorrille-onSauliois and Oriocourt.

Pistay 3: Septamber 1711 .
It was 2 quiet day, except for a rather intense shelling at 0750. Our air was active wenever a slight break in the weather permitted.

Saturday 23 September 1944.
Company "A" moved to a position northeast of town to support the 8th Tank attalion. The Company moved at 1800 and remained there for the night. Enemy artillery.continued to ?all. in the area at frequent intervals. our own artillery was very active with counter-battory.

Sunday 24 Senteminer 1944.
A heavy enerny artillery concentration fell near the Battalion Command Post at 0300. The aid station was hit hard by this fire. Three officers and thirteen aid nen were hit and had to be evacuated. Combat Cormand " $B^{\prime \prime}$ informed us that a relief by the 35 th givision would be effected as soon as possible. The Fattalior was informed that it could move back to the north edge of the forest of Granecy until the relief was made. The Battalion Comander elected to remain in the present location. Tiere had been a total of thirty-three oasualties during the day.

Ionday 25 Sentember 1:44.
Bemy artillery contimed to fall throughout the day. At 2130, the Battalion received orders to move at once to an assembly area south of Hoeville. Previously, the relief was scheduled on a platoon basis, with great deliberation. kow the order stated that the Battalion would move at once. Orders were issued to the company commanders, and preparations were made for the move.

Tues day 25 Seotember 1944.
The Battalion Comander's plan called for an infiltrating movement to the rear by platoons at tenminute intervals. The order of maroh was " $\mathrm{B}^{\prime \prime}$, Headquarters, and He idquarters Company, Nedical Detachment, "C", and " $A$ ". The route of maroh was Gremecer, pettoncourt, Noncel-surSeille, Sorneville and Hoeville. It was an extrenely dark nifht, and driving was very difficulta
" $3^{n}$ Cmnany moved out at 0115, and the remainder of the Rattalion moved as soheduled. The march lasted until dawn, when the colume noved into an assenw bly area botweon !oeville and Serres.

The Battalion had iust closed into the assembly area when it was alerted to relieve two battalions of the 320th Infantry in the vioinity of Arracourt. Criers for this relief required clarification, and it was 1240 before the Battalion moved out in the order of "A," "C," "B," Headquarters and Headquarters Compary. The route of march was Serres, fosinmpipherracourt, where guides


The Battalion was ．

## Arrared Infantry Rat＋n）Ing

 the right．The Battalion Commander tentatively planned to defend with＂A＂and＂C＂ abreast，＂C＂on the right and＂B＂in reserve．It was hoped that the gaps be－ tweon units could be covered by fire．The terrain diotated that＂A＂and＂C＂ dofond with their platoone ifne．＂$A$＂Company took up a frontage of one thousand yards whth its．left at the western edse of Rechicourt．The trace of its uLR followed the high ground south of Rechicourt．Company＂J＂covered a frontage of fiftean hundred yards，with its right on Hill＂318．＂Its $⿺ 辶 ⿱ 亠 乂, ~ R$ followed the high ground running from Hill＂318＂north．＂B＂，the reserve company， took up a position near the Riouville farm．

Tho
stated this was quiet stated this was a quiet sector．Subsequent events were to prove otherwise．

It could be readily seen that the Battalion was over－extended，and it be－ came necessary to commit two platoons of＂B＂almost immediately．One platoon plugged the gap between＂$A$＂Company＇s left flank and the 10 th Armored Infantry Battaltion＇s right．The other platoon moved into position etween＂A＂and＂S．＂ Company．There were still gaps in the line，and．these had to be covered by patrols，as final protective lines were not strong enough owing to the rolling

The 8th Tank Battalion was in position immediately in rear of the $\mathbb{M L R}$ ， prepared to cut off and drive back any break through．

The first shells to fall in the area came shortly after the relief was effected．It was a heavy concentration and indicated that the enemy was here in strength．Two prisoners were captured who gave their unit as the llth panzer Division．They stated that their mission was to attack．

It was obvious that the Battalions＇present position must be held at all costs since the loss of any of the front would give the enemy a vantage point from whioh observed artillery fire could be placed on any position of combat Command＂B＇s＂area．

Wednes day 27 September 1944.
＂A＂Company＇s position in Rechicourt became a facal point for enemy artillery． Concentrations consisted of $105^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ and heavier．The road through town became kaown as the＂Bowling Alloy，＂as it was obviously under enemy obsorvation and more than one vehicle in any one spot immediately brought artillery fire．

Forward observers with our front line continually reported enemy activity， trucks，tank，and personnel．These became targets for our artillery，which was firing incessantly．Our attached tank destroyers nocked out one tank．Three onemy planes appeared over the defensive position at 1315 and were raken under fire by every small arm available．They did not return．Seven prisoners were captured during the day．

## Thurs day 28 Soptember 1944.

At 0230，an enemy patrol was driven away rom，the Cannon Platoons Obser－ vition Post by machine gun fire and hand grenades．＂C＂Company＇s area was heavily shelled during the afternoon，and＂A＂Company continued to receive ar－ dilery on their poeitions．

 attack. It had been fo...d that the Germans invariably auvacked at dawn or duck. Under cover of this snoke screen and making use of World War I trenches, the enemy infiltrated to the crest of hill "318," drove off the personnel manring our Observation Post and engaged Compary "C's" right in a hand-çrenade fight. "C" Company's right was withdrawn to the nilitary orest or the reverse slope of Hill "318." Our artillery fired with great effect, as we were to find the next day.

Darkness had set in, and the situation was serious. The enemy now held rround which overlooked the entire combat command position. "A" Compary of the 24th Armored Engineer Battalion which had been oriered to move to tie Bois de Benamont and extend our right, had not been heard from. Instructions were issued to "C" Company to hold their present position at all costs.

Friday 29 September 1944.
The remaining platoon from Company "B" was alerted to move at daylight, prepared to counterattack Hill "318" and extend "C" Company's right to the Bois de Benamont. This platoon moved to the "C" Company's Commerd fost at daylight and contacted the tank company, which would support the attack. a dense fog prevented their movement, and plans were made to rove up as soor as this lifted.

The company commanders concerned roticed that the $f$ og was not dispersing and soon concluded that it was some form of cenerated smoke rixed in with the fog. Ccupled with this was a report from an outpost that the Germans were moving over the hill in strencth. It was decided to attack at once. Taaks and infantry moved across the ridee toward "318," while a platoon of tanks moved around below "318" and came up the large draw on its right. .

The counterattack was a complete success, and here it might be pointed out that our air played a. large part in this move. As the ccirter-attacking force reached the toporraphical orest of " $318, "$ a squadron of P-47's apseared overhead and proceedea to work over the enery on the forward slope of the Hill. They strafed and bombed within three hundred yards of the leading elements in the counter-attack. To hit the forward slope, it was necess-r. sor them $t=$ dive towards our forces, but their accuracy was such that we did not suffer a single casualty due to their work. Meanwhile, the 253 rd Ar ored Field Artillery Battalion had a plane overhead and proceeded to fire on the enemy positions with telling effect.

This was the finest example of the cooperation zossible by all arms that this uhit had experienced to date. With this cooperation, our infantry, roughly seventy men, were able to drive off a force known to consist of at least one battalion. German dead on Hill "318" were too numerous to count, and a rough estimats was around 240. Twelve oneny tanks were knocked out. Forty four prisoners were captured. We suffered two casualties.

The engineer comeny, supported by a platoon of linht tanks, mored up along the Boirs de namazont, contacted and extended our right to this woods. Mines and booby traps ware placed in the large draw to the right of Eill " 318 ," as this was the most likely avenue of enemy' approach. The situation was eased somewhat. The enemy was not able to make a serious penetration any where in our line during the remainder of our stay here.,



At 0300, an enemy combat patrol was"driven off in front of "C" Company by part of our normal barrace. our forward observers continued to call for fire on located targets to the front. The town of Bur os was made untenable by the intensity of this fino. For tie first time, enemy artillery was practidally silent throughout our sector. This may be attributed to a heavy attack which was launched at disk acainst the unit on our left.
at night, the enemy continued to probe our positions with strong patrols but met with litilis success. Two prisoners were taken during the day.


5 Inolss

1. carbon sony, unit diary, I Sop 44 to 15 Sen 4..
2. Carbon cony, nit diary, 16 sep 44 to 30 Sen 44 .
3. s-3 Journal (in dunlicaio).
4. S-2 Work Sheet Journal.
5. Eivint Operational overlays.

Fidaj l September 1041


Left esserlhy area Z013937, 0450B. No enemy action. Crossed Marne River 20791. Nap 13y, Bar-le-Duc-Tassy, Sole l:100,000. Head of column halted at Chassey 23087 to encounter 100 entry with horse drawn vehicles. Deployed one platoon of "B" Company an' assault gun platoon. Before complete deployment, the platoon of infantry and platoon of assault guns were ordered to return to the colum, ans to proceed on the original mission. This small group of emmy was by-passed. Four prisoners were taken, examined, and sent to the rear. (1130B). Seven more prisoners taken at 1200D. Arrived assembly area $Z 498972$ at 1630 B alter crossing reuse River at Epiez-sur-Meuse. No enemy activity there. Companies " $A$ " and " $B$ ", " $A$ " on the right went into defensive position defending against an attack from the east. Platoon $0=$ Company " $A^{\prime \prime}$ outposted Uruffe. One platoon of Company " $\mathrm{B}^{\prime}$ outposted Pagney-La-Blanchi-Cote.

Saturday 2 September 1944
Remained in bivouac area 2498972 . No enemy activity. Awaiting orders to moves

Sunday 3 September 1944

Received maps of Eerlin and Paris sector. Remained in bivouac area 2498972. No enemy activity. Awaiting orders to move.

Monday 4 September 1944 thru Saturday 9 September 1944
Situation remai:'ed the same. Awaiting orders to move.
Sunday 10 September 1944
Moved from bivouac area on new, mission at 2030B. New mission-Move southeast to Punerot, then east to assembly area 2880840. Enemy reported on east side of 'gIselle River at our point of crossing, Banville Aux Miroirs. 25 Ran. "A" and "C" Companies leading our column. Our column consisted of 25 Ron, 51 Arm Inf Bn, "A" Company 24th Eng, Section of 997 Bag, "B" Company of 35 th Tank Bin. Battery of 179 FA, and one company of 704 TD.

Monday 11 September 1944
Companies "A" and "C" went into position on west side of Moselle River east of assembly area 2880840 at 0700 B , then at noon moved forward with mission of establishing bridgehead, and seizing high ground across the river, with "A" on the right, and "C "on the left of the Bainvillo east-bound road (bridge blew). Due to the course of the river Company "C" could not maneuver on the east bank while under heavy, $-\dot{i} \dot{c} ;$ consequently its leading elements were driver back into Banville. Company "A" abandoned the plan of using assault boats, instead used a ford, over which "B" crossed behind "A"thon "B" slipped to the right of " $A$ " across the company boundary. Companies " $A$ " and " $B^{\prime \prime}$ remained in these positions for the night. Battalion ordered to cross Moselle River north of Bayou.

Tues day 12 September 1944
Companies os " $A^{\prime \prime}$ and "r" withdrew during the morning and early afternoon. Moved if om assembly area at 1450B, preceded by the 8th Tank in column to the assembly

APEa at Vircoourt 8957807. Made oro-
alsemily aroa at 1600. No enemy aotiving en routo. in : one platoon of "B" Company at Frovillo. 29538, and "G" Gomauy at Villanit. and the remairdor of "B" Company at Whth fricmdly and enemy artillory itiouaced at assembly area for night

## Mehonday 18 september 1944


#### Abstract

Artilleys stall aotire. Left asshily area at 1400 B to proceod to Vitrimont. Hemi of the oelum halted at Mont at 1600B. Bricge blown there. Went into alsembly area vo48946. Infantry and tanks forded the Mourthe Rivor at VO44961 aid hold high ground to the north while the ongineers worked on the forde Seny hold up the onginears by heary mall arms fire and artillery fire. gonainod in the assambly area overnight. thurs day 14 Septembor 1944


The companies bogan moving across the Mourthe givor at daybrear. Headquarters laft the assmbly area V048946 at.0805E. Crossed the Sourthe River at 08303. Moving an to Vitrimont (check point 71) our objective. Remained in the woods V055898 until 1500R. " $A^{\prime \prime}$ and "C" companies deployed al ong woods 2051020.' $\mathrm{S}^{-3}$ and his track moved to an Outpost V07.095. Attack of the ground 0047021 to 9059016 at 1530 B and attack of the ground Q030026 at 1630 B with tanks, infantry, tank destroyersy artillory, and mortars. Enemy fire by tanks and infantry sighted on hill northeast of Vitrimont. Battle lasted till 1930 at whioh time wo moved to our cormand post and assambly area at Q045016. Remained overnight. memy artillery active.

Friday 15 Soptember 1944
dtarted to move to aheck point 81, Crevic, at 0800B. Ordered to move to check point 80, Maxie, ui $\cup \forall 00 \mathrm{~B}$. Moved out at 1200 B , but received fire from direct Pire woapon north of cross road Q045016 and remained in position. Oiserved onemy artillory fire fram Binville. Companies "A" and "E" deployed alonj high ground south. of canal at Maxie. Famy holding round north of the cenal aleng line-ginville, Crevic, and Maxie. Our position was held for the night.

## Saturday 16 September 1944

Remained in the aseembly area Q045016. Companies " $A$ " and " $B$ " pushed across the river and canal. We left our assembly-area to continue north to Serres. Remained at the bridge in Maxie till l500B at which time Headquarters joined the column and nroceeded to the assembly area Q053115, one-half mile north west of Serres. Our area was fired upon from hirh ground east of Hoeville and north of Hoeville. Small arms fire and fire ffom laree guns in that Vioinity. 1830B enemy columa reported moving northwest. (Report should have read northeasty. Our assault gun platoon attacked the colurm and effectively shot it up. at 0230B enemy column reported moving west, through Eoeville. Platoon of "A" Company was sent out to attack this column with small arms and bazookas. They did not contact the ememy columa.

## Sunday 17 September 1944

Remained in the assembly area till 0800B. Moved out to new assembly area Mailley-sur-Seille, U9035. At ll00B column stopped for chance of orders. Enemy in Sorneville in civilian clothes: \$uch enemy equipment in Sorneville. 51 st

"Č", platoon of 24 Em wers, 253 rc 46 Medics ( 5 ambul onces, were in and Erbeviller to Sorneville in bivouac.

$\qquad$

A firing north, and 8th Tank exteraed from

Monday 18 September 1944
Moved out at 0845 B for new location, U9935. Route Sallonne, Chateau-Salins, and Puziex. Taking main roads. Road blocks at entrance of Chateau-Salins encounted at l230B. Road block was covered by all types of fire. Two hundred German SS Troops were reported to be in the town. " ${ }^{\prime \prime}$ Company attempted to reduce road block and the enemy fire. One platoon of " ${ }^{\prime \prime}$ " Company oriered to push by road block and enter edge of town. Infantry and artillery used to reduce resistance by 1900. Remained in assembly area for the night( $\mathbf{n}$. 080216 ). " ${ }^{\prime \prime}$ Compary outposted our assembly aroa:

Tuesday 19 Soptember 1944
Companies " $A$ " and " $C$ " attempted to drive into town in early morning. Town reduced by 1500B. Eaemy still held high ground to the east. Noved command post into the town at 2330 B . Received heavy artillery and mortar fire in the town. Infantry outposted town of Chateau-Salins.

Wodnesday 20 September 1944
Remained in the town and pushed the infantry forward with supporting artillery and tanks. Enemy tanks contacted north of town. Task force from the 8 th Tank. was sent out to intercept them. Enemy artillery light. Enemy dug in on high ground tc the north of the town. Enemy sniper activity. Ordered to move from town to new location (Q045275) and join in force with the remainder of $C C^{n} B^{n}$ to push to the east. Moved to the assembly area via Moncel-Sur-Seille.
Thursday 21 September 1944
Remained in the assembly area Q045275. Received enemy artillery fire at 17002. 6th Armored Division, and the 35th Infantry Division reported in our vicinity. Niatoon of "B" Company outposted Jallicourt. 51 st Armored Infantry Battalion troops extended from Jallucourt to Rfesnes-en-Saulnois. Two platoons of Company "C." moved outto outpost Laneureville-an-Saulnois and Oriocourt.

## Priday 22 Soptanber 1944

Remained in our as sembly area. many artillery at 0700B. Awaiting orders to more. campany "B" of 35th Tank Bn latt their assembly are to intercept reported enemy tanks to our north.

Saturday 23 September 1944
Cempany "A" attached to the 8th Tank. Rearained in our assembly area. Beceived uwary artillary fire at undetermined intervals. Awaiting to be relieved by the buth Infantry Division.

Bunday 24 Septenber 1944
Soth Imfantry Difision moving into area.' Conaiderable eneny and friendly tank eativity in our vicinity. Enemy concontrating to the east. Heavy artillery dre eaved us to move our command post into the edge of Fresmes-en-saulinois.


Remaingd in assemhty area awaiting ardors to move. Heary artillery fire oente inued. No chan in the situation. at 2200 B we reselved orders to move to a now looation one-half mile southeast of Hoeville, Q056119.
Tues day 26 Soptamber 1944,
Battalion Headquartors, Headquarters Courany, Modioal Dotachnemencm min, Man in order moved out at 10 minute intervil beginning allo. Headquirtorn pollewed the remadnder of the 51 st Armorod Iifentry Battalion at 0225B. No ancmy ative ity on route. Remained in assembly area Q056119, till 1130B at whioh time wo moved to assembly area ©l31146. Arrived 1430B. Two oompanios, "L" and "an, rolieved two battalions of the 320th Infantry Division on a frontage of three kilomoters extending from Q130122 to 0157137 With "A" Company on the left and "g" Company on the right, Company "B" in mobile resorve. We wero being supportodby the 253rd Armored Field Artillery. 10th and 53rd Armored Infantry Battaliona on our left flank, and units of the 25th Cavalry on our right flank. Many artillery fire was reported in "A" Company area.

## Wednes day 27 September 1944

Two nlations of Company "B" filled the gaps on both flanks of company "A" Considerable friendly air activity. Heavy artillery reported landing in Company "C" area.

Thursday 28 Soptember 1944
Our front line received heavy artillery fire. Company "An repelled a etiff counter-attack by a company of German infantry. Closo fighting, hand gremade distance. Cpunter-attiack was suooossfully ropulsed. Friondly units in Bauzemont. At 1900 Company "C" recoived heavy artill ory barrage and ocumterattack by infantry and tanks. Our troops foll back from Hill "318," to take up new position. Enery patrol infiltrated our lines at night. Counter-attaek was halted. Platoon of Company "B" extended Company "C1s" right flank. Friday 29 Septenber 1944

Remained in aroup 24th Engineers and 25th Cavalry oxtended our right flank. They wero in position hy 2200B. Hill "318," was retaken by Company "C", supported by tanks, artillory, and the air force, during early moraing undgr oover of dense fog. Tanks, eneny and frieadly, were active till noon. dir activity, bombing and straffing of onemy positions. Effect was great. 79th Infantry Division was reported to our south and as far east as the 16 th N-S grid line. 24th Encineers laid mines and booby traps to their front.

Saturday 30 September 1944
Remained in position Q131146. Company "C" roported tanks and infantry to their front. Our artillery continued to fire. Our defensive line was thin, but positions were being held. Enemy and friendly artillery continued.


## After Action Report.

TO \% The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (tiro, hiamels) In compliance with AR 345-105, Chare 3, the following after-action
subolitted for the month of October, report is submitted for the month of October, 1944. Sunday 1 October 1.944.

The battalion wall in a defensive position (see overlay). Shelling of the front lines was comparatively light, with shells of 105 calibre or larger being the ohio of type used. Higher headquarters had conceived a plan which called for the withdrawal of the Division to a new defensive position generally north and south through Valley. Adoption of this plan hinged on our present position beaning untenable. The battalion 5-3, S-2, and I \& P platoon left at 0600 this and overlay reconnoiter their now defensive line. The croup returned at 0900, Command "B." The cremations' proposed defensive plan sere submitted to Combat The remainder of the day passed quietly.
Monday 2 October 1944.
Beng activity consisted of an el. even man patrol, which appeared opposite
econd platoon of Company "D" at 0500 . The patrol was driver. of?, and the the second platoon of Company "D" at 0500. The patrol was driver. of?, and the enemy immediately placed a heavy artillery barrage on the position. This indicated the patrol was working on a prearranged plan to have us disclose cur positions by fire and the: bring their artillery to bear on the positions true disclosed. Intermittent shelling continued durirm the dey. At swot 2200 , orders were received from Corivat command "B" to at back the next morning. Tues day 3 october 1944.

These orders were changed at 0 do to have three, platoon-stren th patrols move out and seize three high points disimated as "J,"."K," and "L." (see over These patrols moved out at 1200. ""P" and "C" company's patrols objective, point "J." Fere there were tat point "L," and were unable to move forward under direct fire from "C's" objective, not reach it's objective, point " The platoon from Company "A" could that point. Ever ...ntamnt of all because of heave fire being delivered from brought immediate fire.

In view of the unfavorable positions on the patrols, they were ordered to hold their present positions until darkness and then withdraw to their orin incl lines. This was accomplished by 2230. Total casualties were ore dead, one missing and twenty-one evacuated. To estimation could te made of the loses inflitted on the ene $y$.

Wednesday 4 October 1944.
Enemy activity was confined to inter it, tent shelling of our front line positions. At 1715, a croup of ten friendly planes curried out a bombing ant变

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or

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& \text { the original. }
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# from their tar et area a ter the mission wes completed. 

A flstoon of 4.2 chemical mortars was assi ned to support us, in arsition to the loth Arror ed

## Thursday 5 October 1944.

During the early moraing hours, an enemy notrol of arnroximately si gteen men attempted to infiltrate at the junction of Compary "A " of "B" Company. The patrol was drive: off of chaly A," and the seoni platocn Two dead Germans were fount at first lioht, and small arms and artillery fire. several enemy wouricu .un ootten arav. one and blood the vici it, faricstes Whan the patrol withdrew, an artillery barran in "B" Cowary had ieen lilloc. positions.

About 0900, Company "A" reported a haystack to their front araicst wich .50 c libre bullets wre ineffective. The 1.2 mortar latoon brack-ted the
 during the fire.

Tord was received that the 26 th Ineantry $i$ irision was on ite way up to reliere our Division. At 1230, sbout one hurdred rounds 0 : $150-r y$ enemy courter battalion command post. field artillery batialion two hundred rards west of the battalion comand post.

## Friday 6 October 1944.

plans were perfected during the romirg for the errected relief. at lloo,
 Post. Eis company commane grrived shortly thereatiter. The C.0., staff, ni company commanders were taken to our front line, and nur defensive dispositian were pointed out on the round. The reliev:cu mite tion ade their sont ation dispositicns, and hile the heavy warons compary commoder recon oited or fire positions, the remairior of the rroup returned to the hettolion vormal
post.

At l830, comnany guides from our unit met the incoring tropos st Arracourt and directed them formand, l.t the front line, our compary commanders were wint tin with platoon guides, wa tie relievin", wits were lea into their fositime.

The plan now called for as to renin with tho new rit for tontor ras
 aid in steadyiag the new tr:ops. $\because$ oreover, $y$ our ow exnorience in inorma cu, we kew the cermans invarially attacked when they knew a relief in iorna a $\because$, hoping to hit a unit before it was fully orfsnized cefensivel..

## Satur day 7 Ostober 1944.

At 0330, every man in tic relieving wit rad conletery dur ing at an 0 ,
 of the battalion comard nort. At 1500 , the $c . C$. issiet his withrirawal arcer to the assembled company commanders. It calles for a retrocrais rovement $3 ; \cdots$... on to the vehicular asseabl $\because$ area when car ness $\because a s$ cor lete. $\because$ on arrinai at fice rehicular assembly area platoon leaders vole rerort to the atalina vornara
 subdivide the new bircuatc area in the ridivity of SErres.

Battalion Headcuarte (", minus the C.0., s-3, and Come moved out at 1850. The remainder of the battalion reported by platoons to the command post and was dispatched at tom-minute intervals until the entire battalion had loft. At 2230, the C.O., S-3, and Communications Section closed out the old C.P. and moved to Serves.

The relief hod worked smoothly and quietly.
8 to 31 october 1944.
During this period the battalion was at first in Corps Reserve and then in a "rest period." No contact or action with the enemy was made. On 0otober 20th the battalion moved to Droivillo and set in in and around the town. It remained here through October 31st. ITothing of tactical importance occurred during this period.

5 Incl;

1. Unit diary, 1 Oct 44 to 15 oct 44 .
2. Unit diary, 16 Oct 44 to 31 Oct 44 .
3. S-2 Journal, l Oct 44 to 7 Oct 44 .
4. S-3 Journal, Cotuinar, 1944.
5. Operational Overlay, 1 Oct 44 to 7 oct 44.

Branday 1 0otober 1944.
ESJOURIAL

Positions remetre? the eame. pany patrole were aotive Aneing the alent. maiting units to raliove us our pealtion. Friadly pation trin 2ch gingempe
 Artillery wan weught on them.

## randay 5 0otober 19440





 Forent to Parrey to our aceuth.

## Treaday 8 ootober 194.


 front. They are to move cat at 12008. Platema morcal out but mare ghmind lame by artillory and mall arm fire. Beny observitiom from hill mon ambint










## Telnealay 4 optober 1946


 exill ury contsimele

## suralay 5 ootsober 18A40









 - .

Moved entire Elst axiored Infantry Battalion from serres to Grouville q022088 where the Battalion comand post was lecated, and the oompanien went into bivouac. The Battalion reained in reaorve in case of an onemy breakthrough on the front lines.


## SUBJECT: After Action Report.

IO :The Adjutant ieneral, Washington, D. U. (THROUGH CHANNELS).
Ir connliance with AR 345-105, Change 3, the following after action report is submi ted ior the month of November 1944.

1-8 1 Orember 1944.

During this period the battalion was in a rest period in Drouville. On 7 November 1944 orders were received for an advance to the east, with Morhange as the first objeotive and Bining as the final objective. (For troop list and order of march see attached CCB orders dated 2 and 3 November) The plan was to exploit an initial breakthoufh by the 35 th Division, which attacked 8 November 44.

9 Thursday rovember 1944.

Task Force Maybach moved out from Drouville at 0515 along the designated route (See overlay). Firt snemy resistance was encountered one and one-half miles northeast of dallaucourt in the f'orm of antitank and automatie meapons fire from woods west of the road, destroying an assault gun and a halfatrack. Thex, advance guard opened fire with machine guns and assault guns. The tank platoong." followed by a lismounted platoon from "A" Company, attacked and destroyod the enemy antitank gin, and the column resumed it's advance. In Oriocourt a road Slook was oncountered and the head of the colum oame under artillery fire. The advance guard by-pas ed the road block and succeeded in pushing through the town under cover of its own vehicular machine gun fire directed at the windows. Test of Laneurevillemen-Saulnois the advance muard again came under fire from two enem" anti-tank guns, and a second assault gun was lost. Machine gun fire silenced one oi the antiatank guns and the Germans abandoned the other. The colum pushed on into tow and took many prisoners. Coning over the hill north of town the adrance guard received both artillery and direat fire, but pushed on and caotured two field pieces with their crews in the draw. As the head of the column cume over the ridge south of Fonteny it came under severe mortar fire and also direct fire from several batteries of 88 nim and 20 m antiaircraft artillery on the high ground northeast of that town, knocking out the third assault gun an eithint ialf-tracks. "C" Campany of the 37 th Tank Battalion launched an attack on Fontery at 1445, but bor ed down in the -oit ground and beoame an easy prey to the ierman dual purpose puns. The battalion vent into position on the reverse slope for the night, after making an o posed advance that day of about four and a halimiles, and capturing 9 guns, 4 vehicles, and 57 prisoners. Total casualtier were 14 killed and 84 evacuated; three assault guns and ten half-tracks were lost. Troops of the 35 th Division, following in our zone of advance, cuptured 450 oriscners, including a complete battery of fiel artillery.

10 Friday Noven ber 1944.
One enery patrol was driven back during the night. Through the night and this day the forwari positions received fire fron enemy artillery, mortars,
 white the north columin was to swin
north column, however was held up that day by stiff c. position in the acis de Serves.) Panther tanks appeared in the Fontery area and on the ride to the west. An infantry bazooka team vas unsuccessful, but tank destroyers drove the enemy tanks back to cover. Infantry of the 35 th Division came up to extend our Planks. Meanwhile the enemy infiltrated into Viviers, teriporarily cut ting off the north column. The 35th Division moved to attack viviers on the left ard the west edge of the Forest of Chateau Saline on the rirht. The vat talion maintaine the same positions for the night. During this day the unportin arilaery fired on the suspected en en antiaircraft positions from ra map data, sire direct observation was impossible.

## 11 Saturday November 1944.

Sporadic artillery and mortar fire fell on our positions urine the night and morning. CCB ordered the column to take Oran and secure its approaches while the north colum passed through to the east. The battalion coarancer gave orders for the column to move out on the original route to Con, this time with "C" Company in the lead, and "F" Troop (light tanks) of the 25th cavalry replaced the attached medium tank company. The head or the column moved out at 1445; and, as it came over the ridge south of Fonteny it again cane under intense fire. An enemy tank in Fontenyoknocked out the leading, halftrack at the edp of tow, and the forward art of the colunh, thea brourht to a halt, was subjected to observed enemy mortar fire on the crest and north slope of the ill. The uattalior commander and tic wander of the supporting artillery battalion were mortally wounded, and many other casualties were sut'tered. "C" Company dismounted and, in conjunction with two companies of the and Battalion, 134 th Infantry Regiaent, attacked Fonteny on foot. By dark they had cleared the southern half of town, . and they went into position there.

12 Sunday November 1944.
"F" Troop, 25th Cavalry, was replaced by two light tank platoons of "D" Company, 35th Tank Battalion, and the and Bn., 137 th Infantry, joined the collin. The three infantry companies in Fonteny cleared the town by 1000 , and "C" Company's vehicles were brought forward. Meanwhile the Forest of Chateau Saline, from which much of our previous opposition had cone, was reported cleared by the 35th Division on our right. The Fonteny bridge was found prepared for demolition, and our engineers cleared it. The column moved alone' the designated route to Orion without opposition. Orders were received to continue to Chateau-irenain via the southern routes and, since this route was believed impassable, permission was asked and granted to use the northern route ( see overlay). The column moved out without opposition, but was halted just before dark by a destroyed bride north of Chateau Brehain. "C" Company outposted a line around the bridge, which was repaired by the engineers under cover of darkness. Some artillery and mortar fire was received, but the night was generally quiet.

13 Monday November 1944.
At 0715 the column moved out on the original route. A olown-out bridge southeast of Br chain was repaired by the engineers. The road from Brehain to Achain proved impassable because of mud. A new route was selected, leading back to Chateau-Brehai.., with to the main Chateau-Salins-Baronville highway, and thence northeast to Baronville. The column moved out on the new route, but was
storped just before $a \ldots k$ by nines at the cross roads $\ddot{c}$... 1 lees southwest of garonville. Some artillery ire fell on the colum at this point, and arillery concentrations lanied in nearby areas. The bad weather, wrich continually heripered our operations, was it its worst, with rain, cold, and snow. 24 nen vere evacuated with trosuite tinis day.

14 Tuesday 14 INovember 1944.
In the mornin the vehicles were extricated from the mud witn consicerable diriciculty, anc ohe colum had not roved very far before one of the leadin light tanks hit a mine. While this new mine field was beins cleared, a platoon of our attached light tanks, in a move to assist the 35th Division's attack on Baronville, moved on to the ridge overlooking the town and encounterea more mines. The column was held up the rest of the day by mines, and was harassed by artillery and direct fire. The attached tank destroyers knocked out an enery tank and a self-propelled gun. The battalion assembled for the night southeast of jaronville, which had been taken by the 35th Division.

15 Wednes day November 1944.
The column moved out through Baronville with "3" Company in the lead and proceoded east on the road passing north of lorhange, which was being attacked from the southeast by the 35th Division. As the cclumn moved along the ridge north of Horhange it was slowed up by artillery and anti-tank fire from the aireetion of Harprich. "B" Company attacked anc took Tie Lorraine (Bellevue), taking 18 prisoners, and round the roads across the railroad were blocked. "B" Company outposted this town alon the railroad track, tying in on both flanks with elements of the 35th Division, which had taken Liorhanee. The rest of the battalion went into position along the ridge north of lorhanfe. Considerable artillery fire was received, and some of it which struck near the railroad was from the 35 th Division artillery. Continuing bad weather raised the toll of frostbite cases to 45 this day.

16 Thurs day November 1944.
Orders were reseived from CCB to remain in position in the Norhange area. "A" Company was moved to the east edge of Norhange. Artillery fire was received, ohiefly in "B" Company's positions. Ctherwise there was no eneray action, and casualties were light.

17 Friday November 1944.
Early in the afternoon the battalion was ordered back to "ezanfe-la-grande for regrouping. The battalion, less "p" Company, moved out at 1530 and arrived in assembly area at 2300. " B " Company moved out under cover of darkness and arrived at 0200 .

18 Saturday Vovemhan ?344.
The battalion was assigned to Reserve conmand and spent the day in renabilitation at Bezance-la-rrande. "C" Company took over bridge puard in Vic-surSeille and Moyenvic.

## 19 Sunday Novenbor 1 1.

, The battalion was attached to the 26th Division. Leaving one platoon of "C" Company on bridge guard, the battalion noved out at 1300, was pieked up at "oyenvic by a 26 th Division liaison officer, and proceeded through the Ferest of Bride and Koecking, assembling at 1630 about two miles north of Kerprieh-lesDieuze. The battalion was attached to the Jird Eattalion, 328 th Infantry Regiment. " $\mathrm{B}^{\prime}$ Company moved to the oouth edge of the woods to cover that unit's right flank. The battalion was to attack Dieuze in conjunction with $3 / 128$ the noxt day (see S-3 Periodic Feport, 328th Infantry, 200900 Nov 44, attached). The battalions were to attack ahrnnst, 51 st on the ifight, with the boundary following the read from Kerprich-les-Dieuze to Diouze. The attack was to start at 1000, the line of departure running east and west through Kerprich-les-Dieuze. The order was issued at 2300.

## 20 Yonday liovember 1944.

During the nifht considerable enemy traffic was-reported on the DieuzeJorraville road, but the strenpth of the enemy ir Dieuze was unknown. After a fifteen-minute artillery preparation on Dieuze, the battalion jumped off shortly after 1000 in column of companies, with " B " leading and " C " in resorvo. The 2nd Cavalry's lieht tank troop moved east fron Mulcey and delivered supportinf. fire on the approaches to Dieuze. As "B" Company moved into town abreast of the 328 th, "A" Coripany surung right and moved into the south part of tow. It was f'ound that the enery had withdrawn, and the town was completely oscupied by 1200, with no osposition except for a few rounds of artillery, which was silonced by counterbattery. " $A$ " and " $B$ " Companies thoroughly searched the town; and, when the 3rd Rattalion, 328th Infantry moved on to Vergaville, "A" and "B" companies outposted the entire town, with "C" in reserve at Kerprich-las-Dieuzo. CCB noved through town headine northeast late in the afternoon, and halted just beiore dark.

## 21 Tues day Noveraber 1944.

The bactalion reverted to Reserve Comand and remained in position all day.
22 Te ines day November 1944 .
The battalinn -ass actached to CCA, but received no orders to move.
23 Tnursday November 1944.
The batalion remained in position awaiting orders. The platoon of "C" connany whicn had been on bridpe guard reverted to battalion control.

24 Friday November 1944.
"C" Company moved out at 1530 with orders to assist CCB in its Sarre River bridgehead. "C" company joined a company of the 35th Tank Battalion north of Zomance anc proceeded east on the main road to outpost the woods west of Fenetran e for CCB. The rest of the battalion was alerted to move the next day, with "A" Company in the south column of CCA and the remainder of the battalion in the north column of CCB.

A chance of or crs at 0700 directed the battalion (less "C" Company) to move at once to the assistance of CC"B". The battalion proceeded to a vehi cular assembly area west or Fenetrance. Orders were received to dismount and go into position on the higi ground east of Fenetrange in rear of the 8th Tank Battalion as supnort for the 53 r d Amored Infantry Battalion. The battalion moved out with "B" Coripany iquuin, erossed the Sarre bridge under intermittent shellfire, and was mov $n$, toward the new position when another change of orders arrived. The battalion was reassigned to CC"B" as part of a task force under the commander of the 8th Tank Battalion. The 5lst was to move on foot, supported by the tanks, east to Postroff and then north to Wolfskirchen. As the battalion roved to join the tanks, a new change of orders came, directing an attack on the Bois de L'Isch. The companies moved back behind the high ground; and, after a ten-minute artillery preparation, jumned off at 1520 , with " $P$ " Company leading. Enemy artillery fire was hoavy all the way, and tree bursts in the Bois de L'Isch caused several casualties. At the edse of the woods "A" Company moved un on "B" Company's right flank. After advancing through the lower half of the woods, both companies dug in. Three German light antiaircraft guns were knocked out in the course of the attack. Meanwhile Company "C" commenced an attack on Wiederstinzel, encountering onposition at the south edge of town at 1000. They received heavy artillery íire, and, after bitter fighting, in which 5. ferian machine guns were knocked out, the company received orders at 1400 to withdraw to the high ground southwest of town. They were to revert to batcalion control next morning. A total of 22 prisoners was taken this day, and enemy dead were estimated at 17. Tho battalion lost 4 killed and 8 wounded.

26 Sundav Yovenber 1944.
At 0luO one of our ration yarties was fired on without challenging by an outbost of the $53 \mathrm{r} d$ Armored Inrantry Pattalion at the edge of the woods; one man was killed and one wounded. During the night the forward elements received small arms and artillery fire from the northeast. At 0800, "B" Company started to infiltrate to the north edge of the woods, the first elements reaching that point at 0830 without onposition. Both companies moved forward and dur in on the now wa eure of the woods. "C" Company reverted to battalion control and went into reserve in the southwest part of the Bois de L'Isch. A "C" Company natrol went to the bridge east of Niederstinzel, found it was destroyed, and returned with 6 prisoners. Just after dark, an eneny demolition party tried to reach the bridge in front of "B" Company, but our outpost drove it away with hand grenades. Sporadic artillery fire fell in the woods during the day. An attack was ordered toward wolfskirchen for the following day.
27. Ponday Yovemiver 1914.

A'ter a fuiet night, our artillery put down a preparation on Wolfskirchen at 0935, an at, the same time smoked Diedendorf. The objective was the high Fround northeast of Tolfskirchen, and the town itself was to be bypessed to the east, unless fire received from town interfered with the advanoe. The battalion ivas to attack in column of companies, in the order "B," "C," and "A," novin: out ircr " $B$ " com ary's position and across the bridge over the Isoh River. "D" Comnany (li, hht tanks), 8th Tank Battalion was to give supporting fire from the north edge or the woods, and the balance of the 8 th Tank Battalion was in ;eneral supoort. The leading elements moved out at 1010, and soon oame under small arms ani nachine run irire from Folfskirchen. "B" and "C" Companies were then counitted abreast, with " B " on the right, to take the town, with a mediun

# tank company in suppó. .. By dark the town wis taken, bugh not completely cleared, after stubborn resistance. The Germans followed their usual custom of shelling the town before their own troops had cornletely evacuated it. When the town was finally cleared, the companies outposted it for the night, with " $C$ " to the northwest, "B" to the northeast, and "A" to the south and southeast. Evacuation of casualties that day was mostly by light tank. The battalion vehicles moved up to an area northwest of kirrburg. 

28 Tuesday November 1944.
The battalion was ordered to attack Burbach after the 71 st Infantry Regiment had cleared the Boos de Wolsthof on the r: ht. The woods bin, cleared out by noon, the attack began at 1215. Artillery preparation was omitted for the sake of secrecy. A platoon of "C" Company secured the high ground northeast of Wolfskirchen, while the main body moved in column of companies, in the order "A," "Bs" and "C." The axis of advance was east, then north, taking all possible advantage of woods for concealment. The leadin- elements entered Burbach without opposition, but the enemy commenced an almost continuous shelling of the town. The companies outpostec the town, and the vehicles were moved to an area in aus suit of .olfskirchen.

29 Wednesday November 1944.
The task force objective this day was Rimsdorf. A maneuvering* force, consisting of " $B$ " Company of the infantry mounted on " $A$ " Company of the tank and preceded by a platoon of light tanks, was to make a reconnaissance in force northwest along the east edge of the Geisbusch, then northeast throuich the Dannholz to determine the amount of opposition in Rimsdorf. If this was successful, the balance of the task force was to move east and then north on the main Eywiller-Rimsdorf rose to take the objective. The reconnaissance in force moved out at first light; but when it topped the ridge south of Juscherhor, extremely heavy artillery fire drove it back into defilade, Finally this force was withdrawn, and the battalion went into position for the night, with "C" Company northeast of town, " E " Company to the northwest, and a company of tanks supporting each. The severe weather, ever-present mud, and the unprecedented volume of enemy artillery concentrations had brought the men near a state of exhaustion. Company strengths had dropped sharply, and antitank platoons were being put into the line to bring effective strengths up to seventy or eighty men per company.

30 Thursday November 1944.
Orders wore received to hold in the existing positions until relieved by the last Battalion, lOlst Infantry Regiment, and then to move into assembly area prepared to attack Rimsdorf. When the relief was completed in the afternoon, " $A$ " Company moved east and then north to tie in on the left flank of the 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion on the reverse alone of hill 357, southeast of Rimsdorf. "C" Company uiou in to the left and rear of "A," and "B" Company went into reserve a mile to the south. The move was made without opposition before dark, and the men dug in. One tank company moved out to support us, and the other remained in position until the next morning's attack on Rimsdorf.
Uncle:
if Operational Overlays.
\%2 S-3 Journal -with inserts.
if 3 s-2 Journal.
4.


FORTRAN L. HOPE,
Capt., Slat Armed Inf $\mathrm{In}_{\mathrm{n}}$, S-3

##  APO 284. J. 8. AKM

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In compli ince with ak 345-105, Change 3, the following after-action report is subnitted for the month or Jecember 1944.

Friday 1 December 1944.
Supported by Company "C," 8th Tank Battalion, and in conjunction with a 10 minute artillery breparation, the battalion jumped oif in attack on Rimsdorf at 080 in column of corpanies according to plan(see Battalion Urder for 1 Dec 44). The enemy threw heavy concentrations of artillery in our zone of advance. "B" Company, ridiré the tanks, movedin quickly under the barrage and entered Rimsdorf within 20 minutes without casualties, but "A" Company, following on foot, suffered considerable casualties from artillery during the advance, especially in crossing the road southeast from limsdorf. The to:m was then cleaned out fron east to :rest, with "A" Company roving on the lef"t, and "B" on the right. unly light o position was met, but the enemy started youring artillery concentrations into the town. The companies then moved out to secure the ground north and east of limsdorf, and by 1200 they had taken up a senicircular position around the tovm, in the order "A,:" "B," and "C" Companies from left to right, with the tanks concentr ted principally behind "B" and "C" Companies. At 1225 a short and violent enemy artillery barrage on the town preceded a hail of direct fire und a tank a tack from the east. The battalion conmander was wounded by a shell at this time. The enemy tank attack was pushed forward boldly in estimated battalion strength. The excellent positions and alertness of our tank company, however, and the speedy adjustment of our artillery resulted in the complete repulse of the attack. 4 enemy tanks were knocked out, including the command tanks of two company commanders, who were captured. A "C" Company patrol, sent out to locate th: enemy tanks, encountered severe artillery fire and returned wi thout making enemy contact. A "B" Company patrol was sent out along the north : :est edge of the Faessbusch, and two "C" Company patrols were sent along the south edge of the s:ime wods, all with the mission of contacting friendly troops sunnosed to be on our right(namely the loth Armored Infantry Battalion and 35 th Tank fattalion.); but all three patrols returned without making friendly contact. That aftermoon a German scout Car ventured near "B" Company's position and was knocked out by machine gun tire. Heavy shelling continued on the town and our nositions through the afternoon and night. Preparations were made to continue on the mission of securing the high ground in the vicinity of Schlosshof Farm the nevt day.

## Jaturdizy ? December 19l4.

in enemy patrol attempting to infiltrate "B" Company's lines eariy in the moming w:s ropulsed with heavy enemy losses. "+ 0900, "A" and "C" Companies moved out abreast, with "A" on the left, througi "B". Company's positions in the attack on jchlosshof Fiam (See Battalion Order for 2 December 1944). Enemy machine gun and smill arms f'ire was encountered almost immediately, but four light tanks from "D," Company, 8th Tank Battalion, came up along the edge of the woods and helned the companies to overcome the resistance and push on. Enemy artillery fire fell in the entire zone of advance, and almost every shell was a tree burst. Hassing throurg the snarsely-wooded bottleneck between the Freywald and the Neuwald at 1015 was narticularly costly due to the enemy's direct observation down the

ual. (a consi or our nocket nemy re istance in the ismbal or on our eatalion on the ric $a$ and the Irlast Infantry m, ance sntata ntil the reuced by the lolst until the following day).
 ar. as of we wo saw enery tanks in the vin to nan. An observer at we the bua. ir ol ort was calladiks in the vicinity of Jchlosshof Farm thy: thto tho ach. jurin the for, and two air atacks drove the enemy on or minn ne mine fron the north slo time the right flank of "Company was fire as roceived rot the suth east. "1a: companilsoerg Hill, and some direct
 The two rifle compaies junped otif at 1415 and followed the tanks in the assaul on jonlosishot Furm, which was burning from our tank fire. Heavy niber enemy siells tell on the avancing riflemen, but by lu42 the comnanies had taken the taken frm the blazing farm and nearby nositions. "Beveral German prisoners were rositions alons the east edse of the Neuwald, and by ordered up to comnany's right flank. That evenine "euw Company by dark was tied in with "C" Intiontry on the left. Artillery fire A Company estiblished contact with the lolst and on simsdorf. sill suprly and evacuation had to be handled forward positions to terr in conditions.

## janciay 3 Lecanber 19i4.

Durin: the nicht a "S" Company outpost of 4 men in the south :.estcorner of the Burbasch s cavtured by the enemy. Orders were issued for a projected movement to the high ground 1 Km south est of Voellordingen; but this move being c.ntincent on a further advance of the lolst Intantry on our left, the battalion mivisch were revulsed oy our tatempts by enemy tanks to nush out from the murbisch were reulsed by our tanks. anemy artillery continued active.
ond 3y it Decerber 194.
The battalion remained in position all day awaiting orders. The 10th Armored In ntry Batalion and the 8th Tank Battalion passed through our nositions in an a*t.ck on Voellerdinsen. "A" Company extended its left flank to tie in with the tht attilion, lulst Infantry, and "B" Company maintained contact by patrol with the 3 rd amored infantry Battalion on the right.
Iuesday $\bar{z}$ Lecenber 19!4.
Durn the morning the vchicles were brought up in anticipation of the execied relief or the battalion. however, at noon the battalion was attached to $\because$ 'a" and ordered to count up and move northeast through Domfessel to support the 37 th Tunk antalion, which had oroken through to a noint southwest of Dehlingen. At 10 we buttilion started moving, and nassed through Domfessel, crossed the acon, onsed venlingen (still erimy occupied) to the west, continued north we.e est to oucury semintiller ithout resist nce. unly 3 rounds of artillery were reserod ir. .ie encry. life battalion outnosted Schmittviller for the night.


A $\mathfrak{M}$ Ge curanies moved out with the tanks for the attack on Bining and
 so ad that :il full tracked vohicles could maneuver, even on trails. In soite of a movamontrat ond on Sin ling, however, heavy enemy fire from that at wo fit or orees in the left flank, and the tank commander decided



take Singling. After retillery and smoke preparatir These companies asoulted the tow in the fac. powerful and stubborn resis. $=$ at 1030. it least 3 enemy tanks and 5 assault guns were seen and enemy infantry was entimated at two companies. By $130 C$ the town was cleared except for the extreme western fortion. Cur tenks had destroyed one assault gun, and an infentry bazooka vean had damaged another so bidly it had to be towed out; over 00 prisoners we e taken, and the eneny armor was driven out of town. Later in the afternoon Combat Command "B" arrived, and completed the relief of the two "B" companies between loju and 1730. During this action "A" Company of the 51 st with "A" of the 37 th , held their position west of Bining under heavy artillery and direct fire, until a battalion of the 328 th Infiantry came up from the south and entered Bining. At dark both "A" and "B" Companies were ordered back to Schmittviller, while "C" Company remained in position for the night northeast of Schmittviller. The three comp nies were gravely depleted in strength, and the men were nearly worn
out.

## Thursday 7 December 19L4.

The battalion remained in position all day, waiting for relief by elements of the l2th Armored Division. After dark, "C" Company was ordered back to Schmit. tviller.

Friday 8 December 1944.
At 0130 the battalion moved out for an initial assembly area south:iest of Rimsdorf, arriving there at 0430 . The column moved out again at 0730 and reached a rear assembly area in Bidestrof f at 1215.

Saturday 9 December to konday 18 December 1944.
The battalion remained in rear assembly area for reorganization and rehabilitation. A move was made 11 December to jueblange-les-Licu e and Gelucourt. The battalion was alerted 18 December to patrol the area against eneny paratroopers who vere revorted to have veen ciropped in the woods west of Nancy, but this report proved to be unfounded. That night, however, the brief renabilltition oeriod was abruptly cut short by a warning order alerting the battain for mover.ent at one hour's notice.

## Tuesday 19 December 1944.

At 0300 orders were received from Combat Command "A" to move to an assembly area south of Longwy, near the Belgian frontier in the lst Army zone (see CC"A" March Order, 18 December 1944). At 0830 the battalion moved out according to plan (see Battalion March Urder 19 December 19/山) and reached Trieux at 1030 where it assembled and awaited further orders. On order frm Co:bat Command "Ay the battalion mived out at 1930 and assembled for the night at 0125 in Clemency, Luxembourg. The weather was bitter cold, and continued so throughout the ensuing operation.

## Wednesday 20 December 19L4.

Local police and civilian volunteers patrolled the streets of olerency, due to reports of German Paratroopers in the area; but the night passed without incident. In the morning considerable refugee traffic flowed into town from the north. Shortly after $n$ on orders were received to move to ioncelange, but a
change of orders five mimutes later altered the destination to Toernich. The battalion moved out at 1330 and was outposting Toernich by 1535 . At loco orcuers were received to send a task force to block roads north anc northeast of irlon (see Battalion Crder, 1015, 20 December 194山). "C" Company and a reconnaissance section moved out at once, under command of Captain Rockefeller, picked up the
$35 \mathrm{th}^{\prime}$ Tank Battalion's a ult gun platoon at Arlin, and 'ned "D" company of the 35 th north of town. Koans to the north and northeast of .sion were outposted and patrols were set up between them. Three double road blocks were prepared jut not actually put in position, since troops of the coth Division were known to be out in front of them. These dispositions were completed before midnight.

## Thursday 21 December 1944.

Early in the afternoon orders were received to assumble a task force in Toernich under command of major ilanis, and to move after dark to an assembly area north of Arlin, prepared to advance northward to the relief of the 101 st Airborne Division and other elements cut off in Bastogne by the German counier-offensive. Task Force Alanis, consisting of the 5lst (less "C" Company l reinforced by a ink company, tank destroyer company, and engineer company, with the $27 \dot{4}$ th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in support, moved out at 1800 and went into assembly in $T$ ter at 2040 .

## Friday 22 December 1944.

At 0515 the column moved out of Tatter, and at 074.5 Combat Command 'A" broke radio silence. A heavy mist rendered visibility very poor even after daybreak. At 0800, when the advance guard was about a mile north of Heinstert, an under if ied aircraft, believed to be a "V-l," flew low over the column from the north. Fropress was slow, due to close reconnaissance by the cavalry in front. it u930 an impasseable road crater was reported 2 km west of rerle, and the engineers started to bridge it. The cavalry, meanwhile reported bortelinge occupied by the enemy. combat Command "A" ordered Task Force Uden diverted to the route of the west column, and both columns halted just short of the crossroads four km south of sarteliange. Shortly after noon the other column moved forward to occupy the high ground north of Merle without opposition, and took up positions to surnort the zotack on lartelange by fire. At 1330 "A" Company, suptorted by a tank platoon, started the autack of liartelange on foot, and within half an hour had occupied the western portion of :antLartelange without resistance. "B" Company then moved forward on the left with another platoon of tanks, and was near the center of town when considerable small arms and bazooka fire was received from the buildings on the west side. Jitter street fighting continued all afternoon in the center oi t tow, and one later of "B" Company wis pinned down on the embankment just west of the hi machine gun fire from a group of buildings above. artillery fire was placed on the west side of town and some of the houses caught fire, but the resistance continued. Bright moonlight and new-fallen snow made any movement in the open an easy target for the enemy's automatic weapons. With the aid of two tings, however, an attack was made at 1800 which wiped out the enemy pocket, by 040023 December. "A" and "B" Companies continued tc fight their way toward the bank of the river sure.

## Saturday 23 December 1944.

By 0430 kartelange was cleared of enemy up to the river bank. The briage on the main Bastogne Highway wis found completely demolished, but the bridge on the Radelange road, although partially destroyed, proved to be passable for foist trocos. At 0300 "A" Company started across the bridge and by 0500 had secured the high ground to the northwest without opposition, permitting corps engineers to bevin bridging the river for vehicular traffic. At 1430 the bridge was completed, and I: ok Force den moved across the river and north on the Bastogne highway, with Task Force Alanis following in support. Part of "C" Company, riding the lead tanks of Task Force Oder, suffered several casualties from enemy 20 mm fire a mile north of lintelangle at 1600. This fire was silenced and the column continued on, but near Farnach stiffer opposition was encountered. While the tanks moved rest off the road and advanced to the northwest, "C" Comp. any moved along the highway and lost two halftracks from enemy antitank fire southwest of Farnach. A platoon of "C" Company, supported by four light tanks, wis sent into Warnach and suffered severe casualties before it was withdrawn. At 2030, "B" Company :as mounted on the tanks of "B"

Coming of the 3 th and，moving rest of fine road a mile northwest of Hartelange， followed in sort of the tank battalion，advancing by bounds from ridge to ridge in a rorthmostar！y direction．ilesistance in＂rarnach continued active，and it was 1：ter revealed th the romans had two battalions in the tom the time，one ot the ch ．．：：Line，itharam．
antsy hitecmber 12 ht．
A．いう3．＂P川 Company，mounted on tanks，moved east across the road to attack ＇urn c！！，tn wis met it the outskirts of town by a hail of direct and small arms ＂re．Bevel sours of victor street fighting drove the enemy annor and infantry inti；the northern portion of tow，where they defied efforts to dislodge them． $\therefore$ init it wis decided so withdraw our small tank－infantry team slightly to the rear oi the church，in order to employ artillery fire safely．After this artillery ofttnin；，the a tack wis resumed and severe fighting continued through the day． $1_{n}$ the curse of this action our force took 135 prisoners；knocked out an assault an，？armored cars，and a truck；captured 3 vehicles and an antitank gun；and res－ cred 3 men from＂C：＂Company and an engineer unit，who had been held prisoners by the detains．bruch o：the equipment used by the encmy was american．By 1715 the last dem．；were clewed iron＂almach，and an attempted enemy counterattack from the woods northe st o：bum wis renuled by artillery fire．Meanwhile＂A＂Company，with＂C＂ ？pry o：the 35 th ，had ：loved out at noon to clear the woods north of Warnach． $\therefore$ in toxin？rainy misuser，＂in Company reached the edge of the woods two kilometers rom nest of atman by lulus，and moved on to a position just short of the rintange－ Guranchma fro al for th mi ht．Murine this time＂C＂Company，attach ad to＂A＂ Cuman o＂the 3 ，th，div need or the other side of the highway，taking the Herren－ bert，the ．rods to the north，and the Boys de worienal，and ant into position on
 forsotent ser in natant：to infiltrate．
－andy 2 December 19h1．
at one the attack ：s s resumed，with＂C＂Company on the left of the highway and＂A＂Company on the right，and＂B＂remaining in reserve at Warnach．While＂A＂ company of tree 35 th took supporting＇s positions overlooking Strainchamps，＂C＂Com－ may sent una latoon to clear th town．From Strainchamns it was possible to see rabat Commend＂ib＂Lacicin；to the north on the surnon－Chaumont hoad，and it was also ：ossible to wee the aus in coitions of an extensive enemy pocket bypassed
 after istrainchamps was cleared without o position，the companies moved forward ab－ rest．＂S＂Company met light resistance in the patches of woods to the north，taking a few prisoners，and received mortar，rocket，and tank fire from the north．＂A＂ Company met heavy small arms fire in the north encage of the Boas de mel ch；and，in order to writ them to advance，the light tanks of the 35 th moved up on the left and went the re with fire．At 1315 ur forward elements were att sacked by Amer－ icon $14 i^{\prime} \mathrm{s}$ ，ind ，he resulting contusion delayed the advance considerably．By lob ＂C＂Company，still．smarted by＂A＂of the 35 th，had advanced across difficult terrain the tanks skididis prec riously on the snow－covered slopes to high ground about five hundred yards south of nollange．A＇C＂Company patrol was sent toward Hollange to find out if the tow wascupied by the enemy，and at 1700 the patrol returned safely and recorded creamy enemy 3 mll arms fire from the town．Luring this operation the mortar baton，assault gun platoon，and supporting artillery fired on the enemy rocket coos the railroad tracks．＂A＂Company dug in on＂C＂Company＇s right， and in＂remained in＂armach．Since air reconnaissance indicated that Hollange was held by th：onemy in strength，heavy artillery concentrations were fired on it during the night．

At 0800 one platoon of "C" Company supported by two platoons of tanks from "A" Con.jany of the 35 th Tank Battalion began the attack as planned (see insert \#l6) on fill 490 northeast of hollange and at 0945 were just south of the road munning east from the tom to the highway. This force met heavy resistance in the form of artillery fire from the northeast, direct fire from north and north west and small arms fire from the tow of :iollange and requested air support on that town and air observation on the trea around hill 490. "A" Company continued the attack on the right of the nishway moving north to a position 500 yards north of Strainchamps-Honville Road and received artillery fire. Tanks from "B" Company of the 35 th Tank Battalion roved un 1015 to suport them. At 1100 "A" Company reached the reverse slope of Hill $/ 100$ with left flank on highway and right.flank 1200 yards to the right. This movement brought "A" Company abreast of "C". "B" Company remained in Warnach n reserve. dir support searched areas north for reported enemy column but found no trace of j.t. They did however locate enemy gun positions 000 yards north of nollange and attacked them at 1210. At 1400 one platoon of "C" Company and 2 nlatoon of tinks ge ned their objective. They continued to receive small arms fire from iollange and cur artillery preparation began on that town at 1425 lasting for about 10 misutes. As it lifted the remaining two platoons of "C" Company and a latoon of tanks from "A" Company 35 th Tank Battalion moved in from the northeast to attrack and at 1730 the town was taken along with 174 P. W.'s "C" and "A" company reriained in this location for the night. "B" Company moved north and extended "A's" right flank to make contact with $3 / 318$ Infiantry which had taken Honville. Defensive fires vere planned for areas north of 48 grid line. 35 th Tank Battalion consolidated with "A" and "C" on position.

## Yednesday 27 December 194i.

at 0800 " C " and "A" Companies moved north according to plan after an artillery preparation on aux iburchons and Sainlez and advanced 800 yards through woods meeting light resistance. at 0940 "C" Company was held up by small arms fire from buildings on main road 400 yards west of Sainlez and called for tank support. "A" Company halted in north edge of Aux-burchons and awaited the artillery preparation on Sainlea. "B" Company moved at 1010 according to plan (see insert if 17 ) to support "A's" attack on Sainlez. The tanks of the 35 th Tank Battalion which supported "C" Surpany fired on the buildings from which fire had come and "C" Company moved in llearing the houses then moving north along this original axis of advance. At 1150 the artillery placed a large concentration on Sainlez and as it was lifted "A" Comnany using marching fire, moved in to attack the town. Several Germans in foxholes on the south west edge of town gave up with out a fight as "A" Company sprayed the area with all available fire and a total of 133 Pm's were taken in the ensuing action in the tom. Finere ias some Si and mortar fire falling on "h" during the $7^{+}$tack. The town as taken at 1350 and outposted inmediately, "B" Company then moved trou h 'is and across open ground towards the woods to the north. Two squads from "R" vorp ny were pinned dom by wa and 20 mm fire from the north east at 1455 but zoon overame the resistance with artillery fire and moved into the woods abreast of "う" ©oparj. The a tack proceeded slowly through thick forrest and at 1630 "C" Comp ny was ield up by lio fire from the north as they were half through the Bois d: Jicire. "3" roved abreast and the two companies tied in on the highway and consolidated the nosition for the ni sht. "A" remained in Sainlez. One platoon outpostod id 3 ; rorth west of tow.

EMracay 20 Lesember 19\%.
ifter the 5 minute artillery prearation on the moods north of their positions, "C" and tiz" Companies roved out abreast at 0800 and met no resistance for a distance of about 400 yards. A road block, hastily built, and mines were discovered on the hi ghway near cross roads between Bois du Vicaire and $L^{\prime}$ Irdoisiere.

The engineers succeded in clearing these obstacles at 1115. "An company remained at Sainlez to reorganize. At 1115 "B" Company on the right launched their attack on Chateau Losange which was resorted to be a German Regimental CP. They met considerable resistance from small arms, but as the supporting tanks of B/35 Tank Battalion moved into the clearing, south of the Chateau and fired point blank at the buildings, resistance lessened and "B" Company moved in and cleared area t 1550 . "C" Company on the left of the highway advanced without opposition through L' Ardoisiere Forest and sent patrols to investigate buildings at Rimifosse. "B" Company continued its advance north ward after the battle at the Chateau meeting very light resistance through the woods, however, some mortar fire from their right flank harmassed their movement. Enemy small arms fire from Hill 530 was directed upon "C" Company as they attempted to emerge from north edge of woods. At 1000 "A" Company, mounted in their vehicles, moved from Sainlez on main highway to an assembly area 400 yards south of Chateau Losange. There they dismounted and moved on foot to the east edge of the woods west of Lutrebois. Companies tied in at 1710 along the trail on the eastern edge of Chivresoux Forest, "C" on left with left flank on trail 200 yards west of main highway. "B" in the center and "A" on right with right flank on trail junction 300 yards east of Chateau. "B" and "C" Companies continued to re cedve small arms and MG fire from Hill 530 during the night.

## Friday 29 December 1944.

The town of Lutrebois on the Battalion's right was a serious threat to the attack planned across open ground to the north and at 0500 supporting artillery fired concentrations on its east and west edge. "C" and "B" Company moved as planned (see Battalion Order, Insert \#19) at 0800 and at 0830 "C" Company's left flank was pinned down by small arms and MG fire from Remifosse. "B" Company received small arms and machine gun fire from their front and called supporting tanks of "B" Company 35 th Tank Battalion forward to move out on the resistance. This force moved forward at 0925, over coming resistance on Hill 530 and aiding "C" Company in clearing out houses at Remifosse. This action completed, the advance northward continued until 1025 at which time "B" Company was taken under fire by an SP gun from their right rear in vi init, if Lutrebois. Artillery and tank fire was brought to bear on it and "A" Company (-) 1 platoon was moved forward to give close support to "B" and "C." At 1100 the Ord Battalion of the 134th Infantry Regiment, 35 th Infantry Division began their attack on Lutrebois relieving pressure on "B" Company's right flank and allowing them to continue the advance. Engineers removed mines and abatis on the highway through Remifosse during this action. At 1130 "C" Company made contact with outposts of the holst Airborne Division 1000 yards southeast of Bastogne. Both "C" and "B" Companies set up a defensive line toward the east 500 yards Southwest of Marvie with "C" on left and "B" on the right. Tanks of "B" Commany 35 th Tank Battalion were corporate in the defensive plan and "A" Company 51 st moved into the Bois d' Hazy as the reserve. Neither "C" nor "B" were in contact with the enemy. One platoon $A / 51$ outposted one platoon of "A" Company 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion at the trail junction in the southern portion of woods west of Lutrebois.

Saturday 30 December 1944.
At 0430 the 3rd Battalion of the 134th Infantry Regiment which had a tacked the town of Iutrebois on the previous day reported that they were receiving a stiff counter-attack from enemy troops in the eastern end of the town. "B" and "C" Compansies were alerted and ordered to stand by while "A" Company was moved south along west side of highway to fill the gap between "B's" right flank and the Ord Battalion 134 th, when the report came in that enemy infantry was infiltrating in a bold attempt to sever the highway south of Remifosse. At 0845 enemy machine gun fire from the woods east of the Battalion CP opened an enemy attack and German infantry followed the withdrawing troops of the 134 th down the slope towards the Chateau. It was very
difficult to fire on them since friendly infantry were emerging from the woods in the direct line of sight. The machine gun platoon which had outposted the Command Post with vehicles drew the first fire from both rifles and machine guns and one vehicle was abandoned for a short time as the fire became very intense and the halftrack afforded little cover. About 15 rounds of mortar fire fell on and around the two buildings during the attack and tracers could be seen bouncing off vehicles and buildings. ken from Headquarters Company were placed at windows where observation on the attackers was good considering the denseness of the forest. Two tanks from "A" Company of 35 th Tank Battalion took up a position 50 yards north of the Chateau and all available small arms, machine guns, and 75 mm tank gun fire power was poured into the enemy positions for a period of 10 minutes, driving the attackers back through the woods. Enemy killed and wounded could be seen lying at the edge of the woods. At 1020 artillery liaison planes reported 20 to 25 Tiger Tanks moving Northwest from Lutremange to Lutrebois and shortly there after they were again reported nearing Remifosse. Tank and air support were called for and "B" Company of the 35 th Tank Battalion took them under fire, knocking out 12. Fighter planes bombed and strafed and claimed a total of four. The total number destroyed by the combined fire of artillery, tanks and planes was 18 and the attempt to cut the highway was repulsed. just before noon "A" ( - ), and "B" Companies were ordered to mop up the woods from which the early morning infantry attack had come. They moved out from the highway toward the southeast with "A's" left flank on the outer edge of the woods and "B's" right flank on the east edge of the clearing. "C" Company moved 400 yards wouth of their former position and the platoon from "A" Company, 51 st outposting tanks on wouth en of Losange forest remained in that position. "A" and "B" moved out at 1500 and met stiff resistance from pocket still in roods about dark which split the companies and held "A" up throughout the night but they succeeded in taking 16 prisoners and "B" Company found 18 enemy dead and large amounts of weapons and ammunition along their route of advance. "C" Company moved into woods behind "A" Company at 2100 and "B" Company set up defense around the Command Post. "A" Company patrol met stubborn resistance and suffered some casualties.

## Sunday 31 December 1944.

At 0355 "A" Company was still trying to clean up enemy pocket in the woods west of Lutrebois and their patrol located 1 enemy tank and 4 self propelled gins near trail at eastern edge of woods. These vehicles ere liter found to be knocked out. "B" Company swept the woods on west side of clearing from south to north at 0830 with two platoons abreast and 2 su:porting tanks from "A" Company 35 th Tank Battalion along trail to their right meeting no resistance. The remaining platoon of "B" Company relieved the platoon of "A" Company which as outposting the section of tanks on trail junction and the latter rejoined the other two platoons of "A" around pocket on north east edge of woods. "B" Company again swept down the south west edge of the woods and took up the same position that they had occupied the previous night (see Overlay $\ddot{f}$ ) At ilo higher headquarters reported an enemy colum moving from the north toward Tordin and large concentrations of German troops in woods east of Lutrebois; therefore "C" Compans took up defensive position on "A's" left flank along north edge of Chivresoux going north. At 1830 the Bn was ordered to be on the alert for infiltration and for 3 crew members who had bailed out of a JU-88 near Remichampagne.

## For the Battalion Commander:

3 Incls:
Incl \# 1 - S-E Journal
Incl \# 2 - Messages
Incl \# $z$ - Overlays

Chutes Rimy Major, 51st Armed Inf Bn , S-3

APO 254, U. S. Army
S-3 JOURNAL

FROM: 1 Doc 44. TO : 31 Dee 44.

DEC TIME
10800 Attack on Rimsdorf began.
(Insert \#l: Bn order for 1 Dec 44)
$0900 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ and $B / 51$ start to ole oar town.
1100 Rimsdorf cleared, cos in poss around town.
1225 Enemy tank attack from E on Rimsdorf repulsed; Bn C.O. wounded.
1330 En arty fire on Rimsdorf.
20130
0430
0530
0730
0850
0900
non Co patrol reported failure to contact luth Inf on right. "C" Co patrol reported failure to contact 35 th Wk Bn on right. Command vehicle moved to timsdorf.
Rocket fire received in Rimsdorf.
$22 F$.A. fired 10 min preparation on woods to north. Attack on Schlosshof Farm began against hoy small arms fire.
(Insert \#2; Bn Order for 2 Dec 44).
0905 En arty fire fall on Rimsdorf.
1015 Assault echelon at Phase Line 1 , receiving en arty fire.
1110
1120 " " " $\quad$ " 3.
1200
$A$ and $C / 51$ halted $S$ of Phase Line 4, retd 9 on tanks in Schlosshof Farm Area. Air spf re vested; 2 air atks dispersed on tanks.
1415 Assault echelon moved out behind-A/8 to atc objective, receiving large cal on arty fire.
1442 objective taken.
$1730 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ in position on right of $\mathrm{C} / 51$.
$30400 \mathrm{C} / 51$ outpost missing in Le Burbusch.
0745 Rocket fire fell on Rimsdorf. Situation remained the same.
4 Situation remained the same.
51100 Vehicles ordered moved up to Rimsdorf.
1200 Atchd to CC"A," ordered to move $N$ through Domfessel.
1440 Bn Column moved out toward Domfessel, in the order B, A, Hq, C.
1530 Head of column passed Damfessel.
$1700 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ entered Schmittvillor without opposition.
0700 Cos moved into posh for ats on Binding.
( Ins ort \#3 Bn Crier for 6 Dec 44)

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DEC.}-\frac{TIME}{0750}\mathrm{ Arty and smoke preparation began.
    0800 Assault echelons hold up by flank fire from Singling; B/51 and B/37 ordered
        to atk singling.
    0900 A/51 and A/37 on lst objective, immobilized by hvy on fire.
    1030 B/5l and B/37 met heavy small arms and tank fire in Singling.
    1300 B/51 and B/37 near Wedge of Singling; l en SP gun destroyed, 1 SP gun dam-
        aged, over 60 PW's taken.
    1630 CC"B" began relief of B/51 and B/37.
        Information received on projected relief by }12\mathrm{ A.D.
(Insert #4; CC"A" Instructions for Initial Withdrawal of Troops from Area.)
7 1630 C/5l ordered baok to Schmittviller; Bn remained in posn.
8 0l30 Bn moved out for initial assembly area, in the order A, Hq, B, C.
    0430 Bn closed in assembly area l Km SW of Rimsdorf.
    0730 Bn moved out for rear assembly area.
9 N15 Bn closed in rear assembly area in Bidestroff.
10 0730 Moved out to new assembly area in Gueblange and Gelucourt.
    1030 Closed in ruw assembly area.
11-17 Situation unchenged.
18 0430 Rcvd warning of en paratroop activity from CC"A".
    1000 Rcvd orders from CC"A," for anti-paratroop patrolling.
(Insert #5 CC"A," Order 18 Dec 44 for "Systematic Road Patrol."
    1200 CC"A" order cancelled.
    1900 Bn alerted for l-hr movement.
    2230 Bn prepared for l-hr movement.
130100 Warning ord rovd from CC"A": CC"A" mvs at 190900. IP is CR on main Dieuze-
        i'ittersheim Rd,N of Rorbach, S of Cutting. Each Bn and Soparate co. send
        an advance bicouac party to rpt to Col WITHERS at CC"A" hqs. at 0800. Radio
        nets remain open; radio silenoe. Map; Verdun-Wissembourg Sheet 57.
    0300 Revd orders for movement to vic Longwy.
(Insert #6; CCA Laroh Order 19 Deo 44)
    0830 Bn moved out as ordered.
(Insert #7, Br. Narch Order 19 Dec 44)
    0 9 1 0 ~ A s s e n o n c o u r t . ~
    0925 Guermange.
    1000 I.P.
    1010 Domnom-les-mouze.
    1020 Narimont-les-Renestroff.
    1030 Benestroff.
    1040 Rermering.
    1050 Morhange
    1115 Baronville.
    1120 Destry.
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DEC TME
I9 IlSZ Brulange.
        1136 Arrainoourt
        1145 Vatimont.
        1200 Han-sur-Nied.
        1210 Bechy.
        1220 Luppy.
        1227 Buchy.
        1230 vigny.
        1250 cheminot.
        1315 Lesmenils.
        1400 Pont A Kouseon.
        1412 Vandiores.
        1420 Pagny-sur-Moselle.
        1430 Arnaville.
        1433 Bayonville.
        1437 Onville.
        1445 Chambley.
        1505 Puzioux.
        1520 Mars.
        1535 Jarny.
        1600 Briey.
        1610 Avril.
        1630 Bn assembled in Trieux, awaiting orders to move.
    1915 bn moved out as ordered.
(Insert #8, Bn march Order 1800, 19 Dec 44)
    Bn Hqs passed:
    2030 Audun.
    2045 Beuvillers.
    2115 Aumetz.
    2125 Crusnes.
    2145 Brehain.
    2205 Villers.
    2215 Haucourt.
    2 2 4 0 ~ L o n g w y .
    2325 Aubange.
    2400 Messancy.
20 0l25 Bn Assembled in Clemency. Local police and volunteers were patrolling
        streets as a result of rpts of on paratroopers.
    1200 Many refugees moved into town.
    1215 Rcvd orders to move to Handelange.
    1220 Orders changed to move to Toernich.
    1330 Bn moved outas ordered.
(Insert #9: Bn march Order 1230, 20 De0 44)
        Bn Hqs passed:
    1410 Selange.
    1420 Hondelange.
    1450 Wolkrange.
    1535 Bn outposted Toernich.
    1600 Rovd orders for movemont of task force.
    1630 Task Force Rockefoller moved out as ordered.
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(Insert \#10: Bn Order 1615, 20 Dec 44).

20200 TFR retd in position; road blocks prepared, but not in place due to presonce of friendly tops in front.
$21 \quad 1315$ Cos alerted for 30 -minute movement.
(Insert \#ll; CC"A" Opns Overlay 21 Dec 44).
1500 Order issued for movement to north.
1800 Bn moved out of Toernich.
(Insert \#12: Bn Order 1500, 21 Dec 44). Bn His passed
1850 I.P.
1920 Stoker.
1925 Heinsch.
2040 Bn assembled in Tatter.
220515 Bn Moved out of Tatter.
0615 Bn Hq passed Chiaumont.
0730 Bn His passed Nobressart.
0745 CC"A" broke raric silence.
0755 Head of Chm 1 Km N of red phase line (Heinstert).
0800 Uni aircraft, believed V-1, flew low over chm from N.
$0805 \mathrm{CC"A}^{\prime \prime}$ directed ran to investigate all towns on flanks; no enemy to be bypassed.
084025 Cav retd bridge bl own P 612333.
0900 Clem halted, waiting for A/25 to ron route.
$0930 \mathrm{~A} / 25$ retd crater in road at $P$ 563365. Engr started bridging crater. $T F$ Oden ordered to join TF Alanis route at RJ P 572335.
0940 bn Hq at Heinstert.
113525 Cav rpt ink no en at P 594396.
1200 Order issued for att on Martelange.
(Insert \#13: Bn Order 1200, 22 Dec 44).
1230 Rcn/51 retd Perle clear.
124025 Cav retd to CCB they rove 3 rds HE direct fire $N$ of CR P 606357, driven back by on small arms fire vic P 606357; fwd elms 25 Cav ic $P$ 625305; retd hoy en vehicular traffic E of CR P 606357.
1330 A/51 began atc.
$1400 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ entered Martelange.
$1430 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ near center of tow, rovg hoy bazooka and small arms fire from buildings $\pi$ of main road.
1600 A and $\mathrm{B} / 51$ meeting stiff resistance in center of town.
1700 Plat $B / 51$ pinned down on slope W of livy by hoy MG fire from houses at P 567386
1800 Plat $B / 51$ and section $B / 85$ att on pocket at $P 567386$ fran S.
2000 Pocket reduced, 7 side of town cleared.
230130 A and $B / 51$ retd Lartelange cleared up to river. Bridge on Radelange road retd passable on foot only.
$0300 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ crossed river on Radelange road bridge.
$0500 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ in poss on high ground NW of Martelange without opposition. Corps engrs started to $r$ enair bridge. $B / 51$ secured Martelange.
0530 Bn CP moved into Martelange.
10003 rds en arty record Martelange.

23133 C 1 rd AP rovd Martelango.
1480 Bridge completed; TF Oden moved out; TF Alanis prepared to follow in support.
$1500 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ returned to vehicles.
15157 rds on arty rovd Martelange.
1600 TF Oden held up by direct fire from P 560410.
1645 Resistance reduced, clm continued march.
$1815 C^{\prime \prime} B^{\prime \prime}$ rptd to $C C^{\prime \prime} A^{\prime \prime}$ that on vehicles were moving $S$ on Bastogne-Martelange Rd.
1930 Bn Hqs moved out of Martelange.
2000
Ron $/ 51$ rptd TF Oden held up by 20 mm and small arms fire 3 of Warnache C/51 lost two half-tracks. Tanks moved NW to left of road. Plat of $\mathrm{C} / 51 \mathrm{with}$ a plat of limht tanks suffered hvy oasualties in atk on Warnaoh, and were withdrawn.
2030
0430
$B / 51$ mounted on $B / 35$ followed TF Oden $W$ of highway.
Head of T.F. Alanis Clm SW of Warnach.
$0530 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ and $\mathrm{B} / 35$ mod E to atk Farnach.
0605
$B / 51$ held up at odge of Narnaoh by 2 on tanks:
$0735 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ and $\mathrm{B} / 35$ two thirds of way through Warnach.
$0745 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rptd en in $N$ odge of town est 1 tank and 30 inf.
$0900 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ withdrew behind ohurch to permit arty fire on N part of town.
$1000 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ and $\mathrm{R} / 35$ resumed Warnach atk after arty proparation.
1030
1200
1330
B/51 rptd steady progress.
$A / 51$ and $C / 35$ began atk on woods $N$ of Warnach.
$1430 \quad \mathrm{~N} / 51$ AT gun silenced.
1435 CC"A" rptd on had defended Warnach with 2 bns on 23 Dec.
$1440 \mathrm{~B} / 51 \mathrm{rptd}$ near end of Warnach.
$1450 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rptd rescue of personnel from $C / 51$ and friendly ongr unit held by Germans in Warnach.
$1540 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rptd rong considerable fire in NE Warnach.
$1645 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ rptd at P.L. 3 ( 2 km NW of Warnach) 。
$1715 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rptd Warnach clnared.
$1720 \mathrm{C} / 35$ at P. L. 4; A/51 mvg toward P.L. 4 (Tintange-Strainchamps road).
$1800 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rptd on atk fram woods NE Warnach; arty concn on $P 558432$ repulsed on atk.
$1930 \mathrm{~B} / 35$ repulsed on infiltrating toward Warnach.
(Insert \#14: CC"A" F.O. H?, 24 Deo 44).
250800 Pl at. $\mathrm{C} / 51$ mvd on Strainchamps.
(Insert \#15; Bn Order 2200, 24 Dec 44).

0915

Ln 0. rotd $1 / 318$ at $P$ 567435, 100 yds fram LD, rong small arms fire. $\mathrm{C} / 51$ rptd Strainchamps cleared without opposition, continuing adv to N, rong small arms fire. Rong mortar fire. C.C. rpta minefield and trip wires at $P 538450$.

A/35 rptd locn P. L. 1 (Strainchamps-Honville rd).
C/51 rptd locn P. L. 1.
$A / 51$ ordered to move fwd after $D / 35$ swept area to $N$. $C / 51$ rptd $\mathrm{mvg} N$ from woods $P 530450$.

1315 1410 A/51 rete 10 cn just $S$ of P.L. I.
1430 Ln 0 . retd $1 / 318$ took many P.W. is
1430 Ln O. retd $1 / 318$ took many P.W.'s in Tintange, resistance light. $1630 \mathrm{C} / 51$ retd loon 50 yds S of Hollange, rang mortar, rocket, and AT fire. 1645274 AFA Ln plane retd conan en rah and personnel in Hollange.
$1700 \mathrm{C} / 51$ patrol retd drawing fire from Hollange.
(Insert \#16: Bn Order, 25 Dec 44).
0800 Plat $C / 51$ and 2 plats $A / 35$ start atc on Hill 490 .
0945 Adv elms. $C / 51$ and $A / B 5$ rpt $\operatorname{locn}$ PoL. 3 (Rd E from Hollange), rcvg arty from NE, direct fire from $N$ and NW, small arms from Hollange.
0950 Requested air spot from CC"A," also obs of Hollange-Hill 490 area by arty en plane.
$1000 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ rpt loon P.L. 2 ( 500 yds N of StrainohampsmHonville rd). 318 Inf retd 600 yd advance from last night's posnse.
1015 Plat $B / 35 \mathrm{mvd}$ up to pt $A / 51$.
$1100 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ retd loon $S$ of $P$. L. 3 (vic Hill 460) with left flank on hwy and right flank at $P$ 545470, rang arty fire.
1111 C. O. rpt mines at RJ P 539471.
$1130 C C^{\prime \prime} B^{\prime \prime}$ retd loon vic $P 525491$.
1145 A 51 retd being strafed by planes from their rear.
1150 CC"A," retd en clam mig S on Bastogne hwy last seen at P 545510 at $1130 \mathrm{hrs}$.
$1155 \mathrm{~A} / 51 \mathrm{rptd} 200 \mathrm{yds} \mathrm{S}$ of P . L. 3 in contact with $\mathrm{C} / 51$ on left. Plat $\mathrm{B} / 35$ retd 200 yds $S$ of $A / 51$.
1200 Requested air spt from CC "A" against en chm.
1205 CC"A" retd air sit already looking for en chm.
$1208 \mathrm{C} / 51$ and $\mathrm{A} / 35 \mathrm{rpt}$ on rocket fire from N .
$1210 C^{\prime \prime} A^{\prime \prime}$ retd on chm no longer visible, but air sot would atc on gun posns 600 to E C C is NE of Hollange.
$1215 \mathrm{C} / 51$ retd loon P. L. 3, rang small arms fire from woods to NE,
1245318 Inf retd loon $T$ of Honville.
1400 Plat $C / 51$ and 2 plats $\mathbb{A} / 35$ on Hill 490, rang fire fran Hollange.
1425 Arty preparation began on Hollange.
1430 A. 51 at P. L. 3, rang small arms fire from right front.
1437 Arty lifted fran Hollange; 2 plats $C / 51$ and plat $A / 35$ began auk on town.
$1500 \mathrm{C} / 51$ retd. P. W. 's being taken in Hollange.
1540318 retd rang considerable arty but little small arms fire in Hollange.
$1550 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ retd mig in on right of $\mathrm{A} / 51$ to make contact with 318 .
1605 $C^{\prime \prime} A^{\prime \prime}$ retd on aircraft active.
$1700 \mathrm{C} / 51$ retd Hollange almost cleared of en.
$17103 / 318$ retd Honville taken.
$1730 \mathrm{C} / 51$ retd Hollange taken.
270755 Arty prop fired on Sainlez and Aux-Fourchons.
0800 Attack began as flamed.
$0900 \mathrm{C} / 51$ an P.L. $4 \mathrm{~A} / 51 \& B / 51200 \mathrm{yds}$ south of P. L. 4.
$0940 \mathrm{C} / 51$ held up by fire on right (543488)
0950 A/51 150 yds SP. L. 4.
0955 Friendly air rets 8 on bks vic 5551.
100035 Tk Bn will fire on enemy at 543488.
$1010 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ ordered to move according to plan.
102235 Tk Bn moved to support $\mathrm{C} / 51$.
1040318 on high ground just N Liverchamps.
1055 N 51 just $N$ P.L 4, awaiting arty concentration on Sainlez. Will attack immediately after concentration.
$271180 \mathrm{C} / 51$ proparing to take houses aloag main road at $P$. L. 4 , supporting tank
$1186 \mathrm{C} / 61$ held up by MG fire Iram bldge on road.
1180 Arty prep plaoed on sainiez.
$1155 \mathrm{~N} / 51$ reooiving mortar fire.
$1220 \quad \mathcal{W} / 51$ ordered to more on Sainles upported by fire from $B / 51$.
1245 /51 coins quiet.
1305 N 51 has reached churoh in ocetor of resistance, taldng a fow prisanera.
1330318 mored out on right.
$1350 \mathrm{C} / 51$ \& $\mathrm{B} / 61$ at P. L. 5, $4 / 51$ holde Sainlez. B/61 roports morement in woode
1400
1455318 sum rptd rnocked out in 8ainlez.
1455 B/51 2 ne of Sainlez.

$1630 \mathrm{C} / 61 \mathrm{rpta} 300$ yds I of P. L. 6.
1640 Vohicles moved to Hollange \& vic.
$1642 \mathrm{C} / 51$ held up by a tank.
$1730 \mathrm{C} / 51$ rpts on P. L. 7 recaiving 1900 fire.
$1900 \mathrm{~B} / 51 \mathrm{~N}$ atill pinned by fire.
$2100 \mathrm{C} / \boldsymbol{\mathrm { L }} \mathrm{\&} \mathrm{B} / 51$ abreast on P.L. 7 \& tied in on main highway. "B" receiving ame SA and AT fire. $A / 51(-)$ remains in Sainlez. lst Plt/A Co out posting $N / 35$
(Insert \#18 Bn Order).
$280800 \mathrm{~B} \& \mathrm{C} / 51$ moved off as soheduled.
$0930 \mathrm{~B} \& \mathrm{C} / 51$ abreast on P. L. 8 meeting no resistance.
1045 One road block \& a fow mines on highway 300 yds
examining for removal.
1048 loth Armd Inf Bn reptd in contact with friendly forces at Bastogne. Bois Buhu \& Bois d' Hazy oleared of enemy.
$1115 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ meeting same resistance at Chateau Losange, $C / 51$ crossing P. L. 8.
1140 mgrs removing two road blocks \& mines.
$1145 \mathrm{C} / 51$ at $P$. L. 9 still moving. 8 onoountering small arms $\& 20$ murire.
$1207 \mathrm{C} / 51$ reaches $P$. L. 10 receiving MG fire.
$1210 \mathrm{C} / 51$ sends patrols to recomnoiter Bl dg at 552540.
$1410 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ atoks Chateau supported by $B / 35$ Tks receiving $S A$. MG fire.
$1550 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ receiving $S A$ \& mortar fire from right flank 318 moving to assist. SA fire from Hill 530 .
4/51 555516 .
1630 Bn Forwd CP moves to Chateau.
1710 Companies tie in C on left, B center, A along trail in last edge of
1710 MG's on Hill 530 continued to harass $C / 51$.
(Insert \#19)

290500 Arty fires at coordinates 56305300 \& 55705310(Lutrebois).
$0800 \mathrm{C} / 51$ \& $\mathrm{B} / 51$ move out as planed.
$0830 \mathrm{C} / 51 \mathrm{rpts}$ left flank pinned down by SA fire \& LG fire.
$0900 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rets receiving SA fire to front.
0920 B/51 moves out.
$0925 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rets receiving heavy MG fire, tanks of $B / 35$ move out on resistance.
0950 B \& C cos dleaning out houses on P. L. 10.
$1025 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ rets one self propelled gun to their right rear in woods. $B \& C$ between P. L. $10 \& 11$ bringing arty to bear on SP gun $\&$ alsc moving tais into position to fire on it.

1030
1045
1100

1105
1430
1500
1530

A/51 ordered to move forward to give close support to B \& C. 10 Armed Inf Bn sending patrols to contact $\mathrm{C} / 51$.
$B / 51$ at $P$. L. 12 receiving same SA fire from NE.
B/51 not in contact with enemy
A/51 in position Bois d' Hazy on P. L. 12 in reserve. B \& C take defensive position joining east on line P 564553 - P 567545 C on left, $B$ on right.

300530 Bn alerted for counter-attack for Vic Lutrebois.
0700 3/134 Inf Bn retd to hold only the west portion of Lutrebois.
0800 Enemy retd to be infiltrating Mortelange-Bastogne hwy west of Lutrebois.
$0830 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ ordered to move into woods west of Lutrebois.
084551 CP attacked by enemy infantry. Mortar fire also fell around the Chateau.
0900 Hq Co, MG Plat, section of tanks A/35 drove off enemy attack. Medical Detachment moved to Vic Hollange.
102020 to 25 enemy tanks rpt moving NW from Lutrimange to Lutrebois.
$1030 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ retd 9 enemy the NW of Lutrebois.
1045 Enemy tanks reported 800 yeds NW of Lutrebois. Air support called for.
$1050 \mathrm{~N} / 51$ rets friendly arty falling short on their positions 1 km west of Lutrebois in woods.
$1055 \mathrm{~N} / 51$ reaches north edge of woods west of Lutrebois. $A$ Co working on 2 enemy tanks east of their position.
$1125 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ taking some prisoners, $B / 51$ moving south to tie in on left of $\mathbb{N} / 51$
1125 Mortar \& arty fire falling near Bn CP (Chateau-Losange).
$1125 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ moved to west side of highway, west of $\mathrm{A} / 51$.
$1315 \mathrm{C} / 51$ in woods $P 563545$.
13502 enemy this moved fran Lutrebois west into woods $P 560529$.
1420 nd Plat $A / 51 \& 2$ tanks $B / 35$ ordered to block trail at P 560517 against hostile attack from North.
$1500 \mathrm{~A} \& \mathrm{~B} / 51$ sweeping woods to SE
$2100 \mathrm{~A} / 51$ unable to tie in on right with 134 Inf Regt mooting resistance Ir on AW \& SA fire in woods $P$ 559529.
$0355 \mathrm{~N} / 51$ separated fr on 134.th by MG fire. Still attempting to made contact. 0720 Patrols from A/51 rpt 1 enemy tr \& 4 enemy SP guns in $P 561529$ near trail.
$0830 \mathrm{~B} / 51$ starts swooping woods west of Chateau north fran Chateau net no resistanoe.

## INSERT \#1

Bn Order for 1 Dec 4 :
Enemy holds east-west line through pimsdorf.
53 rd Armd Inf Bn is on our right; list Bn , lolst Inf on our left. Rimsdorf, and be prepared to comorrow at 0800, secure the high ground east of Artillery preparation on edga of to 0810.

Formation: column of companies-nB", "A", "C்".
Line of departure: "A" Co present podition.
Axis of advance and phase lines: (map).
B/51 mounts on tanks of $\mathrm{C} / 8$ by 0745 , follow planned route and secure high ground east of Rimsdorf.

A/5l follows rapidly on foot, prepared to extend "B" Co's left or attack the southern half of Rimsdorf.

C/51 follows A/51 on foot, prepared to assist either "A" or "B" Co or protect right flank.

Aid station at Q558333; two It tks of D/8 will evacuate casualties. Supplies to companies tonight.
Hand-carry radios.
CO will be with "A" Co;command vehicle remains in Burbach.


EnOrtior for 2 Dec 448

- th TK Bn rpts en inf in woods $N$ and NE of our present posen. 4 en tks sptd in MW edge of Bois d'Altenburg.

53rd Armd Inf Bn is on our right; lat Bn , 101st Inf on our left.
51 atics at 0900 to secure the high ground $N$ of Schlosshof Farm.
Arty preparation on woods $I$ of Bimsdorf from 0850 to 0900.
Formations 4 and $c / 21$ abreast, $C$ on right.
Idine of departure: $B / 51$ present posn.
Boundary, route, phase liness (map).
$A$ and $C / 51$ to have front of approx 200 yds each, with $C / 51$ rt flank guiding on E edge of Nexwald. Just $S$ of Sarre Union-Domfessel road, A and C/51 halt, prepared to follow $\mathcal{L} / 8$ in asssmilt on objective; then take up prescribed posn (map).

B/51 remain present posn until further orders.
did station: same location; adis of evacuation same as axds of advance. Current SOI. Hand-carry radios.
CP - Bimsdorf.

Bn Order /for 6 Dec 4 :
Enemy occupies Singling, Bining, and Rohrbach; for pillboxes and Maginot Line defenses, see defense map.

On our right, 53 and 35 will attack $N$ through Dehling and Rahling; on our left, 10 and 8 will attack Singling; a bn of 328 th Inf will support our atk. 0800.

Arty preparation and smoke on Singling 0750 to 080; thereafter assault guns of 37 continue smoking Singling.
$\mathrm{A} / 704$ will maintain fire on pillboxes E of Singling.
$B / 51$, mounted on $B / 37$, move at 0700 to posn $\bar{W}$ of Bining, and then move on Bining at 0800 .
$A / 51$, in vehicles, follow $A / 37$ at 0700 , move on lst objective (high ground 1 km W of Rohrbach) at 0800; then move on 2nd objective (Rohrbach), and then continue to 3rd objective (high ground 1 km NE of Rohrbach).
$C / 51$ and $C / 37$ move to Vic $Q 607473$ and remain in reserve.
Aid station: Schmittviller; casualties to be evacuated by tank where necessary.

Current SOI.
CO will accompany forward elements in tank; command vehicle will be at $C P$ of 37 NE of Schmittviller.
$\mathrm{Hq} \mathrm{CC"A"}$
Rimedorf $Q 553368$
6 Dec 19山4

## INSTKUC'IIUNS FUR INITIAL WITHDRAWAL <br> OF TROOPS FROM AREA

1. 35 Tk Bn will move and take up a reserve position on high ground vic Hill 356 ( 594430 ), south of crossroads at 003451 . Movement tonight will be completed by 070530. This bn will remain in reserve position until moved to assembly area on order CG CC"A", 4th Arm Div.
2. A medium tank bn from 12th Arms DIv will leave its present position near Kirrberg ( 5125 ) about $0705 \theta 0$ to take up a position west of the N-S road and in the vic of 606402. 35 Tk Bn will furnish an officer and non-commissioned officer as guides for this bn. Guides will report to G-3 Lith Arms Dir at 070600. Div Fwd CP is in west end of Domfessel. Route of March: Domfessel, Lorentzen, Rahling, CR at 003451 , assembly area ( 006412 ).
3. Units will remove all trains and resupply vehicles from the area north and east of the $L^{\prime}$ eichel river which flows through Lorentzen and Voellerdingen. Movement will occur tonight and be completed so as to have all these vehicles closed in their trains areas by 070530. Thereafter there will be no forward movement of trains except by the 37 Tk Bn which may have a minimum of resupply vehicles only. Assembly area of trains: present area unless these areas are north of l'Eichel river in which case trains will move to vic of That (568348).

EARNEST

## MULLOCK

S-3
$\mathrm{H}_{2} C C$ "A" $\dot{L}_{A D}$ Loudrefing, France 18 Dec 山 4.

TV: CO Div Arty, 35 th Mk Bn, 53rd Inf, 5lst Inf.

1. A systematic road patrol has been ordered by Division to guard against enemy paratroops which may be in the 4 th Arm Div area or may be dropped in the area in the future.
2. CC "A" has responsibility for an area as shown on attached overlay. For the purpose of conducting this patrol, and only in this connection, CC "A" troops include the Artillery Command, 53 rd Arm Inf Bn, 5lst Arm Inf Bn, and $35 \mathrm{th} \mathrm{Tk} \mathrm{Bn}$. Unit responsibility: See overlay. Patrols commence at daylight 18 December 1944 and continue until further orders.
3. Each battalion will maintain thorough coverage of its assigned area with a minimum of three patrols operating simultaneously and as many more as is necessary to accomplish its mission. Each patrol will consist of not less than 2 or more than 3 vehicles, one of which must be a light tank or a half track; each patroll will consist of at least 8 men . The remainder of the Battalion will be organized as a Reserve ready to reinforce a patrol in its area on call.
4. Units are cautioned against setting up a patrol on a road which has not been cleared on mines. $\mathrm{Na}^{+}$.
5. a. Ans will open sufficient radio nets to provide for continuous commanications with patrols.
b. CC "A" Command Net will open at 100700. 51, 53, 35 and Div Arty will remain in this not until further orders. Hourly reports will be made to this Hq by radio; any unusual report may be made by telephone.

- 0. Div Arty, 53, 51, and 35 will submit an overlay and plan for patrols to this hq by 181000 .

EARNEST
CG
m.URDOCK
. S-3
In addition to original instructions ( 18 Dec 44): Patrols will be instructed to be suspicious of all civilians. No civilian movement outside of towns will be permitted, and civilians must remain indoors after dark.

EARNEST
MURDCCK

SECRET
AUTH: CG. CC "A"
Initial HCP
DATE 19 Dec

Hq CCMá", LAD
Loudrefing, France 19 Dec 4

## March UHLan

$M_{\text {ap: }}$ Europe Road map: $1: 200,000$ - Sheet 57.

1. CC"A" moves at 090019 Dec in one chm to assy area vicLONGNT. The Command may bivouac the night of 19-20 in the area BRIEY-AUDUN.
2. a. OKUbH OSOMAKCH

| 35 | 0900 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Hq CC"A" and Plat B/489 | 0940 |
| 51 | 0955 |
| A/24 and Plat/995 | 1030 (Join clem at CUTTING) |
| A/46 |  |
| Hq Div Arty) | 1045 |
| 66 |  |
| 94 | 1055 |
| 53 |  |
| A/\& B/25 | 1210 |
| Ins (Incl A/120 | 121,5 |

b. Route Hwy D-126 - CG 131 - N 74 - N 399 N 410 - PONT-A-LCUSSCN. N on hwy N $52-N 52-B-N 400-N 52$ to destination. (Marked map atchd).
c. I.P.; RJ. Route D35 and D120.
d. Average rate of march - $12^{\frac{1}{2}}$ MPH.
e. Halts: First halt 1045, thereafter 10 minute halt every two hours ending on the hour.
3. a. There will be no movement from Bivouac areas until time ne cessary
to hit IP.
b. Each unit establish in with preceeding unit.
c. Limited $\mathbb{M P}$ traffic control by CC. Units will post ova guides at critical points.
d. "A" Trains march with units. "B" Trains remain in unit Div areas till ordered out by CC S-4. Service Co. Cmdrs report to CC S-4 at CP CC "A" at 080019 Dec .
e. Areas and billets will be policed prior to departure.
f. Advance parties for each bn and separate unit will be limited to one (1)
ton truck. Report to IP at 0800 to Colonel Withers.
4. Radio - Nets silent.

EARNEST
OFFICIAL:
Comdg
MURDOCK

Bn march order 19 Dec $\psi_{4}$ :
Enemy has launched counter-offensive with at least eleven divisions in our list Army zone. (For details, see Ln O's Rpt for 17-18 Dec Lh). infamy air CC"A" moves at 0900 to assy area vic LNNGNY, but may bivouac for night in
Briey-Audun. area Briey-Audun. 51 moves at 830 to cross IP at 0955.
CC order of march: $35, \mathrm{Hq} C \mathrm{CN} \mathrm{A}$, Plat $\mathrm{B} / 489,51, \mathrm{~A} / 24$, Plat 995 , $\mathrm{A} / 40$, in q Div Arty, $60,94,53, A / 25, B / 25$, This (incl $A / 126$ ). Route: Gueblange- Gelucourt Co , Med, $\mathrm{B}, \mathrm{A}$, hint, A Tins.
(thence, see CC"A" march order). IP. RJ route D35 and Dl20.
Average rate of march: $12 \frac{1}{2} \mathrm{kPH} .70 \mathrm{yds}$ between vehicles.
hour. Halts: list halt 1045, thereafter 10 min halts every two hrs ending on the
Staff establish ln with preceding unit and control traffic. "B" tans remain in area. Serve Co Cmdr rpt to S-4, CC"A" at 0800. Ran plat lar with one $\frac{4}{4}$ ton truck rpt to Col Withers at IF at $08: \mathrm{C}$. Radios on listening silence.

Bn march order 1800, 19 Dec Wm:
Major unit moves to Arlo (Belgium) at 1930).
51 moves to Clemency (Luxembourg) at 1915.
Order of march: same.
route: Audun, Aumetz, Longuy, Route N-18 to Aubange, Messancy, Cluency. Rate of march: 8 MPI; use cat-eye lights. fen plat move out at once to post guides, find billets in Clemency and ron kessancy-Clemency road.

Radios on listening silence.

In march order 1230, 20 Dec 44:
40 to 00 enemy in civilian clothes are reported in this area. En retd at itedange. In is expected to atc at Norille. En tanks retd at P587046, P435023, and Longvilly (F O460). 130th Pa Lehr Div retd at Wardin (P 0056 ). Large scale en at expected at P5558. US tanks reva small arms fire at P558508. Pillbox at Po 08520. Att is expected at P0347. Unidentified tanks rota at P5oo5. En inf rot at P 605505 . German forces retd moving down from AAchen sector. Div Hq is in Arlo. CC"B" at 0230 retd no en contact $N$ of Arlin. 51 will move to Toernich at 1330 to outpost town.
Under of march: same.
Route of march: Selange, Hondelange, Wolkrange, Toernich.
Ron Flat place road guides and furnish billeting party.
Radios on listening silence.

Bn order 1015, 20 Dec Lu4:
Enemy information same.
$\mathrm{D} / 35$ is in posn N and NE of Arlon.
51 will send a task force at once under cmd of Capt rockafeller, consisting of C/5l, section Ren Flat/51, D/35, assault gun plat/35, plat $A / 24$, to establish road blocks N and NE of Arlon.

C/51, section $\mathrm{rcn} / 51$ and $\mathrm{A} / 24$ will move at once, picking up assault guns $/ 35$ at Arlon, to join $D / 35 \mathrm{~N}$ of Arlon, prepare 3 defended double road blocks $N$ and $N \mathrm{E}$ of Arlon, and patrol between roads of the road net. Road blocks will be prepared but not actually put in position as long as friendly troops are known to be in front of them. TF/CP in vic junction of 3 roads.

Remainder of bn remain in posn prepared to move to reinforce TF Rockafeller.
Radios on listening silence except in emergency.

Hq CC"A" 4 AD
Initial HCP Lidange, Bel rim

Date 21 Dec 44

FU \#1
Maps: Virton, Tintigny, Arlo, Luxembourg, Luebuy, Vielsalm.

1. a. See Int elligence Overlay.
b. III Corps atks to the North with Divisions abreast from right to left 80th Div, 20 th Div, 4 th Armed Div. 4 th Arm Div ats with COs abreast, CO "A" on the right, with Res Comp following CC"A" by bounds on Div order. 25 Cav ( $-\mathrm{A} \& \mathrm{~B}$ ) will screen to North of CC"B" and upon contact protect left flank of the Division. CC"B" will maintain contact with CC"A" and be prepared to screen the movements of CC"A" and artillery into their atk positions.
2. CC"A" will move to atm poss during night 21-22 Dec and atm to North at H-Hour (see overlay). Both Task Forces will cross Phase Line "RED" at H-Hour.


Lit T CULUMN (ANNIS)
$51 \operatorname{Inf}(-1 \mathrm{co})$
Co /35 (B)
A/24 ( 1 plat 12 Br Trek)
A/704 ( - 1 plat)
274 FA Bn
Medical Support

## RIGHT COLUMN (OLEN)

35 th Pk Bn (-leo)
C $1 / 51$ (C)
rlat/A24 plus 2 Br tr
Plat /A/704
00 FA Bn
inedic:al Support
3. a. A/25 operate under CC control. hove at once and establish screen to North of $\bar{C} C$ "A" along Phase Line "RED" (See Opns overlay). Report when screen is established. Establish and maintain contact with 20 Div on our right. hove to North and screen CC "A" on CC order; upon contact with enemy, report and develop situation until main forces come up, then screen right flank of CC"A".
b. TF ALANIS assemble this afternoon vicinity TUENICH; move to atm assembly area $N$ of ARLON on CC order after dark; atm North crossing Phase Line "ai" at H-Hour. (See Chs overlay).
c. TF ODEN assemble this afternoon (less outpost forces) vicinity WOLKRANG; move to atc assembly area $N$ of ARLCN on CC order after dark and con-. solidate outpost forces into Task Force there; at North crossing Phase Line "R ie v" at H-Hour (See Cns overlay).
d. Arty will move to positions along route of respective columns \%est of ARLON afternoon 21 Dec. Be prepared to support movement of Task Forces curing their assembly night of $21-22 \mathrm{Dec}$, and support the ats to the North. Registration not permitted.
(1) All units be especially alert for enemy air atks; local security will be constant and thorough.
(2) TF Cmdr ron routes as far North as rinse Line "nim" this afternoon; minimum number of vehicles.
4. a. "A" Trains with units; held to a minimum.
b. Task Force Cmdrs arrange with subordinate unit cmdr immediately for supply of same.

Bn order, 15 0, 21 Dec 44:
101st Airborne Div and elements of 9 th and lUth Armed Dive have been cut off in Bastogne by German counter-offensive. Nearest retd en at Redange. 14 tanks at Grosbous. 3 bridges out in Martelange. Road crate $S$ of Martelange. (See also intelligence overlay).

CC"A" atks $N$ at "H"-Hour in 2 clos: Task Force Alanis on the left and Task Force Eden on the right. CC"B" moves on the left of CC"A"; A/25 moves out today to secure CC"A" atc assy areas and ron to $N$ until en is contacted, then screens right flank of CC"A".

Task Force Alanis consists of $5 l(-C), B / 35, A / 704, A / 24$, with 274 in support. Task Force Alanis assembles in Toernich and moves at 1800 to atm assy area vic Tattert; atks N at H-Hour, advances in zone of action to destroy the enemy, and effect contact with friendly forces surrounded in Bastogne. Order of March:

Advance Guard ( $\infty$ - Capt Rockafeller) Ran/ 51 and Ren/704, Plat A/51, Plat $B / 35$, Plat $A / 704$, Squad $A / 24$ and bridge truck, 1 med $\frac{1}{4}$ tan.

Main Body: $A / 51(-), B / 35(-), A / 24(-), H_{q} \& H q \mathrm{Co} / 51$, lied $/ 51, B / 51, A / 704(-)$, 1 med $\frac{i}{4}$ ton, A ins. ( 274 initially in porn vic stockem, then follow rear of column.

Route, boundaries, phase lines: (see ops overlay).
Ren/5l, with plat rcn/704 atchd, moves at once to ron assy area and set up outposts to N .

Radios silent until first enemy contact.

In order 12 O, 22 Dec 4:
En rotd in and around lartelange; $A / 25$ revd $k$ fire from $W$ end of Haut liartelange.

TF Uden supports us by fire from high ground $N$ of ferle.
TF ilanis atks immediately to clear martelange, and secure a crossing over the river.

Formation: $A / 51$ and $B / 51$ abreast, $A$ on the right.
Boundary between Cos: Arlon-Bastogne highway.
A/51 on foot, supported by plat B/35, clears Haut liartelange, outposts it, prepared to continue on to river abreast of $B / 51$ and secure a bridgehead. $B / 51$, mounted on 2 plats $B / 35$ and sec $A / 704$, moves out when $A / 51$ reaches haut diartelange, and clears $W$ sid of town up to river, prepared to secure a bridyehead.
$A / 24$ be prepared to repair martelange bridge after bridgehead is secured. CP initially at P504357, then follows axis of advance. Hand-carry radios.


## F.O. \#2

## MAPS TDITIGNY, BASTOGNE ( $1 / 50,000$ )

Hq CC nA", 4 A.D. Martalange, Belgium 24 December 194

1. a. See Intelligence Overlay. right CC $\frac{D_{B},}{}$, CC Arms Div. continues attach North with COs abreast from left to hold that tom with 249 th Engr Bn extended West to include BICUNVILNe and will and block portion of Div zone from BIcoNVILuci ( Itch to to MARTha Armand Div. will defend Command, 4 th 1 D , upon relief by 188 and 249 Engrs will move during (Incl). Res Dec to left of CC "B" and auk North, early 25th Dec. and Bn/318
2. CC "A" with last Bn 318 Inf atchd will ark North at 250800 in zone and link up with friendly troops South of BASTOGNE. Formation Inf Ens abreast, 5lst on the left, with 35 th Mk Bn in general support prepared to immediately exploit a breakthrough.
3. a. 51 st Inf with Plat $A / 24$ and Plat $A / 70_{4}$ atchd ats $N$ in zone at 0800, and gain contact with friendly troops vicinity BASTOAN. b. lat Bn 318 with Plat A/24 and Plat A/704 atchd at in zone at 0800 , take town of TINTAGE and drive North and gain contact with friendly troops vicinity BASTOGNE: Bn will assemble vicinity 5642 during noght $24-25$ Dec. and move out in time to atk from ID at 0800. Arty preparation will be on call by cbsr with list Bn . when it reaches ID.
c. 35 th Mk Bn with $\mathrm{A} / 24$ ( -2 Pl at) and $\mathrm{A} / 704$ ( -2 Plat) atchd in general support of both Inf Bis and will coordinate atk with them. Be prepared to exploit a breakthrough at any point in CC zone. Send Ln 0 with list $\mathrm{Bn} / 318$ Inf with radio.
d. Arty: 66, 274 Arm F.A. Bis direct support; 177 F.A. Bn general support. Fire harassing fires during night $24-25$ Dec., and preparation for ats as requested by Combat Commander and Inf Bn Cmdrs. Support the atm.
e. Engross Platoons with Inf Bis responsible for clearing mines from all roads within Inf zone of advance keeping well up to the forward elements. Platoon with list Bn 318 blow all bridges on right flank of zone. $00 \mathrm{~A} / 24$ report to CC "A" CP for coordination.
f. A/25 continue patrols on both flanks of CC "A".
$\mathbf{X}$ (1) In from left to right. CC "A" will send Ln with radio to last $\mathrm{Bn} / 318$ Inf.
(2) Th Co. and Inf Co. in WARNAC ${ }^{12}$ will remain there for security reasons until released to their Bis by CC order.
(3) Units be especially alert against enemy air at and ground infiltration.
4. a. $\mathrm{S}-4$ list Bn 318 Inf Contact $\mathrm{S}-4 \mathrm{CC}$ " A " and arrange for supply.
b. PW evacuation to Bn CP by units; from $B n C P$ to CC "A" enclosures by CC, upon notification from units. c. A/46 Med Co. in PERLE; Collecting Point, NAKTHWNGE.
5. a. CC axis advance: Main road marifuidile to BADTUGNE: Roving CC amd CP along same route.

Hq CC nal 4 th Armd Div. F.O. \#2, 24 December 1944. (Cont'd)
b. Current SOI. Call sign for lst Bn 318 Inf: 25 Dec HJX; 26 Dec IRH.

Emidinct Gung.

OFFICIAL:
mURDOCK
S-3

DISTHIBUTION:
CC "A" File
1st $\mathrm{Bn} / 318 \mathrm{Inf}$
35 th Tk Bn
51 st Armd $\mathrm{Inf}_{\mathrm{Bn}}$ A/704
A/24
66 Armd F.A. Bn
274 Armd F.A. Bn.
4th AD-G-3
CC "B"
Res and
$A / 25$
$A / 46$

## INSERT MW.

$\mathrm{Bn}_{0}$ Order 2200, 24 Dec $4 \mathrm{~L}^{2}$
Conan on vehicles vic Sainles. 10 to 20 en ta ks Vic Chaumont. fin retd massing ta ks $S$ of Blstocut.

CC "A" continues ark North; 1/318 atchd to OC "A" and atke on right of 51; 35 in general support. CC "B" on left of CC "A", 26 th DiV on right.

51 arks at 0800 to adv in zone of action and contact friendly tops. 3 of Bastogne plat $A / 24$ and plat $A / 704$ atchd to 51 ; arty and air on call. Left bdry: RR; rt bay: N-S grid line 55. Adds of adv: Bastogne highway (also bdry. between co.). LD: Strainchamps - Tintange rd. Phase lines ${ }^{8}$ See map.

C Co on left of hwy clear Strainchamps with 1 Flat, with $1 / 35$ in apt on high ground NE of town; then clean out woods and adv N., keeping contact with A Co.

A Co. on right of hwy adv Nabreast of C Co after Strainchamps is cleared.
B Co. remain present poss in rsv until further orders.
Plat A/704 apt $\mathrm{A} / 51$ and $\mathrm{C} / 51$ with 1 sec each.
Plat $A / 24$ sweep rds in zone of adv., be prepared to blow bridges on exposed flanks on order.

Supply and evac: axis of adv.
Current SUI; C.O. will be on axis of adv., Ex. O. in E zone, S-3 in $W$ zone. Capt. Lashinske en C to $1 / 318$.

Bn Urder for 25 Dec $4 山$ :
Large conen en vehicles and personnel rptd in Hollange; en dug in SW of Hollange and on Hill 490; en vehicles rptd in Sainleg.

CC "B" is on the left advancing NW of Lambay Chenet; $1 / 318$ is on the right, moving NW from Tintange.
5.2 atks at 080J, Iissins tie cal e.

C:1, axis of adv., phase lines: same.
LD: A and C Co. present posns.
Plat $C / 51$ with $A / 35$ ( - ) and $\sec A / 704$ mvs $N$ to secure Hill 490; then $C / 51$ (-) with plat $A / 35$ mvs $N T$ and clears Hollange, prepared to continue adv to $N$.

A/5l secures Hill 400, obsss Honville, prepared to continue adv abreast of $0 / 51$ after mollange is cleared.

D/51 rawain in present posn until further orders.
Lort and assailt siun plats be prepared to fire on Hollange or Hill 490 on call.
Arty preparation on Hollange and Hill 490 until 0800, then on call.
Supply and evacuation: same.
Cummunication: same.

Hgs Cc "A" Lth AD
Warnach, Belgium
26 December 1944.

SWary
Authe CO,CC MA
Initials 26 Dec 44
$\stackrel{\bullet}{\bullet}$

## F.O. \#3

1. a. See Intalligence Overlay.
․ CC MB" and Res Cand Lth Armd Div. contimue atk to North night of 20-27 Dec. 6 Cav Squadron will continue its advance North along right Flank of CC "A". 35th Div. arrives in sector between 4th Armd Div and 26th Div and prepares to advance to the Morth, 27 Dec.
2. CC "A" contimues atk in zone to join with friendly forces South of BASMGis at 0800, 27 Dec. Units will move to assembly and defensive areas, as given to Ln Officers this afternoon, when contact with friendly troops is attained. No change in zones of action.
3. a. lst Bn 318 th Inf and 51st Armd Inf will secure towns and objectives within their $r^{\circ}$ zones, supported by 35 th Tk Bn . Each Bn initially hold out a minimum of one company mimus one platoon as Bn reserve. Atk will be pushed vigourously and relentiessly.
b. 35 th Tk Bn support both Inf Bns pasing particular attention to assisting in securing key terrain features.
c. Arty, Air, and 4.2 Mortars missions on call. It is insisted that this be used to the maxdmum. Arty will fire 10 minute precaration from $\mathrm{H}-5$ to H 15 .
d. A/25: Outpost road from MOLLANGici South to BUDaUlis and patrol road from CR at 539556 South to GR East of WARNACH 550425.
e. Tank Destroyers: Block roads within zone of attachment, especially
East of lst Bn 318 Inf sector. roads to East of lst Bn 318 Inf sector.
f. Engineers: Continue present mission. Be prepared to be used as an Inf Reserve in case of counterattack. Probable employment in present zone of action. X. (1) Units will designate air targets as far in advance as possible. Target designation must be speciflc as to type and location.
4. a. CC "A" control Point and Water Point at HuNSSCH (507241)

MARTEJANGE. AXIs evacuation - Main road BASTCGNE to MAKTCNLNGL. Med Co. at Coll. Point at WARNACH.
5. a. Current SOI.
b. GP CC "A": Initially WARNACH, then axis of movement.
$r$ LARNEST

OrFICIAL:

Bn Order 2000, 26 Dec L4:

- 1. a. Elements of 14 th and 5 th Paratroop Regts in contact enemy vehicles in Sainle $\vec{z}$. No details known as to strength or disposition.
$\mathrm{b}_{0} \mathrm{CC}$ " B " on left will continue attack to north tonight. 1/318 on right vic Honville continues attack with like mission of relieving BADTUGris.

2. 51 attack north at 0800 with mission of joining friendly forces south of Bastogne.

Boundaries: West - Strange river; East - 55 N-S brid line.
Axis of advance - Martelange-Bastogne highway.
Phase lines: Same (see overlay II 8)
LD: C and A Co present positions.
3. a. $A$ and $C / 51$ attack abreast with $A$ on right and $C$ on left. Highway is boundary between companies.
b. C/51 will clear woods to north.
c. A/5l attack Sainlez.
d. $B / 51$ remain in present position and support $A$ with fire to iv and NE. After C clears woods, B moves to $P 549482$ and fire on Sainlez from SE. Be prepared to move through $A$ to north.
e. 35 th Tk Bn supports attack.
f. Mortar Plat be in position to fire on call.
g. Assault Gun Plat fires smoke or HE on call.
h. 4.2 mortars fire on call.
i. Arty fires 0755 to 0805 on woods to N. thereafter on call.
4. Supply and Evac - no change.
5. Signal Com - radio.
SECRET
Auth: CG, CCNA":
Initials
27 Dec 19世4

Hqs CC "A" 4th AD Warnach, Belgium 27 December 1944.

$$
\text { F.O.\#4 - MAPS: BASTUGNE } 1 / 50,000
$$

1. a. En situation to our front unchanged other than we know the 5 th Para Troop Divo has been reinforced by elements of 104 Regt $P_{z}$ Gr. Div.
b. Lth Armd Div continues mission of driving North in Zone and establishing contact with friendly elements vicinity BASTCGNE. Crder of units from left to right: CC "A" 9th Armd Div. (Atchd), Res Command, CC "B", CC "A" 4 th Armd Div. CC "A" 9th Armd Div. Continue atk tomorrow; Res. Command, now situated in BASTOCNE, wi-1 sontinue patroling road from ASSENOIS to BASTCGVE and clear out zone; OC iJ" continue atk tonight and join with friendly forces. 35 th Inf Div., on our right, continue atk in zone.
2. CC "A" with Inf. Bns abreast, continues atk to North at $\varnothing 8 \phi \varnothing$ to join with friendly forces, vicinity BASTUGNE. See opns overlay for new boundries.
3. a. 5lst Armd Inf Bn atk North in zone at $\$ 8 \phi \varnothing$, cle aring area from present lines to first road to North, then continue North in zone, join contact with friendly forces.
b. list Bn 318 Inf with Plat $A / 25$ atchd, atk North in zone at $\phi 9 \phi \phi /$, take town of LUTREBOIS, continue North and make contact with friendly forces.
c. 35 th Tk Bn continue present mission. Move D/35 (-) around left flank of 51 st Inf on order Lt. Col. Oden to assist movement of 51 st and reconnoiter in force.
d. Arty - Fire 5 minute preparations from $H-5$ to $H$ for respective Inf Bns prior to their atk. Coordinate No-fire area with © "B" arty. Fire harassing and interdiction fires during night 27-28 Dec.
e. Engrs - Continue present mission. Be prepared for employment as an Inf

Reserve.
f. 4.2 Mortar Cos Continue present mission.
g. Tank Destroyers: Continue present mission. Guard carefully avenues of approach, especially tank avenues. Patrol main road from WARNACH to SAINLEE.
h. Cavalry: Atch one platoon to lst Bn 318 Inf. Outpost West and East flank of CC "A" as per verbal orders of Combat Commander, this afternoon.
4. No change.
5. CC "A" CP WARNACH; forward CP along route of advance.

# EARNEST <br> Gmdg 

OFFICIAL:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { צURUUCK } \\
& \text { S-3. }
\end{aligned}
$$

Bn Erder 2 $2 \phi \phi, 27$ Dec 4山:

1. a. PW's indicate that l4th Paratroop Regt still in contact on North with mission of holding at all costs. 5th Paratroop Div has been rediforced by elements of 104 Regt $\mathrm{Pz}_{\mathrm{z}}$ Gren Div.
b. Res command now in BASTUCNE and hold Assenois - Bastogne road. CC MB" on immediate left continues atk tonight to join with friendly forces. 35 th Div on right continues atk in zone. 318 th on immediate right now located $2 \mathrm{Km} N$ Sainlez.
2. 51 attack north at $\varnothing 8 \phi \phi$ with mission of breaking through to BASTOCNE and opening Martelange - Bastogne highway.

Boundaries: West - West edge L'Arloisiere, thence IM along highway to Bastogne.

## East - Trail (P558513) NE through woods to NW-SE road west of Lutrebois, thence generally along line IutreboisMaruis, not including these town. (see overlay to accompany FO \#L CC "A")

Axis of advance - no change.
Phase lines - 2, 10, 11, 12, 13 added (see overlay \#8)
3. a. $C$ and $B / 51$ move out abreast, $B$ on right, $C$ on left.
b. A/51 remain present position until ordered to move.
c. Arty fires $\phi 755$ to $\phi 8 \phi \varnothing$ on woods north of present position.
d.
4.2 mortars fire on call.
4. Supply and evacuation - Martelange - Bastogen highway.
5. Signal Communication - Current SOI.


## Bn Order Laps, 28 Dec the

1. a. Many holds Hill 53p and town of Latrebois. forces as objective. 1/134 tomorrow with Maris as objective. 3/134 attacks Lutrebois tomorrow. 318 now in CC Mall reserve.
2. 51 attacks north at $\$ 8 \%$ to join Bastogne forces.

Boundaries: - no dare.
Phase lines - no change.
Axis of advance - no change.
LD: - north edge of woods now occupied.
3. a $C$ and $B / 51$ move out abreast, $C$ on left, $B$ on right.

ㄷ. B/51 takes Hill 530 and continues advance.
c. $4 / 51$ remain in support until $3 / 134$ moves up on right in atc on town I. Arty fires on call. Harassing fires on tow of Lutrebois tonight.
4. Supply and evacuation - no change.
5. Signal Communication - Current SOI。







| BATE | IIT OUT | MSG | 47 | SUBUEGT-TANKS AND FETICLE ${ }^{\text {S }}$ |  | T |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| DIC |  | HO | SIUN |  | CCB | $0-2$ |
| 26 | 1085 | 24 | 1005 | Div rpts lge olm en armor going into Dailoeont p9249 fr E no ols at that $\mathrm{pt} / \mathrm{at}$ 1000 more lato |  |  |
| * | 1140 | 8 | 1036 | Lge olm on armor rptd going into Dahlhoooht P7349 fr E HD olm at that PI at 1000 | 9 | CCE |
| * | 1400 | 16 | 1322 | 1000 A TAC/a rpte cons Deralbe motor rah act obsvd mVE both dir btn Boulade P624470 Basohlen P6246 | CCA den | $\begin{aligned} & C C B \\ & G=2 \end{aligned}$ |
| * | 2200 | 30 | 2103 | En olm with 15 tke mvg sir sibrot to Cloohimo direct fire last point olm mig $S$ fr Morhot are has traok laying vohe | $\begin{gathered} \text { on } \\ C C R \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & G-2 \\ & C C A \end{aligned}$ |
| $\cdots$ | 2300 | 31 | 2200 | 2 Armd olme rptd by 53 rd Inf Bn oln mvg 8 EF fr Sibert P4954 other fr Mornet P4553 mvg 1315 at 2145A | O-2 | $\begin{aligned} & 25 \\ & \mathrm{CCA} \\ & \mathrm{CCB} \end{aligned}$ |
| 27 | 0005 | 1 | 2110 | En olm with 15 tke mig $S$ fr sibort to Cloohimon also on clm mpg 8 Pr Morinot | CCB | 25 |
| n | 0042 | 2 | 2200 | En vohe captd w Bastogne ogntaining many CP and other signe used by our trps particulariy 101 B Div. Be carcful of such signs- | G-2 | CCB |
| $\cdots$. | 0938 | 7 | 0845 | What is on sit/re armd olms rptd vic Morhet and sibert last night | 25 | CCR |
| 29 | 1326 | 7 | 1237 | Armd olm mog s fr Houralize air worldng unit | 25 | CCR |
| * | 1440 | 8 | 1430 | Photo inter/at p465623/3 woll oumo AA guns mtd on vehs Dus in. | 25 | CCR |
| 30 | 1430 | 4 | 1212 | 1 tiger royal/ 1 tiger/ 1 mk four dest by friendly fighter bambers vic Lutrebois 10 strafed same vic/same left burning | CCB | G-2 |
| * | 1515 | 6 | 1445 | Air rpts 32 on tks mog N Bastogne P5645 and P5652/1415A | CCB | G-2 |
| * | 1525 | 7 | 1430 | En tk 1 rptd 561520/ 12 on tks rptd 572527 1 on tk and 1 co inf 576518/ 3 on tks 570502 2 on tka 560528/ total no on tks knooked out vic Lutrobois 18- | CCB | G-2 |
| * | 1650 | 10 | 1620 | 1615/1 on tk mivg NE fr P577504 towards Lutrebois | 25 | Gm2 |
| 31 | 1200 | 6 | 1157 | Fr inf rpts 6 on tks mvg along rd ir Villers-La-Bonne-EAU/P570502 | 25 | GCO |
| * | 1335 | 7 | 1140 | 35/Inf Div rpts 6 tks P570503 J225A/ 5 tks P564528 1200A | G-2 | Het |


| $\begin{aligned} & \text { DATE } \\ & \text { DEC } \end{aligned}$ | IN | $\begin{aligned} & \text { OOT MSSG } \\ & \text { HO } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { TMI } \\ & \text { SI } \end{aligned}$ | SUBJECT TANES AND VEHTCLES COPme ${ }^{\text {D }}$ | FROM | T0 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 31 | 1606 | 9 | 1543 | Justioe rpts r.eo counter atok vic Villors p543502 by 2 on tke and undetind inf at 1500/ atok not strong often rpts 2 tks at 561529 at 1520 hrs | CCB | $\begin{array}{r} 10 \\ 8 \end{array}$ |
| * | 1714 | 10 | 1655 | Add on oast for 30 Deo/2 thes type unk dest by friondly arty fire | CCB | $\begin{array}{r} 10 \\ 8 \end{array}$ |
| $\cdots$ | 1810 | 11 | 1755 | 35 I.D. rpte 6 on tks p573484 our arty hit them 1 saall CT atk 1 tk and some inf P572499 at 1745 | CCB | $\begin{aligned} & \text { G-2 } \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ |
|  |  |  |  | SUBJEGT RECOMHAISANCE |  |  |
| 22 | 1251 | 3 | 1245 | D of 25 Cav C $P 49$ nug air CP 20/ of 25 CaF at 484345/CP ame Luen/mvi alow no on contaot | 35 | G-2 |
| n | 1520 | 5 | 1500 | D of 25 Car find olms AT CP 20 and migy into Witry/all other dispositions unohnged | 35 | G-2 |
| " | 2003 | 11 | 1725 | 25 Cav CP at 496422/D 35 CP at 470402 with plts at CP 3 and CP 20 and $O$ P at 478440 C 25 Cav CP 508445 | 35 | CCB |
| 26 |  | 13 | 1215 | 25th Cav CP loon 489449 | 35 | G-2 |
| - | 1340 | 15 | 1310 | 25th Car fiwd olma 464472/CP 42/475484 495474/ 507479/no on contaot | 35 | Hot |
| 27 | 1940 | 22 | 1800 | 25th CP no ohange/with OP at P494482 with OP at P52750/523495/526485/fwd 518459/no an cas/no en oontact today | 35 | Hot |
| 28 | 1134 | 7 | 430 | 25th Cav CP 75/CP 118 tr oocn no obange | 25 | G-2 |
| * | 1200 | 8 |  | Ptrl rpts CP 73 olear of on | 25 | CCB $\mathrm{G}=2$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | CCB |
| $\cdots$ | 1250 | 13 |  | Morhet olear 271555 a oleared Marge Reetio 280915A one one-half HRR olm traveling E from St Hubert to Moirey thru river | CCB | 602 |
| * | 1750 | 17 | 8705 | 25th Cav CP at CP 118/D of 25 CP at 72 with OP at CP 73/533507/528495/R of 25 Cav GP at CP 118 with OP at 527444/520474 on oas today 2 pwherg no en contact | 25 | 0-2 |
| 29 | 0830 | 2 | 0825 | Quiet night/no on act rptd | CGB | G-2 |
| - | 1508 | 9 | 1450 | 25th Cav GP Loan Hompre | CCB | 0-2 |
| $\cdots$ | 2010 | 13 | 1920 | 1914/unident obj and atreak of fire passed over GP 72 fr S /obsd in air for approx 5-8e0- |  | $0-2$ |
| 30 | 1600 | 9 | 1555 | Re out 1445/assault gun rpt no on aot obed. around that vic $-70$ | G-2 | $48$ |





| $\begin{aligned} & \text { DATY } \\ & \text { DEC } \end{aligned}$ | OUT | $\begin{aligned} & \text { usg } \\ & \text { HO } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { TD' } \\ & \text { SI } \end{aligned}$ | SUBJECT MESSAGE OUT CONTED | FRCM | 50 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 23 | 1155 | 2 | 1100 | 3 vehe obs on rd vic 542417/unk if fr or an look like US peops/obs heard 3 tike mivg vic 560411 fr 0830 to 0930 at 15 min interval/ $s$ sim tk trks 2,000 to 3,000 yds W of that pt/ saw 3 en soldiors at $8 W$ edge of woods vic 549415 heard on SA fire coming fr vic 562413 | $\begin{array}{r} s / 2 \\ 51 \end{array}$ | CCA |
| $\cdots$ | 1215 | 3 | 1109 | 1 PW oaptd this nang at Martolange ident 3rd Bn Hq 15 Para Regt was attached to 10 Co with 8 other men of whom he was in charge states 10 Co had 120 men and 4 tks in town/2 of the tks were Us oaptd/states he came fr Baohlfiden 6246/yesterday on foot/ 10 Co was here night before last/oame fr Tintange 5744 | $\begin{array}{r} 8 / 2 \\ 61 \end{array}$ | CCA |
| N | 1240 | 4 | 1202 | 1 PT oaptd Martelange ident 10 Co 15 Para Regt/confirme info given by other pirs | $\begin{array}{r} 8 / 2 \\ 51 \end{array}$ | CCA |
| n | 1520 | 5 | 1216 | Bolgian Off at Martelange tates vic woman ocming ir Radelonge 550400 this mong rpts 2 en dressed in uniform of 08 soldior with US peop staying in house at $N$ edge of town/off is willing to lead party to capture them | $\begin{aligned} & 8 / 2 \\ & 51 \end{aligned}$ | CCA |
| * | 1617 | 6 | 1520 | Civ passing along rd fr Bigonville to Martolange says she sam on tks firing fr posn around farm just $I I$ of rd 1 ka $:$ Martelange | $\begin{gathered} 8 / 2 \\ 51 \end{gathered}$ | CCA |
| $\cdots$ | 1640 | 7 | 1570 | 4 ran arty at 105 mm fell in Martelange approx $1520 \wedge$ fr IF | $\begin{aligned} & 8 / 2 \\ & 51 \end{aligned}$ | CCA |
| $\cdots$ | 1804 | 8 | 1700 | Po oas rpt 22 Deo neg/rpt 23 Dec 3 Pive 3 Til $1 \mathrm{kd} / 1$ con captd/ 2 us two and one half $t / t r k s / 3$ pecps recaptd fr on - | $\begin{aligned} & 8 / 2 \\ & 5 \end{aligned}$ | CCA |
| 24 | 1448 | 1 | 1404 | Ron plt rpts brs at 578403 and 578415 intaot/ later not in good condition/ ford at 577429/ on OP edge of woods/at and oratermbleak rd at $574451 /$ rovd sa and mort fire fr Fic 880428- | $\begin{aligned} & 8 / 2 \\ & 81 \end{aligned}$ | COA |
| $\cdots$ | 1745 | 2 | 1655 | 133 PN oaptd Warmach ident $5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 10 / 12 /$ 14 Cos 15 Para Regt and and btry 11 Para. Ar Brig | $\begin{aligned} & 8 / 2 \\ & 51 \end{aligned}$ | $c^{*}$ |
| " | - | 3 | 1740 | En ocmpeletely oleared fr Warnach at//715 eat 80 to 100 on driven lide |  |  |



pw etatee co 600104 per it seleh he comdr 5 ongr ha eapt martale 003 co 5 angr ins it muopeak 0019013 para rogt $1 t$ smider $e 012$ co 23 para regt Int 14 etucmond

## pir captd $n$ acinles idet 2005 mar bue 5 para div. co comdr 11 hildrioh pre fr 1400104 per rapth ante luen rpts 00 acmary 1 it buule 4 jp 7 ec 13 para rost same luen eo it otucwor

 4 towd 20 man guns/ 1 towd 50 men at gum/ 2 norta $80 \mathrm{ma} / 7 \mathrm{ma} / 3$ primemovers for 1 t at gume/ 2 tha/ 1 trk/ 1 us $3-4$ t trk/ 2 us poopis/ 1 staff eardost 1 prime mover for hry at gun captd
pw captd vic woods $n$ mairles ident 700104 pgr rece $m$ polish conscrips state they were carring mort min 0 fr dp in house at 547515 be op at oastle at 555517 Fith posne dug in and woll propared 12 bn op and at ledst2 co of bnatthose 2 places 1 at 547515 alse op $7 \mathrm{co} / 1$ pw 500104 pgr and 1 pw angr co 104 pgr all oaptd sane vic/ mgr coused as inf cane fr chamont 2 days ago/mission rptd by all to hold present posns
plane seon falling inflames vic chaumont ident as on "n by suund of motor only/ occured apprux 2130

20 pws captd vic woods $n$ sainles/ident 2 co 5 at bn states co retreated $n 1 \mathrm{~km}$ at 0400 fighing str of co $8 \mathrm{men} c o \mathrm{comdr}$ it thomas rens of bn formed into 2 custocont fight had 4 sp 88 mm guns dest 2 day ago bn comdr capt funk5 engr bn and 14 para regt 5 para div were in same loon/ pw states pw 6 co 14 para regt states co comdr it thomann told mento save their lives everybody for himself 2 pr 15 brty 3 bn 12 arty regt 5 para div rpte remaining men co colaur li role bn comdr capt miller div comdr brig yen hoilmann state must territiying experience of war was atk by planes using burning gasoline bombs pw $1300104 \mathrm{pgr} /$ states we captd last 150 mm gun in co/ str 40 to 50 mon 00 camor $1 t$ Korn l-auer/ 8 pr 6 btry div arty pzlehr div rpt unit left 22 Dec these menleit behind with-150 mm gun/ 2 pw $3, c o 14$ para regt rpts elme of regt redrg into fighting team equal to approx 16n pr 4 co 4 para regt states cohad 40 men co comdr capt hollionly 1 hvy wepns left in co $/ 2 \mathrm{hvy} \mathrm{mg} / \mathrm{pw}$ ag co 14 para rpts mission of plat to hold us as long as

pr taken by friendly unis/ ident as $7 / 8$ cos 371 regt/s2/51 167 vg div/ 0000700 it sandor/ bw comdrcapthatzonnetter regt 00 lt col zellner/ dir 00 maj genhofker 8 co co lst it froohlich 8 co of 335regt has 4-75man guns horsodrawn also 4 hvy mg and $4-50$ man morts/ 5 days no food/ Pwis taken Ir 77 lah/states 00 2nd bn 2 regt haptstmedeher/sohnello/ 002 regt o bessturmbann fouher/sand/ div oo oberfuere monke trps reached villerama-bonne-cau by tri/short on gas/mission to aurround 2 amor div/ to take a supply dp/ lah end mvy cas in russia 1943 rec 300 ropl out of every 77 div in $20 c$ 43/pw also states about 10-75 or 88men anti-tk guns along rd btn villers-la-bonnemeas and lotrebois $/ 1 \mathrm{pw}$ taken ir 10014 regt 5 para regt 5 para div 1 states co etr approx 30 men/ complotly wiped out today/ very short rations last 2 weeks

012520050

| 1127 | 3 | 1125 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1255 | 4 | 1246 |

$1840 \quad 5 \quad 1335$
$1545 \quad 61454$

2 pw captd 560530 ident 8002 regt lah rpts 1 tk 3 to 4 ag on rd vic 561529 along with 3 dest tiss in same vic/ no hry wans loft in co/ elms of $6 / 7 / 8 / \mathrm{cos}$ total 50 to $80 \mathrm{men} /$ obsvd for sec of the armor/arrivod wilfrs la-bunnelfau 292 400a fr vic stavelot by tri/ bn comdr cas/ new comdr it keil former 00 comdr $8 \mathrm{co} /$ allowance of gas per veh for trip here and mut fr hore 40 liters/ 8 co has hvy moors 120 and med morts $80 \mathrm{~mm} /$ and 1 at gun 75 mm spin organic equip but all have been dest
on cas rpt 30 Dec 44 /total $16 \mathrm{pw} / 12$ evac thru " med channels/ all fr inf $18 \mathrm{kd} / 30 \mathrm{wd} /$
approx 20 rds est 105 memfll 5565131120 dir fr ne
fr inf rpts 6 on tks mvg $n$ along rd fr villers- la- " bonne-eau 1570502

1300/ I on tk obsvd still in posn at 560529 "

2 pw captd vic 559528 idnt 500331 vg rogt 167 Vg " div rpts his $c o$ and 1 othercamud into woods $\theta$ lutrebuis yesterday fr adenau nr pruemm mud thru lutrebuis 0430 today saw $2 t$ tks and 1 plat 77 unit in center of town saw 3 other ths on rd at 562529 crews dismtd approx 35 men with mg dug in around tks/ tks were $\operatorname{Pr} 77$ unit co mud into posn 558528 withdrest approxat 1045 twd lutrebuis mission to secure and hold posns at all costs/ 5 co had 40 men 6 co dest/ 7 and 8 co had hvy cas also in posn woods e Iutrebuis yesterday food revd regular revd hot meal fr field Eitchen last night.

31
183291810

1130112140
regt 267 Vg div mas pegd 901 pgr 4 days ago but couldn't find unit rptd to op for stragglers in lutrenange 5850 at 1400 today bn comdr 3 regt 339 cegt picked up all inf stragglers and took them to regt op in woods vie 563531 off in formed then our arty sion. shelled rt of approach march two lutrebuis in plicted hry cas only 30 men left in bn and stopped atk bn condr org co at regt cp and mud thru lutrebuis at dusk with 70 to 80 men/ this pi left to treat wd on edge of town and beceme lost pw rpts be op lutrebuis/ 1 tk mk 5 parised on rd at 58165172 out of ras/ posn of niebelwerers vic 579534/ axty posn woods ne 1 utremange/ 20 to 20 tks of 77 unit and 77 lah regt conc vic villers $5750 /$ told mission to cut rd and surround 3 us div/ capt weber bn comder old repl bn 26 spoketo men and stated this is last big offort/ if it fails the war is lost
on cas rpt/ $14 \mathrm{kd} / 20 \mathrm{mq}$ / 4 pw total 2 evac thru med channels
civ coming fr Iutreduisa $t$ dusk today rpts large no of in pers and at least2 the in bldge in town/ hry cas buffered by on in town fr arty sav wd beingtreated

Pvenptd Iutrobuis whem anay to join 5 co 329

13011 100

dod 1 pw to en cas rpt 37 Dec fur total of 5/ pw 5 co S2/51 CCA 339 regt 167 vg div rpts reowino food for 3 days/ erew of nebelwfreers. 579534 states they only had 200 rde ammo.


SUBJECT: After Action Report. -
TO : The Adjutant Goneral, idashington, D. C. (THRU C:HaidELS).
In compliance witn Array Regulations $345-104$, Change 3 , the following after action report is submitted for the mont $n$ of January 1945:

Monday, 1 January 1945.
The companies ramained in their previausty held defensive positions (see overlay ifl) witn $C$ on lef't, $A$ in center and $B$ on the right. The smail enemy pocket on the nortneast eage of the forest held it's arouna, wiaed oy the perfect rows of trees wnich furnishea cood fire ianes. an personnel rer.inea or the alert for expectea counter attack from tne east. Supporting artiliery was active. Some mortar iire fell on "C" Company.

Tuesday, 2 ranuary 1945 .
Situation was unchained during the morning. Patrois Irun. "C" Comany reported tait the enem, woret is aparantly 25 yaras in derta and 100 yards in wiath, containine 30 to 40 men and 10 to 12 macnine guns. at cyju the Battulion Commander issued an order to reduce the enemy jocket. (See En Order \#l-s-3 ir for 2 Jan 45). At 105's the and Fattalion of the 134tn Infantry on our right reportod that they had captured 30 SE सी fl in their resumed advance toward the northeast and it was believed that they might nave cone from the jocket. The plan began on schedule and at 1210 A Co hao adanced to the uage ol the woods. The report came at 1337 that the pocket had been reauced withut opposition winc all companies were in their assigned yositions (see overiay $\neq 2$; alone trail in eastern edje of forest and in nost instances had occupied iox moles and shelters which inad been aug and built $b=r$ the enemy. Internittent mortar fire feil near Battalion CP and on B Company area.

Hednesday, 3 January 1945.
Light enemy artillery fire on E Company was the only onemy activity. Companies remained in present positions with exception that tat left jiatcon of C Cundany was relieved of it's tank outpost duty and put into tre fefensive line of trat company facing nortin. Bn remained tied in on left with luth armi fuf Bn and on the right witi $28 t \mathrm{~h}$ Cavalry. One jiatoon of $B$ Company ramained an out jost duty with section of tanks and plation or TDS south of woods on ra. (See ovarday aj)火issiun remained the same to nold derensive line in eist eace of woods diu jrevent enemy countorattacks from cutting Eastogne aighway. (See insert fil)

## Thurgoday 4 yamary 1945.

Spuradic artillery fire iell vicinity Eattalion CP. Conyanies remainea in present position ana were cierted at 0500 for possible counterattack. All artillery fired on tanks and iniantry whicn was reportea to be moving from petrerange to Lutrebois.

## Friaay, 5 danuary 1945.

Battailion alerted at 0500 for possible counter attack from tne notly contested town of Lutrebois which the l34th was still attempting to cajture. Companies received heavy mortur fire during nignt. C Company pulled one piatoun out of the line and to the vicinity of the Battalion CP for a la hour rest. A and $B$ Companies were to follow this procedure in that order. o rourds of ayroxizintely 75 lim arty fell in vicinity of Battalion CP at 0944.

Saturday, 6 January 1945.
Buttalion again alerved at 0500 for possible counter atticic for the Nortneast. fission still that of prevaling germans from cutting Eastogne menway, a $C 0$ of $35 \mathrm{th} \operatorname{TanK} \mathrm{Bn}$ ana one piation of A Co 704tn TD En in direct support. TF Witners on left (North) and TF Oden on rignt. No change in situation (See insert \#人)

Sunday, 7 January 1945.
Battaiion was alerted at 0400 aue to fw report tiat eneme titack from North east was scheculed at that hour. The attacic was not fortncomine and situation remained the same. At 1020 "B" Company sent a patrol to tneir iront and shorthy after crossing the Lutrebois-dillers La Bonne Eau road it was fired ujon by a MG from the east. It returned without casuaities.

Monajy, 8 January 1945.
At U6OU all personnei was awaine and alert for any enemy action. No activity in company areas auring tize daj. at 1720 enemy artiliery and mortar fire fell in the vicinity of the Eattalion CP and again at 1940 a large concentration or artiliery fire fell near the CP. One nalf track wes bit squarely on the hoou but no personnei casualties were suffered.

Tuesday, 9 January 1942.
Battalion was alerted at 0600 . A warning order for movenient came from CC" $A^{\prime \prime}$ at 0830 following the information that 137 th Infantry which relievea the $28 t \mathrm{~h}$ Cavalry on the risht of the En was to aitack soutneast at 1000 while the 134 n and 320 th in the vicinity of Lutrebois were to attack east to the gidigh ground. at 1215 the Bn was ordered to move on foot to vehicie assecoly ared tuence to designated temporary asseably areu (see insert (3) and revert to reseive comand (see Bn oraer \#2 in S-3 journal for 9 fan) The movement began at ance and at 1500 B and C companies had closed in their assy areas. A closed at 1000 and all companies remained in tris location (see overlaj \#ó) during the nignt with all around defense against infiltration.

Hednesday, 10 J an 1945.
at 1306 the pattaiion was aierted for movement by feserye Command and a billeting party was serit to Assenois, however, at 1830 another orcer mas iamed (see an orcer \#'3 in S-3 journal) and companies remained in thoir preseat temporary assembly areas for the night preparatory to movini to vieindty. Luxemiourg city the following morning.

Thursday, 11 January 1945.
The head of the Bn colum crossed the IP at 0920. All vehicular markings were obliterated for the march and the companies moved out in the order, $B$, Hq and Hq CO, A and C. Assembly area was reached at 1600 and the companies occupied towns as follows: $B$ in Evange, $H q$ and Hq Co in Briestroff La Grange, $A$ in Rouse la Bourg and $C$ in Roussy le Village (see overlays \#7 \& 8) The Division was as id to be in 3rd Army reserve but it was not officially a rest period.

Friday, 12 January 1945.
One platoon B Co moved to Boler. Maintenance and rehabilitation period begins. Plans discussed for defense against air borne landings.

Saturday, 13 January 1945.
Reconnaissance made of areas North and East of Luxembourg city for counter attack $k$ plans in those areas. Bn ordered to move vioinfty Bittenburg for tactical reasons.

Sunday, 14 January 2945.
The Battalion moved out at 0830 and arrived in new assembly area at 0946. The companies were looted as follows 1 at Bugem, B at Noertang, C at fontPierre, Hq and Service at Sohifflange (see overlays \#9 \& 10).

Monday, 15 January 1945.
Rehabilitation period continued.
Tuesday, 16 January 1945, to Sunday, 21 January 1945.
One rifle company alerted at all times for possible immediate employment against enemy airborne Landings. (see inserts \#5,6,d 7)

Monday, 22 January 1945.
At 1530 Battalion ma alerted for movement to fth or Eth Division areas
 location during the night.

Tuesday, 23 January 1945.
Reconnaissance made of areas cooupied by the and Eth Infantry Divisions. Bn attached to $C C^{N} B^{\prime \prime}$, Companies moved out at 1615 in following order, $B, ~ E q, A$ $4 C$ and arrived in assembly area vicinity Heisdorf at 1600 ( 800 overlays \% 21 \& 12 and Bn order $\mathrm{H}_{5}$ in $\mathrm{S}-3$ Journo)

Wodnes day, 24 January 1945.
Reconnaissance made of areas occupied by 22nd and eth Inf Regt of eth Inf Div. $C C$ " $B^{\prime \prime}$ ordered reconnaissance made of all massey areas for comber attache (See insert \#8)

## 

To change in the tractical sitmaticm.

## ypang. 20 somusy 2045.




 was the vollioular ascembly arce at about 1700 at rhich thim the men 14 moumbed, domad mite camonelace arite to blond whth the omow and mevel on foot to offoct the reliaf. A Co roliovel I Co of the 819th on tho loft and took up thais dofoneive peastien in the fielaity of Forimon. This mas the mont axpesed seoter of the Battalicm frent and roliof had to take piace aftor lark to provort draining flre frum the pill becec of the siogiriod lime which lay aeress the our River to the cant. Cempany moved to Longriosf and relleved the eomtor ocmpany mitich mas 20 compary marohol through bittorsdorf and thon relieved I Co ca the formard

 and 24)

## Treaday, 80 samany 2045.

Mo aotivity.

## Erenealiny, 81 Jannary 2945.

The firct activity that cocurred sinec taking up the cofonsive posith en enve
 a 27 man patrol wae sont eut by $B$ Co at 2050 to reenmoiter in frem of their reaition, lecate mony plilbocies, outposts, chook the our river for bridges, colifuens, of eurront, dopth and orose it if peasiblo. It was avooessful in leating two bill boces bat all attempts at gotting to the river mere stopped
 patrel to thoir frcat durime the aight.

For the Battalion Commander:

## 3 Incls:

Incl \# 1-s-3 Journal
Incl \# 2 - Messages
Incl \# 3-Overlays


Chnelof If Kimay CHARLES L. KIMSEY,
Maior, 51 st Armd Inf Br. S-3.


#  afU 254, \% Yostmaster, Hew Yark, N.I. 

5 April 1945

Mrin' After Action Heport.

TU: The adjutiant General, Nashington 25, D.C. (THRU CHANNELS)
In compliance with AR 345-105, Change 3, the following after action report is subnitted for the month of February 1945.

## 1 Tebruary 1045 to o February 1915 inclusive

Juring the first five (5) days of the period, activity was limited to routine patrolling. (See overlay fl). Reconnaissance and listening patrols were sent out nightly. These patrols moved as far forward as the road runing narallel to the cur river between Bettel (P9147) and Gentingen (P9245). Enemy activity wis observed in the vicinity of the pillboxes in the Siegfried line. wach right numerous flares were seen. These were yellow, red, white, and white star clusters. Luring the neriod five eneny infantrymen deserted and surrendered to our forward nlatoons. l'hese men talked very freely, and gave information as to the location of their Company and Battalion Command Posts. Scattered artillery and mortar fire fell in our area during the period. There were no large concentrations, and no large calibre fire reported.

On 6 February at 0945 the Battalion was ordered to attack and eedse the town of bettel, to move our lines up to the river bank, and to protect the left flank of the 319th Infantry Regiment during their crossing of the river. Whe Battalion was specifically ordered to remain on the West bank of the river and not attempt to cross. The attack was to jump off at 0200, the 7 th of February 1945. A forty ( 40 ) minute artillery preparation was to precede the attack. ifter occupying the forward positions, "C" and "B" Companies were to flre small arms in support of "A" Company's attack on the tow of Bettel. Assault Gums and Mortars were to fire concentrations into the town of Bettel prior to "A" Company moving in, and then to be prepared to fire on call from any of the Companios.

## 1 February 1945

at 0220 the Battalion kortar Platoon and Assault Guns began firing on targets given them in the fire plan. Enemy artillery began falling in the battilion area and a considerable amount of white flares were seen from the vicinity of Bettel. "A" Company, moving on their objective, did not contact the eneny, but received eleven (il) casualties from anti-personnel mines. They reached their objective and had consolidated the position at 0430. "C" Campany, on their right, reached their objective without enemy contact, but received artillery, mortar and some small arms fire from Siegfried Line positions across the cur liver.

Total casualties for the attack were eighteen (18) - fifteen (15) from mines, three (3) from artillery fire.

## 8 February 1945

In 8 l"obmary 1945, en were called uut to remove the mines in the vicinity of Bettel. These they nilcd a ainst, a builoing, total number being about forty (40). Later in the day durins a shelling by enemy artillery, a round landed in the middle of the mines, xetonatin; them. une (1) man was killed and five (5) wounded. It is felt that becnuse of this danger, mines when removed should be destroyed as quickly as possibln, and if this is impracticable, they should be stacked in small viles several yards apart.

## 2 rebruary 1945 to 10 February 1245 inclusive

The neriod 9 February to 17 February was spent holding the positions along the west bank of the Cur kiver, firing with Assault Guns and wortars at targets indicated by Livision artillery, 40th Livision, and 319th Infantry Regiment.

## 17 February 1945

Un 17 February 19.6 the battalion mas relieved by the 80th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and was urdered to move to the 4 th Armored Division Assembly Area in the vicinicy of schifillange.

## 18 February 1945 to 21 February 1945 inclusive

The period 1 . February to 21 rebruary inclusive was spent in rehabilitation, maintenance of venicles, in preparation for further action which was knowm to be inminent. it 1700 on the ?lst of February, the Battalion was attached to combat cormand "Bi, and alerted for rovement.

## 22 February 1245

A 0710 the battalion moved from its assembly area to the Combat Command "B" assembly area in the vicinity of (bersgegen (F9349). The mission of the Combat Command was to attack and seize the towm of Sinspelt (P9853), and the bridge over the inz River. (See notes fron Verbal Attack Order accompanying the S-3 Journal. At 1945 the entire attack was postponed until the first and second Baitalions of the 319 th Infantry liegiment could make contact in front of us. it 2330, this contact was reported to have been made, and the three infantry battalions were ordered to move on their attack immediately. This battalion was not committed during the night, and due to the slowness with which the assault com anies moved, spent the entire night in their vehicles on the road.

## 23 February 192.5

At 1220, "C" Company :ias ordered to take high ground, hill 405, coordinates j073513. iney moved out at 1330. At 2030, one platoon leader returned and said the hill was stronjly held and ou $r$ troops could not get up. He was ordered to return und tike the inill, which was done at 2300. Three (3) prisoners of war werc trken and several enemy killed. "C" Company was relieved at 0300 by " $G$ " cownicinity 319 th Infantry regiment, and returned to their company area in the vicinity o: heiderseckler. At lo30, "C" Company was ordered to send a platoon to Naidergeckler (PS753) to relieve "A" Company of the loth Armored Inf antry Battalion, and outnost the town. They moved out at 1700, and at 1730 were in nosition. A latoon of "C" Company, 701th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was attached. t 1700 enery infantry appeared on the ridge five hundred (500) yards

south of "B" Company. Artillery and Assault Gun fire was brought dom on them. Twelve (12) prisoners of war were taken and several enemy wounded. it 2030, "A" Company was ordered to move to clear the road from P978537 to F980539. The road was reported to be blocked by trees felled across it, and to be defended by enemy riflemen and three (3) tanks. after cleaning out the road, they were to relieve "B" Company of the loth Armored Infantry Battalion of their outpost mission in Sinspelt at the road junction north of the town. mission accomplished at 0320. Sixteen (16) prisoners of war taken, several enemy killed. No casualties. One (1) enemy tank encountered, fired several rounds and withdrew before infantry could bring fire on it.

## 24 February 1945

At 2100, 23. February 1945, Combat Command "B" ordered 5lst Armored Infantry Battalion to attack and seize Uutscheid (IO156) and high ground north and east of town. The battalion to move out as soon as possible after being relieved by "F" Company, 3l9th Infantry Hegiment in Sinspelt.

It was determined that the earliest time that $\because e$ could move would be 1230 . Attached to 5 lst Armored Infantry Battalion, "B" Company, 8th Tank Battalion and "B" Company, 5lst Armored Infantry Battalion were given the mission of leading initially and seizing the high ground north and east of Cutscheid, followed by "A" Company, who was ordered to seize high ground north of Outscheid. They were to be followed by "C" Corpany, who was to seize and outpost the town.

At 1245 the attack moved off, being delayed fifteen ( 15 ) minutes by an enemy artillery barrage. They moved approximately six hundred (600) yards when a crater blowm in the road delayed the movement of the tanks. In the meantime, one tank hit a mine in trying to find a path around the crater. The infantry that had been riding on the tanks dismounted and entered the woods on the side of the crater, and reconnoitered route for the continued advance of the column.

The tanks located two (2) enery tanks, orened fire and destroyed both of them. The column then moved on again. When "B" Company, 5lst irmored Infantry Battalion and "B" Company, 8th Tank Battalion arrived on high ground overlooking Cutschied, three (3) enemy self-propelled gums and one (1) tank wer? seen to leave the town in the direction of Weidingen, (I0357). Tanks opened fire on them destroying one (1) self-propelled gun and one (1) enemy tank. 111 Companies reached their objectives and a total of One Hundred and Six (106) prisoners of war were taken in the afternoon's operations. Positions were consolidated and the men dug in. 37th Tank Battalion joined 5 lst Armored Infantry Battalion at 1730, and B Company, 8th Tank Battalion was relieved and moved to the rear to join their parent battalion.

At 2230 the Battalion was ordered to move in conjunction with 37th Tank Battalion at 250715 to seize toms of Neiderweidingen (L0357) and Altscheid, (LO358) and to seize high ground South and East of Altscheid in preparation for a move to force a crossing of the Prum Biver in vicinity of Wedsmandorf (L0755) or Hemesdorf (L0756).

## 25 February 1945.

At 0715 "B" Company, 51 st Armored Infantry Battalion and "B" Company, 37th Tank Battalion attacked Liederweidingen and Weidingen. at 0855 "C" Company, 51st Armored Infantry Battalion and "C" Company, 37th Tank Battalion attacked and scized Altscheid. "A" Compary, 5lst Armored Infantry Battalion and "A" Company, 37th Tank Battalion then moved to high ground Morth and Frest of town. dpproxdmataly sixty-seven ( $\cup 7$ ) prisoners of war were taken, nine (9) enemy killed. Four (4) trucks, two (2) half-tracks, and one (1) 75mm anti-tank gun were destroyed. at 1150 "A" Company, 51st and "A" Company, 37th moved from hill "472" attacked and seized Koosbusch (L0656) and high ground East of town and overlooking the Prum Biver. At 1251 "B" Company, 5 lst and "B" Company, 37 th were then ordered to assault the town of Hermesdorf, seize the bridge over the Prum River, and move to high ground East of town. At $14 / 10$ the town was reported clear and the crossing secured. "C" Company, 5 lst and "C" Company, 37th were then ordered to move to the high ground West of Hittersdorf (L1156) to support the assault of the town and river crossing by "A" Company, 5lst and "A" Company, 37th. At 1530 "C" Company, 51 st and "C" Company, 37th had reached their objective on hill "366", coordinates L103568. "A" Company, 5 lst and "A" Company, 37 th then moved and assaulted the tow of Bittersdorf, seized the tow and the bridge across the Nins River. Companies were then ordered to consolidate and hold from their positions. "A" Company, 5lst on high ground East of Rittersdorf and the river extending from Ll 250 to Ll20560. "B" Company, 51 st from positions East of the river extending from 1080565 to 1090565 . "C" Company, 51 st on high ground at hill "306" from cross road 12101546 to road Rittersdorf-Liessem. (See overlay attached)

## 26 February 1945.

(See notes from verbal order 2030, $25 \mathrm{Feb} / 45$ by $\infty$ 5lst)
At 0800 "B" Company, 51st and "B" Company, 37th moved out and encountered Anti-Tank fire from woods at 134552, losing three (3) tanks and knocking out one (1) enemy tank. At 0900, "B" Company, 5lst and "B" Company, 37th arrived on the initial objective but were driven back from the open ground by direct fire from across the river. Heavy small ams fire was encountered on their right flank.

Company "C", 5lst and "C" Company, 37.th meanwhile, moved on the left flank, destroyed one (1) 88 mm gun, and one (1) half-track prime-mover, and reached their initial objective at 0910, where they encountered direct fire from across the river, and withdrew to a covered position after losing one (1) tank.
"A" Company, 37 th and "A" Company, 5 lst were ordered forward, and occupied the ground at 150058. "B" Company, 5lst was ordered to dismount and assault the town of Brdorf (Lll $55^{\circ}$ ). As they moved down the steep sides of the hill into the town of erdorf, enemy sinall arms, machinemgun, 20 mm gun and 88 mm fire pinned them ciow, and after seven (7) hours of unsuccessful attempts to advance against strongly held eneny positions, they were ordered to withdraw under cover of smoke and at 2230 they were able to withdraw the last of the Company.

Cn orders from Combat Command "B", "C" Company, 5lst and "C" Company, 37th moved from their positions to assault and clear the strip of woods at 123549130552. At 1030, "C" Company, 5lst and "C" Company, 37 th jumped off. The tanks giving support by firing over the heads of the assaulting infantry. The infantry moved in, cleared the woods, and reported their mission accomplished at 1700 .

## The following

image(s) may be of
poor quality due to the poor quality of the original.
"S" Compary, 5lst and "C" Company, 37th then moved to a defensive position extending from the himay at 133500 in an arc, to the east of hill "418" and tied in with "A" Company, 37th and "A" Compary, Slst at I40573. "A" Company,
 "then "C" Compay, Tu4th rank Destroyer Jattalion extended fron thet roint to wio rever at 115075. Conbet Command "is moved in on the south flank and evioce the aroa tying in with "O" Oompany, 5lst on "C: Company, 5lst right "n. "I vor:ony, Slst nd "3" Company, 37th roved to an assembly area in talanity of l3uv. at 2130, the bttalion was ordered in conjunction with $\because \cdots$ Gh to stack wt su and seize the to no of Nattenhein and Fleissem, and Sh ounc thill ib3l", coorinates 4132000 .

## 2 ' 7 rebruary_1945

Fis movod off intin "A" Gompany, Jist and "A" Compeny, 37 th attacking
 ace ws sin h, ma the toin as clearea at 900 . nemy casuaties vere four (4) illoc, ive ( $)$ ronded, eigty-ive ( 85 ) prisoners or war taken. Two (2) Gucke, one (I) motorecle and on (1) staff car were destroyed. "B" Company, Sist wh "B" Compary, 37 th loved to attack high round at hill "431". At 1030,

 their objee ive. deaver machine-gun and mall ams fire was encountered, but Ws beaten dom by tink fire. Iron the tanks. it $130 \%$ a patrol, consisting of
 37t: roved odt, on orter íron: $\therefore$ bliorce Comander, to reconnoiter a foot
 the con: nies to consolidue nd hula in positions as follows:
i" Comocoly, 37 tin plus "C" Company, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion from 115590 to 125595.
"3:1 Cowany, 5Ist and "B" Dompany, 37th from that point to 135990.
'A" Domany', SIst and "d" Compny, 37 th irm that point to 145594.
 thay ficd in itn j3ra mored Infantry Battalion of Combat Comand "A".
 raccuan arm to ind the remtedy intact bridge across the river.
$2 \mathrm{~S}^{2}$ Forum 104
$\therefore$ IN, Jommang lític on vombet Cormand "B: ordered the Task Force to rove :own lone main whe bo clear woods and seize the town of Seffer-





 W : billed ir: iction, She attack nalted for reorganization, and for the purpose $\phi$ restalisiling suntact between the ?3jult comanies. Three (3) tanks of "A surany, j7tin ank settalion ran over rines in minefield and were disabled. Whers for bruat forira, and cleared the minetield in face of heavy


again, and after encountering slight resistance, reached the edge of the woods. at 1910 hours. The companies were ordered to consolidate and dig-in in thed $r$ positions, and hold until morning, when the attack would be continued. Defensive positions as shown on attached oveclay wore taken by all units. S-3.
2 Incles
得 Fob s-3 Journal (trip)
Th Operational Overlays (trip)


HEEADQUARTERRS
FTFIT FTRST ARMOTRED INFANTME BAGMASTOR

31 MARCH 1945

MARCH
AFTERACTION REPORT

uvaicil: after Action heport

In corpliance with Ai $345-105$, Change 3 , the following after-action report is sumistted for the month of karch 194i.

## 1-arch, 1945

heavy Artillery and mortar fire begen to fall in positions occupied by "d" and '. conn nies of the 5lst irnored Infantry Battalions and 37th Tank Battalion. At II5 enen, tanks and infantry launched a counter-attack, directed at "A" and "B" company nositions. The heaviest force of the counter-attack was aimed at $A / 51$ and A/37 nositions. In soite of many casualties, the positions were held. Four eneny tanks were destroyed, fifty-five enemy personnel killed, and approximately thirtyfive others mere :inned down by fire and later taken prisoners of var. The remainaer of the counter-attacking force hastily withdrew. The effective strength of the assult companies was getting very low, and they were ordered to hold until their osit uns could be occupied by elerients of the 25 th Cavalry Recon. Squadron. At 120, the relicf of "A" nd " 3 " Comonnies was completed, and the companies moved on fot to the vicinity of Nattenhein. where they assembled for reorganization. The lattalion was relieved from attachaent to Combat Command "B", and attached to teserve Cowand.

## 2- Larch, 2442

The :eriod 2-6 march 1045 inclusive was spent in the maintenance of vehicles and wea ons, and rehabilitation of personnel. Duringthis time, the Battalion was alerted ior possible movement to relieve elenents of the 317 th Infantry Regiment, in the area shienz-Scheid-Bickendorf; but due to a change in division boundaries the : lan was not carried out. The Battalion was again alerted for movement to the area uccupied by Cumiat Conmand "B", but that was cancelled also.

## 7-女arch2 194:

At Oil5 the Satt lion began to move as part of Reserve Command following the route taken by Comoat Conmand "B". One platoon from "B" Company had been sent to Division rieadquarters for the protection of the command post. The column halted in the vicinity of Seinsfeld and the Battalion C.F. was set up with the view of moving forward again as suon as Division neadquartors could catch up and move into place in the center of Reserve Cormand Column. At li400, the colunn began to :ove again ith UImen as the objective. Bad road conditions and heavy traffic caused the colurn to move very slowly. At 1700 the $2 C$ "R" Commancier ordered the column to move off the road and take $\because \mathrm{p}$ defensive positions in the vicinity of Darscheid. no enemy activity was remorted during the night.

## 8 Karch, 1845

The colimn was ordered to move out again at 1300, with Folch as the objective. The march was made without incident, and the companies :rere disposed on the high Eriund west, no th, and northeast of town.

## 9 上arch 2

At 73 the Battalion was attached to Combat Command "B", with the mission of
moving with the 35 th Tank dattalion to sase and hold the bridge or er the losel Birer between Karden and Ircis. At 1100 the colum moved out with "CN Compmy, mounted on the tanks of $0 / 35$ th, leading the maroh. As the head of the colvin reached a point on the route at coordinates L-679,:772, ancmy anlmanme fire was encountered, and the lead tank struck a mine. The explosion started the tank burning. The infentry deployed, and began aleming oot fox-boles along the road while the tanks moved off to the right and laft of the road to support the infantry. The terrain here was very diffloult for mancuver. at the point whore
 hill into the Kosel Valley. The tenks ware complotely road-bound, and the cliffs exteading up connthe right of the road, and pimin on the left of the road, made it nearly imposadble for the infentry to maneutir and outilank the ency machinc-gun pogitione and basookamen dus in anong the pocks. At 1000 the company comander of C/51 was soriously womded, and the F.O. Nith him was kdiled by machine gun fire Ircem the enmy positions to our right front. At 1620 , the mine-fleld was cleared, and the tanks and infantry begm noring up. The tanks laid down a heary volume of machime-gun fire into the enemy positions; and the Infantry dizmounted as they came to the positions and ldilled or captured the raaining encuy. At 1640, the head of the' colum reached the outskirts of Karden, were a 50My. Anti-tank gun covered a road-block. This was mopped-up very quickly, and the job of cleaning out the badidinge of the toma began. At this point $N / 35$ with $1 / 51$ mounted on the tanks was ordired to pass through "C" Company, and to move rapidiy through the tovn and attempt to sieze the bridge before it could be blown. The lead tank of this force reached the near and of the bridge just as it was blown. The companies where then ordared to clear the rest of the town, and then move back to the high ground from which the attack was launched. At 2030 the mission was accomplished, and the companies had occupied positions as follows. $1 / 51$ with $N / 35$ in the vicinity of coordinates L 675,$786 ; \mathrm{C} / 51$ with $\mathrm{C} / 35$, coordinates L-675, 789. at 2700 the Company Commanders were called to the Battalion C.P. and given the mission for the next morning. That mission was to clear the town of Wirfus, Illerich, Landicem, and Gredmersburg, to be designated as objectives one, two, three, and four, reapectively.

## 10 March $_{2} 1945$

The attack moved off as planned and passed through the four objectives without meeting any resistance. The campanies occupied positions as follows. "A" company one and one-half miles from Binningen coordinates Lm6778; "B" and "C" companies two miles from Binningen at coordinates L-6777. At 1930 the Battalion was ordered by combat Command " $B$ " to move to the new Combat Commend assembly area in the Ficinity of Roes, Kaufeaheim, and Galen. The Battalion was to be asscmbled in and around Roes. During the night, patrols were sent into Karden. They reported no enemy activity.

## 11 March, 1945

The move to the assembly area in the vicinity of Roes was completed at 1000, with the exception of "C" Company, which was relieved in their positions at 1300 by olements of the lith Infantry Regiment. They closed in the Roes assembly area at 1330. Earlier in the day, information had been received ralative to a proposed area for the Division, which indicated that the Battalion would move to Kehrig.

## 12 March, 1945

The day was spent with the companies engaged in maintenance of vehicles and weapons, and rehabilitation of personnel. At 2330 , orders were received to move the Battalion to the new Combat Command Assembly area in the vicinity of Wollmerath. The movement was to begin at 0900, the following morning.

At 0915 the Battalion moved out, and at 1200 was closed in the new assembly
at Follmerath. area at Follmerath.
-

$$
14 \text { March, } 1945
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No enemy activity was reported. The campanies were occupied with maintenance of vehicles and weapons, and range fliring for the newly assioned personnel. The Battalion was relieved from attachment to Combat Command "B", and attached to

## 15 March, 1945

The Battalion was ordered to move to the Reserve Command Assembly Area in the Vicinity of Dungenheim. At 0935 they moved out, and at 1130 closed in the new assembly to the area in the vicinity, orders were issued for the movement of Reserve Command arossing the hosel River in the vimeinity of column was to follow Combat Command "B"

## 16 March $_{2} 1945$

The column moved out at 0800, and at 1740 had closed in arissembly area in the vicinity of Simmern. The companies had the mission of cutting the main roads leading out of Simmern. A squad of men was left on each of five bridges in and around the town. At 2115, an order was issued attaching the Battalion to Combat Carmand nBn, concelled on order from Reserve Command

## 17-18 March, 1945

at 1230 the Reserve Command began to move east from Simmern, but was held up bafore reaching the I.P. by a column from the lith Infantry Regiment cutting in front of them. As the head of the colum reached Tiefenbach, sporadic mortar fire On arrival of the head of the colwwance, but no casualties were caused by fire. thatenemy infantry from the south, moving interbach, Reserve Command was informed attempting to cut the main supply route on in the direction of Winterburg, was composed of $D / 35$, and $C / 51$ was sent forwand to ch we were traveling. 4 Task Force route for the continued advance of the In charge of this Task Force, which was later rajnforced by $\mathrm{L}_{0}$ Kinidey was placed and a section of T.D.'s. The Attack was driven back by thed a Madim Tank coppair, Which was able, since the eneay had no anti-tank weapon the Idght Tank company, meely through the entire area, killing mamy of theapons with them, to cruise thay more to surrender to our infentry that had moved upy infentry, and causing Light Tanks. The Mddivm Tank company, and the iseaved up dismounted with the Trak Battalion mored aroumd the laft flank of thsenlt Gun platocn of the 35th the rout of the onany infentry and destroy of the Light Tank company, conpleting malaced on the ridge cast of Eckwailer. Hing three 40 MM . Anti-aircraft guns around the tanks and infantry. After determining thy arthillery began to fall area was cleaned out, the Idight Tanks ware withdrent the enemy in the inmediate Infantry occupied the commanding ground overlooking the the Modive Tanks and Hehbach, and Irpensched. Positions wore occupied to co towns of Eolcmedier, onexy approaches to the main supply route. Both the cover and cut posadble platoons of the Battalion wore ordered at 2000 the Asanult ove and Mortar aseanbly ares at Foinshedim to join this 2000 to more from the Battalion moving eastward over the route, thes did not Eorce, but due to the heary traffic morning. They were then taken by guides to previve until 0430 the following in suppert of the Task Force. The foll to previously reconnoitered positions In suppert of the Task Force. The following morning, it was decided to send
atrols into line tows o1 buabach and eckweiler, to determine if the enemy hald the torm, and if io, in what strength. The Task Force Commander decided that if the enemy occupied these towns, it presented a direct threat to his positions, and they would have to be cleared. The patrol into Daubach found the tom clear of anemy, and occupied by a for ard patrol from the 5 th Infantry Division. The patrol into Eckwedler found the town occupied in some strength by enemy infantry, with machine-gun nositions overlooking the entrances to the town. No tanks or anti-tank gans were see:. It was deciced to attack the town with a platoon of tanks and a platoon of infantry after a heavy shelling from the Ledium Tanks and the Assault Gun Platoons of the 3 , th and tine 51st, firing direct into the town. This was carried out, and $b$, the tive the infintry moved into the tow, many of the buildings were burning. The encry machine ;in positions at the entrance to the town through which the Infantry $w$, ind been knocked out by the tank fire. The Infantry moved in against very lizht owosition. Sixty-one r.i.' 'o were taken, and seven enemy were killed. The cnv casualty anng the attacking forces was an infantryman who was slightly rounded: $\because$ wirs framents. it is thuught that. the ease with which the tow was tiken, as are the intense fire placeu on the town by the tanks and assault guns ti: their heavi veaions, and 30 ard 50 caliber machine-guns. After cle aring the torn, wo Tams ind intantry withdrew to the high ground overlooking the town. At Ni030, the avalion S.as:ander arrived at the C.F. with orders that the Task porce w uld be witho: ince the area was being occupied by the First Battalion of the lith nif atm, arinit. the cumanies moved out in the following order: D/35, plat-
 Asser:hi is a it the vici.it of einsheim at 182030. At 1745, A/51, and B/35 were attached to Combat comand "Y", under the Com and of Naj. Harry J. Rockafeller, to rove to rurfeli to protect the right flank of O.C. "B". At 1945, orders were issued to wove we reaacior of the Battalion ith Reserve Command at 0030 .

10 archg zet
Pise colun roved out at 030 , and at 0845 closed in a temporary assembly area at cirlelc. St thise time $A / 51$ and $B / 35$ were returned to Reserve Command control during heir attack to sieze the high ground at coordinates $\ln -131,305$, and $\mathrm{k}-130$, 31?, the Mad crossin at ..-134,300, and the high ground at in-144,309. kaj. Harry U. Rectuil $r$ tas in carand oj this force. The Reserve Command plan was to attack Thshei.. wid utein Bockenhein: froi. the northwest, depending on the successful comrletion of the attaci by hat. Roc afeller's ficre. fior to the completion of his attack, esorve com main recived instructions fron Combat Command "B" that they woulc tike ansing and that .eserve vomiand should concentrate on Stein Bockenheim. Anti-tai: Ere foo. $\therefore \therefore . a$ suns at coordinates $-139,302,-142,305,-139,308$, and ines .t crosoroans ... -13 , 3 cu held $w$ the advance of the force until it could be clacned out. T:o tains crossed the rine-ficld inthcut detonating any rines, but the thira aid fourth taiks struck rines and held up the advance of the column. Recor ery vehicles are brught a im. diately and engineers reacved the mines under cover of the Endaitry aeloyed ahead of the ine-field. The attack moved on at 1430, all objectives ere reorted take. and pusitins consoiciated. A/35 and C/51 were then nassed throusi: this cbjective to attack the town to Stein Bockenheim moving southeas, fro.. the minn road between Furfeld and Monsheim, with their left flank on the trail ru:zing southeast frow the hi ghiay at ccordinates M-154, 312, to Stein Bockenhcir. inti-tank fire fron. the west edge of Wonshein knocked out one of the tanks. The attack movcd in over the crest of the hill into Stein Bockenheim, where they had deiflade ir... the fire from Vonsheim. At 1525 , Stein Bockenhein was reported clear, it: the taiks and infantiry occupying the high ground southeast of town. at tilis tise, a force consisting of a platoon of tanks and a platoon of infantry "as sent to knock cut the anti-tank gans, dug-in infantry, and machine-gun nests in the vicinity of coorcinates $\mathrm{L}-100,31$. Pris was accomplished at 1545 . B/51 and C/35 vere then sent to clean out the toins of Winterbom and Neiderhausen in conjunction witi an attack in Tieffenthsl, with a platoon of $A / 51$ and a platoon of $B / 35$. in dietserer ...'s are taler. In the attack on Stein Bockenheim, fourteen onery wore killed, and fourty r...'s were taken at an anti-tank position west of onshoim. The comaries were orcered to consolidate in the posi ions that they held. Lurins; the night C/51 was attached to Combat Comand "B", and roved out to join them i th the 35 th Tank Battalion. C/35 and D/35 were left under the comand of the C.C./51.

## O. arch, $1 \times$

Crirs wore issued to the comparies, instructing then to regroup and hold dominating err in features covering the right flank of town, and the main route of sui: In et::cen rurfeld and rendelsheir. At 1300, the companies moved cut to occupy nositions indicuted or the attached overlaj. At 1400 , all companies were reported in osition.

## $21 . \operatorname{rch}, 1915$

The Batt:lion reaineä in the same loc tion, and was juined by C/51 at li430. A billotting varty letit the Buttalion to report to weserve Jomend.

## 2 aran, 1,4

": nd "O" comnnies noved to "onshein; tine rainder of the Battalion veman it in whe same rosituons.

## 3.. $\mathrm{rch}_{2} \mathrm{I} ; 45$

Con. ny "A.' ttacned tu a rask Frce comanded by Lu. Sol. Uden, 35 th Tunk
 the u hout the diy.

## 2ll ran, 24

A 191; the Battalion moved with Heserve Comand to cross the Rhine River in the vicinit, of dieistein, and at ?2lis the Battalion Command Group crossed the nontoun bridite uver the Rine kiver.
$25 \operatorname{arch}_{2} 1215$
Tin 3 ttiaion closed in assenbly area at aschollbrucker. at 01 jou and the cancaides mre dis orsed to cover the rouds and avenues of aporoach south and east of the tom. a jov, su comany as given the rission of clearing ut the town of : fun stadi, and at 1100 resorted the tom olear. "is" ompany moved :inth Task Fowce vien at 1230 to take the tuin of D nistadt. lio o position as encountered, and at ? $C$. $\because$ comany retirmed and slosec in their assembly area in the vicinity of scholiorscien. At 1000 the Keserve Co mand colurn began to mov to the vicinity of biev r: Y lijo tile ?attalion as clused in the new assemuly area, iith the attal in $3 . \therefore$ in Diebirs. At 2240 " 3 " comany ias attacied to Combat $C$ mand "A",

$\therefore$ 朝
nir in: is swent hoidin: the positi, ns occupied the night before. $\because$ Yaven, -2
 jar. . .in ...... Prane, Battilicn s-2 was sent to cumpany to take cormand. At 1i $\therefore$ ho jatt lion mas ordered to Hauser, where it would be attached to Com at 3 mand $4.1 . . . .$.

Battalion C.P. was set u. $n$ the schoolhouse in H.usen. is 2330 the Batt 1 in or received orders to move out at 0000 with Cumbat Command "B", cross the kin yhy ar at Hanau, and sdeze the high ground east of Gedssen. The Infantry and Tank companies were teamed, A, B, and C companies of the Tank Battalion working with the respective companies of the Infantry. The remainder of the Infantry thit were not able to ride the tanks followed in their half-tracks, the enpty tracks were sent back to trairs to haul gas and ammunition.

## 28 March, 1945

At 0545 the column besan moving out. N/35 with $1 / 51$ crossed the wain river at Hannau, and at 0645 passed tirough the 90 th Infantry Division at Wilhelmsbad, where a road-block delayed the movement of the column for a few minutes. At littelbuchen light resistance was met, but was quickly overcame by tank-fire; the infantry dismounted and mopped-up the remaining enemy. The remainder of the march to the Vicinity of Harbach was merely a series of skirmishes in which the enemy would offer a slight amount of resistance, but would quickly surrender. Liany prisoners were taken, and many vehicles including three self-propelled guns were destrojed. Flfty enemy wore killed, one hundred and fifty were wounded, and over a thiusand were taken prisoners of war. Our infantry casualties for the day were two men. killed. At 1735 the Battalion closed inan assembly area at Beltersham. Cne company of Inf antry and one company of tanks was left to hold the road center of Lich, and guird approximately 2000 P.i.'.s, taken by the Combat Command during the day.

## 29 March, 1945

At 0000 the column moved out again with Lauterbach as the objective. A blown bridge was encountered a Fluesengen, but an alternate route was found immediately, and the column moved on with just a few minutes' delay. Scattered groups of enemy were encountered along the way, most of them, trying to give themselves up, offered no resistance. At 1140 Lauterbach was taken witinout casualty to us. During the day, five hundred and sixty orisoners of war were taken, and fourteen trucks, seven scout cars, and three trailers :iere captured.

30 kiarch, 1945
At 0920 instructions were received to be prepared to rove on order aiter 1200. Our objective was the high ground east of Hersfeld and the tow itself. The Infantry and Tank teams were to continue to move as they had, with tho infantry meunted on the tanks. The column moved out at 1300, and the first contact was made at iijederaula, where two enemy troop trains were taken under fire. Approximately $-n e$ hundred P.W.'s were taken here, and fifty-five American and British P. I. 's were liberated. A platoon each of Infantry and Tanks were drooped off to mo -up the town. As the Light Tank corlpany wich was leading the column at the time entered Asbach, enemy bazooka-men knocked out the leading tank. The $\mathbf{l}$ adirg ledium Tank company, $A / 35$, with $A / 51$ munted on the tanks vas brought up to the edge of the torin, where the Infantry dismounted and the assault of the town began. Fanatical enemy resistance in the town, and fire from five enemy tanks fror: the north and west of the tow, held up the advance until artillery cculd be brought into position. Une enemy tank was destroyed, and the artillery made the job of our infantry in roping up the town much easier. The other four enemy tanks ithdrew behind the autooahn, about a mile north of the town. By the time the infantry had novod through, nearly all the buildings in the town were on fire. This fact tended to disccurago the enemy infantry from remaining in the buildings. At 1900 the town of Ascach was cleared, and the colwan roved on with $B / 51$ and $B / 35^{\circ}$ leading to take the town of Hersfeld. Near the autobahn two more enemy tanks were destroyed. The Task Force corposed of $B / 51$ and $B / 35$ was placed inder the command of in jor Charles L. Kimsey. The plan for the attack was to move a platoon of Tanks and a olatoon of infantry cross-country over hill 324 to the main road leading from the west into Hersfeld; then to sing east dow that road moming up to the center of the to:m. Two platoons of tanks, and two platoons of infaniry were to rove in from the south ropping u to the center of tow, and then to clear out the nart east of the road which runs north-
east through the center of tow. C/51 an C/35 would then be sent: to cle $\therefore$ tice north purt uf the town, and to assist in u'tting all the roads leading cut of the town. Trie attack movec off at 190, and resistance was encounterec o.. the rute of advance at the entrance to the town. Drkness as beginning to ial, hich made the job very difficult on the narrow winding streets of the town. The blatcon wich had been sent to move into the town from the west, became concused in the darkness, and came in on the wrong street. Ai enemy tank at the street intersection knocked out the leading tank, and enem machine-guns emplaced on the high grund to the left held up the infantry. The street was to nariow to dy-nass the birainj taw, and an attempt was made to find a rute around it. At this $o o i . t$, orde s were receivad frou Combat Comand "B" to rithdraw and take un positions along the autobinn astride our axis of advance. Tris was completed at 0,30 .

## 31 March, 194.5

At 0100 the Battalion was ordered to continue the attack at UJUC, using ne of two plans. rlan "A" was to by-pass Hersfeld around the east and attack it froi. the north. Plinn "B" was to bj-pass the town entirely, and. ove on to the erra River at Kreuzburg. If olan "i" was used, the two "C" teams would lead a cine "A" tear.s would follow. The "C" teans to move to hill 335, cuordinates $1-305,555$, and to attack and clean uut the west side of tow. The ". " teans to ove ine the east sicie of the "C" teams and clean out the east side of torn. The route of march for plan "A" was Kerspenhauser, Ross ach, Hi Lpenhausen, uberhaun, unte haili; anc tinen by way of the autobahn to hathaus, Leckiach, Lucklar; across the Fulca kiver and south along the highway to the line of departure, onich was the line ruming east and west through hill 335. At 0400, the Battalion was infomed tiat plan "\&" ..culd ve in effect, and the Task Force under the comand ot bajor Charles $L$. $n$ sey nicrad out. Bad roads and trails de ayed the colimm. in the vicinity if fioursneusen. in alternate $r$ uie was fund and the column moved on. At Unterhaun, . rcad-iluck ..as encountered, and an enemy S.F. gun was destroyed while the road-block wis be ng cleared. The column roved $n$, until an undefended road-block across the Autobann at courdinates $\mathrm{L}-1 \mathrm{l} 5,520$ had to ve removed. A road-block at li-4llo, jic forcec the columin to iove across country to the town of Sarga, inere an eneriv suo $I_{i}$ nsuala ion was fund, and three hundred P.W.'s were taken. The colimit ved on thruigh Salzorafe, id onen oack o. th original route at hathaus. The trail threugi whe woods to leckuach as a very poor logsing $t_{r}$ ail, and many vehicles becare :ired the sof"t rud. hany enemy. F..."'s were pickec un in the woods rile trying oo escae. They did not offor any resistance, but he hanili ni of una. each tire they wre
 ak int the viluare seckroh, here a: eny anti-aircraft positions i. is -
 twelve 20 in . Anti-aircratt gans, one enemy tank, nd womerous trucks nd staff cars were cest oyed, and 125 P.W.' s were taken. While one platoon oi ini ntry, anc one platoon ci tanks $\because$ re left in the town of ieckbach, the reainder fithe tric co: nunies rovod nto becklar. They encuntered d.g-in oney th bazookaj aion: the way, ad as they reached the oridge, it was blown. it this noint, criers were received ir: Jnbat oon and "5" to :ove back over the trail to un assen bly area along the autuahn at sarisa. Fere, orders ue e issued to nove north anc east $u$ : the autobinh on our orisinal rouje to seize th bricise ver the "erri :s.r r at
 an cvermass so that the ceoris blucked we aut,bahn. jasy infantry ciaj-ira a ana the autobih: mane it necessary for our infantry to dishowit and mu new. an a


 Teau were to clear t:e timns of ofrossensee, hosscirf, adi seruas, ut ost


the row fumoticn at colerim out the tom of Oberguhl, and to' out the autobah at For the Battelion Comander:

Phanlert. Minaey Major, $\underset{\substack{\text { s. } \\ \text { st }}}{\text { Armd }} \operatorname{Inf} \mathrm{Bn}$. In s-3 Journal vith Ampaces.
\#2 Operational Ovariave.
\#3 s-2 Jownal.


FIFIT PIRST ANAOND IMFANTRY BATPALION APO 254, U.S. APMIY

30 APRIL 1945

APRII
AFTERACTIONRRPORT

66

UUBUCT: After Acti-n Report.
TC : The Adjutant General, Fashingtion, D. C. ('iaru UiH Cit Aiviv).
In compliance with $A R 345-105$, Change 3 , the following after-action report is submitted for the month of April 1945.

1-2 April 1945
On the morning of April 1, 1945, Combat Command "B" continued it's attack to the east. The composition of the column was the same as for the previous day. "C" Sompany of the 5lst Armored Infantry Battalion, riding on the tanks of "C" company, 35 th Tank Battalion, followed by the Command uroups of the 51 st and the 35 th. A/ 51 riding on the tanks of $A / 35$, ooth F.A. Battalion, $A / 24$ th Engineers, $B / 51$ riding on the tanks of $B / 35$. The remainder of the Cambat Command followed. The column moved up the autobahn to the vicinity of Sallmannhausen ( 0070 ), when dismounted enemy troops were seen on the east side of the river. They were taken under fire, but they succeeded in blowing the bridge over the werra River at that point. Combat Command "A", moving on our right took them under tire, and our column moved on. Small pockets of enery riflemen were over-run in the vicinity of Wommen (072710, and at Herleshausen (7070) an enemy Panther-tank was knocked out, and it's crew taken prisoner before they could fire on our column. Several enemy vehicles, including two tanks, were seen to move south from Herleshausen on the road to Lauchroden, and CC "A"'s column moving up on our right, destroyed the two tanks and two other vehicles. The two columns, $C C$ " A " and CC " B ", now came together on the autobann, with CC "A" intendin ${ }^{\circ}$ to cross the "erra River on the railroad bridge at Horschel (749707). As the column neared that point, the railroad bridge was blown. Lnemy machine-gunners and riflemen from the vicinity of Horschel began firing on the column, and several Infantryman riding on the tanks were hit. Enemy riflemen from the high ground on the left of the road also fired on the Infantrymen, and several casualties were sustained. It was decided here, to hold up $C C$ "A", and send CC "B" north along the road that runs parallel to the railroad, and in turn runs parallel to the Werra River. A burning enemy truck, at a turn in the road, delayed the coluin until it could be moved. Our Infantry, who was dismounted, moved forward alongside the tracks, but were subjected to fire fram the high ground on the left, from the right rear, and from the right front. There was no cover available. The only thing possible, was to keep ruming with the tanks until defilade could be found. In the space of 500 yards, seven men were killed, and fourteen were wounded. As the tanks and Infantry reached a point where the Infantry had defilade, two enemy antitank guns in the vicinity of Soichar (755723) opened fire on the tanks, and before they could get the exact locition of the guns, four tanks had been knocked out. The tanks following up, destroyed the two anti-tank guns and one self-propalled gun in the vicinity of the bridge. Fire from the tanks neutralized the enemy machine-gun fire that had been coming in on the Infantry. The Infantry deployed on the left of the road, and cleaned out the onemy that had fired on them from the high ground. At this point, the head of the column was ordered to hold up, and a short time later, was moved back to the qutobahn, and back to the vicinity of Herleshausen. This crossing site was to be left to CC "A". In the meantime $B / 51$ and $B / 35^{\circ}$ were ordered to move north fromerleshamsen to Ifta (711709), and then east to Oreusberg (7676), to cross the Werra River at that point. $A / 51$ and $A / 35$
were ordered to move to Wommen, Markershausen, and Laderbach, and assemble on the high ground porth of Ifta. $C / 51$ and $C / 35$ were ordered to move by the same route, and assemble in the vicinity of coordinates 7470. The Battalion Headquarters, and Headquarters Company moved into Ifta. The "B" tean ran into otiff opposition in Creusberg. Fincy Infantrymen in the town were supported by two tanks and three anti-airoraft tanks from the high ground east of the river overlooking the town. Two of the anti-aircraft tanks mounted 37 lm guns, and one a 20 mg gun . The fire from the tanks of $B / 35$ started many fires in the south part of town. A high wind was blowing frcm the south, and before morning, nearly all the houses in town had burned, with the exception of the castle which was situsted on a high point in the center of town. This castle made an oxcellant observation post for Artillery Forward Observers, and during the time that we stayed in Creuzberg, accurate fire was placed on all eneny in the vicinity. Just as the final mopping up in the town was done, the bridge across the rivar was blown. As darkness fall, patrols were sent to reconnoiter a posaible site for a bridge, and to inspect the damage done on the bridge by demolitions. The great fires burning in the town lit the whole countryside almost as bright as daylight. This made the work of the patrols slow, but by 2300 they had returned with the recomendation for the site, which was to be just south of the blown bridge. Engineers were brought up, and under the protection of a rail-road grade, they inflated a pontoon which after being taken to the river, served as a ferry to move the Infantry across. $B / 51$ was moved over, and occupied a line ruming from the trail at 775745 , southwest to the stream at 763735. C/51 was moved across, and occupied the high ground from 703757 to the point on the trail occupied by the left flank of $B / 51$. Thirty-seven prisoners were taken in pushing out to this line. In the mean time, the Engineers began working on the bridge. The task of placing the treadway on the pontoons was made mare difficult by the fact that the crane that had been sent to them had been lost, and did not arrive. As daylight came, the last ponton was being put into place, when three enemy bombers came over, circled the site, and dropped fragmentation bombs on the bridge, puncturing all the pontoons. At 0715, approximately 50 enemy aircraft came over, strafing the roads from the bridge west beyond the Battalion Comm Post at Ifta. Seven enemy planes were shot down in our area. The re-building of the bridge was delayed until new pontoons could be brought up. No further enemy action was encountered, and at 1500 the bridge was completed, and the tanks of $B / 35$ and $C / 35$ leading, started noving across. With $B / 51$ mounted back on the tanks of $B / 35$, and leading, the attack was pushed on thruugh $U$ etteroda, Neukirchen, and Berteroda. Here, the column halted for the might, and the Battalion Command Post was set up in Uetteroda 795738. A/51 with $1 / 35$ occupied the high ground south of Netteroda in the vicinity of Hill 301. B/51 occupied the high ground north of Uetteroda, in the vicinity of $\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{il}} \mathrm{L} 278$, and $\mathrm{C} / 51$ occupied the town of Neukirchen 8272.

## 3 April 1945

At 0700 the Combat Command moved ut to continue the attack to the east. (See Operations Memi. CC "B", 2 A ril 1945, in S-3 Jcurnal attached) The objective was the city of Gotha. The column moved cut without serious resistance, and picked up many small groups of P.if.'s who came out of the woods and side roads to surrender. At Nordhofen, $v 070, C / 51$ with $C / 35$ was sent east to Goldbach, 0570 , and $B / 51$ with $B / 35$ was sent through hetebach, 0267, vilth orders to move through the woods and attack Gotha from the west. A/51 : ith A/ 35 was sent to Aspach, 0135, then east to Trugleben. The main effort was to be made by the "B" Teams. hajor Charles L. Kinsey was placed in command of the "B" Teams. As they moved thrugh the wood east of inetebach,
eneny Infantrymen, Bazookamen, and 20 hin gun were encountered. The task of cleaning the woods out was slow because the tanks could not get off the trail. Enemy resistance was stiff, and few P.W.'s were taken. The majority of enemy riflemen had rifles equipped with telescopic sights. In cleaning the woods, 15 enemy were kdiled, 25 P...'s were taken and three 20 mill guns were destroyed. The attack moved on through the outskirts of the town, where much sniping from buildings was encountered. The houses on both sides of the streets were cleaned by the Infantrymen supported by the tanks. As the head of the column neared the square in the center of tow, an 88 min anti-tank gun knocked out one of the lead tanks. Enemy riflemen and bazooka-men began firing from all sides. An attempt was made to move one platoon of Infantry arcund the right flank, but they were halted oy fire that came in on their right flank. The same situation resulted $\because$ hen a platoon was moved to the left flank. The Task Force Commanier requested Higher "eadquarters that a force be sent in on the right or left to ease some of the oressure. "C" Company, from the vicinity of Goldbach, then launched an attack down the main ruad into Gotha. This attack was moved very slowly due to the same type of resistance that had been encountered by the " B " Teams. In the meantime, the Company Commanders of both "B" Companies had been killed by sniper-fire. The Task Force Commander of the "B" Teams then ordered them to withdraw to the hi;h ground on the edge of the town, from where they $h$ launched the attack. un order from $C C$ " $B$ ", all companies were ordered to occupy defensive positions for the night. "h." moved, and "R" Company was ordered to move to the town of Gildbach and reorganize.

## 4 ADril_1945

At 0800 information was received that the town of Gotha had offered to surrender. The majority of the troops had been withdra:n the night before. The surrender was arranged, and the Combat Command moved, with the forward elements assembled on Hill 424 at coordinites 130538. In preparation for the attack on the town of Uhrdruf 1150. (See notes on Com:any Commander's lieeting, 4 A ril 1945, in the S-3 Juurnal). The move was completed, and CC "A" took the town of Ohrdruf. The Battalion Command Fost was set up in suhlberg 1756.

## 5 April 1945

The day was spent in cleaning vehicles and weapons, and in preparation for movement to a new assembly area at echmar.

## - april 1945

On the oth of April the Battalion Headouart rs moved to "echrar, $A / 51$ with $A / 35$ to Seebergen, $B / 51$ with $B / 55$ to Echwabhausen, and $C / 51$ rith $C / 35$ to imleben.

## 1 Anril 1945

$0 / 51$ with $\mathrm{C} / 35$ was sent to the town of leudeitendorf to attempt to rescue some Cificers and inlisted ien wine had been amousined in that town. T.ey returneci vith three bodies, but aid not ind the remainder of the group.

## 8 April 1945

$B / 51$ and $C / 51$ were moved into the town of Wechnar. Range firing for newly assigned reinforcements, and maintenance of vehicles and weapons was carried out throughout the day.

## 2-10 April 1945

This period was spent in preparation for a new drive to the east.

## 11 April 1945

The Battalion moved out under CC "A" according to the order received the night before. (See F.O. \#7 Hq. CC "A", 11 Aril 1945, in S-3 Journal attached.) The Battalion did not get into any action this day because it was so far back in the column. However the Battalion Commander was given the job of bridging the Sale River in the vicinity of hama 728590, the bridge having been blown by the enemy as the head of the column approached. The Battalion Command Fort was set un in Bucha 655602.

## 12 April 1945

Enemy small-arms and $<U$ fire was encountered at the bridge site during the early hoursof the morning. Tills was quickly neutralized by artillery fire, and the bridging wenton un-interrupted. lt 1300 the bridge was completed, and the ficrward elements began moving across. The Battalion minus "C" Cor:pany, with A/8th Tank Battalion attached, was ordered to move to the vicinity of Schungleina, and assemble there for the night. As the head of the column reached the crossroads at 725020 , enemy small arms fire from the ridge north of the road was encountered. It was quickly cleaned up but the Company Commander of $A / 5 l$ was seriously wounded and evacuated. The The Battalion occupied it's assigned objective with. ut further contact with the enemy. The companies occupied defensive positions west, north, and north east of the town and tied-in with the 8th Tank Battalion on the right.

## 13 April 1945

The column moved out in the same order of march, moving east through naldeck, Bobeck, and chen east on the main highway. No enemy was encountered, and the column moved rapidly through Klosterlausnitz, 900 , and Tautenhain, but as it approached the town of Bad Kostritz, the bridge Over the weiss River was blown. However, the colum on the right under the command of the Commanding $u$ officer of the 8 th Tank Batt ilion had found the bridge on the autobahn martially blow, but still in a usable condition. The Battalion was then ordered to move south from Bad Kostritz, along the river, and to cross the bridge on the autobahn, following the th Tank Battalion. At coordinates 015005, the head of the column ran into the trail-end of a horse-drawn enemy column, consisting of supply vehicles, and wagon-loads of enemy soldiers atter:oting to escape. It was taken under fire and destroyed. Seventy two P. $\because .1$ 's were inurn. The column then moved on to the autobahn and across the river. at the crossroads at 158019, the, column was halted, and then ordered to move to the left and sieve a crossing of the Zwick tilde River at "oldenburg. The order was issued, and at 1400 the column moved out. Groups of enemy stragglers were picked up, and the column moved at about 15 miles an hour through Jchmolin, then east to Gossnitz. After the tanks and Infantry had passed thru ugh this town, and had reached

Tettau, the remainder of the column was held up by small-arms and bazooka fire. The head of the column was held up at that point while the town of Gossnitz was being cleaned up. This required about an ho ur, and a platoon of Infantry plus the Assault Gun platoon was left to hold the bridge. "hen the tail of the column caught up with the tanks and Infantry, the column moved out through Ober Weira to the main road leading into Waldenburg. In the woods at 399045 , enemy bazooka-men were encountered, but were quickly cleaned up by the Infantry. Tanks and Infantry then rolled into ":oldenburg, sieved the bridge, and occupied the high ground at Hill 318, coordinates 435025. In the town of Waldenburg, no rifle or machine gun fire was encountered. All $\mathrm{P} . \mathrm{FW}^{\prime}$ s that were picked up were armed with pistols and bazookas. In occupying the town, one half-track of the machine gun platoon was hit by bazooka-fire and four men were killed, and five wounded. A Task Force consisting of a platoon of Infantry, and a platoon of tanks under the command of Captain James $J$. Nally was sent to the southwest along the west bank of the Zwick hulde River, to contact the 8 th Tank Battalion at Remse. This was accomplished, and the force returned to the Battalion at 2330. Ene hundred and fourty P.W.'s were taken in Waldenburg.

## 14 Anvil 1945

At 0420 the Battalion was ordered to move at 0700 to seize and occupy the tow of Linbach 5303. At 0700, the head of the column moved out, and moved rapidly until it reached the village of kussdorf 5061 . There, enemy infantry and bazookamen delayed the column. The job of cleaning out each house was begun, and after heavy artillery fire had fallen onto the town of Limbach, and the roads approaching the town, the resistance was over come, and the companies moved to their objectives through the town to the high ground on Hill 409 and Hill 401. In the light for the tow, 25 enemy Infantry-men were killed and wounded and 280 r. Y.'.s were taken.

This completed the conibat for the Battalion, the remainder of the time the 15 th of Aril to the 9th of lay, was spent on outpost duty where no enemy contact was made, in a rest area, and in the movement into Czechoslovakia, here nu enemy was encountered until after the unconditional surrender had become effective at 0001, 9 Lay 1945.

For the Battalion Commander:

Incls: I S-3 Journal with Annexes.


 APO 284, U. S. Army

SUBINCT: After dotion Report.
TO : The Ad Jutant Ganeral. Fashington. D. C. (THROJGR CHANNBLS).

1-8 Kay 1945
Notual combat $=$ erapleted $b_{j}$ this battalion on 14 April 2945. During the fod $1-8$ May 2 woo the battalice was in a rost aron, and mado a marah into period 1-8 May dino who the battali un was on outpost duty. No anemy was anocuntCsechosloradit, whe unoondithonal surrender had bocane effective at 00019 May 45. For the Battalion Commander:

Charlen L. Kinsing
CHAPKEKI LIMSES.
Major. 5ist Armad Inf Bn. S-3

Inale: fis-8 jourmal with amexes.


