

1st Div
635 Dec 31 Dec 72
1466

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
57

THE CAMPAIGN ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE 13

U In early May 1966, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group patrol, led by U.S. Special Forces personnel, killed a Viet Cong Lieutenant about five kilometers southeast of LOC NHEM District Town, along National Route 13 in northern BINH LONG Province. Among the papers discovered on the body of this officer was a war and a plan for the attack on LOC NHEM Town and the Special Forces Camp by three Viet Cong Regiments and one North Vietnamese Army Regiment. The discovery of this document marked the beginning of a prolonged campaign along National Route 13, leading from BINH SON through THU DAN HOA, the provincial capital of BINH DUONG province; onward to the north through CHAU THANH District Town; through MON QUAN (AT LOC) the provincial capital of BINH LONG Province; and finally north through the LOC NHEM Plantation to the Cambodian Border.

U On 17 May, a CIDG Force and one battalion of the 9th ARVN Regiment engaged a two battalion VC force which included the 2d Battalion 273d Regiment and possibly a battalion of the 271st Regiment. The action which took place vicinity XU 5904, about two kilometers from the Cambodian border, resulted in heavy casualties by both sides.

(U) The 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, was dispatched to LOC NHEM with three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion on 19 and 20 May 1966. Between 19 and 26 May, this brigade established a defensive perimeter around the LOC NHEM airstrip and patrolled and conducted search operations westward to the Cambodian Border without substantial contact. The brigade returned to its base at LAI NHEM on 26 May 1966.

U Subsequently, intelligence from a number of sources indicated that the VC, having postponed their attack, intended to go ahead with their original plans. Agents reported through the Vietnamese Army that the VC were inaugurating a campaign to last from 20 May until 20 August to destroy friendly forces along Route 13; to interdict the route and to harass or attack LOC NHEM, MON QUAN, CHAU THANH, BINH THANH, and SONG BE. VC forces involved consisted of six regiments. It was assumed that these regiments included three of the 9th Viet Cong Division, 271st, 272d, and 273d; and another grouping of the 101st, 141st, and possibly the 250th Regiments of the North Vietnamese Army.

U The 3d Brigade returned to LOC NHEM on 2 June 1966 with one infantry battalion and one artillery battalion. At this time, the 5th ARVN Division Commander, with headquarters at THU OL, informed the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, that he believed the Viet Cong would attack the BINH LONG provincial capital, MON QUAN. The decision was made to move one troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, with two ground units to MON QUAN.

U On 2 June, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was moved to LAI NHEM assigned as an infantry reaction force and A Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry commenced its move from LAI NHEM through CHAU THANH to MON QUAN. Although road blocks, mines, and minor harassment were encountered Troop arrived at CHAU THANH about 1300 without significant contact.

REGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
PER AUTHORITY DOD 5300.1-R
DATE 30 Nov 2001 Chris L. Johnson

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

At this point the 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry was moved by helicopters to the HOI QUAN airstrip, placing it in a better position to react to any engagement between HOI QUAN and HOI QUAN. At 1440 hours, approximately 12 kilometers south of HOI QUAN in a densely wooded area, the lead tank received a direct hit from a 75mm recoilless rifle. The ambush by all three battalions of the 72d Viet Cong Regiment was triggered. During the three and a half hours duration of the battle, Troop A was supported by a number of airstrikes, and 105 mm, 152 mm, and 8" artillery. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was committed in an airmobile assault to the north of the battle area and swept both sides of the woods in support of the cavalry. Coupled with the valiant fight by A Troop, these measures destroyed 90% of the 1st Battalion 272d Regiment, including the battalion commander. Fifty percent of the 2d Battalion was destroyed, while the 3d Battalion was generally south of the major action. The chief of staff, 272d Regiment, reportedly was also killed during the engagement. Troop A and the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry continued to HOI QUAN the following day.

u) On 11 June 1966, A Company, 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry committed one rifle platoon with a CIDG reconnaissance platoon in an airmobile recon operation to the western edge of the LOC HINH airstrip to effect a link up. Night contact was made at 0900 and about noon, C Company was committed to assist. By 1400 hours it was apparent that the VC force consisted of at least one battalion and the remainder of the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry moved by foot to the LOC HINH Plantation. Massive air and artillery fire power assisted the infantry in overrunning the positions and by 1900 the VC withdrew leaving 98 dead and numerous weapons on the battlefield. Subsequent reports from plantation workers and captured VC revealed that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry had destroyed over 50% of the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment.

u) The 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry under O.CCM of the 1st Brigade conducted an air mobile raid on 21 June in the area of a reported rice storage area along the SANGHAI River west of the HINH QUAN Plantation. This raid discovered 1506 tons of rice and large quantities of other supplies. A second unit, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, was committed before the operation terminated on 28 June.

u) The 1st Infantry Division was deployed, on 30 June to S & D enemy location. The 1st Battalion 28th Infantry was conducting operations to the rear area. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, under division control with attached 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-), was conducting armed reconnaissance operations and infantry reconnaissance patrolling in the general area of the QUAN LOI - AN LOC Plantation. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry was securing engineers finishing the airstrip at HINH QUAN. The 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, under control of the Division Artillery Commander, continued its pacification operations in the HINH LOI area with the HINH DUONG Province Chief and the 7th ARVN Regiment.

UNCLASSIFIED

4) About 0900 on 30 June, Troops B and C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry and C Company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry proceeded north from HON QUAM and replaced an ATLD adjacent to the damaged CM 14 Bridge. The column then moved north to conduct an armed recon mission along Route 13 and secure engineer equipment to be brought on the return trip from LOC NHEE to the bridge site. Four thousand meters from the bridge site, Troop B started receiving recoilless rifle, small arms, and mortar fire and this triggered an ambush by all three battalions of the 271st Viet Cong Regiment. The Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division was notified of this action while he was with the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry at LOC VHEE for a fixed-wing airlift to QUAN LOI. At 1020 the 3d Brigade Commander was instructed to retract the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry from its operation to the SCNG BE Airstrip at QUAN LOI. At 1000 hours the 1st Brigade Commander was ordered to move the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and the Brigade Command Post to QUAN LOI in that order and upon arrival to take command of the operation. By 1330 hours, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, had been committed into a landing zone north of the cavalry, and placed under the operational control of the squadron commander. It is interesting to note that when the battle started, the Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry was under the OCOP of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry; however, because he was in command on the ground, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was placed under his command. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry closed QUAN LOI by fixed-wing aircraft at 1530 hours and by 1609 hours was introduced by airmobile assault into an LZ west of the battle area. By 1620 hours, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry had closed into QUAN LOI and was prepared for an airmobile assault. The 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry was ordered to move from LAI NHEE by fixed wing aircraft to QUAN LOI and assume the mission of security for QUAN LOI - HON QUAM. With the infantry sweeping south; the U.S. and ARVN cavalry blocking along Route 13 and the road south of the battle area; and air strikes and artillery covering the routes of withdrawal; the 271st Viet Cong Regiment was defeated by 1700 hours and began withdrawing to the northwest. Eighty-eight close air support sorties were flown in support of the battle and the 8" and 155mm batteries expended 277 and 248 rounds respectively. The Viet Cong bodies counted on 30 June totaled 267 killed. Due to bad weather on 1 July, the airmobile assault by the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry into an LZ farther to the west did not take place until 1000 hours. This landing was made into an area in which VC prisoners indicated the 271st Regiment would rally. A heavy preparation by air and artillery was fired, including fires from one battery which had been lifted into the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry LZ by OH-47. Additional wounded VC were picked up in the area, but there was no evidence of a major force in the immediate area of this landing zone.

4) At 1630 hours, 1 July, the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry was lifted by assault helicopters from their perimeter along Route 13 into two LZ's farther to the northwest. At 1800 hours, A Company proceeded to a major trail crossing and became heavily engaged. C Company and the recon platoon were sent to reinforce A Company. Company B was 1500 meters farther to the north and the battalion command post was 1000 meters to the north. Companies A and C received a heavy volume of mortar and automatic weapons fire against their perimeter during the early evening. During the night a VC battalion surrounded the two companies, The battalion headquarters had no significant contact.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4

At 0850, 2 July, the VC launched a series of five assaults against A Company, C Company, and the Recon Platoon. The 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry was sent from the south to link up and B company, 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry from the north. Fighter bomber strikes were brought in under a 200 foot ceiling and artillery fire delivered from the landing zone occupied by the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry. The VC attack was repulsed with losses to the 3d Battalion, 273d VC Regiment that included 78 killed. The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, minus one company at the artillery base, was assembled on Route 13 and helilifted to an LZ east of the battle. The landing zone was secured by the 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry and the attached AFVN APC troop and rifle company of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment. The 3d Brigade was ordered to move its headquarters back to LOC NHEI at 0900 together with the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was ordered to move by fixed-wing aircraft from LAI NHEI to LOC NHEI and provide a reaction force to be used to the northwest. The 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry linked up with the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, at 0930 and then proceeded to the lake at XU 5904. The battalion was lightly engaged en route. A large VC force was then located between the Infantry/Cavalry force on the east and the two infantry battalions on the west. At 1500 hours, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry from HAI NOI relieved the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, preparatory to a sweep to the east. During the night, the 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry came under mortar attack which later seemed to be a cover for the withdrawal of the VC both to the southwest and northwest. After sweeping the area with only minor contact, all forces were withdrawn from the operational area on 4 July. The 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, and 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Infantry were assembled at the QUAN LOI Plantation. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (-) assembled at the HOI QUAN airfield. These troops stood down for two days for rest, resupply, new uniforms, and for maintenance on armored vehicles. The first Chapter of the Campaign along Route 13 was closed.

U) While the battles with the 271st and 273d Regiments took place north of HOI QUAN, the 272d Regiment at least partially recovered from its battle south of HOI QUAN, moved to an area between CHON THAM and HOI QUAN. Further reports indicate that another regiment may have taken up positions along route 13 between CHON THAM and LAI NHEI. When the 272d Viet Cong Regiment ambushed A Troop, it may have expected a soft convey and instead ran into an armored troop. However, a diary taken from the body of a VC captain from the 271st Regiment after the battle on 30 June indicated that his mission was to destroy U.S. armored forces on Route 13. It thus appears that the VC are under orders to fight and win the battle of National Route 13 and that they intend to do so regardless of losses. The remaining chapters in the Campaign along National Route 13 are yet to be written.

The remainder of this document amplifies the battles along highway 13 and covers the battle of 9 July near the NHEI THON rubber plantation, and the battle of 25 August which did not involve any squadron elements under squadron control.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Combat After Action Report (OP EL PASO II)

1. OP EL PASO II. Combat movement to reposition 1st Infantry Division combat elements. S&D missions and recon in force operations. Troop A OPCOM 3d Brigade 8 June 1966. OPCOM 2/18 9 June to 18 June 1966.

2. Dates: 8 June - 18 June 1966.

3. General: 1/4 Cav conducted combat movement to reposition 1st Infantry Division elements; conducted S&D missions and continuous recon in force operations.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC Leonard L. Lewane.

b. Task Organization: Task organization during this phase of OP EL PASO consisted of: Troop A commanded by Cpt Ralph H Sturgis; Troop B commanded by Lt James C Flores; Troop C commanded by 1st Lt Kyles Ellengberg; Troop D commanded by Maj Clyde M Bryan; Hq Trp commanded by Cpt Ronald Davidson. Troop A was the only unit involved. TF control consisted of LTC Leonard L Lewane, Squadron commander; Maj George E Taylor Squadron S3; Cpt Edward Palus, Squadron S-2; Cpt Alex L Greene, Squadron S-1 and Cpt William Greene Squadron S4.

4. Intelligence:

a. Available information prior to commencement of OP EL PASO II: Information had been received of the presence of three VC main force Regiments, 271, 272, and 273 were active in the area from LOC NINH (XT 7408) to LOC (HON QUAN) (XT 7588) west to the Cambodian border. Other information had been received that VC local forces had been engaged in interdicting Highway 13 using road blocks and tax collecting points from LAI KHE (XT 7738) north to the Cambodian border.

b. Enemy Situation:

(1) On 8 June 1966, 2/18 Infantry was moved to LAI KHE Airfield as an infantry reaction force and Troop A 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry commenced its move from LAI KHE through CHON THANH to HON QUAN. Although road blocks, mines, and minor harassment were encountered, Troop A arrived at CHON THANH about 1300 without significant contact. At this point 2/18th Infantry was moved by helicopters to the HON QUAN Airfield, placing it in a better position to react to any engagement between CHON THANH and HON QUAN. At 1400 hours approximately 12 kms south of HON QUAN in a densely wooded area. The lead tank hit a mine which triggered an ambush along three kms of road by the 272 Regiment. The fighting lasted for three and a half hours with air strikes assisting the unit. The 2/18 Inf was committed in an airborne assault to the north of the battle area and swept both sides of the woods in support of the cavalry. Results indicated that 90% of the 1st Battalion, 272d Regiment, including the Battalion Commander, 50% of the 2d Battalion was destroyed, while the 3d Battalion was generally south of the major action. The chief of staff 272d Regiment reportedly was also killed during the engagement. Troop A and 2/18 moved to HON QUAN the next day.

(2) On 11 June 1966, A Company, 2d Bn, 28th Inf committed one rifle platoon with a CIDG reconnaissance platoon in an airborne reconnaissance operation to the western edge of the LOC NINH Plantation. The remainder of A Company moved by foot from the LOC NINH Airstrip to effect a link up. Light contact was made at 0900 and about noon, C Co was committed to assist. By 1400 hrs it was apparent that the VC force consisted of at least one battalion and the remainder of the 2d Bn, 28th Inf moved by foot to the LOC NINH Plantation.

1 UNCLASSIFIED

b. 9-18 June 1966. Troop A and the 2/18 Inf conducted daily recon in force operations throughout the area of operation with negative results. Security was also provided for the HON QUAN Airstrip.

8. Supporting Forces: Before contact the column had continuous visual reconnaissance from an airborne Forward Air Controller. Upon enemy contact continuous combat air support was rendered by the Air Force.

9. Results:

a. US Casualties: KIA 15; WIA: 34.

b. US Equipment Destroyed:

4 crew served weapons.

9 small arms weapons.

2 personnel carriers (M113's)

c. VC Casualties: KIA: 170 (BC), 250 (est), 4 VC captured.

d. VC Equipment Captured:

12 crew served weapons

30 small arms weapons

18 ChiCom grenades.

10. Administrative matters:

a. Administrative and Logistical orders provided were adequate.

(1) Supply: Supply of Class I, III, and V was carried by troops as basic load. Resupply was moved from Lai Khe and Phu Loi by air craft.

(2) Maintenance: Maintenance of vehicles was greatly assisted by the arrival of and ordnance contact team from the 701st maintenance Battalion.

(3) Treatment of Casualties: Dustoff aircraft provided immediate evacuation to rear areas for proper medical treatment.

(4) Transportation: Transportation of all items of resupply was accomplished by aircraft.

11. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:

a. Infantry in front of the fighting elements limits the fire power of the Cavalry units. Infantry units should be employed in a separate sector.

b. Armored columns on the move should have a minimum of 1 fire team overhead. It is desirable that a FAC with immediate air strikes be available.

c. The headquarters elements should be utilized for evacuation of the wounded, leaving the combat vehicles at the point of contact.

Massive air and artillery fire power assisted the infantry in overrunning the positions and by 1900 the VC withdrew leaving 98 dead and numerous weapons on the battle field. Subsequent reports from plantation workers and captured VC revealed that the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry had destroyed over 50% of the 1st Battalion, 273d Regiment.

c. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain: The area of operations can be characterized as flat with many streams throughout the area, wooded areas run from heavy dense jungle growth to areas dominated by rubber tree plantations. Secondary roads are trafficable even during prolonged periods of wet weather. Cross country trafficability in from good to excellent in dry periods, but extremely limited during wet periods.

(2) Weather: Characterized by early morning fog clearing off by mid-morning. Rain showers occurred every day from light drizzles to heavy showers with occasional thunder storms of intense but short duration.

5. Mission: 1/4 Cavalry (-) completed all missions assigned. Missions consist of: convoy escort and security while propositioning 1st Infantry Division combat elements; conducting several and extensive S&D missions; and recon in force operations. 1/4 Cavalry (-) was to locate VC/RNV forces, capture and/or destroy them and their equipment to prevent the VC from escaping to the Cambodian border, and reconnaissance of National Route 13 preventing sabotage and mining incidents along the highway, to prevent VC/RNV forces from mounting a nonse n offensive directed against U.S. and ARVN base camps and subjecting villagers of BINH LONG to VC taxation.

6. Concept of Operations: To locate and stop VC forces within BINH LONG Province from harassing U.S. and GVN forces. To conduct recon patrols and S&D missions in the area of operations in conjunction with the 2/18 Infantry.

7. Execution:

a. 0700 June 1966: Troop A executed a combat movement along National Route 13 in order to strengthen U.S. forces in the BINH LONG Province. Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance by fire was used in most areas. Troop A became OPCON 3d Brigade when they arrived in its TAOR. In a heavily wooded area approximately 12 km south of AN LOC the lead tank hit a mine and simultaneously the entire column came under heavy mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire. The VC force estimated in regimental size was later confirmed as the 272d VC main force regiment. The VC forces were armed with recoilless rifles, anti-tank weapons, mortars, 50 caliber machine guns and small arms. Initial contact was made around 1400 hours. Continuing air strikes were placed upon the enemy as well as the organic cavalry weapons. The 2/18 Infantry linked up and established a perimeter for the night. U.S. casualties were light and two APC's destroyed. VC losses were 105 KIA (BC), 250 KIA (est), 3 VCC, and several crew served weapons captured.

UNCLASSIFIED

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF BM 69

8 JUNE 1966

INTRODUCTION

The 272d VC main force Regiment was defeated on 8 June 1966, in a densely wooded area along National Route 13, referred to as Bench Mark 69. The VC were attempting to stop the efforts of the 1st Infantry Division in the AN LOC, LOC NINH area.

BACKGROUND

Operation EL PASO II began on 2 June 1966 when intelligence indicated that three Viet Cong and one North Vietnamese regiments were poised to resume their "Monsoon Campaign" by attacking GVN and US Special Forces compounds in BINH TRAM, HOA QUAN, LOC NINH and SONG BE. Because of this threat; commanding general, II Field Force, Vietnam directed one infantry and one artillery battalion to be employed to LOC NINH to strengthen the defensive in this area. No significant battle had been fought prior to 8 June 1966.

The 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division had been dispatched to LOC NINH with three Infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. Between 19 and 26 May the 3d Bde established a defensive perimeter around the LOC NINH airstrip and patrolled and conducted search operations westward to the Cambodian border without substantial contact. The 3d Brigade returned to its base on 26 May 1966 at LAI KHE.

Subsequently, intelligence from a number of sources indicated that the VC, having postponed their attack, intended to go ahead with their original plans. Agents reported through the Vietnamese Army that the VC were inaugurating a campaign to last from 20 May until 20 August to destroy friendly forces along Route 13; to interdict the route; and to harass or attack LOC NINH, HOA QUAN, BINH TRAM, BINH TRAM and SONG BE. VC forces involved consisted of six regiments. It was assumed that these regiments included three of the 9th Viet Cong Division, 272d, 271st and 273d, and another grouping of the 101st, 141st and possible the 250th regiments of PAVN.

The 5th ARVN Division Commander with headquarters at PHU LOI, informed the Commanding General 1st Infantry Division that he believed that the Viet Cong would attack the BINH LONG Provincial Capital, HOA QUAN. This led to the decision to move Troop A, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry with two ground units to HOA QUAN. The 2d Battalion 18th Infantry was moved to LAI KHE airfield as an infantry reaction force as Troop A commenced its move from PHU LOI, through LAI KHE and BINH TRAM to HOA QUAN.

THE BATTLE OF BENCH MARK 69

On 8 June 1966 Troop A 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry departed PHU LOI at 0700 enroute to HOA QUAN, NVN where there existed a threat of a Viet Cong monsoon offensive. Under the direction of LTC Leonard L Lewano, above them in a OH 13 helicopter, the troop proceeded up the old road bed (vic XT 839191) (see map #1) to LAI KHE rather than use highway 13 the scene of many mining incidents. At about 0805 the lead tank of the 1st Platoon hit a mine vic (XT 837241) with no resulting casualties, but the vehicle was disabled.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2

At this time an APC of the second platoon was experiencing mechanical difficulties and the decision was made to send both vehicles back to POU LOI.

When the column resumed it's northward move it left the railroad bed and moved cross country. The third platoon took the lead from this point and moved on to LAI KHE to refuel. Two vehicles dropped out of the column and were picked up by the trail party and brought forward.

After refueling the column pushed north on Highway 13 out of LAI KHE. The AVIB got stuck at the north check point of LAI KHE and was left for the trail party to retrieve. The troop passed through CHAN TRAM at 1300 hours and had made no enemy contact. The decision was made to push on to HOA QUAN.

At about 1415 hours the 3d platoon lead vehicle hit a mine (vic NF766751 (see Map #2). A short time before a claymore had been detonated but no casualties resulted. Almost simultaneously the entire column came under intense small arms automatic weapons, mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Lt Joseph Hale, 3d Platoon leader, reported that he was in heavy contact with an undeterminable force. Capt Ralph Sturgis, troop commander immediately ordered the 2d platoon, led by Lt David Kinkaid, to come up and reinforce the third platoon.

Reports indicated that the Viet Cong were employed along 3,000 meters of the highway with the majority of their concentration on the west. The troop commanders vehicle was hit by recoilless rifle wounding the driver, Sp 4 James Dempsey. The observer, Sgt Nick Saporito, took over the driving responsibility. Moving forward the crew could see a recoilless rifle crew taking aim on them again. All of a sudden the entire area became very hot as SFC Pearson Cole commander of the attached Flamethrower APC let loose with a burst from his M32 flame thrower APC roasting the VC to a crisp.

The troop moved forward into some high ground and began to set up a perimeter. The first platoon leader Lt Louis Bourcull, reported that one of his vehicles was experiencing mechanical difficulties (vic NF 766729,) and that they were leaving a tank with it for security. Further up the road a 1st platoon APC was blazing a fire resulting from several hits. At 1630 hours the BAC (Cpt Richard Wetzel) reported that the Viet Cong had captured an APC and had driven it off into the woods with the headlights on. Fire was not immediately called in on the vehicle for fear that a U.S. soldier might still be in the vehicle. A later check revealed that it was the vehicle in which 1st Sgt Michael Lepe had been seriously injured in when it took two direct hits from a recoilless rifle.

Compiling all of the reports in the perimeter Cpt Sturgis realized that there was one tank stuck south of the 1st platoon tank and APC that had been under sporadic fire. Under the capable guidance of Lt Kinkaid the evacuation of the wounded personnel was organized.

With a lull in the fighting Cpt Sturgis called for his trail party, which had been held up at CHAN TRAM to come forward. The trail party, headed by the troop executive officer Lt Ronald Copes reached the first stuck tank, and retrieved it with no difficulty. At this point LTC Leyano landed on the highway to brief Lt Copes on the tactical situation and the latest reports on enemy locations.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3

Radio contact had been lost with the 1st platoon tank and AFC but suddenly the voice of SFC Eugene Blair, 1st platoon Sgt, could be heard requesting assistance. Cpt Sturcis immediately diverted the air force jets to SFC Blair's position and SFC Blair called them in very close to his position due to attempts by the Viet Cong to storm his position. When the VC were driven off SFC Blair was assured that the trail party would soon link up with him. Prior to this SFC Blair an infantryman for 17 years, had never rode inside of a tank.

When the trail party reached vic (MF756722) the lead vehicle hit a mine seriously wounding the driver, Sp 5 Hugh Oliver. The vehicle commander exchanged drivers and the column moved on. It went about 75 meters further and hit another mine at which time the trail party came under mortar, recoilless rifle and automatic weapons fire. The tank took a direct hit and burst into flames throwing the vehicle commander SSG Charles Morris clear of the track. SSG Morris had a brief struggle with a VC in the bushes and then reached the safety of an AFC. As soon as he got inside of the vehicle a grenade was tossed inside, but an alert crewmember, tossed it out before it exploded.

The column again started north leaving the burning tank behind and picked up the first platoon vehicles before closing into the perimeter. Specialist Oliver appeared badly burned and blind in one eye. Spec 4 Oliver was the first driver of the tank that led the trail party. It was believed at first that Oliver was killed when the mortar round hit the vehicle, but as he explained, he was thrown into the jungle unconscious. When he regained his senses he could hear the VC running off into the woods and the vehicle moving off so he ran back to the road and climbed into the still burning tank and drove it into the troop perimeter.

Shortly after contact had been made the 2/18 Infantry battalion was airlifted from HON QUAM to assist Troop A. The only suitable landing zone was a considerable distance to the north so consequently the battalion did not reach Troop A until after the fighting had subsided. The 2/18 Infantry immediately searched the area for VC bodies, and then tied in with Troop A on the perimeter.

The fighting lasted for four (4) hours resulting in American losses of 14 KIA's and 37 WIA. The VC 272 Regiment which was engaged suffered 105 KIA (BG) with an additional 250 estimated killed. Troop A had 2 AFC's destroyed, and two tanks badly damaged.

UNCLASSIFIED

FIRE SUPPORT

There was a minimum of one FAC on station at all times. These FAC's were in constant communication with the squadron commander and the troop commander. At the time initial contact was made, there was a flight of fighters high in the clouds on the way to another area. These fighters were quickly diverted to the battle area. The battle occurred in an area which was outside the fan of the artillery at CHON THANH and the artillery at HOA BINH. Consequently it was strictly an Air Force show with no artillery.

From the initial air strike, close air support was continuous and unlimited. A total of 43 sorties were flown with 17 flights of fighter bombers.

Ordinance expended included:

26,240 lbs high explosive

26,500 lbs napalms

13,160 lbs frag bombs

24 canisters CBU

There was a minimum of 2 UE 1B fire teams air/borne at all times.

RESULTS

Enemy losses included:

170 VC KIA (BC)

250 VC KIA (Est)

4 VC captured

30 Small arms

12 Crew served weapons

78 Chi Com grenades

Friendly Losses:

TROOP A:

13 KIA

30 MIA

D Co 1st Engr:

2 KIA

4 MIA

AWARDS - TROOP A, 1ST SQUADRON, 4TH CAVALRY

HEAD QUARTERS PLATOON

SFC COLB	BRONZE STAR "V"
SF4 CORBIN	ACM "V"
LT COPEL	SILVER STAR
SF5 KNIPPERT	ACM "V"
SFC ARMITAGE	BRONZE STAR "V"
CPT STURGIS	BRONZE STAR "V"

FIRST PLATOON

SFC BLAIR	SILVER STAR
SP4 SCHELLER	BRONZE STAR "V"
PFC BASS	BRONZE "
PFC MORGAN	BRONZE "
SP4 LUKE	"
SSG SANTIAGO	"
PFC DAWSON	"
SGT GUNN	"
SP4 LAMBERT	"
SG. BENOKLEN	"
PFC LARLIN	"
PFC PLYTON	"
SP4 BURGESS	"
SP4 FRIEMUTH	"
PFC SCHNIDBAUR	"
SP5 BOWLING	"
SGT RODRIGUEZ	"
PFC JAMES	"
PFC SWANSON	"
SP5 MC GLOKIN	"
SP5 SILVER	"
SSG LITTLE	"

1ST ENGINEERS	
SP4 DISCHER	BRONZE STAR "V"
SSG BOUNDS	"
PFC DUMPREE	ACM "V"
SP4 WALKER	"
PFC DUNCAN	"
PFC HILL	"
PFC MITCHELL	"

SECOND PLATOON

LT KINKAD	SILVER STAR
PFC BAKER	BRONZE STAR "V"
PFC MEDINA	"
PFC KINNEY	"
SSG SANDERS	"
PFC DETOSI	ACM "V"
PFC GUILLIAMS	"
SP4 MENDOR (TRP B)	"
SGT LURA	"
SSG WARD	"
SGT WILLIAMS	"
SGT OWENS (TRP B)	"
SP4 TALL	"
SSG HARPER	"
SSG MORGAN (TRP B)	"
SGT COUCH	"

THIRD PLATOON

SP5 OLIVER	SILVER STAR
LT LAKE	BRONZE STAR "V"
PFC A SMITH	"
PFC SORENSON	"
PFC LANLUM	"
SGT LISTLE (TRP C)	"
SSG MORRIS	"
PFC LOSSEE	ACM "V"
SP4 JARVIS	"
SSG MC CARTY	"
SGT HARRIS	"
SSG SLATLER	"
SGT CALLNER	"
SSG RUMPELL	"

TROOP A PERSONNEL THAT TOOK PART IN THE AMBUSH 8 JUNE 1966, 12KM SCUTE
OF AN LOC

STURGIS, RALPH M	04071394	Cpt
COPEB, RONALD A	05532138	1ST LT
BOULULT, LOUIS L	05321630	1ST LT
NINKELD, DAVID C	05227468	1ST LT
LANE, JOSEPH R	05101547	1ST LT
PEPE, MICHAEL	RA 32822488	1ST SG E8
LINELA, RICHARD L	RA 15204799	PSG E7
MEDINA, OSWALDO	RA 18355081	PSG E7

SSG & SFC E6

AMITAGE, ALBERT E	RA 21757596
BLAIR, EUGENE F	RA 35958294
BRITAN, ARTHUR W	RA 18590540
FISCHER, FRANCIS E	RA 12337426
HUNTER, ARGYLE JR	RA 25268619
JACKSON, ROBERT A	RA 17422567
JOHNSON, WILLIAM A	RA 54032686
LITTLE, TOM F	RA 19291595
MC CARTY, WILLIAM W	RA 37816227
MOLDNER, HAROLD H	RA 37597950
NORRIS, CHARLES E	RA 24914580
RUMMEL, FRANCIS C	RA 23786302
SANDERS, DENNIS L	RA 17458213
SANTIAGO-GONZALES, CARLOS	RA 51261405
WARD, JOE E	RA 18591951

SGT E5

BROOKER, JOE O	RA 27377019
CAMBER, MERLIN R	RA 55672838
*COOK, DONALD E	RA 15494975
COUCH, ROY C	RA 25343676
GUNN, JOHN W	RA 14692943
HARRIS, WILLIAM E	RA 53292831
JOHNSON, JOHN C	RA 14456474
KICK, PIERCE K	RA 16706467
LURA, WAYNE T SR	RA 16688208
SAPORITO, THOMAS	RA 19779278
SANTER, HERBERT D	RA 52526990
WILLIAMS, JOHN D	RA 32593923

SP 5 E5

BOWLING, ROBERT W	RA 12669858
CARRON, DONALD L	RA 17370824
CURR, NELLIE G	RA 18325156
*FERGUSON, DENEY L	RA 18325156
GUBISTA, DONALD W	RA 12588614

HARRISON, RODNEY D	RA 55561461
KAPPERT, WILLIAM R	RA 16675046
KING, WARREN JR	RA 53322444
MC GLOKIN, JOHN W	RA 13744278
*OANEY, JOHN R	RA 19719265
OLIVER, RUGL JR	RA 18707168
RANDALL, EDWARD L	RA 21195280
*SMITH, PHILLIP R	RA 28979913
STEVENS, ARNOLD D	RA 19341395
VEGA, RAFIGITO G	RA 25853862
WALKER, ARNOLD E	RA 16545064

SP 4 E4

BURGESS, LEMONT N	RA 11438813
CORBIN, ROBERT A	RA 17663441
DUBNEY, JOSEPH M	US 52624065
DELISLIE, MICHAEL E	RA 11430407
DEPSEY, JAMES H	RA 16655274
ELLIOTT, JOHN R	RA 55640651
FARMER, WILLIE G	RA 53326243
*FERNANDEZ, JORGE L	RA 12694492
FORD, GERRY	RA 52556973
FRIEMUTH, ROGER R	RA 19783611
GARZA, CHARLIE R	RA 54345870
HENRY, GEORGE E	RA 18723738
HOLLEY, WILLIAM W	RA 19737000
HONANER, JAMES L	RA 15698977
JARVIS, MICHAEL	RA 15697869
KECK, RUSSELL P	RA 14483268
LABERT, STEVEN L	RA 18778607
LARKIN, SAMUEL J	RA 19815031
LENA, ROBERT D	US 25763434
LUKE, L C	RA 29921314
MILLER, ROBERT L	RA 14567920
MORGAN, LORENZO	RA 14698166
MURPHY, THOMAS R	RA 14884213
SCHILLER, FREDERICK	RA 14822917
TEAL, HAROLD O	RA 15649936
*TORZON, JOSEPH	RA 52551729
WELLS, JAMES L	US 53394679
WARNE, GARY A	RA 16785229
WHITE, BUEL L	RA 19816710
ZOLLER, MELVIN I JR	RA 19783139

PFC E3

AURINGER, STANLEY A	US 51570353
BARTON, JOHN L	US 53399748
BUCKNER, HARLAN D	US 53383364
CARRICOBRANU, MAURICE A	US 24665838
CHISHOLM, ANTHONY V	US 52615245
*CONNER, ROGER L	US 52614613
CRISMAN, DARL B	US 52634819
DAWSON, MERRON E JR	RA 12724096

DE ROSSI, JOSEPH	US 55805092
CRANE, JAMES	US 55804980
DILLON, ROBERT P	US 28288667
FRANZ, ROBERT G	US 51547811
GOSLING, BURTON B	RA 16326613
GRODI, DAVID R	RA 15730608
GUILLIAMS, EDWARD L	US 52633945
HOWARD, JACK A	RA 17715715
IRIART, RONALD J	US 56380772
IVEY, SHEPPARD E	US 53408728
JAMES, TERRANCE B	RA 53720970
KESSLER, RICHARD E	US 55822429
KINNEY, JOHNNIE R	RA 18690775
LANDING, RONALD L	RA 17663704
LOSSEE, LANE J	US 56346695
MUSICK, THOMAS H	US 55806743
ORRHAL, JOHN F	US 55834277
*PENNYGRAFT, GEORGE R	US 52630890
*PETERSON, MERRILL O	RA 17721057
PISKLESNIER, DAVID A	RA 16814675
PRICE, KEITH	US 56379521
REHRIG, WILLARD W JR	US 52640264
REVENTI, GARY L	US 52649413
ROBINSON, JOHNNIE M	RA 15719618
SANDERS, JERRY D	RA 19839833
SCHRIDBAUER, RONALD W	RA 13794339
SCHWARZ, MICHAEL E	RA 16811684
SMITH, AVERY G	US 52614620
SNYDER, ROBERT C	US 51545452
TERRIEN, JOSEPH S II	RA 11463048
VAN DORNE, ROGER C	RA 19842887
VAN HENNERYCK, LOUIS R SR	US 51543221

PVT EM

HILLS, FLOYD B RA 15424093

* Indicate EM KIA on 8 June 1966. Awards to be made posthumously.

UNCLASSIFIED


DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST SQUADRON 4TH CAVALRY
PAO U.S. Forces 96345

AVID-QH

29 July 1966

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Report (OP EL PASO II)

TO: Commanding Officer
1st Brigade
ATTN: S-3
1st Infantry Division
APO San Francisco



1. **U** OP EL PASO II, 42-66, Hq 1/4 Cavalry, dtd 162330 June 1966. Combat movement to preposition 1st Infantry Division combat elements; S&D missions and recon in force operations. OPCON 3d Brigade 18-30 June 1966, OPCON 1st Brigade 30 June-10 July 1966.

2. (U) Dates. 18 June-10 July 1966.

3. **U** General. 1/4 Cav (-) conducted combat movement to reposition 1st Infantry Division elements; conducted extensive S&D missions; and continuous recon in force operations.

a. Reporting Officer: LTC Lewane, Leonard L.

b. Task Organization: Task organization during OP EL PASO II consisted of: Troop B commanded by 1/Lt James P Flores until 2 July 1966, Cpt David S Kelley assumed command 2 July 1966; Troop C commanded by Cpt Stephen M. Slattery; Troop D (air) commanded by Maj Bryan Jr.; Hq Troop commanded by Cpt Dudley M Andres; Troop A commanded by 1/Lt Ronald A Copes, not used during OP EL PASO II. TF Control consisted of LTC Leonard L. Lewane, Squadron Commander; Maj George E. Taylor and Maj David C. Martin, Squadron S3; 1/Lt John A. Morrette, Squadron S-2; Cpt Alex L. Greene, Squadron S-1; and Cpt Ralph M. Sturgis, Squadron S-4.

4. **U** Intelligence.

a. Available information prior to commencement of OP EL PASO II: Information had been received of the presence of three VC main force Regiments, 271, 272, and 273 were active in the area from LOC HHEH (XU 7408), AN LOC (HOM QUAN) (XT 7588) west to the Cambodian border. Other information had been received that VC local forces had been engaged in interdiction Highway 13 using road blocks and tax collecting points from LAI HHE (XT 7738) north to the Cambodian border.

UNCLASSIFIED

ADS
S-3
12072

UNCLASSIFIED

b. Enemy Situation:

(1) During the period 18 June through 29 June 1966 there were no significant engagements with VC forces.

(2) On 30 June 1966, Troops B and C along with elements of the 2/18th Infantry engaged elements of the 271st VC main force regiment in the vic of XU725020. The battle lasted approximately seven hours. Initial contact came at 300930H when Trp B 1/4 Cav received heavy mortar fire along the length of the column in the vicinity of XU 725020. At 300945H, B 1/4 Cav began receiving heavy and intense AW and SA fire from the vicinity of XU 723020, and became heavily engaged when the VC attempted to split the column. C 1/4 Cav and C 2/18 Inf were moved forward to assist Troop B, and also became heavily engaged. The VC employed AW (cal .50 and 7.62mm), small arms and recoilless rifles. Elements were dug in and concealed on both sides of Highway 13. Enemy losses were 270 VC KIA (BC), 300 KIA (est), seven VCC, weapons captured included 23 crew served weapons, 50 small arms, 1630 rds of SA arms, three rounds for the Soviet Anti-tank grenade launcher RPG-2, one AN/PRC-10 radio, five US protective masks (M17), one home made protective mask and two 7.62 barrels. All weapons and equipment captured were through the combined efforts of the Cavalry Troops and infantry battalions during the mop-up phase conducted after the battle.

(3) During the period 1 July through 8 July 1966 there were no significant engagements with VC forces by units of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

(4) On 9 July 1966, Troops B and C engaged elements of the 272d VC main force regiment vicinity XT680744. Reinforcing infantry battalions were helifted into the battle area to seal off escape routes of the VC. Initial contact was made at 091110H, and lasted for approximately three hours. Cumulative totals of enemy losses were 239 VC KIA (BC), 300 KIA (est), those were total counts conducted during mop-up operations. Weapons captured by units of the 4th U.S. Cavalry included six US Browning Automatic Rifles, six Soviet 7.62mm SKS Carbines, one US carbine, M1, two Soviet model bolt action rifles, one CHICOM LiG 7.62mm, three US M-14 rifles, one 60mm mortar with base plate, and one tripod for a recoilless weapon.

c. Terrain and Weather:

(1) Terrain: The area of operations can be characterized as flat with many streams throughout the area, wooded areas run from heavy dense jungle growth to areas dominated by rubber tree plantation. Secondary roads are trafficable even during prolonged periods of wet weather. Cross country trafficability is from good to excellent in dry periods, but extremely limited during the wet periods.

(2) Weather: Characterized by early morning fog clearing off by mid-morning. Rain showers occurred every day from light drizzles to heavy showers with occasional thunderstorms of intense but short duration.

d. Fortifications: None.

e. CA/Psy ops: Sick calls were conducted in numerous villages by the squadron medical surgeons. No leaflet drops were conducted by units of the squadron.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5. **U**) Mission: 1/4 Cav (-) completed all missions assigned. Missions consisted of: Convoy escort and security while prepositioning 1st Infantry Division combat elements; conducting several and extensive S&D missions; and reconnaissance in force operations. 1/4 Cav (-) was to locate VC/RNV forces, capture and or destroy them and their equipment, to prevent the VC from escaping to the Cambodian border, and reconnaissance of National Route 13 preventing sabotage and mining incidents along the highway, to prevent VC/RNV forces from mounting a monsoon offensive directed against US and ARVN base camps and subjecting villagers of BINH LONG Province to VC tasation.

6. **U**) Concept of Operation. To locate and stop VC forces within BINH LONG Province from harassing US and GVN forces. To create a friendship with the local villagers and inhabitants of nearby hamlets that were predominately controlled by the VC. To conduct extensive reconnaissance patrols and S&D operations in the area of operations by strategically positioning and vigorously employing all combat elements of the 1st Sqdn 4th Cavalry. To provide security for other elements of the 1st Infantry Division and to serve as a flexible, highly mobilized counter-attack force.

7. **U**) Execution:

a. 180700 June 1966: 1/4 Cavalry executed OPOD 42-66 (OP EL PASO II), HQ 1/4 Cav, dtd 16 June 1966. 1/4 Cav (-) executed combat movement along National Route 13 in order to preposition 1st Infantry Division combat elements. Squadron (-) moved from PHU LOI to AN LOC, securing Highway 13 at critical points. Squadron (-) closed in vicinity AN LOC/QUAN LOI areas with negative enemy contact. Maximum use of reconnaissance by fire was utilized in known hostile areas. Artillery preparation, TAC CAS and armed helicopters (both CH 47A and UH 1B) fires were used. Upon arrival 3d Bde TAOR, OPCON 3d Bde.

b. 19-29 June 1966: 1/4 Cav (-) conducted continuous escort and security missions along National Route 13, provided security for infantry elements conducting S&D operations, established squad-sized ambush patrols jointly with Infantry elements during hours of darkness daily. During this period of time the squadron encountered light enemy contact.

c. 30 June 1966: 1/4 Cavalry (-) conducted recon in force along Highway 13 while providing security for an AVLB located at critical bridge sight (XT721973). While moving north from BM69 to BM 101 lead elements were taken under fire by heavy enemy forces, at UT 725020. Simultaneously, a heavily armed VC force ambushed the cavalry elements from vic UT 724008, the VC main force regiment. VC forces were armed with recoilless rifles, anti-tank weapons, mortars, .50 caliber machine guns, BAR's, and small arms. Initial contact was made at 0930 hours. Continuous CAS, artillery, and organic cavalry fires were placed on enemy positions. These forced the VC to retreat to safe havens along the Cambodian border.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Infantry units were promptly air lifted to possible avenues of escape to event and block the VC forces from retreating to safe havens. Cavalry forces with attached infantry regrouped and set up an assembly area at XT 721972 to pursue fleeing VC forces. Results of an estimated 300 VC KIA (est) and 270 VC MIA (BC) and 23 crew served weapons, .50 caliber and all arms (Soviet, ChiCom and US) weapons captured during the battle. US casualties were light and two vehicles destroyed (APC's). LP's were posted around perimeter of assembly area with negative enemy contact during the hours of darkness.

d. 1-8 July 1966 Cavalry (-) elements conducted daily reconnaissance in force operations throughout area of operations with attached infantry elements resulting with negative enemy action.

e. 9 July 1966: 1/4 Cav (-) moved from AN LOC on a recon in force mission 090700 July 1966. On movement to KIEN THANH at 1110 hours vicinity XT 662743 Cavalry units were ambushed by the 272d VC Regiment. Continuous CAS and TAC CAS, artillery preparation, helicopter gunships and organic cavalry fires were placed on enemy positions. Both attached infantry elements and brigade infantry elements deployed to sweep and block possible avenues of escape. The enemy used recoiled rifles, anti-tank, mortars, various Soviet, ChiCom, US automatic and small arms weapons. Contact subsided approximately 1400 hours resulting in estimated 300 VC KIA, 239 VC MIA (BC) and numerous weapons captured, US casualties were light and four APC's destroyed. 1/4 Cav (-) remained in position at XT693740 and XT 662736 on 9 July 1966. they continued to hold these positions and on 10 July proceeded to KIEN THANH, and returned to AN LOC the following day with negative enemy contact.

8. (U) Supporting Forces: Upon enemy contact, continuous CAS support by USAF. An ARVN APC Troop (Troop 1/3d Cav) stationed at AN LOC helped to provide resupply and evacuation.

9. (U) Results.

- a. US Casualties: KIA-24, WIA-123.
- b. US Equipment Destroyed:
 - 26 crew served weapons
 - 43 small arms weapons.
 - 3 personnel carriers. (M113)
 - 2 mortar carriers. (M106)
- c. VC Casualties: KIA (BC)-509, WIA (est)-600, VCC-7.
- d. VC Equipment Captured:
 - 26 Crew served weapons
 - 62 small arms weapons
 - 1,630 rds small arms ammo
 - 1 PRC - 10 radio set.

4 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

10. Administrative Matters.

a. Administrative and logistical orders provided were adequate.

(1) Supply: Supply of Class I, III, and V was carried by troops as basic combat load. Resupply moved from LAI KHE and PHOUK VIEN to the Squadron Forward Logistical Control Point at AN LOC by aircraft, then distributed while the squadron was engaged in combat. The ARVN APC Troop located at AN LOC assisted with surface resupply.

(2) Maintenance: Maintenance of vehicles was slow due to time element for resupply from base camp area. 701st Maintenance Battalion Contact Teams provided immediate and efficient maintenance assistance. The overall maintenance posture was good.

(3) Treatment of casualties: Treatment of casualties was excellent with emergency medical evacuation timely and sufficient.

(4) Transportation: Transportation most items of resupply was generally accomplished by the use of aircraft. Very little resupply was made by surface means. Medical evacuation by Dust-Off procedures.

(5) Communications: During OP EL PASO II various communications techniques were utilized to insure constant effective communications at all levels. It was determined that both a reporting net and a net for command and control should be utilized. This method proved effective and is recommended for adoption.

(6) Medical evaluation: During OP EL PASO II the medical section operated as a forward aid station, taking care of routine sick call, and any emergencies arising from the troops. During enemy contact the medical section set up and operated an emergency aid station at the forward resupply point. The aid station promptly and efficiently took control of treatment of wounds, and Dust-Off for emergency medical evacuation. Resupply of medical items to troops was on an "as needed basis". Emergency medical evacuation was prompt, excellent and timely through Dust-Off procedures.

b. Personnel analysis:

<u>ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION</u>	<u>OPERATION INITIATED</u>	<u>OPERATION TERM</u>
Squadron Authorized	1,019	1,019
Squadron Assigned	1,312	1,229
PDY	1,174	1,043
PIF	492	561
PBC HQ Trp	230	219
Trp B	81	72
Trp C	39	32
Trp D (air)	64	145
Total PBC	414	468

11. Special Equipment and Techniques.

a. Equipment: During the battle of 9 July, RCA was dropped from a CH 47 helicopter. Results have not yet been determined.

b. Techniques:

(1) Designation of specific zones for artillery and close air support; designation of priority of fires within these zones. Designation of fire zones, i.e. air on west of road, artillery on the east, allows the simultaneous use of all types of supporting fires.

UNCLASSIFIED

(2) Infantry mounted on and fighting from armored personnel carriers. Found to be unsatisfactory, when the crew exceeds five men, the members tend to get in each others way, infantry can best be utilized by riding on vehicles of the trail troops, then committed as dismounted infantry where needed.

(3) Concentration of elements in "killing zone". An extra closed column (10-15 meters between vehicles) proved effective in that it massed more firepower in the VC "killing zone".

(4) Troop "Y" formation. This technique envisions an armored cavalry troop marching with two columns straddling a road where off-road mobility is affected. Two armored cavalry platoons move side-by-side approximately 20 meters on either side with the third platoon moving on or off the road with the forward elements abreast with the last element of the landing platoons. This formation affords mutual supporting fires from two platoons in a given area of contact and puts the maximum amount of strength to the front of the troop.

12. **W**) Conclusions and Lessons Learned.

a. Dust-Off and resupply site should be established by elements other than those engaged in the battle. The wounded must be evacuated by Dust-Off/resupply elements, allowing maximum fire power to be brought to bear on the enemy. Empty medical evacuation vehicles including armored personnel carriers and helicopters should be utilized to ferry ammunition to the engaged elements.

b. Reserve (trail troops must be committed as soon as contact with the enemy is established in order to bring maximum firepower to bear on the enemy at the earliest opportunity.

c. It is beneficial to carry infantry or have them immediately available on the trail troops as they are able to influence the battle at the critical time and place.

/s/ LEONARD L. LEWANE
/t/ LEONARD L. LEWANE
LTC, Armor
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BATTLE OF HIGHWAY 13
30 June 66 XT 725030

Troop B was conducting an area reconnaissance north on Highway 13 in Binh Long Province, along with Troop C and elements of the 1st Brigade.

Troop B was leading the armored column and reconning by fire to the flanks. At approximately 0930 hours the head of the column crossed the Cam Le (Golden Gate Bridge) XT724013 and was immediately fired upon by an undetermined number of Viet Cong. The volume of fire increased as the lead elements returned fire. At this time the troop commander estimated that the column had triggered a Viet Cong ambush of regimental size. The troop commander, Lieutenant Flores, immediately informed the squadron commander who was air borne at the time of the enemy ambush.

Meanwhile the troop deployed into defensive positions by staging vehicles to enable them to fire on both sides of the combat area. At this time the head of the column was receiving heavy recoilless weapons fire and the 3d platoon was heavily engaged.

The squadron commander immediately called in TAC Air and friendly artillery fire, on both sides of the armored column, and at the same time committed troop C into battle. The 3d platoon had at this time suffered moderate casualties and was quickly reinforced by the tanks from the 1st, 2d and 3d platoons.

All platoons reported heavy contact on both flanks and the troops were inflicting heavy casualties on the Viet Cong, who by this time became disorganized under heavy fire from the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry elements.

As the battle progressed, throughout the morning the 75's - 57 recoilless rifles had destroyed 1 tank and knocked out 2 others. Enemy mortar fire had also knocked out 3 APC's and at this time the casualties were immediately evacuated to the rear of the column. Throughout this evacuation there were countless acts of heroism. In most cases individual crews would abandon their destroyed vehicles to continue with the battle, or continued fighting on the ground with their individual weapons.

The battle continued throughout the day for six hours. After the Viet Cong had broken contact and retreated into the heavy elephant grass and jungle area, the estimated Viet Cong body count was well over 300 killed in action and several wounded prisoners captured. There were countless enemy weapons captured, to include several 75mm and 57 recoilless rifles, dozens of automatic weapons and various types of small arms and ammunition.

The armored column remained at this scene of battle for the next few days and continued to search for the enemy. We found several shallow graves and evidence that several wounded Viet Cong had been carried off during the battle.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BATTLE OF HIGHWAY 13
30 June 66 XT725030
(CONTINUED)

After three or four days of searching the armored column returned to the LOC, refitted and rearmed and waited for the next mission.

/s/ANTHONY S RONIZ
/t/ANTHONY S RONIZ
1SG, Troop B
1st Sqn, 4th Cav

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACHED INFANTRY ACTION - 30 June 1966

Commanding Officer Troop C

On 30 June 1966, Troop C was assigned a zone recon mission as part of a Squadron recon in force operation North of An Loc, RVII. The troop was assigned an operational area generally west of highway 13 with the axis of advance being the secondary roadway leading from BM 69 (Coords XT 721 994) to the west.

For this operation Company B (-) 1/18 Infantry Bn was attached to Troop C. This force consisted of 2 rifle platoons (platoons were understrength and consisted of about 30-33 men), a weapons platoon (-) of about 10 men and the company Hq group. One rifle platoon was attached to Troop B.

The infantry platoons were loaded aboard the 1st and 2d armored cavalry platoons of Troop C. Company Hq B 1/18 rode with the Troop CP group. The infantry weapons platoon rode with the 3d platoon of Troop C. The 3d platoon also had attached the troop mortars in battery.

After moving north on Highway 13 and crossing an AVLB emplaced at coords XT 721972 (later known as Golden Gate), the troop moved north to check point 1 at BM 69 and deployed westward.

The 3d platoon, troop mortars and the infantry weapons platoon established a strong point at this road junction (coords XT 722995). The infantry at this location dismounted and together with dismounted cavalry troopers set up ground security for the mortars and 3d platoon APC's.

The two infantry platoons and the infantry company Hq remained mounted as the troop moved to the west. The infantry remained mounted as the cavalry platoons maneuvered in line formation on either side of the east west roadway until the second stream was crossed. The jungle growth thickened at this location, the infantry platoons dismounted and moved ahead of the APC's. Just as the recon advance continued Troop B became engaged with a large VC force. The 3d platoon, Troop C reported receiving small arms fire at this same time.

The two dismounted infantry platoons and company Hq were remounted and the troop started its move back to BM 69 with the 1st platoon, Troop C in the lead. As the troop closed into the BM 69 strong point the 3d platoon was heavily engaged against Viet Cong automatic weapons fire coming from the North along both sides of the road. White phosphorous mortar rounds or rifle grenades began to fall into the area.

Upon arriving at the cross roads the infantry remained mounted initially but as they were being shot off the APC's the infantry CO requested permission to dismount.

The infantry dismounted and were given instructions to form a perimeter in the same areas assigned to the cavalry platoon on which they were riding. The 3d platoon, Troop C with troop mortars shifted to the north, took the NW corner of the intersection, the 1st platoon the NE and the 2d platoon the south side of the secondary road in both sides of highway 13. Heavy incoming fire continued and numerous infantry were wounded.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 (cont)

I saw the infantry company FO get hit by a white phosphorous round and one of their platoon leaders shot through the neck and killed along with his radio operator.

The troop was then ordered to move north along Highway 13 and relieve pressure on Troop B. There was no radio contact with the infantry at this time, heavy fire had them pinned down and there was insufficient time to contact the infantry leaders on the ground for reloading. The troop moved north leaving elements of the 3d platoon, the troop mortars and the infantry company (-) at BH 69.

Later as the fight around SROK Dong quieted down and other elements of the 1/18 Infantry began to land at an LZ at coords XT 721004 the 1st platoon brought B 1/18 (-) forward to the main battle area (coords XT 724009). The company then came under control of the CO 1/18 Infantry who had just arrived in the area. The infantry company took up immediate positions to the east and west of the highway battle area. Later the company conducted sweeping actions to the west.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVID-T

1 July 1966

SUBJECT: Ground Forces Commander's Daily Situation Report (SITREP)
300001 to 302400H Jun 66 (U)

TO: Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: G-3
APO 96266

REGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED
PER AUTHORITY DOD 5200.1-R
DATE 3 Nov 75 NAME Chris Eichman

1. *U* OPERATIONS SUMMARY:

a. General: 1st Inf Div engaged in a major battle in the EL PASO II operation 30 Jun. This was the "Battle of BM 69" (Bench Mark 69) in the vicinity of XT7299. This engagement was with a VC force conclusively identified as the 271st VC Regt of the 9th VC Div. The battle developed when B/1/4 Cav, conducting a ROAD RUNNER operation along Hwy 13 north from HON QUAN to LOC NINH, made initial contact with an unknown VC force in the vicinity of XU725020 at 0930H. Trp B received a heavy mortar attack along the length of the column while in the vicinity of XU723020 at 0945H the troop began receiving SA and AW fire and became heavily engaged with what was then estimated to be a battalion size force. The VC were equipped with .50 cal MG's, two of the positions being located and destroyed early in the action. A heavy volume of Trp B's organic fire power, in addition to artillery and air strikes were delivered into the VC positions, dug in and concealed on both sides of the roads. 2/28 Inf was immediately alerted and other elements of 1/4 Cav (-) were committed to the battle. 2/18 Inf elements conducted an airmobile combat assault into an LZ to the N of the VC positions. The 5th ARVN Div elements responded immediately by the timely arrival of Lt Col TUAN, Deputy Division Commander to coordinate the employment of ARVN forces. Three CIDG companies were dispatched to blocking positions to the north. An APC troop and 2 companies of 1/9 ARVN Regt were placed under the operational control of the 1st Inf Div and initially occupied blocking positions to the south. The ARVN and US forces closely tied in their flanks and began constricting the area in a boxing-in maneuver on the NE, E, SE, S and SW. 1/2 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into LZ BLUE (XT670990) to the west and began sweeping to the east. The battalion that landed to the north (2/18 Inf) began sweeping from that position against the block. Artillery, ~~etc~~, and helicopter gun ships played important roles and responded in a minimum of time to supply timely and accurate fires into the VC positions. Armed CH-47 gun ships were in the target area within 15

6 D3
Declas
Dec 72

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

minutes of initial contact and poured a heavy and effective volume of fire into the VC positions. To gain the maximum effectiveness from the supporting fires, artillery fires were placed on one side of the road and air strikes on the other side. The heavy volume of air, ground, and artillery fire severely mauled the 271st VC Regt with the following results attained: 300 VC KIA (BC), 300 VC KIA (Prob); 6 VCC; 40 weapons among which were 2 57mm RR, and 1 7.62 MG on wheels. This major engagement necessitated the rapid deployment of 1st Inf Div forces and thus extensive realignment of units was made. Army Air and Air Force Airlift were immediately responsive to the requirements, and in a six hour period 5 plus infantry battalions, 1st Bde Hqs, and 2 artillery batteries were successfully redeployed. 1/28 Inf was moved from SONG BE to QUAN LOI. 2/18 Inf (-) was helilifted from QUAN LOI to LZ 2. 1/2 Inf was moved from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI, and further lifted into LZ BLUE. 2/2 Inf moved by fixed wing from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI. C/2/16 Inf moved from BEAR CAT to PHUOC VINH. 1/16 Inf moved overland from AO north of LAI KHE back to LAI KHE. A/2/33 Arty was moved (CH-47) from SONG BE to QUAN LOI. C/1/7 Arty was moved overland from QUAN LOI to HON QUAN. 1st Bde CP was moved from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI. Army Air supplied 30 UH-1D's, 3 CH-47's and 6 CV-2's in support of the operations and the Air Force supplied 4 C-123's in support of the division operations.

In addition USAF, USNF, and VNAF supported the division with a total of 100 fighter sorties. 4 of these sorties were SKY SPOT missions and 4 B-57 sorties flying seeding missions. Among the results of the close air support were (BDA) 1 57mm RR position and 3 machine gun positions.

(b) 1/18 Inf: The battalion remained under the OPCON of 1st Inf Div and continued to secure the MINH THAN base area. Security was also provided for the engineer work parties working in and around the airfield area. Company S&D operations were conducted in AO's BRANDY and GIN with negative contact.

(c) Div Rear: 1st Engr Bn had a command detonated mine set off between two vehicles at 1710H in the vicinity of XT931080. No damage or casualties resulted and the fire was not returned.

(2) 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: 1st Bde CP moved to a forward position from PHUOC VINH to QUAN LOI by airlift closing at 1530H. The brigade CQ assumed operational control of 1/2 Inf, 1/28 Inf, 2/18 Inf and 1/4 Cav (-) at that time. 1/2 Inf was also airlifted to QUAN LOI. A total of 20 C-123 and CV-2 sorties were used for the lift. At 1745H C/2/16 Inf arrived at PHUOC VINH from BEAR CAT and assumed the mission of providing security for the PHUOC VINH base camp perimeter.

(b) 1/2 Inf: At 1003H the battalion was alerted for air move to QUAN LOI (XT6190). The first lift commenced at 1234H and the battalion closed at 1530H. The battalion then conducted an airmobile assault into LZ BLUE (XT670995) at 1625H in support of the Battle of BM 69 with the 271st VC Regt of the 9th VC Div. The battalion closed into the LZ at 1809H. A total of 54 sorties of UH-1D's were utilized. Co A commenced movement to an objective in the vicinity of XU685005. There was negative contact by the battalion. The battalion positions are as

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

follows: Hqs and Co C-XT676996, Co A-XU685005, Co B-XT685993. The battalion established overnight ambush sites at XU685012, XU683014, XU684990 and XU685000.

(c) 2/18 Inf; 1/4 Cav (-): At 1550H 1st Bde assumed OPCON of both elements. In the earliest part of the day 1/4 Cav (-) and 2/28 Inf made contact and became involved in a major battle with the 271st VC Regt-the Battle of BM 69. Trp B came under heavy mortar attack in the vicinity of XU725020 at 0930H while conducting a ROAD RUNNER operation north along Hwy 13 to LOC NINE. At 0945H Trp B became heavily engaged with an estimated 400 VC at XU723020. The VC were using mortars, RR, AW and SA fire. 2 MG positions were spotted and these were .50 cal MG's mounted on a chassis with wheels. Co C/2/18 Inf and Trp C were called in to relieve the pressure on Trp B. The VC appeared to be making an attempt at 0950H to try and split the Trp B column. The VC were located on both sides of the road. Air strikes and artillery fires were immediately employed, with artillery on one side of the road and air strikes on the other. This control measure allowed for the maximum use of supporting fires. Armed CH-47's answered the call for support and were on station at 0945H. Organic ground, air, and artillery fires were heavily poured into the VC positions and inflicted a heavy toll of the VC. Co B was moved by truck from QUAN LOI to HON QUAN at 1030H. Co C became heavily engaged at 1039H, while enroute to Trp B's position, in the vicinity of XT720986. Co A conducted an airmobile assault into LZ 2 (XU724014) followed by Co B. Co A then pushed their attack to the south, staying on the west of Hwy 13. The battalion CP displaced to LZ 2. ARVN elements assisted in the operation as 3 CIDG companies were employed to occupy blocking positions to the south. Trp C maintained a blocking position to the SE. 1/2 Inf was airlifted into LZ BLUE (XT6799) to the west and commenced S&D operations to the east against the blocks. Blocking forces continued constricting the area and tied in their flanks to block-in the VC forces. All companies of 2/28 Inf and C/1/4 Cav were engaged with the heavy contact lasting until 1730H. The VC force was a minimum of a regiment and subsequently found to be the 271st VC Regt of the 9th VC Div. Results of the battle up to this time (2400H) are 300 VC KIA (BC); 300 VC KIA (Prob); 8 VCC (wounded); 1MG; 2 57mm RR; 37 SA (rifles).

(3) 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: 2/16 Inf conducted a company size patrol north of the brigade BEARCAT base camp with negative contact. One company also was airlifted to PHUOC VINH at 1725H where it was placed under OPCON of 1st Bde. 1/18 Inf remained OPCON 1st Inf Div. 2/18 Inf also placed under OPCON 1st Bde. 4/23 Inf continued operations under CPAN 9-66 (Operation UNICONTOWN) and continued S&D operations to the NW of BEARCAT with one company.

(b) 2/16 Inf: Co A moved into an area north of BEARCAT bounded by YTL30025, YTL39085, YT240080, YT240050, YTL82010, and YTL69084 to conduct company size patrolling. There was negative contact. Co A remained in a overnight position in the vicinity of YTL75074. Co B was on standby as brigade RRF and Co C was alerted at 1435H for a move to PHUOC VINH. The Airlift commenced at 1725H with Co C closing at 1813H, assuming the mission of base camp security.

UNCLASSIFIED

(c) 4/23 Inf: The battalion secured the RMK rock quarry and the SARCUM site with Co A. Co D continued S&D operations in the area bounded by YTL104, YTL106, YTL304, YTL306. No enemy contact was made and the unit occupied an overnight position in the vicinity of YT 110052, and established ambush sites for the night. Co C conducted S&D operations in area C (YTO416), but with negative contact.

(4) 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div:

(a) General: The brigade TF continued their participation in EL PASO II in the SONG BE AO. A battalion and a company airmobile assault was conducted in the AO and 2 artillery batteries displaced to new positions (one airlift).

(b) 1/28 Inf: At 1000H 1/28 Inf conducted a combat assault from LZ RED to Obj 1. Upon landing the battalion received scattered SA fire. Patrols searched the area with negative results. At 1020H the battalion was ordered to QUAN LOI. The battalion (-) was already on Obj 1 and Co A was still on LZ RED. Co A was moved to NUI BA RA. The battalion (-) was moved to NUI BA RA Airfield closing at 1350H. The last lift of Co C was lifted directly from Obj 1 to QUAN LOI. The battalion (-) was then lifted from NUI BA RA to QUAN LOI by UH-1D closing at 1620H. Upon closing, the battalion came under OPCON 1st Bde.

(c) 2/28 Inf: At 0900H Co B conducted a combat assault into an LZ in the vicinity of YU190134. Co B secured an area for arrival of B/1/5 Arty by CH-47. At 1500H the battalion patrol found several well camouflaged bunkers with good overhead cover. Several houses in the area had tunnels under them. 1 bag of rice was found and destroyed. At 1510H C/2/13 Arty moved to NUI BA RA and closed 1545H. ARVN supplied trucks and provided road security. Co A moved by foot from their overnight position to NUI BA RA Airfield, closing at 1745H. The battalion (-) remained at NUI BA RA Airfield. Co B and B/1/5 Arty remained in the vicinity of YU190134.

(d) 1/16 Inf: The battalion continued their S&D operation north of LAI KHE without contact, and at 1420H were ordered to return to LAI KHE base camp, closing at 1717H. Upon arrival the battalion assumed responsibility for security of the LAI KHE base camp.

(5) 1st Inf Div Arty:

(a) Div Arty Fwd: B/1/5 Arty airlifted from the vicinity of YU145072 to the vicinity of YU192130 closing at 1040H. 8/6 Arty (-) provided artillery support for 1/4 Cav operation throughout the day. C/1/7 Arty conveyed to the vicinity of XT766897, closing at 1400H. A/2/33 Arty was airlifted from the vicinity of SONG BE (YU145072) at 1735H to the vicinity of XT814905. All tubes were in position at 1850H. A/2/33 Arty was attached to 8/6 Arty. C/2/13 Arty conveyed from the vicinity of YU195037 to YU145027 and closed at 1508H.

(b) LAM SON II: 1/26 Inf, in cooperation with 5th Recon Co, 5th ARVN Div, and A/1/4 Cav, successfully sealed HOA THANH in the vicinity of XT849137 at 0630H. The BINH DUONG Search Forces entered the hamlet, assembled a total of 159 men, ages 15-45, screened them at National Police Hqs and searched the village. Three of these men were apprehended as they attempted to leave the hamlet. Of the men screened there were 3 VCS, 10 draft dodgers, 7 deserters, and 4 males with false ID cards.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Within the cordon and search area, search forces apprehended 2 VC after they were identified by PF soldiers in the hamlet. A total of 92 villagers were screened in the 969 interrogation tents. The majority of the people were uncooperative during the 969 interviews. Nine names of VC operating in the PHU HO village were added to the blacklist. Both of the VCC were on the blacklist utilized by interrogation teams. In the operational area, search forces discovered one tunnel which was destroyed by a demo team. 4 hand grenades were found and destroyed and one COMMUNIST flag was captured. Approximately 450 people took part in the festival activities. 205 people were treated by the MEDCAP teams. The VIS team provided PSY WAR movies and rice was distributed in 2 kilo bags to 106 villagers. Province youth services prepared popcorn for the children and the Province Agricultural Services prepared 3 gallons of bulgar wheat for sample distribution. Entertainment was also provided by the 5th ARVN Cultural Team and the 5th ARVN and RF Bands. Approximately 450 meals were served to the villagers. In addition, a raffle was conducted in which 7 villagers received prepared gift packages. 4/16 Inf, while participating in the seal of HOA THANH, pursued 3 VC in the vicinity of XT855135 at 0925H. Contact was never gained with the fleeing VC, however the company captured 1 pistol bolt and 2 grenades while in pursuit.

b. Plans Summary:

(1) 1/18 Inf: The battalion will continue to provide security for the MINH THANH base perimeter and the engineer work parties. A company size S&D operation will be conducted in AO BRANDY. 2/2 Inf remains OPCON 1st Inf Div and maintains security of the division base and facilities in the QUAN LOI AO.

(2) 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div: The brigade will position forces to prevent VC withdrawal into safe havens. 1/2 Inf secures LZ BLUE for arrival of A/2/33 Arty with one company NLT 0630H; 1/2 Inf (-) moves on axis LEMON to seize and secure Obj 1 (XU698027) subsequent to seizure of bridge at XT683998 by 1/4 Cav (-); upon arrival on Obj 1 1/2 Inf (-) prepares to conduct combat patrols to the northwest or to conduct holiborne assault into LZ PINK (XU594033) or LZ PURPLE (XT581961). 1/28 Inf conducts airmobile assault on LZ GREEN (XT616995) commencing 0900H and seizes Obj BASEBALL (XT623995). 1/28 Inf on order moves to LZ WHITE (XU656037) on axis PEACK; upon arrival LZ WHITE conducts combat patrols with primary attention to the southeast. 2/18 Inf moves to and occupies blocking position CONGO (XU707012) commencing 0600H and prepares to attack to the west in event 1/2 Inf establishes contact. 2/18 Inf prepares to conduct airmobile assault on LZ PINK or PURPLE on order. 1/4 Cav (-) moves on Route HANK to secure bridge at XT683998 commencing 0630H; continues to move on Route HANK to seize Obj SOCCER (XT674998); 1/4 Cav detaches one troop to secure A/2/33 and on order moves on Route HANK to seize Obj BASEBALL (XT623995).

(3) 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div: 2/16 Inf will continue company size patrolling of BEARCAT base camp with Co A and will maintain Co B as brigade RRF. Co C will remain attached to 1st Bde. 4/23 Inf (-) will continue their security mission under OPLAN 9-66 (Operation UTTONTOWN). Co B will complete S&D operations in the vicinity of YT1205 and will be extrated from the area at approximately 1200H.

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) 3d Bde, 1st Inf Div: On 1 Jul B/1/5 Arty will be moved from their present location to QUAN LOI by CH-47. Upon completion of the move of B/1/5 Arty, B/2/28 Inf will be moved to NUI BA RA Airfield by UH-1D. 2/28 Inf will conduct local patrolling in the vicinity of NUI BA RA Airfield. 1/16 Inf will continue to secure the LAM KHE base camp area.

(5) 1st Inf Div Arty: Div Arty Fwd will continue support of Operation EL PASO II. A/2/33 Arty will be airlifted to the vicinity of XT669982 at 0630H. B/1/5 Arty will be airlifted from the vicinity of SONG BE (YU192130) to an LZ in the vicinity of XT814905. The PHU LOI Pacification TF continues Operation LAM SON II with 1/26 Inf conducting S&C operations and establishing overnight ambush sites in assigned AO's. Security will continue to be provided for cadre teams operating in TAM PHUOC KHANH and BINH GIUAN. 3/C/1st Engr Bn continues construction of a road to connect TAM PHUOC KHANH with Hwy 313 and roadwork south of TAM PHUOC KHANH.

c. Major Unit Operations:

(1) Operation LAM SON II: 1st Inf Div Arty; continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 6 KIA, 71 WIA.

2 Equip Damaged: 2 APC's/

(b) EN LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 8 KIA (BC), 12 KIA (est) total of 625 VCS as follows: 23 VC probation violators; 28 individuals on blacklists; 15 false ID cards; 44 deserters (ARVN, PF); 209 draft dodgers; 307 VCS held for interrogation.

2 Equip Captured: 5 SA; 1 syringe; 1 pistol belt; various documents; 1-60mm mortar base plate; 15-60mm mortar rds; 2 bicycles; 1 plastic gas mask w/2 packets of chemicals; 1 diary.

3 Equip destroyed: 8 tunnels; 32 hand grenades; 5 base camps; 900 rds SA; 12 rds 105mm, 7-155mm rds; 4 CBU bomblets; 3-8 inch rds; 9 AP mines; 1 WP rocket; 15 rifle grenades; 5 huts; 3 rucksacks; 2 holnets; 3 wolls; 3 Lambrettas; 17 uniforms; 5 gal gasoline; 1 qt oil; 150 lbs rice; several booby traps; 10 lbs dono; 4-4.5 V batteries; 1 shelter half; 30 foxholes; 15 pots and pans; 2 claymores; 1-20lb bomb; 3 trench systems with foxholes; 50 foot traps.

(2) Operation EL PASO II: 1st Inf Div; continuing.

(a) US LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 76 KIA, 251 WIA.

2 Equip Damaged: 2 UH-1B; 6 UH-1D; 3 OH-13; 3 APC; 3 tanks; 1 CH-47; 105 mm howitzer.

3 Equip Destroyed: 1 APC; 1 CH-47, 1 UH-1D.

4 Equip Lost: 1 M60 MG, 3 M16's, 1 PRC-25.

(b) EN LOSSES:

1 Personnel: 533 KIA (BC), 791 KIA (est): 26 VCC; 61 VCS; 1 Raillier.

2 Equip Destroyed: 27 81mm rds; 33 60mm rds; 2 155mm rds; 3 105mm rds; 1-3.5 rocket; 1 AT mine; 2 Claymore; 2 AP mines; 1 CBU bomblet; 22 base camps; 118 huts; 14 sampans; 172 bunkers; 2 hospitals 6 tires; 1-1/2 ton trailer; 2 hand carts; 30 gal sauce; 6-5gal cans tobacco

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

3 Equip Captured: 1522.5 tons rice; 5400 sheets tin; 25 tons salt; 16.5 tons dried fish; 1 60mm mortar; 5 57mm RR; 79 AS; 184 grenades; 64 60mm mortar rds; 9 RPG2 grenades; 2478 rds SA; 1 MG-42MB; 1-7.62 MG on wheels; 2 Panzerfausts; 1000 gal kerosene; 1000 cans sarlins; 500 hoe heads; 600 gal oil; 8000 aluminum pans; 300 lbs tea; 900 soup ladles; 20 kerosene stoves; 15 thermos bottles; $\frac{1}{2}$ lb TNT; 2 typewriters; 1 water pump 2-7 HP motors; 2 web belts; 1350 lbs flour; 2 bicycles; numerous documents; medical supplies; kitchen facilities.

2. (d) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS:

C. Objectives:

	<u>Province</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Init/Term</u>
C1	BIEN DUONG	XT885172	S&C	LAM SON II	231430H May/Cont
C2	BIEN LONG	XU735089	S&D	EL PASO II	021430H Jun/Cont

D. Force:

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Obi</u>	<u>Contact</u> <u>Initi/Term</u>	<u>Init By</u>	<u>Air Spt</u>	<u>NGFS</u>
D1	1st Inf Div Arty	C1	1000H/1020H	Fr1	0	0
D2	1st Inf Div	C2	0930H/1930H	Fr1	F4/Navy F100/AF A1E/LF A1H/VNAF	0

K. Losses/Damage:

K1 Enemy:

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>KIA/VCC</u>	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>Armo</u>
D1		2/Unk	0/2	0	0
D2		Regt/271st	300 (BC) / 8 300 (est) / 8	2 57mm RR, 1 7.62 Hvy MG 37 SA	0

K2 Enemy: None

K3 Friendly:

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>KIL/WIA/Cptr/MLA</u>	<u>Wpns</u>	<u>Armo</u>
D2		Regt/27sst	10/66/0/0	0	0

K4 Friendly:

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Size/ID</u>	<u>Structures</u> <u>Dest/Dem</u>	<u>Material</u> <u>Dest/Dem</u>	<u>LOC</u>
D2		Regt/27sst	0/0	1 UH-1D, 2UH-1D, 1 tank 2 APC's	0

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

K5 Total friendly initiated small unit actions w/o contact: 42

K5A Friendly initiated small unit contacts: 0

" A TRUE COPY"

DEPUY
Maj Gen

/s/ WILLIAM G YARBOROUGH
/t/ WILLIAM G YARBOROUGH
Cpt. Armor
S3 Air

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

BATTLE OF 9 JULY 1966

Intelligence sources had indicated that there was a Viet Cong Regiment in the MINH THAN area. The US 1st Infantry Division immediately made plans to find and fix the unit. Word leaked out that a small unit would proceed to MINH THAN on the AN LOC MINH THAN Road, but actually plans were made for a heavy armor task force to make the trip. Preplanned air strikes and artillery fires were included in the planning.

The 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry (-) departed AN LOC at 0700 hrs 9 July with Trp C leading followed by Trp B. Co B 1/2 Inf was carried on the squadron vehicles. They were divided up so as to provide seven (7) men on each M113. It was felt that if contact were made it would be in the vicinity of position DICK, a bridge at XT 694751. With this in mind Trp C moved with a platoon on each side of the road in an echelon formation and one platoon in column on the road. The unit conducted a heavy reconnaissance by fire as it moved along.

At 0900 hrs Trp C approached the bridge and deployed on both sides of the road to provide covering fire for the infantry. The infantry dismounted at this point to go forward and check the bridge for mines and booby traps. After thoroughly checking the area around the bridge for mines and booby traps, Troop C moved out, this time in column formation with all three platoons on the road. A preplanned airstrike went in at position TOM, a road junction at XT 663736 while a GO-GO aircraft reconnoitered the area to the southwest of TOM. The G-GO aircraft, a CH-47 helicopter with 4 cal .50 machineguns, a 40mm grenade launcher and 2- 7.62mm machineguns, was being field tested in the Republic of Vietnam at this time. Despite the ordnance dropped on the position the Viet Cong did not reveal their presence at this time. At approximately 1106 hours Lt Jack Lyons, 1st Plt Ldr of Trp C, reported that his lead vehicle had spotted 10 VN personnel running across the road. Five minutes later he reported that 10 more had run across the road and he was taking them under fire. This seemed to set off the entire ambush. The lead vehicle at this time was in the vic XT 682743.

Lt Lyons deployed his platoon, putting the main firepower of his tanks in the direction of the fleeing enemy. The whole column was receiving intense automatic weapons, small arms, recoilless rifle and mortar fire. Cpt Steve Slattery Trp C commander called for an air strike and the air force responded with Napalm along the road.

The forward air controller at 1120, reported to the Squadron Commander, LTC Leonard Lewane that he had sighted the VC on the north side of the road and was bringing tactical air in on them. Cpt Slattery reported to LTC Lewane that the rear of his column was being hit hard by recoilless rifle and mortar fire.

Cpt David Kelley, Trp B commander moved his troop forward into the battle area after receiving the command from the squadron commander. Cpt Kelley sent his second platoon forward and he immediately lost his platoon leader, Lt Benjamin Phillips, and the Plt Sgt PSG Roberto Quijano, due to direct mortar hits. The second platoon tank section leader SSG Chester Fehnel took charge of the platoon and moved it forward to assist Troop C.

Cpt Kelley instructed his third platoon leader, Lt Richard Wroe, to secure an area for medical evacuation for wounded. The GO-GO aircraft received several hits and went down in the vicinity of the Dust-Off area. This area was still receiving small arms and mortar fire. Sgt John Blair a vehicle commander in the third platoon of Troop B was running short of ammunition and had "burned up" his .50 cal machinegun. Using his initiative he took his vehicle up to the downed GO-GO and acquired one of their 50 calibers and a supply of ammunition.

UNCLASSIFIED

He made several trips bringing ammunition up to resupply the vehicles. Meanwhile at the point of heaviest contact, SSG Alfred Trp C, 1st Plt scout section leader reported sighting several VC moving a recoilless rifle trying to get it around to his flank. SSG Breitschinder, in the lead tank, attempted to take it under fire. He was mortally wounded by a snipers bullet as he attempted to take it under fire. He was mortally wounded by a snipers bullet as he attempted to raise himself up from his Cupola for a better look. SSG Alfred was wounded shortly thereafter but remained behind his weapon, rallying his crewmembers to repel the VC attack.

The Dust-Off area was becoming jammed with vehicles and Cpt Slattery ordered his second platoon leader Lt Stanislas Reczek to take charge. With able assistance of SSG Guy Killingsworth of Troop B Lt Reczek got the Dust-Off area operations smoothly and started the combat vehicles back to the front.

Col Lewane, upon seeing the direction of the main attack, reported this to the Division Commander who sprang the rest of the troop, three infantry battalions poised to cut off the retreat of the battered VC force. With air on the north, artillery on the south adding to the tremendous fire power of the cavalry unit on the ground, the VC soon broke contact and fled. The 1/28 Inf landed to the north and attacked in a southwest direction while the 1/18 Inf landed and worked closely with the 1/4 Cav (-). B and C were given the mission to set up a blocking position from XT 693-750 to 650728.

Troop C (air) had been providing flank reconnaissance and fire support, and was given the mission to put their Aero Rifle Platoon in at position DICK to RON with Troop C at the bridge site.

The fighting had lasted for approximately three hours resulting in American losses of 12 KIA's and 51 WIA's. The 272 Regiment which was engaged suffered 278 KIA (BC) and 300 (est) KIA. Troop C had 4 APC's destroyed.

Fire Support

At the time troop C made contact, a preplanned air strike was about to be put in forward of their position. This was quickly reverted to the area where contact had been made. The FAC requested immediate air and there was constant air coverage throughout the battle. There was at least one artillery observer in the air at all times. The fire support had been split up prior to contact and the air worked the south side of the road and left the north side to the artillery. Gun teams filled in between sorties and concentrations. The CH-47, GO-GO, provided heavy fire before being shot down.

Results

Friendly Losses:

Troop C

Troop B

12 KIA

39 WIA

21 WIA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Excellent

Battle Experiences 9 July 1966

Commanding Officer, Troop C

On the morning of 9 July 1966, the 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry (-) moved to execute a division size recon in force mission in the area south of AN LOC and west of Highway 13. The main axis of advance was along the MINH THANH Road. This road is a secondary laterite road which was in excellent condition during the operation. It extends from the southern portion of the KA CAT Rubber Plantation at coordinate XT 744801 through secondary undergrowth and over two semi-fordable streams to the entrance of the Minh Thanh rubber Plantation area at coordinates XT 638706.

The Squadron moved from its perimeter at the AN LOC airstrip with Troop C leading followed by Troop. SP time was early morning approximately 0730.

Artillery units were pre-positioned to support the squadron move to the SW. Air support was readily available with an air-cap over the column and an airforce LHO riding in the squadron C&C helicopter.

Troop C moved south of Hwy 13 to a RJ at XT 760847 where the troop then proceeded west and south along secondary laterite plantation roads to a holding area at approximate coords XT 745808.

Troop C order of march and formation were as follows:

- 1st Platoon, CP group w/CO's APC Medic APC
- 2d Platoon, 3d platoon and Hq (-) group consisting of Operations/Comm APC, AVIB and Maintenance section APC.

The troop VTR had been left at the Minh Thanh plantation during an earlier operation. The flame thrower track (Zippo was integrated into the tactical formation of the 1st platoon. Tactical formation throughout the majority of the operation consisted of the 1st platoon flanking the road way on the right or west and NW of the road, the 2d platoon on the left or East, south and SE of the road. The CP group, 3d platoon and Troop Hq (-) followed by various distances along the roadway with the Troop CP group generally aligned with the rear vehicle of the flanking platoons. Three tanks were available for this operation; one from the 1st platoon advanced along the roadway, the other two tanks led their respective flank platoon formations. The 3d platoon did not have tanks. The squadron (-) had integrated elements of Company B, 1/2 Inf Bn into troop formations on 7 July giving a total of six fighting troopers aboard each track. Although it is impossible to narrate the separate actions of either attached infantry or organic cavalry troopers, it must be said that these infantrymen adapted quickly and excellently to cavalry troop tactics and fought exceedingly well.

With the troop halted in the pre-recon positions, artillery preparations were fixed along the route of advance. Poor weather delayed pre-planning airstrikes approximately an hour. The Troop remained in this holding position at coords XT 745808 for slightly over an hour until the low ceiling lifted.

LTC Lewanc, Squadron CO, gave the order to move out and Troop C in a deployed formation, moved south and then SW paralleling the roadway. As the troop left the southern edge of the rubber, the underbrush and jungle growth became so thick that the 1st platoon was unable to maneuver in a flanking formation on the right of the road. The platoon returned to the roadway and proceeded SW in a column formation along the road.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

See the 2d platoon, because of extremely limited visibility and thick jungle growth, was forced to return to the road from its left flanking formation. The troop continued in this posture for approximately 2,100 meters.

The troop returned to its flanking wedge formation approximately at coords XT 730786. This wedge formation was continued by Troop C for several hours as the Squadron (-) conducted its recon mission along the axis of advance. Recon by fire was employed by the flanking platoons. No return fire was received and no enemy activity observed. During this time artillery preparations were being fixed several thousand meters in advance of the troop's lead elements. The effectiveness of this fire could be observed along the roadway. Fire teams and an armed Chinook was making passes along the road in front of the troop. Overhead there were many LOH's and other command and observation aircraft. However, no signs of enemy activity were observed. The advance continued in this manner without incident until the troop reached a position short of Objective DICK on the bridge site at coords XT 694751.

Upon arrival at coords XT 698754 the troop assumed a box formation with the 3d platoon deployed facing west, the flanking platoons deployed to the north and south respectively and the Troop Hq securing the rear of the box and maintaining contact with the trail troop - Troop B. Artillery preparations followed by airstrikes were used in softening up the bridge area. A particularly effective napalm strike was employed to burn out dense undergrowth along the left side of the road adjacent to the bridge. Following the strikes the 3d platoon supported by overwatching tank fire, with two engineer mine sweeper/demolition teams attached, rapidly moved forward in a mounted posture to the bridge sides of the bridge, a quick check was made for demolitions and then the 3d platoon leader, PSG Torres crossed several APC's to add force on the far side of the bridge. Extensive scouting mine sweeping and checks were made of the bridge and surrounding areas. No evidence of enemy activity was found. The bridge was in good condition and would facilitate the crossing of heavy armor.

During this time the TC of C19 received a moderately serious small caliber bullet round in one of his legs. No incoming rounds had been heard in the area, although a gun team had just made a pass and it was felt that the man had been hit by a tray slug. It is entirely probable that he could have been wounded by a hidden enemy sniper.

Upon securing the bridge at DICK, the 1st and 2d platoons respectively were rapidly moved forward across the bridge and into blocking positions along either side of the roadway at approximate coords XT 688748. It was late mid morning by this time.

At this time a radio message was received from the Squadron CO, to speed up the operations. Because of time factors and the thick jungle growth the troop reverted to a column formation, as described earlier, and moved out to the SW towards Objective TOM or the RJ at BM 59 (coords XT 663737).

The advance continued without incident until the lead platoon leader, Lt Lyons (1st Platoon) reported 5 to 7 VC's running across the road from right to left at approximate coords 671740. He quickly reported a group of 20 VC running in the same direction. Both these groups were immediately taken under fire. This information was rapidly reported. It was soon followed by reports of incoming small arms, then automatic weapons fire

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Rapidly the lead elements deployed and were engaged by enemy mortar and anti-tank fire. As enemy contact developed rapidly the word was passed to the Squadron CO, that "this was it!" A large VC Force had been contacted just short of objective TOM. Precise detail narration of the battle is extremely difficult because of the lack of observation, loss of contact with vehicles and killed and wounded leaders and vehicle commanders.

The Squadron CO requested a determination as to which side of the road the main concentration was located. Initially this was difficult to determine because of the tremendous volume of fire being put out by all the deployed APC's. Reports were made that the VC were attempting to cross the road at the front of the column from right to left. Additional reports were received of heavy enemy fire being received at the rear of the troop and coming from the left side of the road. Initial determination was made that the main VC force was located on the left or south side of the road. Soon after this, as accurate casualty counts, concise reports and aerial observer reports tallied up; it was determined that enemy forces were concentrated on the right or NW side of the road. Artillery fire was reconcentrated in this area and its devastating effect could be observed by the ground troops.

Airstrikes were immediately called in on the left side of the road. They were continuous and extremely effective, especially the Skyriders - napalm runs and several of the CBU attacks.

Artillery barrages were devoted to the right side of the road. They ranged both up and down the troop column and in and out from the roadway. Fires were brought in quite close to the troop APC's but no damage was sustained by friendly forces.

During this period several CS gas drops were made from helicopters of Troop C (air) 1/4 Cavalry. These proved extremely effective. The gas drifted over the roadway and settled along the dense jungle on the NW of the APC's along the road. Initially some slight concern developed in certain members of the troop, this was quickly overcome and the CS concentration in the troop battle area was not sufficient to cause masking.

A platoon level approach to the detail combat actions starts initially with the 1st platoon, the lead platoon. The 1st platoon was leading with two tanks. This platoon received the brunt of initial enemy fire. The TC of the lead tank was killed immediately by a bullet round in the head. Soon after the platoon leader reported his scout section out of action. Later it was learned that the section leader and 2d squad leader were killed and casualties sustained on all vehicles.

The attached infantry NCO's remanned the TC positions where possible. Soon the platoon leader was hit by fragments in the face, neck and head. He was evacuated by his platoon SGT, PSG Crawford, who took command of the platoon. The 1st platoon at this time was recoiling under the pressure of heavy enemy fire. PSG Crawford returned to the forefront of the column, initiated action to reman the lead tank and caused the 1st platoon to hold its own at the lead of the troop column. The TC of the flame thrower track was seriously wounded and placed in the mobile APC. The flame thrower APC continued to fight vigorously. Under direction of the Troop CO, PSG Crawford had his zippo expend its napalm along the right side of the road at about a 25 degree angle with the roadway. C-13, the scout section leader's vehicle was down to a two man crew as it returned from the Dust-off or medical collecting point at the rear of the column. It was hit by anti-tank fire and was soon burning, likewise C-19 was hit by enemy fire disabled and was soon burning, about mid-way along the column just off the road.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

As the fight continued the 1st platoon had both tanks in full operation along with the four APC's. They had lost four TC's killed.

The CP group was split upon initial VC contact as the medic APC began collecting the wounded and taking them to a collection/evacuation point with the troop Hq (-) group. C-66, the Troop CO's track, was initially in a position at the rear of the 1st platoon APC's then among lead elements of the 2d platoon. All tracks were constantly moving and readjusting positions to avoid anti-tank and mortar fire. The majority of platoon vehicles remained on one side of the road or the other in their herringbone positions. The commander's track, C-66 was constantly on the move to both sides of the road. The second platoon was leading with tank C-25, commanded by the platoon sergeant, SSG Wilson. This platoon reacted quickly and effectively to close on the 1st platoon, deploy and lay down a heavy volume of tank, 50 caliber and 7.62 machine gun and 1279 fire. C-25 tank maneuvered along both sides of the road firing HE and cannister into suspected locations. It was hit in the turret by either anti-tank or rifle grenade fire. The TC was moderately injured and forced to evacuate the tank. This tank was rapidly remanned by SSG Born and continued to fight well during the remainder of the battle. The 2d platoon APC's were well deployed along either side of the road in a tight formation. They provided the stable center of sector for the troop column.

Since contact was lost with the medic APC, permission was given for the 2d platoon to collect wounded and return to the dust-off area in one of the fighting carriers. Upon return of the evacuation track to the platoon a report was made that C-23 had been hit by the 20mm cannon fire and that C-29 had sustained several anti-tank round hits and was disabled with all the crew killed or wounded. The 2d platoon continued to fire aggressively and concentrated its fires on the right side of the road. Later as the enemy withdrew, elements of the 2d platoon with Lt Rezek, the platoon leader, moved to the Dust-Off site, consolidated and moved the wounded to a new Dust-Off location at objective DICK, west of the bridge.

The 3d platoon was hit by enemy fire from both sides of the road immediately after the action initiated in the 1st platoon area. This platoon was unable to close in the 2d platoon in a tight formation. A gap of about 300 meters developed between these platoons as the fighting progressed. The 3d platoon soon was in a heavy engagement of its own around the AVLB, the troop Hq group and an armed Chinook which had been shot down on the roadway. This position, at coords XT 687746, became a strong point and the initial Dust-Off site. The 3d platoon fought to protect the growing number of casualties which were accumulating at the Chinook or GO-GO site. In the process the platoon lost two tracks to anti-tank fire. These tracks also burned. Fortunately the gap between the two platoons was never capitalized upon by the VC and the troop was not split. The road remained open but heavy fire was received from this area. The troop headquarters (-) group is included with the 3d platoon because they fought the engagement in the same location. The crew of the AVLB gave a good account for themselves, they maneuvered the vehicle continuously and used machine gun fire and grenades to keep the enemy at a distance. This vehicle was not damaged. The maintenance section fought their APC as a gun track and covered the medic APC and the operations/commo APC (C50).

4 UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SFC Dennis, ammo chief worked his 50 caliber machine gun and the radios alternately and loaded many wounded into his truck. He kept reports flowing and called in the initial Dust-Off evacuations. The area of the downed Chinook became too "hot" for Dust-Off's. The WIA's were placed in the medic APC for cover and beside the various firing APC's. This accounted for the loss of contact with the medic track. Several of the medics were wounded while they cared for the wounded and one burned seriously when he entered one of the burning APC's to rescue wounded.

Troop B elements began to enter the fighting zone and advanced up Troop C's herringbone column taking up firing positions. Several of the vehicles closed the gap between the 2d and 3d platoons. Later the commanding officer of Troop B, Opt Kyles, came to the forward location of the 1st and 2d platoons with a full cavalry platoon. These vehicles took up firing positions with the majority of the fire being placed on the roadway.

At this time in coordination with the CO of Troop D (air) the Dust-Off and resupply site was reestablished to the NE of the downed Chinook at Objective DICK. This area was relatively free of enemy fire and had a larger area which could accommodate several helicopters. This new site remained the evacuation and resupply point throughout the rest of the battle and during the reorganization phase.

With Troop B well disposed along the roadway and recon elements of that Troop pushing to the SW, Troop C was ordered to phase back its forces to objective DICK with the assigned mission of securing that area, protecting the bridge and resupplying, the platoons moved back in order: 3d, 1st and 2d. All wounded were taken directly to the Dust-Off site and all dead evacuated aboard APC's to that area. Resupply and re-arming began immediately. Support was tremendous! Plenty of ammo of all kinds, replacement weapons, medical supplies and support personnel were brought into DICK. The troop was joined by the Squadron Headquarters APC section along with the M577 Squadron medic track, with surgeon. Troop D (air) Aero Rifle Platoon was landed and attached to Troop C at Dick in the late afternoon.

During this period larger reinforcements had also arrived in the immediate battle area in the form of the 1/28 Infantry, which was airlifted to DICK and swept SW along the right position of the road; and an ARVN APC Troop (with an RF Company) which closed on the eastern edge of DICK in mid-afternoon. The RF Company secured the LZ at DICK for several hours by pushing out a considerable distance into the dense undergrowth on either side of the road and the stream line. This allowed Troop C to resupply and rearm rapidly. The ARVN APC Troop later moved to secure the downed Chinook for the night.

As the afternoon drew to a close Troop C had completed resupply, rearmament, Class 1 and was in a tactical posture for future missions. The troop was given orders to RON, at DICK, secure the bridge and establish the forward squadron CP. The troop disposition consisted of the 3d platoon and a rifle squad securing the bridge and the area to the east of the bridge. The 2d platoon and the Aero Rifle platoon (-) on the south or left side of the road with emphasis on the thick underbrush near the road. The battle day ended with the troop in the above described posture at Objective DICK.

The following lessons learned are foremost in mind during the preparation of this narration; flame thrower APC's (Zippl) should be kept under direct control of the troop CO. The location of the enemy concentration must be quickly determined by troops on the ground as well as aerial observers. A heavy initial base of fire on all suspected areas is essential to gain fire superiority rapidly in any attempted ambush.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Zippo's should be employed ASAP upon determination of the enemy concentrations. Track mounted Zippo service units should accompany the column. Medic APC's should not be utilized as a "storehouse" for wounded, but kept in constant shuttle between the fighting area and a Dust-Off site. A Dust-Off resupply site must be established and controlled by operational and medical personnel in a reasonably secure area once enemy contact is made. Medical evacuation from the battle area must be controlled by small unit leaders as well as medical clearing personnel.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

	S3 Wvd	1st Squadron 4th Cavalry	COMM CO, Prov.	Vic 66700	0001 09 Jul 66 2400	09 Jul 66		
1	0001	Opn-S3: Opened S3 Journal.					IA	EW
2	0530	Trps BCC-Opn: Stand-to complete					IA	JW
3	0700	Trp B CO-Opn: SP at this time.					S3	EW
4	0710	Trp B CO-Opn: SP at this time.					S3	EW
5	0740	Trp B CO-Opn: Holding at pos HAMA until further orders.					S3, Co 1st Bde	JF
6	0805	Trp C-Opn: CP3 mov.					S3	IM
7	0806	Trp B CO-Opn: Checked out 1 WGS, neg results.					S3	JF
8	0843	Trp B CO-Opn: Started moving toward CP7					1st Bde	JF
9	0847	Trp B CO-Opn: Starting to move.					1st Bde	JF
10	0904	Trp C-Opn: Trp C CO ele at CP 4					1st Bde	JF
11	0920	Trp B CO-Opn: CP 4 mov.					1st Bde	EW
12	0935	S3-Opn: Air strike going in at pos TOL, CO CO recon by fire SW of TOL.					1st Bde	JF
13	0950	Trp C-Opn: Lead ele at CP 5					1st Bde	JF
14	1000	S3-Opn: Bad size VC force spotted at vic 663736, moving N.					S3	JF
15	1025	Trp C-Opn: Head Dust-Off for one man w slight leg wound leg wound vic 66740000.					Dust-Off	EW
16	1035	Opn monitored: Dust-Off in for Trp C wounded at this time. Man wounded by ind fire, Dust-Off complete at 1037 hrs.					Info	EW
17	1059	CO-Opn: Notify 1/19 Inf an air strike (napalm) will go in at vic 663737 in 3 min.					1st Bde relay	EW
18	1110	Trp C CO CO: Under attack vic 662743, coming from N.					Info	EW
19	1111	FAC-CO: Have VC in sight, working on them to the N.					Info	EW
20	1125	CO-G3: Now appears main force is to the S.					Info	EW

UNCLASSIFIED

21	1130	Trp C: (Mon) Being hit hard at rear w/mort and AT.	Info	EW
22	1133	CO-Trp C CO: Cover the AVTB.	Info	EW
23	1135	C)-Trp C CO: Trp B is moving up around the AVTB, coming up on Trp C rear.	Info	EW
24	1137	(Mon)Trp C-Trp C CO: Hit hard back here, many wounded, only many wounded, only about 3 MW are firing.	Info	EW
25	1140	CO-Trp C CO: Trp B moving up to your front now.	Info	EW
26	1141	Trp C-Trp B: Have wounded, where is secure Dust-Off area? Trp B: Near CP 6.	Info	EW
27	1155	S3-Opn: Sit Rep: CO-CO is down 50 meters S of CP 6001, Trp B elm securing rounded ship; rest of 1/4 Coy extends to CP 6 in three grps firing principally to the SW.	Info	EW
28	1200	1st Bde CO-S3: 1/18 Inf will land at LZ (1D) at 1215 hrs, will work w/you.	Info	EW
29	1202	CO-Trp B CO: Move your elm to head of Trp C.	Info	EW
30	1207	CO-S3: Going in to refuel, take over battle.	Info	EW
31	1211	S3-Opn: Have S4 and HHC arrange for empty Dust-Off acct to bring in armo.	S4	EW
32	1220	S3-Opn: SitRep: Air has been hitting S of rd, arty to the W. CMC going in fwd now. 2 veh burning, cas being evac, need armo.	1st BdeOpn	EW
33	1225	1st Bde Opn-Opn: Armo going in, one road on the way now.	S3	EW
34	1245	1st Bde CO-S3: 1/18 Inf under C.COM 1/4 Coy.	Info	EW
35	1246	S3-Opn: 2 AHC's loaded w/wounded at RT 695750, get Dust-Off in there.	1st Bde	EW
36	1253	S3-CO: 1/18 Inf will be atk W on W side of road.	Info	EW
37	1257	1st Bde CO-CO: 1 C VC moving MW along trails from head of column.	Info	EW
38	1308	CO-1/28 Inf CO: Your elm atk fr LZ (1D) SW along KUMFE.	Info	EW

UNCLASSIFIED

39	1425	Trp B-Opn: Captured 2 VC.	S3	JF
40	1429	Trp C-Opn: CRAMER SWING etc living in LOC for DICK.	1st Bde	JF
41	1505	1st Bde CO-CO: Hsn chg go; Trps B&C to block along route HENFE to the S fr 693750 to 650728.	Info	JF
42	1805	1st Bde-CO: 1/18 Inf revert to 1st Bde OICOM immediately.	Info	JF
43	1815	CO-Opn: Trp D (Air) Aero rifle plat to be w/Trp C tonight at DICK.	Trp D (air)	JF
44	1910	Trp D CO-Opn: Last of Aero rifle plat being loaded and going to Trp C loc.	Asst S3	IM
45	1912	Trp B CO-Opn: Leaving Boda net to get on 1/18 Inf net.	Info	JF
46	1920	Opn-1st Bde Opn: Sit/Op: Cas 11 KIA, 51 WIA; veh dest 6 KIA; VC body count 65; these figures subject to change later as more info is obtained. Wpns captured: 1 Soviet AT gren launcher, M16 7, SN 302637; 1 Soviet 7.62 IAK RPD SN908059; 2 US BAR SN 805262, 563476; 1 Soviet carbine M194A, SN 4285.	Info	
47	2300	CO-Opn: Relay to S3 and Asst S3; Do not turn on SPOONY BEAR or SPOONY without permission from 1st Bde.	S3	Je
48	2400	Opn-S3: Closed S3 Journal. SUMMARY: Trp A OICOM 1/26 Inf at KUU LOI. Trp D (air) OICOM 1st Inf Div at KUU LOI. 1/4 Cav (-) (No Con Gp, Trp B and Trp C) conducted area recon SW of AN MCC to loc etc of 272d VC Regt. Contact was made 091110 Jul 66 vic RT 62743. Preliminary results: US-1 KIA, 51 WIA, 6 AIC KIA dest. VC-65 KIA (2C), numerous SA and AW captured. Contact broken approx 091400 Jul 66.	H/A	IM

DAVID C MARTIN, Major, Armor, 53

/s/ David C. Martin

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

vic AM LOC

0001 09 Jul 66 2400 09 Jul 66

"SUMMARY"

Sectn Disposition 090001 thru 092400:
 Trp A CIGCM 1/26 Inf, HAU LOI. Trp D
 (Air) CIGCM 1st Inf Div, SUMM LOI. 1/4
 Coy (-) (Co Con Gp, Trp B and Trp C),
 conducted area recon SW of AM LOC to loc
 ctn of the 273d VC Regiment.
 Trp C lead ele SF.
 Trp B lead ele SF.
 Initial contact by Trp C.
 Contact broken (approx).

0700
 0710
 1110
 1400

Trp Losses:	MIA	WIA	MIA
Trp C	10	43	4
Trp B	1	23	0
Sectn Total	11	66	4

Vehicles:	M113	M106
Trp C	2	2
Trp B	0	0
Sectn Total	2	2

Weapons:	M60	M79	M14	M16
Trp C	8	1	1	2
Trp B	0	0	0	0
Sectn Total	8	1	1	2

Enemy body count - 265; En' wps count - 26.

Capture Armo: M1-15 rds; AT Gren-9;
 Chicom Hand Gren- 1; US Hand gren-1;
 7.62mm-250 rds; 30 cal (U.S.) - 150.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DAILY STATE JOURNAL ON DAILY'S NIGHT'S LOG

1

53 FWD
1st Squadron 4th Cavalry BENTON PROV
Vic AM LOC 0001 30 Jun 66 2400 Jun 66

1	0001	Opn-53: Opened 53 Journal.	N/A	JTR
2	0120	Trp C-Opn: Req VTR at 2/18 Inf Loc 0615 hrs tomorrow.	Info	JTR
3	0615	Trp C-Opn: Stand-to complete, sending two AIC's for Class I, will take VTR back to fix tk.	Info	JTR
4	0805	Trp C-Opn: Moving to AM LOC now.	G3	JTR
5	0812	Trp B CO-Opn: AEB is in place now.	S3	JTR
6	0827	Trp C-Opn: Closed in my Motor Pool at this time.	Info	JTR
7	0837	Trp B-Opn: 1st 1st dpt AM LOC for bridge site now.	G3	JTR
8	0840	Trp C-Opn: SR at this time.	G3	JTR
9	0910	Trp C-Opn: Crossing bridge ov.	G3	JTR
10	0930	MAC 31-Opn: Airstrike going on in.	S3	JTR
11	0932	Trp B CO-Opn: Id. ele. loc UT725020 on hill. Rec mort fire, req airstrike be diverted.	G3	JTR
12	0933	MAC 31-Opn: Rec fire from Quad 50, I can see two VC psns-putting up a CBU in. S2, 2/18	JTR	JTR
13	0940	Trp B CO-Opn: Rec Dust-Off.	Dust-Off	JTR
14	0942	MAC 31-CO: VC bringing in reinf from W.	S2	JTR
15	0943	Trp B CO-Opn: VC coming from E side of rd at UT 723020.	S2	JTR
16	0945	Opn-trps B & C CO's: Dust-Off on the way to Cl-1.	Info	JTR
17	948	CO-8/6 Arty CO: Put arty in at NE 7189 6; Trk at UT 723025. Hold arty, airstrike going in.	Info	JTR

UNCLASSIFIED

18	0950	MAC 31-Opn: 4th airstrike completed.	Info	JIR
19	0953	Trp B CO-Opn: Rec mort and RR fire, being hit hard, quite a few cas.	G3	JIR
20	0954	CO-S/6 Arty CO: Part arty B of rd from UT730000 to UT730015. Will use airstrike to the W.	Info	JIR
21	0955	CO-Opn: En is primarily on W side of rd.	S2	JIR
22	0957	S3-Opn: Gas will be passed back to bridge crossing site for Dust-Off.	S2	JIR
23	1000	CO-G3: Approx 400 VC at UT725008 mostly on W side of Hwy 13.	S2	JIR
24	1002	CO-Trp B CO: Shoot into that pile of logs to your right front.	Info	C
25	1003	S/6 Arty CO-Opn: Arty is loaded, ready to fire. CO: Go ahead, shoot.	Info	C
26	1004	Trp B CO-Opn: Rec RR fire from T723020,	S2	C
27	1005	Trp B CO-Opn: 1st tk is cut off, has a few cas.	S3	C
28	1006	Trp C CO-Opn: Rept hvy fire on his column. Trp B CO-Trp C CO: Need a tk get up here quick and move it.	Info	C
29	1007	Trp C CO-Opn: Have loc 3 APC's- knocked out already.	S2, S3	C
30	1010	MAC 31-Opn: Airstrike on W side of rd. Rec you stop arty. Opn: Arty stop etc.	Arty MAC	C
31	1011	Trp B CO-Opn: 1 tk and 1 APC at head of column is cut off.	S3	C
32	1013	CO-Opn: B/2/18 Inf loaded on trucks and moving out to ambush loc. G3 is expediting air and Inf.	S3	C
33	1015	2/18 Inf CO-Opn: Giving you all the trps I can to help you fight the battle.	Info	C
34	1019	CO GO 4-CO: Proceeding to ambush site, will arr in 10 min.	Info	C
35	1020	S/6 Arty S3-CO: Rec permission to fire arty CO: Rec at this time.	Info	C

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3

36	1021	Trp C CO-Opn: Moving upon Trp B at this time. CO: Move to head of column where Trp B is receiving fire.	CO	C
37	1023	CO GO 4-Opn: In Trp C area, waiting on fire tm.	Info	C
38	1024	CO-Opn: What freq is MUSTANG on, need lin up here.	Ans	JHR
39	1025	CO-FAC 31: Are there airstrikes coming in? I want to put in GO GO in 5 min. FAC: Go ahead, airstrikes info in, will let you know when they get here so you can lift GO GO.	Info	JHR
40	1026	CO-Mustang: Get up to GO CO to W of rd at coord 715015.	Info	JHR
41	1026	CO- GO GO4: I want you to saturate the area at 720014, can you do it?	Info	JHR
42	1026	GO GO4-CO: Roger, is it free fire on both sides of rd or just the W side, also how about airstrike? CO: Airstrike be in shortly, I want you to saturate the area first. Free fire both sides of rd.	Info	JHR
43	1027	MUSTANG-CO GO: Where do you want us? GO CO: one ea side and behind me.	Info	JHR
44	1027	OPN-Fac 25: What is ETA next strike? FAC: 5-8 min on target, will give you 2 min warning.	S3	JHR
45	1027	Opn-COGO: You have about 5 min to fire.	Actn	JHR
46	1028	FAC 25-Opn: Req you hold fire, airstrike about to begin.	GO GO	JHR
47	1028	FAC 25-OPN: Have GO GO orbit to SE of rd.	GO GO	JHR
48	1030	Trp B CO-Trp C CO: Move this up 300 mtrs more please, tell COOP CMT (Trp C tm), to be careful of RL.	Info	JHR
49	1031	Trp B-Opn: RL W of rd, just off rd 200 mtrs.	GO	JHR
50	1031	CO-Fac 21: Can you get the strikes in from W to E in that area and I'll have GO GO hit that saturation point.	Info	JHR

UNCLASSIFIED

51 1033 GO GO-CO: Saturate area 725014 where the trail intersects the main route. GO GO: Are the fnd out of there? CO: Yes, no more fnd of that th you see notionless. Info JER

52 1034 MAC 21-CO: Where is your strike on W side of rd 20 meters. Info JER

53 1034 MAC: That th just got hit. Info JER

54 1035 CO-CO: You can use any elm of 2/18 Inf you wish. I am moving another Bn in their area will take all day, what do you estb on strength? CO: about 400 mostly on W side of rd, some on E with 21. CG: As soon as they break contact I want you to move out and get some of them. I'll be in the opn area, keep me informed. Info JER

55 1037 CO-MAC: Put airstrikes a little further to the W so I can get GOGO in there. Info JER

56 1038 CO-2/18 Inf CO: What is your loc: 2/18 Inf CO: Just waiting to pull out. CO: Have them go to GOVIL 3111 and wait there. Info JER

57 1038 CO-S3: You monitor 2/18 Inf, take them to Golden Gate and wait there. Info JER

58 1039 8/6 Arty CO-CO: 1 mil SW of clearing there is one hell of bunch of VC, where you are firing at now. Airstrike just W of it. S2 JER

59 1042 CO-GO GO: See where the white smoke is work the W side of rd to where the trail intersects the main rd. Info JER

60 1045 8/6 Arty HQ-CO: We are shooting now. CO: Start shooting 155mm on E side of rd. Info JER

61 1045 8/6 Arty CO-CO: In the clearing to the SW of where you been shooting, there is a hell of a bunch of them W side. I just dropped red smoke and MAC should see it. They are all over that area there. They are moving SW into the woods. Info JER

62 1046 CO-8/6 Arty CO: Put arty in there. 8/6 Arty CO: It will cross the path of GO GO. CO: That's a chance we'll have to take, have him stay low. Info JER

63 1047 CO-GO GO: Get in a little closer to the rd. Info JER

64 1048 Trp C CO-ONE: It has been hit at lead of coln. S3 JER

65	1049	CG-CO: Lots got some arty on that red smoke fast.	Info	JER
66	1050	CO-FAC 31: Putting in arty at 7150 2, work our air strikes W of that loc. FAC: We just hit the red smoke w 20mm CO: You did, I didn't catch it. Can you work to the W? FAC: Neg, we need a lot of room for the fighters, let me have the W and put arty on the E.	Info	JER
67	1050	CG-CO: Keep striking on the W with fighters, also I want air further S.	Info	JER
68	10 0	MUSKING 1-CO GO 4: Must go down for fuel and ammo. CO GO: Make one more pass. S-3Opn: Get another MUSKING.	Info	JER
69	1052	S3-CO: GO GO is down, 50 meters NE of the column.	Info	JER
70	1052	Trp C CO-Opn: Need air and arty along the road.	Arty INFO	JER
71	1052	Trp B CO-Opn: Have 7 veh up w Trp C, RR is apparently after th.	CO	JER
72	1053	CO: Haven't got RR yet.	Info	JER
73	1055	Trp B CO-CO: We need ammo, perhaps you can get RR to bring some. CO-Opn: send HQ AFC w/ammo.	Info	JER
74	1057	S3-Opn: Send HQ APC's to Golden Gate. Opn: HQ APC's already at Golden Gate, they have cas. there.	Info	JER
75	1059	Trp B CO-Opn: Need air strikes to W and W. FAC: The air strike going in now, will advise you when we get thru w/then. FAC-Trp B CO: Just made a correction, check this next impact.	Info	JER
76	1100	Opn Rear-FAC 21: Relay to S3 the Trp B elm are aprt now, they need to know the loc of the downed GO GO. FAC: He is up now, no problem.	Info	JER
77	1106	FAC: Downed GO GO is gone and you are cleared.	Info	JER
78	1101	MUSKING 1-Opn: The GO GO has made it safely to Div, will send aero file plat back to HQ LOI. Opn: Neg bring them in to our loc.		

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 6

79	1102	CO-8/6 Arty CO: Put arty on 725014. 8/6 Arty CO: Arty on the way.	Info	JER
80	1106	Rebel 36-CO: Lt Mine tm on station. CO: Go to 725004, E side of rd and make a strafing pass.	Info	JER
81	1108	83-CO: ARVN will blk to NW, 5 kilm to you r IM. With 06 as fire coord line, 1 Co and 1 Trp ARVN on alert, take about 45 min to get to your loc.	Info	JER
82	1109	Trp C CO-CO: short of ammo, all this are knocked out.	Info	JER
83	1111	8/18 Inf CO-CO: Co C ctm has lost contact w/one plat. Co A ctm ready to go, waiting on acft.	Info	JER
84	1112	CO-8/6 Arty CO: Put another volley in same place.	Info	JER
85	1113	CO-Trp B CO: Rtn to CP-1 and regroup. Trp to go H again.	Info	JER
86	1115	CO-Trp C CO: I want you to stay in pos w/ all your ele up there	Info	JER
87	1116	CO-S3: What is the Sit at Golden Gate? Opn: Have rifle Co 7 MG's and more pers on the way.	Info	JER
88	1118	Trp C CO-CO: Report 723000, CO-MIC: Send an airstrike in there.	Info	JER
89	1119	CO-8/6 Arty CO: Shift fires to E side of rd. 8/6 Arty CO: Right after this volley.	Info	JER
90	1120	83-CO: Call designator of ARVN is Crater Sling 3, CG instr them to secure rd S of Golden Gate.	Info	JER
91	1122	Trp B CO-CO: At 723002 between my ele up front and C-1 VC breaking in need an airstrike. MIC 35: We'll hit it.		
92	1123	CO-Trp B CO: Lets get a fire tr up to CP-1 and hit both sides of rd.	Info	JER
93	1124	CO-Trp B CO: Which side of Hwy is VC on? Ans: W side of rd coord 723004.	Info	JER
94	1126	CO-8/18 Inf CO: I would like as many of your ele I can get at coord 724014. Start moving to the S, wait until I move airstrikes further to the W. I think we can pick up a hell of a lot.	Info	JER

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 7

95 1127 2/18 Inf CO-CC: I will give you Co A at your request your CO-CC. CO: I want to airlift your co at Golden Gate to that rice paddy w/your other Co. Info JHR

96 1128 CO-S3: I want you to set up LZ at Golden Gate to airlift rifle Co to rice paddy vic 724014. Info JHR

97 1129 CO-TRAC 35: I want you to start working S to N about 300 meters W of rd, while I bring in my hel to the right side to the E. Info JHR

98 1131 CO-Trp C CO: I want your elm along the rd to catch the SOB's as they are chased by the Inf. Info JHR

99 1132 CO-S/6 Arty CO: You can put arty on E side of rd from 995 to 010. Stay on E side of rd. The Inf will be on the W side of rd. Info JHR

100 1133 C)-Trp B CO: I want you to be prep at CP1 to go W on that secondary rd, to block. The Inf will land to the N of there and start sweeping S. Info JHR

101 1134 Trp D CO-CC: Fire tm (38) on station waiting instr. CO: Cover the E side of rd about 20-25 meters from S to N from CP1. Info JHR

102 1137 S3-C): LZ at Golden Gate is 735668. Info JHR

103 1139 CO-TRAC 35: I want you to pulverize the area next to the rice paddy, 724014, supposed to be a .50 cal the c. 300 mt s W of rd. Info JHR

104 1140 CO-Trp C CO: Send elm N, leave small crew back to take care of cas. Info JHR

105 1141 CO-Inf: Have the Dust-0 go making pickup now, CO: Lets get them going. Opns: Have aid station moving in now. CO: Lets get the Dust-0's out. Info JHR

106 1142 CO-2/18 Inf S3: Putting in air strike where your co will land, don't commit them until I give you the word. Info JHR

107 1143 CO-TRAC:35: Start air strike now. Info JHR

UNCLASSIFIED

108 1145	G3-CO: Need to know which direction the VC are withdrawing & where you recommend to put this Inf I have into pos. CO: I don't think they are withdrawing.	Info	JER
109 1146	CO-Trp B CO: Have your gunships recon to the W about 400 meters, see if they can see any withdrawal of the VC.	Info	JER
110 1147	2/18 Inf CO-CO: When airstrike is finished start landing your two ele on rice paddy and start atk to the S. I have one of my ele on the rd and another at CP 1 to block to W.	Info	JER
111 1147	Opn-241: Will set up CP at bridge, take care of wounded, ammo, etc.	Ackn	JER
112 1150	Trp C CO-Opn: They have just killed my 3d platoon ldr.	Inf	JER
113 1151	2/18 Inf CO-CO: 1st ele committed in 05.	Info	JER
114 1200	2/18 Inf S3-CO: CO's A and B enroute to LZ now.	Info	JER
115 1205	MAC 35-CO: Airstrike completed. CO: Do you have any more acft avail? MAC: Yes, CO: Keep them coming in.	Info	JER
116 1206	2/18 Inf S3-CO: Co A, first lift, on LZ.	G3	JER
117 1212	2/18 Inf S3-CO: Rec fire from NW of LZ. 9	G3	JER
118 1215	G3-Opn: ANVN APC Co enroute, CG directs atk N. S3: I will meet them at Golden Gate for briefing.	Info	JER
119 1219	2/18 Inf S3-CO: 2d airlift abn now.	G3	JER
120 1221	CO-Trp B CO: Deploy W of CP 1 to creek on rd. Trp B CO: Be there in 10 min.	Info	JER
121 1223	CO-Trp B CO: Send APCs to GOLDEN GATE to pickup resu ply.	Info	JER
122 1227	2/18 Inf CO-CO: A/2/18 Inf all on LZ now	G3	JER
123 1228	A/2/28 Inf CO-CO: Airstrike too close. CO-MAC 35: Move strike to W.	Info	JER
124 1229	C)-2/18 Inf CO: Put CO B 2/18 Inf in on same LZ, have them atk on line SW/Co A	Info	JER
125 1232	Trp B CO-Opn: Have 4 MIA at CP1, Opn have Dust-off on the way.	G3	JER

UNCLASSIFIED

126	1233	CO-A/2/10 Inf CO: Hold pos until Co B links up w/you.	Info	JER
127	1234	S3 S/2/10 Inf 60: Marking LZ w/red smoke.	Info	JER
128	1236	S/6 Arty CO-CO: Anything else we can do?	Info	JER
129	1236	CG-CO: I just heard a rept that the VC are moving S 300 meters off the rd, see if you can get PIC to put CBU or other air in there S to the bridge (NF705999) or even S of the bridge. CO-PLC: Fac: I monitored.	Info	JER
130	1237	S3-CO: 1st airlift off at this time, will take 4 lifts of 5 each.	Info	JER
131	1238	CO-Trp B CO: Are you in your blocking pos yet? Trp B: Set up pos on that secondary rd.	Info	JER
132	1239	S3-CO: 1st lift is out, 2d lift is landing.	Info	JER
133	1240	PIC 35-CO: Where do you want this next strike? CO: From bridge NF705999, S 300 meters off rd.	Info	JER
134	1241	C)-S3: Is that second lift on the way yet? S3: They have just lifted off, on the way.	G3	JER
135	1242	Opn-CO: 3 UH1B's on the way w/air o, no sup, air evac, 3 more slicks are avail. CO: Do you have ammo? Opn: Plenty of SA CO: Load one slick w/ ammo, send it to Trp C pos.	Info	JER
136	1243	S3-CO: ANVN APC Co moving in from Golden Gate. CO-Trp B CO: I'm putting Crater Sling (ANVN APC Co) in behind you to strengthen your blocking pos.	Info	JER
137	1245	S3-CO: 2d lift on the way in.	G3	JER
138	1246	S3-CO: Have you had any contact w/ADCF? CO: No.	Info	JER
139	1248	CO-ANVN Arty APC Co: You are loc at crossing site; cross ANVB, go to NF720994 (RJ;CP1) Turn W; set up blocking pos facing E.	Info	JER
140	1250	Trp B CO-CO: Moving into pos now.	G3	JER
141	1251	CO-ANVN APC Co: Are you moving to CP1? ANVN APC Co: Moving E from Golden Gate	Info	JER

142	1252	TRIP 37-00: Lt fire tm back on station any inst? Co: Work over area S of rd at UT715985.	Info	JHR
143	1253	CO-Trp C CO: How are you doing now? Trp C CO: Pretty good, lt contact now. Can we get a Dust-Off in here for cas? CO-Opn: Dust-Off for Trp C S of C11, 1500 mtrs Opn: Armo ship (Clown 6) on the way in, he will evac cas.	Info	JHR
144	1254	8/6 Arty CO-CO: I'm over here W of the rd. Write a few VC coming out of the woods, would like to put in some blocking fire. CO: Execute.	Info	JHR
145	1256	CO-18 Inf CO: Have one Co ready to go, have one come in, I will take cmd and atk S along the rd.	Info	JHR
146	1300	C)-Opn: Put acro rifle plat in 3 clicks, move them in with Trp B	Info	JHR
147	1302	PL32-S3: Are there any fnd ele at UT710010? S3: Neg. Pac32: Doc some VC putting in air strike. S3: Go ahead.	Info	JHR
148	1304	8/18 Inf S3-S3: Arty landing N of SE, do not want it any closer. S3-Opn: Relay to 8/6 Arty.	8/6 Arty	JHR
149	1306	S3-Trp B CO: ARVN APC CO is moving in behind you block generally N and W.	Info	JHR
150	1308	CO- Opn: Is acro-rifle plat committed yet? Opn: Neg, on the way to Golden Gate.	Trp B	JHR
151	1309	CO-Trp B CO: Do you have Co C 8/18 Inf ele with you? Trp B CO: Neg	Info	JHR
152	1310	Div Arty CO-CO: 8 th arty going into your left, suggest you move airstrike to the left and let arty cont to fire.	PAC 31	JHR
153	1311	S3-Div Arty CO: Stop the arty, one rnd just went in where they are unloading. S3-Opn: One rnd arty went into SE, 1 chopper heavily dam, other acct are evac cas.	Info	JHR
154	1312	Trp D CO-S3: We are working to the W of the 79 grid line. Trying to stop any withdrawal. S3: Roger, do you see the arty firing in that area? Trp D CO: Yes	Info	JHR
155	1315	S3-CO: ARVN APC U in place, blocking pos complete.	Info	JHR
156	1316	CO-ARVN APC Co Adv: Move your U W of that trail.	Info	JHR

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 10

157	1317	CC-Opn: Get 2 Dust-Off for the downed chopper in LZ	Dust-Off	JER
158	1318	S3-ANVT AIC Co: You are in the wrong place. CO: Have you moved down that trail to the W. Ans: Yes	Info	JER
159	1320	G3-CO: Will have another GO GO (CH47A) on station for you in 5 min.	Info	JER
160	1321	CO-Trp D CO: Check area around downed chopper.	Info	JER
161	1322	Dust-Off 70-CO: How many more cas do you have down there? CO: OK at Golden Gate.	Info	JER
162	1325	G3-CO: Rec rept 100 VC at XT 744967 at 1300 hrs.	Info	JER
163	1330	GO GO1-Opn: On station w 1 hr fuel and ordnance Errors no op*on	S3	JER
164	1334	S3-Opn: Will use GO GO 1W of RJ/	GO GO1	JER
165	1336	2/5 Arty CO-S3: We have a hell of a bunch of VC at UT 713017, may be setting up ambush for 2/18 Inf, CO GO: Will put fire in at 712017, will mark w smoke.	Info	JER
166	1339	FAC 31-CO: Have air strikes for you when GO G finishes.	Info	JER
167	1339	3/5 Arty CO-CO: They have all moved into the wood line across the stream.	Info	JER
168	1340	FAC 31-CO: Where do you want the next strike? CO: It should be W at 706010, by the stream.	Info	JER
169	1341	FAC 31-CO: You have a hel where strike is at. CO: Notified him and is moving out now.	Info	JER
170	1342	2/18 Inf S3-CO: My lead elms are 600 mtrs S of LZ.	G3	JER
171	1350	INC/1-Opn: Cas; Trp B-6 MIA, 23 WIA and Trp C 3 MIA, 17 WIA.	G3, S1	JER
172	1401	G3 Opn-Opn: Rec loc Crater Sling 3, Opn: Loc at vic 715995. Errors no op*on	Info	JER

UNCLASSIFIED

173	1402	REBEL 37-Trp D CO: Going into refuel at HW 701.	Info	JMR
174	1408	Trp B CO-CO: 2/18 Inf elm w/ame blocking from F C1 W 2 Bldm.	InfoG3	JMR
175	1410	Trp B CO-2/18 Inf S3: Mad cas in your plat.	InfoG3	JMR
176	1412	ASST G3-Opn: Put in med surveillance on KU5903. Opn-Trp D CO; Mustang.	S3	JMR
177	1413	Trp D CO-Opn: Have Mustang 1 take msg, Ref Msg #176.	Mustang1	JMR
178	1415	CG-Opn: Tell CO he has done a splendid job, I am putting him under OPCOM 1st Bde	CO, S3	JMR
179	1416	2/18 Inf S3-Opn: 200 mtrs S of LZ have wounded VC, need Dust Off.	Dust-Off	JMR
180	1417	MAC 31-S3: Putting in airstrike at vic 708010. There is an H13 in the way can you get it out of there.	Info	JMR
181	1420	2/18 Inf-Opn: At 7090 6 spot 2 squad of VC.	S2, S3, G3	JMR
182	1421	S3-Opn: Tell Trp D CO elm to ck rd vic 7294, rec rept seeing VC.	TrpD CO	JMR
183	1423	2/18 Inf-S3: See 6 VC at 712016.	Info	JMR
184	1424	G3-S3: Put radio on 1st Bde push now.	Info	JMR
185	1425	S3-Opn: Get these wounded out, also one at Trp B.	Dust-Off Trp D (air)	JMR
186	1427	Trp C CO-Opn: I have 2 MIA and 21 WIA, also 16 APC's and no tks ops.	CO	C
187	1429	2/18 Inf CO-CO: Give my Co A a spot.	Info	C
188	1430	CO-Opn: Asst S3 is to take cmd of Golden Gate e'm.	Asst S3	C
189	1431	Asst S3-CO: 1st Bde Cmdr wants to meet you someplace, can you go to Golden Gate? CO: Roger.	Info	JMR
190	1432	A/2/18 Inf-Opn: My elm at 715046.	G3	C
191	1433	Opn-CO: 1st Bde Cmdr enroute to Golden Gate.	Info	C
192	1434	2/18 Inf Cpn-Opn: Can you contact CO and tell him we have switched 2/18 Inf	2/18 Inf CO	C

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 13

193	1435	ADC/A-CO: Get on 1st Bde push, 56.00 he is trying to contact you.	Info	JIR
194	1438	Cpt Kelly-Opn: Rec fire E of CP-1.	G3	JIR
195	1439	LHO/L-Opn: 2/18 Inf S3 is at Golden Gate.	CO	C
196	1442	2/2 Inf-Opn rear: Do you have a couple slicks we can use to transport our U.	Trp D	C
197	1444	Div Relay- Opn: We can relay any msg to elm if you lose contact.	Info	C
198	1445	CO-501: Keep saturating the area for a while. ARVN are down in the W and E 40 mtrs fr Golden Gate.	Info	JIR
199	1446	Opn-2/18 Inf S3: 3 frd WIA at 1/4 Cav CP loc, req a Dust-Off at 724008.	Dust-Off	JIR
200	1450	Opn-LHO/1: If you have any slicks avail send them to 724008 to be used for air evac.	Info	JIR
201	1453	CG-Opn: Reg contact w CO & S3. Where are those pr somers? Opn: vic 724008.	Info	JIR
202	1454	CO-CG: Come to Golden Gate, have 3 VCC.	Info	JIR
203	1456	Clown 6-Opn: Have walking wounded, where do you want them? Opn: Take them to Div.	Info	JIR
204	1502	Mustang-Opn: Tell Trp D CO at your loc, Trp D Opn has Inf and slick avail if needed. also will have gun ship avail in about an hour.	Info	JIR
205	1503	Mustang 1-Trp D rear: Have no need for gunship, slick or Inf at this time.	Info	JIR
206	1510	S3-Opn: We have a few more WIA and VCC here at Golden Gate.	Dust-Off	JIR
207	1511	Clown 9-Opn: On way to Golden Gate to pick up WIA and VCC.	S3	JIR
208	1512	Opn-CO: Msg from 8/6 Arty. req perm to fire arty from CP Z2 to SW.	INFO	JIR
209	1514	G) CO 1-CO: Back on station, will stand by.	Info	JIR
210	1515	CO-Trp B CO: What's the sit? Trp B CO: No contact in last 10 min. people moving W and S. We have been cutting them up in the past 45 min.	G3	JIR

UNCLASSIFIED

211	1516	CO-Trp B CO: 1st Bde ele loc from CP1 left 5 kilom and down 500 mtrs.	Info	JER
212	1520	Opn-S3: Inform CO not to move elem further than 683998 and from the S because of arty conc.	Info	JER
213	1520	Trp B CO-S3: Western most veh is at 703999.	Info	JER
214	1522	Trp C CO-S3: My 1st plat is at M1, has no contact w/ARVN, can you investigate.	G3	JER
215	1523	Opn-Trp B CO: What is the Inf loc? Trp B CO: Co B at 299990 to 715005; Co C at 724006 to CP 1, ARVN from CP1.	Info	JER
216	1529	Opn Fwd-Opn rear: Msg from CO; XO is to come fwd to op area soonest. Opn Rear: XO is at Div rear on courts and boards. Opn Fwd: Give him a call and get him up here.	Info	JER
218	1534	G3-S3: Do you have any more captives, if so where are they? S3: Have six VC at Trp C loc, will take them to ARVN AOI.	Info	JER
219	1536	CO-GO CO: Put some fire on 710015 and to the West.	Info	JER
220	1537	MAC/A-CO: Get some arty and air in on that psn, stop fooling around w GO CO, talking to long.	Info	JER
221	1539	MAC 34-CO: Have sev fighters in area, Can we be any assist to you?	Info	JER
222	1540	Opn-S3: Have some MAC air if A/1/18 Inf needs it.	Info	JER
223	1545	S3-Trp D CO: 12-15 ozcarts at 781084, an moving E, going to investigate.	Info	JER
224	1546	S3-CO: W and SW from 6900, do you have any air going in. CO: Neg, Arty.	Info	JER
225	1550	Trp B CO-CO: VC at 715006, They are blocking Co A.	Info	JER
226	1555	IMO/1-Opn: SSG Acor briefed 1st Bde S3 here at our loc.	Info	JER
227	1556	S3-CO Dvr: Air strike will be put on at 7001.	Info	JER
228	1609	S3-Trp D 3: Like to have Dust-Off or w and push	Info	JER

229	1609	S3-Trp D 3: Like to have Dust-Off on my and push.	Info	JER
230	1610	S3-Trp D 3: Have about 3 or 4 WIA, will need Dust-Off as soon as airstrike is completed.	Info	JER
231	1610	S3-Opn: I will be on station tonight w/Star- light and Lighting.	Info	JER
232	1611	CO-Opn: 1st Bde CO req you call him on his push.	Info	JER
233	1616	Trp B-CO: 8 people carrying weapons at the hill near rice paddies. CO: On way to have a look.	Info	JER
234	1618	Opn-CO: 1st Bde CO wants you to block stream bet out of W.	Info	JER
235	1622	S3-CO: Going back to AM MOC to refuel and get some ammo and water for Trp C.	Info	JER
235	1623	CO-Trp B CO: Make sure you have a strong blocking pos.	Info	JER
236	1623	CO*Trp B CO: Make sure you have a strong bl. blocking pos.	Info	JER
237	1625	G2-CO: 100VC carrying wps at 760963 in village. Also in grid square 840015 or 860030 is a VC base camp.	Info	JER
238	1630	CO-G2: Arty fire being placed on 760963.	Info	JER
239	1635	ADC/b-CO: No village at 760963.	Info	JER
240	1638	S0-S3: Keep on laying in air and arty.	Info	JER
241	1654	Trp C CO-Opn: Acft rec fire vic 740992.	CO	JER
242	1655	S3-CO: At Golden Gate organizing resup, we also have some ARVN trps to help secure the area.	Info	JER
243	1654	CO-Opn rear: Get XO u here ASAP.	Ac'm	JER
244	1700	CO-TAC 34: Hit the whole damn town.	Info	JER
245	1703	S3-CO: Have trucks coming back for resup, moving CP to Golden Gate, also req Spookey.	Info	JER
246	1725	G3-Opn: Rept 100 VC carrying more than one wpn per man spotted at 705725, FAC doing it out.	Info	JER

247	1630	CO-Trp B CO: Stay on rd toni. nt.	Info	JER
248	1807	MAC 31-CO: Air strike at 723022	Info	JER
249	1850	Trp C KO-Opn: Have reporters at Trp C CO loc and req to get back tonight.	Info	
250	1855	Opn-Trp C KO: Clown 9 has msg to carry 2 slips of resup to Golden Gate, and rtn w 3 prisoners and 1 reporter.	Info	JER
251	1900	CO Trp B CO: Move along rd to E of bridge at CP 1.	Info	JER
252	1909	CO-Trp B CO: Pick up AMM adv	Info	JER
253	1912	Trp C KO-Opn: VTR at our loc, if we can keep VTR tonight, we will be able to get 1 th and 1 A/C going by to orrow.	Info	JER
254	1916	Clown 9-Opn: We have 2 VCC, inbound for AF LOC. Opn: Neg Neg take them to Div.	Info	JER
255	1927	Clown 7-Trp B CO: Have a load of water for you and coming in.	Info	JER
256	1930	Trp D CO-Opn: Tell CO I coord w G3, he has approval plan we discussed. Also rtn my acct when you have finished.	CO	JER
257	2000	Trp B & C-Opn: Neg StiRep.	1st B/c	JER
258	2100	" " " "	"	"
259	2200	" " " "	"	"
260	2300	" " " "	"	"
261	2400	" " " "	"	"
262	2400	Opn*53: Closed S3 Journal SUMMARY: Trp A OPCOM 1/26 Inf, NEU LOI. Trp D (air) OPCOM 1st Inf Div, QUAM LOI. Inf Con Cp, Trps B and C-masn, route recon, in area W of AF LOC from bridge to CP 1, E and W, then N. On N recon on contact made at 0930 hrs, contact broken at 1500 hrs. Con Cp AF-Golden Gate Bridge, Trps B and C AF-CP1. Neg on contact rest of night.	N/A	JER

/t/ G.E. TAYLOR, Maj., Armor, S3

/s/ G.E. Taylor